

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

CRIMINAL NO. _____

v.

VIOLATION:

ALSTOM NETWORK SCHWEIZ AG
(formerly known as ALSTOM PROM AG)

18 U.S.C. § 371 (Conspiracy)

INFORMATION

The United States charges:

COUNT ONE
(Conspiracy)

At all times relevant, unless otherwise specified:

1. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, as amended, Title 15, United States Code, Sections 78dd-1, *et seq.* (“FCPA”), was enacted by Congress for the purpose of, among other things, making it unlawful for certain classes of persons and entities to act corruptly in furtherance of an offer, promise, authorization, or payment of money or anything of value to a foreign official for the purpose of assisting in obtaining or retaining business for, or directing business to, any person.

Alstom and Other Relevant Entities and Individuals

2. Alstom S.A. (“Alstom”) was headquartered in France. Alstom was in the business of designing, constructing, and providing services related to power generation facilities, power grids, and rail transportation systems around the world. During the relevant period, Alstom had sales of approximately €21 billion annually and employed approximately 110,000 employees in over seventy countries. Shares of Alstom’s stock were listed on the New York Stock Exchange until August 2004. Accordingly, until August 2004, Alstom was an “issuer” as

that term is used in the FCPA, Title 15, United States Code, Section 78dd-1(a). Alstom had direct and indirect subsidiaries in various countries around the world through which it bid on projects to secure contracts to perform power-related, grid-related, and transportation-related services, including for state-owned entities. Alstom's subsidiaries worked exclusively on behalf of Alstom and for its benefit. Alstom maintained a department called International Network that supported its subsidiaries' efforts to secure contracts around the world. International Network was organized by regions around the world. In certain instances, executives of International Network served as presidents of certain Alstom subsidiaries or businesses. Within Alstom's power sector, the company also maintained a department called Global Power Sales ("GPS"), which performed functions similar to International Network, in that GPS assisted other Alstom entities or businesses in their efforts to secure contracts.

3. Alstom Network Schweiz AG, formerly Alstom Prom AG ("Alstom PROM"), was a subsidiary of Alstom that was headquartered in Switzerland. Alstom PROM was responsible for overseeing compliance as it related to Alstom's consultancy agreements for many of Alstom's power sector subsidiaries.

4. Alstom Power, Inc. ("Alstom Power US") was a subsidiary of Alstom that was headquartered in Windsor, Connecticut, incorporated in Delaware, and thus a "domestic concern," as that term is used in the FCPA, Title 15, United States Code, Section 78dd-2(h)(1)(B). Alstom Power US was in the business of providing power generation-related services around the world, including in Indonesia, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. At certain times, Alstom's boiler division was run out of Windsor, Connecticut. At certain times, the head of Alstom's boiler division and the head of boiler sales for Alstom were both assigned to Alstom Power US.

5. PT Energy Systems Indonesia (“Alstom Indonesia”) was a subsidiary of Alstom that was headquartered in Indonesia. Alstom Indonesia was in the business of providing power generation-related services in Indonesia.

6. Lawrence Hoskins (“Hoskins”), who has been charged separately, was an Alstom Area Senior Vice President for the Asia region in Alstom’s International Network. Hoskins’ responsibilities at Alstom included overseeing Alstom’s subsidiaries’ efforts to obtain contracts with new customers and to retain contracts with existing customers in Asia.

7. Frederic Pierucci (“Pierucci”), who has been charged separately, held various high-level positions and ultimately held an executive-level position as Vice President of Alstom’s boiler product line. At certain times, Pierucci was assigned to Alstom Power US and was responsible for overseeing Alstom Power US’s efforts to obtain boiler contracts with new customers and to retain boiler contracts with existing customers around the world.

8. William Pomponi (“Pomponi”), who has been charged separately, was a Vice President of Regional Sales at Alstom Power US. Pomponi’s responsibilities at Alstom Power US included obtaining boiler contracts with new customers and retaining boiler contracts with existing customers in various countries, including in Indonesia.

9. David Rothschild (“Rothschild”), who has been charged separately, was a Vice President of Regional Sales at Alstom Power US. Rothschild’s responsibilities at Alstom Power US included obtaining boiler contracts with new customers and retaining boiler contracts with existing customers in various countries, including in Indonesia.

10. “Alstom Executive A,” an individual whose identity is known to the United States, was an executive within Alstom’s Compliance Department. At certain times, Alstom

Executive A was responsible for overseeing due diligence efforts on prospective sales consultants for Alstom's various power businesses.

11. "Alstom Executive B," an individual whose identity is known to the United States, worked in Alstom's GPS unit. Alstom Executive B held various executive-level positions within Alstom, including as a high-level executive at Alstom Indonesia and another Alstom entity. Alstom Executive B was one of the people responsible for retaining consultants in connection with Alstom and its subsidiaries' efforts to obtain and retain power contracts in Southeast Asia.

12. "Alstom Indonesia Executive," an individual whose identity is known to the United States, was a high-level executive at Alstom Indonesia. Alstom Indonesia Executive's responsibilities at Alstom Indonesia included assisting other Alstom entities' efforts to obtain contracts with new customers and to retain contracts with existing customers in Indonesia, including assisting Alstom Power US to obtain power projects in Indonesia.

13. "Consultant A," an individual whose identity is known to the United States, was a consultant who purportedly provided legitimate services on behalf of Alstom, Alstom Power US, and Alstom Indonesia in connection with the bidding of a power project in Indonesia. In reality, Consultant A was retained for the purpose of paying bribes to Indonesian government officials to obtain or retain business in connection with the power project.

