Questions
1. What are the protections available and enforced to protect defaulting or tardy debtors from their creditors in Guinea?
2. Please advise whether there was a coup in Guinea in December 2008? What is the situation with law and order in Guinea?
3. Please advise whether the constitution, parliament, the Supreme Court and justice have all been suspended since 23 December 2008.
4. Is there any confirmation that there is a lack of law and order and that “everyday you find dead men in the street”?
5. Is there any information about the level of resourcing by the government in Guinea for police, and that because the police don’t have petrol in their cars they won’t protect citizens?
6. Please provide information about the general level of employment in Guinea and for mining engineers specifically?

RESPONSE

1. What are the protections available and enforced to protect defaulting or tardy debtors from their creditors in Guinea?

A search of the sources consulted did not locate information on the protections available and enforced to protect defaulting or tardy debtors from their creditors in Guinea.
2. Please advise whether there was a coup in Guinea in December 2008? What is the situation with law and order in Guinea?

The US Department of State report on human rights practices in Guinea for 2008 indicates that:

Guinea’s constitution was suspended by a military junta that seized power in a coup on December 23, hours after the death of former President Lansana Conte. Before the coup, Guinea was a constitutional republic in which effective power was concentrated in a strong presidency. President Lansana Conte and his Party for Unity and Progress (PUP) ruled this country of approximately 9.9 million persons from 1984 to 2008, first as head of a military junta and, after 1994, as a civilian president. President Conte won reelection in 2003 in an election that the opposition boycotted and international observers criticized as neither free nor fair. Following a nationwide labor strike in January and February 2007 and a negotiated agreement, President Conte accepted the installation of a consensus government under Prime Minister Lansana Kouyate, whom he later dismissed and replaced with Ahmed Tidiane Souare on May 20. Following the December 23 coup, the Council for Democracy and Development (CNDD) assumed power and proclaimed Captain Moussa Dadis Camara as the country’s new head of state. The CNDD dismissed the National Assembly leaving the country without a legislative institution. The CNDD later named a civilian prime minister, Kabine Komara. Technically, the prime minister serves as head of government while the president serves as head of state, although the divisions of power are unclear. The civilian authorities generally did not maintain effective control of the security forces (US Department of State 2009, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2008 – Guinea, February, Introduction – Attachment 1).


3. Please advise whether the constitution, parliament, the Supreme Court and justice have all been suspended since 23 December 2008.

The US Department of State report on human rights practices in Guinea for 2008 indicates that following the coup on 23 December 2009, “Guinea’s constitution was suspended by a military junta that seized power”. The Council for Democracy and Development (CNDD) which “assumed power and proclaimed Captain Moussa Dadis Camara as the country’s new head of state… dismissed the National Assembly leaving the country without a legislative institution.” The report also indicates that “[t]he constitution provides for the president of the National Assembly to assume power in the event of the president’s death, with the requirement that a presidential election be organized within sixty days. On December 23, the military junta suspended this process when it seized power” (US Department of State 2009, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2008 – Guinea, February, Introduction & Section 3 – Attachment 1).
According to a Freedom House report on Guinea dated 16 July 2009, “[t]he December 2008 military coup suspended all civilian government institutions and the constitution.” The report also indicates that “[t]he CNDD suspended the judiciary following the 2008 coup.” Also, “[a]fter the 2008 coup, the CNDD banned all political and union activity; however, union and political party leaders continued to make public statements and met with the CNDD on several occasions. At least one human rights group and many nongovernmental organizations operated openly, both before and after the coup” (Freedom House 2009, ‘Freedom in the World 2009 – Guinea’, UNHCR Refworld website, 16 July http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,,,GIN,,4a6452b4c,0.html – Accessed 30 November 2009 – Attachment 5).


