



1. Please provide recent information on Jaghouri district in general, but also with reference to ethnic make-up, Taliban presence, political governance and economic circumstances.

Estimates for the population of Jaghouri district range from 150,000 to 250,000. The district is said to be 100% Hazara with some Pashtun enclaves in the border areas. The Taliban reportedly do not control Jaghouri district. Sources indicate that the Taliban does not have significant operations within Jaghouri but it principally focuses on the main road from Ghazni city through Qarabagh to Jaghouri. According to NGO sources, Jaghouri district is said to be controlled by the Afghanistan government; however, it has little presence in the district. The district is reportedly effectively controlled by the Nasr and Khalili factions of Hizb-i Wahdat. Agriculture is the main income source in Jaghouri district. According to a Finnish Immigration Service (FIS) report, money from abroad is vital for survival and approximately a quarter of the population lives abroad and travels regularly – mainly for work in Iran.

Jaghouri district

The population of Jaghouri district has been estimated at approximately 150,000¹ by an Afghanistan government source, and by a “returnee development worker” cited by the FIS² at some 250,000 inhabitants. Ethnically, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) sources have stated that the district is 100% Hazara, but one DFAT source adds that one Jaghouri village is populated mainly by Pashtuns.³ The FIS report, dated 10 December 2009, also states that there are “Pashtun enclaves of villages in the border areas.”⁴ Similarly, the Cooperation for Peace and Unity (CPAU) report, dated April 2009, states that towards the outskirts of Jaghouri there

¹ ‘Provincial Development Plan: Ghazni Provincial Profile’ circa 2007, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development website, p.1
<http://www.mrrd.gov.af/nabdp/Provincial%20Profiles/Ghazni%20PDP%20Provincial%20profile.pdf> – Accessed 21 April 2010 – Attachment 6.

² Finnish Immigration Service 2009, *The Current Situation in the Jaghori District of Ghazni*, 10 December, p.1 – Attachment 7.

³ DIAC Country Information Service 2009, *Country Information Report No. 09/14 – CIS Request No. AFG 9509; Situation for Hazaras in Ghazni, Uruzgan and Dai Kundi Provinces*, (sourced from DFAT advise of 2 February 2009), 3 February – Attachment 8.

⁴ Finnish Immigration Service 2009, *The Current Situation in the Jaghori District of Ghazni*, 10 December, p.1 – Attachment 7.

are enclaves of villages, called *mahalla* – “suburbs or areas of a village occupied by a distinct ethnic group” – including Pashtuns.⁵

The FIS report states that Jaghouri “is a somewhat secure area”, where the Taliban is not able to effectively act but shows an interest in disrupting the district.⁶

FIS reports that the main problem for Jaghouri “is getting in and out of it”⁷ and the Taliban has focussed on the Qarabagh to Jaghouri road.⁸ Sources cited by DFAT in February 2009 also refer to the main road from Jaghouri to Ghazni city through Qarabagh as appearing to be the insurgents’ main focus.⁹

The CPAU states that, despite the “pervasive” influence of the Taliban in Ghazni province, the Taliban remains on the outskirts of Jaghouri¹⁰ and do not control the district¹¹. The CPAU report concludes, however, that the Taliban has an influence in Jaghouri with its attacks on education in other areas of Ghazni and attacks on the Kabul-Kandahar highway preventing aid and development projects reaching the district.¹²

In respect of political governance, an Afghanistan NGO Safety Office (ANSO) report in September 2009 stated that Jaghouri is one of the districts in Ghazni province “said to be under the full control of the GoA [Government of Afghanistan]”.¹³ Another source the CPAU also reported, however, that there is “an extremely low government presence” in the district.¹⁴

The main political parties in Jaghouri identified by the CPAU report are the Hizb-i Wahdat/Khalili/Nasr faction, Hizb-i Wahdat Islami, Hizb-i Wahdat/Akbari, Sepah-i Pasdaran (Mohammad Akbari), Harakat-i Islami, Hizb-i Islami.¹⁵ The Hizb-i Wahdat is a coalition of Hazara parties founded in 1990.¹⁶ Of these parties the Nasr

⁵ Cooperation for Peace and Unity (CPAU) 2009, *Conflict analysis: Jaghori and Malistan districts, Ghazni province*, April, p.10 – Attachment 9.

