COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT

AFGHANISTAN

16 NOVEMBER 2009
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Preface

i This Country of Origin Information Report (COI Report) has been produced by COI Service, United Kingdom Border Agency (UKBA), for use by officials involved in the asylum/human rights determination process. The Report provides general background information about the issues most commonly raised in asylum/human rights claims made in the United Kingdom. The main body of the report includes information available up to 20 September 2009. The ‘Latest News’ section contains further brief information on events and reports accessed from 21 September 2009 to 13 November 2009. The report was issued on 16 November 2009.

ii The Report is compiled wholly from material produced by a wide range of recognised external information sources and does not contain any UKBA opinion or policy. All information in the Report is attributed, throughout the text, to the original source material, which is made available to those working in the asylum/human rights determination process.

iii The Report aims to provide a brief summary of the source material identified, focusing on the main issues raised in asylum and human rights applications. It is not intended to be a detailed or comprehensive survey. For a more detailed account, the relevant source documents should be examined directly.

iv The structure and format of the COI Report reflects the way it is used by UKBA decision makers and appeals presenting officers, who require quick electronic access to information on specific issues and use the contents page to go directly to the subject required. Key issues are usually covered in some depth within a dedicated section, but may also be referred to briefly in several other sections. Some repetition is therefore inherent in the structure of the Report.

v The information included in this COI Report is limited to that which can be identified from source documents. While every effort is made to cover all relevant aspects of a particular topic, it is not always possible to obtain the information concerned. For this reason, it is important to note that information included in the Report should not be taken to imply anything beyond what is actually stated. For example, if it is stated that a particular law has been passed, this should not be taken to imply that it has been effectively implemented unless stated.

vi As noted above, the Report is a collation of material produced by a number of reliable information sources. In compiling the Report, no attempt has been made to resolve discrepancies between information provided in different source documents. For example, different source documents often contain different versions of names and spellings of individuals, places and political parties, etc. COI Reports do not aim to bring consistency of spelling, but to reflect faithfully the spellings used in the original source documents. Similarly, figures given in different source documents sometimes vary and these are simply quoted as per the original text. The term ‘sic’ has been used in this document only to denote incorrect spellings or typographical errors in quoted text; its use is not intended to imply any comment on the content of the material.
vii The Report is based substantially upon source documents issued during the previous two years. However, some older source documents may have been included because they contain relevant information not available in more recent documents. All sources contain information considered relevant at the time this Report was issued.

viii This COI Report and the accompanying source material are public documents. All COI Reports are published on the RDS section of the Home Office website and the great majority of the source material for the Report is readily available in the public domain. Where the source documents identified in the Report are available in electronic form, the relevant web link has been included, together with the date that the link was accessed. Copies of less accessible source documents, such as those provided by government offices or subscription services, are available from the COI Service upon request.

ix COI Reports are published regularly on the top 20 asylum intake countries. COI Key Documents are produced on lower asylum intake countries according to operational need. UKBA officials also have constant access to an information request service for specific enquiries.

x In producing this COI Report, COI Service has sought to provide an accurate, balanced summary of the available source material. Any comments regarding this Report or suggestions for additional source material are very welcome and should be submitted to UKBA as below.

Country of Origin Information Service
UK Border Agency
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Whitgift Centre
15 Wellesley Road
Croydon CR9 1AT
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Email: cois@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk
Website: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/country_reports.html

INDEPENDENT ADVISORY GROUP ON COUNTRY INFORMATION

xi The Independent Advisory Group on Country Information (IAGCI) was set up in March 2009 by the Chief Inspector of the UK Border Agency to make recommendations to him about the content of the UKBA’s country of origin information material. The IAGCI welcomes feedback on UKBA’s COI Reports, COI Key Documents and other country of origin information material. Information about the IAGCI’s work can be found on the Chief Inspector’s website at http://www ociukba.homeoffice.gov.uk

xii In the course of its work, the IAGCI reviews the content of selected UKBA COI documents and makes recommendations specific to those documents and of a more general nature. A list of the COI Reports and other documents which have been reviewed by the IAGCI or the Advisory Panel on Country Information (the independent organisation which monitored UKBA’s COI material from September 2003 to October 2008) is available at http://www ociukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/
Please note: it is not the function of the IAGCI to endorse any UKBA material or procedures. Some of the material examined by the Group relates to countries designated or proposed for designation to the Non-Suspensive Appeals (NSA) list. In such cases, the Group’s work should not be taken to imply any endorsement of the decision or proposal to designate a particular country for NSA, nor of the NSA process itself.
Latest News

Events in Afghanistan from 21 September to 16 November 2009

13 November
A suicide bomber drove his car into a Nato convoy outside a US military base in Kabul, injuring at least four people. Zabihullah Mujahid, a Taliban spokesman said that the group was responsible for the attack.

Aljazeera. Car bomb hits Nato Kabul base, 13 November 2009
Accessed 13 November 2009

BBC Online. Explosion at Nato base in Kabul, 13 November 2009
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8358136.stm
Accessed 13 November 2009

12 November
In a statement to the UN Security Council on 11 November, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) said that 2,021 civilians had been killed between January and October 2009 compared to 1,838 for the same period in 2008. According to UNAMA the majority of civilians have died in attacks from Taliban insurgents than by military operations.

Accessed 13 November 2009

2 November
“Hamid Karzai has been declared president of Afghanistan, after election officials scrapped a planned second round of voting. The announcement comes a day after Mr Karzai’s sole challenger, Abdullah Abdullah, pulled out of the race.”

BBC Online. Karzai declared elected president, 2 November 2009
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8337832.stm
Accessed 1 November 2009

1 November
Dr Abdullah Abdullah, Hamid Karzai’s election rival, announced he was pulling out of the next round of the elections because he was concerned that his demands to ensure a fraud-free vote had not been addressed. A second round run-off became necessary after the Independent Election Committee was ordered by the Electoral Complaints Committee to invalidate votes from 210 polling stations after finding clear and convincing evidence of fraud. This reduced Hamid Karzai share of the vote “… to 49.67% - below the crucial 50% plus one vote threshold needed to avoid a second round.”

BBC Online. Abdullah pulls out of Afghan vote, 1 November 2009
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8336388.stm
Accessed 1 November 2009

29 October
Returnees to the northern provinces of Afghanistan from Iran and internally displaced persons camps in southern Afghanistan are in need of assistance. Efforts are underway to provide assistance to 5,000 Afghan families before the winter sets in. The UN Refugee Agency has already set up a tented camp in Sozma Qala District, Sar-i-Pul Province which has started distributing aid to returnees.

IRIN News. AFGHANISTAN: Northern returnees need aid, 29 October 2009
Accessed 29 October 2009
28 October  At least least five UN workers were killed when the Taliban raided a United Nations (UN) guesthouse in Kabul city on 28 October. The incident, which was condemned by the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon as “shocking and shameless”, is believed to be the first of a new wave of attacks in the build-up to the presidential election run-off scheduled for 7 November 2009.

BBC Online, UN Chief Condemns Kabul Killings, 28 October 2009
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/8329543.stm
Accessed 28 October 2009

16 October  After the fall of the Taliban in 2001 Afghan women began seeing their status rise: women were represented in parliament and girls were allowed back in school. However Fawzia Koofi, one of 68 female members of the parliament, believes these “… hard-won gains are retreating…Unfortunately, there are certain elements within the government, outside the government, nowadays mainly within the government, who don’t believe in women’s progress, because they think, if women becomes [sic] stronger, they will lose the power.”

CNN News: Afghan women still struggle, 8 years on, 16 October 2009
Accessed 16 October 2009

13 October  16 people were reported to have been kidnapped in two separate incidents in northern Afghanistan. Eight healthworkers were seized after a clinic in Sar-i-Pul Province was stormed by Taliban fighters. In the second kidnapping eight police officers were taken by militants after their police station was attacked in the Faryab Province.

RFERL: Taliban Kidnap 16 People In Afghanistan’s North, 13 October 2009
http://www.rferl.org/content/Taliban_Kidnap_16_People_In_Afghanistans_North/1850447.html
Accessed 14 October 2009

12 October  Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) starts working again in Afghanistan. For the first time in five years, an MSF doctor diagnosed and treated a patient at the Ahmed Shah Baba District hospital, in eastern Kabul Province. MSF pulled out of Afghanistan in 2004 after five employees were killed in their car in north Afghanistan.

MSF: No guns, no fees in Ahmed Shah Baba hospital, Kabul, Afghanistan, 12 October 2009
Accessed 15 October 2009

8 October  17 civilians were killed and more than 80 wounded in a suicide attack outside the Indian embassy in Kabul city. “The suicide bomber detonated a car packed with explosives in a market across the street from the Indian Embassy and Afghanistan’s Interior Ministry.”

The Long War Journal: Suicide attack kills 17 outside Indian embassy in Kabul, 8 October 2009
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/10/suicide_attack_kills_2.php#ixzz0TzKB2hT0
Accessed 14 October 2009

7 October  The World Food Programme started distributing cash vouchers worth US$30 to selected vulnerable households in Kabul, mainly to families headed by widows or people with disabilities. The project, which began in September this year, is expected to run until February 2010.
IRIN News: AFGHANISTAN: Cash vouchers for 10,000 families in Kabul, 7 October 2009
Accessed 14 October 2009

4 October Provincial officials told IRIN News that dozens of families from Kalder and Shortepa districts in northern Afghanistan have been displaced after the Amu river bursts its banks. More than 900 people have been forced to set up tents or seek refuge in nearby communities.
IRIN News: AFGHANISTAN: Flooding Amu River displaces hundreds of people
Accessed on 25 September 2009
REPORTS ON AFGHANISTAN PUBLISHED OR ACCESSED SINCE
21 SEPTEMBER 2009

Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) http://www.areu.org.af/
Briefing Paper Series: VOTING TOGETHER
Why Afghanistan’s 2009 Elections were (and were not) a Disaster, November 2009
(Via Refworld)
Date accessed 2 November 2009

International Crisis Group http://www.crisisgroup.org/
Conflict Risk Alert: After Afghanistan’s Fraudulent Elections, published 27 October 2009
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6358&l=1&m=1
Date accessed 29 October 2009

US Department of State http://www.state.gov
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2009/127362.htm
Date accessed 27 October 2009

The Reporters without Borders http://www.rsf.org
Press Freedom Index 2009 published 20 October 2009
Date accessed 21 October 2009

Congressional Research Service (reports accessed via) http://opencrs.com/
Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, 6 October 2009
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL30588_20091006.pdf
Date accessed 13 November 2009

United Nations http://www.unhcr.org
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4ad490b12.html
Date accessed 12 October 2009
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4ac0c0d22.pdf
Date accessed 23 September 2009

Transparency International http://www.transparency.org
TI Global Corruption Report 2009, published 23 September 2009
http://www.transparency.org/publications/gcr/gcr_2009
Date accessed 12 October 2009

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The main text of this COI Report contains the most up to date publicly available information as at 20 September 2009. Further brief information on recent events and reports has been provided in the Latest News section to 13 November 2009.
Background information

1. GEOGRAPHY

1.01 The Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is located in south-western Asia. With an area covering 647,500 sq km it shares borders spanning 5,529 km with Turkmenistan (744 km), Uzbekistan (137 km) and Tajikistan (1,206 km) to the north, Iran (936 km) to the west, the People’s Republic of China (76 km) to the north-east and Pakistan (2,430 km) to the east and south. Afghanistan has a mostly rugged mountainous terrain with plains in the north and southwest. (Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Factbook, last updated 7 August 2009) [3a] The climate can vary considerably with the summer temperature in the south-west reaching 49°C (120°F), while in the winter in the Hindu Kush mountains of the north-east, temperatures can fall to −26°C (−15°F). (Europa World Online, accessed 14 May 2009) [1a]

1.02 In July 2009, the population of Afghanistan was estimated at 33,609,937. (CIA World Factbook, last updated 7 August 2009) [3a] The towns with the largest population are Kabul (the capital), Kandahar/Qandahar, Herat, Mazar-i-Sharif, Jalalabad and Kunduz. (Europa World Online, accessed 14 May 2009 [1a]

1.03 Pushtuns make up the largest ethnic group at 42%, followed by Tajiks (27%), Hazaras (9%), Uzbek (9%) and Aimaq (4%). Other smaller groups include Turkmen and Baluch. (CIA World Factbook, last updated 7 August 2009) [3a]

1.04 The US Department of State’s Background Note on Afghanistan updated in November 2008 recorded that Dari (Afghan Farsi) and Pashto are the official languages, and that Dari is spoken by more than one-third of the population as a first language and serves as a lingua franca for most Afghans. Pashto is spoken throughout the Pashtun areas of eastern and southern Afghanistan and Tajik and Turkic languages are spoken widely in the north. Seventy other languages and numerous dialects are spoken throughout the country by smaller ethnic groups. [2e] The Constitution states “In areas where the majority of people speak one of the Uzbeki, Turkmani, Baluchi, Pashai, Nuristani and Pamiri languages, that language shall be recognized as third official language in addition to Pashtu and Dari, the modality of its implementation shall be regulated by law.” [4b] (Article 16)

1.05 An estimated 80 per cent of the Afghan population are Sunni Muslims, following the Hanafi school of jurisprudence. The remainder of the population, primarily the Hazara ethnic group, are predominantly Shi’a Muslims. (CIA World Factbook, last updated 7 August 2009) [3a]

(See also Section 20: Ethnic Groups)

1.06 The national flag, which was first introduced in 1928 and then modified in 1964, was banned following the coup in 1978. It has three vertical stripes of black, red and green with a white and red state inscription in the centre in Arabic which reads, “There is no God but Allah, and Muhammad is his Prophet, and Allah is Great.” The Islamic date 1298 appears under the inscription. The current flag was introduced in June 2002 following the collapse of the Taliban and bears the word ‘Afghanistan’ in the inscription. (Europa World Online, accessed 14 May 2009) [1a]

1.08 Public holidays include:

“2009 7 January*† (Ashura, Martyrdom of Imam Husayn); 1 February* (Arafat Day); 15 February (Liberation Day, commemoration of mujahidin struggle against Soviet occupation and withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989); 9 March* (Roze-Maulud, Birth of Prophet Muhammad); 21 March (Nauroz: New Year’s Day, Iranian calendar); 28 April (Loss of the Muslim Nation); 1 May (Workers’ Day); 19 August (Independence Day); 22 August* (first day of Ramadan); 20 September* (Id al-Fitr, end of Ramadan); 27 November* (Id al-Adha, Feast of the Sacrifice); 27 December*† (Ashura, Martyrdom of Imam Husayn).

* These holidays are dependent on the Islamic lunar calendar and may vary by one or two days from the dates given.

† This festival occurs twice (in the Afghan years 1387 and 1388) within the same Gregorian year.” (Europa World Online, accessed 14 May 2009) [1a]

MAPS

1.09 United Nations (UN) Map of Afghanistan, July 2009

(UNHCR, July 2009) [11h]
The University of Texas in Austin website also has a number of maps of Afghanistan, including city maps, historical maps and links to further maps. [85a]
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/afghanistan.html#afdetailed.html

Afghanistan Information Management Services (AIMS) provides district profiles and maps on Afghanistan. [82a]
2. ECONOMY

2.01 The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) Afghanistan Country Profile, updated 6 January 2009 noted:

“Afghanistan’s economy has been seriously damaged by decades of war. The main activity remains agriculture (which involves around 80% of the population), both subsistence and some commercial. The main traditional crops are grain, rice, fruit, nuts and vegetables. But all have been severely affected by drought in recent years. Industry is small scale and includes handicrafts, textiles, carpets, and some food processing. Exports consist of mainly fruit, nuts, vegetables and carpets.” [4a]

2.02 The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Factbook, Afghanistan, updated 7 August 2009, noted:

“Afghanistan’s economy is recovering from decades of conflict. The economy has improved significantly since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001 largely because of the infusion of international assistance, the recovery of the agricultural sector, and service sector growth. Real GDP growth exceeded 7% in 2008. Despite the progress of the past few years, Afghanistan is extremely poor, landlocked, and highly dependent on foreign aid, agriculture, and trade with neighboring countries. Much of the population continues to suffer from shortages of housing, clean water, electricity, medical care, and jobs. Criminality, insecurity, and the Afghan Government’s inability to extend rule of law to all parts of the country pose challenges to future economic growth. It will probably take the remainder of the decade and continuing donor aid and attention to significantly raise Afghanistan’s living standards from its current level, among the lowest in the world. International pledges made by more than 60 countries and international financial institutions at the Berlin Donors Conference for Afghan reconstruction in March 2004 reached $8.9 billion for 2004-09. While the international community remains committed to Afghanistan’s development, pledging over $57 billion at three donors' conferences since 2002, Kabul will need to overcome a number of challenges. Expanding poppy cultivation and a growing opium trade generate roughly $3 billion in illicit economic activity and looms as one of Kabul’s most serious policy concerns. Other long-term challenges include: budget sustainability, job creation, corruption, government capacity, and rebuilding war torn infrastructure.” [3a]

2.03 The Department for International Development (DFID) noted in their Country Profile for Afghanistan, updated on 22 August 2008, that over half the Afghan population lived on less than US$1 per day. [51a] The US State Department 2008 report, published on 25 February 2009, noted that:

“MOL [Ministry of Labour] reported the minimum wage was 2,000 Afghanis per month ($40) for government workers and applied to the private sector as well. The parliament passed a law to increase the minimum wage to 4,000 Afghanis ($80), but President Karzai had not signed the law at year’s end. The minimum wage did not provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family and was not observed in practice. Wages were determined by market forces, or, in the case of government workers, dictated by the government. During the year, World Monitors Inc. visited several power company worksites
and reported wages were often paid based on family affinity rather than on a set rate.” [2a] (Section 6a)

2.04 The exchange rate was: 79.1203 AFN = 1.00 GBP (xe.com, 10 September 2009) http://www.xe.com/ucc/convert.cgi [58a]

2.05 Other basic economic data:

- GDP growth in 2008, estimated at 7.5%;
- Inflation rate in 2007, estimated at 13%;
- Unemployment rate in 2008, estimated at 40%; and
- Labour distribution: 80% agriculture, 10% services and 10% industry. (CIA World Factbook, last updated 7 August 2009) [3a]

(See also Section 26 for further information on drug production and addiction)
3. HISTORY

OVERVIEW TO DECEMBER 2001


“After decades of intermittent attempts to assert control and ward off Russian influence in the country, Britain recognized Afghanistan as a fully independent monarchy in 1921. Muhammad Zahir Shah ruled from 1933 until he was deposed in a 1973 coup. Afghanistan entered a period of continuous civil conflict in 1978, when a Marxist faction staged a coup and set out to transform the country’s highly traditional society. The Soviet Union invaded to support its allies in 1979, but was defeated by U.S.-backed guerrillas and forced to withdraw in 1989.

“The mujahideen guerrilla factions overthrew the Marxist government in 1992 and then battled one another for control of Kabul, killing more than 25,000 civilians in the capital by 1995. The Islamist Taliban movement entered the fray, seizing control of Kabul in 1996 and quickly establishing control over most of the country, the rest of which remained in the hands of other factions. In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States launched a military campaign to topple the Taliban regime and eliminate Saudi militant Osama bin Laden’s terrorist network, Al-Qaeda.” [41a]

POST-TALIBAN (DECEMBER 2001 ONWARDS)

3.02 The Foreign & Commonwealth Office Afghanistan Country Profile, updated 6 January 2009, noted:

“After the fall of the Taliban regime in November 2001, the United Nations brought together leaders of Afghan ethnic groups in Germany. The agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions (the Bonn Agreement), signed on 5 December 2001, set out a road map for the restoration of representative government in Afghanistan.” [4a] (History)

3.03 Europa World Online, accessed on 5 January 2009, stated that:

“On 22 December 2001 the Interim Authority was inaugurated; [Hamid] Karzai was sworn in as Chairman. The country returned to the Constitution of 1964, which combined Shari’a with Western concepts of justice. One of Karzai’s first decisions was to appoint Gen. Dostam, who initially boycotted the Government in protest at his exclusion, as Vice-Chairman and Deputy Minister of Defence. At the end of December the UN Security Council authorized, as envisaged in the Bonn Agreement, the deployment of an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to help maintain security in Kabul over the next six months. Some 19 countries were authorized to form a 5,000-strong security force, led by the United Kingdom.” [1c] (Recent history)

3.04 The Foreign & Commonwealth Office Afghanistan Country Profile, updated 6 January 2009, recorded that:
“In June 2002 an Emergency Loya Jirga (Grand Assembly) established a Transitional Administration to govern until elections could be held in 2004. The arrangements for the Loya Jirga were designed to enable a broad-based representation. Seats were reserved for women, refugees, displaced persons, nomads, businessmen, intellectuals and religious scholars. The Loya Jirga concluded on 19 June 2002 with the inauguration of Hamid Karzai as President of the Transitional State of Afghanistan. The Emergency Loya Jirga marked the first opportunity for decades for the Afghan people to play a decisive role in choosing their future.” [4a] (Politics)

(See also Section 5: Constitution)

**Presidential Election 9 October 2004 and the New Cabinet**

3.05 Europa World Online, accessed on 5 January 2009, stated that:

“On 9 October 2004 Afghanistan held its first direct presidential election. Despite some sporadic violence on the day of the election, no widespread disturbances were reported. Shortly after polling had begun, all 15 opposition candidates launched a boycott of the vote and demanded that it be abandoned, owing to alleged widespread electoral fraud. However, international observers announced in the following month that they had concluded, following an inquiry, that alleged irregularities during the poll were not considered significant enough to have altered the final result. Interim President Hamid Karzai was subsequently declared the winner, receiving 55.4% of the votes, sufficient to ensure that a second round of voting would not be necessary. Former Minister of Education Younis Qanooni came second, with 16.3% of the votes, followed by Mohammad Mohaqeq, with 11.7%, and Gen. Abdul Rashid Dostam, with 10.0%. A reported 83.7% of those registered to vote did so. Concerns were, however, raised by the regional nature of Karzai’s victory, which seemed largely to have been secured by voters in the Pashtun-majority provinces, indicating that he had not succeeded in appealing to all ethnic groups.” [1c] (Recent history)

3.06 Europa World Online additionally noted that:

“In December 2004, following his inauguration, President Karzai announced the composition of his Cabinet. While Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr Abdullah Abdullah and Minister of Interior Affairs Ali Ahmad Jalali retained their portfolios, Marshal Fahim was replaced as Minister of Defence by Gen. Abdul Rahim Wardak. Hedayat Amin Arsala was allocated the commerce portfolio and Ismail Khan became Minister of Energy and Water. However, several powerful regional commanders were not included in the new Cabinet, ostensibly owing to the fact that they did not satisfy a requirement that all cabinet ministers be educated to university level. Karzai was criticized for his failure to allocate more portfolios in the Pashtun-dominated Cabinet to other ethnic groups. In an attempt to address Afghanistan’s continuing problems with the widespread cultivation of opium, a Ministry of Counter Narcotics was created, headed by Habibullah Qaderi.” [1c] (Recent history)

**Parliamentary and Provincial Elections, 18 September 2005**

3.07 Europa World Online, accessed 5 January 2009, stated that:
“On 18 September 2005 an estimated 5,800 candidates, including several former Taliban officials, contested elections to the 249-member Wolasi Jirga and 34 provincial legislatures. A total of 68 seats in the Wolasi Jirga were reserved for women. The polls constituted Afghanistan’s first democratic legislative elections since 1969. The nation-wide turn-out was an estimated 53% of those eligible to vote, with the figure decreasing to only 36% in Kabul, a significant decline compared with the level of participation at the 2004 presidential election. The widespread disruption that al-Qa’ida and the Taliban had threatened to orchestrate on polling day did not materialize.” [1c] (Recent history)

Europa World Online further recorded that:

“The [election] results, announced in November [2005], showed that many of those who had been elected were powerful factional figures, not aligned with any particular party, leading to fears that the country’s legislature would be less a unified mechanism through which the central Government could assert its authority, and more a conduit for the re-emergence of provincial ‘warlordism’. The newly elected National Assembly convened for the first time in December. Younis Qanooni, widely perceived to be the most prominent opposition figure in the legislature, was subsequently elected Speaker of the Wolasi Jirga, and Sibghatullah Mojaddedi Speaker of the Meshrano Jirga.” [1c] (Recent history)

AFGHANISTAN COMPACT, 31 JANUARY 2006

3.09 The Foreign & Commonwealth Office Afghanistan Country Profile, updated 6 January 2009, reported:

“With September’s elections and the inaugural session of the Afghan National Assembly in December 2005 marking the formal completion of the Bonn Process, the UK hosted the London Conference on Afghanistan on 31 January-1 February 2006. Co-chaired by the Afghan Government, the UK and the UN, the conference saw the launch of the Afghanistan Compact (an agreement between the Afghan Government and the international community led by the UN), the interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy (I-ANDS), and the National Drug Control Strategy.

“The Afghanistan Compact provides the framework for international engagement in Afghanistan for the next five years, setting outcomes, benchmarks and mutual obligations that aim to ensure greater coherence of effort between the Afghan Government and the international community. The Compact supports the Afghan Government’s interim National Development Strategy which lays out their vision and investment priorities. The IANDS reflects a process of national consultation, underpinning the benchmarks in the Compact and the targets set in Afghanistan’s Millenium Development Goals. To deliver improved co-ordination the Compact created a new mechanism called the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) to ensure coordinated international engagement in Afghanistan.

“The conference was attended by over 60 delegates and demonstrated the commitment of the Afghan Government and the international community to deepen their partnership. Many delegations made new financial pledges at the Conference, making available over $10.5 billion.” [4a]
Full details of the Afghanistan Compact can be located via the Foreign and Commonwealth (FCO) website at:

(See also Annex A for a Timeline of Afghanistan)
4. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

4.01 On 29 April 2009 Mullah Berader, a top Taliban commander, warned that militants would launch a new offensive on Thursday 7 May against “...international and Afghan troops, government officials and ‘whoever is supporting invaders in our country,’ including ...ambushes, roadside bombs and suicide attacks.” However, some past threats of militant offensives never materialised, but the Associated Press pointed out that “…Mr. Berader’s comparatively measured threat could signal a start point to more aggressive attacks this year.” (Associated Press, 29 April 2009) [54a]

4.02 Aljazeera reported on 27 July 2009 that the Taliban leader, Mullah Omar wants to centralise Taliban operations and has issued a ‘code of conduct’ to each of its fighters. The book, which contains 13 chapters and 67 articles, describes that forming of a new mujahideen group is forbidden and that suicide bombing should only be used on high profile targets, minimising civilian casualties. [15d]

ELECTIONS – AUGUST 2009

4.03 The Afghanistan Presidential and Provisional Elections on 20 August 2009 were overseen by the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC). The ECC is:

“…an independent Afghan body established under Article 52 of the Electoral Law to adjudicate all challenges and complaints related to the electoral process. The ECC has been reestablished for the 2009 elections. The ECC can hear complaints related to violations of the election law as defined in Article 53, and it has the authority to impose sanctions, as identified in Article 54, if an offense has been deemed to have been committed. In addition, the ECC can consider challenges to the eligibility of nominated candidates…

“According to the Electoral Law, the ECC is composed of two national Commissioners and three international Commissioners. One Commissioner is appointed by the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, one Commissioner is appointed by the Supreme Court of Afghanistan and the three internationals are appointed by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The 2009 ECC is comprised of national Commissioners, Fahim Hakim and Maulawi Mustafa Barakzai. The international Commissioners are Grant Kippen, Maarten Halff and Scott Worden.” [98c]

4.04 On 13 June 2009 Aljazeera reported that Afghanistan’s electoral authority, the Independent Election Commission (IEC) had released the list of 41 candidates running in the presidential election, scheduled for 20 August 2009. A reporter for Aljazeera commented that he believed the bar for candidates’ registration had been set too low: “All you need to do is come up with $1,000 to register, get 10,000 signatures, be above the age of 40, and have 10 years’ work experience and higher education.” [15b]

4.05 The United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) website noted that two presidential candidates and seven Vice Presidential candidates were
women. The two women that ran for president were Mrs. Shahla Ata and Dr. Frozan Fana. UNIFEM stated that, 328 women competed for provincial council seats (10% of candidates). [72c]

4.06 Article 156 of the Constitution gives the Independent Election Committee of Afghanistan "the authority and responsibility to administrate and supervise all kind[s] of [Afghan] elections; as well as [to] refer to general public opinion of the people, in accordance [with] the provision of the law." [34b]

4.07 The IEC website, accessed on 6 September 2009, listed the criteria for those eligible to vote, which included:

- “Who can vote? All registered Afghans (who is at least 18 years of age, has Afghan citizenship, has not been deprived from his/her civil or political rights by a court of competent jurisdiction) with valid voter ID card will have the right to vote for Presidential and Provincial Council Elections.

- “Identification. Individuals with voter registration cards issued in 2003-05 and 2008-09 are allowed to vote on 20 August 2009. Polling station staff check for ink (to ensure individuals have not already voted), for eligibility, and for identity.

- “Where to vote. Registered voters can vote in the province where they are resident. However if a voter is not resident of that province, he/she is allowed to vote only for the Presidential elections.” [34c]

4.08 In an attempt to secure the safety of the estimated 17 million eligible voters, around 300,000 Afghan and international troops were deployed across the country. (France 24, 20 August 2009) [47a] According to the IEC over 6,800 polling centres across the country were scheduled to be open on 20 August. [34d] UNIFEM reported that “Of the 4.5 million voters who have registered for the first time for this year’s polls, about 38% of those new voters are female.” [72c]

4.09 During the run-up to the elections there were reports that the Taliban attempted to disrupt the election process and warned Afghans against going to the polls. In one incident, reported by BBC Online on 26 July 2009, Mohammed Qasim Fahim a vice-presidential candidate survived an assassination attempt by Taliban fighters. The attack came while he was campaigning for the August elections. The convoy Mohammed Qasim Fahim was travelling in was ambushed and fired at on the road between Kunduz and Takhar. [25n]

4.10 France 24 reported on 20 August that “One leaflet distributed by Taliban in Kandahar city read: ‘This is to respected residents: that you must not participate in the elections so as not to become a victim of our operations, because we will use new tactics.’” [47a]

4.11 At 7am on 20 August 2009 the polls opened to allow Afghans to vote for their next President as well as 420 councillors in 364 districts across Afghanistan’s 34 provinces. (France 24, 20 August 2009) [47a] (Aljazeera, 21 August 2009) [15]
4.12 The BBC Online, updated on 15 September 2009, reported that “...turnout was patchy and there were many incidents of violence across the country - but no major disruptions. The Taliban opposed the vote and called for a boycott. The Nato-led International Security Assistance Force (Isaf) said there were more than 400 insurgent attacks that day, which would make it one of the most violent days in Afghanistan since 2001.” [25ab]

4.13 The BBC Online further reported that “Election officials have estimated average turnout at 40-50%. If confirmed, this would be significantly less than the 70% who voted in the first presidential election in 2004. However, due to investigations into alleged ballot-box stuffing and suspicious tallies, a confirmed turnout is proving difficult to establish.” (BBC Online, updated 15 September 2009) [25ab]

4.14 Following the elections the Taliban released video footage showing Taliban fighters manning an impromptu checkpoint, stopping vehicles and demanding those passing to show their fingers to see if they showed any evidence of the indelible ink which was used on voters’ fingers as a security measure to stop them voting more than once. The Taliban had reportedly issued threats prior to the elections warning that those who voted would have their fingers cut off. (Aljazeera, 27 July 2009) [15c]

(See also Section 8: Security for list of further security incidents during the run-up to the August 2009 elections)

4.15 On 23 August, Abdullah Abdullah, the main rival to Hamid Karzai, commented in a conference that he had evidence of “widespread vote rigging” which he said had possibly spread throughout the country. Just a day earlier, Abdullah had accused Hamid Karzai of rigging the polls, saying that the president “uses the state apparatus in order to rig an election.” The Independent Election Commission (IEC) had already received 225 complaints, 150 of these were classed as priority. [15e]

(See also Section 16: Freedom of Speech and Media for information about incidents of journalists being attacked during the August 2009 elections and Section 8: Security Situation for information about militant attacks in Kabul during the August 2009 Elections)

(See also Section: Latest News for the latest information on the Presidential election)

Results

4.16 On 22 August, Aljazeera reported that European Union (EU) Election observers said that the polls had been generally fair. However, “Philippe Morillon, the chief EU election observer said that the elections had not been free ‘in some parts of the territory’.” [15k]

4.17 Although final results were not due until September 2009, both main candidates Hamid Karzai and ex-foreign minister Abdullah Abdullah claimed an early lead. (Sky News, 22 August 2009) [97a]

4.18 Early media reports claimed there had been accusations of fraud and corruption against the main candidates. The BBC Online recorded that “Voting
cards were sold openly and candidates were offered thousands of dollars in bribes for votes. An Afghan working for the BBC went undercover in Kabul to investigate reports that voting cards were being sold and was offered 1,000 cards, each costing around £6 ($10).” [25ac]

4.19 By the end of August Hamid Karzai had extended his poll lead over his main challenger Abdullah Abdullah with Karzai reportedly having received 46% of votes to Abdullah’s 31.4%. (BBC, 29 August 2009) [25ag] Meanwhile Mr Abdullah had repeatedly raised his concern of fraudulent vote rigging saying that “… ballot boxes across the country had been stuffed with hundreds of thousands of votes.” (BBC, 17 September 2009) [25ac]

4.20 A press release by the Electoral Complaints Commission of Afghanistan on 24 August stated:

“790 Complaints filed during Polling and Counting have been received at the ECC Complaints Processing Center (CPC) as of 4pm on August 24, 2009. The vast majority of these Complaints were submitted directly to the Provincial ECC offices or the ECC Headquarters in Kabul. The remaining Complaints were filed at a number of polling stations in Kabul, Ghor and Dai Kundi provinces;” [98a]

4.21 A further press release by the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) on 10 September 2009 stated that “In the course of its investigations, the ECC has found clear and convincing evidence of fraud in a number of polling stations in the province of Kandahar. The ECC therefore orders that ballots cast in a number of boxes at 51 Polling Stations be invalidated.” [98b]

4.22 By the 16 September CNN had reported that the IEC’s latest election results showed that the current President Hamid Karzai was ahead in the Polls, securing 3,093,256 votes (54%) compared with 1,571,581 (28%) by his nearest challenger, former foreign minister, Abdullah Abdullah. [19a]

(See the Independent Election Commission website for updated news on the Afghanistan Presidential & Provincial Council, 2009 Elections results and Latest News for recent information on the presidential elections)
5. **Constitution**

5.01 The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) Country Profile, updated 6 January 2009, reported:

“The new constitution was agreed on 4 January 2004 and established a presidential system of government with all Afghans equal before the law. The human rights and gender provisions are an improvement on the 1964 Constitution. A minimum number of seats for women are guaranteed in both Houses of the National Assembly. There are also provisions for minority languages and the rights of the Shia minority.” [4a] (Politics)

5.02 The World Bank economic report on Afghanistan, dated February 2008, noted that:

“The Constitution establishes a unitary state with a strong central government, providing for a democratically elected President and for separation of powers among the judiciary, executive, and legislative branches. The Government is allowed to delegate certain authorities to local administrative units (provinces) in the areas of economic, social, and cultural affairs, and to increase the participation of the people in development. To this end, it establishes a role for elected provincial, district, and village level councils to work with the sub-national administration. Municipalities are to administer city affairs under the oversight of elected mayors and municipal councils.” [69a] (para. 4.15)

5.03 A report by the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission in August 2007 noted the main international human rights treaties that Afghanistan is party to (see Section 7: Human Rights) and also stated that:

“The 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan reaffirms the Government’s commitment to human rights:

**“Article Six**
The state shall create a prosperous and progressive society based on social justice, preservation of human dignity, protection of human rights, realization of democracy, attainment of national unity as well as equality between all peoples and tribes and balance development of all areas of the country.

**“Article Seven**
The state shall abide by the UN charter, international treaties, international conventions that Afghanistan has signed, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

“Other provisions of the 2004 Constitution reflect International Human Rights Law, such as the principle of equality between all peoples (Article 6) and between men and women (Article 22).” [78d]

6. **POLITICAL SYSTEM**

**OVERVIEW**

6.01 The CIA World Factbook, updated on 7 August 2009, noted that Afghanistan is an Islamic republic; the Government consists of both executive and legislative branches. [3a]

6.02 The US State Department Report on Human Rights Practices 2007, released on 11 March 2008, (USSD 2007 report) noted: “Under its new constitution, citizens elected Hamid Karzai president in 2004 and the following year selected a new parliament; although the elections did not fully meet international standards for free and fair elections, citizens perceived the outcomes as acceptable, and the elections established the basis for democratic development at the federal and regional levels.” [2h] “Elections to the Lower House of Parliament (Wolesi Jirga) and to the Provincial Councils were held in Afghanistan on 18 September 2005. These were the first such elections for 36 years…. The inaugural session of the Afghan National Assembly took place on 19 December 2005.” (FCO Country Profile, updated 6 January 2009) [4a] (Politics)

6.03 The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country report – Main report, 4 April 2009, in its democracy index ranked:

“... Afghanistan 138th out of the 167 countries rated. It is thus classified as an ‘authoritarian’ regime, despite having conducted democratic elections for both the presidency and legislature (as well as a number of regional bodies). The country should also succeed in holding a presidential election in 2009, although violence will be more disruptive than in the previous 2004 poll. Afghanistan’s low overall score reflects the fact that, despite seven years of strong donor support, including financial, military and governance assistance, its government remains extremely weak—which is reflected in an abysmal score for government functioning. The central government’s writ is applied only weakly in much of Afghanistan, with powerful local individuals having much greater power in many areas. In parts of the country security is so fragile that central government influence is hard to detect at all. Particular concern surrounds issues such as tax collection and the enforcement of law (including the eradication of opium poppy cultivation). Disarmament of militias, or their incorporation into national security bodies, remains incomplete. Corruption and misadministration are widespread and extremely serious problems.

“Reflecting the fact that elections have taken place, the country’s score for electoral process is more impressive, and for such a poor country Afghanistan’s civil liberties score is relatively good. This is partly the result of strong support for civil liberties among Afghanistan’s donors and military backers—a position reflected in the country’s new constitution. However, conservative Islamic forces have challenged the current line on civil rights in many areas, such as women’s rights. In addition, a combination of intimidation (often violent), weak electoral administration skills, poor education and cultural factors mean that the electoral system does not function freely and fairly. Insurgents also target those associated with the government for assassination in much of the country, especially in the south, deterring participation and freedom of expression. Although the Taliban—the fundamentalist movement
that ruled most of the country for several years until 2001—did not seek to prevent the holding of the 2005 parliamentary election, its attitude seems to have become more aggressive since then, which will further discourage participation in government and voting. Afghans are in any case growing more disillusioned with their government, after its failure to deliver on early overoptimistic promises of rapid improvements in security and development. Afghanistan’s political culture and political participation scores are thus low.” [84a]

THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH

6.04 The CIA World Factbook, updated on 7 August 2009, noted that President Hamid Karzai has been the Chief of State of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan since 7 December 2004, after winning 55.4 per cent of the vote. He holds the position of Chief of State and Head of Government. Ahmad Zia Masood and Abdul Karim Khalili have been Vice Presidents since 7 December 2004. Both President and Vice Presidents are elected for a term of five years and are eligible to be elected to serve for a second term. The next election is due to be held on 20 August 2009. There are 25 cabinet ministers who, under the new constitution, are appointed by the president and approved by the National Assembly. [3a]

See also Section 4: Elections 2009 and Latest news for information about the final outcome of August 2009 elections

THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH

6.05 The CIA World Factbook, updated on 7 August 2009, stated that:

“The bicameral National Assembly consists of the Meshrano Jirga or House of Elders (102 seats, one-third elected from provincial councils for four-year terms, one-third elected from local district councils for three-year terms, and one-third nominated by the president for five-year terms) and the Wolesi Jirga or House of People (no more than 249 seats), directly elected for five-year terms.

“note: on rare occasions the government may convene a Loya Jirga (Grand Council) on issues of independence, national sovereignty, and territorial integrity; it can amend the provisions of the constitution and prosecute the president; it is made up of members of the National Assembly and chairpersons of the provincial and district councils.” [3a]

PROVINCIAL COUNCILS

6.06 There are 34 Provincial Councils in Afghanistan (CIA World Factbook, last updated 7 August 2009) [3a] A UN Report dated 11 September 2006 observed that “Provincial governments are the main nodes through which the authority of the central Government is transmitted across the national territory. Centre-province relations are strained in many areas, however, as provincial officials often feel neglected or even undermined by the central Government.” [39c] (p5)

6.07 When reporting on the 2009 Presidential elections The Independent Election Committee Factsheet on Provincial Councils recorded that:
“It is the responsibility of the Provincial Councils members to represent and listen to the concerns of the people of the province and will play an important role in the development of provincial policy and expenditure. Provincial Councils have an important consultative and participatory role in many aspects of provincial affairs. For example, Provincial Councils will participate in determining the provincial development objectives of government in fields such as economic, social, health, education, reconstruction, and will contribute to the improvement of the province.

“The members of the Provincial Council are responsible for working with people to resolve conflicts, such as ethnic conflict and local disputes, for following the laws of the Government of Afghanistan.

“Provincial Council members work closely with the Provincial Governor and other government departments by holding regular monthly meetings. They are required to hold general public meetings at least once every three months.” [34a]

(See also Section 4: Recent Developments – Elections – 2009 for further information on Provincial election results from August 2009)

POLITICAL PARTIES

6.08 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Afghanistan, July 2009 stated that:

“The emergence and formation of political parties in Afghanistan has a long and complex history. Since 2002, the political party system is in almost continuous mutation. Older and more stable parties coexist with new tendencies, and alliances are volatile. Current leftist tendencies (other than those with former links with the PDPA [People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan]) include underground movements with roots in the sixties, movements already existing during the Taleban period that have recently adopted a moderate agenda, and youth movements supporting Western-style social-democracy.” [11a] (p30)

6.09 The Library of Congress, Country Profile on Afghanistan, dated August 2008, recorded that:

“In 2008 the largest individual parties were the Islamic Party of Afghanistan, the National Congress Party of Afghanistan (represented in the presidential election by fifth-place finisher Abdul Latif Pedram), the National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (an Uzbek party, represented in the election by fourth-place finisher Abdul Rashid Dostum), the National Movement of Afghanistan (a coalition of 11 parties also known as the Afghan Nationalist Party), the Islamic Society of Afghanistan, the Islamic Unity Party, and the United National Front (founded by members of the Northern Coalition and other leaders after the 2005 elections). United National Front member Yonous Qanooni, the speaker of the Wolesi Jirga, has been a key voice of opposition to the Karzai government and is considered a likely candidate in the 2009 presidential election. President Karzai has declined to form a party to advance his programs. The first parliament featured a broad division between leaders of previous military conflicts and younger ‘modernists’ who emphasized future
Another important division of political power is between the Pashtun-dominated south and the Tajik- and Uzbek-dominated north.” [96a] (p18)

6.10 The US State Department (USSD) report 2008, published on 25 February 2009, stated that:

“The law on political parties obliges parties to register with the [Ministry of Justice] MOJ and requires them to pursue objectives consistent with Islam. Political parties based on ethnicity, language, Islamic school of thought, and religion were not allowed. At year’s end there were approximately 100 registered political parties. Parties generally were able to conduct activities throughout the country without opposition or hindrance, except in regions where anti-government violence affected overall security.” [2a] (Section 2b)

A copy of the Political Parties Law may be accessed via the Afghanistan Online website. [66]

See Political affiliation for information on political rights in practice and Annex B for more information on political parties and organisations, and a list of political parties approved by the Ministry of Justice.
Human Rights

7. INTRODUCTION

7.01 The UN Secretary General report dated 10 March 2009 stated that:

“Afghanistan continues to be confronted by serious human rights challenges linked to long-standing problems such as weak governance, entrenched impunity, lack of attention to transitional justice, extreme poverty and discriminatory laws and practices, in particular against women and girls. These problems are compounded by the intensifying armed conflict. The transformation of Afghanistan into a peaceful, pluralist society is threatened by growing restrictions on freedom of expression.

“The widespread abuse of power by those in positions of authority, coupled with arbitrary detentions and the continued failure of the judiciary to respect fair trial guarantees or to operate in a just and independent manner, helps sustain the prevailing culture of impunity.

“The Action Plan for Peace, Reconciliation and Justice failed to meet its objectives within the time frame initially envisaged. Reinvigorating the transitional justice agenda is an urgent challenge. The Government and the international community have particular responsibilities to address the concerns of a significant majority of Afghans, who have repeatedly underlined their desire for a just and sustainable peace. The United Nations is reviewing measures needed to safeguard material evidence pertinent to alleged crimes, including allegations of tampering with mass grave sites.” [39] (p11-12)

7.02 The USSD Report on Human Rights Practices 2008, Afghanistan, released on 25 February 2009, stated in its introductory section that the country’s human rights record remained poor. Human rights problems included:

- extrajudicial killings
- torture
- poor prison conditions
- official impunity
- prolonged pretrial detention
- restrictions on freedom of the press
- restrictions on freedoms of religion
- violence and social discrimination against women
- restriction on religious conversions
- abuses against minorities
- sexual abuse of children
- trafficking in persons
- abuse of worker rights
- child labor [2a]

7.03 The Human Rights Watch World Report 2009, Afghanistan, covering events of 2008, stated that “Afghanistan is experiencing its worst violence since the fall of the Taliban government. Widespread human rights abuses, warlordism, and impunity persist, with a government that lacks the strength or will to institute
necessary reforms. Corruption and an escalating cost of living are affecting millions.” [17b]

7.04 An August 2007 report by the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) stated that:

“Afghanistan is a party to the following main international human rights instruments:

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) – ratified April 1983;
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) – ratified April 1983;
Convention Against Torture and other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment (CAT) – ratified June 1987;
International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) – ratified August 1987;
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) – ratified April 1994;
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) – ratified March 2003;
Optional Protocol on the involvement of Children in Armed Conflict – ratified September 2003.” [78d] (p4)

Afghanistan also ratified the International Criminal Court (ICC) Treaty on 10 February 2003. (Human Rights Watch, 2004) [17g]
8. SECURITY SITUATION

OVERVIEW

8.01 The UN Secretary-General’s report, dated 10 March 2009, stated that:

“According to United Nations statistics, 2008 ended as the most violent year in
Afghanistan since 2001, with 31 per cent more incidents than in 2007. The
second half of 2008 saw an average of 857 incidents per month, against 625
per month during the first six months. A mild winter has provided an
environment for high levels of violence at a time that traditionally sees a
decrease in hostilities. Specifically, there were 42 per cent more incidents in
December 2008 than in December 2007, and 75 per cent more in January

“Two trends identified in the previous report further worsened: attempts by
insurgents to destabilize previously stable areas and increased use by
insurgents of more sophisticated asymmetric attacks, with an increasing
disregard for the lives of civilians.

“These attacks, including assassinations, intimidation, abductions, stand-off
attacks, use of improvised explosive devices and suicide attacks, increasingly
targeted civil servants, religious scholars, the aid community and road
construction projects. The numbers of each type of incident increased in the
second half of 2008, and such incidents continued to occur into 2009,
including the coordinated armed and suicide attacks against multiple
Government ministries in Kabul on 11 February…

“Insurgents continued to expand their presence in previously stable areas. The
north-western province of Badghis and the neighbouring province of Faryab
became a battleground through the winter, with a significant increase in
insurgent action.” [39] (p5)

8.02 More than 2,100 civilians were killed in Afghanistan during 2008 because of
escalating fighting that spread to new areas. (RFE/RL, 3 February 2009) [29h]
The US Congressional Research Service report of 20 July 2009 recorded
number of Afghans killed including Taliban fatalities in 2008 was 6,340. [99a]
The Amnesty International Afghanistan Country Report 2009, covering events
from January to December 2008, released 28 May 2009, noted “The Taleban
and other anti-government groups significantly expanded their attacks to cover
more than a third of the country, including areas once considered relatively
safe in the centre and the north. Increased military attacks between
anti-government groups and US and NATO troops resulted in more than 2,000
civilian deaths. The government failed to maintain the rule of law or to provide
basic services to millions of people even in areas under its control.” [7] [j]

8.03 A report by the World Health Organisation released in February 2009 covered
the humanitarian situation in 2008 observing that:

“The security situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated further over the past
year, with the number of incidents worsening the security of humanitarian
operations increasing year on year since 2005. Armed clashes between the
pro-government forces and anti-government elements have continued to rise
both in numbers and intensity. At the same time, asymmetric attacks by
anti-government elements have risen at an even faster rate. These include the
increasing use of suicide attacks, improvised explosive devices, stand-off
attacks, assassinations, intimidation and abductions. Overall security-related
incidents including the insurgency, factional issues and related crime reached
a peak for 2008 in August, with a total of 987 incidents during the month,
against 686 for August of 2007, an increase of 44%.” [43b] (p9)

8.04 The UN Secretary-General’s report, dated 23 June 2009, noted that:

“The security situation has continued to deteriorate… The number of complex
and sophisticated attacks increased in the first four months of 2009 compared
with the same period in 2008… UNAMA [United Nations Assistance Mission in
Afghanistan] recorded 800 civilian casualties between January and May 2009,
mostly in the south, south-east and eastern regions of the country. This
represents an increase of 24 per cent over the same period in 2008, when 646
civilians were killed. According to UNAMA figures, 55 per cent of these deaths
were caused by anti-Government elements and 33 per cent by international
and Afghan forces (the remaining 12 per cent could not be attributed to any of
the parties to the conflict).” [39h] (p5-10)

8.05 US forces are expected to limit the number of airstrikes which is hoped will
reduce the number of civilian casualties. The order came after an airstrike in
Farah province during May 2009 in which, according to US forces, 26 people
were killed. However the Afghan government and human rights groups
estimated over 100 dead. (BBC Online, 22 June 2009) [25c]

8.06 As many as 60 Taliban militants were reported killed during one week in June
2009 just as the US deployed 7,000 troops across southern Afghanistan to
combat the insurgents. The troops were part of the 21,000 additional troops
promised by US President Barack Obama shortly after he took office. (Voice
Of America, 8 June 2009) [6a]

8.07 On 20 July 2009 Refugees International reported:

“In 2009, access continued to deteriorate both for the UN and international aid
organizations. From January to June 2009, security incidents increased by 43
percent compared to the first half of 2008, and hampered the humanitarian
community’s ability to assess vulnerable Afghans and respond to humanitarian
needs. Conflict-affected areas like the south or the southeast of the country
are virtually no-go zones, and information on the scope of needs is vague at
best.” [57b]

8.08 On 5 August 2009 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reported that a secret
Government security assessment map, a copy of which had been obtained by
Reuters, showed the security situation prior to the Presidential elections on
20 August 2009 stated that “133 of Afghanistan’s 356 districts are regarded as
high-risk areas…” [29d]

8.09 The secret map is reportedly said to have been produced in April 2009 ahead
of the August 2009 elections and bears the logos of Afghanistan’s Interior
Ministry and the army as well as the United Nations Department of Safety and
Security. The map shows that nearly all of southern Afghanistan is at risk from
attacks by militants. (RFE/RL, 5 August 2009) [29d]
8.10 On 13 September 2009 Aljazeera reported that:

“Dozens of Afghan civilians, troops and police, and five US soldiers, have been killed in a wave of violence around Afghanistan, officials have said. Roadside bombs, gun battles and a suicide attack took place on Saturday [12 September 2009] in all corners of the country, including the north and west, which had been comparatively quiet until recent weeks…The attacks came as Afghanistan is mired in a drawn-out dispute over election fraud.” [15f]

8.11 News articles on the security situation and security incidents in Afghanistan are regularly published by the international press and are too numerous to detail individually in this report.

