2012 WL 7810806 (N.Y.Sup.) (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit)
Supreme Court of New York.
Kings County

Lynn BOWDEN, Jr., Plaintiff,
v.
Saundra J. COLLIER, Defendant.

No. 47656/03.
July 9, 2012.

Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Support of Her Motion in Limine

Janelle Niles, Esq., Of Counsel to Ernst Perodin, Esq., Attorney for Defendant, 300 Linden Boulevard, Suite 5A, Brooklyn, New York 11226-3573, (718) 287-8113.

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Defendant Saundra J. Collier respectfully submits this memorandum of law in support of her Motion In Limine seeking an Order precluding Plaintiff's from offering evidence of or concerning: (1) the March 27, 2002 letter alleging that the Defendant agreed to re-convey the subject property; (2) the March 30, 2002 and April 25, 2003 letters allegedly written to the Defendant by the Plaintiff, (3) any references to Plaintiff's Counsel as “Legal Services For the **Elderly**,” and/or “LEAP”; (4) any testimony by the Plaintiff and/or the Defendant concerning personal communications and/or transactions with the decedent Louise Bowden, (5) any testimony concerning the mortgage foreclosure action for the premises located at 494 McDonough Street, Brooklyn, NY 11232 (hereafter “the Premises”), (6) any allegations that the Plaintiff engaged in “deed theft and **elder abuse**”, and (7) any allegations that the Defendant engaged in drug use. Plaintiff also will move the court to grant any and all additional relief requested below.

Defendant Saundra Collier's deceased mother, Louise Collier-Bowden (hereinafter “Louise”), and her husband, Plaintiff Lynn Bowden, Jr. (hereinafter “Mr. Bowden”) deeded their three-family home to Defendant (hereinafter “Saundra”) on April 2, 2002. Saundra, who is Mr. Bowden's stepdaughter, contends that her mother and stepfather permanently deeded the premises to her because of the love and gratitude that they felt for Saundra because she had taken good care of Louise for about forty-eight months while Louise was ill. Saundra further contends that sometime after her mother passed away in June 2003, Mr. Bowden decided that he wanted Saundra to give him the Premises back so that he and his paramour, Glory Jean (who, is half his age, and who, by then, had moved into the Premises to live with him) could get married and use the Premises for their marital abode.

Saundra further asserts that Mr. Bowden and Glory Jean conspired, plotted, and pursued a course of conduct to hound and harass Saundra in an effort to convince, intimidate, or pressure her to restore ownership of the Premises to her stepfather. However, they came to realize that they would not succeed in changing her mind. Therefore, Mr. Bowden and Glory Jean concocted a false tale (which tale they incorporated in the Complaint for the instant action) wherein Saundra is portrayed as an evil stepchild who took advantage of her weak, illiterate, and unsophisticated stepfather and sick mother to cheat and trick them into deeding their home to her. Finally, Saundra asserts that Mr. Bowden's motivation for perpetrating a fraud upon this Court by prosecuting his false claims against Saundra is to regain ownership of the property to use as an enticement for Glory Jean to marry him.

Mr. Bowden alleges that Saundra defrauded him into conveying his interest in the premises by tricking him into believing that the New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development (“HPD”) would take the premises from him (apparently because of outstanding violations that HPD had placed on the premises and because he was having problems with some tenants who resided in the apartment located on the top floor of the Premises) if he did not temporarily transfer the property

to her. According to Mr. Bowden, he feared that he was going to lose his home because of the problems with the tenants and HPD, so he agreed to transfer the property to Saundra. Mr. Bowden claims that Saundra promised to deed the property back to him once the problems with HPD and the tenants were resolved. Mr. Bowden also claims that Saundra manipulated, threatened and coerced her mother who was in poor health to execute a power of attorney in favor of Saundra and transfer her interest in the Premises to Saundra unbeknownst to him. Some of the allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint and motion papers are confusing, contradictory, and incredible.