⁶ Finnish Immigration Service 2009, *The Current Situation in the Jaghori District of Ghazni*, 10 December, p.3 – Attachment 7.

⁷ Finnish Immigration Service 2009, *The Current Situation in the Jaghori District of Ghazni*, 10 December, p.3 – Attachment 7.

⁸ Finnish Immigration Service 2009, *The Current Situation in the Jaghori District of Ghazni*, 10 December, p.3 – Attachment 7; Cooperation for Peace and Unity (CPAU) 2009, *Conflict analysis: Jaghori and Malistan districts, Ghazni province*, April, p.23 – Attachment 9.

⁹ DIAC Country Information Service 2009, *Country Information Report No. 09/14 – CIS Request No. AFG 9509; Situation for Hazaras in Ghazni, Uruzgan and Dai Kundi Provinces*, (sourced from DFAT advise of 2 February 2009), 3 February, para.R.2 – Attachment 8.

¹⁰ Cooperation for Peace and Unity (CPAU) 2009, *Conflict analysis: Jaghori and Malistan districts, Ghazni province*, April, p.23 – Attachment 9.

¹¹ Cooperation for Peace and Unity (CPAU) 2009, *Conflict analysis: Jaghori and Malistan districts, Ghazni province*, April, pp.22,25 – Attachment 9.

¹² Cooperation for Peace and Unity (CPAU) 2009, *Conflict analysis: Jaghori and Malistan districts, Ghazni province*, April, p.25 – Attachment 9.

¹³ Afghanistan NGO Safety Office 2009, ‘Ghazni’, *The ANSO Report*, 16-30 September, p.12 [http://www.afgnsso.org/2008%20week/THE%20ANSO%20REPORT%20\(16-30%20September%202009\).pdf](http://www.afgnsso.org/2008%20week/THE%20ANSO%20REPORT%20(16-30%20September%202009).pdf) – Accessed 19 April 2010 – Attachment 10.

¹⁴ Cooperation for Peace and Unity (CPAU) 2009, *Conflict analysis: Jaghori and Malistan districts, Ghazni province*, April, p.11 – Attachment 9.

¹⁵ Cooperation for Peace and Unity (CPAU) 2009, *Conflict analysis: Jaghori and Malistan districts, Ghazni province*, April, p.6 – Attachment 9.

¹⁶ Adamec, Ludwig W. 2003, *Historical Dictionary of Afghanistan*, The Scarecrow Press Inc., Lanham, pp.169-170 – Attachment 11.

(Sazmani Nasr) and Khalili factions of the Wahdat party reportedly effectively control Jaghouri.¹⁷

Khodadad Irfani is governor of Jaghouri.¹⁸ Irfani is said to have been an important military commander and is aligned to President Hamid Karzai and the Vice-president Khalili.¹⁹ The police chief, Ishaq Ali, is said to belong to the Khalili faction.²⁰ According to the Finnish report the district shura is described as passive and the Justice Department corrupt.²¹

Economically, agriculture is the main income source in Jaghouri district.²² Agricultural production includes wheat, potatoes, onions and walnuts. Villages are also engaged in handicrafts.²³ According to FIS approximately a quarter of the population lives abroad and travels regularly – mainly for work in Iran. It also stated that money from abroad was a vital for survival in Jaghouri district.²⁴

2. Please provide information on targeting of transport drivers in Afghanistan.

According to the UNHCR eligibility guidelines, dated July 2009, groups that are at risk are those Afghans who work with, or are associated with, international organisations, security forces or humanitarian workers and civil society activists in regions of insurgent activity or are infiltrated by Taliban and/or Hezb-e-Islami forces. It considered that civilian workers, including truck drivers, to be the main targets of such attacks. An earlier 2007 Finnish fact-finding mission report, however, also described truck drivers as being targets of opportunity. In addition, drivers have complained that insurgents, as well as the security forces, operate illegal checkpoints to extort money and goods.

