COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION REPORT

BANGLADESH

APRIL 2006
This Country of Origin Information Report contains the most up-to-date publicly available information as at 10 March 2006. Older source material has been included where it contains relevant information not available in more recent documents.

Contents

1. Scope of Document ................................................... 1.01
2. Geography ............................................................... 2.01
3. Economy ...................................................................... 3.01
4. History ...................................................................... 4.01
   Pre-independence: 1947 – 1971 ..................................... 4.01
   1972 – 1982 ................................................................ 4.05
   1983 – 1990 ................................................................ 4.09
   1991 – 1999 ................................................................ 4.15
   2000 – March 2006 ..................................................... 4.27
5. State Structures ......................................................... 5.01
   The Constitution ......................................................... 5.01
   Citizenship and Nationality ......................................... 5.04
   Political System ........................................................... 5.07
   Government .................................................................. 5.07
   Supervision of Elections .............................................. 5.14
   Judiciary ...................................................................... 5.17
   Special Tribunals .......................................................... 5.24
   The Law and Order Disruption Crimes Speedy Trial Act .... 5.25
   Informal Systems of Justice, and Village Courts ............ 5.27
   Fatwas ....................................................................... 5.28
   Family Law .................................................................. 5.29
   Legal Rights/Detention ............................................... 5.30
   Preventive Detention and its Legislative Framework ....... 5.31
   The Special Powers Act (SPA) ....................................... 5.33
   Pre-trial Detention .......................................................... 5.37
   Bail ........................................................................... 5.39
   ‘Safe Custody’ .............................................................. 5.40
   Death Penalty ............................................................... 5.41
   Internal Security ........................................................... 5.44
   Prisons and Prison Conditions ....................................... 5.47
   Military Service ............................................................ 5.51
   Medical Services .......................................................... 5.52
   People with Disabilities .................................................. 5.58
   Education System ......................................................... 5.60
6. Human Rights ............................................................... 6.01
6.A Human Rights Issues ............................................... 6.01
   Overview ..................................................................... 6.01
   Torture ....................................................................... 6.08
   Politically-motivated Detentions .................................... 6.11
   Police and Army Accountability .................................... 6.15
   Freedom of Speech and the Media ................................. 6.26
   Treatment of journalists ............................................... 6.30
   Freedom of Religion ...................................................... 6.38
   Introduction .................................................................. 6.38
   Hindus ....................................................................... 6.46
   Ahmadis (Ahmadiyyas/Kadianis/Qadianis) .................... 6.55
   Christians ................................................................. 6.67
Freedom of Assembly and Association ........................................ 6.71
Employment Rights.................................................................... 6.73
People Trafficking...................................................................... 6.80
Freedom of Movement................................................................ 6.84

Ethnic Groups............................................................................ 6.86
   Biharis.................................................................................. 6.86
   The indigenous Jumma peoples of the Chittagong Hill Tracts .. 6.95
   Rohingya.............................................................................. 6.107
Women.................................................................................... 6.113
   Rape.................................................................................... 6.123
   Acid Attacks......................................................................... 6.125
   Children................................................................................ 6.128
   Childcare Arrangements..................................................... 6.136
   Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Persons ............... 6.139

6.C HUMAN RIGHTS – OTHER ISSUES..................................... 6.140
Civil Society................................................................................ 6.140
   Treatment of human rights NGOs....................................... 6.141
   Authentication of Documents ............................................. 6.146

ANNEXES

Annex A – Chronology of Events
Annex B – Maps
Annex C – Political Organisations
Annex D – Prominent People
Annex E – List of Abbreviations
Annex F – References to Source Material
1. Scope of document

1.01 This Country of Origin Information Report (COI Report) has been produced by Research Development and Statistics (RDS), Home Office, for use by officials involved in the asylum/human rights determination process. The Report provides general background information about the issues most commonly raised in asylum/human rights claims made in the United Kingdom. It includes information available up to 10 March 2006.

1.02 The Report is compiled wholly from material produced by a wide range of recognised external information sources and does not contain any Home Office opinion or policy. All information in the Report is attributed, throughout the text, to the original source material, which is made available to those working in the asylum/human rights determination process.

1.03 The Report aims to provide a brief summary of the source material identified, focusing on the main issues raised in asylum and human rights applications. It is not intended to be a detailed or comprehensive survey. For a more detailed account, the relevant source documents should be examined directly.

1.04 The structure and format of the COI Report reflects the way it is used by Home Office caseworkers and appeals presenting officers, who require quick electronic access to information on specific issues and use the contents page to go directly to the subject required. Key issues are usually covered in some depth within a dedicated section, but may also be referred to briefly in several other sections. Some repetition is therefore inherent in the structure of the Report.

1.05 The information included in this COI Report is limited to that which can be identified from source documents. While every effort is made to cover all relevant aspects of a particular topic, it is not always possible to obtain the information concerned. For this reason, it is important to note that information included in the Report should not be taken to imply anything beyond what is actually stated. For example, if it is stated that a particular law has been passed, this should not be taken to imply that it has been effectively implemented unless stated.

1.06 As noted above, the Report is a collation of material produced by a number of reliable information sources. In compiling the Report, no attempt has been made to resolve discrepancies between information provided in different source documents. For example, different source documents often contain different versions of names and spellings of individuals, places and political parties etc. COI Reports do not aim to bring consistency of spelling, but to reflect faithfully the spellings used in the original source documents. Similarly, figures given in different source documents sometimes vary and these are simply quoted as per the original text. The term ‘sic’ has been used in this document only to denote incorrect spellings or typographical errors in quoted text; its use is not intended to imply any comment on the content of the material.

1.07 The Report is based substantially upon source documents issued during the previous two years. However, some older source documents may have been included because they contain relevant information not available in more recent
documents. All sources contain information considered relevant at the time this Report was issued.

1.08 This COI Report and the accompanying source material are public documents. All COI Reports are published on the RDS section of the Home Office website and the great majority of the source material for the Report is readily available in the public domain. Where the source documents identified in the Report are available in electronic form, the relevant web link has been included, together with the date that the link was accessed. Copies of less accessible source documents, such as those provided by government offices or subscription services, are available from the Home Office upon request.

1.09 COI Reports are published every six months on the top 20 asylum producing countries and on those countries for which there is deemed to be a specific operational need. Inevitably, information contained in COI Reports is sometimes overtaken by events that occur between publication dates. Home Office officials are informed of any significant changes in country conditions by means of Country of Origin Information Bulletins, which are also published on the RDS website. They also have constant access to an information request service for specific enquiries.

1.10 In producing this COI Report, the Home Office has sought to provide an accurate, balanced summary of the available source material. Any comments regarding this Report or suggestions for additional source material are very welcome and should be submitted to the Home Office as below.

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ADVISORY PANEL ON COUNTRY INFORMATION

1.11 The independent Advisory Panel on Country Information was established under the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 to make recommendations to the Home Secretary about the content of the Home Office's country of origin information material. The Advisory Panel welcomes all feedback on the Home Office’s COI Reports and other country of origin information material. Information about the Panel’s work can be found on its website at www.apci.org.uk

1.12 It is not the function of the Advisory Panel to endorse any Home Office material or procedures. In the course of its work, the Advisory Panel directly reviews the content of selected individual Home Office COI Reports, but neither the fact that such a review has been undertaken, nor any comments made, should be taken to imply endorsement of the material. Some of the material examined by the Panel relates to countries designated or proposed for designation for the Non-Suspensive Appeals (NSA) list. In such cases, the Panel’s work should not be
taken to imply any endorsement of the decision or proposal to designate a particular country for NSA, nor of the NSA process itself.

Advisory Panel on Country Information
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Website: www.apci.org.uk

Return to contents
2. Geography

2.01 The People’s Republic of Bangladesh is located in south Asia and is bordered almost entirely by India, except for a small frontier in the southeast with Burma and a coastline along the Bay of Bengal in the south. The capital is Dhaka. The country covers an area of almost 57,000 square miles. (Europa Regional Surveys of the World: South Asia 2005) [1b] (p88)

2.02 The country is administratively divided into 6 Divisions, 64 Districts (Zila), 507 sub-districts (Thana or Upazila) and 4,484 Wards/Unions. There are over 87,000 villages in Bangladesh, notes the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website. [77a] A particular name might refer to more than one geographical entity; for example, the city of Chittagong is situated in the district of Chittagong, which is in Chittagong Division. The ‘Chittagong Hill Tracts’ (CHT) area, referred to later in this report, comprises three of the districts within Chittagong Division. [25]

2.03 The Preliminary Report of the 2001 Population Census, published in August 2001 by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, gave the total population of Bangladesh as 129.2 million (statistically adjusted). [43a] (p4) The CIA World Factbook, updated 10 January 2006, estimated the population to have reached 144.3 million by July 2005. [62] The 2001 census showed that 76 per cent of the population resided in rural areas. The metropolitan area of Dhaka, in 2001, had a population of 9.9 million; the populations of the other principal cities (as ‘statistical metropolitan areas’) were as follows in 2001: Chittagong 6.2 million, Khulna 2.6 million, and Rajshahi 1.3 million. [43a] (p6) Apart from territories comprising less than 1,200 sq. km in area, Bangladesh is the most densely populated country in the world. (Europa Regional Surveys of the World: South Asia 2005) [1b] (p88) The 1991 census, as summarised in “Bangladesh: Census Result at a Glance” by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, classified 93.9 million people (88.2 per cent of the total 1991 population) as Muslim, 11.2 million as Hindu, 0.6 million as Buddhist and the remainder as Christian or ‘other’. [43b]

2.04 The state language is Bangla (Bengali) and is spoken by about 95 per cent of the population. (Europa World Year Book 2004) [1a] (p635) A Canadian IRB report of June 1990 stated that Biharis generally speak Urdu, and the tribal populations (Jumma peoples) of the Chittagong Hill Tracts use a variety of dialects. English is also used in commerce and administration. [3a]

2.05 On the following page is a map showing the main cities and towns and the Divisions of Bangladesh. (United Nations Cartographic Section: Map no. 3711 ref.2, dated January 2004.)

Refer also to Annex B: Maps
This Country of Origin Information Report contains the most up-to-date publicly available information as at 10 March 2006. Older source material has been included where it contains relevant information not available in more recent documents.
3. Economy

3.01 The Economist Intelligence Unit, in its Bangladesh Country Profile of 2005 (EIU Country Profile 2005), estimated GDP per head in 2004 to have been US$402, compared with $622 for India, $626 for Pakistan and $975 for Sri Lanka. A household income and expenditure survey showed that 44.3 per cent of the population lived below the poverty line in 2000 compared with 58.8 per cent in 1991. During the 1990s, real GDP increased at an average annual rate of 4.9 per cent; GDP growth for the 2004/2005 fiscal year was 5.4 per cent, according to the EIU Country Report for January 2006. [40a] (p25-26) [40d] (p5)

3.02 Agriculture (including fisheries) employed more than half of the labour force and contributed around 20 per cent of GDP in 2004/2005, noted the EIU Country Profile 2005. Bangladesh has virtually achieved food self-sufficiency; rice production, in particular, has risen by about 150 per cent since the mid-1970s. Bangladesh is the world’s largest exporter of jute; other agricultural exports include tea and frozen foods. The share of manufactured goods in the country’s exports has increased since the 1980s as ready-made garments have emerged as the leading export commodity. [40a] (p24-37) However, a BBC News article of 6 January 2005 cautioned that the future volume of the country’s garment exports had become more uncertain with the final phasing out at the end of 2004 of international export quotas under the Multi-fibre Arrangement (MFA). The article noted that garments accounted for three-quarters of Bangladesh’s exports. About 1.8 million people, mainly women, worked in clothing factories and another 15 million jobs depended indirectly on garment manufacturing. [20ar] According to the EIU Country Report for January 2006, the knitwear sector of the garment industry continued to show strong growth during the 2004/2005 fiscal year, while the woven garment sector suffered a downturn in the same period. [40d] (p20)

3.03 The EIU Country Profile 2005 observed:

“The number of Bangladeshis working abroad and remittances from those employed abroad have been increasing since the mid-1980s. Whereas only 70,000 skilled and unskilled persons obtained employment abroad in 1985/86, more than 250,000 Bangladeshis now do so each year, bringing the total number working abroad in 2005 to around 3m. Annual remittances from those abroad amounted to US$3.8bn in 2004/05, according to statistics released by the Bangladesh Bank (BB, the central bank). The importance of remittance inflows to the economy is likely to be far greater than reflected in official data, as large sums of money are thought to enter the country through unofficial channels.” [40a] (p16)

3.04 A BBC News report of 3 August 2004 pointed out that the devastating floods of July-August 2004, which covered 60 per cent of the country, killed over 600 people and left at least 30 million displaced or stranded, had also damaged infrastructure and disrupted agricultural production and economic activity. [20af] Reuters, on 27 September 2004, quoted the World Bank as estimating that the floods had caused US $2.2 billion in damage. [4f]

3.05 The United Nations Common Country Assessment for 2004 observed:
“Roughly half the country’s rural households can be considered food insecure. Millions of children and women in Bangladesh suffer from one or more forms of malnutrition, including low birth weight, childhood growth failure (stunting), vitamin A deficiency, iodine deficiency disorders and anaemia. The most recent data indicate that 43 percent of children under five are stunted (short-for-age) and 48 percent are under-weight [quoting BDHS 2004]… Bangladesh made substantial progress in reducing child malnutrition between 1990 and 2000, with the percentage of underweight children falling from 67 to 48 percent, and child stunting falling from 66 to 43 per cent. Nevertheless, in 2004 according to WHO criteria the prevalence of child underweight and stunting was still among the highest in the world and more severe than in most other developing countries, including sub-Saharan Africa.” [8d] (p31)

3.06 Grameen Bank reported in February 2006 that it had advanced microcredit loans to 5.8 million borrowers, 96 per cent of whom are women. The Bank has 1,861 branches and its staff work in 62,089 villages. Total loan disbursement since the Bank’s founding in 1976 had reached US$5.34 billion by February 2006, of which $4.73 billion had been repaid. Although Grameen Bank does not require any collateral against its microcredit loans or even require its borrowers to sign a legal instrument, the loan recovery rate is 98.45 per cent. [76a]

3.07 The unit of currency in Bangladesh is the ‘Taka’ (BDT), which is divided into 100 poisha/paisa, notes the Europa World Year Book 2004. [1a] (p644) The approximate rate of exchange on 28 February 2006 was £1 sterling = 119 Bangladesh taka (xe.com Universal Currency Converter). [22]
4. History

PRE-INDEPENDENCE: 1947 - 1971

4.01 The Europa World Year Book 2004 (Europa 2004) notes that present-day Bangladesh was originally one of the five provinces comprising Pakistan, created following the partition of the Indian sub-continent in August 1947. Known as East Pakistan, the province was formed from the former Indian province of East Bengal and the Sylhet district of Assam. [1a] (p635)

4.02 East Pakistan, records Europa 2004, became dissatisfied with the distant central government in West Pakistan, and the situation was exacerbated in 1952 when Urdu was declared Pakistan’s official language. Discontent continued in the eastern wing, mainly due to under-representation in the administration and armed forces. The leading political party of East Pakistan, the Awami League (AL), subsequently demanded autonomy from the West. [1a] (p635)

4.03 Europa 2004 relates that a general election in December 1970 gave the AL an overwhelming victory in the East and thus a majority in Pakistan’s National Assembly. The AL decided that the province should unilaterally secede from Pakistani and, on 26 March 1971, Sheikh Mujib proclaimed the independence of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh (‘Bengal Nation’). Civil war immediately broke out. [1a] (p635)

4.04 Resistance continued from the Liberation Army of East Bengal (the Mukti Bahini), a group of irregular fighters who launched a major offensive in November 1971, notes Europa 2004. As a result, an estimated 9.5 million refugees crossed into India. On 4 December 1971 India declared war on Pakistan, with Indian forces supporting the Mukti Bahini. Pakistan surrendered to the allied forces of Bangladesh and India on 16 December 1971 and Bangladesh achieved its independence, quickly achieving international recognition. [1a]

1972 - 1982

4.05 The Europa World Year Book 2004 states that Sheikh Mujibur became Bangladesh’s first Prime Minister in January 1972. A general election for the country’s first parliament (‘Jatiya Sangsad’) was held in March 1973: the AL won 292 of the 300 directly elective seats. Internal stability was however threatened by opposition groups resorting to terrorism. [1a] (p635)

4.06 Europa 2004 relates that, in January 1975, a presidential government and one-party rule replaced the parliamentary government; Sheikh Mujibur became President, assuming absolute power. [1a] However, Mujibur and members of his family were assassinated in a right wing coup (led by Islamist army officers) in August 1975. Martial law was then declared and political parties banned. A subsequent counter-coup on 3 November 1975 brought Khalid Musharaf, a pro-Indian commander of the Dhaka garrison, to power. This proved to be extremely short-lived, as a third coup on 7 November 1975 overthrew Musharaf
and power was assumed under a neutral non-party government, with Major General Ziaur Rahman (General Zia) taking precedence. [1a] (p635)

4.07 Political parties were again legalised in July 1976, relates Europa 2004. General Zia assumed the presidency in April 1977. In the parliamentary elections of February 1979, Zia’s Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) won 207 of the 300 directly elective seats in the Jatiya Sangsad. A new Prime Minister was appointed in April 1979, and martial law repealed. The state of emergency was revoked in November 1979. [1a] (p635)

4.08 Europa 2004 records that Zia was assassinated on 30 May 1981, during an attempted military coup. Political instability ensued and Vice President Abdus Sattar was nominated President. Sattar (finding it difficult to retain civilian control) formed a National Security Council in January 1982, led by Chief of the Army Staff, Lieutenant-General Hossain Mohammad Ershad. On 24 March 1982 Ershad seized power in a bloodless coup. Martial law was again declared, with Ershad as Chief Martial Law Administrator (although in October 1982 Ershad changed his title to Prime Minister), aided by a military Council of Advisers. [1a] (p635)

1983 - 1990

4.09 The Europa World Year Book 2004 notes that, although the Government’s economic policies achieved some success, increasing demands for a return to democracy ensued throughout 1983, comments Europa 2004. The two principal opposition groups that emerged were an eight-party alliance, headed by a faction of the Awami League under Sheikh Hasina (daughter of the late Sheikh Mujibur) and a seven-party group, led by a faction of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) under former President Sattar and Begum Khaleda Zia (widow of General Zia). In September 1983 the two groups formed an alliance: the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy. In November 1983, permission was given for the resumption of political activity and a new political party, the Jana Dal (People’s Party) was formed to support Ershad as a presidential candidate. Ershad declared himself President on 11 December 1983. [1a] (p636)

4.10 In January 1985, records Europa 2004, a new Council of Ministers was formed, composed almost entirely of military officers and excluding all members of the Jana Dal (in response to the opposition parties’ demands for a neutral government during the pre-election). However, President Ershad refused to relinquish power to an interim government. The National Front (NF), a new five-party political alliance, (comprising the Jana Dal, the United People’s Party, the Gonotantrik Party, the Bangladesh Muslim League and a breakaway section of the BNP) was established in September 1985 to promote government policies. [1a] (p636)

4.11 Europa 2004 notes that the ten-month ban on political activity was lifted in January 1986, and the NF formally became a single pro-government entity: the Jatiya Party (National Party). Although smaller opposition parties participated in the parliamentary elections in May 1986 the elections were boycotted by the BNP. The Jatiya Party won 153 of the 300 directly elective seats in the Jatiya
Sangsad. Mianur Rahman Chowdhury, the former General-Secretary of the Jatiya Party, was appointed Prime Minister in July 1986. [1a] (p636)

4.12 Ershad joined the Jatiya Party in September 1986, being elected as Chairman of the party, relates Europa 2004. In the presidential election of October 1986 (which was boycotted by both the BNP and AL) Ershad received 22 million votes. In November 1986, the Jatiya Sangsad approved indemnity legislation (legalising the military regime's actions since March 1982). Ershad then repealed martial law and formed a new Council of Ministers, including four MPs from the AL. [1a] (p636)

4.13 Europa 2004 records that dissension from the opposition continued throughout 1987 and President Ershad declared a nationwide state of emergency on 27 November of that year. In December 1987, after 12 opposition members had resigned and the 73 AL members had agreed to do likewise, Ershad dissolved the Jatiya Sangsad. The Jatiya Party won a large majority of seats in the parliamentary elections of 3 March 1988. Later that month, Moudud Ahmed, an ally of Ershad, was appointed Prime Minister. Ershad repealed the state of emergency in April 1988. [1a] (p636)

4.14 Violence, anti-government demonstrations and strikes occurred throughout the country in 1990, Europa 2004 notes. Ershad re-proclaimed a state of emergency on 27 November 1990, and later resigned on 4 December 1990, simultaneously revoking the state of emergency (again), and dissolving the Jatiya Sangsad. The newly appointed Vice President, Shahabuddin Ahmed, assumed the responsibilities of acting President, and was placed at the head of a neutral caretaker government. In the week following his resignation, Ershad was placed under house arrest. [1a] (p637)

4.15 The Europa World Year Book 2004 records that, on 27 February 1991, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) alliance won an overall majority at the parliamentary elections. Later, following discussion with the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), the BNP ensured a small working majority in the Jatiya Sangsad, and Begum Khaleda Zia assumed office as Prime Minister. Abdur Rahman Biswas was elected as the new President on 8 October 1991. [1a] (p637)

4.16 All opposition members of the Jatiya Sangsad resigned en masse in December 1994, relates Europa 2004. Nonetheless the Prime Minister, with her party’s parliamentary majority, pledged to maintain constitutional government. On 24 November 1995, the Prime Minister requested that the Jatiya Sangsad be dissolved pending the outcome of the next general election. Although opposition persisted, Begum Khaleda Zia’s administration continued in office in an acting capacity. [1a] (p637)

4.17 Europa 2004 notes that the general election, postponed until 15 February 1996, was boycotted by all of the main opposition parties. Consequently, the BNP won 205 of the 207 legislative seats declared. However, the opposition refused to recognise the legitimacy of the polls and announced the launch of a non co-
operation movement against the Government. Finally, the Prime Minister agreed to hold fresh elections under neutral auspices. [1a] (637)

4.18 Europa 2004 relates that Begum Khaleda Zia and her Government resigned from their posts on 30 March 1996 after making the 13th amendment to the Constitution, which provides that a non-party caretaker government takes control during the period leading up to a general election; the Jatiya Sangsad was subsequently dissolved. President Biswas appointed Muhammad Habibur Rahman as acting Prime Minister. Notwithstanding an unsuccessful military coup on 20 May 1996, a general election was held on 12 June 1996: the Awami League won 146 of the 300 elective seats in the Jatiya Sangsad. An understanding was rapidly reached between the AL and the Jatiya Party. [1a] (p637)

4.19 Sheikh Hasina was sworn in as the new Prime Minister on 23 June 1996. Her Council of Ministers incorporated one member from the Jatiya Party and included a number of retired officials and army officers. On 23 July 1996, Shahabuddin Ahmed was elected as Bangladesh’s new Head of State, records Europa 2004. [1a] (p637-638)

4.20 Ex-President Ershad was released from prison on bail in January 1997. The trial of twenty people accused of direct involvement in Sheikh Mujibur’s assassination began in March 1997, states Europa 2004. [1a] (p638)

4.21 In December 1997 the AL government signed an historic peace accord to end the insurgency in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, it was recorded in Europa 2004 and a Reuters article of 2 December 1997. [1a] (p638) [4c] Opposition to the treaty from the Bangladesh Nationalist Party swiftly ensued. [1a] (p638) However, on 10 February 1998 the Shanti Bahini guerrillas formally surrendered their arms to the Government, marking an end to the 25-year insurgency, Reuters reported on 10 February 1998. [4e]

4.22 The ruling coalition split on 15 March 1998 when the minority Jatiya Party announced that it was leaving the ‘national consensus’ Government, it was recorded in the Keesings Record of World Events of March 1998. [5b] (p42133)

4.23 Keesings, March 1999 reports that two bombs exploded at a music and culture festival in the town of Jessore on 6 March 1999, killing at least eight people and injuring some 150 others. The president of the group organising the festival (the Udichi Shilpi Gosthi) blamed the bombing on Islamic fundamentalists. [5h] (p42837)
4.26 The Europa South Asia 2005 Regional Survey records that political instability and unrest escalated through 1999; in mid-1999 the BNP and other opposition parties began a boycott of parliamentary proceedings. Opposition-led strikes took place in October and December 1999 and January 2000, leading to serious economic disruption. In July 2000 an attempt to assassinate Sheikh Hasina was foiled. [1b] (p93)

2000 - MARCH 2006

4.27 BBC News reported on 19 July 2000 that 24 people had been charged with the March 1999 Jessore bombing, including a former opposition MP. Police suspected a link between the bombing and the murder of prominent investigative journalist Shamsur Rahman the same month. Rahman had exposed the link between organised crime and politics, and police suspected that his murder was a bid to intimidate witnesses in the bombing case. [20d]

4.28 The Europa South Asia 2005 Regional Survey relates that, in July 2001, Sheikh Hasina and her Government resigned. On 15 July 2001 a caretaker government was sworn in to organise new elections, following a violent two-day transition in which twelve people were killed. [1b] (p93)

4.29 BBC News reported on 26 September 2001 that a bomb blast in Dhaka had killed at least eight members of the Awami League (AL) as the hostile atmosphere in the run-up to the general election heightened. In response to the escalating tension the caretaker government deployed more than 50,000 troops to quell the violence. [20h]

4.30 The Europa 2004 World Year Book records that the general election proceeded on 1 October 2001, although voting was suspended in several constituencies owing to violence. [1a] (p639) Notes Keesings, October 2001, the entire election campaign had been characterised by violence. At least 140 people were killed in feuding between the AL and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). [5f] As noted in the U.S. Department of State Report on Human Rights Practices for 2005 [USSD 2005], domestic and international observers deemed the eighth general election held in 2001 to be generally free and fair. [2f] (introduction)

4.31 The initial results of the general election of 1 October 2001, as recorded by the Bangladesh Election Commission, were as follows:
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats won</th>
<th>Total votes obtained</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)**</td>
<td>193</td>
<td>22,833,978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh Awami League</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>22,365,516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaat-e-Islami**</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2,385,361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jatiya Party (Ershad) / Islami Jatio Oikya Front</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4,038,453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh Jatiya Party (N-F/Naziur)**</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>621,772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Oikkya Jote (IOJ)**</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>376,343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jatiya Party (Manju)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>243,617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krishak Sramik Janata League</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>261,344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2,262,073</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>348,168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>300</td>
<td>55,736,625</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The governing coalition (the Four-party Alliance), with control of over two-thirds of the seats in parliament, comprises the BNP, Jamaat-e-Islami (which propagates transition to the rule of Islamic law), the Bangladesh Jatiya Party N-F (not a religious party) and the Islamic Oikkya Jote (an alliance of seven Islamist groups). [1a] [7k]

* Following by-elections to fill two undecided seats.

A round of by-elections was held in on 12 November 2001, mainly necessitated by the fact that certain candidates – including the main party leaders – had stood and won seats in more than one constituency on 1st October. [39ab] The Bangladesh Election Commission recorded the number of seats held by each party, following these by-elections, as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Seats held</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governing coalition (‘Four-party Alliance’) -</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh Jatiya Party (N-F/Naziur)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaat-e-Islami</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>Islamic Oikkya Jote (IOJ)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awami League</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jatiya Party (Ershad) / Islami Jatio Oikya Front</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jatiya Party (Manju)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krishak Sramik Janata League</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independents</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>300</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

4.32 Europa 2004 relates that, on 10 October 2001, Begum Khaleda Zia was sworn in as Prime Minister. At the end of October 2001, the newly elected members of parliament representing the opposition Awami League took the oath of office, but refused to join the opening session of the Jatiya Sangsad (the unicameral legislature) in continuing protest against what they considered a rigged election. [1a] (p639) Sheikh Hasina announced that the newly elected AL members would continue to boycott the Jatiya Sangsad until the new coalition government stopped its “repression” of AL members and minority communities. (Keesings, October 2001) [5f] (p44399)
4.33 Keesings, June 2002, records that on 21 June 2002, President Bardruddoza Chowdhury, who had been elected President on 14 November 2001, resigned under pressure from the ruling BNP after he had failed to visit the grave of Maj-Gen Ziaur Rahman on the anniversary of the latter’s assassination in 1981. Rahman was the husband of the present BNP Prime Minister Khaleda Zia and the founder of the ruling BNP. The AL opposition and other observers regarded Chowdhury’s resignation as unconstitutional. [5a] (p44843) BBC News reported on 5 September 2002 that Iajuddin Ahmed, a retired professor from Dhaka University, had been elected President. [20s]

4.34 The Government of Prime Minister Khaleda Zia, facing criticism for the rising wave of crime and deteriorating law and order in the country, launched “Operation Clean Heart” on 17 October 2002, relates an Amnesty International report, “Accountability needed in Operation Clean Heart”, dated 23 October 2002. [7e] It was reported in BBC News and International Herald Tribune articles of October 2002, January 2003 and March 2003 that Operation Clean Heart involved national deployment of nearly 40,000 soldiers, in all the major cities, to help the authorities restore law and order, arrest “listed criminals” and recover illegal firearms. Several members of the ruling Bangladesh Nationalist Party and the opposition Awami League were detained for their alleged links with criminals. [20w] [20x] [20y] [21c]

4.35 On 11 January 2003, BBC News reported that Bangladeshi authorities had ordered a partial pull-out of soldiers and ordered the troops to return to their barracks. However, soldiers remained in six towns and cities, including Dhaka and Chittagong, to assist the civilian administrations if required. [20z] On 19 February 2003, the Government again confirmed redeployment of the army in six divisional headquarters to assist law enforcement agencies in combating crime, reported The Statesman (India) on 19 February 2003. [21a] BBC News confirmed on 18 February 2003 that the operation, this time, was on a smaller scale and the army had been instructed not to arrest any suspects but to hand the criminals over to the police. [20ab]

4.36 BBC News articles published in January and February 2003 indicate that more than 11,000 people were arrested during Operation Clean Heart, including 2,500 listed criminals and members of Prime Minister Khaleda Zia’s BNP and the opposition, hundreds of weapons were seized, and 40 people died after soldiers detained them. [20z] [20y] [20ab]

4.37 BBC News reported on 9 January 2003 that President Iajuddin Ahmed had signed an order granting the soldiers legal immunity with immediate effect. The President said the Government regretted the deaths, but had no alternative to rewarding the soldiers who had helped the authorities restore law and order. [20x] [20y] Amid angry protests by the opposition, in February 2003, the Bangladesh Parliament passed the controversial indemnity bill entitled “Joint Drive Force Indemnity Ordinance 2003” to give legal protection to the army-led anti-terrorism operation. The Law Minister Mr Ahmed announced that the indemnity would protect the members of the armed forces from facing the civil justice system. At the same time, they would remain under the purview of their own laws. (Financial Times Information, 27 February 2003) [21b]

4.38 Agence France-Presse reported on 28 January 2003 that staggered polls for local elections to 4,267 local councils were taking place from late January to 16 March 2003. The elections were officially held on a non-party basis, but political
parties indirectly nominated candidates to ensure a foothold at grass roots level. A total of 198,704 candidates contested the local council seats, including 42,250 women vying for 2,684 seats reserved for them. [15] The local elections were affected by violence and by 17 February 2003, at least 25 people had reportedly been killed, notes a BBC News report of that date. [20aa]

4.39 It was announced by BBC News on 12 March 2003 that police had detained almost 200 people after a bomb attack in the city of Khulna in which two policemen died. The same day BBC news also reported the arrest of five members of an extremist Islamist group, Jama’atul Mujahideen, on suspicion of being involved in recent bomb attacks. The police denied that there was any link between those arrests and the activities of international terrorist organisations. [20u] [20v]

4.40 BBC News reported a number of attacks on Awami League officials in August and September 2003. On 25 August 2003, the president of the AL in the city of Khulna was shot dead. The Janajuddha faction of the banned Purba Banglar Communist Party claimed responsibility. The killing sparked a riot by AL supporters who attacked offices of the ruling BNP. The BNP denied any responsibility and ministers condemned the killing. [20n]

4.41 A BBC News report on 13 January 2004 stated that Bangladesh police were holding 24 people for questioning following a bomb attack at the Hazrat Shahjalal shrine in the city of Sylhet the previous day, that had killed three people and injured about thirty. No one had admitted responsibility and authorities had launched an investigation. [20e]

4.42 It was reported in the Daily Star on 20, 23 and 27 April 2004 that the Awami League had organised a campaign of public demonstrations during April 2004 in an apparent attempt to force the Government to resign by 30 April. Between 18 and 27 April the police arrested more than 15,000 people, mainly supporters of the Awami League and the NGO Proshika, in an attempt to contain the protests. On 27 April the Government called on the police to stop mass arrests and “not to harass the innocent”. [38g] [38h] [38i]

4.43 On 7 May 2004 a senior Awami League MP, Ahsan Ullah Master, was assassinated by an unknown gunman, reported BBC News. [20ap]

4.44 BBC News announced on 16 May 2004 that Parliament had approved a Constitutional amendment to increase the number of seats in the Jatiya Sangsad from 300 to 345 for a period of ten years, with the additional 45 seats being reserved for women. The additional women MPs would initially be selected in proportion to each party’s support at the 2001 general election. [20ae] See section 6, Women.