14. "Consultant B," an individual whose identity is known to the United States, was a consultant who purportedly provided legitimate services on behalf of Alstom, Alstom Power US, and Alstom Indonesia in connection with the bidding of various power projects in Indonesia. In reality, Consultant B was retained for the purpose of paying bribes to Indonesian government officials to obtain or retain business in connection with the power projects.

15. "Consultant C," an individual whose identity is known to the United States, was a consultant who purportedly provided legitimate services on behalf of Alstom, Alstom Power US, and other Alstom entities in connection with the bidding of various power projects in Saudi Arabia. In reality, Consultant C, who was referred to by the code name "Geneva," was the brother of a member of the board of Saudi Arabia's state-owned electricity company and was retained as a means of bribing at least one Saudi government official to obtain or retain business in connection with the power projects.

16. "Consultant D," an individual whose identity is known to the United States, was a consultant who purportedly provided legitimate services on behalf of Alstom, Alstom Power US, and other Alstom entities in connection with the bidding of various power projects in Saudi Arabia. In reality, Consultant D, who was referred to by the code name "Paris," was a close relative of a member of the board of Saudi Arabia's state-owned electricity company and was retained as a means of bribing at least one Saudi government official to obtain or retain business in connection with the power projects.

17. "Consultant E," an individual whose identity is known to the United States, was a consultant who purportedly provided legitimate services on behalf of Alstom, Alstom Power US, and other Alstom entities in connection with the bidding of various power projects in Saudi Arabia. Consultant E was referred to by the code name "London" and was paid at least \$30 million by Alstom in connection with multiple consultancy agreements for the Saudi power projects despite the absence of documentation or proof of legitimate services being performed.

18. "Consultant F," an individual whose identity is known to the United States, was a consultant who purportedly provided legitimate services on behalf of Alstom, Alstom Power US, and other Alstom entities in connection with the bidding of various power projects in Saudi

Arabia. Consultant F was referred to by the code name "OF" or "Old Friend" and was paid at least \$10 million by Alstom in connection with multiple consultancy agreements for the Saudi power projects despite the absence of documentation or proof of legitimate services being performed.

19. "Consultant G," an individual whose identity is known to the United States, was a consultant who purportedly provided legitimate services on behalf of Alstom, Alstom Power US, and other Alstom entities in connection with the bidding of various power projects in Egypt. In reality, Consultant G was retained for the purpose of paying bribes to Egyptian government officials to obtain or retain business in connection with the power projects.

20. "Consultant H," an individual whose identity is known to the United States, was a consultant who purportedly provided legitimate services on behalf of Alstom and other Alstom entities in connection with the bidding of a power project in the Bahamas. In reality, Consultant H was retained for the purpose of paying bribes to a Bahamian government official to obtain or retain business in connection with the power project. Consultant H was a U.S. citizen, was based in the United States, and maintained a bank account in the United States.

Overview of the Corrupt Scheme

Indonesia

21. Beginning in or around 2002 and continuing to in or around 2009, Alstom PROM, Alstom, Alstom Power US, Alstom Indonesia, and other Alstom entities attempted to secure various power projects in Indonesia through Indonesia's state-owned and state-controlled electricity company, Perusahaan Listrik Negara ("PLN"). PLN was an "agency" and "instrumentality" of a foreign government, as those terms are used in the FCPA, Title 15, United States Code, Sections 78dd-2(h)(2) and dd-3(f)(2). One such project was the Tarahan Project,

sometimes referred to simply as “Tarahan,” a project to provide power-related services to the citizens of Indonesia at a value of approximately \$118 million. Another such project was the Muara Tawar Block 5 Project, a project to expand the existing Muara Tawar power plant and provide additional power-related services to the citizens of Indonesia at a value of approximately \$260 million. In addition, Alstom subsidiaries bid on but were not awarded contracts related to other expansions of the Muara Tawar power plant. Collectively, these projects were sometimes referred to as “Muara Tawar” or “MT.”

22. In connection with these projects, Alstom PROM and its co-conspirators provided millions of dollars and other things of value to Indonesian officials in exchange for those officials’ assistance in securing the power projects for Alstom PROM, Alstom and its subsidiaries.

23. Specifically, Alstom and its subsidiaries retained consultants, including Consultant A and Consultant B, to assist them and their consortium partners in obtaining the contracts for the power projects in Indonesia. The primary purpose of these consultants was not to provide legitimate services to Alstom, its subsidiaries, and its consortium partners, but was instead to pay bribes to Indonesian officials who had the ability to influence the award of the contracts. This was known by Alstom PROM and its co-conspirators, including Hoskins, Pierucci, and Alstom Executives A and B.

24. Alstom PROM and its co-conspirators first retained Consultant A in connection with the Tarahan Project in or around late 2002. Consultant A was to receive a commission based on the overall value that each consortium member would receive from the Tarahan Project contract, from which Consultant A was expected to pay bribes to Indonesian officials, including a high-ranking member of Parliament (“Official 1”) and a high-level executive at PLN (“Official

2”). However, through the course of 2003, Alstom personnel came to the conclusion that Consultant A had not sufficiently assured key Indonesian officials at PLN, including members of the evaluation team (“Official 3” and “Official 4”), that he would adequately pay them after the award of the contract.

25. Accordingly, in or around September or October 2003, Hoskins, Pierucci, Alstom Executive B, and Alstom Indonesia Executive informed Consultant A that Consultant A would be responsible only for paying bribes to Official 1 and that Alstom PROM and its co-conspirators would retain another consultant to pay bribes to PLN officials. Shortly thereafter, Alstom PROM and its co-conspirators sent Consultant A an amended consulting agreement, reducing the amount of Consultant A’s commission to reflect Consultant A’s reduced responsibilities and to cover the additional cost of retaining a new consultant. Alstom then retained Consultant B, through a consulting agreement with Alstom PROM, for the purpose of bribing PLN officials. Around the same time, Alstom and its subsidiaries also retained Consultant B, through a consulting agreement with Alstom PROM, to bribe PLN officials in connection with their efforts to secure a Muara Tawar Project contract.

