



OCTOBER 2005

IRAQ

Home Office Science and Research Group

COUNTRY OF ORIGIN INFORMATION SERVICE

Country reports are produced by the Science & Research Group of the Home Office to provide caseworkers and others involved in processing asylum applications with accurate, balanced and up-to-date information about conditions in asylum seekers' countries of origin.

They contain general background information about the issues most commonly raised in asylum/human rights claims made in the UK.

The reports are compiled from material produced by a wide range of recognised external information sources. They are not intended to be a detailed or comprehensive survey, nor do they contain Home Office opinion or policy.

Contents

	Paragraphs
1. SCOPE OF DOCUMENT	1.01
2. GEOGRAPHY	2.01
3. ECONOMY	3.01
4. HISTORY	4.01
Post Saddam Iraq	4.02
Elections January 2005	4.12
5. STATE STRUCTURES	5.01
The Constitution	5.01
Citizenship and nationality.....	5.09
Political system	5.13
Political system in the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) area.....	5.23
Judiciary	5.26
Judicial system.....	5.32
Religious and traditional law.....	5.37
Judiciary in the KRG area.....	5.42
The Iraq Special Tribunal (IST).....	5.46
Legal documents.....	5.52
Legal rights/detention	5.54
Arrest and detention.....	5.64
Torture and ill-treatment in detention.....	5.77
Death penalty.....	5.86
Internal security organisations	5.90
Police.....	5.94
Iraqi armed forces.....	5.99
Multi-national forces.....	5.101
Prisons and prison conditions	5.105
Prisons in the KRG area.....	5.125
Military service	5.129
Medical services	5.132
Mental health care.....	5.148
HIV/AIDS.....	5.158
People with disabilities.....	5.166
Educational system	5.171
6. HUMAN RIGHTS	6.01
6.A HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES	6.01
General	6.01
Humanitarian situation	6.10
Security situation	6.17
Security in the KRG area.....	6.32
Security forces	6.43
Civilian casualties and deaths.....	6.43
Torture and ill-treatment.....	6.47
The security forces as targets.....	6.51
Militia/Insurgents	6.55
Sunni Arab insurgents.....	6.71
Shi'a militia.....	6.80
Kurdish militia.....	6.93
Foreign insurgents.....	6.99
Other militia.....	6.101
Freedom of speech and the media	6.104

Newspapers, radio and television	6.107
Other forms of media	6.112
Journalists.....	6.113
Freedom of religion	6.123
Shi'a Muslims.....	6.128
Sunni Muslims	6.134
Christians	6.138
Mandaeans/Sabians	6.154
Yazidis	6.160
Jews.....	6.165
Freedom of association and assembly	6.168
Employment rights	6.173
People trafficking	6.177
Freedom of movement	6.181
Travel documents	6.191
6.B HUMAN RIGHTS – SPECIFIC GROUPS	6.194
Ethnic groups	6.194
Arabs	6.195
Shi'a Arabs	6.198
Sunni Arabs	6.201
Marsh Arabs	6.210
Kurds	6.218
Turkmens.....	6.224
Assyrians and Chaldeans	6.228
Women	6.229
Legal provisions.....	6.230
Violence against women.....	6.235
Domestic violence.....	6.243
Honour killing/crime	6.252
Forced marriage	6.261
Female Genital Mutilation (FGM).....	6.263
Prostitution.....	6.268
Single women	6.270
Women's rights in political and public life	6.273
Children	6.282
Orphans and street children	6.285
Children in prison.....	6.293
Homosexuals	6.296
Ba'ath party members.....	6.301
De-Ba'athification.....	6.305
Reprisals against Ba'ath members	6.307
Threat to families of Ba'ath party members	6.314
The tribes	6.316
Perceived collaborators to the coalition	
and Iraqi authorities.....	6.323
6.C HUMAN RIGHTS – OTHER ISSUES	6.330
Treatment of Non-Governmental Organisations	6.330
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).....	6.334
De-Arabisation	6.349
Land and property rights.....	6.354
Refugee camps.....	6.359
Treatment of asylum seekers	6.361
Palestinians	6.368
Iranians	6.372

Afghans.....	6.375
Treatment of returned refugees and failed asylum seekers.....	6.376
Kidnappings / hostage-taking	6.382
Landmines	6.391

ANNEXES

- Annex A – Chronology of major events
- Annex B – Political organisations
- Annex C – Current militia
- Annex D – Past militia
- Annex E – Prominent people: past and present
- Annex F – Health care facilities
- Annex G – Election results
- Annex H – List of source material

1. Scope of document

- 1.01 This Country of Origin Information Report (COI Report) has been produced by Research Development and Statistics (RDS), Home Office, for use by officials involved in the asylum / human rights determination process. The Report provides general background information about the issues most commonly raised in asylum / human rights claims made in the United Kingdom. It includes information available up to 31 August 2005.
- 1.02 The Report is compiled wholly from material produced by a wide range of recognised external information sources and does not contain any Home Office opinion or policy. All information in the Report is attributed, throughout the text, to the original source material, which is made available to those working in the asylum / human rights determination process.
- 1.03 The Report aims to provide a brief summary of the source material identified, focusing on the main issues raised in asylum and human rights applications. It is not intended to be a detailed or comprehensive survey. For a more detailed account, the relevant source documents should be examined directly.
- 1.04 The structure and format of the COI Report reflects the way it is used by Home Office caseworkers and appeals presenting officers, who require quick electronic access to information on specific issues and use the contents page to go directly to the subject required. Key issues are usually covered in some depth within a dedicated section, but may also be referred to briefly in several other sections. Some repetition is therefore inherent in the structure of the Report.
- 1.05 The information included in this COI Report is limited to that which can be identified from source documents. While every effort is made to cover all relevant aspects of a particular topic, it is not always possible to obtain the information concerned. For this reason, it is important to note that information included in the Report should not be taken to imply anything beyond what is actually stated. For example, if it is stated that a particular law has been passed, this should not be taken to imply that it has been effectively implemented unless stated.
- 1.06 As noted above, the Report is a collation of material produced by a number of reliable information sources. In compiling the Report, no attempt has been made to resolve discrepancies between information provided in different source documents. For example, different source documents often contain different versions of names and spellings of individuals, places and political parties etc. COI Reports do not aim to bring consistency of spelling, but to reflect faithfully the spellings used in the original source documents. Similarly, figures given in different source documents sometimes vary and these are simply quoted as per the original text. The term 'sic' has been used in this document only to denote incorrect spellings or typographical errors in quoted text; its use is not intended to imply any comment on the content of the material.
- 1.07 The Report is based substantially upon source documents issued during the previous two years. However, some older source documents may have been included because they contain relevant information not available in more recent

documents. All sources contain information considered relevant at the time this Report was issued.

- 1.08 This COI Report and the accompanying source material are public documents. All COI Reports are published on the RDS section of the Home Office website and the great majority of the source material for the Report is readily available in the public domain. Where the source documents identified in the Report are available in electronic form, the relevant web link has been included, together with the date that the link was accessed. Copies of less accessible source documents, such as those provided by government offices or subscription services, are available from the Home Office upon request.
- 1.09 COI Reports are published every six months on the top 20 asylum producing countries and on those countries for which there is deemed to be a specific operational need. Inevitably, information contained in COI Reports is sometimes overtaken by events that occur between publication dates. Home Office officials are informed of any significant changes in country conditions by means of Country of Origin Information Bulletins, which are also published on the RDS website. They also have constant access to an information request service for specific enquiries.
- 1.10 In producing this COI Report, the Home Office has sought to provide an accurate, balanced summary of the available source material. Any comments regarding this Report or suggestions for additional source material are very welcome and should be submitted to the Home Office as below.

Country of Origin Information Service

Home Office
Apollo House
36 Wellesley Road
Croydon CR9 3RR
United Kingdom

Email: cois@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk

Website: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/country_reports.html

ADVISORY PANEL ON COUNTRY INFORMATION

- 1.11 The independent Advisory Panel on Country Information was established under the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 to make recommendations to the Home Secretary about the content of the Home Office's country of origin information material. The Advisory Panel welcomes all feedback on the Home Office's COI Reports and other country of origin information material. Information about the Panel's work can be found on its website at www.apci.org.uk.
- 1.12 It is not the function of the Advisory Panel to endorse any Home Office material or procedures. In the course of its work, the Advisory Panel directly reviews the content of selected individual Home Office COI Reports, but neither the fact that such a review has been undertaken, nor any comments made, should be taken to imply endorsement of the material. Some of the material examined by the Panel relates to countries designated or proposed for designation for the Non-

Suspensive Appeals (NSA) list. In such cases, the Panel's work should not be taken to imply any endorsement of the decision or proposal to designate a particular country for NSA, nor of the NSA process itself.

Advisory Panel on Country Information

PO Box 1539
Croydon CR9 3WR
United Kingdom

Email: apci@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk

Website: www.apci.org.uk

[Return to Contents](#)

2. Geography

- 2.01 As documented in several sources, the Republic of Iraq is situated in the Middle East. Borders are shared with Turkey to the north, Iran to the east, Kuwait and the Persian Gulf to the south, Saudi Arabia and Jordan to the south-west and Syria to the north-west. [1a] (p460) [78a] (p1,2) [75a] (p4) [61a] The Europa World Yearbook 2004, noted that between the Iraqi, Jordanian and Saudi Arabian borders is a neutral zone devised to facilitate the migrations of pastoral nomads. [1b] (p460)
- 2.02 Europa World Online (accessed on 3 August 2005) noted that Iraq covers an area of 438,317 sq. km. [1c] (Iraq) The United States State Department (USSD) background note (last updated on August 2005) stated that Baghdad is the country's capital city. [2c] (p1) Europa Regional Surveys: The Middle East and North Africa, 2005 added that other principal cities include Mosul, Arbil, Kirkuk, Basra, Sulaimaniya, An-Najaf, Karbala, Hilla and Nasiriya. [1a] (p524)
- 2.03 Europa World Online reported that the United Nations (UN) estimated population of Iraq in 2003 was 25,175,000, [1c] (Area and Population) with an estimated annual growth rate of 2.7 per cent in 2005, according to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) world factbook (last updated on 9 August 2005). [78a] (p3) The USSD background note (last updated on August 2005) stated that "Almost 75% of Iraq's population live in the flat, alluvial plain stretching southeast toward Baghdad and Basrah to the Persian Gulf." [2c] (p2)
- 2.04 Europa World Yearbook 2004, noted that politically, the country is divided into 18 Governorates. [1b] (p2193, 2199) The CIA world factbook (last updated on 9 August 2005) noted that the Governorates comprise of:
- | | | |
|--------------|-----------------|------------------|
| Al Anbar | As Sulaymaniyah | Diyala |
| Al Basrah | At Ta'min | Karbala' |
| Al Muthanna | Babil | Maysan |
| Al Qadisiyah | Baghdad | Ninawa |
| Al Najaf | Dahuk | Salah ad Din |
| Arbil | Dhi Qar | Wasit [78a] (p4) |
- 2.05 The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) country profile (last updated on 11 May 2005) and the CIA world factbook (last updated on 8 August 2005), stated that Iraq's two largest ethnic groups are Arabs, which make up approximately 75–80 per cent of the population and Kurds, which make up approximately 15–20 per cent of the population. [66e] (p1) [78a] (p4) The USSD background note (last updated on August 2005) stated that "Other distinct groups are Turcoman, Chaldeans, Assyrians, Persians and Armenians." [2c] (p2) The USSD background note added that "Arabic is the most commonly spoken language. Kurdish is spoken in the north, and English is the most commonly spoken Western language." [2c] (p2) (See also section 6B on Ethnic groups)
- 2.06 The CIA world factbook (last updated on 8 August 2005) stated that approximately 97 per cent of the population were Muslims, of which 60–65 per cent were Shi'a and 32–37 per cent were Sunni. Approximately three per cent adhered to Christian or other religions. [78a] (p4) (See also section on Freedom of Religion)

3. Economy

- 3.01 The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) Country Profile 2004, stated that “Iraq’s economy, which was already in a poor state after the country’s war with Iran in the 1980s, has been in crisis since the imposition of economic sanctions in 1990. The lifting of sanctions following the passing of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1483 in May 2003 allowed reconstruction efforts to begin, but serious security problems continue to hamper the rebuilding effort.” [58a] (p37)
- 3.02 As documented in the CIA world factbook (last updated on 9 August 2005) “Iraq’s economy is dominated by the oil sector, which has traditionally provided about 95% of foreign exchange earnings.” [78a] (p6) The FCO country profile (last updated on 11 May 2005) added that “Iraq is widely believed to have the world’s second largest reserves of oil after Saudi Arabia. Its high dependency on oil makes the economy vulnerable to fluctuations in the oil price and also to attacks of sabotage on the oil infrastructure.” [66e] (p8)
- 3.03 As documented in the CIA world factbook (last updated on 9 August 2005) the main agricultural products included wheat, barley, rice, vegetables, dates, cotton, cattle, sheep and poultry. [78a] (p7) The USSD background note (last updated on August 2005) stated that “Despite its abundant land and water resources, Iraq is a net food importer. Under the UN oil-for-food program, Iraq imported large quantities of grains, meat, poultry, and dairy products.” [2c] (p5)
- 3.04 The same report observed that:

“Implementation of a UN Oil-For-Food (OFF) program in December 1996 improved conditions for the average Iraqi citizen. In December 1999, Iraq was authorized to export unlimited quantities of oil through OFF to finance essential civilian needs including, among other things, food, medicine, and infrastructure repair parts. ... Per capita food imports increased significantly, while medical supplies and health care services steadily improved.” [2c] (p5)
- 3.05 The FCO country profile (last updated on 11 May 2005) noted that “During the past three decades the Iraqi economy suffered from costly militarisation, three wars, pervasive state intervention, and over a decade of international sanctions. ... More recently, economic activity has been affected by hostility and subsequent looting, sabotage, and security problems.” [66e] (p7)
- 3.06 The USSD background note (last updated on August 2005) explained that “The occupation of the US-led coalition in March-April 2003 resulted in the shutdown of much of the central economic administrative structure. The rebuilding of oil, electricity, and other production proceeded steadily in 2004 with foreign support and despite the continuing internal security incidents.” [2c] (p5)
- 3.07 The EIU country profile 2004, stated that “The oil industry, which remains the bedrock of the economy, has begun gradually to recover from the toll of war-related damage and post-war looting.” [58a] (p37)
- 3.08 The EIU country profile 2004, stated that “More frequent acts of sabotage of key economic facilities (including oil pipelines) and attacks on foreign and local

civilian contractors prompted an exodus of foreign firms involved in the reconstruction.” [58c] (p42)

3.09 As noted in the FCO country profile (last updated on 11 May 2005) “The IMF predicts growth of nearly 17 per cent for 2005, on top of estimated growth of over 50 per cent in 2004. Substantial economic reform has been introduced, designed to maintain price stability, ensure transparency and efficiency in the public finances, and promote economic growth.” [66e] (p7-8)

3.10 The IMF stated in a report, dated 16 August 2005 that:

“The authorities and staff agreed on an updated short-term outlook, with real GDP growth in 2005 revised down to 4 per cent (from 17 per cent in the program). This reflects downward revisions to oil production, now expected to reach only 2.0 mbpd in 2005 (compared with an original program goal of 2.4 mbpd) because of the continuing sabotage of installations and the resulting halting of oil exports from the north (amounting to 0.3 mbpd).” [80a] (p18)

3.11 The same report noted that “A significant step was made on 21 November 2004, when the Paris Club announced agreement of a deal to write off 80 per cent of Iraq’s debt built up by the former regime (which totalled around \$120 billion).” [66e] (p8)

3.12 The USSD report 2004, stated that “During the year [2004], official estimates of unemployment ranged between 20 and 30 per cent. Government officials estimated that the rate of underemployment was roughly equivalent to joblessness. Anecdotal reports suggested that approximately half the working-age population was unemployed.” [2a] (p1)

3.13 On 29 November 2004, however, the Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN) reported that “Officially, unemployment stands at more than 60 per cent, according to unverified statistics from the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MLSA).” [18v] The same article added that:

“Unemployment has increased for a number of reasons since the US-led war in Iraq last spring, al-Aubaydi said. Some Iraqis who have returned home from other countries don’t have jobs yet, for example. And life is so dangerous in Iraq that many businesses and public offices don’t work regular schedules and haven’t taken on any new workers in months. ... The only jobs at the moment are in government ministries, in the country’s state-run oil industry, the new Iraqi army or are security-related.” [18v]

3.14 The Department for International Development (DFID) report, December 2004, noted that “Since the new Iraqi Dinar was introduced about a year ago, replacing the two currencies in use under Saddam’s regime, it has been remarkably stable. Inflation has fallen from around 40-50% pre-conflict to around 2-3% in 2004.” [59c] (p1) As documented in the Europa Regional Survey 2005, there are 1,000 fils to 20 dirhams which is equal to 1 Iraqi Dinar (ID). [1a] (526) The exchange rate on 31 August 2005 was £1 sterling to 2626.30 ID. [55a]

[Return to Contents](#)

4. History

4.01 The Amnesty International (AI) report, dated 25 July 2005, noted that:

“In early April 2003, the US-led military intervention in Iraq, which had started just days earlier on 18 March, ended the 25-year rule of Saddam Hussain and the even longer rule of the Ba’ath party. Following the fall of Baghdad on 9 April, Iraq was occupied by the US-led coalition. US forces controlled central and northern Iraq, with the exception of Kurdistan which has kept its autonomous status since 1991. United Kingdom (UK) forces controlled the south.” [28c] (p2)

POST-SADDAM IRAQ

4.02 As documented in the Europa Regional Survey 2005, “The ousting of Saddam Hussein’s government was followed by a period of civil unrest. Looting, revenge killings and destruction of property were regular occurrences.” [1a] (p497)

4.03 The Europa Regional Survey 2005 noted that “Following the removal of the Baathist regime by the US-led coalition in early April 2003, a Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) was established to administer Iraq in the absence of an elected government, and to assist in the reconstruction in the country’s infrastructure.” [1a] (p529) Europa World Online (accessed on 12 August 2005) added that “UN Security Council Resolution 1483, passed on 22 May 2003, recognized the CPA as the legal occupying power in Iraq, and mandated the CPA to establish a temporary Iraqi governing authority.” [1c] (Recent History)

4.04 An article by the *Washington Post*, dated 12 May 2003, observed that one of the first acts of the CPA was to outlaw the Ba’ath Party and demobilise the Iraqi army and security apparatus including the ministries of defence and information. The dissolution of the Ba’ath Party was announced on 11 May 2003. [16a]

4.05 Europa World Online (accessed 12 August 2005) noted that “On 13 July [2003] the inaugural meeting of the 25-member Iraqi Governing Council was held in Baghdad; members of the Governing Council were appointed by the CPA in direct proportion to the principal ethnic and religious groups in Iraq: 13 Shi’ite Muslims, five Sunni Muslims, five Kurds, one Assyrian Christian and one Turkoman.” [1c] (Recent History)

4.06 A US Congress Report, January 2004, stated that “On December 13 2003, U.S. forces captured Saddam Hussein in the town of Ad Dur, nine miles south of his hometown, Tikrit, in Iraq’s predominately Sunni tribal area north of Baghdad. Saddam, who had been hiding in a tiny cellar on a farm with \$750,000 and a pistol, surrendered to soldiers of the Fourth Infantry Division without a fight.” [33b] (p29)

4.07 The Institute of War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) article, dated 22 March 2004, stated that on 8 March 2004, after considerable last-minute wrangling, a ‘Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period’, generally known as the Transitional Administrative Law, was signed. [11j] The Europa Regional Survey 2005 explained that the Transitional Administrative Law acted as an interim Constitution. [1a] (p499) (See also section 5 on the Constitution)

- 4.08 The FCO human rights report 2005, noted that “In accordance with UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1546, the CPA and the Iraqi Governing Council were dissolved on 28 June 2004. They were succeeded by a sovereign Iraqi interim government, which was established after a wide-ranging consultive process led by the UN.” [66j] (p61)
- 4.09 Europa World Online (accessed on 12 August 2005) stated that Dr Ayad Allawi was appointed interim Prime Minister. [1c] (Recent History) The Europa Regional Survey 2005 added that “The Governing Council and Interim Cabinet were dissolved upon the formation of the new administration, which accepted the handover of sovereignty from the CPA on 28 June 2004 (two days ahead of the scheduled handover date of 30 June 2004).” [1a] (p529)
- 4.10 *The Guardian*, in a timeline (updated on 8 August 2004) noted that on 4 August 2004 ferocious fighting erupted in Najaf breaking a ceasefire agreement. [6s] (p1) The BBC reported on 27 August 2004, that on that day the 22-day stand-off in Najaf ended with a deal brokered by Ayatollah Sistani, Iraq’s most influential Shi’a leader. Iraqi Shia militants were instructed to lay down their arms and leave the Imam Ali shrine – Shi’a Islam’s holiest. [4c]
- 4.11 Europa World Online (accessed on 12 August 2005) explained that:

“In early November 2004 Allawi declared a 60-day state of emergency, closing Baghdad airport and imposing martial law across most of the country as an estimated 15,000 US troops and 3,000 Iraqi troops descended upon Fallujah, which was still dominated by insurgents. ... However, by mid-November US troops claimed to be in absolute control of Fallujah, having killed an estimated 1,200 insurgents, with losses of a reported 38 US and six Iraqi military. Concern was expressed at the fact that convoys with supplies of humanitarian aid had not been able to enter Fallujah since the beginning of the assault due to the town being effectively blockaded.” [1c] (Recent History) (See also Section 6A on the Security situation)

[Return to Contents](#)

ELECTIONS JANUARY 2005

- 4.12 Europa World Online (accessed on 12 August 2005) noted that “In response to the growing insurgent violence, and, specifically, a militant group’s murder of 15 Iraqi soldiers that it had been holding hostage, the Interim Government again closed Baghdad airport and imposed a strict curfew in advance of the elections at the end of January 2005.” [1c] (Recent History) The same report stated that “In advance of the elections, more than 100,000 Iraqi police and soldiers provided tight security in an attempt to forestall insurgent attacks, and the Interim Government closed Iraq’s borders and imposed a vehicle curfew; all voters were subject to searches before being allowed to enter polling stations.” [1c] (Recent History)
- 4.13 *The Guardian* stated, on 14 February 2005, that the multi-party national elections were held in Iraq on 30 January 2005. [6v] As documented in a BBC report, dated 14 February 2005, a total of 8,456 million Iraqis voted in the elections in 2005. [4o] The BBC further reported on 13 February 2005 that “A total of 280,303 Iraqi exiles in 14 countries registered to vote – roughly one in four of those eligible to

do so.” [4p] Several news articles observed that the overall turnout across the country was 58 per cent of registered Iraq voters. [4n] [4o] [17c]

- 4.14 *The Guardian* reported on 27 January 2005 that there were 111 political parties and coalitions, with a total of 7,500 candidates represented in the election. [6p] **(See Annex B on Political organisations)** The IWPR report stated that “The highest-profile – if not necessarily the most representative – voices are those of the insurgents, who demand uncompromising war on the Iraqi interim administration, its foreign sponsors, and the democratic processes they espouse.” [11p] An article by the IWPR, dated 14 February 2005, reported that “Iraq’s major Sunni political groups boycotted the January 30 election, after the influential Muslim Scholars’ Association said a fair poll was impossible because of the continuing violence in Sunni-majority areas.” [11r] The Economist report, dated 17 February 2005, added that many other Sunni Arabs were prevented from voting by the insurgency. [19a] (p2)
- 4.15 The CNN report and *The Guardian* report, both dated 14 February 2005, indicated that turnout was particularly low in many Sunni-dominated areas following calls by clerics to boycott the election and threats of violence by insurgents. [17c] [6t] [41a] An article by *The Guardian*, dated 14 February 2005, added that “Only 13,893 people – 2% of eligible voters – turned out in Anbar province, which includes the restive towns of Falluja and Ramadi.” [6v]
- 4.16 The CNN report, dated 14 February 2005, stated that the results of the election were announced on Sunday 13 February 2005 having initially been delayed. [17c] On 9 February 2005, *The Guardian* indicated that Iraqi officials said that the contents of 300 ballot boxes needed recounting because of various discrepancies. [6f]
- 4.17 The BBC report and the CNN report, both dated 14 February 2005, noted that the result of the Iraqi national election was a victory for the Shia United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), backed by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, with 48 per cent of the votes cast and 140 seats in the 275-seat National Assembly. [4n] [17c] The Kurdistan Alliance List, led by Jalal Talabani, obtained 26 per cent of the vote and 75 seats in the National Assembly, while the Al-Qaimah al-Iraqiyah (Iraqi List), led by the former interim Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, was in third place with 14 per cent and 40 seats. [4r] [6t] [6p] [17c] [11p] [37a] **(See also Annex G on the National election results)**
- 4.18 The Psephos report (accessed on 17 February 2005) stated that the Kurdistan Alliance List gained the majority of the vote in Arbil with 95 per cent, Dahuk with 95 per cent, Ninawa with 38 per cent, Sulaymainyah with 92 per cent and Tamin with 59 per cent. [37b]
- 4.19 The DFID report, February 2005, explained that “93,000 Iraqi monitors and party agents oversaw the administration of the elections, together with 600 international monitors.” [59d] (p1) Reports by the IWPR, dated 14 February 2005, and *The Guardian*, dated 15 February 2005, indicated many Sunnis protested that the election was flawed and unfair. [6t] [11r] The BBC reported, on 17 February 2005, that “Election commission spokesman Farid Ayar told al-Arabiya television that 47 complaints had been filed and most were resolved.” [4r] On 14 February 2005, *The Guardian* reported that many world leaders welcomed the results of the election. The report continued “But the Turkish foreign ministry said in a statement that voter turnout in some regions was low

and charged that there were ‘unbalanced results’ in several regions, including Kirkuk.” [6u]

- 4.20 *The Guardian* report, dated 14 February 2005, mentioned that the UIA failed to get 50 per cent of the vote. [6q] Therefore, as documented in the IWPR report (accessed on 17 February 2005) “The results mean that the Shias and the Kurds, two groups that were oppressed under Saddam Hussein, will now hold the balance of power.” [11s]
- 4.21 The UNSC report, dated 7 June 2005, noted that “As a result of negotiations on the formation of the Presidency Council, Jalal Talabani was sworn in as President of Iraq on 7 April. [38b] (p2) *The Guardian* further reported, on 7 April 2005, that Ibrahim al-Jaafari was appointed as Iraq’s next interim prime minister by the country’s new presidential council. [6o] The UNSC report, dated 7 June 2005, added that “The Government comprises 32 ministerial and 4 deputy ministerial posts.” [38b] (p2)
- 4.22 The IWPR reported that “At the same time as the national ballot, voters across the country will also elect governing councils for Iraq’s 18 provinces. In the three Kurdish provinces (Sulaimaniyah, Arbil and Dohuk), there will also be an election for the 111-member Iraqi Kurdistan National Assembly, a regional lawmaking body.” [11q] The Human Rights Watch (HRW) statement, released 1 February 2005, noted that “The two main Kurdish political parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), formed a joint list for the national and Kurdish assemblies. They did, however, compete in local provincial elections and both parties complained of some threats and manipulation by the other side.” [15c] The Kurdistan Democratic List gained the majority of votes in the Kurdistan legislative election with 90 per cent of the votes and 104 seats in the Kurdistan National Assembly. [37c] (**See also Annex G on the Iraqi Kurdistan election results**)
- 4.23 The BBC stated, on 14 June 2005, that “The leader of one of the two main Kurdish parties in Iraq, Massoud Barzani, has been sworn in as the new regional president of Iraqi Kurdistan [On 12 June 2005].” [4g]
- 4.24 The IWPR report, dated 14 February 2005, added that “The assembly’s principal task is to draft a constitution by August this year, in time for a referendum in October [2005] and fresh parliamentary elections in December [2005]. The final document will define how Iraq is governed and how much autonomy its regions will enjoy – issues in which Sunnis as well as Shias and Kurds have a vital interest.” [11r] However, the IWPR report (accessed on 18 February 2005) noted that “If it is rejected, the assembly will be dissolved and a new one elected to produce another constitution. The permanent constitution will also fail if two-thirds of the population of three provinces object.” [11q] (**See also section 5 on The Constitution**)

(**See also Annex A on Chronology of major events**)

[Return to Contents](#)

5. State structures

THE CONSTITUTION

- 5.01 As documented by numerous reports, on 9 April 2003 Saddam Hussein's regime collapsed and the US established the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to run the country. [4i] (p4) [1b] (p2189) [2a] (p1)
- 5.02 Europa Regional Survey 2005, reported that "On 15 November 2003 the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and the Governing Council agreed on a timetable for the restoration of full Iraqi sovereignty, the creation of a permanent constitution, and the holding of free national elections. [1a] (p529)
- 5.03 The United Nations Development Programme – Programme on Governance in the Arab Region (UNDP – POGAR) report (accessed on 9 February 2005) stated that "The Coalitions Provisional Authority promulgated the Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period on March 8, 2004." [54a] (p1)
- 5.04 Europa World Online (accessed on 3 August 2005) mentioned that "The basic tenets of the Law were to: define the structures of a transitional government and procedures for electing members of the Transitional National Assembly; guarantee basic rights for all Iraqis, including freedom of speech and the press; and respect the Islamic identity of the Iraqi majority, and guarantee religious plurality." [1c] (The Constitution) The FCO human rights report 2005 added that "There is provision for a national commission for human rights and an ombudsman." [66j] (p61)
- 5.05 The BBC report, dated 8 March 2004, noted that "The Transitional Administrative Law [TAL] will be the Supreme Law of Iraq, during the transitional period." [4m] On 22 March 2003, IWPR stated that the TAL will expire once a government is elected under a permanent constitution; this will happen no later than 31 December 2005. [11j]
- 5.06 As stated in the UNSC report, dated 7 June 2005:

"On 10 May 2005, the Transitional National Assembly established the Constitution Drafting Committee. Under the timetable for the political transition, the Committee is expected to write the draft of a permanent constitution by 15 August [2005], unless the six month extension provided for in the Transitional Administrative Law is invoked. The draft permanent Constitution would then be presented to the Iraqi people for approval in a general referendum to be held no later than 15 October [2005]." [38b] (p2)
- 5.07 However, an article by the BBC, dated 16 August 2005, reported that the Committee had failed to meet the deadline to write the draft. [4ae] The RFE/RL article, dated 29 August 2005, noted that the deadline was extended twice and the draft constitution was eventually presented to the National Assembly on 28 August 2005. [22a] (p1) The same article reported that "The National Assembly received the document, but took no vote on whether formally to accept it." [22a] (p1) The article also mentioned that Iraq's Transitional Administrative Law does not explicitly require the body to approve the draft constitution before the popular referendum. [22a] (p1)

- 5.08 *The Times* reported, on 29 August 2005, that “But even before the charter was presented to parliament, embittered leaders of the Sunni Arab community denounced the document and vowed to defeat it at a referendum in two months’ time.” [5a] (p1)

[Return to Contents](#)

CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONALITY

- 5.09 Article 11 of the Transitional Administrative Law confirms that:

- “(A) Anyone who carries Iraqi nationality shall be deemed an Iraqi citizen. His citizenship shall grant him all the rights and duties stipulated in this Law and shall be the basis of his relation to the homeland and the State.
- (B) No Iraqi may have his Iraqi citizenship withdrawn or be exiled unless he is a naturalized citizen who, in his application for citizenship, as established in a court of law, made material falsifications on the basis of which citizenship was granted.
- (C) Each Iraqi shall have the right to carry more than one citizenship. Any Iraqi whose citizenship was withdrawn because he acquired another citizenship shall be deemed an Iraqi.
- (D) Any Iraqi whose Iraqi citizenship was withdrawn for political, religious, racial, or sectarian reasons has the right to reclaim his Iraqi citizenship.
- (E) Decision Number 666 (1980) of the dissolved Revolutionary Command Council is annulled, and anyone whose citizenship was withdrawn on the basis of this decree shall be deemed an Iraqi.
- (F) The National Assembly must issue laws pertaining to citizenship and naturalization consistent with the provisions of this Law.
- (G) The Courts shall examine all disputes arising from the application of the provisions relating to citizenship.” [51a]

- 5.10 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), in a paper dated August 2004, noted that:

“Statelessness is a major issue in Iraq. Up to half a million Iraqis (including Faili Kurds and Arab Shi’ites) were stripped of their nationality by the previous government and expelled to Iran. Meanwhile, Bidouns (stateless nomads) live on either side of the Iraq/Kuwait border. In addition, children of mixed marriages (particularly in cases where the mother is Iraqi and the father of another nationality) may face problems if they wish to return to Iraq, while women (such as those who have married men of another nationality) may face particular obstacles when they wish to return. In the recent past, nationality issues have not been decided in courts, and nationality laws frequently revised, with the result that indigenous expertise on the subject has declined.” [40b] (p7)

- 5.11 The British/Danish fact-finding mission report, October 2004, stated that:

“The source [UNHCR] advised that the draft Nationality law excludes Palestinians. It does address statelessness however, and those that were de-nationalised during Saddam’s regime should receive citizenship. The draft law makes it difficult for Bedoons, however those born in Iraq to an Iraqi mother and a non-Iraqi father should be able to receive citizenship, as well as those born to an Iraqi father. However UNHCR were careful to advise that this law is in draft form and will not be confirmed until after the elections.” [30c] (p28)

5.12 As stated in the FCO letter dated 26 April 2004:

“There is a lack of clarity over the position of Iraqi Jews who left Iraq. Many of them were forced out in the early 60s and were made to renounce citizenship and property rights, so it is ambiguous whether they are allowed to return as, in practice, it was not Saddam’s regime who cancelled their citizenship and on paper they volunteered to renounce their Iraqi nationality. But these decisions were clearly not voluntary.” [66a] (p2)

[Return to Contents](#)

POLITICAL SYSTEM

5.13 The FCO report (accessed on 11 May 2005) stated that “Iraqis now have full responsibility for governing Iraq. Iraq’s first democratic elections took place on 30 January 2005. 58.2% of the electorate voted to form Iraq’s 275-member Transitional National Assembly (TNA).” [66i]

5.14 As noted in an article by the BBC, dated 3 April 2005, the interim parliament met on 3 April 2005 and elected Dr Hajem al-Hassani, a Sunni Arab, as Speaker and Dr Hussein al-Shahristani, a Shia Muslim and Aref Taifour, a Kurd, as Deputy Speakers. [4ao]

5.15 *The Guardian* added, on 6 April 2005, that the Iraqi parliament voted to appoint a new Iraqi Presidency Council on 6 April 2005. The Kurdish leader, Jalal Talabani, was elected President. Ghazi Al Yawer, a Sunni Arab tribal leader, and Adil Abdul Mehdi, a Shia and former Finance Minister, were elected as Vice-Presidents on 7 April 2005. [6m]

5.16 The UNSC report, dated 7 June 2005, noted that “On 28 April 2005, the Transitional National Assembly endorsed the Transitional Government under the premiership of Ibrahim Ja’afari.” [38b] (p2) The BBC stated, on 7 April 2005 that Ibrahim Jaafari was the spokesman for the Islamic Daawa Party and the preferred candidate of the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA). [4ac]

5.17 Europa World Online (accessed on 3 August 2005) noted that “A new Council of Ministers was approved by the TNA on 28 April [2005] and sworn in on 3 May [2005]. Under the timetable for restoration of sovereign institutions of government, this Iraqi Transitional Government was to be replaced by an elected administration by 31 December 2005.” [1c] **(The Government) (See also Annex E on Prominent people: past and present)**

5.18 The UNSC report, dated 7 June 2005, stated that “The Government comprises 32 ministerial and 4 deputy ministerial posts.” [38b] (p2) The DFID reported on June 2005 added that “The government is representative of the main religious

and ethnic groups in Iraq and includes amongst its ministers 17 Shia, 8 Kurds, 6 Sunnis and a Christian. Six of the Ministers are women.” [59e] (p1)

- 5.19 The USSD report 2004, stated that “The TAL provides citizens with the right to change their government peacefully through periodic, free, and fair elections based on universal suffrage.” [2a] (p10) The national elections took place in Iraq on 31 January 2005. [6v]
- 5.20 The BBC report, dated 14 February 2005, noted that in the 2005 Iraqi national election, the Shi’a dominated United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) won 48 per cent of the votes cast. The UIA also holds 140 seats in the 275-seat National Assembly. [4n] The same report noted that the Kurdistan Alliance List is the largest opposition party, with 26 per cent of the vote and 75 seats in the National Assembly. The Al-Qaimah al-Iraqiyah (Iraqi List) gained 14 per cent of the votes and holds 40 seats in the National Assembly. [4n]
- 5.21 The US Agency for International Development report (accessed on 17 February 2005) noted that nine minor parties share the balance of 20 seats in the National Assembly. [41a] As mentioned in the BBC report, dated 31 January 2005, many of the Sunni political parties boycotted the election. [4q] (p6)
- 5.22 The FCO country profile (last updated on 11 May 2005) stated that the President is the Head of State. [66e] (p1) However, the Economist report, dated 10 December 2004, explained that “The prime minister enjoys executive authority in the government, while the positions of president and vice-president are largely ceremonial.” [19b] (See also Annex E on Prominent people: past and present)

[Return to Contents](#)

POLITICAL SYSTEM IN THE KURDISH REGIONAL GOVERNMENT (KRG) AREA

- 5.23 The USSD report 2004 noted that “The Kurdistan Regional Government was recognized in the TAL as the official government of those territories that were administered by the Kurdish Regional Government on March 19, 2003 in the governorates of Dohuk, Arbil, Sulaimaniya, Kirkuk, Diyala, and Ninewah.” [2a] (p1)
- 5.24 The International Crisis Group (ICG) report, dated 8 April 2004, stated that:
- “The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) continues to be the official government of the ‘territories that were administered by that government on 19 March 2003 in the governorates of Dohuk, Arbil, Sulaimaniya, Kirkuk, Diyala and Neneveh’ (Art. 53A), and it will continue to exercise the functions it has performed so far, ‘except with regard to those issues which fall within the exclusive competence of the federal government’, as specified by the TAL. The KRG retains control over its own police and internal security forces and the right to impose taxes within the region (Art. 54A). In sum, these articles recognise the political status quo as per the Kurdish demand for a Kurdish federal region.” [25b] (p19)
- 5.25 As noted in a Peyamner report, dated 14 February 2005, “The turnout for the 111-seat Kurdistan National Assembly was 1,753,919 votes, which means that each entity needs 15,801 votes to get a seat.” [29a] The HRW statement

released 1 February 2005, noted that the KDP and PUK formed a coalition for the national and Kurdish assemblies. [15c] As documented in the Psephos report (accessed on 17 February 2005) the Kurdistan Democratic List gained the majority of votes in the Kurdistan legislative election with 90 per cent of the votes and 104 seats in the Kurdistan National Assembly. The Kurdistan Islamic Group in Iraq came second with 4.9 per cent of the vote and 6 seats in the Kurdistan National Assembly while the Kurdistan Toilers Party gained 1.2 per cent and one seat. [37c] (See also Annex G on the Iraqi Kurdistan election results) The BBC stated, on 14 June 2005 that Massoud Barzani was sworn in as the new regional president of Iraqi Kurdistan on 12 June 2005. [4g]

[Return to Contents](#)

JUDICIARY

- 5.26 The FCO human rights report 2005, stated that “The Iraqi ministry of justice is responsible for the criminal justice system.” [66j] (p64) As stated under Article 43(A) of the Transitional Administrative Law [TAL], dated 8 March 2004, “The judiciary is independent, and it shall in no way be administered by the executive authority, including the Ministry of Justice. The judiciary shall enjoy exclusive competence to determine the innocence or guilt of the accused pursuant to law, without interference from the legislative or executive authorities.” [51a] (p13) However, the Freedom House report 2005, noted that in practice judges come under immense political pressure. [70b] (p309)
- 5.27 The USSD report 2004, added that “Some aspects of the judicial system were dysfunctional, and there were reports that the judiciary was subject to external influence.” [2a] (p2) The joint British/Danish fact-finding mission report, October 2004, mentioned that “In general the court[s] are functioning however some judges do not follow the laws and procedures. In general the courts were functioning without interference from the politicians.” [30c] (p14)
- 5.28 The Dutch country report, December 2004, added that “The effectiveness of the judiciary was hampered by capacity problems and the general instability in Iraq. Just like other institutions in the fledgling Iraqi State, the judiciary has to struggle with corruption and a lack of transparency, which are both a serious impediment to its effectiveness.” [71c] (p47)
- 5.29 As noted in the Europa Regional Survey 2005, “Following the ousting of the Baaath regime, the judicial system was subject to a process of review and De-Baathification. [1a] (p532) The FCO stated in a report (accessed on 8 August 2005) that:
- “A Judicial Review Committee, comprising equal numbers of Iraqi and Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) members, vetted all 860 judges and prosecutors nation-wide for past corruption, ties to the Ba’ath party or former regime, or complicity in atrocities. Approximately 180 judges were removed and replaced with new appointments or re-appointments of persons improperly removed by the former regime. Judicial salaries have also been increased to reduce the temptation to accept bribes.” [66k]
- 5.30 In September 2004, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) noted that:

“When the CPA transferred power to Iraq’s interim government, Iraq’s courts were not yet functioning at prewar levels; by some estimates, the courts in Baghdad, for example, were functioning at about one-third their prewar capacity. Even the Central Criminal Court of Iraq, which the CPA established, lacks the basic materials needed to stock an office – it has no computers, typewriters, or filing cabinets and only a few bare desks and chairs. The CPA did undertake efforts to reform Iraq’s justice system, including vetting Iraq’s judges for ties to the Ba’ath party and corruption, and reestablishing the judiciary as an independent branch of government. It also began addressing Iraqi judges’ outdated legal skills, including with a training program for a small number of judges in the Hague. Nonetheless, the justice system is completely overstretched by the rampant crime and security problems.” [63b] (p37)

5.31 A report by DFID, October 2004, observed that:

“Since February, 216 judges, prosecutors, lawyers and justice department officials have trained in International Human Rights Law; and 50 judges, prosecutors and lawyers have trained in International Humanitarian Law. Participation has been diverse: male and female judges, prosecutors and lawyers have been chosen from all areas of Iraq and from all parts of the community. A number of participants have been trained as trainers, so that the benefits of the training can be disseminated to others in Iraq.” [59b] (p2)

[Return to Contents](#)

JUDICIAL SYSTEM

5.32 As noted in the Europa Regional Survey 2005, “In the interim period, a new judicial system was formed.” [1a] (p532)

5.33 The UNDP – POGAR (accessed on 8 August 2005) stated that “The Iraqi court system is divided into the Civil Courts, Courts of Personal Status, and Criminal Courts.” [54a] (p2) The same report noted that “The court hierarchy consists of Courts of First Instance, Courts of Appeal, and Courts of Cassation, a Federal Court of Cassation, and a new Federal Supreme Court consisting of nine members to be appointed by the Presidency Council. One Supreme Court judge is to preside over the Higher Juridical Council.” [54a] (p2) The USSD report 2004, added that “The courts are geographically organized into 17 appellate districts.” [2a] (p6)

5.34 The USSD report 2004, explained that “The criminal justice system is based on the French or civil system. ... The system is inquisitorial; cases are controlled and investigated by the judiciary.” [2a] (p6) The USSD report 2004, noted that “Defendants who are found guilty are sentenced immediately after the verdict.” [2a] (p6)

5.35 The Dutch country report, December 2004, stated that “A Central Criminal Court of Iraq has been active in Baghdad since August 2003. This court has representations in various other cities.” [71c] (p26) The FCO human rights report 2005 added that the Central Criminal Court dealt with the most serious crimes. [66j] (p64) The same report noted that “Any court may refer cases to it. Alternatively, it can take the initiative and take over proceedings from any other court.” [66j] (p64)

- 5.36 The FCO human rights report 2005, noted that cases in juvenile courts are heard by a three-member panel comprising, a judge, a lawyer and a social worker. [66j] (p64)

[Return to Contents](#)

RELIGIOUS AND TRADITIONAL LAW

- 5.37 Europa World Online (accessed on 9 August 2005) stated that “A Shari`a Court is established wherever there is a First Instance Court; the Muslim judge of the First Instance Court may be a Qadhi to the Shari`a Court if a special Qadhi has not been appointed thereto. The Shari`a Court considers matters of personal status and religious matters in accordance with the provisions of the law supplement to the Civil and Commercial Proceedings Law.” [1c] (Judicial System)
- 5.38 An article by IRIN news, dated 22 October 2004, stated that “Sheikhs from the tribes in Iraq most commonly use Shariat law to settle disputes.” [18m]
- 5.39 The UNHCR report, August 2004, stated that:
- “There has been an increase in the number of people turning to traditional judicial structures since the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime. This increase can be attributed to the lack of authority and general state of lawlessness in Iraq as well as the fact that people have little or no faith in the current ability of the existing official legal structures to resolve disputes in a timely and effective manner. The Iraqi tribal justice system is widely considered by Iraqis to be very effective, especially for criminal cases. It is also a much quicker way of resolving disputes than the long drawn-out court cases where the parties are unable to reach an agreement which is mutually satisfying. Agreements between tribal leaders are considered final, and while the courts are not obliged to adopt such decisions, they generally do as the decision is more likely to be effectively implemented when agreed upon between tribal leaders.” [40b] (p17)
- 5.40 The British/Danish fact-finding mission, October 2004, was informed that in the south tribes deal with problems in the traditional way but in the north there is more reliance on the court system. The report also noted that Moqtada al Sadr has his own courts and prisons. [30c] (p17) The Dutch country report, December 2004, added that “Torture is allegedly used here.” [71c] (p47)
- 5.41 On 1 March 2004, IWPR reported that “Traditional courts offer a non-violent route for pursuing claims against Saddam’s henchmen”. The article added that “Relatives of victims had killed an untold number of Ba’athists, particularly in the south where tribal traditions of vendetta were especially strong.” But while Tribal rules tend to sanction blood vengeance in the case of murder relatively minor injuries such as minor gunshot wounds did not call for such drastic retribution. Instead, victims could take their grievance to a local tribal court which could order the accused to pay compensation. A local Sheikh who sat on a tribunal believes that the arbitration system provides a consensual way of defusing potentially violent disputes: “This approach satisfies all the tribes. It prevents bloodshed and prevents [further] disagreements”. However, “Although such traditional courts are widely accepted by local tribes, some policemen argue that it will deter their colleagues from enforcing the law in the post-Saddam era.” [11f] (See also Section 6B on The tribes)

JUDICIARY IN THE KRG AREA

- 5.42 The Iraqi Kurdistan National Assembly (IKNA) website explained that “Judicial authority in the region is organized according to a special law of judicial authority and according to that law, it is independent and is subjected to no other authority except that of law. No one has the power to interfere with the judiciary sovereignty and the decision of the courts can be applied to all natural or juristic personalities related to the government.” [32a]
- 5.43 The same report noted that types of courts in the region are Court of Cassation, which supervises and monitors all of the courts; Court of Appeal; Court of First Instance; Courts of Personal Status; Criminal Court; Courts of Offence; Juvenile Courts; Court of Labour; and Court of Fact-Finding (investigation). [32a]
- 5.44 A report by RFE/RL, dated 15 September 2004, observed that “The difficulties faced by judges are the worst in central and southern Iraq. By contrast, judges in northern Iraq describe conditions there as normal by most standards of the profession.” [22b]
- 5.45 The same article reported that:

“The judicial system is in place, democracy is in place, there is a parliament in Iraqi Kurdistan, and a judge is free to make rulings in accord with his own convictions and without external pressure.’ ...