4.45 Two people were killed and at least 25 injured in a second bomb attack at the Muslim Hazrat Shahjalal shrine in Sylhet, BBC News reported on 21 May 2004. No parties claimed responsibility. The British High Commissioner to Bangladesh was one of those hurt. [20ah] The Daily Star, on 24 May 2004, gave the total number injured as seventy. [38e]

4.46 In June 2004 Awami League Members of Parliament returned to their seats; almost a year earlier they had declared they would boycott parliamentary sessions; they said they had not been allowed to criticise the Government,
This Country of Origin Information Report contains the most up-to-date publicly available information as at 10 March 2006. Older source material has been included where it contains relevant information not available in more recent documents.

4.47 In July 2004 Bangladesh was hit by devastating floods. A BBC News report of 3 August 2004 stated that about 60 per cent of the country had been under water at one stage and that some 600 people had been killed and at least 30 million displaced or stranded. The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Bangladesh Country Report of January 2005 (EIU January 2005) noted that AL members did not resume their participation in parliamentary standing committees until mid-October 2004. (p13)

4.48 On Saturday 21 August 2004, at least 19 people were killed in a grenade attack at an opposition Awami League party rally in Dhaka which was addressed by former Prime Minister and opposition leader Sheikh Hasina, reported BBC News on 21 and 22 August. There were about 20,000 people in the crowd and 200 were injured in the explosions and the chaos that ensued. The Economist Intelligence Unit, in its Bangladesh Country Report of January 2005, gave the final death toll as 23. (p16) The Asian Tribune confirmed on 22 August 2004 that the casualties included a number of AL party leaders. (p14) BBC News reported subsequent rioting across the country, during which the police arrested more than 200 protesters. The Awami League called a general strike on 24 and 25 August 2004. A further strike took place on 30 August 2004. There had been a rising trend in bomb attacks in Bangladesh over the previous five years in which more than 140 people had died; the targets had been varied, including a cinema, a Muslim shrine and newspaper editors and journalists. (p14) An Agence France-Presse article of 31 August 2004 stated that agents from the United States FBI and from Interpol had, at the request of the Bangladesh Government, arrived in the country to assist with investigations. (p14)

4.49 The Daily Star reported on 30 September 2004 that the police had been carrying out “blanket arrests” ahead of an Awami League mass rally planned for 3 October. The newspaper estimated that over 5,000 people, mostly AL supporters, had been arrested between 22 and 30 September 2004, primarily under Section 86 of the Dhaka Metropolitan Police (DMP) Ordinance. The authorities claimed, however, that the arrests were part of a routine anti-crime drive. On 29 September the High Court issued an injunction forbidding any arrests under Section 86 until 3 October 2004; the Daily Star observed, however, that the police were able to make arrests under other sections of the DMP. (p14) The Daily Star reported on 4 October 2004 that the previous day’s rally, attended by “tens of thousands”, had proceeded largely peacefully. (p14) On 10 October 2004, noted the Daily Star of 11 October, the AL and other opposition parties called a hartal (general strike) to mark the coalition government’s three years in office; there were pitched battles between the police and demonstrators in Dhaka and certain other centres; hundreds of protesters were arrested for short periods. (p14)

4.50 Associated Press reported on 20 October 2004 that a Dhaka court had sentenced three former army officers to death in absentia for their roles in the murder of four Awami League leaders in Dhaka Central Jail on 3 November 1975. The killings had taken place soon after the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and the overthrow of his government in a military coup in August 1975. Twelve other people were sentenced to life imprisonment and five
were acquitted. The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Country Report of January 2005 (EIU January 2005) noted that the case was originally filed in 1975, but could not be heard because of an indemnity ordinance issued by the military government that succeeded Sheikh Mujibur’s Government. [61a] [40b] (p14)

4.51 The Government formally constituted the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) on 21 November 2004, records EIU January 2005. The ACC absorbed most of the 950 staff of the now-dissolved Bureau of Anti-Corruption and is headed by a retired High Court judge. As stated in EIU January 2005: “The commission will conduct independent enquiries into cases of corruption. It is endowed with the powers to issue warrants and summons, interrogate witnesses and collect depositions under oath, review the existing anti-corruption arrangements and make recommendations to the president of the country”. [40b] (p14) The Awami League described the appointment of the Chairman of the ACC – by the country’s President – as politically partisan and unconstitutional, according to a United News of Bangladesh article of 2 December 2004. [39e]

4.52 In mid-November 2004, notes EIU January 2005, the Awami League – together with 11 ‘left-leaning’ opposition parties, Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (JSD), National Awami Party (NAP) and the Jatiya Janata Party – launched a united movement to bring an end to the rule of the BNP-led coalition Government. On 18 November 2004 this AL-led alliance released a list of nine demands, including calls for the immediate resignation of the Government and a general election under a reformed caretaker government. [40b] (p12)

4.53 The AL-led opposition alliance organised two successive nation-wide ‘human chains’ in December 2004 as an expression of no confidence in the BNP-led Government, records EIU January 2005. On 11 December the alliance organised a one-hour 1000-km human chain connecting the country’s southern tip (in Cox’s Bazar) and northern tip (in Dinajpur), and running through 18 districts and the cities of Dhaka and Chittagong. On 30 December an 800-km human chain was formed, linking the eastern and western tips of Bangladesh. These demonstrations were largely peaceful. [40b] (p12-13)

4.54 The *Daily Star* reported on 28 January 2005 that former Finance Minister Shah AMS Kibria and four other people had been killed in a grenade attack on an Awami League rally at Boiudder Bazar in Habiganj district the previous evening. About 70 others were injured. No party or group was reported at the time to have claimed responsibility. Protests immediately erupted in different parts of the country and the AL called a 60-hour general strike commencing on 29 January 2005, maintaining that the BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami were responsible. [38o] The *Daily Star*, on 31 January 2005, recorded that there had been violent clashes between protesters and the police, as well as damage to property, in various parts of the country. At least 150 demonstrators, including a number of AL politicians, had been injured, many of them in baton charges. [38p] BBC News reported renewed anti-government demonstrations and a general strike on 3 February 2005 in protest at the Habiganj grenade attack. [20as] The *Daily Star* announced on 21 March 2005 that ten persons had been formally charged for their role in the murder of Shah AMS Kibria and others in the 27 January grenade attack. Eight of the accused were in custody, while the other two were charged in absentia. According to the *Daily Star*, all ten had connections with the ruling Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP); some of them were local BNP party leaders. [38y] A BBC News article of 21 March 2005, however, quoted police as saying that eight of the ten accused had links with the BNP. [20be]
4.55 The Bangladesh *Daily Star* of 25 January 2005 reported that at least 50 people, including eight policemen, had been injured in clashes between the security forces and Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB) militants on 24 January in Bagmara, when a large number of JMJB supporters had been protesting the lynching, a few days earlier, of three JMJB cadres by a mob of villagers. The lynching had apparently been in retaliation for the attempted murder of a local Awami League leader, and the subsequent killing of another AL official and injury to 30 villagers in a bomb attack. Police held 64 JMJB adherents for questioning. [38r] [20av] The *Daily Star*, on 4 February 2005, quoted a police spokesman as warning that JMJB planned to continue bombing cinemas, theatres and *jatra* folk theatres, having deemed these activities to be “un-Islamic”. NGOs were also to be targets. [38w] The *Daily Star* announced on 11 February 2005 that 40 JMJB activists had been remanded for three days in connection with various murders and for the attack on the police in Bagmara. [38s]

4.56 Associated Press and Agence France-Presse announced on 23 February 2005 that the Government had officially banned Jama’ul Mujahedin Bangladesh (JMB or JM) and Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB) – both militant Islamic groups – blaming them for a recent spate of murders, bombings and related terrorist activities across the country. Police arrested a number of suspected JMB members and said they were intensifying their efforts to find and detain JMB operations commander Siddiquil Islam, also known as ‘Bangla Bhai’. Jama’ul Mujahedin had been accused of bomb attacks at musical concerts, religious shrines and the offices of certain NGOs. [61b] [23] JMJB were believed to have been involved in several recent bombings and vigilante killings, including a bomb attack on a *jatra* folk theatre show in Shahjahanpur on 14 January 2005 in which two people were killed and about 70 wounded. [38t] Police, on 23 February 2005, also arrested Dr Muhammad Asadullah al-Galib (al-Ghalib) – Professor of Arabic at Rajshahi University and head of the Islamist organisation, Ahle Hadith Andolon Bangladesh (AHAB) – as well as three other AHAB officials. [61b] [23] A BBC News article of 23 February 2005 quoted a police spokesman as saying that several detained members of JMB and JMJB had, in confessions, named Dr Asadullah al-Galib as their spiritual leader. [20az]

4.57 On 28 February 2005 BBC News reported that 15 “suspected leaders of radical Islamic groups”, including Asadullah al-Galib, had been charged with sedition. Court officials stated that the persons charged were accused of carrying out bomb attacks on rallies and buildings in attempts to destabilise the country. The same BBC News article noted that more than 70 suspected militants had been arrested since the ‘crackdown’ began the previous week (i.e. since 23 February). [20ba] United News of Bangladesh reported on 25 June 2005 that charges against Dr Galib for involvement in the bombings of two offices of BRAC, an NGO, had been dropped, but that he was still facing charges in at least nine other cases. [39t]

4.58 BBC News announced on 16 April 2005 that 22 people had been sentenced to death for the murder of an Awami League MP, Ahsan Ullah Master, and another man at a political function near Dhaka on 7 May 2004. This was the highest number ever sentenced to death in a single case in Bangladesh. Six others were given life sentences. The judge described the killing as an act of “political vengeance”. [20bg]
On 18 July 2005 the *Daily Star* reported that the law enforcement agencies – including the police, the Rapid Action Battalion, special police units ‘Cobra’ and ‘Cheetah’ and various joint forces – had killed 378 people in so-called “crossfire” incidents since June 2004. [38aa] [See Section 6: Police and Army Accountability]

United News of Bangladesh, in an article dated 22 July 2005, noted that the Awami League-led 14-party opposition alliance had prepared a number of proposals for reforming both the Election Commission and the leadership and functions of the Caretaker Government which takes office during the period immediately preceding a general election (see paragraph 5.11). This had followed several months of public debate in which the opposition parties argued that such reforms were necessary for these two institutions to be seen as neutral and effective in ensuring the credibility of general elections; in particular, a Government decision to extend the retirement age of judges from 65 to 67 was seen by opposition parties as a move by the Government to ensure that Chief Justice KM Hassan, a former BNP activist, would become the head (Chief Advisor) of the next Caretaker Government. [39v] The Economist Intelligence Unit’s (EIU’s) Country Report of July 2005 recorded that the Awami League had threatened to boycott the 2006 general election unless the electoral system and Caretaker Government were reformed; Sheikh Hasina, the Awami League leader, had repeatedly accused the last Caretaker Government of siding with the BNP in the 2001 general election, in which her party was defeated. The EIU report further noted that, under the Constitution, the existing Government would have to hand over power to a Caretaker Government by October 2006. [40c] On 5 August 2005, United News of Bangladesh quoted the Minister of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs as saying there was “no scope” for reforming the Caretaker Government. He indicated, however, that the Government was willing to discuss reforms to the Election Commission, provided that such a debate took place in Parliament. [39w]

BBC News reported on 13 August 2005 that one person had been killed and some 50 others injured in an attack on a Muslim shrine in eastern Bangladesh the previous night (12 August). Several homemade bombs had been thrown during a religious festival at the Hazrat Shah Syed Ahammad shrine at Akhaura, about 100 kilometres from Dhaka. [20bb] According to an Associated Press article of 14 August 2005, two suspects had been arrested in connection with the attack; however, no group had claimed responsibility and police said that the motive for the attack was still unclear. [61d]

BBC News announced on 17 August 2005 that more than 300 bomb explosions had occurred almost simultaneously in cities and towns across the country that day. Most of the bombs were small, rudimentary devices that were set to go off between 10.30 and 11.30 local time. Many of the bombs were set off in the vicinity of government offices, judicial buildings and journalists’ clubs. Jamaatul Mujahedin Bangladesh (JMB), one of two militant Islamic groups that were banned on 23 February 2005 (see above), were believed to have been responsible. Leaflets bearing JMB’s name were found at some of the bombsites; the leaflets called for the implementation of Islamic Law and warned “Bush and Blair” to get out of Muslim countries. [20bc] An Agence France-Presse article of 26 August 2005 provided more specific information on the events of 17 August: 434 small bombs had exploded in 63 of the 64 districts of the country; two people had been killed and more than 100 injured. On 26
August 2005 a Bangladesh court charged (in absentia) the JMB leader, Abdur Rahman, with ‘criminal conspiracy’ and ‘exploding a bomb’. [23l]

4.63 In a judgment delivered on 29 August 2005, the High Court found that the country’s military takeover in 1975 had been illegal, recorded BBC News on 31 August 2005. The Court apparently struck down the fifth amendment to the Constitution which legitimised martial law under former President Ziaur Rahman. The Government – currently led by Ziaur Rahman’s widow, Prime Minister Khaleda Zia – declared its intention to appeal the High Court’s decision. [20bd]

4.64 The NGO Transparency International (TI) ranked Bangladesh and Chad as the most ‘corrupt’ countries among 159 surveyed countries in its 2005 Corruption Perceptions Index. [42b] A BBC News article of 18 October 2005 noted that this was the fifth consecutive year that Bangladesh had been ranked in this position. The TI survey relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption in different countries, as seen by business people, academics and risk analysts. [20bj]

4.65 BBC News reported on 17 October 2005 that the Government had banned the Islamic group Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (better known as ‘Huji’), describing it as a terrorist organisation. [20bk]

4.66 On 4 October 2005, the Daily Star reported a number of bomb attacks inside law court buildings the previous day, in three different districts. In Laxmipur two people were killed and 30 injured, including the judge, in a bomb attack in the Joint District and Sessions court; in Chandpur a bomb went off in the courtroom of the Judge’s Court; in Chittagong a bomb was thrown into a Joint District courtroom, but failed to explode; another attack took place at a magistrate’s court in Chittagong, causing injuries. A number of suspects were arrested at the three locations, some of whom apparently identified themselves as activists of Jama’atul Mujahedin Bangladesh (JMB). Handwritten leaflets found after the Chandpur incident reportedly bore the words “Establish Islamic rule”, followed by “Jama’atul Mujahedin Bangladesh”. [38ae] On 18 October, a judge in Sylhet division escaped an assassination attempt unhurt, recorded the Asian Centre for Human Rights (ACHR) on 23 November 2005. [53c] On 24 October 2005 BBC News reported that a leading member of the BNP in Khulna, Mizanur Rahman, had been killed in a bomb attack; no one claimed responsibility. [20br]

4.67 Two judges were killed in a bomb attack in the southern district of Jhalakathi, reported BBC News on 14 November 2005. Four people were injured, including the suspected bomber. [20bl] According to the ACHR report of 23 November 2005, the police recovered handwritten leaflets of JMB at the site of the attack which read “Ban man-made laws and establish Qur’anic laws”. [53c] The ACHR report of 23 November gives details of death threats made against several other judges during October and November 2005, apparently by members of JMB and other Islamist groups. [53c] (p4-6)

4.68 On 29 November 2005, BBC News reported that at least nine people had been killed and over 40 injured in two separate attacks – a suicide bombing inside the law court building in Gazipur, a town 30 km north of Dhaka, and a bomb blast in the city of Chittagong. [20bm] The EIU Report of January 2006 recorded that the death toll from the two bombings on 29 November had risen to at least 14; the report noted that suicide bombings marked a new phase in the campaign of terrorist violence and that these attacks were designed to kill as many people
as possible; the police believed Jama’ul Mujahedin Bangladesh (JMB) to be responsible. [40d] Another bomb blast in Gazipur, on 1 December 2005, killed one person and injured at least 27, according to a BBC News article of that date. [20bn] On 8 December 2005 at least seven people were killed in a bombing in the northern town of Netrokona. (EIU Country Report of January 2006) [40d]

4.69 The 14-party opposition alliance, dominated by the Awami League, held a mass rally in Dhaka on 23 November 2005 and announced a 23-point common minimum national programme which, in effect, may constitute the opposition’s manifesto for the general election due to be held in late-2006 or at the beginning of 2007, relates EIU January 2006. [40d] The 14-party opposition alliance held another mass rally in Dhaka on Sunday 5 February 2006; at least 40,000 opposition supporters converged at the Paltan Maidan after a three-day ‘Long March’ from different parts of the country, reported Agence France-Presse and ATN Television. [23o] [21g] A large number of opposition activists were arrested during the three-day protest march. National police chief Abdul Kaiyum said that the authorities had taken the “highest security steps to prevent any act of violence”. He specified that 4,500 people had been arrested during the three day period, but asserted that many of those arrests were for reasons not linked to the protest. Awami League leader Sheikh Hasina was quoted as saying that at least 10,000 activists and leaders had been rounded up since the previous Thursday. An opposition spokesman accused the Government of resorting to mass arrests and of preventing people from all over the country from joining the ‘Long March’. [23o] Sheikh Hasina announced at the rally that her party would return to parliament after a boycott of over a year. [23o] [21g] BBC News quoted Hasina as saying that the party’s return to parliament was only to table some key proposals to ensure free and fair elections, but that the opposition would continue with anti-government demonstrations. [20bs] She called for a dawn-to-dusk general strike on 15 February, according to ATN. [21g] It was announced on 20 February 2006 that a leader of the Awami League in the city of Khulna was in a critical condition after two bombs were thrown at him. No one had claimed responsibility for the attack, according to BBC News. [20bp]

4.70 According to the EIU Report of January 2006, police arrested over 800 people between 30 November 2005 and early January 2006 on suspicion of being involved in terrorist activity. The police were said to be hunting a 2,000-strong ‘suicide squad’ drawn from members of Jama’ul Mujahedin Bangladesh (JMB) and other militant Islamist groups. On 5 January 2006 the cabinet approved a bill extending the Government’s power to tap telephones. [40d] BBC News announced on 9 February 2006 that three men had been convicted in a Barisal court for the assassination of the two judges on 14 November 2005. Two of the men received 30-year prison sentences; the would-be suicide bomber, who was injured and arrested at the scene of the attack, is to serve a 40-year sentence. [20bo] On 20 February 2006 the special court in Barisal sentenced four other individuals, in absentia, to prison terms of 40 years each for their roles in the killing of the two judges on 14 November; they included JMB leaders Shaikh Abdur Rahman and Siddiqul Islam, alias ‘Bangla Bhai’ (see paragraphs 4.56 and 4.72). The four fugitives were sentenced under the Explosive Substances Act, but were still liable to murder charges for the same incident. [20bt] On 28 February 2006, a court in Jhenidah district sentenced 21 men to death – three of them in absentia – for their part in the co-ordinated detonation of over 400
bombs throughout the country on 17 August 2005. All 21 were reported to be members of JMB. (Agence France-Presse) [23p]

4.71 BBC News announced on 2 March 2006 that Shaikh Abdur Rahman, the leader of Jama’ul Mujahedin Bangladesh (JMB), had surrendered to police in the district of Sylhet after a 30-hour siege. [20bq] On 6 March 2006, United News of Bangladesh (UNB) reported that Siddiquil Islam, alias ‘Bangla Bhai’, had also been arrested following an encounter with the Rapid Action Battalion at his hideout in Mymensingh district. The UNB article described ‘Bangla Bhai’ as “chieftain of the vigilante group Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB) and Majlish-e-Shura member of Jama’ul Mujahedin Bangladesh (JMB)”. [39ac]

For further details on History, please refer to Europa Regional Surveys of the World: South Asia 2005 (source 1b)
5. State Structures

THE CONSTITUTION

5.01 The Europa World Year Book 2004 (Europa 2004) records that a new Constitution for the People’s Republic of Bangladesh came into effect on 16 December 1972. Following the military coup of 24 March 1982 the Constitution was suspended and the country placed under martial law. On 10 November 1986, martial law was repealed and the Constitution reinstated. [1a] (p647) The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) Country Profile 2005 notes that amendments to the Constitution require a two-thirds majority of parliament. [40a] (p8)

5.02 Europa 2004 notes that the 1972 Constitution based its fundamental principles on nationalism, socialism, democracy and secularism. The Constitution aimed to establish a society free from exploitation in which the rule of law, fundamental human rights and freedoms, justice and equality were to be secured by all citizens. All citizens are equal before the law and have a right to its protection. Arbitrary arrest or detention, discrimination based on race, age, sex, birth, caste or religion, and also forced labour are all prohibited under the Constitution. Subject to the law, public order and morality, every citizen has a right to freedom of movement, of assembly and of association. The Constitution also aims to guarantee freedom of conscience, speech, press and religious worship. [1a] (p647) Europa 2004 relates that the Constitution was amended in 1977 to replace secularism with Islam. A further amendment in 1988 established Islam as the state religion. [1a] (647)

5.03 As noted in a report of September 2002 on behalf of the United Nations Development Programme, entitled “Human Security in Bangladesh” (UNDP 2002): “The Constitution states that all existing laws that are inconsistent with fundamental rights shall be declared void, and the State is forbidden to make any law inconsistent with fundamental rights … However, the enjoyment of any right is subject to ‘reasonable’ restrictions imposed by law in the interest of the State, public order, public health, morality or decency.” The UNDP report points out that “reasonable” is a relative term, and what is reasonable in one given set of circumstances may be unreasonable in another. [8b] (p15)

CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONALITY

5.04 The Bangladesh Citizenship (Temporary Provisions) Order 1972 introduced the citizenship laws after the country’s independence. Article 2 of the Order stipulates that anyone who was born in the territories now comprised in Bangladesh (or whose father or grandfather was born in these territories) and who was a permanent resident in these territories on 25 March 1971 and continues to be so resident, will be deemed to be a Bangladeshi citizen. [18a] Article 2A provides that a person to whom the above article would have applied, but who is resident in the United Kingdom, shall be deemed to have continued to have been permanently resident in Bangladesh. [18a] The Government may notify, in the official Gazette, any person or categories of persons to whom this Article shall not apply. In case of doubt as to whether a person is qualified to be
deemed a citizen of Bangladesh under Article 2 of the Order, a decision of the Government will be final. [18a]

5.05 The Bangladesh Citizenship Order of 1972 further provides that any person who ‘owes, affirms or acknowledges, expressly or by conduct, allegiance to a foreign state’, or is notified under the provisions of Article 2A, does not qualify for Bangladeshi citizenship. [18a]

5.06 The 1978 Bangladesh Citizenship (Temporary Provisions) Rules allow for the Government to consider an application for citizenship from an applicant who is a foreign woman and married to a Bangladeshi citizen and has resided in Bangladesh for two years, or from any other applicant who has resided in Bangladesh for a period of five years. [18b]

POLITICAL SYSTEM

GOVERNMENT

5.07 As recorded in the US State Department Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 2005 (USSD 2004): ‘The country is a multiparty, parliamentary democracy in which elections by secret ballot are held on the basis of universal suffrage.” [2d] (section 3) USSD 2005 adds: “The law provides citizens with the right to change their government peacefully, and citizens exercised this right in practice through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of universal suffrage, albeit with significant instances of violence.” [2f] (section 3) Europa 2004 notes that the Jatiya Sangsad (Parliament) is a unicameral legislature; members are directly elected for a five-year term on the basis of universal adult franchise from single territorial constituencies i.e. a member of parliament for each constituency is elected by simple majority, on a ‘first-past-the-post’ basis. Persons aged eighteen and over are entitled to vote. [1a] (p647) BBC News reported on 16 May 2004 that a Constitutional amendment, approved by Parliament on that day, increased the number of seats in the Jatiya Sangsad from 300 to 345 for a period of ten years, with the additional 45 seats reserved for women. [20ae]

5.08 Europa 2004 notes that the President is the constitutional Head of State and is elected by Parliament (Jatiya Sangsad) for a period of five years; Professor Iajuddin Ahmed was elected unopposed as President on 5 September 2002. Executive power is held by the Prime Minister, who heads the Council of Ministers. [1a] (pp647 & 640)


“Although Bangladesh has had a parliamentary system since 1991, in practice, parliament hardly functions as an effective accountability mechanism. Regardless of which party is in power, the main opposition party has boycotted most parliamentary sessions, alleging Government repression and impediments in parliament to voicing its views. The year 2004 saw no exception to this practice; the AL [Awami League] for the most part refrained from participating in parliament. The AL also boycotted parliamentary committees due to controversies over their composition.” [65a] (p69)

5.11 The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Bangladesh Country Profile 2005 (EIU Country Profile 2005) notes that, under the 13th amendment to the Constitution passed in March 1996, a caretaker government takes office for a period of up to three months preceding a general election. This administration assumes office within 15 days of the dissolution of parliament and must hold the general election within 90 days of the dissolution; it is led by a chief advisor – who holds the status of a prime minister – and who runs the Government with not more than ten other advisors appointed by the President on the advice of the chief advisor. The caretaker government is responsible for giving the Election Commission “all possible aid and assistance that may be required for holding the general election of Members of Parliament peacefully, fairly and impartially”. [40a] (p9) The chief advisor who heads the caretaker government is normally the most recently retired Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, states the EIU Country Report of July 2005. [40c] (p12)

(See also History: paragraph 4.60)

5.12 With regard to local Government in Bangladesh, the EIU Country Profile 2005 states as follows:

“Bangladesh is divided into 64 districts, each with its own district council. Beneath the districts are 460 sub-districts and 4,488 union councils [union parishad], which are currently the lowest tier of government in Bangladesh. In late 2003 the Government formed 40,392 village governments (gram sarkar) as a fourth layer of government. Gram sarkars are non-elected bodies at the grassroots level, and were introduced by a former president, General Zia, in late 1970s. When he was president, General Ershad introduced upazila (local councils) in the mid-1980s, as an elected local government body. The village governments are aimed at local development by local people. Although the constitution provides for elected bodies at all tiers of local government, only the third tier – union councils and municipalities (mostly sub-district and district administrative centres) – is elected; all others are administratively controlled. Bangladesh has six administrative divisions – Dhaka, Chittagong, Khulna, Barisal, Rajshahi and Sylhet – and four major municipal corporations – Dhaka, Chittagong, Rajshahi and Khulna. The mayors of the municipal corporations are directly elected and wield considerable political power.” [40a] (p8)

5.13 On 2 August 2005, United News of Bangladesh and BBC News reported that the High Court had declared Gram Sarkar – village Governments composed of nominated members – illegal and unconstitutional, on the basis that they violated the basic principles of democracy based on elections, as provided for in
the Constitution. The Court was responding to a petition filed by a local rights group, Bangladesh Legal Aids and Services Trust (BLAST), which challenged the legality of the Gram Sarkar Act 2003. The Government announced its intention to appeal the verdict. [20bf] [39x] United News announced on 7 August 2005 that the Supreme Court had stayed for six weeks the operation of the High Court verdict on Gram Sarkar, and had directed the Government to file a regular leave-to-appeal petition. [39y]

SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS

(see also paragraphs 4.60 and 5.11)

5.14 Europa 2004 notes that the Election Commission, a constitutional body, supervises parliamentary and presidential elections. The Commission also delimits constituencies and prepares electoral rolls. It consists of a Chief Election Commissioner and other commissioners, as appointed by the President. The Election Commission is independent in the exercise of its functions. [1a] (647) The Freedom House report of June 2005 noted, however: “The EC’s autonomy is compromised by its dependence on the Government for funding, recruitment and posting of officers, and control over the machinery of law enforcement during elections.” [65a] (p68)

5.15 The United Nations Electoral Assistance Secretariat issued a statement on 2 October 2001 which concluded that the parliamentary elections on 1 October had been generally free, fair, peaceful and orderly, but it was also noted that irregularities during voting had been observed and that there had been sporadic, sometimes serious, incidents of violence on the day. The UN delegation also noted that violence and threats of violence had occurred during the period leading up to the election. [41]

5.16 BBC News reported on 9 October 2001 that, following the October 2001 general election, the defeated Awami League had boycotted the parliamentary swearing-in ceremony, claiming that the election was “rigged”. [20j] It was noted in the EIU Country Profile 2004 that Awami League leader Sheikh Hasina has refused to recognise the 2001 general election as legitimate, claiming that the Caretaker Government which had administered the country in the run-up to the election had conspired with the Election Commission to “oust” the AL. [40a] (p6) Freedom House commented in their report of June 2005:

“Since 1991, three national parliamentary elections have been held at regular five-year intervals; the elections were judged to be largely free and fair by national and international election monitors. The losing party in each election complained of vote rigging, but in all cases it finally accepted the election and agreed to serve as the opposition in parliament. The elections resulted in rotation of power between the two major political parties: The BNP won the 1991 and 2001 elections and the AL won in 1996...Each of the three elections was organized under a neutral non-party CG [Caretaker Government], and all political parties enjoyed equal campaigning opportunities. Voter turnout has sharply increased from 56 percent in 1991 to 75 percent in 1996 and 2001.” [65a] (p66-67)
JUDICIARY

5.17 USSD 2005 comments: “The law provides for an independent judiciary; however, in practice a longstanding temporary provision of the constitution places the lower courts under the executive, and the courts were subject to executive influence largely because judges’ appointments and their pay were dependent on the executive. The higher levels of the judiciary displayed some independence and often ruled against the Government in criminal, civil, and politically controversial cases.” [2f] (section 1e)

Notes USSD 2005:

“The court system has two levels: the lower courts and the Supreme Court. Both hear civil and criminal cases. The lower courts consist of magistrates, who are part of the executive branch, and session and district judges, who belong to the judicial branch. The Supreme Court is divided into two sections: the high court and the appellate court. The high court hears original cases mostly dealing with constitutional issues and reviews cases from the lower courts. The appellate court has jurisdiction to hear appeals of judgments, decrees, orders, or sentences of the high court. Rulings of the appellate court are binding on all other courts. …The law provides the accused with the right to be represented by counsel, to review accusatory material, to call witnesses, and to appeal verdicts. Trials were public, and defendants had the right to an attorney; however, state-funded attorneys were rarely provided. …Defendants were presumed innocent, had the right to appeal, and had the right to access government-held evidence.” [2f] (section 1e)