26. Alstom PROM and its co-conspirators were ultimately awarded the Tarahan Project and Muara Tawar Block 5 Project contracts and made payments to the aforementioned consultants for the purpose of paying Indonesian government officials, including Official 1, Official 2, Official 3, and Official 4, in exchange for their assistance in securing the Tarahan Project and the Muara Tawar Block 5 Project for Alstom, its subsidiaries, and its consortium partners.

Saudi Arabia

27. In or around 2000, Alstom completed the acquisition of the worldwide power business of a separate international power company. Beginning in or around 1998, during the period prior to the acquisition, the separate power company began bidding on power projects in Saudi Arabia and was awarded one such contract. Beginning in or around 1999, during the period in which Alstom and the other power company operated as a joint venture, and continuing through 2000 after the acquisition of the separate power company was complete, Alstom, Alstom PROM and other Alstom entities continued bidding on other power projects in Saudi Arabia. The bids for the power projects in Saudi Arabia were with the Saudi Electric Company (“SEC”), Saudi Arabia’s state-owned and state-controlled electricity company, and its predecessor entities. The SEC, along with its predecessor entities, were “agencies” and “instrumentalities” of a foreign government, as those terms are used in the FCPA, Title 15, United States Code, Sections 78dd-2(h)(2) and dd-3(f)(2).

28. Projects in Saudi Arabia included different projects at a site known as Shoaiba. The Shoaiba Projects were a series of different projects that resulted in the construction of 14 different steam power generating units for the SEC. The Shoaiba Projects had several distinct stages and multiple phases within each stage. In total, the first two stages of the Shoaiba Projects involved the construction of an oil-fired power plant with 11 separate power generating units at a total value of approximately \$3 billion.

29. In connection with the first two of the Shoaiba Projects, Alstom PROM and its co-conspirators provided tens of millions of dollars in payments and other things of value to Saudi officials to obtain or retain business in connection with the projects. The arrangements for these consulting agreements originated with the separate international power company described

above. Subsequently, Alstom, Alstom PROM and other Alstom entities honored, continued, and in certain instances renewed these consulting arrangements knowing that at least some of them were for the purpose of providing money and other things of value to Saudi officials.

30. Specifically, Alstom PROM and its co-conspirators, including the predecessor entity described above, retained at least six consultants in connection with the first two of the Shoaiba Projects, including all six consultants on the first project. These six consultants included Consultant C and Consultant D, whose primary purpose was not to provide legitimate consulting services to Alstom and its subsidiaries but was instead to provide benefits to Saudi officials who had the ability to influence the award of the first two power projects to Alstom and its predecessors.

31. Internal company documents refer to the consultants in code, including names such as “Mr. Geneva” (Consultant C), “Mr. Paris” (Consultant D), “London,” “Quiet Man,” and “Old Friend.” Consultant C, or “Mr. Geneva,” was the brother of a high-level official at the SEC who had the ability to influence the award of the Shoaiba Projects (“Official 5”), which certain Alstom employees knew. Internal documents reflect that Mr. Geneva was paid approximately \$5 million, with no documentation of any legitimate services having been performed by Consultant C commensurate with a \$5 million fee and with no documentation of any technical or other expertise justifying such a fee.

32. Consultant D, or “Mr. Paris,” was a close relative of another high-level official at the SEC who had the ability to influence the award of the Shoaiba Projects (“Official 6”), which certain Alstom employees knew. Internal documents reflect that Mr. Paris was paid at least \$4 million, with no documentation of any legitimate services having been performed by Consultant

D commensurate with a \$4 million fee and with no documentation of any technical or other expertise justifying such a fee.

33. Consultant E, known as "London," received at least \$30 million in fees in connection with multiple consultancy agreements for the first two Shoaiba Projects. Alstom PROM and its co-conspirators did not require of Consultant E documentation of what he actually did to justify these sums of money, and what little documentation exists in Alstom's files for Consultant E's services was created after the fact and with the assistance of Alstom employees.

34. In Saudi Arabia, Alstom hired two consultants at virtually the same time to perform the same ostensible services on the same project. These consultants included Consultant E and Consultant F, referred to as "OF" or "Old Friend." The agreements, executed on or about May 1, 2002 and October 1, 2002, respectively, both cover ostensible services such as "establishing contacts," "arranging appointments," "coordinating customer visits," and "making contacts at all necessary levels." As noted above, Alstom paid Consultant E at least \$30 million in total fees, and paid Consultant F ("OF") at least \$10 million in total fees, with no documentation of any legitimate services having been performed by these consultants commensurate with their fees.

35. In addition to paying consultants as a means of bribing key decision makers at the SEC, Alstom PROM and its co-conspirators paid \$2.2 million to a U.S.-based Islamic education foundation associated with Official 6. The payments were made in three installments, and internal records at Alstom reflect that these payments were included as expenses related to two of the Shoaiba Projects, rather than as a separate and independent charitable contribution.

36. In sum, Alstom PROM and its co-conspirators were awarded the Shoaiba Projects and paid bribes to Saudi government officials, including Official 5 and Official 6, to obtain or retain business in connection with certain of the projects.

Egypt – Power Projects

37. Beginning in or around 2002 and continuing to in or around 2011, Alstom, Alstom PROM and several other Alstom entities began bidding on various power projects with the Egyptian Electricity Holding Company (“EEHC”), the state-owned and state-controlled electricity company in Egypt. EEHC was an “agency” and “instrumentality” of a foreign government, as those terms are used in the FCPA, Title 15, United States Code, Sections 78dd-2(h)(2) and dd-3(f)(2). EEHC engaged the services of global power companies to build power stations in Egypt, usually through competitive bids. One such project was the Nubaria power station, with a value of approximately \$70 million. Another such project was the El Tebbin power station, with a value of approximately \$60 million.