“Much of northern Iraq fell outside of Hussein’s control after the 1991 Gulf War. Since then, the Iraqi Kurds have established their own governmental and security institutions. Police units in the region were not disbanded and reformed by the CPA since they were considered free of ties to the former regime.” [22b]

THE IRAQ SPECIAL TRIBUNAL (IST)

- 5.46 The FCO human rights report 2005 stated that “The Iraqi governing council established the Iraq Special Tribunal (IST) in December 2003 to hear cases against members of the former regime who are accused of war crimes, crimes against humanity and other serious human rights abuses against the Iraqi people and Iraq’s neighbours.” [66] (p64)
- 5.47 The HRW world report 2005 added that:
- “Among other problems, the tribunal law contains no prohibition on using confessions extracted by torture, no right of access to a lawyer in the early stages of investigation, and no requirement that guilt be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Those convicted can face the death penalty. And while justice efforts worldwide have created a cadre of judges and prosecutors with invaluable experience prosecuting genocide and crimes against humanity, the tribunal has been structured to almost entirely exclude their participation. Instead, the tribunal is to be run by lawyers and judges who have acknowledged their own lack of experience in complex prosecutions of this kind.” [15e] (p3)

- 5.48 The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) report, dated 30 August 2005, stated that “Human-rights advocates have accused the court of not upholding international legal standards of due process or sufficiently protecting the rights of the accused.” [8d] (p2)
- 5.49 The HRW report, November 2004, explained that “After more than thirty-five years of Ba’thist rule, Saddam Hussein and a number of other former Iraqi government officials responsible for perpetrating the most heinous crimes under international law crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes are about to be tried for their alleged crimes.” [15g] (p1)
- 5.50 The CFR report, dated 30 August 2005, added that 11 high-ranking Iraqi officials awaiting indictments included Abid Hamid al-Tikriti, a former presidential secretary, Ali Hassan al-Majid (‘Chemical Ali’), Saddam’s cousin and adviser, and Tariq Aziz, the former deputy prime minister. [8d] (p1)
- 5.51 The FCO human rights report 2005 noted that “Saddam Hussein was charged with, among other things, killing religious figures in 1974, the Barzani clan in 1983 and members of political parties over a period of 30 years, as well as gassing Kurds in Halabja in 1988; the 1986–1988 Anfal campaign of displacing Kurds; and suppressing the 1991 Kurdish and Shia uprising.” [66j] (p64)

[Return to Contents](#)

LEGAL DOCUMENTS

- 5.52 The HRW report, January 2005, stated that “Persons may not be arrested without a warrant (except in circumstances prescribed by law, such as crimes committed in flagrante delicto).” [15g] (p20)
- 5.53 The same report observed that “The police and intelligence services conduct arrests without warrants issued by an appropriate judicial authority, frequently on the basis of information provided by ‘secret informants’ from within the police force.” [15g] (p4)

[Return to Contents](#)

LEGAL RIGHTS/DETENTION

- 5.54 The HRW report, January 2005, stated that “The bill of rights contained in the TAL guaranteed a number of fundamental principles pertaining to persons deprived of their liberty.” [15g] (p21) Article 12 of the TAL stipulates that all persons are equal before the law and the courts and “No one may be deprived of his life or liberty, except in accordance with legal procedures.” [51a] (p4)
- 5.55 Articles 15(D) and 15(F) respectively state that “All persons shall be guaranteed the right to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, regardless of whether the proceeding is civil or criminal. Notice of the proceeding and its legal basis must be provided to the accused without delay.” and “The right to a fair, speedy, and open trial shall be guaranteed.” [54a] (p5)
- 5.56 However, according to the HRW world report 2005, “In the vast majority of cases observed by Human Rights Watch, defendants had been detained

without judicial warrants and were brought before the criminal courts without having had prior access to defense counsel.” [15e] (p3) The same report added that “Trials before the criminal courts were summary, lasting less than thirty minutes in the majority of cases.” [54a] (p5)

- 5.57 Article 15(E) of the TAL states that “The accused is innocent until proven guilty pursuant to law, and he likewise has the right to engage independent and competent counsel, to remain silent in response to questions addressed to him with no compulsion to testify for any reason, to participate in preparing his defense, and to summon and examine witnesses or to ask the judge to do so. At the time a person is arrested, he must be notified of these rights.” [15e] (p3)
- 5.58 The HRW world report 2005, nevertheless, noted that “Where defendants were unable or unwilling to engage lawyers to act on their behalf, the courts appointed lawyers for them. However, such lawyers did not have prior access to the defendants nor to the evidence against them, and in some cases, lawyers were not present at investigative hearings.” [15e] (p3)
- 5.59 The HRW report, January 2005, added that “Corruption is a major impediment to respect for basic rights. One of the most common complaints made by detainees was of police officials threatening them with indefinite detention if they failed to pay them sums of money.” [15g] (p5)
- 5.60 As documented in the USSD report 2004 “Some police officers did not present defendants to magistrates and held them in detention cells until their families paid bribes for their release.” [2a] (p5)
- 5.61 The same report added that:
- “Over the course of several months beginning in July 2004, Human Rights Watch received numerous reports of the torture and ill-treatment of persons apprehended because they were suspected members or supporters of Shi’a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr or armed militiamen belonging to the Mahdi Army. Most of the arrests took place in the context of armed clashes that erupted in the city of al-Najaf at the beginning of August [2004] between Iraqi government and Multinational Force troops on the one hand, and armed militiamen loyal to Muqtada al-Sadr on the other. ... During the same period, arrests of other suspected members or sympathizers also took place in Baghdad, some of whom said they were accused of aiding Shi’a militiamen in al-Najaf.” [15g] (p26-27)
- 5.62 The HRW report, January 2005, noted that “Human Rights Watch is also aware of other cases involving the arrest without warrant, illegal detention and ill-treatment of members of several political parties in Baghdad.” [15g] (p35)
- 5.63 The AI report 2005 also mentioned that “Arrests of people suspected of involvement with insurgents or critical of the presence of foreign troops were reported daily. Many of those detained were picked up in indiscriminate and violent raids, often at night.” [28f] (p2)

[Return to Contents](#)

ARREST AND DETENTION

- 5.64 Article 15(C) of the TAL states that “No one may be unlawfully arrested or detained, and no one may be detained by reason of political or religious beliefs.” [51a] (p5) The HRW report, January 2005, added that all person have the right to challenge the legality of arrest or detention without delay. [15g] (p22)
- 5.65 As mentioned in the HRW report, January 2005:
 “Following the transfer of sovereignty on June 28, 2004 under Security Council resolution no. 1546, the so-called Multinational Force-Iraq (essentially U.S. forces and its allies) have maintained responsibility for the apprehension and detention of captured insurgents and other security detainees, including ‘high value detainees’ such as Saddam Hussein and former government officials and foreign terror suspects. The Iraqi Interim Government has assumed responsibility for the detention and prosecution of common criminal suspects and insurgents apprehended by Iraqi security forces.” [15g] (p1)
- 5.66 The AI annual report 2005, mentioned that “On 27 June [2004], the CPA issued a memorandum setting out the process of arrest and detention by US-led forces after 28 June [2004]. Criminal suspects held by the US-led forces had the right to remain silent, to consult a lawyer and to be brought before a judicial authority no later than 90 days. ‘Security internees’ could be held for up to 18 months, but in special cases this could be extended further; they were entitled to periodic reviews of their continued detention.” [28f] (p2)
- 5.67 The AI report, June 2004, observed that those detained within the framework of the Iraqi Code of Criminal Procedure (Article 123) must have their case reviewed within 24 hours. [28a] (p2-3)
- 5.68 The HRW report, January 2005, stated that “The judge may renew their period of detention for not more than fifteen days on each occasion, provided that the total period does not exceed six months. If the criminal investigation is not completed within six months, authorization for further extensions of the detention period must be obtained from the relevant criminal court.” [15g] (p20)
- 5.69 UNHCR noted in August 2004 that “Some cases have remained incommunicado while others have had the right to legal counsel and have been subsequently released. Reports concerning several cases who are still being detained without charge and whose whereabouts are unknown have also been received by UNHCR.” [40b] (p4)
- 5.70 The USSD report 2004 noted that “There was a widespread perception that police made false arrests to extort money. Some police officers did not present defendants to magistrates and held them in detention cells until their families paid bribes for their release. In the Central Criminal Court in Baghdad, the time between arrest and arraignment was often in excess of 30 days, despite the 24-hour requirement.” [2a] (p5)
- 5.71 The AI report 2005 noted that “Thousands of people were held without charge on suspicion of anti-Coalition activities and their legal status at the end of the year [2004] was not clarified. Many were held in harsh conditions, including in unacknowledged centres, for months and were denied access to lawyers and families for long periods.” [28f] (p2)

- 5.72 The HRW report, January 2005, also noted that “Conditions of pre-trial detention are poor.” [15g] (p4)
- 5.73 The HRW report, January 2005, stated that:
“Many persons reported being beaten at the time of their arrest and being very tightly bound in handcuffs or tightly blindfolded. Contrary to the provisions of Iraq’s Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP), which requires a defendant to be brought before an investigating judge within twenty-four hours of arrest, the vast majority had been held without appearing before a judge for far longer – in some cases for almost four months.” [15g] (p4)
- 5.74 The AI report, dated 25 July 2005, noted that “Many Iraqis have complained about US forces’ heavy-handedness in dealing with people they perceive as suspects. US soldiers have often conducted violent house searches and damaged or destroyed property. ... There have also been numerous reports of confiscation of property, including large sums of money and jewellery, by US forces when making arrests. The property is reportedly seldom returned upon release of the detainee.” [28c] (p4)
- 5.75 The Dutch country report, December 2004, noted that “Detainees, security personnel or bystanders were often killed as arrests were being made. Some MNF soldiers have been accused of the murder of Iraqi civilians.” [71c] (p50-51)
- 5.76 The UNHCR report, August 2004, noted that “Families often do not know where their relatives are detained and what the charges against them are. Many families have to travel to multiple prisons across the country searching for news. The right to meet with their families and lawyers and to have a judicial review of their detention is to date still denied to many detained persons.” [40b] (p4)

[Return to Contents](#)

TORTURE AND ILL-TREATMENT IN DETENTION

- 5.77 Article 15(J) stipulates that “Torture in all its forms, physical or mental, shall be prohibited under all circumstances, as shall be cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment. No confession made under compulsion, torture, or threat thereof shall be relied upon or admitted into evidence for any reason in any proceeding, whether criminal or otherwise.” [54a] (p5-6) Nevertheless, HRW stated in its world report 2005 that in some cases the accused had been tortured or ill-treated to extract confessions from them. [15e] (p3)
- 5.78 The AI report, March 2004, added that:
“Many detainees have alleged they were tortured and ill-treated by US and UK troops during interrogation. Methods often reported include prolonged sleep deprivation; beatings; prolonged restraint in painful positions, sometimes combined with exposure to loud music; prolonged hooding; and exposure to bright lights. Virtually none of the allegations of torture or ill-treatment has been adequately investigated.” [28d] (p6-7) This was also stated in the HRW report April 2005. [15b] (p15)
- 5.79 The HRW reported in April 2005 that:

“A panel appointed by the Secretary of Defense noted 55 substantiated cases of detainee abuse in Iraq, plus twenty instances of detainee deaths still under investigation. The earlier investigative report of Maj. Gen. Antonio Taguba found ‘numerous incidents of sadistic, blatant, and wanton criminal abuses’ constituting ‘systematic and illegal abuse of detainees’ at Abu Ghraib. Another Pentagon report documented 44 allegations of such war crimes at Abu Ghraib.” [15b] (p15)

5.80 The AI annual report 2005 noted that the investigation that US military personnel had ‘committed egregious acts and grave breaches of international law at Abu Ghraib and Camp Bucca’.” [28f] (p3) The HRW report April 2005 stated that “An ICRC report concluded that in military intelligence sections of Abu Ghraib, ‘methods of physical and psychological coercion used by the interrogators appeared to be part of the standard operating procedures by military intelligence personnel to obtain confessions and extract information.’” [15b] (p15)

5.81 The AI report, dated 25 July 2005, noted that:

“The torture and ill-treatment of detainees by US forces were highlighted in April 2004 when photographs of Iraqi prisoners being abused were published around the world. The pictures showed groups of naked Iraqi detainees being forced to adopt humiliating and sexually explicit positions. Electric wires were attached to the body of one detainee. Other prisoners were seen being threatened by dogs. Further evidence emerged indicating that Iraqi prisoners had been beaten severely, made to masturbate in front of female US soldiers, and forced to walk on their hands and knees and bark like dogs. A number of detainees died in US custody in Iraq, allegedly as a result of torture.” [28c] (p4)

5.82 The same report added that:

“One US soldier was sentenced to a year’s imprisonment in May after pleading guilty to abuse charges at a special court martial in Baghdad. In October another US soldier was sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment after pleading guilty to several abuse charges. Other soldiers were awaiting trial by the end of the year [2004].” [28f] (p3)

5.83 The FCO human rights report 2005 added that:

“Where there were allegations of abuse by British forces the UK instigated an investigation independent of the chain of command. A court martial in Osnabruck in February 2005 found four British servicemen guilty of abuse and sentenced them to imprisonment. The Chief of General Staff Mike Jackson made a statement at the end of the court martial, apologising to the families of those abused. He announced that the UK would appoint an experienced senior officer to assess lessons learned as a result of the court martial and to track future prosecutions. He also asked that these cases of abuse should be put into the perspective that there have been 65,000 British service personnel in Iraq and only 164 service police enquiries, of which 100 are in connection with incidents of return fire. Only four other known cases involving allegations of deliberate abuse have been, or may be, referred to the prosecuting authorities.” [66] (p63)

- 5.84 With regard to the Iraqi officials, the HRW report, dated January 2005, noted that “There is little indication that any serious measures have been taken to enforce existing laws and put an end to these practices. Human Rights Watch is aware of only a handful of cases in which investigations into allegations of torture or ill-treatment by Iraqi law enforcement personnel resulted in the conviction of the perpetrators, and none of those convicted received prison time.” [15g] (p6)
- 5.85 However, the same report noted that “Officials found guilty of torturing or ill-treating detainees in their custody are punishable by up to fifteen years’ imprisonment under the Penal Code. Detainees have the right to submit a complaint regarding a threat or harm caused to them with a view to initiating criminal proceedings against the perpetrators.” [15g] (p20) **(See also section 5 on Prisons and prison conditions)**

[Return to Contents](#)

DEATH PENALTY

- 5.86 Capital punishment was suspended on 10 June 2003 by Coalition Provisional Order Number 7. [31a] However, *The Guardian* reported, on 9 August 2004, that the Iraqi government announced the reintroduction of the death penalty on 8 August 2004. [6r] The same report stated that “Officials said the move was part of a raft of measures designed to impose the rule of law in Iraq and stem the violence that has shown little sign of easing since the US officially ended its occupation at the end of June [2004].” [6r] This was also mentioned in the AI annual report 2005. [28] (p5)
- 5.87 The HRW report, January 2005, also noted that:
- “The Iraqi Interim Government passed Order 3 of 2004 on August 8; the Order reintroduced capital punishment for a range of offenses, including certain crimes affecting internal state security, public safety, premeditated murder, and drug trafficking. It also introduced the death penalty for abduction. Government officials argued that capital punishment would serve as a deterrent against such crimes, while its implementation would be ‘very limited and only in exceptional cases.’” [15g] (p17)
- 5.88 The Dutch country report, December 2004, added that “The death penalty can only be carried out after the judgement has been upheld by the Presidential Council and the Prime Minister.” [71c] (p53)
- 5.89 The AI report 2005, noted that “In November [2004] the head of the Supreme Judicial Council stated that 10 people had been sentenced to death by Iraqi courts. The death sentences were upheld by an appeal court and were reportedly with the Iraqi President and the Prime Minister for final confirmation. At the end of 2004 it was not known if any executions had been carried out.” [28f] (p5)

[Return to Contents](#)

INTERNAL SECURITY ORGANISATIONS

5.90 Europa World Online (accessed on 9 August 2005) stated that “The US-led CPA dissolved the armed forces and security organizations in place under Saddam Hussain’s regime on 23 May 2003, following the ousting of the regime in the previous month. On 7 August the CPA promulgated the establishment of the New Iraqi Army (NIA), to which an estimated NID 34,800m. was allocated in the full-year budget for 2004.” [1c] (Defence)

5.91 The USSD report 2004 mentioned that:

“Domestic security responsibilities are shared within the IIG between the Ministry of Interior (MOI) and the Ministry of Defense. As set forth in the TAL, certain elements of the Iraqi Armed Forces are under the operational control of the Multi-National Coalition Force (MNF-I) operating in the country under unified command pursuant to UNSCR 1546, and some also have domestic security responsibilities. MOI forces also partner with MNF-I to ensure a coordinated approach to security within the country. The MOI’s responsibilities extend only to internal security. The MOI commands a number of uniformed forces, including the Iraqi Police Service, the Department of Border Enforcement, and the Bureau of Dignitary Protection, as well as the MOI Intelligence Service. Among its other responsibilities, the MOI also regulates private domestic and foreign security companies. While civilian authorities generally maintained effective control of security forces under their authority, there were instances in which security force elements acted without government authority. There were reports that members of the MOI’s security forces committed numerous, serious human rights abuses.” [2a] (p1)

5.92 The EIU report 2005 mentioned that:

“In late April [2005] the US president, George W Bush, confidently asserted that there were nearly 155,000 ‘trained and equipped’ Iraqi security forces, exceeding the number of US forces, estimated at around 140,000. ... The reality, however, is far from impressive. While there has been a strong increase in the number of Iraqi security forces, there has been a far from proportional improvement in their capabilities. The sections of the security forces equipped and trained to handle the insurgency are only a small fraction of the total, which is partly why the insurgency continues unabated.” [58b] (p19-20)

5.93 The AI report, dated 25 July 2005, stated that “Most members of the new Iraqi armed forces, as well as the police and the Iraqi National Guard, lack sufficient experience and training to deal with the daily violence and attacks by armed groups. They are also too few in number and said to be poorly equipped. Most of the personnel in these forces are new recruits, mainly Shi’a Muslims from the south.” [28c] (p3) The AI report dated 25 July 2005 added that “The vast majority of members of these two security forces [Iraqi police and Iraqi National Guard] are Shi’as and Kurds.” [28c] (p9)

[Return to Contents](#)

POLICE

5.94 The USSD report 2004 noted that:

“In the aftermath of the fall of the former regime, a police presence temporarily vanished, except in the Kurdish North. Police equipment was stolen. After April

2003, a large recruitment and training program was established, including hiring former police officers. During the year [2004], various specialized units were created, including an Emergency Response Unit (with capabilities similar to a SWAT team) and Public Order Battalions that perform riot control functions, as well as specialized counterinsurgency units.” [2a] (p5)

- 5.95 A CNN report, dated 25 July 2005, noted that there were approximately 63,000 fully trained Iraq police to date. [17d] (p1) The CSIS report, dated 14 April 2005, noted that “Iraq’s Special Police Forces had grown from zero operational battalions in June 2004 to 20 operational battalions by the end of February [2005]. Nine Police Commando battalions were now operational. Nine Public Order Battalions were operational.” [63d] (p4)
- 5.96 The joint British/Danish fact-finding mission report, October 2004, stated that “UN sources in Amman advised that the police force was not effective enough to provide security to ordinary Iraqis. The source added that the police force was more corrupt than ever before, and that the kidnappers were very rich and so could bribe police officers.” [30c] (p11)
- 5.97 In the Kurdish Regional Government administered area, according to a Reuters report, dated 16 October 2003, “The two Kurdish factions [the PUK and KDP] which took control of the north after the 1991 uprising, built up police forces and local governments which remain in place, largely unaffected by the war.” [7b] (p2)
- 5.98 The USSD report 2004 noted that “More than any other group, the police have been a target of terrorist attacks. Over 1,500 IPS personnel have been killed between April 2003 and year’s end [2004].” [2a] (p5)

[Return to Contents](#)

IRAQI ARMED FORCES

- 5.99 The CIA world factbook (last updated on 8 August 2005) explained that the Iraqi Armed Forces consists of “Iraqi Regular Army (includes Iraqi Special Operations Force, Iraqi Intervention Force), Iraqi Navy (former Iraqi Coastal Defense Force), Iraqi Air Force (former Iraqi Army Air Corps).” [78a] (p10)
- 5.100 According to the EIU report 2005, there are an estimated 25,000 to 30,000 troops in regular forces of the Iraqi Army, who specifically focus on counter-insurgency operations. [58b] (p20) The same report noted that “A large portion of the National Guard, who are currently supposed to be in the process of being merged with the regular army are militias working under their respective Shia or Kurdish organisations.” [58b] (p20)

[Return to Contents](#)

MULTI-NATIONAL FORCES

- 5.101 The DFID advised, on 2 July 2004, that:

“Iraqis control Iraq’s security forces. The Multi-National Force in Iraq (MNFI) is there at the request of the Iraqi Government, under a mandate set out in UN Security Council Resolution 1546. The MNFI’s principal roles are: helping to

maintain security; protecting the UN; and helping to develop Iraq's own security capacity." [59a] (p1)

- 5.102 In June 2004, Keesings stated that the mandate for the MNFI will be reviewed at the request of the Iraqi government or 12 months from the date of the Resolution. "The Mandate should expire on completion of the political process (i.e. by Dec. 31, 2005) but could be terminated earlier if requested by the Government of Iraq." [3a] (p46089)
- 5.103 The Dutch country report, December 2004, noted that "In addition to the US (about 138,000 troops) and the UK (about 8000 troops), thirty countries take part in the MNF." [71c] (p22)
- 5.104 An article by the BBC dated 12 April 2005, the Associated Press dated 5 November 2004 and the Global Security.org report (accessed on 9 August 2005) noted that a number of countries have expressed their intention to pull their troops out of Iraq during 2005. [4an] [65c] [73b] (p1) ([See also section 6A on the Security forces](#))

[Return to Contents](#)

PRISONS AND PRISON CONDITIONS

- 5.105 The Dutch report on Iraq dated June 2004 stated that:
- "CPA Order 10 transferred the management of detention and prison facilities to the Ministry of Justice. Regulations have also been issued governing the safeguarding of proper (according to international norms) living conditions in detention centres and prisons. This includes segregating the sexes, separating suspects from convicts and separating minors from adults. Prisoners are also required to be detained in separate cells. The regulations also provide safeguards relating to the supply of food and drink, sports, recreational and educational facilities, medical care, working conditions, the right to receive visits, the right to complain and faith. The Order also lays down requirements governing disciplinary instructions, including a ban on all forms of mistreatment and rules with which prison staff must comply." [71b]
- 5.106 The USSD report 2004 noted that "Although there was significant improvement in Iraqi Corrections Service (ICS) prison conditions following the fall of the former regime, in many instances the facilities did not meet international penal standards." [2a] (p4)
- 5.107 The USSD report 2004 observed that "Overcrowding was a problem. Inmate disturbances and riots reduced available prison beds by approximately one-third, and pretrial detention facilities were often overcrowded. The insurrections in Sadr City and later in Najaf created additional overcrowding in detention facilities." [2a] (p4) The HRW report, January 2005, added that "Detainees reported receiving little or no food or water for several days at a stretch, and being held in severely overcrowded cells with no room for lying down to sleep, without air conditioning, and in unhygienic conditions." [15g] (p4)
- 5.108 The FCO human rights report 2005 noted that "Detainees are made as comfortable as possible. They are free to practice their religion, have three hot meals a day, access to recreation areas and medical facilities are available.

Detention facilities are open to ICRC and Iraqi Ministry of Human Rights inspection.” [66j] (p63)

- 5.109 The USSD report 2004 advised that “ICS operated 17 facilities, totaling 8,500 beds. Renovation and construction on an additional 6 facilities, totaling 6,000 beds, was underway at year’s end [2004]. No inmates died during the period under review due to poor conditions of confinement or lack of medical care, although the quality of care was low.” [2a] (p4)
- 5.110 An IRIN News article, dated 6 July 2004, stated that “Very little money has been budgeted for prison buildings over the last 30 years in Iraq, according to the CPA. Conditions for prisoners and staff in the main jails had fallen below the standards that are now considered acceptable.” [18s] Nevertheless, the article added that “Faris [head of the Al-Mina prison] believed prison conditions were much better now.” [18s] The report noted that a new prison called Al-Mina was built in Basra to ease overcrowding at the nearby al-Ma’aqal jail. Al-Mina prison, which has a total capacity for 600 inmates, has running water, electrical and sewage facilities. [18s]
- 5.111 The International Centre for Prison Studies report (last updated 13 February 2005) stated that the prison population at April 2004 was approximately 15,000, including pre-trial detainees, of which 7,000 were in the custody of the Ministry of Justice. [45a] An article by the *Washington Post*, dated 21 January 2005, added that the US military held about 7,900 prisoners regarded as security threats. [16e]
- 5.112 The FCO human rights report 2005 stated that “At the end of April 2005 there were 11,000 detainees in US-run detention centres in Iraq and on 24 May 2005 there were 22 security internees in the UK detention facility at Shaibah. The UK does not hold any women or individuals under the age of 18.” [66j] (p63)
- 5.113 The AI report 2005 stated that “Both Camp Bucca and Abu Ghraib remained under the control of US forces after the June [2005] handover of power. Some detainees, known as ‘ghost detainees’, were hidden to prevent the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) from visiting them.” [28f] (p2)
- 5.114 The AI annual report 2005, noted that:
- “Hundreds of detainees were released during 2004. On 23 March [2004] Coalition forces announced the release of 494 detainees because they no longer posed a ‘security threat’. On 15, 16 and 30 September [2004], a total of 563 detainees were reportedly released from Abu Ghraib Prison. After August, cases were reviewed by the Combined Review and Release Board, including six Iraqi officials from the Ministries of Justice, Human Rights and the Interior and three colonels from the multinational force.” [28f] (p3)
- 5.115 The UNSC report, dated 7 June 2005, stated that “Despite the release of some detainees, their number continues to grow.” [38b] (p13)
- 5.116 As mentioned in an article by HRW, dated 25 January 2005, “Human Rights Watch conducted interviews in Iraq with 90 detainees, 72 of whom alleged having been tortured or ill-treated, particularly under interrogation.” [15a]
- 5.117 The HRW report, January 2005, explained that:

“The majority of the detainees interviewed for this report stated that torture and ill-treatment during the initial period of detention was commonplace in facilities under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior’s specialized police agencies. Methods of torture or ill-treatment cited included routine beatings to the body using a variety of implements such as cables, hosepipes and metal rods. Detainees reported kicking, slapping and punching; prolonged suspension from the wrists with the hands tied behind the back; electric shocks to sensitive parts of the body, including the earlobes and genitals; and being kept blindfolded and/or handcuffed continuously for several days. In several cases, the detainees suffered what may be permanent physical disability.” [15g] (p4) **(See also section 5 on Legal rights/detention)**

5.118 The HRW report, January 2005, stated that “Persons tortured or mistreated have inadequate access to health care and no realistic avenue for legal redress. With rare exception, Iraqi authorities have failed to investigate and punish officials responsible for violations.” [15g] (p2)

5.119 The FCO human rights report 2005 stated that “There are no dedicated UK or US detention facilities for women or juveniles. Women and juveniles at US detention facilities are segregated from adult males unless they are members of the same family.” [66j] (p63)

5.120 The AI report, February 2005, observed that “Women have also been at risk of torture or ill-treatment as detainees in the custody of US-led forces. Reports about the torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment of detainees in Abu Ghraib prison and other US detention centres in Iraq have included allegations that women have been subjected to sexual abuse, possibly including rape.” [28e] (p7)

5.121 The USSD report 2004 noted that “The law provides that women and juveniles be held separately from men; according to HRW interviews, juveniles were confined with adults in some cases.” [2a] (p4) The HRW report, January 2005 explained that “The right of child detainees to be held separately from adults is also provided for under Iraq’s Juveniles Welfare Law. Article 52(2) of this law stipulates that in areas where separate detention facilities are not available, measures must be taken to prevent children from mixing with adult detainees.” However “The requirement for the separation of child detainees has not been followed in some cases.” [15g] (p63) The report also noted that “Human Rights Watch continues to receive reports of children being held together with adults in detention facilities under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior. The children include both criminal suspects and others suspected of having taken part in clashes against government forces, including those suspected of links with the Mahdi Army.” [15g] (p62)

5.122 The HRW report, January 2005, stated that:

“Soldiers who guard detainees now work under strict guidelines. ... The military has also overhauled all of its detention facilities since the scandal, which highlighted the poor living conditions of both the detainees and the soldiers. Prisoners at Abu Ghraib now live in heated tents with electricity and have access to showers and to cold water in the summer. They also have extensive medical and dental care.” [16e]

- 5.123 The ICRC report, dated 6 May 2004, stated that “ICRC delegates regularly visit Abu Ghraib and other places of detention in Iraq (including those under the responsibility of UK forces).” [43a] The ICRC report, dated 31 December 2004, added that “These visits are made to monitor conditions of detention and treatment of detainees.” [43b]
- 5.124 The UK Government informed the Foreign Affairs Select Committee, on 29 July 2004, that “Information about internees is available. When someone is arrested their details are passed to the International Committee of the Red Cross which then informs the person’s family. Iraqi police stations and CPA offices hold lists of all those in detention. The CPA is currently in the process of listing all detainees on the CPA website in Arabic”. [62a] (p25)

[Return to Contents](#)

PRISONS IN THE KRG AREA

- 5.125 The USSD report 2003 stated that “Kurdish regional officials reported in 2000 that prisons in the three northern provinces were open to the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) and other international monitors. According to the ICRC, regular and consistent improvement in conditions was observed on their weekly prison visits to declared prisons. However, both the PUK and the KDP reportedly maintained private, undeclared prisons, and both groups reportedly deny access to ICRC officials. There were reports that authorities of both the PUK and KDP tortured detainees and prisoners”. [2f] (p5)
- 5.126 According to the same report, prior to the fall of Saddam’s regime the PUK and KDP enacted laws establishing an independent judiciary, according to press reportings and independent observers generally observed these laws in practice, and in addition had established human rights ministries to monitor human rights conditions, to submit reports to relevant international bodies, and to recommend ways to end abuses. [2a] (p2, 5)
- 5.127 The *Washington Post* stated in an article, dated 20 August 2005, that “Widespread abductions have instilled fear across northern Iraq and led families on a desperate search for relatives who disappear into a maze of prisons in Kurdistan, the semiautonomous region controlled by the two Kurdish parties.” [16f] (p3)
- 5.128 The same article noted that “The Kurds are holding detainees at prisons in Irbil, Sulaymaniyah, Dahuk, Akrah and Shaklawah, according to human rights activists, political leaders and released detainees.” [16f] (p4)

[Return to Contents](#)

MILITARY SERVICE

- 5.129 The Europa regional survey 2005 stated that “Prior to the commencement of the US-led campaign to oust the regime of Saddam Hussain in March 2003, military service was compulsory for all men at the age of 18 years.” [1a] (p537) However, the Child Soldiers global report 2004, noted that “The CPA order creating the new armed forces in August 2003 specified that the minimum age of recruitment was 18 and that recruitment was voluntary. [42a] This was also stated in the Dutch country report, December 2004. [71c] (p56)

- 5.130 The Dutch country report, December 2004, stated that “After joining the armed forces, recruits must abandon any political activity and refrain from making any political statements. There are recruitment offices in almost all Iraqi towns and cities and Iraqis can enlist there for the new Iraqi army.” [71c] (p56)
- 5.131 The same report also noted that “Press reports also pointed to desertion from the ranks of the new Iraqi army.” [71c] (p56) *The Daily Telegraph* reported on 25 April 2005 “Iraqi army and police units are deserting their posts after the recent escalation in insurgent attacks, according to reports from around the country yesterday.” [48a]

[Return to Contents](#)

MEDICAL SERVICES

- 5.132 The World Health Organisation (WHO) report, June 2005, stated that:
- “The physical infrastructure has deteriorated as a result of over twenty years of under-investment, poor management, and conflict. Widespread looting in April 2003, the subsequent unpredictability of electricity and water supply further weakened the functional capacity of health care services, and the general insecurity created an extremely inhospitable working environment for health personnel, particularly women. Although NGOs and UN agencies started rehabilitating some health facilities in the late 1990s, by early 2003, most of the health infrastructure continues to be in poor condition.” [23b] (p12)
- 5.133 The WHO report, June 2005, stated that “The structure and functions of the Ministry of Health are in a state of flux and organizational and structural changes are being conducted, therefore the precise structure and organization will only emerge after the process of reconstruction has been completed.” [23b] (p12)
- 5.134 News24 stated, on 20 February 2005, that “Overwhelmed by a daily influx of trauma cases from insurgent bombings and ambushes, Baghdad’s antiquated and ill-equipped hospitals are nearing breaking point.” [52b] A report by Dahr Jamail dated June 2005 added that “Although the Iraq Ministry of Health claims its independence and has received promises of over \$1 billion of US funding, hospitals in Iraq continue to face ongoing medicine, equipment, and staffing shortages under the US-led occupation.” [12a] (p3)
- 5.135 The same report noted that “International aid has been in short supply due primarily to the horrendous security situation in Iraq. After the UN headquarters was bombed in Baghdad in August 2003, killing 20 people, aid agencies and non-governmental organizations either reduced their staffing or pulled out entirely.” [12a] (p4)
- 5.136 The IRIN article, dated 15 February 2005, noted that “A shortage of medicine is still the main problem throughout the country. Doctors and pharmacists claim that simple medications such as pain killers and antibiotics are unavailable and sometimes they run out of needles and syringes.” [18n] (p2)
- 5.137 The UNHCR report, August 2004, added that:

“While consultations at the public hospitals are free of charge, the price of medicines is very high. Hospitals are generally able to stock and dispense basic medical supplies, although the quantity and quality (there are many problems with expired medicines) are not reliable. Other drugs must be obtained from pharmacies. The high cost of medicines for persons with special medical needs is problematic, especially in light of the very high rate of unemployment and low salaries. The situation in the four southern governates, which each have a main hospital, is particularly severe, with only 25% of hospital equipment functioning IF there is electricity. Medical supplies are very erratic, and hospitals still suffer from the effect of sanctions. Special treatments such as chemotherapy and radiation therapy are difficult to obtain due to both the lack of drugs as well as electricity to run the radiation machines, and children in the paediatric ward who suffer from leukaemia and other treatable illnesses are not expected to survive due to the lack of adequate care”. [40b] (p11)

5.138 An IRIN news report, dated 21 February 2005, explained that:

“The MFP [Medicine for Peace] reported that most hospitals were unclean and unhygienic and lacked an infection control programme. ... The survey was carried out in 90 per cent of the capital’s hospitals and 60 per cent nationwide. ... According to the MFP study, all hospitals were suffering from a sporadic or persistent shortage of essential medicines and disposable supplies, including basics such as detergents, hand washing disinfectants, sterile needles and gloves, masks, antiseptic and soap.” [18r]

5.139 IRIN news further noted, on 15 February 2005, that “Doctors throughout hospitals in the capital complained of a lack of electricity and clean water. They also added that many foreign companies which started working in hospitals had pulled out and new equipment promised had not reached them.” [18n] (p2)

5.140 The WHO report, June 2005, noted that:

“The Private Health sector is strong powerful and has the capacity to supplement the weakness of the public sector especially in curative services. A high number of private clinics are distributed nationwide. In addition there are private hospitals run by specialists mostly located in Baghdad and to a lesser extent in the centers of provinces. Those clinics, in addition to its curative duties, handle a system of distribution of drugs to patients with a long list of chronic diseases through subsidized prices.” [23b] (p15)

5.141 IRIN reported, in July 2004, that 15 out of 68 private hospitals across the country now donate at least one free surgical operation per month to patients in desperate need of care. This was set up by an Iraqi NGO called Health Friends Organisation. The same article added that:

“Surgery regularly costs \$600 to more than \$1,200 – an astronomical sum for people used to paying less than \$1 for a visit to the doctor....Owners of private hospitals decide who should receive free surgery after looking at applications. Doctors often follow up with free after-surgery care as well, she added. The hospital charges patients whatever they can afford to pay, especially if they need to stay overnight or longer after the operation.” [18q] (p1)

5.142 According to the IWPR article, dated 12 July 2005, “Government officials say insurgents are pressuring local doctors to emigrate in an effort to deprive Iraq of

healthcare workers. They say physicians are also falling prey to criminals who kidnap them for ransom.” [11n]

- 5.143 Dahr Jamail’s report, dated June 2005, noted that “Iraqi hospitals are also attempting to cope with brain drain – an event that commonly occurs during wars where trained and talented personnel immigrate (sic) to other nations because of the troubled situation in which they are living. Doctors and medical students in Iraq today agree that this is occurring at an alarming rate, again with kidnapping being a large part of the impetus.” [12a] (p26)
- 5.144 The BBC added, on 28 July 2005, that “Junior doctors in hospitals are already feeling the gap left by specialists who have left.” [4ad] The same article noted that “The government has no precise statistics on the problem. But in June [2005], it announced it would double the salaries of university professors in a bid to keep them from leaving the country.” [4ad]
- 5.145 An article by IRIN news, dated 4 February 2005, reported that the health system was improving in southern Iraq. “According to medical staff in the area, the working environment has been improved and conditions are now better than during the Saddam regime. [18o]
- 5.146 A report by the WHO, dated 18 July 2005, stated that “Since 2004, in collaboration with the Ministry of Health, WHO has developed a four-year reconstruction plan, met urgent needs, strengthened management and built capacity. The Organization has offered public health training to more than 5000 professionals, supported polio vaccination campaigns for some 5 million children and is rehabilitating over 300 health care facilities in Iraq.” [23d] (p1) **(See also Annex F on Health care facilities)**
- 5.147 The FCO stated in a letter, dated 10 October 2005, that “Healthcare spending in Iraq is up more than 30 times on pre-war level. Over 5 million children have received life saving vaccinations. Over 140 healthcare facilities have been completed and one major hospital is under construction. 240 hospitals and 1,200 primary health centres in Iraq are functioning while 20 more hospitals being rehabilitated.” [66m] (p2) **(See also Annex F on Health care facilities)**

[Return to Contents](#)

MENTAL HEALTH CARE

- 5.148 As stated by an Iraqi medical student in a report by Medact dated 26 July 2005 “The mental health service is the worst service in the healthcare system in Iraq.” [10a] (p5) The same report noted that “Figures presented by the Iraqi Ministry of Health at a recent conference in Amman suggested that just 1% of consultant grade doctors in Iraq are psychiatrists.” [10a] (p5)
- 5.149 The Provisions Consulting Incorporated, an American Mental Health Specialist, in an article, dated on 16 April 2004, added that “According to Numan Ali, M.D., secretary-general of the Iraqi Society of Physicians (ISP), there are only 90 psychiatrists, no psychologists, counselors or other mental health providers”. [74a] (p1-2) The same article also stated that “The Alwiyah Women’s clinic provides maternal and mental health care for women in Baghdad. Under Hussein, there was no mental health system and very little care for the mentally ill. Prior to the increase in health funding, the cost of receiving services at the

clinical (sic) was too expensive for many Iraqis. However, the cost is now equivalent to 12 U.S. cents per visit.” [74a] (p1-2)

- 5.150 IRIN reported, on 17 June 2004, that national health adviser Dr. Fakri Saieb Sabeh has named a National Council for Mental Health to discuss Iraq’s future strategy for the mentally ill. The article noted that “Sabeh has sent numerous mental health care nurses and social workers for training programmes in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Turkey”. The article further noted that “The Red Cross has spent more than US \$1 million on various projects, re-equipping rooms and buying new air-conditioners to replace those that were looted”. [18w] (p1-2)
- 5.151 A report by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), dated January/February 2005, stated that “An initial tally of mental health staff in Iraq – a country with a population of roughly 25 million – produced just 154 psychiatrists, 20 clinical psychologists (of whom only 3 had appropriate training), 25 social workers (none of whom were trained in mental health), and 45 nurses (also not properly trained in mental health). The few existing mental health facilities had antiquated ECT machines over 20 years old and very limited medication.” [9a] (p2)
- 5.152 SAMHSA also reported, in May/June 2005, that “Iraq’s main psychiatric institution, the hospital offers both inpatient and outpatient services. Its 1,200 beds, including 250 forensic beds in a secure unit, are always full. There are only eight psychiatrists to serve these patients, very few allied health professionals, and barely any medications available.” [9b] (p1)
- 5.153 A BBC article reported, on 12 August 2005, that “Baghdad has another psychological hospital, Ibn Rushed, but newspaper reports say it has only two doctors and 74 beds.” [4e]
- 5.154 The SAMHSA report added that “The intense stigma attached to mental disorders and the lack of rehabilitation and government support make families reluctant to take back patients even once they’ve stabilized. Some of the psychiatrists at the hospital are ashamed to admit where they work.” [9b] (p1)
- 5.155 The BBC added, on 12 August 2005, that staff and patients left Iraq’s largest psychological hospital because there was no food or medicine. Dr Majid al-Yassiri, chairman of the London-based Centre for Psychosocial Services in Iraq, also stated in the article that female patients were also subjected to rape. [4e]
- 5.156 The WHO report, dated 31 July 2005, noted that “In support to the Iraqi MOH Mental Health Programme, 6 mental healthcare units are being constructed, 4 in Najaf, Nasyria, Karkuk and Arbil, which are under implementation and 2 projects in Baghdad are under bidding. In addition, 6 mental healthcare units are being rehabilitated [Baghdad Karkh/Al-yarmok (65%), Baquba (85%), Babel (85%), Basrah (62%), Mousl (100%), Suleimanya (100%) [and 2 more under bidding.]” [23c] (p3)
- 5.157 The BBC article, dated 12 August 2005, added that “A national commission for mental health services has been appointed, and is working with Britain’s Royal College of Psychiatrists. Training programmes are being organised, and small

numbers of future mental health practitioners are being trained in Jordan and the UK.” [4e]

[Return to Contents](#)

HIV/AIDS

- 5.158 An article in IRIN news, dated 20 July 2005, stated that “Iraq today has 72 people registered as living with HIV/AIDS who are under treatment, according to officials. However, the real figure could be higher as many people may not come forward to seek help due to their fear of discrimination. The disease remains a taboo subject in Iraq.” [18aa] (p1)
- 5.159 The IRIN news article, dated 18 March 2004, noted that resources in clinics in Baghdad for those with HIV/AIDS were limited and although WHO had financed some diagnosis kits, medicines such as anti-retrovirals such as AZT, which cost US \$300 per patient per month, had all been looted. Many registered patients no longer attended hospital. The article also mentioned that “WHO and the A[IDS] S[tudy] C[entre] have together put together a plan to bring HIV-positive patients back to the health centre by paying them US \$20 a month on top of the small monthly allowance they currently receive”. [18i]
- 5.160 An article in IRIN news, dated 20 July 2005, reported that “All patients under treatment receive information, psychological treatment and medicine during weekly meetings at the ARC.” [18aa] (p1)
- 5.161 An IRIN article, dated 7 April 2005, reported that “Officials from the AIDS Research Centre (ARC) in the Iraqi capital, Baghdad, have complained of a shortage of medicines for HIV/AIDS patients under treatment in the country. Those living with the virus depend on free treatment, usually offered at the centre, but for more than five months the stock has been empty and has not been replenished.” [18y] (p1)
- 5.162 The same article stated that “The Iraqi government is, however, offering assistance to those living with the disease. The Ministry of Health (MoH) gives a monthly grant of US \$35 to HIV-positive Iraqis, but this, according to medical staff, is not enough even to buy a single tablet for their treatment. The MoH also gives an extra \$200 per person for general expenses approximately three times a year.” [18y] (p1)
- 5.163 According to an article in IRIN news, dated 20 July 2005, “Iraq’s Ministry of Health (MoH), in affiliation with the Ministry of Interior (Mol), is stepping up routine health checks at some international borders and carrying out compulsory HIV/AIDS tests on people entering the country.” [18aa] (p1)
- 5.164 The 2004 update of the joint report by UNAIDS, UNICEF and WHO noted that:
- “The system of reporting and screening of HIV was tightly monitored by the health authorities. HIV screening was performed at border checkpoints for both Iraqis and non-Iraqis entering the country. Gypsies, who are involved in [the] entertainment business, are also considered to be at potential risk and were tested. Other groups who were tested included STD patients, prostitutes (arrested by the authorities), night club workers, blood recipients, prisoners, patients with TB, patients with hepatitis B or C, sex contacts of AIDS patients,

blood donors, pregnant women, health workers and couples before marriage.” [27b] (p2)

- 5.165 The IRIN news article, dated 20 July 2005, noted that “The tests will be carried out on any foreigner or Iraqi entering the country and there are plans to start this procedure at the airport in Baghdad, with flights arriving from and departing for Syria, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Lebanon, Kuwait and Russia.” [18aa] (p1)

[Return to Contents](#)

PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES

- 5.166 The USSD report 2004 observed that “The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs operated several institutions for the education of disabled children and young adults. These institutions offered basic educational services; however, they did not have access to appropriate pedagogical technology due to the absence of training and funding.” [2a] (p13)

- 5.167 The Handicap International Belgium website (accessed on 18 August 2004) stated that it has been present in the Suleymaniya region since 1991, dealing mainly with victims of anti-personnel mines laid during the various recent conflicts. [72a] (p1)

- 5.168 The Handicap International also advised that:

“The Orthopaedic centre in Suleymaniya ‘Vincent Orthopaedic Centre’ was joined in 1998 by a second orthopaedic centre in Halabja. Next, in 2001 and 2002, two delocalised centres (satellite units) were put in place in the towns of Penjwin and Kalar, to make primary care (physiotherapy, minor repairs to appliances) more accessible to villagers in border areas, who are the first to fall victim to accidents caused by mines (farmers, shepherds etc.)” [72a] (p1)

- 5.169 The same article noted that these centres provide support to some 7,500 disabled people. [72a] (p2)

- 5.170 UNHCR in August 2004 noted that “There are currently no facilities available in Iraq for children with special needs or learning disabilities.” [40b] (p11)

[Return to Contents](#)

EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

- 5.171 An IRIN news article, dated 15 February 2005, stated that “As well as security, education in Iraq is one of the sectors most Iraqis want to see more improvements in. [18n] The same article stated that “According to education experts in the country, there has been a decline in the quality of education and support by the government since the conflict in 2003. There has been inadequate repair work on schools and much more is needed as basics such as books and computers are still missing, according to teachers.” [18n]

- 5.172 The UNHCR report, dated August 2004, noted that “Approximately 50% of Iraq’s primary and secondary schools are in a very poor state of disrepair and

are not considered acceptable for children, as they have neither basic water nor latrine facilities". [40b] (p11)

5.173 The UNICEF report, dated 15 October 2004, added that:

"The worst affected governorates are Thiqr, Salaheldin and Diala, where more than 70 per cent of primary school buildings either lack water service altogether or the existing water system is not working. ... In fact, while there are more than 14,000 named primary schools in Iraq, there are only 11,368 actual schools buildings available to house them. Some 2,700 of these need major rehabilitation." [27a]

5.174 As noted in Europa World Online (accessed on 31 August 2005):

"Education is provided free of charge, and primary education, beginning at six years of age and lasting for six years, has been made compulsory in an effort to reduce illiteracy. Enrolment at primary schools of children in the relevant age-group reached 100% in 1978, fell to 76% by 1995, but reportedly rose again, to 93%, in 1999/2000. Secondary education begins at 12 years of age and lasts for up to six years, divided into two cycles of three years each. Enrolment at secondary schools in 1999/2000 was equivalent to 33% of children in the appropriate age-group." [1c] (Education)

5.175 The USSD report 2004, nevertheless, stated that "Attendance in the sixth grade fell to about 50 per cent of first grade levels due, in part, to the pervasiveness of child labor." [2a] (p13) The UNICEF report, dated 15 October 2004, added that "Some 4.3 million children are currently enrolled in primary schools, up from 3.6 million in 2000, the most recent year for which data were available prior to this survey. However, there are not enough desks, chairs, or classrooms." [27a] The UNHCR report, dated August 2004, noted that "The report further noted that schools are very crowded and children are obliged to attend schools in shifts." [40b] (p11)

5.176 An IRIN article, dated 20 May 2005, stated that:

"An estimated 60 per cent of Iraq's population is now illiterate, and at least 25 per cent of primary school-age children do not go to school, according to World Bank statistics. It is estimated that half of children do not go on to secondary school. In rural areas the numbers are even higher. Up to half of girls never attend school, according to the Ministry of Education (MoE)." [18d]

5.177 The EIU country profile 2005 stated that "The latest World Bank figures, contained in its 2004 edition of World Development Indicators, for the average length of schooling in Iraq show a comparatively good performance, reflecting the strong and well-funded tradition of education in Iraq." [58a] (p28)

5.178 An IRIN news article, dated 10 August 2005, noted that "A deteriorating security situation in Iraq has caused parents to fear for students going to school, and also increased teachers' concern for their own safety, according to Abdul Rahman [a senior official in the Ministry of Education]." [18x] (p1) The same article noted that "Meanwhile, Iraqis suffer the ill effects of an education system under severe pressure and with declining standards." [18x] (p1)

- 5.179 An IRIN news article, dated 22 June 2005, noted that “Huge numbers of qualified and experienced education professionals have already left Iraq following the war in 2003 and as a result of previous conflicts. There are no accurate statistics on how many remain but officials say that this, coupled with insecurity, has had a devastating effect on the country’s education system.” [18u]
- 5.180 The UNHCR report, dated August 2004, noted that “While there is no notable lack of teachers in the north and centre, in the south, there is a general shortage of teachers which is mainly attributed to the lack of salaries.” [40b] (p11)
- 5.181 The IRIN report, dated 15 February 2005, noted that “Children’s education in the country has been heavily dependant on support from the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), among other aid organisations, since the last war. Last year UNICEF managed to deliver US \$80 million of aid to children in Iraq – often in extremely dangerous and difficult circumstances.” [18n]
- 5.182 As noted in Europa World Online (accessed on 1 August 2005) “There are 43 technical institutes and colleges, two postgraduate commissions and 20 universities. In the 2002/03 academic year there were an estimated 240,000 undergraduates enrolled in courses of higher education.” [1c] (Education)
- 5.183 An IRIN news article, dated 22 June 2005, stated that “Iraqi universities have been suffering from a lack of experienced professionals. In addition to the exodus, a growing number of teachers have been targeted by insurgents and have been killed or kidnapped.” [18u]

[Return to Contents](#)

6. Human rights

6.A HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES

GENERAL

6.01 As noted in the USSD report 2004, the Interim Government, reversing a long legacy of serious human rights abuses under the previous regime, generally respected human rights, but serious problems remained. [2a] (p1) Several reports observed that serious human rights violations continued to occur in Iraq. [15e] (p1) [28f] (p1) [38b] (p13) [71c] (p50)

6.02 The HRW world report 2005 stated that “The human rights situation in Iraq remained grave in 2004, aggravated by increased armed attacks by insurgents and counterinsurgency attacks by U.S.-led international and Iraqi forces. Both U.S. forces and insurgents have been implicated in serious violations of the laws of armed conflict, including war crimes.” [15e] (p1)

6.03 AI stated in its 2005 annual report that:

“US-led forces in Iraq committed gross human rights violations, including unlawful killings and arbitrary detention, and evidence emerged of torture and ill-treatment. Thousands of Iraqi civilians were killed during armed clashes between US-led forces and Iraqi security forces on the one side, and Iraqi armed groups on the other.

