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Preface

i This Country of Origin Information (COI) Report has been produced by the COI Service, United Kingdom Border Agency (UKBA), for use by officials involved in the asylum/human rights determination process. The Report provides general background information about the issues most commonly raised in asylum/human rights claims made in the United Kingdom. The main body of the report includes information available up to 10 May 2011. The ‘Latest News’ section contains further brief information on events and reports accessed from 11 May 2011 to 27 May 2011. The report was issued on 27 May 2010.

ii The Report is compiled wholly from material produced by a wide range of recognised external information sources and does not contain any UKBA opinion or policy. All information in the Report is attributed, throughout the text, to the original source material, which is made available to those working in the asylum/human rights determination process.

iii The Report aims to provide a compilation of extracts of the source material identified, focusing on the main issues raised in asylum and human rights applications. It is not intended to be a detailed or comprehensive survey. For a more detailed account, the relevant source documents should be examined directly.

iv The structure and format of the Report reflects the way it is used by UKBA decision makers and appeals presenting officers, who require quick electronic access to information on specific issues and use the contents page to go directly to the subject required. Key issues are usually covered in some depth within a dedicated section, but may also be referred to briefly in several other sections. Some repetition is therefore inherent in the structure of the Report.

v The information included in this Report is limited to that which can be identified from source documents. While every effort is made to cover all relevant aspects of a particular topic, it is not always possible to obtain the information concerned. For this reason, it is important to note that information included in the Report should not be taken to imply anything beyond what is actually stated. For example, if it is stated that a particular law has been passed, this should not be taken to imply that it has been effectively implemented unless stated. Similarly, the absence of information does not necessarily mean that, for example, a particular event or action did not occur.

vi As noted above, the Report is a collation of material produced by a number of reliable information sources. In compiling the Report, no attempt has been made to resolve discrepancies between information provided in different source documents. For example, different source documents often contain different versions of names and spellings of individuals, places and political parties, etc. Reports do not aim to bring consistency of spelling, but to reflect faithfully the spellings used in the original source documents. Similarly, figures given in different source documents sometimes vary and these are simply quoted as per the original text. The term ‘sic’ has been used in this document only to denote incorrect spellings or typographical errors in quoted text; its use is not intended to imply any comment on the content of the material.

vii The Report is based substantially upon source documents issued during the previous two years. However, some older source documents may have been included because they contain relevant information not available in more recent documents. All sources contain information considered relevant at the time this Report was issued.

The main text of this COI Report contains the most up to date publicly available information as at 10 May 2011. Further brief information on recent events and reports has been provided in the Latest News section to 27 May 2011.
This Report and the accompanying source material are public documents. All COI Reports are published on the UK Border Agency website and the great majority of the source material for the Report is readily available in the public domain. Where the source documents identified in the Report are available in electronic form, the relevant web link has been included, together with the date that the link was accessed. Copies of less accessible source documents, such as those provided by government offices or subscription services, are available from the COI Service upon request.

COI Reports are published regularly on the top 20 asylum intake countries. Reports on countries outside the top 20 countries may also be published if there is a particular operational need. UKBA officials also have constant access to an information request service for specific enquiries.

In producing this Report, COI Service has sought to provide an accurate, up to date, balanced, and impartial compilation of the available source material. Any comments regarding this Report or suggestions for additional source material are very welcome and should be submitted to UKBA as below.

**Country of Origin Information Service**

UK Border Agency  
St Anne House  
20-26 Wellesley Road  
Croydon, CR0 9XB  
United Kingdom  
Email: cois@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk  
Website: [http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/policyandlaw/guidance/coi](http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/policyandlaw/guidance/coi)

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**INDEPENDENT ADVISORY GROUP ON COUNTRY INFORMATION**

The Independent Advisory Group on Country Information (IAGCI) was set up in March 2009 by the Independent Chief Inspector of the UK Border Agency to make recommendations to him about the content of the UKBA’s COI material. The IAGCI welcomes feedback on UKBA’s COI Reports and other country of origin information material. Information about the IAGCI’s work can be found on the Independent Chief Inspector’s website at [http://icinspector.independent.gov.uk/country-information-reviews](http://icinspector.independent.gov.uk/country-information-reviews)

In the course of its work, the IAGCI reviews the content of selected UKBA COI documents and makes recommendations specific to those documents and of a more general nature. A list of the COI Reports and other documents which have been reviewed by the IAGCI or the Advisory Panel on Country Information (the independent organisation which monitored UKBA’s COI material from September 2003 to October 2008) is available at [http://icinspector.independent.gov.uk/country-information-reviews](http://icinspector.independent.gov.uk/country-information-reviews)

Please note: it is not the function of the IAGCI to endorse any UKBA material or procedures. Some of the material examined by the Group relates to countries designated or proposed for designation to the Non-Suspensive Appeals (NSA) list. In such cases, the Group’s work should not be taken to imply any endorsement of the decision or proposal to designate a particular country for NSA, nor of the NSA process itself.

**Independent Advisory Group on Country Information contact details:**  
Independent Chief Inspector of the UK Border Agency  
5th Floor, Globe House,  
89 Eccleston Square,
27 MAY 2011

London, SW1V 1PN
Email: chiefinspectorukba@icinspector.gsi.gov.uk
Website: http://icinspector.independent.gov.uk/country-information-reviews
**Latest News**

The Latest News provides a non-exhaustive selection of significant events since 11 May 2011. Further information may also be available from the list of useful sources below.

**EVENTS IN SOMALIA FROM 11 MAY 2011 TO 27 MAY 2011**

21 May 2011  The Kenyan Government has stated that it will support Somaliland as an independent state, and encourage the African Union and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to finally accept Somaliland as a sovereign state.

*Somaliland Press*
Kenya to recognize Somaliland, 21 May 2011
Date accessed 26 May 2011

21 May 2011  AMISOM has designated Bakara Market, a stronghold of Al Shabaab, a ‘no-fire zone’ and will not fire artillery or mortars into the market in order to protect civilians.

*Agence France Presse*
AU force says it will not bomb key Mogadishu market, 21 May 2011
[http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iY7du0trGxkBDWkTPPV7ITR_POqQ?docId=CNG.34fd6b84d49890cb836bc148afa6ad47.741](http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5iY7du0trGxkBDWkTPPV7ITR_POqQ?docId=CNG.34fd6b84d49890cb836bc148afa6ad47.741)
Date accessed 26 May 2011

21 May 2011  The World Food Programme has warned that a drop in donations has forced them to cut both the number of people they feed and the quantity of food rations.

*BBC News*
Somalia food aid cut amid UN funding shortfall, 21 May 2011
Date accessed 26 May 2011

14 May 2011  Somali MPs have called for elections to be held in August 2011 for the position of President, Speaker and Deputy Speaker. The MPs also stated that “The road from the Port of Mogadishu via Debka to Bakara market is not currently accessible. Bondheere, the Ministry of Interior, the Italian Embassy located just 200 metres from Juba Hotel, Fiat, Lucciolo basketball court and the Old Port in Abdulazix are still occupied by Al Shabaab.”. It was also reported that “TFG troops that have reclaimed areas bordering Kenya and Ethiopia…. [and] recaptured areas of strategic importance in Gedo and Juba.”

*Daily Nation*
Somalia MPs demand August poll, 14 May 2011
[http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/-/1064/1162446/-/7s1ghi/-/](http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/-/1064/1162446/-/7s1ghi/-/)
Date accessed 26 May 2011

13 May 2011  Ahlu Sunna Waljama and fighters loyal to Al Shabaab fought over the control of Garbaharey town, the regional capital of Gedo region. Six people were reported to have been killed. Calm has since returned to the town.

*Shabelle Media Network*
Moderate Ahlu Sunna , Al Shabaab Battle in Southern Somalia Town, 13 May 2011
12 May 2011  AMISOM began an operation against Islamic insurgents in the Hodan and Hawlwadag districts of Mogadishu. AMISOM issued a statement saying that the operation led to the death of a commander of the insurgents in Hawlwadag, and several fighters. Two Amisom soldiers were killed and three injured.

**Bloomberg Businessweek**

African Union in Somalia Start ‘Operation’ Against Insurgents, 12 May 2011


Date accessed 27 May 2011

**USEFUL NEWS SOURCES FOR FURTHER INFORMATION**

A list of news sources with Weblinks is provided below, which may be useful if additional up to date information is required to supplement that provided in this report.

Afrol News  www.afrol.com
AlertNet (Thomson Reuters)  http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/index.htm?news=all
All Africa  http://allafria.com/
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)  http://news.bbc.co.uk
Cable News Network (CNN)  http://edition.cnn.com/WWW/?fbid=i0gUtrVnUAy
Daily Nation  http://www.nation.co.ke/-/1148/1148/-/xvvu7uz/-/index.html
ECOI  http://www.ecoi.net/
Food Security and Nutritional Analysis Unit – Somalia  http://www.fsnau.org/
Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN)  http://www.irinnews.org/
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre  http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpCountries)/02EE5A59E76049F5802570A7004B80AB?OpenDocument
ReliefWeb  http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/dbc.nsf/doc104?OpenForm&rc=1&cc=som
UNHCR Refworld  http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain
REPORTS ON SOMALIA PUBLISHED OR ACCESSED BETWEEN 10 MAY 2011 AND 27 MAY 2011

Amnesty International
Annual Report 2011, Somalia, 13 May 2011
Date accessed 25 May 2011
Background Information

1. GEOGRAPHY

1.01 Europa World Online, undated, accessed on 22 February 2011, stated that “The Somali Democratic Republic lies on the east coast of Africa, with Ethiopia to the north-west and Kenya to the west. There is a short frontier with Djibouti to the north-west ....” ¹ The US State Department Background Note: Somalia dated 3 January 2011 noted that “Somalia… with Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Kenya, is often referred to as the Horn of Africa.”²

1.02 The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Factbook, updated on 28 April 2011, noted that Somalia’s total area is 637,657 sq km, of which 627,337 sq km is land and 10,320 sq km is water.³ Suna Times noted that the Transitional Federal Government’s Fishing and Sea Resources Minister Mohamed Moallim said: “… that the territorial waters of Somalia extend upto 370 kilometers which is the exclusive economic zone in line with the United Nations Convention on Law of sea.”

1.03 The country has fragmented into three broad geographical ‘regions’: south and central Somalia partially controlled from the ‘national’ government in Mogadishu, the self-declared republic of Somaliland in the north-west and the semi-autonomous region of Puntland in the north-east.⁴ (United States Department of State, 2010 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Somalia, dated 8 April 2011)

1.04 The CIA World Factbook, updated on 28 April 2011, section on population, cited the population of Somalia as 9,925,640, based on estimates made by the US Census Bureau derived from the 1975 census.⁵ The UN Data Country Profile for Somalia, accessed on 22 February 2011, estimated the population in 2008 to be 8,926,000.⁶ While the Minority Rights Group International report, No redress: Somalia’s forgotten minorities, published 23 November 2010, observed that:

“Calculations for the current population of Somalia, including Somaliland (a self declared republic in the north-west), vary, with the latest World Bank figure suggesting approximately 9 million. Estimates from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), combined with a figure from the authorities in Puntland, suggest the total population might be higher, with around 5 million in south-central Somalia, about 2 to 3 million in Somaliland, and up to 2.4 million in Puntland.”⁷

² US State Department, Background Note: Somalia, Geography, January 2010, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2863.htm Date accessed 3 February 2010
1.05 The BBC News Profile for Puntland gives a population estimate for the region of 2.4 million, while the same website’s Profile for Somaliland gives a population estimate of 3.5 million.

1.06 The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom’s Annual Report 2011, published 28 April 2011 (USCIRF 2011 Report), noted that: “A large majority of citizens are Sunni Muslims of a Sufi tradition. There is a small, low-profile Christian community and small numbers of followers of other religions. The number of adherents of strains of conservative Islam and the number of Islamic schools supported by religiously conservative sources continued to grow.”

1.07 Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment for Somalia, updated 23 July 2010, noted: “The primary and official language is Somali, spoken universally by all the clans. Arabic, Italian and English are also spoken by an educated few and Swahili is spoken in the coastal towns south of Mogadishu.”

For information on the ethnic groups of Somalia, as well as languages and dialects spoken by the various groups see Ethnic groups.

1.08 South and central Somalia consists of the following regions: Galgaduud, Hiiraan, Lower Shabelle, Middle Shabelle, Banaadir, Bakool, Bay, Gedo, Lower Juba and Middle Juba (see map below at 1.07, dated January 2007, accessed 8 December 2010). Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment for Somalia, updated 23 July 2010, noted that “The main cities in the south are Mogadishu (over one million inhabitants estimated), Marka (180,000), Kismaayo (150,000) and Baydhabo (130,000).”

1.09 Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment for Somalia, updated 23 July 2010, gave the following population estimates by region:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Population (2004 estimate)</th>
<th>Population Density (per km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shabeellaha Hoose</td>
<td>1,100,000</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banaadir (Mogadishu)</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>2,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bay</td>
<td>850,000</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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11 Jane’s Sentinel, Country Risk Assessment, Somalia, Demography, Regional Distribution, updated 23 July 2010, Available in hard copy on request
12 Jane’s Sentinel, Country Risk Assessment, Somalia, Demography, Regional Distribution, updated 23 July 2010, Available in hard copy on request
13 Jane’s Sentinel, Country Risk Assessment, Somalia, Demography, Regional Distribution, updated 23 July 2010, Available in hard copy on request
PUNTLAND

1.10 Garowe online in an article dated 25 December 2008, reported that: “During Gen. Siad Barre’s era (1969-1991), Somalia was divided into 18 administrative regions. Therefore, the geographic territory of Puntland was defined according to that map, with five regions (Bari, Nugaal, Mudug, Sool and Sanaag) along with the District of Buhodle, in Togdheer region (Somaliland) sending delegates to Garowe in 1998 to form Puntland’s interim government”. 14 Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment for Somalia, updated 23 July 2010, noted that “The largest towns in Puntland are Boosaaso ([population estimate] 70,000) and Garowe (40,000).” 15

1.11 Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment for Somalia, updated 23 July 2010, gave the following population estimates by region16:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Population (2004 estimate)</th>
<th>Population Density (per km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bari</td>
<td>450,000</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nugaal</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puntland (Northeast)</td>
<td>750,000</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SOMALILAND

15 Jane’s Sentinel, Country Risk Assessment, Somalia, Demography, Regional Distribution, updated 23 July 2010, Available in hard copy on request
16 Jane’s Sentinel, Country Risk Assessment, Somalia, Demography, Regional Distribution, updated 23 July 2010, Available in hard copy on request
1.12 The Somaliland government website, undated, accessed on 22 March 2011, stated that: “Hargeisa is the capital of Somaliland with an estimated population of 0.65 million. The other main towns are Burao, Borama, Berbera, Erigabo and Las Anod”. Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment for Somalia, updated 23 July 2010, noted that: “The main cities in the northern highlands (Somaliland) are Hargeysa ([population estimate] 300,000), Berbera (200,000) and Burao (100,000).”

1.13 Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment for Somalia, updated 23 July 2010, gave the following population estimates by region:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Population (2004 estimate)</th>
<th>Population Density (per km²)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Woqooyi Galbeed</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togdheer</td>
<td>750,000</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awdaal</td>
<td>250,000</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanaag</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sool</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somaliland (North)</td>
<td>2,400,000</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18 Jane’s Sentinel, Country Risk Assessment, Somalia, Demography, Regional Distribution, updated 23 July 2010, Available in hard copy on request
19 Jane’s Sentinel, Country Risk Assessment, Somalia, Demography, Regional Distribution, updated 23 July 2010, Available in hard copy on request
MAPS

1.14 UN Cartographic section map of Somalia (May 2011) 

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1.15 **UNHCR map** of Somalia showing IDP and refugee distribution in January 2010, showing the areas of Somaliland, Puntland and Southern and Central Somalia.

![Map of Somalia](image)

1.17 **Somaliland Government** map of Somaliland, 2000.

For a range of maps of Somalia, please see Reliefweb. For further administrative maps of regions and districts in Somalia, see the Food Security and Nutritional Analysis Unit’s website. For maps of towns within Somalia, please see the Office of the Co-ordinator of Humanitarian Affairs map centre.

**Mogadishu**

1.18 A map of Mogadishu (published 6 May 2010) is available via the UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs website.

2. **ECONOMY**

2.01 The CIA *World Factbook*, updated on 28 April 2011, stated that despite the lack of effective national governance, Somalia has “…maintained a healthy informal economy, largely based on livestock, remittance/money transfer companies, and telecommunications. Agriculture is the most important sector, with livestock normally accounting for about 40% of GDP and more than 50% of export earnings. Nomads and semi-pastoralists, who are dependent upon livestock for their livelihood, make up a large portion of the population.”

2.02 The CIA *World Factbook*, updated on 23 February 2011, continued:

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“Livestock, hides, fish, charcoal, and bananas are Somalia's principal exports, while sugar, sorghum, corn, qat, and machined goods are the principal imports. Somalia's small industrial sector, based on the processing of agricultural products, has largely been looted and sold as scrap metal. Somalia's service sector also has grown. Telecommunication firms provide wireless services in most major cities and offer the lowest international call rates on the continent. In the absence of a formal banking sector, money transfer/remittance services have sprouted throughout the country, handling up to $1.6 billion in remittances annually. Mogadishu’s main market offers a variety of goods from food to the newest electronic gadgets. Hotels continue to operate and are supported with private-security militias.”

2.03 Piracy is also a source of income for some Somali citizens, and this money enters the economy. The Bonn International Centre for Conversion article Piracy in Somalia and its Root Causes on Land, July – September 2009 edition, stated that:

“Piracy provides attractive financial rewards (the pirates receive some 10 percent of the gains, captains, boat owners and financiers some 40 percent), and gives many young Somali men an escape from the impoverished conditions that have caused severe distress throughout the country. Estimates of the sums made by Somali pirates in 2008 range from a low of US $30 to 40 million to a high of US $150 million. Given the absence of other sources of income in Somalia, even the lower estimate is a substantial income for individuals and for the local economy as a whole. This income is spread widely: pirates invest in lavish homes, cars, entertainment, and marriage.”

2.04 The US State Department 2010 Country Report on Human Rights Practices, Somalia, dated 8 April 2011, observed that: “With an estimated 43 percent of the population earning less than 30,000 Somali shillings (less than [US$]1) per day, there was no mechanism to attain a decent standard of living for workers and their families. During the year high inflation, continued insecurity, and other factors significantly decreased the standard of living in all areas of the country. By year's end, 3.5 million Somalis required emergency humanitarian assistance.”

2.05 The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) in its Somalia Country Report, published February 2011, stated that:

“The humanitarian situation in Somalia is expected to deteriorate further in the coming months following failure of the 2010 secondary deyr rainy season (September-December) in most parts of the country, according to the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (Fewsnet) of the US Agency for International Development. The disappointing deyr season has been attributed to a global weather phenomenon known as La Niña. The number of Somalis depending on humanitarian emergency assistance has risen by 20%, from 2m – around one third of the total population, a number that represented an improvement in 2010 after two good rainy seasons – to 2.4m in the second half of 2010. Poor deyr rains have worsened pasture conditions in all major pastoral and farming areas of the country, according to Somalia’s Water and Land Information Management Agency, which is managed by the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO). Fewsnet expects food

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security in Iskushuban, Alula, Qandala and Bossaso districts in particular to weaken in the coming months.” 26

2.06 The UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs’ report, *Humanitarian Funding Analysis for Somalia*, published in March 2011, noted:

“By the end of 2010, the Somalia Consolidated Appeal (CAP) for that year was funded at US$404 million, or 67% out of the required $596 million making Somalia the second-best funded humanitarian appeal worldwide last year.

“However, from a peak in 2008, when Somalia received $429 million (without carry-over), there has been a steady decline in the amount of new funding received each consecutive year. In 2009, $342 million was received in new funding while in 2010 $251 million was received. The decline in new funding between 2008 and 2010 was $178 million, representing a 41% decline.” 27

2.07 With regard to Somaliland, the EIU’s Somalia *Country Report – Main Report* (EIU Report 2011), published February 2011, stated that:

“On January 12th [2011] a local media organisation, Somaliland Press, reported that record high revenues had been collected from customs and duties in December [2010], representing a year-on-year increase of 24.3%. Total revenue from fifteen entry and exit points was SoSh30.4bn (US$5.2m) in December 2010, compared with SoSh24.5bn for December 2009. The port at Berbera, by far the largest contributor to the Treasury’s coffers, raised 75% of this total in December 2010, compared with 72% in the previous December. In absolute terms, Berbera raised SoSh17.7bn in December 2009, a sum that increased by 29% in December 2010 to SoSh22.8bn. Since taking up the finance portfolio, Mr Elmi has reshuffled the country’s customs officers and appointed a new managing director, as well as implementing a new system by which all customs offices can be audited.” 28

**CURRENCY**

2.08 The EIU Report 2011 stated that the currency in Somalia is the Somali shilling (SoSh) and the estimated average exchange rate in 2010 was SoSh1,564 to US$1. The report further stated that the Somaliland Republic has its own currency, the Somaliland shilling (SolSh), and the estimated average exchange rate for the Somaliland shilling in 2008 was SolSh7,240 to US$1. 29 The US State Department *Background Note: Somalia*, updated 3 January 2011, observed that: “The absence of central government authority, as well as profiteering from counterfeiting, has rapidly debased Somalia’s currency. The self-declared ‘Republic of Somaliland’ issues its own currency, the Somaliland shilling, which is not

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26 Economist Intelligence Unit, Somalia Country Report, p13, dated February 2011, available in hard copy on request
28 Economist Intelligence Unit, Somalia Country Report, p15, dated February 2011, available in hard copy on request
29 Economist Intelligence Unit, Somalia Country Report, p4, dated February 2011, available in hard copy on request
accepted outside of the self-declared republic.” 30 The CIA World Factbook stated that “… businesses print their own money”. 31

TELECOMMUNICATIONS

2.09 The EIU, in its Somalia Country Profile for 2008 dated 3 March 2008, noted:

“Small private companies linked to overseas satellite operators provide telecommunications in major towns. Mogadishu is served by three companies set up in 2002 following the closure of the Al-Barakat phone company in November 2001. Its international lines, operated by the US company AT&T, were cut following allegations of association with terrorist networks. Local calls within Mogadishu are free, whereas local cellular calls cost US$0.11 per minute, cheaper than in neighbouring Kenya. Four firms serve Hargeisa, all offering mobile phones and direct international calls at cheaper rates than in neighbouring Djibouti and Kenya. A new gateway system has been installed in Somaliland following a five-year agreement signed between the Ministry of Telecommunications in Hargeisa and a US-based company, Transcom Digital (TDI). Somalia’s largest mobile-phone operator, Telsom Mobile, placed an order for products and services worth US$1.4m with US-based AirNet Communications in July 2005 to upgrade its system within Somalia. The order brings the company’s total investment in AirNet equipment and services to more than US$10m since 2000. Two new television companies, Horn Afrique and Somali Television Network, were set up in 2000. Several ISPs [Internet Service Providers] have opened in recent years and are servicing areas of the country, as well as Somaliland. Strangely, Somalia enjoys better Internet connectivity than some other African countries, including Eritrea.” 32

3. HISTORY (1988 TO OCTOBER 2010)

The section following provides a brief history of Somalia from 1988 to October 2010. Information on events preceding this as well as events during the same period is also available in Annex A: Timeline

CIVIL WAR (1988-1991)

3.01 Endless war: a brief history of the Somali conflict by Mark Bradbury and Sally Healy undated, circa early 2010, reported on the events leading to the collapse of the state of Somalia:

“The collapse of the Somali state was the consequence of a combination of internal and external factors. Externally there were the legacies of European colonialism that divided the Somali people into five states, the impact of Cold War politics in shoring up a predatory state, and the cumulative effect of wars with neighbouring states, most damagingly the 1977-78 Ogaden war with Ethiopia. Internally, there were contradictions between a centralized state authority, and a fractious kinship system and the Somali pastoral culture in which power is diffused.

30 USSD Background Note: Somalia, updated 3 January 2011, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2863.htm Date accessed 20 April 2011
32 Economist Intelligence Unit, Somalia Country Profile, p15, dated 3 March 2008, available in hard copy on request
“Next came the Somali National Movement (SNM) formed in 1982 that drew its support from the Isaaq clan. The SNM insurgency escalated into a full-scale civil war in 1988 when it attacked government garrisons in Burco and Hargeisa. The government responded with a ferocious assault on the Isaaq clan, killing some 50,000 people and forcing 650,000 to flee to Ethiopia and Djibouti.

“Somalia’s collapse was hastened by the ending of the Cold War. As Somalia’s strategic importance to the West declined, the foreign aid that had sustained the state was withdrawn. Without the resources to maintain the system of patronage politics, [President Siad] Barre lost control of the country and the army. In January 1991 he was ousted from Mogadishu by forces of the United Somali Congress (USC) drawing support from the Hawiye clans in south central Somalia.”

STATE COLLAPSE (1991-1992)

3.02 Europa World, undated, accessed on 21 February 2011, reported the consequences of the exit of President Barre:

“On 27 January [1991] Siad Barre was reported to have fled the capital with those forces remaining loyal to him, and the USC took power. It immediately invited all former opposition groups to participate in a national conference to discuss the democratization of Somalia. On 29 January the USC appointed Ali Mahdi Mohamed (a government minister in the 1960s) as President, in a temporary capacity, and he, in turn, invited Umar Arteh Ghalib (a former foreign affairs minister) to form a government that would prepare the country for democracy. The provisional Government was approved by the President on 2 February.

“By mid-March 1991, however, Somalia was close to anarchy. Opposition movements rejected the USC’s invitation to take part in a national conference, and the SNM was reported to have formed an 11-member administration and a legislature to govern the former territory of British Somaliland. In May the SNM announced its official support for the secession of that territory, and later that month the SNM Central Committee elected Abd ar-Rahman Ahmed Ali ‘Tur’ as President of the self-proclaimed ‘Republic of Somaliland’. In June the Committee approved a 17-member government to administer the territory for a period of two years, after which free elections were to be held.”

See also subsection below on The ‘Republic of Somaliland’

3.03 Endless war: a brief history of the Somali conflict reported that:

“Somalis use the word burbur (‘catastrophe’) to describe the period from December 1991 to March 1992, when the country was torn apart by clan-based warfare and factions plundered the remnants of the state and fought for control of rural and urban assets. Four months of fighting in Mogadishu alone in 1991 and 1992 killed an estimated 25,000 people, 1.5 million people fled the country, and at least 2 million were internally displaced.

“In the midst of drought, the destruction of social and economic infrastructure, asset stripping, ‘clan-cleansing’ and the disruption of food supplies caused a famine in which an estimated 250,000 died. Those who suffered most came from the politically marginalized communities.”

34 Europa World Online, Country Profile (Somalia, History), undated, hard copy on request. Date accessed 22 February 2011
and poorly armed riverine and inter-riverine agro-pastoral communities in the south, who suffered waves of invasions from the better-armed militia from the major clans.”

**UN OPERATION IN SOMALIA (1992-1995)**

3.04 *Endless war: a brief history of the Somali conflict* stated that:

“External responses to Somalia’s collapse were belated because other wars in the Gulf and the Balkans commanded international attention. The Djibouti government tried unsuccessfully to broker a deal in June and July 1991. UN diplomatic engagement began only in early 1992, when a ceasefire was negotiated between the two main belligerents in Mogadishu, Ali Mahdi Mohamed and General Mohamed Farah Aideed. A limited UN peacekeeping mission – the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) – was unable to stem the violence or address the famine.

“In December 1992 the outgoing US administration authorized the deployment of US forces to support the beleaguered UN mission in Somalia. Under US leadership, UNOSOM mustered a multinational force of some 30,000 troops. Ostensibly launched for humanitarian reasons, the intervention also responded to the challenge that the collapsed Somali state posed to a supposed ‘new world order’, proclaimed by President George Bush at the end of the Cold War. UNOSOM dominated Somali politics for the next three years.

“UNOSOM turned world attention to a neglected crisis and assisted in saving lives by securing food supplies. It facilitated some local agreements that improved security, reopened Mogadishu airport and seaport, and supported the revival of key services and the creation of local non-governmental organizations. It also provided employment and injected huge resources into the economy to the benefit of a new business class.

“However, the mission failed to mediate an end to hostilities or disarm factions. UN-facilitated peace conferences in Addis Ababa in 1993 and Kenya in 1994 did not engender a process of national reconciliation and state revival. The mission has been criticized for fuelling the war economy, causing a proliferation of factions and shoring up warlord power structures. Before long UNOSOM itself became embroiled in the conflict with General Aideed, leading to the infamous shooting down of US Black Hawk helicopters in Mogadishu and the subsequent withdrawal of US forces.”


3.05 *Endless war: a brief history of the Somali conflict* stated:

“UNOSOM’s humiliating departure from Somalia was followed by international disengagement and a decline in foreign aid. Its departure in March 1995 did not lead to a revival of the civil war, however. Local political processes that had been ‘frozen’ by the intervention resumed and clans and factions consolidated the gains they had made during the war. In some areas communities drew on traditional institutions, such as elders and customary law (xeer), to end violent confrontations, renegotiate relations between groups

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and establish local governance structures as a transitional step to developing public administrations and regional and trans-regional polities.

“In southern Somalia a variety of institutions emerged, including two ‘governments’ in Mogadishu, councils of elders, district councils and Shari’a courts, which provided forms of ‘governance without government’. While fragile and uncoordinated, these structures produced an incremental improvement in security, so that by the late 1990s the situation in much of Somalia was described as ‘neither war nor peace’....The disengagement from Somalia of Western governments resulted in the diplomatic initiative passing [to] regional states and in particular Ethiopia. Addis Ababa’s engagement was driven as much by geopolitical, security and economic interests as by concern to end Somalia’s political turmoil. Ethiopia was especially concerned by the growth of an armed Islamist group in Somalia, Al Itihad Al Islamiya, with regional ambitions. Ethiopian forces attacked and destroyed Al Itihad camps in the border areas during 1997. At the same time, Ethiopia brought Somali factions together at Sodere and attempted to broker an agreement.

“Egypt, Libya and Yemen and the Arab League also made endeavours to broker settlements, but reconciliation in Somalia was actively hindered by competition between these initiatives. After 1998 the breakdown in relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea gave a new impetus to the destabilization of Somalia. Eritrea supported Somali factions opposed to those aligned with Ethiopia, introducing a new element of proxy war to an already crowded arena.

“Competing regional interests led to rival peace conferences sponsored by Ethiopia in Sodere in 1996, and by Egypt in Cairo in 1997. These produced two regional administrations: the short-lived Benadir Administration supported by Egypt and Libya; and the government of Puntland Federal State of Somalia.

“The Benadir Administration collapsed when its leadership failed to agree on modalities for reopening Mogadishu seaport, while in Puntland a combination of a community-driven political processes and strong leadership produced a functional administration.

“Somalis were also divided over the right approach. As the multiple clan-based factions merged into larger regional and transregional polities in the late 1990s, they also mutated into broader political coalitions. One such coalition centred on Mogadishu and the sub-clans of the Hawiye clan-family. Although the Hawiye had failed to reconcile with each other and Mogadishu remained a divided city, but political, business, civic and religious leaders supported the revival of a strong central state in which they would dominate the capital. The other coalition, backed by Ethiopia and led by Puntland President, Abdullahi Yusuf, was dominated by the Darood clan, was anti-Islamist and favoured a federal state.

“In 1999 international support for the building block approach ended when the government of Djibouti initiated a new national peace process.” 37

arta conference, transitional national government and transitional federal government (2000-2004)

3.06 Europa World online, undated, accessed on 22 February 2011, stated that:

“The Somali national reconciliation conference opened in Arta, Djibouti, on 2 May 2000, with some 400 delegates, representing various Somali clans and political and armed groups, in attendance. By mid-June the number of delegates had risen to around 900, although notably only one of the principal Somali faction leaders, Ali Mahdi, was present. In early July the conference produced a draft national charter, which envisaged the Somali Republic adopting a federal system of government, after a three-year interim period, comprising 18 regional administrations. Furthermore, it provided for the creation of the Somali Transitional National Assembly (TNA), which would consist of 225 members, of whom 25 would be women. Each of the four major Somali clans (Dir, Hawiye, Darod and Rahanwin) was allocated 44 parliamentary seats, and an alliance of small clans was to receive 24 seats; the remaining 25 seats were reserved for women from the four major clans and the alliance of small clans, each of which would receive five seats.”

3.07 Endless war: a brief history of the Somali conflict stated that:

“The [Transitional National Government] TNG became the first authority since the fall of Siyad Barre to fill Somalia’s seat at the UN and regional bodies. It was supported by the UN and several Arab states but it failed to win the backing of Ethiopia or the confidence of major donor governments. In Somalia the TNG did not follow through on the reconciliation efforts begun in Arta and became associated with the powerful Mogadishu clans and the business class, which included Islamists. The TNG was opposed by a coalition supported by Ethiopia, called the Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Council (SRRC) in which Abdullahi Yusuf had a leadership role.

“In the climate of international insecurity that followed the 9/11 attacks on the US, the failed state of Somalia attracted renewed interest as a potential haven and breeding ground for international terrorists. The TNG’s reputation suffered as the growing influence of Islamic Courts and Islamic charities increased suspicions about its links with militant Islamists.

“To some Somalis the return of government provided the best opportunity for Somalia for a decade, and they criticized Western governments for failing to adequately support it. The experience of TNG also demonstrated the difficulty of securing a lasting agreement in Somalia that does not address the interests and needs of both internal and external actors.

“The mandate of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) was revised in 1996 to include the promotion of peace and security, in addition to fostering regional cooperation and economic development. IGAD had supported past Somali reconciliation efforts by Ethiopia or Djibouti.

“In 2002 IGAD took up the challenge of reconciling the TNG and the SRRC, each supported by an IGAD member state. The influence of external actors was apparent during the two-year reconciliation conference facilitated by Kenya. The Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which succeeded the TNG in November 2004, saw Somalia’s leadership shift from the Mogadishu-centred, Hawiye and Islamist dominated coalition to the federalist, Darood and Ethiopian backed coalition, with Abdullahi Yusuf chosen as the transitional president.

“Substantial financial support for the TFG was anticipated with the inauguration of a World Bank and UNDP Joint Needs Assessment of the country’s rehabilitation and development requirements. But like its predecessor the TFG fell short of being a government of national unity.

“Power was concentrated in a narrow clan coalition and Abdulahi Yusuf was viewed as a client of Ethiopia. His immediate call for a military force from the African Union (AU) to help him establish his authority in the capital alienated his slender support base in Mogadishu. Without dogged international financial and military support the TFG would not have survived either its internal divisions or the rise of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in 2006.”  

**ISLAMIC COURTS UNION AND ETHIOPIAN INTERVENTION (2005-2006)**

3.08 *Endless war: a brief history of the Somali conflict* stated:

“An important feature of the past two decades has been the emergence of a variety of Islamist movements seeking to establish an Islamic state in Somalia. These range from traditionalist sufi orders, to progressive Islamist movements like Al Islah, and Salafi and Wahhabi inspired groups like Al Itihad Al Islamiya pursuing a regional or global agenda. Their significance came to the fore in April 2006 when a coalition of Islamic Courts, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), in alliance with other clan militia, ousted a coalition of warlords (the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism) from Mogadishu that had been backed by the US government.

“The ICU won public support for creating an unprecedented degree of security in the capital and quickly established a presence across most of south-central Somalia. It seemed to offer an alternative political system that could deliver services and security to the population, in sharp contrast to the failing authority of the TFG.”

“When mediation efforts by the Arab League failed to forge an agreement between the parties, Ethiopian forces, with implicit backing from Western governments, entered Somalia in December 2006. They forced out the ICU and installed the TFG in Mogadishu. The US air force attacked retreating ICU forces in an unsuccessful effort to kill Al Qaeda operatives allegedly harboured by the ICU. The ICU leadership took refuge in Eritrea where, with other opposition figures, they established the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somali (ARS) that mobilized support against the Ethiopian occupation.”


3.09 *Endless war: a brief history of the Somali conflict* stated that:

“In early 2007 a small contingent of AU peacekeepers (the AU Mission in Somalia – AMISOM) was deployed to Mogadishu to protect the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs). But over the next two years efforts by the TFG and Ethiopia to impose a ‘victor’s peace’ provoked violent resistance from a mixture of clan militia and remnants of the militant wing of the ICU – Harakat al Shabaab (‘the youth movement’).

“During 2007 alone fighting between the TFG and the insurgency resulted in the displacement of up to 700,000 people from Mogadishu, and the economic base of the Hawiye in the city was weakened. The Ethiopian occupation rallied support to the

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resistance within Somalia and in the diaspora, helping to radicalize another generation of Somalis."

3.10 The same source observed that:

“During his four years in power, Abdullahi Yusuf’s government failed to implement any of the transitional tasks of government. By inviting Ethiopia to intervene militarily against the ICU, it lost all semblance of legitimacy and was unable to establish its authority over the country.

“When UN-mediated talks between the ARS and the TFG in Djibouti agreed a timetable for Ethiopian withdrawal in late 2008, Abdullahi Yusuf resigned paving the way for the creation of a new TFG under the presidency of the former Chair of the ICU, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed.

“The withdrawal of Ethiopian forces and the establishment of a new ‘unitary’ TFG created an opportunity to establish a moderate Islamist government in Somalia that had considerable backing from Somalis and the international community.” 41

3.11 BBC News reported on 13 January 2009 that there were "... celebrations in the Somalia capital Mogadishu after Ethiopian troops withdrew from their two main bases in the city... A ceremony was held in the city to mark the handover of security to government forces and moderate Islamists. 42

SECOND TRANSITIONAL FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (2009-OCTOBER 2010)


3.13 The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Armed conflict Database, Somalia, section on Political trends, Annual update 2010, undated, accessed 20 April 2011, observed that:

“The Somali parliament was paralysed for most of 2010 as rival factions within the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), loyal either to the president or the prime minister, clashed. The resulting political vacuum hindered the authorities’ ability to deal with the threat posed by hardline Islamist groups al-Shabab and Hisbul al-Islam. These groups, which merged towards the end of the year, managed to increase their global reach this year, perpetrating attacks in both Uganda and Kenya, and made threats to continue operations abroad.

“Early in the year [2010], the TFG tried to strengthen its position by signing a power-sharing agreement with the moderate Islamist group Ahlu Sunnah wal Jama’a. However, mooted changes within the clan-based government soon led to a crippling rift. Ahlu Sunnah pledged to join government troops on the ground in exchange for government positions. After initial

tussles over the prime ministership, it settled for five cabinet seats. The TFG said it was working towards implementing the March power-sharing deal as late as August; however, Ahlu Sunnah officials accused the government of giving previously agreed ministerial posts to others. Despite their differences, Ahlu Sunnah continued to fight alongside government troops in several parts of Somalia.” 44

3.14 On 21 September 2010, BBC News reported that Prime Minister Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke resigned after being “… under intense pressure to resign for some months”. 45 On 14 October 2010, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, former Somali diplomat, was appointed as Prime Minister (IISS, Armed Conflict Database, Somalia, 2011). 46

Further information about the security situation, including trends and notable incidents can be found. For list of major events see Annex A: Chronology of major events.

‘PUNTLAND’ REGIONAL ADMINISTRATION (1998-2010)

3.15 Endless war: a brief history of the Somali conflict reported that:

“In 1998 political leaders in northeast Somalia, frustrated at the lack of progress from internationally-mediated talks in Ethiopia and Egypt, decided to wait no longer for a national government to emerge.

“A series of consultative conferences led to the creation of Puntland State of Somalia in August 1998, as a self-governing state in Somalia’s north eastern regions. Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf, military leader of the SSDF, was selected as Puntland’s first president. He later became president of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government.

“As a non-secessionist state, Puntland epitomizes a ‘building block’ for a future federal Somali state within the 1990 state borders and was duly supported as such by the international community.

“Puntland is a form of ‘ethno-state’, founded on the unity of the Harti clan. Along with the Majeerteen, this includes the Dhulbahante and Warsengeli clans of Sool and Eastern Sanaag regions over which Somaliland also claims sovereignty. The territorial dispute between Puntland and Somaliland has at times escalated into violent clashes and remains a deep fault line in Somali politics.

“Puntland has experienced acute internal divisions and more recently has become internationally known as the home of Somali pirates. However it has remained a relatively stable polity and is in the process of reviewing its constitution and democratizing its political systems.” 47

3.16 The Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment for Somalia, subsection on Puntland, updated 6 May 2011, noted that “During February of 2011, Somaliland militias clashed with local clan militias in Cayn region, part of the Togdheer district that borders Sool. The region

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44 International Institute for Strategic Studies, Armed Conflict Database, Somalia, undated, accessed 20 April 2011. Hard copies only
46 International Institute for Strategic Studies, Armed Conflict Database, Somalia, available in hard copy on request
is claimed by both Puntland and Somaliland, and while Puntland forces have not attempted to enforce their rule in the region, the local militias denounced Somaliland and eventually rebelled against Somaliland attempts to subjugate the region. 


3.17 Endless war: a brief history of the Somali conflict stated that:

“On 18 May 1991, at the ‘Grand Conference of Northern Clans’ in the northern city of Burco, the SNM announced that the northern regions were withdrawing from the union with the south and reasserting their sovereign independence as the Republic of Somaliland.

“The declaration, made under public pressure, has left a deep rift in Somali politics that has yet to be resolved. In 1991, however, the move insulated Somaliland from the war and famine in the south and enabled people to begin a process of reconstruction and statebuilding.

“That process has not been easy. Between 1992 and 1996 Somaliland experienced two civil wars. Embargoes on imports of Somali livestock by Gulf countries, the return of refugees, urban drift, and contested territorial claims over the eastern regions have presented challenges.

“Yet today Somaliland has all the attributes of a sovereign state with an elected government that provides security for its citizens, exercises control over its borders, manages some public assets, levies taxes, issues currency and formulates development policies. This has been achieved through the resourcefulness and resources of people in Somaliland and the diaspora, with minimal international assistance.

“Acknowledgment of what has been achieved in Somaliland has been growing, but no country has formal diplomatic relations with it and it therefore has no international legal status or representation in international forums.

“And yet a generation has grown up in Somaliland that knows no other country than the one they have been educated in, and no other government than the one that they are now able to vote for. Continuing international ambivalence over the status of Somaliland entrenches the vulnerability of the new state and ensures that it remains, in essence, a ‘fragile state’.”

3.18 On 26 June 2010, Somaliland held presidential elections. The Economist reported on 1 July 2010 that:

“In the event, despite an election-eve warning by al-Shabab, the poll went ahead smoothly in most of the country. International election observers reported, with some qualifications, a well-organised and fair vote. There was, for example, the reported distribution of false voter ID cards and widespread underage voting around the town of Borama near the Ethiopian border, home territory of President Dahir Riyale Kahin. There were problems in the regions of Sool and eastern Sanaag, where some clan leaders are unenthusiastic about Somaliland

48 Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessments, Somalia, Puntland, Dispute with Somaliland, updated 6 May 2011, Available in hard copy on request
and where Puntland, another part of Somalia that asserts its autonomy, lays claim to territory.\textsuperscript{50}

3.19 The Committee to Protect Journalists stated on 7 July 2010 that: “Former opposition leader Mohamed Silyano from the Kulmiye Party defeated outgoing president Dahir Riyale, who honored his pre-vote pledge to accept the results and leave office peacefully.”\textsuperscript{51}

4. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

This section covers the period November 2010 to May 2011 and provides a selection of incidents as reported by a number of sources on the political and security situations in the country. Information about human rights and the humanitarian situation is covered in the relevant sections below. This section is organised thematically and then, where appropriate, geographically. Information within each subsection is ordered chronologically, from the oldest to most recent events.

For further information generally, see the following links: International Crisis Group: CrisisWatch Database, Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit, IRIN News and UN Protection Cluster updates. See also Latest news, where there is a fuller list of useful sources to consult for updates on developments in Somalia.

SECURITY SITUATION

More detailed coverage of the security situation, scale and distribution of violence, trends and descriptions of the main protagonists is provided in the section of that name in the Human Rights part of this report.

South and central Somalia

4.01 Agence France Presse reported on 24 December 2010 that: “Somalia’s Islamist Hezb al-Islam militia officially joined forces with the Al Qaeda-inspired Shebab movement in what they said was meant to set up an ‘Islamic Caliphate’ in the country.”\textsuperscript{52}

4.02 The UN Security Council’s Report of the Secretary General on Somalia, published on 28 April 2011, noted that:

\textquotedblleft Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1964 (2010), by which the Council requested the African Union to increase the AMISOM force strength from 8,000 to 12,000, Burundi and Uganda reaffirmed their commitment to deploy the additional 4,000 troops. As a first step, Burundi deployed an additional 1,000 troops in the first week of March 2011, bringing AMISOM strength to about 9,000. Coordination and preparations for the deployment of the additional battalions continue among the troop-contributing countries, the African Union Commission and other partners. While UNSOA coordinates support to AMISOM with the troop-contributing countries and partners on the ground, the United Nations Office to the African Union supports the African Union Commission in planning and managing AMISOM.\textquotedblright

\textsuperscript{50} The Economist, Somaliland’s elections: Not so failing, 1 July 2010, http://www.economist.com/node/16488840 Date accessed 23 March 2011
\textsuperscript{51} Committee to Protect Journalists, Somaliland elections and coverage surprisingly...normal, 7 July 2010, http://www.cpj.org/blog/2010/07/somaliland-elections-and-coverage-surprisinglynormal.php Date accessed 23 March 2011
\textsuperscript{52} Agence France Presse, Somalia’s Islamist militia join forces, 24 December 2010, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5ikmjZ5Ekxpjx6gTDhZi6ZwBr7kYYw?docId=CNG.e746d8801cb9653230a75a93f261b84c.2a1 Date accessed 6 May 2011
operations, including in assisting with force generation. Military planners of the United Nations Office to the African Union have participated in several predeployment visits and inspections to ensure the smooth insertion of troops.\textsuperscript{53}

4.03 The UN Security Council’s \textit{Report of the Secretary General} on Somalia, dated 28 April 2011, observed that:

“The offensive by the Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama’a and other groups allied with the Transitional Federal Government against Al-Shabaab in southern central Somalia has focused on the Ethiopia-Kenya-Somalia border. Hostilities have centred on the Gedo, Bay and Bakool regions, with armed conflict most prevalent in Bula Hawa and, to a lesser extent, in the vicinity of Beletweyne and Dolo. Clashes are expected in other key strategic towns within the Hiraan region. The Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama’a continues to adopt a defensive posture in Dhuusamarreeb, while also continuing to provide security assurances to the United Nations and its humanitarian partners for access to those areas under its control.” \textsuperscript{54}

4.04 On 7 May 2011, Reuters reported that:

“Somalia’s al Qaeda-linked rebels vowed on Saturday [7 May 2011] to avenge the killing of Osama bin Laden and said his death would not hurt their fight to topple the country’s Western-backed government.

“Analysts have said bin Laden’s death is unlikely to dampen the insurgency waged by Somalia's al Shabaab militants, who are regrouping amid infighting among the country's politicians after a recent government offensive.

“After news broke of bin Laden's death in Pakistan some al Shabaab combatants in the Somali capital Mogadishu wore white as a sign of grief, residents said.

“'We shall redouble our jihad and we shall overpower our enemies. Osama is not the first martyr, may God rest his soul,’ al Shabaab spokesman Sheikh Ali Mohamud Rage told reporters on Saturday [7 May 2011].” \textsuperscript{55}

\textbf{Mogadishu}

4.05 \textit{The New York Times} reported on 24 November 2010 that

“The African Union peacekeeping force in Somalia has arrested six of its own peacekeepers after two civilians were killed in a burst of indiscriminate gunfire, African Union officials said Wednesday.

“The killings happened a day earlier. According to witnesses, a convoy of heavily armed peacekeepers was rumbling through central Mogadishu, Somalia’s capital, along the same road where two minibuses had just collided. A small crowd was standing in the middle of


the road, and the peacekeepers may have thought the civilians were forming a roadblock, witnesses said.

“As the convoy approached the crowd, the peacekeepers opened fire. Several children were also wounded.” 56

4.06 Hiiraan News reported on 25 January 2011 that:

“AMISOM can confirm that an investigation is underway, in liaison with the TFG Police, to establish how an AMISOM soldier came to disperse a crowd with gun shots near Immigration on the airport road this morning.

“An AMISOM junior commander and a soldier have been placed under arrest at the Mogadishu Airport base, pending the outcome of the urgent investigation.

“It is understood that an angry crowd gathered near the Immigration base and the soldier attempted to disperse them after seeking the advice of his commander.

“AMISOM understand that three people have been injured and are being treated at Medina Hospital but the Deputy Force Commander has requested further assistance from the TFG Police to help with the investigation and also to identify any witnesses who might have seen what happened.” 57

4.07 On 16 March 2011, BBC News reported on the consequences of the shootings:

“Three Ugandan soldiers from the African Union force in Somalia have been sentenced to two years in prison for injuring civilians in two shooting incidents in the capital, Mogadishu…Amisom commander Maj Gen Nathan Mugisha said the jail terms illustrated that ‘any acts of carelessness and irresponsibility will not be condoned or tolerated’.

“He said the incidents in November 2010 and January 2011 were regrettable.

“Amisom said that no civilians died in the incidents but admitted that some Mogadishu residents were wounded.” 58

4.08 The UN Security Council’s Report of the Secretary General on Somalia, dated 28 April 2011, noted that “A major military offensive against Al-Shabaab began on 19 February. In Mogadishu, Transitional Federal Government forces, supported by AMISOM, have made and continue to hold significant territorial gains, despite repeated counterattacks. They destroyed a network of tunnels and trenches used by Al-Shabaab. Significant casualties have been reported on both sides.” 59

4.09 The UN Security Council’s Report of the Secretary General on Somalia, published on 28 April 2011, stated that “On 21 February, Al-Shabaab launched a suicide car bomb attack on...”
a police camp at Hamar Jabab district. Eleven people, including policemen and civilians, were killed with 40 others injured.”  

4.10 On 7 March 2011, *Africa Review* reported that

“The African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia (Amisom) has gained territory, mainly in Mogadishu, in the last two weeks from al-Shabaab, the Islamist militant group… Amisom now controls seven districts of the Somali capital with six contested and three still under rebel control. Amisom also took over Bulo Hawo, a border town between Kenya and Ethiopia which for the past two years has been under the control of the al-Shabaab…But Amisom’s gains have come at a high cost with reports indicating that at least 50 peacekeepers were killed in battles with the al-Shabaab in Mogadishu. If true, this is the biggest number of Amisom troops killed in battles with al-Shabaab since the mission began in 2007.