See the Latest News page at the beginning of this report for information on the most recent reported incidents.

The BBC News South Asia, Al Jazeera and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty web sites also gives details of incidents as they occur. See:

SECURITY SITUATION IN DIFFERENT REGIONS

Kabul City

8.12 The International Council on Security and Development (ICOS) (formerly Senlis Council) reported in December 2008 “With Taliban presence intensifying and spreading throughout the city [of Kabul], criminal activity has been given space to flourish, increasing significantly in recent months. The fluidity of non-state actors means that it can be impossible to distinguish between Taliban inspired insurgent and pure criminal activities.” [20c] (p5)

8.13 ICOS further reported that:

“Of the four doors leading out of Kabul, three are now compromised by Taliban activity. The roads to the west, towards the Afghan National Ring Road through Wardak to Kandahar have become unsafe for Afghan or international travel by the time travellers reach the entrance to Wardak province, which is about thirty minutes from the city limits. The road south to Logar is no longer safe for Afghan or international travel. The road east to Jalalabad is not safe for Afghan or international travel once travellers reach the Sarobi Junction which is about an hour outside of the city. Of the two roads leaving the city to the north only one – the road towards the Panjshir valley, Salang tunnel and Mazar – is considered safe for Afghan and international travel. The second road towards the north which leads to the Bagram Air Base is frequently used by foreign and military convoys and subject to insurgent attacks.

“By blocking the doors to the city in this way, the Taliban insurgents are closing a noose around the city and establishing bases close to the city from which to launch attacks inside it. Using these bases, the Taliban and insurgent attacks in Kabul have increased dramatically – including kidnapping of Afghans and foreigners, various bomb attacks and assassinations. This dynamic has created a fertile environment for criminal activity. The links between the Taliban and criminals are increasing and the lines between the
various violent actors becoming blurred. All of these Taliban successes are forcing the Afghan government and the West to the negotiating table." [20c]

8.14 In August 2008 The Nato-led International Security Force (ISAF) began handing over command of Kabul to the Afghan security forces. (BBC, 28 August 2008) [25i]

8.15 An article in the Wall street Journal on 19 August 2009, reported on the Taliban’s attempts to disrupt the Presidential elections on the 20 August. Five attacks in the capital were recorded within the week leading up to the elections, killing 15 people and injuring 144. A Western civilian security official in Kabul said ‘They [the Taliban] have been stockpiling weapons and bombs. They have people here,’…” The Wall street Journal recorded that “Afghan officials have had some success in combating the Taliban’s moves. In July [2009], authorities captured a suspected suicide bomber who was believed to be planning to target government buildings in Kabul. [100a]

Afghanistan Information Management Services (AIMS) provides district profiles and maps on Afghanistan. [82a]


(See also Section: Latest News for more recent security incidents.)

List of main security incidents in and around Kabul city:

8.16 BBC News reported on 17 January 2009 that “A suicide bomb near the German embassy and a US base in the capital, Kabul on Saturday 17 January 2009 killed four civilians and an American soldier, injuring at least twenty others. The Taliban claimed the attack." [25a]

8.17 In January 2009 at least 20 people were killed when the Taliban attacked government offices in the capital, Kabul. Two Afghan ministries and a prison headquarters were targeted in the assault, which sent civilians and government workers fleeing for safety. The militants attacked the buildings in response to the alleged mistreatment of Taliban prisoners. (BBC, 11 February 2009) [25f] (New York Times, 11 February 2009) [28a] (The Long War Journal, 11 February 2009) [55d] (Aljazeera, 12 February 2009) [15h]

8.18 The Travel & living abroad, Afghanistan webpage on the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s website (FCO website), updated on 9 August 2009, recorded that the following incidents also occurred in or close to the city of Kabul:

- “On 11 February 2009, Insurgents made co-ordinated attacks on a number of Afghan Government targets in Kabul city, including the Prisons Directorate, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Education. More than 40 Afghan national were killed or injured in the attacks…”

- “On 20 May 2009 an IED detonated against a US military convoy travelling between Kabul and Bagram Airbase, around 20km north of
the capital. One US soldier and one US contractor were killed and a further three US personnel were wounded in the blast." [4f]

8.19 On 19 August 2009, a day before the Presidential and Provincial elections, a suicide car bomb exploded killing seven people, including Nato soldiers and UN staff. The bomb was the second in four days and only hours after two mortar rounds fell close to the Afghan Presidential Palace. (Times Online, 19 August 2009) [68a]

8.20 On 7 September 2009, a senior police official was reported as saying that a rocket attack in western Kabul had killed three civilians, including a young girl. Two children from one family were reportedly injured in the same attack.. (BBC Online, 7 September 2009) [25g]

8.21 On 9 September 2009 IRIN News reported that according to the Ministry of Interior (MoI):

“...In the past month at least 10 rockets have been fired on different parts of Kabul, often killing or wounding civilians… In less than a month, well over a dozen civilians have also died in a number of suicide attacks in Kabul: on 8 September a suicide attack near the airport killed two civilians and wounded six; on 18 August a suicide attack killed 10 (including two UN national staff) and injured 50; and a suicide attack in front of the NATO premises in Kabul on 15 August killed nine and wounded 90, most of them civilians… Taliban insurgents have often claimed responsibility for the attacks through their purported spokesmen.” [36b]

8.22 On 17 September 2009 it was reported that a car carrying a suicide bomber hit two military vehicles in Kabul city centre killing six Italian soldiers and at least ten civilians. The blast injured dozens of others in what was believed to be an attack targeted at a military convoy on Kabul’s airport road. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the attack which was one of the deadliest on foreign troops in recent months. (BBC News, 17 September 2009) [25ah]

Afghanistan Information Management Services (AIMS) provides district profiles and maps on Afghanistan. [82a]

The West

Includes: Harat (Hirat), Farah, Nimroz, Badghis and Gor.

8.23 On the 4 and 5 May 2009 around 100 civilians were killed in what was believed to be a US air strike in Farah province during a battle, resulting in the largest single incident in Afghanistan since the Taliban were toppled in 2001. Between 20 and 30 Taliban insurgents were also reportedly killed in the strike. It is believed that civilians had been sheltering from the fighting when the incident happened. The Taliban had reportedly escaped the fighting in one village and split up taking shelter in two other villages, ushering civilians into their homes and using them as ‘human shields’. (Aljazeera, 7 May 2009) [15i] (BBC News, 6 May 2009) [25af]
8.24 The incident forced an outcry in the town of Farah, the provincial capital, where protesters staged a protest and threw stones at government offices. “Haji Nangyalai, one of the protesters, said the demonstration had been called to ‘show our anger at the crimes committed by the American forces’. ‘They have killed our innocent people carelessly, that is why we are protesting’.” (Aljazeera, 7 May 2009) [15i]

8.25 Al Jazeera reported on 7 May 2009, that

“… there were a number of conflicting accounts of what had occurred. ‘The provincial governor told us that no one consulted him about the air strikes,’ he said. ‘It’s also been reported that the Taliban themselves killed villagers… There is one account of how they herded together three families and put them in a room and chucked a grenade in there.’…General David McKiernan said US forces launched air raids as they came to the aid of Afghan police who may have been ambushed by the Taliban. He said the Taliban beheaded three civilians, possibly to lure in the police.” [15i]

8.26 Aljazeera then reported that the investigation into the US air strike in Farah province 4 and 5 May 2009, headed by an Afghan army general concluded that at least 140 civilians were killed. However, “The US military has acknowledged that ‘a number’ of civilians were killed, but said it was impossible to say how many because all the bodies were buried before investigators arrived.” [15a]

8.27 The FCO website updated on 9 August 2009, noted that “The security situation in Western Afghanistan has become worse in recent months. There have been roadside and suicide attacks, rocket attacks and criminal kidnapping throughout these provinces and increased lawlessness in Western Ghor. There is little security infrastructure in Dai Kundi and Westerners have been kidnapped there.” [4f]

8.28 The FCO website, updated on 9 August 2009 recorded the following incidents in West Afghanistan:


- On 19 May 2009, an American patrol vehicle was struck by a large IED [Improvised Explosive Device] in Farah…

- On 29 May 2009, a large group of AGE [anti-government elements] ambushed a joint ISAF and ANSF patrol in Badghis province. The ensuing firefight lasted a number of hours…

- On 2 June 2009, an American patrol was struck by an IED [Improvised Explosive Device] in Farah. Five US soldiers were wounded in the blast.” [4f]

8.29 On 3 August 2009 at least 12 people were killed and 20 injured in a bomb attack in Herat, western Afghanistan when militants set off a bomb by remote control while targeting a police convoy. Police spokesman Raouf Ahmed was
quoted as saying that “two police officials, a woman and child were among those killed, and that the district police chief had been seriously injured.” (BBC News, 3 August 2009) [25a]

Afghanistan Information Management Services (AIMS) provides district profiles and maps on Afghanistan. [82a]  

Central

Includes: Ghazni, Maidan-Wardak, Logar, Kapisa, Kabul, Parwan and Daikundi

8.30 A UNHCR security update on 6 October 2008, noted that the following Central areas were assessed as being insecure after recent threats had been observed or reported:

- “Ghazni: The entire province including the highways from Kandahar to Ghazni and from Kabul to Ghzani [sic] is assessed as being insecure.
- “Maidan-Wardak: The entire province and the highways within the province is assessed as being insecure.
- “Logar: The entire province apart from the highway from Kabul to Gardez is assessed as being insecure.
- “Kapisa: Alasay, Nijrab, Kohband and Tagab districts and the highways from Mahmood Raqi (the provincial capital of Kapisa) to the mentioned districts are assessed as being insecure.
- “Kabul: Sarobi, Paghman (Arghad-e Bala and Arghand-e Payan), Khak-e-Jabar, Musahi and Charasyab districts are assessed as being insecure.
- “Parwan: Koh-e-Safi, Siya Gird and Shinwari districts are assessed as being insecure.
- “Daikundi: Kiti and Kijran districts and the highway from Uruzgan to Daikundi are assessed as being insecure.” [11d]

Afghanistan Information Management Services (AIMS) provides district profiles and maps on Afghanistan. [82a]  

South, South-East and East

Includes: Helmand (Hilmand), Kandahar, Zabul, Paktika, Khost, Patika, Kunar, Laghman, Nangarhar and Nooristan.
8.31 On 6 January 2009, 32 Taliban (Taleban) insurgents were killed during an operation conducted by coalition forces in Langham Province, east of Kabul. The operation's objective was to disrupt the Taliban’s roadside bomb network. Caches of weapons and explosives were later found during the search of the compound which had been occupied by the insurgents. (BBC Online, 7 January 2009) [25ad]

8.32 On 4 May 2009 the BBC reported on bomb attacks in two provinces leaving 25 dead:

“In the southern province of Zabul, a roadside bomb killed 12 civilians, mainly women and children. A separate ambush killed six security workers. In Laghman, an eastern province, seven people including a mayor, bodyguards and villagers were killed by a suicide bomber, the interior ministry said. Officials said a 14-year-old boy detonated explosives strapped to him. The office of the governor of Laghman said 10 people were also wounded, including three women, in the attack outside a municipal administration building, Reuters news agency reported. Police in Zabul said Taleban militants killed the security workers at a construction site, with two civilians also dying.” [25i]

8.33 The Foreign and Commonwealth Embassy website, updated on 9 August 2009 noted that “Southern Afghanistan is unpredictable and extremely volatile. There are regular military operations throughout the region and there has been a significant increase in the number of incidents ranging from shootings and roadside bombs to suicide bombings that have been targeted against both civilians and the military. Suicide attacks in Helmand, Kandahar and Nimroz continue.” [4f]

8.34 The FCO website also recorded the following incidents that have occurred in Southern Afghanistan:

- “On 24 February 2009, a US Police mentoring team were struck by an IED [Improvised Explosive Device] in Kandahar province…

- “On 27 February 2009, a group of around 100 AGE [anti-government elements] simultaneously attacked four ABP checkpoints in Nimroz province…

- “On 16 March 2009, a male dressed in an ANP uniform approached the front gate of the ANP [Afghanistan National Police] HQ in Lashkar Gah and, on being challenged by the guards, detonated a concealed explosive vest. The detonation caused numerous casualties…

- “On 7 May 2009, a suicide bomber detonated his explosive vest against the lead vehicle of a British Police Mentoring team in Gereshk district centre…

- “On 21 May 2009, an American vehicle patrol struck a mine in Zabul province.” [4f]

8.35 Up to 21 civilians were reportedly killed on 5 August 2009 as a tractor transporting people to a wedding struck a roadside bomb in the Garmsir
district of Helmand province. Those killed included women and children. *(The Independent, 6 August 2009)* [59a]

8.36 It was reported that over 40 people were killed and up to 80 injured in an explosion in Kandahar city after a massive car bomb exploded shortly after the first results of the presidential election were announced. No-one immediately claimed responsibility. Buildings in the city centre were destroyed or badly damaged including a wedding hall and the headquarters of a Japanese construction company. *(BBC, 25 August 2009)* [25p] The following day another bomb exploded in Kandahar close to where Tuesday’s car bomb incident happened, again casualties were reported. *(BBC, 26 August 2009)* [25q]

8.37 Fourteen people were killed on Saturday 12 September 2009 when a roadside bomb struck two passenger cars, in Uruzgan province. *(Aljazeera, 13 September 2009)* [15f]

Afghanistan Information Management Services (AIMS) provides district profiles and maps on Afghanistan. [82a]

**Border region – Afghanistan/Pakistan**

8.38 The International Council on Security and Development (ICOS) (formerly Senlis Council) report published in February 2008 stated that:

“To the east of Afghanistan, it is becoming increasingly clear that several parts of Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province are morphing into semi-autonomous statelets beyond the reach of Islamabad. Militants once trained by Pakistan as part of their strategic arsenal against India have now fallen outside of their mentor’s control. These loose cannons are posing a security risk to the people of Afghanistan and the forces of NATO-ISAF alike, and more direct preventative measures aimed at blocking their passage to, and egress from, Afghanistan must now be implemented.” [20a] (p9)

8.39 “In late June [2003] US-led forces launched a major assault on suspected Taliban and al-Qa’ida fighters along Afghanistan’s border with Pakistan, in response to an increase in attacks on members of the Afghan Transitional Administration and ISAF. The Taliban, reportedly bolstered by new volunteers from Pakistan and by funds from drugs-trafficking, continued their campaign of violence. Humanitarian organizations were also affected by the increase in violent incidents.” *(Europa World Online, accessed 5 January 2009)* [1c] *(Recent history)*

8.40 Europa World Online further added:

“In January 2004 the Pakistani Prime Minister, Zafarullah Khan Jamali, paid his first ever official visit to Afghanistan; the two countries agreed to work together to combat cross-border infiltration. In 2005–06, however, despite a number of meetings between Afghan and Pakistani officials, relations were strained, with President Karzai and his Pakistani counterpart engaging in public recriminations over cross-border activities and the fight against the
Taliban. In December 2006 Pakistan’s proposal to lay landmines and construct fences along the Afghan-Pakistani border to prevent the cross-border movement of militants provoked a negative reaction from Karzai, who claimed that such a strategy would be divisive. Relations between the two countries appeared to improve with the holding of a joint ‘peace jirga’ in Kabul in August 2007.” [1c] (Recent history)

8.41 The US State Department (USSD) report 2007, published on 11 March 2008, stated that:

“Taxi, truck, and bus drivers reported that both security forces and armed militants operated illegal checkpoints and extorted money and goods. The number of such checkpoints increased at night, especially in the border provinces. In Kunduz the customs department had no effective control of the many illegal crossings and claimed the corruption of border police permitted smuggling of drugs, weapons, and other commodities. Residents reported having to pay bribes to ANP [Afghan National Police] and border police officials at checkpoints and border crossings between Jalalabad and Pakistan. The Taliban imposed nightly curfews on the local populace in regions it controlled.” [2h] (Section 2d)

Furthermore, the report noted that “Ethnic Hazaras reported being asked to pay additional bribes at border crossings where Pashtuns were allowed to pass freely.” [2h] (Section 2d)

8.42 Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty reported in November 2008 that:

“The border areas linking northwestern Pakistan with eastern Afghanistan have seen a significant increase in violence of late, threatening Kabul’s control over its share of the vital region. November 13 [2008] saw one of the area’s deadliest attacks in recent months when a suicide car bomber struck a U.S. military convoy passing through a busy cattle market in Bati Kot, a village on the outskirts of Jalalabad, capital of Afghanistan’s eastern Nangarhar Province. A U.S. military spokesman said more than 20 civilians and one U.S. soldier were killed in the attack. Seventy-four civilians were injured, according to an Afghan health official. There was no immediate claim of responsibility for the attack, but Taliban militants regularly use suicide attackers in assaults against Afghan, U.S., and other foreign forces.” [29b]

8.43 The BBC Online reported on 26 November 2008 that the US and Pakistan military “…are working together closely on a section of the border that divides the Afghan province of Kunar and the Pakistani tribal area of Bajaur. Pakistan launched a serious and sustained operation there after its forces were besieged by local Taleban militants supported by foreign fighters from Afghanistan. The Americans say this is having a significant impact in curbing cross-border militancy, and have moved to block the escape of fleeing insurgents.” [25w]

8.44 In December 2008 “…authorities briefly suspended the Khyber supply route to launch an offensive against militants. The operation was intended to halt a wave of hijackings and attacks on vehicles carrying supplies into Afghanistan.” (BBC Online, 14 January 2009) [25s] In January 2009 ethnic Pashtun tribesmen blockaded the border crossing in the Chaman area of Balochistan province in protest at the killing of a tribesman by the security forces.
However, the blockade ended after five days when it was agreed that the killing would be investigated. (BBC Online, 14 January 2009) [25s]

8.45 Four militants were reportedly killed by Pakistani forces in the Bajaur region of the Afghan border on 9 March 2009 after the militants “…fired rocket-propelled grenades at a paramilitary force post near the town of Nawagai, a military official said.” This was the most serious incident in the area since militants declared a cease-fire two weeks previously. “Pakistan is under international pressure to eliminate militant enclaves in lawless ethnic Pashtun areas on the Afghan border from where the Taliban orchestrate their insurgency in Afghanistan and Al-Qaeda plots violence.” (RFE/RL, 9 March 2009) [29j]

Afghanistan Information Management Services (AIMS) provides district profiles and maps on Afghanistan. [82a]

North, North-East and North-West

Including: Faryab and Baghlan

8.46 A UNHCR security update on 6 October 2008 noted that the following areas in the north-west and north-east were assessed as being insecure after recent threats had been observed or reported:

“North West
  • “Faryab: Kohistan, Qaisar and north of Almar districts are assessed as being insecure.

“North East
  • “Baghlan: Baghlan Jadid, Baghlan Kohna, Nahreen, Andarab (now divided to Banu, Deh Salah and Pul-i-Hesar districts), Khost, Fereng, Guzargah Noor, Jelga districts are assessed as being insecure,
  • “Kunduz: Chardara, Dasht-e-Archi, Akhtash area of Khan Abad districts and the highway to Dasht-e-Archi are assessed as being insecure.” [11d]

8.47 On 8 July 2009 a BBC Online news article noted that Kunduz elders had accused the government of ignoring their province and there were clear signs that the Taliban had “… built a shadowy network of control and influence in the province’s villages and districts.” Local farmers were subjected to intimidation and complained of having been forced to pay the Taliban a 10 per cent usher (religious tax) in exchange for resolving their disputes. The Governor of Kunduz was reported as saying that the Taliban have their own courts and are better resourced than the local police. [25e]

8.48 The FCO website, updated on 9 August 2009 recorded the following incidents in the north:

  • “On 29 April 2009, anti-government elements (AGE) attacked an ISAF patrol in Kunduz with small arms fire and rocket propelled grenades.
Two vehicles were destroyed and one German soldier was killed in the attack.

- “Also on 29 April 2009, a suicide bomber detonated his explosives packed vehicle against a passing ISAF convoy in Kunduz province. Five German soldiers and four local national bystanders were wounded in the blast.

- “On 06 May 2009 in Baghlan, two gunmen on a motorbike ambushed a vehicle carrying the District Governor, NDS Chief, district attorney and the son of the governor. All four occupants were killed in the attack.

- “On 29 June 2009 in Baghlan, a group of 30 – 50 AGE attacked a joint ANP and NDS patrol with SAF and RPGs. Five ANP officers were killed and a further six ANP, including the district Chief of Police, were wounded.

- “On 06 July 2009 in Kunduz, an ISAF patrol was struck by an IED that had been placed under a culvert. Four ISAF police mentors (US) were killed in the attack.

- “On 01 August 2009, an remote controlled IED detonated targeting the National Directorate of Security Chief for Baghlan province. As a result, the NDS chief and two ANP officers were killed and one injured.” [4f]

8.49 The BBC reported on 27 July 2009 that in the north-western province of Badghis, the Taliban had agreed a truce with the Afghan government pledging they would not attack voting centres and would hand key areas to government forces. The Afghan government was reported as saying that it hoped to negotiate similar deals in other provinces. [25m]

See also Section 4: Recent Developments – Elections 2009 and Latest news for more recent security incidents.
9. SECURITY FORCES

OVERVIEW

9.01 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: Afghanistan, Security section, accessed 18 June 2009, stated that:

“The new US administration of President Barack Obama has made Afghanistan one of its principal foreign policy priorities...In February 2009, Obama authorised the deployment of 17,000 extra troops to Afghanistan to join the more than 30,000-strong US force there...The United States already has about 23,000 troops serving with NATO and approximately 15,000 under its own command. These additional troops are expected to combat deteriorating security in southern Afghanistan and help to secure more areas for reconstruction.” [35a]

9.02 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: Afghanistan, Armed Forces section, updated 26 June 2009, stated that:

“The ANA is currently comprised of approximately 80,000 troops, of which some 50,000 are in combat units. However, the Afghan Defence Minister stated in July 2006 that “the minimum number we can survive on within this complex, strategic environment...is 150,000 to 200,000, which should also be well-trained and equipped, with mobility and firepower and logistical and training institutions”. This did not receive backing from either the Afghan government or foreign donors, although in September 2008 NATO and Afghan representatives agreed that the size of the ANA should rise to 134,000 by 2012 at an estimated cost of some USD20 billion. It was reported in mid-March 2009 that the US was considering an increase in Afghan security forces to 400,000, of which the army would be 260,000.” [35b]


“The Afghan National Police (ANP), under the Ministry of Interior (MOI), has primary responsibility for internal order. The [National Directorate for Security] NDS has responsibility for investigating cases of national security and also functions as an intelligence agency. In some areas powerful individuals, some of whom reportedly were linked to the insurgency, maintained considerable power as a result of the government’s failure to assert control. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization remained in control of the UN-sanctioned International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which worked closely with the national security forces.” [2a] (Section 1d)

(See also Section 9: ISAF and PRTs and The role of PRTs for more detailed information)

POLICE

Afghan National Police (ANP)

9.04 The Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit’s report, Cops or Robbers? The Struggle to Reform the Afghan National Police, published July 2007 noted that:
“The Afghan National Police (ANP) is Afghanistan’s over-arching police institution, which consists of the following forces: Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) who are responsible for most day-to-day police activities; Afghan Border police (ABP); Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP); and the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA). In 2006 a temporary force, the Afghanistan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP), was established separate from the ANP to support counter-insurgency operations. The ANP operate under the authority of the Ministry of Interior (MoI), which is also responsible for overseeing provincial and district administration and for implementing the government’s counter-narcotics policies.” [22a]

9.05 The Afghan National Police (ANP), under the Ministry of Interior (MOI), has primary responsibility for internal order. (USSD, 2008) [2a] (Section 1d)

9.06 The Jane’s Security Risk Assessment report, Afghanistan, Security forces, updated 3 December 2008, noted that there were approximately 76,000 police personnel. The report also stated:

“The police in Afghanistan have never had an effective national enforcement capacity and have only been able to fully represent the authority of central government within the main cities. Their effectiveness in rural areas (over 90 per cent of the country) has depended entirely on co-operation from local leaders, including religious figures...The Afghan National Police (ANP) force is yet to undergo the reforms required to perform its core mission successfully. Development has been hindered by a lack of federal institution building, corruption, absence of sufficient trainers and a lack of sustained effort by the international community.

“The ANP does not function as a united, professional and disciplined law enforcement entity and is unable to preserve law and order across the majority of the country. Outside Kabul the police depend on considerable assistance from foreign organisations and nations, supported by military force. Former UF [United Front] fighters without any police training who remain loyal to their former military commanders and/or tribal entities constitute the majority of personnel. Illiteracy and an ignorance of the law prevents some of them from performing even basic duties. Like several other tiers of civil service, many police personnel are not paid regularly and their stations lack even basic equipment such as radios/telephones, pens and paper.” [35a]


“There are four levels of police and gendarmes in the rank system and a number of ranks within each level. The first or highest level includes ranks equivalent to brigadier general or assistant deputy commissioner and above. The second level contains ranks equivalent to major or colonel or chief inspector to chief superintendent. The third level includes ranks equivalent to company sergeant major to captain, or police staff seargent to inspector. The fourth level includes ranks equivalent to constable to sergeant.” [23] (p4-5)

9.08 The World Police Encyclopedia, 2006 edition further added that “The basic requirements for entering the police school are Afghan citizenship, age between seventeen and twenty-two years, good physical and mental health, height of at least 1.70 meters, no criminal record, and a minimum nine years...
9.09 The Afghan police do not generally carry firearms. However, they are issued weapons when required. “The Law of the Police and Gendarmes sets out the conditions in which firearms and explosives can be used by the police.” (The World Police Encyclopedia, 2006 edition) [23] (p6)

9.10 The Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit’s Report, ‘Cops or Robbers? The Struggle to Reform the Afghan National Police’, published July 2007 noted that:

“One of the big challenges confronting efforts to develop an effective police force in Afghanistan is the lack of policewomen. Of the 63,000 police being paid salaries in the spring of 2006, only 180 were women. Of these, many carry out menial tasks such as cleaning, cooking, and making tea for the men, rather than meaningful policing duties. A few have been trained and posted to search female passengers and their luggage at Afghanistan’s airports.

“Afghanistan’s conservative culture, which generally requires the strict segregation of men and women, makes the need for more policewomen extremely important. It is culturally unacceptable for male police to interrogate women, let alone search them. The lack of policewomen to question and search female suspects has reportedly resulted in an increasing number of women being used by drug traffickers to smuggle drugs.” [22a]

(See also Section 23: for further information on Afghan women)

9.11 The UN Secretary-General’s report, dated 23 September 2008 stated that:

“Serious shortcomings remain, however, with regard to training and equipping the police. Since the Afghan National Police is the only security force that maintains a durable presence in communities across Afghanistan, its shortcomings have serious effects. A weak, ineffective or distrusted police force becomes an obstacle to implementing an effective counter-insurgency effort, combating crime and ensuring respect for rule of law, securing a stable Government presence in unstable provinces and keeping vital highways safe and accessible. Border police are almost non-existent along significant parts of the country’s border and are unable to prevent large-scale smuggling and drug trafficking. Insufficient numbers of police officers and lack of training and equipment have contributed to a very high casualty rate among the members of the Afghan National Police. As many as 720 police officers have been killed since March. Finally, corruption remains a problem. There are credible reports of police positions, particularly in lucrative transit and drug-trafficking corridors, being ‘sold’ for large amounts of money.” [39a] (p7)
9.12 The Foreign and Commonwealth Office noted in a letter dated 17 March 2008 that:

“The Head of the Police Professional Standards Dept (PPSD) at the Afghan Ministry of Information advises that they investigated 200 complaints against police officers from members of the public this Afghan calendar year (21 March 07-20 March 08). Complaints ranged from minor assaults to using status to demand sexual favours…. 4 out of the 200 have been ‘proven’ and these have been referred to prosecutors within the Ministry to instigate court proceeding.” Complaints involving bribes or corruption, however, are handled by another department in the Ministry.” [4d]

9.13 An article in the The Belfast Telegraph on 11 September 2009 highlighted the difficulties of being the first female police officers recently recruited to the Afghan National Police (ANP). The article recorded that:

“They have no uniform and little training but a small band of Afghan women are taking the battle to the Taliban after becoming Helmand’s first female police recruits, the Ministry of Defence said yesterday. The 13 Afghan National Police (ANP) women were taken under the wing of British MoD Ministry of Defence officer Isabella McManus after she found them sitting unnoticed in a corner at Police Headquarters. Tales of heroic feats already abound — one woman was honoured with a police award after reportedly karate-kicking a detonator from the hands of a would-be bomber.” [95a]

9.14 Ms McManus said she initially noticed that the women were sitting in a corner of the police Headquarters being ignored and she felt the need to help the female recruits, including assisting them to design a uniform suitable for their needs, giving them some status. After which the female officers then began to feel a sense of empowerment [95a]

Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP)

9.15 The Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) report, July 2007 stated that:

“The AUP is the largest force within the ANP and is responsible for day-to-day police activities at the provincial and district levels. AUP responsibilities include maintaining public order and security, preventing and discovering crime, arresting suspects, protecting public and private property, and regulating road traffic. The strength of the AUP envisioned in the Afghanistan Compact was 31,000, but this number is being revised upward to 45,000.” [22a] (p11)

Afghan Border Police (ABP)

9.16 The AREU report, July 2007 stated that:

“The function of the ABP is to secure Afghanistan’s borders and its international airports. It is responsible for providing border security, surveillance and control, including the prevention of smuggling, drug trafficking and the crossborder movement of insurgents. The ABP are currently organised into eight brigades, but will be reorganised into five border zones
that correspond with the five ANP and ANA regional commands. The ABP are responsible for manning 13 border checkpoints, which may be increased to 14, and conducting patrols along the border. The ABP’s current strength is 7,900, and the target is 12,000, but the latter number is being revised upward to 18,000.” [22a] (p12)

Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP)

9.17 The AREU report, July 2007 stated that:

“The ANCOP is a new police force that was conceived in mid-2006. The mission of the ANCOP is to maintain civil order in Afghanistan’s seven largest cities, to provide a robust and mobile police presence in remote high-threat areas, and to serve as a rapid-reaction force to support other police in an emergency. The ANCOP will have strong leadership and be better trained (16 weeks of training) and better equipped than the AUP and ANAP, eventually with special weapons and tactics (SWAT) capabilities.” [22a] (p12)

9.18 The International Crisis Group Briefing, 18 December 2008 noted that “…they are presently operating almost exclusively in areas where the local police have been sent for training under the Focused District Development (FDD) program. ANCOP’s performance and lack of ties to local abusive powerbrokers have apparently led some populations to request these units remain, instead of their regular police returning.” [26a] (p4)

Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA)

9.19 The AREU report, July 2007 stated that:

“The function of the CNPA, which has an approved force size of 2,264, is counter-narcotics investigation and enforcement. Unlike all the other police forces, which report to the MoI’s Deputy Minister for Security, the CNPA reports to the Deputy Minister for Counter Narcotics. The CNPA includes a National Interdiction Unit (NIU), established in October 2004 that conducts interdiction raids across Afghanistan.” [22a] (p13)

Afghanistan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP)

9.20 The Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) report, July 2007, stated that:

“The ANAP is a recently established temporary police force that is separate from the ANP. It was created in 2006 as a quick fix measure to help address the growing Taliban-led insurgency in southern Afghanistan, and as a way to bring militia groups loyal to local governors under the control of the central government. The approved ANAP force size is 11,271. Recruits are hired locally in 124 high-risk districts, initially with a focus on six provinces in southern Afghanistan. New recruits initially receive only ten days of training —
five days of classroom instruction and five days of range firing — followed by one week of additional training each quarter during their one-year contract.

“Upon completion of this brief training, ANAP recruits are issued an AK-47 assault rifle and a standard ANP police uniform, although with a distinctive patch. They are entitled to the same US$70 monthly salary as a regular ANP patrolman. ANAP is presently viewed as a temporary force and recruits are only given contracts for one year, but they are likely to be incorporated into the regular ANP at the end of that year. The first ANAP class graduated in October 2006 in Zabul province, where the programme was first piloted.” [22a] (p13)

Structure and Reform

9.23 International Crisis Group (ICG) reported on 18 December 2008 that:

“Police reform in Afghanistan is receiving more attention and resources than ever before, but such increased efforts are still yet to be matched by significant improvements in police effectiveness and public confidence. Too much emphasis has continued to be placed on using the police to fight the insurgency rather than crime. Corruption and political appointments are derailing attempts to professionalise the force. The government and the international community need to reinforce the International Policing Coordination Board (IPCB) as the central forum for prioritising efforts and drive forward with much greater unity of effort. Tangible steps such as appointing a career police commissioner and establishing community liaison boards will build professionalism and wider outreach. A national police force able to uphold the rule of law is crucial to statebuilding and would help tackle the root causes of alienation that drive the insurgency.” [26a] (p5)

9.24 The ICG continued:

“Considerable work has gone into overhauling payroll and identification systems to provide more accountable oversight and end patronage networks that skim salaries meant for police officers who may or may not exist. The Electronic Payroll System now functions in most regions, with individual records for some 63,486 police. Of these 35,369 are paid by electronic transfers to individual bank accounts.” [26a] (p3)

9.25 The USSD report 2008 stated that:

“Rank and pay reform procedures put in place in 2006 were largely complete. The force rank structure was revised to align the size of the force with the mission requirements and to align ANP salaries with their ANA counterparts. The reform resulted in the retirement or demotion of more than 7,300 officers in the past two years. International support for recruiting and training of new ANP personnel was conditional upon new officers being vetted in a manner consistent with international human rights standards to generate a more professional police force. The international community worked with the government to develop training programs and internal investigation mechanisms to curb security force corruption and abuses. Over the last 18 months, more than 25,000 ANP members received training in the constitution, police values and ethics, professional development, preventing domestic violence, and fundamental standards of human rights in addition to
core policing skills. Under the Focused District Development (FDD) program, ANP were trained in policing skills including human rights at the central training center and regional training centers for eight-week periods. Nevertheless, human rights problems persisted." [2a] (Section 1d)

9.26 The International Crisis Group report dated 18 December 2008 stated that:

“In 2008, insurgents have increasingly targeted female police, with one of the most prominent policewomen, Lt. Colonel Malalai Kakar, killed in Kandahar in September 2008… Her murder followed the killing of a female officer in Herat and two women working at a police station in Ghazni, accused by the insurgents of ‘immorality’, whose execution was filmed and later shown by many national broadcasters to little local outcry.” [26a] (p5)

9.27 The report further noted:

“A number of steps are being taken to build up the number of women in the ranks. Because few women are able to stay away from their families in Kabul for prolonged periods to attend the police academy, efforts to increase the number of female officers include training and special courses for higher ranks in the regions as well as incentive payments. The 2008 tashkeel [authorised personnel ceiling] also provides for a new gender mainstreaming unit in the interior ministry to contribute to policy and planning. The unit has begun work with nine staff in Kabul, with 30 to be appointed in the regions.” [26a] (p5)

(See also Section 23: Women)

9.28 The Freedom House report, *Freedom in the World 2009*, Afghanistan, covering events in 2008, released 16 July 2009, recorded that the national police were suffering from “… inadequate training, illiteracy, corruption, involvement in drug trafficking, and high levels of desertion.” [41a] (p6)

**Torture**

9.29 The USSD report 2008 stated that:

“The constitution prohibits such practices; however, there were reports of abuses by government officials, local prison authorities, police chiefs, and tribal leaders. NGOs reported security forces continued to use excessive force, including beating and torturing civilians.

“Human rights organizations reported local authorities tortured and abused detainees. Torture and abuse included pulling out fingernails and toenails, burning with hot oil, beatings, sexual humiliation, and sodomy. A February 21 UN Secretary-General report noted detainees continued to complain of torture by law enforcement officials.

“The Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MOWA) and NGOs reported police frequently raped female detainees and prisoners. There were reports of abuses by Taliban and other insurgent groups. Media reports and firsthand accounts accused the Taliban of employing torture in interrogations of persons they accused of supporting coalition forces and the central government. The Taliban claimed responsibility in such cases by contacting newspapers and television stations.” [2a] (Section 1c)
(See also Section 23: Women - Rape, and Section 9: Security Forces - National Security Directorate (NSD) (Amniat-e Melli)

Extrajudicial Killings

9.30 The USSD report 2008 noted that extrajudicial killings continued in Afghanistan:

“In May [2008] the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, and arbitrary executions visited the country and reported on many cases in which police killed civilians with impunity. He focused on the need to reform the Afghan National Police and judicial system, curbing Taliban and other anti-government elements’ abuses, and addressing the often overlooked extrajudicial killing of women. His preliminary report dated May 29 stated that although there were no reliable figures on the numbers of such killings, the numbers of alleged killings were high enough to give Afghans, particularly in the south, some reason to support the Taliban.” [2a] (Section 1a)

9.31 An IRIN News article dated 15 May 2008 stated that:

“A special rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights has said hundreds of civilians have been unlawfully killed by the Afghan police, militias, international forces, foreign intelligence agents and Taliban insurgents in the past four months. Philip Alston - UN rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary and arbitrary execution, who visited different parts of Afghanistan and held extensive talks with commanders of the international forces based in Afghanistan, Afghan government officials, tribal elders and other actors - said at least 300 civilians had been killed by insurgents and about 200 others had been killed by international forces in 2008.” [36p]

9.32 On the issue of impunity of government officials who commit human rights abuses an IRIN News article dated 19 May 2008 reported that:

“‘A key reason for these failures to act is the extent to which senior government and international officials focus on ‘stability’ and ‘security’ rather than ‘human rights’,’ he said. ‘No one in the government has any interest in investigating, much less prosecuting, those responsible [for unlawful killings]…and no one in the international community seems prepared to change that situation.’” [36p]

ARMED FORCES

Afghan National Army (ANA)

9.33 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment: Afghanistan, updated 19 March 2009, reported:

“Creating an armed forces from nothing is a lengthy and complex process. Planning in Afghanistan has been haphazard, uncoordinated and complicated by corruption and well-meaning but inchoate foreign assistance. The Ministry of Defence remains near non-functional as regards budgeting, long-term planning, establishment of doctrine, structured acquisition of equipment, or any other facet of force development.” [35a]
9.34 The Afghanistan National Army (ANA) website, accessed on 17 March 2009, noted that:

“Upon becoming president of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai set a goal of an army of 70,000 men by 2009. By January 2003 just over 1,700 soldiers in five kandaks (Pashtun for battalion) had completed the 10-week training course, and by June 2003 a total of 4,000 troops had been trained. Initial recruiting problems lay in the lack of cooperation from regional warlords and inconsistent international support. The problem of desertion dogged the force in its early days: in the summer of 2003, the desertion rate was estimated to be ten percent and in mid-March, 2004 estimate suggested that 3,000 soldiers had deserted.” [12a]

9.35 The ANA website further noted:

“As of September 2005, 28 of the 31 Afghan National Army Battalions were ready for combat operations and many had already participated in them. At least nine brigades are planned at this time, each consisting of six battalions. By March 1, 2007 half of the planned army of 70,000 ANA soldiers has been achieved with 46 Afghan battalions operating in the fore or in concert with NATO forces. A total of 14 brigades that will primarily be regionally oriented are planned for 2008.

“Five Corps exist, serving as regional commands for the ANA: the 201st Corps based in Kabul, the 203rd Corps based in Gardez, the 205th Corps based in Kandahar, the 207th Corps in Herat, and the 209th Corps in Mazar-e-Sharif. Each of the four outlying Corps will be assigned one brigade with the majority of the manpower of the army based in Kabul’s 201st Corps.” [12a]


(See also Section 10: Military Service)
9.38 A report by Amnesty International dated November 2007 stated that:

“The NDS is one of the largest security sector agencies in Afghanistan. With its headquarters in Kabul, the NDS has sub-offices across the country and 30 departments with approximately 15–30,000 staff. The NDS is presumed to report directly to President Karzai, although the mandate of the NDS is outlined in a Presidential decree that has not been published and remains secret. Amnesty International has also been informed that the NDS also operates under a law promulgated in 1987, ‘Law of Crimes against Internal and External Security of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan’, but that its current functions are much broader than this 1987 law would suggest.” [71] (p33)


“Public knowledge of the organization and oversight mechanisms of the NDS remains limited, but its powers to detain, prosecute, sentence and imprison people appear to reach far beyond the mandates of many intelligence agencies around the world. Amnesty International is particularly concerned that the NDS’s powers of investigation and detention are not separated from its powers of prosecution and imprisonment, and that this improper overlapping of functions violates the right to a fair trial, facilitates impunity for perpetrators of human rights violations and undermines the rule of law.” [71] (p34)

See also Section 9: Security Forces – Torture and Section 13: Prison conditions for further information on the NDS

Former security forces – KHAD (KhAD)

9.40 A UNHCR report, dated May 2008, stated:

“The origins of KhAD [‘Khadimat-e Atal’at-e Dowlati’, i.e. State Information Service] can be traced back to a 1,200-strong group inside the PDPA [Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan] which, after the arrival of Russian troops in December 1979, took over intelligence responsibilities from KAM. That group, comprised of parchamis, was active from December 1979 until March 1980, and was known as ‘the activists’. It was led by a smaller group, headed by Dr. Najibullah and Dr. Baha, who worked on designing and establishing the structure which would be known as KhAD. The Government of Babrak Karmal officially announced the creation of KhAD, with its internal structure of multiple Directorates, on 10 January 1980. In 1986, KhAD was upgraded to Ministry level and from then on was known as WAD (Wezarat-e Amniyat-e Dowlati or Ministry of State Security).” [11c] (p2)

9.41 Reporting of the number of KhAD members the UNHCR 2008 report noted that:

“… the strength of the KhAD/WAD, at the peak of its capacity, comprised a total of about 1,000 persons per province, with some provinces having more
than others. Of these, about one quarter are believed to have formed the personnel of Support Directorates. In addition, the organization may have had up to 20,000 personnel at its Headquarters in Kabul, an undetermined number of agents and informers depending on location, and a further undetermined number in its military wings. In total, KhAD/WAD may have had between 15,000 and 30,000 staff at the height of its development, the figure being between 60,000 and 90,000 if agents and informers are also taken into account.” [11c] (p4)

9.42 UNHCR continued:

“KhAD/WAD officers often infiltrated Mujaheddin groups and fighting forces as commanders, tasked with supporting Afghan Government military operations by weakening the Mujaheddin capacity, exposing Mujaheddin military plans, destabilizing Mujaheddin groups and paving the way for government military action against the Mujaheddin. They were authorized to use any necessary strategies to maintain their cover and not disclose their identity as KhAD/WAD officers.” [11c] (p5-6)

INTERNATIONAL FORCES

9.43 Amnesty International reported on 11 November 2007 that:

“On 7 October 2001, the US-led OEF [Operation Enduring Freedom] was launched as a response to the attacks on the US on 11 September 2001. Security Council Resolution 1368 adopted on 12 September 2001 granted international legal authority for OEF, condemning the 11 September attacks and affirming the right of states to individual and collective self-defence. OEF aimed at ousting the Taleban government which had provided a safe haven for Osama bin Laden and al-Qa’ida. US forces were supplemented by ISAF forces in 2001.” [7] (p4)

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)

9.44 The NATO website, updated 3 September 2009, noted that “NATO’s main role in Afghanistan is to assist the Afghan Government in exercising and extending its authority and influence across the country, paving the way for reconstruction and effective governance. It does this predominately through its UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force.” [63a]

9.45 The same source noted:

“In accordance with all the relevant Security Council Resolutions, ISAF’s main role is to assist the Afghan government in the establishment of a secure and stable environment... ISAF is leading a number of Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) which are embedded in ANA [Afghan National Army] Battalions (Kandaks), Brigades, & Corps HQs, to support training and deploy on operations in an advisory role.” [63a]

9.46 The UN Secretary General’s report dated 10 March 2009 noted:

“ISAF now has approximately 55,000 troops from 26 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and 15 non-NATO countries. Coalition force personnel operating under United States command are believed to number
approximately 14,000. The Combined Security Transition Command — Afghanistan, which reports having over 7,000 members, including contracted civilian trainers and mentors, is responsible for assisting the development of the National Army and the National Police." [39] [p6]

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)

9.47 The USAID website, updated 18 May 2009, described the the PRT Mandate:

“PRTs in Afghanistan are key instruments through which the international community delivers assistance at the provincial and district level. As a result of their provincial focus and civilian and military resources, PRTs have a unique mandate to improve security, support good governance, and enhance provincial development. The combination of international civilian and military resources also allows the PRT to have wide latitude to implement their mandate.

“A PRT generally covers one province in Afghanistan, but some cover more than one. There are currently 26 PRTs operating in Afghanistan. PRTs seek to establish an environment that is secure and stable enough for the operation of international and Afghan civilian agencies to provide development support. Due to their unique composition, PRTs are also able to deliver development and support to less secure areas. USAID’s programs attempt to work with PRTs to deliver services in less secure or underserved areas of Afghanistan.

“PRTs have a broad mandate that covers the following areas:

- “They engage key government, military, tribal, village, and religious leaders in the provinces, while monitoring and reporting on important political, military and reconstruction developments.

- “They work with Afghan authorities to provide security, including support for key events such as the Constitutional Loya Jirga, presidential and parliamentary elections, and the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of militia forces.

- “They assist in the deployment and mentoring of Afghan national army and police units assigned to the provinces.

- “In partnership with the Afghan Government, the U.N., other donors and NGOs, PRTs provide needed development and humanitarian assistance.” [60b]

Avenues of Complaint

9.48 BBC News reported on 10 March 2008 that a new government office had been opened to collect “all manner” of complaints and to pass these on to the Office of the President. The office has 23 staff and is currently based in the capital, Kabul. The head of the new office said it “…will take the necessary measures to address people’s problems - but with no executive powers, critics say it is unclear how effective the complaints procedure can really be.” [25r]
9.49 The USSD Report 2008 stated “The MOI [Ministry of Interior] Human Rights Unit receives and responds to complaints of police abuse and has trained at least two ANP officers in each province and one at each checkpoint in Kabul to recognize and report human rights violations. Communication and coordination of reports between the provinces and MOI headquarters in Kabul remained a concern.” [2a] (Section 1d)

9.50 The Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission noted in a report, Economic and social rights in Afghanistan, released in August 2007 that “According to Article 58 of the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan, the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission was established with the purpose of ‘monitoring the observation of human rights in Afghanistan, to promote their advancement and protection’.” [78d]

(See also Section 17: Human Rights Institutions, Organisations and Activists - Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission)

(See also Section: 4 Recent Developments – Elections 2009 for information on complaints to the Independent Election Commission (IEC) about the 2009 Elections.)
10. MILITARY SERVICE

10.01 The Child Soldiers Global Report 2008, Afghanistan, released April 2008, noted that there was no conscription in the country. It also noted that:

“According to the Decree No. 20 dated 25 May 2003 on the voluntary enrolment to the Afghan National Army … the minimum age for recruitment of Afghan Citizen to an active military service is limited by the age of 22 to 28. All recruitments of personnel in the Afghan National Army is voluntary and is not forced or coerced [sic].” [33a]

10.02 The CIA World Factbook, updated 7 August 2009, noted that recruitment started at 22 years old and “inductees are contracted into service for a 4-year term.” [3a] The Library of Congress country profile of Afghanistan, updated in August 2008, observed that “Males are eligible for conscription at age 22, and volunteers may enlist at age 18. The term of service for conscripts is four years.” [98] (p22)

(See also Section 9: Security Forces – Armed Forces for information on the Afghan National Army (ANA) or Section 24: Children for information on child soldiers)
11. JUDICIARY

ORGANISATION

11.01 Europa World Online, accessed on 1 September 2009 stated:

“In December 2001, following more than 20 years of civil conflict, there no longer existed a functioning national judicial system in Afghanistan. In accordance with the Bonn Agreement signed in that month, Afghanistan temporarily reverted to the Constitution of 1964, which combined Shari’a with Western concepts of justice. A new Constitution was introduced in early 2004, which made no specific reference to the role of Shari’a but stated that Afghan laws should not contravene the main tenets of Islam. The Constitution made provision for the creation of a Supreme Court (Stera Mahkama) as the highest judicial organ in Afghanistan. Until the inauguration of the Court, which took place shortly after the Meli Shura (National Assembly) was officially opened on 19 December 2005, an interim Supreme Court, established in January 2005, functioned in the country. The Supreme Court comprises nine members, including the Chief Justice, who are appointed by the President, subject to the approval of the Wolasi Jirga (House of Representatives).” [19] (Judicial system)

11.02 The UN Secretary-General’s Report, dated 10 March 2009, noted that:

“The design of justice sector reform is contained in the National Justice Sector Strategy, to be implemented through the National Justice Programme, which established mechanisms to facilitate the efforts of the Government and donors in these areas. One of these mechanisms is the Programme Oversight Committee, overseeing the implementation of the Justice Sector Reform Project, led by the Government and administered by the World Bank. Another mechanism, the Board of Donors, formed in January 2009, assists the Government in linking donor support with the National Justice Programme and provides the Programme Oversight Committee with strategic advice. [39] (p7)

11.03 The UN Secretary-General’s Report added “Progress on the justice sector is hampered by the lack of resources available to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Attorney-General and the Ministry of Justice. These institutions lack qualified and experienced judges and prosecutors as well as adequate infrastructure.” [39] (p7)


“The judicial branch consists of the Supreme Court, high courts (appeals courts), and primary courts. Judges are appointed with the recommendation of the Supreme Court and approval of the president. The Supreme Court has overall responsibility for the national court system. The president appoints Supreme Court members with the approval of the House of Representatives (Wolesi Jirga). A national security court tried terrorists and other cases, although details on its procedures were limited…

“In some remote areas not under government control, Taliban enforced a parallel judicial system. Punishments handed out by Taliban judicial structures...
included beheadings, hangings, and beatings, according to human rights activists.