“Armed groups committed gross human rights abuses, including targeting civilians, hostage-taking and killing hostages. Women continued to be harassed and threatened amid the mounting daily violence.” [28f] (p1) This was also noted in the HRW world report 2005 [15e] (p1) and the Dutch country report, December 2004. [71c] (p50-51) **(See also section 6A on Security forces)**

6.04 The UNSC report, dated 7 June 2005, stated that:

“Accounts of human rights violations continue to appear in the press, in private security reports and in reports by local human rights groups. Individual accounts provided to UNAMI and admissions by the authorities concerned provide additional indications about this situation. In many cases, the information about violations has been widely publicized. Effective monitoring of the human rights situation remains a challenge, particularly because the current security situation makes it difficult to obtain evidence and further investigate allegations. In most instances, however, the consistency of accounts points to clear patterns.” [38b] (p13)

6.05 The USSD 2004 report added that:

“There remained unresolved problems relating to the large number of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). Corruption at all levels of the Government remained a problem. Some aspects of the judicial system were dysfunctional, and there were reports that the judiciary was subject to external influence. The exercise of labor rights remained limited, largely due to violence, unemployment, and maladapted organizational structures and laws; however, with international assistance, some progress was underway at year’s end [2004]. [2a] (p2)

6.06 The AI report, March 2004, observed that:

“There have been some welcome positive developments in the country, especially in the field of freedom of expression, association and assembly. Dozens of non-government organizations (NGOs), including organizations focusing on women’s rights, have been established, more than 80 daily and weekly newspapers are published and scores of political parties and religious organizations have emerged.” [28d] (p1)

6.07 The same report noted that “However, the positive developments, along with almost everything else, were constantly threatened by the mounting insecurity.” [28d] (p1)

6.08 A June 2004 report by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) noted that:

“As part of the arrangements introduced by the Iraqi Interim Governing Council, an Iraqi Ministry of Human Rights was established in September 2003. It was given the mandate of addressing past human rights atrocities and safeguarding the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all persons within the territory of Iraq in the future. Specifically the Ministry of Human Rights is to help establish conditions conducive to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Iraq and prevent human rights violations in Iraq; to make formal recommendations for measures to prevent human rights violations; and to assist all people in society in healing from past atrocities; to serve as focal point for relations with international human rights bodies; and to provide advice to law makers.” [40c] (p40)

6.09 The UNSC report, dated 7 June 2005, stated that “At the moment, the authorities cannot ensure the full protection of the population from such acts despite the fact that the Order for Safeguarding National Security remains in force. One of the major human rights challenges remains the detention of thousands of persons without due process.” [38b] (p13-14)

[Return to Contents](#)

HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

6.10 The IMF report, dated August 2005, mentioned that “There has been a marked deterioration in Iraq’s human development indicators over the last twenty years.” [80a] (p5) The joint Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation and UNDP report 2004, added that “In 1990, Iraq was ranked 50th on the United Nations Development Programme’s Human Development Index. Ten years later, it was ranked 126th (Unicef 2003). Most Iraqi children today have lived their whole lives under sanctions and war.” [81a] (p57)

6.11 The USSD report 2004 stated that “Serious security problems significantly slowed reconstruction activities.” [2a] (p1)

6.12 The report added that “The water situation in the south of Iraq is extremely poor, and is described by all as worse than before the Coalition invasion, although the existing system was already badly neglected and in need of repair.” [40b] (p10) Furthermore the report noted that “The supply of electricity in

central Iraq can at best be described as erratic, while in the North it is fairly stable and in the south it is extremely poor.” [40b] (p12)

6.13 The IMF report, dated August 2005, noted that:

“The coverage of public services has improved, but reliability remains a serious problem. According to the UNDP Iraq Living Conditions Survey, 98 per cent of households are connected to the electricity grid, although three-quarters of households report their electricity supply to be extremely unreliable; 78 per cent of homes have access to piped water, and 37 per cent of all homes are connected to the sewage system, but two-thirds of households report poor reliability in the provision of safe water and sewage services.” [80a] (p7)

6.14 The joint Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation and UNDP report 2004 stated that:

“Access to public services like health and education facilities is relatively good in Iraq: more than nine in ten households can reach a primary school, a secondary school, a health centre, and a place of worship within 30 minutes from their dwelling with the usual means of transportation (cars, public transportation, walking and other means). In terms of service provision, large geographical differences are found in which rural areas receive poorer access.” [81a] (p15)

6.15 The same report noted that “However, services are relatively widely available, households report very low satisfaction with the educational and health system, particularly in rural areas.” [81a] (p15)

6.16 The UNSC report, dated 7 March 2005, noted that:

“Despite the continuing fragile security environment, the United Nations was able to continue reconstruction efforts throughout Iraq through implementing partners, which included the following activities: rehabilitation of schools, strengthening vocational education, rehabilitation of water treatment plants, rehabilitation of power plants and upgrading transmission systems, housing projects for selected vulnerable groups in urban centres, supporting the Ministry of Trade’s public distribution system and procurement and delivery of food items, provision of technical assistance to the National Mine Action Authority, protection and material assistance for internally displaced persons and returning refugees, support for civil society through professional organizations and women’s groups and support for the electoral process, including voter education programmes for women.” [38a] (p9)

[Return to Contents](#)

SECURITY SITUATION

6.17 The UNSC report, dated 7 June 2005, stated that “Security risk assessments confirm that the level of threat remains high.” [38b] (p15) The BBC article, dated 8 May 2005, reported that “There has been an upsurge in violence around the country since the formation of the government in late April [2005].” [4ap]

- 6.18 The BBC stated, on 15 May 2005, that “More than 400 people have been killed in militant attacks since Iraq’s democratically elected government was announced at the end of April [2005].” [4aq]
- 6.19 The FCO human rights report 2005 noted that “Security in Iraq continues to be a major challenge. ... Most attacks occur in the four Sunni provinces of Baghdad, Al Anbar, Ninewah and Saladin. Ten of Iraq’s 18 provinces are quieter and more stable but are still not immune to insurgent and terrorist violence.” [66j] (p61)
- 6.20 According to a CNN article, dated 19 July 2005, almost 25,000 civilians have been killed in Iraq since the start of the war (between 20 March 2003 and 19 March 2005). [17e] The same article added that “82 per cent of those killed were adult males, 9 per cent were adult women, 1 in 10 was under age 18.” The article added that “Baghdad was the site of almost half of the deaths and Falluja had the second highest loss of life.” [17e]
- 6.21 The UNSC report, dated 7 June 2005, stated that:
- “High levels of violence generated by the insurgency and the accompanying response by security forces, which are often insufficiently trained, restrained and supervised, continue to result in extensive infringements of human rights in the country. The ongoing conflict has affected many innocent civilians, including women and children. Insurgents carried out assassinations against political figures, civil servants, police and security forces. Indiscriminate bombings caused hundreds of fatalities and many more injuries. Reports of threats and intimidation are frequent, including against United Nations national staff.” [38b] (p13)
- 6.22 The AI report, dated 25 July 2005, noted that “Suicide attacks have been mainly directed at Iraqi police stations. The Iraqi police and the Iraqi National Guard are considered by armed groups as ‘traitors’ or ‘collaborators’ in the hands of the ‘foreign occupiers’.” [28c] (p9)
- 6.23 The BBC also noted in an article, dated 6 May 2005, that “The sophistication and scale of some of the attacks appears to be increasing, including the use of tandem bombings, when one device is timed to go off soon after another as rescuers rush to the scene.” [4w]
- 6.24 The AI report, dated 25 July 2005, stated that:
- “Thousands of Iraqi civilians have been killed and thousands more injured in attacks by armed groups in the past two years. Some died or were wounded in attacks aimed primarily at United States (US) or other troops comprising the US-led military alliance that toppled Saddam Hussain’s regime but others were victims of direct attacks intended to cause the greatest possible civilian loss of life. Many of the killings of civilians were carried out in a perfidious way, with suicide bombers or others disguising themselves as civilians, or were marked by appalling brutality – as in the cases of hostages whose deaths, by being beheaded or other means, were filmed by the perpetrators and then disseminated to a wide public audience.” [28c] (p1)
- 6.25 The UNSC report, dated 7 June 2005, stated that:

“Bombings, strikes against Iraqi and Multinational Force installations and convoys, attacks on aircraft, hostage-takings and targeted assassinations against Iraqi civilians, including public figures, many of increasing scale and sophistication, continue to be centred on Baghdad, Mosul, Ramadi and Tikrit. Iraqi police and recruitment centres have received particular attention, and indiscriminate attacks against civilians continue to cause growing numbers of casualties, with the apparent intent of demonstrating the weakness and inability of the new Government to control the security situation and of exacerbating sectarian tensions.” [38b] (p15)

6.26 The UNSC report, dated 7 June 2005, noted that:

“There are continuing media reports about excessive use of force at checkpoints and during searches by Iraqi forces and by the Multinational Force. Investigations into these abuses have rarely resulted in prosecutions. The inability to investigate and prosecute abuses committed by armed forces and groups and the lack of adequate compensation for those whose rights have been violated increases political disaffection and remains a challenge to promoting a culture of accountability and respect for the rule of law. The proliferation of illegitimate militias and attempts to foment intercommunal tension through targeted killings is cause for serious concern.” [38b] (p13-14)

6.27 The joint British/Danish fact-finding mission report, October 2004, also noted that “Suicide bombing and other attacks occurred on a daily basis. The amount of kidnappings was increasing. ... The main reason for the violence was the wish to destabilize Iraq and pressure the Multi National Force to leave the country.” [30c] (p8)

6.28 *The Guardian* report, dated 25 February 2005, noted that “Police and army bases have improved their security following recent devastating attacks, but the insurgents have varied their tactics and profited from excellent intelligence supplied by infiltrators.” [6n]

6.29 The HRW report, January 2005, noted that “On July 3, 2004, the Iraqi Interim Government passed the Order for Safeguarding National Security (No. 1 of 2004 – Amr al-Difa’ ‘An al-Salama al-Wataniyya), introducing emergency legislation to the statute books and enabling the prime minister to declare martial law for up to sixty days at a time, renewable with the approval of the Presidency Council.” [15g] (p16) The CNN report, dated 20 January 2005, noted that the state of emergency allows the Prime Minister to restrict freedom of movement and impose curfews. [17b]

6.30 Several articles reported that during November 2004 Iraq’s Government, under the National Security Law, declared a 60-day state of emergency in response to the escalation of violence by militants. [2a] (p9) [4v] [6e] [38c] (p1-2) [52a] The UNSC report, dated 8 December 2004, noted that the state of emergency was declared in all parts of Iraq, except the three northern governorates. Specific measures were announced for Fallujah and Ramadi. [38c] (p1-2) The report added that “Since then, curfews have been imposed on other cities, including Baghdad, Bayji, Mosul, Najaf, Ba’qubah and Samarra.” [38c] (p1-2) The UNSC report, dated 7 June 2005, noted that “In response to the security situation, the Transitional Government of 13 May [2005] extended the Order for the Safeguarding National Security in all parts of Iraq, except the three northern governorates [Arbil, Dahuk and Sulaymanyah], for 30 days. The Order was first

introduced by the Iraqi Government on 7 November 2004 and has subsequently been extended every month.” [38b] (p3)

- 6.31 The HRW world report 2005 added that the Order for Safeguarding National Security (Number 1 of 2004), introduced emergency legislation to the statute books and enabled the prime minister to declare martial law for up to sixty days (renewable with the approval of the Presidency Council). [15e] (p2) The same report noted that “The Order provides for the imposition of curfews; the closure of roads, sea lanes, and airspace; restrictions or bans on public gatherings; surveillance of electronic and other communications; and wide powers to search property and to detain suspects.” [15e] (p2)

[Return to Contents](#)

SECURITY IN THE KRG AREA

- 6.32 The effectiveness of internal security varies greatly between the Kurdish Regional Government administered areas and elsewhere. The Lebanese newspaper, *The Daily Star*, stated, on 27 April 2004, that “Furthermore, law and order exists [in the Kurdish Regional Government administered area]. Kurdish police and security forces are efficient and the security situation in the self-ruled Kurdish region is a far cry from that in the rest of Iraq. Exemplary relations between coalition troops and the population further enhance stability, including political stability.” [57a]

- 6.33 The UNHCR in its Return Advisory paper, dated September 2004, noted that:

“In the North, although the overall conditions seem to be better than in the rest of the country, the situation remains tense due to a number of factors. These include the political agenda of and relations between the two main Kurdish parties (PUK and KDP) as well as that of the Kurdish Regional Government authorities (KRG) with the IIG [Iraqi Interim Government], the on-going debate linked to the modalities of the constitutional process, as well as the establishment of a representative government, and the degree of autonomy for the Kurdish populated areas.” [40a] (p3)

- 6.34 In July 2004, the CSIS report noted that within the Kurdish area, “The major security concern is infiltration by Arab extremist groups intent on destabilizing an area known for its secularism and its close relations with the United States.” [63a] (p16)

- 6.35 The FCO, in a letter dated 12 April 2005, stated that:

“Ansar al Islam (AI), a fundamentalist terrorist group, was forced out of the region prior to the commencement of fighting in March 2003 and has not been able to regain a strong foothold, although elements are present in other parts of Iraq now. They have made efforts to return to Iraqi Kurdistan, and may have been responsible for the attack on the KDP and PUK headquarters in Irbil in February 2004.” [65h]

- 6.36 *The Guardian* reported, on 4 May 2005, that “The Iraqi militant group Army of Ansar al-Sunna has claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing that killed up to 60 people and wounded around 100 others today. The bomber struck outside a police recruitment centre in the Kurdish city of Irbil, northern Iraq, as a large

crowd gathered outside the building, which also serves as the local offices of the Kurdistan Democratic party, police and security officials said.” [2c]

6.37 The FCO, in a letter dated 12 April 2005, stated that:

“But, although it is quite likely that insurgents are once again living in Kurdish towns and cities in small numbers, and they would use opportunities as they present themselves to exact revenge for their ejection, the peshmerga presence and vigilance within Iraqi Kurdistan would make this difficult. Successful attacks are rare, due to the vigilance of the Kurdish security forces, but not unknown, as further illustrated by attacks in January [2005] in Irbil (indirect fire), and Dahuk (IEDs) [Improvised Explosive Devices].” [65h]

6.38 The same FCO letter noted that:

“The impact of the insurgency in Iraqi Kurdistan, as mentioned above, is not high, although this is primarily as a result of the extreme security measures in place and the effectiveness of both the peshmerga and the Kurdish security services. The green line is quite tightly controlled, and the road between Irbil and Mosul now has Kurdish checkpoints as close to Mosul as 15km. The road from Mosul to Zakho and the Turkish border is also heavily manned by Kurdish security forces, with regular checkpoints.” [65h]

6.39 The FCO letter stated that:

“Criminality in Kurdistan is endemic by western terms. However, much of the activity is considered by the population to be simply a way of earning their crust. Additionally the defined perception that the West has of the areas (e.g. borders with Turkey, Iraq and Syria) is not shared by tribes straddling the designated border areas. The smuggling of sheep, alcohol and other commodities is commonplace. These crimes are largely unchecked and un-checkable by authorities. Returnees going about their legal business would not be at threat from these activities. Although prevalent in Kurd society, blood feud is historical and cultural and would not present a particular immediate threat.” [65h]

6.40 The FCO further stated in a letter, dated 10 October 2005, that “Hawler International Airport in Erbil is now open to commercial traffic and Iraqi Airways and Kurdistan Airlines are operating flights to a number of regional destinations including Amman, Kuwait, Dubai, and most recently the German city of Frankfurt.” [6m] (p3)

6.41 The FCO letter, dated 12 April 2005, noted that:

“Reports are that the peshmerga act as security for the airport, and are responsible for the outer perimeter cordon together with a wider cordon going out 45kms along the flight path. Internal airport security is the responsibility of a professional civilian security company. There have been no reports of any attacks on civil aircraft using Irbil airport.” [65h]

6.42 The FCO letter, dated 10 October 2005, stated that “We also understand that Sulaymaniyah airport is now open to commercial traffic.” [6m] (p3)

[Return to Contents](#)

SECURITY FORCES

CIVILIAN CASUALTIES AND DEATHS

- 6.43 The AI report, dated 25 July 2005, noted that “US forces have used excessive force, resulting in civilian casualties.” [28c] (p3)
- 6.44 The AI annual report 2005 noted that “Hundreds of Iraqi civilians were killed by US-led forces when they launched major attacks against insurgents in Falluja, Baghdad, Mosul, Samarra and other cities and towns. ... In February UK [2004] officials said that UK forces had been involved in the killing of 37 civilians since 1 May 2003, and acknowledged that the figure was not comprehensive.” [28f] (p3)
- 6.45 The UNSC report, dated 7 June 2005, noted that “The Multinational Force and Iraqi security forces have significantly stepped up their anti-insurgent campaigns in and around Baghdad as well as in Western Iraq. There have been reports of high casualty rates and alleged violations of civil liberties and human rights by all sides.” [38b] (p3)
- 6.46 The AI report 2005 stated that “There was intense fighting between the US-led forces and Iraqi armed groups opposed to their presence. Attacks by Iraqi insurgents on Iraqi police stations, US and UK troops and other targets, including civilian targets, steadily mounted. Thousands of Iraqis as well as US soldiers and other nationals died as a result.” [28f] (p1-2)

[Return to Contents](#)

TORTURE AND ILL-TREATMENT

- 6.47 The AI annual report 2005 added that:
- “Torture and ill-treatment by US-led forces were widely reported. An ICRC report leaked in February identified several methods of torture and ill-treatment during arrest, internment and interrogation, including: hooding for up to four days; handcuffing that caused skin lesions and nerve damage; beatings with hard objects; threats of execution; solitary confinement; acts of humiliation with detainees being paraded naked; exposure while hooded to loud noise or music; and being forced to remain for long periods in painful ‘stress’ positions.” [28f] (p3) (See also section 5 on Legal rights/detention)
- 6.48 The AI report, dated 25 July 2005, stated that “US forces have committed gross violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. They have not taken necessary precautions to minimize risk to civilians. They have used cluster weapons in bombing residential areas, which have resulted in the deaths of many civilians. They have used excessive force in responding to demonstrations, tortured and ill-treated detainees and made them ‘disappear’.” [28c] (p3)
- 6.49 The USSD report 2004 stated that “According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), during this reporting period, torture and ill treatment of detainees by police was commonplace.” [2a] (p3) The BBC reported on 27 July 2005 that “Iraq’s new police force is facing mounting allegations of systematic abuse and torture of

people in detention, as well as allegations of extra-judicial killings. The minority Sunni community in particular claims it is being targeted by the Shia-dominated police force.” [4ah]

- 6.50 The *Washington Post* stated, on 20 August 2005, that “In the streets of Basra, a dreary, dun-hued port of 1.5 million people on the banks of the Shatt al Arab, the local police force of 13,600 has become as much an instrument of fear as security.” [16f] (p2)

[Return to Contents](#)

THE SECURITY FORCES AS TARGETS

- 6.51 The Christian Science Monitor report, dated 17 September 2004, stated that police are often a target for insurgents. [34c] (p2) The UNSC report, dated 7 June 2005, stated that “In an apparent challenge to the formation of the elected Government, attacks on Iraq’s police and security forces were particularly frequent.” [38b] (p3)

- 6.52 An article in *The Times*, dated 4 January 2005, stated that “More than 1,000 police and National Guardsmen have been killed since the security forces were established after the war in relentless attacks aimed at plunging the country into chaos.” [5c]

- 6.53 The HRW report, January 2005, stated that “In just the last four months of 2004, approximately 1,300 Iraqi police and scores other Iraqi security forces have died at the hands of insurgents.” [15g] (p1) The same report added that:

“Human Rights Watch recognizes the enormous difficulties inherent in reconstituting a police force in Iraq today, where prevailing security conditions affect all aspects of life and new police recruits are among the prime targets of attack. Those involved in law enforcement additionally have to contend with the legacy of the Saddam Hussein government, whose human rights record stood out as being among the worst anywhere.” [15g] (p3)

- 6.54 The UNSC report, dated 7 June 2005, noted that “A major attack against local security forces in Erbil and incidents in other parts of Iraq demonstrate a sustained ability of hostile elements to select and coordinate attack targets throughout the country.” [38b] (p15)

[Return to Contents](#)

MILITIA/INSURGENTS

- 6.55 AI reported, on 25 July 2005, that “Since mid-2003 a myriad of armed political groups opposed to the occupation of Iraq, and later to the continued presence of the MNF and the interim Iraqi government, have emerged in the country.” [28f] (p4)

- 6.56 The same report noted that:

“Relatively little is known about the precise make up of and relationships between the armed groups currently committing abuses in Iraq. For the most part, they operate in the so-called ‘Sunni triangle’ in central (including

Baghdad), western and north-western Iraq, the area from which Saddam Hussain formerly derived much of his support, but armed groups have also carried out attacks in the Kurdish and other areas of northern Iraq, and in Basra and other parts of the south. They appear to be composed largely of Iraqis, including particularly former soldiers and Ba'athists who previously supported Saddam Hussain but also others who seem motivated to fight because they oppose the continued presence of foreign forces. As well, they include Muslim militants from other countries in the Middle East and beyond who were drawn to Iraq seemingly by their opposition to the US and its policies generally as well as to its military presence in Iraq, with the Jordanian-born militant Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi the most notorious of these." [28c] (p1)

- 6.57 The Dutch country report, December 2004, observed that "Prominent militias include: the Mahdi Army of Muqtada al-Sadr (mainly active in central Iraq, including Baghdad, and southern Iraq), the terrorist movement of al-Zarqawi (mainly active in Baghdad, central and northern Iraq), Ansar al-Sunna (mainly active in central and northern Iraq), and Ansar al-Islam (mainly active in the north)." [71c] (p20)
- 6.58 The CFR report, dated 9 June 2005, noted that "There are a growing number of small, homegrown, paramilitary-style brigades being formed by local tribes, religious leaders, and political parties. Some battle Iraq's largely Sunni insurgency alongside official Interior and Defense ministry troops; others operate without official assistance or sanction." [8a] (p1)
- 6.59 The AI report, dated 25 July 2005, noted that "The armed groups do not seem to be a united movement directed by a single leadership with one ideology. Most members of armed groups in Iraq reportedly do not know the identity of their leaders or the sources of their financing. They do, however, appear to share a common goal – the departure of the MNF from Iraq and the downfall of the interim government." [28g] (p4)
- 6.60 The IWPR stated, on 26 January 2005, that "Though it has moved beyond its Baathist roots, most agree that ex-party loyalists remain a driving force within the insurgency." [11u] (p3) The same report noted that "They have vast wealth at their disposal, having raided the banks before the Americans arrived, and a large supply of weapons and other resources, many of which enter Iraq through the country's long and porous borders. With just 150,000 US troops on the ground, the likes of Zarqawi and other al-Qaeda operatives have little trouble entering Iraq and moving around at will." [11u] (p3)
- 6.61 The AI report, dated 25 July 2005, stated that "In April 2005, former Iraqi Human Rights Minister Bakhtiar Amin estimated that some 6,000 Iraqi civilians had died and at least 16,000 had been wounded in direct or indiscriminate attacks by armed groups since the US-led military intervention in March 2003." [28f] (p1) The same report added that "As well, armed groups in Iraq have been responsible for other grave abuses, including abductions and hostage-taking of Iraqi and foreign nationals, torture and ill-treatment, killing of hostages and of captured Iraqi army and police personnel." [28f] (p1)
- 6.62 *The Guardian*, added on 24 February 2005, that "Insurgents have relentlessly attacked US and Iraqi security forces with car bombs throughout the past year [2004] in a campaign of violence that has also included kidnappings, beheadings and the assassination of leading officials." [61]

- 6.63 The UNSC report, dated 7 June 2005, noted that “Insurgents carried out assassinations against political figures, civil servants, police and security forces. Indiscriminate bombings caused hundreds of fatalities and many more injuries.” [38b] (p13)
- 6.64 The AI annual report 2005 stated that:
- “Armed groups opposed to the presence of US-led forces in Iraq were responsible for gross human rights abuses which caused thousands of civilian casualties. These groups, thought to be a mixture of former Ba’ath supporters, former members of the various security services, Sunni radical Islamist groups and foreign fighters, were behind numerous attacks targeting civilians as well as indiscriminate attacks. Most of their attacks, including suicide bombings and explosions, targeted Iraqi security forces and police stations, members of the US-led forces, members of the government and Iraqis working for or cooperating with the Iraqi interim government and the US-led forces. Some attacks on government targets such as police stations left scores of civilians dead.” [28f] (p4)
- 6.65 An article in the *Washington Post*, dated 20 August 2005, noted that “The parties and their armed wings are sometimes operating independently, and other times as part of Iraqi army and police units trained and equipped by the United States and Britain and controlled by the central government. Their growing authority has enabled them to seize territory, confront their perceived enemies and provide patronage to their followers. Their rise has come because of a power vacuum in Baghdad and their own success in the January elections.” [16f] (p1)
- 6.66 The *Washington Post* stated in an article, dated 20 August 2005, that “Shiite and Kurdish militias, often operating as part of Iraqi government security forces, have carried out a wave of abductions, assassinations and other acts of intimidation, consolidating their control over territory across northern and southern Iraq and deepening the country’s divide along ethnic and sectarian lines, according to political leaders, families of the victims, human rights activists and Iraqi officials.” [16f] (p1)
- 6.67 The article also mentioned that “In both northern and southern Iraq, the parties and their militias defend their tactics as a way of ensuring security in an increasingly lawless atmosphere.” [16f] (p2)
- 6.68 As documented in the CSIS report (last updated on 19 May 2005) US officials estimated a range of 12,000 to 16,000 insurgents operating in Iraq in October 2004. [63c] (p37) However, an article in *The Times*, dated 4 January 2005, reported that “Iraq’s rapidly swelling insurgency numbers 200,000 fighters and active supporters and outnumbers the United States-led coalition forces, the head of the country’s intelligence service said yesterday.” [5c] The same article noted that “General Shahwani said that there were at least 40,000 hardcore fighters attacking US and Iraqi troops, with the bulk made up of part-time guerrillas and volunteers providing logistical support, information, shelter and money.” [5c] The CSIS report (last updated on 19 May 2005) observed that “There is no evidence that number of insurgents is declining as a result of Coalition and Iraqi attacks to date.” [63c] (p37-38)

- 6.69 *The Times* article, dated 4 January 2005, noted that “General Shahwani said that there were at least 40,000 hardcore fighters attacking US and Iraqi troops, with the bulk made up of part-time guerrillas and volunteers providing logistical support, information, shelter and money.” [5c]
- 6.70 The Dutch report, December 2004, added that “The Iraqi interim government has reached an agreement with nine political parties on the dissolution of their militias (including the Kurdish peshmergas and the Badr organisation).” [71c] (p21) The *Duluth News Tribune* article, dated 26 February 2005, explained that “Officially, the Iran-backed Badr militia is the Badr Organization, a political party whose leaders say it’s disarmed. In reality, Badr fighters were so emboldened by their sect’s victory at the polls that they’re again roaming southern Shiite territories with weapons displayed, according to witnesses and Iraqi authorities.” [60a]

[Return to Contents](#)

SUNNI ARAB INSURGENTS

- 6.71 The BBC stated, on 1 August 2005, that “Many of the insurgents waging a campaign throughout Iraq are Sunni militants who have regularly attacked Shia and Kurdish targets.” [4aa]
- 6.72 The CSIS report (last updated on 19 May 2005) indicated that:
- “The insurgency seems to remain largely Iraqi and Sunni dominated. Some 35 Sunni Arab ‘groups’ have made some kind of public announcement of their existence, or claimed responsibility for terrorist or insurgent attacks – although many may be little more than cells and some may be efforts to shift the blame for attacks or make the insurgent movement seem larger than it is. Some may be little more than tribal or clan groupings, since many elements of the Sunni insurgency have strong tribal affiliations or cells.” [63c] (p35)
- 6.73 The same report noted that:
- “The Sunni insurgents are divided into a complex mix of Sunni nationalists, pro-Ba’ath/ex-regime, Sunni Iraqi Islamist, outside Islamic extremists, foreign volunteers with no clear alignment, and paid or politically motivated criminals. Some are organized so that their cadres are in relatively small cells, some as small as 2-3 men. These cells can recruit or call in larger teams, but the loss of even a significant number of such cells may not cripple a given group, and several Sunni groups operate in most areas. Others seem to operate as much larger, but normally dispersed groups, capable of coming together for operations of as many as 30-50 men.” [63c] (p35-36)
- 6.74 The CSIS report (last updated on 19 May 2005) added that:
- “The main Sunni insurgent groups are concentrated in cities like Mosul and Baghdad; in Sunni-populated areas like the ‘Sunni Triangle,’ the Al Anbar Province to the west of Baghdad, and the so-called ‘Triangle of Death’ to the southeast of Baghdad; and in Sunni areas near the Iraqi and Turkish borders. As a result, four of Iraq’s provinces have both a major insurgency threat and a major insurgent presence. Sunni insurgents have also repeatedly shown since the battle of Fallujah that they can strike in ethnically mixed and Shi’ite-

dominated cities like Baghdad, Mosul and Basra. They have also operated in Kurdish areas. No province is safe from occasional attack, and attacks are only part of the story.” [63c] (p35)

6.75 The FCO stated, on 22 October 2004, that “Besides a campaign of kidnapping of both foreign military and ‘soft target’ civilian contractors and the Iraqi police, the insurgents are also targetting (sic) senior officials, assassinating the Mosul Governor on 15 July [2004]; wounding the Minister of Justice, and killing 4 bodyguards on 17 July [2004]. Steps are being taken to strengthen protection of IIG Ministers.” [66c] (p2)

6.76 According to an article in Jane’s Intelligence Review, February 2005, “Though capable of destabilising and intimidating large tracts of central Iraq, the multi-faceted Sunni resistance does not currently boast the strong public support necessary to succeed as an insurgent movement (that is, to gain local or national power).” [14a] (p30)

6.77 The AI report, dated 25 July 2005, stated that:

“Armed groups fighting against the MNF and Iraqi government forces in Iraq do not have recognized political wings or official spokespersons inside or outside the country. However, some Sunni religious entities and personalities appear to exercise influence over some of the groups. Such entities and personalities generally consider that Iraq is still under occupation by the MNF and that fighting against these forces and targeting them for killing is legitimate. Some of them also consider targeting ‘collaborators’, Iraqis and non-Iraqis, as legitimate.” [28c] (p5)

6.78 The CSIS report (last updated on 19 May 2005) stated that:

“The Sunni elements of the insurgency involve a wide range of disparate Iraqi and foreign groups, and of mixes of secular and Islamic extremist factions. There are elements tied to former Ba’athist officials, and to Iraqi and Sunni nationalists. The (sic) are elements composed of native Iraqi Sunni Islamists, groups with outside leadership and links to Al Qa’ida, and foreign volunteers with little real structure – some of which seem to be seeking Islamic martyrdom rather than clearly defined political goals.

“Tribal and clan elements play a strong role at the local level, creating additional patterns of loyalty that cut across ideology or political goals. The stated objectives of various groups range from a return of some form of Ba’athist like regime to the creation of an extremist Sunni Islamic state, with many Iraqi Sunnis acting as much out of anger and fear as any clearly articulated goals.” [63c] (p25)

6.79 The same report noted that:

“These groups often cooperate, although there are indications of divisions between the more-Ba’ath oriented Iraqi Sunni groups and some of the Sunni Islamic extremist groups with outside ties or direction. At least some such Sunni groups are willing to consider negotiating with the new government, while Islamist extremist groups are not. This had led to threats and some violence between various Sunni factions. While not common, there have been growing

reports of Iraqi Sunni executions of foreign Sunni Islamic extremists since November 2004.” [63c] (p25) **(See also Annex C on Current militia)**

[Return to Contents](#)

SHI'A MILITIA

- 6.80 As noted in the CFR report, dated 9 June 2005, Shi'ite militia included the Badr Organisation, the Mahdi Army and the Defenders of Khadammiya. [8a] (p1) **(See also Annex C on Current militia)**
- 6.81 An article by Knight Ridder Newspapers, dated 8 June 2005, stated that the Badr Organisation was accused of conducting a terror campaign against Iraq's Sunni Muslim population. [13b] (p1) The same article reported that the Badr Organisation was involved in a series of attacks against Sunni clerics, including cases where victims were tortured with electric drills. [13b] (p1)
- 6.82 The CNN article, dated 8 June 2005, added that “The Badr Organization has been accused by some prominent Sunni figures as being complicit in a recent spate of killings of Sunni clerics and have charged the Shia-dominated government with giving the organization too much power.” [17a]
- 6.83 The same article noted that the Iraqi government officials publicly praised the organisation for its contribution in maintaining Iraqi security. [17a] According to the Knight Ridder Newspapers article, dated 8 June 2005, Hadi al-Ameri, Badr's commander, stated that the organisation had given up its weapons. [13b] (p1)
- 6.84 The GlobalSecurity.Org report (last modified 6 July 2005) noted that:
“In early April 2004, the militia of Muqtada Al Sadr's army – Jaysh Mahdi or Mahdi Army – attempted to interfere with security in Baghdad, intimidate Iraqi citizens and place them in danger. The militia attempted to occupy and gain control of police stations and government buildings. During this attack, this illegal militia engaged coalition forces and ISF with small arms fire and RPGs. Coalition forces and Iraqi security forces prevented this effort and reestablished security in Baghdad. Coalition troops fought gun battles with members of Muqtada al-Sadr's Imam Al-Mahdi Army militia in the southern cities of Al-Nassiriyah, Amara, and Kut.” [73a] (p3)
- 6.85 The Wikipedia report (accessed on 31 August 2005) noted that armed confrontation against the U.S-led occupation forces in Iraq lasted until 6 June 2005. [7c] (p1) The same report added that:
“The truce agreed to in June was followed by moves to disband the militia and transform al-Sadr's movement into a political party to take part in the 2005 elections; Muqtada al Sadr ordered fighters of the Mahdi army to go into a ceasefire unless attacked first. The truce broke down in August 2004, with new hostilities breaking out, but has remained largely peaceful since.” [7c] (p1)
- 6.86 A Knight Ridder article, dated 25 February 2005, noted that “Officially, the Iran-backed Badr militia is now the Badr Organization, a political party whose leaders say it's disarmed. In reality, Badr fighters were so emboldened by their sect's victory at the polls that they're again roaming southern Shiite territories with weapons displayed, according to witnesses and Iraqi authorities.” [13a]

- 6.87 However, the CSIS report (last updated on 19 May 2005) explained that:
- “His [Moqtada al-Sadr] Mehdi (Mahdi) Army did, however, present a serious threat to Coalition and government forces in Najaf, in Sadr City in Baghdad, and in other Shi'ite areas in the south during much of the summer and early fall of 2004. US officials indicated that US forces faced up to 160 attacks per week in Sadr City between August and September 2004 of varying severity.” [63c] (p48)
- 6.88 The AI report, dated 25 July 2005, noted that “Amnesty International has no evidence, for example, that the Mahdi Army, which comprises followers of Muqtada al-Sadr, killed or targeted civilians when fighting against the US-led Multinational Force before August 2004, and so the activities of this group are not covered in this report.” [28c] (p19)
- 6.89 Articles in *The Guardian* and *Washington Post*, both dated 26 August 2005, reported that fighting broke out between the Mahdi Army and the Badr Organisation in the southern city of Najaf and four other towns in the south at the end of August 2005. [6c] (p2) [16c] (p1) The same *Guardian* article added that “They exchanged rocket and machine-gun fire and burned each other’s offices, leaving at least six dead and dozens injured. Violence eased when Mr Sadr called a press conference in Najaf and pleaded for calm, urging his followers to spare the blood of other Muslims.” [6c] (p2)
- 6.90 The Wikipedia report (accessed on 31 August 2005) mentioned that “Loyalists to al-Sadr ran under the National Independent Cadres and Elites banner in the 2005 Iraqi election. Though a number of the movement’s supporters felt that the election was invalid. The party finished sixth overall in the election and will be represented in the transitional legislature. Another twenty or so candidates aligned with al-Sadr ran for the United Iraqi Alliance.” [7c] (p4)
- 6.91 The CSIS report (last updated on 19 May 2005) noted that “Although Iraqi government forces have been able to move in to the area, Sadr’s movement still controls Sadr City in Baghdad as much as the government does, and remains active in poorer Shi'ite areas throughout the country.” [63c] (p48)
- 6.92 The CSIS report (last updated on 19 May 2005) noted that the faction of Abdul Aziz al-Hakim also still have a large militia element. Al Dawa and the Iraqi Hezbollah also remain potential security problems. [63c] (p49) **(See also Annex C on Current militia)**

[Return to Contents](#)

KURDISH MILITIA

- 6.93 The CSIS report (last updated on 19 May 2005) explained that “The two major Kurdish parties, the Barzani and Talibani factions, retain powerful militias. The Kurds represent a faction that is now considerably more powerful relative to other Iraqi factions in military and security terms than their 15% of the population.” [63c] (p50)
- 6.94 The Christian Science Monitor mentioned, on 2 March 2005, that “The two parties have agreed to unify the Kurdish region under a single government, but

each maintains its own band of armed pesh merga with separate command structures.” [34b] (p1)

- 6.95 According to a report by RFE/RL, dated 9 June 2005, the Kurdish peshmerga militia has estimated 100,000 members. [22f] An article in *The New York Times*, dated 23 February 2005, noted that “The pesh merga, with recruits from two Kurdish parties, total about 100,000 soldiers. A source of ethnic pride, they fought tenaciously against Saddam Hussein and are now relied upon by American commanders to battle the Arab-led insurgency in the north. Perhaps most important in the current power vacuum, they provide Kurdish leaders with armed backing in their demands for broad autonomy.” [24a]
- 6.96 *The New York Times* stated in an article, dated 23 February 2005, that “The pesh merga are everywhere in Iraqi Kurdistan – along the highways, atop government buildings, riding in convoys. They wear a hodgepodge of uniforms, from traditional baggy outfits to desert camouflage hand-me-downs from the United States Army. There is one thing that appears to be consistent, though: they think of themselves as Kurds first and Iraqis second.” [24a]
- 6.97 The EUI report 2005 stated that “The larger Kurdish forces, the peshmerga, have occasionally been deployed out of their locality, but are generally confined to the Kurdish self-rule government area.” [58b] (p20)
- 6.98 *The Washington Post* article, dated 20 August 2005, noted that:

“Across northern Iraq, Kurdish parties have employed a previously undisclosed network of at least five detention facilities to incarcerate hundreds of Sunni Arabs, Turkmens and other minorities abducted and secretly transferred from Mosul, Iraq’s third-largest city, and from territories stretching to the Iranian border, according to political leaders and detainees’ families. Nominally under the authority of the U.S.-backed Iraqi army, the militias have beaten up and threatened government officials and political leaders deemed to be working against Kurdish interests; one bloodied official was paraded through a town in a pickup truck, witnesses said.” [16f] (p1) **(See also Annex C on Current militia)**

[Return to Contents](#)

FOREIGN INSURGENTS

- 6.99 The CSIS report (last updated on 19 May 2005) stated that:
- “Other key insurgent elements include Arab and Islamist groups with significant numbers of foreign volunteers, as well as Iraqi Islamist extremists, like the one led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. It is unlikely that such groups make up more 10% of the insurgent force, and may make up around 5%, but in some ways they are the most dangerous element in the insurgency since they seem to be deliberately trying to provoke a civil war between Iraq’s Arab Sunnis and its Arab Shi’ites, Kurds, and other minorities.” [63c] (p40)
- 6.100 The AI report, dated 25 July 2005, mentioned that:
- “In effect, for many Arabs and Muslims around the world, the occupation of Iraq has provided an opportunity to volunteer to go to Iraq to fight against the ‘infidels’. Much as the US and its allies declared a global ‘war on terror’, so

Islamist groups such as al-Qa'ida declared a global war on the US and its allies. These groups see Iraq as a fertile ground for Jihad (holy war) and a key opportunity to settle scores with the US. Hundreds of Islamists from different countries are said to have gone to Iraq to fight against US forces." [28c] (p4) **(See also Annex C on Current militia)**

[Return to Contents](#)

OTHER MILITIA

6.101 The AI report, June 2004, documented that a number of political and religious opposition groups with armed wings have moved back to Iraq. Amnesty stated that in different parts of Iraq, they have put pressure on women and girls to wear the hijab or the strict Islamic dress, and that other people have been targeted by these groups, including members of religious minorities such as Christians and Sabean/Mandeans, alcohol sellers, well-known secularists, Ba'athists, former civil servants and former members of the old security services. [28a] (p8)

6.102 The same report stated that:

"Basra, for example, has seen the emergence of numerous armed groups, some related to Shi'a Islamist political groups such as the Badr Organization, but many are new such as Tha'r Allah (God's Revenge), Harakat 15 Sha'ban, al-Talee'a (The Vanguard) and Jama'at al-Fudhala (Group of Virtue). These groups have occupied former government buildings which had been looted during the war and use them now as their headquarters. They are feared by many people in Basra because they have been responsible for gross human rights abuses, including killing a large number of former Ba'ath party members or supporters, former security men and alcohol sellers." [28a] (p8)

6.103 The AI report added that "The occupation of Iraq also led to the emergence of armed groups who vowed to end the occupation using all available violent means including suicide attacks. These groups, said to be a mixture of former Ba'ath supporters, former members of the various security services, Sunni radical Islamist groups and foreign fighters, have targeted Coalition Forces, members of the IGC, Iraqis cooperating with or working for the CPA and Coalition Forces, as well as international aid workers and journalists." [28a] (p18) The report added that "These groups have also resorted to hostage-taking and killing of hostages to put pressure on countries that have troops in Iraq to withdraw them." [28a] (p9) **(See also Annex C on Current militia)**

[Return to Contents](#)

FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE MEDIA

6.104 Article 13 of the TAL provides for freedom of expression. [51a] The USSD report 2004, noted that "The TAL protects the freedoms of speech and the press, and the Government generally respected these rights in practice." [2a] (p8) The UNHCR report, August 2004, stated that "Freedom of expression of the media in Iraq has been notably better since the fall of the previous regime." [40b] (p7) However, the UNHCR report, June 2004, explained that restrictive regulations in force under Saddam Hussein are still in force. [40c] (p29-30)

- 6.105 Moreover, the Freedom House 2005 report on Freedom of the Press noted that “In late March [2004], the CPA established the Iraq Communications and Media Commission (later called the National Communications and Media Commission, or NCMC), an independent nonprofit administrative institution with authority to license and regulate media, broadcasting, and telecommunications services.” [70a] (p106)
- 6.106 The same report mentioned that “In August [2004], interim prime minister Iyad Allawi announced the creation of a new Higher Media Commission (HMC) with responsibility for regulating print and broadcast media and imposing sanctions against violators. [70a] (p106)

[Return to Contents](#)