“Most of the dead, according to reports, were Burundian soldiers. It is not yet known how many Ugandan and Burundian soldiers died as secrecy still surrounds Amisom’s losses.”

**Puntland**

4.11 Agence France Presse reported on 16 April 2011 that:

“Gunmen stormed a mosque in the Somali city of Galkayo Saturday [16 April 2011] and sprayed gunfire on worshippers, killing at least five and wounding 10, security officials and witnesses said.

“It was not immediately clear who the attackers were but the carnage took place hours after a senior official from the ministry of religious affairs of Puntland was killed in a roadside bomb attack in Galkayo. 

“The shooting occurred at one of the largest mosques in Galkayo, a city divided by a border between the northern self-proclaimed Puntland state and the rival administration of Galmudug to the south.”

**Somaliland**

4.12 The Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment for Puntland, updated on 6 May 2011, noted that “During February of 2011, Somaliland militias clashed with local clan militias in Cayn region, part of the Togdheer district that borders Sool. The region is claimed by both Puntland and Somaliland, and while Puntland forces have not attempted to enforce their rule in the region, the local militias denounced Somaliland and eventually rebelled against Somaliland attempts to subjugate the region.”

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62 Agence France Presse, Gunmen storm a Somali mosque, kill 5, 16 April 2011, [http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqMjgC590ts60WzPYvophlpkhsHz91Q?docId=CNG.d28e977733e212d40d816gj1892692c61.12f1](http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqMjgC590ts60WzPYvophlpkhsHz91Q?docId=CNG.d28e977733e212d40d816gj1892692c61.12f1) Date accessed 9 May 2011

63 Jane’s Sentinel, Country Risk Assessment – Puntland, updated 6 May 2011, Available in hard copy on request
4.13 The UN Security Council’s *Report of the Secretary General*, published on 28 April 2011, noted that

“Disagreement over water holes in the disputed area of Buuhoodle led to fighting in late February between the ‘Somaliland’ army and Sool-Sanaag-Cayn militias; the latter was reportedly backed by ‘Puntland’ forces. A tentative ceasefire has held since March, aided by ‘Puntland’s’ withdrawal and ‘Somaliland’ peacebuilding measures. However, Buuhoodle remains a militarized zone, and the conflict may resume as competition for water resources and pasture in drought-affected areas increases.”  

Please see [Security situation](http://reliefweb.int/) for further information.

**Political Developments**

Below are a selection of events of a directly political nature or that have had an impact on the political situation.

**South and Central Somalia**

4.14 Reuters reported on 27 November 2010 that “A cabinet named by Somalia’s new prime minister was approved by parliament on Saturday after a previous attempt to endorse the ministers descended into chaos… Prime Minister Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed… had named a trimmed-down cabinet of 18 ministers, less than half the size of the previous cabinet.”  

For further information on the cabinet see [Annex D](http://reliefweb.int/)

4.15 The UN Security Council’s *Report of the Secretary General*, published on 28 April 2011, noted that

“Following the decision of the seventeenth extraordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) on 30 January 2011 calling for the ‘urgent need to extend’ the term of the Parliament, the Transitional Federal Parliament decided on 4 February to extend its term for three years…The decision by the Transitional Federal Parliament led to a rift between President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and the Speaker of the Transitional Federal Parliament, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan. The President, citing a provision in Somalia’s 1960 constitution, refused to sign the extension bill, arguing that the decision had been taken without proper consultation. The Speaker insisted that the President was obliged to sign the bill since the motion had been passed with a two-thirds majority, in accordance with the Transitional Federal Charter.  

“The terms of the extension as promulgated include the introduction of reforms, including rendering parliament more functional, completing the constitution-making process and holding elections for the President and the Speaker before the end of the transition. The President, however, stated that the term of the Transitional Federal Government must also be extended to allow it to complete key transitional tasks, particularly the constitution-making process and stabilizing the security situation in the country.”

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“The decision by the Transitional Federal Parliament to extend itself also prompted a negative reaction from various partners, as well as a small demonstration in Mogadishu. On 5 February, ‘Puntland’ condemned the decision, saying that it could prevent the country from moving to a successful post-transitional period. Partners and international stakeholders described the extension of the Transitional Federal Parliament as unilateral and said that the decision had been taken without consultations and necessary reforms. My Special Representative for Somalia, Augustine Mahiga, is leading discussions with the transitional federal institutions, regional stakeholders and international partners on the arrangements to end the transition. In the spirit of facilitating dialogue and consensus among the Somalis, the Special Representative convened and facilitated a consultative meeting in Nairobi on 12 and 13 April, which was attended by the Speaker of the Transitional Federal Parliament, Presidents of the regional administrations of “Puntland”, Galkudud and Mudug, leaders of Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama’a, and members of the international community…Prime Minister Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, in his address to the Security Council on 10 March… noted that his administration was changing the political landscape in Somalia. He said that the Transitional Federal Government had significantly increased revenue collection at the Mogadishu seaport and airport, established an anti-corruption task force, and enhanced delivery of public services, including improved public safety and new or improved health services, schools, street lighting and refuse collection services. The Prime Minister also noted Transitional Federal Government achievements in resolving the fighting between Saad (Habargadir) and Omar Mohamud (Majerteen) clans in the northern regions of southern central Somalia and “Puntland”. He held that the ongoing joint security operations with the Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama’a showed that the agreement between the Transitional Federal Government and Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama’a was being implemented.” 66

4.16 The Daily Nation reported on 14 February 2011 that protests had been held in Mogadishu:

“Tens of Somali youths and a preacher are seeking an Egypt style solution to force an end to 20 years of chaos and lack of a stable government.

“Waving Somali flags, the youths staged a demonstration at a key road between Banadir and Km 4 junctions in South Mogadishu on Sunday [13 February 2011].

"They protested the seemingly endless war between the pro-government forces and the jihadists (holy warriors) of al Shabaab, the fanatical militant group vehemently challenging the Transitional Federal Government…One of the organisers, Mr Jama Said Qorshel, told journalists they were committed to daily protests till their objectives are achieved.

“‘We are not going to abandon until we achieve our anti-war goals,’ said Qorshel.

“Although the protest ended peacefully, the youth did not hide the facts that they had been motivated by the uprising in Tunisia and Egypt that ended the rules of the former leaders Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak.” 67

4.17 Agence France Presse reported on 17 February 2011:

“Somalia's transitional federal government has arrested five people, including a powerful Mogadishu warlord, over a deadly exchange of fire at a pro-peace demonstration, an official

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said…On Tuesday [15 February 2011] members of the Somali military opened fire on a group of several hundred demonstrators who had been marching from the presidential palace to protest against violence and to support peace efforts.

“Three people were killed in the fire exchange between the soldiers and the security escorting the marchers. Sources said there had been disagreements between rival factions in the security apparatus over the demonstration, which some top brass had wanted to ban.

“Among the five arrested were Mohamed Omar Habeab, also known as Mohamed Dhere, a powerful warlord and a former Mogadishu mayor.” 68

4.18 Shabelle Media Network reported that the arrest of the former mayor had led to: “Violent demonstrations… Hundreds of protesters have congregated in the vicinity of Mogadishu presidential palace… calling for Somali transitional federal government to soon release Mohammed Omar Habeab alias Mohammed Dhere, former Mogadishu mayor.” 69

4.19 Shabelle Media Network further noted, on 24 February 2011, that:


“Hundreds of Mogadishu people are seen in the main roads of the capital chanting slogans showing how they support the military advances Somali government soldiers made in the face of Al Shabaab… The demonstrations wrapped up in a Peaceful atmosphere.” 70

4.20 The UN Security Council’s Report of the Secretary General, dated 28 April 2011, stated that: “In a surprise move, President Sharif dismissed the heads of the army, police, intelligence and prison services on 7 March. The President accused the commanders of being corrupt and said that there was a need to streamline the operations of the security organs. New chiefs were appointed on 29 March.” 71

4.21 The UN Security Council’s Report of the Secretary General, published on 28 April 2011, also stated that “On 27 March, the Council of Ministers of the Transitional Federal Government announced its intention to effectively extend itself by one year, until August 2012.” 72

4.22 The Geopolitical and Conflict Report stated on 6 May 2011 that:

“Within the Juba regions Al Shabaab has also encountered a new source of resistance. Former minister of Defence to the TFG, Dr. Mohamed Abdi Mohamed ‘Gandhi’, has established the new Somali substate of Azaniya. The substate, commonly referred to as Jubaland, is to be modeled after other more stable Somali regions such as Puntland and is meant to comprise the Gedo and both Juba regions… Kenya is reported to have backed the

68 Agence France Presse, Somalia arrests five over demo bloodbath, 17 February 2011, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5j0CeYwYB8N0jgSrj_eXMHrBOfMUA?docId=CNG.9e7fe2533379600587aSef13cxbf59e7.51 Date accessed 9 May 2011

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initiative in order to secure the Somali regions along its border, it is said to have trained the troops that are now under Jubaland command as well as to have delivered Chinese-bought weapons to them."  

4.23 On 8 May 2011, the Daily Nation reported that:

"Former Fafi MP Elias Bare Shill… [stated that] 'Jubaland will not just help us with security, it will open the trade route between Kismayu and Garissa.'

"According to the former MP, Kenya must formulate a clear foreign policy for handling Somalia, if the Jubaland initiative is to succeed.

"The plan is for Kenya to support Jubaland in the southwestern most part of Somalia to follow in the footsteps of the breakaway Somaliland and gain autonomy…Should a buffer zone be established, then the al Shabaab guns and mortar will be driven deep inside Somalia, far from the thin borderline that currently separates residents of Mandera from the battlefields of the Somali town of Bela Hawa... the initiative is beginning to take shape. A new regional authority of Jubaland has been formed by members of the local communities.

“But there are challenges. Former Somali Defence minister Mohamed Abdi Mohamed is yet to be sworn in as the president of Jubaland days after he was named the leader of the semi-autonomous region.

“This is because the region’s parliament and Cabinet have not been put in place.

“Instead, Mr Mohammed was sworn in as the convener of the Juba initiative, which aspires to fully control the region in Somalia’s southwest.

“On Wednesday [4 May 2011], a section of Somali elders supportive of the creation of Jubaland said they were planning to petition the president of Somalia’s Transitional Federation Government, Sheikh Shariff Ahmed, to support their initiative."  

Puntland

4.24 Garowe Online reported on 29 April 2011 that:

“…President Abdirahman Mohamed Farole accused Somali Transitional Federal government assassination killings in Puntland.

“Farole said…'killings in Puntland are politically motivated assassinations carried out by Somali Transitional federal government officials who failed in Somali politics and wants create insecurity in the state,’… He adds that he is wondering about the politicians thinking to create insecurity the only stable area in Somalia, where a large number of Somalis live in peace…Farole also talked about SSC militias in Northern Somalia, he said they were originally created to make unstable situation in Puntland state.

“He accused Somali Transitional federal government of funding those militias whose motive is to create a situation that can causes Puntland and Somaliland states to fight and insecurity for all northern parts of the country."  

74 Daily Nation, MPs support plans to create a buffer zone, 8 May 2011, http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/MPs+support+plans+to+create+a+buffer+zone/~/1064/1158730/~/item/0/-/ldbek2/-/index.html Date accessed 9 May 2011
PIRACY

4.25 The UN Security Council's *Report of the Secretary General*, dated 28 April 2011, stated that:

“Pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia increased to unprecedented levels during the reporting period. As of 15 April 2011, pirates had launched 113 attacks. Reports from the International Maritime Organization (IMO) indicate that as of 15 April, 550 people and 26 vessels were being held hostage in Somalia. The level of violence employed by the pirates, as well as their geographic reach, has continued to increase....On 28 March, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime handed over to ‘Somaliland’ a prison in Hargeysa that holds pirates convicted by the courts in ‘Somaliland’, as well as other criminals. The prison meets international minimum standards, has a holding capacity of 465, and was refurbished at a cost of $1.5 million, partly funded by the trust fund to support initiatives of states countering piracy off the coast of Somalia.” 76

5. CONSTITUTION

5.01 *Africa South of the Sahara*, published in 2005, stated that: “The Constitution promulgated in 1979 and amended in 1990 was revoked following the overthrow of President Siad Barre in January 1991. In July 2000 delegates at the Somali national reconciliation conference in Arta, Djibouti, overwhelmingly approved a national Charter, which was to serve as Somalia’s constitution for an interim period of three years.” 77

5.02 The Transitional Federal Charter came into force in February 2004 and states:

“The Charter shall have legal effect pending the eventual enforcement of the National Federal Constitution…The 1960 Somalia Constitution and other national laws shall apply in respect of all matters not covered and not inconsistent with this Charter…The present Charter shall be the basis for the federal constitution whose draft shall be completed within two and half (2 1/2) years and be adopted by popular referendum during the final year of the transitional period.” 78

5.03 The UN Security Council’s *Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Somalia*, dated 30 December 2010 stated that:

“The United Nations continued to support Somalia’s efforts to draft a new constitution. Following the official launch in August of a broad-based popular consultation on the draft constitution, President Sharif requested that the process be put on hold pending his appointment of the National Advisory Council to review the draft. The 16-member Advisory

Council, composed of independent Somali experts, was appointed in early November, and it will work with the United Nations and the Independent Federal Constitution Commission. Given the fast-approaching end of the transitional period, my Special Representative, the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) and the United Nations country team are engaged in efforts to facilitate a genuine, wide-ranging process of consultations in order to bring to conclusion the constitution-making process.”

5.04 The UN Security Council’s Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in Somalia, dated 28 April 2011, gave a further update:

“In the last few months, [UN Political Office for Somalia] UNPOS has had consultations with the transitional federal institutions, IGAD, the African Union and international partners to agree on a political road map for the finalization of the draft constitution…A political road map elaborating the broad steps of the various components of the process has been agreed upon. The road map sets out three pillars for the successful completion of the draft constitution. The first one is participation and active engagement and support of the country’s political leadership at national and regional levels. The second pillar is ownership by the Somali people. The outcome of the constitution-making process must be a constitution that is supported by the Somali people, reflects their wishes and represents their views. The third pillar is continuity of commitment to the peace process. The Somali constitution process is essentially about reconciliation, peacebuilding, and nation-building. The process must reconcile and unite the Somali people in a common cause.”

THE PUNTLAND CHARTER

5.05 The Constitution of Puntland, signed on 5 June 2001, is based on the following principles:

- Islamic Sharia
- The system of idea sharing and collective decision making
- The proportionality of Government Powers: Legislative, Executive and Judiciary
- Decentralization of the governmental power
- The multi-party system
- Ensuring the existence of private ownership and the free market
- Ensuring the individual fundamental rights and life, security and general stability.

The full constitution is available on the website of the Puntland Government.

THE REPUBLIC OF SOMALILAND CONSTITUTION

5.06 The US State Department 2010 Country Report on Human Rights Practices, Somalia, published 8 April 2011 mentioned that: “The Somaliland constitution is based on democratic principles, but the region continued to use laws that predate the constitution, some of which contradict democratic principles.”

6. POLITICAL SYSTEM


“The territory, which was recognized as the Somali state from 1960 to 1991, fragmented into regions led in whole or in part by three distinct entities: the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Mogadishu, the self-declared Republic of Somaliland in the northwest, and the semiautonomous region of Puntland in the northeast. The TFG was formed in late 2004, with a five-year transitional mandate to establish permanent, representative governmental institutions and organize national elections. In January 2009 an expanded Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP), established under the internationally backed Djibouti Peace Process (DPP), extended the TFG's mandate until August 2011 and elected Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed as TFG president. The DPP stalled in 2009 as the government came under pressure from armed extremist groups and the TFG’s top leadership engaged in political infighting.” 83

6.02 The CIA World Factbook, Somalia, updated 28 April 2011, provided the following summary of the government in Somalia:

“Executive branch:

 “[C]hief of state: Transitional Federal President Sheikh SHARIF Sheikh Ahmed (since 31 January 2009); note - a transitional governing entity with a five-year mandate, known as the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs), was established in October 2004; the TFIs relocated to Somalia in June 2004; in 2009, the TFIs were given a two-year extension to October 2011

 “[H]ead of government: Prime Minister Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed FARMAJO (since 1 November 2010)

 “[C]abinet: Cabinet appointed by the prime minister and approved by the Transitional Federal Assembly… election results: Sheikh SHARIF Sheikh Ahmed elected president by the expanded Transitional Federal Assembly in Djibouti

 “Legislative branch:

 “[U]nicameral National Assembly

 “[N]ote: unicameral Transitional Federal Assembly (TFA) (550 seats; 475 members appointed according to the 4.5 clan formula, with the remaining 75 seats reserved for civil society and business persons)” 84

6.03 The US State Department Background Note: Somalia, stated that “for administrative purposes, Somalia is divided into 18 regions; the nature, authority, and structure of regional governments vary, where they exist.”

See following subsections on Puntland the Republic of Somaliland


For further information on the history of the TFG, please see History: 2007 – October 2010. For further information on recent developments in Somali politics, please see Recent developments: Political developments.

PUNTLAND

6.06 The USSD 2010 report stated that:

“In 1998 Puntland declared itself a semiautonomous regional government during a consultative conference of delegates from six regions that included traditional community elders, the leadership of political organizations, members of local legislative assemblies, regional administrators, and civil society representatives. Puntland has a single-chamber quasi-legislative branch called the Council of Elders, which has played a largely consultative role. Political parties were banned. However, provisions of the Puntland constitution that parliament endorsed in June 2009, which called for the establishment of multiparty democracy in two years, were not enacted. The new constitution limits the number of political parties to three. In January 2009 the council elected Abdirahman Mohamed Mohamud "Faroole" as Puntland's president. The former president, General Mohamud Muse Hersi "Adde Muse," who was one of several candidates, conceded defeat and peacefully handed over power to the new president. Parliamentary representatives were seated by their respective clan elders in the six administrative regions, and the same 66 representatives announced in December 2008 by Puntland's election and ratification commission remained in office.” 85

6.07 The US State Department Background Note further stated that “Puntland declared it would remain autonomous until a federated Somalia state was established.” 86

SOMALILAND

6.08 The USSD 2010 report stated that:

“Somaliland has a constitution and bicameral parliament with proportional clan representation and an elected president and vice president. Somaliland authorities have established functioning administrative institutions in nearly all of the territory they claim, which is the same as the Somaliland state that achieved international recognition briefly in 1960 before entering into a union with the former Italian colony of Somalia. In a 2001 referendum, 97 percent of voters supported Somaliland independence.

“Due in part to concerted international pressure to hold elections, the ruling UDUB party of Somaliland President Dahir Riyale Kahin abandoned repeated efforts to postpone elections. Elections were held on June 26. Independent international and domestic observers described the elections as generally free and fair. There were reports of government restrictions on opposition parties' access to state-owned media, and claims of government use of state resources in elections campaigns. At least two incidents of violence against

86 US Department of State, Background Note: Somalia, Government and political conditions, 3 January 2011, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2863.htm Date accessed 12 April 2011
election officials carried out by separatist clan militia were reported in parts of the disputed Sool and Sanaag regions.  

For further information on the 2010 elections in Somaliland, please see History: ‘The Republic of Somaliland’.

Human Rights

7. INTRODUCTION

The section provides a brief overview of the prevailing human rights issues in Somalia. More detail on specific groups or issues may be found in the sections that follow.

SOUTH AND CENTRAL SOMALIA

7.01 Human Rights Watch summarised the human rights situation in Somalia in 2010 in its World Report 2011, published on 24 January 2011:

“The Transitional Federal Government (TFG), supported by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), lost control of further territory to opposition groups in Somalia in 2010, with bitter fighting imposing a significant toll on civilians, especially during an upsurge of attacks in August and September. Al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam, the militant Islamist groups that spearhead the opposition, consolidated control over much of south-central Somalia, where the population experienced relative stability but also increasingly harsh and intolerant repression, in the name of Sharia law. A humanitarian crisis exists across the country. Humanitarian agencies have limited access due to ongoing insecurity, and armed opposition groups threatened humanitarian workers, journalists, and civil society activists with attack.” 88

7.02 The US State Department 2010 Country Report on Human Rights Practices, Somalia, published 8 April 2011, covering events of 2010 gave the following summary:

“Despite security and capacity problems, the TFG continued to focus on human rights. It designated a human rights official in the Ministry of Justice and a Focal Point for Human Rights and Child Protection in the Office of the Prime Minister and participated in international efforts to encourage better human rights practices. The human rights situation in al-Shabaab and allied extremist-controlled areas deteriorated further during the year. Absence of effective governance institutions and rule of law, the widespread availability of small arms and other light weapons, and al-Shabaab's increased enforcement of extremist societal norms contributed to a worsening human rights situation, particularly in Central and South Somalia.

“Human rights abuses included arbitrary killings, kidnappings, torture, rape, amputations, and beatings; official impunity; harsh and life-threatening prison conditions; and arbitrary arrest, deportation, and detention. In part due to the absence of functioning institutions, perpetrators of human rights abuses, mostly in al-Shabaab controlled areas of Central and South Somalia, were rarely punished. Denial of a fair trial and limited privacy rights were problems, and there were restrictions on freedoms of speech, press, assembly, association, religion, and movement. Discrimination and violence against women, including rape and female genital mutilation; child abuse; recruitment of child soldiers; trafficking in persons; abuse of and discrimination against clan and religious minorities; restrictions on workers' rights; forced labor; and child labor were also problems.

“Members of extremist antigovernment groups, and the al-Shabaab terrorist organization, some of whose members were affiliated with al-Qaeda, committed an increasing number of egregious human rights violations, including killings of TFG officials and civilians;”

kidnappings and disappearances; attacks on journalists, aid workers, civil society leaders, and human rights activists; restrictions on freedom of movement; and displacement of civilians.”

7.03 In a press release dated 10 August 2010, Shamsul Bari, the UN Independent Expert on the Situation of Human Rights in Somalia, Augustus Mahiga, identified the following human rights concerns… summary executions, including beheadings of innocent people, amputations, flogging, whipping, forcible marriage of young girls to militiamen, use of civilians as human shield, imposition of strictest dress code to women and prohibition of use of public mass medias and the bans imposed on hearing music and public gathering, all with lack of due process.”

7.04 The UN Independent Expert on the Situation of Human Rights in Somalia stated in his report dated 16 September 2010 that: “In territories controlled by armed insurgents, many civilians do not have access to humanitarian aid and they are at increasing risk of being punished under arbitrary interpretations of sharia law. Journalists and civil society activists have seen their space for work restricted by threats, intimidation, arbitrary arrests and killings.”

7.05 The Human Rights Watch *World Report 2011* stated that:

“South-central Somalia was under the control of local administrations linked to armed opposition groups throughout 2010. In many areas al-Shabaab rule brought relative stability and order, which contrasts dramatically with the chaos in Mogadishu. Residents from some of these areas credit al-Shabaab with ending a constant menace of extortion, robbery, and murder from bandits and freelance militias. But even where this holds true, security has come at a steep price, especially for women.

“Grinding repression characterizes daily life in communities controlled by al-Shabaab, and many local administrations have sought to implement harsh and intolerant measures in the name of Sharia law. These measures control minute details of personal lives, including the way people dress and work. The punishments for even minor offenses are often summary, arbitrary, and cruel. A climate of fear prevents most people from speaking out against abuses of power. As one resident of the southern town of El Wak said, ‘We just stay quiet. If they tell us to follow a certain path, we follow it.’”

**PUNTLAND**

7.06 The UN Independent Expert on the Situation of Human Rights in Somalia stated in his report dated 16 September 2010 that:

“In Puntland… the situation remained more stable [than south and central Somalia], with functioning authorities… [though] the human rights situation deteriorated in the past few months, as a result of measures undertaken by the government to step up security in the
face of increased infiltration by armed militants from the south. These included the forced transfer of some 900 male IDPs from Bossasso to Galkayo, restrictions on the media, including the imprisonment of a journalist for six years and other measures which are limiting the space of civil society.” 93

7.07 The Human Rights Watch World Report 2011 stated that “The situation remains unstable in the contested regions of Sool, Sanag, and Cayn, which lie between Somaliland, in Somalia's northwest, and the autonomous state of Puntland in the northeast. Thousands of civilians were displaced by clan-based clashes and conflicts over resources in the disputed area in June.” 94

SOMALILAND

7.08 The UN Independent Expert on the Situation of Human Rights in Somalia stated in his report dated 16 September 2010 that “In Somaliland, the situation remained more stable, with functioning authorities…the successful holding of peaceful presidential elections in June and the inauguration of a new President have raised hopes for a new era, including with respect to human rights.” 95 Human Rights Watch, in its World Report 2011, stated that the elections in Somaliland in June 2010 “took place in a largely free and fair atmosphere”.96

For further information see Security situation, Human rights organisations, Extrajudicial Killings, Freedom of speech and media, and Political affiliation and expression

8. SECURITY SITUATION (2010 TO MAY 2011)

For information about the protagonists in the conflict and human rights violations committed by the various groups, read Security forces and Non-state armed groups.

Also see Recent developments: Security situation and background to the current conflict see History.

OVERVIEW

8.01 Jane’s Sentinel Security Risk Assessment, Somalia (JSCRA), updated 9 February 2011, summarised the security situation as:

- “Somalia faces a number of threats to its security ranging from clan militias to pirate groups to radical Islamist groups. The country is a base for active terrorist operations being conducted in concert with Somali insurgents. Successful terrorist operations in Somalia also have negative security implications for regional states.

“Ethiopia completed its officially declared withdrawal from Somalia in January 2009. However, Ethiopian forces continue to conduct military operations against radical Islamist groups inside Somalia, especially in border areas.

“The Transitional Federal Government (TFG), radical Islamist groups and a range of other opposition groups with different agendas continue to fight for control of central and southern Somalia. Mogadishu continues to be the epicentre of what at times is fierce and heavy fighting, resulting in mounting civilian casualties. By late 2010 the Shabab and other Islamist rebel groups had gained control over most of southern Somalia. Some small patches of territory outside of Mogadishu are still in the hands of TFG forces, Ahlu Sunna wal Jamaa militia and other militia loyal to the TFG, but these regions are negligible. TFG military offensives have failed to open up new fronts against the Shabab and combat in Mogadishu has come to a stalemate where the governments (sic) lines are often held by the AMISOM peacekeepers.”

8.02 The US State Department 2010 Country Report on Human Rights Practices, Somalia, published 8 April 2011, covering events of 2010 (USSD 2010 report) noted that “Since the collapse of the government in 1991, tens of thousands of persons, mostly noncombatants, have died in interclan and intraclan fighting and factional armed conflict.” The same source noted that:

“Fighting by TFG troops, allied militias, and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces against antigovernment forces, terrorist groups, and extremist elements affected thousands of civilians in Mogadishu that over 2,000 people were killed due to insecurity [[the report also observed that fighting between the TFG and allied forces against al-Shabaab and Hisbul Islam caused the deaths of 2,000 civilians throughout Somalia. Intermittent resource-related sub-clan disputes escalated into minor armed conflicts Targeted assassinations continued. Terrorist group al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for suicide and roadside bombings against TFG troops, government officials, and AMISOM peacekeepers.”

8.03 The Human Rights Watch World Report 2011, published on 24 January 2011 and covering events of 2010 stated, with regard to the security situation in south and central Somalia that

“Continual fighting between militant Islamist groups and the TFG raged in Mogadishu, Somalia’s capital, throughout 2010, with all parties conducting indiscriminate attacks causing high civilian casualties. Opposition fighters have deployed unlawfully in densely populated civilian neighborhoods and at times used civilians as ‘shields’ to fire mortars at TFG and AMISOM positions. These attacks are conducted so indiscriminately that they frequently destroy civilian homes but rarely strike military targets. Often AMISOM or TFG forces respond in kind, launching indiscriminate mortar strikes on the neighborhoods from which opposition fighters had fired and then fled, leaving only civilians to face the resulting devastation.”

8.04 The USSD 2010 report also noted that: “Fighting among armed moderate and extremist religious factions as well as between extremists themselves caused hundreds of civilian casualties and displacements.” 101 The same report further observed that: “Hundreds of civilians were killed in inter- or intra-clan militia clashes throughout the country. The killings resulted from clan militias fighting for political power and control of territory and resources; revenge attacks; banditry and other criminal activity; private disputes over property and marriage; and vendettas after incidents such as rape, family disagreements, killings, and abductions.” 102

8.05 JSCRA gave an overview of the formation of the groups involved in the conflict:

“Clashes between the TFG, its ally Ethiopia and the SCIC [Supreme Council of Islamic Courts, formerly the Union of Islamic Courts] through 2006 and 2007 dramatically changed the dynamics of the militias of Somalia, forcing clan militias and warlords to take sides, while the SCIC successfully disbanded the freelance militias of Mogadishu. Militia from the warlords and factions allied to the government have been incorporated into the TFG military and police; a milestone was reached in July 2007 when a treaty was signed stipulating that the 3,200-strong army of Puntland was to be included within the TFG army. However, in the face of a renewed threat from Somaliland, the Puntland military was reorganised in 2008. At the end of 2009, in spite of new leadership and training, the TFG army continued to be ineffective against the determined insurgency. Regional and international support for the TFG in 2010 holds the promise of the TFG being able to reassert itself in the face of the insurgency but it is unlikely to decisively improve the situation on the ground. The European Union programme to train Somali troops is based on increasing the combat effectiveness and capabilities of the TFG; the EU is currently training the second battalion of Somali troops in Uganda.” 103

8.06 The Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment for Somalia, section on Security and Foreign Forces, updated 5 October 2010, noted that

“In January 2007, the African Union Peace and Security Council authorised a peacekeeping mission in Somalia, known as AMISOM. It was proposed that the military element would involve the deployment of nine infantry battalions of 850 troops each and accompanying support elements. The UN Security Council (UNSC) officially authorised the operation in February 2007. The mission was initially only mandated for six months, but the UN has repeatedly renewed the mandate. The European Union and the US have both provided financial support for the mission. According to the UN, AMISOM was ‘... mandated to support transitional governmental structures, implement a national security plan, train the Somali security forces and assist in creating a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid.’

“AMISOM consists of a civilian component, essentially a political affairs unit which has the role of assisting the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in the re-establishment of functioning state institutions; a police component which has the role of training, mentoring and advising the Somali Police Force (SPF); and a main element, the military component. Of the 8,000 troops planned, about 4,300 were deployed in early 2009, split between the two contributor nations, Burundi and Uganda. By September 2010, the strength of AMISOM had risen to 7,200, with the force consisting of eight battalions, five from Uganda and three

103 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, Somalia, updated 9 February 2011, Available in hard copy on request
from Burundi. The force is based at Mogadishu airport and the surrounding areas, and protects facilities such as the presidential palace from Islamist insurgents.”

8.07 The UN Security Council’s Report of the Secretary General on Somalia, published on 28 April 2011, noted that “Pursuant to Security Council resolution 1964 (2010), by which the Council requested the African Union to increase the AMISOM force strength from 8,000 to 12,000, Burundi and Uganda reaffirmed their commitment to deploy the additional 4,000 troops. As a first step, Burundi deployed an additional 1,000 troops in the first week of March 2011, bringing AMISOM strength to about 9,000.”

For information about TFG forces and opposition groups such as Al Shabaab see Security forces and Non-state armed groups respectively. Also see Internally Displaced Persons and Humanitarian situation for information on the consequences of the conflict on civilians.

Trends and statistics in security-related incidents and casualties

8.08 Figures and estimates vary considerably between sources over the number and type of casualties, reflecting difficulties in monitoring and documenting incidents in a conflict situation and differences in methodological approach in interpreting data and extrapolating estimates. The UN Security Council’s Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in Somalia, dated 9 November 2010, stated that: “The precarious and unpredictable security situation in Somalia presents a challenge to the provision of a definitive account of violations and perpetrators [against children]. This has been compounded by attacks on humanitarian personnel and the remote location of the United Nations country team in Nairobi.”

Numbers of casualties: 2010

8.09 The estimates of casualties varied with source. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Armed Conflict Database, (IISS ACD) Somalia, Human Security, undated, accessed on 3 May 2011, estimated that there were 5,000 fatalities in 2010 for the whole country (as compared to 2,300 in 2009). The same source stated that: “Children in Mogadishu account for at least one-fifth of the 5,000 people killed in 2010, according to the World Health Organisation. The International Committee of the Red Cross announced in late October that the number of civilians wounded in the conflict had gone up 72% for women and children compared with 2009 levels.” The Congressional Research Service paper, Somalia: Current Conditions and Prospects for a Lasting Peace, dated 16 December 2010, stated that: “Humanitarian, political, and security conditions continue to deteriorate across south-central Somalia. In the past two years, more than 22,000 civilians have been killed...”

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104 Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment, Somalia, Security and Foreign Forces, updated 5 October 2011, Available in hard copy on request
107 International Institute for Strategic Studies, Armed Conflict Database, Somalia, Human security developments, 2010, Available in hard copy on request

“Over the course of 2010, hundreds of civilians were killed and injured as a result of being caught up in the conflict in southern and central Somalia and especially in Mogadishu. The UN Inter Agency Standing Committee Protection Cluster, that provides a coordinated humanitarian response to protection and humanitarian needs, recorded more than 1,000 killings throughout 2010 and more than 1,600 weapon-related casualties between September and November alone – including 127 children under the age of five.” 109

8.11 The USSD 2010 report stated that that at least 2,000 civilians were killed in Mogadishu.110 The source also noted that:

“Fighting during the year between TFG and allied forces against al-Shabaab and Hisbul Islam resulted in the deaths of more than 2,000 civilians throughout Somalia. In Mogadishu, al-Shabaab conducted almost daily attacks and offensives against the TFG and AMISOM; there were numerous media reports of civilian deaths from TFG and AMISOM forces responding to these attacks. According to the Mogadishu-based Elman Human Rights Organization, violence in Mogadishu killed an estimated 918 civilians. According to Lifeline, a Mogadishu-based local human rights organization that provides free ambulances to Mogadishu residents, 5,814 civilian injuries were reported during the year... All parties to the conflict reportedly employed indiscriminate lethal tactics; generally, no action was taken against those responsible for the violence.” 111

8.12 The Institute for Security Studies paper, *Somalia Dilemmas*, published in October 2010, noted that:

“The last part of 2009 and the first month of 2010 witnessed some of the worst fighting in South Central Somalia since mid-2009...There were 248 deaths and injuries to 253 people in Central Somalia alone. The incidents of January 2010 included the fighting of 29–31 January 2010 involving AMISOM, which followed several attacks by insurgents against AMISOM bases and the presidential palace. In February and March 2010, the violence in Mogadishu escalated with devastating consequences for civilians due to a rising number of mortar attacks and indiscriminate shelling. While the worst fighting in February resulted in 24 deaths and 158 war-related injuries, the subsequent fighting in Mogadishu in March led to several deaths and more than 900 injuries.

“Following some slight improvement in the security situation in June, when 20 900 people were displaced throughout Somalia, subsequent months again witnessed heavy fighting, with high levels of civilian casualties and displacements that surpassed previous records. In some of the fiercest clashes in early July 2010, at least 60 people were killed and more than 120 others were wounded. Some 46 civilians were killed and 162 others were wounded in one week from 17 to 23 August 2010. Soon after the 24 August suicide bombings, fierce battles between Al Shabaab and combined TFG and AMISOM forces, involving heavy artillery, resulted in the deaths of at least 80 people and the wounding of close to 200 others in just four days. The majority of the victims were women, children and the elderly.

“The overall figures for civilian deaths and casualties during 2010 serve as an indication of the rise in intensity and regularity of the fighting. According to UN reports, at least 964 civilians have been killed with 2,717 wounded in armed conflicts or in random shootings in residential neighbourhoods since the beginning of 2010. This figure reflects an 18 per cent increase in the number of civilian deaths reported during the same time period in 2009. This is also an indication that the fighting is continuing to affect more and more civilians.

“The surge in fighting has also forced many more Somalis to flee their homes and communities. It has been reported that since the beginning of 2010 more than 100,000 people have been displaced from Mogadishu with nearly 60,000 people – more than double the number of people displaced in February – exiting the city. While more than 12,000 Somalis fled Mogadishu in June 2010, this figure almost doubled in July, with more than 23,000 people fleeing the city. In South Central Somalia as a whole, 200,000 people were reportedly displaced in 2010.”

Frequency of incidents: 2010

8.13 The USSD 2010 report noted that: “In Mogadishu, al-Shabaab conducted almost daily attacks and offensives against the TFG and AMISOM; there were numerous media reports of civilian deaths from TFG and AMISOM forces responding to these attacks.” 113 While the IISS ACD reported that:

“Near-daily clashes between al-Shabab and the squabbling Transitional Federal Government (TFG) were reported in 2010, with both sides claiming successes and military victories. In mid-December, the TFG, backed by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), said it had doubled its area of control from four to eight of Mogadishu’s 16 districts, leaving al-Shabab in control of only four districts, with the remaining four partially under government control. The government went even further on 19 December when it said it had embarked on its ‘100-day plan’ to eradicate Islamists in Somalia… While violence was ongoing throughout the year, there was a notable escalation in August and early September, when hundreds of people were killed each week in clashes between the TFG, backed by AMISOM, and al-Shabab. The government claimed several strategic victories at this time. On 5 September, AMISOM said it had secured key installations and expanded its area of control – most of the roads connecting various government buildings were reportedly under AMISOM control. In addition, it was said to have established ten new bases in Somalia since April. On the same day, al-Shabab paraded hundreds of newly trained fighters in Mogadishu, heavily armed and ready to join what al-Shabab called the ‘final war to topple the government’.”

8.14 The UN Security Council’s Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, covering events since 9 September 2010, dated 30 December 2010 noted that

“In September 2010, troops of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) foiled an attempted suicide attack on their base at the international airport in Mogadishu. In recent weeks, despite continued attacks by insurgent forces, the Transitional Federal Government and AMISOM forces have made some territorial gains in Mogadishu. In central Somalia, the

114 International Institute for Strategic Studies, Armed Conflict Database, Somalia, Military and security, Available in hard copy on request
Transitional Federal Government relies on its alliance with ASWJ for control of the Hiraan, Galguduud and Mudug regions. Overall, however, the security situation in southern and central Somalia remained fragile and unpredictable during the reporting period, which led to a cessation of most humanitarian activities in southern Somalia, while in Mogadishu, humanitarian operations were limited to critical lifesaving activities.

“Since mid-October, fighting between pro-Transitional Federal Government militias and Al-Shabaab over Bula Hawa, a strategic town near the Kenyan and Ethiopian borders, threatened to spill over into Kenya, while causing considerable disruption to living conditions, especially for the population located on the Somali side of border. The consequences from the merger between Al-Shabaab and Hizbul-Islam, reported on 19 December 2010, are still unknown.”

**Incidents in 2011**

8.15 The IISS, ACD noted that “In the first two months of the year [2011] alone, at least 224 people were killed and another 227 wounded...Of the 224 people killed, more than half were civilians.” The UN Security Council’s Report of the Secretary General, published on 28 April 2011, stated that “According to hospital sources in Mogadishu, 62 civilians were killed and 232 wounded within the first two weeks of the February offensive. For the most part, the information available does not allow for a definitive attribution to either party.” The Somalia Report website’s Casualty report for March 2011 estimated that 529 people had been killed and 512 injured during the month. The same website’s Casualty report for April 2011 estimated that 178 people had been killed and 101 injured between 3 and 28 April 2011, and also gave a “running total” of 705 deaths and 613 injured since the beginning of March.

8.16 The UN Security Council’s Report of the Secretary General, published on 28 April 2011, noted that:

“A major military offensive against Al-Shabaab began on 19 February. In Mogadishu, Transitional Federal Government forces, supported by AMISOM, have made and continue to hold significant territorial gains, despite repeated counterattacks. They destroyed a network of tunnels and trenches used by Al-Shabaab. Significant casualties have been reported on both sides.

“The offensive by the Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama’a and other groups allied with the Transitional Federal Government against Al-Shabaab in southern central Somalia has focused on the Ethiopia-Kenya-Somalia border. Hostilities have centred on the Gedo, Bay and Bakool regions, with armed conflict most prevalent in Bula Hawa and, to a lesser extent, in the vicinity of Beletweyne and Dolo. Clashes are expected in other key strategic towns within

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116 International Institute for Strategic Studies, Armed Conflict Database, Somalia, Human security developments, January –February 2011, Available in hard copy on request


the Hiraan region. The Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama’a continues to adopt a defensive posture in Dhuusamarreeb, while also continuing to provide security assurances to the United Nations and its humanitarian partners for access to those areas under its control…Reports of heavy casualties and intensified recruitment efforts on the part of Al-Shabaab suggest that the group’s capabilities may have been reduced through attrition. Al-Shabaab continues to receive arms and ammunition through southern Somali ports and acquires financial resources from extortion, illegal exports and taxation.

“In February in Mogadishu, a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device detonated outside a Transitional Federal Government police training facility, resulting in several casualties, including civilians. On 21 February, Al-Shabaab launched a suicide car bomb attack on a police camp at Hamar Jabab district. Eleven people, including policemen and civilians, were killed with 40 others injured.” 120

8.17 Reuters reported on 5 May 2011 that: “A government-led offensive earlier this year in Mogadishu and along Somalia’s border with Kenya and Ethiopia drove al Shabaab out of several towns. That offensive appeared to fizzle out in early March as a power struggle escalated among the country’s politicians, and there have been further clashes in the south since.” 121

**TYPE AND NATURE OF VIOLENCE**

8.18 The USSD 2010 report observed that:

“All parties to the conflict reportedly employed indiscriminate lethal tactics; generally, no action was taken against those responsible for the violence. Antigovernment and extremist groups, particularly al-Shabaab, were responsible for launching mortar attacks from hidden sites within civilian populated areas and using civilians as human shields. For example, on November 17, artillery gunfire between AMISOM and extremist groups killed at least 21 civilians in Mogadishu. In addition, extremist groups conducted suicide bombings; used land mines and remote-controlled roadside bombs; and conducted targeted killings of journalists, aid workers, and civil society leaders. TFG and AMISOM forces responded to these attacks, which sometimes resulted in shelling of civilian-populated areas. International human rights observers accused all parties to the conflict of indiscriminate attacks, deployment of forces in densely populated areas, and a failure to take steps to minimize civilian harm.” 122

8.19 The same source noted that:

“…extremist groups conducted suicide bombings; used land mines and remote-controlled roadside bombs; and conducted targeted killings of journalists, aid workers, and civil society leaders. TFG and AMISOM forces responded to these attacks, which sometimes resulted in shelling of civilian-populated areas. International human rights observers accused all parties to the conflict of indiscriminate attacks, deployment of forces in densely populated areas,

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and a failure to take steps to minimize civilian harm… Roadside bombings, suicide attacks, and armed raids targeting TFG officials and sympathizers as well as civil society groups continued throughout the year. Antigovernment extremist groups were responsible for numerous killings of government officials and police. Politically motivated killings by al-Shabaab and its affiliates resulted in the deaths of several TFG officials and members of the Banadir regional administration, including district commissioners and their deputies and security and court officials.”

8.20 The same source noted that:

“Few cases of land mines and unexploded ordinance (UXO) were reported during the year compared with 2009. However, antipersonnel and antitank land mines, most of them remotely controlled, were frequently deployed by antigovernment groups against TFG forces, its allied militias, and civilians… Unlike previous years when UXO killed several children, there were no reported incidents of children killed or injured in UXO-related accidents.”

8.21 The Human Rights Watch World Report 2011, Somalia, 24 January 2011, observed that:

“Continual fighting between militant Islamist groups and the TFG raged in Mogadishu, Somalia's capital, throughout 2010, with all parties conducting indiscriminate attacks causing high civilian casualties. Opposition fighters have deployed unlawfully in densely populated civilian neighborhoods and at times used civilians as ‘shields' to fire mortars at TFG and AMISOM positions. These attacks are conducted so indiscriminately that they frequently destroy civilian homes but rarely strike military targets. Often AMISOM or TFG forces respond in kind, launching indiscriminate mortar strikes on the neighborhoods from which opposition fighters had fired and then fled, leaving only civilians to face the resulting devastation.”

8.22 The Institute for Security Studies paper, *Somalia Dilemmas*, published in October 2010, noted that:

“…the 7/11 bombings [in Kampala on 11 July 2010] symbolise the deteriorating security situation in Somalia and mark the intensification of Al Shabaab’s fight against the TFG and AMISOM. Indeed, the 7/11 bombings took place against the background of the intensification and increased regularity of Al Shabaab’s offensive, including suicide bombings and mortar shelling during the course of 2010. A week before the Kampala bombings, fierce clashes took place between Al Shabaab and TFG forces, resulting in the deaths of at least 60 people and injuries to more than 120 others. Since 7/11, Al Shabaab has been expanding its jihadist campaign against the TFG and AMISOM and has called on businesses in Mogadishu, Afgoye and Baidoa to make large financial and military contributions. The organisation has also intensified its offensive against the TFG. According to reports 52 people died and 129 others were injured in the fighting that took place to the north of Mogadishu a week after the bombings.

“The heavy fighting continued in the following month as well, with a combination of suicide bombings and mortar shells. During the first week and in mid-August heavy fighting took place following attacks by Al Shabaab against the TFG. On 24 August 2009 [sic – 2010], Al

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Shabaab executed one of the deadliest attacks in Mogadishu against the TFG. Its fighters, disguised in government security force uniforms, walked into the Huna Hotel (frequented by TFG Members of Parliament) in Mogadishu’s Hamarweyne district and shot people indiscriminately before detonating suicide bombs, killing themselves and others in the hotel. In the attacks close to 40 people lost their lives, including six Members of Parliament and five TFG soldiers. The fact that Al Shabaab is able to carry out such deadly attacks in an area generally considered to be safe and under the control of TFG is indicative of the laxity of the TFG and the AMISOM security system.

“In what seems to be another all-out military campaign against the TFG, Al Shabaab launched a fierce offensive against the TFG that resulted in fighting that continued for about two weeks. In the fighting, Al Shabaab fighters used heavy machine guns and mortars against government troops backed by AMISOM forces. Pushing into TFG-controlled areas, Al Shabaab forces attempted to seize a key street in Mogadishu. The street, known as Mekka-almukara, connects Mogadishu’s international airport of Aden Adde to the presidential palace in the capital. Al-Shabaab closed the street on the side it controls, which leads to the Bakara market, after heavy fighting in which its forces overran the military base of Ahlu Sunna Wal Jamaa, between Dabka and Bakara.

“The areas most affected in the recent fighting are around Bakara market, Hodan, Halwadaag and Wardhiigleey in southern Mogadishu, and the Cabdlicasis, Shabis and Boondheere districts in northern Mogadishu….

“In the wake of these renewed attacks, AMISOM also did not escape from sustaining casualties. On 30 August 2010, a mortar shell that Al Shabaab launched against the presidential palace killed four AMISOM soldiers from Uganda. According to a press release by the AU Commission issued on 31 August, the attack also seriously injured 17 other AMISOM troops. More AMISOM troops lost their lives when two cars with suicide bombs exploded in the mission’s base at Mogadishu Airport on 9 September 2010.

“Apart from an apparent resolve on the part of Al Shabaab and other anti-TFG forces, such as Hizb al Islam, to defeat the TFG, the current fighting is also an attempt on their part to gain support and consolidate their position ahead of the deployment of additional troops to reinforce AMISOM. By further weakening an already ailing TFG and by inflicting losses to AMISOM, Al Shabaab wants to discourage African countries from contributing troops to the Mission.” 126

8.23 The IISS ACD reported that

“Suicide bombings continued throughout the year. At least 32 people were killed in August when two al-Shabab men dressed in military uniforms stormed a hotel in Mogadishu. Six members of the Somali parliament were among those killed. Several suicide attacks followed in September. On 12 September, Somali police said they foiled a suicide attack by rebels on the seaport in Mogadishu in which the attackers intended to use an explosive-laden gasoline tanker.

“Two unexplained attacks on mosques accompanied the fighting in Mogadishu. 39 people were killed and more than 70 injured when two bombs exploded inside the Abdalla Shideye mosque on the capital's Bakara market on 1 May. The mosque is regularly used by al-Shabab officials to deliver speeches and the target may have been senior al-Shabab leader
Fuad Mohamed Khalaf, who was wounded in the blast. Another person died in a landmine explosion at nearby Abu Hureya mosque on 27 April. A third attack on a mosque was reported in Kismayo on 2 May.

“No group claimed responsibility for the mosque attacks, but witnesses believed them to be the result of insurgent infighting. Local journalists reported seeing pro-government Ahlu Sunnah wal Jama’a militia fighting al-Shabab and Hisbul al-Islam forces after the Abdalla Shideye mosque attack. However, an Ahlu Sunnah spokesman blamed the attack on Hisbul al-Islam, which has a difficult relationship with its putative ally, al-Shabab.

“AMISOM has been criticised for returning fire regardless of the risk to civilians. Abuses by African Union (AU) troops deployed to Mogadishu were raised by a Human Rights Watch (HRW) report in April, and an internal AU document leaked in July warned that its peacekeepers’ indiscriminate shelling of civilian areas risked a loss of public confidence.

“HRW was not alone in also pointing to ongoing repression by al-Shabab and Hisbul al-Islam, including amputations, floggings and summary executions. In al-Shabab-controlled territory, BBC broadcasts were forcibly taken off the air for purportedly spreading Christian propaganda. School bells were also banned in Jowhar because they sounded like church bells. Hisbul al-Islam, for its part, ordered men in Mogadishu to shave their moustaches and grow beards, killed at least two people for watching the World Cup, and warned private radio stations in Mogadishu to stop playing music and not to broadcast programmes on 1 July to mark Somalia’s 50th anniversary.”

8.24 The UN Human Rights Council’s Summary : [Universal Periodic Review] : Somalia / prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in accordance with paragraph 15 (c) of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 5/1, published on 21 February 2011, noted that:

“KARMA [a national human rights institution] stated that rape continued to be used as a tool of war in Somalia. The number of rapes inflicted by police has decreased, but the use of rape by armed groups to punish and intimidate rivals persisted. These incidences are rarely prosecuted. Victims of rape have no recourse...SSWC [Save Somalia Women and Children] stated that “war-related rape” was widespread and women in Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) camps were particularly vulnerable, as the rape of women and girls by the militia and bandits was a common phenomenon.

“JS4 [International Fountain of Hope Kenya; IIDA Women Development Organization; Alla Magan; Kalsan; FEPMA (Female Paramedical Association); FATXA; SWEA(Somali Women Entrepreneur Association); Somali Women Diaspora Network; and IIDA Italia] stated that women and girls that were engaged in ‘pastoralism’, were at risk of attacks from militia groups and armed gangs, mainly in southern Somalia.

“SSWC stated that even though women were essentially neutral when it came to clan affiliation they were still the targets of clan-related reprisals and attacks.”

