

**Refugee Review Tribunal
AUSTRALIA**

RRT RESEARCH RESPONSE

Research Response Number: AFG33041
Country: Afghanistan
Date: 29 February 2008

Keywords: Afghanistan – Westernised returnees – Asylum seekers – Secular outlooks

This response was prepared by the Research & Information Services Section of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the RRT within time constraints. This response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. This research response may not, under any circumstance, be cited in a decision or any other document. Anyone wishing to use this information may only cite the primary source material contained herein.

Question

1. Is there any current information on whether an Afghan national who has resided for any period in a western country would be subject to harm on return to Afghanistan now because they would be perceived as having been secularised?

RESPONSE

1. Is there any current information on whether an Afghan national who has resided for any period in a western country would be subject to harm on return to Afghanistan now because they would be perceived as having been secularised?

Previous research responses have considered similar questions and these are summarised as follows:

An RRT Research Response of March 2004 looks at the question of whether people of a secular outlook, or who have turned away from Islam, have faced harm in Afghanistan:

The sources consulted suggest that there are some people of secular outlook in Afghanistan, particularly in Kabul, who are expressing their opinions. However, there have been incidents where such people have faced harassment and threats.

In a July 2003 report, UNHCR includes among its profiles of people who “might be at particular risk of violence, harassment or discrimination”:

- Persons who “have campaigned for a secular state” (Para.85).

- Afghan women who have “adopted a Westernised behaviour or way of life which (i) would be perceived as transgressing social mores in Afghanistan and (ii) has become so fundamental a part of their identity that it would be persecutory for them to have to suppress it (Para.89).
- Those who have “opposed the Islamic denomination of the Transitional Authority of Afghanistan including journalists and women associations” (Para.90) (UNHCR 2003, *Update of the situation in Afghanistan and international protection considerations*, July – Attachment 1).

The latest USDOS report comments on treatment of those who have made public statements supporting a secular state:

Journalists were subjected to harassment, intimidation, and violence during the year. In June, police interrogated and arrested Saveed Mirhassan Mahdawi and Ali Payam Sistany, editor-in-chief and deputy editor of the weekly newspaper Aftaab, after the newspaper published an article that criticized senior leaders of the Northern Alliance, called for a secular government, and questioned the morals of Islamic leaders. Authorities banned the weekly Aftaab and copies of the publication were withdrawn from newsstands in Kabul after their arrest. On June 25, the two journalists were released; however, the charges of blasphemy were pending at year's end (US Department of State 2004, ‘Afghanistan’, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2003*, 25 February, Section 2a – Attachment 2).

USDOS also states:

Blasphemy and apostasy were punishable by death. In the spring, a journalist in Mazar-i Sharif was accused in a local newspaper affiliated with the Jamiat-i-Islami Party of insulting Islam in an article she had written about the formation of the country’s next constitution. The journalist, Mariya Sazawar, was accused of writing that Islamic rules were oppressive to women. The local religious scholars recommended that she be sentenced to death. In March, a local court acquitted her; allegations of blasphemy were not confirmed (US Department of State 2004, ‘Afghanistan’, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2003*, 25 February, Section 2c – Attachment 2).

The October 2002 fact-finding report to Afghanistan by the Danish Immigration Service, Danish Refugee Council and Norwegian Immigration Service contains material on reaction to a perceived secularisation of Afghan society:

A western diplomatic source also said that secular political groups are emerging. There is room for such groups today, especially in Kabul, where the presence of a large number of foreigners makes it difficult to suppress these groups. Spokesmen for these groups are speaking freely, and they have told of harassment. The harassment took the form of threats of arrests rather than serious violations (Danish Immigration Service. Danish Refugee Council. Norwegian Immigration Service 2002, *The political, security and human rights situation in Afghanistan: report on fact-finding mission to Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif, Afghanistan and Islamabad, Pakistan, 22 September to 5 October 2002*, Section 2.6, p.21 – Attachment 3).

The same report also states:

4.7 Religious freedom

4.7.1 Secularisation of the Afghan society

The EU's special representative found that it is the Islamic attitude in general which is dictating the guidelines for acceptable conduct in the Afghan society today, and that there is an intolerant attitude to secularisation.