On December 12, 2003, Mr. Bowden filed this action against Saundra, alleging claims for the imposition of a constructive trust, fraud, conversion, and unjust enrichment, and seeking the re-conveyance of the Premises to him. In December 2003, Saundra started an eviction proceeding to have Mr. Bowden removed from the property, which proceeding she later discontinued. On February 3, 2004, Saundra interposed an answer and counterclaims in this action. On March 3, 2004, Mr. Bowden filed a notice of pendency against the property. By a decision and order dated September 13, 2005, this Court granted Mr. Bowden's motion for a preliminary injunction, enjoining Saundra from transferring, selling, or encumbering title to the property in any manner, and from taking any action to evict Mr. Bowden from the Premises.

ARGUMENT

I. PLAINTIFF HAS THE BURDEN OF PROVING EACH ELEMENT OF HIS CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST CLAIM BY CLEAR AND CONVINGING EVIDENCE.

The Plaintiff has the burden of proving each element of his constructive trust claim to make their prima facie case. *See Cassidy v. Cassidy*, 309 N.Y. 332, 335; 130 N.E.2d 881 (Court of Appeals 1955).

The elements of a constructive trust claim are: (1) a confidential relationship; (2) an express or implied promise; (3) a transfer in reliance on the promise, and (4) unjust enrichment. See *Estate of Bertha Chakine*, 1999 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 700; 221 N.Y.L.J. 50 (Sur. Ct. 1999).

The standard of proof used for a constructive trust claim is clear and convincing evidence. See *Charles C. O'Boyle et al., v. Edward C. Brenner*, 303 N.Y. 572 (Ct. App.); *Klaus Klam v. Renate Klam*, 239 A.D.2d 390, 391 (2nd Dept. 1997).

II. THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE PRECLUDES ADMISSION OF THE MARCH 27, 2002 STATEMENT INTO EVIDENCE BY PLAINTIFF TO PROVE ITS CONTENTS.

The Best Evidence Rule precludes the March 27, 2002 statement from being admitted into evidence to prove its contents.

New York courts apply the Best Evidence Rule when analyzing the admissibility of a document whose contents are in dispute. *Schozer v. William Penn Life Ins. Co. of New York*, 84 N.Y. 639, 643, 620 N.Y.S.2d 797, 799 (Sup. Ct. Bronx 1994).

The Best Evidence Rule requires that a party relying on a disputed document may produce a substitute for the original writing only if the absence or unavailability of the original is satisfactorily explained. *See Glatter et al., v. Borten et al.*, 233 A.D.2d 166; 649 N.Y.S.2d 677 (1st Dept. 1996)

A photocopy of a document will only be admitted if the original writing was in existence, the writing was genuine, and that a sufficient excuse exists for its non-production. See *id.*

A written statement dated March 27, 2002, was submitted by Plaintiff as an exhibit attached to his affidavit in support of a motion for injunctive relief, and stating that: (1) it was purportedly written by Defendant Saundra Collier; (2) she knew that she

was not the owner of the Premises, and that she intended to "put the house back into [Lynn Bowden's] name when the problem with the tenants and HPD is over". The statement was also purportedly signed by Ms. Collier.

Ms. Collier vehemently denies composing, drafting, typing, signing, or in any way contributing to the writing of this letter. Ms. Collier acknowledges that the signature included in the statement looks like her signature; however, she denies ever signing the letter in question. Rather, she believes that her signature was physically cut from another document (that was in Plaintiff's possession), pasted onto the typed statement, and then a photocopy was made of the two so as to merge the signature and typed statement into a seamless appearing document; thereby producing the document that Plaintiff submitted heretofore as an exhibit in support of a motion and which, upon information and belief, he intends to proffer at the trial.

Said document is also suspicious because, although it is dated "March 27, 2002", it was not mentioned in Plaintiff's Complaint, dated December 5, 2003, nor was it submitted with the several other exhibits that were attached to said complaint.

Plaintiff has never produced the original document dated March 27, 2002 for inspection despite the fact that Defendant served him with a written notice to produce the original for inspection years ago. Subsequently, her attorney made numerous oral requests to Plaintiff's attorneys that they produce said document for inspection to no avail. Moreover, Plaintiff's attorneys have never attempted to explain to Defendant's attorney what, if anything, ever happened to the alleged original of said document. Given these facts, Defendant asserts that the Best Evidence Rule precludes admission of this document by Plaintiff to prove its contents.

III. DEFENDANT SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO OFFER THE STATEMENT DATED MARCH 27, 2002 TO ESTABLISH THAT IT IS A FORGERY.