NEWSPAPERS, RADIO AND TELEVISION

- 6.107 The 2005 Freedom House report on Freedom of the Press stated that “Iraq currently has more than 120 daily and weekly publications, and dozens of new private television and radio channels emerged throughout the country. Although most are affiliated with particular religious or political groups, the first privately owned nonpartisan television station, Al-Sharqiya, was launched in March 2004.” [70a] (p107)
- 6.108 The same report noted that “Foreign satellite television, previously banned in all of Iraq under Saddam Hussein (except in the northern Kurdish regions since 1991), became increasingly available during 2004. While the independent press has grown tremendously, economic conditions have hindered the ability of independent publications to sustain themselves.” [70a] (p107)
- 6.109 Several reports stated that, on 7 August 2004, the interim government banned the Qatar-based Al-Jazeera television station from transmitting in the country for one month. The interim government accused the station of inciting violence and hatred. [2a] (p8) [71c] (p33) [20c] (p3) The Dutch country report, December 2004, added that the ban was extended in September [2004] for an unspecified period of time and the office of Al-Jazeera in Baghdad was closed. [71c] (p33) This was also mentioned in the Reporters sans Frontières (RSF) annual report 2005. [20c] (p3) However, according to the USSD report 2004 and the Freedom House 2005 report on Freedom of the Press, the station continued to function in the country by using free lance journalists. [2a] (p8) [70a] (p107)
- 6.110 The RSF annual report, dated 3 May 2005, stated that “Defence minister Hazem Shaalan called *Al-Jazeera* ‘clearly a terrorist TV station’ in an article the same month in the daily *Asharq al-Awsat*, accusing its Baghdad office of operating illegally since it was closed three months earlier.” [20c] (p3)
- 6.111 Furthermore, the Freedom House report on Freedom of the Press 2005, noted that “In March [2004], the CPA suspended *Al-Hawza*, the newspaper of Shiite cleric Muqtada Al-Sadr, for allegedly falsely blaming the U.S. military for the deaths of Iraqi police recruits in a February attack.” [70a] (p107) A BBC article, dated 27 August 2004, observed that “The ban was lifted in mid-July [2004] by the interim Iraqi government, citing the move as proof of its belief in a free press, but the newspaper said it had been preparing to resume publishing anyway.” [4f] (p1)

OTHER FORMS OF MEDIA

6.112 As documented in the USSD report 2004, “There were no restrictions on content or access to books, periodicals, mass media of any sort, satellite dishes, computers, modems, faxes, and Internet services. The authorities formally respected academic freedom.” [2a] (p8) The Freedom House 2005 report on Freedom of the Press added that “Access to the Internet grew during the year, with many Internet cafes opening up in Iraqi cities.” [70a] (p107)

JOURNALISTS

6.113 The Freedom House 2005 report on Freedom of the Press stated that “The ongoing instability and violence remain the biggest threats to press freedom, with Iraqi insurgent groups targeting attacks against media.” [70a] (p106)

6.114 As noted in the RSF annual report, dated 3 May 2005:

“For the second year running, Iraq was the world’s most dangerous country for journalists. The figures were chilling. 31 journalists and media assistants were killed, more than a dozen kidnapped, nearly 80 arrested and several media targeted by violence, making 2004 even more deadly than 2003, when 12 journalists and media assistants were killed.” [20c] (p1)

6.115 The same report stated that “Most of the journalists and media assistants killed in Iraq in 2004 were Iraqis (81%). ... Terrorist and guerrilla attacks accounted for the increase in journalists killed and were the major cause of death (65%). ... US troops were the next biggest cause of death (19%) for media workers in Iraq, with five reporters and media assistants killed in mysterious or controversial circumstances.” [20c] (p1)

6.116 The RSF report, dated 3 May 2005, stated that “16 foreign and Iraqi journalists were kidnapped in the country in 2004, especially from April on.” [20c] (p2)

6.117 An article by AFP, dated 6 January 2005, added that “The US army killed four of the reporters – employees of the Arab television stations Al-Arabiya and Al-Iraqiya – in incidents in March and April [2004], it said.” [21a] *The Guardian* article, dated 18 February 2005, reported that “US government was today accused of hiding behind a ‘culture of denial’ over the deaths of at least 12 journalists who are alleged to have perished at the hands of the US military in Iraq.” [6h]

6.118 As documented in the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) report (accessed on 26 July 2005) since 2004 30 journalists have been abducted. Of those two were killed and 28 were released. [26a]

6.119 The Dutch country report, December 2004, observed that “For journalists it involves risk to criticise militant extremist groups. Attacks or retaliatory actions cannot be excluded. According to some reports journalists could be arrested or even abducted by the Iraqi police.” [71c] (p34) The HRW world report 2005 added that “Many foreign journalists, several of whom have been targeted for abduction, also have pulled out of Iraq.” [15e] (p4)

- 6.120 *The Guardian* stated, on 19 January 2005, that “The number of Iraqis claiming to be journalists has risen from 1,000 to 5,000 since the fall of Saddam Hussein after the US-led invasion.” [6k] (p1)
- 6.121 The USSD report 2004, stated that “On August 15 [2004], police ordered all unembedded journalists to leave the city of Najaf, where Coalition and Iraqi forces had been fighting supporters of Muqtada al-Sadr. The police cited concerns about the journalists’ safety for the order, but many journalists ignored it.” [2a] (p8) An article by RSF, dated 27 August 2004, noted that “Reporters Without Borders today condemned the brief detention yesterday in Najaf of some 60 journalists who were taken to police headquarters in the city and accused by the police chief of failing to tell the truth.” [20b] The report added that “Some accounts highlighted the violent way the journalists were detained, with the police reportedly entering some of their rooms and firing shots in the air.” [20b]
- 6.122 An article by IRIN dated 11 August 2004 documented journalists from al-Takhi newspaper and al-Sabah newspaper have suffered problems, specifically, “Drive-by shootings and threatening letters, e-mails and phone calls are daily fare at the al-Sabah newspaper, which was financed by the US-led Coalition and is now supported by the interim government.” [18x] (p2)

[Return to Contents](#)

FREEDOM OF RELIGION

- 6.123 As documented in the USSD report 2004, “The TAL provides for freedom of thought, conscience, and religious belief and practice. The Government generally respected these rights in practice.” [2a] (p8)
- 6.124 The FCO human rights report 2005 mentioned that:
- “The Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) states that Islam is the official religion of the state and is to be considered a source of legislation. The TAL respects the Islamic identity of the majority of the Iraqi people, while guaranteeing the fundamental rights of all individuals to freedom of religious belief and practice. In his acceptance speech on 6 April 2005, newly elected President Talabani reiterated that the incoming transitional government would ‘respect the Islamic identity of the Iraqi nation, but with full respect also for the identity and beliefs of others’.” [66j] (p66)
- 6.125 The Dutch country report, December 2004, stated that “Iraq has a variety of religious communities.” [71c] (p35) Several reports noted that approximately 97 per cent of the population were Muslim. [2a] (p8) [71c] (p35) [78a] (p4) The USSD report 2004 and the CIA world factbook (last updated on 9 August 2005) stated that approximately 60-65 per cent were Shi’a Muslims, while approximately 32-37 per cent were Sunni Muslims. [2a] (p8) [78a] (p4) Several reports noted that the other three per cent consisted of Christians, such as Chaldeans (Roman Catholic), Assyrians (Church of the East), Syriac (Eastern Orthodox), Armenian Orthodox, several denominations of Protestant Christians, Yazidis, and a small number of Sabeen Mandaeans and Jews. [2a] (p8) [71c] (p35) [78a] (p4)
- 6.126 AI reported, on 25 July 2005, that “Armed groups have targeted members of specific religious and ethnic groups, especially Shi’as, Kurds and Christians.

They have also targeted institutions belonging to these groups, including mosques, churches and headquarters of political parties.” [28c] (p8)

- 6.127 A BBC report, dated 1 August 2005, stated that “Violent killings have become common in Iraq in recent months, fuelling sectarian tension between Sunni and Shias, correspondents say.” [4aa] The AI report, dated 25 July 2005, noted that “The sectarian divide between Sunnis and Shi’as in Iraq has widened in the past two years.” [28c] (p8)

[Return to Contents](#)

SHI’A MUSLIMS

- 6.128 As documented in a BBC report, dated 17 February 2005, “Shia Muslims were oppressed by Iraq’s Baathist regime for more than 30 years and excluded from the highest ranks of power.” [4s] However, the Dutch country report, December 2004, stated that “Since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, there has been a significant improvement in the position of Shi’ites. Many Shi’ite clerics have returned to Iraq from abroad. The end of Saddam Hussein’s regime spelled an end to the suppression of the Shi’ite leadership.” [71c] (p62)

- 6.129 The BBC report, dated 17 February 2005, observed that “The Shia heartland is in the south-east of the country. It includes Basra and the sacred cities of Najaf and Karbala – home to shrines revered by millions of Shia across the East. The Shia also make up a sizeable minority of the population in the capital Baghdad, where most live in poverty in sprawling slum areas on the outskirts.” [4s]

- 6.130 The BBC added, on 21 May 2005, that “Shias in Iraq have been targeted by insurgents for many months in a series of car bombs thought to be aimed at provoking sectarian strife. There have also been assassinations of Shia clerics.” [4ai] The AI report provided a number of examples of attacks that targeted Shi’a Muslims. [28c] (p8-9) An article by the BBC, dated 18 February 2005, reported that violence against the Shi’a Muslims increased following January’s election.” [4t]

- 6.131 The AI report, dated 25 July 2005, stated that “

“Radical Sunni Islamist groups see the Shi’a as ‘infidels’ who should be killed. In early December 2004 al-Qa’ida of Jihad Organization in the Land of Two Rivers issued a statement referring to the Shi’a population as the ‘insurmountable obstacle, the lurking snake, the crafty and malicious scorpion, the spying enemy, and the penetrating venom... They are the enemy. Beware of them. Fight them. By God, they lie... the only solution is for us to strike the religious, military, and other cadres among the Shi’a with blow after blow until they bend to the Sunnis...” [28c] (p8)

- 6.132 The report added that “The same statement said there were four groups of people in Iraq that were ‘enemies’ – the Americans, the Kurds, the Shi’a and the Iraqi security forces.” [28c] (p8)

- 6.133 The USSD country reports on terrorism, dated 27 April 2005, stated that:

“In February [2004], Zarqawi called for a ‘sectarian war’ in Iraq. He and his organization sought to create a rift between Shi’a and Sunnis through several

large terror attacks against Iraqi Shi'a. In March 2004, Zarqawi claimed credit for simultaneous bomb attacks in Baghdad and Karbala that killed over 180 pilgrims as they celebrated the Shi'a festival of Ashura. In December, Zarqawi also claimed credit for a suicide attack at the offices of Abdel Aziz al-Hakim, leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), one of Iraq's largest Shi'a parties, which killed 15 and wounded over 50. Zarqawi has denied responsibility for another significant attack that same month in Karbala and Najaf, two of Shi'a Islam's most holy cities, which killed 62 Iraqi civilians and wounded more than 120." [2d] (p1-2) **(See also Section 6B on Shi'a Arabs)**

[Return to Contents](#)

SUNNI MUSLIMS

- 6.134 The BBC report, dated 17 February 2005, stated that "Sunni Arabs have dominated the politics of Iraq since 1921." [4s] The same report noted that "More recently Saddam Hussein's Baath Party was dominated by Sunni Muslims and he centralised power in his Sunni clan." [4s]
- 6.135 As noted in the USSD religious freedom report 2003, approximately 18 to 20 per cent of Sunni Muslims were Sunni Kurds, 12 to 15 per cent Sunni Arabs, and the remainder were Sunni Turkomen. The same report observed that "Sunnis form the majority in the center of the country and in the north. Shi'a and Sunni Arabs are not ethnically distinct." [2b] (p1-2)
- 6.136 As stated in the Dutch country report, December 2004, "During the reporting period some Sunni clerics were the target of assassinations." [71c] (p63) An article by RFE/RL, dated 24 May 2005, added that both Shi'a and Sunni Muslim clerics have been killed. The article added that "Last week, the head of the Sunni Association of Muslim Scholars placed the blame for the deaths of several of the Sunni clerics on the Badr Brigades – a Shi'ite paramilitary force linked to the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI)." [22g] However, the same article stated that there is no evidence that the Badr Brigades were involved. [22g]
- 6.137 Al (Ireland) stated, on 19 May 2005, that "Sunni Muslims and other religious minorities in these areas [Basra, along with all provinces in southern Iraq] have reportedly been targeted for abuse by radical Shi'a Muslim armed groups. It is alleged that in the past few days in Basra many Sunni Muslims have been arrested, reportedly on the basis of their religion." [28b] **(See also Section 6B Sunni Arabs)**

[Return to Contents](#)

CHRISTIANS

- 6.138 Europa World Online (accessed on 16 August 2005) stated that "There are Christian communities in all the principal towns of Iraq, but their principal villages lie mostly in the Mosul district." [1c] **(Christianity)** The same report mentioned that "There are estimated to be some 700,000 Christians of various denominations in Iraq." [1c] **(Christianity)** An FCO letter, dated 25 January 2005, added that "30% of Iraq's Christians live in the North, with the rest mostly in Baghdad and a few in Basra." [66f] The same letter observed that 12,000

Christians were situated in Kirkuk, 15,000 in Arbil, 13,000 in Dohuk and between 150,000 and 175,000 in Mosul. [66f]

- 6.139 The USSD report on Religious Freedom 2003 noted that “Assyrians and Chaldeans are considered by many to be distinct ethnic groups as well as the descendants of some of the earliest Christian communities.” [2b] (p1) The USSD report 2004, observed that “The majority of the country’s Christians were Chaldeans.” [2a] (p9)
- 6.140 The RFE/RL reported, on 3 July 2005, that “Insurgent propaganda in Iraq has always portrayed U.S.-led multinational forces in Iraq as ‘Christian Crusaders’ who have made Iraq the first stop in their quest to conquer the Arab world and destroy Islam. The comparison has left Christians in Iraq more vulnerable to insurgent attacks. However, it appears until now to have had little impact on Iraqis’ views of indigenous Christians. There is a growing fear among Christians in Iraq, however, that proselytizing evangelical Christians who entered the country after the war may inflict the most harm on the Christian communities.” [22h]
- 6.141 The British/Danish fact-finding mission report, October 2004, mentioned that the Assyrians were integrated into various communities. However, there was a concern for them in Hilla and the Christians there were keeping a low profile. Assyrians are neutrals in Baghdad and Kirkuk; they hold a respected and valued place in society. [30c] (p18) The same report noted that Armenians should not be a target because they are a small non-political group. Chaldeans were sometimes seen as being affiliated to foreigners; however they do not face a problem. [30c] (p18)
- 6.142 Several sources referred to in the British/Danish fact-finding mission report, October 2004, advised that Christians were not a persecuted group in Iraq. One source stated that Christians were not even discriminated against. [30c] (p18-19) The same report noted that “No other religious community looked upon the Christians as a rival for political power and thus there would be no reason for persecution or even harassment.” [30c] (p18)
- 6.143 However, the Freedom House report 2005 noted that “Iraqi Christians were targeted by Islamist terrorist groups in 2004. Between August and November [2004], 12 churches were bombed in Baghdad and Mosul; at least 15 people were killed. Roughly 5 per cent of Iraq’s 900,000-strong Christian community had left the country by year’s end.” [70b] (p309)
- 6.144 The UNHCR report, August 2004, noted that the situation of Christians has dramatically deteriorated since the overthrow of the previous regime. [40b] (p7) The USSD report 2004 observed that “There were numerous incidents of violence against the Christian community this year [2004], ranging from individual killings to intimidation and assaults on women for not wearing a headscarf (hijab). Most of these incidences of violence were related to religion.” [2a] (p8)
- 6.145 The RFE/RL article reported that “Since the fall of the Hussein regime, Christians have been targeted in bombings against churches, shrines, hair salons, and liquor stores. Christian women and children were routinely kidnapped and held for exorbitant ransoms. Muslim zealots have forced women to veil in markets, universities, and schools, some Christians claim.” [22h]

6.146 The IWPR article, dated 28 June 2005, stated that “The small but growing number of Kurds who convert to Christianity say they face discrimination and intolerance from the Muslim majority.” [11c] (p1) The same article noted that:

“Kurdish Christians – still a tiny minority – say they find it difficult to practice their religion because of public intolerance. Muslims in the region counter that it is wrong for Christians to proselytise among other faith groups.

“The converts are joining new, western-style Christian groups which started growing after the fall of Saddam Hussein, rather than the long-established Christian communities such as the Assyrians and Chaldeans, who do not seek new members from Muslim backgrounds.” [11c] (p1)

6.147 The Dutch country report, December 2004, added that “The situation for Christians in Iraq has improved in legislative terms. Since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, Christian parties have been able to take part in the political process throughout Iraq. It is also possible under the TAL for Assyrian Christians to receive education in their own language, (Sureth), which was not permitted under Saddam Hussein.” [71c] (p63-64)

6.148 *The New York Times* stated, on 6 February 2005, that “Some local officials have claimed that hundreds of thousands of Kurdish Christians were prevented from voting because balloting materials did not arrive.” [24b] An RFE/RL article, dated 3 July 2005, noted reported that “The National Assembly election resulted in six Christians gaining seats in the parliament; Christians argued they were entitled to twice as many seats.” [22h]

6.149 The UNHCR report, August 2004, stated that “There are reports of tensions between Christians and Muslims in several parts of Iraq because of increasing Islamification.” [71c] (p64) The FCO letter dated 20 January 2005, stated that “All Iraqis are faced with the daily threat of terrorism and, even more so, of criminality. These problems vary depending on the region, town or locality. Christians in Iraq are perceived as being wealthy citizens.” [66g] The Dutch country report, December 2004, added that “Because Christians are often assumed to hold a better socio-economic position, Christians have frequently fallen victim to abductions aimed at bringing in ransom money.” [71c] (p65) The FCO letter, dated 20 January 2005, stated that “This makes it particularly hard to distinguish between criminal and sectarian motivations for attacks on them.” [66g] The Dutch country report, December 2004, observed that “Religious motives are not thought to play a role in this. However, in the KRG areas the situation for Christians during and prior to the reporting period was more stable.” [71c] (P65)

6.150 As stated in the FCO letter, dated 20 January 2005:

“But Iraqi Christians do face a growing sectarian threat. While we are not aware of any officially sponsored discrimination against Christian communities in Iraq, reports of attacks on them are on the increase. ... We [FCO] see increasing evidence of sectarian intimidation. Recent examples include threatening notes pushed through doors, death threats to priests and church leaders, posters in the north warning Christians to convert to Islam or leave Iraq or face death and destruction of homes and Islamist websites calling for attacks on all infidels in

Iraq. Iraqi Christians are feeling increasingly beleaguered. Church attendance is falling and some families are keeping their children away from school.” [66g]

- 6.151 The FCO letter, dated 20 January 2005, stated that “Local Islamists see them (and all Christians) as supporters of the coalition.” [66g]
- 6.152 The UNSC report, December 2004, stated that “Many Iraqi Christians targeted by extremist religious groups have temporarily moved to neighbouring countries or to safer areas in the Kurdish governorates.” [38c] (p13)
- 6.153 The FCO letter, dated 25 January 2005, added that “Christians are relocating to Suleimaniya, Arbil and Dohuk provinces only. ... Many of the Christians in Basra and Baghdad originally came from the North (Suleimaniya, Arbil and Dohuk as well as Mosul). Under a separate scheme run by the Kurdistan Regional Governments, around 150 families have relocated from Baghdad to Faysh Habur.” [66f] The USSD report 2004 stated that “According to the Christian Endowment Office, more than 30,000 Christian families fled the country during the year [2004].” [2a] (p9) *The Guardian* also noted, on 2 August 2004, that “Several hundred Christian families – who were relatively free to practise their religion under the former Ba’ath regime – have reportedly left the country out of fear of religious persecution at the hands of Islamic extremists.” [6b] (p2)

[Return to Contents](#)

MANDAEANS/SABIANS

- 6.154 IRIN news reported, on 20 April 2005, that there were some 100,000 Mandaeans in Iraq and they lived mainly in southern Iraq. [18g] The USSD religious freedom report 2003 added that Mandaeans also had small communities in Baghdad, Kirkuk and elsewhere. [2b]
- 6.155 The IWPR article, dated 22 January 2004, explained that “A non-violent people (sic) who believe that God alone has the right to take a human life, the Mandaeans are targets partly because they normally don’t carry weapons. That makes them highly vulnerable in the near lawless chaos of post-war Baghdad.” [11i] The report added that Mandaeans do not have clans or tribes to protect them. [11i]
- 6.156 The IWPR article, dated 22 January 2004, stated that “Mandaean officials have filed many complaints with local police, but members claim that no action has been taken to protect them. As a result, they no longer report crimes to the authorities – choosing instead to seek help from higher powers.” [11i] UNHCR advised the British/Danish fact-finding mission that during 2004 a Fatwa was issued against Mandaeans. [30c] (p20)
- 6.157 The Dutch country report, December 2004, stated that:
- “The position of Mandaeans has deteriorated in the south of Iraq since the overthrow of the regime of Saddam Hussein. According to reports these (sic) is increased discrimination (discharge from public service, expulsion from schools, desecration of Mandaean shrines, forcing girls and women to wear veils, forced circumcision of newborn boys, forced conversion). Mandaeans have also fallen victim to abductions and violent crimes. It is assumed that abductions, violent

crimes and other forms of intimidation are not taking place so much for ethnic or religious reasons, but because of their generally affluent socio-economic position, Mandaeans are an attractive target for abductions and demanding ransom money.” [71c] (p65)

- 6.158 As mentioned in the British/Danish fact-finding mission report, October 2004, Mandaeans are generally more at risk in the south than in Baghdad. [30c] (p20) The Dutch country report, December 2004, added that “Various Mandaeans have already moved from the south to Baghdad (where roughly half of the Mandaean community lives).” [71c] (p65)
- 6.159 The same report noted that Mandaeans were not persecuted in Iraq and they have the same access to jobs, schools and health as other Iraqis. However, the report mentioned that many of them have a subjective fear. [30c] (p20-21)

[Return to Contents](#)

YAZIDIS

- 6.160 As documented in the USSD religious freedom report for 2003, “The Yazidis are a syncretistic religious group (or a set of several groups). Many Yazidis consider themselves to be ethnically Kurdish, though some would define themselves as both religiously and ethnically distinct from Muslim Kurds.” [2b] An article by Islam Online, dated 9 December 2004, stated that Yazidis predominately resided in the north of the country, with the main concentration located near the town of Mosul. [102a] A number of reports disagree on the Yazidi population in Iraq. [5d] (p1) [18I] [101a] [102a] The estimates ranged from ‘just a few thousand’ [102a] to 200,000 [18I] and even as many as 700,000. [5d] (p1)
- 6.161 *The Times* article, dated 5 June 2003, stated that the Yazidis practise one of the more secretive and persecuted religions in Iraq. [5d] (p1) Several reports noted that Yazidis have been labelled as heretic, Satanic and Devil-worshippers by their Muslim neighbours. [5d] (p1) [18I] [101a]
- 6.162 The same article goes on to state that the Yazidis believe that:
- “Satan was redeemed and became a peacock, not a Devil. They deny that they are Devil-worshippers. The Yazidis pray twice a day and their day of rest is Wednesday. They can drink alcohol and eat pork but not lettuce, which is seen as a source of evil. Their beliefs are not written down but memorised and passed on. Many of their rituals are so secret that they have never been seen by outsiders. It is impossible to convert to Yazidism and it is forbidden for Yazidis to marry outside the religion.” [5d] (p1-2)
- 6.163 A Reuters news article, dated 18 August 2005, reported that according to Yazidis leaders, there have been a number of attacks on them since the 2003 US invasion. [7a]
- 6.164 A number of articles reported that the Yazidis were represented in the January 2005 national election as part of the coalition, the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), which won with 48 per cent of the votes. [4e] [5b] [65d] [102a] However, the AP reported on 6 February 2005 that Yazidis, as well as members of other small religions in the north, took part in a protest outside Baghdad’s heavily guarded

Green Zone over alleged irregularities in the election. The protesters stated that tens of thousands of people were prevented from voting in Mosul and the surrounding Ninevah province because polling centers never opened. [65e]

[Return to Contents](#)

JEWIS

6.165 The USSD report 2004 stated that:

“The country’s Jewish population reportedly dwindled at year’s end [2004] to only 22 persons in the Baghdad area, from 33 in April 2003. Soon after the fall of the Ba’ath Regime, the IGC signed a memorandum with the Baghdad Jewish community that would protect Jewish assets should all members of the community depart the country. These assets would be transferred to three external organizations.” [2a] (p14)

6.166 The FCO in a letter, dated 26 April 2004, stated that:

“There is a lack of clarity over the position of Iraqi Jews who left Iraq. Many of them were forced out in the early 60s and were made to renounce citizenship and property rights, so it is ambiguous whether they are allowed to return as, in practice, it was not Saddam’s regime who cancelled their citizenship and on paper they volunteered to renounce their Iraqi nationality. But these decisions were clearly not voluntary.” [66a]

6.167 The USSD report 2004, nevertheless, stated that:

“After the promulgation of the TAL in February, the former Governing Council addressed the question of whether Jewish expatriates would be allowed to vote in the 2005 elections. It announced that they would be treated like any other expatriate group. The Government also denied unfounded rumors (sometimes spread in flyers distributed by antigovernment extremist groups) that Jewish expatriates were buying up real estate in an attempt to reassert their influence in the country.” [2a] (p9)

[Return to Contents](#)

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND ASSEMBLY

6.168 The Freedom House report 2005 noted that:

“Freedom of assembly and association are recognized by the TAL and were generally respected in practice. Domestic and international human rights groups were able to operate without restrictions, though security constraints limited their activities in many areas of the country. Peaceful demonstrations occurred frequently during the year [2004] without interference from coalition forces or the Iraqi government, except when they were in violation of curfews.” [70b] (p309)

6.169 The USSD report 2004 stated that “Many demonstrations, which often proved to be a cover for insurgent violence, took place countrywide. According to the Government, the MOI did not break up any peaceful violations, except when a curfew was violated.” [2a] (p8)

- 6.170 The USSD report 2004 and the Freedom House report 2005 observed that the Government generally respected these rights in practice. [2a] (p8) [70b] (p308) However, Voices of Wilderness, a US NGO, noted, on 2 January 2004, that “Order 45 issued on November 2003 by Governor Bremmer requires all organisations of Iraqi civil society and the international NGOs to register and undergo forms of control and scrutiny. This order is a serious impediment which violates the right of freedom of association.” [35a] (p1)
- 6.171 The USSD report 2004 noted that “Political parties and candidates had the right freely to propose themselves or be nominated by other groups. The Government did not restrict political opponents nor did it interfere with their right to organize, seek votes, or publicize their views.” [2a] (p11)
- 6.172 The Freedom House report 2004 observed that “Although the Baath Party is banned, political parties representing a wide range of viewpoints are allowed to organize and campaign freely.” [70b] (p308)

[Return to Contents](#)

EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS

- 6.173 As mentioned in the USSD report 2004, “During the year [2004], official estimates of unemployment ranged between 20 and 30 per cent. Government officials estimated that the rate of underemployment was roughly equivalent to joblessness. Anecdotal reports suggested that approximately half the working-age population was unemployed.” [2a] (p1)
- 6.174 The same report noted that “The exercise of labor rights remained limited, largely due to violence, unemployment, and maladapted organizational structures and laws; however, with international assistance, some progress was underway at year’s end [2004].” [2a] (p2)
- 6.175 The report also noted that “At year’s end [2004] work was in progress to draft a new labor code. The TAL incorporated the 1987 labor code and the CPA Order Number 89 that amended it.” [2a] (p14)
- 6.176 Article 13(C) of the TAL provides for the right to join unions freely. [51a] However, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) stated, on 24 February 2005 that Iraq is an increasingly dangerous place for trade unionists. [47a] The report added that “Following the assassination [on 4 January 2005] of Hadi Saleh, International Secretary of the Iraqi Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU), the torture and murder of labour leaders in Iraq has become a troubling trend in a country where trade unionists still operate under anti-union legislation which dates back to the Saddam-era.” [47a]

[Return to Contents](#)

PEOPLE TRAFFICKING

- 6.177 As mentioned in the USSD report 2004, “Detection of trafficking was extremely difficult due to lack of information because of the security situation, existing societal controls of women, and the closed-tribal culture.” [2a] (p13)

- 6.178 The USSD Trafficking in Persons report, dated 3 June 2005, stated that “Iraq is a country of origin for women and girls trafficked to Yemen, Syria, Jordan, and Gulf countries for the purposes of sexual and labor exploitation. Some Iraqi women and underage girls are reportedly trafficked from rural areas to cities within Iraq itself.” [2e] (p232)
- 6.179 The USSD report, dated 3 June 2005, added that “In 2004, Iraq investigated major crimes against women, some involving activities related to trafficking. ... The Iraqi Interest Section in Syria works regularly with Syrian police to help Iraqi women accused of engaging in prostitution. Iraqi border controls are improving and are expected to stem illegal migration and trafficking of persons across the border.” [2e] (p233)
- 6.180 The same report noted that “Although there are no NGOs or international organizations working on trafficking specifically, the NGO Women-for-Women promotes women’s programs, which indirectly help trafficking victims. Additionally, some NGOs have established safe houses in Baghdad and northern Iraq to shelter abused women, including possible trafficking victims.” [2e] (p233)

[Return to Contents](#)

FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

- 6.181 As noted in the USSD report 2004, the TAL provides for the freedom of movement, and the Government generally respected this right in practice. [2a] (p9)
- 6.182 The UNHCR report, August 2004, noted that “Most legal restrictions to freedom of movement disappeared as a result of the fall of the former regime. Nevertheless, freedom of movement in all parts of Iraq is severely restricted due to the security situation.” [40b] (p6)
- 6.183 The FCO letter, dated 20 January 2005, noted that “Ease of movement within Iraq varies from place to place depending on security restrictions, and is the same for all Iraqis.” [66g] The British/Danish fact-finding mission report, October 2004, observed that “Currently the most dangerous areas in Iraq were the suburbs of Baghdad, Haifa Street in Baghdad, and the cities of Balad and Fallujah and the Sunni triangle.” [30c] (p11)
- 6.184 The UNHCR report, August 2004, stated that:
- “Road travel is hazardous due to the possibility of mined areas, and is further restricted due to the numerous military checkpoints which have been set up, especially in and around Baghdad as well as at the ‘green line’, which separates the northern governates from central Iraq. Freedom of movement is further hindered by the additional illegal checkpoints which have been set up by armed groups linked to various political parties.” [40b] (p6)
- 6.185 The FCO stated in a letter, dated 25 May 2005, that “The threat level on Highway 10 has to be considered as being very high. The threat can be broken down into three main areas, general criminality, insurgent activity and possible mistaken identity by MNFI (Multi National Force Iraq).” [65d]

- 6.186 The British/Danish fact-finding mission report, October 2004, stated that “The source [Diplomatic source in Amman] advised that the route from Jordan is attacked regularly however this is more likely to be criminal elements rather than political insurgents. On this route the attackers will target both foreigners and Iraqis, and there is no distinction of the nationality of the individual. Even Arabs from the neighbouring countries are attacked on this route.” [30c] (p30)
- 6.187 The UNSC report, dated 7 June 2005, noted that “Ground movement between the Baghdad international zone and airport has occasionally been interrupted. A major attack against local security forces in Erbil and incidents in other parts of Iraq demonstrate a sustained ability of hostile elements to select and coordinate attack targets throughout the country.” [38b] (p15-16)
- 6.188 The FCO letter, dated 25 May 2005, added that:
- “Travel within townships is possible with taxis available in areas of greater population areas. As taxis are known to be used as VBIEDs [Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device], MNFI treat them with some suspicion. Travelling in a taxi raises the risk of ‘escalation of force’ incidents from MNFI and PSD.
- “Travel between population centres has the risk of attack by IED [Improvised Explosive Device], VBIED and Ambush. Additionally there are still criminal elements on many of the roads who establish illegal Vehicle Check Points (VCP) in order to extort money.” [65d]
- 6.189 The UNSC report, dated 7 March 2005, added that “Aircraft, together with their cargo and passengers, continue to be exposed to a high level of threat both on the ground and when in Iraqi airspace.” [38a] (p15)
- 6.190 The DFID report, dated July 2005, noted that “On 4 June [2005], Basra International Airport opened its doors and runways to scheduled commercial flights, with Iraqi Airways completing its maiden flight into the airport.” [59f] (p4)

[Return to Contents](#)

TRAVEL DOCUMENTS

- 6.191 *The Guardian* noted, on 5 August 2004, that “The new Iraqi government started issuing passports as soon as it took sovereignty on June 28 [2004], and every day the offices are virtually under siege” The same report stated that “The procedure is relatively simple, or would be without the crowds: copies of identity papers, two colour photographs, a thumbprint and a form to fill out.” [6c]
- 6.192 However *The Washington Post* article, dated 31 July 2004, added that:
- “Although the new passport officially costs 50 cents, people are paying \$100 or more in bribes or other considerations for one of the coveted green booklets, a price too steep for many Iraqis. Passport bureau managers deny that such abuses are occurring in their offices, but Iraqis who have applied for passports say the system, just three weeks old, is already corrupted, deepening their doubts about the interim administration and the chances that it will pave the way for a genuinely democratic government.” [16c]

6.193 The Christian Science Monitor noted, on 21 September 2004, that “Every day long lines of Iraqis form outside passport offices. Officials say they have issued more than 500,000 passports since sovereignty was restored in June. Many applicants say the passport is a kind of insurance policy against deepening chaos.” [34c] (p1)

[Return to Contents](#)

6.B HUMAN RIGHTS – SPECIFIC GROUPS

ETHNIC GROUPS

6.194 The USSD report 2004 stated that “Ethnically and linguistically, the country’s population includes Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, Chaldeans, Assyrians, and Armenians.” [2a] (p13)

ARABS

6.195 According to the CIA world factbook (last updated on 9 August 2005) Arabs make up 75 to 80 per cent of the population of Iraq. [78a] (p4)

6.196 The FCO added that “It should also be noted that Arab Iraqis are instantly recognised by Iraqi Kurds who view them with suspicion and would not generally welcome them into Iraqi Kurdistan.” [65h] The IWPR article, dated 10 August 2004, added that “Iraqi Arabs who visit Iraqi Kurdistan increasingly claim hostility and unfair treatment at the hands of their Kurdish hosts.” [11b] (p1-3) The British/Danish fact-finding mission report, October 2004, mentioned that Arabs would have difficulties living in the Kurdish areas in the north. [30c] (p31) The IWPR article, dated 10 August 2004, however, noted that not all Arabs feel the hostility. [11b] (p1-3)

6.197 A BBC article, dated 12 August 2005, and an IWPR report, dated 24 February 2005, both noted that there was an increasing number of Iraqi Arabs joining the workforce in Iraqi Kurdistan. [4ak] [11g]

[Return to Contents](#)

SHI’A ARABS

6.198 The EIU report 2005 noted that “Baghdad is estimated to be at least 60% Shia Arab, whose numbers are mostly concentrated in the economically disadvantaged ‘Sadr City’ area in the east of the capital.” [58b] (p27)

6.199 As noted in the Dutch country report, December 2004, “Iraqi Shi’ites by no means constitute a homogenous community and they are politically and religiously divided.” [71c] (p62) The same report mentioned that “Since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, there has been a significant improvement in the position of Shi’ites. Many Shi’ite clerics have returned to Iraq from abroad. The end of Saddam Hussein’s regime spelled an end to the suppression of the Shi’ite leadership.” [71c] (p62)

6.200 However, the USSD report 2004 stated that “Sunni-Shi’a violence was widespread and often fuelled by foreign extremists.” [2a] (p8) The CSIS report (last updated on 19 May 2005) stated that:

“While the election turnout initially dealt an apparent blow to the Sunni insurrection, much of the post-election insurgent activity has directly targeted Shi’ite clergy and political leaders, Shi’ite civilians, and Shi’ite institutions, and attacks have been targeted for key Shi’ite holidays like the February 19th Ashura holiday. While most Shi’ite leaders had strongly resisted any calls for reprisals against Sunnis, Shi’ites have called for such action, and there do seem to have been Shi’ite killings of Sunni clergy and civilians.” [63c] (p49) **(See also section 6A on Shi’a insurgents and Shi’a Muslims)**

[Return to Contents](#)

SUNNI ARABS

6.201 The IWPR article, dated 9 February 2004, added that “Sunni Arabs are represented in several different religious trends, as well as by tribes. Some also claim allegiance to the toppled Ba’ath Party.” [11h]

6.202 The Dutch country report, December 2004, observed that:

“Since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, Sunni Arabs have organised themselves to a limited extent into political parties or groups such as Ahl Al-Sunnah wa Al-Jammah, Hay’at Al-Ulama Al-Muslimin (‘Muslim Scholar’s Association’), the Muslim Brotherhood and organisations grouped around secular Arab Sunnis. ... During the reporting period some Sunni clerics were the target of assassinations.” [71c] (p63)

6.203 The AI report, dated 25 July 2005, stated that:

“Members of armed groups opposed to the presence of the MNF in Iraq and the Iraqi government appear to be predominantly from the Sunni Muslim Arab community. Sunni Arabs comprise around 18% of the population and mainly live in central and western Iraq. Before the US-led military intervention, this community dominated successive Iraqi governments and was generally privileged -- key positions in the army, security and intelligence agencies were held by Sunni Arabs. ... Nevertheless, under Saddam Hussain the authorities had no qualms in arresting, torturing or executing Sunni Arabs perceived to be opponents of the regime, or making them ‘disappear’.” [28c] (p2)

6.204 The EIU report 2004 stated that:

“Various coalition military operations have been conducted to crack down on the Sunni fighters, resulting in the arrest of many alleged resistance fighters. Although by definition disparate, the lead element among the Sunni Arab resistance appears to be those who are either loyal to the former regime or, like some of its former officials, sympathetic to Baathist ideology. Some, at least, are organised around the name al-Awdeh (the Return), which is reportedly paying Iraqis to kill coalition forces.” [58a] (p18)

6.205 The AI report, dated 25 July 2005, mentioned that “However, by contrast, many among the Iraqi Sunni Arab community have spoken against violence and abuses by armed groups and have themselves been targeted for killing or kidnapping.” [28c] (p2)

- 6.206 As noted in a BBC article, dated 1 August 2005, stated “The minority Sunni community has often complained of victimisation, including at the hands of Iraq’s new police force.” [4aa]
- 6.207 *The Guardian* reported, on 26 January 2005, that “Having a tribal name that associated you with a Sunni-dominated area or tribe was for centuries a guarantee of access to the government and a good job, but these same names now land you in American custody if you happen to be in the wrong place at the wrong time.” [6a]
- 6.208 A BBC article, dated 19 August 2005, noted that “Three members of Iraq’s main Sunni Arab political party have been abducted and killed in the northern city of Mosul. The Iraqi Islamic Party members were seized as they put up posters urging Sunnis to vote in a referendum planned later this year on a new constitution.” [4a1]
- 6.209 The BBC mentioned, on 28 June 2005, that “Sunni Arabs – formerly the politically dominant sect but with only 6% of MPs – have been left with a deputy president and deputy prime minister and 15 seats on the constitutional committee.” [4am] **(See also section 6A on Sunni Arab insurgents and Sunni Muslims)**

[Return to Contents](#)

MARSH ARABS

- 6.210 As observed by UNHCR in a report, dated August 2004:
- “The majority of Marsh Arabs are concentrated in southern Iraq (Bashrah and surrounding governates). Marsh Arabs have traditionally been regarded by other Iraqis as a very distinct group. A number of international NGOs with projects in the south attested to the fact that Marsh Arabs are often considered by the local population as second class citizens and discriminated against, both as regards access to employment as well as to basic services. Marsh Arab returnees from Iran seem to be especially suspicious in the eyes of the local population and are generally blamed for any criminal activity which takes places in the south.” [40b] (p7)
- 6.211 The same document noted that the Marsh Arabs were subjected to forced migration as a result of the organised Marsh Drainage campaign undertaken by the former regime. [40b] (p17)
- 6.212 The UNHCR report, August 2004, noted that as part of the policy, Marsh Arabs were forced to resettle in the north, in order to alter the ethnic balance of the area. [40b] (p17) The IRIN news article, dated 22 August 2005, reported that “International aid organisations estimate that more than 130,000 were displaced inside the country and another 75,000 entered neighbouring Iran as refugees.” [18b] (p1)
- 6.213 The IWPR stated, on 20 October 2004, that “Things began changing after the fall of Saddam’s regime, as many dams were breached and pumping stations destroyed, and the marshland’s waters began to flow again.” [11a]
- 6.214 The Dutch country report, December 2004, stated that:

“The UN declared in the autumn of 2004, that it wanted to set up a project aimed at restoration of the marsh areas in the south of Iraq. The internally displaced people in Iraq include Marsh Arabs who were driven out, under Saddam Hussein’s regime, from the areas where they had originally lived. Returns to the marsh areas have been reported in prior review periods.” [71c] (p55)

- 6.215 An IRIN news article, dated 22 August 2005, reported that “Since July 2003, more than six projects have been developed by AMAR and the United Nations, who are taking the lead role, to assist the marshland people, but much more is required to guarantee a future for some 30,000 local residents.” [18b] (p1)
- 6.216 *The Daily Telegraph* noted, on 26 June 2004, that “Of the 200,000 people displaced in the central marshes only a few thousand of the poorest have returned from the slums outside Baghdad and other cities where they have lived for the past decade.” [48b]
- 6.217 The IWPR article, dated 20 October 2004, reported that in an attempt to bring back Marsh Arabs to the area, the Government installed ten temporary mobile schools in the marshes of Amara. [11a]

[Return to Contents](#)

KURDS

- 6.218 The BBC stated, on 12 August 2005, that “The Kurds have ruled themselves in northern Iraq since the aftermath of the Gulf war of 1991, when a ‘safe haven’ was created to protect them from Saddam Hussein. Rival Kurdish groups fought one another in 1996, but the current stability in Kurdistan now stands in stark contrast to other parts of the country.” [4ak]
- 6.219 The Dutch country report, December 2004, stated that:
- “In formal terms the situation for the Kurds in Iraq has improved since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Since that time, Kurds have been able to take part in the national and regional political process. ... The security situation was relatively calm in the KRG areas in comparison with the rest of the country. Nonetheless acts of violence were committed against Kurds in Iraq.” [71c] (p53)
- 6.220 The HRW report, August 2004, stated that following the overthrow of the Saddam regime, the Kurds and other non-Arabs began returning to their former homes and farms. [15p] (p1) The IWPR mentioned on 15 November 2004, that many Kurds fled the Sunni triangle where they faced threats from extremists. [11d] (p1)
- 6.221 The same article stated that many Kurds have had difficulties resettling in the Kurdish areas of Iraq. The article mentioned that “While most still speak Kurdish and consider themselves true Kurds, they have received a less than warm welcome since returning to their region of origin. Instead of greeting them as fellow-Kurds, local people have treated them with suspicion, addressing them in Arabic rather than Kurdish.” [11d] (p1-2)

6.222 The HRW report, August 2004, noted that “Ethnic tensions between returning Kurds and others and the Arab settlers escalated rapidly and have continued to do so, along with tensions between the different returning communities – particularly between Kurds and Turkomans – over control of the oil-rich city of Kirkuk.” [15p] (p1)

6.223 As mentioned in the EIU profile 2004, “Kurdish nationalist aspirations within Iraq have historically been weakened by rivalry between the two main parties, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Divisions between the two leaderships reached a peak in August 1996 when the KDP formed a brief alliance with the Iraqi regime to oust the PUK from its main bases.” [58a] (p12)

[Return to Contents](#)

TURKMENS

6.224 The Dutch country report, December 2004, stated that “The Turkmen community in Iraq is divided. There are at least five known Turkmen political organisations, with the largest party being the Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF).” [71c] (p55)

6.225 The same report noted that “It is stipulated in the TAL that Iraqis are entitled to education in their mother tongue at government schools. There are several Turkmen schools in the KRG areas. A Turkmen school is also to be set up in Kirkuk.” [71c] (p55)

6.226 The same report added that:

“As far as it can be gathered from media reports, tensions flared during the reporting period to a limited extent between Turkmen and Kurds. These sometimes led to violence. Such tensions often resulted from the return of people who had been driven out under Saddam Hussein’s arabisation policy and from discontent amongst Turkmen about the possible ‘Kurdisation’ of Kirkuk. According to a confidential source and press reports, many Kurds moved to Kirkuk to influence the demographic balance in the city.” [71c] (p55)

6.227 The AFP reported, on 5 January 2004, that Turkmen IGC member Shangul Shapuk had demanded that Kurdish militias in Kirkuk be disarmed after Kurdish fighters shot dead four people at an Arab and Turkmen demonstration protesting against Kurdish attempts to incorporate Kirkuk into Kurdistan. Shapuk said that they were with the Kurds if they keep out of Turkmen affairs but if they insist on annexing Kirkuk the Turkmen would demand an Iraqi Turkmenistan. [21d]

[Return to Contents](#)

ASSYRIANS AND CHALDEANS

6.228 The USSD report 2004 stated that “Assyrians and Chaldeans are considered by many to be a distinct ethnic group. These communities speak a different language (Syriac), preserve traditions of Christianity, and did not define themselves as Arabs.” [2a] (p13)

WOMEN

6.229 As stated in a DFID report, dated July 2005, “Historically Iraq has had one of the best gender equality records in the Middle East, with women playing an active and visible role in political and economic life. ... Yet years of conflict, isolation from the international community, economic mismanagement and brutal government have had a very negative impact on Iraqi women. Women now suffer multiple forms of deprivation – social, economic and political.” [59f] (p1)

LEGAL PROVISIONS

6.230 As mentioned in the Dutch country report, December 2004, “Since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, attempts have been made to improve the position of women in terms of legislation. According to the TAL, all Iraqis are equal under the law, irrespective of gender.” [71c] (p56) However, the AI report, February 2005, stated that “Women face discriminatory laws and practices that deny them equal justice or protection from violence in the family and community.” [28e] (p1)

6.231 The same report stated that:

“Discrimination against women in the Personal Status Law, Law 188 of 1959 as amended, relates to marriage, divorce and inheritance. Men are allowed to practise polygamy under certain conditions (Article 3(4)). They must have judicial authorization and the judge should take into consideration whether or not the applicant has the financial means to support more than one wife.” [28e] (p13)

6.232 The same report mentioned that:

“Provisions on inheritance in the Personal Status Law also discriminate against women, who are generally only awarded half of the entitlement of their male counterparts (Articles 86-94). The law provides that both husband and wife can seek to end the marriage under certain conditions to be assessed by a family court (Articles 40-45). However, it also allows another form of divorce petition (Talaq) that may only be filed by the husband and does not require him to give any reason (Article 34-39).” [28e] (p14)

6.233 The report also noted that:

“Apart from these discriminatory provisions, the Personal Status Law is still generally seen as having been an achievement for women’s rights in a region in which women often do not have equal legal status to men. In December 2003 the IGC attempted to amend the Personal Status Law to place certain family matters under the control of religious authorities. However, after protests and lobbying by women’s organizations, the IGC reconsidered and later withdrew the resolution containing the proposal (Resolution 137).” [28e] (p14)

6.234 The FCO human rights report 2005 noted that:

“Newly formed Iraqi women’s groups continue to take an active role in advocating fair representation in Government bodies and calling attention to the rights of women in all spheres of Iraq’s democratic development.