38. However, EEHC was not itself responsible for conducting the bidding on these and other projects, and instead relied on Power Generation Engineering & Service Co. (“PGESCO”), which was controlled by and acted on behalf of EEHC. PGESCO worked “for or on behalf of” EEHC, within the meaning of the FCPA, Title 15, United States Code, Sections 78dd-2(h)(2) and dd-3(f)(2).

39. In connection with these projects in Egypt, Alstom, Alstom PROM and several other Alstom entities paid millions of dollars to consultants to pass on to Egyptian officials to obtain or retain business in connection with power projects for Alstom and its subsidiaries.

40. Specifically, in connection with the bidding on these power projects, Alstom and its subsidiaries retained Consultant G through a consulting agreement with Alstom PROM.

Consultant G's primary purpose was not to provide legitimate consulting services to Alstom and its subsidiaries but was instead to make payments to Egyptian officials, including Asem Elgawhary who oversaw the bidding process and who has been charged separately, for the purpose of influencing the award of the contracts.

41. Alstom deviated from its normal policy of paying consultants on a pro-rata basis (corresponding to each payment that Alstom received from the customer) to change the terms of payment for Consultant G so that he received a large payment up front, which provided cash to bribe Egyptian officials, including Elgawhary, for the purpose of securing an improper advantage for Alstom and its subsidiaries in connection with the bidding and awarding of power contracts.

42. From 2004 to 2011, Alstom transferred approximately €5 million to Consultant G's bank account in Germany in connection with the Nubarria project, the El Tebbin project, and others, and Consultant G then transferred more than \$3 million to bank accounts for the benefit of Elgawhary and another EEHC official.

43. Alstom PROM and its co-conspirators were ultimately awarded projects in Egypt, including Nubarria and El Tebbin, and made payments to Consultant G for the purpose of paying Egyptian government officials in exchange for their assistance in awarding projects.

The Bahamas

44. Beginning in or around 1999 and continuing to in or around 2004, Alstom, Alstom PROM and several other Alstom entities began bidding on power projects with the Bahamas Electricity Corporation ("BEC"), the state-owned and state-controlled power company in the Bahamas. BEC was an "agency" and "instrumentality" of a foreign government, as those terms are used in the FCPA, Title 15, United States Code, Sections 78dd-2(h)(2) and dd-3(f)(2).

45. Alstom PROM and its co-conspirators made payments to Bahamian officials to obtain or retain business in connection with the power projects for Alstom and its subsidiaries.

46. Specifically, in connection with the bidding on the power projects, Alstom, through a consulting agreement with Alstom PROM, retained Consultant H who, as certain Alstom employees knew, was a close personal friend of "Official 7" a board member of BEC. Consultant H's primary purpose was not to provide legitimate consulting services to Alstom and its subsidiaries but was instead to pay bribes to Official 7 who had the ability to influence the award of the power contracts. Consultant H was a U.S. citizen, was based in the United States, and maintained a bank account in the United States.

47. Consultant H had no knowledge about, or experience in, the power industry. Rather, Consultant H sold furniture and leather products, and exported chemical products and spare parts. Alstom provided Consultant H with the information to include on the invoices he submitted for payment so that there would be appear to be sufficient documentation of purported services rendered to justify payment.

48. Alstom PROM and its co-conspirators were ultimately awarded the power projects by BEC. Alstom made payments to Consultant H for the purpose of paying Official 7 in exchange for his assistance in awarding the projects to Alstom and its subsidiaries.

The Conspiracy

49. From in or around 2000, and continuing through in or around 2011, in the District of Connecticut, and elsewhere, Alstom PROM did willfully, that is, with the intent to further the objects of the conspiracy, and knowingly conspire, confederate and agree with others known and unknown, to commit offenses against the United States, that is:

a. together with a domestic concern, to willfully make use of the mails and means and instrumentalities of interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, and authorization of the payment of any money, offer, gift, promise to give, and authorization of the giving of anything of value to a foreign official and to a person, while knowing that all or a portion of such money and thing of value would be and had been offered, given, and promised, directly and indirectly, to a foreign official, for purposes of: (i) influencing acts and decisions of such foreign official in his official capacity; (ii) inducing such foreign official to do and omit to do acts in violation of the lawful duty of such official; (iii) securing an improper advantage; and (iv) inducing such foreign official to use his influence with a foreign government and agencies and instrumentalities thereof to affect and influence acts and decisions of such government and agencies and instrumentalities, in order to assist domestic concerns in obtaining and retaining business for and with, and directing business to, Alstom PROM, Alstom, Alstom Power US, Alstom Indonesia, and others, in violation of Title 15, United States Code, Section 78dd-2(a); and

b. while in the territory of the United States, willfully and corruptly to make use of the mails and means and instrumentalities of interstate commerce and to do any other act in furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, and authorization of the

payment of any money, offer, gift, promise to give, and authorization of the giving of anything of value to a foreign official and to a person, while knowing that all or a portion of such money and thing of value would be and had been offered, given, and promised to a foreign official, for purposes of: (i) influencing acts and decisions of such foreign official in his official capacity; (ii) inducing such foreign official to do and omit to do acts in violation of the lawful duty of such official; (iii) securing an improper advantage; and (iv) inducing such foreign official to use his influence with a foreign government and agencies and instrumentalities thereof to affect and influence acts and decisions of such government and agencies and instrumentalities, in order to assist Alstom PROM and others in obtaining and retaining business for and with, and directing business to, Alstom PROM, Alstom, Alstom Power US, Alstom Indonesia, and others, in violation of Title 15, United States Code, Section 78dd-3(a).