8.25 The UN Security Council’s Report of the Secretary General, published on 28 April 2011, noted that:

127 International Institute for Strategic Studies, Armed Conflict Database, Somalia, Human security developments, 2010, Available in hard copy on request
“Al-Shabaab reportedly launched deliberate and indiscriminate attacks against civilians, including through shelling, in violation of humanitarian law. Poor command and control over Transitional Federal Government forces and the loose integration of militia and clan-based divisions led to a series of incidents resulting in civilian casualties. At least 16 people were killed during a shoot-out among Transitional Federal Government security forces in January. The Government publicly regretted the incident and arrested five individuals.” 129

**Distribution of Violence by Region**

8.26 International Crisis Group published the following map showing areas of control in their 21 February 2011 report, *Somalia: The Transitional Government on Life Support* 130:

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The following section of the report provides information relating to the security situation in specific regions of Somalia, concentrating on relevant incidents between **January 2011 and May 2011** in those areas where levels of insecurity are known to persist. It is not intended as a comprehensive list of all security incidents in Somalia. A timeline of events in Somalia, as published by the Institute of Strategic Studies in their Armed Conflict Database is available at Annex B. The International Crisis Group’s [CrisisWatch database](#) gives an overview of incidents in Somalia.
South and central Somalia

Mogadishu

8.27 The USSD 2010 report noted that during 2010: “Fighting during the year between TFG and allied forces against al-Shabaab and Hisbul Islam resulted in the deaths of more than 2,000 civilians throughout Somalia.\(^{131}\) The UN Security Council’s *Report of the Secretary General*, published on 28 April 2011, covering the period 30 December 2010 to 15 April 2011, noted that: “A major military offensive against Al-Shabaab began on 19 February. In Mogadishu, Transitional Federal Government forces, supported by AMISOM, have made and continue to hold significant territorial gains, despite repeated counterattacks. They destroyed a network of tunnels and trenches used by Al-Shabaab. Significant casualties have been reported on both sides.” (p3)\(^{132}\)

8.28 The UN Security Council’s *Report of the Secretary General*, published on 28 April 2011 gave an update with regard to resolution 1964 (2010), particularly the establishment of the United Nations presence in Somalia:

“The general security situation in Mogadishu remains unstable and hostile, thus affecting the safe conduct of United Nations operations. In the reporting period, the city continued to experience mortar and artillery shelling; roadside, vehicle borne, and suicide bomber improvised explosive devices; armed clashes; and hand grenade and stand-off attacks. There is still a very high risk for missions within Mogadishu, especially outside the Aden Adde International Airport area. The recent territorial gains secured by AMISOM and the Transitional Federal Government have, however, considerably reduced the risk of indirect fire and mortar attacks against the airport and its immediate environs.

“Three improvised explosive devices detonated and several others were discovered in Mogadishu in early 2011. There was a rise in hand grenade attacks against the Transitional Federal Government and facilities occupied by the United Nations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Consequently, humanitarian operations in Mogadishu are still limited to critical life-saving activities.”\(^{133}\)

8.29 The UN Security Council’s *Report of the Secretary General*, published on 28 April 2011, gave some further details on the incidents in Mogadishu:

“In February in Mogadishu, a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device detonated outside a Transitional Federal Government police training facility, resulting in several casualties, including civilians. On 21 February, Al-Shabaab launched a suicide car bomb attack on a police camp at Hamar Jabab district. Eleven people, including policemen and civilians, were killed with 40 others injured.”\(^{134}\)

8.30 On 7 March 2011, *Africa Review* reported that


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“The African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia (Amisom) has gained territory, mainly in Mogadishu, in the last two weeks from al-Shabaab, the Islamist militant group.

“Amisom spokesperson Maj. Barigye Bahoku said they now control between 60-70 per cent of Mogadishu following fierce fighting with al-Shabaab in Mogadishu for the last two weeks. The operation against the al-Shabaab militants around areas of Siigaale and El-Hindi was launched on Saturday February 19 by the Ugandan contingent… Amison now controls seven districts of the Somali capital with six contested and three still under rebel control. Amisom also took over Bulo Hawo, a border town between Kenya and Ethiopia which for the past two years has been under the control of the al-Shabaab… But Amisom’s gains have come at a high cost with reports indicating that at least 50 peacekeepers were killed in battles with the al-Shabaab in Mogadishu. If true, this is the biggest number of Amisom troops killed in battles with al-Shabaab since the mission began in 2007.

“Most of the dead, according to reports, were Burundian soldiers. It is not yet known how many Ugandan and Burundian soldiers died as secrecy still surrounds Amisom’s losses.”

Associated Press reported on 13 April 2011 that:

“African Union peacekeepers who launched an offensive seven weeks ago have expanded their control of Mogadishu to around half the Somali capital. They’ve gotten so close to Islamic insurgents that the soldiers can hear them cock their rifles before counterattacks.

“But the campaign has come at a dear cost. Officials tell The Associated Press that more than 50 peacekeepers have been killed, along with an unknown number of Somali dead.

“The casualty rate is so high that the AU has not announced it, saying that is the responsibility of Uganda and Burundi, the two countries that currently contribute troops to the mission that is shoring up the weak U.N.-backed government… In the single heaviest assault since the AU peacekeeping mission began three years ago, soldiers took two key positions in Mogadishu — the former defense ministry and a former milk factory — when the offensive began on Feb. 23 [2011].”

International Committee of the Red Cross reported on 15 April 2011, an incident which left unexploded shells inside the grounds of Medina Hospital:

“The 11 shells that hit Medina Hospital in Mogadishu without exploding three days ago have been collected up and stored, waiting for a bomb disposal unit to neutralize them.

“Even so, their presence inside the hospital compound threatens medical staff, patients and visitors. Two guards were injured by a shell that exploded the same day, but are now recovering.

“‘We are concerned about the patients and staff at Medina. These unexploded shells could cause death or injury, and they may well prevent people from getting lifesaving care,’ said Olivier Humbert-Droz, deputy head of the ICRC’s delegation for Somalia. ‘Endangering this vital medical facility is totally unacceptable.’”

“Although nothing suggests that the hospital was deliberately targeted, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Somali Red Crescent remind all parties to the conflict of their obligation not to harm medical staff, hospitals, clinics and similar facilities. Attacks may be directed only against persons taking a direct part in hostilities and against military objectives, and warring parties must take all necessary precautions to avoid harming the civilian population and civilian objects.”  

Lower Juba, Bay, Bakool, Gedo and Hiraan

8.33 The UN Security Council’s Report of the Secretary General, published on 28 April 2011, noted that “Troops allied with the Transitional Federal Government took control of the town of Dhoobley, close to the Kenyan border, on 3 April. Al-Shabaab reportedly moved most of its forces from the Kenya-Somalia border to strengthen the defence of the port of Kismaayo.”  

8.34 The UN Security Council’s Report of the Secretary General, published on 28 April 2011, noted that:

“The offensive by the Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama’a and other groups allied with the Transitional Federal Government against Al-Shabaab in southern central Somalia has focused on the Ethiopia-Kenya-Somalia border. Hostilities have centred on the Gedo, Bay and Bakool regions, with armed conflict most prevalent in Bula Hawa and, to a lesser extent, in the vicinity of Beletweyne and Dolo. Clashes are expected in other key strategic towns within the Hiraan region. The Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama’a continues to adopt a defensive posture in Dhuusamarreeb, while also continuing to provide security assurances to the United Nations and its humanitarian partners for access to those areas under its control.”

8.35 Mareeg Online reported on 5 May 2011 that “Al-shabaab leaders in…Bay region are in critical situation after they’ve lost many militia men during the bloody fighting that have took place in and around Garbahaarey town of Gedo region, According to local sources, Al-Shabaab is Bay region requested enforcement from other Al-Shabaab run regions in Somalia to rebel the rapidly advancing TFG soldiers.”

8.36 Garowe Online noted on 30 April 2011 that:

“Al-Shabaab, the Al Qaeda linked militias vacated Bardaale, Hudur and Wajid strategic districts in southern Somalia.

“Residents told Garowe Online on phone that the militias with armed vehicles left the districts on Saturday.

“Al-Shabaab militias with armed vehicles left Wajid, Hudur and Bardale districts midnight on Saturday,’ a resident who requested to be anonymous because of his security told Garowe

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Online on phone.

“Sources told GO the militias left to back their militants who lost three strategic districts in southern Somalia after Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a Islamists and local militia forces attacked them and seized their bases.” 141

Agence France Presse reported on 28 April 2011 that “Pro-government forces reclaimed control of a town in southwestern Somalia Thursday [28 April 2011] after troops from the Al Qaeda-inspired Shebab pulled out without a fight, officials and witnesses said.” 142

Mareeg Online reported on 4 May 2011 that TFG-allied forces were advancing in Gedo region:

“According to local informed sources Al-Shabaab leaders differed over destroying key strategic bridges on Juba River that links Gedo region of southern Somalia with other regions especially Bay and Bakool.

“We spoke to Alshabaab fighter who defected from the radical group and secretly reached Dhoobley town. He said that Al-Shabaab leaders in the region differed over whether to destroy Buurduuba and Baardheere Bridges after the intensive TFG soldier’s advancement in the region.

‘Alshabab were defeated and their militia in the region started fleeing leaving their heavy weapons behind, there is serious rift between Al-Shabaab commanders, whether to destroy the two strategic bridges or not, Al-Shabaab leaders from Bay and Bakool wants to destroy the two bridges to halt TFG advancements after their positions in Gedo were run over by TFG soldiers, while other Al-Shabaab leaders from Gedo refused to proceed with the plan to the two bridges because they believe it will cut-off Gedo region from the rest of southern Somalia which will cause serious problems for the people of Gedo’ said the EX-Al-shabab fighter who request not to be identified.” 143

Reuters reported on 5 May 2011 that:

“In Garbaharey, where Qoryoley’s forces [Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a] on Monday repelled advancing al Shabaab fighters, residents removed about 30 corpses littering the streets, including a number of women and children, a local cleric said.

An Ahlu Sunna spokesman said 25 al Shabaab fighters were killed. There was no immediate comment from al Shabaab.” 144

RBC Radio reported on 8 May 2011 that “Somalia government forces have reportedly vacated Gusar village, 50 km away from Elwak town of Gedo region…on Saturday afternoon [7 May 2011] after argument on salaries broke between the forces and their

142 Agence France Presse, Pro-government forces take town in southern Somalia, 28 April 2011, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM51qH6I6woORaI­h11aZmPhTr2IA?docId=CN.75828e0910a820349f05bdc831624369.691 Date accessed 6 May 2011
commanders in Elwak town...Reliable sources confirm the fighters of Al-Shabab re-entered Gusar village which is now under their control.”

8.41 Mareeg Online reported on 8 May 2011 that:

“Al-Shabaab has captured Buusaar village last night following TFG and Ahlu Sunna fighters sudden withdrawal from the village.

“Buursaar is relatively small village that fall between the two key strategic towns of Garbahaarey and Balathawo in Gedo region of southern Somalia, the village has been recently captured by the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia and the Sufi Islamist Militia of Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a after the bloody battle with Al-Shabaab that took place two weeks ago.

“Immediately after TFG and Ahlu Sunna’s withdrawal, Al-Shabaab mobilized their fighters positioned in nearby villages and successfully captured the village without any fighting.

“The reason behind TFG and Ahlu Sunna Withdrawal believed to be related to the recent un reconciled disputes that have surfaced between the two allied forces although government security forces refused to comment on this matter.

“Al-Shabaab’s spokes person in Gedo vowed that they will not rest until they gain back control of all Gedo region towns that have been captured recently by the combined forces of TFG and Ahlu Sunna.

“Most of Gedo region towns are currently under the control of transitional federal government of Somalia and its allies; notably the sufi Islamist Militia Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a.”

The ‘Jubaland’ initiative

8.42 The Jamestown Foundation in an article *The Jubaland Initiative: Is Kenya Creating a Buffer State in Southern Somalia?*, 28 April 2011, noted that “Jubaland would supposedly be composed of three Somali regions: Lower Juba, Middle Juba, and Gedo. The state would be headed by a professor named Muhammad Abdi Muhammad “Gandhi,” who briefly served as defense minister in Mogadishu in February 2009 (Garowe Online, February 21, 2009). Jubaland would have as its capital the Indian Ocean port of Kismayo…”

8.43 *The Geopolitical and Conflict Report* stated on 6 May 2011 that:

“Within the Juba regions Al Shabaab has also encountered a new source of resistance. Former minister of Defence to the TFG, Dr. Mohamed Abdi Mohamed ‘Gandhi’, has established the new Somali substate of Azaniya. The substate, commonly referred to as Jubaland, is to be modeled after other more stable Somali regions such as Puntland and is meant to comprise the Gedo and both Juba regions. The Jubaland undertaking is a fairly...
credible one due to its support from Kenya and reportedly France. Jubaland already has a standing army; at least 2500 Somali troops recruited from Somali refugee camps in Kenya and trained by the Kenyan government are reported to be under the control of Dr. Gandhi, supported by Ahla Suna militias and the remains of the Raas Kambooni Brigade. The fiercest fighting in the region was not with TFG troops, but with the Jubaland troops when they struggled for days over the control of Dhooley, a town located near the Kenyan border from which the road leads up to the strategic towns of Afmadow and the Al Shabaab capital of Kismaayo. Since taking a firm hold of Dhooley, there have been no further signs of activity from the Jubaland forces. Kenya is reported to have backed the initiative in order to secure the Somali regions along its border, it is said to have trained the troops that are now under Jubaland command as well as to have delivered Chinese-bought weapons to them."

8.44 On 8 May 2011, the *Daily Nation* reported that:

“Former Fafi MP Elias Bare Shill …[stated that] ‘Jubaland will not just help us with security, it will open the trade route between Kismayu and Garissa.’

“According to the former MP, Kenya must formulate a clear foreign policy for handling Somalia, if the Jubaland initiative is to succeed.

“The plan is for Kenya to support Jubaland in the southwestern most part of Somalia to follow in the footsteps of the breakaway Somaliland and gain autonom…Should a buffer zone be established, then the al Shabaab guns and mortar will be driven deep inside Somalia, far from the thin borderline that currently separates residents of Mandera from the battlefields of the Somali town of Bela Hawa…the initiative is beginning to take shape. A new regional authority of Jubaland has been formed by members of the local communities.

“But there are challenges. Former Somali Defence minister Mohamed Abdi Mohamed is yet to be sworn in as the president of Jubaland days after he was named the leader of the semi-autonomous region.

“This is because the region’s parliament and Cabinet have not been put in place.

“Instead, Mr Mohammed was sworn in as the convener of the Juba initiative, which aspires to fully control the region in Somalia’s southwest.

“On Wednesday [4 May 2011], a section of Somali elders supportive of the creation of Jubaland said they were planning to petition the president of Somalia’s Transitional Federation Government, Sheikh Shariff Ahmed, to support their initiative.”

8.45 IRIN News reported on 27 April 2011 that:

“Thousands of families in Somalia’s central town of Dusamareb, the regional capital of Galgadud, are caught between an unending conflict and severe drought.

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149 Daily Nation, MPs support plans to create a buffer zone, 8 May 2011, [http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/MPs+support+plans+to+create+a+buffer+zone+/-/1064/1158730/-/item/0/-/ldbek2/-/index.html](http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/MPs+support+plans+to+create+a+buffer+zone+/-/1064/1158730/-/item/0/-/ldbek2/-/index.html) Date accessed 9 May 2011
“Following a weekend of fighting between Islamist militia groups, hundreds of families fled the town to the drought-ravaged countryside, locals told IRIN.  

“On 23 April, the Al-Shabab militia attacked Dusamareb, 500km north of the capital Mogadishu, and captured it from the Ahlu Sunna Waljama’a - a traditional Sufi militia group - but withdrew on the same night." 150

8.46 The UN Security Council’s Report of the Secretary General, published on 28 April 2011, noted that “Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama’a continues to adopt a defensive posture in Dhuusamarreeb, while also continuing to provide security assurances to the United Nations and its humanitarian partners for access to those areas under its control.” 151

**Puntland/Somaliland**

**Somaliland**

8.47 The Danish Demining Group and Small Arms Survey report, *Community safety and small arms in Somaliland*, published in 2010, noted that:

“Somaliland endured more than two decades of oppression and civil war before entering the period of peace it enjoys now...when asked simply how safe they consider their community to be, 96.6% of the household respondents surveyed for this report answered that they considered it ‘safe’, as in comparison to what came before, this is a period of stability in Somaliland’s recent history. However, further examination of this data uncovers a more nuanced perception of safety and security among different sections of the population and it is these differences that this report seeks to highlight.” 152

8.48 The report further stated that:

“In an effort to understand how the security environment is evolving in Somaliland, respondents in the household survey were asked how they considered the security situation in comparison to the situation a year earlier. 52.6% of respondents said the situation had improved, while a further 45.3% said it was about the same. Only 2.1% said it had worsened. The gender, income and urban or rural setting of respondents did not appear to have much impact on perceptions of how the security situation had changed. However...age had a small but significant influence on respondents’ answers, with older people more likely to consider the situation in their communities as having improved on a year previously. Furthermore, respondents from minority clans were less likely to say the security situation had improved, with only 37.8% answering accordingly, compared to 53.5% of respondents from majority clans. However, the proportion of respondents in both clan groups claiming the situation had deteriorated was extremely low...” 153

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The report gave the following information about the nature of the perceived threats in Somaliland: 154

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security concerns arising from:</th>
<th>% of primary concerns</th>
<th>% of secondary concerns</th>
<th>% of tertiary concerns</th>
<th>% of total number of concerns cited combined</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Threats from the state (political instability/insecurity in Somaliland)</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threats from other states (political instability in other countries)</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threats from groups of other people (clan conflicts, inter-clan tensions)</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threats from gangs (crime or street violence caused by gangs)</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threats from individuals (crime or street violence caused by individuals)</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threats against women (rape, domestic abuse, forced marriage)</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threats against children (abuse, kidnapping, baby abandonment)</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accident-related threats (Mines, ERW, SALW, Traffic accidents)</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>22.4</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threats to self (or others) (Suicide, drugs, alcohol, khat)</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threats from nature (wild animals, insects, flooding, drought)</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sool and Sanaag

The UN Security Council’s Report of the Secretary General, published on 28 April 2011, noted that:

“Disagreement over water holes in the disputed area of Buuhoodle led to fighting in late February between the ‘Somaliland’ army and Sool-Sanaag-Cayn militias; the latter was reportedly backed by ‘Puntland’ forces. A tentative ceasefire has held since March, aided by ‘Puntland’s’ withdrawal and ‘Somaliland’ peacebuilding measures. However, Buuhoodle

154 Danish Demining Group and Small Arms Survey, Community safety and small arms in Somaliland, 2010, p14
remains a militarized zone, and the conflict may resume as competition for water resources and pasture in drought-affected areas increases.”  

For further information on the effects of the security situation, please see Internally displaced persons and Humanitarian issues.

9. SECURITY FORCES

This section should be read in conjunction with Security situation and Non-state armed groups.

OVERVIEW

9.01 Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment (JSCRA), Somalia, Security and Foreign Forces, updated 5 October 2010, reported that

“Somalia has lacked an effective central government since the overthrow of the Siad Barre regime in 1991. Local clan militia groups provide a semblance of policing. These groups are loosely controlled by whoever can pay them a regular salary. Their paymasters are typically traditional clan elders, sharia courts, businessmen, or warlords. When the militias have not been paid in the past, they have traditionally turned to banditry or piracy. The lack of a central government with effective, nationwide police and security forces has meant that Somali-based pirates have been free to prey on international shipping. The internationally-recognised Transitional Federal Government (TFG) has only a fragile grip on power in the capital, Mogadishu, and has been battling an Islamist insurgency campaign waged by the powerful Al-Qaeda linked Shabab militia and allied groups. The TFG has its own armed forces, police force and intelligence agency and is supported by various militia groups, some of which operate nominally under the authority of TFG forces.”

SOUTH AND CENTRAL SOMALIA

Transitional Federal Government (TFG) forces

9.02 The US State Department (USSD) Background Note: Somalia, updated 3 January 2011, stated:

“The TFG controls several thousand trained army soldiers. Other various TFG-allied groups throughout Somalia are estimated to control militias ranging in strength from hundreds to thousands. The TFG and some groups possess limited inventories of older armored vehicles and other heavy weapons, and small arms are prevalent throughout Somalia. On September 8, 2009, 500 naval recruits graduated to form Somalia’s first naval force in over 2 decades. The TFG plans to use the force to combat piracy off Somalia’s coastline.”

9.03 JSCRA, Somalia, Security and Foreign Forces, updated 5 October 2010, stated that:

156 Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment (JSCRA), Somalia, Security and Foreign Forces, updated 5 October 2010, available in hard copy on request
“The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) has been building up the strength of the Somali Police Force (SPF) based in Mogadishu with international assistance. It is proposed that the force will have a strength of 10,000. A police training team arrived in Mogadishu in 2009 under the auspices of the African Union’s peace support body AMISOM (African Union Mission in Somalia) to help with training the police force. A police school has been operating in Mogadishu and senior officers have also been trained in Uganda. In June 2010, AMISOM announced plans to train 500 Somali officers in Djibouti. During 2010, more than 900 Somali police personnel completed training in Ethiopia, under a programme financed by the German government - although German media reports claimed they subsequently deserted.

“The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has supported the rehabilitation of police stations, the training of a Special Police Unit and traffic police.”

9.04 The UN Security Council’s Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, 30 December 2010, stated that:

“The United Nations continued to support the development of a professional and accountable police force for Mogadishu. In September, jointly with the African Policing Civilian Oversight Forum, UNDP conducted training for the Mogadishu based Police Advisory Committee in Johannesburg, South Africa, to increase their understanding of police oversight, human rights and policing standards.

“During the reporting period, 60 officers, 10 per cent of whom were women, attended a mid-level officer training course conducted jointly by the Uganda Police Force and UNDP in Kampala. The training focused on managerial aspects of policing, including financial management, procurement, asset management, human resources, training management, logistics and fleet management.

“During the month of November, UNPOS, with funding from the Government of Japan, and in partnership with the AMISOM Civilian Police Unit and the Somalia Police Force Directorate, commenced a three-month training programme in basic policing for 501 new Somalia Police Force recruits in Djibouti at the National Police Academy, 25 per cent of whom were women. The main objective was to improve the professional skills and abilities of the Somalia Police Force based on international best practices.

“The Joint Security Committee Police Technical Working Group continued to hold meetings to follow up on the Committee’s decisions and directives. At the meeting on 16 September 2010, it was agreed that UNDP and UNPOS would harmonize stipend payments to the Somalia Police Force through a monitoring system, in close collaboration with the Somalia Police Force. The meeting also recommended the need to elaborate clear organizational change management structure for the Somalia Police Force. Meanwhile, UNDP renewed its letter of agreement with the Somalia Police Force to provide ongoing support for the running costs of key police facilities, thus allowing trained police officers to carry out their responsibilities.”

9.05 The UN Human Rights Council’s Compilation : [Universal Periodic Review] : Somalia / prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in accordance with

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158 Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment (JSCRA), Somalia, Security and Foreign Forces, updated 5 October 2010, available in hard copy on request
paragraph 15 (b) of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 5/1, published on 21 February 2011 noted that “UNDP stated that the Police Advisory Committee (PAC) continued to monitor police performance at eight police stations under TFG control in Mogadishu. The PAC had made regular visits to the Mogadishu Central Prison.” 160

9.06 JSCRA, Somalia, Security and Foreign Forces, updated 5 October 2010 stated that there is a National Security Agency (NSA) in Somalia: “The NSA is an intelligence agency operating under the Transitional Federal Government. Apart from collection and analysis of intelligence, the NSA also has an immigration control function and a counter-terrorism role. It is headed by General Mohamed Sheikh Hassan. The NSA has been supported financially by the US and other foreign governments.” 161

9.07 The USSD 2010 report noted that: “The police were generally ineffective, underpaid, and corrupt. With the possible exception of a few UN-trained police known as the Somali Police Unit, members of the TFG titular police forces in Mogadishu often directly participated in politically based conflict and owed their positions largely to clan and familial links rather than to government authorities.” 162

**African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM)**

9.08 JSCRA, Somalia, Security and Foreign Forces, updated 5 October 2010, stated that:

“In January 2007, the African Union Peace and Security Council authorised a peacekeeping mission in Somalia, known as AMISOM. It was proposed that the military element would involve the deployment of nine infantry battalions of 850 troops each and accompanying support elements. The UN Security Council (UNSC) officially authorised the operation in February 2007. The mission was initially only mandated for six months, but the UN has repeatedly renewed the mandate. The European Union and the US have have (sic) both provided financial support for the mission. According to the UN, AMISOM was ‘mandated to support transitional governmental structures, implement a national security plan, train the Somali security forces and assist in creating a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid.’

“AMISOM consists of a civilian component, essentially a political affairs unit which has the role of assisting the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in the re-establishment of functioning state institutions; a police component which has the role of training, mentoring and advising the Somali Police Force (SPF); and a main element, the military component. Of the 8,000 troops planned, about 4,300 were deployed in early 2009, split between the two contributor nations, Burundi and Uganda. By September 2010, the strength of AMISOM had risen to 7,200, with the force consisting of eight battalions, five from Uganda and three

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161 Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment (JSCRA), Somalia, Security and Foreign Forces, updated 5 October 2010, available in hard copy on request
The force is based at Mogadishu airport and the surrounding areas, and protects facilities such as the presidential palace from Islamist insurgents.” 163

The US State Department Background Note: Somalia, updated 3 January 2011, stated:

“As of October 2010, the U.S. Government had obligated over $229 million to support AMISOM with equipment, logistical support, and peacekeeping training. U.S. equipment support has included armored personnel carriers, trucks, communications equipment, water purification devices, generators, tents, and night vision equipment. Logistical support has included airlift, food, fuel, medical supplies, and medical evacuation flights. The U.S. Government has provided peacekeeping training to the Ugandan and Burundian peacekeepers through the Department of State’s Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program.” 164

The UN Security Council’s Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, 30 December 2010, stated that:

“Following the deployment of a fifth battalion from Uganda and a fourth battalion from Burundi, AMISOM reached its Security Council-mandated-strength of 8,000 troops during the reporting period [September to December 2010]. Meanwhile, the AMISOM police strength stands at 40 officers.

“On 15 October, the African Union Peace and Security Council endorsed the new AMISOM force strength of 20,000 troops, with the requisite air and maritime capabilities, in two phases: (a) initially, insert an additional 4,000 troops in Mogadishu; and (b) deploy an additional 8,000 troops in order to expand gradually to other areas of Somalia, in particular those areas controlled by groups allied to the Transitional Federal Government. It also endorsed an enhanced civilian component and a police component of 1,680 personnel...Noting the recommendations of the African Union Peace and Security Council, the Security Council adopted resolution 1964 on 22 December 2010 which, inter alia, authorized the deployment of AMISOM until 30 September 2011, and requested that AMISOM increase its force strength from 8,000 troops to 12,000.” 165

Reuters reported on 27 March 2011 that deployment of further troops to AMISOM had started:

“AMISOM said in a statement on Saturday that after a visit to Mogadishu this week by Major General Godefroid Niyombare and General Aronda Nyakairima, the defence chiefs in Burundi and Uganda, the two countries committed more soldiers.

“In a joint statement to field commanders, the chiefs declared that both Burundi and Uganda had committed the additional 4,000 troops mandated by the U.N. in December and that they were already heading for pre-deployment training.

163 Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment (JSCRA), Somalia, Security and Foreign Forces, updated 5 October 2010, available in hard copy on request
164 US Department of State, Background Note: Somalia, Defense, 3 January 2011, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2863.htm Date accessed 13 April 2011
“Each country has pledged a further 2,000 troops and anticipate an efficient deployment around the middle of the year. Burundi has already deployed 1,000 of the 4,000 extra troops in mid March.” 166

See also Recent developments, security situation for an indication of the regions controlled by AMISOM. For information about security and policing in areas beyond the TFG’s control (i.e. most areas outside of Mogadishu) in southern and central Somalia see also Abuses by non-government armed groups.

International naval forces

9.12 JSCRA, Somalia, Security and Foreign Forces, updated 5 October 2010, stated that international naval forces operate in the waters off Somalia’s coast to combat piracy:

“The UN Security Council passed a resolution in June 2008 allowing international forces to use ‘all necessary means’ to deter pirate attacks on commercial and non-military vessels in Somalia's territorial waters. The initial mandate was for six months but was later extended. The UN has also supported the deployment of an EU naval task force to the region as part of the increased multinational counter-piracy effort off the coast of Somalia. The EU Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) began operating in December 2008, and has been covering the waters off Somalia, the south of the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and part of the Indian Ocean, including the Seychelles, as part of Operation Atalanta.

“The force's primary role is to escort merchant ships delivering World Food Programme (WFP) relief supplies to Somalia. EU NAVFOR also protects vessels transporting supplies or personnel to the UN-approved African Union peacekeeping force, AMISOM, supporting the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Mogadishu. It is also part of the EU NAVFOR mission to protect vulnerable ships in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean, and to disrupt and deter pirate activities. In February 2010, EU defence ministers agreed that from the end of March, the objectives of Operation Atalanta would be expanded to include control of Somali ports where pirates are based, as well as ‘neutralising’ mother ships that allow pirates to operate more than 1,000 nautical miles (nm) from the coast...EU NAVFOR has been operating in close liaison with the other two multinational naval forces deployed to the region on an anti-piracy mission, a NATO Standing Maritime Group and the US-led coalition force, Combined Task Force 151 (CTF 151), part of the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) based in Bahrain. The three naval forces patrolling the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) set up a working group, to ensure the sharing of data on vulnerable ships, and to facilitate the interchange of tactical intelligence...In addition, a range of individual countries, including China, Russia, Japan and India, deployed naval vessels to the region on an anti-piracy mission, focused in particular on protecting their own flagged merchant ships. There is liaison between the various forces operating against Somali piracy through the Shared Awareness and De-confliction (SHADE) process based in Bahrain.” 167

PUNTLAND

9.13 JSCRA, Somalia, Security and Foreign Forces, updated 5 October 2010, stated that:

“In the self-declared autonomous area of Puntland there are a range of security forces. The Puntland Police Force (PPF) is responsible for law and order in the civil community, and receives support from the United Nations Development Programme. It is estimated to have a strength of about 1,500. As part of the police force there is a Special Protection Unit (SPU), with a strength of about 270.

“In addition to the PPF, there is an army, an intelligence service and a special forces unit known as Darawish. The latter is a loose, clan-based militia, said to be responsible for "external security". The Puntland Intelligence Agency and Security Force (PIASF) was set up with support from the US government in 2002 and is the enclave’s main intelligence and counter-terrorism agency, and deploys a small armed force.”

9.14 JSCRA, Somalia, Security and Foreign Forces, updated 5 October 2010, added that Puntland has a operational coast guard:

“Estimated to have a strength of about 300, the coast guard was set up in 2000 with the assistance of a UK private security contractor and operates from Boosaaso. It was estimated in recent years to be capable of deploying up to eight armed ocean-going vessels. A UN Monitoring Group observed that since mid-2008, the coast guard had begun to demonstrate 'limited but growing effectiveness in its operations against pirate groups operating in Puntland coastal waters'.

SOMALILAND

9.15 JSCRA, Somalia, Security and Foreign Forces, updated 5 October 2010, stated that:

“There is a police force in Somaliland known as the Somaliland Police Force (SLPF). The force receives assistance from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) under the latter's Rule of Law and Security programme. The strength of the SLPF was previously estimated to be about 5,000; a more recent estimate indicates a figure of about 3,000. The force has a Criminal Investigation Department, with a particular role in counter-piracy operations. It was reported in August 2006 that the UK had agreed to assist in strengthening the police force’s law enforcement capabilities, as well as overhauling the Somaliland Immigration Department, in order to assist Somaliland in countering the threat of terrorism. In 2010, Somaliland police officers were receiving training from British officers at the Ethiopian Federal Police Academy. In addition to the police force and an army, there is an intelligence service known as the Somaliland National Intelligence Agency (SNIA) which comes directly under the control of the president. The SNIA has a counter-terrorism role, and its structure includes the Immigration Department. There is a Custodial Corps, under the minister of justice, which deploys about 1,540 armed guards at various prisons.

“Of particular interest to non-government organisations (NGOs) in Somaliland is a unit of the police known as the Special Protection Unit (SPU). The unit was set up to protect the premises and staff of international NGOs and diplomatic missions. The 400-strong unit,

168 Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment (JSCRA), Somalia, Security and Foreign Forces, updated 5 October 2010, available in hard copy on request
169 Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment (JSCRA), Somalia, Security and Foreign Forces, updated 5 October 2010, available in hard copy on request
which is supported by the UNDP, provides round-the-clock security, as well as nighttime security patrols and armed escorts for staff travelling in Somaliland.”

9.16 JSCRA, Somalia, Security and Foreign Forces, updated 5 October 2010, added that Somaliland has a operational coast guard:

“This force was set up in late 2005 and comes under the control of the Somaliland Ministry of the Interior. According to a United Nations report in 2010, it had a strength of 350, equipped with 10 to 15 small speedboats with outboard engines, and three larger patrol boats with anti-aircraft guns mounted on the bow. Three vehicles were also deployed. The coast guard, whose mission includes a counter-piracy role, patrols 850 km of coastline and maintains about a dozen observatories to monitor suspicious activity.”


“There were no allegations of TFG security officials engaging in extrajudicial killings; however, as in previous years, there were some media reports of TFG troops engaging in indiscriminate firing on civilians, arbitrary arrest and detention, extortion, looting, and harassment.

“In all three regions [of Somalia], abuse by police and militia members were rarely investigated, and a culture of impunity remained a problem.”

9.18 The USSD 2010 report also stated that: “There were reports of several isolated incidents where rogue TFG troops and allied militia opened fire on public transport vehicles, extorted money at checkpoints, and looted private businesses. In most of these cases, other TFG security forces intervened.”

9.19 The stakeholder Summary prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in accordance with paragraph 15 (c) of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 5/116, dated 21 February 2011, submitted as part of Universal Periodic Review of Somalia by the UN Human Rights Council, noted:

“COGWO [Coalition for Grassroots Women Organisations] stated that people were detained in secret facilities in areas controlled by the TFG, some merely for the purposes of a ransom. JS2 [a coalition including Centre for Democracy and Dialogue, Mogadishu,

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170 Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment (JSCRA), Somalia, Security and Foreign Forces, updated 5 October 2010, available in hard copy on request
171 Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment (JSCRA), Somalia, Security and Foreign Forces, updated 5 October 2010, available in hard copy on request

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Somalia; Puntland Human Rights Association, “Puntland”, Somalia; Wanlawyn HR Organization, Somalia; Khalif Hudaw HR Organization, Mogadishu, Somalia; Hiran Women Action, Beletweyne -Hiiran Region, Somalia; Gashan Human Rights Organization, Mudug Region, Somalia; Hogol Social Development Association, Bay Region, Somalia; Center For Democracy & Human Rights, Mogadishu, Somalia; Iniskoy Peace and Democracy Organisation, Bay and Bakol Regions, Somalia; Isha Human Rights Organisation, Bay Region, Somalia]. stated that the police force remained mired in deeply entrenched patterns of extortion, torture, and other forms of ill treatment and that impunity from prosecution remained the biggest single obstacle to ending such abuses. It also stated that the police continued to be implicated in numerous extrajudicial killings in the course of police operations in TFG controlled areas. JS2 stated that in ‘Puntland’ civilians and political rivals were tortured by the military.”

Arbitrary arrest and detention

9.20 The USSD 2010 report stated that:

“In the absence of enforced constitutional or other legal protections, the TFG, its allied militias, and various clan militias across the country continued to engage in arbitrary arrest and detention without due process. Although precise figures were unobtainable, local human rights organizations and international organizations reported that, although there were fewer arrests than the previous years, the TFG continued to arrest and detain persons, most of whom were quickly released. There were no allegations that these detainees were subjected to beatings, mistreatment, or torture.”

9.21 The USSD 2010 report further noted that:

“There were no reports of TFG forces arresting journalists, NGO workers, or UN employees (see section 4). Similarly, there were no reports of TFG-allied militia arresting persons at random and demanding "bail" from their family members as a condition for their release. However, media reports indicate that TFG security forces and corrupt judicial officers, politicians, and clan elders used their influence and monetary inducements to set detainees free from allegations of petty and extreme crimes.

“Unlike in previous years, there were no reports of politically motivated arrests in Somaliland. Authorities in Somaliland, Puntland, and the TFG arrested or detained numerous persons accused of terrorism and of supporting al-Shabaab.”

9.22 The USSD 2010 also stated that: “In the wake of increased extremist-instigated insecurity in Bossaso, Puntland, security forces reportedly arbitrarily arrested people, especially immediately after security incidents. The victims of arbitrary arrests in Puntland were mostly journalists and Somalis from the South. While arbitrary arrest or detention was a common phenomenon in the previous Somaliland government, there was none reported during the year.”

174 Summary prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in accordance with paragraph 15 (c) of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 5/1, p4, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4d9efdd72.html Date accessed 5 May 2011
9.23 Arbitrary arrests of journalists, as reported by the National Union of Somalia Journalists\(^{178}\) and the Somali-speaking centre of PEN\(^{179}\) continued to occur. The USSD 2010 report noted that this occurred in Puntland.\(^{180}\)

For more information on the situation of journalists, please see media. See also Non state armed forces.

Torture

9.24 The USSD 2010 report stated that: “The Transitional Federal Charter (TFC) prohibits torture. The Puntland Charter, also referred to as the Puntland interim constitution, prohibits torture ‘unless sentenced by Islamic Sharia courts in accordance with Islamic law.’” There were no reports of the use of torture by TFG, Puntland, or Somaliland administrations during the year…Unlike in previous years, there were no reports of police raping women…” \(^{181}\)

Extra-judicial killings

9.25 The USSD 2010 report stated that: “The TFG or its agents did not commit any politically motivated killings. However, there were several reports that the TFG or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings. Security forces reportedly killed several drivers of public transport vehicles and passengers at Mogadishu checkpoints. There were no reports that Somaliland and Puntland administrations or their agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings.” \(^{182}\)

10. NON-STATE ARMED FORCES

This section should be read in conjunction with Security situation and Security forces.

ARME GROUPS

10.01 The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Armed Conflict Database, Somalia, Political Trends, undated, accessed on 5 May 2011, listed four broad non-state groups as active in Somalia:

- Clan based militia forces

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\(^{178}\) National Union of Somali Journalists, Submission on Journalism and Freedom of Expression for the Universal Periodic Review 11\(^{th}\) Session, 2-13 May 2011, p2, undated, 

\(^{179}\) Somali-Speaking Centre of International PEN, Contribution to the Universal Periodic Review Mechanism, 11th Session of the Working Group of the UPR (May 2011), Freedom of Expression in Somalia, p1, October 2010, 

\(^{180}\) US Department of State, Report on Human Rights Practices in Somalia, p10, 8 April 2011, 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160144.pdf Date accessed 13 April 2011

\(^{181}\) US Department of State, Report on Human Rights Practices in Somalia, p7, 8 April 2011, 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160144.pdf Date accessed 13 April 2011

\(^{182}\) US Department of State, Report on Human Rights Practices in Somalia, p3, 8 April 2011, 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160144.pdf Date accessed 13 April 2011
al-Shabab

Hisbul al-Islam [reportedly merged with Al Shabaab in December 2010, see subsection on Al Shabaab below]

Ahlu Sunnah wal Jama’a 183

10.02 Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment (JSCRA), Somalia, Security, updated 9 February 2011 stated:

“Somalia faces a number of threats to its security ranging from clan militias to pirate groups to radical Islamist groups. The country is a base for active terrorist operations being conducted in concert with Somali insurgents. Successful terrorist operations in Somalia also have negative security implications for regional states…”The Transitional Federal Government (TFG), radical Islamist groups and a range of other opposition groups with different agendas continue to fight for control of central and southern Somalia. Mogadishu continues to be the epicentre of what at times is fierce and heavy fighting, resulting in mounting civilian casualties. By late 2010 the Shabab and other Islamist rebel groups had gained control over most of southern Somalia. Some small patches of territory outside of Mogadishu are still in the hands of TFG forces, Ahlu Sunna wal Jamaa militia and other militia loyal to the TFG, but these regions are negligible. TFG military offensives have failed to open up new fronts against the Shabab and combat in Mogadishu has come to a stalemate where the governments (sic) lines are often held by the AMISOM peacekeepers.” 184

See Annex C for more details on various armed groups.

Al Shabaab

10.03 Al Shabaab are also know as: Harakat Al-Shabaab al-Mujahidin, al-Shabab, Al-Shabaab, the Youth, Mujahidin al-Shabaab Movement, Mujahideen Youth Movement, Mujahidin Youth Movement. 185

10.04 Al Shabaab is described by the Home Office’s list of proscribed terror organisations, dated 7 May 2010, as:

“…an organisation… which has waged a violent campaign against the Somali Transitional Federal Government and African Union peacekeeping forces since 2007, employing a range of terrorist tactics including suicide bombings, indiscriminate attacks and assassinations. It's (sic) principal aim is the establishment of a fundamentalist Islamic state in Somalia, but the organisation has publicly pledged its allegiance to Usama Bin Laden and has announced an intention to combine its campaign in the Horn of Africa with Al Qaeda’s aims of global jihad.” 186

10.05 The US State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism 2009, published on 5 August 2010, listed al Shabaab as a foreign terrorist organisation and noted:

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183 International Institute for Strategic Studies, Armed Conflict Database, Somalia, Human security developments, 2010, Available in hard copy on request
“Al-Shabaab was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on March 18, 2008. Al-Shabaab is the militant wing of the former Somali Islamic Courts Council that took over most of southern Somalia in the second half of 2006. In December 2006 and January 2007, Somali government and Ethiopian forces routed the Islamic Court militias in a two-week war. Since the end of 2006, al-Shabaab and disparate clan militias led a violent insurgency, using guerrilla warfare and terrorist tactics against the Ethiopian presence in Somalia and the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) peacekeepers. Rank and file militia fighters from multiple clans that are aligned with al-Shabaab are predominantly interested in indigenous issues and have not shown a strong affinity for global jihad. However, al-Shabaab’s core leadership is ideologically aligned with al-Qa’ida (AQ) and has made statements praising Usama bin Ladin and linking the Somali jihad movement to AQ’s wider agenda and strategy. In September 2009, al-Shabaab’s emir released a video titled “We Are at Your Command, Usama,” in which he pledged the group’s allegiance to Usama bin Ladin and AQ. Senior al-Shabaab leaders have also benefited from the training program that was created in southern Somalia by now deceased East African AQ operative Saleh Nabhan.” 187

10.06 JSCRA Somalia, Security, updated 9 February 2011 gave an overview of the history of Al Shabaab:

“After the establishment of TFG rule in Mogadishu a range of Islamic organisations emerged…Shabaab …was previously the youth division of the Islamic Courts, which is why it is still named after the Somali word for youth; Shabab. However Shabab has distanced itself from both the formation of the ARS [Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia] and peace talks between the SCIC [Supreme Council of Islamic Courts] and the TFG. The group refused to negotiate with the TFG, even after the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops was completed in January 2009, and as of late 2010, the Shabab remain adamant in their unwillingness to negotiate. Moreover, the Shabab has stated that it sees itself as a part of the same global struggle as Al-Qaeda, with numerous references to Al-Qaeda ideologues on their websites and claims that their leaders were educated in Afghanistan.

“The organisation is seemingly non-hierarchical. Its leader during the later part of 2007 was Muktar Robow (Abu Mansoor), the former second-in-command of security in the SCIC. He is a Rahanwhein from the Leysan clan and the brother of TFG’s Colonel Robow. However, in December 2007, a new leader, Mukhtar Abdirahman (Abu-Zubeyr), a former doctor trained in Afghanistan, is thought to have been appointed.

“At the beginning of 2009, Shabaab has continued with its activities but it is competing with other armed groups for the control of southern and central Somalia. For example, the ARS-D [Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia - Djibouti – the main component of the TFG] and Ahlu Sunna wal Jamaa have become powerful opponents with increasing military capabilities. Shabab is also thought to be losing support by its alienation of fellow Islamists and implementation of a harsh interpretation of sharia, one closely aligned to the radical wahabi strand of Islam.

“However, by the end of 2009, the Shabaab had witnessed continued successes in its battle against the TFG. It remains the most potent threat to security in the country. On 3 December 2009, a Shabaab suicide bomber attacked a university graduation ceremony at the Shamo hotel in Mogadishu, killing 18 people, including the TFG ministers of health, education and higher education. The Shabaab widened the scope of its operations in July

2010 when it launched two bomb attacks in the Ugandan capital, Kampala which killed over 70 people. The attack was probably meant as a warning to Uganda - which makes up the bulk of the African Union peacekeeping force in Mogadishu - rather than a conscious effort to widen the conflict in Somalia. Nevertheless, with Uganda seemingly intent on strengthening rather than weakening its commitment to Somalia, further regional attacks are possible. Meanwhile, the Shabab continued throughout 2010 to militarily pressure the TFG in Mogadishu and has succeeded in gaining de facto control of most of southern Somalia as well as large parts of central Somalia.” 188

For further information on areas of control, please see the International Crisis Group map of areas of control in Somalia as at January 2011.

10.07 The UN Security Council’s Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, 30 December 2010, stated that: “Notwithstanding the security measures taken by the ‘Puntland’ authorities, there are some indications that Al-Shabaab and other insurgent groups are active in the region…” 189

10.08 The US State Department’s Country Reports on Terrorism 2009, published on 5 August 2010, noted that “Precise numbers are unknown. Some of al-Shabaab’s senior leaders are affiliated with AQ [al Qaeda] operatives, and it is believed that some al-Shabaab members have previously trained and fought with AQ in Afghanistan.” 190

Al Shabaab merges with Hizbul Islam: December 2010

10.09 BBC News reported on 20 December 2010 that “al-Shabab and Hizbul Islam…are to merge…The two had been allies but have fallen out over the past year, with Hizbul Islam losing ground…A spokesman for the African Union force which is supporting the government and which has recently gained ground said the move would make no difference.” 191 The UN Security Council’s Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, 30 December 2010 stated that the “consequences from the merger…are still unknown.” 192 JSCRA Somalia, Security, updated 9 February 2011, stated that “It is possible that the merger will result in the complete assimilation of Hizbul Islam into the Shabab. Nevertheless, some factions within Hizbul Islam opposed the move and have defected to the TFG.” 193

See Hizbul Islam below

Hizbul Islam

10.10 JSCRA Somalia, Security, updated 9 February 2011 stated that

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188 Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment (JSCRA), Somalia, Security, updated 9 February 2011, available in hard copy on request
“Hizbul Islam (HI) is a radical Islamist umbrella organisation... The group represents the political wing of the major Islamist insurgent groups in Somalia and is committed to continuing the struggle against the TFG and international peacekeepers in Somalia. It was founded in January 2009 in response to the election of Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed as Somali president. Its leading figures include the chairman, Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys...During March 2010, Hizbul Islam invited Osama Bin Laden to Somalia, a move which demonstrates their radical position vis-à-vis the TFG. Notwithstanding minor differences they remain allied with the Shabab.” 194

Hizbul Islam reportedly merged with Al Shabab in December 2010, see preceding subsection.

**Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a**

10.11 JSCRA Somalia, Security, updated 9 February 2011 described Ahlu Sunna Waljama as:

“... a moderate Islamist umbrella organisation comprising various tribal and clan groups and local warlords opposed to the harsh radical Islamist agenda of Shabab, ARS-A [Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia – Asmara – later part of Hizbul Islam] and Jabhadda Islamiyya Somalia (JIS). Ahlu Sunna wal Jamaa's main objective is to defend the traditional Sufi values of the Somali population, from jihadist interpretations of Islam. The group is led by Sheikh Muhammad Sheikh Hassan and senior spokesman Sheikh Abdiqadir Muhammad Somow and has reportedly been armed by Ethiopia. Ahlu Sunna wal Jamaa was originally somewhat sympathetic to the Shabab agenda having become disillusioned with the TFG under the leadership of former president Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, but following the territorial gains made by the Shabab in late 2008, the factions making up the group were ostracised by the Shabab's intolerance of other strands of Islamism. These local groups then turned against the Shabab and their combined military offensives in early 2009 contributed to a partial rolling back of the Shabab's 2008 territorial gains. Ahlu Sunna wal Jamaa became aligned with the TFG after Sheikh Ahmed's election as president in February 2009. After being active mainly in the Galguduud region initially, Ahlu Sunna wal Jamaa activity has now spread to the Gedo and Jubba regions as well as Mogadishu. During the first quarter of 2010, the TFG and Ahlu Sunna wal Jamaa concluded a formal agreement of co-operation, the exact details of which were never made public. In any case, Ahlu Sunna and the TFG fell out in July 2010 and the formal alliance fractured. Ahlu Sunna left the government, although it remained informally aligned with the TFG against the Shabab. The replacement of then prime minister Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke in October 2010 was welcomed by Ahlu Sunna wal Jamaa, perhaps paving the way for a reconstitution of the formal governing alliance.” 195

**Clan-based militias**

TFG-allied militia/paramilitary forces reported to clan or factional militia commanders and were outside the control of official authorities."  

10.13 The UN Security Council’s *Report of the Secretary General*, dated 28 April 2011, noted that “Prime Minister Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, in his address to the Security Council on 10 March [2010]… noted Transitional Federal Government achievements in resolving the fighting between Saad (Habargadir) and Omar Mohamud (Majerteen) clans in the northern regions of southern central Somalia and ‘Puntland’.“  

See also: Security situation and Ethnic groups.

## HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS BY ARMED GROUPS

For details of recent significant acts of violence committed by the various armed groups see Security situation, Recent developments: Security situation and Latest news above. For a guide to the areas that are controlled by armed groups, please see the International Crisis Group map.


“South-central Somalia was under the control of local administrations linked to armed opposition groups throughout 2010. In many areas al-Shabaab rule brought relative stability and order, which contrasts dramatically with the chaos in Mogadishu. Residents from some of these areas credit al-Shabaab with ending a constant menace of extortion, robbery, and murder from bandits and freelance militias. But even where this holds true, security has come at a steep price, especially for women.

“Grinding repression characterizes daily life in communities controlled by al-Shabaab, and many local administrations have sought to implement harsh and intolerant measures in the name of Sharia law. These measures control minute details of personal lives, including the way people dress and work. The punishments for even minor offenses are often summary, arbitrary, and cruel. A climate of fear prevents most people from speaking out against abuses of power. As one resident of the southern town of El Wak said, ‘We just stay quiet. If they tell us to follow a certain path, we follow it.’