“Courts primarily decided criminal cases in major cities, although civil cases were often resolved in the informal system. Due to the undeveloped formal legal system, in rural areas local elders and shuras were the primary means of settling both criminal matters and civil disputes; they also allegedly levied unsanctioned punishments. Some estimates suggested 80 percent of all cases went through shuras, which did not adhere to the constitutional rights of citizens and often violated the rights of women and minorities. An NGO in Herat, however, reported shuras often treated women fairly in resolving civil matters such as divorce and custody cases.” [2a] (Section 1e)

11.05 The USSD 2008 report further stated that:

“In 2005, President Karzai passed a counternarcotics law by decree that serves as law pending parliamentary review. The law created a separate central court with national jurisdiction for narcotics prosecutions above a threshold level and an accompanying investigatory unit. During the year, it consisted of 30 prosecutors, 35 investigators, seven primary court judges, and seven appellate court judges. The court handled all cases beyond a threshold of two kilograms of heroin, 10 kilograms of opium, and 50 kilograms of hashish or precursor chemicals.” [2a] (Section 1e)

INDEPENDENCE

11.06 The USSD 2008 report noted “The law provides for an independent judiciary…but in practice the judiciary was often underfunded, understaffed, and subject to political influence and pervasive corruption Pressure from public officials, tribal leaders, families of accused persons, and individuals associated with the insurgency, as well as bribery and corruption, threatened judicial impartiality.” [2a] (Section 1e) On the same subject the Secretary-General’s report dated 6 March 2008 observed that:

“The Ministry of Justice, whose capacity remains limited, continues to be overburdened by the amount and complexity of legislation awaiting drafting, scrutiny and review. The Ministry, as well as the Supreme Court and the Attorney-General’s Office, continue to experience a significant lack of resources, infrastructure and qualified and experienced judges and prosecutors. The establishment of the National Legal Training Centre has resulted in the provision of ‘stage’ training to those being inducted for judicial or prosecutorial service. However, threats and bribery make it difficult to recruit, deploy and retain qualified justice officials of integrity in areas where they are most needed. Low salaries also contribute to creating conditions conducive to corruption. Further, the lack of transparent and merit-based processes for appointments and career advancement and the absence of effective and fair mechanisms for investigating ethical-code violations result in insufficient accountability, undermining public trust in the judicial system.” [39b] (p6)

“The judicial system operates haphazardly, and justice in many places is administered on the basis of a mixture of legal codes by inadequately trained judges. Corruption in the judiciary is extensive, and judges and lawyers are often subject to threats from local leaders or armed groups. Traditional justice remains the main recourse for the population, particularly in rural areas. The Supreme Court, composed of religious scholars who have little knowledge of civil jurisprudence, is particularly in need of reform.” [41a] (p7)

(See also Section 18: Corruption)

FAIR TRIAL

11.08 The US State Department (USSD) report 2008, published on 25 February 2009, stated that:

“Trial procedures rarely met internationally accepted standards. The administration and implementation of justice varied in different areas of the country. Under the law all citizens are entitled to a presumption of innocence. In practice the courts reportedly convicted defendants after sessions that lasted only a few minutes. Defendants have the right to be present and to appeal; however, these rights were not always applied. Trials were usually public, and juries were not used. Defendants also have the right to consult with an advocate or counsel at public expense when resources allowed. This right was inconsistently applied. Defendants frequently were not allowed to confront or question witnesses. Citizens were often unaware of their constitutional rights. Defendants and attorneys were entitled to examine the documents related to their case and the physical evidence before trial; however, NGOs noted that in practice court documents often were not available for review before cases went to trial.

“The court has two months to start hearing a case. An appeal must be filed within 20 days, and the appellate court has two months to review the case. Any second appeal must be filed within 30 days, after which the case moves to the Supreme Court, which could take up to five months to conclude the trial. In many cases, courts did not meet these deadlines.

“Under Shari’a, relatives of victims can pursue a case against a suspected offender and a judge can offer restitution or even, in the case of murder, execution, which the family could choose to carry out only if a member of the victim’s family consents. In addition, under Shari’a law, if the family of the victim pardons the perpetrator, the judge must issue a pardon as well.

“In cases lacking a clearly defined legal statute, or cases in which judges, prosecutors, or elders were simply unaware of the law, courts and informal shuras enforced customary law; this practice often resulted in outcomes that discriminated against women. This included the practice of ordering the defendant to provide compensation in the form of a young girl to be married to a man whose family the defendant had wronged.” [2a] (Section 1e)

11.09 Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty reported in December 2008, that:

“More Afghans are being detained without trial, with poor people or those without powerful connections the most common victims, unable to pay bribes to secure their release... While the number of prisoners in Afghanistan
remains relatively low, the figure has more than doubled in the last three years, says the UN, with 12,500 prisoners in the country compared with 6,000 in January 2006.” [23f]

11.10 The International Development Law Organisation (IDLO) website, accessed on 17 May 2009, noted that

“One of the most serious problems facing the legal system of Afghanistan is a lack of legal material and resources. Libraries and legal collections in the country were in fact largely destroyed during twenty four years of war. Most judges report that they do not have adequate access to professional resources. In a 2007 survey, 83% stated that they do not have access to written decisions of the Supreme Court; 55% stated that they do not have access to textbooks on the law, procedure and practice; and 36% stated that they do not have sufficient access to statutes or governmental regulations.” [81a]

CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

11.11 The USSD 2008 noted that “The Criminal Code, which human rights and legal experts widely reported was inadequate, continued to be rewritten and improved during the year.” [2a] (Section 1d)

11.12 USAID published an English translation of the Shiite Personal Status Law in, April 2009. [60d] The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) website provides a copy of the ‘Interim Criminal Procedure Code for Courts 2004’ [64b]
12. **ARREST AND DETENTION – LEGAL RIGHTS**

12.01 Article 31 of the Constitution adopted in January 2004 states

“Every person upon arrest can seek an advocate to defend his/her rights or to defend his/her case for which he/she is accused under the law. The accused upon arrest has the right to be informed of the attributed accusation and to be summoned to the court within the limits determined by law. In criminal cases, the state shall appoint an advocate for a destitute…The duties and authorities of advocates shall be regulated by law.” [4b]

Article One Hundred and twenty nine Ch. 7. Art. 14 states that “The court is obliged to state the reasons for the decision it issues. All specific decisions of the courts are enforceable, except for capital punishment, which is conditional upon approval of the President.” [4b]


“The law provides for access to legal counsel, the use of warrants and bail, and provides limits on how long detainees may be held without charges. Detainees often were not informed of charges against them. Police have the right to detain a suspect up to 72 hours to complete a preliminary investigation. If they decide to pursue a case, the file is transferred to the prosecutor’s office, which must see the suspect within 48 hours. The investigating prosecutor could continue to detain a suspect without formal charges for 15 days from the time of arrest while continuing the investigation. The prosecutor must file an indictment or drop the case within 30 days of arrest. In practice many detainees did not benefit from any or all of these provisions. NGOs continued to report that prison authorities detained individuals for several months without charging them. The press and human rights organizations reported arbitrary arrest in most provinces. There was little consistency in the length of time detainees were held before trial or arraignment…

“Police often detained women at the request of family members for ‘zina,’ a term used broadly to refer to actions that include defying the family’s wishes on the choice of a spouse, running away from home, fleeing domestic violence, eloping, or other offenses such as adultery or premarital sex. Authorities imprisoned an unknown number of women for reporting crimes perpetrated against them or to serve as substitutes for their husbands or male relatives convicted of crimes. Some women were placed in protective custody to prevent violent retaliation by family members.

“Authorities did not respect limits on length of pretrial detention, and lengthy pretrial detention remained a problem in part because the legal system was unable to guarantee a speedy trial. In other cases, the justice system operated quickly, with the judicial system deciding cases appealed to the Supreme Court within 10 months. There was no system of bond, and defendants released pending appeal often disappeared…”
“According to the MOJ, 12,495 persons were detained in correctional facilities nationwide, of whom 7,855 had been tried and convicted; the remaining 4,640 were awaiting trial. There were also widespread shortages of judges. Bamyan Province, for instance, reported during 2007 no judges were present in three districts and three others were understaffed. Another significant barrier to justice was detainees’ lack of awareness of their rights under the 2004 Interim Criminal Code for Courts.” [2a] (Section 1d)

12.03 A report by the Kings College London on the Alternatives to Imprisonment in Afghanistan dated February 2009 recorded that “An analysis of 104 juvenile cases where the sentence had been confirmed showed that over half would have been eligible under this code for a nonprison sentence. However, there is currently only one day rehabilitation centre recently constructed in Kabul by UNICEF which is not yet operational.” [56a]

12.04 The Human Rights Watch, 2009 report on Afghanistan stated that “The US military operates in Afghanistan without an adequate legal framework, such as a status-of-forces agreement, and continues to detain hundreds of Afghans without adequate legal process.” [17b]
13. PRISON CONDITIONS


“Prison conditions remained poor. Most were decrepit, severely overcrowded, unsanitary, and fell well short of international standards. The AIHRC [Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission] continued to report that inadequate food and water, poor sanitation facilities, insufficient blankets, and infectious diseases were common conditions in the country’s prisons. Infirmary, where they existed, were underequipped. Contagious and mentally ill prisoners were rarely separated from other prisoners.

“The government reported 34 provincial prisons and 203 district detention centers. The government also reported 30 active rehabilitation centers for juveniles. Twenty-two provincial prisons and four district detention centers reported housing female inmates at year’s end.” [2a] (Section 1c)

13.02 The Freedom House report, *Freedom in the World 2009*, Afghanistan, covering events in 2008, stated “Prison conditions are extremely poor, with many detainees held illegally, and a massive June 2008 prison break by the Taliban in Kandahar freed hundreds of inmates. Some warlords, political leaders, and the national intelligence agency maintain their own prisons and do not allow access to detainees.” [41a] (p7)

13.03 The UN Secretary-General’s report, The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security. dated 10 March 2009 also recorded that “Detention centres and prisons in Afghanistan are in a serious state of neglect. Reform of the civil service of these institutions, however, has begun.” [39] (p8)

(See also Section 12: Arrest and Detention – Legal Rights )

13.04 The UNHCR’s Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Afghanistan, July 2009 stated that:

“There are prisons in 34 provinces of Afghanistan administered by the Ministry of Justice, and 30 active rehabilitation centers for juveniles. Prison conditions in most facilities remain below minimum international standards. There are reports of over-crowding, inadequate food and water, poor sanitation facilities, and where available, infirmaries are underequipped. Contagious and mentally ill prisoners are reportedly rarely separated from the general prison population, whilst children of women prisoners live with their mothers, particularly where they have no other family. There is no gender segregation.” [11a] (p60)

13.05 The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime report, Female prisoners and their social reintegration, March 2007 recorded that:

“Pul-e Charki prison for women comprises one of the blocks of the prison complex housing male and female prisoners in Kabul. Accommodation is provided in nine rooms, holding 4 to 15 prisoners each and their children.
There were 69 women prisoners in the prison in December 2006, with 43 children. Twelve of the children were born in prison. There are 15 members of staff. All those working in the prison are female, though external security is provided by male staff.

“Food is delivered to the women’s dormitories. Most women interviewed complained of the lack of adequate and good quality food. Some women also receive food from their families, depending on whether they have visits, which often is not the case.

“Healthcare is inadequate. A prison doctor is said to visit on a regular basis, but interviews suggested that visits take place only on request and that treatment provided typically consists of pain killers only. A female gynaecologist working for AWEC [Afghan Women’s Educational Centre] has been visiting prisoners in Pul-e Charki once a month. The NGO, Emergency, also provides medical care to male and female prisoners in Pul-e Charki, with a 24-hour medical service available to prisoners. AWEC and Emergency supplement the diet of pregnant women and breast feeding mothers. Prisoners were not satisfied with the medical service and complained of various health conditions, including Hepatitis B and especially psychological problems. AIHRC expressed concern regarding the arrangements for childbirth. Hospitals apparently do not send doctors to prisons for delivery (and in any case there are no proper facilities for women to deliver in prisons), and they do not always accept women from prison for childbirth in hospitals.” [87b]

13.06 The report also noted that “Toilet and washing facilities are located outside the prison and hygiene is poor…. and many women complained about the lack of a heating system. There are three rooms which are used for vocational training and education classes, provided by AWEC (Basic Health Education, Literacy Classes, First Aid, Handicrafts and Tailoring). Classes are held five days a week, between 8.30 and 12.00.” [87b]

(See also Section 23: Women and Imprisonment of Women for further information)

13.07 Furthermore, the report noted “There is a day centre for children, though it did not appear to be in use at the time of visits conducted in December 2006, due to the lack of heating. At other times AWEC facilitates a child specialist to take care of the children in this day centre and teaches them the basics of the alphabet, numbers and Islam. The children are said to be given toys to play with and taught to draw. They are also provided with supplementary food by AWEC.” [87b]

(See also Section 24: Children)
14. **DEATH PENALTY**


“The 160 articles make no explicit reference to Sharia law, but the constitution declares Afghanistan to be an ‘Islamic republic’ and states that ‘no law shall be contrary to the beliefs and provisions of the sacred religion of Islam’ – and the Islamic provisions do foresee capital punishment, namely for crimes against Islam (armed robbery, adultery, and apostasy or blasphemy), and for crimes against the person (murder).” [83a]

“The 1976 Penal Code, still in force nowadays, identifies the crimes subject to capital punishment in numerous articles, which refer to two main categories: crimes against the security of the State and crimes against individuals, namely certain types of aggravated murder.

“Other provisions of aggravated murder have been included in recent legislation, such as: the Anti Narcotic and Drug Law issued in November 2003, which provides for the death sentence in the case where a drug smuggler, while resisting arrest, kills a law enforcement officer; and the presidential decree of July 3, 2004 that foresees the death penalty for those convicted of child kidnapping and smuggling aimed at using the victim’s body parts whenever a death is caused as consequence.

“Crimes punishable by death are also listed in the Law on Crimes against Internal and External Security of 1987, and in the Military Law of 1989, both of soviet inspiration and still in force. Such crimes are mostly related to the security of the State, especially in time of war. The crimes identified by these laws are processed respectively by the National Security Court and by the Military Court.

“However, the newly adopted Juvenile Code, that defined as juvenile ‘a person who has completed the age of 12 and has not completed the age of 18’, clearly states, under article 39, paragraph c, that children cannot be convicted to death penalty.” [83a]

14.02 Amnesty International’s article, *Afghanistan moves towards a wide use of executions* published on 13 November 2008 stated that:

“The death penalty is handed down in Afghanistan for crimes such as kidnapping, murder and rape…. According to Afghan law, all death sentences have to be endorsed by three courts (primary, appeal and Supreme Court) before they go to the president who has to sign the execution order, or pardon those accused. The Taliban used the death penalty until the end of their rule in 2001. After they fell from power the new government observed a self-imposed moratorium that ended three years later with the execution of Abdullah Shah in April 2004.” [7c]

(See also Section 16: Freedom of Speech and Media – Journalists for information on journalists sentenced to death)
14.03 Amnesty International’s report, *Death Sentences and Executions in 2008*, published in March 2009 noted:

“In Afghanistan at least 17 people were executed and at least 131 others sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of Afghanistan upheld around 31 death sentences issued by lower courts and which now await President Karzai’s approval. The trial proceedings in most cases violated international standards of fairness, including providing inadequate time for the accused to prepare their defence, lack of legal representation, reliance on weak evidence and the denial of the defendants’ right to call and examine witnesses.” [7e]

14.04 Death sentences handed out in early 2009, included:

- on 27 February 2009 three police officers were sentenced to death and two others sentenced to 20 years in prison after hanging a person, in Ghargi area of Panjwai District while they were manning a police checkpoint;
- on 28 February 2009 a villager was sentenced to death for giving wrong information that resulted in nearly 100 civilians being killed in Nato airstrikes which took place in August 2008 in Herat Province; and.
- on March 12, 2009 three people were sentenced three to death in two murder cases at a primary court in western Herat province. (Hands Off Cain, accessed 18 June 2009) [83a]
15. **POLITICAL AFFILIATION**

**FREEDOM OF POLITICAL EXPRESSION**


“The constitution provides citizens with the right to change their government peacefully, and citizens exercised this right in the 2004 presidential and 2005 parliamentary elections…In 2004, citizens chose Hamid Karzai to be the first democratically elected president in an election that was perceived as acceptable to the majority of the country’s citizens. Observers stated it did not meet international standards and noted irregularities, including pervasive intimidation of voters and candidates, especially women.

“In 2005 citizens elected 249 members of the Wolesi Jirga, the lower house of the National Assembly, in an election the majority of citizens viewed as credible. The AIHRC and UNAMA reported local officials tried to influence the outcome of the 2004 and 2005 elections. In 2005, anti-government forces killed seven parliamentary candidates, two parliamentarians-elect, and at least four election workers. Militants targeted civilians and election officials in a campaign to derail national elections. According to Human Rights Watch, in the south and southwest anti-government forces drove down participation to nearly one-third of registered voters.

“On October 6 [2008], voter registration for the 2009 presidential and provincial council elections and the 2010 parliamentary elections started under the direction of the Independent Election Commission…There was no established tradition of political parties; however, they slowly grew in importance in the National Assembly. The MOJ recognized more than 100 accredited political parties. Political parties generally were able to conduct activities throughout the country, except in regions where anti-government violence affected overall security. Many tribal leaders, former mujaheddin leaders, and insurgents were active MPs. There were reports that some used fear and intimidation to influence the votes of other members. AIHRC and UNAMA reported officials sometimes interfered with political parties. The parties also exercised significant self-censorship. Political parties were visibly suppressed or curtailed in some parts of the country.

“Although women’s political participation gained a degree of acceptance, there were elements that continued to resist this trend. Women active in public life faced disproportionate levels of threats and violence… There were no laws preventing minorities from participating in political life; however, different ethnic groups complained of not having equal access to local government jobs in provinces where they were in the minority. The law requires 10 seats of the Wolesi Jirga be allocated to Kuchis. Some members of parliament disagreed with this allotment arguing that under the constitution all groups were to be treated equally. [2a] (Section 3)

15.02 The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), Afghanistan Country report – Main report, 4 April 2009, ranked Afghanistan 138th out of the 167 countries rated in its democracy index. The EIU classified the country “as an ‘authoritarian’ regime, despite having conducted democratic elections for both the
presidency and legislature (as well as a number of regional bodies)." The low rating reflected the weakness of the government whose “writ” was limited in much of the country. [84a]

(See also Political system and Freedom of Speech and Media)

**FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND ASSEMBLY**

15.03 Article 35 of the new Constitution adopted in January 2004 states:

“The citizens of Afghanistan have the right to form social organizations for the purpose of securing material or spiritual aims in accordance with the provisions of the law. The citizens of Afghanistan have the right to form political parties in accordance with the provisions of the law, provided that:

1. The program and charter of the party are not contrary to the principles of sacred religion of Islam, and the provisions and values of this Constitution.
2. The organizational structure and financial sources of the party are made public.
3. The party does not have military or paramilitary aims and structures.
4. Should have no affiliation to a foreign political party or sources.

“Formation and functioning of a party based on ethnicity, language, religious sect and region is not permissible.

“A party set up in accordance with provisions of the law shall not be dissolved without lawful reasons and the decision of an authorized court.” [4b]

Article 36 states “The citizens of Afghanistan have the right to un-armed demonstrations, for legitimate peaceful purposes in accordance with the law.” [4b]

15.04 The USSD report 2008, published on 25 February 2009, stated that “The constitution provides for freedom of assembly and association; however, security conditions and, in some cases, local officials restricted this right in practice. Increased Taliban and other anti-government activity, particularly in the south and east, forced UN agencies and NGOs to cancel or curtail some public activities.” [2a] (Section 2b)
16. **FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND MEDIA**

**OVERVIEW**


“The independent media were active and reflected differing political views. Approximately 650 print publications, 55 private radio stations, 15 television networks, and 10 news agencies operated during the year. There were 150 private printing houses and 145 media and film production companies across the country. The two largest TV stations are Tolo TV, part of the Moby Media conglomerate, which has a 60 percent market share and Ariana TV, which has a 35 percent market share. The government owns at least 35 publications and about the same number of radio stations. Under a new media law parliament passed in September, the government gave some independence to Radio Television Afghanistan (RTA), the government-run media outlet.” [2a] (Section 2a)

16.02 The International Federation of Journalists report, *In the balance: Press Freedom in South Asia 2007-2008*, stated that:

“Since the fall of the Taliban regime, Afghanistan has witnessed a significant increase in media size and diversity. However, with the economy failing to pick up momentum and levels of poverty remaining high, the growth in advertising spending within Afghanistan has been modest, placing a significant impediment on the growth of an independent media. Donors who supported media development in the early years of post-Taliban Afghanistan imposed strict deadlines for media organisations to become self-sustaining, conditions that for the most part could not be met. Many donors have since pulled out, although the Afghan media continues to maintain a tenuous existence through bridging donations and other short-term financial commitments.” [92a] (p5)


“During the year [2008], various insurgents, government officials, and Taliban subjected members of the press to harassment, intimidation, and violence. According to independent media and observers, government repression and armed groups prevented the media from operating freely. Threatening calls and messages against media organizations also remained common and some resulted in violence… According to Nai Media, the government was responsible for at least 23 of the 45 reported incidents of intimidation, violence, or arrest of journalists between May 2007 and May 2008.” [2a] (Section 2a)


“Afghan media continue to grow and diversify but faced rising threats in 2008, mostly in the form of physical attacks and intimidation… a growing number of journalists have been arrested, threatened, or harassed by politicians, security services, and others in positions of power as a result of their coverage… Media diversity and freedom are markedly higher in Kabul than elsewhere in
the country, but some local warlords display limited tolerance for independent media in their areas… Some independent outlets and publications have been criticized by conservative clerics for airing programs that ‘oppose Islam and national values,’ or fined by the authorities for similar reasons.” [41a] (p4)

16.05 The Committee to Protect Journalists report, Attacks on the Press in 2008, recorded that:

“The security situation deteriorated as reporters came under increasing threats, both political and criminal in nature. At least three foreign correspondents and two local reporters were kidnapped across the country, not only in the provincial areas that became exceedingly dangerous after the U.S.-led invasion in 2001, but in the area surrounding the capital, Kabul, that had once been considered safer.” [91a]

16.06 In the run-up to presidential elections in August 2009, the Institute for War and Peace Reporting, reported in an article dated 9 February 2009 that the authorities have been accused of subduing the media, including the closure of The Payman Daily on 8 February 2009 after

“… mounting pressure on staff, which appears to have been triggered by the January 11 publication of an article that the Ulama, or Council of Religious Clerics, deemed blasphemous.” According to Fazel Rahman Orya, a political commentator for Shamshad Television in Kabul, “Officials in Kabul have no backing among the citizens of Afghanistan, and they have recently been isolated by the international community as well.” [73d]

16.07 The Committee to Protect Journalists reported on 20 August 2009 that:

“Security forces obstructed, assaulted, and detained Afghan and foreign journalists in Kabul and elsewhere in Afghanistan today, enforcing an official gag order on news of violent incidents during the presidential election. A spokesman for President Hamid Karzai told the press that information about attacks would discourage voter turnout.

“Police briefly detained at least three foreign journalists and several local journalists during the course of the day, according to news reports. Multiple accounts mentioned police beating journalists, threatening them with guns, and snatching equipment, but no serious injuries have been reported. Almost all the reported incidents occurred at the scene of attacks by militant groups.” [91b]

MEDIA LAW

16.08 The US State Department (USSD) report 2008, published on 25 February 2009, stated that “The law provides for freedom of speech and of the press; however, there were instances of insurgents, government officials, and Taliban intimidating journalists in order to influence reporting. Some media observers contended individuals could not criticize the government publicly or privately without fear of reprisal.” [2a] (Section 2a)
16.09 The USSD 2008 report further added:

“The parliament passed a media law in September [2008] that contained a number of content restrictions. Under Article 45 of the law, the following are prohibited: works and materials that are contrary to the principles of Islam; works and materials offensive to other religions and sects; works and materials humiliating and offensive to real or legal persons; works and materials considered libelous to real and legal persons and that may cause damage to their personality and credibility, works and materials affecting the stability, national security, and territorial integrity of the country; false literary works, materials and reports disrupting the public’s mind; propagation of religions other than Islam; disclosure of identity and pictures of victims of violence and rape in a manner that damages their social prestige, and articles and topics that harm the physical, spiritual, and moral well-being of people, especially children and adolescents.” [2a] (Section 2a)

16.10 The same source added “Under …new media law …the government gave some independence to Radio Television Afghanistan (RTA), the government-run media outlet…. The freedom of speech law covered foreign media; however, they were restricted from commenting negatively on Islam and from publishing materials considered a threat to the president.” [2a] (Section 2a)

16.11 The USSD 2008 report further stated:

“Also under the new media law, new newspapers, printers, and electronic media must be licensed by and registered with the Ministry of Information and Culture. There was concern within the media community that the new law would place greater restrictions on media content and create an overall climate of government intimidation and self-censorship. The government strictly regulated and limited foreign investment in the media.” [2a] (Section 2a)

NEWSPAPERS, RADIO, INTERNET AND TELEVISION

16.12 The International Federation of Journalists Annual report 2008, released/covering when? stated that:

“Readership of the print media is limited and will remain so until the literacy deficit begins to be bridged at an accelerated pace. Television audiences are potentially very large, but will remain an unrealised potential until innovative methods of bringing electricity to each human settlement in Afghanistan can be found. This leaves radio as the sector with immediate potential for the most rapid growth in content and audience.” [92a] (p5)

16.13 Reuters reported on 13 May 2008 that:

“Taliban insurgents have ordered residents of a province near the capital Kabul to stop watching television, saying the networks were showing un-Islamic programs, officials and local media said… The order is the last in a wave of curbs that the resurgent militants have announced in areas they are active. A senior Afghan information ministry official, Najib Manelai, said that dozens of masked men with weapons entered mosques in Logar province at the weekend and threatened residents against watching television. ‘They threatened the people that ‘if you do not give up watching televisions, you will face violence,’ Manelai told Reuters. Media reports quoted residents as saying

The main text of this COI Report contains the most up to date publicly available information as at 20 September 2009. Further brief information on recent events and reports has been provided in the Latest News section to 13 November 2009.
that the Taliban imposed the ban because TV networks were showing programs that were ‘un-Islamic and anti-Afghan culture’... The information ministry along with security forces was taking action against the Taliban move, minister Manelai said, without giving details.” [24c]

16.14 The USSD 2008 report stated that:

“In August [2008] in Kandahar, a female news anchor for a local television station left the province after she received threatening letters about her work... The Ministry of Information and Culture ordered four private television stations to stop broadcasting Indian soap operas by April 15. Several initially complied with the ban, but at the end of the year three of the four were again broadcasting the shows. In the case of one station, Tolo TV, the outlet reached a separate arrangement with the Ulema Council, the country’s highest quasi-governmental religious authority, which allowed Tolo to broadcast Indian soap operas provided Tolo also dedicated a specific amount of airtime to religious programming.” [2a] (Section 2a)

16.15 The rapid growth of the internet in Afghanistan has “broadened the flow of news and other information, particularly for urban Afghans.” (Freedom in the World 2009, Afghanistan, 16 July 2009) [41a] (p4) The USSD 2008 report further noted that “There were no government restrictions on access to the Internet or reports the government monitored e-mail or Internet chat rooms. Individuals and groups could engage in the peaceful expression of views via the Internet, including e-mail messages. However, Sayed Perwiz Kambakhsh’s case involved government sanction against distributing information he downloaded from the Internet. Internet access was unavailable to most citizens, and computer literacy and ownership rates were minuscule.” [2a] (Section 2a)

16.16 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty is recorded as being the number one radio station for news in Afghanistan, according to the US State Department (USSD) 2008 Country Report on Terrorism, published in April 2009:

“RFE/RL’s Radio Free Afghanistan has a weekly reach of 45.7 percent in the country, according to the most recent national survey conducted in August 2008, making it the number one radio station for news in Afghanistan. Afghanistan is the only country in the RFE/RL broadcast region where a U.S. government-funded broadcaster is the dominant media outlet. Radio Free Afghanistan delivers breaking news, in-depth reporting, and analysis to the people of Afghanistan on the struggles their young democracy faces, including a resurgent Taliban.” [2d] (p243)

16.17 The USSD 2008 Country Report on Terrorism stated “Radio Free Afghanistan not only maintained a close relationship and dialogue with its listeners, but it has had an impact on the country, reuniting families, providing basic health and hygiene information, and promoting change... Unfortunately, Radio Free Afghanistan faces an increasingly challenging security environment.” [2d] (p243-244)
JOURNALISTS

16.18 The US State Department (USSD) report 2008, published on 25 February 2009, stated that “Although some independent journalists and writers published magazines and newsletters, circulation largely was confined to Kabul, and many publications were self-censored. The freedom of speech law covered foreign media; however, they were restricted from commenting negatively on Islam and from publishing materials considered a threat to the president.” [2a] (Section 2a)

16.19 The Reporters Without Borders World Report 2009, covering 2008, released in September 2009, stated that “Afghan journalists are relatively free to express themselves, as long as they do not comment critically on the country’s only really taboo subject: Islam. Through the will of the Mujahideen, the Constitution prevails but Sharia law can be applied, under Articles 130 and 131 of fundamental law.” [62a]

16.20 The Freedom House report, Freedom in the World 2009, Afghanistan, covering events in 2008, released 16 July 2009, recorded that: “Though a new media law has sought to clarify press freedoms and limit the involvement of government in the workings of the free press, a growing number of journalists have been arrested, threatened, or harassed by politicians, security services, and others in positions of power as a result of their coverage.” [41a] (p4)

16.21 Aljazeera.net reported on 8 November 2008 that:

“Mellissa Fung, a journalist working for the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation in Afghanistan, has been freed after being seized at a UN refugee camp outside Kabul last month [October 2008]… Fung had been on assignment in the southern city of Kandahar, where Canada has at least 2,700 troops on a military mission due to end in 2011. Afghan officials said that three men had been arrested over the abduction.” [15g]

16.22 In a Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty article, dated 14 January 2009, it was reported that:

“An Afghan government commission [sic] that oversees the media is taking journalists from the daily ‘Payman’ to the Supreme Court to be prosecuted, RFE/RL’s Radio Free Afghanistan reports. The commission accuses ‘Payman’ of printing articles that are anti-Islamic and anti-religion. It also accuses the chief editor and other staffers at the daily of insulting the beliefs of Afghans and committing unlawful acts. The Religious Council of Afghanistan called in a decree for the government to put the editorial staff of the daily on trial. The daily wrote in the January 14 issue of the newspaper that officials from the Supreme Court have arrested seven members of the ‘Payman’ staff.” [29i]

16.23 The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), press release of 12 March 2009, stated that:

“The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) condemns the killing of Jawed Ahmad, a young Afghan Journalist, in Kandahar on 10 March 2009. The AIHRC, while clearly sees this as an un-Islamic and inhumane act, urges the Afghan government to identify, arrest,
and take accountable the perpetrators of this tragic incident, at their earliest convenience.

“The AIHRC has registered 43 cases of murder, intimidation, and mistreatment against journalists since 2008, which shows an appalling curve. The AIHRC therefore expresses its high level of concern, and believes that continuation of such incidents will not only threat personal safety and security of citizens, and particularly of journalists, but structurally question freedom of expression and citizen’s rights to information as enshrined in the Constitution.

“The AIHRC is therefore urging all parties to the conflict, especially the Afghan Government, to protect civilians’, as well as journalists’ and media personnel’s lives.” [78c]

16.24 The Reporters Without Borders World Report 2009, stated that:

“Journalists still do not have the necessary security for doing their work, more than seven years after the fall of the Taliban. And there are new threats from drug and kidnap gangs as well as the politicising of the crime of ‘blasphemy’, none of which the Karzai government has managed to curb, even if it wanted to.

“Afghanistan’s security, political and financial crisis has serious repercussions for the work of journalists. The state is unable to guarantee journalists’ safety. Thus, between June 2007 and January 2009, there were no fewer than 24 physical assaults, 35 death threats, 14 arrests and seven abductions. Scores more journalists, mainly women and those working in the provinces, have been forced to resign because of external pressure.” [62a]

16.25 On 20 August 2009, the day of the Afghan Presidential Elections, the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) reported that:

“Security forces obstructed, assaulted, and detained Afghan and foreign journalists in Kabul and elsewhere in Afghanistan today, enforcing an official gag order on news of violent incidents during the presidential election. A spokesman for President Hamid Karzai told the press that information about attacks would discourage voter turnout.

“Police briefly detained at least three foreign journalists and several local journalists during the course of the day, according to news reports. Multiple accounts mentioned police beating journalists, threatening them with guns, and snatching equipment, but no serious injuries have been reported. Almost all the reported incidents occurred at the scene of attacks by militant groups.

“Afghanistan’s Foreign and Interior ministries issued statements on Tuesday asking reporters to suppress news of violent incidents and stay away from sites of reported strikes during polling hours, which concluded this evening.” [91b]

16.26 The same source listed further further incidents of journalists being harrassed on 20 August 2009, Presidential election day, including:
• “At least two Afghan journalists with Tolo TV were briefly detained, and three more beaten in the past two days, according to Saad Mohseni, Tolo’s founder and director…

• “Authorities detained Japanese journalist Kojiro Nobuhiro, a Tokyo Broadcasting System (TBS) television correspondent for several hours on Thursday [20 August 2009] morning, according to international news reports. TBS issued a statement saying he had been questioned about his coverage, according to Reuters.

• The Christian Science Monitor said Dutch photojournalist Ruben Terlo and Rohulla Samadi, a translator with independent Afghan media organization Killid Media, were detained for 30 minutes after covering a gun battle between Taliban and police.” [91b]

(See also Section 4 on Recent Developments – Elections 2009)

NIGHT LETTERS

16.27 The International Crisis Group report published on 24 July 2008 noted that:

“Night letters (shabnamah) are a traditional means of communication in Afghanistan. Printed or handwritten pages are delivered to individuals, distributed through towns and villages or even blanketed over provinces. It is difficult to establish the true source of night letters, since messages are sent by a large variety of sources. Criminal groups, including those involved in the drugs trade, could, for example, conceivably use night letters in the name of the Taliban to generate fear in an area.

“The Taliban uses them often to deliver threats, generally directed at Afghans who work with the international forces or the government. For instance, a printed one-page missive distributed in south eastern Afghanistan in May 2008 in the name of the ‘Afghanistan Islamic Emirate Khost Jihadi Military Front’ warned ‘all residents in Khost’ that:

“1. Tribal elders should not consider the U.S. stronger than Allah and not give verdicts against mujahidin; otherwise you will soon regret it.

“2. Those who spy and work for the infidel government and military forces should quit their jobs by 20 June; otherwise they will see something which they have never seen in their lives.

“3. Do not get close to the infidel forces at any time or in any place.

“4. During attacks on government and infidel forces, you should keep yourselves safe and not provide support for them; if this rule is violated, your death will be the same as the death of the U.S. and their puppets.

“5. Our mines are live; we do not allow the killing of civilians, but you should not show them to the infidels and their slaves. We will show our power to those who show our land mines to them or inform them about us.
“6. When you see infidel forces on the street and roads, stop where you are and do not go forward.

“7. Those mullahs who perform funerals for those who are killed in the campaign – national army, national and border police and intelligence – will be killed with torture; and remember: such a mullah will never be forgiven.” [26c] (p12)

16.28 The USSD 2008 report stated:

“As in recent years, Taliban distributed threatening letters at night in villages and sent threatening text messages to intimidate and attempt to curtail development activities… As in the past, insurgents issued night letters threatening women working for the government, local NGOs, and foreign organizations. Women who received threats were often forced to move constantly to evade those harassing them.” [2a] (Section 5)

16.29 In the southeastern province of Ghazni the Taliban reportedly posted ‘night letters’ in the run-up to the August 2009 elections reminding Afghans of their religious obligations and reiterating warnings that they will continue to disrupt the election process. One letter warned Afghans that “In order that this illegitimate process faces failure, the fighters will intensively attack polling centers, and [we] warn voters to stay home one day before,” Young Afghans were specifically warned in one letter to avoid using high-tech gadgets and reminded of the Taliban’s interpretation of the Shari’a law in a letter obtained by Reuters on 3 August 2009 stating “People with camera cellphones must not have pictures of unrelated women and handsome boys in their phones, which is against Islamic Shari’a,” (RFE/RL, 18 August 2009) [29c]

The International Federation of Journalists report, Under Fire, Press Freedom in South Asia 2008-2009, lists media workers that have been subject to physical harm, intimidation, abducted, detained or killed during between May 2008 and April 2009. [92a] (p30-31) The Committee to Protect Journalists and the Reporters Without Borders websites included further details of journalists attacked, threatened, abducted and imprisoned during 2009.
17. HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS, ORGANISATIONS AND ACTIVISTS

AFGHANISTAN INDEPENDENT HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION

17.01 The Chairpersons note from the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) Annual Report 1 January to 31 December 2008, dated? stated that the:

“Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) was established in 2002 with a strong mandate to protect, promote, and monitor human rights of Afghan citizens in the country. The AIHRC has travelled a long way to fulfil its obligations and realize its goals, continuously expanding its operations to reach towns and remote villages in most parts of the country. The commission has received and investigated numerous human rights violation cases and has imparted human rights awareness and knowledge to thousands of Afghans from all segments of society ranging from government officials to the general population and school children. Despite the significant achievements, by the AIHRC and its partners, towards the realization of human rights and respect for human dignity, a vicious circle of challenges continued, and even worsened in 2008, to obstruct the Commission’s goals and jeopardize its success.” [78b] (p5)


“The constitutionally mandated AIHRC continued to address human rights problems. The president appointed the nine-member commission, which generally acted independently of the government, often voicing strong criticism of government institutions and actions, and accepting and investigating general complaints of human rights abuses. The AIHRC operated 12 offices outside Kabul. The AIHRC was reasonably influential in its ability to raise public awareness and shape national policy on human rights. In 2007 some MPs sought to review the law that defines the mandate of the AIHRC and proposed the AIHRC include religious scholars educated in Shari’a. No action was taken on the mandate of the AIHRC by year’s end. In 2007 however, President Karzai appointed a religious scholar as a commissioner who continued in this role throughout the year. The government did not fund the AIHRC, which continued to rely on international donors.” [2a] (Section 4)

17.03 The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission’s (AIHRC) mandate was set out in their report of August 2007:

“According to Article 58 of the 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan, the Independent Human Rights Commission of Afghanistan was established with the purpose of ‘monitoring the observation of human rights in Afghanistan, to promote their advancement and protection.’

“Article 5 of the new Law on the Structure, Duties and Authorities of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (Official Gazette, Issue No. 855, 21 June 2005), sets out the Commission’s objectives and responsibilities, which include:

“The promotion and protection of human rights (Article 5);
“Monitoring the implementation of the Constitution and other laws as well as Afghanistan’s commitment to human rights (Article 21, 2);

“Monitoring the performance of State authorities and NGO’s [sic] regarding the equal distribution of services and welfare (Article 21, 4).

“Where violations and abuses of human rights are identified, the Commission has a mandate to take steps to protect and to promote human rights, including through advocacy and submission of reports to the Government.” [78d] (p3-4)

**NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS (NGOS)**

17.04 The US State Department (USSD) report 2008, published on 25 February 2009, stated that:

“A wide variety of domestic and international human rights groups generally operated without government restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases. Hundreds of local human rights NGOs operated independently and included groups focusing on women’s rights, media freedom, and rights of disabled persons. Government officials were generally cooperative and responsive to the organizations’ views. The lack of security and instability in parts of the country severely reduced NGO activities in these areas.” [2a] (Section 4)

17.05 A statement by the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief in August 2008 stated “Aid organizations and their staff have been subject to increasing attacks, threats and intimidation, by both insurgent and criminal groups. This year [2008] there have been over 84 such incidents, including 21 in June, more than in any other month in the last six years. So far this year [2008] 19 NGO staff have been killed, which already exceeds the total number of NGO workers killed last year.” [94a]

17.06 The *Washington Post*, reported in an article on 17 February 2008 that “In addition to foreigners, Afghans in the capital are also coming under threat, especially those associated with international groups. Employees of foreign aid organizations or news agencies have received warnings to quit. Last week, several such Afghans who previously had been willing to be identified asked not to be named now. Others said they had sent their families to Pakistan as a safety precaution.” [32a]
18. **CORRUPTION**

18.01 In its 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), covering 2008, released in September 2008, Transparency International ranked Afghanistan at 176 out of 180 countries, giving it a CPI score of 1.5. (CPI Score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen to exist among public officials and politicians by business people and country analysts. It ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). [89a]

18.02 The Freedom House report, *Freedom in the World 2009*, covering events in 2008, released 16 July 2009, recorded that in Afghanistan: “Corruption, nepotism, and cronyism are rampant, and woefully inadequate salaries exacerbate corrupt behavior by public-sector workers. Apart from security, donors and other observers maintain that corruption and waste in the government are the foremost challenges to the country’s sustainable development.” [41a] (p4)


“The law provides criminal penalties for official corruption; however, the government did not always implement the law effectively, and officials frequently engaged in corrupt practices with impunity. In March [2008], the UN Office on Drugs and Crime released a statement urging the government to crack down on major smugglers—some linked to government officials—and stated drug lords and corrupt government officials operated with impunity. The government took some steps to address corruption including becoming a state party to the UN Convention against Corruption, adopting new anticorruption legislation, and establishing a new anticorruption body. However, not all of these actions had been implemented by year’s end. The government hired two anticorruption unit employees in September and initiated training for the employees in November. The president replaced a cabinet minister, several governors, police chiefs, and other officials because of their corrupt practices.

“A lack of political accountability and technical capacity to monitor government spending exacerbated government corruption, as did low salaries. Observers alleged governors with reported involvement in the drug trade or past records of human rights violations nevertheless received executive appointments and served with relative impunity.” [2a] (Section 3)

18.04 Corruption has reportedly infected most services in Afghanistan and extends from low-level police officers, who earn approximately $100 a month taking bribes to pay for food and their rent to top Government Officials, including the Attorney General, who was accused of corruption. (*The Chicago Tribune*, 25 November 2008) [86a] The Freedom House report, *Freedom in the World 2009*, Afghanistan, covering events in 2008, released 16 July 2009, added “Corruption in the judiciary is extensive, and judges and lawyers are often subject to threats from local leaders or armed groups.” [41a] (p5)

18.05 *The Chicago Tribune* article also reported that:

“A 2007 survey by Integrity Watch Afghanistan said the average Afghan household pays an estimated [US]$100 in petty bribes every year—even
though 70 percent of the families in Afghanistan live on less than [US]$1 a day… Bribes here are called shirini, which means ‘sweets’ in the Afghan language of Dari. Most interactions with the government require shirini — getting a new driver’s license quickly costs $100 to $160, Afghans say. Even to pay a water or electricity bill, a customer has to hand over a bribe.” [86a]

18.06 The US State Department (USSD) report 2008, published on 25 February 2009, stated that:

“The government made efforts to combat corruption in the security apparatus. The government electronically direct deposited police and military salaries during the year, making pay a more transparent and accountable process and less subject to corruption... In August [2008] the parliament passed the Law on Monitoring the Implementation of the Anti-Administrative Corruption Strategy, which sought to increase ministerial transparency and accountability, tighten contracting laws, and increase legal access to information on high-ranking individuals’ assets. President Karzai appointed the chief of the commission in September [2008]. During December the commission opened a central office in Kabul and hired a small staff. The government also established an anticorruption unit within the Attorney General’s Office. Efforts to staff the unit with prosecutors were ongoing at year’s end.” [2a] (Section 1d)

18.07 The Chicago Tribune reported on 25 November 2008 “…the anti-corruption bureau once had 380 employees, but that number was reduced to 141 and the provincial offices were closed.” None of the 174 major cases of corruption that were sent to the attorney general’s office got very far in the system. However, “[the] …new anti-corruption commission, the High Office of Oversight & Anti-Corruption, includes representatives from several law-enforcement bodies and supposedly has more power.” [86a] The commission “…opened its Kabul headquarters and began to hold regular meetings with the President, the Supreme Court, the Attorney-General and the Ministry of Justice.” (UN Secretary General, 10 March 2009) [39] (p7)

18.08 The USSD 2008 report further noted:

“The law provides for an independent judiciary, but in practice the judiciary was often underfunded, understaffed, and subject to political influence and pervasive corruption. Pressure from public officials, tribal leaders, families of accused persons, and individuals associated with the insurgency, as well as bribery and corruption, threatened judicial impartiality. The Counternarcotics Tribunal in Kabul was an exception and international organizations reported no evidence of corruption or political influence by its officials. Other courts administered justice unevenly according to a mixture of codified law, Shari’a (Islamic law), and local custom.” [2a] (Section 1d)

18.09 The USSD 2008 report additionally noted that “Illegal border checkpoints, some reportedly manned by tribal leaders and low-level members of insurgent groups, extorted bribes. Human rights groups and detainees reported local police extorted bribes from civilians in exchange for release from prison or to avoid arrest.” [2a] (Section 1d)

18.10 On 30 December 2008 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reported:
“The Afghan government …disarmed and arrested about 50 Afghan policemen, suspected of corruption and helping the Taliban, while a dozen others defected to the Taliban… The police were in charge of security posts in the western province of Farah, where a resurgent Taliban insurgency has flared in recent years. ‘We arrested some 48 policemen for their unlawful actions on [December 29], but 12 others handed themselves over to the Taliban,’ provincial Deputy Governor Mohammad Younis Rasooli told Reuters. ‘We are investigating the arrested policemen to find out what other crimes they have committed,’ Rasooli said. The police, often the only arm of the Afghan state active in isolated outposts across the mountainous country, suffer more casualties than any other force… On December 29, a Taliban spokesman told Reuters that about 35 Afghan police had defected to the Islamist group.” [29e]

18.11 The Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, published on 6 May 2009 stated that:

“While specific reforms to the justice system are essential, corruption is the common thread running through many of the problems. It is routine among police, prosecutors, and judges. To their credit, this was candidly acknowledged by Government officials. Senior Government officials described corruption as being so ‘widespread’ as to be ‘unbelievable’, and admitted that they had corruption within their offices. According to many Afghans with whom I spoke, the problem is as blatant as it is rampant. One interlocutor told me that, as you approach a courthouse, you will be approached by persons with some link to the judge who will inquire as to your problem and solicit bribes. It was widely affirmed that when wealthy or powerful people do get convicted, they will not spend long in prison.” [39e] (p29)

(See also Section 9: Security Forces and Section 11: Judiciary for further information)
19. FREEDOM OF RELIGION

OVERVIEW

19.01 The Freedom House report, Freedom in the World 2009, Afghanistan, covering events in 2008, released 16 July, noted that “Religious freedom has improved since the fall of the ultraconservative Taliban government in late 2001, but it is still hampered by violence and harassment aimed at religious minorities and reformist Muslims.” [41a] (p4)


“The Constitution states that Islam is the ‘religion of the state’ and that ‘no law can be contrary to the beliefs and provisions of the sacred religion of Islam.’ It proclaims that ‘followers of other religions are free to exercise their faith and perform their religious rites within the limits of the provisions of law.’ Government and political leaders aspire to a national environment that respects the right to religious freedom. Residual effects of years of Taliban rule, popular suspicion regarding outside influence and the motivations of foreigners, and still weak democratic institutions are factors that slow the realization of this aspiration. Intolerance was manifested in harassment and occasional violence against religious minorities and Muslims who were perceived as not respecting conservative Islamic strictures...The country’s population is nearly entirely Muslim. Non-Muslim minority groups faced incidents of discrimination and persecution. Conversion is understood by many citizens to contravene the tenets of Islam and Shari’a. Within the Muslim population, relations among the different sects continued to be difficult. Historically, the minority Shi’a community faced discrimination from the majority Sunni population. This discrimination continued. Some Sunnis complained about the growing influence of the Shi’a community in political circles. Local Sikh and Hindu populations, although allowed to practice their religion publicly, continued to encounter problems obtaining land for cremation and faced discrimination when seeking government jobs as well as harassment during major celebrations. Due to societal pressure, most local Christians hid their religion from others.” [2c] (Section I)

19.03 The US Commission on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report 2009, covering the period of May 2008 to April 2009, released on 1 May 2009, noted that:

“Conditions for freedom of religion or belief in Afghanistan have become increasingly problematic in recent years. The failure of the new constitution to protect individuals from within the majority Muslim community to dissent from the prevailing Islamic orthodoxy continues to result in serious abuses, including criminal court cases that violate the country’s international commitments. In addition, the failure or inability of the Afghan government to exercise authority over much of the country outside Kabul contributes to a progressively deteriorating situation for religious freedom and other related human rights in many of the provinces. Although the status of religious freedom has improved since the fall of the Taliban regime, religious extremism, including violence and intimidation by resurgent Taliban
insurgents, poses an increasingly serious threat to human rights in the country. In light of these very real dangers to the progress made toward establishing democracy, rule of law, and human rights protections in Afghanistan, the Commission has determined that Afghanistan should remain on its Watch List...the Commission will continue to monitor the deteriorating situation in the country for religious freedom and related human rights.” [70a] (p144)

19.04 The report further noted:

“In January 2004, Afghanistan adopted a new constitution that provides for the freedom of non-Muslim religious groups to exercise their faith, contains an explicit recognition of equality between men and women, and declares the state will abide by ‘the UN charter, international treaties, international conventions…and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.’ However, the constitution does not extend explicit protections for the right to freedom of religion or belief to every individual, particularly to individual Muslims, the overwhelming majority of Afghanistan’s population, or minority religious communities.” [70a] (p 144)

19.05 The report also noted:

“The absence of a guarantee of the individual right to religious freedom and the empowerment of the judicial system to enforce Islamic principles and sharia law mean that the constitution does not fully protect individual Afghan citizens who dissent from state-imposed orthodoxy against unjust accusations of religious ‘crimes,’ such as apostasy and blasphemy. There are few protections for Afghans to debate the role and content of religion in law and society, to advocate the rights of women and religious minorities, and to question interpretations of Islamic precepts without fear of retribution or being charged with ‘insulting Islam.’ These legal deficiencies have permitted the official imposition of harsh, unfair, and at times even abusive interpretations of religious orthodoxy, violating numerous human rights of individuals by stifling dissent within the Afghan population.” [70a] (p 144)


“The constitution proclaims Islam is the ‘religion of the state’ but allows non-Muslim citizens the freedom to perform their rituals within the limits determined by laws for public decency and peace. This right was not respected in practice. The constitution also declares no law can be contrary to the beliefs and provisions of Islam. For matters on which the constitution and penal code are silent--such as conversion and blasphemy--the courts defer to Shari’a. Family courts are governed by a Sunni Hanafi school-based civil code, regardless of whether the parties involved are Shi’a or Sunni. This civil code also applies to non-Muslims.