According to a US Department of State background note on Guinea dated August 2009, “[u]ntil the December 23, 2008 coup d’etat, Guinea was a constitutional republic in which effective power was concentrated in a strong presidency… The government currently is run by a military junta and is operating without a legislative body.” The CNDD had “suspended the constitution, as well as political and union activity… The constitution remains suspended, but political and union activity is currently allowed. Guinea has more than 60 registered political parties, of which six were represented in the National Assembly before it was suspended in December 2008” (US Department of State 2009, Background Note: Guinea, August http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2824.htm - Accessed 30 November 2009 – Attachment 7).

An article on Guinea dated 30 September 2009 by a senior West Africa researcher for Human Rights Watch refers to “bans on phone text-messaging and political activity” being imposed in Guinea, along with the the outlawing of “all political content on popular radio phone-in shows. While some bans were later overturned, the message to journalists and opponents was clear: Camara was ready to silence them if he wanted to” (Dufka, C. 2009, ‘Guinea’s Depressingly Familiar Strongman’, Human Rights Watch website, 30 September http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/09/30/guineas-depressingly-familiar-strongman - Accessed 26 November 2009 – Attachment 8).

In relation to the judiciary, a Human Rights Watch report on Guinea dated 27 April 2009 includes an interview with a judge in Conakry who was working in court handing down a judicial decision in a civil case in February 2009. The report refers to Human Rights Watch documenting “several incidents of intimidation of the judiciary, during which small groups of soldiers interrupted judicial proceedings or threatened lawyers in an apparent attempt to influence the outcome of the proceedings” (Human Rights Watch 2009, Guinea: Rein in Soldiers, 27 April http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,,,GIN,,49f969ac1e,0.html – Accessed 30 November 2009 – Attachment 9).
The Congressional Research Service report dated 30 September 2009 indicates that:

The CNDD has created several new agencies with undefined legal mandates, and has appeared to sideline the role of the judiciary in upholding the rule of law. The formation of a State Secretariat in Charge of Disputes sparked protests by human rights advocates and a strike by members of the Guinean bar association, which contended that “citizens and lawyers are regularly summoned to the military base … where they appear before the Secretariat or before the president in person as part of ostensibly judicial procedures.” Bar members termed these proceedings “pseudo-trials.” The Secretariat was abolished in June, in apparent response to such criticisms.

The report also indicates that:

Upon taking power, the CNDD immediately took steps to assert its authority, for instance by suspending civilian regional administrators and replacing them with military commanders. As the main public face of the CNDD, Dadis Camara has further sought to centralize power and neutralize potential opposition, both to the CNDD and to his dominant leadership within it. The CNDD-appointed civilian prime minister, Kabiné Komara, is viewed as having little decision-making power, and CNDD members directly control key government functions. Komara’s cabinet was named in January 2009 by presidential decree, with 10 of 29 cabinet posts held by military officers—most of them CNDD members, and many lacking experience in public affairs. The CNDD also created several new ministerial-level positions and appointed members of the military or close civilian associates to fill them. Several key ministries, including security, defense, and finance, and the governor of the Central Bank, have been attached to the presidency (Arieff, A. & Cook, N. 2009, ‘Guinea’s 2008 Military Coup and Relations with the United States’, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Federation of American Scientists website, 30 September, pp. 11, 12 & 20 http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40703.pdf - Accessed 30 November 2009 – Attachment 4).

4. Is there any confirmation that there is a lack of law and order and that “everyday you find dead men in the street”?

The Congressional Research Service report dated 30 September 2009 includes the following comments on human rights and the rule of law in Guinea:

Upon Conté’s death, one observer noted that “the army that General Conté has bequeathed his country knows little of the role and methods that it would need to employ in a democratic state respectful of its citizens’ most basic rights.” Since the coup, human rights advocates and members of the international community have expressed growing concern over violations of human rights and the rule of law, including arbitrary arrests and detentions. Military officers accused of plotting against the CNDD and officials accused of corruption or involvement in drug trafficking have been detained without charge. Security forces have been accused of looting private homes and businesses in Conakry, as well as other abuses of power. Human Rights Watch reported in April 2009 that “soldiers in groups numbering up to 20 have raided offices, shops, warehouses, medical clinics, and homes in broad daylight as well as at night… [and] have stolen cars, computers, generators, medicines, jewelry, cash, mobile phones, and large quantities of wholesale and retail merchandise, among other items.” Victims reportedly include both Guineans and foreigners. In September, defense lawyers for individuals detained in connection with cocaine trafficking contended their clients were suffering “degrading and humane” treatment in prison.
In separate incidents, soldiers raided the homes of a political party leader, Cellou Dalein Diallo (in January 2009) and a prominent trade union activist, Rabiatou Sera Diallo (in March). In the former case, the CNDD claimed that the raid was carried out by rogue soldiers; in the second, the CNDD contended that the raid was carried out during a routine anti-drug operation. In May, in an apparent response to criticism by Human Rights Watch and others, Dadis Camara promised security sector reform and ordered hundreds of soldiers to publicly commit to ending criminal behavior. However, it is unclear that these statements have had an impact on military behavior. In August 2009, Human Rights Watch reported that opposition politicians and a human rights activist who had criticized Dadis Camara had been the target of threats and intimidation.

The report also refers to security forces firing on protestors in Conakry on 28 September 2009. It is stated in the report that:

On September 28, 2009, security forces opened fire with live ammunition on a crowd of some 50,000 civilian protesters who had gathered in and around an outdoor stadium near the center of Conakry. The demonstration was organized by opposition political parties to protest statements by Captain Moussa Dadis Camara—the head of the military junta that took power in December 2008, the National Council for Democracy and Development (CNDD)—indicating he might run for president in national elections scheduled for 2010. Several major political leaders were in the stadium and planned to address the crowd. Demonstrators reportedly chanted, “We want true democracy” and held signs reading “Down with the Army in Power.” CNDD authorities had earlier attempted to ban the protest from taking place…

While state authorities reported 57 mortalities as a result of the confrontations, the Guinean Organization for Human Rights (OGDH) reported that at least 157 people were killed, many by bullets, while over 1,000 were wounded. The OGDH toll is based on a survey of hospitals, and many believe the death toll to be significantly higher. Several reports contended that CNDD commanders had ordered bodies to be taken to military camps rather than the morgue. Witnesses reported that soldiers—many wearing red berets and thought to be members of the Presidential Guard—directly fired on the stadium crowd, stabbed those fleeing with knives and bayonets, and molested and raped women openly in public. Military and police officers also reportedly carried out lootings and rapes in residential areas of Conakry during the melee. There also were reports that women were detained in police stations and military camps. Several local journalists were reportedly assaulted and had their equipment smashed by soldiers. Protesters set fire to a police station in apparent response to the crackdown.

By September 29, protesters had largely dispersed, and troops were said to be patrolling Conakry’s main roads. However, looting by soldiers continued and sporadic confrontations were reported in several opposition strongholds in Conakry. Witnesses said at least three civilians were killed in such confrontations.

…At least six opposition leaders—Cellou Dalein Diallo and his deputy Amadou Bah Oury, François Lonsény Fall, Sidya Touré, Jean-Marie Doré, and Mouctar Diallo—were reportedly injured, and at least three were beaten by soldiers. Diallo, Touré, and Fall were reportedly then arrested and taken to the Alpha Yaya Diallo military camp, where the CNDD headquarters is based. They were eventually taken to a hospital, where they were temporarily barred from communicating with the media. The leaders’ homes were reportedly looted by soldiers in their absence, and at least one was sprayed with machine gun fire (Arieff, A. & Cook, N. 2009, ‘Guinea’s 2008 Military Coup and Relations with the United States’, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Federation of American Scientists website, 30 September, pp. 1-2 & 19-20 http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40703.pdf - Accessed 30 November 2009 – Attachment 4).

A Human Rights Watch report dated 27 October 2009 indicates that:

An in-depth investigation into the September 28, 2009 killings and rapes at a peaceful rally in Conakry, Guinea, has uncovered new evidence that the massacre and widespread sexual violence were organized and were committed largely by the elite Presidential Guard, commonly known as the “red berets,” Human Rights Watch said today. Following a 10-day research mission in Guinea, Human Rights Watch also found that the armed forces attempted to hide evidence of the crimes by seizing bodies from the stadium and the city’s morgues and burying them in mass graves (Human Rights Watch 2009, Guinea: September 28 Massacre Was Premeditated, 27 October, p. 1 [http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/10/27/guinea-september-28-massacre-was-premeditated - Accessed 25 November 2009 – Attachment 11).