Purpose of the Conspiracy

50. The purpose of the conspiracy was to make corrupt payments to foreign officials in Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the Bahamas in order to obtain and retain business related to power projects in those countries for and on behalf of Alstom and its subsidiaries.

Manner and Means of the Conspiracy

51. The manner and means by which Alstom PROM and its co-conspirators sought to accomplish the purpose of the conspiracy included, among other things, the following:

52. Alstom PROM, through certain employees and together with other co-conspirators, while in the District of Connecticut and elsewhere, discussed in person, via telephone, and via electronic mail ("e-mail") the need to obtain and retain contracts and other

business for and on behalf of Alstom and its subsidiaries in Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the Bahamas.

53. Alstom PROM, through certain employees and together with other co-conspirators, while in the District of Connecticut and elsewhere, discussed in person, via telephone, and via e-mail making bribe payments to foreign officials in Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the Bahamas in order to obtain and retain contracts and other business for and on behalf of Alstom and its subsidiaries.

54. Alstom PROM, through certain employees and together with other co-conspirators, while in the District of Connecticut and elsewhere, offered to pay, promised to pay, and authorized the payment of bribes, directly and indirectly, to and for the benefit of foreign officials in Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the Bahamas in order to obtain and retain contracts and other business for and on behalf of Alstom and its subsidiaries.

55. Alstom PROM, through certain employees and together with other co-conspirators, while in the District of Connecticut and elsewhere, attempted to conceal the true nature of the payments by entering into consulting agreements with various consultants in order to disguise the bribe payments to the foreign officials in Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the Bahamas.

56. Alstom PROM, through certain employees and together with other co-conspirators, while in the District of Connecticut and elsewhere, made payments to the bank accounts of various consultants to bribe foreign officials in Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the Bahamas in order to obtain and retain contracts and other business for and on behalf of Alstom and its subsidiaries.

57. Alstom PROM, through certain employees and together with other co-conspirators, while in the District of Connecticut and elsewhere, agreed to pay bribes directly to foreign officials by providing gifts and petty cash, by hiring their family members, and by paying money to a charity associated with a foreign official, all in exchange for those officials' assistance in obtaining or retaining business in connection with projects for Alstom and its subsidiaries.

Overt Acts

58. In furtherance of the conspiracy and to achieve the objects thereof, at least one of the co-conspirators committed or caused to be committed, in the District of Connecticut and elsewhere, at least one of the following overt acts, among others:

Indonesia

59. On or about August 8, 2002, an Alstom Indonesia employee sent an e-mail to Rothschild, to which he attached a document explaining, among other things, that Official 1 was a “[k]ey legislator” and “Vice chairman of [the] Parliament commission 8 dedicated for Power & Energy” who had “[e]asy direct access personally to PLN Board” and who could exert “direct influence to PLN ([Official 2] and [another official])” and “utiliz[e] his comission [sic] 8 forum to influence PLN Board” and Ministries.

60. On or about September 4, 2002, Alstom Indonesia Executive sent an e-mail to Rothschild, copying Pierucci, stating, “[W]e have met [Official 1] to confirm whether he is comfortable with your suggested approach on Representation issue (through [Consultant A])....Again, from my point of view whichever approach taken on the Representation issue, must assure the coverage of Palembang [the city in Indonesia where the evaluation committee was located]. You need to be confident that [Consultant A] could do this since he – being the

one who can make the 'commitment' – will have to take over the lead role from us in Palembang.”

61. On or about December 3, 2002, Alstom Indonesia Executive sent an e-mail to Hoskins discussing a Muara Tawar Project, including whether to retain Consultant A in connection with the project, stating, “[Official 1] is a member of INDONESIA Parliament, precisely he is the Vice Chairman of Commission VIII, a commission in charge of handling Power issues....Besides his function in the Parliament, he has long well established relationship with [Official 2] (PLN President Director). As a Vice Chairman of Commission VIII he certainly have [sic] influence in PLN. He is not an agent but one of the players....[L]ooking in to [Consultant A's] performance in Tarahan, we need to think twice prior taking him into consideration....As the [Tarahan] project proceed, it shown that [Consultant A] has been unable to fulfil [sic] his tasks and our expectation, he has no grip on PLN Tender team at all. Basically, his function is more or less similar to cashier which I feel we pay too much....As you know, I have set an appointment to meet [Official 2] tomorrow morning to find out who would be his recommended agent, the one that PLN can really feel comfortable with.”

62. On or about December 3, 2002, Hoskins sent an e-mail to an executive at Alstom, stating, “Will call you after I get feedback from [Alstom Indonesia Executive] on his meeting tomorrow with [Official 2]. At this stage [Alstom Indonesia Executive] does not support appointment of [Consultant A] for MT [Muara Tawar] but believes [Official 1] to be an important part of the jigsaw.”

63. On or about January 3, 2003, Alstom Executive A sent an e-mail to Hoskins, copying another executive in Compliance at Alstom PROM, regarding the approval of the consultancy agreement with Consultant A, stating, “[Consultant A] sent me the completed

'Agent Profile' for his very small company in Baltimore, Maryland, with branch office in Washington....I understand, that the Tarahan job is boiler supply from the US to Indonesia. As I said before, it would make more sens[e] to have an agent in Indonesia, where [Consultant A's] company has obviously an office. As you know, we do not like to have a US domiciliated company as a consultant, with payment in the US, and most probably in USD."