In July 2009 the UNHCR stated that civilian workers, such as truck drivers, are targeted as a group of Afghans who work, or are associated with, international organisations, security forces or humanitarian workers and civil society activists in

¹⁷ Finnish Immigration Service 2009, *The Current Situation in the Jaghori District of Ghazni*, 10 December, p.2 – Attachment 7; Cooperation for Peace and Unity (CPAU) 2009, *Conflict analysis: Jaghori and Malistan districts, Ghazni province*, April, p.11 – Attachment 9.

¹⁸ Finnish Immigration Service 2009, *The Current Situation in the Jaghori District of Ghazni*, 10 December, p.2 – Attachment 7; Cooperation for Peace and Unity (CPAU) 2009, *Conflict analysis: Jaghori and Malistan districts, Ghazni province*, April, p.12 – Attachment 9.

¹⁹ Finnish Immigration Service 2009, *The Current Situation in the Jaghori District of Ghazni*, 10 December, p.2 – Attachment 7.

²⁰ Finnish Immigration Service 2009, *The Current Situation in the Jaghori District of Ghazni*, 10 December, p.2 – Attachment 7; Cooperation for Peace and Unity (CPAU) 2009, *Conflict analysis: Jaghori and Malistan districts, Ghazni province*, April, p.12 – Attachment 9.

²¹ Finnish Immigration Service 2009, *The Current Situation in the Jaghori District of Ghazni*, 10 December, p.2 – Attachment 7.

²² Finnish Immigration Service 2009, *The Current Situation in the Jaghori District of Ghazni*, 10 December, p.1 – Attachment 7.

²³ 'Provincial Development Plan: Ghazni Provincial Profile' circa 2007, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development website, p.6

<http://www.mrrd.gov.af/nabdp/Provincial%20Profiles/Ghazni%20PDP%20Provincial%20profile.pdf> – Accessed 21 April 2010 – Attachment 6; Cooperation for Peace and Unity (CPAU) 2009, *Conflict analysis: Jaghori and Malistan districts, Ghazni province*, April, pp.5-6 – Attachment 9.

²⁴ Finnish Immigration Service 2009, *The Current Situation in the Jaghori District of Ghazni*, 10 December, p.1 – Attachment 7.

regions of insurgent activity or are infiltrated by Taliban and/or Hezb-e-Islami forces.²⁵ In particular the UNHCR wrote [bold type inserted by researcher]:

Other groups at risk are Afghans working or associated with international organizations or security forces, humanitarian workers and civil society activists in areas where there are insurgent activities or infiltration by Taleban and/or Hezb-e-Islami forces. The increased targeting of such persons is based on their perceived association with the central Government. A number of incidents have been reported between 2006 and 2008 in Kandahar, Helmand and Kunar against Afghans accused of working for international military forces. **The main targets of such attacks were civilian workers, such as truck drivers or construction workers.** Since 2007, kidnappings, including of individuals linked, or perceived to be linked, to the Government or the international community, particularly in the south, south-east, east and west regions, have also been on the rise both for political and criminal objectives.²⁶

An earlier 2007 Finnish fact-finding mission report, however, describes truck drivers as targets of opportunity. It states [bold type inserted by researcher]:

Several interviewed Human rights activists stated that they fear local and regional Commanders. The majority had faced some sort of intimidation or had received direct threats. Several stated that additionally to threats by commanders also some local people had threatened them due to their work. Threats from governmental officials were according to these interviews not common. It was stated by one person interviewed, that journalists and human rights activists face similar problems. **However, as a difference to for example truck drivers, who are targeted by the Taliban, journalists and human rights activists are targeted intentionally, while truck drivers are more a “target of opportunity”.**²⁷

Recent media articles refer to a range of attacks by militants on truck drivers:

- In March 2010 suspected militants attacked and torched two trucks carrying stones in Uruzgan province. The drivers were unharmed.²⁸
- Two truck drivers were kidnapped and killed by insurgents in southern Kandahar province. The trucks, part of a convoy of a convoy carrying supplies for NATO forces, had been left behind due to mechanical problems.²⁹
- The Taliban seized three trucks carrying supplies for international and Afghan National Army (ANA) forces in Kapisa province. The Taliban commander reportedly stated that “ the drivers would be punished and the trucks torched after completion of an investigation into the matter”.³⁰

²⁵ UNHCR 2009, *UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Afghanistan*, July, p.24 – Attachment 12.