The US Department of State report on human rights practices in Guinea for 2008 indicates that “[s]erious human rights abuses occurred during the year” and “[p]erpetrators of killings and abuse acted with impunity.” It is stated in the report that:

Serious human rights abuses occurred during the year. Security forces tortured and abused detainees to extract confessions, and killed, beat, and abused civilians. Prison conditions were inhumane and life threatening. Perpetrators of killings and abuse acted with impunity. There were arbitrary arrests, prolonged pretrial detention, and incommunicado detention. The judiciary was subject to corruption and outside influence. The government infringed on citizens’ privacy rights and restricted freedoms of speech, press, assembly, association, and freedom of movement although these restrictions were less evident than in previous years. Violence and societal discrimination against women, prostitution of young girls, and female genital mutilation (FGM) were problems. Trafficking in persons, ethnic discrimination, forced labor, including by children occurred.

The report continues:

The government or its agents did not commit any politically motivated killings; however, security forces killed a number of citizens. The government did not investigate any of these cases and took no legal or disciplinary action against security force members responsible for the killings.

...both civilian and military forces beat and otherwise abused civilians. There also were reports that security forces tortured and beat citizens to extract confessions and employed other forms of brutality. NGOs reported ongoing torture in Conakry’s main prison and police detention facilities. The government did not investigate any of these cases and took no legal or disciplinary action against security force members responsible for the abuses.
The constitution and law prohibit arbitrary arrest and detention; however, security forces did not observe these prohibitions.

The police force was inadequately staffed and lacked training. In addition, a number of police officers were part of a “volunteer” corps that did not receive a salary. Administrative controls over the police were ineffective, and security forces rarely followed the penal code. Corruption was widespread, and security forces generally were not held accountable for abuses of power or criminal activities. Many citizens viewed the security force as corrupt, ineffective, and dangerous. Police ignored legal procedures and extorted money from citizens at roadblocks. The government did not take any action to train or reform security forces, although several NGOs conducted training programs.

Judicial inefficiency, corruption, and lack of political will contributed to high pretrial detention rates. Many detainees have remained in prison for more than 10 years without trial.

The constitution and law provide for an independent judiciary, but judicial officials often deferred to executive authorities. The judicial system was endemically corrupt, and magistrates were civil servants with no assurance of tenure. Authorities routinely accepted bribes in exchange for specific outcomes. Budget shortfalls, a shortage of qualified lawyers and magistrates, and an outdated and restrictive penal code continued to limit the judiciary’s effectiveness.

The constitution and law provide for the inviolability of the home and requires judicial search warrants; however, police and paramilitary police often ignored legal procedures in the pursuit of criminals or when it served personal interests.

Police and security forces continued to detain persons at military roadblocks to extort money. There were fewer such reports than in previous years, but the practice escalated after the December 23 coup.

The law provides criminal penalties for official corruption; however, the government did not implement the law effectively, and officials frequently engaged in corrupt practices with impunity (US Department of State 2009, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2008 – Guinea*, February, Introduction & Sections 1(a), (c), (d), (e) & (f), 2(d) & 3 – Attachment 1).

5. Is there any information about the level of resourcing by the government in Guinea for police, and that the police won’t protect citizens because they don’t have petrol in their cars?

A search of the sources consulted found limited information on the level of resources provided to the police by the government in Guinea.