“Licensing and registration of religious groups is not required; the government assumes all native-born citizens to be Muslim. In practice non-Muslims faced harassment and social persecution and opted to practice their faith discreetly. According to Islamic law, conversion from Islam is punishable by death. In recent years this sentence was not carried out in practice. In May 2007 the General Directorate of Fatwas and Accounts under the Supreme Court issued...
a ruling on the status of the Baha’i faith, declaring it a form of blasphemy. The ruling also declared all Muslims who convert to Baha’i to be apostates and all followers of the Baha’i faith to be infidels.” (2a) (Section 2c)


“After the fall of the Taliban, there continued to be episodic reports of persons at the local level using coercion to enforce social and religious conformity. During the reporting period, moderates in the Government opposed attempts by conservative elements to enforce rules regarding social and religious practices based on their interpretation of Islamic law Shari’a, including the proposed legislation in April 2008 to ban men and women associating in public, loud music, and playing with pigeons, among other things. There were no reports of anti-Semitic acts.” [2c] (Section III)

19.08 Furthermore the report added “Proselytism was practiced discreetly, since it is viewed as contrary to the teachings of Islam. During the period covered by this report, there were a few reported incidents involving individuals attempting to proselytize.” [2c] (Section II)

Religious demography

19.09 The USSR IRF Report 2008 report observed that:

“Reliable data on religious demography is not available because an official nationwide census has not been conducted in decades. Observers estimate that 80 percent of the population is Sunni Muslim, 19 percent Shi’a Muslim, and other religious groups make up less than 1 percent of the population. There are approximately 2,200 Sikh and Hindu believers and more than 400 Baha’is. There is a small, hidden Christian community; estimates on its size range from 500 to 8,000. In addition, there are small numbers of adherents of other religious groups, mostly Buddhist foreigners.” [2c] (Section I)

19.10 The report further stated that:

“In the past, small communities of Hindus, Sikhs, Baha’is, Jews, and Christians lived in the country, although most members of these communities emigrated during the anti-Soviet jihad years of civil war and Taliban rule. Non-Muslim minorities were estimated to number in the hundreds at the end of Taliban rule. A small population of native Hindus and Sikhs never left. Since the fall of the Taliban, some members of religious minorities have returned, with many settling in Kabul.” [2c] (Section I)

19.11 Additionally the report stated:

“Traditionally, the dominant religion is the sect of Sunni Islam that follows the Hanafi school of jurisprudence. For the last 200 years, much of the population adhered to Deobandi-influenced Hanafi Sunnism from Deoband, India, near Delhi. A sizable minority adhered to a more mystical version of Islam, generally known as Sufism. Sufism centers on orders or brotherhoods that follow charismatic religious leaders. During the 20th century, the influence of the Wahhabi form of Islam grew in certain regions.
“Members of the same religious group have traditionally concentrated in certain regions. Some groups were displaced forcibly by kings for internal security reasons or to make agricultural and grazing land available to favored ethnic groups. Sunni Muslim Pashtuns dominate the south and east. The homeland of the Shi’i Hazaras is in the Hazarajat, the mountainous central highlands around Bamyan. Northeastern provinces traditionally have Ismaili populations. Other areas, including Kabul, the capital, are more heterogeneous and include Sunni, Shi’a, Hindu, Sikh, and Baha’i populations. The northern city of Mazar-e-Sharif includes a mix of Sunnis (including ethnic Pashtuns, Turkmen, Uzbeks, and Tajiks) and Shi’a (Hazaras and Qizilbash) including Shi’a Ismailis.”  [2c] (Section I)

LEGISLATION

19.12 Article 2 of the Constitution adopted on 4 January 2004 states “The religion of the state of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is the sacred religion of Islam. Followers of other religions are free to exercise their faith and perform their religious rites within the limits of the provisions of law.” Article 3 states that “In Afghanistan, no law can be contrary to the beliefs and provisions of the sacred religion of Islam.” [4a]


“Blasphemy is a capital crime under some interpretations of Shari’a, and authorities could punish blasphemy with death, if committed by a male over age 18 or a female over age 16, who is of sound mind. Those accused of blasphemy are given 3 days to recant their actions and could otherwise face death by hanging. In recent years, this sentence was not carried out in practice, although during the reporting period a court sentenced a student journalist to death for activity it ruled blasphemous. The case was under appeal at the end of the reporting period.” [2c] (Section II)

(See also subsection - Converts and Christians for more information on religious freedom under the Constitution)

MUSLIMS

Shias (Shiite)

19.14 The USSD International Religious Freedom Report 2008, Afghanistan, released on 19 September 2008 stated that the Shi’a minority represented 19% of the population. Further:

“Prior to the drafting of the Constitution, some conservative jurists argued that the Constitution should favor the Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence associated with the Sunnis over the Jafari school adhered to by Shi’as. These jurists also called for the primacy of Shari’a in the legal system. While the Constitution does not make specific reference to Shari’a, it does state that when there is no provision in the Constitution or other laws guiding ruling on an issue, the courts’ decisions shall accord with Hanafi jurisprudence in such a
way as to serve justice in the best possible manner. The Constitution also grants that Shi’ā law will be applied in cases dealing with personal matters where both sides are Shi’as; there is no separate law applying to non-Muslims.

“The Constitution requires that the President and Vice President be Muslim and does not distinguish in this respect between Sunnis and Shi’as. This requirement is not explicitly applied to government ministers or Members of Parliament, but each of their oaths includes swearing to support the provisions of Islam.” [2c] (Section II)

19.15 The USSD IRF Report 2008 noted “Historically, the minority Shi’ā community faced discrimination from the majority Sunni population. This discrimination continued. Some Sunnis complained about the growing influence of the Shi’ā community in political circle.” [2c] (Section III)

19.16 Furthermore:

“The rigid policies adopted both by the Taliban and by certain opposition groups adversely affected adherents of other branches of Islam and other religious groups. The active persecution of the Shi’ā minority, including Ismailis, which occurred under the Taliban regime ended. Although there were reported incidents of discrimination and treatment varied by locality, Shi’ā generally were free to participate fully in public life.” [2c] (Section II)

19.17 The USSD IRF Report 2008, stated that “The Shi’ā community openly celebrated the birthday of Imam Ali, one of the most revered figures in the Shi’ā tradition. In past years, the Shi’ā holiday of Ashura, during which Shi’ā Muslims hold religious parades, triggered violence in the cities of Kabul and Herat. However, observations of Ashura in January 2008 were peaceful.” [2c] (Section II)

(See also Section 20: Hazaras)

ISMAILIS

19.18 The USSD International Religious Freedom Report 2008, Afghanistan, released on 19 September 2008 stated:

“According to a recent United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) report, while Ismailis were not generally targeted or seriously discriminated against, they continued to be exposed to risks in some local areas. In years past, local commanders in Baghlan province occupied or confiscated and then sold Ismaili land, and Ismailis were unable to reclaim their property. The Baghlan Provincial court and other provincial authorities refused to dispense justice for Ismailis in land-related cases. Ismailis faced illegal taxation and extortion by local commanders. In Tala-wa-Barfak District, cases of rape of Ismaili women were reported, with perpetrators acting with impunity.” [2c] (Section III)

SIKHS AND HINDUS

19.19 The USSD 2008 report noted:
“There were approximately 500 Sikhs and Hindus in the country. Although those communities were allowed to practice their faith publicly, they reportedly continued to face discrimination, including intimidation; discrimination when seeking government jobs; and verbal and physical abuse in public places. Although community representatives expressed concerns over land disputes, they often chose not to pursue restitution through the courts for fear of retaliation, particularly when powerful local leaders occupied their property. The government allocated a plot of land in Kabul for Sikhs to hold funerals.

“Non-Muslims faced discrimination in schools. The AIHRC continued to receive reports [that] students belonging to the Sikh and Hindu faiths were prevented from enrolling in some schools and others stopped attending due to harassment from both teachers and students. Hindus and Sikhs had recourse to dispute resolution mechanisms such as the Special Land and Property Court, but in practice the community felt unprotected. Although Hindus reported being harassed by neighbors in their communities, there were no known reports of discrimination against Hindus by the government.” [2a] (Section 2c)

19.20 The USSD International Religious Freedom Report 2008, Afghanistan, released on 19 September 2008 stated:

“Non-Muslim minorities such as Sikhs, Hindus, and Christians continued to face social discrimination and harassment and, in some cases, violence. This treatment was not systematic, but the Government was not able to improve conditions during the reporting period. The Hindu population, which is less distinguishable than the Sikh population, whose men wear a particular headdress, faced less harassment, although Hindus reported being harassed by neighbors in their communities. The Sikh and Hindu communities, although allowed to practice their faith publicly, reportedly continued to face discrimination, including intimidation, causing them to leave the country. While Hindus and Sikhs had recourse to dispute resolution mechanisms such as the Special Land and Property Court, in practice the communities felt unprotected.” [2c] (Section III)

19.21 The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) noted in a letter dated 17 March 2008 that less than one per cent of the population of Kabul are Sikh, Hindu or Christian. The Hindu community there, although tolerated, are unable to practise their religion freely and face forms of intimidation from both the public and the authorities. Some are reluctant to send their children to school for fear of mistreatment. [4d] The FCO further noted that the Sikh community in Kabul also face forms of intimidation and are also reluctant to send their children to school. However, generally they are tolerated and some own and run successful businesses. The Guru Dwara in Karte Parwan, Kabul is a fully functioning temple. [4d]

19.22 The Annual Report of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, published in May 2009, observed an improvement in the situation of Hindus and Sikhs since the fall of the Taliban in 2001. The report stated: “…there is no longer any official discrimination. Hindus and Sikhs are allowed to practice their faith and to have places of public worship. However, they are effectively barred from most government jobs, and face societal hostility and harassment. The few Afghan Christians, converts from Islam or
their children, are forced to conceal their faith and are unable to worship openly.” [70a] (p146)

19.23 The USSD International Religious Freedom Report 2008 further stated that:

“Some Sikh and Hindu children were unable to attend government schools due to harassment from teachers and students. The Government took limited steps to protect these children and reintegrate them into the classroom environment. The AIHRC reported that members of the Hindu community in Kandahar City faced discrimination in schools and asked the local government to build a separate school for Sikh and Hindu children. This request was not met... [however] In July 2007 the Ministry of Education opened a school for Sikh and Hindu children in Ghazni Province. A Sikh school in Kabul has been privately run with no assistance from the Government for several years and reported having only one full-time teacher for 120 students.” [2c] (Section II)

19.24 Furthermore, the report stated that:

“Unlike in previous years, when Hindus complained of not being able to cremate the remains of their dead in accordance with their customs, the Government intervened to protect their right to carry out cremations. Although community representatives expressed concerns over land disputes, they often chose not to pursue restitution through the courts for fear of retaliation, particularly when powerful, local leaders occupied their property. There were no known reports of discrimination against Hindus by the Government.” [2c] (Section II)

19.25 The Pakistan Daily reported on 25 July 2008 that:

“Ghazni governor inaugurated a temple for adherent of Sikh religion after completion of the construction work on this holy place of Sikh followers in Ghazni province. Accomplished on over 27 acres of land the Sikh temple had been completed by $151000 assistance from Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). Ismail Jahangir spokesman of the Ghazni governor told the new temple had rooms for guests and chicken. Dilip Singh MP of the Sikhs in Ghazni province while praising the step said problems in offering their religious ceremonies and parties was solved with this new temple. They had been faced with several troubles before the inauguration of this new temple, he added. The new temple could house 3000 people at once, he informed, urging the government to focus on the religious minorities in the province to protect their entitled rights. ‘I am an Afghan and I am entitled to all rights to be looked after.’ He added. Thousands of Sikhs and Hindus would rush to Ghazni to attend religious festivals when the peace and stability returns to the province, he hoped… There are two Sikh temples in Ghanzi province.” [93a]

(See also subsection - Legislation)
“Due to societal pressure, Christians were forced to remain underground, not openly practicing their religion or revealing their identity. During the year there were sporadic reports of harassment and threats against Christians. There was only one known Christian church in the country, located in the diplomatic quarter. Local nationals wishing to practice Christianity did so in private locations, as the church was not open to them. Members of the government called for the execution of Christian converts.” [2a] (Section 2c)

19.27 The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) noted in a letter dated 17 March 2008 that practising Christianity in Afghanistan is considered extremely dangerous and is not discussed openly. However, in Kabul there may be small pockets of Afghan Christians who risk worshipping together in secret places. [4d]

19.28 The FCO further noted that Christianity is still not accepted. Christians are regularly discriminated against and face verbal and physical abuse from the authorities, former friends and also family members. Authorities do not generally investigate allegations of harassment or ill-treatment or bring those responsible to justice. [4d]

Christian converts

19.29 The UNHCR’s Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Afghanistan, July 2009 stated that:

“The Afghan Constitution is silent on issues of conversion from Islam to Christianity or other faiths, and while calling for respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms, defers to Sharia law for matters not explicitly stipulated in the Constitution. Conversion from Islam is considered apostasy and is punishable by death according to some interpretations of Shari’a. As in the case of blasphemy, an Afghan citizen who has converted from Islam (if a male over age 18 or a female over age 16, who is of sound mind) has three days to recant his or her conversion and could otherwise be subject to death by hanging. Individuals can also be stripped of all their property and possessions and have their marriage declared invalid. In recent years, the death penalty for conversion has reportedly not been carried out. Converts from Islam face, thus, a risk of persecution on account of their religion.” [11a] (p14)

Baha’is

19.30 The Annual Report of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, published in May 2009 stated “Members of Afghanistan’s small Baha’i community also lead an essentially covert existence, particularly since May 2007 when the General Directorate of Fatwa and Accounts ruled that their faith is a form of blasphemy and that all Muslims who convert to the Baha’i faith are apostates.” [70a] (p146)

19.31 The US State Department report on International Religious Freedom 2008 stated that:

“The [May 2007] ruling creates uncertainties for the country's small Baha’i population, particularly on the question of marriages between Baha’i women and Muslim men. Citizens who convert from Islam to the Baha’i faith face risk of persecution, similar to that of Christian converts. Also unclear is how the
Government will treat second generation Bahá’ís who technically have not converted, as they were born into families of Bahá’í followers, but may still be viewed as having committed blasphemy. The ruling was not expected to affect foreign national Bahá’ís.” [2c] (Section II)

(See also subsection – Legislation for further information on blasphemy)

**Mixed Marriages**

19.32 The US State Department (USSD) report 2008, published on 25 February 2009, stated that:

“The government’s willingness to recognize the right to marry varied according to nationality, gender, and religion. The family court could register a marriage between a Jewish or Christian woman and a Muslim man, but the court required the couple to accept a Muslim ceremony. A woman of any other faith had to convert to Islam before marrying a Muslim man. The court could not register a marriage between a Muslim woman and a non-Muslim man. The court could not register marriages for citizens who stated they were not Muslim, even if they were born into other faiths. During the year these situations rarely occurred, as more than 99 percent of the population was Muslim.” [2a] (Section 1f)

19.33 The South Asia Tourism Society (SATS) description on marriages within ethnic groups noted that “The Uzbeks have no hesitation marrying with Uzbek and Tajik, but are averse to nuptial relations with Pashtuns”. [2a]

(See also Section 23: Women)
20. ETHNIC GROUPS

OVERVIEW

20.01 The US State Department Report on Country Human Rights Practices 2008, Afghanistan, (USSD report 2008) released on 25 February 2009, stated: “The constitution states discrimination between citizens is prohibited and provides for the equal rights of men and women... Equal rights based on race... language, or social status are not explicitly mentioned in the law. There were reports of discrimination based on race, ethnicity, religion...” [2a] (Section 5) Pashtuns make up the largest ethnic group at 42%, followed by Tajiks (27%), Hazaras (9%), Uzbec (9%) and Aimaq (4%). Other smaller groups include Turkmen and Baluch. (CIA World Factbook, last updated 7 August 2009) [3a]

20.02 The USSD 2008 report added:

“A 2006 UNHCR paper reported that although there were attempts to address the problems ethnic minorities faced and there were improvements in some areas, there was still a well-founded fear of persecution. Confiscation and illegal occupation of land by insurgents and tribal leaders caused displacement in isolated situations. Other forms of discrimination concerned access to education, political representation, and civil service employment. A 2006 UNHCR paper reported that although the government attempted to address the problems faced by ethnic minorities and some areas improved, there was still a well-founded fear of persecution by tribal and insurgent leaders. Confiscation and illegal occupation of land by powerful individuals, in some cases tied to the insurgency, caused displacement in isolated situations. Discrimination, at times amounting to persecution, continued in some areas, in the form of extortion of money through illegal taxation, forced recruitment and forced labor, physical abuse and detention.” [2a] (Section 5)

20.03 The UNHCR’s Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Afghanistan, July 2009 stated that:

“Despite constitutional guarantees of ‘equality among all ethnic groups and tribes’ and Government’s attempts to address the problems faced by ethnic minorities, discrimination and ethnic clashes, particularly in relation to land ownership disputes, still occur. Severe discrimination against ethnic minorities in some areas is also reported, most commonly in the form of denial of access to education and other services and political representation. As such, members of ethnic groups may be at risk of persecution on the ground of their ethnicity/race, in areas where they constitute a minority.” [11a] (p20)

Blood Feuds

20.04 The Oxfam Research Report, February 2008 recorded that:

“Afghanistan’s people are a patchwork of different ethnicities and in some areas these differences hinder social cohesion. For example, Oxfam researchers in the Ghorian district of Herat reported that ‘the biggest reason for conflict is land disputes, which mainly happen between Pashtuns and Tajiks’. Despite a strong sense of national identity, ethnic and tribal affiliations
have long been of significance. Inequalities and rivalries between ethnicities existed prior to the Saur Revolution of 1978, but were intensified by conflict as tensions increased and commanders sought to exploit differences for their own ends.” [75a]

20.05 The report further recorded that:

“Another major source of conflict… is disagreements within or between families. Such disputes can easily spread to tribes or communities, and in a significant number of cases relate to women, marriage, or sexual relations. Violence can result from the transgression of traditional conjugal norms, such as the provision of dowries, arranged marriage, the custom of a family providing a girl for marriage as compensation for a crime (baad), or to resolve a dispute (badal), or the practice whereby a widow is expected to marry her deceased husband’s brother. Domestic violence against women or severely discriminatory treatment is also often a cause and consequence of family, tribal, or community disputes.” [75a] (p10)

PASHTUNS (PATHANS)

20.06 In June 2005 UNHCR stated that Pashtuns were the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan, constituting about 38 per cent of the population. [11b] (p8) The 2005 Encyclopedia of the World’s Minorities recorded that there are also Pashtuns in Pakistan, mainly in the North West Frontier and Baluchistan provinces. Their language, Pashto, became an official language of Afghanistan in 1936. The Encyclopedia also stated that “Sociopolitical strife, droughts, and resulting famine have led to mass immigration eastward across a shared border into Pakistan, producing large refugee communities.” [27] (p955)

20.07 The 2005 Encyclopedia of the World’s Minorities also recorded that:

“Pashtun/Pakhtun society is organized along hierarchical, patrilineal lines allegedly connecting tribesfolk back to an eponymous common ancestor. Affiliations to lineages and clans (zai, khel) are fairly fluid in practice. Major groups include the Durrani, Ghilzai, and Karlanri, each consisting of several tribes and clans. Overall there are at least 60 tribes. Tribal genealogy determines societal rank, land use, and patterns of inheritance. Social conduct, especially for men, revolves around the concept of pashtunwali or pakhtunwali – an idealised system of hospitality, honor, and revenge used to regulate interactions and mediate disputes. This system is overseen by tribal chiefs (khan), a title bestowed on Pashtun leaders by Indian Mogul and Iranian Safawid rulers in the sixteenth century CE, and by tribal assemblies (jirgas). Blood feuds often arise between tribesmen over issues relating to personal or familial honor, especially involving women, and over the exercise of property rights, particularly grazing of livestock.” [27] (p955-956)

20.08 The USSD 2008 report, published on 25 February 2009, stated that

“In early September [2008] repatriated Pashtuns and other residents of Khowja Bahawodeen district of Takhar province clashed regarding the
resettlement of the Pashtuns in the area. President Karzai sent a delegation to mediate. Some Pashtun members of parliament strongly criticized the behavior of the Takhar people and threatened that if the conflict continued, Pashtuns would attack minority ethnic groups living in Pashtun majority areas. The president dispatched ANA units to the area and their efforts combined with those of the government mediators resulted in rapid cessation of violence.” [2a] (Section 5)

20.09 The report further noted that “The Hazaras accused President Karzai, a Pashtun, of providing preferential treatment to Pashtuns and of ignoring minorities, especially Hazaras.” [2a] (Section 5)

20.10 The UNHCR’s Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Afghanistan, July 2009 stated that:

“Pashtuns throughout northern Afghanistan, where they constitute an ethnic minority, have since been targeted after being associated with the Taliban regime, whose leadership consisted mostly of Pashtuns from southern Afghanistan. As such, Pashtuns have faced abuses including killings, sexual violence, beatings, extortion, and looting. In addition, formerly displaced Pashtuns may be unable to recover their land and property upon return to their area of origin.” [11a] (p18-19)

TAJIKS

20.11 The 2005 Encyclopedia of the World’s Minorities recorded that the Tajik population in Afghanistan is difficult to determine:

“Most estimates range between three and four million, only slightly less than the number in Tajikistan. Tajik-speakers settle primarily in northeastern Afghanistan extending south to Kabul. A second center exists in the west of the country, in the province of Herat. Tajiks, under the leadership of Ahmad Shah Masud, were very active in the fight of the Northern Alliance against the Taliban. They used to compose a significant portion of the lower and middle level of the state administration as the state capital is located in a Tajik-speaking area. Tajik, or Dari, is one of the two state languages and is also a medium of interethnic communication as minority groups speak Tajik rather than Pashtu as a second language.” [27] (p1175-1176)

20.12 In June 2005, the UNHCR noted that Tajiks comprised about 25 per cent of the population making them the second largest ethnic group; they are Persian (Dari) speaking Afghans. [11b] (p8) The 2005 Encyclopedia of the World’s Minorities recorded that the majority of Tajiks are Sunni Muslims. [27] (p1175)

20.13 The South Asia Tourism Society (SATS) description, accessed 29 April 2009, noted that

“Tajiks or Tadzhiks constitute the second largest ethnic group in Afghanistan. Populating around 4.5 million, they live in the Panjshir Valley north of Kabul and in the northern and northeastern provinces of Parwan, Takhar, Badakhshan, and also Baghlan and Samangan. Few Tajik people extend into the central mountains. Most Tajiks speak Dari Persian language. Tajik community is not divided into tribes. They prefer to identify themselves with the valley or region they live in like Panjsher, Badakhshi, Samangani and
Andarabi. For earning livelihood, Tajiks do sedentary mountain farming and sheep/goat herding. Tajiks grow variety of fine fruits and nuts.” [71a]

HAZARAS

20.14 The Minority Rights Group International website, accessed on 23 July 2008 describes the Hazaras:

“...[they] were once the largest Afghan ethnic group constituting nearly 67% of the total population of the state before the 19th century. More than half were massacred in 1893 when their autonomy was lost as a result of political action. Today they constitute approximately 9% of the Afghan population. The origin of Hazara are much debated, the word Hazara means ‘thousand’ in Persian but given the Hazaras features, current theory supports their decent [sic] from Mongol soldiers left behind by Genghis Khan in the 13th century.

“The majority of Hazaras live in Hazarajat (or Hazarestan), land of the Hazara, which is situated in the rugged central mountainous core of Afghanistan with an area of approximately 50,000 sq. km, with others living in the Badakhshan mountains. In the aftermath of Kabul’s campaign against them in the late 19th century, many Hazaras settled in western Turkestan, in JauzJan and Badghis provinces. Ismaili Hazaras, a smaller religiously differentiated group of Hazaras live in the Hindu Kush mountains. The most recent two decades of war have driven many Hazaras away from their traditional heartland to live on the fringes of the state in close proximity to Iran and Pakistan. There is also a large cross-border community of Hazaras who make up an influential ethnic group in the Pakistani border city of Quetta.” [76a]

20.15 The South Asia Tourism Society (SATS) description of Hazaras, accessed 29 April 2009, noted that:

“Central regions of Afghanistan, known as Hazarat, are inhabited by the Hazaras. Good number[s] of Hazaras also dwell in Badakhshan. Most of them are farmers and shepherds. Most Hazaras are the followers of the Shia sect of Islam. The Hazaras have their ancestors in Xinjiang region of north-western China. For a long time, the Hazaras were a neglected lot. However, they are now trying to get rid of their inferior status.” [71a]

20.16 The Minority Rights Group International website further noted that:

“The Hazaras speak a dialect of Dari (Persian Dialect) called Hazaragi and the vast majority of them follow the Shi’a sect (twelve Imami). A significant number are also followers of the Ismaili sect while a small number are Sunni Muslim. Within Afghani culture the Hazaras are famous for their music and poetry and the proverbs from which their poetry stems ... The Hazaras are reported to have nuclear families with the husband considered the head of the family except in the case of husband’s death, when the woman becomes the head. In the latter case the older wife in polygamous marriages succeeds the deceased husband until the eldest sun [sic] reaches maturity. At national level Hazaras tend to be more progressive concerning women’s rights to education and public activities. Educated Hazara women, in particular ones who returned from exile in Iran are as active as men in civic and political arenas. Hazara families are eager to educate their daughters. U.N. officials in Bamian, 20 miles to the east, said that since the collapse of Taliban rule in late 2001, aid
agencies have scrambled to build schools and have succeeded in attracting qualified female teachers to meet the demand.” [76a]

(See also Section 23: Women)

20.17 Minority Rights Group International also noted:

“Hazaras are one of the national ethnic minorities recognized in the new Afghan constitution and have been given full right to Afghan citizenship. Their main political party, Hizb-e Wahdat gained only one seat in the cabinet. Hazaras are concerned about the rising power of the warlords, who they feel pose a direct threat to their community. Also, given the suppression suffered by Hazaras under the Mujahedeen, the power of Northern Alliance (Mujahedeen leadership of 10 years ago) in the new leadership is a cause for worry.” [76a]

20.18 The USSD International Religious Freedom Report 2008 stated that:

“Throughout the country’s history, there have been many examples of conflicts between the Hazaras and other citizens. The Hazaras accused the Government, led by Pashtuns, of providing preferential treatment to Pashtuns and of ignoring minorities, especially Hazaras. Hazaras have reported being asked to pay bribes at border crossings where Pashtuns were allowed to pass freely. These conflicts often have had economic and political roots but also have religious dimensions. The Government made significant efforts to address historical tensions affecting the Hazara community, including affirmative hiring practices.” [2c] (Section III)

20.19 The US State Department (USSD) report 2008, published on 25 February 2009, stated that:

“On June 15 [2008], a violent clash between Hazaras and Kuchis in the Behsud District of Wardak province continued for several weeks. Kuchi representatives claimed Hazaras killed 30 Kuchis in the clash, but the AIHRC [Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission] did not find evidence to support these claims. In an August 18 report, the AIHRC noted fighters killed 24 Hazara residents of the area during the conflict. The AIHRC also reported that as a result of the conflict, villagers evacuated 400 villages, and fighters burned 79 houses, 10 shops, and three mosques. According to the AIHRC, the ANA response to the conflict was ineffective and failed to prevent an escalation of violence. The AIHRC reported ANP units were successful in preventing some violence and allowing some villagers to return to agricultural activities.” [2a] (Section 5)

20.20 A demonstration by the Hazaras in the capital, Kabul, on 22 July 2008, ended peacefully after five hours, the BBC reported. The demonstrators were calling on the government to do more to protect their land after disputes with the nomadic Kuchis, some called for the President to resign:

“The Hazaras accuse the nomadic Kuchis of killing a number of Hazaras recently in the Behsud district of Wardak province, while the Kuchis say Hazaras attacked their camps, killing several nomads. The Kuchis say they have historic grazing rights over the land in Wardak province, south-west of Kabul. President Karzai set up a commission to deal with the dispute last year.
after several people died in clashes between the Kuchis and the Hazaras.”
(BBC News 22 July 2008) [25k]

**UZBEKS AND TURKMEN**

20.21 The 2005 Encyclopedia of the World’s Minorities recorded that Turkmen reside “… in northwestern and northeastern Afghanistan where they are minorities among Pushtun and Hazara. The Turkmen are Sunni Muslims and relatively few are Shia Muslims.” [27] (p1223) The same source also stated that “Uzbeks were one of the major ethnic groups in the north of the country for centuries. Today, the majority of them are settled in the provinces of Kunduz and Mazar-i Sharif… Uzbeks became known as one of the key elements in the Northern Alliance against the Taliban, under the leadership of General Dostum.” [27] (p1288)

20.22 The South Asia Tourism Society (SATS) website, accessed on 29 April 2009, noted “Most Turkmens are nomadic people who herd yaks. Turkmens speak both archaic form of Turkish and Persian. Many nomadic Turkmens still live in dome-shaped tents based on wooden frames. Men wear coats with long sleeves, while women also wear long dresses to cover their hands in cold weather.” [71a]

20.23 Article 16 of the Constitution recognises six additional languages, besides Dari and Pashtu, as official languages in the regions where they are spoken by the majority of the population. These include Uzbeki and Turkmani. [4a]

**KUCHIS**

20.24 The Associated Press reported on 14 May 2006:

“Officials estimate there are about three million Kuchis [Pashtu for nomads] among the 25 million or so Afghans, with about 60 per cent of them still following the nomadic life. They are among the poorest of the battered country’s poor, owning little more than a tent and a few sheep and cows… Armed villagers and warlords often chase them off the land guaranteed to them under the new constitution. Hospitals refuse their sick, and graveyards reject their dead. They earn money by selling milk from their animals, but many also make their children work or beg. Even if they wanted to settle down, most couldn’t afford to buy or rent a house.

“Yet not all Kuchis share the same lot. Some have bought property and use it as a base to return to after several months of travel. And there is a smaller, more affluent group that settled down long ago, leaving the roaming lifestyle behind.” [54b]

20.25 The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission report, December 2008, stated that:

“One consequence of the drought that has plagued Afghanistan for nearly 15 years is that the Kuchis’ traditional way of life is no longer viable. Their pasturelands have dried up and their animals have weakened or died from a
lack of food and water. The largest concentrations of displaced Kuchis, numbering roughly 60,000 people, are those who cannot return to the Registan desert. Drought conditions in the north, as well as the reluctance of local communities to allow the Kuchis to return with their flocks, has displaced a further 10,000 individuals. With their traditional way of life destroyed, the Kuchi have been forcing [sic] to live in camps and to subsist on food assistance, with daily wage labor as their only livelihood option as few of the Kuchi are educated or have specialized skills. The return of this population to their traditional way of life in the Registan desert is impossible because such return is unsustainable, given the loss of their livestock and the fact that the amelioration of drought conditions, if it happens, will take several years. Replacing flocks is an expensive proposition and will not be supported by donors or government when the likelihood is that the flocks will die for lack of pasture and water. The ability of the Kuchi to adapt to their changed circumstances is limited as most are unfamiliar with settled livelihoods and do not own property. Their landlessness makes their situation particularly difficult.” [78a] (p50)

20.26 The final report of the Joint Electoral Management Body (JEMB) on the September 2005 elections, published in December 2005, stated that the Kuchis were allotted ten seats in the Wolesi Jirga. [74b] (p20)

NURISTANIS

20.27 The USSD International Religious Freedom Report 2008 noted that “Nuristanis, a small but distinct ethnolinguistic group living in a mountainous eastern region, practiced an ancient polytheistic religion until forcibly converted to Islam in the late 19th century. Some non-Muslim religious practices survive today as folk customs.” [2c]

20.28 The Minority Rights Group International website, accessed on 23 July 2008 described the Nuristanis:

“Nuristanis arrived in Afghanistan fleeing the eastward spread off Islam. They speak an unique Indo-European-language. Nuristanis were conquered by Amir Abdur Rahman Khan in 1895-96 and were obliged to abandon their ancient religious belief in favour of Islam. They reside mainly in the East of the country - between the Pashtun tribes of Kunar, the Kalash in Pakistan’s Chitral, and the Tajiks of Badakhshan in the North. Nuristan (land of light) is located on the southern slope of the Hindu Kush mountain range and is spread over four valleys, with each valley having its own distinct language/dialect: Kati, Waigali, Ashkun and Parsun…Nuristani men and women follow a strict division of labour with the working in livestock herding while the women work on grain production or irrigated terraces.” [76c]

20.29 On 7 April 2008, The Long War Journal reported that:

“A series of airstrikes in northeastern Afghanistan on Sunday killed at least 16 people in what Coalition and Afghan Defense officials said was a deliberate operation against the network of top fugitive warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. The strike occurred in the volatile mountain province of Nuristan, a rugged area north of Kunar long known to be a hotbed of insurgent activity. US and Afghan forces launched Sunday’s attack after intelligence sources revealed Gulbuddin Hekmatyar was in the Dohabi (Doab) district trying to meet with
Kashmir Khan, his top military commander, Nuristan’s governor Tamim Nuristani told The Associated Press. The Defense Ministry has since announced Hekmatyar was not the target rather a group of his loyalists who planned on meeting with Nuristani based Taliban fighters…

“Nuristan’s deputy governor, Mohammad Aleem, claimed numerous civilians were killed in the clash, including women and children. Several other Nuristani officials cited the casualty figure around 19 or 20, including women and children, adding local villagers had relayed the figures via radio communications… Both the Afghan Defense Ministry and Coalition officials have denied the reports of civilian casualties.” [55c]
21. LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER PERSONS

LEGAL RIGHTS

21.01 The International Lesbian and Gay Association (ILGA) World Survey: State-sponsored Homophobia, dated May 2009 stated that same-sex male and same-sex female relationships are illegal in Afghanistan. The report also noted that under Article 427 of the Penal (Criminal) Code:

“(1) A person who commits adultery or pederasty shall be sentenced to long imprisonment.
(2) In one of the following cases commitment of the acts, specified above, is considered to be aggravating conditions:
   a. In the case where the person against whom the crime has been committed is not yet eighteen years old.
   b. …” [80a] (p12)

21.02 ILGA added “In Afghan legal terminology ‘pederasty’ appears to refer to intercourse between males regardless of age. The fact that paedophilia or sexual relations with persons under the age of consent falls under subsection 2(a) of article 427 indicates that this is the case… Islamic Sharia law, criminalising homosexual acts with a maximum of death penalty, is applied together with the codified Penal law. However, no known cases of death sentences have been handed out for homosexual acts after the end of Taliban rule.” [80a] (p12)

21.03 UNHCR’s Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Afghanistan, July 2009 stated that “Like apostasy, homosexuality is punishable by death, as a Hudood crime, according to most interpretations of Sharia law, although there were no sexual orientation-related executions reported during 2008.” [11a] (p16)


21.05 The Amnesty International document, Sexual Minorities and the Law: A World Survey, updated July 2006, stated same-sex relationships were illegal (and punishable by up to 15 years in prison) but, with regard to transgender persons, it reported that there was “No data or the legal situation was unclear.” [7d]

SOCIETAL ILL-TREATMENT OR DISCRIMINATION

21.06 UNHCR’s Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Afghanistan, July 2009 stated that “Persons accused of committing crimes against Sharia law, such as… homosexuality and adultery, are at risk not only of social rejection and violence at the hands of family or community members, but also of formal prosecution.” [11a] (p16)

homosexual persons hid their sexual orientation. Many observers believed that societal disapproval of homosexuality was partly the cause for the prevalence of rape of young boys. During 2006 the Taliban published a new set of rules that explicitly forbade the recruitment of young boys for sexual pleasure.” [2h] (Section 5)

21.08 GlobalGayz.com, updated April 2008, noted that:

“Male-to-male conjunctions generally follow along old Arabic traditions. In most modern Islamic ‘cultural’ (premarital) homosexual behaviour there is a mute understanding that sex is mutural [sic] consensual, temporary and that it’s a form of companionship, if not affection, among peers… Whether the activity is mutual or forceful, there is an almost universal attitude in these eastern cultures that such sexual indulgence is not ‘gay’, that is, it’s not sex or love between two men who identify as homosexuals. (In Afghanistan it’s common for the older participants to be married with kids.) Rather, in a collective mental shell game the meaning of sex is re-framed: heterosexual men engage in homosexual behavior in which the younger guy is not a ‘fem’ but obedient and passive and the older one is not a ‘butch queer’ but assertive and active.” [42]

(This section should be read in conjunction with Section 23 on Women.)
22. DISABILITY


“The constitution prohibits any kind of discrimination against citizens and requires the state to assist persons with disabilities and protect their rights, including health care and financial protection. The constitution also requires the state to adopt necessary measures to reintegrate and ensure the active participation of persons with disabilities in society. The government did not effectively enforce these protections. The Ministry of Urban Development and Housing built access ramps for persons with disabilities around the Kabul Municipality building and in all Kabul public bathrooms. In April [2008], the Ministry of Work, Social Affairs, Martyrs, and Disabled (MOWSAMD) released the Afghanistan National Disability Plan 2008-2011 (ANDP), which aims to address the rights and needs of all persons with disabilities.” [2a] (Section 5)

22.02 The USSD 2008 further stated that:

“According to the 2006 National Disability Survey, the country’s population included 747,500 to 867,100 persons with severe disabilities, including 17 percent who had disabilities as a result of war and approximately seven percent as a result of landmines. More than 72 percent of all persons with disabilities have not received any education, and fewer than 30 percent of persons with disabilities have jobs. Although community-based health and rehabilitation committees continued to provide services to approximately 100,000 persons, their activities were restricted to 60 of 330 districts. The MOWSAMD worked to coordinate and develop policy strategies that create employment opportunities, access to education, health care, and greater mobility for citizens with disabilities. During the year ministry services extended to only 16 of the 34 provinces. Groups advocating the rights of persons with disabilities repeatedly protested the inaction of the MOWSAMD.” [2a] (Section 5)

(See also Section 24: Children – Child care and Health issues)

22.03 The 2008 Afghanistan Landmine Monitor report, accessed 12 May 2009, stated that “Afghanistan does not have specific legislation protecting the rights of persons with disabilities, but the constitution provides guarantees for the rights of persons with disabilities.” The Landmine Monitor report 2008 provides further information on the landmine situation in Afghanistan and may be accessed directly via the link given in Annex G for source number [14a].

(See also Section 30: Freedom of Movement – Mines and unexploded ordnance and Section 28: Medical Issues)
23. WOMEN

OVERVIEW

23.01 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Social Institutions and Gender Index, undated Country Profile on Afghanistan (SIGI Afghanistan profile), accessed on 6 September 2009, noted:

“Afghan women are among the most vulnerable in the world. Under the Taliban regime, women and girls were systematically discriminated against and marginalised, and their human rights were violated. Women’s removal from the public domain meant that they could not play any role in the political process and were excluded from all forms of formal or informal governance. Women and girls were also severely restricted in their access to education, health care facilities and employment.

“The overthrow of the Taliban in November 2001 raised hopes that women in Afghanistan would rapidly regain their human rights. Ongoing threats to women’s security make their participation in public life almost impossible” [37a]

23.02 The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) report, Silence is Violence, End the Abuse of Women in Afghanistan, (UNAMA report) published on 8 July 2009 stated that:

“Three decades of armed conflict, coupled with associated lawlessness, insecurity, and weak governance, have had a significant impact on the status and situation of women in Afghanistan as well as on efforts geared to their emancipation and empowerment.

“Distinct phases of the war, since the outbreak of armed conflict in 1978, have been characterized by events that were particularly dangerous and harmful for women. During the Soviet period, aerial bombardments were instrumental in triggering large-scale population movements that, in turn, had ramifications for the rural poor and agrarian livelihoods and infrastructure including vital irrigation systems. The Mujahedeen period (1992-1996) was marked by ferocious, internecine warfare that scarred all aspects of Afghan life. Women’s rights and freedoms were severely restricted. Grave human rights abuses included extra-judicial executions, torture, sexual violence, disappearances, displacement, forced marriage, trafficking and abduction. This period represents one of the darkest chapters in the history of Afghan women.

“The brutality and predatory nature of the civil war, or Mujahedeen period, contributed to the emergence of the Taliban and their consolidation of power throughout much of the country after their capture of Kabul, September 1996. The Taliban, with their strict and idiosyncratic interpretation of Sharia law put an end to much of the brutality and mayhem that characterised the Mujahedeen period.

“Taliban understanding or interpretation of Islam, however, further institutionalized the marginalization of women. Throughout its harsh, five-year rule, the Taliban’s extreme interpretation of Sharia, based on a distorted and oppressive version of Islam, attempted to change the essence of Afghan society to that of a fundamentalist and repressive system of governance
where Taliban edicts reigned supreme. Taliban rule was particularly harsh in urban centers where women, in particular, were victimized and were reduced to a shadowy existence. Women and girls were subjected to systematic discrimination that, effectively, confined most females to their homes. Females were not permitted out in public unless accompanied by a mahram.” [46a] (p5-6)

23.03 The same source noted that “Following the demise of the Taliban regime at the end of 2001, there was a great deal of hope and optimism amongst Afghans, human rights activists and others, that the situation of women would improve significantly. The Bonn Agreement (December 2001), was concerned with the transformation, reconstruction and development of Afghanistan.” [46a] (p6)

23.04 The Women for Women International survey, 2009 Afghanistan Report: Amplifying the Voices of Women in Afghanistan, undated, noted that:

“The 2001 Bonn Agreement pledged to address the structural impediments to women’s rights in Afghanistan and to include women in political life. Quotas were set to ensure places for women in the Loya Jirga and the interim administration, and a Ministry of Women’s Affairs was established. The Gender and Law Working group, a women’s lobby, was able to push through some amendments to the draft constitution released in 2003. These amendments, retained in the final document and approved in 2004, included an explicit reference to the equality of men and women before the law (Article 22) and increased the number of women in the legislature’s lower house to two female delegates from each province (Article 83). Article 7 of the Constitution also requires that Afghanistan abide by various conventions that it has signed, including the UN Convention Against all Forms of Discrimination Against Women.” [94a] (p16)

23.05 Women were now able to participate in public life in some areas (Freedom House, 16 July 2009) [41a] (p6) However, the The US State Department Report on Country Human Rights Practices 2008, Afghanistan, (USSD report 2008) released on 25 February 2009, noted that:

“Women continued to face pervasive human rights violations and remained largely uninformed about their rights under the law. Discrimination was more acute in rural areas and small villages. Women in urban areas continued to make strides toward greater access to public life, education, health care, and employment; however, the denial of educational opportunities during the continuing insurgency, as well as limited employment possibilities and the threat of violence, continued to impede the ability of many women to improve their situation.

“Societal discrimination against women persisted, including domestic abuse, rape, forced marriages, exchange of girls to settle disputes, kidnappings, and honor killings. In some rural areas, particularly in the south, women were forbidden to leave the home except in the company of a male relative.” [2a] (Section 5)

23.06 The UNAMA report of 8 July 2009 stated that:

“Undoubtedly, some progress has been made in advancing the rights of all Afghans including those of women. Noticeable improvements include the
adoption of a new constitution with a specific provision on gender equality. Afghanistan is a party to a number of international human rights treaties, including accession, without reservation, in 2003, to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); this implies the responsibility of the State to protect and promote the human rights of all Afghan women and girls.” [46a] (p7)

(See also Section 23: Violence against women)

23.07 A survey of 1,500 women across different regions by Women for Women International, in their 2009 Afghanistan Report: Amplifying the Voices of Women in Afghanistan, undated revealed that:

- “41.2% of women said that the biggest problem they face in daily life is the lack of important commodities, followed by insufficient employment opportunities (26.2%) and lack of social services (13.5%).
- “66.2% of women said that the first problem the national government should fix is the security situation, followed by economic and political problems. Responses were the same at the local level, giving security the highest priority.” [94a]

23.08 The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) report, Economic and Social Rights Report in Afghanistan-III, dated December 2008, noted that Afghanistan is a signatory to the UN Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (p27). The same report stated that:

“Maternal care is still largely unavailable. Average female life expectancy for females is 45 years... The extent of the lack of coverage for maternal care is reflected in the HRFM [Human Rights Field Monitoring] survey of vulnerable groups. Relatives and friends remain one of the main sources of assistance during labor in 40% of urban and 50% of rural households. Overall, trained staff assisted only 30% of births and about 8% of births took place unassisted. Households in urban locations were more likely to use trained help: 22% with a doctor or nurse and 25% a midwife or trained birth attendant. Only 10% of rural households had the assistance of a doctor or nurse and another 17% were assisted by a midwife or trained birth attendant. In light of the lack of medical care available in rural areas, these numbers leave mothers particularly vulnerable; in case of complications at birth, 30% of the rural population would not be able to reach medical facilities in time.” [78a] (p54)

23.09 WomanKind Worldwide, February 2008, reported that “Although there have certainly been advances in women’s human rights... the progress towards protecting women and girls and including them in the country’s social, civil and political life has been unacceptably slow and characterised by a pattern of trial and error, rather than considerate, needs based planning and responsive action.” [88a] (p7)
“The constitution prohibits discrimination between citizens and provides for the equal rights of men and women; however, local customs and practices that discriminated against women prevailed in much of the country. Equal rights based on race, disability, language, or social status are not explicitly mentioned in the law. There were reports of discrimination based on race, ethnicity, religion, and gender.” [2a] (Section 5)

23.11 The SIGI Afghanistan Profile accessed on 6 September 2009, noted:

“Legislation in Afghanistan provides only weak support for the financial independence of women. Many women work in the agriculture sector, but their access to land is very limited and very few own land of their own. While Islamic law protects a woman’s access to property other than land, customary law traditionally deprives women of economic assets, leaving them dependant on their husbands, fathers or brothers (if unmarried) throughout their lives.