64. On or about January 15, 2003, Hoskins responded to the e-mail referenced in Paragraph 63 above, stating, "I talked to [Alstom Indonesia Executive] and his financial controller [] on this subject to establish whether they could implement an agreement locally in Indonesia. They were uneasy about dealing with a local company but thought an arrangement with Singapore may work. [Alstom Indonesia Executive] is going to check with [Consultant A] to see if he has a company in Singapore."

65. On or about June 5, 2003, Alstom Executive B sent an e-mail to an Alstom Indonesia employee regarding the Muara Tawar Projects and discussing various agents that Alstom could retain in connection with the project, stating, "[Consultant B] basically works for [Official 2]."

66. On or about August 12, 2003, Consultant A sent an e-mail to Pierucci about another upcoming power project with PLN, stating, "PLN people are upset with us that we told them we only need marginal support from them and now putting everything on them. They are comparing the success fee for Tarahan and [the upcoming project] and asking why they are so much different."

67. On or about September 18, 2003, Alstom Indonesia Executive forwarded an e-mail to Hoskins describing a meeting between two Alstom employees and two PLN officials, including Official 4, regarding the Tarahan Project which stated, "PLN has expressed their

concerns over our 'agent'. They did not like the approach made by the agent. More importantly, they concern whether they can trust on the agent or not in regards to 'rewards' issue. They concern that if we have won the job, whether their rewards will still be satisfactory or this agent only give them pocket money and disappear. Nothing has been shown by the agent that the agent is willing to spend money." (emphasis in original).

68. In or around late September 2003, Hoskins, Pierucci, Alstom Executive B, Alstom Indonesia Executive, and other Alstom employees told Consultant A at a meeting in Indonesia that: (i) they were going to retain another consultant to pay bribes to officials at PLN in connection with the Tarahan Project; (ii) Consultant A needed to pay bribes only to Official 1; and (iii) Consultant A's commission, therefore, would be cut from three percent of the total value of the contract to one percent.

69. On or about March 3, 2004, Alstom Indonesia Executive sent an e-mail to Hoskins, which was eventually forwarded to an executive in Compliance at Alstom PROM, stating, "Last Monday we sent Tarahan CA [consultancy agreement] to [Consultant B], he immediately feel [sic] cornered after reading the ToP [terms of payment] which said 'prorata'. When I talked to him on the phone I said that I will look at it and I thought it should not be that bad. I then looked into Tarahan ToP (see attached) and realise that the project payment is spread over 3.5 year! You would understand why he is worry [sic], he is willing to pre-finance his scope, fulfilling his commitment up-front (prior he get paid) to get the right 'influence', but certainly not waiting 2 to 3 years to get paid while most of his scope is completed in the beginning."

70. On or about March 30, 2004, Pomponi sent an e-mail to Hoskins, Pierucci, and Alstom Indonesia Executive, stating, "Approval...has finally been received this morning

authorizing the requested Terms of Payment. Pls proceed with this ASAP to obtain the CA signing by [Consultant B] in order for [Consultant B's] effectiveness to continue.”

71. On or about March 31, 2004, Alstom Indonesia Executive responded to the e-mail from Pomponi referenced in Paragraph 70 above, stating, “I will mentioned [sic] our position to [Official 2] and [Consultant B] this afternoon. Furthermore I would suggest you to contact [an Alstom employee in Compliance at Alstom PROM] with a request to make the necessary CA changes (ToP) and ask her to send me the revised CA asap. Once the revised agreement arrived I will obtain [Consultant B's] signature. Mean while [sic] I will give [Official 2]/[Consultant B] my word.”

72. On or about April 5, 2004, Alstom Indonesia Executive sent an e-mail to Hoskins, copying Pierucci and Alstom Executive B, regarding the Tarahan Project and Muara Tawar Project, stating, “According to [Official 2] Alstom did not show enough its ‘commitment’ to PLN....[Official 2] also asked me whether for PLN Alstom could use one representative (agent), rather than 2 or 3. According to [Official 2] in [another project] [Consultant A] was involved. [Official 2] thought he made to Fred [Pierucci] and you clear [Consultant A] was not the right person.”

73. On or about July 12, 2005, an employee at Alstom Indonesia sent an e-mail to Alstom Executive B, Alstom Indonesia Executive, and another Alstom employee regarding the Muara Tawar Block 5 Project, stating, “We have built relationship [sic] with [Official 4] since the Tarahan [] project. In this [Muara Tawar Project], we were among those who promoted [Official 4] so that he can become a member of the [Muara Tawar Project] procurement team....Looking at this fact, [Official 4] is of critical importance to us as our vehicle....[Official 4] must be ensured that his effort will be worth his while....We need to set up additional CA

[consultancy agreement], separate from the basic CA currently in place, to cover [Official 4] and his people, as our ammunition to approach working level which is currently untouched by our agent.”

74. On or about September 22, 2006, Alstom Executive B sent an e-mail to another Alstom employee with the subject, “Tarahan – commitment fell thru the cracks,” stating, “One of the engineering chaps [Official 4] who had a lot of influence on the outcome of the Tarahan has not been fully compensated on the Tarahan project. Now he is involved in [the Muara Tawar Block 5 Project] and keeps reminding the boys that we owe him something. This issue needs to be sorted out ASAP to ensure proper support on [the Muara Tawar Block 5 Project]. According to [an executive at Alstom Indonesia], [Consultant B] has honored his pro rata portion of the commitment. The original (‘other’) Agent did not. I don’t know if the other guy has received any consulting fees. Would you be able to check that out with [Alstom] Prom? If not then we should block the payments until he takes care of the guy.”

Saudi Arabia

75. In or around 2000, Alstom PROM and its co-conspirators created documents that referred to various consultants in code, including names such as “Mr. Geneva” (Consultant C), “Mr. Paris” (Consultant D), “London” (Consultant E), “Quiet Man,” and “Old Friend” (Consultant F).