Evidence excluded for one purpose may be admitted for another purpose. *Martha Seaberg, v. North Shore Lincoln-Mercury, Inc.*, 85 A.D.3d 1148 (2d. Dept. 2011).

As discussed above, the Defendant denies writing and/or signing the March 27, 2002 statement proffered by Plaintiff heretofore in motion practice. Defendant acknowledges that the signature on the document is a photocopy of her signature; however, she vehemently denies that she ever signed this letter, and instead believes that her signature was physically cut from another document (in the Plaintiff's possession), pasted onto this letter, and photocopied. Given this, the Defendant asserts that this document was forged and/or is otherwise untrustworthy. *People v Carratu*, 26 A.D.3d 514; 811 N.Y.S.2d 92 (2d Dept. 2006).

It is important that the Defendant be permitted to demonstrate that the Plaintiff forged the letter and/or attempted to perpetrate a fraud on the court by submitting a forged document to support his claim, as this would establish that the Plaintiff has "unclean hands", warranting the dismissal of the Plaintiff's case. *Dolny v Borck et al.*, 61 A.D.3d 817 (2nd Dept. 2009). (Given the plaintiff's admitted involvement in this alleged arrangement to convey the property to frustrate his creditors in the collection of their legitimate debts, his claim that the Borcks now should be compelled to convey title to the premises to him pursuant to the terms of that arrangement is barred by the doctrine of unclean hands.)

IV. THE APRIL 25, 2003 LETTER WHICH PLAINTIFF WILL PROFFER SHOULD BE EXCLUDED BECAUSE IT IS A SELF-SERVING AND UNTRUSTWORTHY DOCUMENT THAT WAS PREPARED FOR LITIGATION.

Generally, self-serving documents offered by one party against another are subject to exclusion. See *Steber v. The Palm Knitting Co., Inc,* 206 A.D. 439, 201 N.Y.S. 478(1st Dept. 1923); *Catapano et al. v. Francis et al.*, 31 A.D.2d 650 (2nd Dep't. 1968); *Green et al., v. Downs et al,* 27 N.Y.2d 205(Ct. App. 1970).

The Plaintiff sent a letter to Defendant dated April 25, 2003 in which he stated that he had only transferred the property located at the Premises to the Defendant because of problems that he had experienced with his tenants and with HPD, and that he

wanted Defendant to convey the Premises back to him. Said letter reveals inconsistencies in the facts alleged by Plaintiff in his Complaint and motion papers that were submitted by him in connection with various forms of relief he sought from this Court subsequently. The chief inconsistency in his papers was that Plaintiff transferred the Premises to Defendant prior to HPD's involvement with the Premises; therefore, that could not have been his motivation for deeding the Premises to Defendant.

Finally, this letter, which was probably prepared in anticipation of litigation, is a self-serving document and should not be admitted into evidence.

V. ANY REFERENCE BY COUNSEL AND THEIR WITNESSES TO "LEGAL SERVICES FOR THE ELDERLY", "LEGAL ELDERLY ABUSE PROJECT" AND/OR "L.E.A.P." SHOULD BE PROHIBITED AS IT TENDS TO CREATE AN IMPROPER IMPRESSION OF THE PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL THAT THEY ARE PROTECTORS OF VULNERABLE AND WEAK PEOPLE WHICH IMPRESSION WORKS TO CLASSIFY DEFENDANT AS A PREDATOR AND TO UNFAIRLY PREJUDICE JURORS AGAINST HER.

Parties are entitled, as a matter of law, to a fair trial free from improper comments by counsel or the trial court. *See Ileana Ortiz et. al. v. Ana Jaramillo et. al.*, 84 A.D. 3d 766 (2nd Dep't. 2011). Repeated prejudicial or inflammatory remarks made in the presence of a jury may deprive a party of a fair trial. See *Rudolph Vassura et. al. v. Bruce Taylor et. al.*, 117 A.D.2d 798 (2nd Dep't. 1986).

The Plaintiff is represented by "Legal Services for the **Elderly**" (hereinafter "LEAP"). The use of the terms "Legal Services For the **Elderly**" or "LEAP", are likely to create an unfair prejudice against the Defendant, as such terms depict the Plaintiff's attorneys as protectors of the **elderly**, and suggest that the Plaintiff has been victimized by the Defendant.