5.18 The USSD Country Report of 2003 had stated: “In 2001, the Supreme Court reaffirmed a 1997 High Court order to separate the judiciary from the executive. The ruling declared which elements of the 1997 order could be implemented without constitutional amendment and ordered the Government to implement those elements within 8 weeks.” [2b] (section 1e) USSD 2005 provides an update: “The government continued to delay action on the Supreme Court order asking that administrative measures be put in place separating the judiciary from the executive. In April [2005] the Supreme Court gave the government its 20th extension to comply with the order, setting a deadline for October. On October 20, the Supreme Court refused to entertain the government's 21st appeal seeking another extension; however, at year's [2005’s] end the judiciary was not separated from the executive.” [2f] (section 1e) USSD 2003 quoted Law Minister Moudud Ahmed as saying that the full process of separating the judiciary from the executive branch would take at least six to seven years. [2b] (section 1e)

5.19 According to USSD 2005: “The court system was plagued by corruption and a substantial backlog of cases, and trials were typically marked by extended continuances while the accused remained in prison. These conditions effectively prevented many persons from obtaining a fair trial.” [2f] (section 1e) Transparency International (TI), in a Household Survey in 2002, found that 7.6 per cent of respondents – representing 231 out of a total of 3,030 households – claimed to have had dealings with the judiciary (94 per cent of those respondents had been to the lower courts and 3.5 per cent to the high court). A majority (75 per cent) said that they had encountered corruption; 66 per cent reported corruption by court officials/employees, 13 per cent claimed corruption by public prosecutors, 10 per cent by lawyers representing the opposition and 9
per cent reported corruption by magistrates. [42a] (p59-63) According to the Summary Findings of the 2005 TI Household Survey, 66 per cent of plaintiffs and 65 per cent of accused persons claimed that they had to pay bribes in their dealings with the lower judiciary. (The full findings of this report were not yet available in English by August 2005.) [42c] In April 2004 it was reported in the press that a High Court judge, Syed Shahidur Rahman, had been removed from his post by the President on the recommendation of the Supreme Judicial Council; he had been accused of accepting money to fix bail for a former client. [20ac] [39a]

5.20 A September 2002 report on behalf of the United Nations Development Programme, “Human Security in Bangladesh, In Search of Justice and Dignity” [UNDP 2002], gave the following reasons for the delayed processing of criminal cases and the subsequent backlog of cases in the courts: (a) the number of cases in which bail is not granted; (b) non-attendance of witnesses on the date of the hearing; (c) unnecessary adjournments; (d) delays in completing investigations; (e) acute shortage of judges and magistrates; (f) tendency of lawyers and parties to delay trials; and (g) lack of vigilance on the part of judges and magistrates. [8b] (p82)

5.21 The UNDP 2002 report provided details of the Government legal aid fund which has been in operation since 1994. [8b] (p42-44) The report also stated that more than 300 NGOs in Bangladesh then listed “human rights and legal aid” as one of their activities – though only a few of these NGOs provided legal aid on a large scale. Two organisations, the Bangladesh Legal Aid and Services Trust (BLAST) and the Madaripur Legal Aid Association (MLAA) had, by 2002, each provided legal aid for litigation in more than 2,000 court cases; BLAST has offices in all the Divisions of Bangladesh. Four other NGOs had each provided legal aid in over 500 court cases. [8b] (p44-47)

5.22 The Constitution provides that all citizens are equal before the law and have a right to its protection, states Europa 2004. [1a] It was pointed out in the UNDP 2002 report that the High Court Division of the Supreme Court is responsible for enforcing the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, including the right to equality before the law. Thus, it stated, for enforcement of rights pertaining to human security under the Constitution one has to go to the High Court. But because of the high costs involved, the poor and the vulnerable sections of society seldom access the legal process and ultimately the benefits of the fundamental rights conferred by the Constitution. [8b] (p16)

5.23 As detailed in Section 4 (History) there were, during October and November 2005, serious attacks on the Judiciary by Islamist militants. On 4 October there were bomb attacks inside court buildings in three districts. In Laxmipur two people were killed and 30 injured in a bomb attack in the Joint District and Sessions court; in Chandpur a bomb went off in the courtroom of the Judge’s Court; in Chittagong a bomb was thrown into a Joint District courtroom, but failed to explode; another attack took place at a magistrate’s court in Chittagong, causing injuries. Jama’utul Mujahedin Bangladesh (JMB) were believed responsible; handwritten leaflets found after the Chandpur incident reportedly bore the words “Establish Islamic rule”, followed by “Jama’utul Mujahedin Bangladesh”. [38ae] Two judges were assassinated in Jhalakathi district on 14 November; JMB leaflets found at the scene read “Ban man-made laws and establish Qur’anic laws”. [53c] On 29 November at least 14 people were killed and over 40 injured in two separate attacks – a suicide bombing
inside a court building in Gazipur and a bomb blast in Chittagong. [20bm] [40d] A BBC article of 29 November 2005 noted that the courts and judges may have been targeted because they represent the secular laws of the country. [20bm]

SPECIAL TRIBUNALS

5.24 USSD 2005 records that, under the provisions of the Public Safety Act, the Law and Order Disruption Crimes Speedy Trial Act (see below), and the Women and Children Repression Prevention Act (see section 6, Women), special tribunals hear cases and issue verdicts. Cases under these laws must be investigated and tried within specific time limits, although the law is unclear regarding the disposition of a case if it is not finished within an allotted time period. [2f] (section 1e)

THE LAW AND ORDER DISRUPTION CRIMES SPEEDY TRIAL ACT (STA)

5.25 As noted in USSD 2003:

“In 2002, Parliament rescinded the Public Safety Act (PSA) enacted by the AL Government in 2000. A week after the repeal of PSA, Parliament passed the Law and Order Disruption Crimes Speedy Trial Act (STA) to remain in force for 2 years if not extended. It contains a provision for the trial in special courts of those accused of certain crimes from 30 to 60 days after arrest. Unlike the PSA, the STA has a bail provision with mandatory recording of the grounds for granting bail. As a safeguard against misuse of the law, it provided punishment for bringing false charges with jail terms from 2 to 5 years. In June 2002, in response to a writ filed by Lalmonirhat Bar Association President Matiur Rahman, charged under the STA, the High Court requested the Government to explain why the STA should not be declared unconstitutional. The case remained pending in the High Court [in 2003]. In general, there were no allegations of widespread misuse of the STA.” [2b] (section 1d)

On 16 March 2004 Parliament passed the Disruption of Law and Order Offences (Speedy Trial) Act 2004 to extend the term of the 2002 Act for another two years following its expiry on 9 April 2004, recorded the NGO ‘Hands Off Cain’ in a report of January 2006. [73a]

5.26 The Independent (Bangladesh), on 16 October 2004, quoted the Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs Ministry as saying that a total of 5,143 cases had been filed with the courts under the Speedy Trial Act and that 3,890 of these cases had been disposed of between 10 April 2002 and 31 July 2004; altogether 4,940 people had been convicted in 2,065 of the cases filed under this Act. Speedy Trial Tribunals had sentenced 208 persons to death in the two years preceding the article. [60a]
comprise local community leaders who either individually or in groups provide a forum for arbitration and dispute resolution. A study of Shalish in two districts in 1996 indicated that the majority of disputes dealt with related to family law, maintenance, second marriage, dowry and land ownership. According to UNDP 2002, the option of conciliation through mediation is particularly favoured by women and the poor. Village courts deal with both civil and criminal matters; they have the power to summon witnesses and can impose a fine on contempt charges. The officials of village courts are usually chairmen and members of ‘union parishads’ (the local government authorities, of which there are 4,448 in Bangladesh) and are generally powerful members of the local community. Village courts can, however, be open to outside influences. The main sources of influence are said to be local political leaders, community leaders, wealthy people and other influential individuals in the village. Village courts generally function in co-operation with the local police. [8b] (p91-100)

**FATWAS**

5.28 As was stated in USSD 2003: “In 2001, the High Court ruled illegal all fatwas, or expert opinions on Islamic law. While the Court’s intention was to end the extrajudicial enforcement of penalties by religious leaders, the 2001 ruling, which generated violent protests, declared all fatwas illegal. Several weeks later, the Appellate Court stayed the High Court’s ruling. No date was set for rehearing the issue." Only those Muftis (religious scholars) who have expertise in Islamic law can legitimately issue a fatwa. In practice, however, village religious leaders sometimes make rulings in individual cases and call the ruling a fatwa. Fatwas commonly deal with marriage and divorce, or mete out punishments for perceived moral transgressions. [2b] (section 2c) A BBC News article of 13 February 2001 noted that punishments could vary from public naming and shaming to physical mutilation. [20g] USSD 2005 recorded: “Human rights groups and press reports indicated that vigilantism against women for perceived moral transgressions occurred in rural areas, often under a fatwa... and included punishments such as whipping. A local human rights organization recorded 35 incidents of fatwas calling for physical violence and social ostracization.” [2f] (section 1c)

**FAMILY LAW**

5.29 As noted in USSD 2005, the Muslim Family Ordinance codifies traditional Islamic law concerning inheritance, marriage and divorce for registered marriages of members of the Muslim community. There are similar sets of laws in place for the Hindu and Christian communities. [2f] (section 1e)

**LEGAL RIGHTS/DETENTION**

(see also Section 6 Politically-motivated detentions)

5.30 USSD 2005 stated: “The law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, authorities frequently violated these provisions, even in non-preventive detention cases. The law specifically allows preventive detention, with specified
safeguards, and provides for the detention of individuals on suspicion of criminal activity without an order from a magistrate or a warrant.” [2f] (section 1d)

PREVENTIVE DETENTION AND ITS LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK

5.31 As noted in USSD 2005 “The government arrested and detained persons arbitrarily and used national security legislation such as the Special Powers Act (SPA) of 1974 to detain citizens without filing formal charges or specific complaints.” [2f] (section 1d) The report continues:

“The law does not provide for the use of warrants in all cases. Section 54 of the Criminal Procedure Code and Section 86 of the DMP Ordinance provide for the detention of persons on the suspicion of criminal activity without an order from a magistrate or a warrant, and the government regularly arrested persons without formal charges or specific complaints. Authorities misused ordinances during the year, and mass arrests, often politically motivated, continued to occur. According to Odhikar, a local human rights NGO, police arrested a total of 3,912 persons from January through August of the year under Section 54 and in the Dhaka metropolitan area another 25,374 under Sections 86 and 100 of the DMP Ordinance.” [2f] (section 1d)

“Authorities used Sections 54 and 86 to detain persons on false charges as punishment for the expression of views critical of or different from the government. In September 2004 in Dhaka, police arrested large numbers of opposition party members prior to the opposition's planned public rallies in October 2004. The high court, following the filing of a petition from human rights NGOs, barred police from arresting any citizen under Section 86 until October 2004; however, police continued to arrest persons under section 54. The law provides for the right to a prompt judicial determination; however, this was rarely enforced.” [2f] (section 1d)

USSD 2004 had recorded that, in April 2003, the High Court issued a directive that allowed legal representatives to visit those arrested under Section 54. [2d] (section 1d) However, USSD 2005 states: “Legal representatives are granted access to their clients arrested under Section 54, but in practice police rarely allowed lawyers to confer with their clients arrested under these sections of the law.” [2f] (section 1d)

5.32 A Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) report of September 1998, “Bangladesh: State Protection”, informed that Section 107 of Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) permits preventive detention when the authorities deem there is strong likelihood of public disorder. Section 54 of CrPC authorises any police officer to arrest “without an order from a magistrate or without a warrant…. any person ….concerned in any cognisable offence, or against whom a reasonable complaint has been made or credible information has been received or a reasonable suspicion exists of his having been so concerned”. Section 54 of the CrPC lays down certain procedures to be observed once an arrest has been made. This includes that the accused must be produced before a magistrate within 24 hours, and that a magistrate must give prior permission if police want to hold a prisoner for longer. However, it is reported that despite these safeguards, Section 54 effectively allows the police to arrest anyone at any time for almost any reason, and is one of the most easily abused provisions in the Bangladesh legal system. [3f] (p4)
THE SPECIAL POWERS ACT (SPA)

5.33 The Special Powers Act (SPA) of 1974, as described in the September 1998 Canadian IRB report, gives the Government powers to detain any person for an initial period of up to 30 days without a formal charge or specific complaint, to prevent him or her performing a ‘prejudicial act’. A prejudicial act is broadly defined as “any act... likely to prejudice... the sovereignty and defence of the country, national security, public order or the economic or financial interests of the state”. [3f (p5) UNDP 2002 commented that the definition of ‘prejudicial act’, as provided in the Act, is vague and open to wide interpretation. Detention under SPA precludes the possibility of bail. [8b] (p17)

5.34 An Amnesty International Report entitled “Urgent need for legal and other reforms to protect human rights”, dated May 2003 states:

“Each year, thousands of people are arbitrarily detained under administrative detention laws which deny them access to judicial remedies. The most commonly used of these laws is the Special Powers Act, 1974 (SPA). The SPA overrides safeguards against arbitrary detention in excess of 24 hours in Bangladeshi laws. It allows the Government not only to detain anyone without having to justify the detention before a court, but also to keep the detainee in prison initially for up to four months or, in certain cases, indefinitely, without charge.” [7a] (p2)

5.35 USSD 2003 had noted:

“The magistrate must inform the detainee of the grounds for detention within 15 days, and the Ministry of Home Affairs must agree with the grounds presented for detention within 30 days or release the detainee. The Government does not have to charge the detainee with a statutory crime. In practice, detainees sometimes were held for longer periods. Detainees may appeal their detention, and the Government may grant early release... Detainees are allowed to consult with lawyers, although usually not until a charge is filed; however, they are not entitled to be represented by a lawyer before an advisory board. Detainees may receive visitors. In the past, the Government has held incommunicado prominent prisoners for extended periods of time. There were no such reports during the year [2003]. Historically, the vast majority of SPA detainees were released on orders from the High Court because the SPA cases were so weak and vague that the court had no alternative but to grant bail.” [2b] (section 1d)

USSD 2005 adds: “Under the SPA, the government or a district magistrate may order a person detained for 30 days to prevent the commission of an act that could threaten national security; however, detainees were held for longer periods. In SPA cases, the magistrate must, by the 15th day, inform the detainee of the grounds of his detention, and an advisory board is supposed to examine the cases of SPA detainees after four months. Detainees have the right to appeal.” [2f] (section 1d)

5.36 UNDP 2002 records that 90 per cent of the preventative detention cases that came before the High Court between 1974 and 1995 were determined to have...
been made either “illegally” or “without lawful authority”; these detentions were challenged on the basis of habeas corpus petitions moved before the High Court under Article 102 of the Constitution and under Section 491 of CrPC. [8b] (pp1 and 18)

PRE-TRIAL DETENTION

5.37 USSD 2005 records: “The backlog of criminal cases stood at approximately 40 thousand. In addition, a recent survey by the Ministry of Law stated that 1,013 prisoners have made no court appearance in at least 6 months and many have served longer in pretrial detention than they would have had they been convicted and given the maximum sentences for their alleged crimes. According to Odhikar [a human rights NGO], approximately 75 percent of prison inmates were in pretrial detention.” [2f] (section 1d)

5.38 BBC News reported on 5 January 2004 that the High Court had ordered the Government to reveal how many persons had been in prison for more than a year, awaiting trial. [20aq] USSD 2004 had stated: “During the year [2004], the Government submitted to the [High Court] a list that included 16 persons who had been in prison without trial for more than 11 years, 10 [for] over 10 years, 29 more than 9 years, 51 more than 8 years, 111 for more than 7 years, 238 for more than 6 years, 502 more than 5 years, 917 more than 4 years, 1,592 more than 3 years and 3,673 more than 2 years.” On 3 August 2004, a High Court panel ordered the Government to free on bail over 7,400 detainees who had been in prison, awaiting trial, for more than 360 days. [2d] (section 1d) According to USSD 2005, those prisoners had not been released by the end of 2005. [2f] (section 1d)

BAIL

5.39 USSD 2005 confirmed that there was a functioning bail system in the regular courts; under certain security and crime law, a non-bailable period of detention exists. [2f] (section 1d)

‘SAFE CUSTODY’

5.40 UNDP 2002 noted: “Women and girls who are victims of, or witnesses to, violent offences are imprisoned in many cases on the grounds that they will be in ‘safe custody’ for their own protection. However, orders to place women in ‘safe custody’ are issued by magistrates solely exercising their judicial discretion, and do not have a basis in law. …Thus, the practice of placing women and girls in ‘safe custody’, against their will, is illegal, having no basis in any law, including the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1898”. [8b] (p25)

DEATH PENALTY

5.41 The Amnesty International (AI) Annual Report of 2005 (events of 2004) noted that Bangladesh retains the death penalty. [7n] The 2002 AI Annual Report recorded that after more than three years, the Government had resumed
executions by hanging two men in February 2001. [7g] The 2003 AI Annual Report indicated that at least 87 people were sentenced to death in 2002, although no executions were reported to have been carried out. [7i] The 2004 AI Annual Report recorded that more than 130 men and women were sentenced to death in 2003 and that two men were hanged on 10 July 2003. [7j] As stated in the 2005 AI Annual Report, over 120 people were sentenced to death in 2004; seven people, including three policemen, were actually executed. [7n]

5.42 Hands Off Cain, an Italian NGO which campaigns for an end to the death penalty worldwide, stated as follows in a report of January 2006:

“The number of death sentences passed in Bangladesh increased significantly with the introduction of [Speedy Trial Tribunals established under the Disruption of Law and Order Offences Act of 2002]. According to official sources in the Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, the nine Speedy Trial Tribunals of the country dealt with 650 cases between October 2002, when they were set up, up to June 30, 2005. The tribunals passed death sentences on 311 people. On the other hand, Sessions Judges' courts of the country sentenced 123 people with death punishment from 2001 until June 30, 2005. A total of 221 people were sentenced to death by different courts of the country until 2001 since independence. On the other hand, 80 people were given death sentence in 2002, 162 in 2003, 112 in 2004 and 80 in 2005 (up to June 30), the sources said... The Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, on June 30, 2005, said there were 655 prisoners condemned to death in prisons scattered across the country. The government had only 53 cells for condemned prisoners with each cell originally made to accommodate only one convict. Bangladesh resumed executions in 2001, after a de facto three-year suspension. Two men were hanged between February and March and another in November [2001]. One execution was recorded in 2002 and two people were put to death in 2003... At least 13 people were sent to gallows in 2004 and four in 2005.” [73a]

5.43 Bangladesh applies the death penalty for such crimes as murder, sedition and drug-trafficking, notes Hands Off Cain. In March 1998 the Bangladesh Cabinet approved the death penalty for crimes against women and children, including trafficking and rape. Skyjacking and sabotage became capital offences in 1997. [73a] In 2002 the death penalty was introduced for acid attacks. (State party report to CEDAW, dated 3 January 2003.) [47a] (p20)

INTERNAL SECURITY

5.44 A report of the Canadian Immigration & Refugee Board (IRB) published in September 1998 noted that the internal security establishment in Bangladesh consisted of the Police and four auxiliary forces: the paramilitary Bangladesh Rifles (BDR), the Armed Police, the Ansars and the Village Defence Party. The police and the two paramilitary forces, the BDR and Ansars, were primarily responsible for maintaining law and order. [3] USSD 2004 noted that a new police unit, the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), was created in 2004 to deal with violent criminal gangs. It is composed of personnel from different law enforcement and security agencies, including the military. USSD 2004 stated also: “The Home Affairs Ministry controls the police and paramilitary forces, which have primary responsibility for internal security... The army is responsible
for external security but also occasionally has been given domestic security responsibilities.” [2d] (introduction & section 1d) Noted USSD 2005: “The civilian authorities generally maintained effective control of the security forces.” [2f] (introduction)

The following information on the various auxiliary forces was obtained from the websites of the Rapid Action Battalion [70], the Bangladesh Rifles [72] and the non-governmental website, Bangladesh Military Forces [71] (all accessed in March 2006), and the US State Department’s “Background Note: Bangladesh”, as updated August 2005 [2e]:

**Bangladesh Ansar:** Originally formed in 1948, the Ansars are a lightly armed force under the direction of the Ministry of Home Affairs which renders assistance to the police in maintaining law and order, participates in civic action projects in rural areas and acts in conjunction with the armed forces in the event of war. There are about 23,000 Ansars in battalions across the country. [71]

**Bangladesh Rifles (BDR):** The primary role of this paramilitary force is border control, including anti-smuggling and anti-trafficking activities. [71] The BDR has also been called upon to assist the police in various “internal” operations, such as recovering illegal firearms and guarding election polling stations. [72] The BDR is reported to have 40,000 personnel, is under the authority of the Home Ministry and is mainly commanded by officers seconded from the army. [2e] [72]

**Village Defence Parties (VDP):** Established in 1976, the VDP is intended to consist of one platoon of male and one platoon of female members in each village of Bangladesh (32 members in each platoon). An urban version of the VDP, called “Town Defence Party” (TDP), consists of a platoon in each urban ‘ward’. The roles of a VDP include assisting the police and auxiliary units in maintaining law and order, co-operating with Government agencies in social and economic reconstruction, and supporting the civil administration in the event of a natural disaster. [71]

**Rapid Action Battalion (RAB):** The Rapid Action Battalion was established in March 2004 as a special anti-crime strike force. It functions under the Ministry of Home Affairs and consists of personnel drawn mainly from the police and the armed forces. By August 2005 there were 10 RAB battalions, each with a planned strength of 688, stationed in the main urban centres of the country; each battalion included various specialist investigative units. RAB troops have reportedly received intensive commando training. [70] [71] A Freedom House report of June 2005 stated that the RAB has, since its inception, pursued an aggressive strategy against criminal gang members that has led to a large number of killings in so-called “crossfire” incidents [65a] (p78) – see Section 6: Police and Army Accountability.

(Note: ‘Cobra’ and ‘Cheetah’, sometimes referred to as ‘Kobra’ and ‘Chita’, are units within the Bangladesh Police. [38aa]

The Bangladesh Police is made up of 116,000 personnel serving under police divisions across the country and responsible to the Ministry of Home Affairs, according to the ‘Bangladesh Military Forces’ website (accessed 22 September 2005). [71] The 1998 Canadian IRB report, referred to above, noted that the police force is divided into gazetted and subordinate ranks, roughly analogous to commissioned and non-commissioned officers in the military. While the
gazetted officers were said to be relatively well trained, well paid and occupying important positions within the bureaucracy, the lower ranks were relatively poorly trained, poorly equipped, poorly paid and overworked. [3f] According to the website of the Rapid Action Battalion (accessed 21 September 2005), Bangladesh has one police officer per 1,200 population, compared to ratios of 1:728 for India and 1:625 for Pakistan. [70]

[See Section 6: Police and Army Accountability]

PRISONS AND PRISON CONDITIONS

5.47 According to USSD 2005:

“Prison conditions were abysmal and were a contributing factor to custodial deaths. According to press reports, 76 persons died in prison and 210 died while in the custody of police and other security forces ... All prisons were overcrowded and lacked adequate facilities. Government figures indicated that the existing prison population of 76,328 was nearly 300 percent of the official prison capacity of 27,545. Of the entire prison population, 51,801 were awaiting trial and 24,317 had been convicted, according to figures received by a human rights organization. In most cases, cells were so crowded that prisoners slept in shifts ... Juveniles were required by law to be detained separately from adults; however, in practice, due to a lack of facilities, many juveniles were incarcerated with adults ... Pretrial detainees were not held separately from convicted prisoners ... Although the law prohibits women in safe custody from being housed with criminals, in practice, no separate facilities existed.”

[2f] (section 1c)

5.48 UNDP 2002 specified that there were then 80 prisons in the country, of which 16 were not currently functioning. The Ministry of Home Affairs, through the directorate of prisons, is responsible for their management. Overcrowding had already worsened significantly by 2002, due mainly to the large number of prisoners awaiting trial. Prisoners/detainees were accommodated either in separate cells or in association wards, which are dormitories accommodating about 100 to 150 individuals. Under dormitory rules, each prisoner is entitled to 36 sq. ft of floor space; however, overcrowding had reduced the space available per prisoner. In certain wards prisoners had to sleep in shifts owing to lack of space. Ordinary prisoners received 2,800 to 3,000 calories of food per day, considered satisfactory by the Institute of Public Health Nutrition; so-called “classified prisoners” received more. However, prisoners were often required to eat their meals sitting on the ground under the open sky, in all weathers. The striped, coarse uniform worn by ordinary prisoners was considered demoralising. Bedding, consisting only of two blankets, was inadequate, degrading and detrimental to physical and mental health. Prison authorities still followed statutes framed by the British colonial authorities in the nineteenth century, the main objective of which was the confinement and safe custody of prisoners through suppressive and punitive measures. There was an absence of programmes for the reform and rehabilitation of offenders and vocational training programmes did not cater for all classes of prisoners. The recruitment and training procedures of prison officers was inadequate to facilitate the reform
of prisoners. The number of medical doctors was disproportionate to the size of the prison population, and women prisoners were attended to by male doctors. There were no paid nurses in prison hospitals; literate convicts worked as hospital attendants. There were no trained social welfare officers or psychologists. Handcuffing and the use of fetters were used as punishment for breaches of prison rules. [8b] (p79-89)

5.49  USSD 2004 had commented that women were detained separately from men but faced the same extremely poor conditions. [2d] (section 1c) United News of Bangladesh reported on 10 February 2004 that a new women’s prison was being constructed at Kashimpur, near Dhaka. It will eventually accommodate 2,550 inmates. [39] A United News article of 29 September 2004 noted also that a new prison was due to be opened in the district of Habiganj on 12 October 2004 – it has a separate accommodation building and separate hospital for women, as well as separate facilities for juveniles. [39g]

5.50  It is stated in USSD 2005: “In general, the government did not permit prison visits by independent human rights monitors, including the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Government-appointed committees of prominent private citizens in each prison locality monitored prisons monthly but did not release their findings. District judges occasionally visited prisons but rarely disclosed their findings.” [2f] (section 1c)

MILITARY SERVICE

5.51  War Resisters’ International, published in 1998, notes that conscription has never existed in Bangladesh, although the 1952 Bangladesh Army Act does provide for the possible introduction of compulsory military service. [13] A State Party report, dated 14 July 2005, to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UN CRC) states: “There is no provision for compulsory recruitment into the armed forces of Bangladesh.” [52b] According to the website of the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers (accessed 13 September 2004) the minimum age for voluntary recruitment in the army is 16 and there are indications that three per cent of government armed forces are under 18. [35] However, the UN CRC report of July 2005 indicates that the minimum age for voluntary recruitment in the Army and the Navy is 17 years, and 16 years for the Air Force. Because recruits initially undergo a period of basic training, there is no scope for any person to be employed for actual service or combat duty before attaining the age of 18. The minimum age for recruitment in the Bangladesh Rifles or the Ansar paramilitary force is 18 years. [52b]

MEDICAL SERVICES

5.52  The EIU Country Profile 2005 states that medical facilities in the country are ‘extremely scarce’; in 2001 there were 32,022 hospital beds, 32,498 registered doctors, 18,135 registered nurses and 15,794 midwives in the public sector. This translates to approximately 24 doctors and 13 registered nurses per...
100,000 population. [40a] (p17) A World Bank report of May 2004 estimated the worldwide average to be about 146 physicians and 334 nurses per 100,000 population. [6] According to the United Nations Common Country Assessment for 2004, the private sector provides the major proportion of outpatient curative care, especially among the poor, while the public sector serves the larger proportion of inpatient care. [8d] (p30) The EIU Country Profile notes that only about 12 per cent of all “serious cases” are referred to public health services. [40a] (p17) The World Health Organisation (WHO) World Health Report 2005 estimated total per-capita healthcare expenditure in 2002 to have been US $11. [14c]

5.53 The Government of Bangladesh has been operating a National Integrated Population and Health Programme (NIPHP), or Health and Population Sector Programme (HPSP), informs WHO [14a] The health policy is directed at improving equity and accessibility to the Essential Services Package (ESP). [14a] Since 1997, USAID has funded the NIPHP, employing a network of technical assistance organisations and local NGOs to deliver the Government’s ESP. The USAID website, accessed on 2 March 2006, states: “The NGO Service Delivery Program (NSDP) supports 41 local NGOs to deliver an essential package of health services (ESP) including child health, maternal health care, reproductive health care, clinical and non-clinical family planning services, communicable disease control, tuberculosis, safe delivery including first aid emergency obstetric care, post-abortion care, and limited curative care. This network of NGOs works through 346 urban and rural clinics, nearly 8000 satellite clinics and almost 7000 female depot holders nationwide, serving approximately 17 per cent of the national population. Over 1.5 million customers are served each month.” [17]

5.54 Prior to 1957 there were no psychiatric services in Bangladesh, relates the WHO Project Atlas report of 2005. The first mental hospital opened in 1957. At present, mental healthcare is provided at the primary level by primary care physicians and health workers, at the secondary level by district hospitals, though only one hospital is equipped to provide the services, and at tertiary level by teaching hospitals. Of the 14 drugs for psychiatric treatment listed in the WHO Project Atlas survey for 2005, only three were not available in Bangladesh. [14b] The British High Commission in Dhaka commented in November 2003: “As requested we have made enquiries into the provision of psychiatric care in Bangladesh. We have been advised by doctors working here that there are practising psychiatrists here who trained in the UK. While that standard of care provided in government hospitals is not necessarily fully up to UK standards, most doctors also run high quality private practices where fees are minimal compared with the UK.” [11f]


5.56 According to the UNAIDS website, when accessed on 13 September 2004, Bangladesh is a country with low HIV prevalence but high “vulnerability”. Bangladesh has documented the lowest condom use, very high numbers of
clients of sex workers, low knowledge of HIV/AIDS, and extensive needle/syringe sharing by drug users in the region. In spite of this, national commitment to HIV/AIDS prevention and care is high. UNAIDS comments that Bangladesh has the key ingredients for a successful response, a nationwide network of NGOs implementing effective interventions, effective examples of government organisation/NGO collaboration, a sector-wide approach to health with mechanisms for donor collaboration, an enabling multi-sectoral policy, and a strong commitment from the Government as well as civil society. [36a] The UNAIDS website, on 2 March 2006, noted that a National Strategic Plan for the period 2004-2010 had been developed in 2004 to co-ordinate and fund a national response to HIV. It had been estimated that, by the end of 2003, between 2,500 and 15,000 people in Bangladesh were living with HIV. [36b] In October 2003 it was announced that Beximco Pharmaceuticals Limited, one of Bangladesh’s leading pharmaceutical manufacturers, had formally launched five high specification anti-retroviral drugs. (Espicom Business Intelligence) [28]

5.57 Medecins Sans Frontières (MSF) offers basic medical care to certain parts of the Chittagong Hill Tracts which are difficult to access and where health care has been almost nonexistent; some of these areas are so remote that they are accessible only on foot or by boat. There is a high incidence of malaria in the Chittagong Hill Tracts; MSF and others have been providing the effective artemisinin-based combination therapy (ACT) in Bangladesh since 2004, according to MSF articles of 19 July 2004 and 5 December 2005. [29b] [29c]

PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES

5.58 USSD 2005 advises as follows:

“The law provides for equal treatment and freedom from discrimination for persons with disabilities; however, in practice, persons with disabilities faced social and economic discrimination. The law focuses on prevention of disability, treatment, education, rehabilitation and employment, transport accessibility, and advocacy … The Ministry of Social Welfare, the Department of Social Services, and the National Foundation for the Development of the Disabled are the government agencies responsible for protecting the rights of persons with disabilities. The Ministry of Social Welfare set up a task force, composed of government officials and members of NGOs, who adopted an action plan in 2004 to improve the overall welfare of the disabled. The plan awaits cabinet approval. Government facilities for treating persons with mental handicaps were inadequate. Several private initiatives existed in the areas of medical and vocational rehabilitation, as well as employment of persons with disabilities.” [2f] (section 5)