“Afghani women have only limited access to bank loans… most Afghans, men and women, are too poor to provide collateral for loans. Since 2001, foreign aid has helped to establish several micro-finance institutions in the country, which are available to both women and men.” [37a]

23.12 The UN Secretary-General’s report of 6 March 2008, stated that “While public access to courts and legal aid is a constitutional right, it remains elusive to the majority of Afghans, especially women, children and vulnerable groups. This problem is compounded by the fact that public awareness of legal rights and processes is limited.” [39b] (p6-7)

23.13 Amnesty International’s 2008 report, covering events in 2007, released in May 2008, noted that “Women’s rights continued to be eroded in many areas. Women working for the government faced threats and several survived attempted assassinations.” [7k]

23.14 In a briefing paper, dated 11 June 2008, Amnesty International stated:

“Amnesty International welcomes advances in respect for women’s rights since the fall of the Taliban, notably through the establishment of the Ministry for Women’s Affairs, the National Action Plan for Women, improved access to education and representation of women in parliament. But Afghan women and girls still encounter discriminatory laws, policies and practices, which include physical attacks on them as women. Women and girls face endemic domestic violence, trafficking, forced marriages, including child marriages, and being traded in settlement of disputes. The police, the courts and other justice sector officials seldom address women’s complaints of abuses, including beatings, rape and other sexual violence. Women victims and defendants have little recourse to justice and are discriminated against in both the formal and informal justice systems.” [7a] (3. Protecting and upholding women’s rights)

23.15 A report Womankind, Tackling stock update: Afghan women and girls seven years on, dated February 2008 (Womenkind’s report) concluded that:

“Critical groundwork has been laid in the initiation of legal reform and the creation of institutions mandated to protect women’s human rights. However, a framework alone is not enough. Realising women’s human rights will require
enforcement of the laws, which at present exist on paper only. Translating good intentions and *de jure* rights (rights based on law) into real, meaningful changes for women demands a commitment of political will and the necessary resources to back that will. It also demands co-ordination among stakeholders, long-term visions and strategies, and consistent public assertions from national leaders which demonstrate that women's human rights were not merely a convenient promise to sell a large-scale, resource-consuming intervention to Afghan citizens and Western publics, but a legitimate, genuine and realisable call to action." [88a] (p14)

23.16 On 2 April 2009 the United Nations News Centre reported that

“A new law in Afghanistan seriously curtailing women's rights, even explicitly permitting marital rape, is a 'huge step in the wrong direction,' the United Nations human rights chief said today, calling for its repeal. Not yet published, the law, which was passed by the two houses of Afghanistan’s parliament before being reportedly signed by President Hamid Karzai earlier this month, regulates the personal status of the country’s minority Shi’a community members, including relations between men and women, divorce and property rights.” [39g]

23.17 Afghan women took to the streets in protested against the new law. The BBC reported on 15 April 2009 that: “Thursday’s demonstration took place outside a religious centre run by a cleric who helped draft the law which is aimed at Afghanistan’s Shia minority.

“We actually see it as a law that is limiting women’s rights... We all stand against this law, we want a reform of the law, we want a revisit of it and overturn of it,’ one of the protesters, Sima Ghani, told the BBC. Another protester said the new law was reminiscent of the worst excesses against women during the Taleban’s rule of Afghanistan which ended in 2001. The protesters were quickly swamped by hundreds of Afghans, both men and women, in a counter-demonstration. They pelted the women with small stones and gravel as the police struggled to keep the two sides apart. Some chanted ‘death to the slaves of Christians’. President Karzai ordered an urgent review of the law - which he says has been misinterpreted by Western journalists - earlier this month.” [25v]

23.18 On 16 August 2009, BBC News reported that “The original version [of the new law] obliged Shia women to have sex with their husbands every four days at a minimum, and it effectively condoned rape by removing the need for consent to sex within marriage.” [25j] The *Guardian Online* reported on 24 July 2009 that “The proposed law led to furious protests from women’s groups.” [10a]

23.19 The BBC reported on 16 August 2009 that “Now an amended version of the same bill has passed quietly into law with the apparent approval of President Karzai... ‘There was a review process - Karzai came under huge pressure from all over the world to amend this law, but many of the most oppressive laws remain,’ Rachel Reid, the Human Rights Watch representative in Kabul, told the BBC... Women’s groups say its new wording still violates the principle of equality that is enshrined in their constitution.” [25j]

23.20 A Human Rights Watch article on 13 August 2009 recorded that:
“The [amended] law gives a husband the right to withdraw basic maintenance from his wife, including food, if she refuses to obey his sexual demands. It grants guardianship of children exclusively to their fathers and grandfathers. It requires women to get permission from their husbands to work. It also effectively allows a rapist to avoid prosecution by paying ‘blood money’ to a girl who was injured when he raped her… The law was designed in secret by a powerful and hard-line Shia leader, Ayatollah Asif Mohseni, and supported by conservative Shia leaders in parliament.” [17a]

**POLITICAL RIGHTS**

23.21 The USSD 2008 report stated that “Although women’s political participation gained a degree of acceptance, there were elements that continued to resist this trend.” [2a] (Section 3)

23.22 The Women for Women international paper, *2009 Afghanistan Report*, undated, stated that:

“The overwhelming majority of women in Afghanistan have only limited direct contact with political institutions. The Afghan Government recently committed to fast tracking the increase of women’s participation in the civil service at all levels to 30% by 2013. Currently, only 22% of all regular government employees are women, and only 9% percent of these are at the decision-making level. In the 9,394 Community Development Councils established throughout Afghanistan by May 2007, the number of female members was 21,239 (24%), compared to 67,212 (76%) male members. While women represent 27% of the National Assembly, the Minister of Women’s Affairs is the only female cabinet member, and in 17 of 36 ministries there are fewer than 10% female employees.

“There is currently an Afghan Women Judges Association, created in 2003, and an Afghan Women Lawyers and Professionals Association. The Family and Juvenile Courts are headed by women, but of the 1,547 sitting judges in Afghanistan only 62, or 4.2%, are female. Of the 546 prosecutors, 35 (6.4%) are female, and of the 1,241 attorneys 76 (6.1%) are female. There are no women members in the Supreme Court Council.” [94a] (p17)

23.23 The UNIFEM fact sheet of 2008, dated exactly? noted the following statistics on women’s participation in the spheres of politics, justice and security respectively:

- “Women represent 27% of the National Assembly: (68 out of 249 seats in the Wolesi Jirga and 23 out of 102 seats in the Mesherano Jirga
- “Women held 121 out of 420 Provincial Council seats in 2005
- “Women account for 25.9% of all civil servants
- “The number of women who registered for elections increased from 41.5% in 2004 to 44% in 2005... [however]
- “Only one cabinet member is female (the Minister of Women’s Affairs)
- “There were not enough women to meet the 124 seat quota at the Provincial Council elections, and 3 seats had to be given to men
- “In 17 of the 36 Ministries there are less than 10% female employees
- “Out of the total 17 Ambassadors of Afghanistan to other countries in 2007, only two were women.” [72b] (Political participation)
• “There is currently an Afghan Women Judges Association, created in
2003, and an Afghan Women Lawyers and Professionals Association
• “The Family and Juvenile Courts are headed by women
• “Of the 1,547 sitting judges in Afghanistan only 62 or 4.2% are female
• “Of the 546 prosecutors, 35 or 6.4% are female
• “Of the 1,241 attorneys 76 or 6.1% are female
• “There are no women members in the Supreme Court Council.” [72b] (Participation in the Justice sector)
• “Women represent less than 1% of employees in police and military services
• “There were only 233 policewomen out of the total 62,407 personnel in Afghanistan in February 2007
• “There are 259 women in the Afghan National Army, which is 0.6% of approximately 43,000 military personnel
• “There are no women in the auxiliary police force.” [72b] (Participation in Security services)

See Annex E for a list of Cabinet members.

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS

23.24 The USSD 2008 stated “Women active in public life faced disproportionate levels of threats and violence. As required by law, there were 68 women in the 249-seat Wolesi Jirga. President Karzai appointed 17 women to serve in the 102-seat Meshrano Jirga, and an additional six female MPs were elected to that house, bringing the total to 23 women in the Meshrano Jirga. There was one woman in the cabinet. There were no women on the Supreme Court.” [2a] (Section 2d)

(See also Section 30: Freedom of Movement)

23.25 The UNHCR’s Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Afghanistan, July 2009 stated that:

“Women are at particular risk of ill-treatment if perceived as not conforming to the gender roles ascribed to them by society, tradition and even the legal system. Ill-treatment occurs in a variety of forms and may be inflicted by several actors, including family members. Such treatment includes domestic violence, excessive custodial sentences and degrading and inhuman treatment. While there is a limited number of women holding public office, women’s rights continue to be curtailed, restricted and systematically violated. In April 2009, for instance, a Shiite Personal Status Law was passed by Parliament and signed by President Karzai. The law requires, inter alia, women to comply with their husbands’ sexual requests, and to obtain permission to leave the home, except in emergencies. The code has yet to be implemented and is currently under review as a result of international pressure.” [11a] (p31)

23.26 The Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI), accessed on 6 September 2009, recorded that “Unlike the Taliban, the current government imposes no legal restrictions on women’s freedom of dress.” [37a] The USSD 2008 report noted that “The government did not require women to wear burqas. Although
some women continued to wear the burqa out of personal choice, many other women felt compelled to wear one due to societal or familial pressure. Cases of local authorities policing aspects of women’s appearance to conform to a conservative interpretation of Islam did occur… and most women, even in Kabul, wore head covering. In rural areas and villages made more accessible by new roads, formerly unveiled women donned burqas when they worked in the fields to avoid being seen by strangers." [2a] (Section 5) The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan report, Silence is Violence, End the Abuse of Women in Afghanistan, published on 8 July 2009 reported that:

“The burqa received an inordinate amount of attention in the West during the Taliban period. The removal of the burqa is often viewed as a symbol of the ‘liberation’ of Afghan women. However, for many women, this is often the only protection they have to move in public locations without being harassed. The burqa allows women to maintain a low-profile. Female police officers have reported that they wear a burqa for their own personal safety when outside of the police station.” [46a] (p10)

Access to education and employment


“Afghan women and girls rank among the world’s worst-off by most indicators, including maternal mortality, life expectancy, and literacy.

“Insecurity prevents the vast majority of girls from attending school in the south and southeast…Even in conflict-free areas, Afghan girls continue to face immense obstacles to education such as lack of girls’ schools, sexual harassment en route to school, and early marriage which tends to prematurely end schooling. According to Ministry of Education data, 46 percent of primary school-aged girls were enrolled in primary school, compared with 74 percent of boys. At the secondary level only 8 percent of girls and 18 percent of boys were enrolled.

“Women still confront widespread discrimination, significant barriers to working outside the home, and restrictions on their mobility; many still cannot travel without an accompanying male relative and a burqa.” [17b]

23.28 The US State Department 2008 report noted that although women had better access to education, the denial of education during the ongoing insurgency was an impediment to improving their situation. [2a] (Section 5)

23.29 The UNAMA report of 8 July 2009 stated that “The adult literacy rate of Afghans over 15 years of age is 28 per cent including 12.6 per cent for females. In rural areas, where 74 per cent of Afghans reside, it is estimated that 90 per cent of women cannot read or write.” [46a] (p8)

23.30 The Women for Women International report 2009 recorded that:

“In the economy of rural Afghanistan, male and female roles differ. For the most part, women and girls engage in a number of farm-based activities ‘ranging from seed bed preparation, weeding, horticulture, and fruit cultivation
to a series of post-harvest crop processing activities such as cleaning and drying vegetables, fruits and nuts for domestic use and for marketing.’

“In rural areas, the definition of ‘economic activity’ frequently ‘excludes the exchange of labor and products between households’ and ‘post-harvest processing of crops (drying/cleaning/preserving), which is a predominately female domain.’ It also seems to exclude ‘the vital role women in the South play regarding a household’s contracting of poppy harvesters, for whom three solid daily meals are part of their wage packet.’

“In urban areas, women’s access to the labor market ‘is constrained by historical circumstances, low skills, limited opportunities, stringent cultural norms, occupational sex segregation and a number of demographic factors.’ Outside the domestic sphere, women’s employment has always been subject to severe restrictions, and the limited access to childcare continues to pose a significant obstacle to women’s employment outside the home.” [94a] (p18)

23.31 UNIFEM’s January 2008 fact sheet reported:

- “30% of agricultural workers are women
- “Women receive 3 times less wages than men
- “There are some 50,000 war widows in Kabul, supporting an average of 6 dependents
- “Only 38.2% of women in Afghanistan are economically active
- “In 2004, the per capita Gross Domestic Product was US$402 for women, compared to US$1,182 for men.” [72b] (Labour force participation)

23.32 The USSD 2008 report stated that “Some local authorities excluded women from all employment outside the home, apart from the traditional work of women in agriculture.” [2a] (Section 5) However, the report further stated that “… recently graduated women police officers there were active in crime investigation including investigating cases of domestic violence. During the year [2008], a local NGO conducted four domestic violence trainings for 240 ANP officers in Kabul, including those working in ANP Family Response Units. The Family Response Units are staffed primarily by female police officers and address violence and crimes against women, children, and families. They offer mediation and resources to prevent future instances of domestic violence.” [2a] (Section 4)

23.33 A Womankind report of February 2008 recorded that “In recent research, a relationship was found between higher rates of domestic abuse and women working outside the home, highlighting a possible backlash against new found freedoms. There is very little research on, or understanding of Afghan women in the private sector: small businesses, agriculture or industry.” [88a] (p45)

Marriage and Divorce

This section should also be read in conjunction with Section 24: Children – Child Marriage
23.34 The US State Department (USSD) report 2008, published on 25 February 2009, stated that “The legal age for marriage was 16 for girls and 18 for boys.” [2a] (Section 5) The Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI) undated Country Profile on Afghanistan and the situation of equality for Afghan women, accessed on 6 September 2009, noted “The Afghan Constitution and Islamic Sharia law both support polygamy, allowing men to take up to four wives. Certain conditions apply to polygamous marriages, such as the equal treatment of all wives, but these are not always observed…” [37a]

23.35 The USSD 2008 report additionally noted:

“The government’s willingness to recognize the right to marry varied according to nationality, gender, and religion. The family court could register a marriage between a Jewish or Christian woman and a Muslim man, but the court required the couple to accept a Muslim ceremony. A woman of any other faith had to convert to Islam before marrying a Muslim man. The court could not register a marriage between a Muslim woman and a non-Muslim man. The court could not register marriages for citizens who stated they were not Muslim, even if they were born into other faiths. During the year these situations rarely occurred, as more than 99 percent of the population was Muslim.” [2a] (Section 1f)

23.36 The USSD 2008 further noted that:

“The AIHRC [Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission] estimated approximately 40 percent of marriages were forced, and distinguished this category from 20 percent of marriages that were ‘arranged,’ the latter allowing the woman the choice to decline marriage but not to choose her spouse. During the year the AIHRC recorded 30 cases of women given to another family to settle disputes, although the practice is outlawed by presidential decree. The unreported number was believed to be much higher.” [2a] (Section 4)

23.37 However, the USSD 2008 report also noted that a Womankind report had recorded that “…more than 60 percent of marriages were forced and, despite laws banning the practice, 57 percent of brides were under the legal marriage age of 16.” [2a] (Section 5)

23.38 The Womankind report of February 2008 noted “Afghan civil law contains numerous provisions that protect women’s human rights in the family, such as their right to divorce if they are being maltreated. While seldom enforced, existing law provides a basis from which to advocate for enforcement and education about women’s human rights.” [88a] (p24) The Freedom House report, Freedom in the World 2009, Afghanistan, covering events in 2008, noted “Women’s choices regarding marriage and divorce remain circumscribed by custom and discriminatory laws…” [41a] (p6)

23.39 Womankind also recorded that “Stigma and shame surround divorced women…rendering them unmarriageable and subsequently, financially destitute. Polygamy is one of the few options available to divorced women, who have low social status but require a husband for financial dependence… [88a] (p25) Women’s economic dependence on male family members prevents them from seeking divorce or leaving abusive marriages.” [88a] (p44) The USSD 2008 stated that “An NGO in Herat, however, reported shuras often
treated women fairly in resolving civil matters such as divorce and custody cases.” [2a] (Section 1e)

23.40 The Afghanistan Human Rights Commission report, December 2008, stated that:

“Islamic Sharia and Constitution of the country have provided suitable rights for women and men, but practically and in some rules and practices of equality between men and women these rights are not ensured. Current legislation leaves women largely unprotected. A man can divorce his wife without due process. In the absence of officially enforced marriage and divorce registration women remain particularly open to abusive practices. A woman can remarry three months after divorce period (Edat). However, if challenged, she will have to provide witnesses to prove her divorce in court. The woman can initiate the divorce process if she has enough reasons to do so; accepted reasons among others include: her husband must be sick and it endangers her; her husband must fail to provide for the family; her husband must be absent for more than four years in the house or be sentenced for imprisonment of 10 years or more. In this case, the court will assign her mahr – divorce maintenance – and custody of girls until they reach their ninth birthday and boys until their seventh birthday.” [78a] (p33)

23.41 An IRIN News article dated 16 July 2008 reported that “In Afghanistan sexual relations between a man and a woman outside marriage are considered a serious crime and offenders can face death penalty and/or a lengthy prison sentence, depending on their marital status and other circumstances. Every year hundreds of female sex workers are sent to prison for allegedly having ‘unlawful sexual relationships’, according to women’s rights activists...” [36g] However, “High food prices, drought, unemployment and lack of socio-economic opportunities are pushing some women and young girls in northern Afghanistan into commercial sex work, women’s rights activists and several affected women told IRIN.” [36g]

23.42 The USSD Religious Freedom report 2008, noted:

“There were no new reported cases of forced chastity examinations. However, local marriage traditions in which a newlywed couple consummates their marriage on a white hankie that is later displayed as proof of the bride’s virginity until marriage remain popular throughout the country. Women run the risk of immediate divorce and social ostracism, severe punishment from her in-laws, or death, if her virginity is not confirmed through this ritual. There were no reports of examinations imposed on non-Muslims.” [2c] (Section 3)

23.43 The SIGI Afghanistan Profile accessed on 6 September 2009, noted:

“Under Islamic law, provisions on parental authority hold that fathers are the natural guardians of their children. In the case of divorce, mothers are usually granted physical – but not legal – custody of children until they reach the age of custodial transfer. At that time, children are returned to the physical custody of the father or the father’s family.

“Women’s right to inheritance in Afghanistan may vary, depending on whether they are determined by Islamic and customary law. Under Islamic law, women may inherit from their parents, husbands or children, and, under certain
conditions, from other family members. However, their share is always smaller than that to which men are entitled. This is commonly justified by the argument that women have no financial responsibility towards their husbands and children. Under customary law, women do not inherit from their fathers or husbands, but are taken into the care of the husband’s family. If a widow is young, she is often encouraged to marry one of her brothers-in-law as a means of being able to take care of her children.” [37a]

(See also Section 19: Freedom of Religion – Mixed Marriages and Section 24: Children - Child Marriage)

Single women and widows

23.44 The Womankind report of February 2008 recorded that:

“Afghanistan has one of the largest numbers of widows in the world, estimated to exceed 1 million as a result of the last 30 years of war. Little has been done to support widows in the provinces, who have no or little source of income. Without any literacy, training or skills, and no social safety net, widows are often forced to beg. They are systematically denied their right to traditional protections under Islamic law, such as nafaqa (payment by male family members to widowed or destitute female family members).” [88a] [p44]

23.45 In May 2009 a France 24 news article reported that “In Afghanistan, it is virtually impossible for women to live alone, without the protection of the family and especially of male relatives. Given the importance of the family, Afghan women’s advocates say the emphasis in domestic violence cases is on trying to solve the situation within the family through counseling and outreach services.” [47b] The article also noted that the organisation ‘Women for Afghan Women’ (WAW) are assisting their clients to find new husbands. “Prospective grooms are carefully selected and approved by the shelter’s staff, and tend to be men who cannot afford the customary bride price, making them more accommodating when seeking a wife.” [47b]

23.46 UNHCR’s Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum seekers from Afghanistan, July 2009 noted that:

“Unaccompanied women or women lacking a male ‘tutor’ (mahram) continued to face limitations on conducting a normal social life. They include divorced women, unmarried women who are not virgins, and women whose engagements to be married have been broken. Unless they marry, which is very difficult given the social stigma associated with these women, social rejection and discrimination continue to be the norm.” [11a] [p32]

23.47 The report further noted:

“Women without male support and protection generally lack the means of survival, given the social restrictions on women living alone, including the limitations on their freedom of movement. This is reflected in the absence of solutions available to the few women able to access domestic violence shelters. Unable to live independently, they face years of quasi-detention,
prompting many to return to abusive family situations. The results of such "reconciliation" are generally not monitored and abuse or honor crimes committed upon return are often done with impunity." [11a] (p32)

### Imprisonment of Women

23.48 The Foreign and Commonwealth Office noted in a letter dated 17 March 2008 that “A number of NGOs report that hundreds of women and girls are being detained in prisons across the country: the majority for violating social, behavioural and religious codes. There is uncertainty surrounding the legality of their detention.” [4d]

23.49 The US State Department (USSD) report 2008, published on 25 February 2009, stated that:

“Local officials occasionally imprisoned women at the request of family members for opposing the family’s choice of a marriage partner or being charged with adultery or bigamy. Women also faced bigamy charges from husbands who had deserted them and then reappeared after the woman had remarried. Local officials imprisoned women in place of a family member who had committed a crime but could not be located. Some women resided in detention facilities because they had run away from home due to domestic violence or the prospect of forced marriage. Several girls between the ages of 17 and 21 remained detained in Pol-e-Charkhi prison having been captured after fleeing abusive forced marriages.” [2a] (Section 5)

23.50 Womankind’s February 2008 report concurred “The vast majority of women in prison are there for zina (sexual relations outside of marriage) or for running away from home to escape abuse or forced marriage, rather than for legitimate crimes recognised under international law.” [88a] (p23)

23.51 MSNBC cable television news channel noted on 30 April 2008 that “In parts of Afghanistan and neighboring Pakistan, where stern social codes prevail, a woman who runs away from home is typically suspected of having taken a lover and can be prosecuted for adultery. Simply leaving her house without her family’s permission may be deemed an offense... although it is not classified as such under Afghanistan’s penal code.” [30a] “... a U.N. human rights officer in eastern Afghanistan, said that in 70 to 80 percent of the cases she has seen, a woman complaining of domestic violence is charged as a criminal for running away from home.” [30a]

23.52 In January 2008 “...the new Female Prison/Detention Center (FDC) in Kabul was handed over by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to the Ministry of Justice of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

“The new Female Prison/Detention Center that is located in the Tahia-e-Maskan area of the capital will host 96 female prisoners. This center has been constructed by UNODC as a part of Project AFG/R41: ‘The Reform of Penitentiary System in Afghanistan’. The project has been carried out with the generous financial assistance of the government of Italy.

“The construction of a new Female Prison/Detention Center in Kabul was launched in December 2005. This center is also equipped and furnished with...
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN

23.53 Womankind Worldwide reported in February 2008:

“In Afghanistan, seven years after the fall of the misogynist Taliban regime, Afghanistan is still one of the most dangerous places in the world to be a woman. It has the highest maternal mortality rate in the world, one of the highest rates of domestic violence and is perhaps the only country where suicide rates are higher among women than men.

“It is a place where women set themselves on fire to escape brutality, where girls as young as eight years old are married to elderly men and where 60 percent of marriages are forced. Women and girls still have minimal protection from violence, their basic needs are still not being met and international aid frequently fails to address women’s most urgent priorities in judicial reform, health, employment and education.” [88a] (p7)

23.54 The UNIFEM Annual Report 2008-2009 stated that “For many women in Afghanistan, violence is an everyday reality. Frequently forced into marriage, often before the legal age of sixteen, women and girls face abuse on a horrific scale: statistics indicate that over 87 percent of all women suffer from domestic abuse, making the country one of the most dangerous places in the world to be a woman.” [72d]

23.55 IRIN News reported on 8 March 2008 that “Registered cases of physical violence against women and girls in Afghanistan have increased by about 40 percent since March 2007. UN agencies involved in women’s development efforts in Afghanistan say a dramatic increase in the number of reported cases of violence against women does not necessarily imply that gender-based violence has increased.” [36a] A later report by IRIN News, published in July 2008, recorded that there was little support for the victims of child sexual abuse in Afghanistan. [36m]

23.56 The UN Secretary-General’s report of 6 March 2008, stated that “Violence and harmful practices against women and girls remain a cause for serious concern. In 2007, UNAMA received over 2,000 complaints of gender-based violence. Better coordination to tackle violence against women is being pursued at the policy level through the Inter-Ministerial Commission on Violence against Women and numerous community-level initiatives.” [39b] (p11)

23.57 An Amnesty International briefing paper of June 2008 recorded:

“ Afghan women and girls still encounter discriminatory laws, policies and practices, which include physical attacks on them as women. Women and girls face endemic domestic violence, trafficking, forced marriages, including child
The police, the courts and other justice sector officials seldom address women’s complaints of abuses, including beatings, rape and other sexual violence. Women victims and defendants have little recourse to justice and are discriminated against in both the formal and informal justice systems.” [7a] (3. Protecting and upholding women’s rights)

23.58 UNIFEM’s January 2008 fact sheet recorded the following statistics on violence against women in Afghanistan:

- “Out of 1,327 incidents of Violence Against Women (VAW) in Afghanistan, 30.7% were related to physical violence; 30.1% to psychological violence; 25.2% to sexual violence; and 14% a combination of the three
- “82% of incidents of VAW are committed by family members, 9% by the community and 1.7% by state authorities” [72b]

23.59 UNIFEM’s Violence against women – primary database of March 2008 concluded that women are “…mostly being victimized by close family members… “ [72a] (5.1 Analysis) Further, “UNAMA’s analysis and the statistics generated by the primary VAW database highlight the young age of the victims… 30% of the recorded cases concern victims who are younger than 20 years of age. 9% of the cases relate to girls aged 15 years of younger.” [72a] (5.1 Analysis) The report continued: “It is disturbing to note in the information provided by UNAMA that victims seeking support from government agencies are further subjected to violence by government officials.” [72a] (5.1 Analysis)

23.60 The USSD 2008 report noted that:

“Authorities rarely prosecuted abusers and only occasionally investigated complaints of violent attacks, rape, or killings, or suicides of women. If cases came to court, the accused were often exonerated or punished lightly. The director of a women’s shelter in Kabul noted domestic violence occurred in most homes but went largely unreported due to societal acceptance of the practice. Domestic violence usually consisted of beating women and children and, less often, burning women. During the year, the AIHRC initiated additional efforts to collect statistics on violence against women.” [2a] (Section 5)

23.61 The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan report, dated 8 July 2009, (UNAMA report) stated that:

“Female parliamentarians, provincial council members, civil servants, journalists, women working for international organizations (including the United Nations), as well as those considered to be engaged in immoral professions, have been targeted by antigovernment elements (AGEs), by local traditional and religious power-holders, by their own families and communities, and in some instances by government authorities.” [46a]p11

Honour killings

23.62 The Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, published on 6 May 2009 stated that:

“Honor killings’ occur with impunity in parts of Afghanistan. In the eastern region, for example, one source had documented 40 honor killings between
January 2007 and December 2008. The actual number is certainly far higher due to fear of reporting such cases. The victims are predominantly women, although men are also killed. Rarely are perpetrators investigated and prosecuted.” [39e] (p30)

23.63 The UNAMA report, dated 8 July 2009, noted:

“Private feuds, such as those between families or within communities are also a motive for sexual violence. In such contexts, rape is used to ‘dishonour’ another family, tribe or clan, to obtain revenge for a previous crime. Men thus enter into a cycle of revenge, based on the sexual abuse of women. Sexual violence and rape are seen as ‘compensating’ for an earlier crime. However, it was noted by some interlocutors that revenge is usually meted out on families that are considered less powerful.” [46a] (p23)

23.64 The USSD 2008 report noted that:

“The AIHRC documented a total of 76 honor killings throughout the year; however, the unreported number was believed to be much higher. In September, according to a local NGO, an 18 year-old woman in Kapisa Province was killed by her brother because she had run away from a forced marriage. Reportedly, after the woman ran away to a Kabul women’s shelter the Governor of Kapisa intervened in the case, sheltered her, and forced the woman’s mother to return her to Kapisa, resulting in her death.” [2a] (Section 5)

23.65 The Report of the Special Rapporteur, 6 May 2009 also recorded the ‘honour killing’ of two cousins (boy and girl) who:

“allegedly had sexual relations outside of marriage. They were invited to a ‘dinner’ by their uncles and, when sleeping, were shot and killed. The boy’s body was sent to his father. The girl’s was buried without any funeral prayers. No family members complained to the police. The police knew about the deaths, but did not investigate, claiming that they could not do so without a complaint from the family.” [39e] (p30)

23.66 The same source recorded:

“Other women were killed for attempting to flee their homes, often because of domestic violence. Women in the family of the deceased victim of an ‘honor killing’ are typically too afraid of their own families to make a complaint to police. And they know that the police are unlikely to carry out an investigation, or that if they do, bribery will ensure impunity for the perpetrators. I received reports of a number of cases in which police did attempt to carry out investigations, but senior Government officials interfered with or prevented the investigations. Like any other murders, international law requires that these killings be investigated, prosecuted, and punished.” [39e] (p30-31)

Rape

23.67 The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) report, dated 8 July 2009, stated that

“There is no explicit provision in the 1976 Afghan Penal Code that criminalises rape. In instances of forced sexual intercourse, law enforcement and judicial
authorities overwhelmingly resort to the concept of zina, which does not adequately address the issue of consent, one of the core elements of the crime of rape. Zina (under chapter eight of the Penal Code which focuses on crimes of adultery, pederasty, and violation of 'honour'), only refers to individuals engaged in sex outside of marriage... (p23) The issue of the criminalization of rape is further complicated by the fact that judges rely extensively on their own interpretation of Islamic law and its jurisprudence when adjudicating zina cases. In this respect, a party alleging zina has to provide four adult male witnesses of sound standing – this is impossible in nearly all cases." [46a] (p24)

23.68 However, the USSD 2008 report stated that:

“The law criminalizes rape, which is punishable by death, but under Shari’a, which the country’s laws draw from and cannot conflict, the criminalization did not extend to spousal rape. Under Shari’a, a rape case requires a woman to produce multiple witnesses to the incident, while the man need simply claim it was consensual sex, often leading to an adultery conviction of the victim. Adultery is defined in the Penal Code and designated a crime; premarital sex is not designated a crime, but local officials often considered it a ‘moral’ offense.” [2a] (Section 5)

23.69 The US Commission on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report 2009, released on 1 May 2009, noted that:

“In April 2009, Parliament passed and President Hamid Karzai signed a law to enact a Shi’a Muslim family code. However, as written, the code would have sanctioned marital rape and the inability of a woman to leave home without her husband’s permission, except in emergencies. Proponents of the measure stated it would have recognized the distinct practices of Afghanistan’s Shi’a minority, constituting about 15 percent of the population. However, a swift international outcry prompted suspension of the legislation. According to Afghan government officials, the law will be reviewed for its permissibility under the Afghan Constitution and international human rights instruments.” [70a] (p 146)

23.70 The UNAMA report, dated 8 July 2009, stated that:

“In general, Afghan women and men consider discussing issues related to sex and sexual violence as taboo, as women’s sexuality is effectively controlled by men. In the course of this research, UNAMA found it extremely difficult to use terms like ‘rape’, ‘sexual consent’ and zina. The issue of marital rape is never considered or reported, since women have no choice in terms of consenting to sexual intercourse with their spouse... Any woman who dares to report a rape subjects herself to potential further victimization, including criminal prosecution and imprisonment for zina.” [46a] (p21)

23.71 UNAMA further added:

“Most information on sexual violence and rape in particular, is anecdotal, incomplete and at times unreliable. There is a lack of official primary and comprehensive data on rape. Statistics on rape cases (including cases reported to the police, Prosecutors and the courts) as well as on the profile of both victims and perpetrators, are currently unavailable. To address this gap,
the Ministry of Women’s Affairs has established a database, though cases remain under-reported.” [46a] (p22)

Self-Harm

23.72 IRIN News reported on 8 March 2008 that:

“The number of women attempting suicide in the past year was 626, of whom 130 died. Suicide methods included self-immolation, the slashing of veins and taking lethal doses of drugs, according to the AIHRC [Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission]. Cases of rape and self-immolation appeared to be going up: ‘In 2006 we recorded 1,545 cases of violence against [or severe psychological oppression of] women, which included 98 cases of self-immolation and 34 cases of rape, while in 2007 we listed 2,374 cases of violence, which constitute 165 self-immolations and 51 cases of rape,’ Subhrang [Suraya Subhrang, a commissioner on the rights of women at AIHRC] told IRIN…” [36s]

23.73 The USSD 2008 report noted that “Women occasionally resorted to self-immolation when they felt there was no escape from their situations. During the year the AIHRC documented 72 cases of self-immolation, in contrast to 110 cases in 2007. Other organizations reported an overall increase during the past two years. According to the AIHRC [Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission], almost all the women had doused themselves with gasoline and set themselves alight. In Herat Province, during the first six months of the year, the Herat city hospital alone recorded 47 cases of self-immolation, of whom 40 died. There have also been reports of relatives setting women on fire to create the appearance of self-immolation.” [2a] (Section 5) The Womankind report of February 2008 recorded that “While no decrease in cases of self-immolation can be reported, the issue became a public concern for the first time when several organisations began work on it.” [88a] (p24)

23.74 On 27 May 2008, the Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA) reported on a typical case of attempted suicide where the woman victim ended up in Kabul hospital after setting fire to herself. RAWA reported that “For those who live through this form of suicide attempt, the scarring can be a death sentence in itself. The survivors who leave this ward cannot return home because of the shame they brought on their family. Some will live the rest of their lives on the streets or if they’re lucky, they may find a safe house.” [49b]

GOVERNMENT AND NGO ASSISTANCE

Shelters

23.75 The US State Department (USSD) report 2008, published on 25 February 2009, stated that:

“There were at least 19 women’s shelters across the country. The five shelters in Kabul were home to more than 100 women and girls. The Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MOWA) and other agencies referred women to the centers,
which were designed to give protection, accommodation, food, training, and healthcare to women escaping violence in the home or seeking legal support due to family feuds. According to the MOWA [The Ministry of Women’s Affairs], as many as 20 women and girls were referred to the MOWA’s legal department every day; however, space at the specialized shelters was limited. Women in need of shelter who could not find a place in the Kabul shelters often ended up in prison.

“The concept of women’s shelters was not widely accepted in society, as many persons treated them with distrust and did not understand their utility. The director of one shelter stated she always referred to the location as a mediation center, as ‘shelter’ was considered a negative word. Policewomen trained to help victims of domestic violence complained they were instructed not to do outreach to victims but simply to wait for victims to show up at police stations. This significantly hindered their work, as reporting domestic violence was not socially accepted. UNAMA [United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan] reported police leadership often did not provide female officers with equipment or vehicles necessary to do outside investigations. A Heart-based NGO, however, reported recently graduated women police officers there were active in crime investigation including investigating cases of domestic violence. During the year, a local NGO conducted four domestic violence trainings for 240 ANP [Afghan National Police] officers in Kabul, including those working in ANP Family Response Units. The Family Response Units are staffed primarily by female police officers and address violence and crimes against women, children, and families. They offer mediation and resources to prevent future instances of domestic violence.” [2a] (Section 5)

23.76 The Womankind report of February 2008 recorded “A new shelter has opened in Mazar-i-sharif, the first in the northern region. At present, an estimated 8-10 shelters operate in the country (four in Kabul, one in Herat, one in Balkh and two in central Afghanistan).” [88a] (p21) Also, “The Government of Afghanistan (GoA) provided land to the International Organisation of Migration (IOM) for the construction of a shelter for trafficking victims.” [88a] (p26) Nevertheless, “Afghan women leaders and activists overwhelmingly feel that aid is donor-led rather than being needs-based. For example, while there is an acute need for women’s shelters, this has not been a popular project among donors.” [88a] (p52)

23.77 Located in Kabul is the Humanitarian Assistance for the Women and Children of Afghanistan (HAWCA) which offers “… temporary housing/ protection for those women or girls who have been abuse [sic] physically, psychological or mentally by family members, powerful communities members, warlords, officials or any, and has not committed crime and need protection and those women who have no house to live (a temporary protection solution).” (Humanitarian Assistance for the Women and Children of Afghanistan, Annual Report, 2008) [18a]

See Section 24: Children - Education

23.78 The UNIFEM Annual Report 2008-2009 stated that

“Since 2008, two referral centres in Parwan and Nangahar provide a safe haven and 24-hour legal advice for cases concerning elopement, divorce, domestic violence and land rights. Staffed and utilized solely by women, the
centres were established by the Ministries of the Interior and Women’s Affairs, with support from UNIFEM. Nangahar records indicate a 90 percent decline in arbitrary detention of women by the police since the opening in mid 2008. The Government has committed to extend the centers to all 34 provinces in the country.” [72d]
24. CHILDREN

OVERVIEW

24.01 Afghanistan has ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). (Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, August 2007) [78d] (p20)

24.02 The Save the Children website, accessed on 22 June 2009, noted that:

“In the past five years progress has been made [to improve the lives of children], but Afghanistan still faces many challenges. It has high infant, child and maternal mortality; low immunization; chronic nutritional deficiencies among children; low literacy levels; low school enrollment and high drop-out rates, especially among girls; and difficulty protecting children and promoting their rights...Afghanistan remains a generally unsafe place for children - especially street and working children, children who have been institutionalized because of family constraints and children injured by landmines or other accidents. There are also many girls and boys who are subjected to corporal and psychological punishment in schools and homes.” [50a]

24.03 Save the Children has been helping children:

“...through community and school-based education for teachers, parents and grandparents and other community members. With our International Save the Children Alliance partners, other child-focused organizations and the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, we work to ensure that the Child Protection Action Network we helped create remains strong. Save the Children-led Child-to-Child group activities also are key to children receiving help with their day-to-day problems.” [50a]


“The government demonstrated a continuing commitment to address the concerns of vulnerable children and their families. In 2006 the government launched its National Strategy for Children at Risk (NSFCAR), which was designed by the Ministry of Work, Social Affairs, Martyred, and Disabled (MOWSAMD) to improve care for vulnerable children and families. In 2007, the Ministry of Public Health (MOPH) trained 500 health workers on prevention of child abuse and violence against children.” [2a] (Section 5)

CHILD LABOUR

24.05 The US State Department (USSD) report 2008, published on 25 February 2009, stated that:

“The law recognizes the standard legal age for work as 15, but there are provisions for 13- and 14-year-olds to work as apprentices, provided they work only 35 hours per week. Under the law, children under 13 may not work under any circumstances. There was no evidence that authorities in any part of the country enforced child labor laws. Child labor remained a pervasive problem. According to UNICEF estimates, at least 30 percent of primary school-age
children undertook some form of work and there were more than one million child laborers under age 14. Most child laborers worked as street vendors or shopkeepers. Others in northern provinces worked in the carpet weaving industry. Some sectors in which child labor was concentrated exposed children to the dangers of landmines. AIHRC [Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission] reported approximately 60,000 child laborers in Kabul alone, the majority of whom migrated to the city from other provinces. According to Save the Children, there were as many as 5,000 child laborers in brick factories in Nangarhar. Children faced numerous health and safety risks at work and some of them sustained serious injuries such as broken bones.

“MOWSAMD [Ministry of Work, Social Affairs, Martyred, and Disabled] reported the government was working on the problem of child labor. The NSFCAR [National Strategy for Children at Risk] addressed child labor and demanded the creation of diversified services for vulnerable families to prevent family separation and exploitation of children. MOE efforts to promote universal basic education, such as workshops in schools and outreach to employers, also contributed to the prevention of exploitative child labor.” [2a] (Section 6d)

24.06 The Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) Briefing Paper, Confronting Child Labour in Afghanistan, May 2009, (AREU Report 2009) stated that “Child labour is an issue of growing concern in Afghanistan. According to recent estimates, one in four Afghan children aged seven to 14 is engaged in some form of work.” [22d]

24.07 Cases of child slavery and debt bondage practices have also risen in Afghanistan, particularly in poor rural communities and is often disguised as marriage. IRIN News reported in February 2009 on the “Extreme poverty, lack of awareness about child rights, weak law enforcement and strong conservative traditions are among the problems which have pushed many minors - boys and girls - into situations of peonage, child rights activists say.” [36k]

24.08 The AREU Report 2009 reported that

“The decision to send children to work is influenced by a complex interaction of economic, social and cultural factors… Faced with the apparent lack of concrete benefits to education in the short- or long-term, poor households may decide that their children’s time is more effectively used for income generation. The opportunity cost of spending time in school is often too high to bear given poor educational quality and outcomes and the pressing need for household survival. Child labour, then, is not only a means of ensuring short-term benefit to the household in terms of increased income in the present; it is also a way for children to learn marketable skills that can support them in an uncertain future… In the absence of an overarching social protection framework, child labour is one of the strategies that some poor households use to diversify and increase income.” [22d]

24.09 On 12 June 2009, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) reported that UNICEF had voiced it’s concern about the growing number of children working in Afghanistan and noted that girls were more likely to be pressured into work than boys. The number of children working had increased since a survey undertaken in 2003 by UNICEF. UNICEF were reported as saying that “...
many Afghan families have no money to send their children to school and need them to earn money to support the family." However, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty also reported that "Afghanistan recently signed an international convention for preventing child labor, which UN officials expect will help reduce the extent of the problem there." [291]

VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN

24.10 The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) Briefing for The Human Rights Council Universal Periodic Review – 5th session, 2008 noted:

"Corporal punishment of children is lawful in the home. Children have limited protection from violence under the Penal Code, the Constitution and the Juvenile Code, but there is no explicit prohibition of corporal punishment. In an official statement in 2005, the Ministry of Justice announced that ‘the use of any form of violent behaviours and beating and humiliating of children that breaches their human rights ‘to be respected and treated with dignity’, is prohibited’, and at a meeting of the South Asia Forum in July 2006, following the regional consultation in 2005 of the UN Secretary General’s Study on Violence against Children, the government made a commitment to prohibition in all settings, including the home. But legal reform to enact explicit prohibition has yet to begin." [79a]

24.11 The OHCHR further noted that based on research undertaken in 2008:

"...interviews with more than 200 men and women from 61 families in urban and rural areas in four provinces, plus 56 focus group discussions and 46 interviews with key informants, found that physical violence occurred within all 61 case study families, most commonly slapping, verbal abuse, punching, kicking, and hitting with sticks, electrical cables and shoes. More unusual types of violence included shooting at children, tying them up, washing them in cold water outside during winter and public humiliation. Corporal punishment was used on children as young as 2 or 3 years." [79a]

24.12 In February 2008 the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) published a report on their 2006 research project investigating the changing nature of family dynamics in Afghanistan. The report noted that corporal punishment was widely used in Afghanistan and stated:

"...there are two dominant and interrelated motivations for this: parents’ fears for their children’s futures and second, the idea that keeping children frightened of adults makes them behave well. Parents are extremely frightened of their children not growing into good, useful moral adults. For example, for virtually all the parents the research teams spoke to, ensuring that their children studied hard and got a good education was uppermost in their concerns. Since violence has been used as the primary way to discipline children many adult family members are frightened of not using corporal punishment in case this will lead to their children not behaving correctly or not turning into the adults they want them to be. The common, if not universal, assumption that in order to discipline children they should be frightened was expressed to the research teams. Alongside this is the idea that if a beating is severe enough children will never forget how it felt and, therefore, not repeat their ‘bad behaviour’." [36k] (p43)
24.13 The report added:

“…data reveal that keeping children in a state of fear is believed to be the only way to make them behave. For example, a young man during a focus group discussion in Nangarhar proudly told the team that he beats the children so hard so that they are always frightened of him. This now means that when he comes home they are all so frightened of him that they become instantly quiet. This is a situation in his family he is proud of and he believes he is doing the right thing for his children.” [36k] (p43)

24.14 The United Nations Security Council’s report, 10 November 2008 stated that:

“Violence against children, specifically of a sexual nature, occurs particularly during times of instability. The practice of ‘bacha baazi’ (boy-play) consists of boys kept cloistered and used for sexual and harmful social entertainment by warlords and other armed group leaders. This practice, like any violence against children, is strongly condemned by Islam and by all religious and by governmental as well as cultural leaders. Prosecution of a small number of cases has been confirmed by the country Task Force on Monitoring and Reporting, and more initiatives, including studies on the issue of child sexual abuse, are being developed. However, law enforcement officials and human rights activists highlighted difficulties in preventing the practice, addressing the violence and prosecuting the perpetrators more consistently.” [39f] (p14)

24.15 The US State Department (USSD) 2008 report, further noted that:

“Child abuse was endemic throughout the country, ranging from general neglect, physical abuse, abandonment, and confinement to working to pay off family debts. The Ministry of Work and Social Affairs stated that child labor and police beatings frequently occurred and more than five million children lived in desperate need of humanitarian assistance. During the year drought and food shortages across the country forced many families to send their children onto the streets to beg for food and money. According to an AIHRC report during the year, police regularly beat children they took off the streets and incarcerated them. Detention centers for ‘young offenders’ deprived children of the right to an education, the report stated. In a statement commenting on the AIHRC report, UNICEF reported a punitive and retributive approach to juvenile justice predominated throughout the country. Although it is against the law, corporal punishment in schools remained common.” [2a] (Section 5)

24.16 The report further added:

“Sexual abuse of children remained pervasive. During the year an AIHRC study found most child victims were abused by extended family members. A UNHCR report noted boys were also abused by tribal leaders. In 2008, the MOI recorded 36 cases of rape of young boys, following approximately 80 documented cases in 2007; the unreported number is believed to be much higher. According to the AIHRC, only 24 percent of child sexual abusers are incarcerated.

“According to MOI the number of reported sexual assaults on children in the north significantly increased during the year. UNAMA reported 80 cases of
rape of girls between ages 8 and 14 in Takhar province during the year. The AIHRC attributed the relatively high number of reported cases of rape in the north to greater insecurity inhibiting reporting in the south. Due to ongoing violence in many areas of the south, aid organizations and government agencies could not assist victims or investigate crimes to the same degree as in more secure northern provinces" [2a] (Section 5)

24.17 The United Nations Security Council’s report, 10 November 2008, observed:

“There are a number of substantive reports of children, especially boys, being sexually abused and exploited by members of the armed forces and armed groups. For example, two police officers in a south-eastern province who were arrested after the intervention of child protection actors for sexually abusing a 15-year-old boy were released after allegedly bribing the authorities. In a similar incident, in the north, a 16-year-old boy reportedly recruited into the Afghan National Army after providing a falsified identity document was subsequently sexually abused by two soldiers. There is insufficient protection for victims of or witnesses to violence, and very few cases reach the prosecution stage. Fear of violent retaliation against victims and families was cited as a factor by reliable sources. In addition, given the lack of specific legislation on the subject of sexual violence, victims are often arrested and charged with adultery.” [39d] (p13)

24.18 The United Nations Security Council’s report, 10 November 2008 stated that:

“While most of the victims do not wish their experience to be reported, it is possible to discuss certain incidents involving personnel of the Afghan National Security Forces where the cases were appropriately dealt with by the authorities. For instance, a member of the Afghan National Army active in northern Afghanistan raped an 11-year-old girl and was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment by a military court in early 2008. A 12-year-old boy and an adult male relative employed in a police post who were sexually abused by three police officers over an unknown period of time filed a complaint with the support of the Child Protection Action Network. The perpetrators were sentenced to 10 years imprisonment. In a southern province, a 16-year-old boy, stopped on the pretext of an identity check by a police officer, was subsequently raped. He reported the abuse to service providers who helped him to file a complaint. The case is being prosecuted.” [39f] (p13)


“As part of their campaign of terrorizing the civilian population, the Taliban and other insurgent groups continue to target schools, and in particular girls’ schools. According to the Ministry of Education, over one hundred schools were attacked between March and October 2008, with the Afghanistan NGO Security Office recording more than 30 teachers and students killed in the first 10 months of 2008…. child labor is prevalent throughout the country and is another reason children do not attend school.