The TAL enshrines fundamental human rights for men and women and states that the electoral law ‘shall aim to achieve the goal of having women constitute no less than one-quarter of the members of the national assembly’.” [66j] (p65)

[Return to Contents](#)

VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN

6.235 The AI report, February 2005, noted that “Women and girls in Iraq live in fear of violence as the conflict intensifies and insecurity spirals. Tens of thousands of civilians are reported to have been killed or injured in military operations or attacks by armed groups since the US-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003.” [28e] (p1)

6.236 The same report stated that “Violence and threats have directly affected women and have been specifically aimed at women. Armed opposition groups have targeted and killed several women political leaders and women’s right activists. Women detained by US forces have in some cases been subjected to sexual abuse, possibly including rape.” [28e] (p5)

6.237 The Dutch country report, December 2004, stated that “For women it is becoming increasingly difficult to travel without being accompanied by a male member of the family, in view of the risk of violence and abduction.” [71c] (p58) The British/Danish fact-finding mission report, October 2004, added that:

“A representative from a UN development agency in Amman stated that women have freedom of movement within Iraq however there is becoming an increased need for a male companion otherwise the woman is vulnerable. Women are generally safe in the Kurdish area however if they are escaping a family problem, the family will follow them wherever they go in Iraq. Women can leave Iraq without needing a male escort however they cannot obtain a passport without being accompanied by their guardian – this may be their father, brother, uncle or even son.” [30c] (p25)

6.238 The HRW report, January 2004, stated that “Iraqi police give a low priority to allegations of sexual violence and abduction. The victims of sexual violence confront indifference and sexism from Iraqi law enforcement personnel, and the U.S. military police are not filling the gap.” [15d] (p4) The Dutch country report, December 2004, noted that “The maximum prison sentence for rape and/or sexual violence is life. The maximum sentence for indecent assault is fifteen years’ imprisonment.” [71c] (p59)

6.239 An article in IWPR, dated 3 August 2005, noted that “Although there are no accurate statistics available, women’s groups say rape is increasing in Iraq – because of the lawlessness that is plaguing the country and the male-dominated nature of society.” [11t]

6.240 As mentioned in the AI report, February 2005:

“Women continue to be forced to wear headscarves by threats and harassment from members of Islamist groups. These groups have targeted women and girls who have not covered their heads, including non-Muslims, in the streets, in schools and in universities. As a consequence, the number of women and girls wearing a headscarf or veil has further increased.” [28e] (p5)

- 6.241 An IWPR article added, on 5 July 2005, that “Those who put on makeup or choose not to wear the veil fall victim to militants.” [11m] The same article noted that “Many women in Mosul, north of Baghdad, say insurgent groups are trying to impose Taliban-style restrictions on them and make the city a more conservative place.” [11m]
- 6.242 The AI report, dated 25 July 2005, noted that “Scores of women and girls have died in attacks by armed groups. In some cases, the deaths have been the result of indiscriminate attacks. In other cases, women campaigning to protect women’s rights have been threatened, kidnapped and killed by members of armed groups in Iraq.” [28c] (p13)

[Return to Contents](#)

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

- 6.243 As documented in the AI report, February 2005:

“For decades, violence in the family in Iraq has been under-reported. Most acts of violence in the home are carried out on women and girls by husbands, brothers, fathers or sons. The men are sometimes acting on the orders of family councils, gatherings of family or clan elders who decide the punishment for women deemed to have infringed traditional codes of honour. Tradition all too often serves as a pretext for acts of brutality against women for daring to choose how to lead their lives. An underlying cause of the violence, and closely bound up with it, is the discrimination that denies women equality with men in every area of life, including within the family.” [28e] (p8)

- 6.244 The AI report, February 2005, observed that “Most victims of violence in the family have no access to medical treatment.” [28e] (p12)
- 6.245 The IWPR reported, on 19 July 2005, that “Analysts say cases of domestic violence have been on the rise, but accurate statistics are difficult to gain because much of it goes unreported. Deteriorating living conditions, which have put additional stress on families, are considered to be a major factor.” [11e]
- 6.246 The same report stated that “This high level of acceptance of violence within marriage is supported by Iraqi legislation. According to the Penal Code of 1969, which is still in force, a husband who ‘disciplines’ his wife is exempt from criminal liability for doing so (Article 41(1)).” [28e] (p11-12)

- 6.247 The report also noted that:

“In recent years, organizations in Iraq have started working to provide support to women who have experienced violence in the home. Women’s rights activists have helped women to escape violent men and to hold their attackers to account. They confront the prejudices that hold women’s protests and complaints about ill-treatment to be shameful to the family. They are often

themselves faced with threats and assaults from the families of the women they support.” [28e] (p8)

6.248 The Dutch country report, December 2004, explained that “The extent to which women can avoid the threat of honour crimes through settling elsewhere in Iraq is impossible to determine with certainty. The extent to which the current security organisations in Iraq can offer protection to women exposed to (sexual) violence at the hands of third parties or honour crimes is also unknown.” [71c] (p59)

6.249 The British/Danish fact-finding mission report, October 2004, stated that:

“A diplomatic source in Amman stated that there are numerous NGO’s, which help women and that some are quite well organised. Some have been based in the Kurdish area since 1991 and have only recently moved down to central Iraq. There are women’s shelters in Iraq and they can, and do, arrange meetings between women and their communities. The source advised that people working for these organisations have received death threats. There are women’s shelters in Dohuk, Arbil and Sulaimaniyah. The shelter in Sulaimaniyah receives women and then sends them to the Arbil shelter. The Arbil shelter is not particularly large. The source advised that the shelter in Dohuk is fully functioning with no problems. The majority of women who seek protection from these shelters have had disagreements on marriage with their father. Mediation tends to be the traditional solution for the women’s organisations. Tribal justice is also an effective remedy for family and community problems, and the source advised that in the current unstable environment the traditional ways are surfacing. The source concluded that women are a vulnerable group in Iraq.” [30c] (p23)

6.250 The same report noted that “As well as 2 refuges in Baghdad and Arbil, there are also two in Hilla and Kirkuk.” [30c] (p24)

6.251 The report also mentioned that “Women are scared of the social stigma attached to the shelters, and often consider them a dead-end or a prison. The shelters are secret and few people know where they are. There are a number of drop-in refuges run by the US, and then the women are referred to the shelters. More often than not women eventually return to their families.” [30c] (p23)

[Return to Contents](#)

HONOUR KILLING/CRIME

6.252 The Dutch country report, December 2004, observed that “There have been several reports pointing to the fact that honour killings are occurring in various parts of Iraq.” [71c] (p59)

6.253 The AI report, February 2005, stated that “Most victims of ‘honour crimes’ are women and girls who are considered to have shamed the women’s families by immoral behaviour. Often the grounds for such an accusation are flimsy and no more than rumour. ‘Honour crimes’ are most often perpetrated by male members of the women’s families in the belief that such crimes restore their and the family’s honour.” [28e] (p8-9)

- 6.254 As mentioned in *The Times*, on 28 September 2003, Iraqi police reported that the number of honour killings of Iraqi women had increased rapidly in the months since the war, particularly in rural Sh'ite dominated areas where moral and religious codes were strictly observed. [5e]
- 6.255 Nevertheless, the AI report, February 2005, explained that:
- “There is insufficient information available to establish whether the incidence of ‘honour killings’ has increased over the past decades of armed conflict in Iraq. However, during the months of lawlessness following the 2003 US-led invasion, the perpetrators of ‘honour killings’ – like other criminals – were unlikely to be tried. The lack of a functioning judicial system during the months after the 2003 war contributed to an increase in the part played by tribal bodies in resolving conflicts, including in relation to ‘honour crimes’.” [28e] (p11)
- 6.256 *The Times* article, dated 28 September 2003, noted that women might be killed because they lost their virginity before marriage, had extra-marital affairs, or even because they were raped. Honour killings were treated leniently by the Iraqi judicial system, with perpetrators facing a maximum of one year in prison. [5e]
- 6.257 As noted in the AI report, February 2005, “Mutilation is another form of ‘honour crime’ used in northern Iraq as a punishment for people accused of a relationship considered to be illegitimate. ... Between 2000 and 2002 the Kurdish authorities amended the law so that courts could no longer find ‘honourable motivation’ a mitigating circumstance in ‘honour crimes’ against women. [28e] (p9)
- 6.258 The AI report, February 2005, noted that “Until legal reforms specifically to address ‘honour killings’ were introduced by the Kurdish authorities in northern Iraq between 2000 and 2002, the perpetrators of such killings were either never tried or received generally lenient sentences.” [28e] (p9)
- 6.259 As stated in the British/Danish fact-finding mission report, October 2004, “A diplomatic source in Amman informed the delegation that with regards to honour crimes the victim can go to the police however whether they got support from the police would rely on whom within the police you talk to and whether you have a contact via your family.” [30c] (p26)
- 6.260 The AI report, February 2005, observed that “In recent years several organizations have been established in northern Iraq that offer support for women at risk of violence, including survivors of attempted ‘honour killings’. One of these organizations is the Sulaimaniya-based Asuda Centre for Combating Violence against Women (Asuda Centre), which in August 2002 opened a shelter for women survivors of violence at a secret location.” [28e] (p10)

[Return to Contents](#)

FORCED MARRIAGE

- 6.261 The AI report, February 2005, stated that:

“Under Iraq’s Personal Status Law, forced marriage is prohibited and punishable by up to three years’ imprisonment (Article 9). The legal age for

marriage is 18 (Article 7). Anyone who wishes to marry under the age of 18 must meet certain conditions prescribed by law: being at least 15 years old, having the approval of parent or guardian, and having judicial permission (Article 8).

“However, in practice forced marriages, including of underage girls, continue to take place. Girls under the age of 15 are particularly vulnerable to forced marriage, which are arranged by the family in the vast majority of cases. Early pregnancy, frequently a result of child marriage, is associated with adverse health effects for both mother and child.” [28e] (p13)

- 6.262 The same report noted that “Many women and young girls in Iraq are denied the right to choose their marriage partner freely, and those who oppose forced marriage are at risk of violence or even of being killed.” [28e] (p12) The report also mentioned that:

“In northern Iraq, the practice of ‘Jin be Jin’ contributes to the high incidence of forced marriage. It involves the exchange of girls – the girl from one family marrying the son of another (or from the same extended) family, while his sister is given in marriage in return – to avoid having to pay ‘bride prices’ for the daughters. Similar marriage arrangements take place in other regions of Iraq.” [28e] (p12)

[Return to Contents](#)

FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION (FGM)

- 6.263 Several reports noted that the German NGO, Wadi, conducted a survey of 40 villages in the Germian region of northern Iraq. The survey found that about 60 per cent of women in that area had undergone female genital mutilation. [18h] [28e] (p11) [22c]

- 6.264 The AI report, February 2005, stated that “In some rural areas in northern Iraq, FGM appears to be widespread. ... Areas where FGM seems to be common are within the region where the Sorani Kurdish dialect is spoken, including around Halabja, Germian and Kirkuk.” [28e] (p11) However, the AI report, February 2005, stated that “In a 2003 survey on women’s health in southern Iraq, FGM was not identified as a common practice.” [28e] (p11)

- 6.265 The AI report, February 2005, noted that:

“There are indications that the practice has been decreasing. A Norwegian journalist and a Kurdish writer from northern Iraq interviewed numerous people about FGM – including, doctors, women’s rights activists and Muslim clerics – in the course of research in late 2003. Two chief physicians at the Sulaimaniya University Hospital and at the Soresh Maternity Hospital reported that in recent years the number of girls brought into hospital with haemorrhages caused by FGM has decreased. The doctors saw this development as an indication that the practice of FGM had declined. Although FGM is usually carried out on girls, the doctor at the Soresh Maternity Hospital reported that, in the course of her 25-year career as a gynaecologist, she recalled about 10 cases in which she or a colleague had carried out FGM on a married adult woman at the request of the husband.” [28e] (p11)

- 6.266 As noted in the RFE/RL report, dated 21 January 2005, some local women's organisations, as well as NGOs such as Wadi, have campaigned against the practice of FGM in northern Iraq for more than a decade. [18h] [22c]
- 6.267 An article by Womens News, dated 1 August 2004, reported that "There are now some penalties for practicing FGM in Iraqi Kurdistan. Certified midwives caught operating on girls lose their certification. But activists admit threats of legal action rarely have any effect on traditional practitioners in the villages, who work in the secrecy of their homes." [69a] (p2)

[Return to Contents](#)

PROSTITUTION

- 6.268 The British/Danish fact-finding mission report, October 2004, stated that trafficking, drugs and prostitution was common in Iraq and was more noticeable in Baghdad. [30c] (p23) The report explained that "Girls between the ages of 8 – 15 years old are prostituting themselves, women with babies and children are observed begging in Baghdad. The system is very well organised by Mafia groups; prostitutes live in hotels, and minibuses take them to the streets. They give money to their organisers in exchange for food and shelter." [30c] (p23)
- 6.269 IWPR noted, on 27 July 2005, that "The easing of travel restrictions that allows Arabs to travel more freely to Kurdish areas – which are considered to be safer than other parts of the country – has brought more prostitutes and customers to the north." [11o]

[Return to Contents](#)

SINGLE WOMEN

- 6.270 As mentioned in the British/Danish fact-finding mission report, October 2004, "Sources in the Ministry of Displacement and Migration (MoDM) in Baghdad informed the delegation that single women returning to Iraq from abroad were in a less favourable position compared with women travelling with their family." [30c] (p27)
- 6.271 The same report noted that "UNHCR in Amman noted that single women have a more vulnerable situation. Families can protect them, however tribes can target them just as easily as they can protect them." [30c] (p27)
- 6.272 The report also mentioned that:

"A humanitarian organisation working in the region advised the delegation that there are plenty of women's associations that can provide basic needs for those women who are the single head of household. The source advised that it is difficult for women to live alone and that the government are currently working to improve that. The source stated that women who had married non-Iraqis would be unlikely to stay within Iraq.

An UN development agency in Amman stated that in the rural areas it is not possible for women to be single, and they would be supported by families or in the case of their husband's death, they would marry the husband's brother.

Women can refuse to marry the brother, however this makes the situation much harder for the woman.” [30c] (p27)

[Return to Contents](#)

WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN POLITICAL AND PUBLIC LIFE

- 6.273 As noted in an article by the German NGO, Wadi, “Several laws were passed in favour of women encouraging them to participate in the nation’s development and establishing equal rights in the field of education, health, and employment, but they were never enforced or were cancelled, like the majority of the laws passed by other bodies than the CCR. Rape, abuse and torture were practised on a daily base by the Iraqi Security.” [68a]
- 6.274 UNHCR, in a report, dated August 2004, noted that, “The United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) is currently trying to implement a strategy to support women leaders in Iraq. UNIFEM works with the Interim Iraqi Government and has assigned a gender focal point to each Ministry. A Ministry of Women’s Affairs has also been created.” [40b] (p6)
- 6.275 As documented in the Dutch country report, December 2004, “The TAL stipulates that from August of this year 25% of the total number of seats in the National Conference and the future parliament must be held by women.” [71c] (p56) The same report noted that “Women are under-represented in the political establishment on a national level.... There have also been reports of religious leaders and groups expressing protests and uttering threats against women because of their aversion to women participating in the political and social process.” [71c] (p56-57)
- 6.276 However, the FCO article (accessed on 28 February 2005) stated that “One third of candidates in the 30 January [2005] elections were women, to meet the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) target of no less than one-quarter women’s representation in the TNA. Figures obtained from the Independent Electoral Commission for Iraq indicate that at least 86 women were elected to the TNA, or 31% of the total seats.” [66i]
- 6.277 The FCO human rights report 2005 stated that “Newly-formed Iraqi women’s groups continue to take an active role in advocating fair representation in government bodies and calling attention to the rights of women in all spheres of Iraq’s democratic development.” [66j] (p65)
- 6.278 The report also noted that:
- “Over the last year Iraqi women have organised conferences in Baghdad and in the regions to discuss women’s political participation and human rights issues. ... Numerous women’s centres have been established throughout the country. These centres offer opportunities for women to acquire skills that will open up employment or other economic opportunities and take part in programmes that will give them a better understanding of their rights and how to participate in the decisions that affect their lives.” [66j] (p65)
- 6.279 The AI report, February 2005, noted that “The widespread fear of violence affecting all Iraqis has restricted the participation of women in civil society since

the 2003 war, particularly in education, employment and political decision-making.” [28e] (p5)

- 6.280 As mentioned in the British/Danish fact-finding mission report, October 2004, “An UN development agency in Amman stated that the situation for women is economically better in the rural areas. In the cities there is a real economic problem, however women do have access to the job market.” [30c] (p22)
- 6.281 The British/Danish fact-finding mission was advised by a UN representative “Nursing and teaching have the highest proportion of women. The source added that 5 to 6 women are Ministers and that for the region this figure is excellent. More women than ever are reaching senior professional levels. The source added that from a legalistic perspective no barriers existed with regards to women’s access to the labour market.” [30c] (p22)

[Return to Contents](#)

CHILDREN

- 6.282 As mentioned in the UNICEF report (accessed on 23 March 2004) “Almost half of the population is under the age of 18.” [27c] According to Save the Children an estimated 4.2 million were under the age of five. [64a]
- 6.283 The same UNICEF report observed that “Even before the most recent conflict began, many children were highly vulnerable to disease and malnutrition. One in four children under five years of age is chronically malnourished.” [27c]
- 6.284 The IWPR article, dated 19 July 2005, mentioned that “Last month, IWPR reported on an increase in child abuse across the country with minors being beaten by their fathers and even suffocated to death by their mothers.” [11e]

[Return to Contents](#)

ORPHANS AND STREET CHILDREN

- 6.285 The RFE/RL article, dated 21 June 2004, observed that many children lost their parents during the war and the frequent violence that continued. Many others were thrown out of the state-run orphanages that ceased to function after the collapse of the Saddam regime. [22d]
- 6.286 An IRIN news article, dated 1 February 2005, reported that about six per cent of Iraqi males between 10 and 14 years of age were found to be working. [18f] The same report added that “Some 35 per cent of child workers were unpaid by their employers.” [18f]
- 6.287 An article by RFE/RL, dated 21 June 2004, stated that “Thousands of homeless children are living on the streets of the Iraqi capital Baghdad.” [22d] The same article added that “The beggars are children, some as young as five years old.” [22d]
- 6.288 On 8 January 2004, IWPR reported that a specialist unit had been set up to address the alarming numbers of kidnapping for ransom of children. A spokesman for the unit estimated that there were 100 kidnapping gangs operating in Baghdad and two neighbouring governorates and that they had

carried out 350 kidnappings in October and November 2003 alone. The number of incidents was said to be falling but the kidnap gangs still exerted fear over Baghdad. [111]

6.289 An article by *Al-Adala*, dated 4 March 2004, stated that “An official in the Ministry of Human Rights claimed to have (sic) evidence that 100 homeless children have been raped in the Betawiyeen neighbourhood in Baghdad.” The article added that “An official in the Ministry of Labour said there was an obvious slackness on the part of the Ministry of Interior, which is responsible for identifying homeless children and reporting them to the Ministry of Labour. For its part, the Ministry of Interior claims the Ministry of Labour has refused to receive the homeless into its shelters.” [46a]

6.290 An IRIN news article, dated 8 August 2005, reported that:

“Following the conflict in 2003, there has been an increase in the number of commercial sex workers (CSWs) in the country, especially among teenagers, according to local officials.

“This increase is attributed to economic pressure faced by families countrywide and the presence of new prostitution rings that have sprung up since the invasion. With society in turmoil and a raft of other serious issues to address, child protection has not been uppermost in the priorities of the transitional government.” [18k] (p1)

6.291 The same article noted that the adolescents were also often under the threat of street gangs. [18k] (p1)

6.292 The article also mentioned that “Based on information supplied by the Ministry of Labour, two small local NGOs are trying to help the child sex workers. One (sic) of them, Iraqi Peace and Better Future (IPBF), has collected the names of more than 50 teenage boys who say they cannot leave the trade because of threats. Few cases have been resolved, however.” [18k] (p3)

[Return to Contents](#)

CHILDREN IN PRISON

6.293 The HRW report, January 2005, stated that “Human Rights Watch continues to receive reports of children being held together with adults in detention facilities under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior. The children include both criminal suspects and others suspected of having taken part in clashes against government forces, including those suspected of links with the Mahdi Army. [15g] (p62)

6.294 The HRW report also mentioned that under the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), Article 52(2) of Iraq’s Juveniles Welfare Law and orders promulgated by the CPA on the management of detention facilities, children should be detained separately from adults. [15g] (p63)

6.295 However, the same HRW report noted that:

“The requirement for the separation of child detainees has not been followed in some cases. Human Rights Watch found that such cases sometimes arose

when police apprehended children as part of a large sweep in a given area, where they arrested scores and sometimes several hundred people as part of the government's efforts to crack down on violent crime. Police invariably conduct such sweeps without warrants, and children are sometimes caught up." [15g] (p63)

[Return to Contents](#)

HOMOSEXUALS

6.296 An IRIN news article, dated 8 August 2005, stated that "Under Shari'ah or Islamic law, homosexual practise is a religious crime that carries the death sentence. The transition constitution in place in Iraq for the past two years does not address homosexuality." [18k] (p2) The International Lesbian and Gay Association (ILGA) stated in July 2000 that "Homosexual behaviour between consenting adults is not an offence under Iraq's Penal Code." [53a]

6.297 However, an IRIN news article, dated 8 August 2005, noted that "Whether or not homosexuality is illegal, it is a taboo subject in Iraq and homosexual acts are strongly condemned by Muslims." [18k] (p2)

6.298 The ILGA noted, in July 2000, that "Under Article 395 of the 1969 Penal Code, the age of consent to sodomy was set at 18. Where the minor is between 15 and 18 years old and does not resist the act, the adult may be punished with imprisonment of up to 7 years. Where the minor is 14 years or below, the punishment is a maximum of 10 years." [53a]

6.299 A Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board stated, on 5 September 2003, that:

"An article on homosexuals in the American army during the Iraqi conflict, published in 2003 on the AtomicQueens.com Website, cited the remarks of a gay man in Baghdad who said in an interview that gays are treated better in Iraq than in other Arab countries, and that he had never witnessed overt gay abuse in Iraq. He nevertheless went on to describe Iraq as a 'complex and repressive' society whose eyes are shut to the reality of gays and which uses 'homophobic proclamations against political opponents, rather than to target gays'." [77a]

6.300 The report added that:

"An article on the status of homosexuals in Iraq since the fall of Saddam Hussein, published in the Atlanta magazine *Southern Voice*, quoted a gay American-Arab journalist who frequently travels to the Middle East as saying that the family unit dictates the direction of a country in the Middle East, that families and tribal communities have widely differing views on individual rights, and that thinking 'any government change in the short term will secure the rights of gays and lesbians in Iraq is unbelievably naïve'." [77a]

[Return to Contents](#)

BA'ATH PARTY MEMBERS

6.301 According to an article in the *Washington Post*, dated 3 February 2005, the Ba'ath party had an estimated one million to 2.5 million members. [16d] The

same article noted that membership of the Ba'ath party was an 'unavoidable fact of life' during the Saddam regime. "It was required for most civil service jobs, and almost everyone who wanted to go to college had to join." [16d]

- 6.302 The AI report, dated 25 July 2005, noted that "In early April 2003, the US-led military intervention in Iraq, which had started just days earlier on 18 March, ended the 25-year rule of Saddam Hussain and the even longer rule of the Ba'ath party." [28c] (p2)
- 6.303 The CFR report, dated 7 April 2005, added that "In the early months of the U.S.-led occupation, authorities banned the Baath Party and removed all senior Baathists from the government and security forces. But U.S. officials began to shift their strategy in April 2004 and, in a bid to strengthen the officer corps, allowed some senior ex-Baathists to return to the security forces." [8b] (p1)
- 6.304 The AI report, dated 25 July 2005, noted that "Many of those involved in the insurgency or in armed groups are believed to be former army officers, Ba'athists and members of the various security agencies of the previous regime." [28c] (p4)

[Return to Contents](#)

DE-BA'ATHIFICATION

- 6.305 The RFE/RL report, dated 22 October 2004, informed that the Ba'ath party restructured under the name 'Al-Islah' (the reform). It was being led by former regime loyalists, including Tahir Jalil al-Habush, the former director of Iraqi intelligence; former Republican Guard commander Sayf al-Rawi; and Hani and Rafi'a Tulfah, relatives of Hussein. [22e] (p9)
- 6.306 The Associated Press report, dated 17 February 2005, stated that "The Shiite-dominated United Iraqi Alliance, which took 48 per cent of the vote in the Jan. 30 [2005] national elections, has made weeding out Baath Party members part of its platform. The policy has raised concerns among Sunnis, who see it as a way to make sure they have no positions in a new government." [65b]

[Return to Contents](#)

REPRISALS AGAINST BA'ATH PARTY MEMBERS

- 6.307 An AI report, dated 18 March 2004, stated that former members of the Ba'ath party and security force members were targeted in revenge attacks. [24d]
- 6.308 Sources told the 2003 UK-Danish fact-finding mission only those former Ba'athists who were known to have abused their position were being targeted for reprisals; these would mostly be former members of the intelligence services, the security services or Fedayeen Saddam, but according to one source, even in these categories only individuals known to have committed abuses would be targeted. This could however mean that relatively low ranking Ba'ath Party members could be at risk because they had operated at street level and were therefore known to their victims or their victims' families or associates. [30a]
- 6.309 The *Duluth News Tribune* article, dated 26 February 2005, also noted that:

“Especially besieged are Shiite Baathists who live in predominantly Shiite or mixed Sunni-Shiite neighborhoods, where targets are more accessible than in homogenous Sunni strongholds. Militiamen have demanded that former Baathists fly white flags to atone for their party membership and let their neighbors know they have renounced their pasts. Those who refuse often end up dead.” [60a]

6.310 Nevertheless, the Dutch country report, December 2004, stated that “The assumption is that members of the former Ba’ath Party run proportionately less risk of meeting with acts of violence than those who are believed to be co-operating with the Interim Government or the MNF.” [71c] (p61)

6.311 A Knight Ridder article, dated 25 February 2005, stated that “Shiite Muslim assassins are killing former members of Saddam Hussein’s mostly Sunni Muslim regime with impunity in a wave of violence that, combined with the ongoing Sunni insurgency, threatens to escalate into civil war.” [13a]

6.312 The same article noted that:

“The war between Shiite vigilantes and former Baath Party members is seldom investigated and largely overshadowed by the insurgency. The U.S. military is preoccupied with hunting down suicide bombers and foreign terrorists, and Iraq’s new Shiite leaders have little interest in prosecuting those who kill their former oppressors or their enemies in the insurgency.” [13a]

6.313 The report also noted that “Since the Jan. 30 elections [2005], Shiite militants have stepped up their campaign to exact street justice from men who were part of the regime that oppressed and massacred members of their sect for decades. While Shiite politicians turn a blind eye, assassins are working their way through a hit list of Saddam’s former security and intelligence personnel, according to Iraqi authorities, Sunni politicians and interviews with the families of those who’ve been targeted.” [13a]

[Return to Contents](#)

THREATS TO FAMILIES OF BA’ATH PARTY MEMBERS

6.314 The UK/Danish fact-finding mission 2003 noted that there is little evidence of widespread deliberate targeting of the families of Ba’ath Party members in reprisal attacks and the families of Ba’ath Party officials or people associated with the former regime would not be targeted in revenge for crimes committed during the Saddam regime. [30a]

6.315 *The Guardian* report, dated 20 June 2003, and an article by albawaba.com, on 1 July 2003, observed that there is however evidence that the family of Ba’ath Party members are being caught up in attacks on the members themselves. [6ag] [79a]

[Return to Contents](#)

THE TRIBES

- 6.316 As noted in the British/Danish fact-finding mission report, October 2004, tribes are very significant in Iraq. Most of the political parties in the country were developed from tribal practices, including the PUK and the KDP. [30c] (p17)
- 6.317 The CFR report, dated 14 November 2003, noted that “Tribes are regional power-holders, and tribal sheiks are often respected members of Iraqi communities.” [8c] (p1) The British/Danish fact-finding mission report, October 2004, explained that Iraqis often approached tribal-leaders to solve various problems in regard of criminal cases and problems between members of different tribes. [30c] (p17) The report stated that “The system seems to be surprisingly effective.” [30c] (p17) However, the same report also noted that “Tribes can resolve problems, but in the same way they can exclude people. ... The conflict- solving system of the tribes is much more effective than the police and courts.” [30c] (p17)
- 6.318 The British/Danish fact-finding mission report, October 2004, stated that:

“Sources in the Ministry of Displacement and Migration (MoDM) in Baghdad informed the delegation that in particular in the countryside, the tribal system worked well as a conflict solving institution. A decision of a sheik (tribal leader) was normally respected by everyone, even by the defeated party. Representatives for the Iraqi Ministry of Justice in Baghdad stated that tribal justice was most common in the southern parts of Iraq. The sources characterized tribal justice as medieval but still a reality in some parts of Iraq.” [30c] (p17)
- 6.319 The CFR report, dated 14 November 2003, stated that “Tribes appear to have limited influence in Baghdad. In smaller cities and rural areas, however – especially in the Shiite-dominated south – press reports indicate that many tribal sheiks have emerged as intermediaries between occupying authorities and the Iraqi people.” [8c] (p2)
- 6.320 The British/Danish fact-finding mission report, October 2004, informed that both UNHCR in Amman and an international humanitarian organisation stated that the tribal conflict solving system was active and strong all over Iraq. [30c] (p17) **(See also section 5 on Traditional and religious law)**
- 6.321 The IWPR article, dated 20 October 2003, stated that people had also been exploiting the tribal arbitration mechanism whereby tribal leaders would mediate between the families of victims and perpetrators to try to arrive at a figure for compensation, or ‘blood money’. In the aftermath of the conflict, tribal leaders had been ‘swamped’ with false claims from people trying to earn a few dollars and openly expressed concern at the damage that tribal-based criminality was having on their communities. [11v]
- 6.322 The same article noted that the police were reportedly reluctant to intervene for fear of reprisals from other tribal members and victims may have been reluctant to report crime for the same reason. [11v]

[Return to Contents](#)

PERCEIVED COLLABORATORS TO THE COALITION AND IRAQI AUTHORITIES

- 6.323 The AI report, dated 25 July 2005, noted that:

“Armed groups fighting against the MNF and Iraqi government forces in Iraq do not have recognized political wings or official spokespersons inside or outside the country. However, some Sunni religious entities and personalities appear to exercise influence over some of the groups. Such entities and personalities generally consider that Iraq is still under occupation by the MNF and that fighting against these forces and targeting them for killing is legitimate. Some of them also consider targeting ‘collaborators’, Iraqis and non-Iraqis, as legitimate.” [28c] (p5)

6.324 The same report stated:

“Just before, during and after the US-led war on Iraq a few prominent Muslim scholars and religious institutions outside Iraq issued fatwas (religious edicts) or statements giving their interpretation of Islam’s position on the war and the reaction of Muslims. ... Fatwas and statements by prominent Muslim figures before the war and during the first few months of Iraq’s occupation did not clarify what forms the resistance should take and whether civilians, Iraqis or foreign nationals, who may be perceived as cooperating with the occupying forces, should also be targeted. They did not acknowledge limitations, such as those provided in international humanitarian law, on methods that may be used.” [28c] (p6)

6.325 The UNHCR in a Return Advisory, dated September 2004, noted that:

“While most security incidents prior to the handover directly targeted soldiers and or nationals of countries participating in the Coalition Forces, threats and attacks over the past six months have been increasingly aimed at Iraqi civilians employed by the UN, NGOs and foreign contractors as well as foreign nationals who work for any of the above. Furthermore, Iraqi intellectuals, medical staff, doctors, journalists, artists, as well as anyone associated with or perceived as supporting the new Interim Iraqi Government (IIG) have also become frequent targets of both harassment and violence. Members of the Iraqi police force, as well as potential police recruits are often the victims of lethal attacks.” [40a] (p2)

6.326 The AI report, dated 25 July 2005, added that “Hundreds of Iraqis have been killed by armed groups because they were perceived as ‘traitors’ or ‘collaborators’. Among them have been translators, drivers and other civilians working for the MNF, civil servants, government officials, judges and journalists. The attacks have sometimes resulted in the killing of people accompanying the ‘targets,’ including children.” [28c] (p7)

6.327 The same report also noted that “The armed groups are resentful of Kurds and Shi’as for generally having supported the military intervention in Iraq and for cooperating with the MNF.” [28c] (p8)

6.328 The AI report, dated 25 July 2005, however, noted that “On 26 September 2004, the IAMS [International Association of Muslim Scholars] denounced the kidnapping and killing of civilians.” [28c] (p7)

6.329 Furthermore, the IWPR article, dated 10 August 2004, observed that an unofficial Islamic court imposes harsh sentences on Iraqis who work for the Americans and their allies. The report stated that “An ‘Islamic resistance’ court based in western Iraq has begun to order harsh punishments against Iraqis

accused of collaborating with so-called foreign occupiers, inhabitants in the region said.” [11k] (p1-3)

[Return to Contents](#)

6.C HUMAN RIGHTS – OTHER ISSUES

TREATMENT OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS (NGOs)

6.330 As mentioned in the USSD report 2004:

“A number of domestic and international human rights groups generally operated without government restriction other than security constraints, investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases. While NGO advocacy is still in its infancy, government officials were generally cooperative and responsive to their views. The Ministry of Human Rights met regularly with NGO leaders.” [2a] (p11)

6.331 Voices of Wilderness, a US non governmental organisation noted, on 2 January 2004, that “Order 45 issued on November 2003 by Governor Bremmer requires all organisations of Iraqi civil society and the international NGOs to register and undergo forms of control and scrutiny. This order is a serious impediment which violates the right of freedom of association.” [35a] (p1) The same article added that “We also demand that, as contemplated in Resolution 1483, the activities of the international NGOs should be coordinated by the United Nations and not ‘caged’ within the restriction of Order 45.” [35a] (p2)

6.332 The USSD report 2004 noted that “Terrorists throughout the country have systematically killed NGO and civic leaders.” [2a] (p11)

6.333 The AI report, dated 25 July 2005, mentioned that:

“The UN and several humanitarian agencies have been targeted by car bombs or suicide attacks. The attacks have been aimed at the headquarters of these organizations, mostly in Baghdad, but there have been similar attacks in other cities and towns. International and national aid workers have also been victims of kidnapping and fatal attacks, particularly when travelling in vehicles that carry the organization’s logo.

“Such attacks, as well as hostage-taking, have forced these organizations and agencies to leave the country or to severely reduce their operations. Most, if not all, have withdrawn their international staff. They are now operating from neighbouring countries, particularly Jordan, waiting for an improvement in the security situation.” [28c] (p10)

[Return to Contents](#)

INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS (IDPs)

6.334 As documented in the Global IDP Project report, dated 11 July 2005:

“Decades of conflict and human rights abuses have caused the displacement of more than a million people within Iraq. The majority of internally displaced

people (IDPs) were forcibly displaced under the previous regime, which targeted communities perceived to be in political opposition as well as using forcible displacement as one of its tactics to strengthen control of resource-rich areas.” [50a] (p1)

6.335 The FCO human rights report 2005 mentioned that:

“Before the April 2003 conflict an estimated 800,000 people were internally displaced throughout northern Iraq and an additional 100,000 – 300,000 people were displaced in the centre and south. Obtaining reliable figures since the conflict has not been possible, due to the security situation. An estimated 900,000 Iraqis are considered to be refugees or in a refugee-like situation in countries neighbouring Iraq and beyond. According to the UNHCR around 400,000 Iraqi refugees returned to Iraq before September 2004, either by making their own arrangements or with assistance from Iraqi institutions, regional authorities and international organisations. Returnees face many challenges, including security and finding employment and housing.” [66j] (p65)

6.336 The Dutch country report, December 2004, noted that:

“In broad terms internally displaced persons can be broken down into three categories. The first category is primarily made up of Marsh Arabs, who were driven out of their original homes in the south of Iraq in the nineties by the previous regime, and the Arabs and Kurds who had to leave their areas under the arabisation policy. ... The group is found mainly in the south of Iraq (Basra, Maysan and Dhi'Qar) and in the KRG areas. The second category primarily consists of Arabs from central Iraq (especially Diyala and Salah Al-Din). They were forced to settle elsewhere under the arabisation policy and are now being forced to leave these areas. ... The third category of internally displaced persons is made up of families fleeing temporary violent conflagrations, such as in Fallujah, Kerbala, Tell-Afar, Kufa and Samarra. These people generally return home as soon as the situation so permits.” [71c] (p70)

6.337 The Forced Migration Review, January 2005, added that “Kurds comprise the largest number of displaced Iraqis. Almost all Iraqi Kurds have been refugees or IDPs at some time in their lives.” [49a]

6.338 The Global IDP Project report, dated 11 July 2005, noted that:

“Since the 2003 conflict, new population displacements have occurred primarily as a result of fighting between the Multi-National Force-Iraq, MNF/I (formerly the US Coalition Forces) and Iraqi armed insurgent groups. At the end of 2004 and in the first half of 2005, hundreds of thousands of Iraqis have been forced to flee their homes, mainly in Al Anbar province, where multiple military operations have been launched by the MNF/I forces.” [50a] (p1)

6.339 The same report also noted that:

“In the first half of 2005, population displacement occurred in predominantly Sunni areas of central Iraq where MNF/I say the insurgent strongholds are. MNF/I forces launched military offensives in Fallujah, Ar Ramadi and Al Qa'im, all cities located in Al Anbar province. ... Other cities that have been targeted by military operations and fighting causing internal displacement in the first six months of 2005 include Samarra, Mosul and Kirkuk.” [50a] (p4)

- 6.340 The same report added that “Displacements have generally been of a temporary nature, with IDPs moving back when fighting lessened, with some exceptions, including the siege of Fallujah in November 2004 which has resulted in prolonged displacement.” **[50a] (p4)**
- 6.341 The USCRI report 2005 stated that “Chain displacement occurred when returnees reclaimed property or residences lost under the previous regime. Housing shortages exacerbated tensions as the displaced vied for space and demographic representation in contested areas of the country.” **[44a] (p2)**
- 6.342 The Global IDP Project report, dated 11 July 2005, stated that “At the same time, nearly half a million IDPs are estimated to have returned, although many have found themselves in a situation of continued displacement because their homes are destroyed or because they did not own property in their areas of origin.” **[50a] (p1)**
- 6.343 A survey undertaken by UNHCR in the lower southern provinces found that of 56,700 returning refugees surveyed, 65 per cent had returned from their country of asylum to a situation of internal displacement. The survey also found that nearly seven per cent of the population in southern Iraq live in displacement or have recently returned from displacement.” **[50a] (p5-6)**
- 6.344 IRIN news reported, on 4 January 2004, that thousands of IDPs live in tents or mud shacks, with no income with which to buy their way out of the situation and totally dependent on the monthly food rations under the Oil-for-Food programme. **[18j] (p3-4)**
- 6.345 The UNSC report, dated 7 June 2005, noted that “Particular attention has focused on the material and protection needs of internally displaced persons resulting from conflict. ... Food, water, non-food items such as mattresses, tents and water storage containers, and essential medical supplies were distributed to families in need and to local health facilities.” **[38b] (p11)**
- 6.346 The same report mentioned that “A total of 298,132 internally displaced persons throughout Iraq benefited from the emergency humanitarian response (totalling \$2.1 million) through the distribution of non-food items and canned food for immediate consumption to complement the shortages in the public distribution system.” **[38b] (p11)**
- 6.347 The UNHCR global report 2004 noted that “A number of IDPs and refugees returned only to suffer renewed internal displacement, due to insufficient local absorption capacities and ongoing conflict, and are now staying with relatives or in public buildings with little or no basic facilities.” **[40d] (p326)**
- 6.348 The same report stated that “The three northern Governorates still held three-quarters of a million IDPs despite efforts by local authorities to enhance the absorption capacity of certain return areas. By the end of 2004, there were still 1.2 million persons displaced throughout Iraq. In addition, large numbers are believed to have left Iraq in the course of 2004, mainly to Syria and Jordan.” **[40d] (p327)**

[Return to Contents](#)

DE-ARABISATION

6.349 As mentioned in the HRW report, August 2004, “Since 1975, the former Iraqi government forcibly displaced hundreds of thousands of Kurds, Turkomans, and Assyrians from their homes, and brought in Arab settlers to replace them, under a policy known as ‘Arabization.’” [15q] (p1) The HRW report, August 2004, stated that:

“Kurds and other non-Arabs in Kirkuk faced constant harassment, and were forced to choose between immediate expulsion or joining the Ba’th Party, changing their ethnic identity (commonly referred to as ‘nationality correction’) to Arab, and ‘volunteering’ for paramilitary forces such as the Jerusalem Army (Jaysh al-Quds). Families who refused to comply were issued expulsion orders requiring them to leave their homes and were then expelled to the Kurdish-controlled areas. The government of Iraq expelled approximately 120,000 persons from Kirkuk and other areas under Iraqi government control during the 1990s in furtherance of its Arabization policies. Arabs were encouraged to settle in the north through financial incentives and subsidized home prices.” [15q] (p2)

6.350 The Dutch country report, December 2004, stated that “After the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, returning Kurds started to demand their original homes back from the Arabs now living there. The KRG [Kurdish Regional Government] encouraged Kurds to return to the area around Kirkuk in order to boost the political role of the Kurdish in the area.” [71c] (p70) This was also reported in the IRIN news article, dated 23 September 2004. [18e]

6.351 The USCRI report 2005 noted that:

“Returning Kurds, displaced by the Arabization policies of the former regime, themselves displaced thousands of Arabs who then took refuge in military bases in the hotly contested city of Kirkuk. Kurdish political factions reportedly distributed property titles to Kurds over other ethnic groups to promote Kurdish claims to the oil-rich area. This circumvented the newly-formed Iraqi Property Claims Commission established in January to resolve claims resulting from the Arabization policies. Coalition forces aggressively searched, detained without charge, and accused newly displaced Arabs in the central towns of Tameem, Ninewa, and Diyala of association with the former regime or terrorists.” [44a] (p2)

6.352 The HRW report, August 2004, explained that:

“While the majority of Arabs who had come north during the Arabization campaign fled their homes without facing direct threats or violence, a significant number who chose to remain in their homes did face direct threats and intimidation from returning Kurds, although Human Rights Watch is not aware of many cases in which such threats materialized into violence or killings. In almost all cases, returning Kurds left pre-Arabization Arab populations alone and focused their threats and intimidation on the Arabs who had come north during the Arabization campaign.” [15q] (p34)

6.353 The Forced Migration Review, January 2005, stated that “While many [Arabs] have returned south to former towns and villages, others – without communities to return to or who fear insecurity in places of origin – remain in makeshift camps in the north, particularly around Mosul.” [49a]

LAND AND PROPERTY RIGHTS

6.354 The Global IDP Project report, dated 11 July 2005, noted that “The resolution of property and land disputes remains one of the key steps to establishing durable solutions for the displaced in Iraq and is also a crucial step in the prevention of further displacement.” [50a] (p10)

6.355 UNHCR, in a document dated August 2004, observed that:

“The Iraq Property Claims Commission (IPCC) is the organization set up to reinstate peoples’ property rights that were taken away by widespread property confiscations by the former Iraqi Government.... The Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) played a lead role in drafting the Statute that established the IPCC and its boundaries.... The IPCC process is open to all persons, or their heirs, who have been wrongfully deprived of real property (e.g. house, apartment or parcel of land) or an interest in real property (e.g. right to farm the land) because of actions taken by the former governments between July 17, 1968 and April 9, 2003 and or actions which can be attributed to them. The latter includes actions carried out by Ba’ath party members and relatives of senior officials of the government or Ba’ath party.” [40b] (p13)

6.356 The Global IDP Project report, dated 11 July 2005, noted that “However, following a revision of the IPCC mandate in June 2004, Arab settlers who lost the properties allocated to them by the former regime as a result of the return of the previous owners after 18 March 2003 were also enabled to submit claims to the IPCC by 30 June 2005.” [50a] (p10)

6.357 The same report stated that:

“The slowness of the IPCC process has raised concerns that land and property disputes might escalate into further conflict and more displacement. While formally established in January 2004, the IPCC was not functioning until July 2004. ... During this period, UNHCR expressed concern about reports that Kurdish local authorities had in some cases redistributed land as well as provided incentives for Kurds to return to claim land in the Kirkuk area. As of end-May 2005, the IPCC had received over 64,000 claims and adjudicated around 5,000. The IPCC continues to face numerous challenges in carrying out its mandate, including technical and operational obstacles. Effective implementation of the property restitution process is also affected by the lack of alternative accommodation which poses an obstacle for people who may be asked to leave the property they are currently occupying. IPCC offices have received threats of violence due to the contentiousness of property and land claims in some areas.” [50a] (p10-11)

6.358 The same Global IDP Project report mentioned that “IDPs who are not able to submit their property applications before the deadline will still be able to file their claims to local courts.” [50a] (p11)

REFUGEE CAMPS

- 6.359 The HRW report, August 2004, stated that “For the Kurds who did own homes in Kirkuk and had them seized by the government, the situation was often intolerable. Like the other displaced, they found themselves living in mud homes without running water in camps like Benislawa, in the knowledge that an Arab was living in much more comfortable surroundings in their former home in Kirkuk.” [15q] (p52)
- 6.360 A BBC article, dated 14 December 2004, reported that “The UNHCR is to close several camps for Iraqi refugees in Iran because more than half of the 202,000 exiles have returned home.” [4u]

[Return to Contents](#)

TREATMENT OF ASYLUM SEEKERS

- 6.361 As noted in the USSD report 2004, “The law does not provide for the granting of asylum or refugee status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol, and the Government has not established a system for providing protection to refugees.” [2a] (p9)
- 6.362 However, the US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI) report 2005, stated that “Iraq continued to host three significant groups of refugees: Palestinians (for more than 35 years); Iranians (mostly Kurds, since the Iran-Iraq War from 1980 to 1988), and Kurds from Turkey (since the first Gulf War from 1990 to 1991).” [44a]
- 6.363 The UNHCR global report 2004 stated that:
- “More than 23,000 refugees inside Iraq were provided with protection and assistance, in camps, villages and urban areas. Direct beneficiaries included: 13,000 Turks, 7,060 Iranian Kurds, 2,400 Palestinians and 540 Syrians. The local authorities in the Governorate of Sulaymaniyah expressed their readiness to allow Iranian Kurdish refugees (some 270 families) from the Al Tash Camp to move in, and allocated land for settlement. In 2004, 47 Iranian refugees benefited from resettlement (mainly family reunification).” [40d] (p328)
- 6.364 UNHCR added, in August 2004, that “Refugees have witnessed a marked deterioration in their access to basic services and other humanitarian assistance. In addition, as regards respect for their basic human rights, the situation changes according to groups and regions, but is overall far from satisfactory.” [40b] (p4)
- 6.365 The USCRI report 2005 noted that “Some NGOs continued to help refugees, and various development organizations worked to restore housing, electricity, water supply, and other public services for the displaced and refugees alike. NGOs were most active in the relatively secure north of the country.” [44a] (p2)
- 6.366 The USSD report 2005 stated that “The Government cooperated with U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees and asylum seekers.” [2a] (p9)
- 6.367 The UNHCR global report 2004 noted that “In addition, protection and assistance to refugees continued to pose particular challenges. Refugees, except those residing in the north, were exposed to various threats and

hardships, not least because of the dire economic situation, but also because of continued instability in the country and the perception that they had supported the former regime.” [40d] (p326)

[Return to Contents](#)

PALESTINIANS

- 6.368 The USCRI report 2005 stated that “Iraqi landlords evicted nearly 400 Palestinian families whose rents the previous regime had controlled.” [44a]
- 6.369 The British/Danish fact-finding mission report, October 2004, stated that although the Palestinian returnees do not face any persecution from the Iraqi Government, the Government has not been firm in providing protection for them. [30c] (p28) The same report noted that Palestinians experienced hostility and discrimination because they were viewed as being associated with Saddam Hussein. [30c] (p29)
- 6.370 IRIN noted, on 21 June 2004, that “170 Palestinians who fled Iraq last year have now left a no man’s land site and the adjacent al-Ruweished refugee camp on the Jordanian border and returned to Baghdad. The refugees said they had given up hope of finding a new home in the Middle East and preferred to return to Baghdad. UNHCR is providing all the returnees with transport assistance and various relief items.” [18p] (p2)
- 6.371 The USCRI report 2005 noted that “Some Palestinian and Syrian refugees were detained and severely mistreated in prison.” [44a] (p1)

[Return to Contents](#)

IRANIANS

- 6.372 The USCRI report 2005 noted that “Iranian officials estimated that some 400 of their nationals were detained in Iraq, most on charges of illegal entry.” [44a] (p1)
- 6.373 IRIN reported, on 13 July 2004, that accommodation is being provided for 250 Iranian Kurdish refugee families who went to the northern Sulaymaniyah governorate, saying they had left deteriorating conditions in Al-Tash camp in the western Iraqi province of Al-Anbar. The article stated that in April and May [2004] numerous families fled the Sunni triangle area. [18t] (p1-2)
- 6.374 The USCRI report 2005 noted that:
- “The interim prime minister imposed a 60-day state of emergency around Fallujah and Ramadi in November [2004], which restricted movement for all residents. The siege of Fallujah also prompted Iranian Kurd refugees to flee from the nearby al-Tash camp. In January 2005, more than 100 headed toward the Jordanian border, where about 650 others lived in a camp in no man’s land between the two countries since Jordan refused them entry in 2003. Jordan, however, restricted access to the border zone for the newly displaced, trapping them on the Iraqi side of the border and subjecting them to harsh climatic conditions with little physical protection.” [44a] (p1-2)

[Return to Contents](#)

AFGHANS

- 6.375 The USCRI report 2005 stated that “In October [2004], the Iraqi National Guard arrested 73 Afghans, many of whom were women and children, for illegal entry.” [44a] (p1)

[Return to Contents](#)

TREATMENT OF RETURNED REFUGEES AND FAILED ASYLUM SEEKERS

- 6.376 The USCRI report 2005 noted that:

“UNHCR issued a return advisory in September [2004] against repatriating Iraqi refugees and asylum seekers, citing general insecurity and irregular access to basic services throughout Iraq. Nevertheless, tens of thousands of Iraqis spontaneously returned from Iran and surrounding countries, prompting UNHCR to help some return convoys. Nearly 300 Iraqi refugees returned from Rafha camp in the Saudi Arabian desert. Some 400 remained.” [44a] (p2)

- 6.377 The UNHCR Global report 2004 stated that “During 2004, UNHCR facilitated the return, mainly from the Islamic Republic of Iran and Saudi Arabia, of 14,000 refugees. In addition to these returnees, an estimated 230,000 refugees returned spontaneously since May 2003, mainly from the Islamic Republic of Iran.” [40d] (p324)

- 6.378 The same report noted that “Some 48,000 displaced persons from Fallujah were provided with emergency relief assistance from UNHCR’s regional stocks which helped to alleviate their suffering.” [40d] (p324)

- 6.379 The British/Danish fact-finding mission report, October 2004, stated that:

“Sources in the Ministry of Displacement and Migration (MoDM) in Baghdad informed the delegation that Iraqis returning from abroad had full access to the education and health system. They would also receive the monthly food package. UN-sources in Amman added that the distribution of food was working very well.