²⁶ UNHCR 2009, *UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Afghanistan*, July, p.24 – Attachment 12.

²⁷ Finland Directorate of Immigration 2007, *Report from a fact-finding mission to Afghanistan 5–19 September 2006*, European Country of Origin Information Network database, May, p.16 http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/432_1196090607_finland-directorate-of-immigration-finnish-fact-finding-mission-report-from-a-fact-finding-mission-to-afghanistan-5-19-september-2006-01-05.pdf – Accessed 20 November 2008 – Attachment 13.

²⁸ ‘Two civilian trucks torched in Uruzgan’ 2010, *Pajhwok Afghan News*, 28 March – Attachment 14.

²⁹ ‘Bodies of two NATO truck drivers found’ 2010, *Pajhwok Afghan News*, 17 March – Attachment 15.

³⁰ ‘French soldier injured; trucks seized’ 2010, *Pajhwok Afghan News*, 10 February – Attachment 16.

- In Farah province three militants were killed attempting to kidnap a truck driver and seize his truck carrying asphalt for road construction.³¹

In addition drivers have complained that insurgents, as well as the security forces, operate illegal checkpoints to extort money and goods.³² A news article reported that in one instance police in Kabul beat a truck driver to death after he had refused to pay them money.³³

3. Please provide information on state protection.

The UNHCR stated in its July 2009 eligibility guidelines that, on the whole, state protection is not available to those who fear harm from non-state actors in Afghanistan. Reports indicate that there is corruption in both the police and the judiciary. Anti-government and pro-government forces reportedly also take part in operations putting the lives of civilians at risk.

The UNHCR stated:

To the extent that the harm feared is from non-State actors, State protection is on the whole not available in Afghanistan. Moreover, State agents are themselves accused of carrying out violence and other forms of human rights transgressions. Consequently, an Afghan asylum-seeker should not be expected to seek the protection of the authorities, and failure to do so should not be the sole reason for doubting credibility or rejecting the claim.³⁴

According to a March 2010 United Nations (UN) report corruption is often cited as “a primary impediment to the entrenchment of effective institutions.”³⁵

In respect of the police and security apparatus, the US State Department has reported that impunity was “pervasive”. According to the US State Department police extorted bribes at checkpoints and from civilians who seek release from prison or to avoid arrest.³⁶ The UN also reports that the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) receives complaints that police are involved in extortion, kidnapping and smuggling.³⁷ It also noted, however, that a United

³¹ ‘Five Afghans dead in roadside bombing: police’ 2010, *Agence France Presse*, 1 January – Attachment 17.

³² US Department of State 2010, ‘Freedom of Movement, Internally Displaced Persons, Protection of Refugees, and Stateless Persons’ in *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2009 – Afghanistan*, 11 March – Attachment 18; ‘Afghan minister assures drivers, passengers’ security on highways’ 2010, *BBC Monitoring South Asia*, source: National Afghanistan TV, 12 January – Attachment 19.

³³ ‘Afghan driver beaten to death for refusing pay the police’ 2010, *BBC Monitoring South Asia*, source: Tolo TV, 9 January – Attachment 20.

³⁴ UNHCR 2009, *UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Afghanistan*, July, p.53 – Attachment 12.

³⁵ ‘Report of the Secretary-General: The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security’ 2010, *United Nations Security Council*, A/64/705-S/2010/127, 10 March, p.3/para.9 UNHCR website <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4bb44c5c2.pdf> – Accessed 20 April 2010 – Attachment 21.

³⁶ US Department of State 2010, ‘Role of the Police and Security Apparatus’ in *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2009 – Afghanistan*, 11 March – Attachment 18.

³⁷ ‘Report of the Secretary-General: The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security’ 2010, *United Nations Security Council*, A/64/705-S/2010/127, 10 March, p.8/para.29 UNHCR website <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4bb44c5c2.pdf> – Accessed 20 April 2010 – Attachment 21.