An Amnesty International press release dated 8 October 2009 refers to new information emerging “about international supplies of South African and French weapons and equipment” being “used by Guinean police and security forces during the past week.” The report refers to “[p]ress photos of Guinean police officers taken in Conakry on 1 October” showing them carrying what appear to be French made grenade launchers. “Guinean security forces were also photographed on 1 October patrolling Conakry in a Mamba armoured personnel carrier (APC). Ten Mamba APCs were sold to Guinea in 2003 by a South Africa-based subsidiary of a UK company”. Also, France had “exported 500 unspecified anti-riot grenades to the Guinean Ministry of Interior during 2006, and in 2008 issued a further pre-export authorisation [agrément préalable] for the sale to the Guinean Ministry of Interior of stun

According to the US Department of State country specific information on Guinea dated 16 September 2009, “[d]espite the police’s good intentions, they have been unable to prevent the rapid escalation of crime” in Guinea. “Police and military officials have also been known to make direct and indirect requests for bribes.” Guinea does not have the “emergency assistance… that is similar to the ‘911’ system in the United States.” The document also indicates that “[m]ost border crossings are controlled jointly by Guinean armed forces, gendarmes, police, and immigration officials. A long land frontier and the military’s lack of physical and monetary resources, however, mean that borders are lightly patrolled” (US Department of State 2009, *Guinea: Country Specific Information*, 16 September [http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1132.html?css=print](http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/cis_1132.html?css=print) – Accessed 30 November 2009 – Attachment 13).

As previously mentioned, the US Department of State report on human rights practices in Guinea for 2008 indicates that “[t]he police force was inadequately staffed and lacked training.” It is stated in the report that:

> The police force was inadequately staffed and lacked training. In addition, a number of police officers were part of a “volunteer” corps that did not receive a salary. Administrative controls over the police were ineffective, and security forces rarely followed the penal code. Corruption was widespread, and security forces generally were not held accountable for abuses of power or criminal activities. Many citizens viewed the security force as corrupt, ineffective, and dangerous. Police ignored legal procedures and extorted money from citizens at roadblocks. The government did not take any action to train or reform security forces, although several NGOs conducted training programs (US Department of State 2009, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2008 – Guinea*, February, Section 1(d) – Attachment 1).


6. Please provide information about the general level of employment in Guinea and for mining engineers specifically?

**Employment**

A report dated April 2009 on the USAID website indicates that “the Guinean government does not publish any data on employment and labor costs; as a result, data are sparse.” It is stated in the report that:
The labor force participation rate in Guinea, 88.4 percent in 2006, is not only notably higher than the expected value for a country with Guinea’s characteristics of 76.8 percent, Ghana’s 77.4 percent, and Senegal’s 73.5 percent, it is one of the highest in the world (see Figure 4-4). Moreover, the 2007 PRSP estimated that on average 1.36 people rely on every economically active adult among the nonpoor and that 1.04 individuals rely on every economically active adult among the poor. These figures suggest an acute need for all able adults in Guinea to work to support their families.

…Guinea’s labor force is growing at an estimated rate of 2.1 percent per year, resulting in the need to create jobs or income opportunities for roughly 91,000 workforce entrants per year. As noted in the second PRSP, the labor market is struggling under demographic pressure and with a severe mismatch between training provided in educational institutions and the needs of the Guinean economy. These problems have contributed to high levels of underemployment and unemployment among Guinea’s youth and exacerbate social and political tensions. Donor interventions to improve workforce development, expand agricultural productivity to reduce the economic burden on economically active adults, and provide a better environment for fostering private sector job creation would help Guinea maintain stability and mitigate a major source of social unrest (Nelson, E., Greenbaum, A., Hendry, K. & Muzart, T. 2009, ‘Guinea Economic Recovery Assessment’, USAID website, April, pp. 32-33 http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADP001.pdf - Accessed 30 November 2009 – Attachment 15).


Mining Engineers

A search of the sources consulted found little information on the employment levels of mining engineers in Guinea.

A report on the mineral industry in Guinea in the ‘2007 Minerals Yearbook’ refers to Guinea being “among the world’s leading producers of bauxite.” The report continues:

The bauxite and alumina sector generated more than 60% of the country’s exports and at least 20% of its tax revenues (International Monetary Fund, 2008, p. 4). Other mineral commodities produced in the country included cement, diamond, gold, and salt. Undeveloped mineral resources included graphite, iron ore, limestone, manganese, nickel, and uranium.