“Representatives for the Iraqi Ministry of Justice in Baghdad stated that all Iraqi citizens, including Iraqis returning from abroad, had equal rights. Dual citizenship was accepted.” [30c] (p37)

- 6.380 An IRIN article, dated 7 June 2005, noted that:

“The naval academy compound, situated on the outskirts of the southern city of Basra, shelters more than 250 families, most of whom have returned from neighbouring Iran since May 2003. The compound is considered to be relatively comfortable when compared with living conditions in other abandoned government buildings, many of which are being used to house scores of returnees.”

- 6.381 The UNHCR Global report 2004 mentioned that:

“Attempts to respond to some of the needs were further complicated by fresh population displacement, particularly as a result of a second attack on Fallujah in November 2004, and because thousands of persons returned into situations of internal displacement. UNHCR estimates that in the south nearly one in seven persons is currently or was recently displaced. The three northern Governorates still held three-quarters of a million IDPs despite efforts by local authorities to enhance the absorption capacity of certain return areas. By the end of 2004, there were still 1.2 million persons displaced throughout Iraq. In addition, large numbers are believed to have left Iraq in the course of 2004, mainly to Syria and Jordan.” [40d] (p327)

[Return to Contents](#)

KIDNAPPINGS/HOSTAGE-TAKING

6.382 The AI annual report 2005 noted that:

“Hostage-taking rose dramatically after April [2004]. Many Iraqis and foreign nationals, including aid workers, journalists, truck drivers and civilian contractors, were kidnapped by armed groups to put pressure on their governments to withdraw their troops from Iraq, or to discourage foreigners from travelling to Iraq. Scores of hostages were executed by their captors. Other kidnappings were carried out by armed groups to extract ransoms from families or employers. Some kidnap victims, including children, were killed.” [28f] (p4)

6.383 The report also mentioned that “Many of the hostages, both Iraqis and foreign nationals, were said to have been tortured.” [28c] (p12)

6.384 The Dutch country report, December 2004, also mentioned that abductions were both in exchange for ransom by criminals and/or gangs and politically motivated abductions. [71c] (p51)

6.385 The AI report, dated 25 July 2005, stated that “Most of the victims are sons of wealthy families and professional people such as medical doctors, university professors and businessmen. The aim is to extort money from their families.” [28c] (p12)

6.386 According to the IWPR article, dated 12 July 2005:

“The health ministry says at least 130 physicians have been kidnapped since the fall of the Saddam’s regime, but the Iraqi Medical Association claims that the number is closer to 300.

“So far, 50 doctors have been murdered, and another 3,000 have moved abroad because of threats against them, prompting the interior ministry to offer those who remain guns and bodyguards.” [11n]

6.387 *Asia Times* also noted in an article, dated 7 August 2004, that “Several Iraqi Christians have been kidnapped over the past year. This again has to do with a general perception in Iraq that the Christian community is wealthy. But not all Christians are, and some of those who have been abducted have not been able to raise the enormous ransom demanded by their kidnappers.” [56a] (p1)

6.388 The Dutch country report, December 2004, stated that “Members of the Iraqi military were also regularly abducted. In most cases they were killed.” [71c] (p51)

6.389 The AI report, dated 25 July 2005, noted that “Scores of foreign nationals as well as Iraqis have been taken hostage by various armed groups operating in Iraq. Many of the hostages were later killed. Most of the victims have been civilians, including aid workers, journalists, truck drivers and private contractors.” [28c] (p11)

6.390 The AI report, dated 25 July 2005, noted that:

“It is difficult to distinguish between armed political groups and criminal gangs when it comes to hostage-taking as there are many credible reports suggesting that hostages, in particular foreign nationals, taken by criminal gangs are then handed over to armed political groups in exchange for money. In many cases armed political groups seem to have made the release of their victims conditional on payment of money even when they make political demands such as the withdrawal of foreign troops.” [28c] (p11)

“Iraqi and US military officials have sometimes announced the arrest of members of armed groups who are accused of hostage-taking and killing.” [28c] (p11)

[Return to Contents](#)

LANDMINES

6.391 An IRIN article, dated 6 June 2005, noted that “Decades of war and internal conflicts have left Iraq with large quantities of UXO and mines, and in some parts of the country, depleted uranium (DU) contamination. These pose a serious threat to the safety of the population, internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees, while preventing access to important resources, such as agricultural and grazing land, roads, water sources and residential areas.” [18c] (p1)

6.392 The UNSC report, dated 7 June 2005, stated that “Landmines and unexploded ordnance pose two of the greatest obstacles to reconstruction and development in some areas. The completion of a landmine impact survey, the recovery of 13,812 items of mines, explosive ordnance and unexploded ordnance and the clearance of 225,400 square metres are critical steps towards overcoming those obstacles.” [38b] (p11)

6.393 An article in IRIN, dated 6 June 2005, reported that:

“Ongoing insecurity in Iraq is hampering the clearance of landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO), forcing international organisations to leave the country or halt operations, experts told IRIN. ...

“Some of the NGOs that have stopped clearing mines are Danish Church Aid (DCA), Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA), Handicap International (HI) from France and InterSOS from Italy.” [18c] (p1)

6.394 The same article stated that “The Mines Advisory Group (MAG), a British NGO operating in the area for more than a decade, has removed more than

1,350,000 mines and UXOs from the northern governorates of Iraq since July 2003, but security concerns have delayed its work since the beginning of 2005.”
[18c] (p1)

[Return to Contents](#)

Annex A: Chronology of major events

- 1958** **14 July:** The monarchy is overthrown. The new Government consists of military and civilian members under Brigadier Abd Al-Karim Qassem.
- 1963** **February:** Qassem is ousted in a coup organised by nationalist and Ba'athist officers, who then seized power under Abd Al-Salam Aref.
- 1968** **17 July:** A group of Ba'athist officers led by Ahmad Hasan Al-Bakr organise another coup.
- 30 July:** Ahmad Hasan Al-Bakr made President, and Saddam Hussein is appointed Deputy President.
- 1970** **March:** A peace agreement is reached between Barzani (leader of the KDP) and the Revolution Command Council (RCC).
- 1974** **Spring:** Ba'ath Party promises regarding a Kurdish autonomy are not fulfilled which results in a major conflict between the Kurds and the regime.
- 1975** **March:** Iran and Iraq sign the Algiers agreement, ending their border disputes.
- 1979** **16 July:** Ahmad Hasan Al-Bakr resigns as President in favour of Saddam Hussein. At this time, real power moves away from the Ba'ath Party and almost exclusively to Saddam Hussein.
- 1980** **September:** Saddam Hussein orders Iraqi forces into western Iran, which starts the Iran/Iraq war (also at the time, called the 'Gulf War'). Around this time, Saddam also expels many Iraqis of possible Iranian extraction, mainly Shi'a, from Iraq. They are taken to the Iranian border and left. Many remain there, although some travel to other countries and claim asylum.
- 17 September:** Iraq abrogates the 1975 treaty with Iran. [4i]
- 23 September:** Iran bombs Iraqi military and economic targets. [4i]
- 1981** **7 June:** Israel attacks an Iraqi nuclear research centre at Tuwaythah near Baghdad. [4i]
- 1987** **June:** The United Nations pass Resolution No.598, which calls for a cease-fire of the Iran/Iraq war.
- 1988** **16 March:** Saddam launches the Anfal Campaign. This involves chemical bombing against the Kurds residing in the north of Iraq. Many thousands of Kurds are killed or disappear during this campaign. Halabja is the most publicised town; as many as 5,000 people were poisoned there by chemical gases. This campaign is initially set up to resettle Kurds to where they are more easily controlled.
- 20 August:** A ceasefire comes into effect to be monitored by the UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG).

- 1990** **2 August:** Iraq invades Kuwait and is condemned by United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 660 which calls for full withdrawal. [4i]
- 6 August:** UNSC Resolution 661 imposes economic sanctions on Iraq. [4i]
- 29 November:** UNSC Resolution 678 authorises the states co-operating with Kuwait to use 'all necessary means' to uphold UNSC Resolution 660. [4i]
- 1991** **16-17 January:** The Gulf War commences, in which Iraq is opposed by the UN with coalition forces including troops from 40 countries (including Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait). ('Operation Desert Storm'). [4i]
- 24 February:** The start of a ground operation results in the liberation of Kuwait on 24 February. On 3 March Iraq accepts the terms of a cease-fire. [4i]
- March:** Iraq accepts the terms of a cease-fire. [4i] There is a spontaneous uprising in the north of Iraq in the town of Ranya, which spreads across Kurdistan.
- April:** The Iraqi army recaptures Sulaimaniya (northern Iraq). About 1.5 million Kurds flee to the mountains and this eventually leads to setting-up of the 'Safe Haven' in the north of Iraq. On 10 April the USA orders Iraq to end all military activity in this area. [4i]
- October:** The Iraqi Government withdraws its armed forces from the north, together with police units and pro-Ba'ath employees from the governorates of Irbil, Suliamaniya and the Dohuk areas which it had occupied.
- 1992** **26 August:** A no-fly zone, which Iraqi planes are not allowed to enter, is set up in southern Iraq, south of latitude 32 degrees north. [4i]
- 1993** **27 June:** US forces launch a cruise missile attack on Iraqi intelligence headquarters in Al Mansur district, Baghdad in retaliation for the attempted assassination of US President, George Bush, in Kuwait in April. [4i]
- 1994** **29 May:** Saddam Hussein becomes Prime Minister. [4i]
- October:** An attempted coup is uncovered resulting in the execution of senior army officers.
- 10 November:** The Iraqi National Assembly recognises Kuwait's borders and its independence. [4i]
- 1995** **14 April:** UNSC Resolution 986 allows the partial resumption of Iraq's oil exports to buy food and medicine ('oil-for-food programme'). Iraq does not accept it until May 1996 and it is not implemented until December 1996. [4i]
- 15 October:** Saddam Hussein wins a referendum allowing him to remain President for another seven years. [4i]
- 1996** **February:** Two of Saddam's son-in-laws, Hussein Kamel and Saddam Kamel, are executed after returning to Iraq following their earlier defection to Jordan. [4i]

31 August: KDP forces with Iraqi Government troops, first shelled and recaptured the city of Erbil in northern Iraq. Disturbances continue in September until government authorities are forced to leave the 'Safe Haven'.

3 September: The US extends the northern limit of the southern no-fly zone to latitude 33 degrees north, just south of Baghdad. [4i]

23 October: A cease-fire between the KDP and PUK ends the fighting for the rest of 1996.

12 December: Saddam Hussein's elder son, Uday, is seriously wounded in an assassination attempt in Baghdad's Al-Mansur district. [4i]

1998 **17 January:** President Saddam threatens to halt all co-operation with UNSCOM if sanctions are not lifted.

February: Kofi Annan, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, agrees a deal with the Iraqi Government, and averts a military attack. An agreement for Iraq to double its oil output is also accepted by the UN.

23 February: UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan brokered a memorandum of understanding allowing UNSCOM to inspect eight 'presidential sites'.

April and June: Two Shi'a clerics are murdered.

11-15 June: UNSCOM head Richard Butler and Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz reach agreement on 'road map' for verification of Iraqi disarmament and the eventual lifting of UN sanctions.

27 July: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports that there is evidence that Iraq was concealing nuclear weapons.

August: The Iraqi National Assembly votes to temporarily suspend UNSCOM inspections.

20 August: UN Security Council decide to maintain sanctions against Iraq.

October: The Iraqi National Assembly ceases all co-operation with UNSCOM.

5 November: Amidst a fresh build-up of US and UK forces in the Gulf, the UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1205 demanding that Iraq rescind immediately and unconditionally the October 31 decision, but makes no mention of military threat.

17 November: UNSCOM inspectors return to Iraq.

24 November: UN Security Council approves the renewal of the 'oil-for-food' deal which allows Iraq to sell US\$5,200 million worth of oil over the next six months for the purchase of humanitarian goods.

16-20 December: 'Operation Desert Fox' - The US and UK launch air strikes on Iraq to destroy Iraq's nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programmes. [1a] (p488 - 489) [1b] (p2185)

- 1999** **January and February:** Iraq's repeated violation of the northern and southern no-fly zones and threats against UK and US aircraft causes the latter to respond in self-defence. [1a] (p489)
- 19 February:** Disturbances in southern Iraq following the assassination of Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Sadeq al-Sadr, spiritual leader of the Shi'a sect, and his sons. Later followers of al-Sadr are arrested and executed. There are also demonstrations by Kurds in northern Iraq against the capture by the Turkish authorities of the Turkish PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan. [4i] (p2)
- June:** The Iraq Revolutionary Council issued Decree 101 which bans the detention of women accused of manslaughter during the investigation and trial stages until a decision or sentence is issued in the case. The Iraq Revolutionary Council also issues Decree 110 amending the constitution regarding Iraqi nationals who illegally left the country.
- December:** The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1284 (1999) which creates a new weapons inspection body for Iraq, the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) to replace UNSCOM. The new body is established to operate a reinforced system on ongoing monitoring and verification to eliminate Iraq's nuclear, chemical and biological weapons arsenal. [1a] (p490) Iraq rejects the resolution.
- 2000** **August:** Re-opening of Baghdad airport, followed by a stream of international flights organised by countries and organisations to campaign against sanctions. The flights are labelled humanitarian missions to comply with UN sanctions.
- November:** Deputy Prime Minister Tariz Aziz rejects new weapons inspection proposals.
- 1 December:** Iraq temporarily halts oil exports after the UN rejects a request for a surcharge to be paid into an Iraqi bank account not controlled by the UN.
- 2001** Free-trade zone agreements set up with neighbouring countries. Rail link with Turkey re-opened in May for first time since 1981.
- February:** Britain and United States carry out bombing raids in an attempt to disable Iraq's air defence network. [4i] (p2)
- May:** Saddam Hussein's son Qusay elected to the leadership of the ruling Ba'ath party. [4i] (p2)
- 2002** **May:** UN SC members agree to revise sanction regime to ease humanitarian impact.
- September:** Prime Minister Tony Blair publishes a dossier on Iraq's military capability. [4i]
- 1 October:** The United Nations and Iraq end two days of talks in Vienna on practical arrangements needed to facilitate the return of UN weapons inspectors to Iraq.

George Bush tells a UN General Assembly session to confront “the grave and gathering danger” of Iraq, or stand by as the US acts. [4i] (p3)

October: The British government publishes its dossier on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction.

4 October: PUK and KDP reconvene parliament in northern Iraq.

16 October: Saddam Hussein wins 100 per cent vote in a referendum ensuring him another seven years as President.

20 October: Reported that Saddam Hussein announced a general amnesty for Iraqi prisoners.

27 November: UN weapons inspectors resume inspections within Iraq after a four-year absence. They are backed by a UN resolution which threatens serious consequences if Iraq is in “material breach” of its terms. [4i] (p3) [1b] (p2188)

2003 March: Chief weapons inspector Hans Blix reports that Iraq has accelerated its co-operation with the UN but says inspectors need more time to verify Iraq’s compliance. [4i] (p4)

20 March: American missiles hit targets in Baghdad, marking the start of a US-led campaign to topple Saddam Hussein. In the following days US and British ground troops enter Iraq from the south. [4i] (p4)

9 April: US forces advance into central Baghdad. Saddam Hussein’s grip on the city is broken. In the following days Kurdish fighters and US forces take control of the northern cities of Kirkuk and Mosul. There is widespread looting in the capital and other cities. [4i] (p4) [1b] (p2189) [2a] (p1)

10 April: Senior Shi’a Cleric, Abdul Majid al-Khoei is murdered in Najaf. [4f] (p2)

April: US lists 55 most-wanted members of former regime in the form of a deck of cards. Former deputy prime minister Tariq Aziz is taken into custody. [4i]

1 May: President Bush officially declares an end to ‘major combat operations’. [1b] (p2189)

May: UN Security Council approves resolution backing US-led administration in Iraq and lifting of economic sanctions. US administrator abolishes Ba’ath Party and institutions of former regime. [4i] (p5)

July: Interim Governing Council (IGC) meets for first time. Commander of US forces says his troops face low-intensity guerrilla-style war. Saddam’s sons Uday and Qusay are killed in gun battle in Mosul. [4i] (p5)

August: Bomb attack at Jordanian embassy in Baghdad kills 11; attack at UN HQ in Baghdad kills over 20 including UN’s chief envoy. Saddam’s cousin Ali Hassan al-Majid, or Chemical Ali, captured. Car bomb in Najaf kills 125 including Shi’a leader Ayatollah Mohammed Baqr al-Hakim. [4i]

October: UN Security Council approves amended US resolution on Iraq giving new legitimacy to US-led administration but stressing early transfer of power to Iraqis. [4i] (p5)

October: Dozens are killed in Baghdad bombings, including attack on Red Cross office. [4i] (p5)

November: Security situation continues to deteriorate. By early November – six months after President Bush declared the war over – more US soldiers have been killed in Iraq than died during the war to oust Saddam. In the course of the month, 105 coalition troops are killed – the highest monthly death toll since the war began. [4i] (p5)

15 November: Governing Council unveils accelerated timetable for transferring country to Iraqi control. [1b] (p2189)

13 December: Saddam Hussein is captured. [1b] (p2190)

2004 1 February: More than 100 people are killed in Erbil in a double suicide attack on the offices of PUK and KDP. [21c] [4i] (p5) [6s] (p14)

March: US-backed Governing Council agrees an interim constitution after marathon negotiations and sharp differences over role of Islam and Kurdish autonomy demands. [1b] (p2190)

2 March: A series of bombs exploded during the Shi'a festival of Ashoura killing more than 180 people. [1b] (p2190)

4 April: Demonstrations by supporters of Moqtada Sadr descend into riots in the Sadr city area of Baghdad, as well as in Najaf, Nasiriyia and Amara. Nine coalition troops and more than 50 Iraqis are killed in the clashes, which are described as the worst unrest since Saddam Hussein fell. [6s] (p9-10)

April: US forces surround and blockade Fallujah. 100 Iraqis are reportedly killed in five days of fighting. Two members of the interim cabinet resign in protest. [1b] (p2190) Coalition forces fight Shi'a gunman and Sunni insurgents on several fronts. Local militia take control of Najaf and Kut [6s] (p7-9)

21 April: Five suicide bombings near police stations and police academy in southern city of Basra kill 74 people and wound 160 others. [65a]

29 April: Photos released of US human rights abuses in Abu Ghraib. Many of the pictures were taken in Autumn 2003 but not released until April. [18m] (p1) [6s] (p7)

17 May: Ezzedine Salim, then head of the Iraqi Interim Governing Council is assassinated. [62a] (p1)

28 May: The 25 members of Iraq's US-appointed governing council choose Ayad Allawi, a former Ba'athist turned CIA supporter, to serve as the country's interim prime minister after the June 30 handover. [6s] (p5)

12 June: Deputy Foreign Minister Bassam Qubba is killed. [62a] (p1) [6s] (p4)

17 June: A sport utility vehicle packed with artillery shells slams into a crowd waiting to volunteer for the Iraqi military, killing 35 people and wounding 138. [65a]

21 June: Members of Iran's Revolutionary Guard detain eight United Kingdom servicemen for allegedly straying into the Iranian side of the Shatt al-Arab waterway. The men are shown blindfolded on Iranian television, but are released on 24 June 2004. [62a] (p7)

24 June: Coordinated attacks in north and central Iraq leave 89 people dead, including three US soldiers; at least 318 are wounded. [65a]

28 June: Iraq's US-led administration transfers sovereignty to the interim Iraqi government in a surprise move two days ahead of the scheduled handover. Paul Bremmer, the outgoing US governor, signs over control of the country and responsibility for dealing with its escalating security troubles to the interim Prime Minister, Ayad Allawi, in Baghdad. [6s] (p3)

1 July: Saddam Hussein is shown in court. [6s] (p3)

28 July: A car bomb explodes outside a police station used as a recruiting centre in Baqouba, killing at least 68 people and wounding more than 50. [65a] [6s] (p3)

1 August: A series of co-ordinated explosions on churches across Baghdad and Mosul. Twelve people are killed and 40 others wounded. [3a] (p46177)

August: Ferocious fighting erupts in Najaf breaking a cease-fire agreement. [6s] (p1)

Salem Chalabi, the man organising the trial of Saddam Hussein, is left facing a murder charge after an Iraqi judge issues a warrant for his arrest. [6d]

Clashes also break out in Baghdad's Sadr City slum, and in the southern towns of Kut and Amara, while demonstrators in Nassiriya torch prime minister Ayad Allawi's political party office. [67a] (p1)

11 August: Ahmed Chalabi, a former US ally, has returned to Iraq where he faces arrest on money counterfeiting charges. [4y] (p1) These charges were later (28 September 2004) dropped. [46b] (p2)

27 August: The 22-day stand-off in Najaf ends with a deal brokered by Ayatollah Sistani, Iraq's most influential Shi'a leader. Iraqi Shi'a militants are instructed to lay down their arms and leave the Imam Ali shrine – Shi'a Islam's holiest. [4c]

8 November: The US and Iraqi forces began their offensive against the Sunni rebel city of Fallujah. [20a]

30 January: The multi-party national elections were held in Iraq. [6v] The Shi'a United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) wins with 48 per cent of the votes cast and 140 seats in the 275-seat National Assembly. [4n] [17c] The Kurdistan Alliance List, led by Jalal Talabani, obtains 26 per cent of the vote and 75 seats in the

National Assembly, while the Al-Qaimah al-Iraqiyah (Iraqi List), led by the interim Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, gains third place with 14 per cent and 40 seats. [4r] [6t]

2005 28 February: More than 130 are killed by a massive car bomb in Hilla, south of Baghdad, in the worst single such incident since the US-led invasion. [4i] (p6) [6j] (p8)

April: Parliament selects Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani as president; Ibrahim Jaafari, a Shi'a, is named as prime minister. The formation of a new government comes amid escalating violence. [4i] (p6) A new Council of Ministers is approved by the TNA on 28 April 2005. [1c] (The Government) [6j] (p6) [38b] (p2)

May: The Iraqi government announces a huge counter-insurgency operation in Baghdad, with 40,000 troops being deployed on the streets over the next week to stop the attacks that have killed more than 650 people in the past month. [6j] (p3)

June: Massoud Barzani is sworn in as regional president of Iraqi Kurdistan. [4i] (p6)

July: Study compiled by the UK based non-governmental Iraq Body Count organisation estimates almost 25,000 civilians have been killed in Iraq since the start of the war (between 20 March 2003 and 19 March 2005). [4i] (p6) [17e]

August: Draft constitution is endorsed by Shi'a and Kurdish negotiators, but not by Sunni representatives. [4i] (p6)

August: As many as 1,000 people are feared dead following a stampede during a Shi'a religious ceremony in Baghdad. [4i] (p6)

[Return to Contents](#)

Annex B: Political organisations

Bet-Nahrain Democratic Party (BNDP) www.bndp.net

Founded 1976 [1c] (Political Organisations) Europa World Online (accessed on 31 August 2005) stated that the BNDP sought the establishment of an autonomous state for Assyrians in Bet-Nahrain (Iraq). Its Secretary-General was Shimon Khamo. [1c] (Political Organisations)

Constitutional Monarchy Movement (CMM)/Royal Constitutionality of al-Sharif Ali bin al-Hussain www.iraqcmm.org

Founded 1993. [1c] (Political Organisations) The CMM supported the claim to the Iraqi throne of Sharif Ali bin al-Hussain, cousin to the late King Faisal II, as constitutional monarch with an elected government. [1c] (Political Organisations)

Democratic Assyrian Movement (Zowaa) www.zowaa.org

Founded 1979. [1c] (Political Organisations) Europa World Online (accessed on 31 August 2005) noted that the Democratic Assyrian Movement recognised the Assyrian rights within framework of democratic national government. Its Secretary-General was Younam Yousuf Kana.

Free Officers and Civilians Movement

Formed 1996. [1c] (Political Organisations) Europa World Online (accessed on 31 August 2005) stated that it was formerly known as the Free Officers' Movement. Its founder and Leader was Brigadier-General Nagib as-Salihi. [1c] (Political Organisations)

Hizb ad-Da'wa al-Islamiya (Voice of Islam Party) www.daawaparty.com

Founded 1958; banned 1980; re-established in Baghdad 2003. [1c] (Political Organisations) The BBC report, dated 31 January 2005, observed that the Hizb ad-Da'wa al-Islamiya is the oldest Shi'a political group. [4q] It was based in Iran and London during the Saddam Hussein's regime. [1c] (Political Organisations) [4q] (p3-4) [11p] One of its leaders, Dr Ibrahim al-Ja'fari, was appointed as Iraq's interim Prime Minister on 7 April 2005. [1c] (Political Organisations) [6o] Other leaders included, 'Abd al-Karim al-'Anzi, Muhammad Bakr an-Nasri, Dr Haydar Abbas (London), Abu Bilal al-Adib (Tehran). [1c] (Political Organisations)

Independent Democratic Movement (IDM) (Democratic Centrist Tendency)

Founded 2003. [1c] (Political Organisations) Europa World Online (accessed on 31 August 2005) Noted that it sought a secular and democratic government of Iraq. Its founder Adnan Pachachi returned from exile in the United Arab Emirates in 2003. [1c] (Political Organisations)

Independent National Elites and Cadres

According to Europa World Online (accessed 31 August 2005) the Independent National Elites and Cadres were apparently linked to Shi'ite cleric Muqtada as-Sadr. Its leader was Fatah esh-Sheik. [1c] (Political Organisations)

Iraqi Communist Party www.iraqcp.org

Founded 1934. [1c] (Political Organisations) Europa World Online (accessed 31 August 2005) stated that it became legally recognised in July 1973 on formation of National Progressive Front. It left National Progressive Front in March 1979 and contested elections of January 2005 on People's Union list. Its first Secretary was Hamid Majid Moussa. [1c] (Political Organisations)

Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) (al-Hizb al-Islami al-'Iraqi)

Founded 1960. [1c] (Political Organisations) The IWPR stated, on 14 February 2005 that the IIP, a Sunni party, had affiliations with the wider Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East. [4q] (p6-7) The IIP boycotted elections of January 2005. [1c] (Political Organisations) Although the Iraqi Islamic Party branded the elections illegitimate and refused to participate in the transitional administration, the party had been in negotiations with the veteran Sunni politician Adnan Pachachi, who wanted Sunni groups to take part in shaping the new constitution. [4q] (p6-7) Europa World Online (accessed on 31 August 2005) noted that its Secretary-General was Tareq al-Hashimi. [1c] (Political Organisations)

Iraqi List (Al-Qaimah al-Iraqiyah)

Formed prior to the January 2005 elections. [1c] (Political Organisations) The IWPR report (accessed on 27 January 2005) observed that "The Iraqi List, or Al-Qaimah al-Iraqiyah, is a bloc led by [former] Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, and put together by his National Accord Party." [11p] Europa World Online (accessed on 31 August 2005) stated that the Iraqi List consists of a number of political organisations, including the INA. [1c] (Political Organisations) *The Guardian* report on 27 January 2005, stated that the Iraqi List included a mixture of Sunnis and Shi'as, although most of its leading figures were Shi'as. [6p]

Iraqi National Accord (INA) www.wifaq.com

Founded 1990. [1c] (Political Organisations) Europa World Online (accessed on 31 August 2005) noted that the former interim Prime Minister, General Dr Ayad Allawi, was the founder and Secretary-General. [1c] (Political Organisations) The US Congressional Research Report stated in January 2004, that "He is a secular Shi'a Muslim, but most of the members of the INA are Sunni Muslims." [33b] (p11-12) The same report noted that "Like the INC, the INA does not appear to have a mass following in Iraq, but it has close ties to the U.S. government and does have a constituency among pro-Western Iraqis." [33b] (p11-12)

Iraqi National Alliance (INA) (at-Tahaluf al-Watani al-Iraqi)

Founded 1992. [1c] (Political Organisations) Europa World Online (accessed on 31 August 2005) stated that the Iraqi National Alliance was formerly based in Syria. [1c] (Political Organisations) It was opposed to sanctions and US-led invasion of Iraq and supported a constitutional multi-party government. Its leader was Abd al-Jabbar al-Qubaysi. [1c] (Political Organisations)

Iraqi National Congress (INC) www.inc.org.uk

Founded 1992 in London. [1c] (Political Organisations) Europa World Online (accessed on 31 August 2005) noted that the INC was a multi-party coalition. In November 1999 some 300 delegates elected a 65-member central council and a new, seven-member collegiate leadership. Its leaders included, the former interim Prime Minister, Dr Ayad Allawi (INA), Riyadh al-Yawar (Ind.), Sharif Ali bin al-Hussain (Constitutional Monarchy Movement), Ahmad Chalabi (Ind.), Sheikh Muhammad Muhammad Ali (Ind.), Dr Latif Rashid (PUK), Hoshiyar az-Zibari (KDP). [1c] (Political Organisations)

Europa added that "Following the removal of the regime of Saddam Hussain, many members of the INC returned to Iraq from exile." [1c] (Political Organisations)

Iraqis (Al-Iraqiyun)

The IWPR report observed that "Al-Iraqiyun (The Iraqis) is a bloc formed by [former] President [Sheikh] Ghazi al-Yawar and drawing support from tribes and some of the smaller political parties. Like many other blocs, Al-Iraqiyun has made a conscious attempt to draw support from across ethnic and religious divides." [11p] Europa World

Online (accessed on 31 August 2005) noted that it was a moderate bloc that included both Sunnis and Shi'ites. [1c] (Political Organisations)

Iraqi Turkmen Front <http://www.turkmenfront.org/>

Founded 1995. [1c] (Political Organisations) The Iraqi Turkmen Front is a coalition of 26 Turkmen groups led by Faruk Abdullah Abd ar-Rahman. It sought autonomy for Turkmen areas in Iraq, recognition of Turkmen as one of the main ethnic groups in Iraq and supported the establishment of a democratic multi-party system in Iraq. [1c] (Political Organisations)

Iraqi Women's Organisation

Led by Sondul Chapouk. [1a] (p531)

Islamic Action Organization (Munazzamat al-Amal al-Islami)

Founded 1961. [1c] (Political Organisations) Europa World Online (accessed on 31 August 2005) noted that the Islamic Action Organisation was a member of SCIRI and aligned with Hizb ad-Da'wa al-Islamiya. Its leaders were Sheikh Muhammad Taqi al-Mudarrisi, Hassan Shirazi, Muhammad Hussain Shirazi. [1c] (Political Organisations)

Islamic Group of Kurdistan (Komaleh Islami)

Founded in 2001 as splinter group of the Islamic Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK), described by Europa as moderate Islamist aligned with the PUK. [1a] (p531) Its founder and leader was Mullah Ali Bapir. [1c] (Political Organisations)

Islamic Movement in Iraq

Europa World Online (accessed on 31 August 2005) stated that the Islamic Movement in Iraq was a Shi'ite party and also a member of SCIRI. Its leader was Sheikh Muhammad Mahdi al-Kalisi. [1c] (Political Organisations)

Islamic Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK)

Founded 1987. [1c] (Political Organisations) Its founder and leader was Sheikh Uthman Abd al-Aziz. [1c] (Political Organisations)

Jamaat as-Sadr ath-Thani (Sadr II Movement)

Founded 2003. [1c] (Political Organisations) Europa World Online (accessed on 31 August 2005) noted that it was a Shi'ite group that opposed the presence of US-led coalition in Iraq. Its leader was Hojatoleslam Muqtada as-Sadr. [1c] (Political Organisations) According to the HRW report, January 2005, Muqtada al-Sadr's had an armed group called the Mahdi Army (Jaysh al-Mahdi). [15g] (p11)

Jund al-Imam (Soldiers of the [Twelfth] Imam)

Founded 1969. [1c] (Political Organisations) Europa World Online (accessed on 31 August 2005) stated that Jund al-Imam was a Shi'ite group and a member of SCIRI. Its leader was Sa'd Jawad Qandil. [1c] (Political Organisations)

Kurdish Hezbollah (Party of God)

Founded 1985. [1c] (Political Organisations) Europa World Online (accessed on 31 August 2005) noted that it was a splinter group of the KDP and a member of SCIRI. Its leader was Sheikh Muhammad Khaled Barzani. [1c] (Political Organisations)

Kurdish Socialist Party

Europa World Online (accessed on 31 August 2005) observed that the Kurdish Socialist Party was a splinter group of the PUK. Its founder was Mahmoud Osman. [1c] (Political Organisations)

Kurdistan Alliance List

Founded 2004. [1c] (Political Organisations) Europa World Online (accessed on 31 August 2005) stated that the Kurdistan Alliance List was a coalition of 11 parties, including the PUK, the KDP, the Kurdistan Communist Party, Kurdistan Islamic Union and Kurdistan Toilers Party. [1c] (Political Organisations) Wikipedia (last updated on 30 August 2005) added that the coalition also included the Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party, Democratic Baith-Nahrain Party, Assyrian Patriotic Party or Assyrian National Party and the Chaldean Democratisation Union. [7b]

Kurdistan Communist Party www.kurdistancp.org

Founded 1993. [1c] (Political Organisations) Europa World Online (accessed on 31 August 2005) noted that the Kurdish Communist Party was a branch of the Iraqi Communist Party. Its leader was Kamal Shakir. [1c] (Political Organisations)

Kurdistan Democratic List

Europa World Online (accessed on 31 August 2005) stated that the Kurdistan Democratic List was a coalition list of seven parties formed to contest the elections to the Iraqi Kurdistan National Assembly in January 2005. It included the KDP, the BNDP and the Assyrian Patriotic Party. [1c] (Political Organisations)

Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) www.kdp.pp.se

Founded 1946. [1c] (Political Organisations) Europa World Online (accessed on 31 August 2005) noted that the KDP “seeks to protect Kurdish rights and promote Kurdish culture and interests through regional political and legislative autonomy, as part of a federative republic.” [1c] (Political Organisations) The BBC added on 19 June 2004, that “The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) has remained a dominant force in Iraqi Kurdish politics for more than half a century.” [4k] (p2) The article also note that “Since the death of his father Mullah Mustafa in 1979, Massoud Barzani has led the KDP through decades of conflict with the Iraqi central government and with local rivals, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). The KDP commands tens of thousands of armed militia fighters, known as peshmerga, and controls a large area of north-western Iraq.” [4k] (p2) Europa World Online (accessed on 6 September 2005) noted that Ali Abdullah was the vice President of the KDP. [1c] (Political Organisations)

Kurdistan Islamic Union kurdiu.org

Founded 1991. [1c] (Political Organisations) Europa World Online (accessed on 31 August 2005) stated that the Kurdistan Islamic Union seeks establishment of an Islamic state in Iraq which recognises the rights of Kurds. It was also a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Its Secretary-General was Salaheddin Bahaeddin. [1c] (Political Organisations)

Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party (KSDP)

Founded 1994. [1c] (Political Organisations)

Kurdistan Toilers Party (Hizbi Zahmatkeshani Kurdistan) www.ktp.nu

Founded 1985 [1c] (Political Organisations) The Kurdistan Toilers Party advocated a federal Iraq and was closely associated with the Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party (KSDP). [1c] (Political Organisations) Its leader was Qadir Aziz. [1c] (Political Organisations)

National Democratic Alliance

Its leader was Abed Faisal Ahmad. [1c] (Political Organisations)

National Democratic Party (al-Hizb al-Watani ad-Dimuqrati)

Founded 1946. [1c] (Political Organisations) Europa World Online (accessed on 31 August 2005) stated that its leaders were Nasir Kamal al-Chaderchi, Hodayb al-Hajj Mahmoud. [1c] (Political Organisations)

National Foundation Congress

Founded 2004. [1c] (Political Organisations) Europa World Online (accessed on 31 August 2005) noted that the National Foundation Congress was a multi-party coalition that included Nasserites, pre-Saddam Hussein era Ba'athists, Kurds, Christians, Sunnis and Shi'ites. It sought secular government of national unity and peacefully opposed the presence of the US-led coalition in Iraq. It is led by 25-member secretariat. [1c] (Political Organisations)

National Progressive Front

Founded July 1973. [1c] (Political Organisations) Europa World Online (accessed on 31 August 2005) stated that the National Progressive Front was the former ruling coalition. It was removed from power in 2004. Its Secretary-General was Naim Haddad (Baath). [1c] (Political Organisations)

National Rafidain List (Al-Rafidayn)

Founded 2004. [1c] (Political Organisations) Europa World Online (accessed on 31 August 2005) noted that the National Rafidain List was an Assyrian-Christian list headed by the Assyrian Democratic Movement. Its leader was Younam Kana. [1c] (Political Organisations)

Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) www.puk.org

Founded 1975. [1c] (Political Organisations) Europa World Online (accessed on 31 August 2005) explained that the PUK "seeks to protect and promote Kurdish rights and interests through self-determination." [1c] (Political Organisations) The BBC stated in an article, dated 18 June 2005 that "Under the command of the veteran Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani [Iraqi President], the PUK has created militia forces and a party organisation to rival the traditionally dominant Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)." [4k] (p2) The same article noted that the PUK claimed to have nearly 150,000 members. [4k] (p2) The BBC also noted, on 6 April 2005 that:

"The party has traditionally drawn its support from among the urban population and radical elements in Kurdish society. The PUK stronghold is Sulaymaniya and the south-eastern part of Iraqi Kurdistan – with the rival Kurdistan Democratic Party, KDP, to the north and west. It commanded a militia force of more than 20,000 peshmerga fighters – making it a key military asset for its US allies."

People's Union

Europa World Online (accessed on 31 August 2005) stated that the People's Union was a largely secular independent list formed prior to the January 2005 elections. The Iraqi Communist Party contested elections under this name. [1c] (Political Organisations)

Socialist Nasserite Party

Founded 2003. [1c] (Political Organisations) Europa World Online (accessed on 31 August 2005) mentioned that it was a merger of Iraqi Socialist Party, Vanguard Socialist Nasserite Party, Unity Socialist Party and one other party. Its leader was Mubdir al-Wayyis. [1c] (Political Organisations)

Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) www.sciri.org

Founded 1982. [1c] (Political Organisations) The BBC report, dated 31 January 2005 and Europa World Online (accessed on 31 August 2005) noted that SCIRI is a party that

largely believes in clerical rule and seeks government based on the principle of wilayat-e-faqih (guardianship of the jurisprudent). It was based in Iran for much of the Saddam Hussein era. Its leader, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, heads the United Iraqi Alliance.

[1c] (political Organisations) [4q] (p3) Europa World Online added that the “armed faction, the Badr Organization, assisted coalition forces in Iraq after the removal of Saddam Hussain’s regime.” [1c] (political Organisations)

An article by the IWPR dated 24 May 2005, stated that the military arm of SCIRI, the Badr Organisation, formerly known as the Badr Brigade, is mainly active in Shi’a-dominated southern Iraq. [11d]

Turkoman People’s Party (Turkmen Halk Partisi) www.angelfire.com/tn/halk
Europa World Online (accessed on 31 August 2005) stated that its leader was Irfan Kirkukli. [1c] (Political Organisations)

United Iraqi Alliance (UIA)

Europa World Online (accessed on 31 August 2005) stated that the UIA was a list of 22 mainly Shi’ite parties, that included Hizb ad-Da’wa al-Islamiya, SCIRI, the Islamic Action Organization and the INC. [1c] (Political Organisations) Wikipedia (last modified 25 August 2005) also noted that that UIA included the Badr Organisation, Centrist Assembly Party, Da’wa Islamic Party/Iraq Organisation, Islamic Fayli Grouping in Iraq, Fayli Kurd Islamic Union, Al-Fadilah Islamic Party, First Democratic National Party, Assembly ‘Future of Iraq’, Hezbollah Movement in Iraq, Justice and Equality Grouping, Islamic Master of the Martyrs Movement, Islamic Action Organisation, Islamic Union for Iraqi Turkomans, Islamic Virtue Party, Sayyid Al-Shuhadaa Organisation, Shaheed Al-Mihrab Organisation, Turkmen Fidelity Movement. [7a]

Europa World Online (accessed on 31 August 2005) noted that the UIA was apparently backed by Iraq’s most senior Shi’ite cleric, Ayatollah Ali as-Sistani. Abd al-Aziz Hakim was the leader of the UIA. [1c] (Political Organisations) The BBC report, dated 31 January 2005, observed that “The list is dominated by Shia Muslims, but also includes Christians, Turkomans, Sunnis and Kurds.” [4q] (p3)

United Iraqi Scholars’ Group

Founded 2004. [1c] (Political Organisations) Europa World Online (accessed on 31 August 2005) mentioned that it was a pan-Iraqi coalition of 35 parties who were opposed to the presence of US-led coalition in Iraq. Its leader was Sheikh Jawad al-Khalisi. [1c] (Political Organisations)

Worker Communist Party of Iraq (IWCP) www.wpiraq.net

Founded 1993. [1c] (Political Organisations) The IWCP opposed presence of the US-led coalition in Iraq. Its leader was Rebwar Ahmad. [1c] (Political Organisations)

Illegal Political Organisations – Ba’ath Party

The Library of Congress report 1988 stated that only a small per centage of the Ba’ath Party membership then were ‘full’ members: 30,000, or 0.2 per cent of the 1.5 million membership in 1988. The remainder are known as ‘supporters’ and ‘sympathisers’. [33a] (p2) In a 27 July 2003 report in the *Washington Post* it was estimated by a former Iraqi ambassador that at least 95 per cent of the total ‘membership’ was not loyal to the regime nor did they believe in the doctrine of the Ba’ath Party. [16b]

The 1988 Library of Congress report stated that “Generally, party recruitment procedures emphasized selectivity rather than quantity, and those who desired to join the party had to pass successfully through several apprentice-like stages before being

accepted into full membership.” [33a] (p2-3) The 27 July 2003 *Washington Post* report stated that a potential member would have to spend one to two years as a sympathiser; another one to two years as a supporter, during which time they would receive training; six months to one year as a candidate member undergoing further training; and finally, if accepted, they would become a full member of a local ‘Cell’.

[16b] (p2)

The FCO on 20 September 2004 categorised the ranks of the Ba’ath party as below, from junior to senior:

“Sadiq (friend)
Mu’ayyid (supporter)
Nasir (partisan)
Nasir Mutaqaddam (Senior Partisan)
Rafiq (Comrade)
Udw Firqa (Division Leader)
Udw Shu’ba (Section Leader)
Udw Fara’ (Branch Leader)” [66b]

The ICG report, March 2003, added that the senior ranks of the Ba’ath Party also included qiyada qutriyya (Regional Command). [25a] (p6)

The same report noted that “All party members have received military training and carry light weapons. Some are staunch loyalists and have perpetrated gross human rights violations or engaged in war crimes. However, the bulk of the membership includes opportunists, who joined for personal advancement, as well as former communists, Kurdish nationalists and Islamists who felt compelled to join for self-preservation.” [25a] (p6)

[Return to Contents](#)

Annex C: Current militia

Ansar al-Islam (Protectors of Islam)

The AI report, dated 25 July 2005, noted that Ansar al-Islam is an Islamist group reportedly linked to al-Qa'ida. [28c] (p5) An article by RFE/RL, dated 2 April 2005, stated that:

“Ansar Al-Islam is a relatively new organization in Iraq, but has roots in the Islamist movement in Kurdistan. It is an outgrowth of a group called Jund Al-Islam (Soldiers of Islam) that was formed in 2001 by splintered factions from the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan. Jund Al-Islam, later renamed Ansar Al-Islam (Supporters of Islam) initially based its activities in the villages of Biyara and Tawela, along the Iranian border northeast of Halabjah.