76. On or about January 29, 2002, June 5, 2003, October 7, 2003, and March 15, 2004, Alstom’s lead subsidiary for the Shoaiba Projects sent written invoices to Alstom Power US for its percentage share of these consultant expenses.

77. In or around January 2000, employees of Alstom and its joint venture partner circulated an action plan for bidding on a particular phase of the Shoaiba Projects, which plan

included a section entitled "Client History & Perception: Build the Relationship." One column listed key officials at the SEC and a corresponding column provided "Most Important Concerns" as related to the designated officials. One of the key officials listed in the plan was Official 6, whose close relative was Consultant C, otherwise known as "Mr. Paris." According to the plan, Official 6 was believed to have "70%" of the decision-making responsibility for SEC matters, including the award of a contract being bid on by Alstom. As the most important concerns related to Official 6, the plan stated, "Honest reputation. Son has been known to deal."

78. On or about September 29, 2000, an employee of Alstom's lead subsidiary sent an e-mail to an Alstom Power US employee, among others, discussing payments to a previously retained consultant whose services had already been rendered, stating, "probably you need to create an agreement for your auditors as done before?? If you need support from our side, let me know."

79. On or about June 4, 2002, an Alstom employee sent an e-mail to a sales manager at Alstom Power US and several other Alstom employees, stating, "Without entering into more details, we have concluded a principle agreement with the second network so called 'OF' [Consultant F] for [Shoaiba] Stage II Bid. We have agreed with him to try through his 'system' the 41 wish-item of the feedback that was only partially successful via the network #1. Please note that both networks believe to be the only one working for this issue."

80. In addition, on or about August 21, 2003, an employee of Alstom's lead subsidiary working on the Shoaiba Projects sent an e-mail to an Alstom Power US sales manager, stating, "Could you manage to give us some advice regarding any need to add costs for items such as...Employment of Owner's relatives...Owner's travels, for witnessing tests or for 'other' purposes...?" The Alstom Power US sales manager forwarded this e-mail to another

Alstom Power US employee and a project manager for Alstom Power US, who responded, "This is a significant cost which must be considered in the estimate. Current royal decrees (laws) on the subject of Saudization in the Kingdom require that a minimum of 10% of a companies [sic] employees (companies with 10 or more employees) must b[e] Saudi on construction projects like Shoaiba.... 'Saudization' of course the hammer used by our client to hire Saudis many of whom are strongly recommended by our client, i.e., friends and family. Minimum costs for these guys would be about 10,000 SAR per month including salary, housing, and other living expenses at site...All-in costs can be as high as \$100,000/year depending on the individual's 'qualifications' such as the Consortium's current Site Security Manager....The other problem is that these guys are difficult to lay-off even while ALSTOM's staff is demobilized at the end of the job! Zero productivity may be assumed for any Saudi hire. Make a budget provision!"

81. On or about December 10, 2003, an Alstom employee sent an e-mail to an employee of Alstom Power US and several other Alstom employees working on the Shoaiba Projects regarding a certificate from SEC that was required for Alstom to get paid by the customer for its work on Stage I, Phase 2 of the Shoaiba Projects, stating, "The importance of timely issue of the [certificate] is, as far as AP [Alstom Power] is concerned, of top priority. Hence, I will support financially, in very confidential bases [sic], those who are supporting me respectively us by removing the unreasonable pre-conditions. Taking into consideration that nobody has requested any thing from but is solely my idea and intention on behalf of the Consortium. I will even not mention the Names (Only [two SEC officials] are informed while [another SEC official] will be informed from me confidentially on the telephone). The total amount of support is Euro 20,000 (50% in Saudi Riyals and 50% in Euro). It is very important that no Site Manager or any body else than the above addresses are supposed to be informed

about this. It is very Confidential...I need your O.K. for the sharing. My LN [Lotus Notes e-mail] will be deleted after submission to you.”

82. On or about December 10, 2003, one of the Alstom employees who received the e-mail described in Paragraph 81 above responded, “We agree!” That same day, another Alstom employee responded, “We confirm our agreement.”

Egypt – Power Projects

83. On or about July 23, 2003, an Alstom employee sent an e-mail to an Alstom employee in Egypt requesting that the terms of payment for Consultant G be revised to Alstom’s standard pro rata payments. In the e-mail, the employee wrote, “[Alstom’s office in Paris] would like to see standard terms of payment, i.e. pro rata with the contract, instead of the one as in the keys. Is that a problem with [Consultant G]?”

84. On or about July 27, 2003, the Alstom employee in Egypt replied, “I called [Consultant G] and he does have a problem due to the coverage required etc. ... You know what I mean ...” (Ellipses in original).

85. On or about October 27, 2003, an Alstom employee sent an e-mail to a number of employees stating that he had spoken to Consultant G regarding a new power project in Egypt and that the terms of payment would be the same as with the Nubaria project – “i.e. 50% on down payment, remaining progress.”

86. On or about April 19, 2006, Consultant G sent an e-mail to several Alstom employees requesting payment on an invoice for the Nubaria project. One of the Alstom employees forwarded the e-mail to another Alstom employee responsible for releasing consultancy payments, stating, “FYI, any update on the agent payment?? Perhaps, this is why our payment from [EEHC] is delayed?”

87. On or about April 30, 2004, Alstom transferred approximately €467,134 to Consultant G's bank account in Germany.

88. On or about May 3, 2004, Consultant G then transferred approximately \$140,000 to Elgawhary's bank account at Credit Suisse in Switzerland.

89. On or about June 22, 2004, Consultant G transferred an additional \$60,000 to a bank account in Maryland that was owned by Elgawhary and the son-in-law of a high-level official at EEHC.