To remedy this problem, the Defendant asks that the Plaintiff's counsel be referred to as "Attorneys for the Defendant", "Counsel for the Defendant," or any variation of these words. Unlike the use of "Legal Services for the **Elderly**", "Legal **Elder Abuse** Project", or "L.E.A.P.", the suggested titles create no prejudice against either party.

VI. THE DEADMAN'S STATUTE PRECLUDES THE PLAINTIFF AND THE DEFENDANT FROM TESTIFYING ABOUT PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS AND/OR TRANSACTIONS WITH THE DECEDENT LOUISE BOWDEN

The "Dead Man's Statute" prohibits a witness from testifying on his own behalf concerning a personal transaction or communication between the witness and a deceased person except where a protected person (i.e. the executor, administrator or person deriving their interest from the decedent) is examined on his own behalf, or if the testimony of the deceased person is given into evidence concerning the same transaction. *See* CPLR §4519; See also *Poslock et al., v. Teachers' Retirement Board of Teachers' Retirement System et al.*, 88 N.Y.2d 146; 666 N.E.2d 528 (Ct. App. 1996); see also *Miller et al., v Lu-Whitney*, 61 A.D.3d 1043 (3rd Dep't. 2009).

The Dead Man's Statute applies to both the Plaintiff and the Defendant in the case at bar because both are interested parties who could seek to testify on their own behalf concerning personal transactions and/or communications between themselves and the deceased Louise Bowden. Specifically, Plaintiff should be precluded from testifying that he and his wife never had conversations about transferring their house to Saundra. Consequently, both parties may only present evidence concerning personal transactions and/or communications they may have had with the deceased through the submission of documentary evidence and/or the testimony of non-interested witnesses. See id.

VII. THE VIDEOTAPE OF LOUISE COLLIER-BOWDEN'S STATEMENT WILL BE AUTHENTICATED AT TRIAL, AND IS ADMISSIBLE UNDER CPLR SECTION 4519 AS IT IS THE STATEMENT OF DECEDENT HERSELF, AND AS "DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE", IS ADMISSIBLE UNDER THE DEAD MAN'S STATUTE

In New York, a videotape containing relevant evidence may be introduced into evidence upon proper authentication. See *People v. Strozier*, 116 Misc.2d 103, 104-05, 455 N.Y.S.2d 217, 219 (Justice Ct. Monroe Co. 1982); *People v. Higgins*, 89 Misc.2d 913, 917-18, 392 N.Y.S.2d 800, 803-04 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Co. 1977); *see also People v. Velez*, 190 Misc.2d 206, 208-09, 737 N.Y.D.2d 819, 821 (Sup. Ct. Queens 2002).

In May 2003, Defendant videotaped her mother, Louise, making a statement. In the statement, Louise averred that she voluntarily transferred her interest (in fee simple) in the Premises to her daughter, Saundra, because of the love and gratitude she felt for Saundra and the love and care that Saundra had exhibited to her while she was disabled (i.e., a period of about 48 months from the time she left Brooklyn Hospital in 1999 after suffering from a stroke until on or about May 15, 2003 when the videotape statement was recorded). Unfortunately, Louise Bowden died on June 23, 2003. Within a couple of months thereafter (i.e., on or about August 25, 2003), Plaintiff reneged on the gift that he and his deceased wife had bestowed upon Saundra about fourteen (14) months earlier by asking Saundra to give the Premises back to him.

Therefore, Louise's videotape statement is highly probative on the issues of:

(1) Ms. Bowden's intent to transfer the property at 494 McDonough to the Defendant, (2) Ms. Bowden's mental capacity to effect such transfer, and (3) the relationship between Ms. Bowden and the Defendant.

Videotaped statements are considered documents. See *Zegarelli v. Hughes*, 3 N.Y. 3d 64 (2004). Defendant has identified a non-interested witness, namely videographer, Victor McDade, who will testify both as a fact witness and an expert to establish that the videotape of Louise Collier-Bowden truly and accurately represents what was before the camera when the recording was made. *Id.* As such, Defendant is able to adequately authenticate the videotape, and it should be admitted into evidence. See Id.