A long-standing enemy of the PUK, Ansar Al-Islam fought the PUK, and later embraced a short-lived cease-fire with the group. Ansar later carried out a series of attacks against the PUK in 2002, including the killing of 42 peshmerga fighters in a surprise attack on a PUK village, and attempted to assassinate PUK leader Barham Salih in an attack that left five of Salih's bodyguards dead.” [22i] (p1)

The same article noted that:

“Ansar fighters subsequently arrested by the PUK gave what Human Rights Watch described as ‘credible’ details about Al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan. Documents obtained by ‘The New York Times’ in Al-Qaeda guesthouse in Afghanistan also pointed to an Al-Qaeda link.

The PUK claims that dozens of Al-Qaeda fighters joined Ansar Al-Islam in Iraq after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, with as many as 57 ‘Arab Afghan’ fighters entering Kurdistan via Iran that month. Dozens of other Al-Qaeda fighters came later. The PUK has dozens of Ansar fighters in custody in Al-Sulaymaniyah, many of whom admitted the group's link to Al-Qaeda. Reports indicate, however, that the confessions may have been extracted through the PUK's torture of detainees.” [22i] (p1)

According to a US Congressional research report in January 2004:

“Prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom, during which its base was captured, about 600 primarily Arab fighters lived in the Ansar al-Islam enclave, near the town of Khurmil. Ansar fighters clashed with the PUK around Halabja in December 2002, and Ansar gunmen were allegedly responsible for an assassination attempt against PUK prime minister Barham Salih in April 2002. Possibly because his Ansar movement was largely taken over by the Arab fighters from Afghanistan, Krekar left northern Iraq for northern Europe. He was detained in Norway in August 2002 and was arrested again in early January 2004.” [33b] (p5-6)

[Return to Contents](#)

Ansar al-Sunna (Protectors of the Sunna Faith)

As noted in the AI report, dated 25 July 2005, and an article by AFP, on 11 February 2004, the Ansar al-Sunna (Protectors of the Sunna Faith) stemmed from Ansar al-Islam (Protectors of Islam), an Islamist group reportedly linked to al-Qa'ida. [28c] (p5)

[21c] The same AI report stated that “It was established in Iraqi Kurdistan in September 2001 after the unification of a number of small Islamist groups, including Jund al-Islam (Soldiers of Islam) which had taken root in the mountains along the Iranian border.”

[28c] (p5) The AFP article, dated 11 February 2004, added that it was led by an Arab whose alias is Abu Abdullah Hasan bin Mahmud. [21c]

The AI report, dated 25 July 2005, stated that:

“On 29 March 2003 US forces, together with PUK forces, attacked the town of Khormal, near the Iranian border, where members of Ansar al-Islam were based, killing or scattering hundreds of fighters. Many of the fighters reportedly escaped to Iran, but later came back to northern Iraq and are based in Mosul. On 20 September 2003 Ansar al-Sunna officially declared its existence in an internet statement. The group is said to include Kurds, foreign al-Qa’ida supporters and Iraqi Sunni Arabs. Between 27 February 2004 and 17 March 2004 alone, Ansar al-Sunna claimed responsibility for 15 attacks in or around Mosul, most involving assassinations of Iraqi ‘collaborators’.” [28c] (p5)

The AFP article, dated 11 February 2004, mentioned that “The group claimed responsibility for twin suicide bomb attacks on the offices of the PUK and KDP in Arbil in which at least 105 people died.” [21c]

In May 2004 the Middle East Intelligence Bulletin noted that, “According to *Hawlati* [independent Kurdish newspaper], Abu Abdullah’s deputies, in order of rank, are Hemin Bani Shari and Umar Bazynai. *Hawlati* alleges that Bani Shari was once a KDP peshmerga. Subsequent claims of responsibility and statements indicate that in addition to its political leadership, Ansar al-Sunna maintains both military and information operation committees.” [39a] (p2)

The same article added that, “Ansar al-Sunna unequivocally presents itself as a pan-Islamic movement. Of seven Ansar al-Sunna suicide bombers who have given pre-operation interviews on video, the accents and appearance of six clearly suggest that they are non-Iraq Arabs; one is an Iraqi Kurd.” [39a] (p2) The same report stated that “Ansar al-Sunna’s activities show a well-trained group able to operate throughout much of northern Iraq and Western Iraq, though it does not appear able to operate effectively in the Shiite heartland.” [39a] (p3)

The USSD country reports on terrorism, dated 27 April 2005, noted that “In February 2004, Ansar al-Sunna claimed responsibility for bomb attacks on the offices of two Kurdish political parties in Irbil, which killed 109 Iraqi civilians.” [2d] (p2)

[Return to Contents](#)

Badr Brigade

The Christian Science Monitor report, dated 18 July 2005, noted that “SCIRI controls the roughly 7,000-strong Badr militia force, which frequently has been accused by Sunni leaders of torturing and killing innocent Sunni civilians, including clerics.” [34a] The same article mentioned that “Despite claims of abuse against Sunnis, the Badr militia has reportedly been helpful previously in securing urban neighborhoods. During the Jan. 30 elections, Shiite militiamen, through informal agreements with the Iraqi provisional government, helped Iraqi and coalition security forces set up barricades to defend polling stations.” [34a]

Defenders of Khadamiya

The CFR report, dated 9 June 2005, noted that “This group is comprised of roughly 120 loyalists to Hussein al-Sadr, a distant relative of Muqtada al-Sadr and a Shiite cleric who ran on former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi’s ticket in the January 30 elections. The brigade was formed to guard a shrine in northern Baghdad popular among Shiites, and is one of a number of similar local forces that have emerged.” [8a] (p2)

[Return to Contents](#)

(Jaysh al-Mahdi) Mahdi Army

According to the HRW report, January 2005, Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army (Jaysh al-Mahdi), an armed group, was established in June 2003 to protect Shi’a religious authorities in al-Najaf. [15g] (p11) The BBC noted in an article, dated 11 August 2004, that “Young men were recruited at offices near mosques to defend the Shia Muslim faith and their country in defiance of the US-led coalition’s arms controls.” [4a] The article added that “Its appeal is mainly to ‘those young and desperate Shia in Iraq’s urban slums who have not seen any benefit to their lives from liberation’, Dr Toby Dodge, an Iraq expert at the University of Warwick, told BBC News Online.” [4a]

The CFR report, dated 9 June 2005, noted that:

“Loyal to the young, anti-U.S. cleric, Muqtada al-Sadr, this group of thousands of armed loyalists fought U.S. forces for much of last year before agreeing to an October 2004 ceasefire. Recent news reports suggest the militia, which controls much of Sadr City, a Baghdad slum of some 2.5 million Shiites, may be regrouping and rearming itself. Muqtada al-Sadr has refused to participate directly in the Iraqi government, though some of his followers were elected to seats on the Iraqi National Assembly.” [8a] (p2)

The BBC mentioned, on 27 August 2004, that Muqtada al-Sadr set up a weekly newspaper called *al-Hawzah*. The article added that “The US-led authorities imposed a ban on the paper in March 2004, accusing it of inciting anti-US violence. The ban was lifted in mid-July by the interim Iraqi government, citing the move as proof of its belief in a free press, but the newspaper said it had been preparing to resume publishing anyway.” [4f]

[Return to Contents](#)

Jund al-Islam (See Ansar al-Islam)

Kurdistan Workers’ Party (aka: PKK; KADEK; Kurdistan People’s Congress (KHK); People’s Congress of Kurdistan; KONGRA-GEL)

According to an AFP report on Kurdish Media on 13 January 2004, the latest names to be adopted by the Kurdistan Workers Party were the Kurdistan People’s Congress, the People’s Congress of Kurdistan and KONGRA-GEL. The names were added to the US terrorism blacklist. [21b] The PKK is a proscribed group under the British Terrorism Act 2000. [30d] (p3)

The USSD country reports on terrorism, dated 27 April 2005, noted that:

“PKK/KADEK/Kongra Gel, a designated foreign terrorist group, maintains an estimated 3,000 to 3,500 armed militants in northern Iraq, according to Turkish Government sources and NGOs. In the summer of 2004, PKK/KADEK/Kongra Gel renounced its self-proclaimed cease-fire and threatened to renew its separatist struggle in both Turkey’s Southeast and urban centers.” [2d] (p3)

[Return to Contents](#)

al-Muqawama al-’Iraqiya al-Wataniya al-Islamiya – Fayaliq Thawrat 1920 (the Iraqi National Islamic Resistance – the 1920 Revolution Brigades)

The AI report, dated 25 July 2005, noted that:

“This group reportedly operates in West Baghdad and in al-Anbar, Diyala and Ninawa governorates. It has distributed statements claiming responsibility for specific attacks on US targets outside mosques after Friday prayers. For example, in a statement on 19 August 2004 the group said that between 27 July and 7 August 2004 it had conducted an average of 10 operations a day which resulted in deaths of US soldiers and the destruction of military vehicles.” [28c] (p5)

[Return to Contents](#)

Peshmerga

The CFR report, dated 9 June 2005, stated that:

“They are a Kurdish liberation army whose name translates literally to ‘those who face death.’ Elements of the force, whose roots stretch back to the 1920s, fought against Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq war and provided military backup during the U.S.-led coalition’s ousting of Saddam Hussein in 2003. The peshmerga is now believed to comprise some 100,000 troops, and serves as the primary security force for the Kurdistan Regional Government in northern Iraq. Iraq’s Kurds have repeatedly insisted that the peshmerga remain intact as a fighting force as a condition of their remaining loyal to Baghdad instead of seeking an independent state. Kurdish officials have also requested that Iraq’s interim government security forces operate in Iraqi Kurdistan only with the prior permission of the Kurdistan Regional Government.” [8a] (p1)

[Return to Contents](#)

Tandhim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (al-Qa’ida of Jihad Organization in the Land of Two Rivers)

As stated in the AI report, dated 25 July 2005, Tandhim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (al-Qa’ida of Jihad Organization in the Land of Two Rivers) was reportedly influenced by or linked to al-Qa’ida. [28c] (p5) The report noted that it was allegedly set up by Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian Islamist who was sentenced to death in absentia in Jordan on 6 April 2004. [28c] (p5) The FCO stated, on 22 October 2004, that Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi was based in Fallujah. [66c] (p4) The AI report, dated 25 July 2005, added that “The date of Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi’s arrival in Iraq is not known.” [28c] (p5)

The same AI report mentioned that “This group was initially called al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (Unity and Holy War) but in October 2004 Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi reportedly issued a

statement through the internet stating that he was changing the name to Tandhim Qa'idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn." [28c] (p5)

The US Weekly Standard on 16 August 2004, noted that:

"Baziyani [Umar Baziyani, Zarqawi's number four], also details the military strength of Tawhid and Jihad. He lists seven military commanders under Zarqawi's control throughout Iraq with about 1,400 fighters at their disposal. Not surprisingly, Baziyani stated that the Falluja group, headed by Abu Nawas Falujayee, has the most fighters with 500. Second to Falluja is Mosul, with 400 fighters. (Analysts believe Mosul is a haven for former Ansar al Islam fighters.) There are also strongholds in Anbar (60 fighters), Baghdad (40 fighters), and Diyala, the province just northeast of Baghdad (80 fighters). According to Baziyani, most of the fighters in Tawhid and Jihad are Iraqi Arabs and Kurds – not foreign jihadis – which corroborates reports by U.S. intelligence that the foreign fighter presence is much smaller than previously imagined." [76a] (p2)

The AI report, dated 25 July 2005, stated that:

"In November 2004 Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi and his supporters were among the targets of US military attacks on Falluja. The Iraqi interim government and the US military argued that they wanted to retake Falluja because it was being controlled by insurgents, including foreigners. It turned out that of the 1,000 men reportedly arrested during the assault, only 15 were confirmed as foreign, according to General George W. Casey, Jr., the top US ground commander in Iraq. US military officials stated that many of the fighters had escaped Falluja to other predominantly Sunni Arab cities, including Mosul, before the assault." [28c] (p5)

The same AI report noted al-Qa'ida of Jihad Organization in the Land of Two Rivers claimed responsibility for a number of attacks against civilians and held several others hostage before killing them. [28c] (p8-9, 12, 14)

The USSD report, dated 27 April 2005, noted that:

"Zarqawi's group claimed credit for a number of attacks targeting Coalition and Iraqi forces, as well as civilians, including the October massacre of 49 unarmed, out-of-uniform Iraqi National Guard recruits. Attacks that killed civilians include the March 2004 bombing of the Mount Lebanon Hotel, killing seven and injuring over 30, and a December 24 suicide bombing using a fuel tanker that killed nine and wounded 19 in the al-Mansur district of Baghdad." [2d] (p1)

[Return to Contents](#)

Wolf Brigade

The CFR report, dated 9 June 2005, stated that:

"The most feared and effective commando unit in Iraq, experts say. Formed last October by a former three-star Shiite general and SCIRI member who goes by the nom de guerre Abu Walid, the Wolf Brigade is composed of roughly 2,000 fighters, mostly young, poor Shiites from Sadr City. Members of the group reportedly earn as much as 700,000 Iraqi dinars, or \$400, per month, a large sum in Iraqi terms. They dress in garb-olive uniform and red beret-redolent of Saddam Hussein's elite guard; their logo is a menacing-looking wolf." [8a] (p2)

OTHER MILITIAS

The AI report, dated 25 July 2005, mentioned that:

“Other groups include **al-Jabha al-Wataniya litahri al-'Iraq (the National Front for the Liberation of Iraq)**, which reportedly includes small groups of nationalists and Islamists and its activities are spread around northern Iraq, Falluja, Samarra and Basra in the south; **al-Jaysh al-Islami fi al-'Iraq (the Islamic Army in Iraq)**; **Jaysh Mohammad (the Army of Mohammad)**; **al-Jabha al-Islamiya al-'Iraqiya al-Muqawima (the Iraqi Resistance Islamic Front)**; **Jaysh Tahrir al-'Iraq (the Iraqi Liberation Army)**; and **al-Sahwa wal Jihad (the Awakening and Holy War)**.”
[28c] (p5)

A US congressional research report in January 2004 said that the resistance was operating under a number of different names, which included:

Al Awda (the Return), believed to be one of the largest and most active resistance groups;

Movement of the Victorious Sect;

Iraq's Revolutionaries – Al Anbar's Armed Brigades;

Salafist Jihad Group (Salafi is a Sunni extremist Islamic movement);

Armed Islamic Movement for Al Qaeda - Falluja Branch

Actual linkages to Al Qaeda, if any, are not known;

Black Banners Group

Nasirite Organization and;

Armed Vanguard of the Second Mohammad Army

Claimed responsibility for UN headquarters bombing and threatened attacks on any Arab countries that participate in Iraq peacekeeping. The credibility of the claim is not known. [33b]

Annex D: Past militia

This information relates to the situation prior to the fall of the Saddam regime. It should be considered in that context.

Fedayeen Saddam

The paramilitary unit responsible for security duties was also used for specific propaganda objectives. Over the years the Fedayeen Saddam became better equipped and earned a healthy wage under Iraqi standards. There were also some elite units. The Fedayeen Saddam was made up of both Sunnis and Shiites. There were several brigades of the Fedayeen Saddam in the southern towns of Najaf, Kerbala, Amara, Nasiriyya and Basra who had partially taken over the duties of the local police. [30b] (p9)

Recruitment was not performed according to the same, rigid procedures each time. In view of the fact that there were enough young men who wanted to join the unit, it seemed very unlikely that new recruits had to be forced to join the Fedayeen. An unconfirmed press report noted that they were allowed to perform summary executions. [71a] (p72)

Many young people were recruited through teachers and lecturers at schools and universities affiliated to the Ba'ath party. This occasionally involved forced recruitment, but it was possible for them to be put under pressure, for example, by a leader of their own tribe, or if they have shown that they possessed special (physical and other) capabilities. If they refused to join, they would quite possibly run the risk of being picked up and tortured. Young people sometimes fled or went into hiding to evade the Fedayeen Saddam. Early resignation from the Fedayeen Saddam was not accepted and could have attracted problems, such as arrest, intimidation or physical violence. The gravity of the problems encountered depended on the specific circumstances. Young girls and young women could join the Fedayeen Saddam; it couldn't be completely ruled out that they may have also been forced to join. [71a] (p72)

Al Quds

Initially this army unit was known as the 'Volunteer Forces of Jerusalem Day'. This army, was, according to the Ba'ath authorities, supposed to be made up of volunteers, and was used for the liberation of the Palestinian areas. It was used in particular for propaganda purposes and had little military power. The name of the army was changed in February 2001 to 'Jerusalem Liberation Army/Al Quds Army'. Although the term 'voluntary' no longer featured in the name, the authorities still considered it to be a volunteer army, which is why no formal legislation had been issued making it an offence to refuse to serve in the army. Officially no charges were brought against people who refused to join. This would have run counter to the alleged voluntary nature of the army. Nothing was recorded in Iraqi criminal law about the 'Jerusalem Liberation Army'. [71a] (p75)

Although a volunteer army in principle, in practice it appeared that people were urgently sought to enlist. In general, 'volunteers' (men aged from approximately 18 to 50) were being recruited during house calls by representatives of the Ba'ath party. Men who refused to join (and were unable to bribe the recruitment officer) might have been punished, although the lack of legislation meant that the punishment was not clearly defined. It could have included food ration restrictions, problems at work, or forced termination of studies. Those who refused also found themselves registered as disloyal to the Ba'ath government in the security service files. This could possibly have led to

(serious) problems for the relevant 'volunteer' and the members of his family at a later stage. As a result few probably refused. If you were already recorded as being disloyal, prior to the recruitment (because you came from a 'tainted' family, for example), refusal to serve in the 'Jerusalem Liberation Army' could have been considered a political act. Detention and maltreatment could have then be used. This was a rare category, however. [71a] (p75-76)

It was relatively simple to bribe the relevant recruitment officer. You were then released from the 'obligation' to put yourself forward as a 'volunteer'. Apparently Iraqis living abroad could have bought themselves free for USD 1,000 (€988). They would have had to pay this sum at the Iraqi embassy in the country where they were living and once they had paid, they were issued with a written declaration which could have been presented to the (military) authorities should they have entered Iraq. They were then no longer called up for Al Quds. Although the above amount was high in Iraqi terms, settlement has shown that the Iraqi authorities were accommodating towards people who did not want to serve as volunteers in this army. [71a] (p76)

Jash

Kurdish militias who were allied to Saddam Hussein's regime and operated as mercenaries outside the regular army (popularly derided as 'Jash' or 'Jahsh') were located in central Iraq, especially in and around Mosul. After the intifada in 1991, large groups of Jash deserted to the Kurdish resistance. The KDP and the PUK gave the militias a 'general pardon'. The Jash were incorporated in the existing military structures there or surrendered their weapons. As far as it is known, there was little if any meting out of retribution or settling of scores. The former members of the Jash generally experienced no problems in KAZ because they came from strong tribes, who could defend themselves (if required) in the area. [71a] (p73-74)

Initially the Jash were responsible for espionage, ensuring that no anti-Government opinions were voiced and no anti-Government activities were attempted by the local Kurdish population in the north of Central Iraq. These activities also included contacts with the KDP or the PUK. They were responsible, in conjunction with the Central Iraqi security troops, for maintaining order in the district where they were serving. [71a] (p74)

Because of the military nature of the Jash-militias and the authoritarian culture in the Ba'ath regime of central Iraq, some of these militias regularly abused their power and employed (excessive) violence. There were reports of intimidation, threats and extortion employed against the local Kurdish population. However, there were also Jash-militias who adopted a more accommodating attitude towards the local population. According to reports, the militias were no longer created purely on the basis of clan and tribal relations, unlike in the past, and members also joined on an individual basis. Privileges and financial reward could have been considered the most important motives for joining. [71a] (p74)

[Return to Contents](#)

Annex E: Prominent people: past and present

MEMBERS OF IRAQ'S GOVERNMENT

(As at May 2005)

Jalal Talabani (Kurd) President [6i]

The BBC stated, on 6 April 2005 that "Jalal Talabani, widely referred to by Kurds as Mam (uncle) Jalal, is one of the longest-serving figures in contemporary Iraqi Kurdish politics." [4r] *The Guardian* report (accessed on 31 August 2005) stated that "A leader of Iraq's minority Kurds, he was elected Iraq's new president on April 6 2005. He is the first Kurd to be Iraq's president. Mr Talabani had opposed governments in Baghdad for much of the last 40 years. He leads the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), which controls the eastern part of the Kurds' self-rule area. The PUK controls around 25,000 fighters. Mr Talabani wants a federal Iraq with Kurds running their own region." [6x] The BBC article, dated 6 April 2005, added that "A Baghdad University law graduate, he is considered to be a shrewd politician with an ability to switch alliances and influence friends and foes alike." [4r]

Ghazi Al Yawer (Sunni Arab) Vice-President [6i]

An article in *The Guardian* (accessed on 31 August 2005) stated that "A Sunni tribal leader from Mosul who is one of Iraq's two vice-presidents. Mr Yawar had formally been the interim president before the January 2005 elections. He leads the Iraqis party, an alliance of moderate Sunnis and Shia. His appointment is a conciliatory move to appease the Sunni minority, which largely stayed away from the polls and has been blamed for the insurgency." [6w] The BBC noted, on 6 April 2005 that "The 46-year-old US-educated moderate Sunni Arab and former exile has strong ties to Washington, although he has been sharply critical of the US-led coalition." [4as]

Adel Abdul Mahdi (Shi'a) Vice-President [6i]

The BBC noted, on 6 April 2005, that "Adel Abdul Mahdi is a francophone Islamist and free-marketeer who belongs to the Shia-led list that won a majority of seats in the Iraqi parliament. ... He fled Iraq in the 1960s after being condemned to death for his political activities, and has spent time in France, Lebanon and Iran." [4as]

Dr. Ibrahim Jaafari (Shi'a) Prime Minister [6i]

The Guardian article (accessed on 31 August 2005) mentioned that "The 58-year-old former London GP is Iraq's first democratic prime minister since before the Saddam era. He is a conservative Shia with strong religious beliefs and leads the Islamic Dawa party, which is a major player in the dominant United Iraqi Alliance. The UIA holds more than half of the new parliament's 275 seats. Some analysts see him as a conciliatory figure." [6y] The BBC article stated, on 7 April 2005 that the former Vice-President went into exile in Iran first and then the UK. [4ac]

Ahmed Chalabi (Shi'a) Deputy Prime Minister [4k]

The Guardian report (accessed on 31 August 2005) stated that "One of four deputy prime ministers in the new administration. The former banker once touted in the US as a successor to Saddam Hussein and founded the Iraqi National Congress (INC) opposition party while in exile for 30 years. The INC is now part of the United Iraqi Alliance. The British educated 57-year-old was convicted of fraud in absentia in Jordan in 1992 and sentenced to 22 years in jail. He denied the charges." [6ad]

Ruz Nuri Shawis (Kurdish) Deputy Prime Minister [4k]

Abid Mutlak al-Jubouri (Sunni Arab) Deputy Prime Minister [4k]

Baqir Solagh (Shi'a Turkmen) Interior Minister [4k]

Dr Ibrahim Bahr al-Uloum (Shi'a) Oil Minister [4k]

Narmin Othman Acting (**Kurd**) Human Rights Minister [4ap]

Dr Saadoun al-Dulaimi (Sunni) Defence Minister [4ap]

Dr Mohsen Shlash (Shi'a) Electricity Minister [4ap]

Usama al-Najafi (Sunni) Industry Minister [4ap]

Juwan Fouad Masum (Kurd) Telecommunications Minister [4k]

Ali Abdel Allawi (Shi'a) Finance Minister [4k]

Latif Rashid (Kurd) Minister of Water Resources [4k]

Narmin Othman Minister of Environment [4k]

Jasim Mohammed Jaafar (Shi'a) Minister of Construction and Housing [4k]

Abdel Falah Hassan (Sunni) Education Minister [4k]

Abdel Muttalib Mohammed Ali (Shi'a) Health Minister [4k]

Abdel Basit Karim Mawloud (Kurd) Trade Minister [4k]

Ali al-Bahadili (Shi'a) Agriculture Minister [4k]

Abdel Hussein Shandel (Shi'a) Justice Minister [4k]

Idris Hadi (Kurd) Minister of Labour and Social Affairs [4k]

Salam al-Maliki (Shi'a) Transport Minister [4k]

Nuri Farhan al-Rawi (Sunni) Culture Minister [4k]

Basimah Yusuf Butrus (Christian) Minister of Science and Technology [4k]

Suhaylah Abd-Jaafar (Shi'a) Minister of Displacement of Migration [4k]

Talib Aziz Zayni (Shi'a) Minister of Youths and Sports [4k]

Abd-al-Karim al-Anzi (Shi'a) Minister of State for National Security Affairs [4k]

Saad Najif Mujhim al Harden (Sunni) Minister of State for Governorate Affairs [4k]

La Habib Kazim (Shi'a) Minister of State for Civil Society Affairs [4k]

Safa al-Din Mohammed al-Safi (Shi'a) Minister of State for National Assembly Affairs [4k]

Dr Hajem al-Hassani (Sunni) Speaker [4ao]

The Guardian report (accessed on 31 August 2005) noted that “A Sunni Arab, he is the speaker of the Iraqi parliament. He was appointed after Ghazi al-Yawar turned the post down, insisting he wanted to be vice president. Having a Sunni as speaker is one of the ways the parliament is trying to reach out to Sunnis to try and further involve them in the new Iraq. However, some critics have questioned Mr Hassani’s clout in the Sunni community.” [6aa]

Dr Hussein al-Shahristani (Shi’a) Deputy Speaker [4ao]**Aref Taifour (Kurd) Deputy Speaker [4ao]**

[Return to Contents](#)

PROMINENT PEOPLE IN SADDAM HUSSEIN’S REGIME

(Based on US ‘pack of cards’)

As documented on the BBC, on 27 February 2005:

Saddam Hussein

Former President of Iraq and commander-in-chief of military. Captured by coalition forces 13 December 2003. War crimes claims against the Iraqi leader include genocide of the Kurds, ‘ethnic cleansing’ in which tens of thousands of Kurds, Turkmen, Assyrians around the oil-rich city of Kirkuk were expelled as part of an ‘Arabisation’ programme, mass civilian executions after the Kurdish and Shi’a uprisings in 1991, and religious persecution.

Qusay Hussein

Son of Saddam Hussein. Qusay was in charge of the Special Republican Guard and was Republican Guard commander. Killed 22 July 2003. He is accused of curbing dissident activity in Basra after the failed Shi’a uprising in 1991 with mass executions and torture.

Uday Saddam Hussein

Son of Saddam Hussein. Commander of Saddam’s Fedayeen forces and president of the Iraqi National Olympic Committee. Killed 22 July 2003. According to Indict, the committee seeking to prosecute the Iraqi leadership for war crimes, he was personally engaged in acts of torture and ordered torture by forces under his command. He is said to have routinely abducted and raped women.

Abid Hamid al-Tikriti

Former Presidential secretary. Taken into custody 18 June 2003.

Ali Hasan Majid

Presidential adviser, southern region commander. Captured by coalition forces 21 August 2003. Saddam Hussein’s cousin, Ali Hasan Majid, was known as ‘Chemical Ali’ for his alleged role in the use of poison gas against Kurds in 1988.

Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri

Vice-chairman Revolutionary Command Council, Northern regional commander. War crimes charges have been issued against him in Austria.

Aziz Salih al-Numan

Ba'ath Party regional commander, militia commander. Taken into custody 22 May 2003.

Taha Yassin Ramadan

Vice-president. Taken into custody 18 August 2003.

Tariq Aziz

Deputy prime minister. Surrendered 24 April 2003.

Barzan Ibrahim Hasan al-Tikriti

Ba'ath party official and former member of the intelligence service. Taken into custody 16 April 2003.

Wabban Ibrahim al-Tikriti

Baath Party official. Former intelligence minister. Taken into custody 13 April 2003.

Muhammad Hazmaq al-Zubaidi

Central Euphrates region commander. Taken into custody 21 April 2003. Former deputy prime minister and member of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC).

Humam Abd al-Khaliq Abd al-Ghafur

Minister of higher education and scientific research. Taken into custody 21 April 2003.

Jamal Mustafa Abdallah Sultan al-Tikriti

Deputy chief of tribal affairs. Taken into custody 20 April 2003.

Hikmat al-Azzawi

Finance minister. Taken into custody 19 April 2003.

Samir abd al-Aziz al-Najm

Ba'ath Party chairman, Diyala region. Taken into custody 17 April 2003.

Amir Hamudi Hasan al-Saadi

Presidential scientific adviser. Surrendered 12 April 2003.

Hani abd Latif Tilfa al-Tikriti

Special Security Organisation director.

Kamal Mustafa Abdallah Sultan Tikriti

Republican Guard secretary. Surrendered 17 May 2003.

Barzan abd Ghafur Sulayman al-Tikriti

Special Republican Guard commander. Taken into custody 23 July 2003.

Muzahim Sa'b Hassan al-Tikriti

Air defence force commander. Taken into custody 23 April 2003.

Ibrahim Ahmad abd al-Sattar Muhammad al-Tikriti

Armed forces chief-of-staff. Taken into custody 15 May 2003.

Sayf al-Din Fulayyih Hassan Taha al-Rawi

Republican Guard forces commander.

Rafi Abd Latif al-Tilfah

Director of general security.

Tahir Jalil Habbush al-Tikriti

Internal intelligence services director

Hamid Raja Shalah al-Tikriti

Air force commander. Taken into custody 14 June 2003.

Abd al-Tawab Mullah Huwaysh

Deputy prime minister. Taken into custody 2 May 2003.

Sultan Hashim Ahmad al-Tal

Minister of defence. Surrendered 19 September 2003.

Ayad Futayyih Khalifa al-Rawi

Al-Qud's chief of staff. Taken into custody 5 June 2003.

Zuhayr Talib Abd al-Sattar al-Naqib

Director of military intelligence. Taken into custody 23 April 2003.

Abd al-Baqi abd Karim al-Sadun

Ba'ath Party chairman and Baghdad militia commander.

Muhammad Zimam Abd al-Razzaq al-Sadun

Ba'ath Party chairman, Ta'mim and Ninawa Governorate.

Yahya Abdallah al-Ubaydi

Ba'ath Party chairman, Basra Governate.

Nayif Shindakh Thamir

Ba'ath Party chairman, Salah al-Din Governate.

Sayf al-Din al-Mashhadani

Ba'ath Party chairman and militia commander, Muthanna Governorate. Captured 24 May 2003.

Fadil Mahmud Gharib

Ba'ath Party chairman, Babil and Karbala Governorate. Taken into custody 15 May 2003.

Muhsin Khadar al-Khafaji

Ba'ath Party chairman, Qadisiyah Governorate. Taken into custody 7 February 2004.

Rashid Taan Kazim

Ba'ath Party chairman, Anbar Governorate.

Ugla Abid Sighar al-Kubaysi

Ba'ath Party chairman, Maysan Governorate. Taken into custody 20 May 2003.

Ghazi Hamud al-Adib

Ba'ath Party chairman, Wasit Governorate. Taken into custody 7 May 2003.

Adil Abdallah Mahdi al-Duri al-Tikriti

Ba'ath Party chairman, Dhi Qar Governorate. Taken into custody 15 May 2003.

Husayn al-Awawi

Ba'ath Party chairman, Ninawa Governorate. Taken into custody 9 June 2003.

Khamis Sirhan al-Muhammad

Ba'ath Party chairman, Karbala Governorate. Taken into custody 11 January 2004.

Sad Abd al-Majid al-Faysal

Ba'ath Party chairman, Salah al-Din Governorate. Taken into custody 24 May 2003.

Latif Nussayif Jasim al-Dulaymi

Deputy chairman. Ba'ath Party. Taken into custody 9 June 2003.

Rukan Razuki abd al-Ghaful Sulayman al-Tikriti

Chief of tribal affairs.

Mizban Khidir Hadi

Revolutionary Command Council member, regional commander, Euphrates region. Surrendered 9 July 2003.

Taha Muhyl al-Din Maruf

Vice-president and RCC member. Taken into custody 2 May 2003.

Walid Hamid Tawfiq al-Tikriti

Governor of Basra Governorate. Surrendered 29 April 2003.

Mahmud Dhiyab al-Ahmad

Interior minister. Taken into custody 8 August 2003.

Amir Rashid Muhammad al-Ubaydi

Former oil minister. Taken into custody 28 April 2003.

Muhammad Mahdi al-Salih

Minister of trade. Taken into custody 23 April 2003.

Hossam Mohammed Amin

National monitoring director. Taken into custody 27 April 2003.

Sabawi Ibrahim

Ba'ath Party, Saddam Hussein's maternal half brother. Capture announced 27 February 2005.

Huda Salih Mahdi Ammash

Scientist. Taken into custody 5 May 2003.

[4]

[Return to Contents](#)

OTHER PROMINENT PEOPLE

Abdul Aziz al-Hakim

The Guardian report (accessed on 31 August 2005) stated that "Had been considered by some as a contender for prime minister, Mr Hakim leads the powerful Shia party the

Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (Sciri). Mr Hakim spent 20 years as an exile in Iran and has support from Ayatollah Sistani. Mr Hakim's brother, the revered Ayatollah Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim, was killed in a car bombing in August 2003 outside the shrine of Imam Ali in Najaf." [6ac]

Abdul Majid al-Khoei

The BBC noted, on 27 August 2004, that al-Khoei was a moderate Shia leader who was killed two days after the fall of Baghdad. An arrest warrant has been issued for Moqtada Sadr for the alleged involvement in the murder. [4f] (p1-2)

Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi

The FCO on 22 October 2004, stated that, "Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian-born terrorist with links to Al-Qua'eda, claims to have been behind several of the most devastating suicide bomb attacks as well as the beheading of Western hostages." [66c] (p4) The US *Weekly Standard* article, dated 16 August 2004, noted that Abu Musab al Zarqawi heads the Tawhid and Jihad (Unity and Holy War) group. [76a] (p1)

Dr Ayad Allawi

The Guardian report (accessed on 31 August 2005) mentioned that "A former member of Saddam's ruling Ba'ath party, he became Iraq's interim prime minister in June 2004. Mr Allawi leads the Iraqi List alliance, a secular party which won 40 seats in the January 2005 poll. He failed to keep the prime minister's job and his party is not in Mr Jaafari's cabinet but it has said it will work with the government. In 1976 Mr Allawi formed the opposition Iraq National Accord (INA), which had US backing." [6ab] The BBC stated, on 28 May 2004, that "Religious leaders think he is too secular, the US-led coalition now sees him as a critic, for the anti-Saddam opposition he is an ex-Baathist, while ordinary Iraqis say he is a CIA man." [4at] The article also mentioned that "He was badly wounded in an assassination attempt while living in the UK in 1978, believed to have been ordered by Saddam Hussein." [4at]

Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani

The Guardian report (accessed on 31 August 2005) noted that "Arguably the most powerful man in Iraq. The 73-year-old is the most powerful religious leader in the country as the most senior cleric of Iraq's Shia majority. Since the fall of Saddam he has played a low-profile role, but pressed for the January 2005 elections and had backed Ibrahim al-Jaafari to become prime minister. He is one of only five grand ayatollahs in the world." [6z] The BBC stated, on 27 August 2004, that Sistani is a moderate cleric [4h] (p1-2) *The Financial Times* stated, on 13 August 2004, that "He has imposed prior truces in Najaf and Kerbala, scuppered US plans for regional caucuses in the constitutional process, forced the June 30 [2004] date for the handover of sovereignty and dictated the abandonment of federalism in the latest United Nations resolution." [67b] (p1-2)

Masoud Barzani

The Guardian report (accessed on 31 August 2005) stated that "Leader of the Kurdistan Democratic party (KDP), which rules the western part of the Kurdish self-rule area from the regional capital, Irbil. Represents the more traditional, tribal elements in Kurdish society, and controls a fighting force of up to 35,000." [6af]

Moqtada Al-Sadr

The BBC report, dated 27 August 2004, noted that "Radical Shia cleric Moqtada Sadr has been a turbulent presence in Iraq since the fall of Saddam Hussein. At times he has called for a national rebellion against foreign troops and sent out his militiamen to confront the 'invaders' and Iraqi police." [4f] (p1-2) *The Guardian* report (accessed on 31

August 2005) mentioned that “A Shia cleric from Najaf whose militia army twice revolted against the US-led coalition. He took a deliberately ambiguous line before the January 2005 elections saying he would not vote but gave his blessing to supporters who joined various electoral lists so he would have a voice in the political bargaining.” [6ae] The BBC report, dated 27 August 2004, added that “Moqtada Sadr mixes Iraqi nationalism and Shia radicalism, making him a figurehead for many of Iraq’s poor Shia Muslims. His detractors see him as an inexperienced and impatient radical who aims to dominate Iraq’s most revered Shia institutions by force.” [4f] (p1-2)

[Return to Contents](#)

Annex F: Health care facilities

Health care facilities in Iraq WHO + UNICEF July 2003

Type of facility	Definition and/or service provided	Location	Cost	Working hours	Additional countrywide information *
General and Specialised Hospitals	Preventive, primary, secondary and tertiary care.	Urban and rural areas	Nominal fee	8:00 - 14:00 (A & E Depts are open 24 hr)	282 Hospitals (211 Public and 71 Private) and 110 Specialised Centres.
Health Centres (HC)	Preventive and primary health care.	Urban and rural areas	Free	8:00 - 14:00	With or without doctors. Approx. 1,570 in the country.
Public Clinics (PC)	Preventive, primary, secondary and tertiary care. Doctors have at least two years of experience.	Urban areas	Nominal fee	16:30 - 19:30	Health Centres in the morning often work as Public Clinics in the afternoon. Approx. 339 in the country.
Health Insurance Clinics (HIC)	Same services as PCs but staffed by newly qualified doctors.	Rural areas outside the city	Nominal fee	16:30 - 19:30	Approximately 339 in the country.
Chronic Illness Pharmacy (CIP)	Provide drugs for treatment of chronic diseases on prescription issued by specialist and upon presentation of a special card for chronic illness.	Mainly in urban areas, usually attached to public clinics	Nominal fee	16:30 - 19:30	Approximately 299 in the country.
Bilat Al Shuhada Pharmacies or Pharmacy for Rare Drugs	Bilat Al Shuhada Pharmacies are pharmacies for rare drugs. Patients can obtain rare drugs against prescriptions from medical specialists. Rare drugs are determined by Ministry of Health, based on availability and cost.	Usually attached to public clinics but may be free-standing.	Nominal fee	16:30 - 19:30	Approximately 32 Bilat Al Shuhada Pharmacies in the country.

* All totals are preliminary and are subject to confirmed totals from this current review. This update is as of July 2003.

[23a] (p58)

[Return to Contents](#)

Facilities of the Ministry of Health in Iraq, 2003 + UNICEF July 2003

Governorate	Ministry of Health & Directorates of Health	Health Sectors	Warehouses	Public Hospitals	Private Hospitals	Total Hospital Beds	Specialised Centres	Primary Health Centres with Doctors	Primary Health Centres without Doctors	Within Health Centres: Public Clinics	Health Insurance Clinics	Chronic Illness Pharmacy	Pharmacy for Rare Drugs	Research Institutions	Production Plants
Anbar	1	9	7	11	1	1,242	4	52	67	16	26	21	2	0	0
Babil	1	5	9	8	2	1,098	6	37	35	22	16	11	3	0	1
Baghdad	9	20	59	44	40	11,425	20	127	5	94	23	25	8	14	5
Basra	1	10	8	14	3	3,142	7	64	8	30	37	13	2	0	0
Diyala	1	1	5	9	2	1,059	4	33	24	10	21	22	1	0	0
Karbala	1	-	4	5	0	663	5	22	4	15	9	12	1	0	0
Missan	1	1	5	7	1	869	5	20	11	12	13	17	1	0	0
Muthanna	1	3	5	4	0	826	4	29	1	12	16	11	1	0	0
Najaf	1	2	5	6	0	1,160	4	21	20	14	11	14	2	0	0
Ninewa	1	8	7	14	4	2,603	8	78	45	20	23	22	2	0	2
Qadissiya	1	7	4	8	2	878	6	29	21	17	18	15	1	0	0
Salah al-Din	1	9	6	9	0	812	3	44	33	14	30	20	3	0	1
Tameem	1	5	7	8	2	1,156	5	41	23	22	26	26	2	0	0
Thi-Qar	1	1	4	7	1	977	5	36	29	14	20	9	2	0	0
Wassit	1	5	4	9	1	773	4	29	8	12	19	16	1	0	1
Dahuk	1	-	2	7	12	977	3	48	32	2	20	45	0	0	0
Erbil	1	-	2	12		-	8	61	86	6	11		0	0	0
Sulaymaniyah	1	-	3	29		2,019	9	63	284	7	0		0	0	0
Totals	26	86	146	211	71	31,679	110	834	736	339	339	299	32	14	10

Source: Ministry of Health, WHO & UNOHCI [23a] (p50)

[Return to Contents](#)

Annex G: Election results

NATIONAL ELECTION RESULTS – JANUARY 2005

Party	Valid Votes	Per centage of Votes	Seats
United Iraqi Alliance	4,075,295	48.19	140
Kurdistan Alliance List	2,107,551	25.73	75
(Al-Qaimah al-Iraqiyah) The Iraqi List	1,168,943	13.82	40
(Al-Iraqiyun) Iraqis	150,680	1.78	5
Iraqi Turkomen Front	93,480	1.05	3
National Independent Elites and Cadres Party	69,938	0.83	3
People's Union	69,920	0.83	2
Islamic Group of Kurdistan	60,592	0.72	2
Islamic Action Organization in Iraq	43,205	0.51	2
National Democratic Alliance	36,795	0.46	1
(Al-Rafidayn) National Rafidain List	36,255	0.43	1
Liberation and Reconciliation Gathering	30,796	0.36	1
		Total	275

[1c] (Transitional National Assembly) [41a]

IRAQI KURDISTAN ELECTION RESULTS – JANUARY 2005

Party	Votes	Per centage of Votes	Seats
Kurdistan Democratic List	1,570,663	89.5	104
Kurdistan Islamic Group in Iraq	85,237	4.9	6
Kurdistan Toilers Party	20,585	1.2	1
Others	77,434	4.4	-

[37c]

[Return to Contents](#)

Annex H: List of source material

- 1 **Europa Publications**
 - a The Middle East and North Africa 2005, (51st Edition),
Date accessed 25 January 2005
 - b The Europa World Yearbook 2004, May 2004
 - c Europa World Online: Iraq
http://www.europaworld.com/entry?id=iq&go_country=GO
Date accessed 31 August 2005

- 2 **United States Department of State <http://www.state.gov>**
 - a Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2004, 28 February 2005
<http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27928.htm>
Date accessed 29 March 2005
 - b International Religious freedom report for 2003, 18 December 2003
<http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2003/24452.htm> **Date accessed 29 March 2004**
 - c Background Note: Iraq, August 2004
<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/6804.htm> **Date accessed 27 September 2004**
 - d Country Reports on Terrorism: Iraq, 27 April 2005
<http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/45392.htm> **Date accessed 13 September 2005**
 - e Trafficking in Persons Report: Iraq, 3 June 2005
<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/47255.pdf>
 - f Country Reports of Human Rights Practices 2003, 25 February 2004
<http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41722.htm>
Date accessed 28 February 2005

- 3 **Keesings Record of World Events**
 - a Iraq, 2004 p. 45826 - 46178

- 4 **BBC <http://www.bbc.co.uk/>**
 - a Who are Iraq's Mehdi Army? 11 August 2004
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3604393.stm
Date accessed 19 September 2005
 - b Charges facing Saddam Hussein, 1 July 2004
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3320293.stm
Date accessed 23 July 2004
 - c Iraq rebels told to leave shrine, 27 August 2004
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3603730.stm
Date accessed 27 August 2004
 - d Profile: Kurdish 'satellite' parties, 13 January 2003
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/not_in_website/syndication/monitoring/media_reports/2588651.stm **Date accessed 27 August 2004**
 - e War takes toll on Iraq mental health, 12 August 2005
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4620279.stm
Date accessed 2 September 2005
 - f Who's who in Iraq: Moqtada Sadr, 27 August 2004
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3131330.stm
Date accessed 17 September 2005
 - g Iraqi Kurdistan leader sworn in, 14 June 2005
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4092926.stm
Date accessed 6 September 2005
 - h Who's who in Iraq: Ayatollah Sistani, 26 August 2004
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3033306.stm
Date accessed 31 August 2005

- i Timeline: Iraq, 31 August 2005
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/country_profiles/737483.stm
Date accessed 6 September 2005
- j Iraq Baathists to get jobs back, 23 April 2004
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3651953.stm
Date accessed 24 April 2004
- k New Iraqi Government members, 8 May 2005
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4493999.stm
Date accessed 9 May 2005
- l Iraq's most wanted, 27 February 2005
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/2939125.stm
Date accessed 7 April 2005
- m Text: Iraqi Interim Constitution, 8 March 2004
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3543237.stm
Date accessed 24 February 2005
- n Shia parties triumph in Iraq poll, 14 February 2005
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4261035.stm
Date accessed 16 February 2005
- o Iraq Shias move to form coalition, 14 February 2005
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4263087.stm
Date accessed 16 February 2005
- p Q&A: Iraq election, 13 February 2005
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3971635.stm
Date accessed 17 February 2005
- q Iraq election: Who ran?, 31 January 2005
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4051977.stm
Date accessed 17 February 2005
- r Shia majority for Iraq parliament, 17 February 2005
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4273931.stm
Date accessed 17 February 2005
- s Who are the Iraqi Shia?, 17 February 2005
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/2931903.stm
Date accessed 20 March 2005
- t Blasts target Iraq's Shia Muslims, 18 February 2005
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4276367.stm
Date accessed 20 March 2005
- u Iraqi Shias unveil poll coalition, 9 December 2004
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4082435.stm
Date accessed 21 March 2005
- v Iraq declares state of emergency, 7 November 2004
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3990141.stm
Date accessed 21 March 2005
- w Iraqi rebels 'flushed out by US', 15 May 2005
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4548109.stm
Date accessed 18 May 2005
- x Blistering attacks threaten Iraq's election, 10 January 2005
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4145585.stm
Date accessed 20 April 2005
- y Ahmed Chalabi returns to Baghdad, 11 August 2004
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3556128.stm
Date accessed 12 August 2004
- z Arabs displaced by Iraqi Kurds, (via the *Kurdistan Observer*), 19 February 2004
<http://home.cogeco.ca/~kurdistan1/20-2-04-arab-out-kurds-back.htm>
Date accessed 27 February 2004
- aa Bodies found near Baghdad School, 1 August 2005
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4735123.stm
Date accessed 2 August 2005