5.59 The UN Common Country Assessment for 2004 adds:

“According to the National Forum of Organisations Working With the Disabled [an umbrella organization consisting of more than 80 NGOs working in various fields of disability] approximately 14 percent of the country's population has some form of disability. The economic condition of most families limits their ability to assist with the special needs of the disabled, and superstition and fear of persons with disabilities sometimes results in their isolation.” [8d] (p68-69)
EDUCATION SYSTEM

5.60 After independence in 1971, the Bangladesh Constitution recognised the need for basic education as a fundamental human right. Provision of such education was thought to be a state responsibility and the state nationalised 36,000 private schools, according to a paper prepared for the European Network of Bangladesh Studies Workshop (ENBSW) in May 2000. [33]

5.61 The Bangla2000 website informs that education is divided into four levels: Primary (from grades 1 to 5), Secondary (from grades 6 to 10), Higher Secondary (grades 11 to 12) and Tertiary. In 1998 there were about 52,000 primary schools and 11,000 secondary institutions. The language of tuition in state schools is Bangla. A number of private schools provide an English medium education and offer ‘O’ and ‘A’ level courses. [26a]

5.62 There is also a Madrassa system which emphasises an Islamic religious education. A report published by the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) in 2004 estimated that there were, in 2000/1, some 13,400 madrassas in Bangladesh, of which about 6,900 were state-funded. Approximately 3,340,000 pupils then attended madrassas. [27a] A BBC News article of 25 February 2005 noted that there were then nearly 8,000 madrassas registered with the Government and perhaps “tens of thousands” of others set up unofficially and outside government control. [20aw] United News of Bangladesh, in a report of 4 March 2005, stated: “There are 2.5 lakh (250,000) teachers in around 27,000 Ebtedayi, Dakhil, Alim and Kamil madrassas, with 40 lakh (4,000,000) students across the country.” [39z] An Asian Centre for Human Rights (ACHR) report of November 2005, entitled “Judges under the attacks of the Jihadis”, stated as follows:

“There are presently an estimated 64,000 madrasas in Bangladesh. [The ACHR report quoted the estimate of 64,000 from the Muktadhara website: http://muktadhara.net] The state support to madrasas, which are increasingly being held responsible for fomenting extremism across the world, has increased exponentially during the current BNP-Jamaat rule. It is not only Saudi funds. The Government of Bangladesh has been using assistance for education from UN agencies, western donors and other multilateral financial institutions to fund the madrasas. According to Bangladesh Economic Review, from 2001 to 2005, the number of madrasas increased by 22.22 per cent in comparison to the 9.74 per cent growth of the general educational institutions. Teachers in the general schools and colleges increased by 12.27 per cent against 16.52 per cent in the madrasas during the same period. The number of students in general educational institutions rose by 8.64 per cent while the madrasas saw 10.12 per cent rise. These figures relate to about 9,000 government-registered madrasas. There are about 15,000 Qawmi madrasas under the Bangladesh Qawmi Madrasa Education Board which are totally out of government control and have their own curriculum ... There are thousands of other madrasas which are not registered under any organisation ... Madrasas have been consistently used as training centres by the Jihadis.” [53c] (p8)

5.63 The Government provides free schooling for children of both sexes for eight years, states Europa South Asia 2005. Primary education is compulsory and begins at six years of age and lasts for five years. Secondary education begins at the age of eleven and lasts for seven years. [1b] (p119)
5.64 The EIU Country Profile 2005 records that the level of enrolment in primary schools increased substantially in the 1990s; the number of primary school children increased from 12.0 million in 1990 to 17.7 million in 2001, and the proportion of female students rose from 44.7 per cent to 49.1 per cent over the same period. Secondary education is provided largely by the private sector; in 2004 there were 16,171 secondary schools with 7.9 million students, about half of whom were female. This EIU report noted, however, that fewer than half of all children complete five years of primary education. It attributes a poor quality of elementary education to badly trained or absentee teachers, large classes and a shortage of books. [40a] (p16)

5.65 There are 13 state universities and 138 technical colleges, states Europa South Asia 2005. There is also an Islamic university. [1b] (p119)
6. Human Rights

6.A Human Rights Issues

Overview


“The Government’s poor human rights record remained poor, and the Government continued to commit numerous serious abuses. [2f] (introduction) … Security forces committed numerous extrajudicial killings. The police, Bangladesh Rifles (BDR), and the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) used unwarranted lethal force … Nearly all abuses went uninvestigated and unpunished. (section 1a) … Violence, often resulting in deaths, was a pervasive element in the country’s politics. Supporters of different political parties, and often supporters of different factions within one party, frequently clashed with each other and with police during rallies and demonstrations. (section 1a) … While the law prohibits torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment, security forces, the RAB, and police routinely employed physical and psychological torture as well as cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment during arrests and interrogations. (section 1c) … The law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, authorities frequently violated these provisions, even in non-preventive detention cases. (section 1d) … There was widespread police corruption and a severe lack of resources, training, and discipline. (section 1d) … The government used Sections 54 and 86 to harass and intimidate members of the political opposition and their families. Police detained opposition activists prior to and during demonstrations without citing any legal authority, holding them until the event was over. (section 1d) … Arbitrary and lengthy pretrial detention remained a problem. (section 1d) … Corruption, judicial inefficiency,
targeted violence against judges, and a large backlog were serious problems [in the Judiciary]. (section 1e) … The law allowed intelligence and law enforcement agencies to tap phones. (section 1f) … The law provides for freedom of speech and press; however, in practice the government limited these rights. (section 2a)… Discrimination against Ahmadiyyas, Hindus, and Christians occurred during the year [including serious acts of intimidation against the Ahmadiyya community]. (section 2c) … Corruption remained a problem throughout the government. (section 3) … Domestic violence was widespread… Incidents of vigilantism against women - sometimes led by religious leaders (by means of fatwas) - at times occurred, particularly in rural areas. (section 5) … Child labor remained a problem and frequently resulted in the abuse of children. (section 5) … The law prohibits trafficking in persons; however, trafficking remained a serious problem. (section 5).

The same report quotes as follows: “According to a local human rights organization, 310 persons died and 8,997 were wounded in incidents of political violence [during 2005]. Police arrested 1,216 persons for political reasons during the year, most of whom were held for a short time prior to their release.” [2f] (section 1d)


“The Bangladesh constitution guarantees fundamental rights and civil liberties. Political, cultural, and religious freedoms for all groups are protected. All citizens are recognized as equal irrespective of their ethnicity, gender, or religion. The constitution also mandates affirmative action measures to promote gender, racial, and social equality and eliminate discrimination. Notwithstanding the law, in practice women and ethnic and religious minorities often face discrimination. Over the years Bangladesh has also formulated some laws that limit civil liberties.” [65a]

6.04 USSD 2005 notes:

“A wide variety of domestic and international human rights groups generally operated independently and without government restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases. While human rights groups were often sharply critical of the government, they also practiced [sic] self-censorship, particularly on politically sensitive cases and subjects. Unlike in previous years, the government did not pressure individual human rights advocates by filing false allegations against them or by delaying re-entry visas for international human rights activists.” [2f] (section 4)

According to USSD 2005, the Government co-operated with international organisations such as UNHRC and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). [2f] (section 4)

(See also Section 6C – Treatment of Human Rights NGOs)

6.05 An Amnesty International Report, entitled “Urgent need for legal and other reforms to protect human rights”, had observed in May 2003: “The failure of successive governments to address human rights violations in a consistent and effective manner points to the desperate need for an independent, impartial and competent human rights watchdog in the country – such as a National Human
Rights Commission (NHRC). Human rights defenders and the international community have been urging Bangladeshi governments to set up a NHRC. Both the previous Awami League government and the present BNP government have acknowledged the necessity for its formation, but neither have taken the appropriate action to establish it. [7a] (p11) An article of 26 July 2004, from United News of Bangladesh, quoted the Minister of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs as saying that a bill to facilitate the establishment of an independent Human Rights Commission was currently with the relevant cabinet committee for vetting. [39c]

USSD 2005 confirmed, however: “Despite its election pledge and repeated public announcements, the government did not enact legislation establishing an independent National Human Rights Commission. Previous legislation authorizing the establishment of a Human Rights Ombudsman’s Office continued to remain dormant.” [2f] (section 4)

6.06 An article dated 28 February 2005, on the website of Time (Asia edition), noted the Government’s long delay in taking effective action against militant Islamic groups who, for three years, had perpetrated a wave of bombings, assassinations and religious violence across the country. The article observed:

“Members of the militant Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (J.M.J.B.) in the north have claimed responsibility for the bombings of cinemas and cultural shows, and for the killing of scores of Hindus and Buddhists as well as Muslims they considered too lax. A campaign of assassinations by bombs saw failed attempts last year on British High Commissioner Anwar Choudhury and opposition leader Sheikh Hasina, and a successful bid on Jan. 27 [2005] to kill senior opposition figure Shah Abu Mohammed Shamsul Kibria.” [54b]

“Yet until very recently, Bangladeshi officials flatly denied that the country was a hotbed of militancy and violence. ‘We have no official knowledge of the existence of J.M.J.B.’, State Minister for Home Affairs Lutfozzaman Babar told reporters on Jan. 26 [2005].” [54b]

“Last week [circa 23 February 2005], however, the government dramatically changed its strategy. Police announced the arrest of scores of suspected militants in two days; they allegedly included several in possession of explosives and bomb-making equipment, as well as a professor of Arabic named Mohammed Asadullah Al Galib whom Bangladeshi authorities have accused of having ties to militants in the Middle East and Asia. Officials also banned Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (J.M.B.) and the suddenly acknowledged J.M.J.B., accusing these two organizations of ‘a series of murders, robberies, bomb attacks, threats and various kinds of terrorist acts,’ and of ‘trying to create social unrest by misleading a group of youths and abusing their religious sentiments.’ Police are still looking for Azizur Rahman [a.k.a. Siddiqul Islam, alias ‘Bangla Bhai’], the man they claim is the J.M.J.B.’s leader.” [54b]

The Time article further commented that radical Islam may already have become entrenched in Bangladesh as a result of the Government’s delay in taking action. Time noted that critics of the Government remained unconvinced of its commitment to curbing militancy and prosecuting radicals. [54b]
Note: In March 2006 the police and security forces arrested both Shaikh Abdur Rahman, the leader of Jama’ul Mujahedin Bangladesh (JMB), and JMJB leader Siddiqul Islam, alias ‘Bangla Bhai’. According to an Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) report of January 2006, police detained over 800 people between 30 November 2005 and early January 2006 on suspicion of being involved in terrorist activity.

(See also Section 4 History and Annex C Political Organisations)

6.07 On 5 January 2006 the cabinet approved a bill extending the Government’s power to tap telephones, records the EIU report of January 2006.

“The law allowed intelligence and law enforcement agencies to tap phones with the permission of the chief executive of MOHA [Ministry of Home Affairs]. The ordinance also gives the government the authority to prevent phone operators from delivering messages, in the interest of national security. In cases of national emergency, the government can revoke any permit to provide communications services, without providing compensation to the holder of the license. The ordinance went into effect [on 12 December 2005] during a recess in parliament, but must be approved as soon as parliament returns to become permanent law.”

A BBC News article of 12 December 2005 quoted the Minister of Home Affairs as saying that the Islamist militant network is “maintained” through mobile telephones. He said: “We know Islamist leaders use 20 to 30 different cell phone numbers to guide the bombers…” A Supreme Court lawyer told the BBC: “If the law is applied on a wholesale basis, it will certainly curtail the people’s privacy and violate their fundamental rights.”

TORTURE

6.08 USSD 2005 states:

“While the law prohibits torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment, security forces, the RAB, and police routinely employed physical and psychological torture as well as cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment during arrests and interrogations. Torture consisted of threats and beatings and the use of electric shock. According to the Bangladesh Rehabilitation Center for Trauma Victims, there were 2,297 victims of torture and 15 deaths due to torture by security forces during the year [2005] …The government rarely charged, convicted, or punished those responsible, and a climate of impunity allowed such police abuses to continue.”

According to an Amnesty International Report entitled “Torture and impunity”, dated November 2000:

“Torture has been widespread under successive governments. Neither governments nor the opposition parties past and present have shown serious determination to confront the practice and prevent it.”
“There is a shared consensus amongst human rights defenders in Bangladesh that torture is a product of political corruption, illiteracy, underdevelopment and poverty...Political parties are hardly interested in the violation of the human rights of the people who are not their members.” [7c] (section 9)

“Governments in Bangladesh have been keen to maintain old legislation that facilitate torture or to enact new laws which effectively serve the same function. One such legislation is Section 54 of Bangladesh Code of Criminal Procedure (BCCP) 1898, which allows the police to arrest anyone without a warrant of arrest and keep them in detention for 24 hours.” [7e] (section 7.2)

Amnesty International’s 2004 Annual Report (covering events of 2003) commented: “Torture remained widespread...The government failed to implement safeguards against torture. Victims included suspected criminals, children and people detained on politically motivated grounds. At least 13 people died in police custody. The police reportedly denied allegations that their deaths were the result of torture.” [7f] (p1)

6.09 The Bangladesh Rehabilitation Centre for Trauma Victims (BRCT), in their report “Human Rights Situation of Bangladesh 2003”, reported that law enforcement agencies (including the police, paramilitaries and the Army) in Bangladesh tortured 1,296 people, in 419 “occurrences”, during 2003. Police personnel were responsible for most of these incidents. The report specified: “As method of torture they used sticks, rifle butts, bullet, tear shell, verbal abuses, slapping and kicking”(sic). [63]

6.10 The Redress Trust, a UK-based NGO, produced a report in August 2004 entitled “Torture in Bangladesh 1971-2004”. The report observed, inter alia, that:

Bangladesh had ratified the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR), but numerous reports suggested that the practice of torture continued unabated and that there was nearly complete impunity for perpetrators. [34] (Introduction)

The main perpetrators of torture and other forms of ill-treatment appeared to be the law-enforcement agencies, and the police in particular. The Army and paramilitaries, notably the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR), have also reportedly employed torture in the course of operations. Armed groups associated with political parties, as well as dissident groups from the Chittagong Hill Tract, have used torture in some instances. It appeared that the practice of torture had persisted since 1971, regardless of which government was in power. [34] (section II C)

Ill-treatment, which may amount to torture, was frequently used by the police in the course of criminal investigations, and also as a tool to extract money from detained suspects and their families. Political opponents have reportedly been subjected to ill-treatment and torture under various governments; during times of unrest there has been a marked increase in institutional violence against journalists, demonstrators, opposition members, etc. Members of religious minorities have been subjected to ill-treatment and have been targeted by extremist groups. There was a high incidence of violence against women. [34] (section II C)
Reasons for the prevalence of torture included high levels of corruption, a long practice of using violence for political ends, poor training of police, and inadequate legal safeguards. [34] (section II C)

Torture is expressly prohibited in Article 35(5) of the Constitution. Public officials (including police officers) who committed certain acts amounting to torture could be prosecuted – and imprisoned – under various sections of the Penal Code or, where applicable, under the Dhaka Metropolitan Police Ordinance or the Police Act. (Offences of rape or sexual harassment are tried by the Suppression of Violence against Woman and Children Tribunals.) [34] (section III B ii)

There were no comprehensive official statistics on the number of torture-related complaints filed with magistrates (or the police) and subsequent action taken. A large number of cases remained unreported. Some complaints were withdrawn due to police pressure, including offers of money to victims to drop their claims. Only a few prosecutions of perpetrators had been successful; inadequate investigations and difficulty in finding witnesses and obtaining medical evidence were cited as problems. There had, apparently, been several instances of out-of-court settlements in torture cases. [34] (section IV B)

The High Court was competent to award compensation or reparation to citizens whose Constitutional rights had been violated – including victims of torture – and to initiate criminal proceedings against the perpetrators. [34] (section III B ii)

Bangladeshi laws provided certain groups of public officials with immunity from prosecution for certain offences committed in discharge of their duties. There was also specific legislation [the Joint Drive Indemnity Act] which provided immunity to members of the security forces for human rights violations committed in the course of ‘Operation Clean Heart’ (16 October 2002 to 9 January 2003). [34] (section IV B i)

Specialist treatment was available to torture victims through non-governmental rehabilitation centres, including the Bangladesh Rehabilitation Centre for Trauma Victims (BRCT) and the Centre for Rehabilitation of Torture Survivors, Bangladesh (CRTS.B). [34] (section III B ii)

Politically-motivated detentions

(See also Section 5 Legal rights/detention)

6.11 USSD 2005 notes: “The government stated that it held no political prisoners; however, opposition parties and human rights monitors claimed the government arrested many political activists and convicted them on unfounded criminal charges.” [2f] (section 1e)

6.12 The same report adds:

“Arbitrary arrests were common. The government used serial detentions to prevent the release of political activists.” [2f] (section 1d)
“The government used Sections 54 and 86 to harass and intimidate members of the political opposition and their families. Police detained opposition activists prior to and during demonstrations without citing any legal authority, holding them until the event was over ... It was difficult to estimate the total number of persons detained for political reasons. Many activists were charged with crimes, and many criminals claimed to be political activists. Most such detentions lasted for several days or weeks, and defendants in most cases received bail; however, dismissal of wrongful charges or acquittal took years ... Police arrested 1,216 persons for political reasons during the year, most of whom were held for a short time prior to their release.” [2f] (section 1d)

6.13 USSD 2003 noted that “In March 2002, Home Minister Altaf Hossain Chowdhury said the Government had released 11,706 persons in politically motivated cases since the BNP came to power in 2001. In April 2002, the PSA Repeal Law came into effect and gave the Government authority to determine which cases filed under the SPA law would be withdrawn and which ones would be pursued.” [2b] (section 1e)

6.14 The Daily Star of Bangladesh had reported on 20 April 2004: “Police and paramilitary Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) yesterday cracked down on the activists of Awami league (AL) and workers of Proshika, a non-government organisation, arresting at least 1,363 of them to foil the AL’s programme to lay siege to Hawa Bhaban tomorrow.” The arrests took place during a concerted Awami League programme of public demonstrations to attempt to unseat the Government; Hawa Bhaban is where the offices of the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) are situated. The Commissioner of the Dhaka Metropolitan Police was quoted as saying: ‘It is nothing new. We are conducting routine raids to keep law and order under control’. [38g] On 23 April, the Daily Star informed: “Blanket arrests continued to smother Dhaka yesterday ahead of the Awami League’s April 30 deadline for unseating the government, while anxious relatives thronged jail gates with bail documents for the release of the ‘victims of mindless political manoeuvring’.” Hundreds more people had been arrested since 20 April; police were said to have “picked up” at least 5,000 people arriving at bus, train and launch terminals and sent 2,910 of them to the already overcrowded Dhaka Central Jail. At the same time, 815 people had been released from the prison by the evening of 22 April. [38h] The Daily Star then reported on 27 April 2004: “The government yesterday apparently stopped mass arrests and asked the police not to harass the innocent, after more than 15,000 people were arrested in an eight-day dragnet.” [38i]

POLICE AND ARMY ACCOUNTABILITY

(See also Section 6 Torture)

6.15 According to USSD 2005:

“Police were organized nationally, under the Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA), and had a mandate to maintain internal security and general law and order. Police were generally ineffective, reluctant to investigate persons affiliated with the ruling party, and were used frequently for political purposes by the government ... The RAB [Rapid Action Battalion], a better-equipped police unit
drawing personnel from various police units and security agencies, including the
military, developed plans for overall police reform, but few concrete steps were
taken to address human rights problems. The RAB committed serious human
rights violations … There was widespread police corruption and a severe lack of
resources, training, and discipline. Victims of police abuse were reluctant to file
charges, as there was no independent body charged with investigation of
criminal allegations against members of the police force. There were no
developments during the year regarding the legality of the Joint Drive Indemnity
Act, which barred persons from seeking remuneration for human rights
violations that occurred during Operation Clean Heart in 2003 … Plaintiffs rarely
accused police in criminal cases due to lengthy trial procedures, and out of fear
of retribution against them or their families. This often created a climate of
impunity for police.” [2f] (section 1d)

“Security forces committed numerous extrajudicial killings. The police,
Bangladesh Rifles (BDR), and the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) used
unwarranted lethal force … There was an increased number of killings by
security personnel … Nearly all abuses went uninvestigated and unpunished.
The resulting climate of impunity remained a serious obstacle to ending abuse
and killings. In the few instances where charges were levied, punishment of
those found guilty was predominantly administrative. According to press
reports, law enforcement agencies, including the RAB, a paramilitary group
composed of personnel from different law enforcement agencies, including the
military, killed 396 persons this year. The deaths, all under unusual
circumstances, occurred while an accused was in custody or during police
operations; however, the government described the deaths of some identified
criminals as occurring in crossfire between the RAB or police and criminal
gangs. Of these 396 cases, 340 deaths were attributed to crossfire, of which the
RAB was responsible for 107, the police 212, and other security forces 21.
There were also a number of cases of deaths due to beatings or excessive
force while in custody.” [2f] (section 1a)

6.16 The Freedom House report of June 2005, entitled “Countries at the Crossroads
2005: A Survey of Democratic Governance”, notes:

“A recent and disturbing manifestation of law enforcement without accountability
has been the creation of the RAB [Rapid Action Battalion]. The RAB’s main task
is to track down and apprehend criminal elements who have created an
atmosphere of insecurity throughout the country. The RAB since its inception
has pursued an aggressive strategy against criminal gang members that has
led to a large number of killings in so-called crossfire after people have been
arrested.”

The report continues: “These crossfire custodial deaths are viewed by human
rights groups as a form of extrajudicial execution arising from lack of civilian
oversight of the RAB. These extrajudicial executions have generated serious
disquiet within the political opposition as well as among civil society and have
now drawn the attention of the international community as well. However,
arbitrary action by law enforcement agencies can still be subject to the rule of
law through reference to the higher judiciary, who have frequently intervened to
curb arbitrary behavior.” [65a] (p78)

EIU January 2005 relates that, in the second half of 2004, an estimated 147
people were killed by the Rapid Action Battalion in ‘cross-fire’ during operations
to recover illegal firearms. According to the report, it was widely believed (by the public) that most of those killed were notorious or wanted criminals. The EIU report notes: “These extra-judicial killings routinely made headlines, drawing widespread criticism from civil society organisations, as well as the opposition Awami League. However, the government remained indifferent to the criticism as the law-and-order situation seemed to improve as a result of force of arms.” [40b] (p15)

6.17 On 18 July 2005 the Daily Star reported that the law enforcement agencies had killed 378 people in so-called “crossfire” (or “encounter” or “shootout”) incidents since June 2004. Of these, 245 people had died in police actions, 116 were killed by the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), 12 by Cobra and Cheetah (special police units) and five by joint forces. While the authorities had referred to those killed as known criminals (who had fired first or were attempting to flee), the Daily Star asserted that the victims of “crossfire” also included several people who had no police record. The article stated: “The law enforcers...have been relentless in their attempts to show the innocent victims of crossfire as criminals by coming up with false criminal records against them. But investigations by newspapers have nullified the claims by the law enforcers while corroborated those of the victims’ families.” [38aa] Amnesty International, in its Annual Report 2005 (covering events of 2004) stated:

“At least 147 people reportedly died during the year [2004] in what the government portrayed as deaths in crossfire between the special security force known as the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) and suspected criminals. There were concerns that the deaths, which usually occurred in desolate locations after the arrest of suspects, were deliberate killings by the RAB. Opposition parties alleged their members were most frequently targeted, but the government denied this.” [7n]

United News of Bangladesh and BBC News, on 11 May 2005, quoted the Minister for Home Affairs as saying that there would be an ‘executive inquiry’ into every ‘encounter’ incident involving the Rapid Action Battalion or the police and that legal action would be taken if there was found to have been any wrongdoing. The BBC News article noted that US and European Union officials had expressed serious concern over what they feared may be extra-judicial killings. [20bi] [39aa] In comments submitted to the Advisory Panel on Country Information on 8 September 2005, UNHCR referred to an article in the Prothom Alo newspaper on 17 July 2005, which stated that the executive authority had, by then, investigated 65 incidents involving deaths in “crossfire” and had found justification for such action by the Rapid Action Battalion. This investigation by the executive authority had been severely criticised by human rights groups. [67b] The Asian Human Rights Commission, an independent NGO, commented in a statement issued on 19 July 2005 that impartiality in the official enquiry remained at issue if the law enforcement agencies who were involved in many of the incidents were now designated to investigate those incidents. [66a]

6.18 A study published in 2002 by Transparency International (TI), entitled “Corruption in Bangladesh: A Household Survey”, found that 84 per cent of those respondents who had dealings with the police claimed to have encountered corruption; in most cases this pertained to bribery. [42a] (pp52-58) According to the Summary Findings of a 2005 TI Household Survey: in relation to the Police department, 92 per cent of respondent households who had lodged an FIR (First Information Report) at a police station had to pay an
average of 2,430 taka in bribes; 91 per cent of households who registered a GD (General Diary) complaint at a police station had to pay 939 taka on average as bribes; 80 per cent of households who needed a clearance certificate from police had to pay an average amount of 881 taka as a bribe; 71 per cent of the ‘accused’ had to pay bribes at the rate of 5,718 taka. (The detailed findings of this report were not yet available in English on TI’s website by March 2006.) [42c]

6.19 The British High Commission in Dhaka, in a letter dated 1 October 2004, described how citizens can proceed if the police refuse/decline to investigate a particular complaint or to file a criminal case: “Lawyers working for the respected Human Rights NGO, Odhikar, have advised that in such a case an individual can petition a magistrate. If the magistrate agrees with his [or her] claim, the magistrate can then direct the police to accept the case. [The British High Commission has also] heard the same from another Human Rights NGO, the ‘Human Rights Congress for Bangladeshi Minorities’.” [11h]

6.20 An article in The Hindu newspaper of 27 February 2003 noted that the Bangladesh Parliament had passed a controversial indemnity bill called the Joint Drive Force Indemnity Ordinance 2003. The law gives members of the joint security forces immunity from legal proceedings in civil courts for their actions during the countrywide ‘Operation Clean Heart’ anti-crime drive between 16 October 2002 and 9 January 2003. [21b]

6.21 The Daily Star of Bangladesh reported in November 2003: “After 25 years in service, 302 police officers from inspectors down were forced into retirement on October 7 in the latest in a spate of massive layoffs and transfers in the department since the government changeover in October 2001 ... Home Ministry sources said some 12,000 policemen will be recruited – 5,000 to fill the vacancies and rest for the 7,000 new posts to be created ... According to police records, 19,622 policemen were punished for corruption and other crimes last year, up from 16,913 in 2001 ... By contrast 14,069 policemen were rewarded for good performance last year.” [38a] The human rights NGO, Odhikar, in their 2003 report “Police Reform in Bangladesh – An Agenda for Action”, confirmed that 19,620 police officers had been subject to disciplinary action in 2002 – of those, 1,776 cases were listed under “major punishment” and 17,844 under “minor punishment”. [46a]

6.22 Agence France-Presse reported in September 2004 that three policemen had been hanged for the rape and murder of a 14-year-old girl in 1995. [23h] [23i] In October 2004 a Dhaka court sentenced three former army officers to death for their roles in the murder of four senior Awami League politicians in Dhaka Central Jail on 3 November 1975. (EIU January 2005) [40b] [p14] An article in the Daily Star of 10 March 2005 indicated that 107 officers of the Rapid Action Battalion had faced criminal or disciplinary action for various offences, such as bribe-taking, since June 2004. [38ab]

6.23 BBC News reported on 14 December 2004 that the Inspector General of Police [head of police in Bangladesh] had left his job after he had been found guilty on a charge of contempt of court. Home Ministry officials said that he had “lost the right to function as police chief after the court verdict” – under Bangladeshi law, a public servant automatically loses their job if found to have committed certain criminal offences. [20au]
6.24 An article dated 12 January 2005, on the website of the Bangladesh National Women Lawyers Association (BNWLA), quoted United News of Bangladesh as follows:

“A far-reaching police reform project titled ‘Strengthening Bangladesh Police’ has been launched to improve the law and order situation. The Ministry of Home Affairs launched the project yesterday in co-operation with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the UK Department for International Development (DFID). The three-year project, involving [US]$13 million, aims at improving performance and professionalism at all levels of the police force. It will focus on crime prevention through better engagement with the community, investigation, operation and prosecution, human resource management, training and strategy and oversight, including clear performance target. Of the 115,500 police in Bangladesh, only 12 percent are women, said a UNDP press release.” [39p]

6.25 According to the June 2005 Freedom House report:

“The military, by and large, tend to be free of the influence of nonstate actors and have in the post-1991 situation attempted to avoid being drawn into the political disputes of the major political parties. The internal security services also tend to be immune from outside political influence. The police, on the other hand, are known to build alliances with both commercial and criminal interests.” [65a] (p80)

6.26 According to USSD 2005, the law provides for freedom of speech and press; however, in practice, the Government limited these rights during 2005. USSD 2004 had observed: “The Constitution provides for freedom of speech and press, subject to what it deemed reasonable restrictions in the interest of security, friendly relations with foreign states, public order, decency and morality, or to prohibit defamation or incitement to an offense; however, in practice, the Government limited these rights.” [2d] (section 2a) The New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists commented in its report “Attacks on the Press 2005”: “The Bangladeshi press operates largely without direct government interference, and it routinely exposes government corruption.” But the report further stated that retaliatory physical attacks on journalists (by various Islamist and other militant groups) had occurred frequently and with impunity and little had been done by the state authorities to track down and punish those responsible. [51a]

6.27 The BBC News ‘Country Profile: Bangladesh’ (updated 28 December 2005) notes that “The main broadcast media in Bangladesh – Radio Bangladesh and Bangladesh Television – are state-owned and favourable to the government. Little coverage is given to the political opposition, except in the run-up to general elections when a caretaker Government takes control. …Although Bangladesh Television remains the country’s sole terrestrial TV channel, private satellite-delivered TV stations [such as ‘ATN Bangla’ and ‘Channel i’] have established a presence.” [20am] The website of Population Concern informs that there were, in 1995, only seven television sets per thousand people in
This Country of Origin Information Report contains the most up-to-date publicly available information as at 10 March 2006. Older source material has been included where it contains relevant information not available in more recent documents.

Bangladesh (compared with 612 per thousand people in the UK). [49] According to Country-Data.com, statistics from the early 1980s indicated that about 29 per cent of the country’s urban households had radios at that time. [48]

6.28 USSD 2005 notes:

“There were hundreds of daily and weekly independent publications. Many newspapers criticized government policies and activities, including those of the prime minister.” [2f] (section 2a)

“Newspaper ownership and content were not subject to direct government restriction. The government owned or significantly influenced one radio and some television stations; however, unlike in previous years, these stations did not focus the bulk of their coverage on the government. While four private television stations were in operation, the government shut down one private radio station in May [2005], ostensibly for failing to pay bills on time. The government issued four new private television and three new radio station licenses, giving the licenses allegedly to persons with close political connections. Cable operators generally functioned without government interference; however, all private stations were required to broadcast, without charge, some government news programs and speeches by the prime minister and the president as a condition of operation.” [2f] (section 2a)

“The government applied indirect pressure to coerce journalists into self-censorship. For example, in July 2004 an official of the prime minister's press wing threatened to limit a private television reporter's access to ruling party functions if he did not stop covering an opposition candidate's campaign. The reporter was withdrawn from election coverage by his supervisors for failing to comply.” [2f] (section 2a)

“Foreign publications and films were subject to review and censorship. A government-run film censor board reviewed local and foreign films and had the authority to censor or ban films on the grounds of state security, law and order, religious sentiment, obscenity, foreign relations, defamation, or plagiarism.” [2f] (section 2a)

“The government exercised censorship most often in cases of immodest or obscene photographs, perceived misrepresentation or defamation of Islam, and for objectionable comments regarding national leaders.” [2f] (section 2a)

“The government did not directly restrict citizens’ access to the Internet.” [2f] (section 2a)

“The government did not limit academic freedom; however, authorities discouraged research on sensitive religious and political topics.” [2f] (section 2a)

6.29 The International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), in a report on their fact-finding mission of December 2004, detailed a number of means by which the Bangladeshi authorities were said to indirectly limit freedom of expression in the media:

- Legislative: The FIDH report states that “Although the Constitution enshrines the right to freedom of expression, Bangladesh presents the worrying peculiarity of multiplying seemingly overlapping pieces of...
legislation which all converge to impose serious restrictions on freedom of expression, as well as to access to information. Furthermore, an unfortunate practice has developed, whereby defamation cases are filed immediately, allowing for the immediate detention of the journalist concerned, irrespective of the veracity of his/her report. This creates tremendous pressure on both media outlets and individual journalists.”