“ Freedoms women took for granted in traditional Somali culture have been dramatically rolled back. In many areas women have been barred from engaging in any activity that leads them to mix with men, even small-scale commercial enterprises on which many of them depend for a living. Al-Shabaab authorities have arrested, threatened, or whipped countless women for trying to support their families by selling cups of tea.”  

10.15 The Human Rights Watch report, *Harsh War, Harsh Peace*, published on 19 April 2010, stated that:

“The nature and scale of al-Shabaab’s edicts vary by community, depending partly on the outlook of local leaders. But the method of enforcement is generally the same: intrusive

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surveillance and draconian punishments that include floggings, head shavings, and, in some cases, amputations and execution by stoning. Those who violate al-Shabaab’s edicts receive little, if any, due process and many punishments are meted out on the spot... Al-Shabaab applies a draconian interpretation which goes well beyond its traditional application in Somalia. Many of the measures that al-Shabaab seeks to justify in the name of Sharia contravene regional and international human rights standards.”

10.16 The report further stated:

“As an armed group that effectively controls and acts as the de facto governing body in much of Somalia, al-Shabaab is responsible for respecting fundamental human rights and holding those who abuse them to account. These rights—set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as a host of international human rights treaties—include the rights to life, liberty, fair trials, freedom from torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, freedom of expression, religion, association and peaceful assembly, and equal treatment before the law. Al-Shabaab practices such as summary executions; amputations and floggings; bans on public gatherings; prohibitions on certain forms of women’s work and movement; and arbitrary interference with privacy, family, and home; are contrary to these basic standards.”

10.17 The report gave some examples of things banned under al Shabaab’s rule:

“Al-Shabaab exerts enormous control over personal lives and devotes remarkable energy to policing and penalizing conduct that it deems idle or immoral. Almost no detail is too minute to escape the group’s scrutiny. In many areas, al-Shabaab administrators have banned public gatherings, dancing at weddings, musical ringtones on cell phones, western music, and movies. They have outlawed qat chewing and cigarette smoking. They have barred men from shaving their beards and moustaches, or wearing long hair or long trousers. They have refused to allow people on the streets during prayer times.”

For further information on how certain groups are affected by al Shabaab’s human rights violations, please see Women and Freedom of speech and media.

Arbitrary arrest and detention

10.18 The USSD 2010 report stated that “Al-Shabaab and Hisbul Islam militias across the south central region arbitrarily arrested persons and detained them without charge.” The same report also noted that “Al-Shabaab and associated militia routinely arrested and threatened journalists as well.”

10.19 Shebelle Media Network reported on 11 January 2011 that:

“An arrested man by Al shabaab in Elbur district in Galgudud region of central Somalia, was on Tuesday reported to have gone on hunger strike… in protest of Al shabaab's arbitrary detention.

“Uncomforded [sic – an unknown] number of prisoners are reported in detentions in central Somalia's region of Galgudud, where Al shabaab, which US alleges to be Al Qaeda's proxy in the horn of Africa nation, tightly controls.” 204

Torture and executions

10.20 Harsh War, Harsh Peace documented how al Shabaab used torture and executions as punishments:

“Al-Shabaab’s system of justice is harshest on those it accuses of crimes that holy Islamic texts single out for specific punishments. These include theft (punishable by amputation), extra-marital sex (punishable by death or flogging), and apostasy or renunciation of Islam (punishable by death)…In many areas of Somalia, al-Shabaab leaders have not only embraced amputations and executions but turned them into mandatory public spectacles. In many cases, the alleged offenders receive scant or no due process.” 205

10.21 The USSD 2010 report gave examples of torture used by al Shabaab as punishment:

“On April 26, in Mogadishu's Deyniile District, al-Shabaab chopped off the right hand of an alleged thief and executed an accused murderer. An al-Shabaab ‘Sharia’ judge claimed Shinee Abukar Hersi, whose right hand was amputated, was charged with stealing used bedding. An al-Shabaab firing squad executed Mohamed Ahmed Qasim, whom the al-Shabaab judge accused of murder. On July 16, al-Shabaab militia amputated the right hands of two young men in Balad. The al-Shabaab court convicted the two, Murshid Ahmed Adan and Hassan Omar Mohamed, of robbery. The al-Shabaab judge claimed Aden and Mohamed confessed to stealing 45 million Somali shillings ($1,400) and two million Somali shillings ($60) respectively. As in previous years, Al-Shabaab carried out these amputations and other violent physical punishment in front of community members whom they forced to attend. Al-Shabaab carried out numerous other crude punishments on specious grounds in areas under their control in South and Central Somalia.

“Al-Shabaab used torture on TFG members and individuals suspected to be sympathetic to the government.” 206

10.22 The USSD 2010 report gave details of executions carried out by Al Shabaab:

Al-Shabaab and other extremist groups summarily executed an unknown number of persons whom they accused of spying for the ‘enemy’–the TFG and AMISOM–and other specious charges in Somalia's South and Central regions. On May 26, for example, an al-Shabaab firing squad executed Mohamed Gaboobe, whom al-Shabaab had accused of murder. On July 1, Al-Shabaab militia executed 20-year old Mohamed Guleid Hosh, who was accused of insulting the Prophet Muhammad…On September 28, al-Shabaab publicly executed two young men in Mogadishu after an al-Shabaab court convicted them of espionage. On July 9, al-Shabaab publicly executed 38-year-old former TFG military trainer
Ibrahim Abdikadir Hasan by firing squad in Baidoa. Hassan was arrested in March on charges of being a spy for Ethiopia. Similarly, extremist armed groups in the Juba, Bay, and Bakol regions arrested and beheaded several persons they accused of spying. For example, on November 10, al-Shabaab militia beheaded four people in Waradhumale in Galgaduud Region for their association with ASWJ, a group they perceived as having strong ties with the TFG. In addition, on October 27, al-Shabaab executed two teenage girls, Ayan Mohamed Jama, 18, and Huriyo Ibrahim, 15, in the al-Shabaab-controlled town of Belet Weyne after an al-Shabaab "judge" sentenced the girls to death for spying. They were executed while blindfolded and handcuffed after a hearing in which no evidence was presented nor was legal representation allowed…On July 26, Hisbul Islam militia in Afgoe, Lower Shabelle, executed a man accused of defiling a 12-year-old girl. The man was buried waistdeep and pelted with stones until he died. As was common in public executions, the militia rounded up members of the community to compel them to witness the execution.”

The East African reported on 5 May 2011 that: “… al-Shabaab forced hundreds of residents of Baidoa… to witness the public execution of two men… The two… were sentenced Wednesday by a court run by the militia group opposed to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), after being accused of spying for Ethiopia and Kenya.”

The HRW World Report 2011 stated that: “Al-Shabaab and other opposition forces often threaten to kill people they suspect of harboring sympathies for their opponents or who resist recruitment. These are not empty threats; opposition groups have murdered civilians regularly and with complete impunity.”

Harsh War, Harsh Peace also stated that:

“Al-Shabaab has regularly threatened or killed civilians it accuses of links to the TFG or rival armed groups. In 2009 its fighters publicly executed several people they branded as spies for the TFG or foreign powers. Many of these killings have attracted considerable media attention. However al-Shabaab has also issued numerous death threats and carried out many other killings that have received scant publicity.

“Human Rights Watch gathered a dozen detailed accounts from Somalis who said they had witnessed extrajudicial executions by al-Shabaab or who saw al-Shabaab fighters take relatives, neighbors, or associates who either never resurfaced or were found murdered.”

See also Judiciary, Targeting of TFG officials and supporters and Security situation.

Forced and voluntary recruitment

Harsh War, Harsh Peace noted that:

“Parties to the conflict in Somalia gain new fighters through the use or threat of force and by unlawfully seeking recruits among children and refugees. Opposition forces, especially but not exclusively al-Shabaab, are expanding their ranks by threatening those who resist with death and at times carrying out their threats. Both insurgent groups and government forces are recruiting and using child soldiers to varying degrees, and have entered refugee camps—ostensibly demilitarized areas—in Kenya to enlist additional fighters.”

10.27 *Harsh War, Harsh Peace* further stated that “Human Rights Watch also interviewed several young men who fled Mogadishu because al-Shabaab or Hizbul Islam threatened to kill them for refusing to join their forces. All were initially approached by men who sought to persuade them to join by promising money and the chance to fight for what they described as a ‘just and holy cause.’ But when they rebuffed these offers they found that persuasion quickly gave way to threats.”

10.28 *Africa Review* reported on 25 February 2011 that:

“…al-Shabaab are mobilising the youth in Lower Shabelle regions to join the jihad in Mogadishu, residents confirm… The escalating war is forcing al-Shabaab leaders and militants to call for more volunteers, especially the youth, to join the combat…According to *Jowhar.com*, a Somali news website, the al-Shabaab militants ruling Jowhar town, 90 km north of Mogadishu, are instructing all youngsters to enlist to the movement and join the war in Mogadishu… the order has compelled many youths to flee the town to the countryside, particularly to the farming areas along Shabelle River that passes through the Middle Shabelle region.”

10.29 The UN Security Council’s *Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia*, published on 30 December 2010 stated that: “Partners on the ground consistently reported extensive forced recruitment of children by Al-Shabaab, with an estimated 2,000 children being trained in camps in southern Somalia.” On 18 March 2011, Garowe Online reported that “Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, top Al-Shabaab militia's commander confirmed that his group is using underage children...’We recruit underage children to fight for us, the children are ready to die for their country and religion’ said Sheikh Aweys while addressing people in a mosque at Elasha Biaha camps in outskirt of Mogadishu… He adds they will continue recruiting underage children to fight against Somali government forces and African Union troops.”

For further information on the use of children by all parties to the conflict, please see Child soldiers.

10.30 *Africa Review* reported on 11 March 2011 that al Shabaab had expanded its recruitment to include 'elders':

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“Al-Shabaab on Thursday [10 March 2011] paraded a group of about 50 elders whom it said it had trained in warfare.

“Officials… said that the elders, most of them octogenarians, were ready to join the jihad (holy war) especially in the capital Mogadishu.

“The event took place in Beledweyne town…The group said that the community elders were willing to confront government forces and what they called foreign invaders (a reference to peacekeepers from Uganda and Burundi serving in the African Union Mission in Somalia – Amisom).

“The elders, armed with light arms including assault rifles, spears, daggers, bows and arrows, expressed their desire to sacrifice their lives for the jihad…In early March, 28 elders were moved by Al-Shabaab militants from Jowhar town, 90 km north of Mogadishu to the frontline in the Somali capital to aid the assault on pro-government forces.

“Al-Shabaab (which means youth in Arabic) is a movement that has until now relied on the youth. Observers say the current move of engaging the elders could be a sign of desperation as its position falters.” 216

10.31 Shabelle Media Network reported on 18 March 2011 that

“Al shabaab movement has held meeting with local clan elders from the clan of (Mudulood)… Al shabaab's chairman for Benadir region, Sheikh Mohammed Hassan Abu Abdurrahman said the aim of the meeting was to ensure and strengthen how the fighting against what he called Somalia's government of apostasy and the invading African Christians…Sa'id Mo'allim Ahmed, one of the elders, told the local press after the meeting that his clan (Mudoolood) is ready to help Al shabaab in its fighting against Somalia's internationally recognized government.” 217

Further detail about human rights violations committed by Al Shabaab is provided in the UK Border Agency Report of Fact Finding Mission to Nairobi, 8-15 September 2010, dated 8 October 2010.

10.32 The USSD 2010 report stated that:

“Hundreds of civilians were killed in inter- or intra-clan militia clashes throughout the country. The killings resulted from clan militias fighting for political power and control of territory and resources; revenge attacks; banditry and other criminal activity; private disputes over property and marriage; and vendettas after incidents such as rape, family disagreements, killings, and abductions. Authorities investigated very few of these cases, and there were few reports that any of the cases resulted in formal action by the local justice system.

Inter- and intra-clan conflict

“Despite local efforts to mitigate interclan conflicts, Galkayo and surrounding nomadic villages experienced the most severe and frequent armed clashes in the country. An estimated 100 civilians were killed and hundreds others displaced from their homesteads in water and land resource-related reprisal attacks during the year. Intermittent intraclan armed clashes over resource sharing were also reported in other parts of the Mudug Region, as well as in remote villages between Burao and Buuhoodle towns, in Bari Region, and in parts of Bay, Lower and Middle Shabelle, Hiraan, and Galgaduud regions, resulting in several civilian deaths.”

10.33 The USSD 2010 report added that:

“Abduction as a tactic in clan disputes…was reported but less frequently than in previous years…Clan militia groups and criminal gangs made ransom demands on abductees or demanded property or hostage exchanges as preconditions to the release of abductees. Unlike the previous years where the majority of reported kidnappings were in the southern regions of Somalia, especially in areas surrounding Mogadishu, most kidnappings were reported in the Sool and Sanaag and Mudug regions.”

10.34 The USSD 2010 report also stated that “Rape was commonly perpetrated in interclan conflicts.”

For further information on sexual and gender-based violence, please see Women: Violence against women. For more information on the situation for various clan groups and minorities, please see Ethnic groups.

11. JUDICIARY

11.01 The US State Department (USSD) Background Note: Somalia, updated 3 January 2011, stated that there is “…no functioning nationwide legal system…” and that instead there was an “…informal legal system based on previously codified law, Islamic (shari’a) law, customary practices, and the provisions of the Transitional Federal Charter.”

11.02 The USSD 2010 Country Report on Human Rights Practices, Somalia, published 8 April 2011, covering events of 2010 (USSD 2010 report) stated that “Judicial systems were not well established, were not based upon codified law, did not function, or simply did not exist in most areas of the country.”

11.03 The USSD 2010 report also noted that:

“Traditional clan elders mediated and resolved intra- and inter-clan conflicts throughout the country. During the year traditional elders in Somaliland intervened in political disputes between the government and opposition political parties. Clans and sub-clans frequently
used traditional justice, which was swift. Traditional judgments sometimes held entire opposing clans or sub-clans responsible for alleged violations by individuals.”

11.04 The USSD 2010 report further stated that:

“The inability of the judiciary to handle civil cases involving such matters as defaulted loans or other contract disputes encouraged clans to take matters into their own hands and led to increased inter-clan conflict. There were no lawsuits seeking damages for, or cessation of human rights violations due to the inadequate, nonexistent, and/or routinely corrupt court system. With the breakdown of the rule of law and the lack of a coherent legal system or effective government, individuals were not afforded adequate protection or recourse.”

See Ethnic groups for more information about the clan system and customary law

SOUTH AND CENTRAL SOMALIA

11.05 The USSD 2010 report stated that:

“The TFC provides for an independent judiciary, but there was no functioning judicial system for the TFG to administer.

The TFC provides for a high commission of justice, a Supreme Court, a court of appeal, and courts of first instance; however, in practice no such courts exist. Some regions established local courts that depended on the predominant local clan and associated factions for their authority. The judiciary in most areas relied on some combination of elements from traditional and customary law, Sharia, and the penal code of the pre-1991 Said Barre government. In May 2009 President Sheikh Sharif ratified a parliamentary bill establishing Sharia nationwide; however, at year’s end there were no official institutions charged with the administration of Sharia. In August 2009 President Sharif established a military court for members of the TFG armed forces, but this court did not operate in practice.”

11.06 The USSD 2010 report also stated that:

“Without a functioning judicial system, there were no standard trial procedures in the southern and central regions. The TFC provides for the right of every person to legal proceedings in a competent court. The TFC states every person enjoys the presumption of innocence, the right to be present and consult with an attorney at any time, and adequate time and facilities to prepare a defense. It also provides a guarantee of free legal services for individuals who cannot afford them. While not explicitly mentioned in the TFC, there was a presumption of the right to a public trial and jury, rights pertaining to witnesses and evidence, and the right of appeal. Most of these rights were not respected in practice and did not exist in those areas that applied traditional and customary practices or Sharia.”

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Judicial procedures in areas occupied by al Shabaab

11.07 The USSD 2010 report noted that:

“In areas that al-Shabaab controlled, Sharia [Islamic law] was enforced; however, there were no trained Sharia judges to preside over cases. Al-Shabaab's interpretation of Sharia law resulted in uneven and at times draconian sentencing. For example, on July 26, al-Shabaab militia publicly flogged a young man and woman in Mogadishu's Livestock Market in the Huriwaa district for allegedly having sexual intercourse outside of wedlock. An al-Shabaab "judge" announced that the young woman confessed to the relationship, and she was consequently whipped 100 lashes. The young man denied the charges and was subsequently whipped 30 lashes.”

11.08 The Human Rights Watch report Harsh War, Harsh Peace, published on 19 April 2010, documented how al Shabaab approached criminal procedures:

“Al-Shabaab's system of justice is harshest on those it accuses of crimes that holy Islamic texts single out for specific punishments. These include theft (punishable by amputation), extra-marital sex (punishable by death or flogging), and apostasy or renunciation of Islam (punishable by death)...In many areas of Somalia, al-Shabaab leaders have not only embraced amputations and executions but turned them into mandatory public spectacles. In many cases, the alleged offenders receive scant or no due process.”

See also Human rights violations by armed groups for further details on al Shabaab punishments.

PUNTLAND

11.09 The USSD 2010 report noted that:

“The Puntland interim constitution provides for an independent judiciary; however, the judiciary was not independent in practice. The charter also provides for a Supreme Court, courts of appeal, and courts of first instance. Despite having some functionality, these courts lacked the capacity to provide equal protection under the law...In Puntland, clan elders resolved the majority of cases using traditional methods known as Xeer; those with no clan representation in Puntland, however, were subject to the administration's more formalized judicial system. In this system, as outlined in Puntland's interim constitution, defendants enjoy a presumption of innocence, the right to a public trial, and the right to be present and consult with an attorney at all stages of criminal proceedings. Defendants can question witnesses and present witnesses and evidence on their behalf and have the right of appeal. There were numerous alleged instances of political and executive interference in the determination of high-profile political or security cases, especially concerning journalists. As in the other regions, the constitution stipulates that free legal representation be provided for defendants who cannot afford an attorney; in practice, these and other rights were not respected.”

SOMALILAND

11.10 The USSD 2010 report stated that:

“The Somaliland constitution provides for an independent judiciary; however, the judiciary was not independent in practice. The Somaliland constitution is based on democratic principles, but the region continued to use laws that predate the constitution, some of which contradict democratic principles. Functional courts exist, although there was a serious lack of trained judges and a shortage of legal documentation to build judicial precedence. Untrained police and other unqualified persons reportedly served as judges. International NGOs reported that local officials often interfered in legal matters and that the Public Order Law in Somaliland was often used to detain and incarcerate persons without trial...With the support of UNDP programs addressing judicial reform, Somaliland registered some improvement, except in cases of a political nature. Defendants generally enjoyed a presumption of innocence, the right to a public trial, and the right to be present and consult with an attorney in all stages of criminal proceedings. Defendants can question witnesses and present witnesses and evidence on their behalf and have the right of appeal. Somaliland provides free legal representation for defendants who face serious criminal charges and are unable to hire the services of a private attorney. Authorities in this region did not recognize the TFC and continued to apply the Somaliland constitution and pre-1991 laws. However, a worrying trend of regional and district security committees circumventing due process by ordering arrests and issuing sentences continued. Reportedly, hundreds of persons were serving varying prisons terms imposed by security committees.”

11.11 Somaliland Law, undated, accessed on 15 April 2011, outlined the judicial system:

"Briefly, the Somaliland courts of law are:

● Courts of first instance, which are the District Courts and the Regional Courts.
● The Appeal Courts which are based in each region.
● The Supreme Court, which is also the Constitutional Court. The Court can also sit, with additional representatives as the High Court of Justice when dealing with impeachment of public officers, other than the President & the Vice-President."  

For further information on the Somaliland judicial system, please see Somaliland Law. 

The Somaliland Constitution outlines the requirements for the judiciary.

For more information on the xeer system, please see Ethnic groups.

12. ARREST AND DETENTION – LEGAL RIGHTS

12.01 The US State Department 2010 Country Report on Human Rights Practices in Somalia, published 8 April 2011, covering events of 2010 (USSD 2010 report) stated that Somalia’s “previously codified law requires warrants based on sufficient evidence issued by authorized officials for the apprehension of suspects; prompt notification of charges and judicial determinations; prompt access to lawyers and family members; and other legal
protections for the detained; however, adherence to these procedural safeguards was rare. There was no functioning bail system or the equivalent.”

12.02 The USSD 2010 report also stated: “Arbitrary arrest was a problem countrywide.”

For details of arbitrary arrest and detention committed by the security forces of the TFG, Somaliland and Puntland authorities see Security forces: Arbitrary arrest.

SOUTH AND CENTRAL SOMALIA

12.03 The USSD 2010 report noted that in areas outside of the TFG’s control:

“Extremist elements also arrested and detained persons in their areas of control. For example, on January 25, Hisbul Islam militia arrested three traditional elders for allegedly holding unauthorized meetings with residents of Hakow village in the Lower Shabelle Region. The elders were moved to and detained at Toratorow town before their release on January 27 after the intercession of other elders. On April 17, armed al-Shabaab militia in Baidoa arrested Alin Hilowle, program officer of the Isha Human Rights Organization, and detained him at an undisclosed location. It was later confirmed that Hilowle was transferred to Mogadishu where he was reportedly tortured into confessing that he had been compiling and relaying information regarding al-Shabaab human rights abuses in Bay and Bakol regions. There were unconfirmed media reports that Hilowle escaped from al-Shabaab custody in early October after they allowed him to attend the burial of one of his sons in Baidoa under tight security. Hilowle’s whereabouts remained unknown.

“On August 11, Hisbul Islam militia arrested Haji Jaylani Moalim, a renowned herbalist, and three of his children at their home and detained them without charge. The family was released after one week in custody.”

13. PRISON CONDITIONS


“Prison conditions remained harsh and life threatening in all regions. Overcrowding, poor sanitary conditions, lack of access to health care, and inadequate food and water persisted in prisons throughout the country. Tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, and pneumonia were widespread. Abuse by guards was common. Detainees’ families and clans generally were expected to pay the costs of detention. In many areas prisoners depended on food received from family members or from relief agencies.”

13.02 The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) stated in an undated entry on their website, accessed 18 April 2011, that: “Somalia's prison system has been chronically under-funded and its capacity to prosecute and imprison pirates needs to be urgently strengthened.”

13.03 The UNODC February 2011 update on the Counter-Piracy Programme stated that: “UNODC seeks to improve the correction regimes in Somalia for two reasons. First, to ensure secure and humane imprisonment for those sentenced by local Somali courts. Second, improvement to the imprisonment regimes offers the possibility that those convicted of piracy in regional states may be transferred back to Somalia to serve their sentences.”

13.04 The update further stated that “The UNODC programme commenced in January 2010 in Somalia and delivers support towards improved imprisonment arrangements and to courts through law reform and training of prosecutors.”

SOUTH AND CENTRAL SOMALIA


13.06 The USSD 2010 report stated that:

“As a result of the worsening security situation and infiltration of violent extremists in TFG-controlled parts of Mogadishu, TFG police arrested suspects in security operations. However, there were fewer prisoners and detainees held in TFG prisons than in previous years. TFG prison officials reported that there were an estimated 400 prisoners held at Mogadishu central prison. As part of their efforts to strengthen the rule of law and improve security in Somalia, in mid-September official foreign donors sponsored training for the TFG Police Advisory Committee (PAC) held in South Africa. PAC is a civilian oversight authority established to ensure prisoners and detainees are treated in accordance with international human rights standards.

“There have been no reports of TFG-allied militias operating detention centers since the end of Abdullahi Yusuf's regime in 2008. Antigovernment extremist elements and clan leaders, however, reportedly continued to operate detention centers in which conditions were harsh and guards frequently abused detainees. Al-Shabaab and affiliated extremist armed groups operated dilapidated detention centers in areas under their control in the

south and central regions. Although there were no official numbers, informal/unpublished sources estimated that thousands were incarcerated throughout extremist-controlled areas in inhumane conditions for relatively minor offenses such as smoking, listening to music, watching or playing soccer, and not wearing the hijab. There were no reports by human rights organizations and civil society leaders in Mogadishu of the existence of makeshift detention centers in Mogadishu where prisoners were held during and after episodes of heavy fighting.

“In prisons and detention centers, juveniles frequently were held with adults. The incarceration of juveniles at the request of families who wanted their children disciplined continued to be a major problem. Female prisoners were separated from males. Particularly in the south central region, pretrial detainees were often not separated from convicted prisoners.” 240

**PUNTLAND AND SOMALILAND**

13.07 The USSD 2010 report stated that:

“The Puntland and Somaliland administrations permitted prison visits by independent monitors. A September 2009 report by the UNIE described conditions at Puntland’s Garowe central prison as ‘terribly bad’ due to lack of capacity. The updated March 23 UNIE report referred to ‘terrible detention conditions of the central prison in Garowe, in particular keeping prisoners in shackles.’ Somaliland authorities and the UN Development Program (UNDP) set up an independent prisoner monitoring committee. The UNDP also trained the prison custodial corps on human rights. There were no visits by the International Committee of the Red Cross to prisons in the country during the year; however, a prisons conditions management committee organized by UNDP and composed of medical doctors, government officials, and civil society representatives continued to visit prisons in Somaliland. During the year UNDP managed a program to improve Somaliland prisons by building new facilities and assisting in training wardens and judicial officials.” 241

13.08 The UN’s Report of the independent expert on the situation of human rights in Somalia, published on 16 September 2010 stated that “There were 400 pirates in Puntland prisons, including some listed by United States intelligence, which exceeded the capacity of the prisons.” 242

13.09 The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) February 2011 update on the Counter-Piracy Programme stated that they had delivered the following improvements in Somaliland:

- Opening of the Hargeisa Prison following the completion of the final work on site and supply of material. The prison is in accordance with proper international standards and provides a safe and secure environment for 185 staff and 462 inmates
- The introduction of prison standing orders, prisoner records and staff records to the Somaliland Correctional Service

• Comprehensive training for 35 prison supervisors and 185 staff allocated to the Hargeisa Prison
• The introduction of, and training in, prisoner classification in Somaliland for the first time, including the commencement of retrospective classification to allow proper allocation of prisoners to appropriate facilities
• The reintroduction of prison uniforms after a 30 year absence
• Assessment of the prisons in Mandera, Burao and Berbera with a view to detailed refurbishment work in the future
• Agreed and commenced Phase One refurbishment of Bosasso prison
• Introduced Standing Orders for Somaliland Custodial Service
• Delivered training in prisoner categorization to the Somaliland Corrections Service to ensure that prisoners are properly managed through their sentences

13.10 The UN Security Council’s Report of the Secretary General, published on 28 April 2011, stated that:

“On 28 March, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime handed over to ‘Somaliland’ a prison in Hargeysa that holds pirates convicted by the courts in ‘Somaliland’, as well as other criminals. The prison meets international minimum standards, has a holding capacity of 465, and was refurbished at a cost of $1.5 million, partly funded by the trust fund to support initiatives of states countering piracy off the coast of Somalia.”

14. DEATH PENALTY

14.01 The Amnesty International report, Death sentences and executions in 2010, published on 28 March 2011 and covering events in 2010, stated that:

“At least eight executions were carried out and eight people were sentenced to death in Somalia last year [2010]. At least seven people were executed and six sentenced to death in the autonomous region of Puntland, while two people were reportedly sentenced to death in Somaliland. Nur Ahmed Shire was executed by the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in December 2010, the first execution to be ordered by the TFG authorities since 2007. In December 2010 Somalia again voted in favour of the third UN General Assembly resolution on a moratorium on execution; Somalia had voted in favour of a similar UN General Assembly resolution in 2008.”

14.02 All Headline News reported on 13 January 2011 that: “A police officer has been sentenced to death by a military court in the semi-autonomous state of Puntland after being found guilty of murder…after confessing to murdering three Puntland policemen in downtown


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Bosaso." 246 The same report noted that: “On Jan. 24, 2010, Hussein Mohammed Ali, who was dressed in women attire and veil when captured, was sentenced to death by a court in Garowe… The court accused Ali of planning terrorist attacks against Puntland and the break-away republic of Somaliland.” 247


14.03 The Human Rights Watch report, Harsh War, Harsh Peace, published on 19 April 2010, stated that the death penalty is applied by non-state armed groups:

“Al-Shabaab’s system of justice is harshest on those it accuses of crimes that holy Islamic texts single out for specific punishments. These include…extra-marital sex (punishable by death or flogging), and apostasy or renunciation of Islam (punishable by death)... According to independent media and civil society groups, al-Shabaab has stoned to death at least three people since late 2008 for allegedly committing adultery. In one case, in November 2008, al-Shabaab drew hundreds of spectators to a soccer stadium in Kismayo to watch its enforcers stone to death an alleged female adulterer. The victim’s age has not been confirmed; some reports say she was as young as 13 while others say she was an adult.

“In the village of Wajid, about 250 miles (400 kilometers) northwest of Mogadishu, al-Shabaab reportedly stoned to death a divorcée in November 2009 for having an affair with an unmarried man. The man was reportedly given 100 lashes. The same month, media reported that al-Shabaab stoned a man to death for adultery in the port of Merka, south of Mogadishu. Al-Shabaab announced it would execute the man’s pregnant girlfriend after she gives birth.” 249

For information on executions carried out by non-state armed forces, please see Abuses by non-government armed forces, Torture and executions.

15. POLITICAL AFFILIATION AND EXPRESSION

For freedom of expression generally, see Freedom of speech and media

15.01 The US State Department 2010 Country Report on Human Rights Practices, Somalia, 8 April 2011, observed that:

“The TFG failed to make progress on prescribed tasks necessary for transition to a popularly elected federal government. In January 2009 the Djibouti Process expanded parliament and extended the TFG mandate until August 2011 to provide more time to...”

prepare the country for national elections. However, like the administrations that preceded it, the TFG administration was wholly unsuccessful in delivering on its core transitional tasks.

“Unlike in previous years when clan leaders operated as de facto rulers in most regions under the nominal control of the TFG, much of the country remained under the rule of armed militias during year, many associated with the al-Shabaab terrorist group. Although al-Shabaab often collaborated with clan leaders in the areas it controlled, many clan leaders continued to face opposition from intraclan groups and political factions.

“The Somaliland constitution provides citizens the right to change their government peacefully, and citizens exercised this right through periodic, free, and fair elections based on universal suffrage. Although the constitution of semi-autonomous Puntland provides citizens the right to change their government peacefully, only members of parliament selected by traditional clan elders exercised this right, supposedly acting on the behalf of the people.”

SOUTH AND CENTRAL SOMALIA

Targeting of TFG officials and supporters


“Roadside bombings, suicide attacks, and armed raids targeting TFG officials and sympathizers as well as civil society groups continued throughout the year. Antigovernment extremist groups were responsible for numerous killings of government officials and police. Politically motivated killings by al-Shabaab and its affiliates resulted in the deaths of several TFG officials and members of the Banadir regional administration, including district commissioners and their deputies and security and court officials.

“Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for several attacks against the TFG and its supporters during the year. For example, on May 24, al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for a landmine explosion at a TFG checkpoint in Mogadishu's Buula Hubeey neighborhood that killed three TFG soldiers and injured four. The explosion also injured two children. On June 9, an explosion of a remote controlled device killed nine TFG police on foot patrol near the police academy, in Mogadishu's Hamar Jajab District. Seven civilians were also killed in the attack. On August 17, a remote-controlled roadside explosion targeting Guriel District Commissioner Osman Isse Nur "Tar-dhuleed" injured two of his children who were riding in the car with him. ASWJ militia arrested 10 suspects in the attack.

“The TFG's Waberi police station commander was killed during August 23 to 25 clashes between the TFG and al-Shabaab. On August 24, an al-Shabaab armed raid and subsequent suicide attack on a Mogadishu hotel killed 31 persons, including four MPs. On September 20, AMISOM peacekeepers killed a lone gunman reportedly on a suicide mission as he tried to gain access to the presidential palace. The gunman belonged to extremist group Hisbul Islam and reportedly intended to kill his uncle, the interior minister.

Unlike in 2009, there were no reports of al-Shabaab taking TFG forces hostage or summarily executing any security officers.”  

15.03 The USSD 2010 report also stated that: “Al-Shabaab used torture on TFG members and individuals suspected to be sympathetic to the government.”

15.04 The Human Rights Watch report, *Harsh War, Harsh Peace*, published on 19 April 2010, stated that Al Shabaab seek to “… suppress potential dissent. ‘Al-Shabaab believe they are on a mission from God and therefore only they have the right to rule,’ a civil society leader told Human Rights Watch. ‘You have no right to talk about politics. You have no right to exercise your values and beliefs.’”

**PUNTLAND**

15.05 The USSD 2010 report stated that: “The Puntland interim constitution provides for freedom of association; however, the Puntland administration continued to ban all political parties.” The same report further noted that “Islamist extremists increased attacks on Puntland regional officials. During the year 50 senior government officials and security officers were killed in roadside bombs and gun violence, mostly in Puntland’s Bari Region.”

**SOMALILAND**

15.06 Freedom House’s Freedom in the World Report 2010 on Somaliland, published 1 June 2010, stated that: “Somaliland’s constitution allows for a maximum of three political parties, and parties defined by region or clan are technically prohibited. Nevertheless, party and clan affiliations tend to coincide: the UDUB [Democratic United Peoples’ Movement] is identified with a subclan of the Dir clan; the UCID is largely supported by members of other Dir sub-clans; and the Darood clan tends to support Kulmiye.”

15.07 The USSD 2010 report stated that “In Somaliland’s disputed Sool and Sanaag regions, disaffected sub-clans waged sporadic violence against government officials.”

15.08 The USSD 2010 report stated that “Somaliland laws prohibit Somalilanders from participating in TFG politics. Over the year, Somaliland authorities banished several prominent TFG politicians who were serving or had served in TFG as MPs or ministers from Somaliland. On December 13, Somaliland’s president, through a presidential decree, pardoned Mohamed Abdullahi Jama "Sifir," a prominent TFG politician who once served as an MP, deputy prime minister, and minister in

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the TFG, following Sifir’s application expressing his recognition of Somaliland’s separate status from that of Somalia.”

15.09 The USSD 2010 report noted that “On June 26, the Somaliland administration conducted its second direct presidential election in five years. On July 2, the Somaliland independent national elections commission declared Ahmed Mohamed Mohamud "Silanyo" as the winner in a presidential election that domestic and international observers declared as free and fair.” The same source noted with regard to political prisoners:

“…some arrests and detentions, especially in Somaliland, appeared to be politically motivated. In September 2009 there were reports that Somaliland authorities arrested and detained more than 100 persons, including several opposition leaders, after four persons were killed during demonstrations in Hargeisa. In August an estimated 270 prisoners, including those arrested in September 2009, were released from Somaliland prisons through a presidential amnesty.

“Somaliland’s Parliamentary Committee on Justice and Constitution reported in March that half of the 765 prisoners and remandees held in the Mandheera Prison were detained on the orders of regional or district security committees.”

For further information on the 2010 Presidential election, please see History: ‘The Republic of Somaliland’ (1991 to 2010) For more information on the political system in all three regions, please see Political system.

16. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND MEDIA

See also sections on Political affiliation and expression, and Human rights institutions, organisations and activists.

16.01 Reporters Without Borders noted, in their report Predators of Press Freedom: Somalia - Islamist militias, published on 3 May 2011, that:

“There is no sign of any respite for Somalia after 20 years of war. Islamist insurgents, previously united against Ethiopia’s troops and now embroiled in internal rivalry and conflicts, have contributed to the chaos since 2009 by waging a war of harassment against the fragile transitional government. The bearers of a strict version of Islam, they ban cinema, video games and radio music. Al-Shabaab (The Youth) has emerged as the biggest and best organized of these groups. It wages a campaign of terror and targeted murders against leading members of Somali civil society who are, it says, guilty of serving the interests of the "Crusaders" of the West. Dozens of teachers, academics and politicians have been killed.

“The victims include journalists, who are regarded almost by definition as enemies. Twelve of them have been killed since 2009, either caught in crossfire or directly targeted by the various militia factions. Radio Shabelle has paid a particularly heavy price, losing its
manager, Mukhtar Mohamed Hirabe, and three of its reporters in the space of a few months. Other Radio Shabelle employees fled the country. Al-Shabaab and Hizb-Al-Islam now control a large part of the country, have their own prisons, carry out arrests and execute sentences. They also issue directives to journalists about how to cover the news and, in 2010, seized control of about 10 radio stations, which now broadcast their political and religious propaganda.”

16.02 The Human Rights Watch World Report 2011, covering events in 2010, published on 24 January 2010, stated that:

“Somalia remains one of the world’s most dangerous places to be a journalist. At least three journalists were killed in 2010, bringing the total killed since 2007 to 22. Two were targeted killings: Sheikh Nur Mohamed Abkey of state-run Radio Mogadishu was killed by three gunmen in May, and Abdullahi Omar Gedi was stabbed by unknown assailants in Galkayo. Barkhat Awale was killed by a stray bullet in Mogadishu on August 24. Both TFG and opposition forces have harassed the dwindling number of journalists still struggling to operate in Somalia. In April al-Shabaab banned all BBC broadcasts in Somalia and confiscated equipment.”


“The TFC and the Somaliland constitution provide for freedom of speech and of the press. The Puntland interim constitution provides for press freedom ‘as long as journalists respect the law’; however, this right was not respected in practice. Instances of violence, including murder, harassment, arrest, and detention of journalists in all regions of Somalia continued. Journalists engaged in rigorous self-censorship to avoid reprisals.”

16.04 The report further stated that during 2010: “... two journalists were killed in targeted or collateral incidents, down from nine in 2009. On May 4, al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the murder of Sheikh Nur Mohamed Abkey, a journalist with the Somali government’s Somalia National News Agency. On August 24, journalist Barkhat Awale was killed while working on the Hurma Radio transmitter in Mogadishu. It is unclear whether he was targeted or hit by a stray bullet.”

16.05 The Committee to Protect Journalists report, Attacks on Press Freedom 2010 – Somalia, released on 15 February 2011 reported that:

“Somalia remained Africa’s most dangerous country for the press. Two journalists were killed during the year in direct relation to their work, bringing the death toll to 23 since 2005. The conflict between Islamic insurgent groups and a weak Transitional Federal Government backed by African Union troops continued to fuel a steady exodus of journalists seeking to escape deadly violence, severe censorship, and harassment. CPJ’s 2010 analysis of exiled journalists, published in June, found that at least 16 journalists had fled the country in the

prior 12 months, with 59 having gone into exile over the past decade. Remaining journalists practiced extreme self-censorship to survive." 265

16.06 The BBC Country Profile for Somalia, updated on 3 March 2011, reported that:

“Somalia’s disintegration is reflected in its media, which tends to be fragmented and often partisan.

“Broadcasters and journalists operate in an atmosphere which is hostile to free expression, and often dangerous. Reporters Without Borders describes Somalia as ‘Africa’s deadliest country for journalists’. Islamist groups have often taken action against media outlets with which they disagree.

“Nevertheless, diverse and increasingly professional media outlets have emerged in recent years - in particular, FM radio stations with no explicit factional links.

“The TV and press sectors are weak and radio is the dominant medium. There are around 20 radio stations, but no national, domestic broadcaster. Many listeners tune to Somali-language media based abroad, in particular the BBC Somali service. The latter is available on shortwave, and via FM relays in Mogadishu (91.1), the Somaliland capital Hargeisa (89.0), and elsewhere.

“The Somali diaspora - in the West, the Gulf states and elsewhere - sustains a rich internet presence. But domestic web access is hampered by practicalities such as limited access to mains electricity. There were 102,000 internet users by September 2009 (Internetworldstats).

“In secessionist Somaliland and Puntland the authorities maintain a tight hold on broadcasting.” 266

SOUTH AND CENTRAL SOMALIA

16.07 The UN Independent Expert on the Situation of Human Rights in Somalia noted in his report dated 16 September 2010 that:

“The media continued to be subjected to severe restrictions in areas controlled by Al-Shabaab and Hizbul-Islam. In September, Al-Shabaab and Hizbul-Islam, respectively, seized control of two independent radio stations, Horn of Africa and the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation, in Mogadishu. Throughout the reporting period, multiple threats against reporters and journalists continued in southern central Somalia, forcing some to flee.” 267

Radio


The BBC Country Profile for Somalia, updated on 3 March 2011, listed the following radio stations in Central and Southern Somalia:

- Radio Mogadishu - FM station operated by transitional government, coverage limited to the capital
- Radio HornAfrik - popular private FM station based in Mogadishu, rebroadcasts BBC
- Radio Shabelle - private FM station in Mogadishu, Marka
- Radio Banaadir - private, Mogadishu-based FM station
- Holy Koran Radio - private, Mogadishu FM station
- Radio Simba - private, Mogadishu

The Committee to Protect Journalists report, Attacks on Press Freedom 2010 – Somalia, released on 15 February 2011 noted that

“Highly sensitive to local radio coverage, hard-line militants were quick to seize journalists, censor news content, and close stations...Several media houses in Mogadishu sought refuge by relocating to the slivers of government-controlled territory. ‘While the government will harass and detain you, the other side will kill you – that’s the difference, Radio Shabelle correspondent Abdihakim Jimale told CPJ. Shabelle, one of the leading independent radio stations, stealthily moved its equipment, piece by piece, from Mogadishu's insurgent-controlled Bakara Market to a government-controlled area in June.

“By late year, virtually all media in insurgent-controlled areas were forced to run propaganda or were shut down entirely. Al-Shabaab raided the studios of major independent broadcasters such as HornAfrik, Somalweyn, and GBC in Mogadishu, and Radio Mandeeq in the southern town of Belet-Hawo, using the seized equipment for its own fledgling network of five stations, called Radio Al-Andalus.

“Insurgents imposed severe censorship on all stations in rebel-held territories. Hizbul Islam and Al-Shabaab banned broadcasts of the World Cup, BBC programming, and all music, including advertising jingles and theme music introducing programming. Fourteen private radio stations in the capital stopped airing music in April after a Hizbul Islam leader, Sheikh Ma'alin Hashi, issued an ultimatum. Several stations started to use sound effects in place of music previously used to introduce programs, local journalists told CPJ...In May, before Radio Shabelle moved to a government-controlled area, Al-Shabaab commanders demanded that the station never mention shells fired by its forces and that it refer to civilians killed as ‘martyrs’.

“Broadcasters Radio Shabelle, Tusmo, Voice of Democracy, Codka Nabadda, HCTV, Universal TV, the U.N.-backed Bar-Kulan Radio, as well as the state-run Radio Mogadishu, all operated within the government-controlled areas, Information Minister Abdirahman Omar Osman told CPJ. Nonetheless, Tusmo and Codka Nabadda upheld the insurgents' ban on music, while HCTV refrained from criticizing Al-Shabaab, the minister added.

“Journalists found themselves caught between two sides at times. After the insurgents sought to ban music on the radio, the government threatened to close the stations that complied with the order. ‘We will not tolerate the radio stations that halted airing music and songs in the government-controlled area,’ Abdikafi Hilowle Osman, general secretary of the Banadir Regional Administration, told reporters at an April press conference. Two stations that complied with the music ban were taken off the air for six hours by security agents until

the information minister at the time, Dahir Mohamud Gelle, intervened and reversed the 
order, the Somali Foreign Correspondents Association reported.” 269

Newspapers

16.10 The BBC Country Profile, updated on 3 March 2011, listed the following newspapers in 
Mogadishu:

- Qaran
- Xog-Ogaal
- Codka Xoriyadda
- Ayaamaha 270

16.11 The USSD 2010 report stated that: “The print media throughout Somalia consisted largely 
of short, photocopied dailies published in the larger cities and often affiliated with one or 
another of the factions. Several of these dailies were nominally independent and published 
criticism of political leaders and other prominent persons” 271

Journalists

16.12 The Committee to Protect Journalists report, Attacks on Press Freedom 2010 – Somalia, 
released on 15 February 2011 noted that: “Insurgent groups often considered professional 
journalists to be government supporters and, thus, enemy targets. The ongoing threat led 
reporters to flee the capital, with some resettling in Hargeisa, Somalia's second-largest city, 
and others leaving the country entirely to live in Kenya, Uganda, and Djibouti” 272

16.13 The USSD 2010 report stated:

“Unlike in the previous years, journalists did not receive direct threats from the TFG. 
However, al-Shabaab and other extremists continued to harass journalists, and the overall 
climate for freedom of speech and press deteriorated. Journalists reported that al-Shabaab 
threatened to kill them if they did not report on antigovernment attacks conducted by al-
Shabaab. Reporters also remained under threat if they published criticism of the 
government. The Kismayo al-Shabaab administration continued to enforce rules for 
journalists, including a requirement to refrain from reporting news that undermined Islamic 
law.” 273

16.14 The National Union of Somali Journalists (NUSOJ) report, The Untold Tales of Deep 
Misery, Somali Journalists and their Precarious Work, published on 10 December 2010, 
stated that:

“As the disastrous conflict in south-central Somalia has intensified in recent years, the area 
has become one of the most dangerous in the world for working journalists. The work is

269 Committee to Protect Journalists, Attacks on the Press 2010: Somalia, 15 February 2011 http://www.cpj.org/2011/02/attacks-on-
the-press-2010-somalia.php Date accessed 20 April 2011
Date accessed 20 April 2011
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160144.pdf Date accessed 20 April 2011
272 Committee to Protect Journalists, Attacks on the Press 2010: Somalia, 15 February 2011 http://www.cpj.org/2011/02/attacks-on-
the-press-2010-somalia.php Date accessed 20 April 2011
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160144.pdf Date accessed 20 April 2011
often poorly paid, insecure, unprotected, and cannot support the families of the journalists. International employers, such as major media aggregators, wire-services, and other news outlets often employ local stringers to cover events in Somalia that would be unsafe for their own nationals…women working as journalists face an especially dangerous and challenging environment. Female journalists confront deeply held biases and traditions. The local media houses often perceive women as persons only recruited for advertisements, as presenters, and as assistants to their male colleagues.

“Across the board, precarious media workers receive low wages, and hold only part-time or temporary work without benefits. However, female journalists are even more likely to hold part-time positions, receive less payment than men do for the same work, and face additional barriers to advancement in their careers. A large number of the women journalists responding to this survey reported that the majority of media owners believe that women journalists would only work temporarily until they got married and become mothers, at which time they would leave from the work.” 274


“Journalists found themselves caught between two sides at times. After the insurgents sought to ban music on the radio, the government threatened to close the stations that complied with the order. ‘We will not tolerate the radio stations that halted airing music and songs in the government-controlled area,’ Abdikafi Hilowle Osman, general secretary of the Banadir Regional Administration, told reporters at an April press conference. Two stations that complied with the music ban were taken off the air for six hours by security agents until the information minister at the time, Dahir Mohamud Gelle, intervened and reversed the order, the Somali Foreign Correspondents Association reported.” 275

16.16 The report continued:

“As the fighting intensified, the government harassed independent journalists covering the conflict. ‘You are not allowed to take pictures. If government soldiers are defeated in battle, they complain whether it is fact or not,’ AFP’s Abdinur said. Police detained Abdinur and freelance cameraman Yusuf Jama in July for taking pictures of their colleague, Associated Press photojournalist Farah Abdi Warsame, who had been hit in crossfire in Mogadishu. The journalists were interrogated for several hours and forced to delete their photographs, Abdinur told CPJ. In June, *New York Times* correspondent Mohammed Ibrahim fled Somalia after receiving threats from government security forces over an article saying that the government had enlisted child soldiers. Ibrahim returned to Mogadishu in September after the government pledged that no harm would come to him.

“African Union peacekeeping forces also obstructed local journalists. In November, AU troops at Aden-Adde International Airport prevented several photographers from taking pictures of a British couple who had been released by kidnappers, according to local reports.” 276

16.17 Reporters Without Borders noted on 31 March 2011 that:

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Two journalists who were wrongfully arrested by the National Security Agency in Mogadishu on 27 March – Radio Shabelle manager Abdirashid Omar Qase and news director Abdi Mohamed Ismail – were released unconditionally yesterday.

"Shabelle Media Network, which owns the station, thanked all those who condemned the detention of their employees and paid tribute to the courage of the many Somalis who demonstrated on the streets of Mogadishu in protest."

Further details about incidents involving journalists and media workers can be found on the websites of the RSF and the CPJ.

PUNTLAND

Television and Radio

16.18 The BBC Profile for Puntland, updated on 1 December 2010, listed the following TV and radio stations as operating in the region:

- Somali Broadcasting Corporation (SBC) - private, Bosasso
- Eastern TV Network (ETN) - private
- SBC Radio - private, Bosasso
- Radio Midnimo - private, Bosasso
- Radio Galkayo
- Radio Garowe - community station

Journalists

16.19 The Committee to Protect Journalists report, Attacks on Press Freedom 2010 – Somalia, released on 15 February 2011 noted that:

"Islamic rebel groups gradually infiltrated the semiautonomous region of Puntland, prompting authorities to crack down on the press under the guise of state security. Puntland Information Minister Abdihakim Ahmed Guled barred Nuh Muse, a correspondent for Universal TV and the U.S. government-funded Voice of America, from working in Puntland, local journalists told CPJ. No explanation was given, but colleagues said the government apparently believed Muse had arranged interviews with the Islamic militant leader Sheikh Mohamed Said Atom. Since 2005, Atom had led a protracted guerrilla war from a base in the mountainous village of Galgala, about 30 miles (45 kilometers) south of the port city Bossasso.

"The private station Horseed FM also faced government reprisals for interviewing Atom in August, after his forces attacked Puntland troops in the Galgala region, Horseed Director Mahad Ahmed told CPJ. Armed police stormed the station in Bossasso the day of the interview, arresting Deputy Director Abdifatah Jama and seven other staff members, according to local journalists. The other staff members were released after a few hours, but Jama was convicted and sentenced to six years in prison the following day under a broad
regional anti-terror law. Horseed appealed the court decision, noting that Jama had no access to a lawyer during the summary proceedings, Ahmed said. Provisions of the anti-terror law, passed by the regional parliament in July, had not been publicly disseminated by late year, leaving the press unsure even of what constituted a violation, local journalists told CPJ. Following international pressure, Jama was freed on a presidential pardon in November.

“Journalists faced several other threats from Puntland security forces and rebel groups throughout the year. CPJ documented nine cases of police and security personnel attacking journalists with impunity. In one case, security guards stationed at the High Court in Bossasso beat Radio Simba journalist Ahmed Ibrahim Noor, leaving him unconscious, local journalists reported. Noor suffered headaches and dizziness for days following the unexplained attack, the National Union of Somali Journalists reported.”