Nations Development Programme (UNDP) survey in 2009 found that 82% of respondents “believed that the police in their areas were doing a very good or fairly good job.”³⁸

The UNDP survey noted, however, that Afghans did not hold the police primarily responsible for problems associated with crime, but saw these more as a result of the judiciary and prosecution being unable to prosecute criminals and provide solutions:

Afghans also do not primarily hold the police responsible for problems involving crime. Indeed, two-thirds (68%) see the problem as being more a result of the judiciary and prosecution being unable to further prosecute criminals and implement just solutions. It is understandable then that 82% of respondents think that the local police are doing a ‘very good job’ or ‘fairly good job’ in terms of executing their duties if Afghans in general don’t see them as responsible for making decisions or enforcing settlements. These numbers vary between the regions, with the Central/Kabul and Northern region respondents believing police do a good job with a 90% response rate. Again, the southwestern region (65%) and south-central region (67%) express the least support for the local police forces. Once again, it should be noted that one of the disappointments among respondents was related to concerns that bribes or fees are required when interacting with the police...³⁹

The UNDP survey also reported that confidence in a local police force’s ability decreased as the severity of the crime increased. In respect of corruption and insurgency 59% and 57% of respondents respectively believed that their local police force was capable of handling these issues.⁴⁰

The UN report also stated on police recruitment practices:

...Recruitment practices within provincial and district police hierarchies have resulted in ethnic and tribal imbalances among recruits, exacerbating tensions with local communities...⁴¹

The respondents in the UNDP survey were divided on whether a policeman’s own tribe (*qawm*) affected his/her impartiality. Half the respondents believed the police

³⁸ ‘Report of the Secretary-General: The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security’ 2010, *United Nations Security Council*, A/64/705-S/2010/127, 10 March, p.8/para.29 UNHCR website <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4bb44c5c2.pdf> – Accessed 20 April 2010 – Attachment 21.

³⁹ United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 2009, *Police Perception Survey, 2009: The Afghan Perspective*, October, p.19, UNDP website <http://www.undp.org.af/Publications/KeyDocuments/PolicePerceptionSurvey09.pdf> – Accessed 28 April 2010 – Attachment 28.

⁴⁰ United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 2009, *Police Perception Survey, 2009: The Afghan Perspective*, October, p.16, UNDP website <http://www.undp.org.af/Publications/KeyDocuments/PolicePerceptionSurvey09.pdf> – Accessed 28 April 2010 – Attachment 28.

⁴¹ ‘Report of the Secretary-General: The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security’ 2010, *United Nations Security Council*, A/64/705-S/2010/127, 10 March, p.8/para.29 UNHCR website <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4bb44c5c2.pdf> – Accessed 20 April 2010 – Attachment 21.

officers would favour their own tribe, 45% said they were not partial and 5% were unsure.⁴²

With respect to the judiciary, the US Department of State reported that although Afghanistan law provides for an independent judiciary in practice it is understaffed, underfunded and “subject to political interference and pervasive corruption”.⁴³ It noted allegations from observers that “the high acquittal rate in courts reflected the lack of training of judges, poor investigations, lack of evidence, and possible bribes to legal officials.”⁴⁴ The UN has also stated that the formal justice system remains out of reach for many Afghans. Concerns about the corruption of judges, high costs and inefficiency lead many citizens to seek traditional methods to resolve disputes.⁴⁵

In addition, a January 2010 UN report stated that anti-government elements (AGEs) and pro-government forces (PGFs) “increasingly conducted operations that put the lives of civilians at risk.”⁴⁶ The UN reported that between January and November 2009 of 2,186 casualties recorded 23% were attributed to AGEs and 23% to the PGFs.⁴⁷ Of the deaths attributed to AGEs 66% resulted from suicide attacks and improvised explosive devices (IEDs).⁴⁸ PGFs were responsible for 23% of civilian deaths with air strikes accounting for 14% of the total number of civilians killed.⁴⁹

4. Please provide an assessment of the report: Dorronsoro, Gilles 2009, *The Taliban’s Winning Strategy in Afghanistan*, June, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington.

[The report was accessed on the Carnegie Endowment’s website and is attached⁵⁰].

⁴² United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 2009, *Police Perception Survey, 2009: The Afghan Perspective*, October, p.18, UNDP website <http://www.undp.org.af/Publications/KeyDocuments/PolicePerceptionSurvey09.pdf> – Accessed 28 April 2010 – Attachment 28.