The coordinator of UNAMA's Civil Affairs Branch believed that Muslims behaving in a secular manner are in latent danger of reprisals. Non-Islamic/secular conduct is not acceptable in Afghanistan today. Depending on the political development, non-Islamic conduct may cause repercussions in the future, first and foremost in Kabul. According to the source, there is no doubt that the intelligence service (Amniat) is keeping an eye on which restaurants are selling alcohol – of which there are a few in Kabul - and which shops are selling controversial videos. There is a chance that raids may take place in the future. The source did not know of any such cases, but believed that there was a latent possibility of this happening.

The senior human rights advisor for UNAMA believed that there is presently opposition in the government against secularisation of the Afghan society. According to the Bonn agreement, this is the aim, but the source said that it does not happen in practice.

UNHCR-Kabul found that compared to the Taliban period, there has been some secularisation. Currently, there is room for religious minorities such as Shias, Hindus and Sikhs. The UNHCR also pointed out that Afghanistan is an Islamic state, and a special department has been set up within the Ministry for Islamic Affairs for the promotion of virtue and combat of vices. (cf. also section 4.8). The source also mentioned the recent prohibition against showing singing and dancing (in Indian movies) on TV. In this connection, action has been taken to close a series of video shops.

According to CCA, no steps have been taken towards the secularisation of the Afghan society at this stage. It is a Muslim society, and Islamic groups are in power, but religious tolerance towards Shias, Ismaelis as well as Hindus and Sikhs is greater than in the past. Alcohol is still prohibited. There is also prohibition against videos showing dancing and a prohibition against female singers on TV and radio. According to the source, such videos are still being sold on the market despite the ban on showing them. Harassment may occur in this context, as the prohibition includes the sale of videos, but according to the source, this will depend on the situation of the person. The source did not know of any such cases. The source believed that it would not be a problem simply to possess such video tapes, but that threats might take place in this context. As regards the people selling such videos, the source assumed that the reaction by authorities would be limited to confiscating the illegal movies.

The coordinator of ACBAR believed that Islam is pervading all areas of the Afghan society today and that the religion is being used as a political tool. In this connection the source said that it has always been a strong element in Afghan culture to declare holy war (Jihad) against certain groups. The source also referred to the ban that has now been made on showing female singers and dancing on TV and to the recently established department for "virtue and vices" at ministerial level (Danish Immigration Service. Danish Refugee Council. Norwegian Immigration Service 2002, *The political, security and human rights situation in Afghanistan: report on fact-finding mission to Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif, Afghanistan and Islamabad, Pakistan, 22 September to 5 October 2002*, Section 2.6, p.21 – Attachment 3).

Recent news reports are attached which describe the debate between religious and secular elements over the new Afghan constitution and government:

- A January 2004 report quotes opinions from Afghans that the Afghan president “compromised too far with religious leaders when he agreed to support a constitution based on Islamic law”, angering secular delegates to the constitutional convention (‘Analysis: Preparations for legislative and presidential elections in Afghanistan this summer’ 2004, *National Public Radio News*, 16 January – Attachment 4).
- A December 2003 report quotes Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, the leader of the extreme Islamist party Ettahad-e Eslami-e Afghanistan, who states that “there is no place for secularism in Afghanistan” and that the new presidential system is against Islam (‘Former party leader, Sayyaf, says “no place for secularism in Afghanistan”’ 2003, *BBC Monitoring South Asia*, 14 December – Attachment 5).
- During the formulation of the draft constitution, committee members were quoted as saying that “there was widespread anxiety that Afghanistan would become a secular

state” and that “there could be no compromise on Islam” (Gall, C. 2003, ‘New Afghan constitution juggles Koran and democracy’, *The New York Times*, 19 October – Attachment 6). (RRT Country Research 2004, *Research Response AFG16520*, 8 March – Attachment 7)

A Research Response of June 2004 included a question which asked whether returnees who had lived in western countries who are considered to be lapsed Muslims were targeted:

Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid gave a talk to the RRT on 22 April 2004, he was asked whether there are any problems for secular Afghans who have lived in the west for a while, and perhaps do not follow Islam to the same extent as they did. The answer is as follows:

There are no tensions as such between secular and non-secular, especially in the cities. I think in the villages, in the small rural areas for example, where there’s a tradition of collective prayers and where you may not go to the collective prayers or to the mosque, I mean those people may look at you strangely but there is no such thing in any of the towns or cities. I think a lot of the expats, a lot of young people who have come back from Pakistan are very, very secular. They all watch Indian movies, and they watch TV and all the rest of it; they are not particularly interested in saying your prayers 5 times a day. And there are no problems I think there. So I think it depends on where you are. I don’t think there is discrimination for being secular in any way (Rashid, Ahmed 2004, *Transcription Of Conference Telephone Call Between RRT Melbourne, RRT Sydney And Ahmed Rashid In Lahore, Pakistan On Thursday, 22 April 2004*, 22 April – Attachment 8).

Questions 1 and 2 of RRT Research Response AFG 16520 dated 8 March 2004 (RRT Country Research 2004, *Research Response AFG16520*, 8 March – Attachment 7) provide information on whether people of a secular outlook or who have turned away from Islam have faced harm in Afghanistan, including Jaghori.

Questions 1 and 2 of RRT Research Response AFG16554 dated 9 March 2004 (RRT Country Research 2004, *Research Response AFG16554*, 9 March – Attachment 9) provide information on societal attitudes to a Hazara returning from Australia to a village in Jaghori who expressed his opinions freely, did not fast or pray, drank alcohol and ignored Halal/Haram rules and the consequences of exhibiting such behaviour in public.

Both responses refer to contradictory UNHCR advice of March and February 2004 on the treatment of wealthy returnees to Ghazni. UNHCR advice dated 5 April 2004 clarifies the discrepancies. It states:

Returnees would not be targeted for criminal activities specifically because they are returnees per se. Also returnees (and others) will not be targeted simply because they are wealthy. Since criminal activities are on the rise in general, returnees could be subjected to criminal activities, but not more than other Afghans (UNHCR Afghanistan 2004, UNHCR advice ‘clarification of UNHCR response on security of westernised afghan returnees’, 5 April – Attachment 10).

The 11 March 2004 UNHCR advice seems to relate to returnees to Ghazni province generally rather than Jaghori district specifically and states:

Returnees are not specifically targeted for criminal activities (UNHCR Kabul 2004, *Response to DIMIA Case Managers’ Questions for UNHCR*, 11 March 2004 – Attachment 11).

The 14 February 2004 UNHCR advice seems to relate to returnees to Ghazni province generally rather than Jaghori district specifically and states:

Westernized and wealthy returnees could be targeted, particularly for their wealth, and if they transcend rather strongly the norms of the society (UNHCR OCM Kabul 2004, *Afghanistan: UNHCR Responses to DIMIA Case Managers' Questions for UNHCR*, 14 February – Attachment 12). (RRT Country Research 2004, Research Response AFG16804, 7 June – Attachment 13)

The Research Response of 16th August 2006 (question 5 in particular) includes information relating to the treatment of Afghan asylum seekers returned to Afghanistan from Nauru carried out by the Edmund Rice Centre and comments provided to the RRT by Professor William Maley and Dr Jonathan Goodhand concerning the treatment of Westernised returnees in Kabul:

The Edmund Rice Centre is currently researching into the fate of 200 former Afghan asylum seekers who were sent home mainly from Nauru by the Australian Government. Researchers from the Centre conducted eight formal interviews in Afghanistan before they were forced to leave because of security concerns. Local police and local thugs tried to stop the research team from completing the interviews. According to the Centre, nine failed asylum seekers who were forcibly repatriated by Australia to Afghanistan have been killed, with others arrested. Researchers report that the NGO community and church people on the ground in Afghanistan “told us that they believe that no Afghan, particularly Hazara, should ever be sent back, because they are targeted.” The Minister for Immigration has not yet investigated these claims:

- Hazara Abdul’s two daughters were killed after a hand grenade was thrown at his home “because he was regarded as a supporter of the old communist regime.” Abdul fled to Pakistan. A Pakistan newspaper reported on the April 2003 grenade attack stating that “Afghans who come back to Afghanistan after spending years as refugees face constant abuse, their house robbed, and in some cases murdered, forcing them to leave the country again”;
- Two Hazaras, Mohammed Moussa Nazaree and Yacoub Baklri, were “apparently gunned down by local militias commanders”;
- Hazara Ghulam was arrested upon his return by a warlord and gaoled for three months where he was tortured. Ghulam fled to Pakistan where he remains illegally;
- Hazara Mohammed received death threats and fled to Pakistan where he remains illegally with his four children (Banham, Cynthia 2006, ‘Rejected refugees sent home to die: families tell harrowing stories’, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 8 August <http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/rejected-refugees-sent-home-to-die/2006/08/07/1154802823160.html?page=fullpage#> – 10 August 2006 – Attachment 14; and O’Neill, Margot 2006, ‘Group claims returned asylum seekers killed’, *Lateline*, 7 August <http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2006/s1708870.htm> – Accessed 10 August 2006 – Attachment 15).

The US Department of State reports that Hazaras “found difficulty in returning” to Afghanistan (US Department of State 2006, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2005 – Afghanistan*, 8 March, Section 2d – Attachment 16).

On 30 September 2005 Professor Maley provided the Tribunal with the following information on the treatment of returnees:

There is a very basic day labourer market in Kabul in which you find some of the Hazaras but that is extremely insecure and unpredictable.

People who are seen as being in some respect outside the social norm for whatever reason are less likely to find that they secure the sort of assistance that they would need in order to access the labour market because there could be potential costs for

the middle man in being seen to assist somebody who has, in the eyes of others, moved outside the realm of traditional social norms. I think for younger people who have lived in Australia for some years it is perhaps not so much an issue of adopting a Western lifestyle in a conscious sense as having been drawn into it in an unconscious way and I was saying to Kerry earlier we – I was at an Afghan community function in Brisbane a couple of years ago when a group of young Hazaras rather unexpectedly did the Macarena.

And I can remember sitting there thinking, “My God, what would their mothers think.” Yet it is not just what their mothers would think: it is what other people think as well. And it is not just something like doing a Latin American dance. There are all sorts of matters that can be as simple as one bearing one’s degree of deference to other people that can bring about antagonisms without a person who has lived in Australia for some years even appreciating why those antagonisms might be there.

And something that might almost have slipped from the memory of a person who has lived in Australia for four or five years could still be terribly important and salient to a person they might encounter and thus I suspect that the greatest danger for young people who have been here for quite some time and being sent back to Afghanistan is not that they would be consciously offensive to Afghan norms but that they would by this stage have assimilated Australian ways of behaviour to the extent that their grasp of Afghan norms would be fragile and in that way they would end up offending somebody very dangerous without even realising that they were in the process of doing it.

It is quite a complex story. But even Afghans who came to Australia as adults who are going back after 10 or 20 years are finding that they are instantly recognised as people who lived outside the country even though they speak fluent Persian, they are not unfamiliar with the layout of cities and that kind of thing, but there is just something about them that the locals pick up. And, again, I witnessed this last week. An Afghan Australian friend of mine was in Kabul when I was there, who has lived in Canberra for more than 20 years – he is a pharmacist, and is always the case he wanted to buy a carpet for his wife.

And I said, “Well, there’s no point in taking me because if you and I walk in the door of a carpet shop the seller will immediately conclude that you are the interpreter and I am the client and the price will triple on the spot.” And he came back with a carpet and I said, “How did you go?” He said, “The price tripled anyway.” You see, he was recognised almost instantly as an Afghan who had been living outside the country.

MALE SPEAKER: How long do they carry that label for? If they return to Afghanistan with the purpose of re-establishing themselves in the country how long are they expected to – or how long can they carry that label of being foreigners?