Attachment 17), indicates that GAC was to operate a bauxite mine and alumina refinery in Guinea, and that “[a]lthough full operations is not expected to occur for several years, recruitment and training to prepare the workforce for operations will commence in the short term (within three years).” Skills and expertise required for the operations of the bauxite mine and alumina refinery were “likely to include” mining and engineering. “The operations workforce will be comprised of local and non-local personnel. Over time, the organisational goal is to transition to a predominantly locally operated refinery” (‘People and Employment: Career Opportunities’ (undated), Guinea Alumina Corporation website http://www.guineaalumina.com/index.php?id=20 – Accessed 30 November 2009 – Attachment 18).

A section on group projects in the Rio Tinto annual report for 2008 refers to “[t]he Simandou project in eastern Guinea, west Africa,” which “lies within one of the best undeveloped major iron ore provinces in the world. During the year RTIO conducted advanced studies into establishing an iron ore mine”. The project had “employed an average workforce of 1,800 staff and contractors across the year, 90 per cent of them Guinean, operating from offices in Conakry and Kerouane, and construction camps at Canga East and Oueleba in the mining concession.” The annual report also indicates that:

In August, Rio Tinto received correspondence from the Guinean Government purporting to rescind the Concession, the legality of which Rio Tinto questioned. In December it received further correspondence referring to a purported compulsory relinquishment of the northern half of the Concession whilst confirming Rio Tinto’s entitlement to the southern half of the Concession. A number of political developments in Guinea since then have occurred and RTIO has engaged in top level discussions with various stakeholders in an effort to clarify the status of the project (Rio Tinto 2009, ‘Rio Tinto Annual Report 2008’, Rio Tinto website, 9 April http://www.riotinto.com/annualreport2008/performance/iron_ore/group_projects/ - Accessed 30 November 2009 – Attachment 19).

The Congressional Research Service report dated 30 September 2009 indicates that:

In August 2009, the multinational mining company Rio Tinto announced it would pull its equipment from an iron ore project in Simandou earlier valued at $6 billion, reportedly after the CNDD indicated it would uphold a decision made under Conté to unilaterally award half of Rio Tinto’s concession to another company, BSG Resources Guinea.

The report also indicates that:

Dadis Camara has appeared at times to take unpredictable actions related to mining oversight, such as publicly threatening to close or take over various mining projects. He has also forced several mining projects to close down for days or weeks at a time…

These actions have reportedly sparked fears among international investors concerned for the security of their assets. Analysts contend that a global fall in primary commodity prices and a decrease in funding available for foreign direct investment have weakened the junta’s bargaining position, causing some firms to consider withdrawing entirely from Guinea. Recent reports suggest the CNDD may attempt to ease investor fears, though the junta reportedly “has minimal experience or technical capacity to review contracts with some of the world’s largest mining firms” (Arieff, A. & Cook, N. 2009, ‘Guinea’s 2008 Military Coup and Relations with the United States’, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Federation of American Scientists website, 30 September, pp. 15-16 http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40703.pdf - Accessed 30 November 2009 – Attachment 4).
List of Sources Consulted

Internet Sources:

Government Information & Reports
Immigration & Refugee Board of Canada http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/
UK Home Office http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/
US Department of State http://www.state.gov/

United Nations (UN)
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Refworld http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain

Non-Government Organisations
Human Rights Watch http://www.hrw.org/
Amnesty International http://www.amnesty.org

International News & Politics
BBC News http://news.bbc.co.uk

Topic Specific Links
Rio Tinto http://www.riotinto.com/
Guinea Alumina Corporation http://www.guineaalumina.com/index.php?id=1

Region Specific Links

Search Engines
Copernic http://www.copernic.com/

Databases:
FACTIVA (news database)
BACIS (DIAC Country Information database)
REFINFO (IRBDC (Canada) Country Information database)
ISYS (RRT Research & Information database, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, US Department of State Reports)
MRT-RRT Library Catalogue

List of Attachments