Furthermore, CPLR Section 4519 only bars testimony. A document that is signed by the decedent is admissible if it can be authenticated by testimony of a non-interested witness. *Acevedo v. Audubon Management, Inc.*, 280 A.D.2d 91, 721 N.Y.S.2d 332 (1st Dept 2001).

Plaintiff is mistaken in his interpretation of CPLR 4519 to the effect that said statute prohibits the statement of the decedent herself from being admitted into evidence against her husband. In her video statement, Louise averred that she voluntarily transferred her interest in the Premises to the Defendant because she loved her daughter and wanted her to live her life in dignity. Therefore, the videotape is highly probative of the following issues: (1) Ms. Bowden's intent to transfer the property at 494 McDonough Street to the Defendant permanently, (2) Ms. Bowden's mental capacity to effect such a transfer, and (3) the relationship between Ms. Bowden and the Defendant.

Plaintiff is also mistaken in his assertion that the videotape of Louise's statement was altered. Plaintiff never asked Saundra Collier what she meant when she said at the taking of her deposition that the videotape had been "edited." Had Plaintiff followed up in her questioning of Defendant about the "editing" of the videotape he might have discovered that what she meant was that the videographer, Victor McDade, copied the portions of the original Hi8 video cassette which depicted Saundra's mother onto a SVHS tape so that Saundra could more conveniently view the footage of her mother on her television set via a VHS player/ recorder. However, in copying the digital information that was on one format to another format, the videographer did not alter, doctor or affect the original Hi8 cassette in any way. Therefore, the original Hi8 cassette is in substantially the same condition as it was when the recording was first made. New York courts will permit the introduction into evidence of a videotape containing relevant evidence once the videotape has been properly authenticated.

Plaintiff's argument that the videotape should be excluded because it is “unauthenticated” is premature as the authenticity of a document or videotape such as the Hi8 videotape at issue herein can only be determined during the trial and not before. Defendant intends to properly authenticate Louise Collier-Bowden's videotape statement at the trial prior to proffering it into evidence.

Defendant respectfully requests that the Court not rule on the admissibility of said videotape until after Defendant has had an opportunity to lay a proper foundation for this crucial piece of evidence.

[Removed entire paragraph, as it repeated a paragraph above]

VIII. EVIDENCE SUBMITTED CONCERNING PLAINTIFF'S VERACITY WILL CORROBORATE DIRECT EVIDENCE, AND THEREFORE SHOULD NOT BE EXCLUDED AS COLLATERAL EVIDENCE

Evidence that will prove an issue in dispute is admissible, even if tends to prove a collateral fact. *People v. Thompson*, 212 N.Y. 249; 106 N.E. 78 (2nd Cir. Ct. 1914); *People v. Cade*, 73 N.Y.2d 904 (Ct. App. 1989).

Defendant intends to submit testimony and documents challenging the Plaintiff's credibility, including: (1) evidence on whether Plaintiff perjured himself by submitting an affidavit that directly contradicts an affidavit of Glory Jean which he had submitted about four (4) years earlier about a fact (i.e., whether she resided at the Premises as she asserted in her affidavit or never resided there as he swore in his affidavit), and (2) evidence that supports Defendant's theory of the case and her affirmative defense that Plaintiff and Glory Jean fabricated a tale about Saundra tricking her stepfather into deeding Saundra the Premises because he feared that he would lose his house to HPD if he did not do that.

This evidence will corroborate direct evidence in the case, and therefore should not be excluded as collateral.

IX. TESTIMONY CONCERNING THE A PENDING MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE ACTION FOR PREMISES SHOULD BE PRECLUDED AS REFERENCE TO IT MAY CONFUSE OR MISLEAD THE JURY

Generally, relevant evidence may be precluded if the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by the danger that it will confuse or mislead the jury. *People v. Caban*, 14 N.Y.3d 369 (Ct. App. 2010).

A mortgage foreclosure action is currently pending against the premises. This action is not relevant to the instant claims, especially in light of the fact that the foreclosure was caused by the Plaintiff's failure to repay a loan which was assumed prior to the transfer of the subject property to the Defendant. Testimony concerning the mortgage foreclosure action should be precluded as it is collateral, will likely prolong the trial, cause confusion, and create undue prejudice for either party.