- ab Iraqi hospital hit by bomb blast, 27 July 2005
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4722307.stm
Date accessed 29 July 2005
- ac Profile: Ibrahim Jaafari, 7 April 2005
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4268143.stm
Date accessed 4 August 2005
- ad Brain drain puts new strain on Iraq, 28 July 2005
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4726281.stm
Date accessed 10 August 2005
- ae Bush hails Iraqi constitution bid, 16 August 2005
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4155086.stm
Date accessed 16 August 2005
- af Deadlock over Iraq constitution, 15 August 2005
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4150160.stm
Date accessed 16 August 2005
- ag Fresh attacks target Iraqi Shia, 28 March 2005
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4387117.stm
Date accessed 16 August 2005
- ah Iraqi police accused of torture, 27 July 2005
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4718999.stm
Date accessed 16 August 2005
- ai Angry Sunnis shut Baghdad mosques, 21 May 2005
http://newswww.bbc.net.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4569103.stm
Date accessed 16 August 2005
- aj Insurgents kill 15 Iraqi soldiers, 9 April 2005
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4427151.stm
Date accessed 24 August 2005
- ak Iraqi Kurdistan a world away from war, 12 August 2005
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4145110.stm
Date accessed 15 August 2005
- al Iraq Sunni party workers killed, 19 August 2005
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4167304.stm
Date accessed 30 August 2005
- am Q&A: Iraq's political progress, 28 June 2005
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4630525.stm
Date accessed 30 August 2005
- an Poland confirms Iraq withdrawal, 12 April 2005
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4436165.stm>
Date accessed 1 September 2005
- ao Iraqi parliament elects speaker, 3 April 2005
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4405643.stm
Date accessed 10 May 2005
- ap Iraq fills crucial cabinet post, 8 May 2005
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4527685.stm
Date accessed 9 May 2005
- aq Militants' challenge to new Iraq, 6 May 2005
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4513215.stm
Date accessed 10 May 2005
- ar Who's who in Iraq: Jalal Talabani, 6 April 2005
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4415531.stm
Date accessed 22 September 2005
- as Who's who in Iraq: Vice-presidents, 6 April 2005
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4416873.stm
Date accessed 22 September 2005
- at Who's who in Iraq: Iyad Allawi, 28 May 2004
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3757923.stm
Date accessed 22 September 2005

- 5 The Times** <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/>
- a Sunnis promise to reject Iraq's new constitution at poll, 29 August 2005
<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,7374-1755427,00.html>
Date accessed 19 September 2005
 - b Powerful Shia election coalition is boost for Bush, 9 December 2004
<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,3-1396157,00.html>
Date accessed 21 March 2005
 - c Iraqi insurgents now outnumber coalition forces, 4 January 2005
<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,7374-1425022,00.html>
Date accessed 15 February 2005
 - d Peacock worshippers return to the fold, 5 June 2003
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_6-6-2003_pg9_12
Date accessed 6 June 2003
 - e Iraqi women die in 'honour' murders, 28 September 2003
<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/printFriendly/0,,1-524-833535,00.html>
Date accessed 19 October 2003
 - f Iraqi insurgents now outnumber coalition forces, 4 January 2005
<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,7374-1425022,00.html>
Date accessed 15 February 2005
- 6 The Guardian** <http://www.guardian.co.uk/>
- a 'The US is behaving as if every Sunni is a terrorist', 26 January 2005
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1398636,00.html>
Date accessed 4 March 2005
 - b Twelve killed as bombers attack Christians in Iraq, 2 August 2004
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1274107,00.html>
Date accessed 2 August 2004
 - c Hopes fade for deal on Iraqi constitution, 26 August 2005
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,5271204-103681,00.html>
Date accessed 19 September 2005
 - d Mosul deputy police chief assassinated, 25 February 2004
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1155940,00.html>
Date accessed 3 November 2004
 - e Curfews as Iraq rebellion spreads, 13 November 2004
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1350445,00.html>
Date accessed 21 March 2005
 - f US helps Iraq prepare for war crimes trials, 8 March 2004
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,1164209,00.html>
Date accessed 3 November 2004
 - g New Iraqi PM named, 7 April 2005
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1454391,00.html>
Date accessed 10 May 2005
 - h Journalist group calls US to account over Iraq, 18 January 2005
<http://media.guardian.co.uk/site/story/0,14173,1417691,00.html>
Date accessed 18 March 2005
 - i Talabani elected as Iraqi president, 6 April 2005
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1453415,00.html>
Date accessed 10 May 2005
 - j Iraq timeline: January 1 2005 – present
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/page/0,12438,1394573,00.html>
Date accessed 6 September 2005
 - k 2004 was deadliest year for media, 19 January 2005
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,1393270,00.html>
Date accessed 18 March 2005

- l Fifteen dead in Tikrit car bomb, 24 February 2005
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,,1424214,00.html>
Date accessed 16 March 2005
- m Talabani elected as Iraqi president, 6 April 2005
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1453415,00.html>
Date accessed 10 May 2005
- n Bomber in uniform kills 12 Iraqi police, 25 February 2005
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1424866,00.html>
Date accessed 16 March 2005
- o Talabani elected as Iraqi president, 6 April 2005
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1453415,00.html>
Date accessed 10 May 2005
- p Iraqi elections: the key parties, 27 January 2005
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1399971,00.html>
Date accessed 27 January 2005
- q Balance of parties means new constitution will be a product of compromise, 14 February 2005
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1412336,00.html>
Date accessed 16 February 2005
- r Allawi attempts to restore rule of law, 9 August 2004
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4988962-103550,00.html>
Date accessed 9 August 2004
- s Iraq Timeline February 1 2004 to December 31 2004, 29 December 2004
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/page/0,12438,1151021,00.html>
Date accessed 11 April 2005
- t Sunnis admit poll boycott blunder and ask to share power, 15 February 2005
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1414818,00.html>
Date accessed 16 February 2005
- u Iraq election results fail to stem violence, 14 February 2005
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,1414572,00.html>
Date accessed 16 February 2005
- v Iraq's Shias in landmark poll victory, 14 February 2005
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1412317,00.html>
Date accessed 16 February 2005
- w Key people for post-conflict Iraq: Ghazi al-Yawar
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/gallery/image/0,8543,-10904645647,00.html>
Date accessed 31 August 2005
- x Key people for post-conflict Iraq: Jahal Talabani
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/gallery/image/0,8543,-10704645647,00.html>
Date accessed 31 August 2005
- y Key people for post-conflict Iraq: Ibrahim al-Jaafari
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/gallery/image/0,8543,-10404645647,00.html>
Date accessed 31 August 2005
- z Key people for post-conflict Iraq: Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/gallery/image/0,8543,-10304645647,00.html>
Date accessed 31 August 2005
- aa Key people for post-conflict Iraq: Hajim al-Hassani
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/gallery/image/0,8543,-11004645647,00.html>
Date accessed 31 August 2005
- ab Key people for post-conflict Iraq: Ayad Allawi
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/gallery/image/0,8543,-11204645647,00.html>
Date accessed 31 August 2005
- ac Key people for post-conflict Iraq: Abdul Aziz al-Hakim
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/gallery/image/0,8543,-11304645647,00.html>
Date accessed 31 August 2005

- ad Key people in post-conflict Iraq: Ahmad Chalabi
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/gallery/image/0,8543,-11404645647,00.html>
 Date accessed 31 August 2005
- ae Key people in post-conflict Iraq: Moqtada al-Sadr
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/gallery/image/0,8543,-11504645647,00.html>
 Date accessed 31 August 2005
- af Key people in post-conflict Iraq: Masoud Barzani
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/gallery/image/0,8543,-11704645647,00.html>
 Date accessed 31 August 2005
- ag 'Either the people who did this must be brought to court or we should ask for the authority to kill them', 20 June 2003
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,981282,00.html> Date accessed 20 June 2003
- 7 Wikipedia** http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Main_Page
- a United Iraqi Alliance, last modified 25 August 2005
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Iraqi_Alliance
 Date accessed 31 August 2005
- b Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan, last modified 30 August 2005
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurdish_Alliance
 Date accessed 9 September 2005
- c Madhi Army http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mahdi_Army
 Date accessed 31 August 2005
- 8 Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), USA**
- a Iraq: Militia Groups, 9 June 2005
<http://www.cfr.org/publication.html?id=8175>
 Date accessed 2 September 2005
- b Iraq : Debaathification, 7 April 2005
<http://www.cfr.org/publication.html?id=7853>
 Date accessed 5 September 2005
- c Iraq: The Role of Tribes, 14 November 2003
<http://www.cfr.org/publication/7681/iraq.html>
 Date accessed 5 September 2005
- d Iraq: Saddam's Trial, 30 August 2005
<http://www.cfr.org/publication/8750/iraq.html> Date accessed 30 August 2005
- 9 Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA)**
- a Across Borders: Rebuilding Iraq, January / February 2005, Volume 13, Number 1 http://alt.samhsa.gov/samhsa_news/VolumeXIII_1/article6.htm
 Date accessed 11 August 2005
- b In Transition: Al-Rashad Mental Hospital, May / June 2005, Volume 13, Number 3 http://alt.samhsa.gov/SAMHSA_News/VolumeXIII_3/index3.htm
 Date accessed 11 August 2005
- 10 Medact** <http://www.medact.org/>
- a Iraq health update, Summer 2005, (via ReliefWeb), 26 July 2005
<http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/RMOI-6EP9GR?OpenDocument> Date accessed 10 August 2005
- 11 Institute for War and Peace Reporting**
http://www.iwpr.net/home_index_new.html
- a Mobile Schools Set up for Marsh Arabs, 20 October 2004
http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/irq/irq_85_3_eng.txt
 Date accessed 22 March 2005

- b Arabs encounter prejudice in Kurdistan, 10 August 2004
http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/irq/irq_78_4_eng.txt
Date accessed 13 August 2004
- c Kurdish Christians Complain of Discrimination, 28 June 2005
http://iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/irq/irq_130_5_eng.txt
Date accessed 15 September 2005
- d Shia Militia Takes on the Insurgents, 24 May 2005
http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/irq/irq_126_1_eng.txt
Date accessed 7 September 2005
- e Stressed-Out Men Beating Their Wives, 19 July 2005
http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/irq/irq_133_4_eng.txt
Date accessed 30 August 2005
- f Peer judgement, 1 March 2004
http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/irq/irq_50_3_eng.txt
Date accessed 8 March 2004
- g Arab Lecturers Go North, (via Tharwa Project), 24 February 2005
http://www.tharwaproject.com/index.php?option=com_keywords&task=view&id=566&Itemid=0 **Date accessed 31 March 2005**
- h Sunnis seek new political role, 9 February 2004
http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/irq/irq_47_2_eng.txt
Date accessed 11 February 2004
- i Ancient sect targeted, 22 January 2004
http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/irq/irq_45_5_eng.txt
Date accessed 3 February 2004
- j Summary of Iraqi Transitional Administrative Law, 22 March 2004
http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?iraq_ta_law_032004.html
Date accessed 22 March 2004
- k Islamic Tribunal wins approval, 10 August 2004
http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/irq/irq_78_2_eng.txt
Date accessed 13 August 2004
- l Children held for ransom, 8 January 2004
http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/irq/irq_43_3_eng.txt
Date accessed 15 January 2004
- m Insurgents Impose Curbs on Women, 5 July 2005
http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/irq/irq_131_1_eng.txt
Date accessed 15 August 2005
- n Insurgents Target Doctors, 12 July 2005
http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/irq/irq_132_2_eng.txt
Date accessed 15 August 2005
- o Sex Trade Blights the North, 27 July 2005
http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/irq/irq_134_6_eng.txt
Date accessed 15 August 2005
- p Main Players http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?iraq_elect_players.html
Date accessed 27 January 2005
- q What are Iraqis Voting for?
http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?iraq_elect_voting.html
Date accessed 18 February 2005
- r After the Sunni Boycott, 14 February 2005
http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/irq/irq_112_2_eng.txt
Date accessed 17 February 2005
- s Iraqi Election: Winners Rejoice, but Talk to Losers, 14 February 2005
http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/irq/irq_112_1_eng.txt
Date accessed 17 February 2005
- t Rape Victims Suffer in Silence, 3 August 2005
http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/irq/irq_135_2_eng.txt
Date accessed 15 August 2005

- u Special report: Defusing Sunni Anger, 26 January 2005
http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/irq/irq_101_1_eng.txt
Date accessed 30 March 2005
 - v Blood thicker than water, 20 October 2003
http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/irq/irq_32_2_eng.txt
Date accessed 28 October 2003
- 12 Dahr Jamail's Iraq Dispatches** <http://dahrjamailiraq.com/index.php>
- a Iraqi Hospitals Ailing Under Occupation, June 2005
<http://dahrjamailiraq.com/reports/HealthcareUnderOccupationDahrJamail.pdf>
Date accessed 10 August 2005
- 13 Knight Ridder Newspapers, USA**
- a Revenge killings of members of Saddam's former regime rise, 25 February 2005
<http://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington/10994419.htm?template=contentModules/printstory.jsp> Date accessed 29 July 2005
 - b Sunnis claim Shiite militia carries out campaign of threats, murder, 8 June 2005
<http://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington/11846777.htm?template=contentModules/printstory.jsp> Date accessed 16 September 2005
- 14 Jane's Intelligence Review** <http://jir.janes.com/>
- a Northern Iraq faces increased instability in 2005, February 2005,
Date accessed 27 July 2005
- 15 Human Rights Watch** <http://www.hrw.org/>
- a Torture Continues at Hands of New Government, 25 January 2005
<http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/01/26/iraq10053.htm> Date accessed 15 March 2005
 - b Getting Away with Torture? Command Responsibility for the U.S. Abuses of Detainees, April 2005, Vol.17, No 1(G)
<http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/us0405/us0405.pdf>
Date accessed 29 July 2005
 - c Iraqi Election 2005, 1 February 2005
<http://hrw.org/campaigns/iraq/elections/index.htm>
Date accessed 17 February 2005
 - d Sidelined: Human rights in postwar Iraq, January 2004
<http://hrw.org/wr2k4/6.htm> Date accessed 27 January 2004
 - e Human Rights Overview: Iraq, World Report 2005
<http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/01/13/iraq9805.htm>
Date accessed 28 January 2005
 - f Iraq: In Kurdistan, Land disputes fuel unrest, 3 August 2004
<http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/08/03/iraq9174.htm>
Date accessed 4 August 2004
 - g The New Iraq? Torture and ill-treatment of detainees in Iraq custody, January 2005
<http://hrw.org/reports/2005/iraq0105/iraq0105.pdf>
Date accessed 31 January 2005
 - h Claims in conflict: Reversing Ethnic Cleansing in Northern Iraq, August 2004
<http://hrw.org/reports/2004/iraq0804/iraq0804.pdf>
Date accessed 1 September 2004
- 16 Washington Post** <http://www.washingtonpost.com/>
- a Iraq's Baath Party is abolished ,12 May 2003
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp->

[dyn?pagename=article&contentId=A42950-2003May11¬Found=true](http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn?pagename=article&contentId=A42950-2003May11¬Found=true)
Date accessed 12 May 2003

- b It's not over until Saddam is over, 27 July 2003
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A48705-2003Jul25?language=printer> **Date accessed 8 August 2003**
- c Political Violence Surges in Iraq, 26 August 2005
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/25/AR2005082500294.html>
Date accessed 2 September 2005
- d 'My Hands Are Not Stained with Blood', 3 February 2005
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A59279-2005Feb3.html>
Date accessed 23 March 2005
- e US Prisons in Iraq Nearly Full with Rise in Insurgent Arrests, 21 January 2005
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A24875-2005Jan20?language=printer> **Date accessed 15 March 2005**
- f Militias Wresting Control Across Iraq's North and South, 20 August 2005
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/20/AR2005082000940.html>
Date accessed 25 August 2005

17 CNN.com <http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/>

- a Iraq leaders praise group accused of killings, 8 June 2005
<http://cgi.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/06/08/iraq.badr/> **Date accessed 2 September 2005**
- b Sources say hundreds of Iraq attacks planned, 20 January 2005
<http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/01/20/iraq.main/>
Date accessed 21 March 2005
- c Shiite alliance wins plurality in Iraq, 14 February 2005
<http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/02/13/iraq.main/>
Date accessed 16 February 2005
- d US Study: Insurgents infiltrate Iraq police, 25 July 2005
<http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/07/25/iraq.police/>
Date accessed 9 August 2005
- e Survey: 25,000 civilians killed in Iraq war, 19 July 2005
<http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/07/19/iraq.bodycount/>
Date accessed 9 August 2005

18 IRIN <http://www.irinnews.org/>

- a Growing frustration among returnees, 7 June 2005
<http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=47506&SelectRegion=MiddleEast> **Date accessed 20 September 2005**
- b Focus on progress made in marshlands, 22 August 2005
<http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=48679&SelectRegion=MiddleEast> **Date accessed 26 August 2005**
- c Ongoing insecurity hampers landmine clearance, 6 June 2005
<http://www.irinnews.org/print.asp?ReportID=47482>
Date accessed 5 September 2005
- d Briefing paper on Education, 20 May 2005
<http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=41159&SelectRegion=MiddleEast> **Date accessed 6 September 2005**
- e Focus of displacement in Kirkuk, 23 September 2004
<http://www.irinnews.org/print.asp?ReportID=43319>
Date accessed 22 March 2005
- f Children expect a better future, survey says, 1 February 2005
<http://www.plusnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=45319&SelectRegion=MiddleEast&SelectCountry=IRAQ> **Date accessed 23 March 2005**

- g Religious and ethnic minorities want rights enshrined in new constitution, 20 April 2005
<http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=46725&SelectRegion=MiddleEast&SelectCountry=IRAQ> Date accessed 25 August 2005
- h Survey suggests widespread female circumcision in Germain region, 7 January 2005
<http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=44944&SelectRegion=MiddleEast&SelectCountry=IRAQ> Date accessed 22 March 2005
- j Iraq: Special report on IDPs, 5 January 2004
http://www.irinnews.org/S_report.asp?ReportID=38726&SelectRegion=MiddleEast Date accessed 15 January 2004
- k Focus on boys trapped in commercial sex trade, 8 August 2005
<http://www.plusnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=48485&SelectRegion=MiddleEast> Date accessed 11 August 2005
- l Isolated Sinjaris call for more development assistance, 4 November 2004
http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=43995&SelectRegion=Iraq_Crisis&SelectCountry=IRAQ Date accessed 21 March 2005
- m Interview with senior advisor to Ministry of Justice, 22 October 2004
http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=43801&SelectRegion=Iraq_Crisis&SelectCountry=IRAQ Date accessed 7 February 2005
- n Focus on election outcome, 15 February 2005
<http://www.plusnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=45583&SelectRegion=MiddleEast> Date accessed 22 February 2005
- o Health system improves in south, 4 February 2005
<http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=45384&SelectRegion=MiddleEast&SelectCountry=IRAQ> Date accessed 24 February 2005
- p Palestinian refugees still waiting to be moved, 21 June 2004
http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=41786&SelectRegion=Iraq_Crisis&SelectCountry=IRAQ Date accessed 2 July 2004
- q Private hospitals offer free surgery, 27 July 2004
http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=42379&SelectRegion=Iraq_Crisis&SelectCountry=IRAQ Date accessed 30 July 2004
- r Baghdad hospitals need urgent improvements, survey says, 21 February 2005
<http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=45679&SelectRegion=MiddleEast&SelectCountry=IRAQ> Date accessed 22 February 2005
- s New prison in Basra eases overcrowding, 6 July 2004
http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=42027&SelectRegion=Iraq_Crisis&SelectCountry=IRAQ Date accessed 16 February 2005
- t Iranian refugees moving to north, 13 July 2004
http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=42145&SelectRegion=Iraq_Crisis&SelectCountry=IRAQ Date accessed 12 August 2004
- u Salaries increased to improve education, 22 June 2005
<http://www.plusnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=47758&SelectRegion=MiddleEast&SelectCountry=IRAQ> Date accessed 11 August 2005
- v Unemployment caused by insecurity and vice-versa, 29 November 2004
<http://www.irinnews.org/print.asp?ReportID=44392> Date accessed 27 January 2005
- w New dawn for the mentally ill, 17 June 2003
http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=41732&SelectRegion=Iraq_Crisis&SelectCountry=IRAQ Date accessed 20 August 2004
- x Insecurity threatens to leave students with late start, 10 August 2005
<http://www.plusnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=48529&SelectRegion=MiddleEast&SelectCountry=IRAQ> Date accessed 11 August 2005

- y Focus on shortage of medicine for HIV/AIDS patients, 7 April 2005
http://www.plusnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=46501&SelectRegion=Middle_East&SelectCountry=IRAQ Date accessed 11 August 2005
- z Political IDPs on the rise in Dyala governorate, 17 September 2004
<http://www.irinnews.org/print.asp?REportID=43222>
Date accessed 18 September 2004
- aa Preventive measures taken on Syrian border against HIV, 20 July 2005
http://www.plusnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=48203&SelectRegion=Middle_East&SelectCountry=IRAQ Date accessed 11 August 2005
- 19 The Economist** <http://www.economist.com/countries/Iraq/index.cfm>
- a Iraqi's Shias go from exclusion to dominance, 17 February 2005
http://www.economist.com/agenda/displayStory.cfm?story_id=3663599
Date accessed 31 August 2005
- b Political Structure, 10 December 2004
<http://www.economist.com/countries/Iraq/profile.cfm?folder=Profile%2DPolitical%20Structure> Date accessed 7 February 2005
- 20 Reporters sans Frontières (RSF)** <http://www.rsf.org/>
- a "Unacceptable" allegations against Al-Jazeera by defence minister, 25 November 2004
http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=11938 Date accessed 18 March 2005
- b New attempt by police to intimidate journalists, 27 August 2004
http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=11268 Date accessed 18 March 2005
- c Iraq: 2005 annual report, 3 May 2005
http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=13307
Date accessed 25 July 2005
- 21 Agence France-Presse (AFP)** <http://www.afp.com/>
- a 2004 deadliest year for Journalists, (via LexisNexis), 6 January 2005,
Date accessed 18 March 2005
- b US makes good on pledge to blacklist PKK under new name, 13 January 2004
<http://www.kurdmedia.com/news.asp?id=4617>
Date accessed 6 February 2004
- c Kurdish paper says Al Qaeda-linked suspects in Arbil blast were Iraqis, (via the *Kurdistan Observer*), 11 February 2004
<http://home.cogeco.ca/~kurdistan1/12-2-04-arbil-bombers-irqi.htm>
Date accessed 12 February 2004
- d Iraqi Turkmen official wants Kurds disarmed, (via Kurdish Media), 5 January 2004
<http://www.kurdmedia.com/news.asp?id=4588>
Date accessed 6 February 2004
- e Iraqi Kurds returning home drive out Shiites relocated by Saddam, (via the *Kurdistan Observer*), 9 July 2003
<http://home.cogeco.ca/~konuche/9-7-03-kurds-return-their-home.html> Date accessed 9 July 2003
- f Kurdish deputy security chief killed by Ansar-al-Islam, (via the *Kurdistan Observer*), 29 August 2003
<http://home.cogeco.ca/~konuche/30-8-03-puk-security-chief-killed.html> Date accessed 29 August 2003
- 22 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL)** <http://www.rferl.org/>
- a Iraq: Writing Of Draft Constitution Ends Amid Disputes, 29 August 2005
<http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/08/11bb58f4-888a-4a99-9d80-1aa231333bd5.html> Date accessed 30 August 2005
- b Iraq: Judges Say Improving Rule Of Law Depends On Security, 15 September 2004
<http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2004/09/c727eb91-42a7-4039-b4ea-d26500b15f05.html> Date accessed 28 February 2005

- c Study says Female Genital Mutilation Widespread in North, 21 January 2005 <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/01/5c740d58-641a-4f32-b375-5c731a811634.html> Date accessed 22 March 2005
- d Iraq: New NGO Helps Street Children in Baghdad, 21 June 2004 <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2004/06/f0d81bca-e15d-4d87-80de-f2610a393da0.html> Date accessed 23 March 2005
- e Iraq Report: Inside Iraq, 22 October 2004, Volume 7, Number 39 <http://www.rferl.org/reports/iraq-report/2004/10/39-221004.asp> Date accessed 29 March 2005
- f Iraq: President, PM Praise Shi'a and Kurdish Militias, 9 June 2005 <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/06/bd3081d9-58e9-4faf-a049-5874bbbff9b.html> Date accessed 24 August 2005
- g Iraq: Sectarian Violence On The Rise, 24 May 2005 <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/05/3111e849-611e-4da7-b29c-51e352fb84f3.html> Date accessed 24 August 2005
- h Iraq: Christians Face Threats From All Sides, 3 July 2005 <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/07/4362a76d-1036-45fd-9ef6-04aa53a1d805.html> Date accessed 25 July 2005
- i Iraq: Alleged Terrorist Leader To Be Deported From Norway, 2 April 2005 <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/04/d36876fc-0a66-4594-ab86-2f5a2b95ee5a.html> Date accessed 12 September 2005

23 World Health Organisation (WHO) <http://www.who.int/en/>

- a Iraq Watching Briefs: Health and Nutrition, (via the Columbia University Medical Center), July 2003 <http://cpmcnet.columbia.edu/dept/nursing/institutes-centers/whoCenter/pdf/wtchnngBfHlthNutrf110903.pdf> Date accessed 1 August 2003
- b Health Systems Profile: Iraq, June 2005 <http://www.emro.who.int/iraq/pdf/HealthSystemsProfile.pdf> Date accessed 10 August 2005
- c WHO in Iraq: Weekly Bulletin 215, 31 July 2005 <http://unjobs.org/news/1123155855.98> Date accessed 11 August 2005
- d WHO calls for more investment in health in Iraq, (via ReliefWeb), 18 July 2005 <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/HMYT-6EEKMK?OpenDocument> Date accessed 11 August 2005

24 The New York Times <http://www.nytimes.com/>

- a Kurds Vow to Retain Militia as Guardians of Autonomy, 23 February 2005 <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/27/international/middleeast/27militia.html/?ex=1125028800&en=38849835522763da&ei=5070> Date accessed 24 August 2005
- b Islamic parties winning Iraqi election, (via Jihad Watch), 6 February 2005 <http://www.jihadwatch.org/archives/004935.php> Date accessed 6 April 2005

25 International Crisis Group <http://www.crisisweb.org/home/index.cfm>

- a War In Iraq: Political Challenges After The Conflict, (via ReliefWeb), 25 March 2003 <http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2003/icg-irq-25mar.pdf> Date accessed 25 March 2005
- b Iraq Kurds: Towards an historic compromise?, 8 April 2004 <http://www.icg.org/home/getfile.cfm?id=1168&tid=2584> Date accessed 23 March 2005

26 Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) <http://www.cpj.org/>

- a Journalists in Danger: Facts on Iraq
http://www.cpj.org/Briefings/2003/gulf03/iraq_stats.html
Date accessed 26 July 2005
- 27 United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)** <http://www.unicef.org/>
- a Iraq's Schools Suffering From Neglect and War, 15 October 2004
http://www.unicef.org/media/media_23630.htm Date accessed 14 March 2005
- b Iraq: Epidemiological fact sheet on HIV and Sexually Transmitted Infections 2004 (Joint report by WHO, UNAIDS and INICEF)
http://www.childinfo.org/eddb/hiv_aids/factsheets/pdfs/Iraq_en.pdf
Date accessed 14 March 2005
- c At a glance: Iraq <http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/iraq.html>
Date accessed 23 March 2005
- 28 Amnesty International** <http://www.amnesty.org/>
- a Iraq: Human rights protection and promotion vital in the transitional period, 28 June 2004
<http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGMDE140302004?open&of=ENG-IRQ> Date accessed 31 August 2004
- b UA: Iraq, 19 May 2005 <http://www.amnesty.ie/user/content/view/full/3859/>
Date accessed 25 August 2005
- c Iraq: In cold blood: Abuses by armed groups, AI Index: MDE 14/009/2005, 25 July 2005 <http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGMDE140092005>
Date accessed 27 July 2005
- d Iraq: One year on the human rights situation remains dire, 18 March 2004
<http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGMDE140062004>
Date accessed 13 March 2004
- e Iraq: Decades of suffering, Now women deserve better, AI Index: MDE 14/001/2005, 22 February 2005
<http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGMDE140012005>
Date accessed 13 March 2005
- f Iraq: Annual report 2005, Covering events from January – December 2004
<http://web.amnesty.org/report2005/irq-summary-eng>
Date accessed 28 July 2005
- 29 Peyamner** <http://www.peyamner.com/index.php?lang=english>
- a 14 February 2005, (via Iraqi Media Monitoring)
<http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iraq/2005/02/imm-050215-unami.htm> Date accessed 13 March 2005
- 30 Home Office**
- a Report of the Joint Danish/UK fact-finding mission to Damascus, Amman and Geneva on conditions in Iraq – July 2003
- b Joint British/Danish fact-finding mission to Amman and Ankara regarding Iraqi asylum seekers – 26 May – 4 June 2002
- c Joint British/Danish fact-finding mission to Baghdad and Amman on Conditions in Iraq (1 – 8 September 2004), October 2004
- d Terrorism Act 2000 (TACT): Terrorist Groups
<http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/terrorism/threat/groups/index.html>
Date accessed 20 April 2005
- 31 Coalition Provisional Authority Orders** <http://www.cpa-iraq.org/>
- a No 7: Penal Code, 10 June 2003
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030610_CPAORD_7_Penal_Cod_e.pdf Date accessed 10 June 2003

- 32 Iraqi Kurdistan National Assembly (IKNA)** <http://www.kurdistan-parliament.org/>
- a Judicial Authority in the Region, <http://www.kurdistan-parliament.org/www.kurdistan-parliament.org/justice.htm>
Date accessed 28 February 2005
- 33 US Library of Congress** <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/iqtoc.html>
- a The Baath Party, 1988 [http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field\(DOCID+iq0077\)](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+iq0077)) Date accessed 7 August 2003
- b Iraq: US regime change efforts and post-Saddam governance, 7 January 2004 <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/28648.pdf>
Date accessed 7 January 2004
- 34 The Christian Science Monitor** <http://www.csmonitor.com/>
- a After the attacks, calls for militia grow, 18 July 2005
<http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0718/p06s01-woiq.html>
Date accessed 2 September 2005
- b Though battle-hardened, Iraq's Kurdish militia struggles for role, 2 March 2005 <http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0302/p05s01-woiq.htm>
Date accessed 19 September 2005
- c Iraq's hottest front line: the police, 17 September 2004
<http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0917/p01s02-woiq.html>
Date accessed 24 September 2004
- d Ethnic divide deepens in new Iraq, 8 March 2004
<http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0308/p01s04-woiq.html>
Date accessed 8 March 2004
- 35 Voices of the Wilderness** <http://vitw.org/>
- a Bremmer puts Iraqi civil society and international NGO's on probation, 2 January 2004, Date accessed 26 September 2004
- 36 Time** <http://www.time.com/time/>
- a How al-Qaeda's ally came back, 11 August 2003
<http://www.time.com/time/archive/preview/0,10987,474577,00.html>
Date accessed 12 August 2003
- 37 Psephos, Australia** <http://psephos.adam-carr.net/>
- a 2005 legislative election <http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/i/iraq/iraqmapindex.shtml> Date accessed 17 February 2005
- b Votes by Governorate <http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/i/iraq/iraq20052.txt> Date accessed 17 February 2005
- c Iraqi Kurdistan Election Results <http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/i/iraq/kurdistan2005.txt> Date accessed 17 February 2005
- 38 United Nations Security Council (UNSC)** <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/>
- a Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 30 of resolution 1546 (2004), 7 March 2005 <http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/2005/141&Lang=E&Area=UNDO>
C Date accessed 26 July 2005
- b Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 30 of resolution 1546 (2004), 7 June 2005 <http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?Open&DS=S/2005/373&Lang=E&Area=UNDO>
C Date accessed 26 July 2005

- c Report of the Secretary-General, 8 December 2004
<http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrep04.html> Date accessed 27 January 2005
- 39 Middle East Intelligence Bulletin** <http://www.meib.org/>
a Ansar al-Sunna: Iraq's new terrorist threat, May 2004
http://www.meib.org/articles/0405_iraq1.htm Date accessed 12 April 2005
- 40 UNHCR** <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/tehis/vtx/home>
a UNHCR return advisory regarding Iraqi asylum seekers and refugees, September 2004 <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/tehis/vtx/publ/pendoc.pdf?tbl=RSDLEGAL&id=4174df314&page=publ>
Date accessed 12 April 2005
b Country of Origin Information – Iraq, 8 August 2004
[http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/tehis/vtx/rsd/+gwwBmegYorexxwwwwwwwwwwwwwwwFqwqFqh1DrqGmFqwnFqwhFqwtFqnoGw3rFqwoFqzwFqAFqqejh+qFqo-uPPyER0MFmmDFqm7y-dFqt2lygZf3zmzwwwwwwwww1zmwwwwwwwww/rsddocview.pdf](http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/tehis/vtx/rsd/+gwwBmegYorexxwwwwwwwwwwwwFqwqFqh1DrqGmFqwnFqwhFqwtFqnoGw3rFqwoFqzwFqAFqqejh+qFqo-uPPyER0MFmmDFqm7y-dFqt2lygZf3zmzwwwwwwwww1zmwwwwwwwww/rsddocview.pdf)
Date accessed 14 August 2004
c The present situation of Human Rights in Iraq, 4 June 2004
www.unhchr.ch/html/hchr/docs/iraq.doc Date accessed 30 June 2004
d UNHRC Global Report 2004 <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/tehis/vtx/home/pendoc.pdf?id=42ad4da20&tbl=PUBL>
Date accessed 31 August 2005
- 41 US Agency for International Development (via Electionguide)** <http://www.electionguide.org/>
a Results Summary: Iraq
http://www.electionguide.org/resultsum/iraq_parl_2005.htm
Date accessed 17 February 2005
- 42 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers** <http://www.child-soldiers.org/>
a Child Soldiers global report: Iraq, 17 November 2004 http://www.child-soldiers.org/document_get.php?id=944 Date accessed 22 March 2005
- 43 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)** <http://www.icrc.org/eng>
a What is the ICRC's position on the reported abuses of Iraqi prisoners by US and UK forces?, 6 May 2004
<http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList322/40A0CDE4C698440BC1256E8A004B42AA> Date accessed 16 February 2005
b Iraq: ICRC operations in 2004, 31 December 2004
<http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/693L9H?OpenDocument>
Date accessed 16 February 2005
- 44 US Committee on Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI)**
a World Refugee Survey 2005 Country Report: Iraq, (via UNHCR), 20 June 2005 <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/tehis/vtx/home/pendoc.htm?tbl=RSDCOI&page=research&id=42c928902f> Date accessed 25 July 2005
- 45 International Centre for Prison Studies, Kings College, UK** <http://www.prisonstudies.org/>
a Prison Brief for Iraq, last updated 13 February 2005
<http://www.prisonstudies.org/> Date accessed 24 February 2005

- 46 Iraqi Press Monitor (published by the IWPR)**
http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?iraq_ipm_index.html
 a No 28, 04 March 2004 http://www.iwpr.net/archive/ipm/ipm_028.html
 Date accessed 4 March 2004
 b No.164, 28 September 2004 http://www.iwpr.net/archive/ipm/ipm_164.html
 Date accessed 30 September 2004
- 47 International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU)**
 a Iraq – murder of oil trade unionist and wave of kidnappings mark surge in worker intimidation, 24 February 2005
<http://www.icftu.org/displaydocument.asp?Index=991221334&Language=EN>
 Date accessed 21 March 2005
- 48 The Daily Telegraph** <http://www.telegraph.co.uk>
 a Iraqi forces desert posts as insurgent posts are stepped up, 25 April 2005
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2005/04/25/wirq25.xml&sSheet=/news/2005/04/25/ixnewstop.html>
 Date accessed 1 September 2005
 b Waters return but the Marsh Arabs are still hungry, 26 June 2004
<http://arts.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2004/06/26/wirq126.xml> Date accessed 21 March 2005
- 49 Forced Migration Review, Oxford University, UK**
<http://www.fmreview.org/welcome.htm>
 a Displaced Iraqis – caught in the maelstrom, Issue 22, January 2005
<http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR22/FMR22contents.pdf>
 Date accessed 30 March 2005
- 50 Global IDP Project, Norwegian Refugee Council** <http://www.idpproject.org/>
 a Iraq: continued insecurity adds to vulnerability of over 1 million IDPs, 11 July 2005
[http://www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/IdpProjectDb/idpSurvey.nsf/wSummaryPDFs/6556FD5E01ACAF28C1256E6A004C646C/\\$file/Iraq_summary.pdf](http://www.db.idpproject.org/Sites/IdpProjectDb/idpSurvey.nsf/wSummaryPDFs/6556FD5E01ACAF28C1256E6A004C646C/$file/Iraq_summary.pdf)
 Date accessed 1 August 2005
- 51 The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)**
 a Law of administration for the state of Iraq for the transitional period, 8 March 2004 <http://www.cpa-iraq.org/government/TAL.html>
 Date accessed 10 February 2005
- 52 News24, South Africa**
 a State of emergency in Iraq, 7 November 2004
http://www.news24.com/News24/World/Iraq/0,,2-10-1460_1617260,00.html
 Date accessed 21 March 2005
 b Baghdad hospitals taking strain, 20 February 2005
http://www.news24.com/News24/World/Iraq/0,,2-10-1460_1665070,00.html
 Date accessed 24 February 2005
- 53 The International Lesbian and Gay Association** <http://www.ilga.org/>
 a World Legal Survey: Iraq, last updated 31 July 2000
http://www.ilga.info/Information/Legal_survey/middle%20east/iraq.htm
 Date accessed 31 March 2003

- 54 United Nations Development Programme – Programme on Governance in the Arab Region (UNDP – POGAR)** <http://www.pogar.org/>
a Iraq in Brief <http://www.pogar.org/countries/index.asp?cid=6>
Date accessed 8 August 2005
- 55 Currency Converter** <http://www.oanda.com/convert/classic>
a FXConverter – 164 Currency Converter Results, British pound to Iraqi Dinar, 31 August 2005, Date accessed 31 August 2005
- 56 Asia Times** http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Front_Page.html
a Muqtada stirs new storms, 7 August 2004
http://atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/FH07Ak01.html
Date accessed 31 March 2004
- 57 The Daily Star, Lebanon** http://www.dailystar.com.lb/home.asp?edition_id=10
a Not all is bad in Iraq: Look at the Kurdish areas, 27 April 2004
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=10&categ_id=5&article_id=2861 Date accessed 27 April 2004
- 58 Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), UK** <http://www.eiu.com/index.asp>
a Country Profile 2004: Iraq
http://db.eiu.com/report_dl.asp?mode=pdf&eiu_issue_id=497374849
Date accessed 26 January 2005
b Country report 2005: Iraq
http://www.eiu.com/report_dl.asp?issue_id=739172459&mode=pdf
Date accessed 9 August 2005
- 59 Department for International Development (DFID)**
http://www.dfid.gov.uk/DFIDAroundWorld/asia/iraq_crisis.htm#Updates
a Iraq Update: No 92, 2 July 2004
b Iraq Update: Issue 2, October 2004
<http://www.dfid.gov.uk/news/files/iraqupdate/Oct04.pdf>
Date accessed 9 February 2005
c Iraq Update: Issue 4, December 2004
<http://www.dfid.gov.uk/news/files/iraqupdate/dec04.pdf>
Date accessed 9 February 2005
d Iraq Update: Issue 6, February 2005
<http://www.dfid.gov.uk/news/files/iraqupdate/feb05.pdf>
Date accessed 16 March 2005
e Iraq Update: Issue 8, June 2005
<http://www.dfid.gov.uk/news/files/iraqupdate/june05.pdf>
Date accessed 28 July 2005
f Iraq Update: Issue 9, July 2005
<http://www.dfid.gov.uk/news/files/iraqupdate/july05.pdf>
Date accessed 30 August 2005
- 60 Duluth News Tribune** <http://www.duluthsuperior.com/mld/duluthsuperior/>
a Shiites target former Baathists, 26 February 2005
<http://www.stg.duluthsuperior.com/mld/duluthsuperior/2005/02/26/news/10934161.htm> Date accessed 23 March 2005
- 61 UN Cartographic Section**
<http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/english/index.htm>
a Map of Iraq, January 2004, Date accessed 26 January 2005

- 62 The United Kingdom Parliament** <http://www.parliament.uk/index.cfm>
 a Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Seventh Report, 29 July 2004
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmselect/cmffaff/441/44105.htm> Date accessed 30 July 2004
- 63 Center for Strategic and International Studies** <http://www.csis.org/>
 a Capturing Iraqi Voices, July 2004
http://www.csis.org/isp/pcr/0407_Capturing_Iraqi_Voices.pdf
 Date accessed 30 July 2004
 b Progress or peril? Measuring Iraq's Reconstruction, September 2004
http://www.csis.org/isp/pcr/0409_progressperil.pdf
 Date accessed 30 September 2004
 c Iraq's Evolving Insurgency, 19 May 2005
http://www.csis.org/features/050512_IraqInsurg.pdf
 Date accessed 22 August 2005
 d Iraq's Security Forces: 150,000 or Bust? 14 April 2005
http://www.csis.org/features/050414_Iraq150000orBust.pdf
 Date accessed 9 August 2005
- 64 Save the Children**
 a Iraq – Working to Improve Children's Lives
<http://www.savethechildren.org/emergencies/iraq/index.asp>
 Date accessed 23 March 2005
- 65 Associated Press** <http://ap.tbo.com/ap/breaking/index.htm>
 a Deadliest attacks in Iraq this year, (via *The Guardian*), 29 July 2004
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/worldlatest/story/0,1280,-4362046,00.html>
 Date accessed 29 July 2004
 b Allawi Cautions Shiites on Baath Ban, (via *Macon Telegraph*), 17 February 2005
http://www.macon.com/mld/macon/news/breaking_news/10925175.htm
 Date accessed 23 March 2005
 c U.S.-Led Coalition Could See Desertions, (via Common Dreams News Centre), 5 November 2004
<http://www.commondreams.org/headlines04/1105-22.htm>
 Date accessed 14 March 2005
 d Shi'ites list Iraq election hopefuls, (via the *Washington Times*), 10 December 2004
<http://washingtontimes.com/world/20041210-120723-8356r.htm> accessed 21 March 2005
 e Iraqis Protest Said Voting Irregularities, (via *Duluth News Tribune*), 6 February 2005
<http://www.duluthsuperior.com/mld/duluthsuperior/news/world/10833120.htm>
 Date accessed 21 March 2005
- 66 Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), UK**
<http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029390554>
 a Letter dated 26 April 2004
 b Letter dated 20 September 2004
 c Letter dated 22 October 2004
 d Letter dated 25 May 2005 (Travel on Highway 10), Date accessed 25 May 2005
 e Country Profile: Iraq, 11 May 2005
<http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029394365&a=KCountryProfile&aid=1020338054604> Date accessed 3 August 2005

- f Letter dated 25 January 2005 (Christians in Iraq)
 - g Letter dated 20 January 2005 (Christian Community in Iraq)
 - h Letter dated 12 April 2005 (Security Situation), **Date accessed 12 April 2005**
 - i Women
<http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1082830025454> **Date accessed 28 February 2005**
 - j Human Rights Annual report 2005, July 2005
<http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/HumanRights2005.pdf>
Date accessed 9 August 2005
 - k Justice,
<http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1075299384650> **Date accessed 8 August 2005**
 - l Iraq: Political Process,
<http://www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1024313924085> **Date accessed 10 May 2005**
 - m Letter dated 10 October 2005 (Iraq country report – Comments)
- 67 The Financial Times** <http://news.ft.com/home/uk>
- a US troops launch offensive in Najaf, 11 August 2004
<http://news.ft.com/cms/s/16ce4778-eb6d-11d8-82f7-00000e2511c8.html>
Date 12 August 2004
 - b Beyond the battle, the quiet struggle for Iraq's future, (via LexisNexis) 13 August 2004, **Date accessed 13 August 2004**
- 68 Wadi (Germany)** <http://www.wadinet.de/index.php>
- a Assistance for women in distress in Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan,
<http://www.wadinet.de/projekte/newiraq/women/shelters.htm>
Date accessed 22 March 2005
- 69 Womens News** <http://www.womensenews.org/index.cfm>
- a Genital mutilation s traditional in Iraqi Kurdistan, (via Wadi), 1 August 2004
<http://www.wadinet.de/projekte/frauen/fgm/attach4.htm>
Date accessed 22 March 2005
- 70 Freedom House** <http://www.freedomhouse.org/>
- a Freedom of the Press: Iraq 2005
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/pressurvey/fop05.pdf>
Date accessed 15 August 2005
 - b Freedom in the World – 2005: Iraq, August 2005
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2005/iraq05.pdf>
Date accessed 30 August 2005
- 71 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs**
- a Official Country Report Central Iraq, November 2002
 - b General Official Report on Iraq, Translated in and owned by the UK, June 2004
 - c General Country report Iraq, Translated in and owned by the UK, December 2004 **Date accessed 14 March 2005**
- 72 Handicap International Belgium**
<http://www.handicapinternational.be/hi.asp?lng=1>
- a Handicap International's activities in Iraq,
<http://www.handicapinternational.be/content.asp?lng=1&cid=34>
Date accessed 18 August 2004

- 73 **GlobalSecurity.org** <http://www.globalsecurity.org/index.html>
 a Military: Al-Mahdi Army / Active Religious Seminary / Al-Sadr's Group, 6 July 2005 <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/al-sadr.htm>
 Date accessed 17 September 2005
 b Military: Non-US Forces in Iraq, 15 March 2005,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_orbat_coalition.htm
 Date accessed 9 August 2005
- 74 **Provisions Consulting Incorporated**
<http://www.provisionsconsulting.com/index.htm>
 a Outline for a new mental health system in Iraq, E-News from Washington Vol.04-09, 16 April 2004
http://www.provisionsconsulting.com/LegislativeUpdates/enews_from_washington63.htm Date accessed 30 August 2004
- 75 **The Permanent Committee on Geographical Names for British Official Use (PCGN), UK** <http://www.pcn.org.uk/Indexx.htm>
 a Country Names, 7 January 2005 http://www.pcn.org.uk/Page_10x.htm
 Date accessed 26 January 2005
- 76 **The Weekly Standard** <http://www.weeklystandard.com/>
 a Inside the Zarqawi network, Volume 9, No. 46, (via LexisNexis), 16 August 2004, Date accessed 16 August 2004
- 77 **Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board** <http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/infobase.htm>
 a Iraq: Situation of Muslim and Christian homosexuals; their legal status; sanctions imposed on them; the public's attitude toward them, IRQ41942.FE, 5 September 2003 http://www.cisr-irb.gc.ca/cgi-bin/foioci.exe/refinfo_e/query=irq41942!2Efe/doc/{@8223}?
 Date accessed 10 October 2003
- 78 **Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), USA**
 a <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/>
 The World Factbook: Iraq, last updated 9 August 2005
<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/iz.html>
 Date accessed 4 September 2005
- 79 **alawaba.com** <http://www.alawaba.com/main/index.ie.php3?lang=e>
 a Head of Saddam Hussein's tribe shot dead in Tikrit, 1 July 2003, Date accessed 20 July 2003
- 80 **International Monetary Fund (IMF)** <http://www.imf.org/external/index.htm>
 a Iraq: 2005 Article IV Consultation—Staff Report; Staff Supplement; Public Information Notice on the Executive Board Discussion; and Statement by the Executive Director for Iraq, August 2005, IMF Country Report No. 05/294 <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2005/cr05294.pdf> Date accessed 11 October 2005
- 81 **Ministry of Planning and Development Co-operation**
 a Iraq living Conditions Survey 2004, Analytical report, with UNDP, First published 2005
<http://www.iq.undp.org/ILCS/PDF/Analytical%20Report%20-%20English.pdf> Date accessed 11 October 2005