- Commercial: For example, the authorities can limit the volume of public sector advertising placed in certain newspapers.

- Administrative: For example, the Act which regulates the licensing of printers, publishers and editors bars the publication of material ‘which is objectionable for, or offensive against, the interests of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh or its government’. [68a] (pp7-11 and 15)

TREATMENT OF JOURNALISTS

6.30 The Committee to Protect Journalists, in their report “Attacks on the Press 2005” [CPJ 2005], stated:

“Bangladesh was already [prior to 2005] one of the most dangerous countries for the press in Asia, according to CPJ research. Even by that poor standard, death threats and physical attacks against journalists spiked in 2005. Traditional enemies of the press such as criminal gangs, underground leftist groups, police, politicians, and student activists continued to lash out at journalists. The newer and potentially graver threat from radical Islamist groups exacerbated the treacherous landscape … In May [2005], CPJ named Bangladesh one of the world’s five most murderous countries for journalists. Nine journalists were killed over five years, eight of them in the lawless southwestern Khulna district, which is rife with criminal gangs, outlawed political groups, and drug traffickers. Seven of the victims received death threats beforehand. Investigations into the murders have yielded no convictions … Journalists in rural provinces faced threats from the growing number of illegal groups… [R]etaliatory physical attacks and threats occur frequently and with impunity. Despite promises from officials to track down those responsible for the attacks, little is done to punish offenders – even in high-profile murder cases.” [51a]

The CPJ 2004 report noted that Islamic extremist groups had threatened journalists throughout the country for reporting on their activities, branding them ‘enemies of Islam’. [51d] CPJ 2005 noted that journalists continued to receive death threats from Islamist militants during 2005 and, in the series of bomb attacks across Bangladesh on 17 August 2005 for which the group Jamatul Mujahedin Bangladesh are believed responsible (see Section 4: History), at least seven press clubs were targeted. [51a]

6.31 Reporters Without Borders (Reporters sans frontières – RSF) 2005 Annual Report noted: “For the third year running, Bangladesh was [in 2004] the country with the largest number of journalists physically attacked or threatened with death. Four reporters were killed and 10 were arrested. The conservative government showed no interest in combating the scourges of corruption and violence against the press. Protected by the authorities, Islamist groups stepped up their intimidation of independent news media.” [9i] The report continued: “Violence against journalists, especially in the provinces, has continued to limit the possibility of freely covering key issues such as corruption,
human rights violations and the collusion between politicians and organised crime. The police and courts were unable to put an end to the impunity enjoyed by the activists of the ruling parties, especially the BNP youth, who attack journalists … Physical attacks became increasingly common in 2004.” [91]

6.32 According to USSD 2005:

“Attacks on journalists and newspapers, and government efforts to intimidate them, political party activists, and others, occurred frequently. Attacks against journalists by political activists were common during times of political violence, and some journalists were injured in police actions. According to a local human rights organization, 142 journalists were injured, 2 killed, 11 arrested, 4 kidnapped, 53 assaulted, and 249 threatened during the year [2005].” [2f] (section 2a)

6.33 BBC News and the Committee to Protect Journalists announced on 28 June 2004 that Humayun Kabir Balu, editor of the Bengali newspaper Dainik Janmabhumi and president of the Khulna Press Club, had been killed in a bomb attack in Khulna the previous day. An underground group known as Janajuddha (Peoples’ War), a faction of the Purba Banglar Communist Party, claimed responsibility. Kabir was the sixth journalist to be murdered in the division of Khulna since 2000. [20a] [51b] Associated Press reported on 27 April 2005 that the police had charged eight persons, all believed to be members of the Purba Banglar Communist Party, with Humayun Kabir’s murder. [61e] According to CPJ 2005, Kabir’s family did not believe that the “masterminds” behind the killing had been apprehended. [51a]

6.34 Reporters Without Borders (RSF) Annual Report for 2005 related that Maoist armed groups had “sowed terror” in the south-western Khulna region during 2004. More than 50 journalists were threatened with death and three were killed. RSF had stated in a press release on 27 January 2004:

“An underground Maoist organisation has admitted responsibility for the murder of a BBC stringer and in a letter, apparently from its leader, threatened to kill nine more named journalists in the region. Manik Saha [who was also a correspondent for the newspaper New Age] died instantly when a bomb was thrown at his head in a street in Khulna in the country’s south-west on 15 January [2004]. Reporters Without Borders (Reporters sans frontières) called on the authorities, in particular the interior minister, to continue to explore every avenue to track down and punish Saha’s killers…The journalist’s murder prompted a two-day general strike in Khulna on 16 and 17 January [2004]. Information minister Tariqul Islam, who went to the town, promised to leave no stone unturned to find and punish those responsible”. [9c]

CPJ 2004 recorded that, in June 2004, police charged 12 people with Saha’s murder; their trial was scheduled to begin in early 2005. [51d]

6.35 CPJ 2005 noted that, in September 2005, nine journalists received pieces of white cloth, symbolizing funeral shrouds, accompanied by letters co-signed by the outlawed Islamic militant ‘Bangla Bhai’ and the radical movement Ahle Hadith. These letters warned journalists not to write about their groups’ activities and also threatened to kill ethnic Hindu reporters. In February 2005 Sheikh Belaluddin, a journalist with the national daily Sangbad, died after a homemade bomb detonated outside the Khulna Press Club. In July 2005 a former leader of
the Islami Chhatra Shibir, the student wing of the Islamic fundamentalist political party Jamaat-e-Islami, reportedly confessed to taking part in the bombing. But three weeks later, the suspect was freed on bail and apparently absconded. A journalist was attacked in Rajshahi in June 2005 by members of the Islamist group JMJB, after providing information about the group’s activities. [51a]

6.36 According to CPJ 2005: “Police brutality was a continuing problem, particularly for photographers covering the country's growing political tensions. In May [2005], baton-wielding riot police on the Dhaka University campus beat seven photographers and camera operators who were covering protests. When journalists staged their own demonstration [on 7 July 2005] to protest the mistreatment, intelligence officers assaulted nine photojournalists in full view of police." [51a] According to a Reporters Without Borders press release of 8 July 2005, the nine press photographers were assailed when one of them tried to take photos of graffiti on the outside of the NSI building. [9h]

6.37 A Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) press release of 3 March 2006 recorded that Salah Uddin Shoaib Choudhury, the editor of the tabloid weekly Blitz, was shortly to be tried in a Dhaka court on a charge of sedition. He had initially been arrested for a passport violation in November 2003 for attempting to travel to Israel to attend a conference and had spent 17 months in prison until his release in May 2005 after the passport charge was dropped; it is illegal for Bangladeshi citizens to travel to Israel. Choudhury was formally charged with sedition in February 2004; he told CPJ that he believed the sedition charge related to his journalistic work to improve relations between Israel and Muslim countries and to promote interfaith dialogue. [51f]
6.39 The 2005 Religious Freedom Report states: “The Constitution establishes Islam as the state religion but provides for the right to practice – subject to law, public order, and morality – the religion of one’s choice. The Government’s respect for religious freedom was inconsistent and, due to the action of extremists, the year [July 2004 to June 2005] was marked with harassment and violent attacks against the Ahmadiyya community.” [2c] (introduction) The Report continues:

“Citizens generally are free to practice the religion of their choice; however, police are normally ineffective in upholding law and order and are often slow to assist members of religious minorities who have been victims of crimes. Although the Government states that acts of violence against members of religious minority groups are politically or economically motivated and cannot be solely attributed to religion, religiously motivated violence was a continuing problem … The generally amicable relationships among religions in society contributed to religious freedom; however, Hindu, Christian, and Buddhist minorities experienced discrimination by the Muslim majority, and the year was marked with harassment of Ahmadis.” [2c] (introduction)

6.40 USSD 2005 notes: “The government allowed various religions to establish places of worship, train clergy, travel for religious purposes, and maintain links with co-religionists abroad.” The law permits citizens to proselytise. However there is strong social resistance to conversion from Islam. [2f] (section 2c) The 2005 Religious Freedom Report adds: “Family laws concerning marriage, divorce, and adoption differ slightly depending on the religion of the person involved. There are no legal restrictions on marriage between members of different faiths.” The report further notes that “Religion is taught in government schools, and parents have the right to have their children taught in their own religion; however, some claim that many government-employed religious teachers of minority religions are neither members of the religion they are teaching nor qualified to teach it.” [2c] (section II) A BBC News article of 25 February 2005 noted that thousands of madrassas – or Islamic schools – have opened across the country. “In 1970 there were 1,500 madrassas registered with the government. Today there are nearly 8,000. Tens of thousands more have been set up unofficially and are outside official control.” Critics of madrassas claim that some could be exploiting the zeal of students to recruit them to extremist groups. [20aw] The 2005 Religious Freedom Report quotes a “recent” US Government study as stating that there are “at least 25,000” madrassas in Bangladesh, some government funded and some privately funded and run. The Report added: “There are no known government-run Hindu, Buddhist or Christian schools.” [2c] (section II) (See Section 5 Education System)

6.41 The 2005 Religious Freedom Report comments: “Religion exerts a powerful influence on politics, and the Government is sensitive to the Muslim consciousness of its political allies [the Jamaat-e-Islami and Islami Okiyya Jote political parties] and the majority of its citizens.” [2c] (introduction) The report adds: “The Government has taken some steps to promote interfaith understanding. For example, Government leaders issued statements on the eve of religious holidays calling for peace and warning that action would be taken against those attempting to disrupt the celebrations.” [2c] (section II) On 6 November 2004 the daily newspaper Prothom Alo quoted Matiur Rahman Nizami, the leader of Jamaat-e-Islami and a government minister, as saying that his party does not believe in the principle of using force against any

“Evidence is emerging that the oppression of minorities is becoming systematic. Bangladesh, which is 85 per cent Muslim but has a long tradition of tolerance to religious minorities, is, say local organisations, being pushed towards fundamentalism by the Jamaat-e-Islami, which is growing rapidly in rural areas with the deepest poverty and runs two key ministries.” [55a]

“This is like a silent revolution. We are returning to the dark ages’, a leading lawyer said, asking not to be named …’I think the backdrop is being created for the introduction of strict sharia laws. You see extremist rightwing fundamentalists infiltrating every professional area, in the appointment of the judiciary, the law, medicine and in education. They are capturing key positions in government, the universities and institutions’.” [55a]

“Thousands of Bangladeshis are thought to have crossed the border to India in the past two years. It is impossible to verify numbers because New Delhi will not release records, but Dhaka’s statistics show the Muslim majority increasing dramatically and the Hindu, Buddhist, Christian and other minorities declining.” [55a]

“Leading Islamic scholars are appalled by the repression and the rise of fundamentalism. ‘What we are seeing is the Talibanisation of Bangladesh,’ Maolama Abdul Awal, former director of the Bangladesh Islamic Foundation, said. ‘If we allow them to continue … [minorities] will be eliminated. Bangladesh will become a fascist country’.” [55a]

6.43 *A Time Magazine* (Asia edition) article, in the 12 April 2004 issue, described the extent of corruption and criminal violence in the country and commented:

“Making the violence more toxic is the spread of a brand of intolerant Islamic fundamentalism in a country with a history of religious tolerance. Bangladesh’s Hindus, who constitute about 10 per cent of the population of the predominantly Muslim nation, say they are increasingly being intimidated by gangs of Islamic fundamentalists, who attack them in their homes, warn them to pack up and leave for India and, for good measure, extort ransom from them.” [54a]

6.44 The 2005 Religious Freedom Report observed:

“Since the 2001 elections, religious minorities reportedly have continued to be targeted for attacks, which has led to the requirement for guards to be present at church and temple ceremonies. Reportedly, incidents include killings, rape, torture, attacks on places of worship, destruction of homes, forced evictions, and desecration of items of worship. These claims continued during the period covered by this report. However, many such reports have not been verified independently, and there also has been violence during important Muslim holidays. The Government sometimes has failed to investigate the crimes and prosecute the perpetrators, who are often local gang leaders.” [2c] (section II)
6.45 The UK Bangladesh Hindu Baudha Christian Unity Council (BHBCUC), an independent human rights organisation, has provided a series of reports listing a total of 404 incidents of violent and other crime or acts of intimidation which occurred in Bangladesh during the eight-month period April to November 2005 – in which the victims were members of minority religious communities, or in which sacred images or property belonging to religious minorities was destroyed or damaged. It is not clear from the reports how many of these criminal incidents were religiously motivated. In most cases the perpetrators were said to be either “fundamentalists” or “miscreants”. Most of these incidents had been reported in the press in Bangladesh. [57a] (Copies of the BHBCUC reports [57a] are enclosed with the source material.)

6.46 The Global IDP report, “Profile of Internal Displacement: Bangladesh” updated February 2005, quotes various primary sources as follows:

“In the weeks following the 1 October [2001] general elections, Bangladesh witnessed an outburst of systematic attacks on the minority Hindu community across the country, in addition to attacks on activists of the freshly ousted Awami League… By 8 October 2001, at least 30 people had been killed and more than 1,000 others injured. Their houses were torched, ransacked and in many cases seized, women were raped, and temples were desecrated… The Hindu-dominated areas in Barisal, Bhola, Pirojpur, Satkhira, Jessore, Khulna, Kushtia, Jhenidah, Bagerhat, Feni, Tangail, Noakhali, Natore, Bogra, Sirajganj, Munshiganj, Narayanganj, Narsingdi, Brahmanbaria, Gazipur and Chittagong were the worst hit… Many Hindu families have reportedly fled their homes and sought refuge in areas considered ‘safe’. The Bangladesh Observer reported that at least 10,000 people of the minority community from Barisal district ran away from their homes following attacks by activists of the fundamentalist Jamaat-e-Islami party and took shelter in neighbouring Gopalganj district, the electorate of the former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. Many others fled to the Indian State of Tripura and West Bengal. (HRF March 2002)... Post election violence and oppression against minority [sic] has displaced more than 15 thousand minority families in Barishal and Bagerhat districts.”...“Islamic fundamentalists have initiated a rain [sic] of terror forcing minorities to endure living in a nightmare condition in those areas. (HRCBM)"... "Women are particularly targeted – in many cases rape of female family members made it impossible for families to stay in their villages.”... “The Human Rights Congress for Bangladeshi Minorities estimated that dozens of people were killed, more than 1,000 women from minority groups were raped and several thousand people lost their land in the three months around the [2001] election. (Guardian Unlimited, 21 July 2003, ‘Britain ignores Bangladeshi persecution’)” [45] (p16-17)

6.47 The 2005 Religious Freedom Report states:

“Reports of BNP harassment of Hindus, who traditionally vote for the AL, preceded and followed the 2001 election. Reported incidents included killings, rape, looting, and torture. The BNP acknowledged reports of atrocities committed between Muslims and Hindus: but claimed that they were exaggerated. The Home Minister was unable to confirm reports that Hindus had fled the country and insisted that there was no link between religion and the
violence. He also dismissed allegations that the BNP was linked to the perpetrators. In 2001, the High Court ordered the Government to investigate and report on attacks on religious minorities and to demonstrate that it was taking adequate steps to protect them. The Government submitted its report to the High Court in 2002. The report claimed that some of the incidents of post-election violence were not connected to communal relations, and that some reports of violence were fabricated or exaggerated. Since then neither the High Court nor the Government has taken further action.” [2c] (section II)

6.48 As outlined in the 2003 Religious Freedom Report:

“Inter-communal violence caused many Hindus to emigrate to India between 1947 and 1971 and continued on a smaller scale throughout the 1980s. Since the 1991 return to democracy, emigration of Hindus has decreased significantly, which generally can be attributed to the significant reduction in the Hindu population over the last 30 years. In recent years, emigration has been primarily motivated by economic and family reasons. Nevertheless, incidents of communal violence continue to occur.” [2g] (p4)

6.49 According to the 2005 Religious Freedom Report:

“Many Hindus have been unable to recover landholdings lost because of discrimination in the application of the law, especially under the now-defunct Vested Property Act. The act was an East Pakistan-era law that allowed ‘enemy’ (in practice Hindu) lands to be expropriated by the Government. Approximately 2.5 million acres of land were seized from Hindus, and almost all of the 10 million Hindus in the country were affected. Property ownership, particularly among Hindus, has been a contentious issue since partition from India in 1947. However, in April 2001, Parliament passed the Vested Property Return Act. This law stipulated that land remaining under government control that was seized under the Vested Property Act be returned to its original owners, provided that the original owners or their heirs remain resident citizens. Hindus who fled to India and resettled there are not eligible to have their land returned, and the act does not provide for compensation for return of properties that the Government has sold. By law, the Government was required to prepare a list of vested property holdings by October 2001, and claims were to have been filed within 90 days of the publication date. However, by the end of the period covered by this report, the Government had not published the list of vested properties; the reasons for the extended delay could not be determined …In 2002, Parliament passed an amendment to the Vested Property Return Act, allowing the Government unlimited time to return the vested properties. The properties are to remain under the control of deputy commissioners until a tribunal settles ownership. The amendment also gives the deputy commissioners the right to lease such properties until they are returned to their owners. The Government claimed that this provision would prevent the properties from being stolen.” [2c] (section II)

USSD 2005 notes: “As in previous years the government failed to prepare a list of property that was expropriated by the government from Hindus following the 1965 India-Pakistan War.” [2f] (section 2c)

6.50 A particularly serious attack took place on 19 November 2003. The 2005 Religious Freedom Report refers to this incident as follows:
“In 2003, 11 members of a Hindu family burned to death after assailants set fire to their home near the port city of Chittagong. BDG officials ascribed the crime to robbers following a failed robbery attempt, but the opposition Awami League alleged that BNP members attacked the family as part of a local anti-Hindu cleansing effort. A local human rights NGO claimed that the attack was a planned assault on the family because of its Hindu faith. Government ministers visited the home within a few days of the incident and promised action against the perpetrators. Within a month of the attack police arrested 5 persons, 3 of whom confessed to the magistrate and claimed that 14 persons were involved in what they said was an attempted robbery. At the conclusion of the period covered by this report [30 June 2005], police have submitted their investigations to court twice but the Public Prosecutor has declared the investigations ‘faulty’, so a third round of investigation was in process.” [2c] (section II)

6.51 The Press Trust of India, on 2 January 2004, relayed a report in the newspaper *The Daily Janakantha* that 30 Hindu people had been injured and 20 houses burnt down in an attack on a village in Natore district. The attackers, numbering about 50, were said to have been led by Moslemuddin, a local BNP leader. Victims said the attack had centred around a property dispute. [56a] The same article recorded that the Government had given Taka 4 lakhs (Tk 400,000) to relatives of the victims of the 19 November 2003 attack near Chittagong, towards their rehabilitation. [56a]

6.52 The 2004 Religious Freedom Report noted: “In January [2004] a Hindu temple and three houses belonging to Hindus in Chittagong were burned. According to a prominent human rights NGO, the temple was on disputed ground, and the temple priest sought to expand temple lands. Subsequently, there was conflict between the police, the local fire brigade, and Hindu devotees, who accused the police of destroying the temple. They attacked the police and fire brigade personnel with stones and incendiary devices. There has been no subsequent legal action.” [2h] (section II) The *Daily Star* reported on 25 August 2004 that 22 houses belonging to Hindus had been set ablaze in a remote village in Pirgachha upazila, apparently by 30 to 40 armed “mobsters” with alleged links to the ruling BNP. The perpetrators left with a “booty” of 18 cows and about Tk 60,000 in cash. [38k]

6.53 As mentioned in paragraph 6.45 above, the UK Bangladesh Hindu Baudha Christian Unity Council (BHBCUC), an independent human rights organisation, has provided a listing of numerous incidents of violent and other crime and acts of intimidation which occurred in Bangladesh during the period April to November 2005 – in which the victims were members of the Hindu (or another religious minority) community, or in which Hindu sacred images or property were destroyed or damaged. [57a] (Copies of the BHBCUC reports are enclosed with the source material.)

6.54 Freedom House, in a report of June 2005, noted:

“As with the Ahmadiyya mosques, the government also took steps to provide police protection for the religious festivals of other minorities, most notably the Hindus. No major incident of Hindu-Muslim communal violence was reported in the media in 2004. However, over the past few decades, Hindus have faced continual discrimination. For example, immediately following the 2001 elections, the Hindus were subjected to various forms of violence including killing, assault, rape, ransom-seeking, and loss of property.” [65a] (p73)
AHMADIS (ALTERNATIVELY AHMADIYYAS OR KADIYANIS OR QADIANIS)

6.55 The Ahmadiyya community was founded in the 1880s by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, who was born in the Punjab town of Qadian, according to a report of the Canadian IRB dated June 1991. It later split into two groups, of which Qadiani is the larger; the other is the Lahore branch. While they identify as a Muslim community, Ahmadiyyas are considered heretics by mainstream Islam.

[20ay] The Human Rights Watch report of June 2005, “Breach of Faith: Persecution of the Ahmadiyya Community in Bangladesh” (HRW 2005 Ahmadiyya report), relates that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad declared himself to be the expected mahdi, or messiah of the latter days. According to this HRW report: “Virtually all mainstream Muslim sects believe that Ahmad proclaimed himself as a prophet, thereby rejecting a fundamental tenet of Islam: Khatme Nabuwat (literally, the belief in the ‘finality of prophethood’ – that the Prophet Mohammed was the last of the line of prophets leading back through Jesus, Moses, and Abraham).” [10a] (p7) In an Amnesty International (AI) report of 23 April 2004, entitled “The Ahmadiyya Community – their rights must be protected”, it was estimated that there are about 100,000 Ahmadiyyas in Bangladesh. [7k] The HRW 2005 Ahmadiyya report notes that the Ahmadiyya community is also derogatorily referred to by some as the “Qadiani” (or “Kadiyani”) community, a term derived from Ahmad’s birthplace. [10a] (p7)

6.56 According to the 2004 Religious Freedom Report: “In the latter part of 2003, [Ahmads] were the targets of attacks and harassment prompted by clerics and the rhetoric of leaders of the Islami Okkiya Jote, an Islamic party and coalition partner of the ruling BNP. Many mainstream Muslims view Ahmadis as heretics.” [2h] (section III) The report states: “Following demands for the ban of Ahmadiyya publications and that Ahmadis be declared non-Muslims, the Government announced such a ban [on publications] on January 8 [2004]. However, several days later…the Prime Minister announced that the Government would not declare Ahmadis to be non-Muslims.” [2h] (section IV) USSD 2005 relates: “Discrimination against Ahmadiyyas continued during the year [2005].” [2f] (section 2c)

6.57 The Amnesty International report of 23 April 2004 had observed:

“Members of the ‘Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat’, a religious community which considers itself a sect of Islam, has been the target of a campaign of hate speech organized by a number of Islamist groups in the country in recent months.

“These groups have mobilised crowds to chant anti-Ahmadiyya slogans, have sought confiscation of Ahmadi mosques, and have demanded that the government declare the sect non-Muslim. Members of the Ahmadiyya community in Bangladesh, about 100,000 in number, have been living in fear of attack, looting and killing since around October 2003 when the Anti-Ahmadi agitations began...The agitators have been involved in ‘excommunication’ and illegal house arrest of Ahmadis, the killing of an Ahmadi Imam (preacher), beating of Ahmadis, and marches to occupy Ahmadi mosques... While the Government of Bangladesh has acted to prevent the crowds from entering Ahmadi mosques, it has taken no action against the perpetrators of the hate campaign. Fundamental rights of the Ahmadis have been further violated by a government ban on their publications.” [7k] (p1)
The same AI report records that on 31 October 2003, the Imam of an Ahmadi mosque in Jessore district was beaten to death after he refused to recant his faith; no charges had been brought against his attackers by the time the AI report was published. [7k] (p1)

6.58 On 9 January 2004 Agence France-Presse announced: “Bangladesh banned publications of the Ahmadiyyas, a minority Muslim movement, from Friday after pressure from rival Islamic hardliners, officials said. The Home Ministry banned the sale, distribution and possession of publications by the Ahmadiyyas, estimated to number 100,000 in Bangladesh …"The ban was imposed in view of objectionable materials in such publications that hurt or might hurt the sentiments of the majority Muslim population’, a Home Ministry statement said late Thursday [8 January].” [23f] The AI report of 23 April 2004 detailed that the ban on Ahmadiyya publications included any translations, with interpretations, of the Koran. The report commented: “The ban highlighted the possibility that the government had yielded to pressure from anti-Ahmadi Islamist groups. According to reports in Bangladeshi newspapers, it had been imposed at the instigation of Islami Oikya Jote, a political party and junior partner in the coalition government.” [7k] (p2) BBC News announced on 21 December 2004 that the High Court had temporarily suspended the Government’s ban on Ahmadiyya publications. [20ay] The HRW 2005 Ahmadiyya report provides the following detail:

“On December 21, 2004, while not in session, Bangladesh’s High Court temporarily suspended the order of January 8, 2004 banning the Ahmadiyya publications in response to a legal challenge launched by human rights groups in the country. The court issued an interim stay order suspending the ban pending the reopening of the High Court. It also directed that the ban not be notified in the official Bangladesh gazette. In January 2005, the High Court extended the stay order and it remained in effect at this writing [mid-2005].” [10a] (p31-32) The HRW report noted that any order banning Ahmadiyya publications would have to be published in the Bangladesh government gazette in order to have legal effect. [10a] (p30)

USSD 2005 observed: “The government ban on the publishing of Ahmadiyya literature continued to be stayed by the high court, and the government did not appeal the stay to the appellate court, effectively allowing Ahmadiyas, for the time being, to publish their materials.” [2f] (section 2c)

6.59 The HRW 2005 Ahmadiyya report states:

“Throughout 2004 and into 2005, the Khatme Nabuwat (K.N.), an umbrella organization of Islamist groups dedicated to the preservation of ‘the finality of the prophethood’ of Mohammad, has threatened the Ahmadiyya community with attacks on their mosques and campaigned for Ahmadis to be declared non-Muslim. The K.N. enjoys links to the governing Bangladesh National Party (BNP) through the BNP’s coalition partners, the Jama’at-e-Islami (J.I.) and the Islami Oikya Jote (IOJ).” [10a] (p2)

The report adds: “Since the government ban on Ahmadiyya publications was introduced [see 6.59 above], anti-Ahmadi activities have continued and intensified across Bangladesh. These incidents have included massive anti-Ahmadi rallies, threats against members of the group, attacks on mosques, the
refusal to allow Ahmadi children to go to school, and the confiscation of Ahmadiyya publications.” [10a] (p3)

The HRW report comments: “In the overheated, sectarian atmosphere of contemporary Bangladesh, with the ruling government more religiously intolerant than any government since the country’s founding, Ahmadis fear that even a tiny spark could unleash a serious and perhaps uncontrollable wave of violence against members of their community.” [10a] (p4)

6.60 USSD 2004 related: “In April [2004], police failed to prevent Muslim demonstrators from destroying 12 houses belonging to Ahmadiyas and harassing 15 converted Ahmadiya men and women in a village in Rangpur. The converts were held against their will for several hours and pressured to renounce their new faith by some local Muslims.” [2d] (section 2c) The 2004 Religious Freedom Report recorded that no legal action had been taken against their assailants. [2h] (section III)

6.61 The Daily Star of 29 August 2004 reported that the police had “foiled” plans by religious extremists to lay siege to the Ahmadiyya central complex in Dhaka on Friday 27 August. [38j] (An Amnesty International release of 25 August 2004 had stated that Islamist leaders had threatened to attack the Ahmadiyya complex on 27 August unless the Government declared the sect to be ‘non-Muslim’. [7l] A Financial Times Information report of 28 August 2004 noted that fourteen platoons of police had been deployed to protect the Ahmadiyya complex. [21d] USSD 2004 indicated that the threats against the Ahmadiyya community were coming primarily from members of the groups ‘Khatme Nabuwat Movement/Committee’ and ‘Aamra Dhakabashi’. On August 27 [2004] the police arrested four leaders of Aamra Dhakabashi prior to the planned siege of the Ahmadiyya complex in Dhaka. [2d] (section 2c)

6.62 The Daily Star announced on 9 October 2004 that, on 7 October, hundreds of Islamist “zealots” under the banner of the Khatme Nabuwat Committee had attempted to “capture” an Ahmadiyya mosque in Narayanganj, but that they had been prevented from doing so by the security forces and by eleven cultural and religious bodies who staged a counter-demonstration. [38u] However, the Daily Star reported on 30 October 2004 that “orthodox Muslim fanatics” had razed an Ahmadiyya mosque at Bhadughar in Brahmanbaria on 29 October, minutes before the start of Juma (Friday) prayers. The mob forced their way into the mosque and went on a rampage inside it; they then broke away the bamboo walls, while hundreds chanted anti-Ahmadiyya slogans outside. At least 11 people were injured; the Imam of the mosque was in a critical condition after being hit with an axe. [The Imam reportedly died from his injuries en route to hospital.] The mob then vandalised the nearby homes of 12 Ahmadi families. Police arrived at the scene an hour after the incident but did not make any arrests; they apparently only cautioned the leaders of the anti-Ahmadiyya groups and some influential local people against any further attacks. [38v]

6.63 HRW 2005 Ahmadiyya report records that, on 11 March 2005 at Seuzgari in the northern district of Bogra, around ten thousand supporters of the Khatme Nabuwat (KN) movement gathered and, with the active participation of the local police, hung a signboard on the local Ahmadiyya mosque which read: “A place of worship of the Qadianis in Bogra Town; no Muslim should be deceived into considering it a mosque”. [10a] (p38) The HRW 2005 Ahmadiyya report also
details an attack on the Ahmadiyya community on 17 April 2005 in Joytidianagar, a remote village in the southwestern Satkhira district. A mob led by Khatme Nabuwat sought to place on the Ahmadi mosque a signboard reading: “This is a place of worship for Kadianis; no Muslim should mistake it for a mosque”. When the mob met with resistance from members of the local Ahmadiyya community it retaliated, injuring at least 25 people. The police, instead of preventing the incident from occurring, apparently sought to contain the situation by taking possession of the signboard and hanging it themselves on the Ahmadi mosque. Afterwards, KN activists went on the rampage, looting nearby Ahmadiyya homes and injuring many Ahmadis in the process, some of them seriously. [10a] (p2)

On 22 June 2005, an Ahmadiyya mosque in Nator was set ablaze. (USSD 2005) Two days later, several bombs were detonated at an Ahmadiyya mosque in Brahmanbaria and four bombs at an Ahmadiyya mosque in Bhadugarh in the Branmanbaria area. Eight persons were arrested in connection with these attacks. [2f] (section 2c)

The Daily Star reported on 19 July 2005: “Local zealots yesterday vandalised an under-construction Ahmadiyya mosque in the presence of police at Dakshin Khan in city’s Uttara [in Dhaka district], causing panic among the sect members. The Ahmadiyyas alleged that the religious bigots have been obstructing the construction work since it began in February this year.” A local BNP leader was quoted as saying: “We have never asked them [Ahmadiyyas] not to build any mosque on their land … They have a mosque on their land for years.” [38z]

BBC News reported on 23 December 2005 that hundreds of Khatme Nabuwat (KN) supporters had marched on an Ahmadiyya mosque in Dhaka the previous day and attempted to hang a sign saying that the Ahmadiyya mosque was not a mosque. Police used batons and teargas to disperse the KN supporters; at least ten people, including some policemen, were injured in the clash. The Junior Religious Affairs Minister reportedly described as “not acceptable” the demand that the Government enact a law to declare the Ahmadiyya non-Muslim. [20bv]

CHRISTIANS

A report from the Canadian IRB, dated 5 August 2003, states as follows:

“An Associated Press article estimates that there are approximately 300,000 to 350,000 Christians in Bangladesh (1 Mar. 2002) … According to Open Doors International (ODI), an evangelical Christian organization that provides religious materials, training, and support to Christians around the world, Christian practice in Bangladesh is ethnically divided into the Underground Church, which consists of those who converted from Islam, and the Visible Church, which consists of those who converted from Hinduism (n.d.). Moreover, the Underground Church can be divided into those who worship in secret and those who worship openly, such as when an entire village converts to Christianity (ODI n.d.). Article 41 of the constitution of Bangladesh states that all citizens have the right ‘to profess, practice or propagate any religion’ (ICC 6 June 2003). However, Open Doors International maintains that the predominantly lower income Christian population relies on foreign aid and ‘as a result, many people..."
in Bangladesh, including the government, consider the Christians as foreign ... [which] makes it easier for the regime to impose restrictions’ (n.d.). International Christian Concern (ICC) reports [certain] limitations for members of the Christian community in Bangladesh: All Christian organizations need to be registered as a Non-Government Organization (NGO), whose charter and board need to be presented to the government for approval; the board may be dismissed at any time and be replaced by another board appointed by the government. [Secondly], the NGO Affairs Bureau has imposed restrictions on Bible printing and importation. Distribution of Bibles must be limited to Christians.”