X. TESTIMONY ABOUT AN OUTSTANDING LOAN THAT IS SECURED BY THE PREMISES AND WHICH PLAINTIFF WAS REPAYING IS PROBATIVE, BUT SHOULD NOT BE ADMITTED UNLESS PLAINTIFF DISCLOSES WHAT USE IF ANY HE MADE OF THE PROCEEDS OF THE LOAN.

In New York the general rule is that all relevant evidence is admissible unless its admission violates an exclusionary rule. *People v. Scarola*, 71 N.Y.2d 769 (Ct. App. 1988). Relevant evidence is evidence that has any tendency to prove the existence of any material fact. See id.

However, relevant evidence may be excluded if is misleading, or likely to confuse the jury. See *People v. Kenneth George*, 197 A.D.2d 588 (2nd Dept. 1993).

The Plaintiff assumed a loan, secured by the subject property prior to 2002 to allegedly make repairs in an effort to lease one or more of the apartments therein. To date, the Plaintiff has not disclosed how the money was used. However, he has alleged that the Defendant would be unjustly enriched because she took the home subject to the payment of the loan upon the transfer of the property, however, had not made payments towards the loan. His use of the non-payment of the loan as a means of alleging that a constructive trust exists may mislead the jury, if the manner in which the money was spent is not disclosed.

Consequently, the Plaintiff should be precluded from mentioning, testifying, or in any way providing evidence concerning the non-payment of the loan, unless he provides evidence as to how the proceeds were used.

XI. ALLEGATIONS THAT THE PLAINTIFF ENGAGED IN "DEED THEFT AND ELDER ABUSE" SHOULD BE EXCLUDED AS THEY ARE FALSE, AND ARE HIGHLY PREDJUDICIAL, AND ARE IN NO WAY PROBATIVE

In Plaintiff's "Memorandum of Law in Support of the Attorney Affirmation In Support of Order to Show Cause" (dated May 25, 2012), in court proceedings, and elsewhere, Plaintiff has alleged that the Defendant engaged in "deed theft and **elder abuse**". This statement is false, highly prejudicial, and in no way probative of any of the legal claims made by the Plaintiff. As such, these statements should be excluded. See *Vassura et. al. v. Taylor et. al. supra.*

XII. ANY ALLEGATION THAT DEFENDANT ENGAGED IN DRUG USE SHOULD BE PRECLUDED BY PLAINTIFF, HIS COUNSEL, AND HIS WITNESSES BECAUSE SUCH REMARKS ARE VERY PREJUDICIAL TO DEFENDANT.

Prejudicial remarks by counsel may affect a proceeding, such as to deprive a party of a fair trial. See *Ortiz et al. v Jaramillo et al., supra; Vassura et al. v. Taylor et al., supra.* In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant engaged in drug use, including crack, and/or was addicted to drugs. This allegation highly prejudicial.

Plaintiffs should be precluded from making any such remarks during his case in chief, which if allowed would create a substantial danger of undue prejudice to the Defendant.

XIII. PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE PRECLUDED FROM WEARING CLOTHING OR OTHER PARAPHERNALIA INDICATING THAT HE WAS A MEMBER OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY AS SUCH BEHAVIOR IS INTENDED TO BIAS THE JURY IN HIS FAVOR.

Upon information and belief, Plaintiff served in the United States Army as a private during World War II, and on several occasions, Plaintiff has worn a uniform and/or other military garb and paraphernalia in pre-trial proceedings herein. This behavior is improper, as it is intended to bias the jury in his favor. To remedy this problem, Defendant asks that the Plaintiff refrain from wearing any clothing or paraphernalia indicating that he has served in the United States Armed Forces, thereby preventing jury bias and undue prejudice against the Defendant.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing Defendant respectfully requests that this Court grant all of the above-mentioned relief to Defendant.

Dated: Brooklyn, New York

July 9, 2012

By: <<signature>>

Janelle Niles, Esq., Of Counsel to Ernst Perodin, Esq.

Attorney for Defendant

300 Linden Boulevard, Suite 5A

Brooklyn, New York 11226-3573

Tel: (718) 287-8113

End of Document