16.20 The USSD 2010 report stated that

“During the year there continued to be incidents of banning journalists and arresting them in the Puntland Region. For example, on August 10, Puntland authorities banned Nuh Musse Birjeeb, a contractor for Voice of America, from reporting; Birjeeb had conducted an interview with an Islamic insurgent leader. Days later, the Puntland information minister lifted the ban. On August 13, Abdifatah Jama Mire, director of radio station Horseed Media, was arrested for broadcasting an interview with an armed Muslim extremist leader active in Puntland. Seventeen hours later, Mire was sentenced to six years in prison for his actions. At year’s end his case was being appealed. On August 15, the Puntland information minister banned media from reporting on violent extremist leaders active in Puntland.”

16.21 Reporters Without Borders reported on 31 March 2011 that

“Liban Abdi Farah of the Somali Broadcasting Corporation (SBC) was immediately arrested by police when he went to the site of a bomb explosion in Galkayo, in the semi-autonomous northeastern region of Puntland, on 19 March. He is being held at police headquarters, where his relatives have been able to visit him but not his colleagues.

“Under Puntland’s judicial system, he should have been taken before a judge within 48 hours, but that has not yet taken place.”

Return to contents

SOMALILAND


“Somaliland boasted a vibrant press. Papers such as the critical private weekly Heegan were able to provide thorough and balanced coverage of the region’s presidential election. Regional officials staged a relatively peaceful and free election in which opposition leader Ahmed M. Mahamoud Silanyo defeated the incumbent, Dahir Riyale Kahin, for the presidency…The National Union of Somali Journalists petitioned the new government to

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allow private broadcasters to operate in Somaliland. Although Somaliland had a relatively free, independent print press, its radio and TV outlets were state-controlled. Many citizens relied on private radio stations that broadcast outside of the country, such as the Netherlands-based Horyaal Radio, local journalists told CPJ.” 282

16.23 The BBC Profile for Somaliland, updated 1 December 2010, gave the following summary of the media in Somaliland:

“Since 1991, Radio Hargeisa has been the Somaliland government's official mouthpiece. The government also owns Somaliland National Television (SLNTV).

“The authorities maintain a tight hold on broadcasting. Radio is the most accessible form of media, although Radio Hargeisa is the only permitted domestic outlet. The BBC is available in Hargeisa on 89 FM.

“A private TV station, Somaliland Television (SLTV), is permitted to operate. A cable TV service is run by Hargeysa Cable.

“The press can carry criticism of the government but the market for printed publications is small.” 283

Television and Radio

16.24 The BBC Profile for Somaliland, updated on 1 December 2010, listed the following TV and radio stations as operating in Somaliland:

- Somaliland National TV (SLNTV) - government-controlled, Hargeisa area
- Somaliland Television (SLTV) - private
- Radio Hargeisa - government-controlled 284

Newspapers

16.25 The BBC Profile for Somaliland, updated on 1 December 2010, stated that the following publications are distributed in Somalia:

- Somaliland Times - Hargeisa, English-language weekly published by Haatuf Media Network
- Haatuf - Hargeisa, private daily
- Jamhuuriya - Hargeisa, private
- Mandeeq - Hargeisa, state-owned 285

Journalists


“‘Given the poor resources and training of the journalists here,’ BBC reporter Jamal Abdi told CPJ, ‘the local media did a remarkably good job covering the elections and polling across Somaliland’s six polling regions.’ They did so despite some harassment. In early June, police detained several journalists for a day after they took pictures of presidential guards attacking people displaying an opposition party flag, local journalists told CPJ. Security agents arrested Hadis Mohamed, editor of a critical website *Baadiya*, and held him without charge for a three-day period that coincided with the voting, Mohamed told CPJ. He said he was targeted for giving equal coverage to the opposition.”

16.27 Reporters Without Borders reported on 31 March 2011 that:

“…two journalists were harassed by soldiers in Las Anod, in the breakaway northwestern territory of Somaliland, on 22 March because of reports deemed to be defamatory. Mohamed Abdinur Hashi of Somali Channel TV was arrested while Mohamed Shaqale of Universal TV managed to avoid arrest and has since been in hiding. His laptop, camera and voice recorders were confiscated by the military, which is still looking for him.”

17. **HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN INSTITUTIONS, ORGANISATIONS AND ACTIVISTS**

Please read in conjunction with Humanitarian situation and Internally displaced persons.


“A number of domestic and international human rights groups operated in some areas of the country, investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases; however, security considerations constrained their ability to operate freely. In contrast with previous years, government officials were responsive to their views, although the TFG had limited capacity to implement human rights programs. There was also an increase in al-Shabaab's targeting of civil society groups, peace activists, media, and human rights and humanitarian organizations. The Mogadishu-based Dr. Ismael Jumale Human Rights Center (DIJHRC), Elman Peace and Human Rights Center (EPRHC), Peace and Human Rights Network, Isha Baidoa Human Rights Organization in the Bay and Bakol regions, KISIMA in Kismayo, Coalition of Grassroots Women's Organization (COGWO), and other local human rights groups were active during the year, although less than previously because of the increased targeting by al-Shabaab. The DIJHRC, EPRHC, and COGWO continued to investigate and document human rights violations, study the causes of the continuing conflict in the Mogadishu area, and conduct human rights monitoring. The Mogadishu-based National Union of Somali Journalists (NUSOJ) continued to advocate for media freedom throughout the country. The Mogadishu-based Center for Research and Dialogue, Puntland Development and Research Centre, and several women's NGOs and civil society organizations also played a role in promoting intraclan dialogue in Puntland and parts of the


south central region...International and local NGOs generally worked without major
restrictions in Puntland and Somaliland. The TFG did not interfere with NGO operations.”

17.02 The Human Rights Watch World Report 2011, covering events in 2010, published on 24
January 2010 (HRW World Report 2011), observed that “The majority of human rights
defenders fled the country in the past years amid increasing threats to civil society and
media; the few individuals remaining in south-central Somalia censor themselves.”

SOUTH AND CENTRAL SOMALIA

17.03 The UN Independent Expert on the Situation of Human Rights in Somalia noted in his report
dated 16 September 2010 that: “Somali human rights defenders continued to face
enormous constraints, challenges and threats in carrying out their work. At a meeting in
September, human rights defenders from southern and central Somalia agreed to form a
national coalition and began identifying capacity-building gaps and needs.”

17.04 New Europe reported on 17 April 2011 that:

“Philippe Royan, Technical Assistant for DG ECHO [the European Community’s
Humanitarian Aid Department] Somalia, spoke to New Europe about the difficulties of
delivering aid to a nation that has become synonymous with anarchy.

“We are working in a country where 80% of the food security needs are in the regions
under the control of Al Shebaab, that is the south and centre. For them, food comes from
God and not the World Food Programme, which is why they have been closing down these
food programmes’.

“The humanitarian expert, says that ECHO and the UN agencies are, ‘tolerated at best’ by
the Islamic fighters, who are fighting the transitional Somali government. ‘They asked our
partners to register with them, for a fee of $10,000. They said there could be no female
staff, no programmes for women and 10% of staff wages should go to al Shabaab, and the
same with any contract fees’.

“They have also expelled 18 partner organisations of ECHO and the World Food
Programme, including those who worked in development, ‘because they say development
comes only from God,’ and for any organisation with American links.

“Royan says that there is also many dangers to working in the field, last week two aid
workers were kidnapped. They were eventually released after traditional elders intervened.”

17.05 The UK Border Agency’s Report of the Fact Finding Mission to Nairobi, 8-15 September
2010, published on 8 October 2010, reported that:

http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160144.pdf Date accessed 20 April 2011
2011
“A security advisor noted:

‘All aid agencies are in the process of moving their international staff out of southern and central Somalia. Life saving programmes do still occur but are in the minority. Some operate expensive wet feeding programmes and other medical agencies operate clinics and hospitals. This is currently under threat due to taxation from AS of [US]$10 000 per 6 months. This is under debate by NGOs.’” 292

17.06 The report added that an international NGO had agreed: “There are almost no NGOs helping IDPs in southern and central Somalia.” 293

17.07 The HRW World Report 2011 noted that

“The delivery of humanitarian assistance to south-central Somalia has been partially blocked by insecurity as well as measures imposed by armed opposition groups specifically targeting humanitarian agencies. At least eight agencies have been expelled from Somalia by al-Shabaab since January. In addition, United States sanctions on support to terrorist groups have restricted the delivery of food aid toward southern and central Somalia. As a result, some agencies had to cancel their operations, and access is reportedly at its lowest point since 2006.” 294

17.08 The USSD 2010 report stated that:

“During the year attacks and incidents of harassment of humanitarian, religious, civil society, and NGO workers resulted in numerous deaths. Unlike in previous years, TFG officials did not accuse NGOs and civil society organizations of siding with opposition groups and exaggerating human rights abuses committed by TFG forces, nor did the TFG intimidate and arrest NGO workers. However, on numerous occasions, al-Shabaab extorted money from local and international NGOs, threatening serious consequences for noncompliance. Al-Shabaab militia expelled international NGOs, and raided and looted humanitarian supplies and equipment from NGO compounds in regions under its control.” 295

17.09 The report further noted that:

“Deteriorating security conditions complicated the work of local and international organizations, especially in the South. During the year attacks on NGOs, seizure of NGO premises, and looting hindered humanitarian aid delivery. As a result of killings, extortion, threats, and harassment, some organizations evacuated their staff or halted food distribution and other aid-related activities. In addition, al-Shabaab banned an unprecedented number of international NGOs from areas under its control, and several other international NGOs were forced to scale down their humanitarian operations after refusing to agree to al-Shabaab extortion demands...While the TFG did not hamper

humanitarian aid delivery, it was unable to prevent attacks on UN and NGO personnel and assets." 296

17.10 The USSD 2010 report also stated that:

“Al-Shabaab banned approximately 10 international NGOs from working in areas under its control. Several other NGOs suspended their operations, being unable to meet extortion demands. On January 22, al-Shabaab militia raided World Health Organization and Save the Children premises in Beledweyne and looted computers and other equipment after briefly holding local staff hostage. On April 8, al-Shabaab stormed and took over the WFP compound in Wajid, Bakol Region. Al-Shabaab also took control of Wajid’s airstrip, which was the largest humanitarian hub in south and central Somalia.

“On August 31, al-Shabaab attacked and occupied international NGO Adventist Relief and Development Association’s offices in Beledweyne and Bulaburde towns, Hiran Region. Evacuating the offices the same day, al-Shabaab took with them equipment such as computers and furniture. The organization had been implementing education and livelihood projects, and 180,000 beneficiaries were affected by its closure." 297

17.11 The UN Security Council’s Report of the Secretary General, published on 28 April 2011 gave an update with regard to resolution 1964 (2010), particularly the establishment of the United Nations presence in Somalia:

“The Department of Safety and Security has approved additional security compliant accommodations within the AMISOM protected area at the Aden Adde International Airport. In January, the authorized United Nations international staff ceiling for Mogadishu was increased from 14 to a maximum of 52 staff. The United Nations Mine Action Service, the World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations Support Office for the African Union Mission in Somalia (UNSOA), the Department of Safety and Security and UNPOS currently maintain a presence of international staff members on a rotational basis, normally averaging 24 to 28 staff per day.

“Meanwhile, the United Nations common compound, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) compound and the WFP facility at Mogadishu port continue to serve as accommodation and office space for United Nations national staff. About 60 United Nations staff members currently work and live in Mogadishu, of which about half are international staff residing at the Aden Adde International Airport for security reasons.” 298
The USSD 2010 report noted that: “In its August humanitarian overview report, UNOCHA reported that Puntland had experienced some access problems, especially in July and August, as a result of internal conflicts and looting of relief food supplies and assets.” 299

The USSD 2010 report reported that “Access was generally good in Somaliland.” 300 The UN Security Council’s Report of the Secretary General, published on 28 April 2011 gave an update with regard to resolution 1964 (2010), particularly the establishment of the United Nations presence in Somalia, and stated that “UNPOS [UN Political Office for Somalia] has continued with the deployment of international staff to other regions to augment national staff there. Deployments have begun mainly to Hargeysa in ‘Somaliland’, and to Garoowe in ‘Puntland’.” 301

See also Humanitarian situation and IDPs

The OCHA Somalia situation reports give more information on humanitarian aid and access in Somalia, and are available here.

18. FREEDOM OF RELIGION

18.01 The US State Department’s International Religious Freedom Report 2011 (USSD IRF report 2011), covering the period from 1 July 2009 to 30 June 2010, published on 17 November 2010 noted that:

“The [Transitional Federal] charter established Islam as the national religion.

“The constitution and charters governing the various regions provided the right to study and discuss the religion of one’s choice; however, proselytizing for any religion other than Islam was strictly prohibited. The TFG neither observed nor enforced constitutional provisions guaranteeing the free exercise of religion. Moreover, statutes and regulations provided no effective recourse for violations of religious freedom…In May 2009 the TFG ratified legislation to implement Shari’a (Islamic law) nationwide. In practice the TFG does not have the capacity or mechanisms to implement the legislation uniformly. Since the TFG’s ratification of the legislation, there have been no reports of the implementation.” 302

18.02 The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom’s Annual Report 2011, published 28 April 2011 (USCIRF 2011 Report), noted that: “A large majority of citizens are Sunni Muslims of a Sufi tradition. There is a small, low-profile Christian community and small numbers of followers of other religions. The number of adherents of strains of conservative Islam and the number of Islamic schools supported by religiously conservative sources continued to grow.” 303

18.03 The USSD IRF report 2010 further stated that
“Serious religious freedom abuses persist in Somalia. These violations include: the killing of Sufi clerics and non-Muslims and the desecration of Sufi religious sites; the implementation of a strict interpretation of Islamic law, under which hudood punishments are performed and practices deemed ‘un-Islamic’ are repressed; and an increase in violent interpretations of Islam and the growth of extremist Islamic schools. Violations are conducted by the U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization al-Shabaab. The internationally-recognized Transitional Federal Government (TFG) is dependent on the African Union peacekeeping force in Mogadishu (AMISOM) for survival, controls only portions of the capital, and lacks the capacity to enforce religious freedom protections or address religious freedom violations.”

18.04 The USSD IRF report 2010 stated that:

“Although the Transitional Federal Charter (charter) provides for freedom of religion, there were limits on the extent to which this right was respected in practice.

“Active violent conflict among militia groups and the TFG continued during the reporting period. The Transitional Federal Government (TFG) generally did not enforce legal protections of religious freedom in practice. There was a decline in the status of respect for religious freedom during the reporting period primarily as a result of extremist militias taking control over significant territory in the country although some territory has been transferred back to the TFG.

“There were reports of societal abuses and discrimination based on religious affiliation, belief, and practice. Militia groups, particularly those associated with the U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) al-Shabaab harrassed persons suspected of conversion from Islam, killed Sufi clerics, and destroyed Sufi graves and mosques. There were also reports that non-Muslims experienced discrimination, violence, and detention because of their religious beliefs.”

18.05 With regard to religious freedom in areas controlled by non-state armed groups, the USSD IRF report 2010 stated that: “… al-Shabaab systematically closed cinemas, burned kiosks selling the narcotic khat, shaved the hair of persons with Western haircuts, ordered women to be fully veiled, instituted total bans on smoking and music, and strictly prohibited behavior they deemed un-Islamic.” The report further stated that: “Al-Shabaab and affiliated organizations imposed their own interpretation of Islamic laws and practices on other Muslims. Al-Shabaab destroyed the tombs of Sufi clerics and killed clerics, civilians, and government officials of Sufi orientation. In targeted assassinations members of these extremist groups killed TFG officials and allies and denounced them as non-Muslims or apostates.”

For further information on the interpretation of Sharia law by al Shabaab, please see Human rights violations by armed groups.
18.06 The USCIRF 2011 Report stated that:

“Puntland and Somaliland are governed by their own constitutions. Both regions establish Islam as the official religion, prohibit promotion of other religions, ban conversion from Islam, detain converts, and require presidential candidates to be Muslim. The Somaliland Constitution also requires Islamic education and that laws derive from and not contradict Islam. The May 2009 Puntland Constitution does provide non-Muslims the freedom to practice their religion. There was little reporting of religious freedom violations in Somaliland and Puntland. In February 2009, a border official detained and beat Kenyan Christian convert Abdi Welli Ahmed when he tried to enter Somaliland with a Bible and other Christian literature. There were no new reports on Ahmed. Other violations in this reporting period include suicide attacks on government officials who spoke out against al-Shabaab’s interpretation and practice of Islam in central and southern Somalia.”

18.07 The USSD IRF report 2010 stated that:

“… Somaliland and Puntland established Islam as the official religion in their regions. The Somaliland constitution prohibited the promotion of any religion other than Islam. The Somaliland criminal code outlined penalties for Muslims who change their religion. The constitution states that candidates for president, vice president, or the house of representatives must be Muslim and further stipulates that Islamic education is compulsory at all levels and that the promotion of Qur’anic schools is the responsibility of the state. The constitution further stated that the laws of the nation shall derive from and not contradict Islam.

“The Puntland constitution provides for the freedom to worship; however, it also states that Muslims cannot renounce their religion. In May 2009 the Puntland cabinet approved a new constitution; on June 30, 2009, the Puntland parliament approved the constitution, which went into effect immediately. The new constitution prohibited propagation of any religion other than Islam. It states that non-Muslims are free to practice their religion and cannot be forced to convert; however, the same article prohibits Muslims from converting from Islam. Puntland security forces closely monitored religious activities.”

For further information on freedom of religion in Somalia, please see the US Commission on International Religious Freedom’s Annual Report 2011.
language of Somalia after independence. The other big group is composed of the largely sedentary agro-pastoralist people, residing in the inter-riverine area between the Juba and Shabelle rivers in Southern Somalia, known as Digil-Mirifle or Raxanweyn. They speak Af-Maay-tiri, which is quite distinct from Af-Maxaa-tiri. Outside this homogeneity, you also find the minority ‘outcaste’ groups, or bondsmen known collectively as sab, and groups of ethnic Bantu descent, as well as of Arabic descent, such as the Bajunis and Barawanis. It is important to realise that the traditional structures of the Raxanweyn, the minorities, and the people of Bantu and Arabic descent are often very different from the nomadic culture…The lineages of the [nomadic] pastoral Somalis are united by a common, mythological perception of direct lineal descent from the forefather Samaal and the household of the prophet Mohammed, notably the Qurayshi clan, and specifically his cousin, Aqiil Bin Abi-Talib. Today, this segmentary clan system is represented by three to four main clan families descending from Darood, Hawiye, Dir and de-pending on who you ask, Isaaq... the Raxanweyn are distinct from the pastoralist Somalis, and has a different genealogy as they stem from the forefather Saab. However, they still claim to be Somalis via a similar mythological descent to the Qurayshi.”  


“More than 85 percent of the population shared a common ethnic heritage, religion, and nomad-influenced culture. UNIE estimated that minority groups constitute approximately 22 percent of the population. In most areas, members of groups other than the predominant clan were excluded from effective participation in governing institutions and were subject to discrimination in employment, judicial proceedings, and access to public services.

“Minority groups and low-caste clans included the Bantu (the largest minority group), the Benadiri, Rer Hamar, Brawanese, Swahili, Tumal, Yibir, Yaxar, Madhiban, Hawrarsame, Muse Dheryo, Faqayaqub, and Somaliland’s Gabooye. Intermarriage between minority groups and mainstream clans was restricted by custom. Minority groups had no armed militias and continued to be disproportionately subject to killings, torture, rape, kidnapping for ransom, and looting of land and property with impunity by faction militias and majority clan members. Many minority communities continued to live in deep poverty and suffer from numerous forms of discrimination and exclusion.”

CLAN SYSTEM

19.03 The Predicament of the ‘Oday’, dated November 2006, reported that:

“The clan-system is the most important constituent social factor among the nomadic-pastoralist Somalis [i.e. the clan-families of the Darood, Hawiye, Dir and Isaaq]. I. M. Lewis wrote in 1961 that ‘the segmented clan system remains the bedrock foundation of the pastoral Somali society and ‘clannishness’ - the primacy of clan interests - is its natural divisive reflection on the political level’ … In short, the Somali society is based on a vertically oriented segmentary lineage system in which individuals take their position

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according to their patrilineal descent (traced through the male line). Hence, according to Lewis, all the pastoral Somalis belong to genealogical lineages, which also function as their basic political units. The segmentary lineage system can be differentiated into categories of clan-family, clan, sub-clan, primary lineage and mag-paying [blood compensation also known as diya] group as divisions of varying size (Lewis 1961: 4)…The Clan (often 20 generations) can act as a corporate political unit, and do tend to have some territorial exclusiveness, following their regular seasonal movements for pasture and semi-permanent settlements. Clan-members derive their identity from their common agnatic descent rather than the sense of territorial belonging. The clan is in other words the upper limit of political action, has some territorial properties, and is often led by a clan-head, but remains without centralized administration or government. The most distinct descent group within the clan is the 'primary lineage', defined as the lineage to which a person describes himself as a member (most often between 6 and 10 generations).

“Marriage is usually outside the primary lineage, and links them together, which functions to reduce the otherwise endless feuds between primary lineages (Lewis 1961: 5).

“The most basic and functional lineage unit is the mag-paying group or diya-paying group… Diya is the Arabic word for blood-compensation. Mag is the Somali word… The mag-paying group is above or beyond the uterine family (qoys or xaas), and is the most important level of social organisation for each individual. It is a small corporate group of a few lineages who reckon descent to a common ancestor some 4 to 8 generations, and is sufficiently large in numbers (few hundred to a few thousand men) to be able to pay the mag (according to Sharia: 100 camels for homicide) if need be. Hence, all men are defined by their belonging to a mag-paying group, and their social and political relations are defined by contracts called xeer – the Somali customary laws – that are entered within and between mag-paying groups…. It should be noted that the described segmentary lineage system is not absolute, but rather in a constant process of relative change. This is due to population growth whereby the number of primary lineages grows too. Hence forth, the primary lineages and even mag-paying groups will eventually split, and when they do, every ancestor in the genealogy is in principle a point of potential division, as well as of unity.”

19.04 The International Crisis Group (IGC) report of December 2008, To move beyond the failed state, commented on clan dynamics, stated that many factors such as business, political and ideological interests have eroded strict clan relationships. However, it also stated: “…large swathes of the country [have] revert[ed] back to a style of clan government that predates colonialism.”

19.05 The same IGC report observed that:

“That clan elders are now targets in the violence sweeping the country is the best indicator that the classical clan system is fraying. Even during the worst of inter-clan feuds, elders had always been respected and played a recognised conflict mediation role, with access to the key players. The apparent erosion of their power does not mean, however, that they no longer wield influence. Part of the crisis in the south stems from the inability, perhaps the unwillingness, to bring them fully into the political decision-making process.”


314 International Crisis Group (ICG), Somalia: to move beyond the failed state, 23 December 2008, p4,
CUSTOMARY LAW (XEER) AND BLOOD COMPENSATION (DIYA OR MAG)


“The Somali traditional ‘political contract’ consists of customary laws – referred to in Somali as xeer – through which ‘members of a mag-paying group are obliged to support each other in political and jural responsibilities, especially in paying and receiving compensation for acts committed by members of one group against another - even over vast distances, since it is the kinship that bonds them. It is the responsibility of the elders (oday) of the mag-paying groups to oversee that the terms of the xeer are honoured (Lewis 1961: 6).’ (Gundel, 2006, p. 6)

“They are historically based on precedents, hence, unlike fixed law, they are constantly capable of evolving, with future decisions based on ones made in the past. Today the xeer are particularly important in rural areas where the presence of modern political institutions is weak. They are however also applied in urban areas with local administrations and even here the xeer, instituted through traditional elders, is usually the first recourse in dispute management, settlement and reconciliation among both ordinary citizens and between business people. The importance of the xeer is indisputable, especially in Northern Somalia as the xeer are applied in solving perhaps 80-90% of all disputes and criminal cases. In Southern Somalia with increasing pre-dominance of radical Islamic groups, strict versions of Sharia are increasingly applied as the ruling law rather than the traditional xeer. However, while the xeer is simultaneously a force for justice and social cohesion, it may also conflict with both international human rights standards and Islamic Sharia law. In general, the collective responsibility imposed on mag-groups by the xeer is seen as removing responsibility from individual perpetrators of crimes. (Gundel, 2006, iii)”

19.07 The Landinfo response, Somalia: Protection and conflict resolution mechanisms, dated 2 June 2009, stated that:

“The Somali transitional institutions, including the legal system, are weak and the transitional authorities’ ability to protect the population’s rights is extremely limited.

“Law enforcement in Somalia is currently carried out in three different ways; traditional common law practiced through the councils of elders/clan leaders, Islamic law practiced through Sharia courts and secular law practiced through an ordinary court authority. However, the ordinary court authority was destroyed during the civil war, and is still almost non-existent in Southern Somalia. Traditional common law [xeer] is the most widespread and most commonly used legal system in present day Somalia.

http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/africa/horn-of-africa/somalia/Somalia%20To%20Move%20Beyond%20the%20Failed%20State.ashx Date accessed 20 April 2011


“The fundamental unit in the clan system is the Diya group (the blood compensation group, mag in Somali). The Diya group consists of the male members of one or more family lines, who have the same forefathers going back four to eight generations, and who are collectively responsible for the members’ actions. The Diya groups are large enough to be able to pay compensation and it is between these groups that the traditional legal framework is practiced and agreements (xeer) are entered into. The members of the Diya group are therefore obliged to support each other in the political and legal responsibilities that are defined in the xeer agreements (Gundel 2006). The Diya group is also responsible for providing assistance to members who are in difficult financial situations, etc. Xeer is the most important element that links alliances between clans in Somalia, and is considered to be the glue that holds the community together. “However, xeer is only entered into between Somali clans, with the minority groups normally being excluded from xeer and the Diya system.

“Some observers have claimed that the traditional legal system and the conflict resolution mechanisms in Somalia no longer work. A well-informed international aid organisation representative who had worked in Somalia for a long time pointed out in March 2009 that the traditional leaders are losing their hold on power. This worrying trend is evident throughout Southern Somalia, and it is more prevalent in the towns than in the country. Globalisation and, not least, the long-standing conflict in the country has led young people to dismiss the elders’ advice in favour of that of others. The influence of the media and the warlords’ undermining of the old authorities have weakened the position of elders (interview in Nairobi, 24 March 2009). Gundel (2006) estimates however that xeer is used to resolve between 80 and 90 per cent of all disputes and criminal cases. All of the sources that Landinfo met in Nairobi in 2007 also believed that the system still works, albeit to varying degrees. This was confirmed by Landinfo’s interlocutors in Nairobi in June 2008 and in March 2009.” 317

For more information on the judicial process in Somalia, see Judicial system.

CLAN PROTECTION

19.08 The Landinfo response Somalia: Vulnerability – minority groups, weak clans and vulnerable individuals, published June 2009, gave the following information:

“According to Somali traditions, weak groups – i.e. women, children, the sick, the elderly, the disabled, religious men, unarmed and neutral groups, prisoners of war, travellers etc. – shall not be attacked but protected during conflicts (ICRC 1998). Both during and after the civil war, however, protection of these groups has been weakened, and the tradition is far less respected today.

“In the present situation, vulnerability in Somalia is closely linked to clan or group affiliation, the presence or absence of conflict and the power situation in the area in question. However, individuals can also find themselves in a vulnerable position because of their political or ideological views.” 318

19.09 The Gundel Lecture 2009 report noted:

“One aspect of the Somali tradition is that the rights of groups effectively are protected by force, or threat of force. Tenure of rights thus ultimately depends on the ability to defend them, by coercion if necessary. This is also the case for individual security, which rests upon the individual's mag-paying group's ability to fight, and the solidarity between the mag-groups of the wider clan and their fighting capability. They must therefore both be able to retaliate and pay compensation. Hence, the lack of impartial enforcement mechanisms becomes apparent in cases when a judgment is passed that favours a militarily weak clan, and a militarily strong clan then openly refuses to comply with it. As a result, Somali minority groups are heavily discriminated against through xeer application…

“In the Somali tradition, weak and scattered clans who are driven to seek protection from the stronger clans can enter a protection status with them. The protecting clans naturally expect something in return. Such alliances based on contractual agreements between weak and strong clans are known as gaashaanbuur, meaning ‘pile of shields’. Hence, minorities can seek protection by attachment to stronger lineages by joining a gaashaanbuur coalition. There exist varying degrees of adoption and incorporation within stronger lineages. These range in degree of dependent status with associated inferiority from neighbour (deris), appendage (saar - parasitic creepers), followers (soo raac), to pretenders (sheegad - those who claim to be what they are not.) In the case of sheegad, the weak group may assume the lineage affiliation of its protectors and may claim a common agnatic origin. The Somali family to which the sab ['traditionally bondsmen to the pastoral clan groups…' (p15)] are attached protects them vis à vis other Somali and are responsible for any damage inflicted on them. The extent to which the sab presently have managed to set up their own independent map-paying [sic] groups needs to be investigated further. The lesson is that adoption of weak clans does occur, and it is possible to move the stronger clans into compromise with their traditional position. When this happens, the stronger clans may even pay mag for the adoptives…”

19.10 The same source noted, in light of the current conflict, that:

“It is a traditional code in Somali culture that when a person comes to your house and seeks protection, one is obliged to protect this person. Thus failing to protect a person is considered dishonourable, signifying that one did not live up to his obligations. However, in the light of the massive displacements of recent times, the numbers of people have become too large for the local host clans to service this traditional obligation – which has increased their vulnerability. In this context, it should be noted in particular that women and children are at the bottom in all the social hierarchies. Women from minority clans or other groups not part of the main nomadic local clans are in particularly bad positions, even the more if they belong to a minority in an IDP camp. Due to this destruction of the social fabric and state structures, there is a high level of lack of law and order. There are many young men who are often armed (or have access to arms) who abuse the situation of big IDP camps and feel free to harass IDPs, rape women, force people into certain kinds of labour, extort money etc. As these men usually originate from the host clans, they are in a position of impunity.

“The only possible way of bringing change into such a situation can be found in entering a new xeer agreement between the elders of the host clans and those representing the IDPs and the other clan communities, in which the host clan promises to protect them against this kind of abuse. However, members of the sab-minorities or the Rahanweyn will in this
context stand weaker compared to those who belong to one of the bigger nomadic clans, one of the reasons for this being that the nomadic clans have a clear xeer between them.

“Particularly in South Central Somalia, where these traditional structures are not sufficient due to prevailing lawlessness, Sharia, as it was practiced by the Islamic Courts, is being brought forward, as the common perception is that the only possible way to deal with high levels of crime and freelance gangs is by implementing a harsh rule and exerting severe punishments. Hence there are clans in the South which claim that it is not sufficient to pay the diya compensation (usually, in the Somali tradition, one is obliged to pay the 100 camels per person who has been killed), but the “wrongdoer” has to be killed as a punishment.”

The Landinfo response of 2 June 2009, *Somalia: Protection and conflict resolution mechanisms*, stated:

“Individual security in the traditional Somali society was dependent on the clan’s, i.e. the Diya group's ability to pay compensation and to defend itself in the event of attacks. This situation has not changed significantly in modern times, and the clan has remained the safety net of the Somali population since the collapse of the government institutions in 1991. Vulnerability and protection in Somalia are therefore closely linked to a clan’s strength. However, weak clans or groups have traditionally been able to seek protection from and affiliation with the dominant clans in a specific area.

“The internal clan conflicts that have characterised the situation in recent years, however, mean that affiliation to a dominant clan does not necessarily provide protection (interviews in Nairobi March 2007, June 2008 and March 2009). Clans are still important, but it is evident that clan loyalty is superseded by political, ideological and international conditions.

“A clan’s ability to provide protection is contingent on the clan’s military strength. In the current situation, however, in which al-Shabaab and other Islamist groups control large parts of Southern Somalia, protection from one’s own clan in, for example, an al-Shabaab controlled area is not very realistic. Al-Shabaab maintains its distance to the clan dimension, and has the support of various clans and minority groups in the areas it controls. Numerous dominant clans in many districts are therefore currently subordinate to al-Shabaab, and must, among other things, abide by al-Shabaab’s enforcement of Sharia law.

“In meetings with Landinfo in Nairobi in March 2007, June 2008 and March 2009 respectively, all of the interlocutors referred to the fact that the protection aspect is composed of a number of factors, and the individual’s vulnerability and potential to obtain protection and support are dependent on several conditions. Moreover, conflicts relating to scarce resources have contributed in particular to undermining the mechanisms. Clan protection is still relevant, but primarily in relation to ordinary crime. With regard to the situation linked to ideological or political conditions – which were particularly important when Ethiopian forces were present in Somalia – clan protection is not realistic (interviews in Nairobi, June 2008 and March 2009). The current dividing line is more between al-Shabaab/extremist groups on the one hand and GNU, the government of national unity, on the other hand. Moreover, clans cannot offer protection against random violence or grenade and bomb attacks. As pointed out during interviews in Nairobi, the violence is often indiscriminate ‘Your clan cannot protect you from bombs’ (Nairobi, June 2008 and March

However, clans continue to be important in relation to where a person flees (interview UNHCR, June 2008).

“These conflicts often trigger a number of revenge killings. The ideological/political dimension that made its entry with the TFG, and not least the Ethiopian entry in December 2007, has further strengthened this trend (interviews with international observers in Nairobi, June 2008). However, according to a well-informed international organisation, those leaving conflict areas still tend to go to their clan areas, and the protection issue nowadays is primarily linked to the situation in the arrival areas (interview in Nairobi, June 2008 and March 2009).

“In response to the question of protection for Midgan groups, a well-informed international source explained (interview in Nairobi, March 2009) that protection for these groups often entails various forms of paid protection. The same source described protection in Mogadishu as a protection racket. Another well-informed international source told Landinfo during a meeting in June 2008 that minorities that are forced to leave their homes due to difficult security conditions seek to establish a client relationship to a host clan at their new place of residence (interview in Nairobi, June 2008).” 321

With regard to the protection of minority groups by dominant clans, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Africa research analyst, Dr Cedric Barnes’ paper dated 16 May 2008 (FCO Analyst Paper 2008) commented that:

“In the past – especially before the full development of state structures - minority groups would have had some relationship of protection with majority clans. The rise of the modern state (colonial and post-colonial) ostensibly ended the necessity for some of these historical relationships of protection. Some relationships will have endured, others may have lapsed. However, the modern state itself became the active protector and sponsor of some minority groups. Siad Barre’s regime in particular, used weak clans or minorities as strategic allies in their government and employed them selectively in the security forces and other government agencies, as reliable and dependant allies. This association has added to the vulnerability of some minority groups and small clans.

“The situation since the breakdown of state and formal structures of law and order has left most ‘minority’ groups as second, if not third ‘class’ citizens. The revival of ‘neo-traditional’ customs in stateless Somalia, may have led to new agreements between minority groups and major clans, though these will be precarious and one-sided agreements (i.e. to the advantage of the protecting clan). Sometimes relationships of protection may work through marriage alliances; generally involving a minority or minor clan female marrying a majority clan male. But again the weakness of the minority group or clan would favour the majority clan in this agreement; the effectiveness of protection or willingness to give it would vary depending on individuals and families involved. Minority groups will always occupy a junior position in any socio-political arrangement in which they might be included. Again this specific information can be best sourced by people with direct links to minority groups still resident in Somalia. Direct contact with human rights organisations and local NGOs in Somalia would provide a detailed and up-to-date assessment.” 322[60a] (paragraphs 7-8)

See Minority groups below

322 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Analyst’s Unit, Report on COIS’ work on clans, May 2008, Available in hard copy on request
MAIN CLANS: DAROOD, HAWIYE, DIR AND ISAAQ

19.13 The Gundel Lecture 2009 report provided an overview of the main (nomadic or pastoral) clan families (as identified by Dr Gundel in the quote cited in paragraph 18.01) and where they are approximately located:

“Darood

“The Darood are commonly divided into three major groups referred to as Ogaden, Marehan, and Harti. The Harti are composed of the Majerteen who now are found in Puntland mainly, and the Dulbahante and Warsangeli who mainly live within the borders of Somaliland. Puntland almost entirely overlaps with the Majerteen clan family. The Marehan inhabit South-Central Somalia, where they are dominant in Gedo region. The Ogaden can be found in Southern Somalia where, over the last years, they have gained increased control of Lower and Middle Juba, as well as in Ethiopia and Kenya. Since the Darood are present in the North, in South-Central Somalia as well as inside Ethiopia, and Kenya, they can be considered the strongest pan-Somali nationalists.

“Hawiye

“As to the Hawiye, the two most important and commonly used sub-divisions are the Habar Gedir and the Abgal. The Hawiye can be found in central and southern Somalia, and particularly its Abgal and Habr Gedir groups are dominant in Mogadishu. The Hawiye are not as present in the other areas, and would generally be content with control over South Central Somalia.

“Dir

“The Dir include groups such as Issa, Gadabursi, and Biyamal. Dir groups live in Somaliland as well as in South-Central Somalia.

“Isaaq

“… there is a controversy as to whether they constitute a clan family of their own. This is being affirmed by the Isaaq themselves, while southern Somalis and the Majerteen claim that Isaaq are part of the Dir. The Isaaq have cousin links to the Dir groups such as the Biyamal, Issa and Gadabursi. Isaaq are the primary inhabitants of Somaliland (although its current president is from the Gadabursi group).”

19.14 The Minority Rights Group International report, No Redress: Somalia’s Forgotten Minorities, published on 23 November 2010, (MRGI report 2010) gave the following brief notes on the main clans:

- Darod: a clan family or federation dominant in Puntland, with clan branches in eastern Somaliland and southern Somalia.
- Hawiye: a clan dominant in Mogadishu, the surrounding Benadir region, and also Hiran, Galgaduud and Middle Shabelle regions.
- Dir: a clan family comprising Issaq and Gadabursi in Somaliland, Isse in Djibouti, and Biyamal in southern Somalia.
• Rahanweyn: known also as Digil-Mirifle, a clan federation living in the agricultural ‘inter-riverine’ area between the Juba and Shebelle rivers in southern Somalia, now considered equivalent in status to the three pastoralist clans, consisting of two merged agro-pastoralist clans – Digil and Mirifle – claiming descent from a common ancestor.\footnote{Minority Rights Group International, No Redress: Somalia’s Forgotten Minorities, 23 November 2010, p7, http://www.minorityrights.org/10370/reports/no-redress-somalias-forgotten-minorities.html Date accessed 20 April 2011}

The UNHCR have produced a genealogical table of clans, including minority groups dated circa 2000 as a guide to the clans and where they were located.

Digil and Mirifle (Rahanweyn)

For information about protection generally see subsection Clan protection above.


“Digil and Mirifle, or Rahanweyn, seem to take a middle position between a Somali clan and a minority. They are considered as a minority group by some experts (such as the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Somalia, Ms Mona Rishmawi). By others they are considered as clans related to the major Somali clans, though considered as less ‘noble’… Different use is made of the names Digil, Mirifle (Merifle) and Rahanweyn. A UN source in Nairobi explained that this is a consequence of an effort made by Siad Barre to amalgamate all these clans under the one name Rahanweyn (the largest group). Originally, however, the Somali distinguished two clan-families, one called the Digil and another variously called Rahanweyn or Mirifle.

“The Digil and Mirifle are related ethnically to the four main Somali clan-families in various ways. Both Somali and Digil-Mirifle trace their origins back to the same ancestor, at the highest genealogical level: the ancestor of the Digil-Mirifle, Sab, and the ancestor of the four main Somali clan-families, Somali (or Samaale), are traced back to a common ancestor… The descendants of Sab are segmented into three families: the Digil, Mirifle (or Rahanweyn) and Tunni; the Mirifle and Tunni derive from the Digil. The Mirifle and Tunni are numerically the most important, but the Digil survive as a small independent confederacy.”\footnote{Report on Minority Groups in Somalia. Joint British, Danish and Dutch Fact-Finding Mission to Nairobi, Kenya 17-24 September 2000, published December 2000, p56, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6a5fa0.html Date accessed 12 March 2010}

19.16 The report further stated:

“The Digil and Mirifle are held in contempt by the nomadic Somali clans for their lowly origins, stemming from Sab as opposed to Somali, for their heterogeneous composition that includes Bantu elements, for their lack of a clear, politically significant genealogical structure, and, more important perhaps, because they are predominantly cultivators. They were shunned as marriage partners by the ‘noble’ Somali clans. They do have diya paying
groups, and thus fall within this aspect of clan law. Villages could function as diya paying groups, even if villagers were members of different kinship-based diya paying groups.”

19.17 The Gundel Lecture 2009 report gave background information on the groups:

“The Somali agro-pastoralists refer to themselves as originating from Saab…and encompass the two groups of Mirifle and Digil, as well as the Rahanweyn who sometimes refer to be identical with Mirifle and Digil. The agro-pastoralist clan structure is considerably different from that of the nomadic groups. As far as the Rahanweyn are concerned, they do not trace their genealogy as far backwards as the nomads and ‘the segmentation at the larger units of the clan is one of the important features that make the Rahanweyn social organisation different. Their clans are composed of 4-7 jilib that pays diya together. Hence, the diya-paying group structure of the Rahanweyn is different as they pay diya collectively at a much higher level in their lineage structure than the pastoralists do…These differences are due to the fact that these groups do not practice transhumance migration in the same way as nomads, but agriculture. They also keep camels as a last resort strategy for severe droughts, in which case they may also migrate, however this needs to be distinguished from nomadic ways of migration. Hence their basis is location, and their home state is more important for their identity than the clan. Their structure of elders are considerably more hierarchical and tightly related to the villages and home states.

“Politically, since 1999, the Rahanweyn clans have increasingly gained control of their ‘own’ regions of Bay and Bakool in the inter-riverine area between the Juba and Shabelle rivers in Southern Somalia. While traditionally, the Rahanweyn were traditionally peaceful people and not involved in the original civil war, they have now established their own army and seek to control their own areas (where Al-Shabaab is predominant today). However, they generally do not appear to be concerned with controlling other areas.”

Tunni

Sources distinguish between ‘rural’ and ‘urban’ Tunni. The latter are linked with the minority Benadiri (see subsection on Benadiri below).

19.18 As noted in paragraph 19.14 above, the JFFMR 2000 stated that the Tunni are “derived” from the Digil. The report also stated that: “Lewis describes the Tunni as a large tribe, or rather tribal confederacy… [which] eventually settled in and around Brava.” 328 An Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada response to an information request dated 1 August 1997 observed that: “Author Lee Cassannelli in Victims and Vulnerable Groups in Southern Somalia, states that the Tunni are one of the seven subclans of the minority Digil clan… Together, the Digil and Mirifle comprise the Rahanweyn (Reewin) clan, which is one of Somalia's minority clans (ibid.)." The same response reported that:

“… a representative of the Toronto-based Benadir Somali Association, who has done extensive research on the cultural history of the Benadir coast… emphasized that there is a difference between urban Tunnis who are Barawans and rural Tunnis who are not Barawans. He explained that the difference between urban Tunnis and rural Tunnis is

linguistic, with the rural Tunnis speaking the Tunni language, which is not comprehensible to the majority of urban Tunnis.” 329

For information about the ‘urban’ Tunni see subsection on Reer Brava (also Bravanese or Baravani) and Tunni below.

Language/dialect

19.19 The Digil-Mirifle (Rahanweyn) speak “… Af-Maay-tiri, which is quite distinct from Af-Maxaat-tiri. [standard Somali]” (Gundel, Predicament of the Oday November 2006) 330 The JFFMR 2000 stated that: “The Mirifle speak a separate Somali dialect (called Af-may or Af-maymay), which serves as a lingua franca among the various Mirifle groups, several of whom also speak distinct local dialects, and some of their Bantu neighbours. Also the Digil speak Af-may, although some will speak standard Somali. Both Digil and Mirifle generally understand the standard Somali spoken elsewhere.” 331

MINORITY GROUPS

19.20 The term ‘minority groups’ is taken to include all of the population outside of the Somali lineage system (i.e. the ‘clan system’). These include occupational and out-caste groups (such as the Tumal, Midgan and Yibir), the urban coastal communities of the Benadir region of south and central Somalia (including the Reer Hamar, Barawani - also referred to as the Reer Brava or Bravanese - and Bajuni) and the ethnically ‘African’ population (usually referred to as the Bantu). The position of the agro-pastoral population – the Digil and Mirifle (Rahanweyn) – is complicated (some commentators consider them to be a minority although they fall within the clan system) and they are not covered in this section (see preceding subsection).

Background

19.21 The MRGI report 2010 noted that: “Somalia’s minorities are diverse and not framed simply by elements of ethnic, religious or linguistic differentiation as set out in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities. This diversity also rests on social and historical distinctions between minorities and the pastoralist majorities highlighted in the previous section.” 332

19.22 The Gundel Lecture 2009 report stated that:

“Among the minorities, one can find the ‘outcaste’ groups, or bondsmen known collectively as sab, as well as groups of ethnic Bantu descent and the coastal groups, including those of Arabic descent such as the Bajunis and Baranwis. Minorities are not counted and their languages and cultures are neither accepted nor respected… in terms of their size, the

329 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Somalia: Information on the Tuenis clan from Barawe including the languages spoken, their unique qualities, any identifiable attributes, and on which clans from Barawa speak Chimini, 1 August 1997, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6ac7710.html Date accessed 2 February 2010
notion of ‘minorities’ is sometimes misleading. Many minorities, such as Bantus, are in many places in South Central Somalia in fact local majorities. However, they are being oppressed by the militarily stronger nomadic clans. Globally, in the Somali context, they are a minority, because they are not overall dominant. The sab are an exception to this, as they are in numbers a clear-cut minority due to the fact that, unlike the Bantus, who live in certain locations, they are scattered over many places.” 333

19.23 Dr Cedric Barnes, in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s Africa Research Group, observed in a paper dated 16 May 2008 (FCO Analyst Paper 2008) that:

“The term minority has come to cover a wide and diverse range of peoples in Somalia. Some minorities may be more identifiable (e.g. appearance, dialect, accent) than others. Others, especially those are treated as lower ‘castes’ – due to the stigma associated with their way of life, profession, putative ancestors, etc. – will be indistinguishable from majority Somali clan groups. The groups that are associated by occupation may no longer exclusively practice the occupation with which they are traditionally identified.” 334

19.24 Dr Barnes also observed that:

“Previously groups like the Bantu, Bajuni and Benadiri, and particularly their sub-groups were made up of isolated and discrete communities each with its own set of external relationships, internal histories, hierarchies and areas of concentration. The experience of the state in Somalia during the twentieth century has tended to de-emphasise difference between communities, against which these small groups have often fought a rear-guard action. Conversely in the aftermath of state collapse, small sub-groups of vaguely common ancestry or custom have come together to produce larger identities such as Bantu, Bajuni, Brawanese or Benadiri, or even Midgan/Madhiban. These are constructs made in the face of common adversity and common historical experience, but as ‘identities’ may have little historical precedence. It is therefore extremely difficult to expect standardised accounts or beliefs.” 335

19.25 Dr Barnes also commented that:

“Information on cultural practices and traditional histories (including lineages, leading personalities) are not widely recorded in the published literature. Most knowledge is maintained by oral tradition and not recorded systematically. Individuals themselves hold this knowledge, and one account will never exactly match another…. It should be remembered that the degree and depth of knowledge will differ from one individual to another. Generally the older generation should have better knowledge, as might be expected, but this is not always the case.

“Cultural practices vary from group to group, some of which are common throughout a ‘cultural region’ e.g. the East African coast, or Bantu speaking communities, and some of

334 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Analyst’s Unit, Report on COIS’ work on clans, May 2008, paragraph 2, Available in hard copy on request
335 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Analyst’s Unit, Report on COIS’ work on clans, May 2008, paragraph 18-19, Available in hard copy on request
which are specific to one group. However one group may practice similar customs to another with some slight internal differences."

19.26 There is no definitive ‘list’ of minority groups. The MRGI report 2010 stated that “Minorities comprise mainly three distinct unarmed social groups – Bantu, Benadiri and the ‘occupational groups’. All the minorities are Somali too, sharing language and many cultural characteristics with the majorities.” The JFFMR 2000 was divided into sections which covered the following broad minority groups (each section provided further detail on various subgroups). This provides a useful guide to the main groups. (Detail on the Bajuni, Bantu, Benadiri and the outcaste or Sab groups is provided in the following subsections):

- Bajuni;
- Bantu;
- Benadiri;
- Eyle;
- Midgan, Tumal, Yibir (Sab ‘outcaste groups’);
- Shekhal; and
- Digil and Mirifle (Rahanweyn) [Their position in Somali society is complex: JFFMR 2000 observed the Digil and Mirifle “… seem to take a middle position between a Somali clan and a minority…” See preceding sub-section]

Size and location

Readers should note that there are no reliable census statistics and estimates vary for the total population of Somalia (between 7 and 9 million; see section on Geography). The population has also been subject to massive displacement (see section on Internally Displaced Persons) and migration (see section on Somalis refugees in the region).

19.27 The MRGI report 2010 noted that: “The number and identities of minorities were confusing. There was no official list to rely on, or clear ethnographic or census data. In addition to the main minorities described previously, there were also several other self-proclaimed ‘minorities’ who were of ‘noble’ origin but numerically and politically disadvantaged where they lived and sought to enhance their standing by claiming this new political minority status.”

19.28 The USSD 2010 report, referring to an estimate made by the UN’s Independent Expert, stated that minority groups represented around 22% of the total Somali population. A UN paper, *Minorities of Somalia*, dated August 2002, (UN Report 2002) stated:

“Until recently, many people perceived Somalia as a country with a population of 7,000,000 people who share one culture, one language and one religion. This was the
impression given during previous regimes in order to sustain the illusion of homogeneity... estimates indicate that... [minorities] constitute one third of the total Somalia population; approximately 2,000,000 people. The minority groups include Bantu, Bravenese, Rerhamar, Bajuni, Eyle, Galgala, Tumal, Yibir and Gaboye. These groups continue to live in conditions of great poverty and suffer numerous forms of discrimination and exclusion." 341

19.29 The Gundel Lecture 2009 report stated that:

“It can be observed that the area between the Juba and Shabelle rivers in Southern Somalia is characterised by considerably greater population density than the areas inhabited by nomadic groups. Therefore, particularly the Rahanweyn groups may constitute at least 25 to 30 per cent of the full population, and hence be larger in size than they are commonly said to be. The Bantus who are often referred to as small groups of perhaps 6 per cent may in fact constitute 20 per cent of the population, and in South-Central there may even be local districts where they form even 50 per cent of the local population. However, these groups are politically suppressed and ‘hidden away in Somali figures which favour the nomadic clans.’” 342

19.30 The UN Report 2002 estimated that approximately 15% of the total Somalia population (representing around half of the minority groups’ population) were Bantu. Though, the size of the other main minority groups identified were a much smaller proportion of the total population. The report also provided some background information to the groups, such as where they were located, language and traditional skills. 343

19.31 The JFFM report 2000 stated: “Minority groups are not evenly distributed throughout Somalia; there is a higher concentration in the central and southern parts of the country.” 344

While the FCO Analyst Paper 2008 reported that:

“Minorities are present in all areas of Somalia. Minority groups are not necessarily exclusively present in the areas they were traditionally associated with, or if they are still resident in their traditional locations, they are no longer present in the concentrations they were before the 1990s. Even before the breakdown of the Somali state in the early 1990s, during the 1970s and 1980s (earlier in some cases) there was a great deal of internal migration-emigration throughout Somalia. Certain areas not traditionally associated with minority groups, will have become home to families or communities of minority groups (pursuing business opportunities or in their role as government servants).