The Canadian IRB report notes that proselytising is permitted under the law, but strong social resistance to conversion from Islam means most proselytising tends to be aimed at Hindus and tribal groups. [3n]

6.68 The 2004 Religious Freedom Report recorded: “In June 2001, in Baniarchar, Gopalganj District, a bomb exploded inside a Catholic church during Sunday Mass, killing 10 persons and injuring 20 others. The army arrived to investigate approximately 10 hours after the blast. Police detained various persons for questioning, but [by June 2004], the police had reported no progress on the case.” A judicial commission was formed in December 2001 to investigate the bombing, but its findings have subsequently been discredited. The Government has taken no action on the commission’s report and the police are reportedly not pursuing the case actively. [2h] (section II)

6.69 According to an article in The Guardian (UK) of 21 July 2003: “In the village of Fhainjana, a mob of 200 fundamentalists recently looted 10 Christian houses, allegedly assaulting many women and children. Christians were seriously beaten and others molested after refusing to give money to thugs in the village of Kamalapur, near Dhaka. [55a]

6.70 USSD 2005 noted that, on 18 September 2004, unidentified assailants killed Dr. Joseph Gomes, a Christian convert, near his home in Jamalpur district. Police arrested a local madrassah teacher, Maulana Abdus Sobhan Munshi, alias Michha Munshi, for the killing, held him for two weeks, and released him. By the end of 2004 no one else had been charged in connection with the crime. [2f] (section 2c) On 28 July 2005, unknown assailants in Faridpur district killed two employees of the NGO Christian Life Bangladesh, allegedly because they showed an evangelical film. Police arrested several suspects for the killing, but by the end of 2005 police had released all suspects and no charges had been filed. [2f] (section 2c)

FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION

6.71 As noted in USSD 2005:

“The law provides for freedom of assembly and association, subject to restrictions in the interest of public order and public health; however, the government frequently limited these rights. The law allows the government to ban assemblies of more than four persons, and, according to Ain O Shalish Kendro, a local human rights NGO, the government imposed 73 such bans from
January to mid-August [2005]. The government sometimes used bans to prohibit rallies for security reasons.” [2f] (section 2b)

USSD 2004 had recorded: “Police rarely interfered with ruling party processions on any occasion, but police often used force to disrupt and discourage opposition processions.” [2d] (section 2b) On 22 November 2005, according to USSD 2005, both Bangladesh Nationalist Party activists and police disrupted the free movement of Awami League supporters on their way to a Grand Rally in Dhaka. These obstructions took place in at least three sites within an hour’s travel of Dhaka: Dhamrai, Keraniganj and Manikganj. [2f] (section 2b)

USSD 2005 states: “The law provides for the right of every citizen to form associations, subject to ‘reasonable restrictions’ in the interest of morality or public order, and the government generally respected this right. Individuals were free to join private groups.” [2f] (section 2b)

6.72 According to a Freedom House report of June 2005:

“The Bangladesh constitution guarantees freedom of association and assembly, yet these rights were repeatedly violated by the state in 2004. Partisan supporters of the ruling coalition disrupted the meetings of the newly formed political party, BDB [Bikalpa Dhara Bangladesh], and rallies and protest marches of the AL [Awami League]. In addition, law enforcement agencies tended to apply excessive force in dealing with peaceful demonstrations and public protests.” [65a] (p73)

Amnesty International, in a statement dated 18 August 2005, reported attacks on Awami League gatherings by BNP supporters on 15 August 2005. Hundreds of Awami League (AL) supporters were reportedly injured, including an MP and a local AL leader. According to reports received by Amnesty International, police who were present failed to stop the attackers and AL members reacted angrily, getting involved in physical clashes with the attackers. The Awami League had held gatherings and processions throughout the country on 15 August to observe the thirtieth anniversary of the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Bangladesh’s first president. Amnesty International expressed concern about comments attributed to the Communications Minister which may have encouraged the attackers. [7o] The Daily Star reported on 17 August 2005 that the Communications Minister had categorically denied reports of his involvement in an attack on an Awami League rally in Dohar on 15 August. [38ad]

EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS

6.73 USSD 2005 states:

“The law provides for the right to join unions and, with government approval, the right to form a union; however, the government did not always respect these rights in practice. The total workforce was approximately 65 million persons, of whom 1.8 million belonged to unions, most of which were affiliated with political parties. There were no reliable labor statistics for the large informal sector, in
which the vast majority (75 to 80 percent) of citizens worked ... An estimated 15 percent of the approximately 5,450 labor unions were affiliated with 25 officially registered National Trade Union (NTU) centers. There were also several unregistered NTUs... Unions were generally highly politicized, and unions were strongest in state-owned enterprises and in such institutions as the government-run port in Chittagong. Civil service and security force employees were forbidden to join unions because of their highly political character. Teachers in both the public and the private sector were not allowed to form trade unions.” [2f] (section 6a)

6.74 Freedom House, in a report of June 2005, noted:

“The organized trade union movement in Bangladesh remains weak, politically fragmented, and in many cases subject to control by individual leaders or employers. As a result, rates of trade union membership in Bangladesh remain among the lowest in the world. In the principal export industry – ready-made garments – most owners severely discourage unionization of their workers and prefer to treat them as casual labor with few legally enforceable rights. Formation of trade unions in the export processing zones is illegal, and unions affiliated with the political opposition tend to face repression. In the past decade, many professional and business organizations have also become politically factionalized.” [65a] (p73)

6.75 USSD 2005 comments as follows: “The right to strike is not recognized specifically by the law, but strikes were a common form of workers' protest and were recognized as a legitimate avenue for addressing unresolved grievances by the Industrial Relations Ordinance of 1969. In addition opposition political parties used general strikes to pressure the government to meet political demands.” [2f] (section 6b) USSD 2005 adds:

“Collective bargaining, other than in EPZs [Export Processing Zones], is legal on the condition that unions are legally registered by the Registrar of Trade Unions as collective bargaining agents represent workers...The Essential Services Ordinance permits the government to bar strikes for three months in any sector it declares essential ...The Government is empowered to prohibit a strike or lockout at any time before or after the strike or lockout begins and to refer the dispute to the Labor Court.” [2f] (section 6b)

6.76 The 2004 Annual Report of Amnesty International (events of 2003) states: “Police continued to use excessive force during opposition or trade union demonstrations. Hundreds of protesters were injured, some critically.” On 10 October 2003 police officers attacked and beat unemployed and student nurses when the demonstrators – who were from 38 government nursing institutions – attempted to enter the Directorate of Nursing Services. Over 50 nurses were reportedly injured, with three of them in a critical condition. The nurses had been protesting against changes in the terms and conditions of their employment. [7j] (p1)

6.77 USSD 2005 notes:

“There is no national minimum wage. Instead, the wage commission, which convenes sporadically, sets wages and benefits for each industry, using a range based on skill level. In most cases, private sector employers ignored this wage structure ...In September [2005] the government returned the country to a
5 day, 40 hour work week, with a Friday and Saturday weekend. The law applied to government employees, banks, NGOs, and other office workers. Factory workers continued to labor under the old law, a 48 hour work week, with a mandated 1 day off, and up to 12 hours of overtime. The law was enforced poorly.” [2f] (section 6e)

Following a trip to Bangladesh, the entrepreneur Dame Anita Roddick was quoted by BBC News on 15 April 2004 as saying that she was angered by the low pay, long hours and denial of basic rights for the estimated two million women making up the vast majority of workers in Bangladesh’s textile industry. She blamed the Western corporations who use textile factories in the developing world for putting pressure on local owners, who in turn impose “slave labour” conditions on staff in order to keep costs down. She also commented: “In Bangladesh, the garment workers have the legal right to three months’ maternity leave with full pay. Yet, in over 90 per cent of the factories, where women were sewing some of the best-known labels in Europe and America, this right to maternity leave with benefits is routinely violated.” [2ao]

6.78 According to the International Labour Organization website:

“In the field of labour legislation, the various minimum ages, fixed by different labour laws regarding children’s admission to work makes it difficult to implement and enforce the labour laws. The Factories Act of 1965, for instance, set the minimum age at 14 years for admission to work in any factory. The Employment of Children Act of 1938 set the minimum age at 15 years while the Shops and Establishment Act of 1965 set the minimum age at 12 years for admission to work. Thus, to bring uniformity in the laws, the Government has prepared a new Labour Code, which currently awaits approval by the Parliament. The draft Labour Code has prescribed a uniform minimum age of 14 years for admission to work which is in conformity with ILO Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No.138).” [32]

6.79 As noted in USSD 2005: “The law prohibits forced or bonded labor, including by children; however, the government did not enforce this prohibition effectively. The Factories Act and Shops and Establishments Act created inspection mechanisms to strengthen laws against forced labor, but these laws were not enforced rigorously, partly because resources were scarce.” [2f] (section 6c)

6.80 USSD 2005 records:

“The law prohibits trafficking in persons; however, trafficking remained a serious problem. Trafficking in children for immoral or illegal purposes carries the death penalty or life imprisonment, and the government took measures for the expeditious prosecution of traffickers. During the year 65 cases were disposed of by the special courts dealing with incidents of repression against women and children. Courts convicted 28 persons and ordered sentences ranging from death to 10 years in prison. Besides police, the coast guard, BDR, the RAB, and a number of NGOs recovered and assisted victims of trafficking…”
was extensive trafficking in both women and children, primarily to India, Pakistan, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, and destinations within the country, mainly for prostitution and in some instances for labor servitude. Some boys were trafficked to the Middle East to be used as camel jockeys … According to government sources, law enforcement personnel recovered 139 victims of trafficking during the year. A cooperative effort between NGOs, the government, and the UAE, resulted in the repatriation of 164 camel jockeys, 159 of whom were reunited with their biological parents."
[2f] (section 5)

6.81 According to USSD 2005: “Police and local government officials often ignored trafficking in women and children for prostitution and were easily bribed.”
[2f] (section 5) USSD 2004 had commented that there were, in previous years, reports that police corruption facilitated trafficking; however, there had been no reports of this occurring during 2004.” [2d] (section 5)

USSD 2005 continues:

“The government continued its efforts to combat trafficking in persons through the trafficking monitoring cell at police headquarters, a monthly inter-ministerial committee headed by the secretary of the Home Ministry. The cell monitored the activities of the police and assisted in prosecuting relevant cases. The monitoring units formed in each of the 64 district headquarters sent updated statistics to the police headquarters. Arrests and prosecutions continued steadily. Nevertheless, the government's capacity to address this issue remained limited. Government projects included conducting awareness campaigns, research, lobbying, and rescue and rehabilitation programs. Additionally the secretary of the Home Ministry met monthly with NGOs working on anti-trafficking issues to facilitate coordination and cooperation between the government and civil society.” [2f] (section 5)

6.82 USSD 2005 further notes that, besides law enforcement agencies, a number of NGOs recover and assist victims of trafficking and are also engaged in research, advocacy and legislative reform. The Bangladesh National Women Lawyers’ Association (BNWLA) rescued 314 trafficking victims from within the country and repatriated 32 others from the UAE and India during 2004. Over a three-year period, NGOs and the Government had co-operated to establish a common, unified umbrella programme to address the trafficking problem.
[2f] (section 5)

6.83 According to a Freedom House report of June 2005, there was a blacklisting of Bangladesh by the U.S. Department of State on 15 June 2004, on the grounds that the Government had failed to take adequate steps to curb the high rate of trafficking in women and children. The Freedom House report provided the following details:

“The State Department report maintained that an estimated 10,000 to 20,000 women and young girls are trafficked annually from Bangladesh. The Bangladesh government contradicted this figure, claiming that only 708 women and children had been trafficked in 2004. The U.S. government warned Bangladesh of economic sanctions if it failed to take measures to improve the situation within 60 days. After the U.S. threat, the Bangladesh government moved quickly to introduce several concrete measures to constrain trafficking:
revival of the police anti-trafficking unit, appointment of a special prosecutor for dealing with trafficking cases in expedited courts, institution of a referral mechanism for the victims to avail themselves of services offered by NGOs, speedy disposal of 17 pending cases relating to trafficking, and a listing of traffickers. Once the government of Bangladesh made public announcement of these specific steps, the U.S. government withdrew the threat of economic sanctions.” [65a] (p74-75)

**FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT**

6.84 USSD 2005 notes that the Constitution provides for the rights of free movement within the country, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation. The Government, during 2005, generally respected these rights in practice; however, there were instances in which these rights were restricted. [2f] (section 2d) USSD 2004 recorded that, on 6 February 2004, immigration officials at Zia International Airport in Dhaka initially barred Jatiya Party chairman and former president Hossain Muhammad Ershad from travelling to the Maldives, but he was subsequently allowed to proceed. In May 2004, the Government refused permission for Shantu Larma, chairman of the CHT Regional Council, to leave the country to attend the third session of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous issues. [2d] (section 2d)

6.85 USSD 2005 records:

“The Constitution does not provide for the granting of asylum or refugee status in accordance with the 1951 U.S. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol, and the Government has not established a system for providing protection to refugees. In practice, the Government provided some protection against *refoulement*, the return of persons to a country where they feared persecution. Working with the UNHCR, the Government provided temporary protection to individual asylum seekers whom the UNHCR interviewed and recognized as refugees on a case-by-case basis.” [2f] (section 2d)

The US Committee for Refugees “World Refugee Survey 2004” noted:

“At the end of 2003, Bangladesh hosted nearly 119,900 refugees and asylum seekers. These included nearly 19,800 Myanmarese Rohingya, most recognized as prima facie refugees by Bangladesh and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); over 100,000 other Rohingya who have fled to Bangladesh since 1993, and who are considered illegal immigrants by the Bangladeshi government not assisted by UNHCR; 49 persons of other nationalities recognized as refugees by UNHCR; and 8 other Myanmarese with claims pending before UNHCR.” [37b] (p1)

The US Committee for Refugees “World Refugee Survey 2005” stated that there had been no reported cases of *refoulement* in 2004; however, Bangladesh reportedly increased pressure on ethnic Rohingya refugees from Burma to sign voluntary repatriation forms [37e] (See section ‘Rohingya’.)
6.B HUMAN RIGHTS - SPECIFIC GROUPS

ETHNIC GROUPS

BIHARIS

6.86 The US State Department Report 2005 (USSD 2005), published on 8 March 2006, records:

“Approximately 300,000 non-Bengali Bihari Muslims who emigrated to the former East Pakistan during the 1947 partition of British India and who supported Pakistan during the 1971 War of Independence continued to live in camps throughout the country. According to NGO Refugees International, they lived in camps in the country with little access to education, medical attention, and in unsanitary conditions. Some Biharis declined citizenship in 1972 and were awaiting repatriation to Pakistan, where the Government was reluctant to accept them. Many of the stranded Biharis born after 1971 have assimilated into the mainstream Bengali-speaking environment and likely would accept citizenship if it was offered.” [2f] (section 2d)

6.87 As stated in the 1998 article “Fifty Years in Exile: The Biharis Remain in India”, on the US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCR) website: “The Biharis are Muslims who originated in what is now India’s state of Bihar. In 1947, at the time of partition, they, along with millions of other Muslims, moved to East Pakistan (today’s Bangladesh). Unlike the majority of those other Muslims, however, the Biharis were not Bengali-speakers, but Urdu-speakers with closer links to Muslims who moved to West Pakistan (today’s Pakistan). Between 1947 and 1971, as citizens of greater Pakistan, the Biharis enjoyed the same rights as other residents of East Pakistan and lived amicably alongside the Bengali speaking majority.” [37d]

6.88 The US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants World Refugee Survey 2005 (USCR 2005) noted that Pakistan had accepted some 170,000 Biharis for resettlement by 1973. An article in the Dhaka Courier of 5 May 2000 stated: “During an official visit of Begum Zia to Pakistan in August 1992, an agreement was signed between the two governments to take back [a further] 3,000 stranded Pakistani families from Bangladesh to Pakistan. The repatriation process began in early 1993. But after the repatriation of only 325 families, Pakistan on the plea of fund constraint suspended the process.” [12c]

6.89 An undated report entitled “A Forsaken Minority: The Camp Based Bihari Community in Bangladesh”, issued by the Refugee and Migratory Movements Research Unit, Dhaka, relates:

“The legal status of the Biharis has been the subject of a major controversy. Although there is a general perception that Biharis are Pakistanis, Biharis appear to be eligible under the laws of citizenship of Bangladesh. Article 3(d) of the Bangladesh Citizenship Act, 1951 provides citizenship eligibility criterion. It states that ‘who before the commencement of this Act migrated to the territories now included in Bangladesh from any territory in the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent outside those territories with the intention of residing permanently in those territories’. Article 2 of the Bangladesh Citizenship (Temporary Provisions) Order, 1972 stipulates: ‘who or whose father or grandfather was
born in the territories now comprised in Bangladesh and who was a permanent resident of the territories now comprised in Bangladesh on the 25th March 1971, and continues to be so resident; or ‘who was a permanent resident of the territories now comprised in Bangladesh on the 25th day of March 1971, and continues to be so resident and is not otherwise disqualified for being a citizen by or under any law, for the time being in force.’ Under such broad sweep of these laws everyone residing permanently before 25 March 1971, including the Biharis, is entitled to Bangladesh citizenship. Article 2B of the Bangladesh Citizenship (Temporary Provisions) Amendment Ordinance 1978, however, contains a disqualification clause which states that a person shall not be qualified to be a citizen of Bangladesh if he ‘owes, affirms or acknowledges, expressly or by conduct, allegiance to a foreign state…’” [31] (p12-14)

6.90 The USCR World Refugee Survey 2004 noted:

“The Bangladeshi High Court [in 2003] recognized 10 Biharis as citizens of Bangladesh, after they sued to vote in the 2001 elections arguing that all Biharis born in the camps and residing in Bangladesh since 1947 were citizens, and that their citizenship could not be taken away simply because they lived in a camp or wished to go to Pakistan. The Bangladeshi Minister for Law, Justice, and Parliamentary Affairs said that the government would comply with the court judgment on Bangladesh-born Bihari. Legal experts said the landmark judgment would help other Bihari gain citizenship. However, the government appealed the case and it was pending at the end of the year [2003].” [37b] (p2)

A Canadian IRB document of 1 April 2005 confirmed that there was still no news on the outcome of an appeal. [30]

6.91 According to a Canadian IRB report of 9 April 2003, between 240,000 and 300,000 Biharis were estimated to be living in Bangladesh in 2001/02. [31] USCR 2005 estimated that, by 2004/05, around half of the Biharis in Bangladesh – some 126,000 to 159,000 people – were still living in 66 camps situated throughout the country; the remainder were living outside of the camps. These camps had been established after the country’s independence by the International Committee of the Red Cross to accommodate Biharis pending their return to Pakistan. [37e] The Canadian IRB report notes further: “Although Biharis are not mandated to live in the camps, a lack of resources means many cannot afford to live anywhere else (New York Times 13 May 2000; USCR 1998). Some also remain in the camps because they ‘feel more secure living among other Biharis’ (ibid).” [39]

6.92 The NGO Refugees International (RI), in a report dated January 2006, described living conditions in the Bihari camps. The following are excerpts:

“All camps have one thing in common—they are severely overcrowded. In Rangpur, there are several instances in which 12 or more family members sleep huddled together in a single room no larger than eight by ten feet …Over the years, numerous families have been threatened with and reportedly suffered forced evictions. Lack of clean water, co-habitation with animals, and poor drainage and sanitation systems, contribute to a variety of medical problems including skin disease, water-borne illness, upper respiratory infections and gastro-intestinal disorders. In one camp, only two working wells supplied water to 650 families. In Mirpur’s Millat Camp, there was only one latrine for 6,000 people. Few medical clinics exist, and several camps have no
healthcare at all ... The right to a basic education has become a luxury for Bihari children. The school in Saardar Bahardur Camp closed last year due to lack of funding. In Adamgee Camp, only six boys from an entire camp progressed to secondary school. Teachers go unpaid, students study in shifts, and requests to the Minister of Education for new books have been turned down. This lack of education, combined with an already impoverished economy, provides little opportunity for employment either inside or outside the camps. Those able to find employment often face discrimination and harassment ... Poverty is widespread in Bangladesh, and the basic situation for the Biharis resembles that of the poorest citizens of the country. Denial of citizenship, however, creates additional disadvantages for the Bihari. Having no official government recognition and identification papers, prohibits a person from holding a government job and other professions which require higher education. Lack of status also restricts the Biharis’ chances to develop their own economic opportunities and prohibits access to processes that would enable them to safeguard their rights.” [74] (p7-8)

6.93 Agence France-Press reported on 21 December 2004 that 300 Biharis had held a symbolic six-hour hunger strike in Dhaka. Shoukat Ali, general secretary of the Stranded Pakistani General Repatriation Committee, was quoted as saying: “We want to discuss the issue of repatriation with the Pakistani prime minister during the SAARC [South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation] summit as we are being deprived of all [kinds] of facilities here.” [23k]

6.94 The US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants World Refugee Survey 2005 noted: “By 2004... half of the Biharis lived outside of camps, were integrated into the local community, were eligible to receive passports, to vote, and to attend college, and were able to exercise most of the rights of citizens.” [37e]

THE INDIGENOUS JUMMA PEOPLES OF THE CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS

6.95 Amnesty International (AI), in a report of 1 March 2004, stated:

“The Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) is a hilly, forested area in southeastern Bangladesh which for many hundreds of years has been home to people from 13 indigenous tribes [collectively known as the Jumma people]. These tribal people differ significantly from the rest of the population of Bangladesh in terms of their appearance, language, religion and social organisation.” [7m]

“Pressure for land to cultivate and encouragement from successive governments have led to the migration of large numbers of non-tribal Bengali people to the CHT. Tribal people have viewed the movement of Bengali settlers to the CHT as a threat to their way of life and their customs and traditions.” [7m]

“Armed rebellion in the Chittagong Hill Tracts began in mid-1970s. A peace accord signed in 1997 ended the armed conflict, but human rights violations against the tribal people which began during the armed conflict have continued on a smaller scale.” [7m]
(Specifically, the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) covers about 10 per cent of the total land area of Bangladesh; it includes the districts of Khagrachhari, Rangamati and Bandarban within the Division of Chittagong.) [25]

6.96 The Global IDP report “Profile of Internal Displacement: Bangladesh”, updated February 2005, quotes from various primary sources as follows:

“Prior to the creation of Bangladesh in 1971, the population of the [CHT] area consisted almost entirely of people from 13 different indigenous tribes. The tribal people who differ significantly from the majority population of Bangladesh are of Sino-Tibetan descent, have a distinctive appearance with Mongoloid features and are predominantly Buddhists, with small numbers of Hindus. They differ linguistically and in their social organization, marriage customs, birth and death rites, food, agriculture techniques and other social and cultural customs from the people of the rest of the country. (AI February 2000, section 2) …The three largest groups are the Chakma, the Marma and the Tripura. The total population of the CHT, in the 1991 census, was 974,445 of which 51.43 per cent were indigenous Jumma people and 48.57 per cent were non-indigenous Bengalis. At the time of the independence of India in 1947, only 9 per cent of the population of the CHT was non-indigenous. (UNPO 1997)” [45] (p20)

6.97 The Europa World Year Book 2004, Volume 1, records:

“In December 1997 the Bangladesh Government signed a peace agreement with the political wing of the Shanti Bahini [the Parbattya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samity – PCJSS], ending the insurgency in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. The treaty offered the [PCJSS] a general amnesty in return for the surrender of their weapons and gave the [Jumma] people greater powers of self-governance through the establishment of three new elected district councils (to control the area’s land management and policing) and a Regional Council (the chairman of which was to have the rank of a state minister). The peace agreement, which was strongly criticized by the opposition [BNP] for representing a ‘sell-out’ of the area to India and a threat to Bangladesh’s sovereignty, was expected to accelerate the process of repatriating the remaining refugees from Tripura (who totalled about 31,000 at the end of December 1997). According to official Indian sources, only about 5,500 refugees remained in Tripura [in India] by early February 1998. By the end of 2000 most of the Chakma refugees had been repatriated, the district and regional councils were in operation, and a land commission had been established…In June [2001] it was reported that rioting in the Chittagong area had caused a new flow of refugees to Tripura. Following the accession to power of the BNP-led alliance in October [2001], there were reports of thousands of members of Buddhist, Christian and Hindu minorities fleeing to Tripura.” [1a] (p640)

6.98 As stated in USSD 2005:

“Tribal people have had a marginal ability to influence decisions concerning the use of their lands. Despite the 1997 Chittagong Hill Tracks (CHT) Peace Accord, which ended 25 years of insurgency in the CHT, law and order problems and alleged human rights violations continued, as did dissatisfaction with the implementation of the Peace Accord. The Land Commission dealing with land disputes between tribal individuals and Bengali settlers did not function effectively in addressing critical land disputes. Tribal leaders remained
disappointed with the lack of assistance provided to those who left the area during the insurgency.” [2f] (section 5)

6.99 The Global IDP report, as updated February 2005, observes that the ownership of tribal land has remained at the core of the conflict in the CHT:

“In the mid-1980s, Muslim settlers’ appropriation of land belonging to ethnic minorities in Bangladesh’s Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) region caused some 64,000 members of those groups, the vast majority of them Chakma, to flee to India and more than 60,000 others to become internally displaced... Subsequently, the entire refugee population returned from India. However, the situation of more than 60,000 internally displaced Chakma remained unresolved at the end of 2002, despite provisions in the ‘accord’ for the ‘rehabilitation’ of both the refugees and the internally displaced. (USCR 2003)… The settlers confiscated their land and in many instances obtained official certificates of ownership. (AI February 2000) … Most of the 64,000 tribal refugees who returned home from India on the heels of the peace pact are yet to get back their lands (Daily Star 21 May 2003).” [45] (p33-34)

“A major problem is to determine the ownership of tribal land. Among the tribal population many did not possess any documentation of land ownership [tribal communities owned land on a communal basis and little documentation was deemed necessary], while Bengali settlers taking over their land obtained official certificates …The Land Commission, which was supposed to resolve land disputes, has not been functioning for two years, but a new chairperson has recently been appointed.” [45] (p47)

6.100 The AI report of 1 March 2004 records as follows:

“More than six years after the signing of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord, the tribal inhabitants of the area continue to live in fear of attacks from Bengali settlers often carried out with the apparent connivance of army personnel. [One of these attacks] took place in August 2003 in the Mahalchari area of the Khagrachari District. According to testimonies given to Amnesty International by eyewitnesses, nine women were sexually assaulted, one of whom was subjected to gang rape; a man was killed in front of his family, a nine month old baby was strangled to death and several people sustained serious injuries; hundreds of houses were burnt down and dozens were looted … According to witnesses, police initially refused to accept complaints from the tribal people but filed complaints on behalf of the Bengali settlers against thousands of tribal inhabitants of the area, highlighting long standing discriminatory practices in the administration of justice.” [7m]

A report of 25 August 2004 from the Asian Centre for Human Rights (ACHR) states that ten Jumma villages were destroyed in this attack. Hundreds of Jumma people reportedly fled and became displaced. Two parliamentary teams – one from the ruling BNP and one from the Awami League – visited the area… “Yet, both justice and effective rehabilitation eluded the victims.” [53a]

6.101 The Asian Centre for Human Rights report of August 2004 also details an incident on 3 August 2004 in which about 50 Bengali settlers attacked and killed a Jumma man and his wife in the Rangamati hill district. The report comments: “In the post Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord period since December 1997, such attacks on indigenous Jumma peoples have replaced the organised
massacres that characterised the repression on the Jummas between 1976 and 1992. The attacks are aimed to terrorise indigenous Jummas to grab their land. ... The root of the CHT’s crisis lies in the policies of the Government of Bangladesh which seek to establish homogeneous Bengali Muslim society by destroying the district identity of the indigenous Jumma peoples. About 500,000 illegal plain settlers were implanted into the CHT during 1979-1983 by providing inducements. The CHT Accord not only failed to address the [problem] of the implanted illegal settlers, but settlement of illegal settlers intensified.” [53a]

6.102 The Global IDP report, updated February 2005, quotes an article in the Bangladesh Daily Star of 4 September 2003:

“According to The Daily Star..., over 1,500 indigenous people have been displaced by recent ethnic violence in the southeastern district of Khagrachhari. The IDPs (internally displaced persons) have been living in the open and in forests 7 days after Bengali settlers burned and looted 8 villages in revenge for the recent kidnapping of a Bengali businessman in the area. Army and police personnel have been reportedly deployed to the raided villages, however, the IDPs have not yet returned due to security fears. In addition, 5 villages were reportedly completely burnt down. The indigenous people claim that both Hindu and Muslim Bengali settlers torched and looted about 350 houses, killing two and raping at least 10 women. In addition, they allege that police stood by during the attacks. Police claim they could not control the attacking mobs.” [45] (p27)

A press release of 12 September 2003, from the International Federation of the Red Cross, was also quoted from in the above Global IDP report:

“On 26 August 2003, in the remote Upazila1 of Mahalchhari of Khagrachari District in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, violent clashes occurred between two groups involving indigenous tribal people and Bengali settlers over the abduction of a local businessman. As a direct consequence of this incident, one person was killed and more than 10 people wounded. More than 1,500 people (575 families) have been affected. Some 274 houses and three Buddhist temples were ransacked and one burned to the ground.” (IFRC 12 September 2003) [45] (p27)

United News of Bangladesh reported on 29 August 2004 that six persons had been found guilty and sentenced to death for the April 2002 murder of a Buddhist monk, Gyan Jyoti Mohasthibir, in Raojan upazila. [39d]

6.103 USSD 2005 quotes a human rights organisation as saying that 25 persons died and 71 were injured in violence in the CHT during 2005. During the same period, 81 persons were kidnapped, 2 women were raped, and 35 persons were arrested. Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti and the anti-accord tribal group, United People's Democratic Forum (UPDF), blamed each other for most of the abductions in Khagrachhari and Rangamati in 2004. [21] (section 5)

The Global IDP Report of February 2005 adds that, during 2004, both UPDF and PCJSS supporters attacked villages and forced several hundred to flee. For example, the Global IDP Report quotes the Centre of Excellence in Disaster Management & Humanitarian Assistance as follows:

“[In September 2004] at least 300 indigenous people were reportedly displaced in the CHT … after armed members of the United People’s Democratic Front
(UPDF), another tribal group that opposes the treaty, attacked their villages in Rangamati district. About 300 people are currently taking refuge in a community centre, while 500 others are reportedly hiding in the jungle. More than 200 people have reportedly died in violence in CHT since 1997. (COE-DMHA, 21 September 2004)."