⁴³ US Department of State 2010, ‘Denial of Fair Public Trial’ in *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2009 – Afghanistan*, 11 March – Attachment 18.

⁴⁴ US Department of State 2010, ‘Role of the Police and Security Apparatus’ in *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2009 – Afghanistan*, 11 March – Attachment 18.

⁴⁵ ‘Report of the Secretary-General: The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security’ 2010, *United Nations Security Council*, A/64/705-S/2010/127, 10 March, pp.3-4/para.10 UNHCR website <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4bb44c5c2.pdf> – Accessed 20 April 2010 – Attachment 21.

⁴⁶ Human Rights Council 2010, ‘Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan and on the achievements of technical assistance in the field of human rights’, *General Assembly*, A/HRC/13/62, 11 January, p.5/para.7, UNHCR website <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4bc2c8d62.pdf> – Accessed 20 April 2010 – Attachment 22.

⁴⁷ Human Rights Council 2010, ‘Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan and on the achievements of technical assistance in the field of human rights’, *General Assembly*, A/HRC/13/62, 11 January, p.5/para.8, UNHCR website <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4bc2c8d62.pdf> – Accessed 20 April 2010 – Attachment 22.

⁴⁸ Human Rights Council 2010, ‘Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan and on the achievements of technical assistance in the field of human rights’, *General Assembly*, A/HRC/13/62, 11 January, p.5/para.9, UNHCR website <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4bc2c8d62.pdf> – Accessed 20 April 2010 – Attachment 22.

⁴⁹ Human Rights Council 2010, ‘Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan and on the achievements of technical assistance in the field of human rights’, *General Assembly*, A/HRC/13/62, 11 January, p.6/para.14, UNHCR website <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4bc2c8d62.pdf> – Accessed 20 April 2010 – Attachment 22.

⁵⁰ Dorronsoro, Gilles 2009, *The Taliban’s Winning Strategy in Afghanistan*, June, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington

Country Advice does not generally disagree with the information and views expressed by Gilles Dorronsoro in *The Taliban's Winning Strategy in Afghanistan* dated June 2009. Particular attention is drawn at:

- pages 11-12 (how the Taliban builds support over social grievances and hostilities between Pashtuns and other ethnic groups);
- p.21 (sanctuary and roads to and from Pakistan being larger and safer for the Taliban);
- p.22 (the Taliban in Pakistan);
- p.28 (situation around Kabul); and
- p.29 (conclusions on the strategy against the Taliban) of the report.

Country Advice comments that more recent UN information, dated March 2010, states that the security situation in Afghanistan continued to deteriorate with 2009 being the most volatile year since 2001.⁵¹ In April 2010 DFAT also described the security situation in the country as “extremely dangerous”.⁵²

The Dorronsoro paper does not refer specifically to Jaghourai district, although it refers to Ghazni at pages 23, 24, 25 and 29. Dorronsoro does, however, state that the Taliban is “not able to make significant gains” in “Hazara-populated areas”.⁵³ This information relates to Jaghourai because, as mentioned in question 1, Jaghourai is a Hazara-populated district.

Dorronsoro writes on the Taliban and Hazara-populated areas as follows [bold type inserted by researcher]:

According to the level of strength of the insurgency, three zones can be defined. First, places where the insurgency is now dominant (southern and eastern provinces, a few districts in the North); **second, places where the insurgency due to ethnic/social structures will not be able to make significant gains (Hazara-populated areas, Panjshir)** and, third, places where the insurgency is growing, but is still developing (Kunduz, Baghlan, Ghor, Takhar, Faryab, Jawzjan, Samangan, and Badakhshan provinces).⁵⁴

And:

The Taliban are the dominant political force in numerous regions of Afghanistan, including Pashtun-majority provinces in the East and the South: Paktia, Paktika, Zabul,

http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/taliban_winning_strategy.pdf – Accessed 21 April 2010 – Attachment 23.

⁵¹ ‘Report of the Secretary-General: The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security’ 2010, *United Nations Security Council*, A/64/705-S/2010/127, 10 March, p.7/para.23 UNHCR website <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4bb44c5c2.pdf> – Accessed 20 April 2010 – Attachment 21.