“Though some minority groups were primarily associated with geographical locations e.g. Brawanese, Benadiri, others were identified by their ‘occupational caste’ and might be found in any given area. Different ‘Bantu’ groups are traditionally found in many of the river valleys of the Juba and Shabelle. However many minority groups will have migrated to bigger towns and cities in search of work, social services (health, aid, education) or..."
Minority groups are also found in Somaliland and Puntland as residents and as refugees.” 345

The LandInfo report of November 2008, Conflict, security and clan protection in South Somalia, stated: “According to a well-informed observer, the Hawiye clan Suleiman is still represented in Hamar Wayne, Hamar Jabjab, Karaar and Medina, but those who do not control areas in the capital have mostly left. The minorities’ areas are ghost towns and it is unknown how many minority group members remain in Mogadishu.” 346

The UNHCR has produced a genealogical table of clans, including minority groups, dated circa 2000, which is useful as a guide to the minority groups and where they were located.

General situation

For information about protection generally see subsection Clan protection above.

The FCO Analyst Paper 2008 commented that:

“It is difficult – under current conditions in south Somalia [early 2008] - to ascertain with any certainty whether minorities are more or less vulnerable than they were at other periods. However, minorities, by their very nature, will be more vulnerable than ‘majority’ clan’ Somalis since many will not have the protection of a larger clan network/militia who may act with greater impunity against minority clan members since there is little chance of retribution or accountability. It is not my opinion that there is no ‘comparative difference in levels of safety between majority clan and minority group members’. However, there may be little detectable difference between some individual circumstances.

“While the active persecution of some minority groups is less evident than it was, for example, in the early 1990s in the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Somali state, there is no reason to believe social attitudes have changed markedly in present day Somalia. Moreover, it should not be presumed that discrimination and persecution will be perpetrated by all members of Somali society. Nevertheless, in the Somali context there is an inherent disparity in power between majority clans, and smaller clans and minority groups.

“Access to wealth, the social status of the minority group in question, as well as individual connections, can subvert or mediate this prevailing inequality of power. Many individuals from minority groups remain in Somalia. Some may be able to hold on to property, or attend school, or access medical care. Again confirmation and evidence should be sought from those organisations still working on the ground, e.g. Islamic charities or charitable health provider that have the most immediate contact with vulnerable groups.” 347

The Landinfo response, Vulnerability – minority groups, weak clans and vulnerable individuals dated June 2009 stated:

345 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Analyst’s Unit, Report on COIS’ work on clans, May 2008, paragraph 9-11, Available in hard copy on request
347 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Analyst’s Unit, Report on COIS’ work on clans, May 2008, paragraph 3-5, Available in hard copy on request
“In 2008, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights described the situation for Somali minorities as follows:

“Discrimination against minorities and persons with disabilities was also consistently reported, by recently asylum-seekers to Dadaab and in Somaliland. Social constraints put obstacles to inter-marriage, access to work is restricted to traditional jobs – normally those enjoying the lowest social status and pay. In a context of total breakdown of law and order, lack of protection from clans detracts them even from this shelter provided by customary law’ (OHCHR 2008).

“This situation remains unchanged. In his report from February 2009, the UN’s Independent Expert on the human rights situation in Somalia underlines that conditions for minorities are difficult (UN Human Rights Council 2009). A lack of understanding and, to some extent, racist attitudes characterise many people’s views of these groups, who have traditionally had low status in Somali society. The Islamist groups, including al-Shabaab, therefore represent something positive to people who belong to a minority, since clan affiliation is not a criterion for social status and protection. Moreover, the strict law enforcement in areas controlled by the Islamists prevents the crime that for years has affected these groups in particular (interviews in Nairobi, March 2009). Consequently, in regions such as the Lower Shabelle, we note that the minorities support al-Shabaab.

“While, in June 2008, several of Landinfo’s interlocutors pointed out that everyone is affected by the ongoing conflict – grenades and bombs do not discriminate between people – one well-informed observer underlined that minorities such as Midgan, unlike other groups that find themselves in the crossfire between the rebels and the government forces, do not have alternative places to stay in Somalia. However, another international source reported that minorities who are forced to leave their homes due to difficult security conditions will endeavour to establish a client relationship to a host clan in their new place of residence (interview in Nairobi, June 2008). But this strategy only applies to Midgan and Bantu groups, who have traditionally had this type of affiliation to local Somali clans, not to Rer Hamar or other Benadir groups. In many cases, however, these groups have established protective relationships through marriages or by making payments… In a conversation with Landinfo in Nairobi in March 2009, a representative of an international organisation stated that all groups or clans that are outnumbered and lack military strength in their area of residence can be characterised as minorities and at risk of abuse in a conflict situation. However, another well-informed international source gave the impression that no particular groups are especially vulnerable in the current situation, but that the difficult humanitarian situation affects large parts of the population. As an example, the source in question informed us that the population of the Badhaade district (and the neighbouring district) in Lower Juba share three watering holes that are meant to supply everyone with water, including livestock.”

The MRGI report 2010 stated that: “The Somali minorities collectively – and minority members individually – suffer denial and abuse of the whole range of basic human rights set out in international and regional conventions… Many of the abuses minorities have experienced in conflict situations are also violations of the Geneva Conventions and other provisions of international humanitarian law.”

19.37 The UN Compilation prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in accordance with paragraph 15 (b) of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 5/1, dated 21 February 2011, submitted as part of Universal Periodic Review of Somalia by the UN Human Rights Council, noted:

“UNHCR stated that clan identity continued to permeate Somali culture and often resulted in extreme social, economic, political and cultural discrimination for minority clans [groups]. Most IDPs were of minority clan extraction and therefore faced a barrage of discriminatory indignities and generally suffered human rights violations perpetrated with impunity by host communities. The independent expert made similar remarks.

“The independent expert stated that discrimination and abuses against minorities and vulnerable groups continued unabated. Somali minorities such as the Benadir/Rer Hamar, Midgan (Gadoye) and Tomal, in particular the African Bantu/Jarir population, who had been traditionally discriminated against in Somali society, continued to face abuses and human rights violations.” 350

19.38 The stakeholder Summary prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in accordance with paragraph 15 (c) of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 5/116, dated 21 February 2011, submitted as part of Universal Periodic Review of Somalia by the UN Human Rights Council, noted:

“SNHRC stated that in ‘Somaliland’ some minority groups were considered to be of ‘low caste’ and can only work in most undesirable and low-paying jobs. They live in substandard accommodation. Minority children did not attend school, as parents could not afford to pay the nominal fees, and minority children feared being bullied in school.

“SOMRAF stated that after the collapse of Somalia’s central government, the country disintegrated into regions and was controlled by majority tribes. Clan protection became the only way to safeguard individuals and their property, but minority groups were unable to mobilize this protection and they have thus been subjected to various forms of human rights abuses. SOMRAF stated that minorities were denied justice. In ‘Somaliland’ and in ‘Puntland’ the justice system was corrupt and it marginalized minority groups and the poor.

“MRG stated that minority groups suffered from social segregation, economic deprivation and political manipulation. Often, they were also excluded from mainstream government positions and the few minorities who held those positions had no real power to represent their communities. MRG stated that there was a need for appraisal and replacement of the clan-based power-sharing system known as the ‘4.5 formula’ of representation, a discriminatory approach whereby minorities combined were considered to make up only half of one majority clan… MRG stated that minorities have little chance of obtaining justice if they complain of crimes against them or are accused of crimes and arrested. Police, who invariably belong to majority clans, commonly refuse to investigate complaints by minorities and hardly ever investigate allegations of rape. Courts neglected to guarantee defendants’ rights, including the right to legal defence representation, appeal and petition for clemency in regard to a death sentence. Minorities also have little access to justice when customary law was applied.” 351


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Marriage between minority groups and dominant clans

19.39 There is little information regarding majority/minority clan alliances through marriage. However, *Somalia: the untold story: The war through the eyes of Somali women* by Gardner and Bushra, published in 2004, made reference to male majority clan members marrying female minority clan members. However, there is no indication as to whether this refers to clans in general or only certain minority groups. I.M Lewis, in ‘Saints and Somalis, published in 1998, refers to the Bravanese (non-clan minority group, see Bravanese) as occasionally marrying into major clan families but does not specify whether this has been the case for both male and female Bravanese. The Danish Refugee Council report on human rights 2007 notes:

“An international organisation (C) confirmed that a wife is absorbed into her husband’s clan irrespective of her own clan affiliation. This is so except for when she has married below her own clan’s position. However, if the husband dies a problem may arise regarding the widow’s clan affiliation.

“According to NOVIB a woman’s marriage against the wishes of her family or clan may lead to the death of the man if he comes from a lower clan than his wife. NOVIB gave an example of a couple in which the woman’s own clan sent her away to the other end of the country. The couple later found each other again and had to go into hiding or they would be killed.”

19.40 The MRGI report 2010 stated that: “Despite the customary prohibition by clans on intermarriage with a minority, such relationships have historically probably always taken place, clandestinely at least, although they are rare. This restriction on intermarriage has excluded minorities from forms of clan support or advancement through marriage ties.”

See also Women and subsection on Clan protection.

Bajuni

For further information on the current situation for the Bajuni, please see General situation. For further information on protection mechanisms, please see Clan protection.

Background

19.41 The JFFM report 2000 stated that the Bajuni are mainly sailors and fishermen who lived in small communities on the coast south of Kismayo, and on islands between Kismayo and the border with Kenya. The Bajuni are of mixed Arabic, Bantu, Somali and possibly Malay

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352 Gardner and Bushra, *Somalia: the untold story: The war through the eyes of Somali women*, 2004, Available in hard copy on request


ancestry. Bajuni Elders stated that the Bajuni do not regard themselves as Benadiri people, although they had some trading links with the Bravanese people. 356

19.42 The JFFMR December 2000, and the OCHA Minorities Study of August 2002 observed that the Bajuni had traditionally held a low status in Somalia. As Siad Barre’s administration collapsed in the early 1990s, the Bajuni were attacked by groups of Somali militia who wanted to force them off the islands. Many Bajuni left Somalia for Kenya, the majority having fled during 1992. Some Bajuni earned money by transporting refugees out of towns such as Brava and Kismayo to Kenya. In Kenya the Bajuni went to the Jomvo refugee camp in Mombasa. When the Jomvo camp was closed in 1997 many Bajuni were returned by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to the Bajuni islands, which at the time were considered safe. However, with the fall of Kismayo in 1999 to the allied forces of the Somali National Front (SNF) and Aideed’s Somali National Alliance (SNA), and subsequent attacks on the Bajuni islands, the UNHCR suspended returns. (JFFMR December 2000) 357 (p28-30) (OCHA Minorities Study, August 2002) 358

19.43 The OCHA Minorities Study of August 2002 stated that Marehan settlers had effective control of the islands, Bajuni could work for the Marehan as paid labourers. This is an improvement on the period when General Morgan’s (a Somali warlord) forces controlled Kismayo and the islands, when the Bajuni were treated by the occupying Somali clans as little more than slave labour. The position of the Bajuni is more one of denial of economic access by Somali clans than outright abuse. 359

19.44 The JFFMR March 2004 observed that the Bajuni population is estimated to number 11,000. Clan militias routinely occupy parts of the islands and force the Bajuni to work for them, demanding 50 per cent of the revenue. 360

19.45 A Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board response, *Information on the treatment of the Bajuni in Kismayo since 1989*, and on the names of Bajuni towns in Somalia currently, and prior to the civil war, published February 1996, stated that: “Bajuni are a trans-national coastal people found along the Somali and Kenyan coasts”. 361

Language/dialect

19.46 The main language spoken by the Bajuni is Kibajuni ['Ki’ meaning language], a dialect related to Swahili. Bajuni elders considered “… their language is very different to the Swahili
dialect spoken in areas of Kenya immediately below the Kenyan-Somalia border… although there are some common words”. (JFFMR 2000) An Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada response dated 14 November 2005, based on consultations with three linguistic experts/organisations (see source for full details) stated that Bajuni was a dialect of Swahili, noting that “…there are some phonological, syntactical and lexical differences between the two languages.” The response also stated that Kibajuni is:

“… a ‘cross-border’ language spoken in both Somalia and Kenya… in the past, the Bajuni used to live 'on the coast and offshore islands of [southeastern] Somalia and [northeastern] Kenya' while today, Somali Bajuni have moved or are moving to northeastern Kenya… Bajuni is spoken only in a zone that extends from Kisimayu in Southern Somalia to the Lamu archipelago in Kenya by a community of which there are estimated to be between 15,000 and 20,000 members…”

19.47 The JFFMR 2000 noted that:

“… according to the elders most Bajuni speak some Somali, although the main language spoken by the Bajuni is Kibajuni, a dialect related to Swahili. The Bajuni elders advised the delegation that younger Bajuni, who have lived mainly in exile, alienated from mainstream Somali society, may have only a very limited knowledge of Somali but they stressed that they should know at least some key words in Somali as their family elders would have taught them”.


“When asked what languages are spoken and understood by the Bajuni in the Lower Juba, Abdalla Bakari stated that the Bajuni in Kismayo and the outlying islands speak their own dialect. He estimated that 50% of these are also able to speak Somali, but noted that the vast majority of those that can understand Somali are from the mainland (the Kismayo coast, rather than the islands). … When asked what proportion of the younger generation of the mainland-based Bajuni was able to understand Somali, Abdalla Bakari confirmed that all such persons were able to understand and speak Somali.”

19.49 It was highlighted in the JFFMR 2004 that the island-based populations tended not to be able to speak Somali due to their social isolation from the mainland.

Bantu
For further information on the current situation for the Bantu, please see **General situation**. For further information on protection mechanisms, please see **Clan protection**.

### Background

19.50 The origins of the Bantu are discussed in the Ken Menkhaus paper, *Bantu Ethnic Identity in Somalia*, 2003. The paper opined that the notion of Somali Bantu did not exist before 1991 (p323) and further stated:

> “[W]hat we today call the Somali Bantu is actually a very diverse group linked only by a common physical trait (specifically, tightly curled or ‘hard hair’ [tiimo jareer], distinguishing them from ‘soft-haired’ ethnic Somalis); low or no status within the Somali lineage system; an historical identity as subsistence farmers in a predominantly pastoral and agro pastoral society; and a shared history of discrimination and oppression. Until the 1990s, many of these scattered Bantu communities had little knowledge of one another and hence no common sense of identity. The one physical marker that sets them apart from ethnic Somalis – their ‘hard hair’ – earned them the common nickname ‘Jareer’ (‘hard’) from their Somali countrymen … some Bantu Somalis… retain a tribal identity outside the Somali lineage system. But it should be stressed that only a portion of the Bantu population remain outside the Somali lineage system. The bulk of the Bantu population has affiliation with a Somali clan.” 367

19.51 The JFFMR 2000 explained that: “… normally a Somali of Bantu as well as of non-Bantu origin will refer to a Bantu as a ‘Jarer’, which indicates that the person has strong curly hair. According to Perouse de Montclos the Bantuses are also called habash (meaning servants) by the Somali and shaqila by the Ethiopian Oromo along the River Shabelle.” 368 The same source reported that:

> “The term jareer means ‘hard (or kinky) hair’ and literally denotes hair texture and other physical characteristics such as particular bone structures and facial features, which are negatively valued by Somalis. Gosha are said to be bulkier while so-called ‘pure’ Somalis are said to have longer, more slender fingers. But most significantly according to Besteman, the people who are jareer are considered more ‘African’, as distinct from Somalis, who are considered more ‘Arabic’.” 369

19.52 The report further stated:

> “According to Besteman the term jareer has its greatest significance in the cultural values embedded in being jareer (or ‘African’). It is a term that refers to history, that of non-Somali pagan slave origins, a history devalued in Somali culture and ideology. This has the effect in social terms that carrying a jareer identity is a denigrated status within the Somali social structure. On this basis Besteman concludes that the people of the Gosha, grouped together as jareer, share a lower status within Somali society.

> “The Bantu elders with whom the delegation met urged that the Bantu population in Somalia should not be considered as a minority population in Somalia, because, they argued, the...”

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Bantu constitute a majority in a number of regions in Somalia...According to Perouse de Montclos (1997) the Bantu population in Somalia includes nearly one hundred thousand Swahili-speaking Gosha that are sometimes called dalgolet (‘forest people’ in Somali), molema (or milima, ‘mountain people’ in broken Swahili), watoro (‘runaway slaves’ in Oromo) or oji (from the Italian word oggi, 'today', because these Bantu were said not to think beyond the present day).

“According to the Bantu elders the Bantu mainly occupy the territory between the two main rivers in Somalia, the Shabelle and the Juba, the so-called inter-riverine area of Somalia. The area covers eight regions in southern and central Somalia. The elders stated that in the regions of Middle- and Lower Shabelle, Middle- and Lower Juba, Bay, Benadir and former Upper Juba (parts of which are now in Gedo region) the Bantu population is still today actually a majority.”

The JFFMR 2000 gave some information about sub groups within the Bantu:

“According to the Bantu elders the Bantu population is made up of a number of lineages, some of which live in certain areas and some of which are mixed and/or have resettled in other places in Somalia. Only a few groups are distinguished by their location, such as the Mushunguli, almost all of whom live in Lower Juba region. There are a number of well-known Bantu groups that are not attached and have not been swallowed up by the non-Bantu Somali clans. All of these Bantu groups are referred to as lineage-groups:

- Shabelle
- Shiidle
- Kabole
- Mushunguli
- Gabaweyn (Garbaweyn)
- Eyle (Eile)
- Makane

“There is another group of less well-known Bantu-lineages, most of which are living in the Lower and Middle Juba areas:

- Manyasa
- Miyau
- Majindo
- Makua
- Mlima
- Pokomo
- Manyika

“The Bantu elders explained that many Bantu groups would readily identify themselves with the non-Bantu clan that they are attached to and a Bantu from such a group will say, for example, that he is a Hawadle or an Abgal etc. Such a person considers his identity as totally incorporated into the non-Bantu clan with which he is affiliated. The above-mentioned second group of less well-known Bantu lineages originally came from one of the first-mentioned more well-known groups but have lost their identity to other non-Bantu groups.

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Migration and intermarriage can also result in a situation where a Bantu will not identify himself as belonging to one of the Bantu groups.”

19.54 The MRGI report 2010 noted that: “Bantu have retained many separate cultural traditions and characteristics which date back to different earlier historical periods. These traditions have merged into new social formations in Somalia… They were traditionally incorporated as inferiors into Somali clans and lineages.”

19.55 There are different accounts regarding the language spoken by the Bantu. The JFFMR 2000 stated that:

“Some Bantu groups have maintained their own Bantu dialect or language while others have completely lost their dialects. The Mushunguli of the Lower Juba still have their own dialect called ‘kiziguua’ and the Mushunguli call themselves ‘waziguua’. Any other Somali will call them Mushunguli. According to Perouse de Montclos the Zigua are of Tanzanian origin and they claim to be the first to have arrived in the Kismayo hinterland where they settled along ethnic lines in order to preserve their culture.”

19.56 The MRGI report 2010 noted that: “The Bantu Mushunguli language has been preserved largely by particular Gosha communities. While the main language in the Juba River valley is Af-Maay [also spoken by the Rahaweyn], some Bantu in traditional villages do not understand it. They instead speak ancestral tribal languages, such as Kizigua, with Swahili occasionally used as a common language.”

General situation

19.57 The June 2009 Landinfo response, Vulnerability – minority groups, weak clans and vulnerable individuals stated:

“The situation for the Bantus in the Hiraan region deteriorated during 2007-2008, according to one international organisation (interview, June 2008). The fears that the large clans would be attracted by the relatively good conditions for agriculture that the Bantus had enjoyed until 2007 (interview March 2007) proved to be well-founded. The local clans moved in with heavy agricultural machinery, and the Bantu population no longer had access to their irrigation equipment, for example. According to well-informed local and international sources, the current situation is more complex. There are armed Bantu groups in the Juba valley and elsewhere, and, in addition, the Bantu population is being armed and used by local clans in conflicts (interviews in Nairobi, March 2009).”

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Benadiri

For further information on the current situation for the Benadiri please see General situation. For further information on protection mechanisms, please see Clan protection.

19.58 'Benadiri' is an umbrella term for a number of minority groups from the coast of south and central Somalia. The JFFMR 2000 reported that:

“… Benadiri is used… [to] indicate the coastal population of Somalia roughly between Mogadishu and Kismayo, who share an urban culture and who are of mixed origin (Persian/Portuguese/Arabian/Swahili/Somali), separate from the major Somali clans… According to Perouse de Montclos, the name Benadiri does not correspond to any well defined sociological reality. In the context of resettlement programmes for Somali refugees in Kenya, the Somali refugee traders of the coastal ports decided to regroup under the generic term 'Benadir', which designates greater Mogadishu. Those indigenous to this area succeeded in calling themselves 'Benadiri'.

“Perouse de Montclos adds that the term Benadiri, as a community, did not fully appear before the 1990 civil war (N.B. This is also in accordance with other, UN, sources)... [Benadiri] applies to the traders who were the first inhabitants of Mogadishu but have always been seen as foreigners by the Somalis: the Bandhabow, the Morshe-Iskashato, the Abdisamad, the Sadiq Gedi, the Bafadal, the Amudi, the Duruqo, the rer Shikh, the rer Manyo, the Gudmane in Hamar Weyne district and the rer Faqi in Shingani district.

“Other sources use the names Reer Hamar or Reer Brava. Reer Hamar means people from Mogadishu (Hamar Weyne), but some sources (such as the elders interviewed by the delegation) use it to include the whole coastal population of mixed origin. Reer Brava means people from Brava, and is generally used only to indicate people from Brava of mixed origin.”

19.59 The MRGI report 2010 noted that Benadiri comprise mainly the following communities:

“Rer Hamar, living in Mogadishu (at Independence about half of its population), meaning the ‘clan’ of Hamar (another name for Mogadishu), with their own dialect of the Somali language (Af-Hamar), and divided into a large number of different segments or ‘subclans’.

“Residents of Merca port (the former coastal ‘capital’ in the thirteenth century), sometimes called Rer Merca, with a separate Somali dialect (Af-Donte) related to Af-Maymay of the local Rahanweyn clans.

“Barawani (Bravanese), living in the coastal city of Brava, who have a partially separate historical and urban cultural identity deriving from the sixteenth century when Brava (founded in the ninth century) was an important self-governing trading port and fought off Portuguese attacks. In the nineteenth century, Brava was recognized as a local centre of Islamic Sufi scholarship, education, religious propagation and jurisprudence. Bravanese speak Chimini as a first language (also known as Chimbalazi), which is a local Kiswahili dialect, as well as the local Tunni subclan dialect of Af-Maymay.

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“Bajuni, a low-status and poor fishing community who live in the southern port of Kismayu and the offshore Bajuni islands near the Kenyan border. They have some remote south-east Asian ancestry from trading.” 377

The Reer Brava and Bajuni populations are discussed separately in the sections on Reer Brava and Bajuni.

19.60 The JFFMR 2000 stated:

“The delegation gained the impression by comparing information from the discussions with the groups of elders they met with in Nairobi with information gathered in an earlier Danish mission and with information gathered earlier from informants by the Netherlands Embassy in Nairobi, that not all Benadiri would know all the sub-groups, and that there exist many more sub-groups than the ones mentioned by the elders in Nairobi. It also appears that sub-groups mentioned as living in one town or city quarter may have spread to other coastal towns, and sometimes to inland towns like Baidoa.” 378

19.61 The same source noted that the Benadiri “do not put as much weight on genealogical descent as do the Somali clans. They do not count back many generations although life is clan-based.” The Reer Hamar can be categorised into groups and sub-groups (although the list given below is far from exhaustive):

Hamar groups:
- Qalmashube
- Dhabar Weyne
- Shanshiya
- Morshe (Moorshe)
- Bandhawaw
- Reer Faqi

Shangani groups, including:
- Amudi
- Baa Fadal
- Reer Sheich
- Abakarow

Sub-groups in Merka, including:
- Shukereere
- Ahmed Nur
- Reer Maanyo
- All'iyo Mohamed
- Duruqbe
- Gameedle

The Ashraf. 379

19.62 According to Benadiri elders interviewed in the JFFMR 2000:

“… before the civil war the Benadiri in Mogadishu used to live only in the quarters of Hamar Weyne, Shingani and Bondere. Now Benadiri live in all quarters of Mogadishu.

“Another sub-division is made between 'light-skinned' ('gibil ad') and 'black-skinned' ('gibil madow') Benadiri.

“Benadiri intermarry, but the elders stated that 'light-skinned' Benadiri do not marry 'black-skinned' Benadiri like Moorshe or Dhabar Weyne.” 380

19.63 The JFFMR 2000 noted, with regard to occupations, that:

“The Benadiri elders stated that the Benadiri were an urban and educated people, who worked almost exclusively in commercial occupations. The elders mentioned business, fishery, construction, metal work, carpentry, tailoring, weaving and gold smithing as the occupational sectors of the Benadiri. They also mentioned that some Benadiri were medical doctors, engineers or economists. Benadiri women might sell snacks or handicrafts.” 381

19.64 Jane’s Information Group, in its Country Risk Assessment for Somalia, updated 15 July 2009 noted:

“Reer Hamar (Benadirri) in general practice commercial occupations. Their group has the greatest number of professionals (for example bankers, businessmen, skilled personnel) and most live in Mogadishu. When order disintegrated in 1991, they were among the wealthiest Somalis, which caused resentment, but their neutral, unarmed status left them unable to defend themselves. Unaligned with any faction and with no links to Somali lineage, Benadiris were easy prey during the civil war. Their land, property and businesses were taken. Most Benadiris fled in the early years of the fighting and have little or nothing to return to.” 382

19.65 The Benadiri suffered particularly badly during the civil war in 1991-1992, as they were "attacked and targeted by looters, who considered them to be very rich". Many Benadiri women were raped or forced into marriage. (JFFMR 2000) 383 The JFFMR March 2004 observed that it was estimated that 90 per cent of the Reer Hamar population in Mogadishu left the city as a consequence of civil war and lack of security. 384

382 Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment (JSCRA), Somalia, Demography, Bajuni, Migdgan, Tumal, Reer Hamar, updated 23 July 2010, available in hard copy on request
Ashraf

19.66 Dr Virginia Luling, an independent scholar, noted, in a unpublished report on the Ashraf made available to the UK Border Agency, dated 18 March 2011, that

“The Ashraf (or Asheraf) are a group with religious status, held to be descended from the Prophet Mohamed’s daughter Fatima and her husband Ali bin Talib, who live scattered all over Somalia (and all over the Muslim world). Fatima’s two sons were Hassan and Hussein, and all Ashraf claim descent from one or the other of them.

“The Ashraf are by tradition people with religious status who may be teachers, healers, preachers and arbitrators of disputes. However many of them are also businessmen or have other professions.” 385

19.67 Dr Luling stated, with regard to the divisions of the Ashraf, that:

“The Ashraf of Somalia are divided into the Hassan and Hussein groups of subclans, but within these two divisions there is no single agreed list of subclans. Different individuals may know different selections from the same range of possibilities. There is also no clear distinction in most people’s minds between ‘subclan’ and ‘sub-subclan’, indeed these terms have no equivalent in Somali, and were invented by the international bureaucracy.

“What is however agreed is that the Hussein subclans are part of the ‘Benadiri’, i.e. the population of partly Arab and Persian descent living in the coastal cities of Mogadishu (the Reer Hamar), Marka, Brava and Kismayo. This is possible because the Benadir communities like the Reer Hamar are not all of one descent but are federations of subclans of different origins. The Hassan subclans on the other hand with one exception (see below) are not Benadiri... [they] are dark skinned like the other Somali, and live mainly in the interior of the country (some of them of course may have gone to live in Mogadishu)...However the Ashraf al-Ahdali in Marka and Brava, who are Benadiri, are generally said to be Hassan. They are light in complexion like the other Benadiri.” 386

19.68 Ashraf elders interviewed for the 2000 FFMR “… made it clear that only one Ashraf group (or clan) exists in Somalia”, but also noted that the group is “… further sub-divided on the lines of their male ancestors”. The Ashraf elders sub-divided the Ashraf in the following way:

“Hussein:

- Reesharif Magbuul
- Sharif Ahmed
- Sharif Baalawi

Hassan:

- Mohammed Sharif
- Sharif Ali
- Sharif Ahmed

386 Virginia Luling, Report on the Ashraf, 18 March 2011, Available in hard copy on request
However, Dr Luling noted in regard to above list provided by Ashraf elders that:

"...this list is not complete and must not be taken as definitive. Another account is as follows: 'Five major Ashraf lineages were found in Somalia at the end of the nineteenth century. The Ahmad, Jamal al-Leyl and Bah Alawi, claiming descent from Husayn, formed the majority living in the coastal towns. The much smaller Umar and Abdullah lineages, progeny of Hasan, lived as farmers and herders in the interior' (Scott S. Reese ‘Patricians of the Benadir’ unpublished thesis for the University of Pennsylvania, p 208) In fact these last two are sections of the Ashraf Sarman (an example of the confusion between subclans and sub-subclans I mentioned above). Another account that I have, unlike the 2000 report, lists Maqbuul as part of Hassan. There are other groups which appear in neither of these lists, such as the Ashraf Hassan al-Ahdali of Marka and Brava, whom I discuss below, and the Al-Nadhiri of Brava.

"(It must be noted that in listing these groups it does not matter whether ‘Ashraf’ or ‘Sharif’ is used, and whether it comes before or after the personal name - i.e. you could say ‘Mohamed Sharif’ or ‘Sharif Mohamed’ or Ashraf Mohamed’.)...The Ashraf Hussein subclans belong to the ‘Gibil Ad’ or light skinned Benadiri, that is to say they are generally lighter in complexion than majority Somalis (though there is a wide range of variation). They live in the coastal towns of Mogadishu, Marka and Brava, but some have moved to other places in order to trade or because they have bought land. They are traditionally respected for religious reasons by their fellow citizens; however like the other Benadiri they have been subject to brutality and persecution by the militias since the breakdown of government.

"According to Dr Ahmed Sherif Abbas of the UK Somali Benadiri Community Council, Ba-Alawi is a general name for the Ashraf of the Hussein branch who live in Somalia. (Related Ba Alawi live in many parts of the Arab world.)

"The Ashraf Maqbuul are said to originate in Luuq and near the Ethiopian border, but they also live in Mogadishu, and a few of them in Kismayo and perhaps in other places...These are dark skinned like the other Somali, and live mainly in the interior of the country (some of them of course may have gone to live in Mogadishu), and mostly are not Benadiri.

"However the Ashraf al-Ahdali in Marka and Brava, who are Benadiri, are generally said to be Hassan. They are light in complexion like the other Benadiri. There is no reference to them in the published literature that I have found; nevertheless they do exist and I have met them.

"One of the best known Somali Hassan groups is the Ashraf Sarman; they originate in an area named Sarman or Saraman, near Huddur in Bakool region (I.M. Lewis, ‘Peoples of the Horn of Africa’, 1994, Haan Associates, London, p 35). There they are associated with the Leysan clan, who are part of the Rahanweyn. Today they are also found in Baydhaba and the Bay region, in Mogadishu, Kismayo, Luuq, Jalalaqsi and Bardhere and in Afgooye. In Mogadishu they have been acknowledged and to some extent absorbed by the Benadiri Ashraf there.

"Dr Abbas informs me that the Ashraf Sarman and the other Hassan branches have been persecuted in the same way as those who are Benadiri, and this is confirmed by Mr Mohamud Mohamed Hassan, Ashraf Sarman representative in London.

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“The Sharif Ali of the Hassan branch are especially associated with Kismayo, though they may also live elsewhere.” 388

19.70 The JFFMR 2000 further stated:

“The Ashraf elders indicated that the Ashraf are living in southern and central Somalia, especially in urban locations like Bardera, Kismayo, Baidoa, Hoddur, Merka, Brava and Mogadishu. In Mogadishu the largest concentration of Ashraf was to be found in the Shingani district, but they also lived in Hamar Weyne. Ashraf used to live also in Ethiopia. Some Ashraf from Ethiopia became exiled in Somalia at the time of the Ogaden war in 1977. These Ashraf came from Ogaden, Oromia, Dire Dawa and Harar in Ethiopia and some of them fled Somalia in 1991-92. Those remaining in Somalia reside with other Ashraf. UN sources confirmed that Ashraf communities are also to be found in the Ogaden district of Ethiopia.” 389

19.71 The JFFMR 2000 also noted with regard to the Ashraf traditional occupations, that:

“The Ashraf elders explained that the Ashraf are a religious people. They were traditionally considered a highly respected clan whose members travelled throughout Somalia as religious teachers. Before the civil war a relatively large number of Ashraf received education in Somalia, and during the Siad Barre administration a number of Ashraf were employed as civil servants in the administration while others were businesspeople and therefore travelled frequently throughout the country.” 390

19.72 The elders further stated that the Ashraf:

“… trace their origin to the Prophet Mohamed, whose daughter Fatima had two sons with Ali, named Hassan and Hussein. Any member of the Ashraf community belongs to one of these two lines of descent, from Hassan or Hussein, and any Ashraf (both females and males from the age of two) is able to identify her- or himself as belonging to one of these two lines… [Ashraf] have the name Sharif as part of their name, added to the personal name and the father’s, and sometimes the grandfather’s, name. From this comes the name of the group, Ashraf being the plural of Sharif.” 391

19.73 Dr Luling noted that:

“Sharif (the word of which ‘Ashraf’ is the superlative) is a title, rather like ‘Father’ addressed to a priest. It is an Arabic word meaning ‘noble’ or ‘respected’. It can be attached to one of a person’s names or to more than one, e.g. Sharif Mohamed Sharif Osman Ali or Mohamed Osman Sharif Ali or Mohamed Sharif Osman Sharif Ali. An individual may use it at one time but not at another. It can be used by all Ashraf, but not necessarily, and some nowadays prefer to omit it. It is not generally a personal name, and hence will not always appear on documents such as identity cards or passports.

“It is also occasionally used as a personal name, not only among the Ashraf.”

Dr Luling gave details of the Reer Aw Hassan, a group that associate themselves with the Ashraf:

“This is a separate group from the Ashraf, but they maintain they are related to them. (However it is not to be expected that Ashraf people will necessarily know about the Reer Aw Hassan.)

“Firstly, it must be understood that ‘Reer Aw Hassan’ simply means ‘the family or descendants of Father Hassan (or Mr Hassan - ‘Aw’ means ‘father’ and is a title, used especially for religious men). Since ‘Hassan’ is a common name, it is not surprising that there is more than one descent group called that or something like it, though this can lead to confusion.

“On 10 July 2004, I held an interview with the elders or representatives of the Reer Aw Hassan community in London, who informed me about this group. They stated that they consider themselves by origin part of the Ashraf, though they do not use that name or call themselves ‘Sharif’. They trace descent ultimately to Hussein, son of Fatima daughter of the Prophet. It was a descendent of his, a Sheikh named Hassan, also known as ‘Kalweyne’ who came from the Hadramaut (in Yemen) to Somalia in the 15th century in order to preach Islam.

“In Somalia (tradition says) he married two wives, one belonging to the Marehan clan and the other to the Jidle. They are supposedly the ancestresses of the two branches of the Aw Hassan. The son of the Jidle mother was named Said and his descendants live in the south, from Marka and Qorioley as far as Mandera in Kenya. The son of the Marehan mother was named Nur, and his descendants live in and around Beledweyn in the Hiran region, and in what is now the Somali National Regional State in Ethiopia. (However one descendant of his, Ahmed, moved to the coast, where his progeny became part of the Benadiri.) The Nur branch are further subdivided into the Reer Aw Elmi, the Reer Aw Udgoone and the Reer Aw Mahdi.

“They state that the Reer Aw Hassan are considered a religious clan, and used to be respected accordingly, but ‘the days of respecting the respectable people are gone in Somalia’. They are now simply a small, weak group without armed support.” 392

Language/dialect

The JFFMR 2000 stated:

“According to the Benadir community in Nairobi the Benadir populations in Somalia generally speak a dialect that is different from the dialect of the major Somali clans. Even within this dialect there are sub-dialects: the dialect spoken by the Benadir of Mogadishu is called Af-Reer Hamar, that spoken by the Benadir of Merka is called Af-Merka, and the dialect spoken by the Benadir in Brava and further south is called Af-Brava. The Af-Brava dialect is not understood by the other Benadir. An informant of the Netherlands Embassy stated earlier that the Ashraf in Bay area speak the Rahanweyn dialect.” 393

A Landinfo response, Somalia: Reer Hamar, dated 17 December 2009, reported on the languages spoken by the various Benadiri groups in Mogadishu that:

“No linguistic work has been done in Somalia since the 1980s, and Marcello Lamberti’s study Die Somali-Dialekte (1986) is one of the very few existing comparative studies of the various Somali dialects. According to this study, as well as other Somali sources, including Dr Ahmed Sharif Abbas, leader of the United Somali Benadir Council in London (interview in London, 16 March 2005), the Hamar-dialect is still spoken by Reer Hamar members in Hamar Weyne [in Mogadishu]. Dr Abbas also stated that Reer Hamar living outside Hamar Weyne, particularly the older generation, have kept their dialect. Dr Abbas…did, however, not exclude non-Hamar speaking applicants from being Reer Hamar since obviously not all actually speak the dialect.

“Dr. Martin Orwin, lecturer in Somali and Amharic at University of London’s School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), has underlined (personal communication 16 November 2006) another important aspect: Other Somalis growing up and living in the same neighbourhood as the Reer Hamar probably also know and speak the Hamar dialect. Moreover, in most countries speakers of one dialect or language naturally come into direct or indirect contact with those of neighbouring (or culturally) dominant languages or dialects through business and trade relations, daily life or intermarriages. Whatever the degree or nature of contact between neighbouring peoples, it is generally sufficient to lead to some kind of linguistic interinfluencing, affecting not only the ethnic Somalis [i.e. non minority groups] living in the Reer Hamar neighbourhood, but also the Reer Hamar within Hamar Weyne and in other parts of the city.” 394

Sprakab, a Swedish company that supplies language analysis services to immigration authorities in a mobile text message sent on 24 February 2009 stated: “The Reer-Hamar dialect of Somali is not only spoken by members of the Reer-Hamar clan. It is also spoken by persons who have had their language socialized in Reer-Hamar speaking areas or among Reer-Hamar speaking persons.” 395

Dr Luling noted, with regard to the Ashraf, that:

“It is sometimes erroneously believed that all Ashraf speak Af Reer Hamar, the dialect of the Reer Hamar Benadir community in Mogadishu. In fact almost none of them speak this as their first dialect.

“Since most of the Hassan subclans do not come from Mogadishu there is no reason they should speak Af Reer Hamar; they speak whatever dialect is used by the people among whom they live. However if they have moved to Mogadishu they may have picked up Af Reer Hamar, or more likely the similar dialect used by the Abgal and other people in the Mogadishu area. (This latter is also often called ‘Af Reer Hamar’ in a broader sense, which is confusing.)

“On the other hand the Hussein subclans, and the Hassan Al-Ahdali of Marka, speak a highly distinctive dialect of their own. This is spoken only by the Benadiri people in the city of Marka, including the Ashraf of Marka, and in a slightly different version by the people in the district of Shangani in Mogadishu, including the Ashraf there. It is generally called ‘May

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395 Sprakab, Letter to COIS, dated 24 February 2009, Available in hard copy on request
Dhoonte’, or ‘Madonte’, or in the case of the Marka variant ‘Af Marka’. It is extremely distinctive and noticeably different both from Af Hamar and from Standard Somali.

“It has been described by professional linguists working on Somali, notably Marcello Lamberti, ‘Die Somali Dialekte’, especially pages 34-35, and ‘Map of Somali Dialects’ (Helmut Buske Verlag, Hamburg 1986). Lamberti calls both the Shangani and the Marka varieties ‘Af Ashraf’ because the Benadiri Ashraf are its main speakers (though in fact they are not the only ones).

“The Ashraf of Brava (Ba-Alawi, Al Nadhiri and Al Ahdali subclans) speak the Bravanese language, ‘Chimini’. This is not a Somali dialect, but a separate language, related to Swahili. In that language they refer to themselves as ‘Masharifu’, and the Al Ahdali subclan are also called ‘Mahadali’.

“The Ashraf Sarman in their original home near Huddur speak the ‘May-May’ dialect of the Rahanweyn clans among whom they live. Those who have moved to other areas normally speak the dialects of those areas.

“Needless to say, all these will probably also speak Standard Somali to some degree.”

For more information on the Benadiri, please see the Landinfo response, Reer Hamar.

Reer Brava (also Bravanese or Baravani) and Tunni

See subsection on Digil and Mirifle (Rahanweyne) for information about the ‘rural’ Tunni. For further information on the current situation for the Reer Brava, please see General situation. For further information on protection mechanisms, please see Clan protection.

19.79 The JFFMR 2000 observed that within Brava, elders described “two sub-groups: the Bravanese and the Tunni. Both groups are from Brava and they share to a large extent the same culture. They intermarry between their groups. However, the Bravanese consider themselves Benadiri, while the Tunni do not.” The divisions of the Bravanese were:

- Bida
- Hatimi
- Ashraf

19.80 The Tunni are sub-divided into the Tunni Torre plus five gamas (sub-groups):

- Da'afarad
- Goygal
- Daqtiro
- Hayo
- Werile (JFFMR 2000)

19.81 An Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada response to information request dated 14 November 2005 stated:

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396 Virginia Luling, Report on the Ashraf, 18 March 2011, Available in hard copy on request
In an 11 August 1997 telephone interview with the DIRB, a representative of the Toronto-based Benadir Somali Association, who has done extensive research on the cultural history of the Benadir coast... clarified that the Dafard, Werile, Daqtira, Hafuwa and Goygal are Tunnis-Barawans or urban Tunnis who live in Merka and Barawa and speak the Barawan language (ibid.). However, he emphasized that there is a difference between urban Tunnis who are Barawans and rural Tunnis who are not Barawans. He explained that the difference between urban Tunnis and rural Tunnis is linguistic, with the rural Tunnis speaking the Tuni language, which is not comprehensible to the majority of urban Tunnis (ibid.)." 399


“Historically, in Brava (like in Merka) the Arabs from Zanzibar allied with the Tunni, a Digil clan, in order to counter the Hawiye from the hinterland. Brava was the scene of numerous battles, against the Portuguese, Omanis, British, Egyptians, Italians and Somalis of the interior (Rahanweyn and Dir), many of them establishing lineage. As a consequence, the races in the city were completely 'mixed up'. Although the common hardships and tragedies experienced during and after the 1990 civil war certainly reinforced the sentiment of an identity and uniqueness, on closer inspection we discover communities with very diverse backgrounds despite numerous instances of intermarriage. On the one hand there are immigrants of Arab origin, while on the other hand there are the Somalis of the Brava surroundings, whose minority status is more doubtful because they are part of the Tuni lineage of the Digil.” 400

19.83 Somalia: The Untold Story noted: “... [the Reer Brava/Bravanese] traditionally practice endogamous marriage, that is marrying within the extended family; this is in contrast to the exogamous marriage practice of pastoral groups.” One account in the book is by a Bravanese woman whose husband and mother were both from major clans. No indication is given about how common such ‘exogamous’ marriage might be among the Bravanese but evidently it did exist. 401

19.84 The JFFMR 2000 noted that: “The Bravanese and Tunni elders said their people were also [like other Benadir groups] commercially orientated or working as craftsmen.” 402

Language/dialect

19.85 A Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board information response dated 1 August 1997 which considered, amongst other things, the language spoken by the Reer Brava, stated that:

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399 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Somalia: Information on the Tuenis clan from Barawe including the languages spoken, their unique qualities, any identifiable attributes, and on which clans from Barawa speak Chimini, 1 August 1997, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6ac7710.html Date accessed 2 February 2010
401 Gardner and Bushra, Somalia: the untold story: The war through the eyes of Somali women, 2004, p8, Available in hard copy on request
“[According to a document entitled Barawan Refugees from Somalia published by the Migration and Refugee Services (MRS) of the United States Catholic Conference in Washington] the formal Barawan language of Chimbalazi, written with an Arabic script, is spoken mostly by older Barawans. Chimini, which is different from both Somali and other Benadir languages, incorporates some Somali, Swahili, and even Portuguese vocabulary and is the Barawans' common language... However, the representative of the Benadir Somali Association insisted that while Chimbalazi is the archaic poetic version of Chimini, the two languages are one and the same. He agreed, however, that Chimini is the language commonly spoken by the Barawans (ibid.).” 403

19.86 Dr Luling noted that “The Ashraf of Brava (Ba-Alawi, Al Nadhiri and Al Ahdali subclans) speak the Bravanese language, ‘Chimini’. This is not a Somali dialect, but a separate language, related to Swahili. In that language they refer to themselves as ‘Masharifu’, and the Al Ahdali subclan are also called ‘Mahadali’.” 404

‘Caste’ groups (Sab) - Midgan, Tumal, Yibir and Galgala

19.87 The JFFMR 2000 stated that:

“In traditional Somali society a number of ‘occupational castes’ lived scattered in a client status among the majority of ‘noble’ Somali clans. Various names are used for these groups, and their use is not always consistent.

“The northern Somali pastoral society distinguishes three occupational castes, the Midgan, Tumal (also called Tum Tum, Tumaal, Tomal) and Yibir (also called Yibro, Hebrew), referred to collectively as sab (which means low-caste). These names are also used by the southern Darod. Another collective term used for these groups in northern Somalia is Gaboye (Geboyo), but Gaboye is also used as another name for the Midgan only. A third collective name used for the three groups is Baidari. The terms Midgan, Gaboye and sab are derogatory terms.

“According to Perouse de Montclos the word sab refers to professional castes without territorial, genealogical or ethnic foundation, less than 1% of the country's population. Three quarters of them are shoemakers or barbers who carry out circumcision: they are called 'untouchables', Midgan, and try to impose a new name since the beginning of the war, the 'harmless' Madhiban. Less than a quarter are Tumal blackssmiths. One also finds a handful of Yibir hunters, said to have magic power, and some weavers called Yahhar in the south (according to the name of the shuttle of their weaving loom)... In the inter-riverine area of southern Somalia, occupational caste groups were scattered through the clan system, but the words Midgan and Yibir used to be unknown, while Tumaal was simply the name of the occupation of smith and not of a descent group. Here, the occupational castes were collectively known as boon or gum. But again, by others, Boon and Midgan were used interchangeably.” 405
19.88 Further information from the JFFMR 2000 stated that a “staff member of a UN organisation informed the delegation that the Midgan, Tumal and Yibir live to this day scattered all over Somalia, but especially in the central and northern areas.” 406

19.89 The MRGI report 2010 noted that:

“The occupational groups are a distinct minority grouping comprising three main groupings practicing specific nonpastoralist occupations and crafts, which were essential to the nomadic economy. They are found in all Somali territories; in Somaliland, they are the principal minority.

“Members of the occupational groups are not physically distinct from the pastoralist clans with whom they lived and are not regarded as having a non-Somali or foreign origin. They speak local dialects of the Somali language.

“The three main groups are Midgan (singular Midgan, plural Midgo), also known as Gaboye in Somaliland, who were traditionally hunters and leatherworkers but also undertook various arts and craft work and male circumcision and female genital mutilation (FGM); Tumal, traditionally blacksmiths; and Yibro (singular Yibir, plural Yibro), traditionally ritual specialists.

“Some traditional occupations died out in the mid/late twentieth century. Yibro, for example, can no longer benefit from their once main income of samanyo birth and wedding payments by ‘nobles’ (received in exchange for promises of good fortune), since this custom was banned by the Siad Barre government in the early 1970s as ‘tribalistic’.

“The few educated members of occupational groups work in any chosen field, but most find work in manual and service jobs, such as market-selling and trading, butcheries, domestic work, cooking and selling tea. However, they have lost their monopoly over their traditional tasks (where these still exist), and have often failed to find replacement employment.

“With the disappearance of their traditional lifestyles, and as a result of conflict, many have moved to urban settlements or IDP camps or fled to refugee camps in neighbouring countries.

“On the positive side, several well-known musicians and entertainers hail from the Midgan occupational group, and enjoy respect and success among majority communities.” 407

19.90 The Gundel Lecture 2009 report stated that:

“The sab are traditionally bondsmen of the pastoralist clan groups and they can only have relations with the Somali through an abbaan (Somali patron). Internally the sab may have segmented lineage systems along the Somali pattern. Intermarriage is not allowed nor accepted between these minorities/sub-minorities and the ‘noble’ nomadic clans. The sab are traditionally denied the right to own land or livestock, to participate in the local businesses, market economy, or politics.

“The sab practice various but despised [by main clans] professional skills. Hence sab often refer to groups identified in terms of their occupation. They protect themselves by keeping their own affairs secret, this being their only power to resist the dominance of the Somali nomads, as this creates a dependency of the latter on these groups when it comes to house construction and various kinds of handicraft.”

The same report noted that:

“Sab include the following groups:

“GABOOYE/MIDGAN

“In the North, the Gabooye are composed of the Tumaal (blacksmiths), Midgan (shoemakers, hunters and gatherers, poison makers, and hairdressers), and Yibr (see below for details). Groups which belong to Gabooye/Midgan include the Madhibaan, Muuse Dhariyo, Howleh, Hawraar Same, and Habar Yaquup. These groups are also found scattered in Southern Somalia.

“YIBR

“The Yibr or Yibro (some find Yibro is a mispronunciation) live along the coast in Mogadishu and in Bosasso, Borama, and Burco. In the South, they are described as being distinct from Gabooye. The Yibr are often claimed to be descendants of early Hebrews who settled in the Horn of Africa. According to Virginia Luling, the 'Hebrew' idea is not an anti-Semitic invention by others, but was and is maintained by the Yibr themselves, who have found in this a way of dignifying their outcast status. However, while this Hebrew descendancy is disputed, it is not entirely baseless. While it is true that the 1970’s produced a myth about their descent, which was related to a political effort at discrediting them by playing on anti-Semitic sentiments, there is some historical merit to the notion that ancient Somali people prior to Islam and Christianity did have a connection to Jewish or similar religions, and the present group may derive from the ‘losing’ part in an ancient religious dispute at Aw-Barkhadle (a religious centre commemorating Sheikh Yusuf Al-Kownin) in present day Somaliland, which still is a location of pilgrimage located between Hargeysa and Berbera. This, however, needs more research outside our present scope.