USSD 2005 notes that there were also reports in 2005 of violence in Rangamati involving Bengalis and tribal people and in other areas there were reports of tribal people losing land to Bengali Muslims. USSD 2005 states that Government-initiated ecoparks and national park projects on land traditionally owned by indigenous communities continued to progress in the Moulvibazar and Modhupur forest area despite resistance efforts of indigenous groups.

6.104 USSD 2004 recorded that the army withdrew an estimated two dozen camps from the CHT in 2004, in partial fulfilment of the PCJSS demand for withdrawal of all army camps as required in the Peace Accord. Police have replaced the army in some of the camps. The Asian Centre for Human Rights (ACHR), in a report of May 2005, quoted the PCJSS as saying that only 35 out of 500 security forces camps had by then been withdrawn, while some new camps had been established.

6.105 The Asian Centre for Human Rights (ACHR) report of May 2005 claimed that members of the United People’s Democratic Forum (UPDF) had been facing repression from the state; hundreds of its activists had reportedly been arrested on false charges to “weaken their protests against the policies of the government of Bangladesh”. On 23 May 2005 police reportedly raided a UPDF office at Swanirbhar Bazar and arrested 16 of its members, ahead of a UPDF demonstration planned to take place on 7 June. Meanwhile, the ongoing ‘internecine’ conflict between the UPDF and PCJSS has continued to be evident.


**ROHINGYA**

6.107 The US Committee for Refugees (USCR) Country Report for 2002 had noted:

“Some 250,000 Rohingya fled to Bangladesh from Burma in late 1991 and early 1992. The Rohingya, who are Muslim, claim religious and other forms of persecution in Burma. Although the refugees were initially welcomed by Bangladeshis who share ethnic and cultural links with the Rohingya, relations between the refugees and the local residents quickly turned sour. Between mid-1992 and 1999, more than 230,000 Rohingya repatriated to Burma. Although some returned voluntarily, Bangladesh coerced most into returning. At the end of 2001, only 22,061 of the Rohingya who entered Bangladesh in 1991 to 1992 remained, mostly living in UNHCR-run camps.”
The USCR World Refugee Survey 2004 estimated that by the end of 2003, Bangladesh was hosting nearly 19,800 Burmese Rohingya, most recognised as prima facie refugees by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and over 100,000 other Rohingya who had fled to Bangladesh since 1993 and who are considered illegal immigrants by the Bangladeshi Government and are not assisted by UNHCR. [37b]

6.108 The USCR World Refugee Survey 2004 added:

“During the year [2003], 3,200 Rohingya repatriated to Myanmar [Burma]. Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), who received over 550 complaints, and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs) reported that the government imprisoned, evicted from homes, seized ration books for food and medicine, and threatened to physically attack or imprison Rohingya to force return. UNHCR acknowledged some coercion but disputed its severity, and the government denied it. MSF also reported that many repatriated refugees from Myanmar had returned to Bangladesh and were seeking shelter outside of the camps. Other NGOs reported that thousands of Myanmarese came to Bangladesh during the year, fleeing arbitrary taxation, extortion, restricted movement, and lack of citizenship...UNHCR announced that as of December [2003] it would no longer participate in the repatriation of refugees to Myanmar. Since the government refused to grant refugees permanent status, UNHCR planned to encourage and assist self-sufficiency until the refugees could repatriate. A local Bangladeshi official reportedly told the South Asia Forum that this decision had caused officials to try to speed up repatriations of the Myanmarese...In October [2003] the government sealed the border fearing an influx of refugees following clashes in Myanmar between Muslims and Buddhists. In November, an estimated 6,000 fled to the border. After initially denying them entry, the local Bangladeshi authorities let them in.” [37b]

According to the US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI) World Refugee Survey 2005:

“Bangladesh increased pressure on ethnic Rohingya refugees from Myanmar to sign voluntary repatriation forms by threatening to resume repatriation practices that, in the past, included false criminal accusations and arrests, physical abuse, withholding of rations and medical care, and arbitrary relocation within the camp. Authorities also tightened border controls, slowing the influx of new arrivals. In October [2004], refugees stopped entering the country altogether after leaders removed General Khin Nyunt in Myanmar and conditions improved, but this was reversed in February 2005 when the army reasserted control.” [37e]

6.109 USSD 2003 had observed: “Since 1992, approximately 236,000 Rohingya (Muslims from the northern Burmese state of Arakan) have been repatriated voluntarily to Burma. An additional 22,700 have left the camps and are living among the local citizens.” [2b] (section 2d)

USSD 2005 relates:

“During the year [2005] 20,939 Rohingya refugees remained in 2 camps [Nayapara and Kutupalong, which are in the Cox’s Bazar district in Chittagong], administered by the government in cooperation with the UNHCR, while another approximately 200 thousand Rohingyas not officially recognized as refugees
lived outside the camps in the surrounding area of Teknaf and Cox's Bazaar. The Government and UNHCR collaborated in the repatriation of 92 refugees [in 2005]. While UNHCR managed to substantially decrease the number of forced repatriation cases, they have received numerous allegations that government camp authorities placed pressure on refugees to repatriate, intimidating them with arbitrary arrest, physical abuse, and harassment …During the year the government denied asylum to Rohingya from Burma by categorizing them as illegal economic migrants and turned back as many persons as possible at the border. According to the UNHCR, some refugees returned by the government were fleeing persecution and were entitled to refugee status. Some unregistered persons in UNHCR camps returned illegally after their official repatriation to Burma, sharing food and lodging with relatives who received rations as registered members of the camps. On a number of occasions, camp officials handed some of the unregistered persons over to police, who sent them to prison under the Foreigners' Act. There were 114 Rohingya refugees in local prisons in the Cox's Bazaar area at year's end. [2005]. UNHCR officials visited the detained refugees once a month … UNHCR field workers reported several cases of refugee abuse including rape, assault, domestic abuse, deprivation of food ration entitlements, and documentation problems … The government placed excessive restrictions on refugees' freedom of movement and ability to work or earn a livelihood. The government continued to ignore UNHCR requests to allow those Rohingya refugees, unable to return to Burma, to work, benefit from local medical programs, or participate in the education system, insisting that all Rohingya refugees remained in camps until their return to Burma … The government has repeatedly rejected a UNHCR proposal to grant the refugees rights for temporary stay and freedom of movement under a self-reliance program. "[2f] (section 2d)

6.110 The Economist Intelligence Unit's Country Report of January 2005 recorded that, in mid-November 2004, Bangladeshi paramilitary forces conducted a joint operation in the Rohingya refugee camps. The report states: "The government claimed that the operation was launched [because] the Rohingya Refugee Repatriation Commission of Cox's Bazar reported violence in the camps in recent months. The refugees were also said to have given shelter to illegal outsiders and brought in illegal arms through the hilly border areas."

6.111 A UNHCR briefing paper of 19 July 2005 outlined the plight of between 6,000 and 10,000 Rohingya living, outside of the refugee camps, on the tidal river flats of the Teknaf River – which forms the border with Burma. The paper described conditions there as "extremely risky and deplorably squalid". The river flats are very vulnerable to seasonal high tides, flooding and cyclones during the monsoon season. There is, according to the briefing paper, no water or sanitation at the site. The UNHCR paper commented:

"The group are unregistered people of concern to UNHCR. The only difference from Rohingya refugees in the two government-run camps is that they were either not in the camps during the 1991-92 influx, or they had arrived after the 1994 cut-off date for prima facie refugee status. Even though Rohingyas in the group have been living unregistered outside the camps, their reasons for coming to Bangladesh are the same as the refugees in the camps." [67a]

The Government had not responded to international requests to relocate the group; the Bangladeshi authorities reportedly regarded the group as illegal immigrants who should return to Burma. [67a]
6.112 In September 2005, UNHCR published a paper on living conditions in the government-run Nayapara and Kutupalong camps in Cox’s Bazar district. “The refugees in the camps claim to have been beaten, family books which entitled them to rations confiscated and money extorted, often by refugee leaders, known as Mahjees, and their followers.” The UNHCR Representative in Bangladesh confirmed that many such claims were true, and that UNHCR had brought the matter to the attention of the authorities many times. Refugees had apparently also been left feeling fearful and traumatised by some violent incidents during the previous year, including the murder of a Mahjee in Nyapara in July 2005 and the killing of three refugees in Kutupalong after a power struggle; the killings in Kutupalong led to many arrests and several hundred other refugees fled the camp. Living conditions in the two camps were described as sub-standard; housing was overcrowded and badly in need of repair or renewal. Children, who made up 65 per cent of the camp population, received only a partial education and this was in the Myanmar language. Most children, however, used a Chittagong dialect and many also spoke Bengali. Some refugees claimed to have been coerced by the Mahjees and camp officials to repatriate; none had reportedly been forced to do so. Between January and August 2005, about 90 refugees returned to Burma. The local Bangladeshi authorities were said to believe that some of the camp inhabitants were involved in criminal activities such as arms trafficking, drugs smuggling and terrorism, though there had been no court convictions to date on these charges. Although not officially allowed to do so, some refugees from the camps worked in the local community. [67c] A Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) Report of April 2002, entitled “10 Years for the Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh”, had observed: “For 10 years running, the majority of the Rohingya refugees have been malnourished. In a closed-camp setting, the refugees still do not have enough food. Today, 58 percent of the refugee children and 53 percent of the adults are chronically malnourished.” [29a] (p12)

WOMEN

6.113 The State party report to the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), dated 3 January 2003, comments: “Bangladesh is a gradually changing society where the position, status and roles of men and women have primarily been shaped by the stereotype of male predominance and authority over women.” [47a] (p16) The report notes: “Traditional socio-cultural values and practices work against raising the status of women. Women still have limited opportunities for education, technical and vocational training, employment and activities.” (p5-6) … According to the Constitution, women enjoy the same status and rights as men in terms of education, health, political process, employment, development processes and social welfare. However, in practice, they do not enjoy the fundamental rights and freedom to the extent as men do. The unequal status of women in society and in public life is largely due to the fact of having unequal status in the family life. Women’s lower socio-economic status, lower literacy, lesser mobility are some of the practical obstacles to the establishment of their fundamental rights.” (p10) The same report details recent initiatives both by the Government and by NGOs to reduce discrimination and gender-based oppression. [47a] (pp7, 10-18) CEDAW, in its Concluding Comments dated 26 July
2004, urged the Bangladesh Government to implement comprehensive awareness-raising programmes to change stereotypical attitudes and norms about the roles of women; CEDAW also expressed concern over the unequal status of Bangladeshi women within the family and the fact that personal laws, derived from religious precepts which are discriminatory to women, continued to exist in the country. [47b] (p5)

6.114 USSD 2005 notes:

“Laws specifically prohibit certain forms of discrimination against women, provide for special procedures for persons accused of violence against women and children, call for harsher penalties, provide compensation to victims, and require action against investigating officers for negligence or wilful failure of duty; however, enforcement of these laws was weak. In July 2003, an amendment to the current law was passed, weakening provisions for dowry crimes and addressing the issue of suicide committed by female victims of acts of ‘dishonor’.” [2f] (section 5)

USSD 2003 had stated:

“In recent years, female school enrolment has improved. Approximately 50 percent of primary and secondary school students were female. Women often were ignorant of their rights because of continued high illiteracy rates and unequal educational opportunities. Strong social stigmas and lack of means to obtain legal assistance frequently kept women from seeking redress in the courts. Many NGOs operated programs to raise women’s awareness of their rights, and to encourage and assist them in exercising those rights. The Government also expanded incentives for female education by making education free for girls up to grade 12 (approximately age 18) and using a stipend system from grades 6 to 12. By comparison, boys received free education up to grade five.” [2b] (section 5)

A Freedom House report of June 2005 adds: “The state continued [in 2004] to take some proactive measures, such as an employment quota and free education for girls up to the secondary level, to promote gender equity.” [65a] (p74)

6.115 The United Nations Common Country Assessment for 2004 records:

“The UNDP Gender Development Index (GDI) for 2004 ranked Bangladesh 110 among 144, which represents an increase of 13 positions since 1999. This improvement can be tied in part to a number of factors relating to Bangladesh’s ascendancy into the ranks of those countries considered to be of medium human development. It also reflects a reduction of the gender gap in key indicators such as life expectancy and school enrolment. Bangladesh was also one of the first developing countries to establish a Ministry of Women’s Affairs in 1978, three years after the Mexico Conference. Concerted efforts by national and international development agencies, and the Government's own commitment to both national and international pledges, paved the way for the enhancement of women's position and status in society. The Government has already prepared a National Policy for Advancement of Women and made some noteworthy progress in implementing the National Action Plan, prepared in response to the Beijing Platform for Action (PFA) … However, the relatively low score reflects a continued inequality with respect to literacy rates (31.4%
6.116 USSD 2005 notes that domestic violence in Bangladesh is widespread, though difficult to quantify. Much of the reported violence against women is related to disputes over dowries; during 2005 the NGO Odhikar found 227 reports of dowry-related killings. The law prohibits rape and physical spousal abuse, but makes no specific provision for spousal rape as a crime. [2f] (section 5)

The Daily Star of 14 August 2003 reported that the results of a study conducted by the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), entitled “Assessing male psycho-socio attitudes towards violence against women”, were presented at a workshop in Dhaka on 13 August 2003; the former deputy representative of UNFPA was quoted as saying: “Sixty-five per cent of Bangladeshi males think it is justifiable to beat up their wives, 38 per cent have no clear idea what constitutes physical violence and 40 per cent support keeping women socially dormant.” [38] A report of the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board, dated 12 January 2004, referred to a study quoted by UNFPA’s “The State of the World Population” for 2000 – which found that 47 per cent of women surveyed in Bangladeshi villages had, at some time, experienced physical abuse by male partners. [3i]

6.117 A State Party report to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), published on 14 March 2003, notes that under the Suppression of Violence against Women and Children Act 2000 violence against a wife by, or on behalf of a husband, carries a penalty of five to 14 years’ imprisonment if injury is caused, and a maximum penalty of life imprisonment for causing or attempting to cause the wife’s death. [52a] (p31) An article dated 26 January 2004 from United News of Bangladesh revealed that there were then 2,200 cases pending in the Women and Children Repression Prevention Tribunal, with at least 50 new cases added monthly. [39h]

6.118 Comments USSD 2005: “Incidents of vigilantism against women – sometimes led by religious leaders (by means of fatwas) – at times occurred, particularly in rural areas.” [2f] (section 5) USSD 2004 stated that such incidents included punishments such as the whipping of women accused of moral offenses. ASK [an NGO] reported 35 such cases during 2004. [2d] (section 5)

(See also Section 5 Fatwas)
6.119 USSD 2005 records that the Women Affairs Department runs six shelters, one each in the six divisional headquarters, for abused women and children, with a total capacity of 2,300 individuals. The report continues:

“NGOs, such as the Bangladesh National Women Lawyers' Associations (BNWLA), also ran facilities to provide shelter to destitute persons and distressed women and children; however, this was insufficient to meet victims' shelter needs. As a result, the government often held women who filed rape complaints in safe custody, usually in prison. Safe custody frequently resulted in further abuses against victims, discouraged the filing of complaints by other women, and often continued for extended periods during which women were unable to gain release. In September 2004 there were 184 women in safe custody with 320 children accompanying them.” [2f] (section 5)

6.120 BBC News reported on 16 May 2004 that Parliament had approved a Constitutional amendment to increase the number of seats in the Jatiya Sangsad from 300 to 345 for a period of ten years, with the additional 45 seats being reserved for women. [20ae] The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Bangladesh Country Report of January 2005 (EIU January 2005) noted that the enabling Reserved Women Seats Election Bill was passed in November 2004, but had drawn sharp criticism from women’s rights activists and others who argued that the provision of reserved seats violated women’s fundamental rights, since no woman can contest such a seat unless nominated by a political party or alliance represented in parliament. Opposition parties criticised the measure as being ‘very complex and impractical’. [40b] (p14)

6.121 The State party report to CEDAW dated 3 January 2003 notes that six women were elected to general seats in Parliament in 2001 and that both the current Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition are women. At the local government level, three seats on each of the 4,479 Union Parishad councils and three seats on each Zila (district) council are reserved for women. [47a] (pp5, 23)

6.122 USSD 2005 notes: “Employment opportunities increased at a greater rate for women than for men in the last decade, largely due to the growth of the export garment industry. Women made up 80 percent of garment factory staff. Programs run by the Government and NGOs extending microcredit to rural women improved their economic power. Pay was generally comparable for men and women.” [2f] (section 5)

Rape

6.123 USSD 2005 observes: “The law prohibits rape and physical spousal abuse but makes no specific provision for spousal rape as a crime. During the year local NGOs found 907 reported incidents of rape and 91 of attempted rape. The press reported that 126 of the rape victims were killed and that another 14 committed suicide after being raped. Human rights monitors insisted that the actual number of rapes was higher, as many rape victims did not report the incidents in order to avoid social disgrace. Prosecution of rapists was uneven. On January 19 at a workshop organized by BSEHR [Bangladesh Society for the Enforcement of Human Rights], then attorney general A.F. Hassan Ariff said that judges “consider rape like theft, robbery and other crimes.” [2f] (section 5) As noted in the State Party report dated 14 March 2003 to the UN Convention
on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the Suppression of Violence against Women and Children Act 2000 carries the death penalty or life imprisonment for rape if death or injury results or is intended. Attempted rape is subject to a penalty of five to ten years’ imprisonment. [52a] (p31) Amnesty International’s 2004 Annual Report (covering events of 2003) stated: “Women’s rights groups blamed the low rate of convictions for violence against women on a lack of government institutions to support the victims and a lack of trained police officers to investigate the cases.” [7j] (p2)

6.124 USSD 2004 had noted:

“According to BSEHR, there were 11 incidents of rape by law enforcement personnel or other officials during the year [2004]. On December 18 [2004], in Chaudanga, police took Dolly Khatun to a police camp for questioning, where 14 police officers subsequently raped her. Responding to public outcry, the Government withdrew all 14 policemen from duty and arrested 5 of them. On December 21, Khatun filed criminal charges against the policemen. The case remained open at year’s end. In most cases, law enforcement personnel accused of rape and torture were not investigated; however, in some instances the Government took action. In September, three policemen convicted of raping and killing a teenage girl in Dinajpur in 1995 were hanged inside Rangpur prison. In some cases, women were often detained in ‘safe custody’ after reporting a rape (in reality, confined in jail cells), where they endured poor conditions and were sometimes abused and raped again.” [2d] (section 1c)

The Suppression of Violence against Women and Children Act 2000 specifies a prison term of five to ten years for the rape of a woman by a police officer who is responsible for her safe custody. [52a] (p31)

6.125 USSD 2005 states: “Rejected suitors, angry husbands, or those seeking revenge sometimes threw acid on a woman's face as an act of retribution.” [2f] (section 1c) “Acid attacks remained a serious problem. Assaultants threw acid in the faces of women and a growing number of men, leaving victims disfigured and often blind… Few perpetrators of the acid attacks were prosecuted.” [2f] (section 5)

6.126 The State party report to the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), dated 3 January 2003, confirmed that two new laws had been introduced in 2002 – the Acid Crime Prevention Act 2002 and the Acid Control Act 2002 – to restrict the import and sale of acid in open markets, allow for trials in acid-throwing cases by a special tribunal (with a right of appeal to a higher court) to make the maximum punishment for acid-throwing offences the death penalty and to provide for the treatment and rehabilitation of victims. [47a] (p20) The Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board, in a report of 12 January 2004, quoted NGO representatives to a 2003 meeting on violence against women as alleging that police, in return for money, had been charging perpetrators under the Women and Children Repression Prevention Act instead of the more severe Acid Control Act. [3i] In a statement by the Asian Legal Resource Centre to the UN Economic and Social Council, dated 10 March 2003, it was stated that the Bangladesh National Women
Lawyers Association and the Bangladesh Acid Survivor’s Foundation estimated that only ten per cent of attackers were ever brought to trial. It was also stated that the total number of acid attacks against women was difficult to document because many cases went unreported for fear of reprisals. [8c]

6.127 A BBC News article of 29 April 2005 confirmed a continued decrease in the incidence of acid-related attacks in Bangladesh. [20bh] Statistics provided by the Acid Survivors Foundation (ASF) – as updated January 2006 – showed that 211 acid attack incidents were recorded in 2005, with a total of 267 victims; in 2004, 266 incidents were recorded, with 322 victims; in 2003 there had been 335 recorded incidents involving 412 victims. Of the 267 victims in 2005, there were 145 women, 69 men and 53 children under 18 years. Case conviction rates increased after the introduction of the two new acid-related laws in 2002; there was then a lower number of convictions in 2004 and 2005. In 2003, 86 cases led to a conviction, compared with 52 in 2002 and 17 in 2001. During 2005, 32 cases resulted in a conviction. The motives for acid attacks are not always gender-related. For example, 45 per cent of recorded acid attacks in 2005 were, according to the ASF, in connection with land or property or money disputes; 17 per cent of attacks related to marital or dowry disputes and 15 per cent of attacks were categorised as “refusal/rejection of love/marriage/sex”. [64]

Children

6.128 According to USSD 2005: “The government was generally responsive to children’s rights and welfare. Many of these efforts were supplemented by local and foreign NGOs, and these joint efforts allowed the country to make significant progress in improving health, nutrition, and education; however, slightly more than one-half of all children were chronically malnourished… According to human rights groups, 205 children were abducted, nearly 314 suffered unnatural deaths, and more than 486 children fell victim to serious abuses such as rape, sexual harassment, torture, and acid attack during the year [2005]. According to child rights activists, violence against children declined due to growing awareness regarding child rights.” [2f] (section 5)

6.129 The State Party report to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), dated 14 March 2003, noted as follows:

“The age of majority in Bangladesh is set at 18 years under the Majority Act 1875, although the Act has no effect on the capacity of any person in relation to marriage, dowry, divorce and adoption or on the religion and religious customs of any citizen …Other legislation relating to children does not adopt a uniform definition of the child. This anomalous situation is compounded by the lack of documentary proof of children’s ages due to the low level of birth registration, which is a major obstacle to ensuring the rights of children under both the Convention and domestic legislation. The Government is working to arrive at a uniform definition of a child.” [52a] (paragraphs 45, 46)

The State Party report of March 2003 gives examples of minimum legal age requirements set by various pieces of national legislation; for example:
• End of compulsory education – 10 years;
• Admission to employment – various ages between 12 and 21 years (see paragraph 6.133 below);
• Marriage – 18 years for girls and 21 years for boys under the Child Marriage Restraint Act 1929, but religious personal laws permit marriage at an earlier age;
• Sexual consent – 14 years;
• Criminal responsibility – full criminal responsibility from the age of 12 years; rebuttable presumption of capacity to infringe the criminal law between the ages of 7 and 11 years;
• Deprivation of liberty including by arrest, detention and imprisonment: Juvenile justice cases – linked to age of criminal responsibility (see above); care and protection cases – no minimum age;
• Capital punishment – 17 years. Life imprisonment in certain exceptional circumstances – 7 years if presumption of capacity not rebutted, otherwise 12 years;
• Giving testimony in court – no minimum age but a witness must be capable of understanding questions put to him or her and of giving intelligible and sensible answers;
• Lodging complaints and seeking redress before the courts without parental consent – 18 years. [52a] (paragraph 47)

6.130 UNICEF (website accessed 28 March 2005) has observed: “The level of malnutrition in children is very high and micro-nutrient deficiency is common. Prevalence of wasting and anaemia in children is estimated to be high.” The under-five mortality rate is still considered very high and about 325,000 children die each year due to various diseases, malnutrition, accidents and, in particular, drowning. [58a] The same website, accessed on 19 September 2005, noted also: “The country receives development assistance of approximately US$1.6 to US$1.8 billion per year and this support has enabled Bangladesh to make great progress, especially in child survival and development through providing safe drinking water, immunization, primary education and sanitation, and in promoting and defending children’s rights.” [58b]

6.131 As noted in USSD 2005: “Because of widespread poverty, many children began to work at a very young age. According to the Government’s National Child Labor Survey published in 2003, the Government estimated that approximately 3.2 million children between the ages of 5 and 14 years worked.” The report observes that this has frequently resulted in abuse of children, mainly through mistreatment by employers during domestic service and occasionally including servitude and prostitution. [2f] (section 6d] USSD 2004 recorded that there had been a significant reduction in child labour in the garment industry. In 2004 about 4,000 garment factories were inspected and those found to be employing children were fined. Outside of the garment sector, however, there was virtually no enforcement of child labour laws during 2004. The Government sometimes brought criminal charges against employers who abused domestic servants. [2d] (section 6d] USSD 2005 reports also: “The Government has been a member of ILO-IPEC [the ILO’s International Programme for the Elimination of Child Labour] since 1994. ILO-IPEC programs include a $6 million project to eliminate the worst forms of child labor in five targeted industries: beedi [cigarette]
production, matchmaking, tanneries, construction, and child domestic workers. As of December 2003, 19,874 children had been removed from hazardous work, 19,508 were attending non-formal education training, 7,623 had been admitted to formal schooling, and 3,060 were receiving pre-vocational training.” [2f] (section 6d)

6.132 USSD 2005 quotes a 2002 report published by the government news agency Bangladesh Shongbad Shongsta in saying that there were then approximately 400,000 homeless children, of whom as many as 150,000 had no knowledge of their parents. [2f] (section 5)

6.133 The State Party report to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), published on 14 March 2003, states:

“In 1995-1996, the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics carried out the first ever comprehensive national household survey on child labour, covering children aged 5 to 14 years. According to the survey, there are 6.6 million child workers in Bangladesh (including those looking for work but excluding students). Of these, 14 per cent work as child domestics. A higher proportion of boys (22 per cent) than girls (16 per cent) work, and the proportion of child workers in rural areas (20 per cent) is higher than in urban areas (15 per cent). More than 90 per cent of working children operate in the informal sector. Two thirds of children work in agriculture, the other main occupations being domestic service, selling, collecting waste, construction work and work in small workshops and factories.”

The report details various statutes which stipulate the minimum ages at which children can legally work in certain sectors: Mines, 15 years (with medical certificate); shops and other commercial establishments, 12 years; factories, 14 years (with medical certificate); workshops where hazardous work is performed, 12 years; tea plantations, 15 years. [52a] (p73-76)

6.134 The State Party report to the CRC dated 23 December 2005 notes that the Suppression of Violence against Women and Children Act 2000 lays down severe penalties for various kinds of offences against children (up to 14 years) including rape, sexual harassment, kidnapping and detention for ransom. The same report mentions that it is an offence under the Children Act for a person who has custody, care or charge of a child to assault, ill-treat, neglect, abandon or expose the child or to cause such things to happen to him or her in a way likely to cause the child unnecessary suffering or injury to their health. [52c] (p14-15)

6.135 Agence France-Presse confirmed on 8 March 2005 that the Muslim Marriages and Divorces (Registration)(Amendment) Bill 2005 had received presidential consent. [23n]. The Act provides for the registration of all marriages to be made compulsory and has introduced stiffer penalties for under-age marriages; the legal minimum age for marriage remains 18 years for a woman and 21 for a man. (United News of Bangladesh: 16 February 2005) [39q]

**Children Arrangements**

6.136 The Child Rights Information Network (CRIN) website has noted that Bangladesh is a signatory to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the state is thus obliged to ensure proper care, protection, mental and physical
treatment of children and regular review of treatment for the child victims of armed conflict, torture, neglect, maltreatment or exploitation. [30]

6.137 According to research carried out by the Bangladeshi human rights group Odhikar in 2001:

“The Department of Social Services, under the Ministry of Social Welfare has a major programme named Child Welfare and Child Development in order to provide access to food, shelter, basic education, health services and other basic opportunities for hapless children. There are 73 state orphanages for approximately 9,500 orphan children, three Baby Homes for Abandoned Children with the capacity for 250 babies, one Destitute Children’s Rehabilitation Centre for 400 children, one Vocational Training Centre for Orphans and Destitute Children for 100 children, sixty-five Welfare and Rehabilitation Programmes for children with disability for about 1400 children...In many Government run orphanages children are deprived of government grant allocation.” [46b]

6.138 The State Party report of 14 March 2003 to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) confirmed that there were, in 2001, 73 state-run orphanages and also three homes for abandoned children aged one to 5 years. The report added that there were another 950 orphanages run by NGOs, some with Government funding. These included institutions linked to various religions: over 300 Muslim orphanages attached to madrassah schools, nine Hindu, five Buddhist and four Christian orphanages. [52a] (p29)

LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER PERSONS

6.139 According to the International Lesbian and Gay Association (ILGA) website, accessed 24 March 2006, same-sex male and same-sex female relationships are both deemed to be illegal. Section 377 of the Penal Code provides: “Whoever voluntarily has carnal intercourse against the order of nature with any man, woman or animal, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may be extended to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine”. A Bangladeshi lawyer, in a statement to the Swedish Embassy in Dhaka, commented: “You will notice that the word ‘homosexual’ or ‘homosexuality’ have not been used in the statute. The instances of prosecution under this section is extremely rare. In my twenty years of law practise, I have not known or heard of a case where a person has been prosecuted for or convicted of homosexuality under the aforesaid section. Such a prosecution in fact would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for lack of witness or evidence.” [24]
6.140 The United Nations Common Country Assessment for 2004 observed:

“The growth of civil society and in particular nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) has been one of the great success stories in Bangladesh. Though the country has a long tradition of social activism throughout its history – the language movement being one example – the emergence of the NGO sector has been a relatively new phenomenon that began in the late 1970s. Today, NGOs are a significant provider of social services, in particular health and education, to the rural poor. Specialized microfinance institutions (MFIs) such as the Grameen Bank, pioneered the micro-credit model that has been replicated all around the world and MFIs have had considerable success in helping to provide alternative income-generating opportunities for poor women in Bangladesh. The emergence of NGOs has also played a significant role in the improvement of human development indicators and compensated, in part, for weak market and state institutions. Within the context of a rights-based approach, it should be noted that local NGOs have also played a significant role in terms of helping poor and marginalized groups to make claims for the fulfilment of their rights to education and health and secure and sustainable livelihoods. Today there are well over a thousand NGOs registered with the Government. From village cooperatives and women’s groups on the one hand to large internationally recognized institutions with staff running into the thousands, civil society in Bangladesh has thrived since the restoration of democracy.” [8d] (p 69)

The report added:

“Legitimate questions have been raised on the accountability and representation of (foreign funded) NGOs and there have been several attempts to limit the work of NGOs to basic service provision. In a couple of notable cases, prominent NGOs have come under fire from within and outside the sector for allegedly crossing the line into direct partisan activities. Legislation is under consideration for tightening the regulatory environment for NGOs including issues relating to registration and taxation.” [8d] (p70)
for international human rights activists. Missionaries who advocated on behalf of human rights faced problems regarding visas. A few human rights activists reported harassment by the intelligence agencies. For example the government blocked foreign funding to the PRIP [Private Rural Initiatives Project] Trust NGO because the organization’s executive director, Aroma Dutta, championed minority rights during the 2001 general election. The government released part of the foreign funding to the PRIP Trust during the year … In February several offices of leading NGOs, such as the Grameen Bank and Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), came under attack in northern areas of the country. Authorities charged Dr. Asudullah Al-Gailb, the leader of Ahle Hadith, a local Islamic group for the bombings of the Grameen and BRAC offices and for targeting a series of cultural events and organizations for attack. On March 1, an office of CARITAS in Dinajpur caught fire which, according to some press accounts, was caused by the explosion of two bombs. [2f] (section 4)