90. On or about May 3, 2007, Alstom transferred approximately €1.1 million to Consultant G's bank account in Germany.

91. On or about May 4, 2007, Consultant G then transferred approximately €300,000 to Elgawhary's bank account at Credit Suisse in Switzerland.

The Bahamas

92. On or about April 25, 2000, Consultant H sent a letter to an employee of an Alstom subsidiary in connection with a project to perform power-related services for BEC, stating, "Please let me know as soon as possible when you are coming so I can set up a meeting with [Official 7] and I [sic]....If you have figured out what to say on the invoice fax it to me so that I can have the invoice prepared when you arrive."

93. On or about June 9, 2000, Consultant H issued a check to Official 7 in the amount of \$74,229, which was half of the amount that Alstom, through Alstom PROM, paid Consultant H two weeks earlier in connection with a power project with BEC. The check stated in the "For" line: "Commission."

94. On or about June 27, 2000, Consultant H sent an e-mail to an employee of an Alstom subsidiary regarding a consultancy agreement for a new project at BEC, stating, "As per

our conversation of last week you stated I should be receiving the final contract in Miami by today, as of yet it has not yet arrived.”

95. On or about July 4, 2000, Consultant H sent an e-mail to an employee of an Alstom subsidiary, stating, “Tender is Opening on Thursday, [Official 7] has been appointed to oversee the opening of the tender by the chairman of the board...Also [Official 7] is trying to Speak With The Ministry who is in charge of Immigration. We also have all our people in place that we discussed. However I still have no contract. [Official 7] told me that we are not going to move forward until we have this contract. You must understand [sic] we are ready to go and have done all the set up work to get what you need. But we will not go any further until we have this contract.”

96. On or about July 5, 2000, the Alstom subsidiary employee sent an e-mail to Consultant H in response to the e-mail referenced in Paragraph 95 above, stating, “I have been discussing with the persons involved in this matter and I can confirm that they have accepted the terms and amount agreed with you verbally in Miami. All the documents will be sent directly to your office in Miami during next week.”

97. On or about July 11, 2000, an employee in Compliance at Alstom sent to Consultant H, copying Alstom Executive A, a draft consultancy agreement for the project with BEC. The agreement included a provision 7.2 that required the consultant to warrant that he “shall not directly or indirectly divert or pay any amounts to any person, including but not limited to government officials, employees or agents, or use any amounts due hereunder in a manner which may constitute an unlawful or improper payment under any applicable law.” It also contained a provision 10.4 and a provision 10.5 that the agreement would be null and void if

the agreement was found to be contrary to the laws of any country or the representations and warranties set forth in the agreement.

98. On or about July 12, 2000, Consultant H sent an e-mail to an employee of an Alstom subsidiary with the subject, "Contract Amendments," stating, "7.2 [prohibiting unlawful payments] How can I sign this?...10.4 & 10.5 [rendering the contract null and void in the event of unlawful activity] Due to the nature of how we need to secure what is need [sic], these articles can not be in the contract."

99. On or about July 14, 2000, Consultant H sent an e-mail to an employee of an Alstom subsidiary, stating, "Please advise progress of amendments to contract....Also [Official 7] would like your word on the other 1/2% we have discussed."

100. On or about July 21, 2000, the Alstom subsidiary employee sent an e-mail to Consultant H in response to the e-mail referenced in Paragraph 99 above, attaching a revised consultancy agreement and stating that they could not delete the provisions regarding unlawful payments.

101. On or about July 24, 2000, an employee in Compliance at Alstom sent to Consultant H, copying Alstom Executive A, the finalized consultancy agreement for the project with BEC.

102. On or about February 8, 2001, Consultant H sent an e-mail to an Alstom employee regarding delays in the award of the contract, stating, "I have [Official 7] going down to BEC Talk with [a high-level official] to try to get a feel for what's going on."

103. On or about March 1, 2001, an Alstom employee sent a fax to Consultant H, stating, "As per my news, Letter of Acceptance was agreed upon yesterday."

104. On or about March 20, 2001, Consultant H sent an e-mail to an Alstom employee, stating, "I received a suggested copy of how to invoice your company. However there is a notation on it that said I should make a notation of what we did with dates etc....Because of the sensitive nature of what we did to help get this contract, I'm not to [sic] happy about spelling out what we did. [Two Alstom employees] and as well as yourself, know exactly what we did. So please advice [sic] me on this. We have bent over backwards to all the new technicalities dealing with Alstom Power....Now I have to take on the expence [sic] and the tax problems our company will have to deal with because of needing to open a Bank account outside the country. So please help me out with this and let me know how to do the invoice so we get paid."

105. On or about May 15, 2001, shortly after receiving payment from Alstom, through Alstom PROM, Consultant H issued a check in the amount of approximately \$56,000 to Official 7, with the "For" line stating, "Consulting Fee For Alstom Power Contract."

106. On or about September 24, 2001, shortly after receiving payment from Alstom, through Alstom PROM, Consultant H issued a check in the amount of approximately \$42,000 to Official 7, with the "For" line stating, "Commission Alstom Power."

107. On or about February 19, 2002, shortly after receiving payment from Alstom, through Alstom PROM, Consultant H issued a check in the amount of approximately \$42,000 to Official 7.

108. On or about July 8, 2002, shortly after receiving payment from Alstom, through Alstom PROM, Consultant H issued a check in the amount of approximately \$40,000 to Official 7, with the "For" line stating, "Contract."

109. On or about February 12, 2003, shortly after receiving payment from Alstom, through Alstom PROM, Consultant H issued a check in the amount of approximately \$27,000 to Official 7, with the "For" line stating, "Commission Alstom Power."

All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 371.



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