“Members of Yibr used to have mythological functions in society (and do not involve themselves in other tasks in traditional Somali society): They collected the Samanyo (a birth gift) from new-born babies and newly-married girls in exchange for giving them a good fortune. Historically, the Yibr enjoyed some protection before independence through this superstitious practice that prevailed about them, and which is now no longer widely practiced. After independence they suffered from the banning of the Samanyo custom and other related traditions by the government.

“With the presence of radical Islamic groups like Al-Shabaab with strong anti-Jewish attitudes, the Yibr who claim historical descent from the Hebrews have been increasingly suspected by Somalis with a radical Islamic orientation. Therefore members of the Yibr may be targeted in South Central Somalia, despite the fact that they are Muslims today.

“Further sab groups present in the South are the Yahhar, Galgalo (woodcarvers), Boon, and Eyle.”

The Galgale (Galgala or Galgalo) are described in the OCHA report 2002 as making up 0.2% of the population of Somalia. They were, at that time, found in Mogadishu and Gedihir within the Middle Shabelle region and have the traditional skills of woodcraft and pastoral activity.

Language/dialect

The JFFMR 2000 stated that: “Lewis (1994a) notes that the Midgan, Tumal and Yibir speak the Somali language of the clan to which they are attached. The Midgan and Yibir also have a special, secret dialect that the major Somali clans would not understand.” Dr Gundel noted that “[the Sab]… speak a language of their own, although it is disappearing.” (Gundel Lecture 2009)

For more information on issues that affect ethnic minorities, please also see Latest News, Recent developments, Security Forces, Abuses by non-state armed groups, Women, Children, Internally Displaced Persons and Humanitarian Situation.

20. LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER PERSONS

LEGAL RIGHTS

The International Lesbian and Gay Association’s report, State sponsored homophobia, updated in May 2010, (ILGA Report 2010) noted that same-sex relations between men and between women are illegal and referred to the relevant parts of the Somali penal code:

“Article 409 Homosexuality ‘Whoever (a) has carnal intercourse (b) with a person of the same sex shall be punished, where the act does not constitute a more serious crime, with imprisonment from three months to three years. Where a) the act committed b) is an act of lust different from carnal intercourse, the punishment imposed shall be reduced by one-third.’

“Article 410 Security Measures ‘A security measure may be added to a sentence for crimes referred to in Articles 407, 408, and 409

“Somalia has not had a functioning central government since the fall of the dictator Mohamed Siad Barre in 1991, and the enforcement of the national Penal Code can be questioned. In the southern parts Islamic courts rule, having imposed Islamic Sharia law

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punishing homosexual acts with death penalty or flogging. However, Somaliland in the north has declared itself independent, and it still applies the Penal Code.”

**SOCIETAL TREATMENT AND ATTITUDES**

20.02 The US State Department *Report on Human Rights Practices in Somalia*, published on 8 April 2011, covering events of 2010 (USSD 2010 report) stated that “Sexual orientation was considered a taboo topic, and there was no public discussion of this issue in any region of the country. There were no reports of societal violence or discrimination based on sexual orientation.”

See Freedom of religion for details on how Somalia has adopted Sharia law, and Non-state armed groups for details of how Al Shabaab has applied a strict, and intolerant, interpretation of this. Also see following section on women in regard to the difficulties faced by lesbians and bi-sexual women because of their gender in addition to their sexual orientation.

21. **WOMEN**

**OVERVIEW**

21.01 Somalia is not a signatory to the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). (Countries as signatories are set out in the CEDAW official signatories list, accessed on 3 May 2011.)

21.02 The Freedom House report, *Freedom in the World 2010*, published on 3 May 2010 noted that: “Women in Somalia face a great deal of discrimination. Female genital mutilation is still practiced in some form on nearly all Somali girls. Sexual violence is rampant due to lawlessness and impunity for perpetrators, and rape victims are often stigmatized.”

21.03 The same report noted, with regard to Somaliland, that: “Society in Somaliland is patriarchal. While women are present in the workplace and hold some public positions, men make the political decisions. As in the rest of Somalia, female genital mutilation is practiced on the vast majority of women.”

21.04 Human Rights Watch, in its *World Report 2011*, published on 24 January 2011, stated that in areas governed by Al Shabaab: “Freedoms women took for granted in traditional Somali culture have been dramatically rolled back. In many areas women have been barred from engaging in any activity that leads them to mix with men, even small-scale commercial enterprises on which many of them depend for a living. Al-Shabaab authorities have

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arrested, threatened, or whipped countless women for trying to support their families by selling cups of tea.” 417


LEGAL RIGHTS

21.06 The USSD 2010 report noted that

“In the country’s overwhelmingly patriarchal culture, women did not have the same rights as men and were systematically subordinated. Polygamy was permitted… according to Sharia and the local tradition of blood compensation, anyone found guilty of the death of a woman must pay half the amount that would be payable to the aggrieved family if the victim were male… Women’s groups in Mogadishu, Hargeisa, Bossaso, and other major towns in South Central Somalia, Somaliland, and Puntland actively promoted equal rights for women and advocated the inclusion of women in responsible government positions, and observers reported some improvement in the profile and political participation of women in the country.” 419

21.07 The Human Rights Watch report, Harsh War, Harsh Peace, published on 19 April 2010, noted that: “In November 2009, al-Shabaab insurgents reportedly closed three grassroots women’s organizations in the southern border town of Balad Hawa, saying that Islam does not allow women to go to offices.” 420

21.08 The Danish Refugee Council and the Danish Immigration Service, in their Joint Fact-Finding Mission report on human rights and security in central and southern Somalia, published in August 2007 added: “NOVIB explained that there is almost general impunity for violence against women in Somalia. Traditional law is not focused on the victim as an individual and women as victims are normally not covered by the compensation system. Even in Hargeisa, Somaliland it is the male who decides whether or not a case should be tried according to traditional law or the legal system.” 421

See Violence against women, and subsections on Rape and Domestic violence

POLITICAL RIGHTS

21.09 The USSD 2010 report noted:

“There were 37 women in the expanded 550-seat TFP; there were only seven women selected as MPs out of the additional 275 MPs that were appointed when the ARS entered the TFG. The number fell short of the TFC requirement that at least 12 percent of parliamentary seats be reserved for women.

“Despite low female representation in the Somaliland administration, President Silanyo appointed three women to his new 26-member cabinet. There were only two women in the 82-member lower house of parliament, but for the first time a women sat in the Somaliland lower house after taking over the position left vacant by her deceased husband.

“In Puntland there have never been any women on the Council of Elders. In December 2008, two women were selected as representatives to the 66-member parliament, reduced from five in the previous parliament. Only three women were appointed to Puntland’s 40-member cabinet and only one as a full minister.”

21.10 A socio-economic survey of Somalia by the World Bank and UNDP carried out in 2002, (report dated January 2004), noted:

“Female members of the household were questioned on their participation in women’s group and local councils. A popular community based women’s group is uruurka haweenka normally formed at district level by female representatives from different communities. 6.4 percent and 16.8 percent of the urban households and 3.6 percent and 13 percent of the rural and nomadic households confirmed regular and occasional participation in women’s groups respectively. Women from 71.2 percent of the households in urban and 78 percent from non-urban areas stated that they have never participated in any women’s group. Similarly, their participation rates in local councils are quite low. Even though comparative figures are not available for the pre-war period, the general impression is that these rates represent an upward trend.”

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS

21.11 The Human Rights Watch report, *Harsh War, Harsh Peace*, published on 19 April 2010, noted that: "While all Somalis living under local al-Shabaab administrations cope with onerous and repressive edicts, women bear the brunt of the group’s repression and abuse. Somali women already faced serious discrimination, but al-Shabaab’s rules have reinforced traditional and cultural prejudices while introducing an array of new ones.”


| Life expectancy: females as a % of males | 2009 | 106 |
| Contraceptive prevalence (%) | 2005–2009 | 15 |
| Antenatal care coverage (%) | At least once | 2005–2009 | 26 |
| | At least four times | | 6 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Delivery care coverage (%)</th>
<th>Skilled attendant at birth</th>
<th>2005–2009</th>
<th>33</th>
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<td></td>
<td>Institutional delivery</td>
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<td>9</td>
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<td>Maternal mortality ratio</td>
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<td>reported</td>
<td>1000</td>
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<td>2008</td>
<td>adjusted</td>
<td>1200</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lifetime risk of maternal death: 1 in:</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

21.13 UN Women reported on 5 April 2011 that:

“Ms. Bachelet [UN Women Executive Director] spoke with women refugee leaders, who complained of high illiteracy among women and girls, which makes it difficult for them to compete equally with their male counterparts for opportunities.

“Girl child education needs to be supported to give them intellectual empowerment,’ said Ms. Bachelet.

“Women refugee leaders told Ms. Bachelet that high divorce rates and family breakdown among the refugees is worrying. They added that divorced women and neglected children are adversely affected by the loss of socio-economic support from their husbands and fathers, respectively.

“One of the women leaders said: ‘Widows and orphans face many problems socially, economically and emotionally as they carry out responsibilities as heads of families. This often leads to sexual and economic exploitation and early marriages, while marital rape and sexual violence are also rampant. Many women are unemployed due to limited job opportunities, illiteracy and restricted movement outside the camp. We do not have money to start up self-employment initiatives. Elderly women have the least opportunities in the camps. This has disempowered women economically. We need income-generating activities to empower us.’”

See also IDPs and [Somali refugees in the region](http://www.unwomen.org/2011/04/un-women-head-raises-alarm-on-insecurity-facing-somali-refugee-women-and-girls-in-kenya/) for further information on conditions for IDPs and refugees outside Somalia in general.

**Property**

21.14 The USSD 2010 report noted that: “Under laws promulgated by the former government, girls and women could inherit property, but only half the amount to which their minor and adult brothers were entitled.”

**Marriage**

21.15 The USSD 2010 report stated that “Polygamy was permitted.”

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21.16 The Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada response, Somalia: Prevalence of forced or arranged marriages in Somalia; consequences for a young woman who refuses to participate in a forced or arranged marriage, published on 20 September 2007, stated:


"Cited in a joint Danish, Finnish, Norwegian and British report on human rights and security in central and southern Somalia, lawyer Hassan Isak provides a description of two types of marriages in Somalia (Denmark Mar. 2004, 53). According to Isak, one type of marriage is a marriage that is arranged by the parents, either with or without the knowledge of the couple (ibid.). Another type of marriage is a marriage that occurs without the knowledge of the parents (i.e., where a couple secretly elopes) (ibid.; Musse Ahmed 2004, 54).

"According to an article on marriage traditions in Somalia published in a 2004 book entitled Somalia – The Untold Story: The War Through the Eyes of Somali Women, elopement is a common way for a Somali woman to avoid an arranged marriage (ibid; see also Gardner and El Bushra 2004, 148). However, the practice is frowned upon in Somali society and a woman who elopes may be 'risking her family's wrath' (Musse Ahmed 2004, 54). In October 2006, Islamic leaders in Somalia reportedly banned this type of marriage, known as masaafo, saying that it 'violate[d] islam' (SAPA/AP 30 Oct. 2006). Further information on the banning of masaafo could not be found among the sources consulted by the Research Directorate within time constraints.

"The article on marriage traditions in Somalia indicates that in cases where a marriage is arranged without the consent of the couple, the girl may be able to refuse the marriage if she gains her mother's support (Musse Ahmed 2004, 53). However, to avoid this situation, the father or male relative of the girl may try to formalize the union without advising the family (ibid.). The author notes that although a 1975 Family Law states that a father must not arrange a marriage without the consent of his daughter, this law is no longer applied in the country (ibid.). Still, some women living in urban areas of Somalia who are aware of the law continue to refer to it (ibid.).

"A 2004 report by the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) similarly indicates that a woman can be forced into a marriage arranged by her father or male guardian (21 Aug. 2004, 10). The father or guardian may justify the arrangement, believing that he is looking out for the woman's welfare (ibid.). A prior xeer [customary law (Denmark Mar. 2004; UN 10 May 2007)] agreement between two tribes may also be used to encourage a union (DRC 21 Aug. 2004, 10). In such cases, the woman's family must agree to give her in marriage to another tribe because of 'a precedent case where the girl's male relative or kin was able to marry from her suitor's tribe in a similar manner' (DRC 21 Aug. 2004, 10). Large bride prices are often used to bribe the father (ibid.).

"Arranged marriages in Somalia can also take place through the exchange of women between warring tribes, which is viewed as sealing a peace agreement (Gardner and El Bushra 2004, 147; Musse Ahmed 2004, 54; Ibrahim 2004, 167). Referred to as godob reeb in northern Somalia and godob tir in the south (Gardner and El Bushra 2004, 147), this type of marriage is usually arranged without the consent of the woman or the man (Musse Ahmed 2004, 54). According to the article on marriage traditions in Somalia, if either partner refuses to take part in this type of arranged marriage, then another family member will take his or her place; however, the article also notes that girls who are promised in these types
of marriages are usually ‘very young and find it hard to refuse unless they elope or unless there is some resistance to the marriage within the family’ (ibid.).

“According to the 2004 DRC report, ‘inherited marriage’ is another form of marriage in Somalia in which a woman is unable to choose her husband (DRC 21 Aug. 2004, 10). Inherited marriage includes dumaal, the Somali tradition where a man is entitled to "inherit" or marry the widow of his deceased brother or close relative (ibid., 11; UN Dec. 2002, 24). It also includes higsiisin [also referred to as xigsiisan], where a man is permitted to marry the sister of his deceased wife (ibid.; DRC 21 Aug. 2004, 11).

"Traditions of arranged and inherited marriages are said to be ‘particularly strong’ among nomadic pastoralist populations in Somalia (DRC 21 Aug. 2004, 10). The DRC report indicates that women who refuse to participate in these marriages ‘face strong pressure and sanction’ from their family and their in-laws and, in cases of dumaal, could also be denied certain rights, including child custody and the management of the deceased husband's property (ibid., 11)” 429

For information on inter-clan marriage, please see Ethnic groups. For information on forced marriage, please see Violence against women: Forced marriage.

Reproductive rights

21.17 The USSD 2010 report stated that:

“Women do not have the right to decide freely the number, spacing, and timing of their children and often faced discrimination, coercion, and violence when they attempted to exercise these rights. In part because of cultural sensitivities, there was limited information about and access to contraception. With inadequate health care, women rarely had skilled attendance during childbirth or essential obstetric and postpartum care. In Somaliland and Puntland, international programs ensured that women were equally diagnosed and treated for sexually transmitted infections, including HIV. There were limited programs in the southern and central regions, largely because of al-Shabaab’s access restrictions on humanitarian agencies.” 430

Dress code

21.18 The Minority Rights Group International report, State of the World's Minorities and Indigenous Peoples 2010, published on 1 July 2010, noted: “The impact of increasing Islamic fundamentalism on women in Somalia is clear. In April, CNN reported that Al Shabab ordered women in Baidoa to cover their bodies and heads from view or risk a jail term, and prescribed the specific colours for such clothing. It is not clear yet how this order

429 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Somalia: Prevalence of forced or arranged marriages in Somalia; consequences for a young woman who refuses to participate in a forced or arranged marriage, 20 September 2007, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/47ce6d7a2b.html Date accessed 3 May 2011

has affected women from minority groups in the country, but it curtails women’s right to privacy and bodily integrity.”


“In the second quarter of 2009, as al-Shabaab consolidated its hold on south/central Somalia, its local authorities began requiring women to be fully veiled in public. Over the next few months, many leaders added the additional stipulation that women wear an abaya made of a particularly thick cloth and that touches the ground and hides all physical contours.

“These orders were a dramatic departure for many Somali women, who traditionally cover their heads and bodies, but often with lightweight, colorful fabrics that they wrap around themselves loosely.

“One former al-Shabaab fighter described how he would patrol the neighborhoods of Kismayo in August and September 2009 and punish women in lighter-weight abayas or traditional Somali clothing. First, he said, they would slash the woman’s clothes with a knife or scissors. Afterwards, he continued, ‘We would whip her for a while to feel the pain and then take her to the nearest emir [local al-Shabaab commander] to decide punishment.’…The abaya decrees have severely hampered freedom of movement for women who simply cannot afford the expensive, imported garments. Many poor women have had to share one abaya across an entire family or group of households, meaning that only one of them can leave the home at any given time. In some areas, al-Shabaab militiamen have threatened men over their wives’ or daughters’ attire… Women are also targeted with sporadically applied decrees that appear to underscore the arbitrary power and impunity of some local leaders rather than a coordinated policy. Only in some areas, for example, did al-Shabaab order women to don gloves and socks, a common addition to the abaya in conservative countries such as Saudi Arabia. Similarly, in some neighborhoods of Mogadishu, Kismayo, and Baardheere, a few women told us al-Shabaab had banned bras because they considered them a ‘western deception.’ But this did not appear to be a uniform mandate, despite widespread media coverage.

“Some women who were devout Muslims and already wore abayas told us they initially had welcomed the dress codes, particularly those who had been criticized for wearing the hijab by troops from neighboring Ethiopia who were bolstering the TFG. But soon, these women said, they felt as if they had been yanked from one extreme to the other.”

See [Human rights abuses by non-state armed groups](http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2010/04/13/harsh-war-harsh-peace) for more information on abuses by al Shabaab.

Employment

21.20 The USSD 2010 report noted:

“Many Somali women have assumed a greater burden by becoming the sole bread winners for their families. Women form a negligible part of those employed in both the formal public

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and private sectors because of disparities in education. Women continue to experience economic discrimination in areas under al-Shabaab control because of al-Shabaab’s extremist position, which regards women’s participation in economic activities as anti-Islamic. Despite difficult economic conditions generally prevalent in Somalia, women were not discriminated against in terms of owning or managing businesses. There are no visible government efforts in any region of Somalia to combat economic discrimination.”

21.21 The Human Rights Watch report, *Harsh War Harsh Peace*, published on 19 April 2010, stated that:

“Somali women have traditionally engaged in a wide array of small-scale businesses such as selling tea, qat, and fruit in kiosks, small shops, and markets. But al-Shabaab administrations have ordered women to close their shops. As one resident of a southern village explained, ‘Al-Shabaab said this is social mixing [with men].’ These discriminatory bans have profoundly curtailed women’s rights to freedom of movement and to earn a living. In a country with a vast number of war widows and female-headed households, with scarce employment options, they also have left many families without crucial sources of income.

“Several refugees told us that al-Shabaab enforcers did not hesitate to punish working women who were infirm, elderly, or pregnant, or who had lost all other breadwinners in the conflict...Al-Shabaab has reserved some of its harshest treatment for women who commit what it considers the double transgression of selling tea or other goods to alleged TFG sympathizers. In the Hawlwadaq neighborhood of Mogadishu, one woman said al-Shabaab gave her 185 lashes over the course of a week in jail in December 2008 after accusing her of that ‘crime.’”

**Prostitution**

21.22 The USSD 2010 report noted that: “Child prostitution was practiced, and like all other forms of prostitution, was legally prohibited in all areas. In al-Shabaab areas, the penalty was flogging or even death by stoning.”

The US State Department Trafficking in Persons Report 2010, published on 14 June 2010 stated that: “Somali women and girls, some of whom were trafficking victims, engaged in prostitution in brothels in Garowe, the Puntland-administered part of Las Anod (Sooq region), and pirate towns such as Eyl and Harardheere. Some female brothel owners, who can profit as much as $50 per client, reportedly kept these victims in harsh conditions and meted out physical abuse.”

**Freedom of travel**

21.23 The Human Rights Watch Report, *Harsh War, Harsh Peace*, published on 19 April 2010, noted that “When women travel, they are often required to have a male escort... Male escorts must sit in a different seat if the woman is traveling in a vehicle, however, as al-Shabaab bars men and women from sitting together. Several women told us they were

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warned by bus drivers that they would be flogged if they were caught sitting beside a man.”

See also Freedom of movement for a wider overview

VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN

For general information about the security situation and human rights violations committed by the security forces and non-government groups see Latest news, Recent developments, Security situation, Security forces and Non-government armed groups. Female Genital Mutilation is typically practised on female children between four and seven years, and is covered in the section on Children, Female Genital Mutilation (FGM).

21.24 The UN Human Rights Council’s Compilation : [Universal Periodic Review] : Somalia / prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in accordance with paragraph 15 (b) of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 5/1, published on 21 February 2011, noted:

“The independent expert raised concerns that there were no credible statistics on violence against women. Women were often victims of rape by warlords, and reportedly continued to face cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment on a daily basis, particularly in Al-Shabaab-controlled areas. The independent expert stated that no amnesty should be granted for violence against women that qualified as crimes against humanity, in line with Security Council resolutions 1325 and 1820. The Secretary-General also noted that gender-based violence remained grossly underreported, particularly in southern and central Somalia.”

21.25 The report of the UN’s Independent Expert on Somalia, dated 16 September 2010, stated that:

“While such violence is normally underreported, according to a likely confidential database kept by United Nations agencies, some 409 incidents of rape, attempted rape/sexual assault, forced prostitution and domestic violence took place in the period January to June 2010 in Somalia. Assessments conducted revealed that there was a high prevalence of sexual violence in IDP settlements, where victims were generally of minority clan origin, bereft of clan protection and often forced to engage in risky coping mechanisms.”

21.26 On the issue of impunity, the Danish JFFM R of August 2007 stated that: “The culprits are not prosecuted and enjoy impunity.”

The LandInfo report of November 2008 on impunity stated: “Escaping punishment for violence against women is extremely common, both because traditional law does not focus on the victim and because women’s rights are not

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protected in the same way as men in the compensation system (interview, Oxfam Novib, March 2007)." 441

Rape

21.27 The USSD 2010 report stated:

“Laws prohibiting rape exist in Puntland, Somaliland, and TFG-controlled areas; however, they were not enforced. There were no laws against spousal rape. While there were prosecutions of rape cases in Puntland and Somaliland, there were no reports of the TFG prosecuting rape cases during the year. The UNHCR and UNICEF documented patterns of rape perpetrated with impunity, particularly of women displaced from their homes due to civil conflict or who were members of minority clans. Police and militia members engaged in rape, and rape was commonly used in interclan conflicts. Traditional approaches to dealing with rape tended to ignore the victim's situation and instead communalized the resolution or compensation for rape through a negotiation between members of the perpetrator's and the victim's clans. Victims suffered from subsequent discrimination based on attributions of ‘impurity.’ Women and girls in IDP camps were especially vulnerable to sexual violence, contributing to the spread of HIV/AIDS. In 2008 the UNIE reported that in Mogadishu and Kismayo, IDP women and girls, particularly those belonging to minority groups, were increasingly the targets of sexual violence by youth gangs. In Somaliland gang rape continued to be a problem in urban areas, primarily perpetrated by youth gangs, members of police forces, and male students. Many of these cases occurred in poorer neighborhoods and among immigrants, refugee returnees, and displaced rural populations living in urban areas. Many cases were not reported… Women suffered disproportionately in the country's civil war and interclan fighting.” 442

21.28 The UN Human Rights Council’s Summary : [Universal Periodic Review] : Somalia / prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in accordance with paragraph 15 (c) of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 5/1, published on 21 February 2011, noted that:

“KARMA [a national human rights institution] stated that rape continued to be used as a tool of war in Somalia. The number of rapes inflicted by police has decreased, but the use of rape by armed groups to punish and intimidate rivals persisted. These incidences are rarely prosecuted. Victims of rape have no recourse…SSWC [Save Somalia Women and Children] stated that ‘war-related rape’ was widespread and women in Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) camps were particularly vulnerable, as the rape of women and girls by the militia and bandits was a common phenomenon.

“JS4 [International Fountain of Hope Kenya; IIDA Women Development Organization; Alla Magan; Kalsan; FEPMA (Female Paramedical Association); FATXA; SWEA(Somali Women Entrepreneur Association); Somali Women Diaspora Network; and IIDA Italia] stated that women and girls that were engaged in ‘pastoralism’, were at risk of attacks from militia groups and armed gangs, mainly in southern Somalia.

441 Landinfo, Conflict, security and clan protection in South Somalia, 12 November 2008, p18
http://www.landinfo.no/asset/784/1/784_1.pdf Date accessed 2 April 2009
442 US Department of State, Report on Human Rights Practices in Somalia, p36-37, 8 April 2011,
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160144.pdf Date accessed 4 May 2011
“SSWC stated that even though women were essentially neutral when it came to clan affiliation they were still the targets of clan-related reprisals and attacks.” 443

21.29 The Danish JFFMR of August 2007 stated that:

“AI reported in May 2007 that refugees interviewed in Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya ‘were particularly concerned about sexual and gender based violence against women and girls.’ According to AI these concerns are reflected in reports from NGOs working with IDPs in Somalia. AI reported about the mother of two teenage daughters who were both raped by members of an armed group who were manning a road block that they encountered while fleeing. The mother explained that rape by members of armed groups (mainly clan-based) manning road blocks was common.” 444

21.30 The LandInfo report of November 2008, Conflict, security and clan protection in South Somalia, has updated information about the issue of rape in Somalia, and stated:

“Some of the international sources that Landinfo met in June 2008 believed that rape is a tool in the conflict, but no distinct groups or clans appear to be particularly subjected to sexual violence. How widespread the assaults are is also unclear, but no increases in rape have been registered in for example the Keysaney hospital in Mogadishu. This does not necessarily mean that the number of rapes has fallen, since rape is associated with shame, and women rarely speak of the attack. Opportunities to open criminal proceedings against the perpetrators are also rare because the perpetrators are unknown in most cases. The rapes are committed by government soldiers, freelance militia and other criminal elements. It is claimed that government soldiers are more often responsible for the rapes than the insurgents, and that the Islamists commit such offences to a lesser extent than others (interview June 2008).” 445

21.31 The Danish JFFMR of August 2007 observed that:

“Women who have been sexually abused or raped are stigmatised, according to NOVIB. … A married woman who has been the victim of rape may also risk being divorced by her husband. NOVIB added that divorced women might be stigmatised, depending on their particular situation. NOVIB added that even though rape of women and killings comprise the majority of the reported human rights violations in Somalia many rapes go unreported.” 446

21.32 The Danish JFFMR of August 2007 also stated that: “Lazzarini [Oxfam NOVIS source] referred to a network called Protection Monitoring Network (PMN), which undertook a research of Sexual Gender-Based Violence (SGBV). The research covered 600 reported

cases of rape. After a period of six months 10% of the assaulted women had committed suicide and 25% had disappeared.” 447

21.33 The Danish JFFMR of August 2007 added that: “An unmarried and raped woman will typically meet a demand from her own family and clan to marry the rapist as she will not have a chance to marry anyone else. As a consequence many rapes go unreported by the women. An unmarried woman who gets raped and refuses to marry the rapist may face severe consequences from her own family and clan, and she may be excluded from the clan.” 448

Forced marriage

21.34 The Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada response, *Somalia: Prevalence of forced or arranged marriages in Somalia; consequences for a young woman who refuses to participate in a forced or arranged marriage*, published on 20 September 2007, stated:

“A 2004 report by the Danish Refugee Council (DRC)… indicates that a woman can be forced into a marriage arranged by her father or male guardian (21 Aug. 2004, 10). The father or guardian may justify the arrangement, believing that he is looking out for the woman's welfare (ibid.)… According to the 2004 DRC report, 'inherited marriage' is another form of marriage in Somalia in which a woman is unable to choose her husband (DRC 21 Aug. 2004, 10). Inherited marriage includes dumaal, the Somali tradition where a man is entitled to 'inherit' or marry the widow of his deceased brother or close relative (ibid., 11; UN Dec. 2002, 24). It also includes higsiisin [also referred to as xigsiisan], where a man is permitted to marry the sister of his deceased wife (ibid.; DRC 21 Aug. 2004, 11).

"Traditions of arranged and inherited marriages are said to be 'particularly strong' among nomadic pastoralist populations in Somalia (DRC 21 Aug. 2004, 10). The DRC report indicates that women who refuse to participate in these marriages 'face strong pressure and sanction' from their family and their in-laws and, in cases of dumaal, could also be denied certain rights, including child custody and the management of the deceased husband's property (ibid., 11)… Several sources consulted by the Research Directorate indicate that many women in Somalia who have been raped are forced to marry their rapist (Peacewomen.org 4 Mar. 2006; Musse 2004, 77; Denmark Aug. 2007, 33). According to a 2004 article on war crimes against women and girls in Somalia, this type of marriage occurs mainly in nomadic pastoral societies where women are valued for their 'bride wealth' (Musse 2004, 77). The practice occurs when a suitor feels that a father has demanded a "bride wealth" that is too expensive and then conspires to rape a girl in order to negotiate a lower price (ibid.). A woman who has been raped will generally be forced to take part in such an arranged marriage in order to uphold her family's honour (ibid.; Denmark Aug. 2007, 33). A woman who refuses to marry her rapist can reportedly face 'severe consequences from her own family and clan, and ... may be excluded from the clan' (Denmark Aug. 2007, 33).

“Another form of forced marriage in Somalia, called dhabar-garaac, takes place in nomadic societies where a woman may be kidnapped by ‘raiders’ and forced to marry one of them (Musse 2004, 77). The 2004 article on war crimes against women and girls in Somalia states that this type of forced marriage is ‘extremely coercive, with the girl being beaten, starved and otherwise physically and psychologically abused until she agrees to marry’ (ibid.). Often, a girl will only be allowed to return to her family once she has become pregnant and the marriage cannot be annulled (ibid.). The article notes that although the prevalence of abduction for forced marriage had begun to decline, there has been a resurgence of the practice as a result of the civil war (ibid.).”  

21.35 The US State Department Trafficking in Persons Report 2010, published on 14 June 2010, noted that al Shabaab: “… forcibly recruited young girls who were then ‘married off’ to its militia leaders and used for logistical support and intelligence gathering. In February 2010, for example, Hassan Turki recruited 100 girls between 14 and 18 years of age into his militia in Afmadow, Lower Juba. Al-Shabaab also reportedly recruited Somali children from Kenya-based refugee camps and Nairobi’s Eastleigh neighborhood.”

21.36 BBC News reported on 7 October 2010 about forced marriage:

“‘This year we have been hearing a lot about forced marriages and rapes,’ says a member of an aid agency working on the ground with newly arrived Somali refugees in Yemen… ‘Unmarried women are forced to marry and if she refuses they say she’s a non-Muslim. Many parents choose to send their girls away with relatives and friends so as not to be forced into marriage or raped.

“‘If a woman refuses a forced marriage, we have reports of them being beheaded and their head sent to their father.’”

Domestic violence

21.37 The UN Human Rights Council’s Compilation : [Universal Periodic Review] : Somalia / prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in accordance with paragraph 15 (b) of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 5/1, published on 21 February 2011, noted that “The independent expert cited domestic violence which victimized women as a major problem throughout Somalia. Because of the destruction of formerly functioning clan structures, in many places women had no access to any formal or traditional protection.”

21.38 The USSD 2010 report noted that: “Domestic violence against women remained a serious problem. There were no laws specifically addressing domestic violence; however, both

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449 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Somalia: Prevalence of forced or arranged marriages in Somalia; consequences for a young woman who refuses to participate in a forced or arranged marriage, 20 September 2007, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/47ce6d7a2b.html Date accessed 3 May 2011
Sharia and customary law address the resolution of family disputes. Sexual violence in the home was reportedly a serious problem, linked to general gender discrimination. 453

**Trafficking**

21.39 The US State Department Trafficking in Persons Report 2010, published on 14 June 2010 stated that:

“There were reports of trafficking offenders preying on young women and children, mostly internally displaced persons from South/ Central Somalia, at marketplaces and in the streets, falsely promising them lucrative jobs outside Somalia. Dubious employment agencies are involved with or serve as fronts for traffickers, targeting individuals desiring to reach the Gulf States. Somali women are smuggled, sometimes via Djibouti, to destinations in the Middle East, including Yemen and Syria, as well as to Sudan and South Africa, where they are subjected to conditions of involuntary domestic servitude and, to a lesser extent, forced prostitution. In 2009, there were several reported cases of Somali women trafficked into the commercial sex trade in Sudan after smugglers abandoned them midway through their journey to Libya. Somali men are subjected to conditions of forced labor as herdsmen and menial workers in the Gulf States.” 454

See also Trafficking for a wider overview

**ASSISTANCE FOR WOMEN**

21.40 The UN Human Rights Council’s Compilation : [Universal Periodic Review] : Somalia / prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in accordance with paragraph 15 (b) of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 5/1, published on 21 February 2011, stated that:

“UNDP noted that survivors of sexual and gender-based violence had faced considerable difficulties in accessing after-care services such as medical assistance, psychosocial support and legal assistance. In addition, the majority of cases of sexual violence had been settled through traditional dispute-resolution mechanisms. UNDP indicated that the Sexual Assault Referral Centre had been established as a pilot project in Hargeisa in October 2008.” 455

21.41 The USSD 2010 report noted that: “Women's groups in Mogadishu, Hargeisa, Bossaso, and other major towns in South Central Somalia, Somaliland, and Puntland actively promoted equal rights for women and advocated the inclusion of women in responsible government positions, and observers reported some improvement in the profile and political participation of women in the country.” 456

21.42 The women’s NGO SAACID:

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“... is an indigenous Somali, not-for-profit, non-religious, non-political, Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) founded and directed by Somali women, that focuses on practical measures to enhance the life-options of women, children and the poor... Originally founded in Somalia in October 1990, SAACID reorganised its operations in 2001 to gain better donor recognition and expand its capacity to provide better delivery into the Somali context.” 457

For further information on the assistance that SAACID provides, please see their website.

21.43 The UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Somalia, dated 5 May 2010, noted that: “Women’s organizations have also been closed by al-Shabaab in an attempt to prevent women from working.” 458
The Human Rights Watch report, Harsh War, Harsh Peace, published on 19 April 2010, noted that: “In November 2009, al-Shabaab insurgents reportedly closed three grassroots women’s organizations in the southern border town of Balad Hawa, saying that Islam does not allow women to go to offices.” 459

22. CHILDREN

This section should be read in conjunction with the section on Women.

OVERVIEW

22.01 UNICEF, in state made in discussion on Somalia arranged by the UN Human Rights Council on 29 September 2010 urged: “… the Somali Transitional Federal Government to implement its declared intention to ratify as soon as possible the Convention on the Rights of the Child and to ensure that the specific rights of children will be duly acknowledged and protected in the new Constitution.” 460

22.02 The US State Department 2010 Country Report on Human Rights Practices in Somalia, published on 8 April 2011, covering events of 2010 (USSD 2010 report) stated that “Children remained among the chief victims of continuing societal violence. UNICEF and other international NGO child-protection monitors verified that hundreds of children were killed or injured during the year as a direct result of conflict.” 461

22.03 The UN Security Council’s Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in Somalia, published on 9 November 2010, stated that:

“...the level and scale of grave violations against children in Somalia have been increasing over the past two years, particularly with regard to the recruitment and use of children in armed conflict; the killing and maiming of children; and the denial of humanitarian access to children. In Mogadishu, tens of thousands of children are suffering under the direct impact

of one of the most intense and indiscriminate conflicts in the world, while the broader implications of displacement, livelihood collapse and lack of statutory protection services have affected children across the entire country and further increased their vulnerability to all forms of violence, exploitation and abuse.”  

22.04 The same report also noted that:

“Civilians, including children, continue to be the majority of casualties, primarily as a result of being caught in the crossfire between parties to conflict, shelling and explosions. Violations of child rights need to be viewed in the broader context of challenges to collecting data for Somalia, particularly for children. During 2009, some 3.64 million people, including approximately 1.8 million children, relied on humanitarian assistance. This number is almost double that of January 2008. Food supplies remain disrupted, and access to clean water and medical assistance hindered, and the hospitals are stretched to capacity... Many schools in Mogadishu have been closed, and several taken over by armed groups... Children continue to be acutely affected by displacement, exhaustion, separation and emotional trauma, and deprived of access to basic services and protection.”

22.05 UNICEF published the following information about Somalia, dated February 2011:

- 241,000 children acutely malnourished, 75 per cent of them are in the conflict-stricken southern regions. Global acute malnutrition rates are 21 per cent nationally (deterioration from 15 per cent in the last six months).
- In the south, 1 in 4 children is acutely malnourished and 1 in 23 severely malnourished, at exceptionally high risk of death.
- Routine immunization coverage among the lowest in the world (measles coverage in Central South in 2008 was 26 per cent)
- School enrolment amongst the lowest in the world, 30 per cent throughout Somalia and 22 per cent in Central South (Gross enrolment rate)
- Only 30 per cent of the population has access to safe water
- Conflict continues to maim and kill children and women. Campaigns to recruit thousands of children into armed forces/groups - including girls- became more aggressive.

22.06 The summary prepared by the UN Human Rights Council for the Universal Periodic review in Somalia, (UPR Stakeholder Report 2011) dated 21 February 2011, noted that:

“JS1 [Somaliland Civil Society Coalition for the Universal Periodic Review, comprising Nagaad Umbrella, Comprehensive Community Based Rehabilitation in ‘Somaliland’, Hargeisa University Legal Clinic, Somaliland Women Lawyers association, ‘Somaliland’ youth development association, ‘Somaliland’, Somalia] stated that in ‘Somaliland’ there were reports of children being detained for minor cases, such as parental disobedience, with hard-core criminals, which exposed these children to abuse, physical and
psychological trauma. Almost all of the police stations and local prisons in ‘Somaliland’ lacked separate cells for child offenders.” 465

Socio-economic data on children in Somalia covering, amongst other things, child mortality, nutrition, health, prevalence and treatment for HIV/AIDS, education, demographic and economic indicators and child protection, is available in annexes to UNICEF’s State of World’s Children 2011, dated February 2011.

LEGAL RIGHTS

22.07 The USSD 2010 report stated that:

“The practice of ‘asi walid’, a custom whereby parents placed their children in prison for disciplinary purposes and without any legal procedure, continued. Many of these juveniles were incarcerated with adults.

“UNICEF and the UNDP started a project to provide abandoned children and child prisoners with legal and other protection assistance. The juvenile justice program also educated justices and lawyers about human rights problems for children.

“The country is not a party to the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.” 466

See Prison conditions

VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN

22.08 The USSD 2010 report noted that:

“Child abuse and rape were serious problems, although no statistics on their prevalence were available. UNIE reported that throughout Somalia, ‘Rape and other grave sexual violence against children continued to be a major protection concern.’ There were no known efforts by regional governments to combat this practice. Children remained among the chief victims of continuing societal violence. UNICEF and other international NGO child-protection monitors verified that hundreds of children were killed or injured during the year as a direct result of conflict.” 467

22.09 The summary of stakeholders prepared by the UN Human Rights Council for the Universal Periodic review in Somalia, dated 21 February 2011, noted that

“GIEACPC [Global Initiative to End All Corporal Punishment of Children] stated that, pursuant to Article 439 of the Penal Code (1962), corporal punishment was lawful in the home and in schools. In the penal system, there was no provision for corporal punishment as a sentence for crime, but it was lawful under Somali Islamic Law. In alternative care

settings, corporal punishment was lawful. In ‘Somaliland’ corporal punishment was unlawful in the home, in schools, and in alternative care settings.” 468

See Latest news, Recent developments and Security situation. Also Security forces, subsection Human rights violations by security forces, Non-government armed groups and Ethnic groups.

**Trafficking of children**

See also Child Soldiers.

22.10 The US State Department Trafficking in Persons Report 2010, published on 14 June 2010, stated that:

“Somali women and girls, some of whom were trafficking victims, engaged in prostitution in brothels in Garowe, the Puntland-administered part of Las Anod (Soo region), and pirate towns such as Eyl and Harardheere. Some female brothel owners, who can profit as much as $50 per client, reportedly kept these victims in harsh conditions and meted out physical abuse. Because of an inability to provide care for all family members, some desperate Somalis willingly surrender custody of their children to people with whom they share family relations and clan linkages; some of these children may become victims of forced labor or commercial sexual exploitation. There were reports of trafficking offenders preying on young women and children, mostly internally displaced persons from South/ Central Somalia, at marketplaces and in the streets, falsely promising them lucrative jobs outside Somalia. Dubious employment agencies are involved with or serve as fronts for traffickers, targeting individuals desiring to reach the Gulf States. Somali children are reportedly smuggled to Saudi Arabia through Yemen for forced begging.” 469

See also Trafficking for a wider overview

**Female Genital Mutilation (FGM)**

22.11 The form of FGM practiced most commonly in Somalia is type III or infibulation (see following paragraphs), which is defined, in an IRIN news article, In-depth: Razor’s Edge - The Controversy of Female Genital Mutilation, dated 1 March 2005, as: “Excision (removal) of part or all of the external genitalia (clitoris, labia minora and labia majora), and stitching or narrowing of the vaginal opening, leaving a very small opening, about the size of a matchstick, to allow for the flow of urine and menstrual blood. Also known as pharaonic circumcision.” The same source provides further background about the practice of FGM in general terms, not specifically to Somalia. 470

22.12 The USSD 2010 report stated:

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The practice of female genital mutilation (FGM) was widespread throughout the country. As many as 98 percent of women and girls had undergone FGM; the majority were subjected to infibulation [the most severe form of FGM]. In Somaliland and Puntland, FGM is illegal, but the law was not enforced. UN agencies and NGOs tried to educate the population about the dangers of FGM, but there were no reliable statistics to measure the success of their programs.

The UPR Stakeholder Report 2011 observed that:

“JS1 stated that female genital mutilation was a deeply rooted traditional practice. COGWO stated that this practice was rampant and that gender based violence was a common problem which remained a secret. SWC stated that young girls between the ages of 4–8 were subjected to ‘infibulations’ to ensure their chastity until they were married. SSWC indicated that many girls die from the shock and pain of the procedure which was normally done without anesthesia, as well as from infections and massive blood loss.”

Although there have been more recent studies that have summarised key aspects of FGM issues, the most comprehensive source found is the World Bank study of November 2004, *Female Genital Mutilation / Cutting in Somalia.*

The LandInfo report, *Female genital mutilation in Sudan and Somalia,* published on 10 December 2008, stated: “Some sources ... claim to have observed a transition from infibulation to sunna [excising of part of the female genitals] in recent years, however it is difficult to ascertain with any degree of certainty how extensively patterns might have changed. Sunna is common among the Benadir population in the coastal areas. In these population groups, the procedure is performed on newborns (ibid).” The World Bank 2004 study rejects the use of the term sunna as the authors consider it a euphemism that grants the practice a false sense of religious obligation and acceptance. The World Bank 2004 study stated: “Type II or excision of the clitoris accounts for 80 percent of all operations in Africa. Among Somali and Sudanese women, 80 to 90 percent undergo type III or infibulation, which accounts for only 15 percent of cases in Africa. Ethnic Somalis in Kenya and Ethiopia practice infibulation which is also common among other ethnic groups in Ethiopia and Eritrea.” The Somali term for infibulation is gudnin fircooni.

These findings on numbers of women affected by and the different forms of FGM used are reflected in older material, such as the JFFMR March 2004, which stated:

“According to Jones [Gary P. Jones, Country Director, Somalia, Kenya and Djibouti, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), Horn of Africa Programme], FGM is still the norm in Somalia. The main mode of the FGM is the ‘pharaonic’ form [infibulation], but still many...”

would claim that they only practice ‘Sunna’ which is a lighter version of FGM. Jones stated that this was done from a business point of view, explaining that people promoting ‘Sunna’ would receive financial support. In reality, however, girls are circumcised in the same manner as usual, i.e. ‘Pharaonic’ style. Nearly 100% of women are affected by FGM in Somalia. Jones did not expect that any significant change would emerge in this respect during the next 15 years, even though some modest progress has been made in some areas. It was emphasised that it is extremely difficult to change the attitude towards FGM, and providing education and information to young girls might be the only way to make any impact on the issue.”

22.17 The World Bank 2004 study summarised information about the practitioners of FGM:

“In most parts of Somalia, traditional circumcisers, guddaay, conduct most operations. The number of professional health providers who circumcise girls is also increasing. Interviews with two members of the Professional Nursing Association in Mogadishu revealed that almost all the association’s members carry out a ‘milder form of circumcision’ for a fee. They also discourage the work of traditional circumcisers and the Pharaonic FGM/FGC. Complications arising from FGM/FGC are turning more families towards health providers, trained TBAs and nurses who perform whatever type of FGM/FGC parents’ desire. This medicalisation of FGM/FGC started at the dawn of Somalia's independence when a Lebanese medical practitioner, began circumcising girls in Martini Hospital in Mogadishu under sterilized and anaesthetic conditions. He claimed to minimize damage and dangers associated with FGM/FGC. He conducted partial or total clitoridectomies without infibulations for those who demanded ‘Sunna’ circumcision. Other health providers emulated him, spreading services to Mogadishu's elite. WHO, UNFPA and UNICEF condemn health providers who perform FGM/FGC.”

22.18 The age when FGM is performed is in later childhood: the LandInfo report of December 2008 stated that it is usually between the ages of five and eight in Somalia generally and much older in the Somali diaspora; the JFFMR March 2004 states between the ages of four and seven; an IRIN report of February 2009 stated that full infibulation at about five to seven years, was practised in Dadaab camp, Kenya. The World Bank 2004 study noted that: “Girls are now circumcised between the ages of five and eight, often within the privacy of their homes.”

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The LandInfo report of December 2008 has detail about the amount of societal pressure on families to perform FGM. An IRIN report of February 2009 highlights a mother’s fears for her daughters, as she has resisted FGM coercion; her family is still facing societal discrimination in Dadaab refugee camp, Kenya.

The Danish Refugee Council and the Danish Immigration Service, in their Joint Fact-Finding Mission report on human rights and security in central and southern Somalia, published in August 2007, noted: “In case the father or brother (in the father’s absence) decides not to go through with the FGM of the daughter/sister the father/brother will be attacked by family or clan members. Anti-FGM is in Somali translated into ‘anti-purity’ … It was added that a girl who has not undergone FGM would be very difficult to marry off.”

The LandInfo report of December 2008 added: “In Somalia, genital mutilation is not a rite of passage that marks the transition from child to adult. The practice is linked to tradition and notions about purity, virginity and control of unwanted sexuality.”

The LandInfo comment effectively summarises a complex, detailed explanation within the World Bank 2004 study, on perceptions of purity and other reasoning behind the practice.

An IRIN article dated 7 April 2008 noted that local organisations, such as We Are Women Activists (WAWA) in Bossasso, were developing in Puntland to support women objectors and to lobby for FGM’s eradication. The article added “Puntland officials said they were encouraging civil society organisations to fight FGM and making it part of the fight for human rights and women’s rights.”

The UN in Somalia reported on 7 March 2011 about a programme to combat FGM in Galkayo:

“For over 20 years Hawa Aden Mohamed, educationalist, peace activist and human rights campaigner, has worked to improve the lives of Somali women and girls. She is one of the founders of the Galkayo Education Centre for Peace and Development (GECPD) which has been instrumental in increasing girls’ enrolment in the Mudug region of Puntland (northeast Somalia) and ensuring that at 40% the region has the highest girls' enrolment throughout Somalia. This, in a country where only 24.6% of Somali girls attend school.

Funded by UKaid from the Department for International Development, UNICEF is partnering with the GECPD to support 3,220 girls as they reach puberty. In total, the maturation project will benefit 12,000 primary school girls, women in vulnerable communities and help to mainstream gender in Puntland’s educational policies...Hawa recounts that her father—opposed female circumcision.

“Before I was born, my elder sister had died at age nine from tetanus as a result of FGM. If my father had had support we wouldn't have been cut but it was my stepmother's responsibility and she didn't know any better. I suffered. I only learnt my sister had died after I was cut. In those days no-one spoke out. Human rights issues were not discussed but the health issues were always there”... Hawa's FGM abandonment programme is now renowned in Galkayo and communities there acknowledge her enormous contribution to girls' education and women's economic and social empowerment. Several women from IDP communities now have the skills to run a bakery and are selling their products in the market while their daughters study at the Centre's schools...‘In Somalia [FGM] is considered ‘a women's issue’ but women alone cannot fight for its elimination. It will take time. There are still places where they haven't even heard that it is not right. Maybe one day there will be no FGM and one day we will get government support’ [Hawa said].” 489

UNICEF also reported on 7 March 2011 about a programme to educate women in Somaliland about alternatives to FGM;

“It is a shame and a disgrace if a girl is uncut. She will be outcast and ostracized from her community'. This is what Ubah Abdillahi believed until she was convinced otherwise by the community education programme aiming to end the practice of female genital mutilation (FGM) in Somaliland.

Ubah Abdillahi, mother of 5 girls and 3 boys, lives in Daami village in Hargeisa. She came to know about a programme run by NGO TOSTAN- supported by UNICEF- aiming to create community awareness around various issues including FGM/C, child rights, hygiene and sanitation, environment and health among others. She started to attend classes offered by the programme and participated in its activities.

‘Before participating in this programme, I believed that all girls have to be cut, just like I was cut when I was a young girl. I cut my daughters because I always believed it was good for protecting girls from men. If the girl is not cut, she can't get married either. This was done to me by my mother and I did the same to two of my five daughters.’ said Ms. Abdullahi.

‘I wouldn't have been able to socialize and have friends if I wasn't cut. It was considered a disgrace and people would gossip if a nurse wasn't called to the house for opening the stitching after a woman gets married or for child birth.’

TOSTAN started its community advocacy work in Daami village in 2006 and formed the ‘Community Management Committee' which played a key role in engaging in discussions with the community and creating awareness on the harms of FGM. After three years of the programme's inception, the people of Daami village publically declared abandonment of the practice. Ms. Abdullahi was one of the Committee members who were trained by TOSTAN... Over a year has passed since Daami community declared abandoning FGM in 2009, but the Committee members are still active in their advocacy work. They meet regularly at the classroom provided by TOSTAN to discuss and exchange their experiences and plan joint activities within and outside their village, including writing and performing songs and plays.

“So far, a total of 84 communities have been mobilized through this programme in Somalia.
Of them, 28 communities including Daami village declared collective abandonment of FGM. 490

22.25 The Edna Adan Hospital in Hargeisa gives medical treatment for those who have suffered FGM:

“The Edna Adan Maternity and Teaching Hospital confronts the effects and complications of FGM almost on a daily basis. Cases include children who have been mutilated hours and sometimes days before being brought to the hospital and who are still bleeding quite heavily or unable to pass urine because of their new stitches. The severest case of a mutilated child seen at the hospital was one where the child had been so badly cut, that there was virtually no skin to suture together to stop the gushing blood coming from her little body.