“The UN special representative for children and armed conflict drew attention in 2008 to the largely taboo practice of bacha bazi (the keeping of boys as sex slaves by wealthy or powerful patrons). The government of Afghanistan has done little to tackle this abusive cultural tradition.” [17b]
24.20 The UNICEF website’s country page on Afghanistan, undated, accessed 17 May 2009 noted that “...violence against girls and women remains alarmingly common. Creating a protective environment for women and children is a high priority on both national and local levels. More than half of Afghans are under 18, making efforts on behalf of children vital to the country’s future.” [44e] It also listed some of main issues facing children and also some recent achievements:

- “Infant, under-five, and maternal mortality rates in Afghanistan are among the world’s highest. Twenty five per cent of children die before reaching their fifth birthday. Fifty women die each day from pregnancy-related complications. More than half of all children are stunted.
- “Because immunization coverage is still very low, preventable diseases kill thousands of children annually. Malaria (which afflicts approximately 2 million people per year), measles, and respiratory infections are the leading causes of childhood death.
- “The great majority of Afghanistan’s population lacks access to safe water or sanitation. Diarrhoeal diseases and tuberculosis are chronic threats to public health.
- “Two million children of primary school age do not attend classes. Literacy rates are low.
- “The gender gap in education is narrowing, but girls still lag far behind boys in school enrolment.
- “Landmines and unexploded ordnance pose a serious risk to children’s safety…
- “UNICEF and its partners have immunized 5 million children against polio and delivered millions of vitamin A supplements. Polio cases dropped from 27 in 2004 to only five in 2005. New health facilities are making immunizations more routine.
- “Five new salt iodization plants are helping to reduce iodine deficiency, while therapeutic feeding programmes in 20 hospitals have been created to combat malnutrition.
- “Half a million Afghans have gained access to safe water and sanitary latrines…
- “More than 500,000 girls enrolled in school for the first time in 2005.
- “UNICEF and its partners have trained 30,000 teachers and supplied educational materials for 4.87 million students. In areas with no schoolhouses, tents, teacher training, and learning materials have been provided to offer informal learning opportunities for 250,000 children…
- “Nearly 3,500 former child soldiers have been reintegrated into family settings…
- “More than 8,000 children received vocational training. UNICEF mobilized 670 people to prevent child trafficking.” [44e]

24.21 The US State Department (USSD) report 2008, published on 25 February 2009, stated that “There were reports of Taliban forces using children younger than 18 in some cases as suicide bombers. Although most of the children were between 15 and 16 years old, children as young as 12 were used. UNAMA reported Taliban tricked, promised money, or forced the children to become suicide bombers.” [2a] (Section 1g)
Child kidnappings

24.22 The UN Security Council noted on 10 November 2008 that:

“Very few cases of children having been abducted as a result of the conflict have been documented. However, due to the security vacuum prevailing in some areas, criminal kidnapping of children is reported frequently. In one case, antigovernment elements in the Western Region abducted the child of a Provincial Prosecutor who had launched a criminal investigation against the group. The child was killed soon after his abduction.” [39f] (p11)

(See also Section 27: Kidnappings for further information and Section 25: Trafficking for more information on Trafficking)

Child Marriage

This section should also be read in conjunction with Section 23: Women – Marriage and Divorce

24.23 The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) reported in December 2008 that:

“Forced marriages are common throughout the country and among the Afghan diaspora. Women rarely make decisions about their own life and girls as young as two years old are sometimes committed for marriage as a way to settle family feuds or debts. According to the German non-governmental organization, Medica Mondiale, the majority of females (57 per cent) are married before the legal age of 16 with up to 80 per cent of marriages being forced in Afghanistan. Women and girls are often considered to be a mere commodity and those girls who try to escape such control over their lives are ostracized by their families for alleged dishonour and non-respect of Afghan tradition.” [38a]

24.24 The US State Department’s Human Rights Report, 2008 recorded that “The legal age for marriage was 16 for girls and 18 for boys. International and local observers estimated that 60 percent of girls were married before 16.” [2h] (Section 5) Radio Free Radio Liberty however, reported on 10 January 2008 that the legal age for marriage for girls had changed from 16 to 17 years old and that “Men who want to marry girls under 17 are not entitled to obtain a marriage certificate, although rights activists say many men simply do not bother with officially registering their marriages.” [29g]

24.25 The Freedom House report, Freedom in the World 2009, Afghanistan, covering events in 2008, released 16 July 2009, recorded that “Nearly 60 percent of Afghan girls are married before the legal age of 16, according to UNICEF. However, in March 2007 the Supreme Court approved a new formal marriage contract stipulating that the bride must be at least 16, a move welcomed by activists who hope that it will lead to fewer underage marriages.” [41a] (p10)

24.26 The US State Department’s Human Rights Report, 2008 further noted that:

“There is no clear provision in the Criminal Procedure Law to penalize those who arrange forced or underage marriages. Article 99 of the Law on Marriage
states marriage of a minor may be conducted by a guardian. In March 2007, the Supreme Court approved a new marriage contract stipulating the man needs to verify his bride is 16 years of age, and marriage certificates would not be issued for underage brides. According to local NGOs, legal proceedings based on this contract proceeded in Kabul. The proceedings often took longer than a week, and a local shelter housed numerous women during the course of these proceedings. The AIHRC estimated as many as 70 percent of reported cases of domestic violence have roots in child marriage.” [2a] (Section 5)

(See also Section 23: Violence against women and section 24: Child Marriage)

24.27 Statistics published by UNICEF show that the total child marriage rate 1987-2006 was 43 per cent. [44a]

24.28 A report by the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit in February 2009 noted the issue of boys’ being forced into marriage, in some cases often leading to committing polygamy because the male was not satisfied with his first chosen wife. The objection of being forcibly married was also noted as one reason that some younger men had wanted to continue their education or apprenticeships, but their families had insisted they get married. Additionally, families forced their sons to marry a girl he did not want to marry just because they considered it an alternative to the girl the boy was “in love with”, who the family had considered unsuitable. [22b]

Child Soldiers


“The legal recruitment age for members of the armed forces was 18. There were unconfirmed reports of children younger than 18 falsifying their identification records to join the national security forces, which offered a large-scale source of new employment opportunities. There were no reports of forced child conscription by the government; however, Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), the AIHRC, and the UN reported children younger than 18 were being recruited and in some cases sexually abused by the ANP and government-supported local militias.” [2a] (Section 5)

24.30 Additionally, the Child Soldiers Global report 2008, released April 2008, stated that “There were anecdotal reports of under-18s serving in the armed forces. There were reports of the use of children as suicide bombers by antigovernment elements including the Taliban, and of both forcible and voluntary recruitment by the Taliban of children in southern provinces and parts of Pakistan.” [33a]

24.31 The USSD 2008 further noted that:

“Although most of the children were between 15 and 16 years old, children as young as 12 were used. UNAMA reported Taliban tricked, promised money, or forced the children to become suicide bombers. Warlords and Taliban leaders were reported to be involved in the sexual exploitation of young men. Rule 19 of the Taliban Rule Book, updated in 2006, states, ‘Mujaheddin are not
allowed to take young boys with no facial hair onto the battlefield or into their private quarters,’ implying sexual exploitation of young men had occurred.” [2a] (Section 1)

(See also Section 10: Military Service and Section 25: Trafficking)

JUDICIAL AND PENAL RIGHTS

24.32 Afghanistan has adopted the Juvenile code of 2005 which includes:

- **“Circumstances for arrest** If there is grounded evidence of misdemeanour, felony, or crime, police has the authority to arrest a child under any one of the following circumstances: risk of flight, alteration of documents and evidence, and risk of repetition of a new crime.

- **“Notification of the arrest** Police are duty bound to report the arrest and place of detention of a child to child’s legal representative and social services institutions within 24 hours of arrest.

- **“The legal representative can demand immediately after apprehension of a child, his/her release on bail. The police and prosecutor are duty bound to declare their decision on the release request within 24 hours.**

- **“Detention place** The detention authority is obliged to provide access of the detained child to social, educational, vocational, psychological and health services considering the age and gender requirements of the child.

- **“Preparing first investigation report** Police is duty bound to organize papers containing all required information about the suspected child and disposition of the case within 24 hours from the time of discovery and submit to the juvenile prosecutor’s office.” (UNICEF, Justice for children in Afghanistan series, The role of police: the key to change, January 2009) [44b]

24.33 The Hands off Cain website, accessed on 18 June 2009, noted that according to the Juvenile Code a child between 12 and 18 cannot be sentenced to death. [83a]

24.34 A report by King’s College, London, on International Centre for Prison Studies in February 2009 noted that:

“The treatment of juveniles is of particular concern because of their vulnerability and the potential for abuse. It is reported that in January 2008, 455 juveniles were in prison, of whom 437 were still not yet sentenced and 18 had been sentenced. It was suggested to us that most juveniles are imprisoned for theft. In 1994 Afghanistan ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child which requires children to be held separately from adults and for custody to be used as a last report and for the shortest possible time.” [56a]
24.35 The same source noted that:

“An analysis of 104 juvenile cases where the sentence had been confirmed showed that over half would have been eligible under this code for a nonprison sentence. However, there is currently only one day rehabilitation centre recently constructed in Kabul by UNICEF which is not yet operational. Work is underway to establish the criteria by which juveniles will be selected for attendance at the centre. There are also concerns about the ability of children from different parts of the city to travel safely to the centre.” [56a]

24.36 The source added:

“The infrastructure to provide the alternatives to custody set out in the Code are not in place and no training on the new Code has been provided to prosecutors and judges. The Code is exemplary but the requirements it sets down require people to operate it with high levels of literary and legal education, extensive legal representation, and a range of facilities. No country as poor as Afghanistan has a functioning system remotely like the system predicated in the new Penal Code… Currently juveniles are still being held in adult prisons and much needs to be done to ensure their safety and the establishment of proper facilities for children. There is a closed rehabilitation centre in Kabul where 78 boys and 20 girls were held instead of being in prison but such centres are not available outside the capital. [56a]

24.37 The US State Department (USSD) report 2008, published on 25 February 2009, stated that:

“Children whose mothers had been convicted of a crime often lived in prison with their mothers, particularly if they had no other family. Prisons did not separate prisoners and lacked adequate separate housing for women, accompanying children, and juveniles. Women were never imprisoned with men. Authorities generally did not separate prisoners awaiting trial from the rest of the inmate population.” [2a] (Section 1c)

24.38 The Institute for War and Peace Reporting reported on 2 September 2009 that a main complaint from the children at the juvenile correction and education centre in Mazar-e-Sharif, in Balkh Province, was the waiting time before their cases are heard in court. One young boy aged about 17 years old had reportedly been detained for eighteen months without his case being heard. The director of the centre, Mohammad Wais Sufizada, acknowledged that the court hadn’t decided on children’s cases on time and said that “It is a problem all over the country”. However, Mohammad Sadeq Fayaz, the director of the Balkh juvenile appeal court said “The maximum delay for a case in our court has been two months. It is an outright lie that we have kept cases for six to 18 months.” [73a]

24.39 UNICEF reported in January 2009 that: “Daily monitoring of detention centres in 10 provinces was conducted from February to September 2008. This included juvenile rehabilitation centres, police detention facilities, and prisons. During this time a total of 812 children were encountered. Of these cases 30% of children were able to be released into family care after being contacted and assisted by detention monitors and lawyers.” [44b]

(See also Section – 12: Arrest and Detention – Legal Rights)
EDUCATION

24.40 The Constitution adopted in January 2004 recognised that education is the right of all citizens of Afghanistan. The US State Department 2008 report recorded that “The law makes education mandatory up to the secondary level and provides for free education up to the college level.” (Section 5) Statistics published by UNICEF show that the literacy rate for young women (aged 15-24), 2000-2006 is only 18 per cent, compared to 51 per cent for boys. Statistics also show that secondary school attendance for girls, 2000–2006, was 6 per cent compared to 18 per cent for boys. An April 2009 IRIN News article noted there were approximately 12,000 public schools in Afghanistan.

(See also Section 23: Women and Section 24: Children)

24.41 The UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the Protection Needs of Asylum Seekers from Afghanistan, July 2009, noted that “There has been an escalation of incidents affecting the education sector, including attacks on schools, students and teachers. According to the Ministry of Education and aid agencies over five million children (three million of them girls) have been deprived of education as a consequence of conservative customs, poverty, lack of education facilities and a culture of gender discrimination.”

24.42 The USSD 2008 report stated:

“Violence continued to impede access to education in some parts of the country where Taliban and other extremists threatened or attacked schools, officials, teachers, and students, especially in girls’ schools. Where schools did remain open, parents were often afraid to send their children to school, particularly girls… Due to insecurity, inadequate facilities, severe shortage of female teachers, and lack of motivation to send girls to school, the status of girls and women in education remained a matter of concern. In some villages girls stopped attending school at the age of 12 or 13 because parents would not permit their teenage girls to be taught by adult men. The general lack of protection of schools from attacks and inadequate and distant facilities, resulted in lower enrollment and higher dropout rates among girls, as did early and forced marriages.”

24.43 The USSD 2008 report further noted:

“In most of the country the enrollment of girls in schools may have increased, in some places significantly. However, nearly one-third of districts and several provinces had no schools for girls. Girls’ enrollment was as low as 15 percent in some areas. Even in secure areas such as Kabul, where access to schools was not an issue, some male family members did not allow girls to attend school. In most regions boys and girls attended primary classes together but were separated for intermediate and high school-level education.”

24.44 A UNICEF article on 28 April 2008 recorded that:

“The Ministry of Education’s goal is to increase the net enrolment rate for girls and boys in primary grades to at least 60 per cent and 75 per cent,
respectively, by 2010…To help reach the goal for girls’ education, AGEI was launched in March 2007 with support from UNICEF and key partners under the umbrella of the global UN Girl’s Education Initiative.

“The Afghan initiative offers a forum for extensive information-sharing, networking and funding to improve coordination and collaboration on girls’ education. The forum links local and national initiatives, and draws necessary expertise from within the country and outside sources.” [44c]

24.45 Approximately one third of Afghanistan’s 14.5 million under 18 year olds miss out on education, according to the UN Children’s Fund. Most of these are girls suffering from threats of violence, gender discrimination and culture. Lack of educational facilities is also a problem. (IRIN, 13 May 2009) [36e] However, on 1 May 2009 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reported that:

“Due to the efforts of tribal and community leaders, more than 200 schools have reopened in Afghanistan recently, many of them in the country’s volatile southern region…. in the past year some 11,000 schools have reopened despite more than 200 school-related terrorist attacks…the ministry is also addressing textbook shortages by buying 30 million new books for the next academic year.” [29a]

24.46 The UNHCR’s Eligibility Guidelines report, July 2009 noted that “Access to education for girls is also severely curtailed. According to the Ministry of Education and aid agencies over five million school-age children (three million of them girls) have been deprived of education as a consequence of conservative customs, poverty, lack of education facilities and a culture of gender discrimination.” The report added “Girls’ schools are increasingly a target of attacks. Some 50 percent of security incidents at schools across the country were specifically directed against girls’ schools despite the fact that they represent only 14.8 percent of the total number of primary, secondary and high schools in the country. Furthermore, female teachers are specifically targeted and higher bounties are offered for killing them.” [11a] (p33)

CHILD CARE

24.47 The US State Department (USSD) report 2008, published on 25 February 2009, stated that:

“Living conditions for children in orphanages were unsatisfactory. Children reported mental, physical, and sexual abuse, were sometimes trafficked out of state-run orphanages, and did not always have access to running water, health services, recreational facilities, or education…

“Displacement due to the conflict also affected children. NGOs estimated up to one-third of all refugees were children, and street children remained a problem in urban areas, although no reliable estimates were available. Street children had little to no access to government services, although several NGOs provided access to basic needs such as shelter and food.” [2a] (Section 5)
HEALTH ISSUES

(See also Section 28: Medical Issues)

24.48 The US State Department 2007 report, published on 11 March 2008, recorded that “Children did not have adequate access to health care; only one children’s hospital existed in the country, and it was not readily accessible to those outside Kabul.” [2h] (Section 5)

24.49 The Foreign & Commonwealth Office Afghanistan Country Profile, reviewed in January 2009, noted that:

“Immunisation is having a real impact. In March 2006, a Ministry of Public Health, UNICEF and World Bank nationwide campaign was launched to immunise 7 million children, in all of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, against polio. Since 2002 UN agencies have administered 16 million vaccinations against measles, saving an estimated 35,000 lives. Cholera and diarrhoeal diseases are being tackled through health education, water chlorination and the construction of wells throughout the country.” [4a] (p9)

24.50 The UNICEF country page on Afghanistan, updated on 17 May 2009 provides statistics on child health and nutrition, as well as other indicators including economic situation, demography and education. [44e]
25. TRAFFICKING

OVERVIEW

25.01 The US State Department (USSD) report 2008, published on 25 February 2009, stated that:

“A new law enacted on July 14 [2008] prohibits trafficking in persons. The law defines trafficking in persons as the transfer, transit, employing, keeping, and or giving a person in one’s control for the purpose of exploitation or taking advantage of weak financial status or helplessness by spending or taking money or interest or other means of deception to gain the consent of the victim or the guardian of the victim.” [2a] (Section 5)

25.02 The US State Department (USSD) Trafficking in Persons Report, covering which period?, (USSD TiP Report), published in June 2009, stated:

“Afghanistan is a source, transit, and destination country for men, women, and children trafficked for the purposes of forced labor and commercial sexual exploitation. Afghan boys and girls are trafficked within the country for commercial sexual exploitation, forced marriage to settle debts or disputes, forced begging, as well as forced labor or debt bondage in brick kilns, carpet-making factories, and domestic service. Afghan children are also trafficked to Iran and Pakistan for forced labor, particularly in Pakistan’s carpet factories, and forced marriage. Boys are promised enrollment in Islamic schools in Pakistan, but instead are trafficked to camps for paramilitary training by extremist groups. Afghan women and girls are trafficked within the country and to Pakistan and Iran for commercial sexual exploitation and temporary marriages. Some Afghan men force their wives or daughters into prostitution. Afghan men are trafficked to Iran and Pakistan for forced labor and debt bondage, as well as to Greece for forced labor in the agriculture or construction sectors. Afghanistan is also a destination for women and girls from Iran, Tajikistan, and possibly China trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation. Tajik women are also believed to be trafficked through Afghanistan to Pakistan and Iran for commercial sexual exploitation. Trafficked Iranian women transit Afghanistan en route to Pakistan.” [2f] (Country Narratives, Afghanistan, p59)

Prevention

25.03 USSD TiP Report, published in June 2009, stated:

“The Government of Afghanistan does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is making significant efforts to do so. Government actors continue to conflate the crimes of kidnapping and trafficking; this poor understanding of trafficking poses an impediment to targeted intervention. An undeveloped judicial and prosecutorial system, judicial delays, corruption, and weak coordination remain obstacles to effectively punishing trafficking offenses. In addition, Afghanistan punishes some victims of sex trafficking with imprisonment for adultery or prostitution, acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked. Although the government lacks resources to provide comprehensive victim protection services and did not adequately punish all identified acts of trafficking, its newly instituted victim referral process, launching of victim referral centers, and passage of anti-
trafficking legislation demonstrate progress in providing increased protective services for trafficking victims and punishment of their exploiters." [2f] (Country Narratives, Afghanistan, p59)

25.04 The USSD TiP Report further noted that:

“During the reporting period, the Afghan government made negligible efforts to prevent human trafficking. The government did not carry out any public awareness campaigns to warn at-risk populations of the dangers of trafficking or potential traffickers of the consequences of trafficking. Ministry of Justice officials participated in a televised roundtable discussing the July 2008 anti-trafficking law. The government did not take steps to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts or forced labor during the reporting period. Afghanistan has not ratified the 2000 UN TIP Protocol.” [2f] (Country Narratives, Afghanistan, p60)

25.05 The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) stated on 4 December 2008 that:

“Successful cooperation with the government has recently led to the enactment of Afghanistan’s first counter-trafficking legislation, the Law on Combating Kidnapping and Human Trafficking, on 14 July [2008]. IOM worked closely with members of the Legislation Department at the Ministry of Justice in drafting the law and provided necessary technical advice through weekly meetings and a series of training activities.

“Under the victim assistance component of IOM’s counter-trafficking programme, both foreign nationals trafficked to Afghanistan as well as Afghan victims of internal and cross-border trafficking are identified through IOM’s referral network. They are assisted through the provision of daily necessities such as clothing and food, medical and psychological support as well as reintegration assistance where appropriate. IOM has assisted over 130 victims of trafficking since 2006.” [38a]

Prosecution

25.06 USSD TiP Report, published in June 2009, stated:

“Despite the enactment of anti-trafficking legislation, it is not clear whether the Government of Afghanistan adequately prosecuted or punished trafficking offenders over the reporting period. In July 2008, the government enacted an anti-trafficking law, the Law Countering Abduction and Human Trafficking, through presidential decree; the law prescribes penalties of life imprisonment for sex trafficking and ‘maximum term’ imprisonment for labor trafficking, which, in practice, is between eight and 15 years. These penalties are sufficiently stringent and exceed those prescribed for other grave crimes, such as rape. According to government records, there were no prosecutions under the new anti-trafficking legislation. The government, however, reported the convictions of 62 trafficking offenders under statutes criminalizing kidnapping and rape; sentences reportedly ranged from five to 18 years’ imprisonment. It is unknown how many cases may have been prosecuted that resulted in acquittals. As the government was unable to provide disaggregated data or specific case information, it is unclear if these offenses meet the definition of trafficking or whether they address labor trafficking offenses. The Ministry of
Interior’s (MOI) six-person counter-trafficking unit made some initial arrests and investigated an unknown number of these cases. The government reported difficulty engaging Pakistani authorities for joint investigation of transnational trafficking cases. In 2008, the MOI stationed personnel at airports and border crossings to detect trafficking cases. There was no evidence that the government made any efforts to investigate, arrest, or prosecute government officials facilitating trafficking offenses despite reports of widespread complicity among national and border police." [2f] (Country Narratives, Afghanistan, p59)

Protection to victims of trafficking

25.07 The USSD Trafficking in Persons, 2009 report stated:

“The government’s protection of trafficking victims remained poor, but showed improvements during the reporting period. The government lacked resources to provide victims with protective services directly; NGOs operated the country’s 18 shelters and provided the vast majority of victim assistance, but some faced hardships due to threats from the local community, particularly when assisting in cases that involved so-called ‘honor’ crimes. Serious concerns remain regarding the government’s punishment of victims of trafficking for acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked. Female trafficking victims continued to be arrested and imprisoned or otherwise punished for prostitution and fleeing forced marriages. However, NGOs noted a decrease in arbitrary detentions after the late 2007 signing of a formalized referral agreement among the MOI [Ministry of Interior], the Ministry of Woman’s Affairs (MOWA), and various shelters, and the opening of two government-run referral centers. Under this new procedure, police refer women victimized by violence to MOWA which, in turn, refers the women, including trafficking victims, to appropriate NGO facilities.” [2f] (Country Narratives, Afghanistan, p59-60)

25.08 The USSD TiP, 2009 report further stated that:

“The MOI’s referral center in Jalalabad assisted female victims of trafficking and other crimes with support from MOWA and UNIFEM [The United Nations Development Fund for Women]. Its four MOI officers investigated cases and four MOWA paralegals provided support and legal advice to the women. A second referral center opened in April 2008 in Parwan. The government referred and transported victims to IOM and NGOs during the reporting period, but did not provide information on the number of victims assisted in this manner. An NGO reported that the police referred 23 victims and the MOWA referred four to its shelter in Kabul. The MOI referred the majority of the 40 victims assisted by IOM in 2008.” [2f] (Country Narratives, Afghanistan, p59-60)

25.09 The USSD TiP 2009 report additionally stated that:

“There are no facilities in Afghanistan to provide shelter or specific protective services to male trafficking victims; during the reporting period, some trafficked boys were placed in government-run orphanages and a facility for juvenile criminals while their cases were being investigated. MOWA staff reportedly visited prisons during the reporting period to ensure women and girls in custody are not victims of sex crimes or sex trafficking; concrete results from these prison visits are unknown. There is no evidence that the government
encouraged victims to assist in investigations of their traffickers during the reporting period. The new anti-trafficking law permits foreign victims to remain in Afghanistan for at least six months.” [2f] (Country Narratives, Afghanistan, p59-60)

25.10 The US State Department (USSD) report 2008, published on 25 February 2009, stated that the “MOJ ran an Italian-supported juvenile rehabilitation center where minor victims of trafficking in need of shelter assistance were accommodated. NGOs operated shelters that provided medical, psychological, and legal counseling. Adult victims were sometimes jailed.” [2a] (Section 5)

(See also Section: 23 Women and Section 24 Children)
26. DRUG PRODUCTION AND ADDICTION

OPIUM PRODUCTION

26.01 The World Bank report of August 2008 recorded that “Afghanistan is the world’s largest producer of opium, which is used to make heroin.” [69b]

26.02 The United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC) report, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2009, published in September 2009, stated that “The bottom is starting to fall out of the Afghan opium market. For the second year in a row, cultivation, production, work-force, prices, revenues, exports and its GDP share are all down, while the number of poppy-free provinces and drug seizures continue to rise.” [87a] (Executive Directors Commentary)

26.03 The UNODC report further noted;

“The total opium poppy cultivation estimated for Afghanistan in 2009 was 123,000 hectares (ha), a 22% reduction compared to the level in 2008. Ninety nine per cent of the total cultivation took place in seven provinces in the Southern and Western regions, including the most insecure provinces in the country. This further substantiates the link between insecurity and opium cultivation observed since 2007.

Total opium production in 2009 was estimated at 6,900 metric tons (mt), a 10% decrease from 2008. Virtually all the production (99%) took place in the same provinces where cultivation is concentrated. The other provinces produced only 1% of the country’s total opium in 2009.

The seven main opium cultivating and producing provinces were Hilmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Day Kundi, Zabul, Farah and Badghis. The province of Nimroz is not on this list because its main opium cultivating area, located in Khash Rod district, was administratively re-defined as part of Farah province. The Northern region was poppy free for the first time in a decade.

Among the 34 provinces in the country, 20 were poppy free in 2009, compared to 18 in 2008. With the exception of Nangarhar, all provinces that were poppy free in 2008 remained so in 2009. The new poppy free provinces are Kapisa, Baghlan and Faryab.” [87a]

26.04 The US Department of State International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), published on 27 February 2009 stated that:

“The Afghan government’s Criminal Justice Task Force (CJTF) and Counter Narcotics Tribunal (CNT) is a vetted, self-contained unit, which consists of 30 Afghan prosecutors, 35 Afghan criminal investigators, 7 primary court and 7 appellate court judges. The CJTF/CNT is mentored by DOJ Senior Legal Advisors. The CJTF/CNT has had a favorable impact on capacity building, and is working toward its first prosecutions. Regrettably, no major drug trafficker has been arrested or convicted in Afghanistan since 2006. It uses modern investigative techniques to investigate and ultimately prosecute narcotics traffickers under the December 2005 Counter Narcotics Law.” [2g]
ADDICTION

26.05 IRIN News, on 28 April 2009, reported that “Over 900,000 people in Afghanistan were considered drug addicts and many of them had little awareness of addiction-related diseases, according to a 2005 survey of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), which also provided the figure of 19,000 intravenous drug users.” \[36u\] It was estimated that there were “At least 50,000-60,000 drug users in Kabul alone.” (IRIN News, 30 August 2009) \[36a\]

26.06 A research study carried out by the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), *Effective Factors Associated with Drug Addiction and the Consequences of Addiction among Afghan Women*, published February 2008, involving 828 individuals interviewed in 21 provinces found that:

“It is rather difficult to establish a direct relationship between income and drug addiction. Although, the majority of the respondents report very low monthly income, it can not be said that poverty leads to drug addiction, as there are many women who live in poverty, but they are not addicted to drugs. The relationship between poverty and drug addiction, can be explored through access to health care. People with low income are more likely to be concentrated in remote parts of the country, whose access to health centers is very limited. Thus, these women use drugs for medical purposes… (p4) In general, as it can be observed from the findings, addicted women are not lonely reclusive women who lack any family members or friends. The fact that the majorities of respondents are married and have children shows that these respondents are surrounded by their immediate family members and lead a social life. However, many [of] these women live in poor economic conditions; they are jobless or involved in the kind of occupations that does not generate sufficient income to sustain a family.” \[48a\] (p9)

26.07 The AIHRC research study also recorded that:

“A quarter of respondents… report that their children use drugs. The age of children was not reported in the survey, however, the qualitative interviews reveal that younger children are fed opium by their mothers to keep them quiet, and the older children in addition to consuming drugs themselves provide drugs for their mothers. Additionally, other immediate family members who were reported to have been using drugs were fathers (9.78 %), mothers (7.49 %), brothers (6.28 %), and sisters (7.0 %).” \[48a\] (p10)

26.08 Furthermore, the study recorded that women’s reasons given for using drugs included recreation, pain, insomnia, fatigue, sexual dysfunction, hemorrhage, cough, diarrhoea, sadness and grief. \[48a\] (p17)

(See also Section 23: Women and Section 24: Children)

26.09 A Reliefweb article dated 20 April 2008 recorded that:

“Afghan deputy health minister for technical affairs Faizullah Kakar said mental illness and drug abuse were the most urgent health problems that the country now needs to tackle … 66 percent of Afghans suffer from depression or some form of mental disorder, and an increasing number are turning to illegal drugs… The picture is grim in parts of the country’s south and west where Kakar said government healthcare workers have not been able to
provide service because of the ongoing Taliban insurgency. ‘Forty of our doctors and workers died in the south, so many people are scared to go to the south to work. When we try to build a clinic in the south, it’s hard to find a company that will build it. Maintaining it is a challenge’. [40a]

26.10 A Save the Children/Columbia University survey recorded that “Poverty, unemployment, mental illness and depression, lack of awareness and various other socio-economic factors are driving many Afghan youths to drug abuse and addiction…” (IRIN News, 28 April 2009) [36u]

26.11 In April 2009, an IRIN News article reported that:

“…treatment and rehabilitation services meet only 0.25 percent of the needs nationwide, according to UNODC [United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime]. There are only about 100 beds in a handful of specialist centres dedicated to tackling addiction. Several drug users in Kabul told IRIN they would have to wait months to be admitted to a rehabilitation centre… Lack of funds was the main problem: ‘We only have about US$700,000 for all treatment and rehabilitation activities in the country, which is very little,’ Abdullah Wardak, a Health Ministry official, told IRIN.” [36u]

26.12 An Article on the National Public Radio (NPR) website dated 17 April 2009 commented that there are approximately three dozen clinics across Afghanistan that can cater for male drug addiction. However health care workers were overwhelmed due to the increase in drug abuse amongst men, women and children and feel they are fighting a losing battle. [52b] In the Nejat Centre, a NGO-run drug addicts’ rehabilitation centre in Kabul which opened in May 2009 had around 200 addicts on their list, some of whom were having to wait up to three months for a bed in the clinic. (IRIN News, 30 August 2009) [36a]
27. ABUSES BY NON-GOVERNMENT ARMED FORCES

OVERVIEW

27.01 The Freedom House report, Freedom in the World 2009, Afghanistan, covering events in 2008, released 16 July 2009, recorded that “An estimated 2,000 illegal armed groups, with as many as 125,000 members, continue to operate. A voluntary disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) program targeting irregular militia forces between 2003 and 2005…” [41a] (p6)

KIDNAPPINGS

27.02 The Foreign and Commonwealth’s website on travelling within Afghanistan, updated 9 August 2009, noted that “On 26 July 2007, one Taliban commander is reported to have urged Taliban fighters to continue the tactic of kidnapping foreign nationals.” [4f]


“UNAMA [United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan] reported 260 abductions during the year, at least 40 of which resulted in the death of the hostage; however, the unreported number was believed to be much higher. The Afghanistan International Chamber of Commerce reported insurgents and others kidnapped 173 businesspersons during the past three years. UNAMA reported insurgents and others kidnapped 141 aid workers during the year, including 134 Afghans and seven international staff. UNAMA also reported insurgents and criminal gangs killed 38 aid workers and looted 70 aid convoys during the year. Taliban, militants, tribal leaders, and insurgents abducted security forces, civilians, and journalists for political and financial gain. Many abductees were killed but some were allowed to live if they vowed to resign, join anti-government elements, or, in the case of journalists, stop reporting on issues objectionable to the kidnappers.” [2a] (Section 1d)

(See also Section 24: Children – Child Kidnappings and Section 8: Security situation – Kabul)

WARLORDS AND COMMANDERS

27.04 Human Rights Watch reported on 27 September 2006 that:

“Afghans throughout the country have told Human Rights Watch that they view regional warlords, ostensibly allied with the government, as a major source of insecurity. In southern Afghanistan, tribal chiefs, like Sher Mohammad Akhundzada the former governor of Helmand province who was removed due to allegations of corruption and involvement in the drug trade, have been allowed to operate private militias with the blessing of President Karzai. Warlords with records of war crimes and serious abuses during Afghanistan’s civil war in the 1990s, such as parliamentarians Abdul Rabb al Rasul Sayyaf and Burhanuddin Rabbani, General Abdul Rashid Dostum, and current Vice...
President Karim Khalili, have been allowed to hold and misuse positions of power, to the dismay of ordinary Afghans.” [17f]

27.05 The USSD report 2008, published on 25 February 2009, recorded that the Afghan National Police (ANP) had primary responsibility for internal order. “In some areas powerful individuals, some of whom reportedly were linked to the insurgency, maintained considerable power as a result of the government’s failure to assert control.” [2a] (Section 1d) “NGOs reported powerful local leaders and insurgents, including Taliban, continued to operate private prisons.” [2a] (Section 1c)

27.06 The Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) recorded on 9 July 2008 that:

“The Afghan government scored a minor victory last month by reeling in a rebellious ‘warlord’ who led a band of warriors over nearly three decades. What really set this case apart is that the militia commander is a woman. The authorities’ decision to co-opt rather than capture Bibi Aysha, who goes by the nickname Kaftar (‘the pigeon’), has upset locals who say that given her record, she is unlikely to accept the strictures of civilian life, still less a job as a public servant. Kaftar probably never meant to strike a blow for gender equality, but over the years she has shown that an Afghan woman can make just as tough and ruthless a warlord as her male counterparts. Now 55, Kaftar has fought almost everyone from the Russians and the Taleban to the present government of President Hamed Karzai. Until recently, she had the dubious distinction of being the only paramilitary commander – outside the Taleban and its allies – still in open confrontation with the Afghan state. Last month, she surrendered to the government together with five armed men, most of them her relatives. It was the second time she had laid down her weapons since the fall of the Taleban regime in 2001.” [73c]

27.07 The US State Department (USSD) report 2008, published on 25 February 2009, stated that:

“In February 2007 both houses of parliament drafted versions of a bill that, if passed, would grant amnesty from prosecution to all persons engaged in conflict for the past 25 years, as well as those who were fighting during the year. Both versions of the bill allow for individuals to bring cases against perpetrators. NGOs, the AIHRC, and many citizens criticized the draft bills, noting they would grant amnesty to gross violators of human rights, including many parliamentarians. The drafts of the amnesty bill had a few minor differences. Under the constitution, the parliament must convene a joint committee to resolve these differences. At year’s end this committee had not been convened.” [2a] (Section 1d)
“DDR supported the disarmament of 63,380 former officers and soldiers of the Afghan Military Forces (AMF) as well as the decommissioning of 259 AMF units. Fifty-five thousand eight hundred and four (55,804) ex-combatants chose one of the reintegration options, which further benefited 53,415 of them, leaving aside 2,759 drop-outs.

“The approach to reintegration has been holistic and reintegration options have ranged from agriculture, vocational training and job placement, small business opportunities, demining, teaching, government jobs, wage labor and joining [the] Afghan National Army (ANA) or the Police.” [40b]

**DISBANDMENT OF ILLEGAL ARMED GROUPS (DIAG)**

27.09 UN Security Council report of 10 November 2008 recorded:

“The Afghan Government’s disbandment of illegal armed groups programme targets the estimated 1,800 illegal armed groups active in the country, which still possess approximately 336,000 weapons. In addition to the risk represented by those weapons, the armed groups represent an obstacle to the restoration of the rule of law. Some factions targeted by the countrywide demobilization, disarmament and reintegration programme have neither been fully disarmed nor mainstreamed into the regular political system. As a result, several armed groups remain heavily involved in illegal activities such as narcotics and weapons trafficking.” [39d] (p5)


“… the follow-up Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) initiative, succeeded in demobilizing over 60,000 militiamen and collected a considerable amount of weaponry. However, the disarmament process never evolved to the enforcement stage as planned, and international programs supported by the United States, Britain, and Canada to rearm informal militias as a counterinsurgency force are actively undermining efforts to curtail and regulate the use of illegal arms. The question of sidelined illegal armed groups from political life remains contentious, and will be even more significant in the country’s elections in 2009 and 2010 as Afghan law demands such groups be excluded from elections, but Afghan institutions lack the will and capacity to enforce this ban. Such groups continue to entrench and reinforce their power bases through legitimate and illegitimate means, and ultimately pose a permanently troubling threat to stability and good governance.” [41a] (p6)

**ANTI-GOVERNMENT AND ANTI-COALITION FORCES (ACF)**

27.11 Anti-Government elements remain responsible for the largest proportion of civilian casualties, demonstrating in their tactics a disregard for the lives of civilians. Civilian deaths caused by anti-Government elements rose from 700 in 2007 to 1,160 in 2008 — an increase of over 65 per cent. (UN Secretary-General’s report, 10 March 2009) [39j] and they “…continued to threaten, rob, attack, and kill villagers, government officials, foreigners, and nongovernmental organization (NGO) workers.” (USSD 2008 report) [2a]
27.12 The UN Secretary-General’s report, dated 10 March 2009, noted that “Two trends identified in the previous report further worsened: attempts by insurgents to destabilize previously stable areas and increased use by insurgents of more sophisticated asymmetric attacks, with an increasing disregard for the lives of civilians.” [39]

27.13 The Human Rights Watch World Report 2009, Afghanistan, released in January 2009 stated that “The Taliban and other militants have extended their control into parts of the country previously considered relatively stable, such as Logar and Wardak which border Kabul province, and parts of Herat province in the west. Kabul was a target of several audacious militant attacks in 2008, with several major roads out of the capital becoming dangerous to travel.” [17b]

(See also Latest news, Section 8: Security situation and Annex C for list of armed groups)
28. **MEDICAL ISSUES**

**OVERVIEW OF AVAILABILITY OF MEDICAL TREATMENT AND DRUGS**

28.01 The UNHCR’s Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Afghanistan, July 2009 stated that “The average life expectancy in Afghanistan for both men and women is 42 years which is among the lowest in the world. Maternal and infant mortality rates are among the highest in the world and stand at 1600 for 100,000 births and at 210 for 1000 live births, respectively. Less than 15 percent of births are attended by trained health workers.” [11a] (p57)

28.02 The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), December 2008 report stated:

“The government of Afghanistan has committed to provide free health care services to all citizens under article 52 of the 2004 Constitution. This is reinforced by the Government’s ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child under which the Government has committed itself to take appropriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality and to ensure appropriate pre-natal and post-natal health care for mothers (Article 24 (2)). This commitment was further asserted by the Afghanistan Compact following the London conference in 2006 and has been extended into the ANDS [Afghanistan National Development Strategy], signed by the President in April 2008.” [78a] (p52)

28.03 The UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines also observed:

“In terms of access to healthcare, Afghanistan’s poor healthcare system has a very strong urban bias in its existing infrastructure. Overall, there are only 210 health facilities with beds to hospitalize patients. With the exception of four provinces, the current ratio of doctors per patient stands at one doctor per 10,000 patients. Many Afghan women are reluctant to be, or may be prevented from being, treated by male health workers. At the same time, due to the reduction of available health facilities, women in rural areas are obliged to walk much longer distances to access health care, and frequently will not do so because they do not have a male relative ready to accompany them, or because of fear of insurgents. Women from rural areas are at an even greater risk of dying during childbirth. Such areas average fewer than six doctors, seven nurses and four midwives for every 100,000 women. In Panjshir province, for example, there are seventeen health centres. Each employs only one female doctor and one midwife to serve 30,000 to 60,000 people.

“While important progress in healthcare has been made through the Government’s expansion of the basic package of health services, health infrastructure in Afghanistan is reported to be damaged and poorly maintained, lacking trained and skilled workers and medical supplies. Some observers claim that the health services are not able to meet the basic health needs of a majority of the population. The United Nations reports that the basic package of health services now covers 82 per cent of the population. There are 900 clinics and approximately 40 percent of the population has access to healthcare. According to the Ministry of Public Health, over 600,000 persons lack basic healthcare services due to attacks on healthcare facilities...
and health workers – a figure that has doubled since 2007. The overall quality of health services in Afghanistan has however been improved. According to Fahim, ‘the infant mortality rate has reduced by 26 percent and now 80,000 fewer infants are dying each year compared to during Taleban rule.’

“First-aid is available at the district level but emergency transport is lacking; trauma care and continuing care are limited to a few hospitals in major cities and can be of poor quality and expensive.” [11a] (p57-58)

28.04 The International Organization for Migration (IOM) Country Sheet on Afghanistan, updated on 6 March 2009 stated that:

“Afghanistan’s modern health facilities are mostly concentrated in Kabul and other large cities. The country has always had a shortage of medical facilities, particularly in rural areas. Afghanistan has a severe shortage of doctors, nurses, medical supplies, drugs and hospital beds. The current government is working to reopen hospitals and boost the level of available care. Considerable amounts have been earmarked for the construction of clinics throughout the country. The country is in dire need of skilled Afghan professionals who would be able to provide sustainable medical services to the Afghan population. The hospitals in Afghanistan are rudimentary. They are understaffed, there are not enough drugs, and they lack specialist facilities. High tech equipment is not available and cleanliness is a luxury that few medical centers offer. Afghans are still crossing into neighbouring Pakistan to seek basic medical services. Such phenomenon is the result of higher medical standards as well as the relative ease with which Afghans may cross the Afghan-Pakistani border. The vast majority of the health sector is financed by international donors either bilaterally or multilaterally to support the recovery and development of the health sector.” [38b]

28.05 The IOM Country Sheet on Afghanistan further observed that:

“Although there are only three Pharmaceutical companies in Afghanistan: Aria, Afghan American and Kemiagar which have very limited production, all kinds of medicines are becoming more widely available in the country, with a prevalence of imports from Pakistan India and Iran. It is good to mention that the individual fees of doctors in Afghanistan is 150 to 200 AFA excluding laboratory and other tests and the average daily charge of a bed in private hospitals is 500 – 1500 AFA.” [38b]

The IOM Country Sheet on Afghanistan lists the names of both private and state owned hospitals throughout Afghanistan. [38b]

28.06 IRIN News reported on 7 April 2009 that: “Over 600,000 Afghans lack basic healthcare services due to attacks on healthcare facilities and health workers - a figure that has doubled since 2007, Abdullah Fahim, a spokesman for the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH), has said.” [36n]

28.07 IRIN further reported that there was “… an increase in the number of attacks on health facilities and health workers over the past year… About 32 health centres were torched, destroyed and/or closed down due to insecurity in 2007, and 28 health facilities were shut down or attacked in 2008, MoPH [Ministry of Public Health] said.” [36n]
28.08 The Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) Afghanistan Country Profile, reviewed in January 2009, stated that:

“The health infrastructure in Afghanistan damaged or destroyed by years of conflict, is gradually being reestablished by the Afghan Government with the help of the international community. The health services inherited at the end of 2001 were limited in capacity and coverage, and while the Ministry of Health has shown leadership the health status of the Afghan people is still among the worst in the world. The majority of the population lacks access to safe drinking water and sanitary facilities. Disease, malnutrition and poverty are rife and an estimated 6.5 million people remain dependant on food aid.” [4a] (p8-9)

28.09 Statistics in the FCO Country Profile, updated on 6 January 2009, on Afghanistan stated that:

- “average life expectancy is 43.1 years (UNDP, 2005)
- “13.5% of babies dies during or shortly after birth (UNDP, 2007)
- “26% of children die before reaching the age of 5 (UNDP, 2007)
- “Maternal mortality rate: 1600 per 100000 live births (UNDP, 2007)
- “More than three million Afghans benefited from rural water supply and sanitation activities in the country. 10119 water points, 66 networks and 1713 water reservoirs have been constructed
- “32.5% of the rural population has access to safe drinking water (UNAMA 2008)” [4a] (Health)

28.10 The same FCO Country Profile also stated that:

“The World Bank, the United States Agency for International Development and the European Community are helping the Afghan Ministry of Health, through NGOs, to provide a basic healthcare service to the entire population. The package consists of services for maternal and newborn health; child health and immunisation; nutrition; communicable disease; mental health; disability; and the supply of essential drugs. The Ministry of Health has established a Child and Adolescent Health Department and a Department of Women and Reproductive Health to tackle high infant and maternal mortality rates.

- “83% of the population now has access to medical facilities, compared to 9% in 2004 (NATO, June 2007)
- “76% of children under the age of five have been immunised against childhood diseases (NATO, June 2007)
- “More than 4000 medical facilities have been opened since 2004 (NATO, June 2007).” [4a] (Health)

28.11 Mirwais Hospital, in Kandahar, Sheberghan Hospital, in Jawzjan, and Jalalabad Public Health Hospital all benefit from ICRC support and training, which has enabled them to continue treating victims of the conflict and
responding to other emergencies. A joint ICRC-health ministry project is also
under way to further strengthen Mirwais hospital’s capacity to deliver essential
health services. The three hospitals:

- treated around 42,700 inpatients and 200,100 outpatients;
- performed some 17,200 operations.

In Kabul and elsewhere, the ICRC provided medical supplies to the 400-bed
Afghan National Army hospital and seven other medical facilities, including the
health ministry’s Central Blood Bank and Radiology Department. An
emergency kit for the treatment of up to 50 war-wounded is pre-positioned at
the ministry. The organization also provided supplies and financial support
to nine Afghan Red Crescent clinics which offer general consultations and
vaccinations for women and children. “All combatants wounded in war have
the right to medical assistance. The ICRC sent over 900 consignments of
first-aid and pre-hospital care supplies to remote areas lacking medical
facilities.” (International Committee of the Red Cross, 13 November 2008) [64a]

2008 stated that:

“Based on the recommendations by the World Health Organization to
Afghanistan, the government has adopted the budget policy to spend 60
percent of the budget on primary health care and 40 percent of the budget on
hospital services. However, according to the budget published by the Ministry
of Public Health in 2007, out of US$105 million required to fund planned
services, only US$10 million were allocated. This severely undermines the
ability of the health services to reach the public.” [78a] (p54-55)

28.13 The Foreign and Commonwealth Profile of Afghanistan, updated in January
2009 stated that:

“In response to a strategy outlined by the Ministry of Health, the international
community is supporting the government in rebuilding the primary health-care
system. Since the fall of the Taliban in 2001, the health sector has seen
significant progress in development, with reductions in morbidity (disease) and
mortality (death). In 2001, 8% of the Afghan population had access to basic
health care; today, 79% have access to basic health services. In 2001,
Afghanistan was ranked the world’s worst in infant mortality; in 2007
Afghanistan’s infant mortality rates were falling due to the efforts of the
Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) and its international partners.” [4a]

28.14 Furthermore, the FCO Profile stated that:

“There has been a marked increase in health infrastructure; the number of
health facilities providing the BPHS has increased to 897 (from 746), the
number of health facilities providing comprehensive emergency obstetric care
has also increased to 89 (from 79), and the number of health facilities within
the government’s program of Integrated Management of Childhood Illnesses
stands at 309 facilities located in eight provinces and 39 districts. Thirteen
therapeutic feeding units have been established, and two additional midwifery
schools were opened. Twelve mobile health facilities were established to
provide basic health services to the nomadic Kuchi population. The number of
health facilities providing direct observed treatment short courses (in the treatment of tuberculosis) increased to 55% (from 45%).

“Approximately 40,000 insecticide bed nets were distributed to control the spread of malaria. Provincial teams in eight provinces were established to track the prevalence of avian flu. In total, 670 health facilities have been renovated or constructed.” [4a]

28.15 The Afghan government’s national licensed drugs list (LDL), dated December 2007, contained:

“… all medicines that can be imported and sold in Afghanistan, under their International Non-proprietary Name (INN). The LDL contains all the drugs listed in the EDL, and hence contains all the drugs recommended for use in the BPH, EPHS and the MoPH’s national programs. It also contains dispensary products and products used in dentistry. It is used as guideline by the authorities granting import licenses for drugs used in the public and private sector.” [13a]


28.16 In Paktika province where the Central Statistics Office estimated the female population to be over 180,000, women have access to little healthcare. There are no female doctors and very few nurses or midwives. However, “With the help of aid organisations, the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) increased the number of midwives in the country from 400 in 2001, to about 2,500 in 2008, but that is still not enough.” (IRIN News, 1 February 2009) [36e]

(See also Section 23: Women and Section 24: Children)

HIV/AIDS

28.17 The World Bank report on HIV/AIDS in Afghanistan, August 2008 stated that:

“Reliable data on HIV prevalence in Afghanistan is sparse. To date, 478 HIV cases have been reported. However, UNAIDS and WHO estimate that there could be between 1,000 and 2,000 Afghans living with HIV. The HIV epidemic is at an early stage in Afghanistan and is concentrated among high-risk groups, mainly injecting drug users (IDUs) and their partners. Afghanistan’s emerging epidemic likely hinges on a combination of injecting drug use and unsafe paid sex. According to a 2006 study, 3 percent of IDUs in Kabul were HIV positive. Almost one third of the IDUs participating in the study said they used contaminated injecting equipment. In addition, large proportions of these (male) drug users also engaged in other high-risk behavior. For example, 32 percent had sex with men or boys, and 69 percent bought sex. Only about half of the IDUs knew that using unclean syringes carries a high risk of HIV transmission or that condoms can prevent infection.” [69b]

28.18 IRIN stated in an article dated 7 January 2009 that:

“Forty of the 504 people diagnosed with HIV/AIDS in Afghanistan will be provided with standard antiretroviral therapy for the first time, as efforts are
made to boost control of the killer disease, the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) has said. 'We expect WHO [the World Health Organization] to have imported ARVs [antiretrovirals] by the end of January. We will give them to 40 already identified patients,' Saif ur-Rehman, head of the national HIV/AIDS programme at the MoPH, told IRIN." [36f]

MENTAL HEALTH

28.19 The BBC recorded that “According to studies cited by the Afghan health ministry an astonishing 66% of Afghans suffer mental health problems.” (BBC Online, 20 January 2009) [25u]

28.20 The World Health Organisation Mental Health Atlas 2005 noted that:

“Mental health is not a part of [the] primary health care system. Actual treatment of severe mental disorders is not available at the primary level. Community level workers from the local population (villages) have been involved in providing integrated health care for the last 8 years… There are community care facilities for patients with mental disorders. Mental Health is included in Basic Package for Health Services (BPHS) which covers health service delivery up to district level. New treatment guidelines for common mental health disorder[s] are being formulated (draft is ready). Four Community Mental Health Centers have been established in the capital [Kabul], but further expansion is required. There are 2 general psychiatric rehabilitation centres with 160 beds." [43]

28.21 The World Health Organisation Mental Health Atlas 2005 stated:

“Currently, there are no social workers, and there are only very few trained psychiatrists. Most doctors working as psychiatrists have either had in-service training or have attended short courses abroad. A three month diploma course was held in 1996 to train some doctors in psychiatry. Postgraduate training in psychiatry is not present. Psychologists get their training from Kabul University. Much of qualified manpower and technical expertise has left the country… NGOs [Non-Governmental Organisations] are involved with mental health in the country. They are mainly involved in treatment. The Afghan Government collaborates with non-governmental organizations to rapidly expand basic (mental) health services to underserved populations…The following therapeutic drugs are generally available at the primary health care level of the country: carbamazepine, Phenobarbital, amitriptyline, chlorpromazine, diazepam, haloperidol. The cost of medicines keeps fluctuating as the local currency is unstable due to the war. Over-the-counter sales of psychotropics occur." [43]

28.22 The BBC Online recorded on 20 January 2009 that:

“The Afghan health ministry readily admits that there simply are not enough facilities or doctors to even begin dealing with the most serious cases. Other health issues - such as infant and maternal mortality - have taken priority… Because of a lack of understanding, many Afghans suffering mental health problems are believed to be possessed. Some are chained in rooms or even caves until it is believed that the ‘jinns’ - evil spirits - have been exorcised. But others are simply abandoned by their families because they can no longer
cope or afford the medication that is required to treat their medical conditions. A small number of mentally ill people are cared for by local charities.” [25u]

28.23 UNHCR’s Eligibility Guidelines, July 2009, noted that “The social stigma attached to the reporting of gender-based violence in Afghanistan often prevents victims from seeking physical or psychological treatment.” [11a] (p32)

LANDMINE AND ORDNANCE - VICTIM ASSISTANCE

28.24 The 2008 Afghanistan Landmine Monitor Report stated that “Ongoing conflict, extreme poverty, a lack of infrastructure, and low economic development continue to hamper access to services for the entire population, but particularly for the most vulnerable groups. Afghanistan lacks or has low quality services in all areas of victim assistance (VA).” [14a]

28.25 The report further stated that:

“The MPH [Ministry of Public Health] coordinates healthcare through two strategies: the Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS) and the Essential Package of Hospital Services (EPHS), implementation of which is mostly contracted to NGOs and international organizations. Coordination among service providers remained limited and the MPH lacked the capacity to efficiently contract services to NGOs. BPHS coverage was said to have increased from 9% in 2002 to 85% by 2008; EPHS was implemented in 15 hospitals. Nevertheless, healthcare in Afghanistan remains among the worst in the world. It lacks infrastructure, emergency transport, trained staff (especially women), and supplies and funding, often preventing persons with disabilities, including mine/ERW survivors, from receiving needed assistance. It will take an estimated five to 10 years to train sufficient medical staff, some of whom may refuse to work in rural areas.