The report continues:

“On April 19, Rafiq Ali, president of the country’s chapter of Non-Violence International, was acquitted for his alleged involvement in an arms act case. Authorities arrested Mr. Ali on suspicion of arms smuggling because he, in collaboration with Forum Asia, was providing community education seminars on small arms smuggling … The government cooperated with international organizations such as the UNHRC and the ICRC; however, the ICRC did not visit the country during the year. In December 2004 the Asia Pacific director of the UNHCR visited the country to investigate the status of the Rohingyas. Despite its election pledge and repeated public announcements, the government did not enact legislation establishing an independent National Human Rights Commission. Previous legislation authorizing the establishment of a Human Rights Ombudsman’s Office continued to remain dormant.” [2f] (section 4)

6.142 The Amnesty International (AI) Annual Report 2005 (covering 2004) stated: “Human rights defenders continued to receive death threats and to be at risk of attacks [in 2004]. Perpetrators were believed to be linked to Islamist groups or armed criminal gangs whose conduct the defenders had criticized.” AI cited a serious attack on Dr Humayun Azad of Dhaka University by unknown assailants in February 2004, following the publication of his novel about Islamist groups. AI also noted the stabbing of a correspondent for the magazine Weekly 2000 who had been investigating the involvement of politicians and Islamist groups in attacks on Hindus. [7n] The AI Annual Report 2005 added: “Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) perceived to oppose government policies were at risk of harassment.” The report mentioned the arrest in May 2004 of the president and vice-president of the NGO Proshika, which was alleged to have been politically motivated. [7o]

6.143 An article in the Daily Star of 29 June 2004 noted that the president of the NGO Proshika, Qazi Faruque Ahmed, had been released on bail by the High Court in connection with several cases of graft. [38b] Dr Ahmed and six other Proshika officials had, according to a BBC News article of 21 June 2004, also been charged with sedition (see above). His lawyers argued that none of the charges against him were concrete and that he was being harassed by the authorities. BBC News described Proshika as one of the largest NGOs in the world, employing thousands of people in poverty alleviation, education and development projects. [20ax]
The International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) report on its fact-finding mission of December 2004 commented:

“The harassment against PROSHIKA began almost as soon as the elections of 2001 were completed and the BNP [Bangladesh Nationalist Party] coalition government came into power. Directing its powerful political wand directly at the organization and its leadership, the last year has seen their offices raided, their leaders arrested with charges of unlawful activities, mismanagement of funds etc, foreign funding to most of their programs blocked and even to the extent of threatening its registration to be cancelled.” [68a] (p19)

The same report contains details of alleged Government harassment of certain other NGOs, including the Private Rural Initiatives Project (PRIP) Trust and the International Voluntary Service (IVS), and the umbrella organisation ADAB (Association of Development Agencies of Bangladesh). [68a] (p19-23)

BBC News, on 17 February 2005, reported bomb attacks on the offices of two development aid organisations, the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) and Grameen Bank. At least eight of their workers were injured. The Executive Director of BRAC blamed the attack on Islamic extremists, noting BRAC’s work for the empowerment of women. [20at] A BBC News article of 25 February 2005 quoted the Bangladeshi authorities as saying that at least 20 suspects who were arrested after the BRAC and Grameen bombings had confessed to links with the militant Islamic groups Jamatul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) and Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB). [20aw]

AUTHENTICATION OF DOCUMENTS

Information received from the British High Commission in Dhaka in December 2003 was as follows:

“Forged and fraudulently obtained documents are readily available in Bangladesh and are frequently submitted in support of entry clearance applications. Such documents include forged passports, birth, death and marriage certificates, bank statements (local and British), business plus employment related documents and educational certificates. Maintenance of official records in Bangladesh tends to be haphazard. Most records are kept in hand written logs, with very little in the way of computerised records. There is no local equivalent of the UK Police National Computer system. Instead, records are kept at local police stations with no national link. With regard to birth and death certificates, and marriage and divorce certificates, local municipal corporations or union councils, and local registrars issue these respectively. As with police records, there is no national link up between any of these records. Most banks have similar poor maintenance of accounts, and most rural branches lack computers or even telephones.” [11g]

The Country Information Service of the Australian Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs noted in a 1998 document entitled “Bangladesh: Profile of Asylum Claims and Country Conditions”:
“Asylum applicants from all [Bangladeshi political] parties submit voluminous documentation to support their claims, including in particular outstanding warrants for their arrest if they return to Bangladesh and other alleged court and police documents. Arrest warrants are not generally available to the public, and all such documents should be scrutinized carefully. Many ‘documented’ claims of outstanding arrest warrants have proved to be fraudulent. As of December 1997, the Embassy had examined several hundred documents submitted by asylum applicants; none proved to be genuine.” [50a]

6.148 In a response to a query, the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board advised in January 2004:

“Specific information on whether civilians bribe newspapers to publish fraudulent articles, or the frequency of this practice in Bangladesh, could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate. However, a research report commissioned by the Florida-based Institute for Public Relations and the United Kingdom-based International Public Relations Association, that was sponsored by the Turkish newspaper, *Hurriyet*, found that, among the 66 nations surveyed, there was a high likelihood in Bangladesh of print journalists seeking or accepting money for news coverage from a variety of sources (IPR 21 July 2003, Table 1; ibid. n.d.).” [51]
Annex A: Chronology of Events

1947 British colonial rule over India ended. A largely Muslim state comprising East and West Pakistan was established, either side of India. The two provinces were separated from each other by more than 1,500 km of Indian territory.

1949 The Awami League was established to campaign for East Pakistan's autonomy from West Pakistan.

1970 The Awami League, under Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, won an overwhelming election victory in East Pakistan. The Government in West Pakistan refused to recognise the results, leading to rioting.

INDEPENDENCE

1971 Independence of the province of East Pakistan – as the People’s Republic of Bangladesh – was proclaimed on 26 March. The Awami League formed the government-in-exile on 17 April with Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, imprisoned in Pakistan, as the President.

1972 Sheikh Mujibur became Prime Minister. He began a programme of nationalising key industries in an attempt to improve living standards, but with little success.

1974 Severe floods devastated much of the grain crop, leading to an estimated 28,000 deaths. A national state of emergency was declared as political unrest grew.

1975 Sheikh Mujibur became President of Bangladesh. The political situation worsened. Sheikh Mujibur was assassinated in a military coup in August. Martial law was imposed.

1976 The military banned trade unions.

1977 General Ziaur Rahman assumed the presidency. Islam was adopted in the Constitution.

1979 Martial law was lifted following elections, which Zia’s Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) won.

1981 Zia was assassinated during an abortive military coup. He was succeeded by Abdus Sattar.

THE ERSHAD ERA

1982 General Ershad assumed power in an army coup. He suspended the Constitution and political parties.

1983 Ershad’s proposal that all schools should teach Arabic and the Koran led to demonstrations. Limited political activity was permitted. Ershad became President.
1986 Parliamentary and presidential elections were held. Ershad was elected to a five-year term. He lifted martial law and reinstated the Constitution.

1987 A State of emergency was declared after opposition demonstrations and strikes.

1988 Islam became the state religion. Floods covered up to three-quarters of the country. Tens of millions were displaced.

1990 Ershad stepped down following mass protests.

1991 Ershad was convicted and jailed for corruption and illegal possession of weapons. Begum Khaleda Zia, widow of President Ziaur Rahman, became Prime Minister. The Constitution was changed to render the position of president ceremonial. The prime minister now had primary executive power. A cyclonic tidal wave killed up to 138,000.

**AWAMI LEAGUE RETURNS TO POWER**

1996 Two sets of elections saw the Awami League win power, with Sheikh Hasina, the daughter of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, becoming Prime Minister.

1997 Ershad was released from prison. The opposition BNP began a campaign of strikes against the Government.

1998 Two-thirds of the country was affected by floods. Fifteen former army officers were sentenced to death for involvement in the assassination of President Mujibur in 1975.

2000 **September:** Sheikh Hasina criticised military regimes in a UN speech, prompting Pakistani leader General Musharraf to cancel talks with her. Relations were strained further by a row over the leaked Pakistani report on the 1971 War of Independence. **December:** Bangladesh expelled a Pakistani diplomat for comments on the 1971 war. The diplomat had put the number of dead at 26,000, whereas Bangladesh insisted nearly three million were killed. Bangladesh wanted Pakistan to apologise for alleged genocide that it said Pakistani forces were guilty of during the War of Independence.

2001 **July:** Sheikh Hasina stepped down and handed power to a caretaker government. She was the first Prime Minister in the country’s history to complete a five-year term.

**BNP-LED COALITION GOVERNMENT**

2001 **October:** A BNP-led coalition won an overwhelming victory in the general election. Khaleda Zia once again became Prime Minister. Three hundred international monitors declared the poll to have been free and fair. [1a] [5f]

2002 **March:** The Government introduced a law making acid attacks punishable by death. **April:** The Government approved a temporary law to speed up the legal process for dealing with violent crime.
June: President Chowdhury resigned after the Bangladesh Nationalist Party accused him of taking an anti-party line. The opposition Awami League ended its boycott of parliament and attended for the first time since losing the general election of October 2001.

September: Iajuddin Ahmed, a retired professor from Dhaka University, was announced as the new President.

October: “Operation Clean Heart” was launched by the Government in response to criticism over rising crime and deteriorating law and order. This involved the deployment of nearly 40,000 soldiers in all major cities to help restore law and order, arrest “listed criminals” and recover illegal firearms. More than 11,000 people were arrested during the Operation, and between 31 and 40 people died after soldiers detained them.

2003

January to March: Local elections to 4,267 local councils were held. By February 2003, 25 people had reportedly been killed in election-related violence.

February: The Joint Force Indemnity Ordinance 2003 was passed by Parliament to give legal protection to members of the army and security forces who took part in Operation Clean Heart.

2004

January: A bomb attack took place on a shrine in Sylhet.

May: A Constitutional amendment increased the number of seats in Parliament from 300 to 345, the additional 45 being reserved for nominated women members.

May: A bomb attack at a Muslim shrine in Sylhet killed two and injured 25, including the British High Commissioner.

July-August: Devastating floods hit Bangladesh: more than 600 people were killed and an estimated 30 million people were displaced or stranded; 60 per cent of the country, including half of Dhaka, was under water at one stage.

August: On 21 August a grenade attack at an Awami League rally in Dhaka, addressed by Sheikh Hasina, killed 23 people and injured about 200. Rioting by Awami League supporters subsequently erupted across the country; the Awami League called general strikes.

September-October: Police carried out “blanket” arrests ahead of an Awami League mass rally on 3 October.

November: The Anti-Corruption Commission was established.

December: An Awami League-led opposition alliance staged two “human chain” demonstrations stretching right across the country.

2005

January: Former Finance Minister Shah AMS Kibria and four other Awami League activists were killed in a grenade attack in Habiganj.

February: The Government banned two militant Islamic groups, Jumatul Mujahedin Bangladesh (JMB) and Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB).

August: Some 400 small home-made bombs exploded almost simultaneously in 63 cities and towns across Bangladesh, killing two people and injuring over 100. Jumatul Mujahedin Bangladesh (JMB) reportedly claimed responsibility.

October: Bomb attacks inside law court buildings in three districts killed two people and injured dozens; Jumatul Mujahedin Bangladesh (JMB) were believed responsible. The Islamist group Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (Huji) was banned.

November: Two judges were assassinated on 14 November. Several other judges received death threats from Islamist groups. On 29 November at least 14 people were killed and over 40 injured in a suicide bombing inside the law
courts in Gazipur and a bomb blast in Chittagong. JMB were believed to be responsible.

2006  **February:** At least 40,000 members of the Awami League-led opposition alliance held a mass rally in Dhaka.  
      **March:** Shaikh Abdur Rahman, the leader of Jama’ul Mujahedin Bangladesh (JMB), and Siddiqui Islam, alias ‘Bangla Bhai’, of Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB) and JMB, were captured by police and RAB units.
Annex B: Maps

BANGLADESH

The Bangladesh Government website has links to various national and regional maps of the country:

http://www.bangladesh.gov.bd/  (Click on 'Maps')

CHITTAGONG HILL TRACTS (CHT)

On the website of Bangladesh-GIS are maps showing the distribution of the Jumma populations and overall population density within the CHT:

http://www.bangladesh-gis.net/LGED_myasp/map_catalogue/Bangladesh/Chittagong%20Hill%20Tracts/population/bigs/Cht_popdensity.jpg
Annex C: Political Organisations

Main Political Parties

Awami League (AL)
Founded 1949. The Awami League spearheaded the war of independence under Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and is currently headed by his daughter, former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. Advocates socialist economy, but with a private sector, and a secular state. Has about 1,025,000 members, according to Europa. The AL last governed Bangladesh between June 1996 and July 2001, after 21 years in opposition. [1b] [40a]

Despite obtaining the votes of 22,365,516 people in the 2001 general election (40 per cent of all votes cast), the AL secured only 62 seats in the 300-seat parliament due to the first-past-the-post electoral system. [16]

Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) (Bangladesh Jatiyatabadi Dal)
Founded in 1978 by a former President, General Zia, and is now led by his widow, current Prime Minister, Khaleda Zia. [40a]
The BNP won 193 of the 300 parliamentary seats in the 2001 general election and formed a government in coalition with Jamaat-e-Islami, the Jatiya Party and the Islamic Oikya Jote. [16] According to the Economist Intelligence Unit Country Profile 2003: “The BNP espouses Bangladesh nationalism with anti-Indian and pro-Islamic nuances; however, these nuances have not been evident in its policymaking since coming to power in October 2001… The BNP, with close links to business, is committed to fostering a market economy and liberal democracy, and encourages private sector-led economic growth.” [40a]

Islami Oikya Jote (IOJ) (alternatively Islami Oikkya Jote)
Won two seats in 2001 election and is currently a member of the BNP-led coalition Government. Seeks to implement Islamic doctrine and draws support from traditional religious groups. Mufti Fazlul Haque Amini is secretary-general of IOJ. [40a] (p11) [2b]

Jamaat-e-Islami
Founded 1941. A fundamentalist party that espouses an Islamic state. Opposed to Bangladesh’s independence in the 1971 civil war with Pakistan. [1b] [40a] Leader is Matiur Rahman Nizami. [40a] The party was banned after independence but got its rights back after General Zia allowed it and other fundamentalist parties to enter politics after the first AL-led Government had banned them from politics. [4b] Won 17 seats in the October 2001 election to form part of the ruling BNP-led coalition. [20m]

Jatiya Party (Ershad): The Jatiya (Jatio) Party was founded 1983 as Jana Dal; it reorganised in 1986 when the National Front (founded 1985) formally converted itself into a single pro-Ershad grouping. [5g] The JP’s main faction is led by the deposed former President, General Ershad. Stood in the 2001 general election as ‘Islami Jatio Oikya Front’ and won 14 seats. [40a] [16]

Bangladesh Jatiya Party (N-F), or Jatiya Party (Naziur): This faction, led by Naziur Rahman Manzur, secured four seats in the 2001 election and is currently part of the BNP-led governing coalition. The party is secular.

Jatiya Party (Manju) is a separate party/faction which broke away from the Jatiya party in 1999 and won one seat in 2001. [1b]
A full list of the 95 political parties allocated symbols for the 2001 general election is on the website of the Bangladesh Election Commission:

Another extended list of political parties can be found at:
http://elive.matamat.com/ppb.php

**STUDENT/YOUTH ORGANISATIONS**

**Bangladesh Chhatra League (BCL)**
Affiliated to Awami League. [11c]

**Jatiyatabadi Chhatra Dal (JCD)**
Affiliated to Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). [11c]

**Islami Chhatra Shibir (ICS)**
Affiliated to Jamaat-e-Islami (Jamaat). [11c]

**Jatiya Chhatra Samaj**
Affiliated to Jatiya Party. [11c]

**Gonobitantrik Chhatra League**
Affiliated to the Democratic League. [11c]

**PROSCRIBED AND/OR EXTREMIST ORGANISATIONS**

**Jagrata Muslim Janata of Bangladesh (JMJB)**
JMJB is a fundamentalist ‘vigilante’ group whose aim is Islamic revolution through jihad. It is claimed that the group was first founded in 1998; the present name (JMJB) first became apparent in April 2004. According to the *South Asia Intelligence Review* of 31 May 2004, its highest decision-making body is the seven-member Majlis-e-Shura (also referred to as the Sura Board); the first tier of the organisation has activists called ‘Ehsar’ who are recruited on a full-time basis and act at the directive of top echelons. The second tier, ‘Gayeri Ehsar’, has over 100,000 part-time activists. The third tier involves those who indirectly co-operate with JMJB. The organisation operates mainly in the northern districts of the country, but also has bases in some southern districts.

Shaikh Abdur Rahman is said to be amir (‘spiritual leader’) of JMJB – as well as being the leader of Jamatul Mujahedin Bangladesh (JMB), with which JMJB has close links – see below. Siddiquul Islam, also known as ‘Bangla Bhai’, is a senior member who has assumed command of JMJB operations. The *Daily Star* has quoted Bangla Bhai as claiming that JMJB has 300,000 activists, about 10,000 of whom are full-time activists. There have been violent clashes between JMJB and the maoist Purba Bangla Communist Party (PBCP) since April 2004; for example, in May 2004 JMJB operatives killed six members of the PBCP; the PBCP retaliated by killing two JMJB men and injuring six others. On 22 May 2004 several thousand JMJB activists armed with bamboo and hockey sticks staged a rally in Rajshahi city, under police escort, threatening journalists with death for reporting against them. In May 2004 the Government issued a warrant for Bangla Bhai’s arrest. [38] [19a] [59b] [38ac] JMJB is believed to have been involved in a number of recent bombings and vigilante killings, including a bomb attack on a jatra folk theatre show in Shahjahanpur on 14 January 2005 in which two people were killed and 70 wounded. [38] The *Daily Star* of 25 January 2005 reported that at least 50 people, including eight policemen, were injured in clashes between the security forces and JMJB militants in Bagmara the previous
day. A large number of JMJB supporters had been protesting the lynching, a few days earlier, of three JMJB cadres by a mob of villagers. Police held 64 JMJB activists for questioning, and also arrested JMJB’s Bagmara leader. JMJB had also distributed leaflets in Bagmara and in Bogra calling for Muslims to prepare for a Jihad. [38r] [20av] A police spokesman, on 4 February 2005, warned that JMJB planned to continue with bomb attacks on cinemas, theatres and jatra, which they have deemed to be “un-Islamic”. NGOs were also to be targets. [38w] It was announced on 23 February 2005 that the Government had officially banned Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB) – as well as its associated militant Islamic group, Jummatul Mujahedeen. [61b] [23j] [38ac] The newspaper Prothom Alo reported on 21 July that JMJB had secretly continued with fund raising and recruitment since being banned in February 2005. [21f] BBC News reported on 2 March 2006 that Shaikh Abdur Rahman, had surrendered to police in the district of Sylhet. [20bq] United News of Bangladesh and BBC News announced on 6 March 2006 that Siddiqul Islam, also known as ‘Bangla Bhai’, had been arrested after an encounter with the Rapid Action Battalion in Mymensingh district. [39ac] [20bw]

Other JMJB activities are detailed at http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutfits/JMJB.htm and http://www.thedailystar.net/2005/08/28/d5082801022.htm

**Jamatul Mujahedin Bangladesh (JMB or JM) (alternatively Jama’atul Mujahideen)**
A militant Islamist group founded in the 1990s, JMB is said to be an offshoot of Hizb ul-Mujahedeen. JMB has strong links with Jagrata Muslim Janata of Bangladesh (JMJB) – see above. Agence France-Presse, Associated Press and BBC News reported on 23 February 2005 that the Home Ministry had banned two militant Islamic groups, Jamatul Mujahedeen and JMJB (above). Police arrested 19 JM suspects whom they reportedly blamed for involvement in a string of bomb attacks at musical concerts, religious shrines and the offices of voluntary organisations (NGOs). [23j] [61b] [20az] A Daily Star report of 28 August 2005 states: “Activists of [JMB] believe in capturing power through armed revolution and running the country by establishing Islamic rule by a Majlish-e-Shura.” [38ac] JMB is believed to have been responsible for the 400+ simultaneous bomb blasts across the country on 17 August 2005, according to Agence France-Presse and United News of Bangladesh; leaflets bearing JMB’s name and calling for the implementation of Islamic law were reportedly found at some of the bomb sites. Shaikh Abdur Rahman, referred to as the leader of JMB by both of these news sources, was charged in absentia on 26 August 2005 for his alleged role in the 17 August bombings. [23l] [23m] [39r] [38ac] The police have reportedly named Dr Muhammad Asadullah al-Galib as the amir or ‘spiritual leader’ of JMB; according to the Daily Star report of 28 August 2005, however, Galib is just one of JMB’s “policy makers” and Shaikh Abdur Rahman is the “spiritual leader” of both JMB and JMJB. [20az] [38ac] BBC News announced on 2 March 2006 that Shaikh Abdur Rahman had surrendered to police in the district of Sylhet. [20bq]

**Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (alternatively known as Huji or Harkatul Jihad)**
According to a Daily Star report of 28 August 2005, Harkatul Jihad was established in the early-1990s apparently with assistance from Osama bin Laden; its ideals were also inspired by the Taliban in Afghanistan. Many of its founders fought with the Mujahideen in Afghanistan in the 1980s. Current leader is said to be Shawkat Osman, alias ‘Shaikh Farid’; Imtiaz Quddus is apparently general secretary. Huji mainly operates in the southern coastal belt and apparently has training camps in Chittagong division. It is said to have around 15,000 members in Bangladesh. Huji has been accused of plotting to assassinate Sheikh Hasina when she was Prime Minister. [38ac] BBC News reported on 17 October 2005 that the Government had banned Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (Huji), describing it as a terrorist organisation. [20bk]
Other Islamist extremist/militant organisations in Bangladesh include Shahadat Al Hiqma, Hizbut Towhid (HT), Hizb-ut Tahrir and Islami Biplobi Parishad (IBP). Further information on each of these appears in a Daily Star report of 28 August 2005 (source [38ac]) at http://www.thedailystar.net/2005/08/28/d5082801022.htm

Purba Bangla(r) Communist Party (PBCP)
A proscribed radical Maoist movement. Seeks communist revolution by violent means. Responsible for the murder of police, officials, merchants and others; also engaged in robbery and extortion. According to the South Asia Terrorism portal of the Institute for Conflict Management (accessed 30 March 2005), current leader is Mofakkar Chowdhury. The PBCP was founded in 1968 following a split in the Bangladesh Communist Party. [11a] [59a]

As stated above, there were violent clashes between the PBCP and Jagrata Muslim Janata of Bangladesh (JMJB) during 2004. Various articles from United News of Bangladesh have also recorded that several gun battles took place between the security forces and PBCP in the latter half of 2004 and early 2005; some of these involved the PBCP faction Janajuddha. Also during this period a number of PBCP members were apparently lynched by civilian mobs. For example, a PBCP member was beaten to death by villagers in Chitolmari upazila on 4 October 2004 when he went to collect tolls [39i]; a regional leader of Janajuddha was killed in a shootout with police in Akamdanga upazila on 8 October – he had been wanted for seven murders [39j]; five Janajuddha operatives were killed in gunfights with police in Alamdabga upazila in late November [39k]; on 2 December 2004 a PBCP (Janajuddha) cadre was beaten to death by a mob in Rupsa when he went to collect his takings [39l]; Mohidul Islam Shamim, said to be second-in-command of PBCP (Janajuddha), was killed in a gunfight between police and PBCP cadres in Daulatour upazila on 12 February 2005. [39n] Abdul Malek, a regional leader of PBCP, had been killed in a gunfight between PBCP and New Biplobi Communist Party members on 2 February 2005. [39m]

The Janajuddha faction claimed responsibility for the assassination of the Khulna president of the Awami League in August 2003. [20n] PBCP has also reportedly claimed responsibility for a number of attacks on journalists, including the bombing outside the Khulna Press Club on 5 February 2005 in which a journalist was killed and others injured. PBCP has threatened that it has “many more journalists in its sights”. [9f]

Further details at http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/bangladesh/terroristoutfits/PBCP.htm

Biplobi Communist Party (before 1971 was known as the Communist Party of East Pakistan)
Maoist movement. Fought against both the Pakistan army and the Awami League during independence struggle. By mid-1970s largely suppressed by State; revived 1980s. [11a]

New Biplobi Communist Party (NBCP)
Formed in 1999 after the Biplobi Communist Party split. Police estimate about 5,000 ‘cadres’. Leader was Monoranjon Goshal, alias ‘Mrinal’. Has mainly been active in Khulna, Jessore, Bagerhat and Satkhira districts. Financed through racketeering. [38x]

The Bangladesh Daily Star reported on 22 September 2004 that ‘Mrinal’ had been shot dead the previous day by unidentified assailants. He had been wanted by the police in
connection with 103 cases of murder, 43 abductions for ransom and various other crimes. [38x]

According to a United News of Bangladesh article of 20 December 2004, Habibur Rahman, alias Ekdil, had styled himself as “commander-in-chief” of NBCP. Three of his bodyguards were killed in an encounter with police on this date. [39o]

Swadhin Bangabhumı Movement (‘Free Land of Bengal’)  
Hindu separatist movement. Founded in Calcutta by former Awami League MP, who fled to India in August 1975. Seeks separate state in southwest Bangladesh (where there is a large Hindu minority). Responsible for attempted take-over of Bangladesh High Commission in Calcutta in 1984. [11a]

Shanti Bahini (‘Peace Force’)  
Armed wing of the Parbattya Chattagram Jana Sanghati Samity (PCJSS), a tribal insurgency which operated in the Chittagong Hill Tracts. Founded in 1972. Stood for political independence for the Chittagong Hills Tracts, and drew support from Chakma tribes. [11a] However, following the Peace Accord of 2 December 1997, [4c] Shantu Larma reportedly declared an end to the Shanti Bahini. [4e] On 10 February 1998 the Shanti Bahini formally surrendered their arms to the Government, marking an end to the 25-year insurgency. [4e] The group is now considered to have disbanded, having surrendered their arms and had criminal cases against them dropped as part of the Peace Accord. [7b]
Annex D: Prominent People

AHMED Prof. Iajuddin
President of Bangladesh since 6 September 2002. [20s]

ERSHAD General Hossain Mohammed
Leader of the main faction of the Jatiya Party. Came to power following a military coup in March 1982 and ruled as an autocrat until December 1990. [1a] [40a]

HASINA Sheikh
The leader of the opposition Awami League. Prime Minister in 1996-2001. A daughter of Bangladesh’s founder, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Sheikh Hasina Wajed became leader of the AL in 1981. Sheikh Hasina and the current Prime Minister, Khaleda Zia, have a legendary antipathy toward one another. [40a] [1a]

NIZAMI Motiur Rahman
Leader of Jamaat-e-Islami, Bangladesh’s largest Islamist party and a member of the BNP-led coalition Government. [40a]

RAHMAN Sheikh Mujibur (Mujib)
Bangladesh’s first Prime Minister; assassinated in August 1975. [1a]

RAHMAN Ziaur (General Zia)
Assumed presidency April 1977; assassinated in May 1981. [1a]

ZIA Begum Khaleda
Leader of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Prime Minister since October 2001. She was previously Prime Minister from 1991 to 1996. The wife of former President Ziaur Rahman, she became leader of the BNP in 1981. [20i] [40a]
Annex E: List of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>AI</td>
<td>Amnesty International</td>
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<td>AL</td>
<td>Awami League</td>
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<td>BCL</td>
<td>Bangladesh Chhatra League</td>
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<tr>
<td>BJP</td>
<td>Bangladesh Jatiya Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>BLAST</td>
<td>Bangladesh Legal Aid and Services Trust</td>
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<td>BNP</td>
<td>Bangladesh Nationalist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>BNWLA</td>
<td>Bangladesh National Women Lawyers Association</td>
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<td>BRAC</td>
<td>Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEDAW</td>
<td>Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women</td>
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<td>CHT</td>
<td>Chittagong Hill Tracts</td>
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<td>CPJ</td>
<td>Committee to Protect Journalists</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCO</td>
<td>Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK)</td>
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<td>FH</td>
<td>Freedom House</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
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<tr>
<td>HUJI / Huji</td>
<td>Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami</td>
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<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
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<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee for Red Cross</td>
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<td>ICS</td>
<td>Islami Chhatra Shibir</td>
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<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>IOJ</td>
<td>Islami Oikya Jote</td>
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<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCD</td>
<td>Jatiyatabadi Chhatra Dal</td>
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<td>JMB or JM</td>
<td>Jamaatul Mujahedin Bangladesh</td>
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<td>JMJB</td>
<td>Jagrata Muslim Janata of Bangladesh</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSF</td>
<td>Médecins sans Frontières</td>
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<tr>
<td>NBCP</td>
<td>New Biplobi Communist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>ODIHR</td>
<td>Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights</td>
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<td>ODPR</td>
<td>Office for Displaced Persons and Refugees</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<td>PBCP</td>
<td>Purba Bangla(r) Communist Party</td>
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<td>RSF</td>
<td>Reporters sans frontières</td>
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<td>STC</td>
<td>Save The Children</td>
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<td>TI</td>
<td>Transparency International</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNAIDS</td>
<td>Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCHR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children's Fund</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>USDD</td>
<td>United States Department of State</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
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Annex F: References to Source Material

The Home Office is not responsible for the content of external websites.

Numbering of the source documents below is not always consecutive because some older sources have been removed in the course of updating this document.

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   b  Europa Regional Surveys of the World: South Asia 2005 (pp. 88-121)

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   http://www.state.gov/g/drl/irf/rpt/ (Religious Freedom reports)
   e  Background Note: Bangladesh; updated August 2005.
   g  Bangladesh: International Religious Freedom Report 2003
   h  Bangladesh: International Religious Freedom Report 2004

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   a  Bangladesh: Country Profile: June 1990
   f  Bangladesh: State Protection: September 1998
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   m  Cultural Profile: The Ahmadiyya: June 1991
   o  BGD43465.E, 1 April 2005. Bangladesh: Information on the impact of the May 2003 High Court ruling allowing some Bihari citizenship...
This Country of Origin Information Report contains the most up-to-date publicly available information as
at 10 March 2006. Older source material has been included where it contains relevant information not available
in more recent documents.

(by subscription)
a  Attack on journalists: 9 July 2002 (via The Independent Bangladesh)
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b  March 1998
c  April 1998
d  May 1998
f  October 2001
g  March 2002
h  March 1999

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    rights, ASA 13/012/2003
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    ASA 13/015/2002, 23 October 2002
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i  Bangladesh Annual Report 2003 (events of 2002)
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    AI Index: ASA 13/005/2004: 23 April 2004
l  Bangladesh: Ahmadiyya community headquarters, AI Index: ASA
    13/016/2004: 25 August 2004
m  Chittagong Hill Tracts: A Call for Justice at Mahalchari. AI Index: ASA
    13/003/2004: 1 March 2004
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c Underground Maoist group admits responsibility for journalist’s murder and threatens nine others: 27 January 2004


e Journalist dies from wounds in press club bomb attack: 11 February 2005

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a Breach of Faith: Persecution of the Ahmadiyya Community in Bangladesh: June 2005. (Vol. 17, No. 6c.)


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g Letter dated 1 December 2003 (authentication of documents in Bangladesh)

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c Neglecting the Bihari Time Bomb: 5 May 2000


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j Bangladesh MPs sworn in: 9 October 2001
k Bangladesh bomb kills politician: 7 September 2003
l Bangladesh opposition leader killed: 27 August 2003
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Return to contents