PROF MALEY: Well, in the eyes of particular people they can carry it for as long as their personalities seem to be out of the ordinary. The problem is they don’t know exactly why that is and there is not enough detailed study to know how long it would take for people to cease to be recognisable amongst the locals but I can even begin to pick it in the body language that there is a kind – it is very hard to pin this down but Afghans within Afghanistan in their body language tend to be somewhat deferential in the way in which they walk and sit whereas people who have lived in Australia tend to have a slightly more swagger.

I don’t know – they have been watching George W. Bush on television. It is very, very hard to pin down but you can – if you have been around long enough you can

begin to spot the difference. So I don't know how long it would take. Perhaps I should – I have used too much time in this presentation so perhaps I should stop at that point but I am very happy to respond to specific questions that members of the group may wish to raise. But I will take up in more detail some of the questions that Maria sent me.

FEMALE SPEAKER: On the subject of Westernisation some people say that they are not practising their religion to the same extent in Australia. If they went back they had forgotten some of it or – can that cause people problems too?

PROF MALEY: It could, yes. There is an expression that is used in Afghanistan, “gharbzadeh”, which means “son of the West” and it is applied to people who seemed to have lost an element of their Afghan identity. And the area in which it is potentially most problematical would be in the area of religion. If people began to be suspected of having ceased to be good Muslims in the sense in which some group within Afghanistan might use that term.

FEMALE SPEAKER: Do you think that would be more of a problem with the Shiites or the Sunnis?

PROF MALEY: It could be the same. There are extremists within both the Shiite and the Sunni community if you scratch hard enough. The Sunni extremists tend to regard the Shia as heretics in any case so, they are beyond the pale, but they are very devout (Maley, Professor William 2005, *Transcript of Seminar on Afghanistan*, 30 September – Attachment 17).

On 13 April 2005 Dr Jonathan Goodhand provided the Tribunal with the following information on the treatment of returnees:

There is also, to some extent, a reaction against expatriate Afghans. So radical Islam or however one chooses to describe it (some people call it Islamic fundamentalism), will continue to have an important and ongoing role in politics in Afghanistan.

...THE CHAIRMAN: Dr Goodhand, would you be able to comment on – some of our applicants claim that they state to the Tribunal they would be considered infidels and persecuted because they have now married a westerner. Would they be targeted by the local mullahs?

DR GOODHAND: I have spoken to colleagues about this very question and it is perhaps not a very useful response but it is actually a realistic one and that is, it all depends on the area and the local mullahs. Certainly, that scenario that you have painted is plausible and possible and I come across areas of Afghanistan, where those kind of situations have developed, and I alluded to earlier the kind of the radicalisation of Islam, which has been one of the characteristics of the conflict and how, Islam has become a banner issue that has been used and mobilised by a whole range of different groups and the Taliban were perhaps the most extreme manifestation of that.

But it is also, it has happened not only at the higher political levels but at the grass roots as well in terms of the changing role of mullahs and so, that situation is very plausible but it is also – would be inaccurate to kind of paint the picture that all mullahs would take that position. One of the people I spoke to on this has said, well actually an alternative way of looking at it would be, they would think, they would be respectful of someone coming from outside who had been successful and got some of the trappings of the west but I think it is tied up with a whole range of other things.

There is a lot of resentment around people coming back, particularly in terms of the pressure on land and resources, and so pretexts are created to point the finger at these people, and one of those pretexts may be Islam, it may be their kind of past political connections and so on, but the underlying issue could quite easily be either one around resources or a personalised kind of long running history of enmity.

...FEMALE SPEAKER: So would the situation then be the same for returnees who are perhaps more secular, who aren't as religious as they were when they left Afghanistan? Would that be an issue coming back, not visiting the mosque, perhaps drinking alcohol, having more secular views rather than religious?

DR GOODHAND: It depends, there is strong pressure to conform in Afghan society, you know, in lots of ways. So not conforming is frowned upon and could be dangerous for the person not to do so but clearly it is different for a person going back to Kabul than it is to going to rural Ghazni. In rural Ghazni it would certainly be frowned upon for somebody to kind of say that they were an atheist and to be un-Islamic in their practices.

So I think, you know, that that would be dangerous for people to go back into that kind of a context and be openly, if you like, "un-Islamic". In Kabul it would be easier for that, for somebody to kind of perhaps have a more liberal lifestyle, but certainly in rural areas it would be extremely difficult.