“Although basic healthcare is in principle free, most public hospitals are poorly equipped, forcing people to go to unaffordable private clinics. The MPH estimated that some 360,000 people in the conflict-affected Helmand, Kandahar, Paktika, and Zabul provinces do not have access to health services. Non-state armed groups targeted and killed some 40 health workers in 2007–2008, resulting in the closure of at least 36 health centers and the withdrawal of international health providers. NGOs provide first-aid training, but there is no formal training to deal with traumatic injury; ISAF occasionally provides emergency transport.

“Physiotherapy services are available in 19 provinces and 14 orthopedic workshops—completely dependent on international organizations—operate in 10 provinces. The MPH is in charge of coordinating physical rehabilitation, but only manages one center.” [14a]

(See also Section 22: Disability and Section 30: Freedom of Movement - Mines and unexploded ordnance)
29. HUMANITARIAN ISSUES

OVERVIEW

29.01 Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world. “Because of conflict and insecurity, the people of Afghanistan have for years been denied the basic services that we take for granted, like healthcare and schooling. Although some real progress is being made, Afghanistan is currently off track to meet all Millennium Development Goals.” (DFID, 22 August 2008) [51a]

(See also Section 2: Economy)

29.02 A report by the World Health Organisation released in February 2009 covered the humanitarian situation in 2008 observing that “The humanitarian situation worsened during 2008. The most pressing problems today are the perilous food security situation – which is affecting as much as one-sixth of the population and is caused by the current drought and exacerbated by high global food prices – and the impact of the armed conflict on civilians.

“More than half of Afghanistan’s land area received less than 25% of its normal rainfall in 2008. The cereal harvest in 2008 was the lowest since 2002 and 30% lower than in 2007. The production of wheat in 2008 decreased 85% in rain-fed land and 16% in irrigated land compared to 2007. As a consequence of drought, an estimated 1.2 million children under five and 550,000 pregnant and lactating women in 22 provinces are at high risk of severe malnutrition. The ‘Afghanistan Joint Appeal for the Humanitarian Consequences of the Rise in Food Prices 2008,’ launched in January 2008, received 82% of the $81.3 million requested to provide a safety net for the 425,000 most vulnerable households. On 9 July 2008, Vice-President Khalili and the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) launched a second appeal (‘Afghanistan Joint Emergency Appeal: High Food Price & Drought Crisis’) for an additional $404 million to support nearly two million people affected by current conditions, in addition to the 2.6 million people assisted during the previous six months. [Resource mobilisation for the second appeal has been slow to date; only 50% of the amount requested has been met. The response is also insufficient to counteract extreme water shortages in certain areas that may lead to the displacement of vulnerable populations. Outside these two appeals, additional international humanitarian funding for Afghanistan in 2008 amounted to $263 million, bringing the combined total to an impressive $532 million.” [43b] (p6)

29.03 The Department for International Development (DFID) Country Profile, updated 22 November 2008 noted the progress being made since 2001:

- “Over 5 million children are now in school, over a third of them girls – a stark contrast to when it was illegal for girls to go to school.
- “4.8 million refugees have returned home.
- “40,000 fewer babies die each year compared to under the Taliban rule.
- “The number of functioning health clinics has increased by 60%.
- “The proportion of women receiving antenatal care increased from 5% in 2003 to 30% in 2006.
- “The legal economy grew by 8% in 2006/07.
- “70% of registered voters participated in the 2004 Presidential elections.
29.04 The Refugee International report, dated 29 January 2009, stated that “The conflict between NATO/ISAF forces and armed opposition groups has severe consequences on the humanitarian situation. The violence destroys crops and homes, generates displacement, and hampers the ability of humanitarian actors to intervene. Moreover, civilians are often caught in the middle of military operations.” [51a]

29.05 The UN Secretary General report, dated 10 March 2009, stated that “The impact of conflict reduced access to essential services and affected livelihoods and coping mechanisms; it also intensified the challenge for the humanitarian agencies to address the needs of the population. Geographic areas that were once accessible are now largely out of reach for most humanitarian organizations.” [39j] (p13)

29.06 The report further stated that:

“Owing to poor rainfall, the year’s cereal harvest was the smallest since 2002, and more than 5 million people are in need of immediate food assistance. Approximately 1.2 million children under the age of five and 550,000 pregnant or lactating mothers in 22 provinces remain at high risk of severe malnutrition. Water shortages may also lead to the displacement of vulnerable populations. United Nations agencies constructed over 800 watering points in returnee and drought-affected areas. Winterization efforts continued through pre-positioning and delivery of foodstuffs and non-food items. By January 2009, the World Food Programme had pre-positioned 98 per cent of its planned assistance for 963,000 beneficiaries in 24 provinces, and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) provided non-food items to 212,000 vulnerable returnees and internally displaced persons.” [39j] (p14)

29.07 Two earthquakes struck Nangarhar province, about 50 miles east of Kabul on 17 April 2009, killing at least 22 people and injuring over 30. The tremors registered 5.5 and 5.1 magnitudes respectively, an aftershock followed two hours later. Hundreds of houses, many made from dried mud, were destroyed. (BBC, 17 April 2009) [25t]

29.08 IRIN News further reported on 29 April 2009 that:

“Flash floods, landslides and earthquakes in different parts of Afghanistan in the last 10 days or so have damaged thousands of houses, killed hundreds of livestock and made thousands homeless, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has said. At least 15 people lost their lives and over a dozen of others were injured by floods in Herat, Badakhshan, Parwan, Faryab and Takhar provinces over the past two weeks, according to the Afghanistan National Disasters Management Authority (ANDMA).” [36a]

29.09 Over 216,000 Afghan residents in the city of Kabul now have round-the-clock access to electricity. The Afghan Government, along with a consortium of international donors, launched the project to bring power to Kabul in December 2008 when “…Ministers of Energy and Economy requested assistance from USAID [United States Agency International Development] to import 40 megawatts (MW) of power from Uzbekistan to serve the Kabul area
within one month." The project took just 36 days to complete. (USAID, 12 February 2009) [60c]

29.10 At least eleven people were killed and dozens of properties severely damaged during flash floods on 2 September 2009 in Aliningar District, Laghman Province, eastern Afghanistan. The neighbouring Province of Nangarhar had also experienced flash floods just a few days earlier. An Afghan Red Crescent Society-led assessment team estimated that a total of 4,000 people had been affected, mostly in Jalalabad city, the provincial capital of Nangarhar. Other districts affected in Nangarhar included Sorkhorood, Kuzkunar, Rodat, Chaparhar, and Behsood. An assessment report by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) recorded “…11 casualties (four dead, seven injured), 289 houses destroyed and 234 damaged and 30 livestock killed in Nangarhar Province.” (IRIN News, 3 September 2009) [60c]

(See also Section 31: Internally Displaced People and Section 32:- Returning Afghan Refugees)

INTERNATIONAL AID

29.11 In July 2009 Refugees International reported that:

“The humanitarian appeal of $604 million, launched on February 3, 2009, is well funded, but over 52 percent of the appeal addresses food security, and most pledges have gone to the World Food Program’s (WFP) operations. Major humanitarian donors still have very limited budgets compared to the main development players. Indeed, the Europe Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO) has a 2009 budget of €35 million, while the U.S. Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) has a budget of only $29 million, half of which is dedicated to urban projects. By comparison, USAID has a budget of more than $1 billion for 2009. More focus, and funding, is needed to respond to humanitarian needs.” [57b]

29.12 The same source added:

“Most NGOs get the majority of their funding for development projects, as donors have emphasized this sector over the past few years. As many donors are looking to fund projects in the areas where their troops are located, development has been used since 2001 as a tool for counter-insurgency activities instead of being focused on responding to needs alone. This, combined with the UN’s partiality derived from its political mandate, has made it extremely difficult to get a real picture of humanitarian needs in Afghanistan. In the words of one UN official, Afghanistan is a ‘faceless emergency’ – nearly eight years after the collapse of the Taliban regime, the needs are significant, but the international community is still unable to define their magnitude” [57b]

29.13 Refugees International also added:

“The picture is not completely grim however. In contrast to last year, humanitarian issues are now on the table, and openly discussed by donors and the Afghan government. Donors have also accepted that for aid agencies to get a clear picture and secure access to populations in need they must be able to talk to all parties to the conflict. This is a major step in the right
direction, and could help restore at least some of the humanitarian space lost over the past eight years.” [57b]

(See also Section 3: Afghanistan Compact)

LAND AND PROPERTY DISPUTES

29.14 The US State report, 2008 recorded that “Land disputes remained the most common civil dispute and were most often resolved by informal local courts.” [2a] (Section 1e)

29.15 The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission report, December 2008 stated that:

“Existing mechanisms to ensure security of tenure are either ineffective or do not have mandate to act effectively. From 2002, the Special Land Property Court was established to resolve a large number of property dispute cases; as of January 2007, this court was dissolved and land disputes are now heard in civil courts. Customary forms of adjudication like jirgas and shuras, however, settle most land disputes in Afghanistan. In such cases, customary practice sometimes prevails over state law. This is a problem because customary law often contradicts the principles of equality enshrined in civil law, particularly when it comes to inheritance. On the other hand, shuras often have more accurate records of land ownership than the government, the registries of which are both incomplete and contradictory. Several NGOs interviewed have successfully used shuras to determine ownership of land and settle disputes.” [78a] (p40-41)

29.16 The AIHRC further recorded that:

“HRFM [the Human Rights Field Monitoring survey] respondents reported a number of cases of illegal occupation. Twenty households had their house occupied by government officials; 208 households were forced out of their homes by unknown individuals; 51 by a ‘commander’; 146 by a member of their own community; and, 66 faced problems because they did not have documents to prove the ownership. These problems reflect only a fraction of disputes that require special attention. They are an indication of larger problems: the lack of a land management system, no effective system to resolve disputes, and no facilities for law enforcement.” [78a] (p41)

29.17 IRIN News reported in September 2008 on the return of hundreds of Pashtun refugees from Pakistan. The refugees who returned to Takar Province accused local people and militias, mostly Uzbek, of seizing their land.

“Returnee families insist they possess formal and traditional documents proving their ownership over disputed properties. ‘We are not making false claims,’ said an elderly man, Haji Wali Khan. However, their claims were rejected by people who occupy or control the lands. ‘We don’t accept their deeds ... they’ve forged documents,’ charged a local man, Sayed Hakim. Some Uzbek and Tajik locals also criticised previous governments for alleged arbitrary distribution of public land to Pashtuns. ‘Documents issued during the
The main text of this COI Report contains the most up to date publicly available information as at 20 September 2009. Further brief information on recent events and reports has been provided in the Latest News section to 13 November 2009.

reign of Zahir Shah [1933-1973] are no longer valid here,’ said an Uzbek leader, Jamshid.” [36o]

29.18 The IRIN article further noted that “President Hamid Karzai appointed a government commission to resolve the land disputes in Takhar Province and to help the reintegration of returnees. However, after several days of heated talks the commission returned to Kabul virtually empty-handed… the government was intending to clarify property ownership documents via the judiciary after Ramadan.” [36o]

29.19 IRIN News further reported in June 2009 on the US military intervention in a dispute over access to grazing land in Daimirdad District, Wardak Province, between Kuchi nomads and ethnic Hazaras. The US forces provided Kuchi families with food, water and veterinary supplies on condition the Kuchis agreed not to encroach on land also used by the Hazaras. [36c]
30. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT


“The law provides for freedom of movement within the country, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation; however, certain laws limited citizens’ movement, and the government limited citizens’ movement due to security interests. The greatest restriction to movement in some parts of the country was the lack of security. In many areas insurgent violence, banditry, and landmines made travel extremely dangerous, especially at night. The government cooperated with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to internally displaced persons, refugees, returning refugees, asylum seekers, stateless persons, and other persons of concern. In 2007, the parliament amended the passport law to give women the right to apply for a passport without permission from a male relative. In some areas of the country, however, local custom or tradition forbids women from leaving the home except in the company of a male relative.

“Taxi, truck, and bus drivers reported security forces and armed militants operated illegal checkpoints and extorted money and goods. The number of such checkpoints increased at night, especially in the border provinces. Residents reported having to pay bribes to ANP and border police officials at checkpoints and the Khyber pass border crossing between Jalalabad and Pakistan. Taliban imposed nightly curfews on the local populace in regions where it exercised authority, mostly in the southeast.

“In July 2007, the MOI issued an order requesting it be informed of foreign aid and assistance workers’ movements outside Kabul. The MOI maintained that this policy helped the government protect and locate foreigners in cases of emergency. The policy remained in place at year’s end.” [2a] (Section 2d)

(See also Section 23: Women or further information on restrictions on movement for women)

(See also Section 23: Single women and widows)

MINES AND UNEXPLODED ORDNANCE


30.03 The UN Security Council report, 10 November 2008 noted that “An estimated 728 square kilometres of land, containing 5,027 hazardous areas with anti-personnel and anti-tank mines and a large number of explosive remnants of war from both the previous and current periods of conflict still require clearance, particularly in the east, north and south-east regions.” [39d] (p10)
30.04 The 2008 Afghanistan Landmine Monitor Report stated that “Afghanistan was unable to meet its 1 March 2007 deadline for stockpile destruction. In April 2007, Afghanistan informed States Parties that while it had destroyed 486,226 stockpiled antipersonnel mines, two depots of antipersonnel mines still remained in Panjshir province, about 150km north of Kabul. Provincial authorities did not make the mines available for destruction in a timely fashion.” [14a]

30.05 The report further noted Landmines and ERW (explosive remnants of war), however, continue to cause a high level of casualties, resulting in 608 people killed or injured in 2007, and still pose a formidable challenge to social and economic reconstruction, which is critical to the country’s political stabilization. Mine and ERW contamination is particularly concentrated in central and key food-producing eastern provinces, affecting towns and urban commercial areas as well as villages, farm and grazing land, and roads. [14a]

30.06 Furthermore the report stated that

“Afghanistan has the world’s longest established and biggest mine action program. In 2007, some 8,000 Afghans worked for organizations coordinated by MACA [Mine Action Center for Afghanistan]. These included five Afghan NGOs (Afghan Technical Consultants, Demining Agency for Afghanistan, Mine Clearance Planning Agency, Mine Detection and Dog Centre, and Organization for Mine Clearance and Afghan Rehabilitation), and two international NGOs (Danish Demining Group and HALO Trust). In addition, eight commercial companies operated in Afghanistan in 2007 (ArmorGroup, DynCorp International, EOD [explosive ordnance disposal] Technology, Hemayatbrothers Demining International, Kardan Demining Group, RONCO, S3AG, and UXB International). MineTech International, which left Afghanistan in 2006, was due to restart operations in the second half of 2008 after winning a contract in May. The Zimbabwe-based TDI (The Development Initiative) also opened an office in Kabul in 2008.” [14a]

30.07 An IRIN News article dated 13 November 2008 reported on the dangers of unexploded ordnance in returnees’ settlements, in Baghlan and Nangarhar Provinces. The article recorded that:

“UXOs and explosive remnants of war have also been reported in other returnees’ settlements in the eastern provinces of Nangarhar and Kunar. Hundreds of thousands have returned there in the past few years. ‘About 200 metres from our settlement the area is full of landmines and explosive devices which often kill animals,’ said Mohammad Afzal, a resident of a settlement in Nangahar Province. Provincial officials said mine-clearing agencies had been asked to re-examine areas in Baghlan and Nangarhar provinces for any hazardous explosives. The Refugees and Returnees’ Ministry, however, said it allocated settlement sites for landless returnees after mine-clearing agencies declared those areas risk-free.” [36h]

30.08 The US State Department (USSD) report 2008, published on 25 February 2009, stated that:

“Landmines and unexploded ordnance caused deaths and injuries, restricted areas available for cultivation, and impeded the return of refugees to
mine-affected regions. The most heavily mined areas were the provinces bordering Iran and Pakistan. The UN Mine Action Center for Afghanistan (UNMACA) reported landmines and unexploded ordnance killed or injured an average of 57 persons each month. Mine explosions during the past two decades affected 4.2 million with an estimated 1.5 million casualties.

“The UN, with funding from international donors, organized and trained mine detection and clearance teams that operated throughout the country. UN agencies and NGOs conducted educational programs and mine awareness campaigns for women and children in various parts of the country. HALO Trust, an anti-mine NGO, cleared 1.14 billion square feet of land. There were almost 83.74 billion square feet of uncleared land remaining at year’s end, according to UNMACA.” [2a] (Section 1d)

(See also Section 22: Disability and Section 28: Medical Issues - Landmine and ordnance – victim assistance)
31. INTERNALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE (IDPs)


“Authorities estimated there were more than 200,000 IDPs in the country at year’s end. Many of these were members of the residual caseload of more than one million IDPs who left their places of origin because of drought in 1995, insecurity and drought in 2002, and human rights violations and ethnic-based conflict linked to land and property matters between 2003 and 2004. These individuals resided in camp-like circumstances. Most are in the south, but officially organized as well as spontaneous settlements have sprung up on the outskirts of major cities, including Kabul, Herat, and Jalalabad.” [2a] (Section 2d)

31.02 The Freedom House report, Freedom in the World 2009, Afghanistan, covering events in 2008, released 16 July 2009, estimated that there were 150,000 internal displaced persons (IDPs) in Afghanistan, 100,000 of whom had been displaced due to increased fighting and insecurity over the last two years. [41a] (p6)

31.03 An IRIN News article dated 23 April 2009 reported that:

“Open defecation, lack of toilets and poor sanitation in makeshift internally displaced persons (IDP) camps throughout Afghanistan are a health threat, particularly to children, health workers and aid agencies say. According to the Afghan government, at least 230,000 people are living in formal IDP camps and informal settlements where few sanitary, water and toilet facilities are available. About 500 families (2,500 individuals) displaced from southern regions have set up shacks, tents and mud huts in Qambar on the western outskirts of Kabul. Most residents there are forced to defecate in the open. Some also use insecure pit latrines or dry vault toilets near their shacks.” [36t]

31.04 On 20 July 2009, Refugee International reported on the humanitarian situation for Internal Displaced People (IDPs):

“The humanitarian situation for IDPs in Afghanistan is often overlooked because of the complexity of finding durable solutions. More than half of the IDP population was displaced as a result of conflict prior to and around the fall of the Taliban in 2001. Some of the internally displaced were previously refugees in Pakistan or Iran, yet have been unable to settle back home upon their return. Others have been displaced by natural disasters that created unsustainable economic conditions. Finally, as the security situation deteriorates, a growing number have been displaced because of conflict between international and Afghan forces against Taliban groups.” [104c]
32. RETURNING AFGHAN REFUGEES

32.01 A November 2008 UNHCR report recorded that: “More than 5 million Afghan refugees – 20 percent of Afghanistan’s population – have returned home since 2002. The large majority have gone back to their areas of origin, but recent returnees are facing more difficulties as the country’s absorption capacity reaches its current limits...” [11e]

32.02 The UN Secretary-General’s report of 10 March 2009 stated that “In 2008, some 278,000 registered refugees had returned to Afghanistan and been assisted by UNHCR; 98.5 per cent of them returned from Pakistan. Some 10 per cent of returnees were unable to return to their place of origin due to insecurity, socio-economic hardships and land disputes.” [39] (p14)

32.03 The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission Economic and Social Rights (AIHRC) report, December 2008, stated that:

“The fate of Afghan refugees is dependent on negotiations between the governments of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran and UNHCR. According to the Ministry of Returnees and Reintegration (MoRR), Afghanistan cannot accept any further returnees from Iran or Pakistan due to the lack of economic opportunities and the government’s inability to provide them with basic services and infrastructure... However, “[t]he government of Pakistan wishes to repatriate as many Afghan refugees as possible, and wishes to close all its refugee camps for Afghans. In 2006, Pakistan announced its intention to repatriate 900,000 refugees to Afghanistan per year, a decision opposed by UNHCR and the government of Afghanistan. The same year, it planned to close two camps in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and two camps in Balochistan. As of March 2008, only the NWFP camps (Jalazai and Kachagari) had been shut down.” [78a] (p46)

32.04 The AIHRC report further stated that:

“The status of Afghan refugees in Iran is no less precarious. Previously, refugees were repatriated at a slower rate. From 2001 to 2006, it is estimated that 833,000 Afghans living in Iran were able to return, leaving a population of 920,000 registered refugees in the country. However, several areas within Iran were declared off-limits to foreigners, including Afghans registered as refugees. Since there has been a near-continuous migration to Iran for the past 30 years, many Afghans have settled in these no-go areas. The real problem arises because the Iranian government is currently in process of reregistering its refugees and no registration centers are set up in areas considered offlimits to foreigners. If Afghans in these areas are not re-registered, their refugee status will be revoked and they will be subject to deportation. Iran’s policy both on labor migrants and refugees has become considerably more restrictive in the past several years. In 2001, Iran began its program to deport all those without a work permit. Though the vast majority of Iranian deportees are not refugees, genuine refugees often get caught up in the process.” [78a] (p46)

32.05 The Foreign and Commonwealth Profile of Afghanistan, updated in January 2009 stated that:
“The Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation (MORR) leads the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in assisting its citizens in returning from exile. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) leads the international community’s response, in coordination with the International Organization of Migration (IOM), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Program (WFP), the World Health Organization (WHO), and a number of other national and international NGOs and donors. As of November 2008, approximately 3 million Afghans remained in neighboring countries. The U.S. provided more than $500 million in support to Afghan refugees, returnees, and other conflict victims between September 2001 and November 2008.” [2e] (p11-12)

(See also Section 20: Pashtuns for more information on Pashtuns returning to the north)

32.06 A Refugee International report, dated 26 January 2009, recorded that:

“The five million Afghans who have returned home since 2001 face challenges of their own, most notably access to land and jobs. Programs targeted at these returnees are still inadequate. Donor governments must increase their allocation of funding towards programs in high returns areas that focus on livelihoods, housing, health and education. However, the U.S., the lead donor in Afghanistan, still spends a disproportionate amount of its aid money on large infrastructure projects. Of USAID’s budget of $1.1 billion in FY08, $398 million were allocated to road construction alone. This does little to meet the primary needs of the millions of people who are returning home and attempting to rebuild their lives.

“A similar gap is found in the UN’s response. While the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) provides a basic package to returnees upon arriving in Afghanistan, the agency is unable to provide livelihood support to more than extremely vulnerable families. The UN Development Program (UNDP), whose mandate extends to early recovery activities, should be more involved in the design and implementation of projects that bridge the gap between assistance and self-sufficiency. The early recovery cluster should be established in Kabul, and UNDP must lead it.” [57a]

32.07 The International Crisis Group (ICG) report, What Now for Refugees?, published on 31 August 2009 focused on the situation of returning Afghan refugees, noted:

“A number of Afghans who returned to the countryside after 2002 had fled their homes in the late nineties or in end-2001. During their relatively short absence, most had maintained strong ties with their communities and often managed to retain their property or access to land. Regular visits and contacts between families and friends facilitated returns and reintegration. These returnees have similar needs to those who had stayed behind, including assistance to rebuild their destroyed houses, seeds and saplings for their fields and orchards, and livestock to replenish their herds.” [26e] (p6)

32.08 The same IGC report noted that “With the rural areas increasingly insecure, many returning Afghans have migrated to towns and cities, causing rapid urbanisation that is contributing to rising poverty, unemployment and criminality. Kabul’s population has tripled in just seven years.” [26e] (pi)
TREATMENT OF RETURNING ASYLUM SEEKERS

32.09 The UNHCR Country Operations Profile accessed on 21 August 2009 stated that:

“The return of almost 5 million Afghans since 2002 has placed great pressure on the country’s absorption capacity, especially on its limited local-labour markets. The spread of insecurity has also posed new difficulties for returnees. Nevertheless, by mid-September 2008, almost 250,000 individuals had returned to Afghanistan, driven mainly by a combination of rising prices and the closure of refugee villages in neighbouring Pakistan. With the prospect of more difficult living conditions in both Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran, decisions on return have become increasingly complex for the remaining refugee population, 80 per cent of whom have been in exile for more than 20 years.” [11f] (p1)

32.10 The UNHCR further added:

“Rising insecurity, political instability and economic and social conditions in Afghanistan have constrained voluntary repatriation. Any deterioration in current conditions could further reduce the expected number of returnees and hamper delivery of assistance to individuals with specific needs and protection risks. UNHCR will update its contingency plan for sudden displacement emergencies on both the Pakistan and Iranian borders. Access to the south and south-east are likely to remain difficult.” [11f]

32.11 In November 2008, a UNHCR report recorded that “Some – including 30,000 returnees now living under tents in the eastern region – are unable to return to their villages due to insecurity, a lack of land, shelter, basic services or job opportunities. These challenges have been compounded by a food crisis and severe drought, forcing thousands of desperate families to leave their homes for other districts, even for neighbouring Iran and Pakistan.” [11e]

32.12 The AIHRC Economic and Social Rights Report dated December 2008 stated that:

“In 2005 the Afghan Government developed a Land Allocation Scheme (LAS) to assist with the internal resettlement of Afghan returnees. These LAS sites are conceived as small towns with adequate infrastructure and services able to support small-scale commercial activity and ensure livelihood options. Initially, the government announced plans for 100 such sites, later inaugurating only 50. Presently, only 15 sites operating with the assistance of UNHCR have been developed; the remaining lots lie vacant.” [78a] (p47)

32.13 The International Crisis Group (IGC) further noted that:

“The [Afghanistan] ministry of rural rehabilitation and development and the ministry of urban development and housing have included returnee assistance, aimed at both refugees and IDPs [Internal Displaced Persons], in their national programs. Others, including NGOs [Non Governmental Organisations], UN agencies and donors, are also aiming to integrate returnee assistance into their development programs. Since reintegration permeates all aspects of reconstruction and development, the needs and vulnerabilities of
returning households fall under the mandate of almost all government ministries.” [26e] (p11)

32.14 The International Crisis Group (IGC) report, *What Now for Refugees?* published on 31 August 2009 focused on the situation of returning Afghan refugees, noting that “Humanitarian agencies have provided significant emergency relief assistance including food, shelter reconstruction, water tanks and pumps to rural communities in several provinces but, as security deteriorates, these organisations are struggling to reach everyone, particularly in the south and south east.” [26e] (p6)

32.15 The IGC report also noted that “Landlessness also remains a major obstacle to return. According to the Norwegian Refugee Council’s (NRC) Ingrid Macdonald, ‘Of the two million refugees remaining in Pakistan, almost 90 per cent claim to have no land or property in Afghanistan; along with insecurity, this will be one of the greatest challenges facing their return and reintegration’.” [26e] (p7)

**Voluntary Returns**

32.16 The UNHCR Voluntary Repatriation Leaflet, Afghanistan, 1 February 2009 stated that “UNHCR is mandated to provide international protection to refugees and to seek long-term or durable solutions to their displacement. Among the solutions available, voluntary repatriation in safety and dignity remains the agency’s preferred option and presented the one sought by the majority of Afghan refugees.” [11g]

32.17 The UNHCR also added:

“An Afghan refugee wishing to return to Afghanistan with the assistance of UNHCR must approach UNHCR in the country of asylum to register for return and sign a Voluntary Repatriation Form (VRF). VRFs are available at Voluntary Repatriation Centres (VRC) in Pakistan and Iran and at UNHCR offices in other countries of asylum.

“Upon arrival in Afghanistan, returnees must visit a UNHCR Encashment Centre (EC) to receive the transportation and reintegration cash assistance. At the ECs, returnees also have access to a variety of services including mine-awareness training, polio and measles vaccinations for children, basic medical assistance, legal aid, mosquito nets in malaria prone areas and transit centres for overnight staying. There are five ECs (Kabul, Herat, Jalalabad, Gardez and Kandahar); all of them are managed by UNHCR in cooperation with the Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation (MoRR).” [11g]
33. **CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONALITY**

33.01 The United States Office of Personnel Management document, Citizenship Laws of the World, dated March 2001 recorded:


"BY BIRTH: Birth within the territory of Afghanistan does not automatically confer citizenship. Exception is a child of unknown/stateless parents.

"BY DESCENT: Child whose mother or father is a citizen, regardless of the country of birth.

"MARRIAGE: Foreign national who marries a citizen of Afghanistan is granted citizenship upon application.

"BY NATURALIZATION: Afghan citizenship may be acquired upon fulfillment [sic] of the following conditions: Person was born in Afghanistan and has resided continually in country for at least five years.

"DUAL CITIZENSHIP: NOT RECOGNIZED.

"Exceptions: A former citizen of Afghanistan, who fled the country due to political instability or war and has acquired new citizenship, may still hold ‘unofficial’ Afghan citizenship. This is recognition that those who fled the country might some day want to return as Afghan citizens without losing new citizenship. The Afghani spouse of a foreign national is not required to renounce Afghan citizenship unless demanded by the spouse’s country.

"LOSS OF CITIZENSHIP: VOLUNTARY: Voluntary renunciation of Afghan citizenship is permitted by law… The following persons are not allowed to renounce citizenship:

- "Person who has continuing financial obligations to the government or other institutions.
- "Person who has been convicted of a crime and sentenced to jail.
- "Persons involved in national security, whose loss to the country might endanger Afghan security.

"IN VOLUNTARY: The following is grounds for involuntary loss of Afghan citizenship: Person voluntarily acquires foreign citizenship and does not fall under the exempted status described under ‘Dual Citizenship’. Persons concerned with dual citizenship should not assume their Afghan citizenship was lost by default. Embassy should be contacted and citizenship formally renounced." [61] (p13)

33.02 The Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board, Canada stated research into Afghanistan citizenship February 2005 recorded that:

"Afghanistan does recognize dual citizenship. However, the decision, made back [sic] three years ago, remains void of any bilateral or multilateral enforcement bearing as it has been adopted solely by the Government of
Afghanistan. The decision principally aims to facilitate and ultimately pave the way for the return of expatriates including refugees abroad to Afghanistan and to get them engaged in the ongoing political and reconstruction processes. The Government has yet to establish regulatory and even statutory frameworks to define legal parameters of the issue both domestically and within the context of bilateral relations involving other States, and for that matter Pakistan. At present, laws and rights of Afghan nationals for dual Afghanistan-Pakistan citizenship remains pending...

“Children born in countries other than the country of origin, including Pakistan, to father or mother or both, who are Afghanistan citizens are considered entitled to Afghanistan citizenship. In fact, the prevailing acts on citizenship in Afghanistan provide that citizenship is hereditary and a child born to either or both Afghan parents anywhere would automatically acquire Afghanistan citizenship.

“However, according to information provided by the High Commission of Pakistan, in Ottawa, Pakistan does not recognize dual nationality with Afghanistan, and although the child of parents who are Afghan citizens may have been born in Pakistan, he/she is not be [sic] entitled to Pakistani citizenship (25 Feb. 2005).” 

33.03 The AIHRC full name of group Economic and Social Rights Report in Afghanistan-III, December 2008, noted “Article 47 of Afghan Civil Code stated that, a person’s civil status shall be marked down in identity card and shall be given to him/ her upon his demand. The identity card shall contain the name, family name, the birth date and birth place, occupation, nationality, place of domicile, name of the spouse and name of the children together with their dates and places of birth.”

33.04 The Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, recorded on 18 December 2007 that:

“In correspondence dated 16 April 2006 a representative of the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) - a donor-funded, Kabul-based research organization (AREU n.d.) - indicated that tazkiras [identity documents] are much more common than passports. The Representative stated that about 70 percent of Afghans have such documents (AREU 16 Apr. 2006). Similarly, the report of a Finnish fact-finding mission to Afghanistan states that the taskira (referred to in the report as Tashkera) is the most commonly used identity document in Afghanistan (Finland Sept. 2006, 36). The United States (US)-issued Reciprocity Schedule states that the taskera is ‘the most universal and accurate document in Afghanistan’ (US n.d.). According to the AREU Representative, the identity cards ‘are required for transacting any business with the government, including the purchase or sale of immovable property, the preparation of official documents (including the passports), admission into school and so on’ (AREU 16 Apr. 2006).”

33.05 Furthermore, the Refugee Board of Canada recorded that:
“In 7 April 2006 correspondence, the Counsellor of the Embassy of Afghanistan in Ottawa informed the Research Directorate that there are two kinds of identity cards still in circulation in Afghanistan: tazkiras (identity cards) and tazkira certificates. According to the Counsellor, in 1990 or 1992 the Afghan government stopped issuing the tazkira, which is a 20-page identity document, and replaced it with a tazkira certificate, which is only one page that includes the minimum essential information: name of the person, father’s name, grandfather’s name, date of birth (according to the Hijri calendar) and birthplace (Afghanistan 7 Apr. 2006).” [77b]

**DOCUMENTS AND REGISTRATION OF BIRTHS AND MARRIAGES**

33.06 The AIHRC Economic and Social Rights Report in Afghanistan-III, December 2008, noted that:

“Birth certificates are under the remit of the Ministry of Interior…. Currently, most maternity hospitals in Kabul offer birth certificates, but it is hard to reach mothers who deliver at home. Registration facilities are available only in provincial centers. Using vaccination drives as a means to promote birth registration is a good idea; however, medical workers struggle to access insecure and remote areas. A more comprehensive strategy is needed to achieve the target of having all newborns register by the end of 2009… Official statistics state that less than 1% of the population has birth certificates.” [78a] (p31-32)

33.07 Furthermore, the report added:

“The marriage certificate includes registration procedures, marriage contract, and the responsibilities of the parties. The 1976 Civil Law of Afghanistan in article 61 says that all marriages must be registered. To date, however, there has been no enforcement mechanism to make marriage and divorce registration a routine process. There are arguments that the more traditional areas resist the registration procedure to avoid exposing women’s identities. However, there is no substantial evidence available to support this. Drawing on the experience of the Presidential elections where a significant number of women were registered to vote the main barrier to compliance is in inaccessibility of the registrars rather than in active resistance.” [78a] (p34)

33.08 On 2 July 2008, The National Public Radio (NPR) website reported that:

“At the moment, Kabul is the only place in Afghanistan where every newborn baby is being registered, including those who are born at home. The Afghan government, with United Nations help, hopes to do the same for newborns all over the country by the end of 2009. If they succeed, it will be the first time this has happened in Afghan history. Currently, the government says less than 1 percent of Afghans have a birth certificate.” [52a]
34. FORGED AND FRAUDULENTLY OBTAINED DOCUMENTS

34.01 No information was available to COI Service at the time of writing.
35. **EXIT AND RETURN**


“...however, certain laws limited citizens’ movement, and the government limited citizens’ movement due to security interests... In 2007, the parliament amended the passport law to give women the right to apply for a passport without permission from a male relative. In some areas of the country, however, local custom or tradition forbids women from leaving the home except in the company of a male relative.” [2a] (Section 2d)
36. **EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS**

36.01 Article 48 of the new Constitution adopted in January 2004 states “Work is the right of every Afghan. Working hours, paid holidays, right of employment and employee and other related affairs are regulated by law. Choice of occupation and craft is free within the limits of law.” [4b]

36.02 The US State Department 2008 report published on 25 February 2009 noted that:

“The law provides broad provisions for protection of workers, and in January 2007 the parliament passed a new labor law that allows workers to join and form unions. Implementation remained a problem due to lack of funding, personnel, political will, and a central enforcement authority. Labor rights were not understood outside the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, and workers were not aware of their rights.” [2a] (Section 6a)

36.03 The USSD 2008 report also recorded that:

“The law defines the standard workweek as 40 hours per week, eight hours per day with one hour for lunch and noon prayers. Reduced standard workweeks were stipulated for youth, pregnant women, nursing mothers, and miners and other occupations that present health risks. Many employers allotted workers time off for prayers and observance of religious holidays. The law provides workers the right to receive wages, annual vacation time in addition to national holidays, compensation for injuries suffered in the line of work, overtime pay, health insurance for the employee and immediate family members, per diem for official trips, daily transportation, food allowances, night shift differentials, retirement rights, and compensation for funeral expenses in case of death while performing official duties. These standards were not effectively enforced, and citizens were not generally aware of the full extent of their labor rights under the law.

“There were no occupational health and safety standards and no enforcement mechanism. Employment was at will, and although there was a Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, there were few if any protections for workers under either the 1987 or the 2007 law. Workers did not have the right to remove themselves from situations that endangered their health or safety without jeopardizing their employment, as all employment could be terminated without cause.” [2a] (Section 6a)

(See also Section 24: Child Labour)
Annex A: Chronology of major events

Source (BBC Timeline, updated on 27 March 2009) [25b] unless otherwise stated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event Summary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>Afghanistan regains independence after third war against British forces trying to bring country under their sphere of influence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>Amanullah proclaims himself king and attempts to introduce social reforms leading to opposition from conservative forces. [NB. Europa records that Amanullah succeeded his father, Habibullah, after Habibullah’s assassination in 1919.] [1f] (p53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>Amanullah flees after civil unrest over his reforms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>Zahir Shah becomes king and Afghanistan remains a monarchy for next four decades.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>General Mohammed Daud becomes prime minister. Turns to Soviet Union for economic and military assistance. Introduces a number of social reforms, such as abolition of purdah (practice of secluding women from public view).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>Mohammed Daud forced to resign as prime minister.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Constitutional monarchy introduced – but leads to political polarisation and power struggles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Mohammed Daud seizes power in a coup and declares a republic. Tries to play off USSR against Western powers. His style alienates left-wing factions who join forces against him.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>General Daud is overthrown and killed in a coup by leftist People’s Democratic Party. But party’s Khalq and Parcham factions fall out, leading to purging or exile of most Parcham leaders. At the same time, conservative Islamic and ethnic leaders who objected to social changes begin armed revolt in countryside.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Power struggle between leftist leaders Hafizullah Amin and Nur Mohammed Taraki in Kabul won by Amin. Revolts in countryside continue and Afghan army faces collapse. Soviet Union finally sends in troops to help remove Amin, who is executed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Babrak Karmal, leader of the People’s Democratic Party Parcham faction, is installed as ruler, backed by Soviet troops. But anti-regime resistance intensifies with various mujahedin groups fighting Soviet forces. US, Pakistan, China, Iran and Saudi Arabia supply money and arms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Mujahedin come together in Pakistan to form alliance against Soviet forces. Half of Afghan population now estimated to be displaced by war, with many fleeing to neighbouring Iran or Pakistan. New Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev says he will withdraw troops from Afghanistan.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1988  Afghanistan, USSR, the US and Pakistan sign peace accords and Soviet Union begins pulling out troops.

1989  Last Soviet troops leave, but civil war continues as mujahedin push to overthrow Najibullah.

1991  The US and USSR agree to end military aid to both sides.

1992  Resistance closes in on Kabul and Najibullah falls from power. Rival militias vie for influence.

1993  Mujahedin factions agree on formation of a government with ethnic Tajik, Burhanuddin Rabbani, proclaimed president.

1994  Factional contests continue and the Pashtun-dominated Taleban emerge as major challenge to the Rabbani government.

1996  Taleban seize control of Kabul and introduce hardline version of Islam, banning women from work, and introducing Islamic punishments, which include stoning to death and amputations. Rabbani flees to join anti-Taleban northern alliance.

1997  Taleban recognised as legitimate rulers by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Most other countries continue to regard Rabbani as head of state. Taleban now control about two-thirds of country.


1999  UN imposes an air embargo and financial sanctions to force Afghanistan to hand over Osama bin Laden for trial.

2001  January: UN imposes further sanctions on Taleban to force them to hand over Osama bin Laden.

March: Taleban blow up giant Buddha statues in defiance of international efforts to save them.

April: Mullah Mohammad Rabbani, the second most powerful Taleban leader after the supreme commander, Mullah Mohammad Omar, dies of liver cancer.

May: Taleban order religious minorities to wear tags identifying themselves as non-Muslims, and Hindu women to veil themselves like other Afghan women.

September: Eight foreign aid workers on trial in the Supreme Court for promoting Christianity. This follows months of tension between Taleban and aid agencies.

Ahmad Shah Masood, legendary guerrilla and leader of the main opposition to the Taleban, is killed, apparently by assassins posing as journalists.

October: USA, Britain launch air strikes against Afghanistan after Taleban refuse to hand over Osama bin Laden, held responsible for the September 11 attacks on America.
**November:** Opposition forces seize Mazar-e Sharif and within days march into Kabul and other key cities.

**5 December:** Afghan groups agree deal in Bonn for interim government.

**7 December:** Taleban finally give up last stronghold of Kandahar, but Mullah Omar remains at large.

**22 December:** Pashtun royalist Hamid Karzai is sworn in as head of a 30-member interim power-sharing government.

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**2002 January:** First contingent of foreign peacekeepers in place.

**April:** Former king Zahir Shah returns, but says he makes no claim to the throne.

**May:** UN Security Council extends mandate of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) until December 2002.

Allied forces continue their military campaign to find remnants of Al-Qaeda and Taleban forces in the south-east.

**June:** Loya Jirga, or grand council, elects Hamid Karzai as interim head of state. Karzai picks members of his administration which is to serve until 2004.

**July:** Vice-President Haji Abdul Qadir is assassinated by gunmen in Kabul. US air raid in Uruzgan province kills 48 civilians, many of them members of a wedding party.

**September:** Karzai narrowly escapes an assassination attempt in Kandahar, his home town.

**December:** President Karzai and Pakistani, [and] Turkmen leaders sign agreement paving way for construction of gas pipeline through Afghanistan, carrying Turkmen gas to Pakistan. Asian Development Bank resumes lending to Afghanistan after 23-year gap.

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**2003 August:** NATO takes control of security in Kabul. It is the organisation’s first operational commitment outside Europe in its history.

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**2004 January:** Grand assembly – or Loya Jirga – adopts new constitution which provides for strong presidency.

**March:** Afghanistan secures $8.2bn (£4.5bn) in aid over three years.

**April:** Fighting in northwest between regional commander and provincial governor allied to government. Twenty people, including two aid workers and a police chief, are killed in incidents in the south. Taleban militants are suspected.

First execution since the fall of the Taleban is carried out.

**June:** Eleven Chinese construction workers killed by gunmen in Kunduz.

**September:** Rocket fired at helicopter carrying President Karzai misses its target; it is the most serious attempt on his life since September 2002.

**October/November:** Presidential elections: Hamid Karzai is declared the winner, with 55 per cent of the vote. He is sworn in, amid tight security, in December.

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**2005 February:** Several hundred people are killed in the harshest winter weather in a decade.

**May:** Details emerge of alleged prisoner abuse by US forces at detention centres in Afghanistan.

**September:** First parliamentary and provincial elections in more than 30 years.

**December:** New parliament holds its inaugural session.
2006

January: More than 30 people are killed in a series of suicide attacks in southern Kandahar province.

February: International donors meeting in London pledge more than $10bn (£5.7bn) in reconstruction aid over five years.

May: Violent anti-US protests in Kabul, the worst since the fall of the Taleban in 2001, erupt after a US military vehicle crashes and kills several people.

May–June: Scores of people are killed in battles between Taleban fighters and Afghan and coalition forces in the south during an offensive known as Operation Mountain Thrust.

October: NATO assumes responsibility for security across the whole of Afghanistan.

2007

March: Mullah Obaidullah Akhund, the third most senior member of the Taleban’s leadership council is arrested, according to Pakistan authorities. Afghan President Hamid Karzai signs a controversial bill which provides sweeping amnesty for war crimes committed over more than two decades of conflict in Afghanistan.

May: Taleban’s most senior military commander, Mullah Dadullah, is killed during fighting with US, Afghan forces.

Afghan and Pakistani troops clash on the border in the worst violence in decades in a simmering border dispute.

July: Former king Zahir Shah dies.

November: Forty-one people killed after suicide attack on a parliamentary delegation in Baghlan.

2008

February: Prince Harry’s tour of duty in Afghanistan comes to an end after spending ten weeks on the front-line in Helmand Province.

June: 350 Taleban militants break out of Kandahar prison.

July: More than 40 are killed in suicide attack on Indian Embassy in Kabul. British Defence Secretary Des Browne announces British troop numbers in Afghanistan to increase by 230 to new high of more than 8,000 by spring 2009.

August: Ten French soldiers killed in an ambush by Taleban fighters.

President Karzai accuses Afghan and US-led coalition forces of killing at least 89 civilians in an air strike in the western province of Herat. He later sacks two senior military commanders over the strike.

September: President Bush sends an extra 4,500 US troops to Afghanistan, in a move he described as a ‘quiet surge’.

October: Germany extends Afghanistan mission to 2009 and boosts troop numbers in Afghanistan by 1,000, to 4,500.

November: Taleban militants reject an offer of peace talks from President Karzai, saying there can be no negotiations until foreign troops leave Afghanistan.

December: President Karzai and new Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari agree to form joint strategy to fight militants operating in their border regions.

2009

March: Afghanistan’s Election Commission rejects President Karzai’s call for an April presidential vote, saying it will take place on 20 August.

President Hamid Karzai signed a new law that legalises rape within marriage and bans wives from stepping outside their homes without their husbands’ permission.