⁵² Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2010, *Travel Advice: Afghanistan*, 20 April <http://www.smartraveller.gov.au/zw-cgi/view/Advice/Afghanistan> – Accessed 20 April 2010 – Attachment 24.

⁵³ Dorronsoro, Gilles 2009, *The Taliban's Winning Strategy in Afghanistan*, June, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, pp.21,24 http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/taliban_winning_strategy.pdf – Accessed 21 April 2010 – Attachment 23.

⁵⁴ Dorronsoro, Gilles 2009, *The Taliban's Winning Strategy in Afghanistan*, June, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, p.20 http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/taliban_winning_strategy.pdf – Accessed 21 April 2010 – Attachment 23.

Kandahar, Uruzgan, Ghazni, Wardak, Logar, Helmand, Farah, Kunar, and Laghman. **(In Ghazni, Uruzgan, and Wardak, the Hazara-populated areas exclude the Taliban).** The Taliban also dominate the Bala Murghrab and Gormach districts (Badghris) and most of the Kunar and Laghman provinces. The situation in Nangrahar is confusing, especially around Jalalabad, and requires separate analysis, but the insurgency is well entrenched, notably in the southern part of the province (Khogiani district) and in the northern part. Helmand is often misdiagnosed: this province is not the main base of the Taliban—even though the opposition is extremely strong there, the organization of the insurgency isn't classically Taliban. Overall, the core territory for the movement is Kandahar, Zabul, and from Ghazni to the south of Wardak. In this area, the Taliban have the support of a significant part of the population and its elites (mostly mullahs, but also landlords and tribal leaders).⁵⁵

In relation to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, information accessed on its website states that it was founded in 1910 in the USA. It describes itself as “a private, nonprofit organization dedicated to advancing cooperation between nations and promoting active international engagement by the United States”. It has offices in Washington, Moscow, Beijing, Beirut and Brussels.⁵⁶

The author of the report, Gilles Dorronsoro, is described on the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace website as being a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment and an expert on Afghanistan, Turkey and South Asia. He was previously a professor of political science at the Sorbonne, Paris and the Institute of Political Studies of Rennes.⁵⁷ Dorronsoro has extensively published in books, journals and newspapers on Afghanistan.⁵⁸

Attachments

1. Deleted.
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5. Deleted.
6. ‘Provincial Development Plan: Ghazni Provincial Profile’ circa 2007, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development website

⁵⁵ Dorronsoro, Gilles 2009, *The Taliban's Winning Strategy in Afghanistan*, June, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, p.24

http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/taliban_winning_strategy.pdf – Accessed 21 April 2010 – Attachment 23.

⁵⁶ ‘A New Vision: Pioneering the Global Think Tank’ (undated), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace website <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/about/> – Accessed 21 April 2010 – Attachment 25.

⁵⁷ ‘Gilles Dorronsoro’ (undated), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace website http://www.carnegieendowment.org/experts/index.cfm?fa=expert_view&expert_id=435&zoom_highlight=Dorronsoro – Accessed 21 April 2010 – Attachment 26.

⁵⁸ ‘Gilles Dorronsoro’ (undated), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace website http://www.carnegieendowment.org/experts/index.cfm?fa=expert_view&expert_id=435&zoom_highlight=Dorronsoro – Accessed 21 April 2010 – Attachment 26; ‘Publications by Author: Dorronsoro, Gilles (undated), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace website <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=viewAuthor&authorLetter=d> – Accessed 21 April 2010 – Attachment 27.

<http://www.mrrd.gov.af/nabdp/Provincial%20Profiles/Ghazni%20PDP%20Provincial%20profile.pdf> – Accessed 21 April 2010.

7. Finnish Immigration Service 2009, *The Current Situation in the Jaghori District of Ghazni*, 10 December. (CISNET Accession Number 18216)
8. DIAC Country Information Service 2009, *Country Information Report No. 09/14 – CIS Request No. AFG 9509; Situation for Hazaras in Ghazni, Uruzgan and Dai Kundi Provinces*, (sourced from DFAT advise of 2 February 2009), 3 February. (CISNET Afghanistan CX219955)
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