THE CHAIRMAN: Melbourne, any further questions? Sydney, do you have any further questions? Okay. I have got just one follow-up question, Dr Goodhand, if you can shed some light on. A lot of our applicants have been in Australia for quite a long time, so consequently we were wondering would someone who had lived in a western country and returned to Afghanistan, in particular to Ghazni, encounter discrimination or persecution because of their perceived western taint?

DR GOODHAND: There is certainly a growing animosity and resentment towards expatriate Afghans coming back and walking into kind of relatively high paying positions and taking resources. I mean, anywhere there has been a war and there are people who have stayed and there are people who have left, when people return there is always, (almost always) tensions and resentment towards those who come back.

One sees this, in particular, in Kabul, with the return of a lot of technocrats but certainly in Kabul, I think it is a big issue because of the perception that the better qualified, the English speaking, the computer trained Afghans coming back and are taking relatively high paid positions.

In Ghazni, I think that certainly there would be a much more profound question around adjustments and because the difference between the lifestyle the person would have experienced in Australia and they would come back to in rural Ghazni would be much more profound and certainly that person is likely to stand out more. I think a lot of this though, comes back to whether this person is bringing in resources or competing for resources, and then if it is around trying to reclaim land, for instance, this being used then, that would become much more of a tension inducing issue (Goodhand, Dr Jonathan 2005, *Transcript of Video Conference on Afghanistan between RRT Melbourne, RRT Sydney and Dr Jonathan Goodhand*, 13 April – Attachment 18). (RRT Country Research 2006, *Research Response AFG30446*, 16 August – Attachment 19)

As pointed out in a later Research Response in June 2007, the Edmund Rice Centre also published a report on its research in September 2006:

The response refers to research then being carried out by the Edmund Rice Centre in relation to the situation of returned failed asylum seekers from Australia. A subsequent report dated September 2006 by the Edmund Rice Centre for Justice and Community Education is attached. Of the 41 people interviewed for the report, 36 were Hazaras from Afghanistan (Edmund Rice Centre for Justice and Community Education 2006, *Deported to Danger II: The Continuing Study of Australia's Treatment of Rejected Asylum Seekers*, September – Attachment 20). (RRT Country Research 2007, *Research Response AFG31828*, 7 June – Attachment 21)

A search has also been conducted for any more recent reports on the treatment of Afghan nationals who return home after having resided in a western country. Whilst there are many current reports concerning the treatment of returnees from neighbouring countries Iran and Pakistan, no such recent reports directly dealing with the treatment of westernised or secularised returnees in the last six months or so have been located. One recent study investigated the experience of young male and female second-generation Afghans who had re-located to Afghanistan from Iran and Pakistan but although issues of individual and cultural identity, integration, material and social support, employment and educational opportunities are thematic for the sample group, secularisation itself is not discussed (Saito, Mamiko 2007, “Second Generation Afghans in Neighbouring Countries. From mahajer to hamwatan: Afghans return home”, December <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/afghan?page=studies> – Accessed 27 February 2008 – Attachment 22).

The UNHCR has issued a recent situation report on Afghanistan and guidelines for decision-makers needing to assess the protection needs of Afghan asylum-seekers (UNHCR 2007, “UNHCR’s Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Afghan Asylum-Seekers”, December <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?docid=477ce70a2> - Attachment 23).

List of Sources Consulted

Internet Sources:

Government Information & Reports

US Department of State <http://www.state.gov/>

UK Home Office <http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/>

Immigration & Refugee Board of Canada <http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/>

European Country of Origin Information Network <http://www.ecoi.net>

Non-Government Organisations

Human Rights Watch <http://www.hrw.org/>

UK Refugee Council

http://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/howwehelp/directly/voluntary_returns/advice_afghanistan.htm

Senlis Council <http://www.senliscouncil.net/>

Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit

http://www.areu.org.af/index.php?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=25