August: Elections are held, but are marred by widespread Talibn attacks, patchy turnout and claims of serious fraud. Accusations of vote rigging and concerns over the low voter turnout cast doubt on the legitimacy of the polls.
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Annex B: Political organisations and other groups

In September 2003 a new law allowing the formation of political parties was passed. By July 2007 more than 80 parties were registered with the Ministry of Justice. (Europa Online, accessed 1 September 2009) [1e] (Political Organisations)

REGISTERED POLITICAL PARTIES

The Ministry of Justice website provided an undated list of licensed political parties in Afghanistan, which recounted 84 parties when accessed on 14 October 2009. [65a]

1 Republican Party (Hizb-e Jamhuri Khwahan)
   Leader: Sibghatullah Sanjar

2 National Unity Movement (Tahrik-e Wahdat-e Melli)
   Leader: Sultan Mahmood Ghazi

3 Freedom Party of Afghanistan (Hizb-e-Istiqlal-e-Afghanistan)
   Leader: Ghulam Farooq Najrabi

4 Youth Solidarity Party of Afghanistan (Hizb-e Hambastagi-ye Melli-ye Jawanan-e Afghanistan)
   Leader: Mohammad Jamil Karzai

5 National Unity Party of Afghanistan (Hizb-e Wahdat-e Melli-ye Afghanistan)
   Leader: Abdul Rasheed Jalili (The International Crisis Group (ICG) noted in June 2005 that Jalili is a former Education Minister and dean of the agriculture faculty at Kabul University under the PDPA’s Amin. The party depends on support from intellectual Pashtuns and former Khalqi Pashtuns. [26d] (p9))

6 National Tribal Unity Islamic Party of Afghanistan (Hizb-e Melli-ye Wahdat-e Aqwam-e Islami-ye Afghanistan)
   Leader: Mohammad Shah Khugianay

7 Labor and Progress of Afghanistan Party (Hizb-e Kar wa Tawse’a-e Afghanistan)
   Leader: Zulfiqar Omid

8 National Solidarity Movement of Afghanistan (Nahzat-e Hambastagi-ye Melli-ye Afghanistan)
   Leader: Pir Sayyad Ishaq Gailani

9 National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (Mahaz-e Melli-ye Islami-ye Afghanistan)
   Leader: Sayyad Ahmad Gailani

10 Freedom and Democracy Movement of Afghanistan (Nahzat-e Azadi wa Demokrasi-ye Afghanistan)
   Leader: Abdul Raqib Jawed Kohestani

11 Afghan Social Democratic Party (Afghan Mellat)
   Leader: Anwar al-Haq Ahadi
12 Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (Harakat-e Islami-ye Afghanistan)
   Leader: Mohammad Ali Jawed

13 United Afghanistan Party (Hizb-e Afghanistan-e Wahid)
   Leader: Mohammad Wasel Rahimi

14 People’s Welfare Party of Afghanistan (Hizb-e Sahadat-e Mardum-e Afghanistan)
   Leader: Mohammad Zubair Payroz

15 National Unity Movement of Afghanistan (Hizb-e Harakat-e Melli-ye Wahdat-e Afghanistan)
   Leader: Mohammad Nader Atash

16 Human Rights Protection and Development Party of Afghanistan (Hizb-e Hifazat az Hoquq-e Bashar wa Inkeshaf-e Afghanistan)
   Leader: Baryalai Nasrati

17 National Party of Afghanistan (Hizb-e Melli-ye Afghanistan)
   Leader: Abdul Rashid Aryan (ICG noted in June 2005 that the party has its roots in the Khalq faction of the PDPA. [26d] (p8))

18 National Congress Party of Afghanistan (Hizb-e Kongra-ye Melli-ye Afghanistan)
   Leader: Abdul Latif Pedram

19 Peace Movement (Da Afghanistan Da Solay Ghorzang Gond)
   Leader: Shahnawaz Tanai

20 Islamic People’s Movement of Afghanistan (Hizb-e Harak-e Islami-ye Mardum-e Afghanistan)
   Leader: Al-Hajj Sayyed Hosain Anwari

21 Islamic Justice Party of Afghanistan (Hizb-e Adalat-e Islami-ye Afghanistan)
   Leader: Mohammad Kabir Marzban

22 People’s Message Party of Afghanistan (Hizb-e Risalat-e Mardum-e Afghanistan)
   Leader: Noor Aqa Wainee

23 People’s Welfare Party of Afghanistan (Hizb-e Refah-e Mardum-e Afghanistan)
   Leader: Miagul Waseq

24 National Peace & Unity Party of Afghanistan (Hizb-e Sulh wa Wahdat-e Melli-ye Afghanistan)
   Leader: Abdul Qader Imami

25 Understanding and Democracy Party of Afghanistan (Hizb-e Tafahum-e wa Demokrasi-ye Afghanistan)
   Leader: Ahmad Shaheen

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26 Young Afghanistan’s Islamic Organization (Sazman-e Islami-ye Afghanistan-e Jawan)
Leader: Sayyed Jawad Husaini

27 National Peace & Islamic Party of the Tribes of Afghanistan (Hizb-e Sulh-e Melli-ye Islami-ye Aqwam-e Afghanistan)
Leader: Abdul Qaher Shari’ati

28 Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan (Hizb-e Wahdat-e Islami-ye Afghanistan)
Leader: Mohammad Karim Khalili ICG noted in June 2005 “The rump faction of the party led by Vice President Karim Khalili maintains a larger and more powerful network of former commanders than its competitor led by Mohaqeq [see party 29 below] but appears to have comparatively little infrastructure or public support. It did badly in the elections to the Constitutional Loya Jirga, when Khalili was criticised by Hazara delegates for soft-peddling the issues of language and parliamentary powers. He has yet to regain lost ground with his Hazara base.” [26d] (p8)

29 Islamic Unity Party of the People of Afghanistan (Hizb-e Wahdat-e Islami-ye Mardum-e Afghanistan)
Leader: Haji Mohammad Mohaqeq (ICG noted in June 2005 that this faction of the Wahdat had gained support, as shown in its leader’s credible performance [third [25y]] in the presidential elections. “It [the party] appears to have shifted its identity from primarily Shia to Hazara nationalism. Avowedly anti-Karzai and fearful of ‘re-Pashtunisation’ of the government – which plays on historical Hazara concerns about political and economic marginalisation – the party has gained support from many Hazara intellectuals.” [26d] (p8))

30 People’s Liberal Freedom Seekers Party of Afghanistan (Hizb-e Libral-e Azadi-ye Khwa-e Mardum-e Afghanistan)
Leader: Ajmal Sohail

31 People’s Prosperity Party of Afghanistan (Hizb-e Falah-e Mardum-e Afghanistan)
Leader: Ustad Mohammad Zareef

32 Solidarity Party of Afghanistan (Hizb-e Hambastagi Afghanistan)
Leader: Abdul Khaleq Né’mat

33 Afghan Society for the Call to the Koran and Sunna (Jama’at al-Da’wat il’l Qur’an wa Sunnat al-Afghanistan)
Leader: Mawlawi Sami’ullah Najibi

34 National Movement of Afghanistan (Hizb-e Nahzat-e Melli-ye Afghanistan)
Leader: Ahmad Wali Masood

35 National Peace Islamic Party of Afghanistan (Da Afghanistan Da Solay Melli Islami Gond)
Leader: Shah Mahmud Popalzai

36 People’s Aspirations Party of Afghanistan (Hizb-e Arman-e Mardum-e Afghanistan)
Leader: Al-Hajj Sirajuddeen Zafari
37 National Solidarity Party of Afghanistan (Hizb-e Paiwand-e Melli-ye Afghanistan)  
Leader: Sayyed Mansur Naderi

38 National Prosperity and Islamic Party of Afghanistan (Hizb-e Sahadat-e Melli wa Islami-ye Afghanistan)  
Leader: Mohammad Osman Salekzada

39 Freedom Party of Afghanistan (Hizb-e Azadi-ye Afghanistan)  
Leader: Abdul Malik

40 People's Uprising Party of Afghanistan (Hizb-e Rastakhaiz-e Mardum-e Afghanistan)  
Leader: Sayyed Zaher Qaydam Al-beladi

41 Peace and National Welfare Activists Society (Majmah-e Melli-ye Fahalin-e Suhl-e Afghanistan)  
Leader: Shams al-Haq Nur Shams

42 Islamic Party of the Afghan Land (Da Afghan Watan Islami Gond)  
Leader: Mohammad Hassan Ferozkhel

43 People's Freedom Seekers Party of Afghanistan (Hizb-e Azadi-ye Khwa-e Mardum-e Afghanistan)  
Leader: Fida Mohammad Ehsass

44 Muslim Unity Movement Party of Afghanistan (Hizb-e Wahdat-ul-Muslimeen Afghanistan)  
Leader: Wazir Mohammad Wahdat

45 Tribes Solidarity Party of Afghanistan Hizb-e Hambastagi-ye Melli-ye Aqwam-e Afghanistan)  
Leader: Mohammad Zareef Naseri

46 National Islamic Moderation Party of Afghanistan (Hizb-e Etedaal Melli Islami ye Afghanistan)  
Leader: Qara Baik Izadyar

47 National Development Party of Afghanistan (Hizb-e Taraqi Melli ye Afghanistan)  
Leader: Dr. Assef Baktash

48 National Independence Party of Afghanistan (Hezb-e-Isteqlal Milli Afghanistan)  
Leader: Taj Mohammad Wardak

50 National Islamic Unity Party of Afghanistan (Hizb-e Wahdat-e Melli-ye Islami-ye Afghanistan)  
Leader: Mohammad Akbari

51 People's Sovereignty Movement of Afghanistan (Nahzat-e Hakimyat-e Mardum-e Afghanistan)  
Leader: Hayatullah Subhani

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52 National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (Hizb-e Junbish-e-Melli-ye Afghanistan)
Leader: Sayed Noorullah [65a]
Formed in 1992 mainly from troops of former Northern Command of the Afghan army; predominantly Uzbek/Tajik/Turkmen/Ismaili and Hazara Shi’a; 65,000–150,000 supporters. [11]
The JEMB list of political parties approved by the Ministry of Justice dated 20 August 2005 included Junbish-i Melli [Hezb-e-Junbish Mili Islami-e-Afghanistan], led by Sayed Noorullah. [74a]

53 Islamic Unity of the Nation of Afghanistan Party (Hizb-e Wahdat-e-Islami Millat-e-Afghanistan)
Leader: Qurban Ali Irfani

54 Elites People of Afghanistan Party (Hib-e Nukhbag-e Mardum-e-Afghanistan)
Leader: Abdul Hamid Jawaad

55 National Country Party
Leader: Ghulam Mohammad

56 National Freedom Seekers Party (Hizb-e-Azaadi Khwahan-e-Maihan)
Leader: Abdul Hadi Dabeer

57 National Patch of Afghanistan Party (Hib-e-Paiwand-e-Mehanee Afghanistan)
Leader: Sayyed Kamal Sadaat

58 Islamic Society of Afghanistan (Jami’at-e Islami-ye Afghanistan)
Leader: Ustad Rabbani

59 Afghanistan’s Islamic Mission Organization (Tanzim-e Dahwat-e Islami-ye Afghanistan)
Leader: Abdul Rabb Rasool Sayyaf

61 People’s Party of Afghanistan (Hizb-e Mardum-e Afghanistan)
Leader: Ahmad Shah Asar

62 National Stability Party (Hizb-e Subat-e Melli)
Leader: Mohammad Sami Kharotai

63 National Islamic Fighters Party of Afghanistan (Da Afghanistan Da Melli Mubarizinu Islami Gond)
Leader: Amanat Nangarhari

64 Democratic Party of Afghanistan (Hizb-e-Democrat-e-Afghanistan)
Leader: Abdul Kabir Ranjbar

65 People’s Movement of the National Unity of Afghanistan (Da Afghanistan da Melli Wahdat Wolesi Tahreek)
Leader: Abdul Hakim Noorzai

66 National Sovereignty Party (Hizb-e-Iqtedar Melli)
Leader: Sayyed Mustafa Kazimi
67 New Afghanistan Party (Hezb-e-Afghanistan Naween)
Leader: Mohammad Yunis Qanuni

68 National Prosperity Party (Hizb-e Refah-e Melli)
Leader: Mohammad Hasan Jahfari

69 National Stance Party (Hizb-e-Melli Dareez)
Leader: Habibullah Janebdar

70 Afghanistan’s Welfare Party (Hizb-e Refah-e Afghanistan)
Leader: Mir Mohammad Asef Za’ifi

71 Afghanistan’s Islamic Nation Party (Hizb-e-Umat-e-Islami Afghanistan)
Leader: Tooran (Captain) Noor Aqa Ahmadzai

72 Afghanistan’s National Islamic Party (Hizb-e-Melli Islami Afghanistan)
Leader: Ruhullah Ludin

73 The People of Afghanistan’s Democratic Movement (Hizb-e-Junbish-Democracy Mardum-e-Afghanistan)
Leader: Mohammad Sharif Nazari

74 Progressive Democratic Party of Afghanistan (Hizb-e-Mutaraqi Democaraat Afghanistan)
Leader: Mohammad Wali Aria

75 Democratic Party of Afghanistan (Hizb-e-Democracy Afghanistan)
Leader: Al-hajj Mohammad Tawoos Arab

76 Muslim People of Afghanistan Party (Hizb-e-Mardum-e-Muslman-e-Afghanistan)
Leader: Bismillah Joyan

77 Hizullah-e-Afghanistan
Leader: Qari Ahmad Ali

78 Islamic Party of Afghanistan (Hizb-e-Islami Afghanistan)
Leader: Mohammad Khalid Farooqi

79 Comprehensive Movement of Democracy and Development of Afghanistan Party (Hizb-e-Nahzat Faragir Democracy wa Taraqi-e-Afghanistan)
Leader: Sher Mohammad Bazgar

80 Afghanistan Peoples’ Treaty Party (Hizb-e-Wolesi Tarhun Afghanistan)
Leader: Sayyed Amir Tahseen

81 United Islamic Party of Afghanistan (Hizb-e-Mutahed Islami Afghanistan)
Leader: Wahidullah Sabawoon

82 Islamic Movement of Afghanistan Party (Hizb-e-Nahzat-e-Melli Islami Afghanistan)
Leader: Mohammad Mukhtar Mufleh
National and Islamic Sovereignty Movement Party of Afghanistan (Hizb-e-Eqtedar-e-Melli wa Islami Afghanistan)
Leader: Engineer Ahmad Shah Ahmadzai

The Afghanistan’s Mujahid Nation’s Islamic Unity Movement (Da Afghanistan Mujahid Woles Yaowaali Islami Tahreek)
Leader: Saeedullah Saeed

OTHER POLITICAL GROUPS

Hizb-e Islami Gulbuddin [or Hizb-e Islami Hekmatyar]
(NB. Spellings differ e.g. Hezb-e Islami/Hisb-i Islami/Hisb-e Islami)
Pashtun/Turkmen/Tajik. Leader: Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. c. 50,000 supporters (estimate); based in Iran 1998–99. [1f] Founded in the 1970s and reached the height of its power in 1992 when the Soviet-backed Government of President Najibullah fell to a coalition of mujahedin factions, including Hizb-i-Islami. Hekmatyar served as Prime Minister in 1995. [73a] Hekmatyar was designated a terrorist by the US State Department on 18 February 2003 [5a] for participation in and support for terrorist acts committed by Al-Qaeda and the Taleban, and is currently in hiding. [73b]

“Gulbuddin Hekmatyar runs his own faction of Hezb-i-Islami, a radical Islamist group that is loosely aligned with al Qaeda and the Taliban. Hekmatyar was a key player in the Soviet-Afghan war and led one of the biggest insurgent factions against Soviet and Afghan communists’ [Sic] forces. His brutal battlefield tactics and wanton destruction of Kabul following the collapse of the Afghan Communist regime in the early 1990’s led to the demise of Hekmatyar’s popularity. The Taliban overran his last stronghold south of Kabul in 1995 and forced him into exile in Iran from 1996-2002.

“His low-profile return to Afghanistan led to a small and temporary alliance with the Taliban before Mullah Omar ultimately ceased cooperation with Hekmatyar’s meager forces. Two groups, however, were created as a merger between local Taliban and Hezb-i-Islami fighters in 2002, Nohzat al-Fath and Lashkar Fedayan-e Islam. Both facilitated training with suicide bombers and improvised explosive devices.

“Hekmatyar leads a band of a few hundred loyalists and several senior subcommanders including, Kahsmir Kahan, Haji Eshanullah, Abdul Salam Hashemi, Engineer Obaidullah, and Munshi Abdul Majid. Kashmir Khan, the most notorious of the bunch, is believed to have helped top al Qaeda members escape the Coalition’s air blitz on their Tora Bora Mountain hideout in December 2001. Khan kept a low-profile up until 2006 when he re-emerged as a key insurgent leader in Afghanistan’s northeastern regions.

“‘The Hezb-i-Islami’s fighting potential has eroded over the years,’ Hekmatyar expert Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmad said in an interview with Afgha.com. ‘The current insurgency is essentially led by the Taliban. However, this does not mean the contribution to this insurgency by Hezb-i-Islami is meaningless. Its renegade commanders still at large such as Kashmir Khan and Obaidullah still pose a threat to Afghanistan, as they are the ones who carry out Hekmatyar’s politically motivated militarism on the ground in alliance with the Taliban’.” [55a]

(See also Annex C:- Armed Groups)
Hizb-e Islami Khalis [Khaless] (Islamic Party Khalis): Pashtun

Leader: Maulvi Muhammed Younis Khalis (deceased) [55b] “Pashtun; promotes establishment of an Islamic state in accordance with Qu’ran, Sunnah and Shariah doctrines.” c. 40,000 supporters. [1e]


(See also Annex C:- Armed Groups)

Ittihad-i Islami Bara i Azadi Afghanistan (Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan): Pashtun
Leader: Prof. Abdul Rasul Sayef [Sayyaf]; Deputy Leader: Ahmad Shah Ahmadzay; c. 18,000 supporters. [1f] Sayef’s party was renamed and registered as Tanzim Dawat-e-Islami-e-Afghanistan to run in the September 2005 parliamentary elections [see party 59 above]. [74a]

Jamiat-i Islami (Islamic Society): Turkmen/Uzbek/Tajik [1f]
The ICG noted in June 2005: “Led by former President Burhanuddin Rabbani, the Jamiat is one of the country’s oldest Islamist political organisations but its support has been undermined by internal fissures, stemming from discontent with Rabbani’s leadership as well as sub-regional rivalries in the north.” [26d] (p9) In June 2005, the ICG [26d] (p5) and UNHCR [11b] (p19) noted that Rabbani’s Jamiat-i Islami were among the major parties registered for the September 2005 elections. The JEMB list of political parties approved by the Ministry of Justice dated 20 August 2005 included Jamiat-i Islami [Hezb-e-Jamihat-e-Islami-e-Afghanistan], led by Ustad Rabanee. [74a]

Khudamul Furqan Jamiat (KFJ) – Society of Servants of the Holy Koran
Eurasianet reported on 27 December 2001 “The KFJ is a Pashtun-dominated organization, and, according to sources, is led by so-called moderate Taliban. KFJ leaders include former Taliban Minister of Foreign Affairs Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil, Education Minister Maulvi Arsala Rahmani, and the Taliban’s envoy to the United Nations, Abdul Hakim Mujahid.” [45]

Jabhe-ye-Motahed-e-Milli (United National Front - UNF) / National Understanding Front (NUF)
The ICG recorded in June 2005:

“On 1 April 2005, the leader of the Hizb-e Afghanistan-e Nawin (New Afghanistan Party), Younus Qanooni, and a group of mainly Islamist parties announced formation of a new coalition, the National Understanding Front (NUF), comprised of eleven re-branded mujahidin groups and personalities, including three former presidential candidates...Although the NUF’s leadership is multi-ethnic and includes Ahmad Shah Ahmadzai, a Pashtun, Qanooni, a Tajik and Mohammad Mohaqqeq, a Shia Hazara, many of its parties share common perceptions that Afghanistan, under Karzai, will again become a Pashtun-dominated state.” [26d] (p10-11) Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reported on 29 December 2005 that Qanuni had resigned as leader of the NUF after being elected as speaker of the Afghan National Assembly’s People’s Council (Wolesi Jirga). [29k]

However, Europa World Online recorded the following information: “Founded 2007; informal political grouping incl. fmr mems of United Front; advocates parliamentary
system of govt rather than presidential system; mems incl. Younis Qanooni, Ahmad Zia Masoud, Gen. Abdul Rashid Dostam and Marshal Muhammed Qassim Fahim.” The Chairman is Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani. [1e]

Northern Alliance
Europa records that the Northern Alliance (NA) was an anti-Taliban coalition formed in 1996 by Ahmed Shah Masoud [Masood], General Dostam [Dostum] of Uzbek origin [Jonbesh-e-Melli-e-Islami], and the Hazara leader, General Karim Khalili [Hizb-i-Wahdat] under the presidency of Burhanuddin Rabbani. The NA was expanded and strengthened in June 1997 and restyled as the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (commonly known as the Northern Alliance or United Front). Following the terrorist attacks on the US on 11 September 2001, US-led coalition forces strengthened and assisted the NA, resulting in the defeat of the Taliban. [1f] (See also UIFSA below.)

People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA)
The UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Afghanistan, July 2009 recorded:

“The People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was formed in 1965 by Nur Mohammad Taraki on Marxist/Leninist ideology due to domestic discontent and the absence of political freedoms. It believed in a one-party, heavily secularized state, and was particularly intolerant of political opposition from its Islamist rivals. The PDPA eventually split into the Khaq (People) and Parcham (Flag) branches. After the Khaq faction of the PDPA deposed the ruling party through a coup carried out by its supporters in the military in 1978 (the Saur Revolution), it formed a government that was violently intolerant of political opposition. The Soviet-supported PDPA government’s attempts at forcible reform of polity and society resulted in a surge of support for its Islamist rivals, who attempted to oust it with Pakistani support. In 1977, the two factions reunited under Soviet pressure and its name was changed to Watan (Homeland) Party. It collapsed in 1992 when, following the Peshawar Accords, Mujaheddin troops entered Kabul and the last President of a communist government in Afghanistan, Mohammed Najibullah (previously head of the secret service KhAD) had to seek refuge in a UN-building in Kabul where he stayed until he was killed by Taleban troops entering Kabul in September 1996. In late 2003, a congress of the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) took place in Afghanistan, which led to the creation of Hezb-e-Mutahid-e-Mili (National United Party), a party registered in 2005 then comprising 600 members. Former PDPA members have also reportedly founded several other parties. Most recently, a new parliamentary group, the United National Front, was inaugurated on 12 March 2007 as a broad coalition of former and current militia leaders, commanders from the anti-Soviet resistance, ex-Communist leaders, and various representatives of social and ethnic groups.” [11a] (p29)

Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA)
The RAWA website, accessed on 26 August 2008, advised:

“RAWA, the Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan, was established in Kabul, Afghanistan, in 1977 as an independent political/social organization of Afghan women fighting for human rights and for social justice in Afghanistan. The founders were a number of Afghan woman intellectuals under the sagacious leadership of Meena who in 1987 was assassinated in Quetta, Pakistan, by Afghan agents of the then KGB in connivance with fundamentalist band of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. RAWA’s objective was to involve an increasing number of Afghan women in social and political
activities aimed at acquiring women’s human rights and contributing to the struggle for the establishment of a government based on democratic and secular values in Afghanistan.” [49a]

Shura-yi Nazar
An August 2007 International Crisis Group report recorded that “After the fall of the Taliban, the security organs at the centre were monopolised by the Panjshiri Tajik-dominated Shura-yi Nazar-i Shamali one of whose leaders, Younus Qanooni, was appointed interior minister.” [26b] (p5) “The Shura-yi Nazar Shamali (Supervisory Council of the North) was a regional military and political structure founded by Ahmad Shah Massoud. Its core leaders were Panjshiris associated with the Jamiat-i Islami party of former President Burhanuddin Rabbani.” [26b] (Footnote 32)

Taliban [Taleban]
Emerged in 1994; Islamist fundamentalist; mainly Sunni Pashtuns; in power 1996-2001; also active in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan. Leader Mullah Mohammad Omar. c. 12,000 supporters. [1e] UNHCR noted in June 2005 that “The core of the Taliban was educated in madrassas (religious schools) in Pakistan which adhere to the Deobandi orthodox legal and state doctrine and promote taqlid, the obedience to the Koran in its original letter. The political aims of the Taliban were to re-establish security in Afghanistan, to create a truly Islamic State, to disarm the population and to implement a strict interpretation of Shari’a law throughout the country.” [11b] (p48)

An Associated Press article of August 2008 noted “Taliban insurgents once derided as a ragtag rabble unable to match U.S. troops have transformed into a fighting force - one advanced enough to mount massive conventional attacks and claim American lives at a record pace.” [53a]

(See also Annex C:- Armed Groups)

United National Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (UIFSA) – commonly known as the Northern Alliance or United Front
An anti-Taliban coalition that superseded the Supreme Council for the Defence of Afghanistan in June 1997. [1f] (p60) Europa World Online, accessed on 5 January 2009, recorded that “The [Northern] alliance was reported to have been expanded and strengthened in early June [1997] by the inclusion of the forces of Hekmatyar and of the Mahaz-i-Melli-i-Islami (National Islamic Front), led by Pir Sayed Ahmad Gailani. This new coalition, which superseded the Supreme Council for the Defence of Afghanistan, was known as the United National Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan, commonly known as the United Front and the Northern Alliance. The United Front was the military wing of the exiled Government, the ‘Islamic State of Afghanistan’.” [1e]
Annex C: Armed groups

Taliban (Taleban)

The BBC recorded that “The Taliban emerged in the early 1990s in northern Pakistan following the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. A predominantly Pashtun movement, the Taliban came to prominence in Afghanistan in the autumn of 1994.” (BBC Online, 18 June 2009) [25h]

The UN Security Council reported in November 2008 that:

“The Taliban emerged in 1994 from southern Afghanistan and launched an armed movement against the various factions that were then fighting each other. After the fall of Kabul to the Taliban in 1996, most of these factions joined together as the Northern Alliance and continued to resist the Taliban. By September 2001, the Taliban controlled approximately 90 per cent of the country. During its regime, in areas under its control, the Taliban interpreted religious and tribal law in their most ultra-conservative forms, thereby trampling women’s rights and denying education to children. At the same time, the country became a haven for activity of international groups using terror tactics, including Al-Qaeda.” [39f] (p2)

“In November 1999, the Security Council, by its resolution 1267 (1999), introduced mandatory sanctions against key members of the Taliban and Al-Qaida. Following the events of 11 September 2001, international military forces entered Afghanistan in October 2001 and removed the Taliban from power…” (UN Security Council, 10 November 2008) [39f] (p2)

The New York Times (NYT) stated that: “The Taliban grew out of a student movement dedicated to purifying the country, based in the Pashtun region in the country’s southeast. Their rise was initially greeted with relief by many Afghans weary of the corruption and brutality of the warlords who had fought for control in the years after the end of Soviet occupation.

“Once in power, the group imposed strict enforcement of fundamentalist Islamic law, banning movies, music and forcing women out of schools and into all-enveloping burqa clothing. The Taliban also provided a haven for Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda organization. International condemnation of its harsh measures had little effect on the regime, which seemed almost to welcome pariah status.” [28c]

After the attack on the World Trade Center in New York on Sept. 11, 2001, the US launched an air and ground campaign that same year in Afghanistan, putting an end to the Taliban regime. However, “…the Taliban continued to exist, living as a guerrilla warfare operation based in the mountainous and largely lawless tribal area on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. As the American military focus was diverted to the invasion and occupation of Iraq, the Taliban regrouped and began to extend its influence in the southern part of Afghanistan.” (NYT, 23 April 2009) [28c]

In February 2009 three Pakistani powerful Taliban commanders - Baitullah Mehsud, Hafiz Gul Bahadur and Maulavi Nazir in North and South Waziristan:
“...formed a united council, or shura, called the Council of United Mujahedeen. In a printed statement the leaders vowed to put aside their disputes and focus on fighting American-led forces in Afghanistan. The new Taliban alliance has raised concern in Afghanistan, where NATO generals warn that the conflict will worsen this year. It has also generated anxiety in Pakistan, where officials fear that a united Taliban will be more dangerous, even if focused on Afghanistan, and draw more attacks inside Pakistan from United States drone aircraft.” (NYT, 23 April 2009) [28c]

The International Council on Security and Development (ICOS) (formerly Senlis Council) report dated December 2008 recorded that “The Taliban are now dictating terms in Afghanistan, both politically and militarily. At the national level, talk of reconciliation and power sharing between undefined moderate elements of the Taliban movement and elected government officials is commonplace. At a local level, the Taliban is manoeuvring skilfully to fill the governance void, frequently offering a mellower version of localised leadership than characterised their last stint in power.” [20c] (p11) However, the USSD report on Terrorism, 2008 reported that “The Government of Afghanistan continued to strengthen its national institutions, and some polls indicated the majority of Afghans believed they were better off than they were under the Taliban.” [2d] (p10)

The International Council on Security and Development (ICOS) (formerly Senlis Council) also reported that:

“The name ‘Taliban’ (students) refers to the religious scholars who led the strict Islamist movement that ruled Afghanistan from 1996 and 2001. The Taliban can be described as a semi-spontaneous movement lacking deep ideological roots, whose political purposes derived from a fundamentalist interpretation of the Koran. Although small in number at first, the Taliban succeeded in building alliances with local warlords and progressively acquired power. However, although the number of alleged Taliban increased, not all shared the original hyper-conservative beliefs.” [20b] (p54)

The International Council on Security and Development (ICOS) (formerly Senlis Council) report dated 5 September 2006 noted that:

“A significant number of the original Taliban militants were killed during Operation Enduring Freedom’s initial phases, and the Taliban defeat was guaranteed by the defection of the many warlords to the US-sponsored Northern Alliance. Since late 2001, the remnants of the Taliban have been based mainly in Pakistan, and have been supported by a loose coalition comprising Afghans loyal to the former Taliban regime, disenchanted and nationalist Pashtuns, religious conservatives, criminal gangs, opium traffickers, and a new generation of Pakistani and Afghan scholars educated in the madrassas along the Pakistan-Afghan border. This coalition of supporters can be described as the neo-Taliban.

“Both the original Taliban and the neo-Taliban share a common faith in an extreme interpretation of Sunni-Islam. The cohesion of the two Taliban groups, and their local support, is based on a common dislike of political leaders such as the warlords of the 1990s, or the current US-backed Karzai government. However, the tactics employed by the neo-Taliban differ from those of the original Taliban. The neo-Taliban has adopted high-impact terrorist tactics,
and has indiscriminately targeted civilians, rather than specific groups of people like the teachers, criminals and Hazara people targeted by the Taliban.

“As a disparate assemblage of several different groups, the neo-Taliban movement has no clear political purpose. However, the strength of their current offensives against NATO-ISAF troops indicates an increase in coordination and military preparation between these groups. Indeed, field research indicates that the composition of the neo-Taliban exposes a proxy war dynamic, especially given the well-funded, highly organised and technologically sophisticated nature of parts of the insurgency. On closer inspection, there appear to be two aspects to the insurgency. One aspect is highly funded, and technologically sophisticated, while the other conforms to low-level, classic guerrilla-warfare techniques. Pakistan has been implicated in the coordination, financing and organisation of the insurgency.

“The Karzai government tried to create divisions inside the neo-Taliban by offering and making [a] distinction between ‘good Taliban’ and ‘bad Taliban’. So far, the strategy for reconciliation has produced no substantial results in softening the insurgency.” [20b] (Chapter 1, p55-56)

The International Council on Security and Development (ICOS) (formerly Senlis Council) report published on 5 September 2006 stated that the Taliban was using a mixture of threats and compensation to gain new recruits, particularly in the south of the country where their offensive had intensified:

“These recruits have different motives. They may share the religious beliefs of the combatants. They may also be attracted by the nationalist rhetoric against the foreign troops. They can also join the Taliban because of family or tribal relations. Similarly, the Taliban have generated support by giving poppy farmers protection and financial compensation when their crops are eradicated...In addition, anti-government elements use money to enrol Afghan people in their combat units. The Taliban are also recruiting trained Afghan policemen and guards, who are offered a choice between fighting for the Taliban, and facing death...They [the Taliban] have achieved success because the Afghan Government, backed by US and NATO-ISAF forces, has shown itself incapable of keeping its promises and responding to people’s needs.” [20b] (p69-70)

IRIN News reported on 27 February 2008 that high levels of rural poverty or unemployment are probably helping to drive young people to join the Taliban, who are offering mobile phones, money and other financial incentives to young men to join their ranks. [36r]

Former Taliban Members

A New York Times article in March 2009 noted that over 6000 former Taliban members had moved over to the government side since the fall of the Taliban, however, very few senior Taliban commanders had been persuaded to convert. (NYT, 11 March 2009) [28d] The article noted that “…Mullah Salam, a former Taliban commander who was persuaded by the British, with the aid of the Afghan president, Hamid Karzai, to cross sides in 2007. He remains
ostensibly loyal to NATO forces, and some British officials mention him as an example of how a campaign to woo Taliban district commanders might work.” [28b]

Haqqani network

A Reuters article in February 2009 reported that the Haqqani network was “Headed by Jalaluddin Haqqani… is allied with the Taliban and is believed to be linked to al Qaeda. It has been behind several high-profile attacks in Afghanistan. Effective leadership of the group has now passed from Jalaluddin, who is in his 70s, to his more radical eldest son Sirajuddin, security analysts say.” [24b]

The article further noted that “The senior Haqqani rose to prominence during the 1980s, receiving weapons and funds from the CIA and Saudi Arabia to fight the Soviet occupation and has also had long-standing links with Pakistan’s military Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). After the Taliban captured Kabul in 1996, Haqqani sided with the austere Islamist movement and became a government minister.” [24b]

The Haqqani network is operative in the eastern provinces of Khost and Paktya and is suspected of having masterminded the attack on Kabul’s Serena Hotel in January 2008, the attack on a military parade during a ceremony at Kabul Stadium in April 2008 and the attack on the Indian Embassy in July 2008. (UN Security Council, 10 November 2008) [39d] (p4)

In March 2009 Sirajuddin told Reuters that his group was “…under the overall command of Taliban leader Mullah Omar and admitted ties with al Qaeda but said he did not need its support.” [24b]

Hizb-e-Islami (Hisb-e-Islami/Hezb-e-Islami/Hizb-i-Islami)

The UN Security Council reported on 10 November 2008 that “Gulbuddin Hekmatyar is the leader of Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin, a group that is mostly active in the east of Afghanistan and in the provinces surrounding Kabul. The group focuses its military operations on suicide attacks and attacks on the Afghan National Security Forces and international forces.” [39d] (p4)

A Reuters article in February 2009 reported that:

“Founded by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Hizb-i-Islami was one of the main mujahideen groups fighting the Soviet invasion in the 1980s, receiving the lion’s share of U.S. and Saudi arms and money channelled through the Pakistani intelligence service.

“After the Soviet withdrawal Hekmatyar fought and made fleeting alliances with most other mujahideen factions during the resulting civil war and is credited with killing thousands in Kabul with indiscriminate rocket attacks on the capital.” [24b]

The article further noted that:

“Pakistan dropped the party in 1994 in favour of the Taliban and, after losing to Mullah Omar’s forces, Hekmatyar fled to Iran in 1997. Many of his fighters
joined Taliban ranks. After the Sept. 11 attacks Hekmatyar declared himself against the U.S. invasion, was expelled by Iran and returned to his homeland to take up the fight in alliance with the Taliban… With many of his former lieutenants now either in parliament or government, Hekmatyar has declared himself against suicide bombings and there have been a number of false Afghan media reports that he has made peace with the Afghan government.” [24b]

In February 2008 The Long War Journal reported that:

“…several Afghan insurgents with ties to a Taliban splinter group, Hizb-i-Islami (Khalis faction), and foreign al Qaeda fighters, were arrested in separate raids in western Pakistan last week. The raids were conducted in Chakdara, located in the volatile Swat Valley, and Peshawar, with at least four Afghan nationals with links to al Qaeda being arrested in the Chakdara bust, according to the Pakistani Daily, The Nation.

“One of those arrested has been identified as Mian Mohammad Agha, a top Afghan jihadi commander under the Younus Khalis faction of Hizb-i-Islami. The faction folded into the Afghan Taliban movement following the death of Younus Khalis in 2006. A Pajhwok Afghan News report described Mian Mohammad Agha as having ‘links to al-Qaeda and Taliban insurgents’.” [55b]

Former Hizb-e-Islami Members

The Danish fact-finding mission of March/April 2004 reported the views of various sources on the position for people with connections to Hezb-e-Islami in their report published in November 2004. According to UNHCR, ex-Hezb-e-Islami, including former commanders, do not have any problems with the Government in Afghanistan today if they make it clear that they are no longer working with Hekmatyar. UNHCR was reported as saying that “A number of ex-Hezb-e-Islami members occupy high positions within the government. As an example the source mentioned that Hekmatyar’s former right-hand [man] currently holds a high position in the government. The present situation taken into consideration, the source found that it depends on the history of a former member of the Hezb-e-Islami whether or not he/she risks being persecuted in Afghanistan.” [8] (Section 6.8)

The Danish report also noted:

“The CCA [Co-operation Centre for Afghanistan] confirmed that there are people connected with the government who earlier belonged to Hezb-e-Islami. The source mentioned that one of President Karzai’s advisors was formerly the deputy head of Hezb-e-Islami’s security forces in Peshawar. The source was of the opinion that a former member of the Hezb-e-Islami who has changed side, and who is clearly expressing his support for the government can remain in Afghanistan without being involved in problems. However, it is a pre-condition that one is no longer connected with the party. People who are currently active for the Hezb-e-Islami are considered to be at war with the current government like the Taliban supporters. They will not be able to remain in the country without encountering problems.” [8] (Section 6.8)
Al Qa’ida (Al-Qaeda)

The BBC Timeline on Afghanistan updated 7 August 2008 noted that al-Qaeda "was formed around 1988 from elements of the international Muslim brigades opposed to the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It seeks to rid Muslim countries of Western influence, get rid of what it views as ‘corrupt’ regimes and set up a pan-Islamic caliphate. The network is thought to have links to radical Islamist groups in various parts of the world." [25d]

A Reuters article in February 2009 reported that “Following the 2001 U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan, al Qaeda leaders, including bin Laden, are believed to have fled to neighbouring Pakistan, seeking refuge in the tribal areas. Al Qaeda is not now believed to play a leading role in Afghanistan but other militant groups operating inside Afghanistan, particularly the Haqqani network, claim to have close links to the group.” [24b]

(See also Section 8: Kabul)

Jamat Sunat al-Dawn Salafia

In a special report by the Secretary General to the UN Security Council dated 3 July 2008 noted that "Jamat Sunat al-Dawa Salafia is an Islamic fundamentalist group led by Hajir Ruhollah. The network’s activities are very limited because of the tension between this group and Hezb-i-Islami Gulbuddin. As a result, the Salafists are only present in parts of Kunar and Nuristan provinces. In general, the group focuses its military operations on actions against international military forces.” [39d] (p4-5)

(See also Section 27: Abuses by Non-Government Armed Forces)
Annex D: Prominent people

Hamid Karzai

“Hamid Karzai, who was sworn in as Afghanistan’s first elected president in December 2004, is a moderate Pashtun leader from Kandahar.

“A charismatic and stylish member of the influential Popolzai tribe, he has built up a considerable international profile, especially in the West and is backed by the United States. But some at home view his closeness to America with suspicion and distrust. He initially supported the Taleban but hardened against them after the assassination of his father, a former politician, for which the Taleban was widely blamed.” (BBC Online, 20 November 2008, accessed 16 July 2009)

Yunnus Qanuni

“Former minister, Mr Qanuni is now the Speaker of the Wolesi Jirga, the lower house of parliament. Seen by some as the most serious contender to Mr Karzai, he stood against him in the presidential elections of 2004.

“A key figure in the Northern Alliance in the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Taleban, Mr Qanuni first held the powerful post of interior minister but later moved to the education ministry. Differences with President Karzai led to his resignation from the cabinet, following which he formed his own political party, Afghanistan-e-Naween. Though unable to hold together a political alliance which could provide a formidable challenge to the Karzai government, Mr Qanuni has been too powerful to be completely marginalised.” (BBC Online, 20 November 2008, accessed 16 July 2009)

Sibghatullah Mojaddedi

“A former mujahideen leader, Mr Mojadidi is the Speaker of the upper house of parliament, the Meshrano Jirga. He has played an important and influential part since the fall of the Taleban.

“He was made chairman of the constitutional Loya Jirga in 2003, a delicate process which involved reconciling the interests of Afghanistan’s different ethnic groups. Since March 2005, he has headed Afghanistan’s National Peace Commission, the body for implementing the process of national reconciliation through the surrender and absorption of former Taleban members.” (BBC Online, 20 November 2008, accessed 16 July 2009)

General Rashid Dostum

“The Uzbek general who was one of the most powerful warlords with an independent military base in the north remains a powerful figure in the country. Mr Dostum still heads the Junbesh-e Melli Islami (National Islamic Movement), a predominantly Uzbek militia faction. He was one of the most high-profile candidates to challenge Mr Karzai in the presidential elections in October 2004.

“A veteran of many wars, he has displayed an uncanny ability to switch sides and stay on the right side of those in power. In the 1980s Gen Dostum backed the invading forces of the Soviet Union against the mujahideen rebels. He then played a prominent role...”
role in the civil war that destroyed much of the capital, Kabul, and left thousands dead. In 2001, while helping the United States, his militias were accused of suffocating hundreds of Taleban prisoners to death by locking them inside shipping containers.” (BBC Online, 20 November 2008, accessed 16 July 2009) [25y]

**Burhanuddin Rabbani**

“A former Afghan president, Mr Rabbani was elected as an MP from Badakshan in 2005 parliamentary elections. He remains an influential Tajik figure although he is not a frontline political player. He heads the conservative Jamiat-e-Islami, which was the largest political party in the Northern Alliance that helped sweep the Taleban from power in 2001.” (BBC Online, 20 November 2008, accessed 16 July 2009) [25y]

**Marshall Mohammed Qasim Fahim**

“The former defence minister used to be one of the most powerful men in the country but has been sidelined. He lost his place in the cabinet and is now a member of the upper house. Gen Fahim commanded thousands of men loyal to the Tajik-dominated Northern Alliance that helped topple the Taleban in late 2001. He was widely expected to be named as one of President Karzai’s running mates in the 2004 presidential poll, but ended up backing the main challenger, fellow Tajik Yunus Qanuni.

“He was head of intelligence of the Northern Alliance and succeeded General Ahmad Shah Masood, who was assassinated shortly before the 11 September attacks on the US.” (BBC Online, 20 November 2008, accessed 16 July 2009) [25y]

**General Atta Mohammad**

“An arch rival of Gen Dostum, Atta Mohammad is the governor of the northern province of Balkh. Their bitter history goes back to the days of the Soviet occupation, when they fought on opposite sides. A former teacher, Gen Atta briefly joined forces with Gen Dostum to recapture Mazar-e-Sharif from the Taleban in 2001. For now, he remains a key regional player in Afghanistan with considerable influence.” (BBC Online, 20 November 2008, accessed 16 July 2009) [25y]

**Gul Agha Sherzai**

“Nangarhar province Governor Gul Agha Sherzai commands considerable loyalty among the Pashtuns in Kandahar, the city he controlled before the Taleban took power in 1994. Within hours of the Northern Alliance taking control of Kabul in 2001, Sherzai entered and took control of the southern city. In December 2004, he was appointed as governor of Kandahar with an added, though symbolic, portfolio of minister adviser to Mr Karzai. His reappointment became controversial and human rights groups have accused Mr Sherzai of involvement in the drugs trade. Mr Sherzai was made governor of Nangarhar as part of a series of reshuffles viewed as an attempt to curb the power of the warlords.” (BBC Online, 20 November 2008, accessed 16 July 2009) [25y]

**Masooda Jalal**

“The only female candidate in the October 2003 [Sic] [2004] presidential elections, Dr Jalal was the subject of much media attention. A qualified paediatrician from Kabul, she was treating children when the Taleban came to power in 1996 and stopped women from working. Ms Jalal made her presence felt when she challenged President Karzai in the first loya jirga (grand council) after the Taleban were ousted. She was
appointed minister for women's affairs in December 2004, but was dropped in the reshuffle of April 2006." (BBC Online, 20 November 2008, accessed 16 July 2009) [25y]

Abdul Rassoul Sayyaf

“A former mujahideen leader, Mr Sayyaf is now an elected member of parliament. Leader of the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan, he was the only anti-Taliban Pashtun leader to be part of the Northern Alliance. A hardliner, he is believed to have formed his party with Saudi backing. A former professor of Islamic law, Mr Sayyaf was the chairman of the first rebel alliance in 1980.” (BBC Online, 20 November 2008, accessed 16 July 2009) [25y]

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar

The BBC Online description of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar on 20 November 2008 stated:

“Leader of the Hezb-e Islami faction, Mr Hekmatyar is a warlord who is in hiding - evading American forces - and is believed to be somewhere along the Afghan-Pakistan border. He is opposed to President Karzai and the presence of US-led foreign forces in Afghanistan and is blamed for carrying out several major attacks in the country.

“The US labelled him a terrorist in 2003. Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e-Islami was the strongest force during the years of Soviet occupation. This was largely because his party was the main benefactor of the seven official mujahideen groups recognised by Pakistan and US intelligence agencies for the channelling of money and arms. He later joined forces with General Dostum because he felt his power had been slighted by the mujahideen administration which ran the country from 1992 to 1996.

“The fighting between him and Kabul’s administration at the time, controlled by the murdered Afghan commander, Ahmad Shah Masood, is said to have resulted in the deaths of more than 25,000 civilians. The faction of his party which broke away to participate in the electoral process garnered the largest number of seats.” [25y]

Hazrat Ali

An International Council on Security and Development (Formerly known as the ‘Senlis Council’) report published in April 2009 described Hazrat Ali as:

“Born in 1964, he is a member of the Pashai minority. His emergence as an important leader came during the Soviet occupation - he was an Afghan army commander under the Soviet puppet regime. During the war against the Taliban he is said to have aligned with Ahmad Shah Massoud. Following the fall of the Taliban he set up the Eastern Shura (local provisional government) in the Jalalabad/Tora Bora area, where he was the ‘Minister of Law and Order’. In 2001, the Pentagon is said to have asked the Shura for military help in finding Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda.

“He was appointed as police chief for Jalalabad by Karzai. In the late 2005 Wolesi Jirga election he won a seat for Nangarhar. He has a following in Nangarhar province but remains a controversial figure in many areas. He has become less prominent on the Afghan political scene in the last period.” [20d] (p32)

Abdol Karim Khalili (General)

Hazara; Economic Minister of Afghanistan 1993 – 995; Vice-President in the Interim Government of 2001. [31] Mr Khalili is currently the second Vice-President in the
present Government inaugurated in December 2004. [67] Khalili is also the leader of Hezb-e-Wahdat-e-Islami-e-Afghanistan. The party was registered by the Ministry of Justice and participated in the September 2005 parliamentary elections. [74a]

Ahmed Shah Masoud [Massood] (General)
BBC News recorded on 8 September 2004 that “Commander Masood [Masoud] – known as the Lion of the Panjshir – was killed three years ago in a suicide bomb attack by two men posing as journalists. That attack – just before the 11 September [2001] bombings in the United States – was subsequently blamed on al-Qaeda and its Taleban allies. Masood remains a powerful symbol. He was famed as a military strategist during the war against the Soviet Union and gained his nom de guerre from his dogged resistance in the Panjshir valley.” [25z]

Mullah Mohammad Omar
Omar is the leader of the Taliban who lost his right eye fighting the occupying forces of the Soviet Union in the 1980s. He survived the US-led military action, which led to the fall of the Taliban in late 2001 and has evaded capture. (BBC News, 18 June 2009) [25h]
Annex E: List of Cabinet Ministers

Europa World Online entries for Cabinet, updated March 2009, accessed on 24 June 2009:

President:
H.E. Hamid Karzai [1h]

Vice Presidents:
Karim Khalili
Ahmad Zia Masoud [1h]

Senior Minister in the Cabinet
Hedayat Amin Arsala [1d]

Commerce and Industry Minister:
Wahidullah [1d]

National Defence Minister:
General Abdul Rahim Wardak [1d]

Foreign Affairs Minister:
Dr Rangin Dadfar Spanta [1d]

Finance Minister:
Mohammad Omar Zakhilwal [1d]

Interior Affairs Minister:
Dr Muhammad Hanif Atmar [1d]

Economy Minister:
Dr Mohammad Jalil Shams [1d]

Communications and Information Technology Minister:
Engineer Amirzai Sangin [Sangeen] [1d]

Borders & Tribal Affairs Minister:
Abdul Karim Barahawi [1d]

Refugees and Repatriation Minister:
Zara Ahmad Moqbel [1d]

Mines and Industries Minister:
Ibrahim Adil [1d]

Water and Energy Minister:
Mohammad Ismail Khan [1d]

Public Health Minister:
Dr Mohammad Amin Fatemi [Fatimi/Fatimie] [1d]
Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock Minister:
Muhammad Asif Rahimi [1d]

Justice Minister:
Mohammad Sarwar Danesh [1d]

Culture and Youth Affairs Minister
Abdul Karim Khoram [1d]

Hajj and Islamic Affairs Minister:
[Professor] Nematullah Shahrani [1d]

Urban Development Minister
Mohammad Yousef Pashtun [1d]

Public Welfare Minister:
Suhrab Ali Safari [Sohrab Ali Saffary] [1d]

Work, Social Affairs, the Martyred and the Disabled Minister:
Noor Mohammad Karkin [Qarqeen] [1d]

Higher Education Minister:
Dr Mohammad Azam Dadfar [1d]

Transport and Civil Aviation Minister:
Hamidullah Farooqi [1d]

Education Minister:
Dr Ghulam Farooq Wardak [1d]

Parliamentary Affairs Minister:
Asadullah Khaled [1d]

Rural Rehabilitation and Development Minister:
Eshan Zia [1d]

Women's Affairs Minister:
Hosna Banu Ghazanfar (Hosn Bano Ghazanfar) [1d]

[Anti-] Counter-Narcotics Minister:
Gen. Khodaidad [1d]

National Security Advisor:
Dr Zalmay Rassoul [1d]
Annex F: List of Abbreviations

AI  Amnesty International
AIHRC  Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission
ANBP  Afghanistan New Beginnings Programme
CEDAW  Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
CPJ  Committee to Protect Journalists
DDR  Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme
DIAG  Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG)
EU  European Union
EBRD  European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
FCO  Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK)
FH  Freedom House
GDP  Gross Domestic Product
HIV/AIDS  Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
HRW  Human Rights Watch
IAG  Illegal Armed Group
IEC  Independent Election Commission
ICG  International Crisis Group
ICRC  International Committee for Red Cross
IDP  Internally Displaced Person
IFRC  International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IMF  International Monetary Fund
IOM  International Organisation for Migration
JCMB  Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board
MOI  Ministry of Justice
MSF  Médecins sans Frontières
NA  Northern Alliance
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO  Non Governmental Organisation
OCHA  Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODIHR  Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
ODPR  Office for Displaced Persons and Refugees
OECD  Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development
OHCHR  Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
RSF  Reporters sans Frontières
STC  Save The Children
STD  Sexually Transmitted Disease
TB  Tuberculosis
TI  Transparency International
UN  United Nations
UNAIDS  Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNAMA  United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNESCO  United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCHR  United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNHCR  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF  United Nations Children’s Fund
UNIFEM  United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNODC  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
USAID  United States Agency for International Development
USSD  United States State Department
WFP  World Food Programme
WfWI  Women for Women International

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