International News & Politics

BBC News <http://news.bbc.co.uk>

Region Specific Links

Pajhwok Afghan News <http://www.pajhwak.com/>
Afghanistan Conflict Monitor (HSRP)
<http://www.afghanconflictmonitor.org/2008/02/index.html>
Afghanistan News Center <http://www.afghanistannewscenter.com/>

Search Engines

Google <http://www.google.com.au/>
Google Scholar <http://www.google.com.au>
Vivisimo <http://www.vivisimo.com>

Databases:

CISNET (DIAC Country Information database)
ISYS (RRT Country Research database, including Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, US Department of State Reports)
Stratfor <http://www.stratfor.com/>

Other

Congressional Research Service 2007, "Afghan Refugees: Current Status and Future Prospects" 26 January <http://openocrs.cdt.org/document/RL33851/2007-01-26%2000:00:00> – Accessed 29 February 2008.

List of Attachments

1. UNHCR 2003, *Update of the situation in Afghanistan and international protection considerations*, July.
2. US Department of State 2004, 'Afghanistan', *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2003*, 25 February.
3. Danish Immigration Service. Danish Refugee Council. Norwegian Immigration Service 2002, *The political, security and human rights situation in Afghanistan: report on fact-finding mission to Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif, Afghanistan and Islamabad, Pakistan, 22 September to 5 October 2002*, Section 2.6.
4. 'Analysis: Preparations for legislative and presidential elections in Afghanistan this summer' 2004, *National Public Radio News*, 16 January. (FACTIVA)
5. 'Former party leader, Sayyaf, says "no place for secularism in Afghanistan"' 2003, *BBC Monitoring South Asia*, 14 December. (FACTIVA)
6. Gall, C. 2003, 'New Afghan constitution juggles Koran and democracy', *The New York Times*, 19 October.
7. RRT Country Research 2004, *Research Response AFG16520*, 8 March.
8. Rashid, Ahmed 2004, *Transcription Of Conference Telephone Call Between RRT Melbourne, RRT Sydney And Ahmed Rashid In Lahore, Pakistan On Thursday, 22 April 2004*, 22 April.

9. RRT Country Research 2004, *Research Response AFG16554*, 9 March.
10. UNHCR Afghanistan 2004, UNHCR advice 'clarification of UNHCR response on security of westernised afghan returnees', 5 April.
11. UNHCR Kabul 2004, *Response to DIMIA Case Managers' Questions for UNHCR*, 11 March 2004.
12. UNHCR OCM Kabul 2004, *Afghanistan: UNHCR Responses to DIMIA Case Managers' Questions for UNHCR*, 14 February.
13. RRT Country Research 2004, *Research Response AFG16804*, 7 June.
14. Banham, Cynthia 2006, 'Rejected refugees sent home to die: families tell harrowing stories', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 8 August
<http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/rejected-refugees-sent-home-to-die/2006/08/07/1154802823160.html?page=fullpage#> – 10 August 2006.
15. O'Neill, Margot 2006, 'Group claims returned asylum seekers killed', *Lateline*, 7 August <http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2006/s1708870.htm> – Accessed 10 August 2006.
16. US Department of State 2006, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2005 – Afghanistan*, 8 March.
17. Maley, Professor William 2005, *Transcript of Seminar on Afghanistan*, 30 September.
18. Goodhand, Dr Jonathan 2005, *Transcript of Video Conference on Afghanistan between RRT Melbourne, RRT Sydney and Dr Jonathan Goodhand*, 13 April.
19. RRT Country Research 2006, *Research Response AFG30446*, 16 August.
20. Edmund Rice Centre for Justice and Community Education 2006, *Deported to Danger II: The Continuing Study of Australia's Treatment of Rejected Asylum Seekers*, September.
21. RRT Country Research 2007, *Research Response AFG31828*, 7 June.
22. Saito, Mamiko 2007, "Second Generation Afghans in Neighbouring Countries. From mahajer to hamwatan: Afghans return home", December <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/afghan?page=studies> – Accessed 27 February 2008.
23. UNHCR 2007, "UNHCR's eligibility guidelines for assessing the international protection needs of Afghan asylum-seekers", UNHCR Refworld website, December <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?docid=477ce70a2> – Accessed 6 February 2008.