“Common cases also include newly married girls and women just de-infibulated and suffering from bleeding, infection or just plain pain. Also, women in Labour for much longer than they need be because scarring due to FGM prevents the birth canal from dilating properly. Some of those women end up with third degree lacerations and other post natal complications.

“Edna Adan has been dealing with cases of this nature in her 50 years of midwifery experience and has been engaged in a life-long struggle to see the end of this practice. With the establishment of her maternity hospital and with the still much needed services to deal with FGM, It has become essential for the hospital to lead the campaign. it is fast becoming a repository of all information relating to FGM in Somaliland and the region. The hospital has started an auditing process to have baseline data about the prevalence of FGM and the survey in this report is the first data to come out of that auditing initiative and it is believed to be the first of its kind in Somaliland. The hospital holds educational and sensitization seminars for concerned groups. At a patient level, counselling services are provided to the victims of FGM and their families. There is no other institution in the country better equipped with the experience, knowledge, facilities, and above all, dedication and sheer 'Will' to tackle this issue.” 491

Child soldiers

22.26 The USSD 2010 report noted that:

The recruitment and use of children in militias and other fighting forces was a longstanding practice in the country and continued during the year. Without established birth registration systems, it was often difficult to determine the exact age of persons, including recruits to armed groups. The July 2009 report of the UN Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict cited the TFG, Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’a, al-Shabaab, Hisbul Islam, clans, and the Puntland regional administration as continuously recruiting children into their militias. In May the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) for Children and Armed Conflict reported an increase in the recruitment of children, some as young as nine, in armed conflict in Somalia. In response, TFG Prime Minister Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed committed his government to eradicating the practice in a meeting with this SRSG and agreed to

491 Edna Adan University Hospital, Female Genital Mutilation, undated, http://www.ednahospital.org/hospital-mission/female-genital-mutilation/ Date accessed 2 May 2011
designate a focal point to work with the UN to pave the way towards the signing of an action plan and an official agreement to secure and verify the release of child soldiers.

“The TFG did not conscript or condone the recruitment of child soldiers for use by its National Security Force or allied fighting units. However, there were reports that a small number of under-age persons remained associated with TFG forces, and the TFG pledged to address this issue comprehensively. Children were most heavily recruited and forcibly conscripted by clan militias and antigovernment groups.

“Al-Shabaab conscripted children into armed conflict and military operations in addition to using them to plant roadside bombs and other explosive devices. According to the UN, al-Shabaab recruited children as young as eight from schools and madrassas and trained them to plant bombs and carry out assassinations for financial reward. In May 2009 TFG police arrested 11 minors who had been kidnapped in Lower Shabelle Region and forced into al-Shabaab militias. All of the children were subsequently released to their parents or guardians. In Kismayo, Baidoa, and Merka, al-Shabaab forced boys 15 and older to fight as ‘mujahedeen’ or face execution. In 2009 al-Shabaab killed an estimated 16 teenagers after they refused to become al-Shabaab fighters.

“Because of the risk in intervening directly with militia groups, UNICEF protection partners engaged in low-profile condemnation of child recruitment while undertaking public education and youth empowerment initiatives. UNICEF also assisted the TFG in preparing an action plan that would include measures to screen its troops, as well as establish mechanisms to prevent further child recruitment.

“The Somaliland constitution contains no minimum age for recruitment into the armed forces, but there were no reports of minors in its forces.”

22.27 The US State Department Trafficking in Persons Report 2010, published on 14 June 2010, noted that:

“The recruitment and use of children in militias and other fighting forces is a longstanding practice in Somalia and continued during the year. A January 2010 UN report indicated that the number of child soldiers in Somalia had increased over the last three years, with widespread recruitment from schools, madrasas, and among street children. While the TFG’s military appeared to be less systematic in the practice of recruiting children than other armed groups, youth under the age of 18 continued to be recruited, including by force and deception, into militias associated with the TFG, its allied forces, and into militias controlled by individuals within the government. Ethnic Somalis claiming to represent the TFG reportedly also recruited underage Somalis from Kenya-based refugee camps in North East Province, as well as possibly Kenyan youth from surrounding areas. There were no reports of Somaliland and Puntland authorities recruiting or using child soldiers during the reporting period.

“During the reporting period, al-Shabaab, Hisbul Islam, and allied armed groups used force and deception to exploit orphaned and street children for use in armed conflict, carrying out assassinations, planting bombs, portering, and domestic servitude. Al-Shabaab systematically and forcibly conscripted children, sometimes as young as eight, from southern Somalia, as well as smaller numbers from Puntland. In Kismayo, Baidoa, and Merka, al-Shabaab obligated all boys 15 years of age and older to fight or face death;

leaders reportedly killed an estimated 16 teenagers after they refused to serve as fighters. The group also forcibly recruited young girls who were then “married off” to its militia leaders and used for logistical support and intelligence gathering. In February 2010, for example, Hassan Turki recruited 100 girls between 14 and 18 years of age into his militia in Afmadow, Lower Juba. Al-Shabaab also reportedly recruited Somali children from Kenya-based refugee camps and Nairobi’s Eastleigh neighborhood. 493

IRIN reported on 21 March 2011 that:

“…armed groups have reportedly recruited more child soldiers to their ranks, some even forcing teachers to enlist pupils.

“In a recent offensive against rebel groups in Bulo Hawo town on the border with Kenya, the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) stated on 17 March, ‘…children were involved as fighters and a significant number of them were killed. According to reports, intense fighting in the area between Dhusamareb and Ceel bur in Galgadud has also resulted in many child casualties.’

“The TFG [Transitional Federal Government] forces, their allies, the Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama, and Al-Shabab are all engaged in the recruitment. Al-Shabab [the largest armed opposition group] is the biggest culprit,’ said an official working with an NGO that monitors the state of children in the country. The official, who asked not to be named, did not suggest the African Union’s TFG-supporting military mission in Somalia, AMISOM, was also using children.

“He said although the exact number of child soldiers was unknown, his group suspected between 2,000 and 3,000 children were in different armed groups.

“He added that Al-Shabab was forcing Koranic and other teachers to bring their charges to be trained. ‘We have noticed a major increase in the recruitment of children since January 2011. It coincided with the current escalation of fighting in Mogadishu and parts of south and central Somalia.’” 494

The UN Security Council’s Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in Somalia, published on 9 November 2010 noted that:

“Evidence gathered by monitors during the reporting period suggests a considerable increase in the scale of recruitment and use of children by all parties to conflict during the past two years. This has been confirmed following field research conducted by the United Nations in May and June 2009. Recruitment has also become more systematic in the past year. Although the total number of children being recruited and used in the conflict is unknown, estimates suggest that there are several hundred children in the forces of the Transitional Federal Government or its associated militias, and several thousand among the insurgent groups. Children are being trained in basic arms techniques as well as more sophisticated skills such as assassination, intelligence collection, use of improvised explosive devices and suicide missions. Continued displacement, abandonment, neglect, orphanhood and destitution have made children, especially those living on the streets and in internally displaced settlements, particularly vulnerable to recruitment. Revenge and radical teachings also play a role in some children’s decision to join an armed group...The forces of the Transitional Federal Government, Hizbul Islam, Al-Shabaab and Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama’a, and clan-based armed groups throughout central and southern Somalia have

all been accused of recruiting and using children in the conflict. From May 2008 to March 2010, United Nations partner organizations interviewed 208 boys and 2 girls who had been recruited and used in armed conflict or policing activities. All but six of those children were between 13 and 17 years old. These numbers are indicative, but do not reflect the considerable scope of the problem. It is difficult to reach affected children, and monitors have been concerned that the reporting of recruitment activities might endanger their safety, following death threats against them.

“Children are typically recruited from schools and madrasas and from internally displaced settlements in Somalia and refugee camps in neighbouring Kenya. Children are often told it is their duty to fight or to avenge a family member’s death, or they are offered money or are directly threatened. Forcible recruitment has also become much more common during 2009 and 2010, with teachers and parents under pressure to send children to the frontline to support the cause. There is evidence that increasing numbers of families are fleeing the country to avoid this widespread and aggressive recruitment. Civil society and local non-governmental organizations have consistently reported that it has become more difficult to prevent recruitment because of the increasingly aggressive attitude of the various armed groups.

“Children as young as 11 are used by insurgent groups and are paid between US$ 3 and $35 per operation (attacks, assassination, intelligence gathering). In June 2009, UNICEF partners received reports that some children were given up to $80 to join. In July 2009, a 14-year-old boy, whose father died in crossfire and who fled Mogadishu with his family to Kalagoooye internally displaced person camp, was recruited by Al-Shabaab. He was transferred to Beledweyne to fight against the Transitional Federal Government. A UNICEF partner met his mother and asked why he joined. She said: ‘We were starving to death, so he could not resist the offer from Al-Shabaab to be a soldier and be paid.’

“While recruitment of girls has been rare and is generally regarded as socially unacceptable, there are documented accounts of girls working for armed groups, particularly in cooking and cleaning. Girls are also brought in to transport detonators, provide logistics support and collect intelligence, as well as receiving weapons. An Al-Shabaab training camp for about 120 girls is located near Kismayu, where girls learn intelligence-gathering techniques, transport of explosives and driving. Girls are reported also to be recruited for marriage to young combatants.”

The same report broke the accounts of recruitment down by organisation:

“Al-Shabaab

“Available information indicates that Al-Shabaab has undertaken the most systematic and widespread recruitment and use of children in the conflict. While very active in the central and southern region, the group is also reportedly recruiting children in Puntland and Somaliland, and training them in Bay, Bakool, Galgaduud, Hiraan, Mogadishu and Raas Kaamboni.

“In December 2008, eyewitness accounts of the clashes in Guriel and Dhuusamarreeb indicated that between 30 and 45 per cent of Al-Shabaab combatants were children. Seven children were killed and three were injured in the clashes. In February 2009, Al-Shabaab

reportedly redirected a minibus full of young children for military recruitment with parental permission in Marka. In March 2009 alone, Al-Shabaab reportedly recruited 600 children. At the Galdumuma base on the border between Bay and Lower Shabelle, it is alleged that Al-Shabaab has 1,800 children, as young as 9 years old. In Raas Kaambooni, Al-Shabaab trains boys from 12 to 18 years old and, every six months, 270 students graduate into operational units.

“In September 2009, AMISOM gained information related to the deployment of 270 children within Mogadishu. They were trained by Al-Shabaab in Baidoa and Galgaduud and were brought in to replace fatigued fighters. From January to March 2010, monitors recorded 41 cases of children recruited to the ranks of Al-Shabaab.

“…In July 2010, there have been consistent reports from partners, United Nations staff and media on forced recruitment by Al-Shabaab, typically from schools and madrasas, of several hundreds of children, some as young as 9 years, for training and combat.

“Hizbul Islam

“Hizbul Islam reportedly had 30 people dedicated to recruiting children, and the group is estimated to have about 500 active children in its ranks, as at 31 March 2010. In February 2009, at an internally displaced camp in Mogadishu, monitors came across two boys aged 15 and 16 years who had been fighting as members of Hizbul Islam. In March 2009, monitors interviewed a 15-year-old boy who had been recruited as a fighter with Hizbul Islam in Mogadishu. Monitors revealed that there were many other children at the Hizbul Islam base but they could not interview them for security reasons…

“Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama’a and other militia groups

“Additionally, Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama’a reportedly recruited children, in their hundreds, mostly within the Hiraan and Galgaduud regions of Somalia, early in 2009. Eighteen children newly recruited to the ASWJ armed group have been interviewed since January 2010 by monitors. Some children cited better salaries as a reason for voluntarily switching from one insurgent group to ASWJ.

“Transitional Federal Government

“The new Transitional Federal Government is reportedly recruiting children between the ages of 14 and 18 years. Some of them are sent to what is officially called a ‘rehabilitation centre’ located in Harunta Xisbiga, near the stadium in Mogadishu, which is allegedly a training base for children who had previously fought for other armed groups.

“…In May and June 2010, the situation of children allegedly fighting on the side of the Transitional Federal Government was widely covered in a variety of media reports and confirmed by monitoring partners on the ground. The issue was made public by the New York Times on 13 June 2010. On 15 June, President Ahmed in a public statement expressed strong concern over the New York Times report and stated that the Somali Government has not and will not knowingly recruit underage youth for the national security forces. President Ahmed requested the Army Chief to conduct an investigation into the issue and report back to him in four weeks and also instructed the army to demobilize any
underage recruits without delay. At the time of writing this report the outcome of the Transitional Federal Government investigation is not yet known.” 496

22.31 The UK Border Agency Fact finding mission report to Somalia, dated 8 October 2010, noted that, with regard to TFG recruitment of child soldiers:

“...An international NGO noted:

"'The TFG has carried out forced recruitment of adults and children in the past.'"

“...An international NGO noted:

"'All parties to the conflict (except AMISOM) recruit children, although it is not certain that TFG forcibly recruit.'" 497

See also Non-state armed groups and Child trafficking

Child labour

22.32 The USSD 2010 report noted:

“The pre-1991 labor code and the TFC prohibit child labor; however, child labor was widespread…. Young persons commonly were employed in herding, agriculture, and household labor from an early age. Children broke rocks into gravel and worked as vendors of cigarettes and khat on the streets. UNICEF estimated that from 1999 to 2005, 36 percent of children between the ages of five and 14 were in the workforce—31 percent of males and 41 percent of females. The actual percentage of working children was believed to be higher. The lack of educational opportunities and severely depressed economic conditions contributed to the prevalence of child labor.

“In Somalia the ministries of Labor and Social Affairs and Gender and Family Affairs were responsible for enforcing child labor laws. In Somaliland it was the Ministry of Family and Social Development, and in Puntland it was the Ministry of Labor, Youth, and Sports. In practice none of these ministries enforced these laws.” 498

See also Child soldiers

Street children

22.33 IRIN News reported on 14 April 2011 about street children in Mogadishu:

“Ahmed Dini, a civil society activist involved in children’s welfare, told IRIN that exact figures were not available but estimated that ‘roughly between 4,000 and 4,500 children live on the streets of Mogadishu’.

“He said the numbers had been increasing in the past few years. ‘Some have lost their parents and others have been separated from families who fled the violence.’

“Halimo Ahmed* [not her real name], an official of a women’s business association in Mogadishu, told IRIN: ‘These children live under difficult situations while working in the streets. Sometimes, a child shining the shoes of soldier is caught up in conflict if rivals attack while the task is going on. In such situations, the children are [sometimes] killed accidentally.

“Two children were shot dead three months ago in K4 [a neighbourhood of southern Mogadishu] when the soldiers whose shoes they were shining were attacked by a militia group.’” 499

CHILD CARE AND PROTECTION

22.34 UNICEF reported on 7 March 2011 that:

“Young unmarried women who get pregnant often have to abandon their children because of the social stigma attached to pregnancy out of wedlock…UNICEF Child Protection Officer Issa Ahmed Nur [said] ‘There are many cases of abandoned infants who are found on the street, and if still alive, they are often given to orphanages.’…Children in Somalia are exposed to all forms of abuse, violence, exploitation, and lack of care. In the semi-autonomous regions of Puntland and Somaliland, in particular, social welfare systems have been weakened by neglect, an influx of displaced persons and overall lack of capacity.

“UNICEF is working with partners towards the creation of a protective environment for children by increasing community capacity to care for and protect them.

“With generous contributions from the Government of Japan as well as other emergency and UNICEF funds, UNICEF currently supports 68 Child Protection Advocates (CPAs) and 350 CPCs [child protection centres] across the country. They are responsible for mobilizing communities around child rights as well as monitoring child protection issues and referring cases to appropriate services.

“In Somaliland, UNICEF implements the project through collaboration with the non-governmental organization Comprehensive Community-based Rehabilitation Services (CCBRS), which runs a network of CPAs and volunteers.” 500

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22.35 An IRIN report published in June 2001, principally focusing on Somaliland, noted there were very few orphans in Somali society. Few children were abandoned, even during the hardest of times. It is explained that before the introduction of the modern nation state, the clan structure effectively prevented the very concept of ‘orphan’ – relatives would take in a child who had lost its parents. Within Somalia a case of pregnancy outside of marriage is almost unthinkable; however, the report refers to a Somaliland social worker’s comment that: “Urbanisation, prostitution and drugs are the most common reason now for unwanted pregnancies.” 501

22.36 The IRIN report of June 2001 noted that after reaching 15 years of age Somali children were considered to have reached the age of independence, and were unlikely to be kept in orphanages; this left orphaned teenagers with very little support. With regard to the possibility of adoption, the report suggested that the clan structure worked prohibitively against adoption, a practice that was not regarded as a ‘cultural norm.’ 502

EDUCATION

22.37 The UNICEF report State of the World’s Children port 2011, released in February 2011, gave the following statistics for education in Somalia:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Youth (15–24 years) literacy rate 2004–2008</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Data unavailable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary school enrolment ratio 2005–2009</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>42</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary school attendance ratio 2005–2009</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>25</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Survival rate to last primary grade (%) 2005–2009</th>
<th>Survey data</th>
<th>85</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Secondary school enrolment ratio 2005–2009</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>11</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Secondary school attendance ratio 2005–2009</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

501 UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Integrated Regional Information Networks, Looking after the unwanted, 15 June 2001, http://wwwnotes.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/480fa8736b88bbe3c12564f004c8ad5/6d5b53071b4325cd85256a6c006b50cb?OpenDocum
502 UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Integrated Regional Information Networks, Looking after the unwanted, 15 June 2001, http://wwwnotes.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/480fa8736b88bbe3c12564f004c8ad5/6d5b53071b4325cd85256a6c006b50cb?OpenDocum
22.38 The USSD 2010 report noted that:

“Primary education was not compulsory, free, or universal in all regions of Somalia. Since the collapse of the state in 1991, education services have been partially revived in various forms, including a traditional system of Qur'anic schools; public primary and secondary school systems financed by communities, foreign donors, and the administrations in Somaliland and Puntland; Islamic charity-run schools; and a number of privately run primary and secondary schools, universities, and vocational training institutes. In al-Shabaab-controlled areas, ‘jihad’ was added to the curriculum of elementary schools. There was a continued influx of foreign teachers to teach in private Qur'anic schools and madrassas. These schools were inexpensive and provided basic education; however, there were reports that they required the veiling of small girls and other conservative Islamic practices not traditionally found in the local culture.” 503

22.39 IRIN News reported on 25 January 2011 that free primary education had been made available in Somaliland:

“The self-declared republic of Somaliland has introduced free education at primary and intermediate levels and doubled teachers' salaries but these decisions will be hard to sustain and could affect the quality of public education, say experts.

“We need to ask ourselves, does the Somaliland government have the capacity to handle this [salary] increase? The short answer is ‘no’,” Saeed Osman, a Uganda-based researcher in Somaliland's education development, told IRIN.

“The Ministry of Education requested the Finance Ministry to recruit 2,000 teachers but the response was that only 1,500 teachers could be recruited,' he added. ‘This shows that Somaliland's government lacks the capacity to handle the increased school enrollment.'

“Somaliland's Finance Minister Mohamed Hashi Elmi announced on 16 January the introduction of free education in primary and intermediate schools.” 504

22.40 The UN in Somalia reported on 7 March 2011 about the work of Hawa Aden Mohamed in Galkayo:

“For over 20 years Hawa Aden Mohamed, educationalist, peace activist and human rights campaigner, has worked to improve the lives of Somali women and girls. She is one of the founders of the Galkayo Education Centre for Peace and Development (GECPD) which has been instrumental in increasing girls' enrolment in the Mudug region of Puntland (northeast Somalia ) and ensuring that at 40% the region has the highest girls' enrolment throughout Somalia . This, in a country where only 24.6% of Somali girls attend school.

“Funded by UKaid from the Department for International Development, UNICEF is partnering with the GECPD to support 3,220 girls as they reach puberty. In total, the

The maturation project will benefit 12,000 primary school girls, women in vulnerable communities and help to mainstream gender in Puntland’s educational policies.  

22.41 The USSD 2010 report noted that: “There were several functioning universities—three each in Mogadishu, Somaliland, and Puntland. Dozens of others existed only in name.”

Attacks on education

22.42 The USSD 2010 report noted that:

“During the year there were fewer direct attacks on schoolchildren, teachers, and schools across the country. Most attacks involved indirect or stray fire on children and schools due to fighting or mortar shelling in Mogadishu... Unlike in previous years, TFG forces were not responsible for any of these attacks. Al-Shabaab, other antigovernment groups, and ordinary criminals were responsible for targeted attacks... Al-Shabaab and armed militia associated with the former Union of Islamic Courts attacked schools and killed teachers and other education workers. For example, in February 2009, unknown armed militia forcefully entered Yusuf Kownayn School in Mogadishu's Wadajir District. The militia reportedly robbed, beat up, and harassed teachers and students.”

See also Violence against children

HEALTH AND WELFARE

22.43 A UNHCR factsheet on Somalia, published on 17 January 2011, noted that “One in every seven Somali children dies before the age of five and one in every five children living in the South-Central region is malnourished.”

22.44 The UNICEF State of the World’s Children report 2011 give the following statistics for 2009:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Under 5 mortality rank</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under-5 mortality rate (per 1000)</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infant mortality rate (under 1) (per 1000)</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neonatal mortality rate (per 1000)</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annual no. of births (thousands)</td>
<td>402</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit Somalia reported on 7 April 2011 that:

“The most recent analysis of the nutrition situation of the children in the country indicates that 16% of the total under five population in Somalia are acutely malnourished, with 4% percent being severely malnourished. This translates to approximately 241,000 acutely malnourished children, with 57,000 being severely malnourished. These statistics show that 1 in 7 children are acutely malnourished; and 1 in 25 is severely malnourished. The latest analysis also indicates a 7 percent increase in the total caseloads of malnourished children, compared to the previous rates reported six months ago. Although the overall nutrition situation of the country is very worrying, of great concern are the southern regions of Somalia (See nutrition situation map). Currently these areas are the most affected by food insecurity and limited humanitarian interventions. A regional global acute malnutrition rate of 25% and 6% for severe acute malnutrition is reported, this translates to 1 in 4 children being acutely malnourished, and 1 in 17 severely malnourished. The South hosts 181,000 (75%) of all the acutely malnourished children and 46,000 (80%) of all the severely malnourished children. The regional median rate of acute malnutrition was 16% six months ago, a significant deterioration has been observed in the recent months.”

For further information on nutrition in Somalia, please see Humanitarian situation.

UNICEF operated the Child Health Days campaign throughout Somalia, which “… offers immunization against the deadly measles virus. It also protects against polio, diphtheria, whooping cough and tetanus, screens the nutritional status of each child, and offers vitamin A supplementation, oral rehydration salts and water purification tablets. Women of child-bearing age are vaccinated against neonatal tetanus.”

IRIN News reported on 7 April 2011 that there had been a measles outbreak in Somalia, and that: “According to the UN World Health Organization (WHO) Somalia, 83 cases, including five deaths, were reported in Mogadishu in the past five weeks. Some 127 cases were reported in Puntland, WHO said.” The report further stated that:

“The cause of [the] measles outbreak in Somalia has yet to be determined but doctors say initial suspicions point to ‘unfounded rumours’ that the vaccine could cause HIV/AIDS in children and interfere with their reproductive abilities…. Ismail Isse Roble, head of the Bari Medical Association in Bosasso, capital of Somalia’s semi-autonomous region of Puntland…said most of the children brought to his clinic had not been vaccinated.

“The irony is that most of the affected children are those whose parents can afford medical care,’ he said. ‘Children in IDP [internally displaced persons] camps [in Bosasso] are least affected because they took advantage of the free vaccinations provided.’”

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Statistics on children’s health in Somalia can be found in the UNICEF State of the World’s Children 2011 report.

**DOCUMENTATION**

22.48 The USSD 2010 report noted:

“In the absence of functioning central authority, births were not registered in Puntland or southern and central Somalia. The failure to register births was not a key factor in the denial of public services. Birth registration was taken seriously in Somaliland for hospital and home births; however, limited government capacity, combined with the nomadic lifestyle of many persons, caused numerous births to go unregistered. In Puntland citizenship is derived from one's parents and not by birth within the region's territory. By extension, any child born in Puntland to a father from non-Puntland sub-clans is not entitled to Puntland citizenship.” 514

23. TRAFFICKING

23.01 The US State Department Trafficking in Persons Report 2010, published on 14 June 2010 stated that, under ‘Special cases’, Somalia is listed as a country of particular concern:

“Somalia currently lacks a national governing structure that could assume responsibility for addressing the country’s human trafficking problem... Information regarding trafficking in Somalia remains extremely difficult to obtain or verify; however, the Somali territory is believed to be a source, transit, and perhaps destination country for men, women, and children who are subjected to trafficking in persons, specifically conditions of forced labor and sexual servitude...Human smuggling is widespread in Somalia and evidence suggests that traffickers utilize the same networks and methods as those used by smugglers. There were reports of trafficking offenders preying on young women and children, mostly internally displaced persons from South/ Central Somalia, at marketplaces and in the streets, falsely promising them lucrative jobs outside Somalia...The government did not provide anti-trafficking training for government officials or protection to trafficking victims; extremely limited victim services were available through national and international NGOs.

“The Somaliland administration sustained a partnership with IOM during the reporting period to raise public awareness of human trafficking through radio messaging, posters, billboards, and community-level meetings. IOM also helped local officials construct a one-room counter-trafficking center and establish a committee to identify and assist victims at the Togwajale border post.” 515

23.02 The UN Human Rights Council’s Compilation : [Universal Periodic Review] : Somalia / prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in accordance with paragraph 15 (b) of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 5/1, published on 21 February 2011, noted that “The [UN's] independent expert [on Somalia] reported that human trafficking, especially for the purposes of sexual exploitation and domestic servitude,

both inside and outside the country, remained of serious concern. The Secretary-General raised similar concerns." 516

See chapters on Women and Children for details on how trafficking affects these particular groups.

24. HUMANITARIAN SITUATION

For information about Internally Displaced Persons, see following section.

The UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs publishes regular updates on the humanitarian situation in Somalia. These can be accessed here.

24.01 The UN Security Council’s Report of the Secretary General, dated 28 April 2011, stated that:

“The number of people in Somalia needing humanitarian assistance and livelihood support has reached 2.4 million, an increase of 20 per cent over the previous six months. Somalis have been adversely affected by continued civil insecurity, displacement and food insecurity. Recent nutrition surveys have shown a steady rise in global acute malnutrition rates, particularly in southern central Somalia, with rates increasing from 17.9 to 25 per cent in Gedo region and from 25 to 30 per cent in Juba region in less than six months. One in four children in southern Somalia is acutely malnourished.” 517

24.02 The UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) stated in their Consolidated Appeals Process for Somalia in 2011, published in December 2010, (UN OCHA CAP 2011) that

“There was a fragile improvement [in the humanitarian situation] in 2010. Two good rainy seasons reduced the population in crisis by 25% to two million people. However, this improvement only underscores how rain-dependent Somalia is, and the La Niña forecast for early 2011 will likely cause below-average rainfall. The two million people in crisis are urban poor, pastoralists yet to recover from six seasons of drought, riverine populations affected by floods, and internally displaced people (IDPs).” 518

24.03 The UN OCHA CAP 2011 for Somalia 519 gave the following humanitarian indicators:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>CAP 2010</th>
<th>CAP 2011</th>
<th>Improve↑ or Deteriorate ↓</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>7,502,654</td>
<td>7,502,654</td>
<td>↔</td>
<td>UNDP 2005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Gross domestic product per capita</strong></th>
<th>$291</th>
<th>$298</th>
<th>↑</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percentage of population living on less than $1 per day</strong></td>
<td>43.20%</td>
<td>43.20%</td>
<td>↔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adult mortality</strong></td>
<td>381/1,000 (male 447/1,000; female 312/1,000)</td>
<td>416/1,000 (male 459/1,000; female 373/1,000)</td>
<td>↓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maternal mortality</strong></td>
<td>1,400 /100,000</td>
<td>1,400 /100,000</td>
<td>↔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Under-five mortality</strong></td>
<td>142/1,000 (male 140/1,000; female 144/1,000)</td>
<td>200/1,000 – (male 197/1,000; female 203/1,000)</td>
<td>↓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Life expectancy</strong></td>
<td>45 (male 44; female 46)</td>
<td>48 – (male 47; female 49)</td>
<td>↑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of nurses or midwives per 10,000 population</strong></td>
<td>2/10,000</td>
<td>1/10,000</td>
<td>↓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Measles immunization coverage among one year olds</strong></td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>↑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of medical doctors per 10,000 population</strong></td>
<td>&gt;1/10,000</td>
<td>&gt;0.5/10,000</td>
<td>↓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Under-five GAM</strong></td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
<td>↑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[global acute malnutrition] rate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population in crisis</td>
<td>2.65 million</td>
<td>2 million</td>
<td>↑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population using improved drinking water sources</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>↑</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>1.41 million</td>
<td>1.46 million</td>
<td>↓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>1,746 refugees; 18,600 registered asylum seekers (October 2009)</td>
<td>1,886 refugees; 24,916 registered asylum seekers (September 2010)</td>
<td>↓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somali refugees in the Horn region</td>
<td>529,700 (Yemen, Kenya, Eritrea, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Uganda, Tanzania)</td>
<td>617,127 (Yemen, Kenya, Eritrea, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Uganda, Tanzania)</td>
<td>↓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**DROUGHT AND FAMINE**

24.04 The Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit-Somalia gave a post-Deyr analysis for the 2010/2011 rainy season:

“Failure of the Deyr seasonal rains linked to prevailing La Niña event affecting Somalia, caused a severe water crisis in most parts of the country with the exception of northwestern regions. The dry conditions have also resulted in substantial crop harvest failure in the South and Central crop-producing regions. The resulting dramatic increases in the prices of water and local cereals are the main drivers of the deteriorating food security situation in Somalia. The situation is exacerbated by the sustained conflict, which continues to be the primary reason of displacement affecting southern and central parts of the country... Population in agropastoral and riverine areas of southern Somalia, who predominantly rely on rainfall for subsistence farming, have suffered from a significant decline of the Deyr 2010 cereal crop production, which is only one-fifth of the normal short rain season production. As a result, in the South, the number of people in crisis increased..."
by almost 70 percent in agropastoral and riverine areas and currently stands at 440,000 people.” 520

24.05 On 2 March 2011, the UN’s Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights gave a preliminary report of a field visit to Somalia by United Nations Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Somalia, Shamsul Bari, from 21 to 25 February 2011:

“[The Independent Expert] called upon the international community to intensify its efforts to address the devastating effects of the ongoing drought on the already exposed Somali population.

“The drought situation in the country and the slow international response is extremely serious and may lead to a natural and human disaster,’ said Mr. Bari. ‘The ongoing drought response is far from meeting the needs of the affected population, in terms of access to food, clean drinking water, nutrition and health, among others.

“I strongly urge the international community, including the UN, to take immediate and concerted measures to address the dire humanitarian crisis that affects all human rights of the vulnerable Somali population, including women, children and the elderly as well as the internally displaced people (IDP) and minorities,’ he said.

“The human rights expert warned that ‘the drought is now a cause for displacement in Somalia, in addition to conflict,’ and expressed his deep concerns over its effect on the life of the population in many regions of Somalia, including Hiiraan, Bakool, central regions (Mudug, Galgaduud), Juba and Northern Gedo, as well as Somaliland and Puntland.

“It was with shock and great sadness that during my recent field visit to Mogadishu, Puntland and Somaliland (21-25 February) I learnt from local authorities and civil society from the various parts of Somalia that the drought affected population has sought assistance closer to urban areas, such as Mogadishu, where the ongoing fighting presents increased risk for the civilian population.’ …According to the latest country-wide food security assessment, an estimated 2.4 million people in Somalia are in Humanitarian Emergency and Acute Food and Livelihoods Crisis, or 32 per cent of the total population in Somalia, are in need of humanitarian assistance or livelihood at least until June 2011. The increase is due to poor Deyr rains, civil insecurity and displacement.

“The central regions have suffered form eight consecutive seasons of below average seasonal performance and the capacity to withstand the current crisis during the harsh Jilaal dry season (January to March) is limited. Up to 70 per cent of the total populations in Hiiraan region are in crisis and in need of humanitarian assistance or livelihood support. At the same time, Hiiraan and rest of the southern Somalia regions have not received general food distribution since December 2009 due to the suspension of WFP food distribution.” 521

24.06 BBC News reported on 22 April 2011 that:

“An UN official told the BBC about two and a half million people had been affected.

“She said there had been complete crop failure in southern Somalia and that many had lost their livelihoods… Many people are leaving rural areas to search for work in Somali towns, while others are quitting the country altogether - going to Kenya and Yemen, said Grainne Molony of the UN Food and Agricultural Organisation.”

24.07 The International Committee of the Red Cross reported on 21 April 2011 that:

“Somalia has been in the grip of a severe drought since the failure of the deyr rainy season, which normally takes place from mid-September to December. Some rainfall was reported in the Bay region last week, but it was too insignificant to restore hope for a good harvest. The coastal areas from the Kenyan border to Mudug, and the southern regions of Bay, Bakool, Lower and Middle Shabelle, have been the most severely affected by the drought. Water sources are either completely dried up or seriously depleted. Only deep boreholes and some wells still provide water… Following the failure of the deyr seasonal rains, the ICRC launched a major water-trucking operation. Since January, up to 350,000 displaced people and residents in 11 regions from northern Bari to southern Juba have benefited.

“During the same period, the organization completed four major water infrastructure projects in Garowe, Galgaduud and Benadir benefiting some 7,500 people.

“The ICRC provided the leaders of seven communities in Lower Shabelle and southern Galgaduud with cash and tools enabling them to hire unemployed people to upgrade rainwater catchments benefiting almost 4,000 people.

“In Middle Juba, the ICRC paid workers to produce maize for seed, which was distributed to 900 needy farmers. The ICRC also distributed seed for fodder production to 10,000 farmers in Gedo, Lower and Middle Juba, and irrigation pumps to 2,220 farmers in several provinces in the south.

“Fourteen outpatient therapeutic feeding centres operated by the Somali Red Crescent in Galgaduud, Bay and Lower Juba receive support from the ICRC. A total of 2,344 children are currently being nourished by the centres. From January to March, the centres provided services for almost 3,500 children. Two new feeding centres that were opened in Middle Juba at the end of March are currently providing services for 219 children.”

24.08 The World Food Programme’s overview of Somalia stated that: “In the first quarter of the year [2011], WFP delivered life-saving assistance to about 1 million people in Mogadishu, central and northern Somalia.”

For further information see Human rights and humanitarian organisations and Non-state armed groups. Also see Internally Displaced Persons. OCHA situation reports for Somalia are produced frequently, and are available on its website. For maps of food aid distribution in Somalia, visit the OCHA Thematic Maps page.

25. MEDICAL ISSUES
For a list of health services available in Somalia see the World Health Organisation Somalia cluster website. For statistics on health, please see Humanitarian issues.

**OVERVIEW OF AVAILABILITY OF MEDICAL TREATMENT AND DRUGS**

25.01 The World Health Organisation report, *A Situation Analysis of Mental Health in Somalia*, published in October 2010, noted that:

“Even before the outbreak of the internal conflict, the health system in Somalia was rather weak and underfunded. The centralized government did not manage to allocate any budget to some services like mental health and some facilities were completely neglected. In 1989, the Ministry of Health was allocated 2.95% of the government’s regular budget. While in 1984, 67% of the total health budget came from external aid, 95% of the utilized budget came from this source during 1990. In 1990, over 79% of the Ministry of Health’s financial resources were allocated to the capital Mogadishu, alone.

“After 19 years of conflict, the health care system in Somalia remains underdeveloped, poorly resourced, inequitable and unbalanced. It struggles to provide services to a limited number of Somalis against crushing constraints. Insecurity, geographical challenges and nomadic populations, an unstructured and unskilled workforce, lack of motivation and vision, uncertainty about the political future and administrative settings, financial and operational fragmentation and poor information and surveillance are some of the key issues that the Somali Health System is facing. The country has an internationally recognized Federal Ministry of Health (MOH), while the selfdeclared autonomous zones of Puntland and Somaliland have separate Ministries. There is currently no functional link between the federal and zonal ministries, regional authorities and programme management levels. The MOH’s ability to coordinate and monitor health services provided by NGOs, public and private sector is almost absent.

“A fragmented health sector provides limited services to the Somali population. The public health care network is small. It mostly relies on national and international NGOs that tend to be concentrated in towns and in secure areas. The health workforce is small, under-skilled and ageing, often engaged in dual (public and private) practices, and forced to work in an insecure and de-motivating environment. Direct provision by ministries of health is marginal. Private health care outlets have proliferated throughout the country and are now estimated to be with thousands with large variations in size, type of services offered, staff qualifications and performance. In aggregated terms at USD 8 per capita, external financing looks modest (World Bank-2008), while private spending is not quantified but considered to be substantial. Health information is fragmented, unreliable and underused. In Somalia, the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) health-related indicators are among the worst in the world. The collapse of the pre-war public health system has encouraged the emergence of a variety of relief and vertical programmes, run by donors, NGOs and UN agencies.

“The 2000 UNDP’s Human Development Report (HDR) ranked Somalia lowest in all health indicators, except life expectancy. In the latest HDR, the country is not even ranked, due to the lack of reliable data. As a result, it was noted that ‘most Somalis spend most of their time trying to stay alive and keep their families alive’ (UN, 2005). Extreme poverty in Somalia is estimated to be 43% with large disparities between the urban population (23%) and the rural and nomadic populations (53%) (UNICEF, 2001)

“Currently, financial as well as human resources are utterly inadequate. All Somali zones depend almost entirely on external sources (international aid or international remittances) for health financing. This reflection becomes more worrying when it is applied on mental...
health, a neglected and almost forgotten sector. It is widely perceived that no governmental or institutional infrastructure exists in the country which is capable of supporting the development or expansion of mental health care. Therefore, despite some pilot and effective interventions in some areas of the country, mental health for almost all activities must start again from zero."  

25.02 Médecins Sans Frontières reported on 1 April 2011 that they would continue to work in Somalia:

"Médecins Sans Frontières remains committed to providing medical assistance to its patients across Somalia despite misleading reports that the medical organization has suspended operations in the whole country.

"MSF has indeed temporarily suspended operations in Medina, Mogadishu, after two grenade attacks on its compound in Wadajir district this March, but continues to operate in 8 regions of south central Somalia. The organization is working towards restoring its operations in Medina and calls on all groups in Somalia to respect its humanitarian mandate, health facilities and staff.

"MSF has over 1300 Somali staff working on the ground and has been continuously present in the country since 1991. Currently, it has projects in Banadir, Bay, Galgaduud, Lower Juba, Hiraan, Lower Shabelle, Middle Shabelle, Mudug, Somaliland and Puntland."  

25.03 The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reported on 21 April 2011 that:

"From January to March [2011], the ICRC made surgical and other medical supplies available to Keysaney and Medina hospitals, the capital's two referral hospitals for war casualties. Among the more than 1,200 wounded patients admitted during this period, 40 per cent were women and children.

"The ICRC also delivered over 8.5 tonnes of dressing materials and other medical supplies to various medical facilities throughout the country for the treatment of war-wounded patients.

"In addition, the ICRC provides equipment, staff training and other support for 39 Somali Red Crescent health-care facilities in the southern and central parts of the country to ensure that the basic needs of the population are met. More than 150,000 people used the services of these facilities between January and March. The ICRC also arranged for three Somali Red Crescent facilities to be renovated and upgraded.

"During the same period, around 20,000 children were vaccinated against common childhood diseases such as polio."  

See also IDPs

HOSPITALS AND CLINICS

25.04 The International Committee of the Red Cross report for 2009, published on 19 May 2010, noted that:

“When they fell ill, many Somalis could not afford transport to a clinic, let alone treatment costs. Like water infrastructure, Somali health services had deteriorated, with all clinics now run privately or by NGOs. By year-end, some 540,000 IDPs and residents in conflict zones in central and southern Somalia had access to free health care at 36 Somali Red Crescent outpatient clinics supported by the ICRC. All clinics received ICRC drugs, dressing materials, funds and staff training for curative and mother-and-child care, while UNICEF provided vaccines. Following fierce fighting, two more temporary clinics were opened in November in camps for displaced people in the north and east of Mogadishu, while the six temporary clinics opened in 2008 for IDPs in and around the capital received additional supplies and staff to cope...In the 36 ICRC-supported health centres (average monthly catchment population: 467,000):

- 499,265 people given consultations, including 93,293 attending ante/post-natal consultations and 405,972 attending curative consultations
- 71,112 vaccine doses administered (including 58,490 to children aged five or under and 12,622 to women of childbearing age)
- 4,690 patients referred to a second level of care
- 1,383 health education sessions held
- health facilities (average number of consultations per day: 61) benefited from water/sanitation/habitat projects.”

25.05 The International Committee of the Red Cross report for 2009, published on 19 May 2010, further stated that:

“In the 8 ICRC-supported hospitals that provided data:

- 8,194 patients (including 1,625 women and 934 children) admitted: of whom 5,860 weapon-wounded (including 956 women and 516 children; 99 people injured by mines or explosive remnants of war), 1,467 other surgical cases, and 758 medical and 109 gynaecological/obstetric patients
- 13,090 surgical operations performed
- 12,324 outpatients given surgical or medical consultations
- 2 hospitals (140 beds) benefited from water/sanitation/habitat projects.”

25.06 On 2 October 2009, BBC News published an interview with a young Somali doctor based in Marere. She described the hospital as having “about 200 beds”, and although there are “… no machines in the hospital…” there was “… a generator so the hospital has electricity and…internet. Wells provide clean water. The most common complaints are malaria, TB, cholera and bilharzias”.

Hospitals in Mogadishu

25.07 On 15 April 2011, the International Committee of the Red Cross reported that:

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“Medina hospital, which is clearly marked with the Red Crescent emblem, is one of two ICRC-supported surgical referral hospitals in Mogadishu. It is a community-based hospital and accepts all patients, regardless of their clan, their religion or their political background. The ICRC provides the hospital with surgical equipment, medicines and training for doctors and nurses. Since the beginning of the year, nearly 550 war patients have been treated at Medina, including more than 150 women and around 50 children.” 531

25.08 On 27 June 2009, Garowe reported that: “There are upwards of 650 wounded persons currently receiving treatment at Mogadishu’s three main hospitals – Medina, Keysaney and Daynile. The hospitals are operated by ICRC and MSF.” 532

25.09 The LandInfo report of 12 November 2008, Conflict, security and clan protection in South Somalia, gave the following information from an interlocutor: “One of Landinfo’s interlocutors in June 2008 compared the situation in Mogadishu with the situation in Gaza, where despite the blockade, the Palestinian population has working hospitals and ambulances etc. This is not the situation in Mogadishu. Although there are hospitals and doctors there is a lack of equipment and there are no other services.” 533

HIV/AIDS

25.10 UNICEF gave the prevalence rate of HIV in Somalia in 2009 at 0.7%, with estimates of the number of people living with HIV ranging from 25,000 to 48,000.534

25.11 The United Nations Development Programme in Somalia (UNDP) in an article dated 13 December 2009 reported that:

“UNDP Somalia’s ‘Most at Risk Populations’ project seeks to reduce the vulnerability and risk of HIV transmission amongst high risk groups in Somalia, such as truck drivers, staff of uniformed services, Internally Displaced People (IDPs) and People Living with HIV & AIDS (PLHAs). The project uses behavior change communication to try and reduce the vulnerability of these groups to HIV transmission.

“At the beginning of this project, UNDP conducted a Training Or Trainers (TOT), focusing on peer education: there are now 574 Peer Educators in Somaliland, Puntland and South Central Somalia, who have trained approximately 12,000 people on HIV Prevention, Stigma Reduction, Care and Treatment. In addition, three Peer Education Networks have been established (one in each zone) to support the work of all Peer Educators working in a particular zone.

“Currently, and because Somalia has a concentrated HIV & AIDS epidemic, the focus of this project is to conduct workshops for those populations which are at greatest risk of HIV infection.

“In order to implement this project UNDP has formed partnership agreements with three local NGOs, one in Somaliland, Puntland and South Central Somalia.”  

25.12 IRIN reported that in Puntland, people infected with HIV are stigmatised by the local community (IRIN, February 2009) and likewise in Somaliland (IRIN, 27 March 2009). The IRIN article of 27 March 2009 reported that in Somaliland, religious leaders have been involved in HIV prevention efforts and “are now stepping in to persuade communities to treat people with HIV more humanely.”


“Persons with HIV/AIDS continued to face discrimination and abuse in their local communities, and by employers in all parts of the country. UNICEF reported that persons with HIV/AIDS were subjected to physical abuse, rejected by their families, and subjected to workplace discrimination and dismissal. Children with HIV-positive parent(s)) also suffered discrimination, which hindered prevention efforts and access to services.”

MENTAL HEALTH CARE

25.14 In its 2005 Somalia Country Profile, the World Health Organization (WHO) reported that: “The whole mental health set-up of Somalia is based on the efforts of NGOs – GRT-UNA of Italy and General Assistance and Volunteer Association (GAVO), a local Somali NGO. They help in the provision of services to mental patients and street children and provide training for primary health care personnel.”

25.15 The report added:

“There are only three centres for psychiatry, the mental hospital in Berbera and the general psychiatric wards in Hargesia and Mogadishu. Until the arrival of the NGO from Italy, the condition of the mental hospital was appalling. Patients were kept in chains, and supply of food was largely dependent on charity. UNDP [United Nations Development Programme] is supporting the psychiatric ward in Hargesia in terms of structural facilities and supplies. There is no private psychiatric inpatient facility though there are a few private clinics in Mogadishu and Hargesia. There is no specialized drug abuse treatment centre and there is

no mental health training facility in the country. Only limited data about one area of Somalia, Somaliland is available. Psychiatrists have private clinics.” 541

25.16 The World Health Organisation report, *A Situation Analysis of Mental Health in Somalia*, published in October 2010, noted that:

“Mental health key challenges and opportunities for its development are interlinked with the strengthening of the health system in Somalia as a whole. It has some peculiar features that should be taken into account. This document will highlight few of them that can be summarized as follows:

- Need of policies, strategic plans and guidelines on mental health tailored to the three zones;
- Need of allocating national budget and international assistance for the development of the mental health sector;
- Need of qualified and properly trained health workers;
- Need to improve access to quality mental health services. 542

25.17 The report stated that: “The containment with chains of mentally challenged people is prevalent in both urban and rural areas and is widespread regardless of gender. This is also used as a locally accepted medical treatment in many mental health facilities.” 543

25.18 The report also stated that: “Due to the lack of proper medical treatment and facilities and the huge need for them, the communities are faced with several kinds of traditional healers where some of them allegedly treat mental disorders. Each treatment has its own rituals, rationale, procedures and complexity that is not easy to explain.” 544

25.19 The report further outlined current mental health provision in Somalia, stating that there are three Habeb Mental Health hospitals in south and central Somalia and that all facilities have an inpatients unit. There is one mental health hospital (Berbera Mental Health Hospital), one ward in Hargeisa Group general hospital and one community owned psychiatric inpatients unit in Somaliland, with one ward in Bossaso Hospital and one community residential facility serving Puntland. 545

25.20 The report also outlined, with regard to the availability of medication for psychiatric disorders, that:

“The hospitals do not purchase the drugs. They are usually provided on an irregular basis by WHO and/or by private donations/INGO supplies. Only five facilities receive drugs, whereby two in NW Somalia receive them on a regular basis. Hargeisa and Berbera rely mainly on different channels of provisions, while two facilities out of seven rely on private donations and another two on INGO contributions. WHO do not provide drugs to community-run facilities, which very occasionally receive contributions from charity and

http://www.who.int/mental_health/evidence/atlas/profiles_countries_s1.pdf Date accessed 20 April 2010
542 World Health Organisation, A Situation Analysis of Mental Health in Somalia, October 2010, p13,
http://www.emro.who.int/somalia/pdf/Situation_Analysis_Mental_Health_print.pdf Date accessed 27 April 2011
543 World Health Organisation, A Situation Analysis of Mental Health in Somalia, October 2010, p22,
http://www.emro.who.int/somalia/pdf/Situation_Analysis_Mental_Health_print.pdf Date accessed 27 April 2011
544 World Health Organisation, A Situation Analysis of Mental Health in Somalia, October 2010, p23,
http://www.emro.who.int/somalia/pdf/Situation_Analysis_Mental_Health_print.pdf Date accessed 27 April 2011
545 World Health Organisation, A Situation Analysis of Mental Health in Somalia, October 2010, p34-35,
http://www.emro.who.int/somalia/pdf/Situation_Analysis_Mental_Health_print.pdf Date accessed 27 April 2011
private donations. All of the facilities complained about very poor storage conditions such as poor safety of the store, ventilation and space arrangements.”  

26. FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

26.01 The US State Department Report on Human Rights Practices in Somalia, published on 8 April 2011, covering events of 2010 (USSD 2010 report) noted that: “The TFC [Transitional Federal Charter], the Puntland interim constitution, and the Somaliland constitution provide for freedom of movement; however, this right continued to be restricted in some parts of the country.”  

INTERNAL MOVEMENT

26.02 The UK Border Agency Fact Finding Mission report on Somalia, dated 8 October 2011, noted that:

“An international NGO which has worked in Somalia noted:

“Travel between different areas controlled by Al Shabaab is certainly possible, and a system exists where civilians can obtain a permit in order to travel, as long as they explain to Al Shabaab where they are going and why. People have to travel through Al Shabaab checkpoints and may have to exercise some caution when explaining why they are travelling if they know it is against the Al Shabaab rules. It is not unknown for people to lie about their reasons for travel. Al Shabaab have removed all ‘illegal’ roadblocks and left only their own checkpoints.’

“…A diplomatic source noted:

“Everybody can move freely in central-southern Somalia and there is public transport in the form of minibuses. Business is taking place, it is cross-clans. There are AS and clan-based checkpoints but 90% of them do not cause threats to Somalis. Sometimes people have to pay facilitators to go through.

“People can, for instance, get out of Mogadishu and travel to the Afgoye Corridor for business.

“Young men may be targeted by AS for recruitment when travelling in AS held areas.’

“…An international NGO noted:

“It is possible to travel between Mogadishu and Kismayo without difficulty.

“People will travel if their means allow it, and there are many ways of getting around, including buses, taxis and space rented from truck drivers. There is an informal bus timetable system with buses travelling to Galcayo and other major towns in Somalia. There is a bus station at Bakara market.

546 World Health Organisation, A Situation Analysis of Mental Health in Somalia, October 2010, p34-35,  
http://www.emro.who.int/somalia/pdf/Situation_Analysis_Mental_Health_print.pdf Date accessed 27 April 2011  
547 US Department of State, Report on Human Rights Practices in Somalia, p29, 8 April 2011,  
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160144.pdf Date accessed 28 April 2011
“AS will ask why people are moving around the country, and if they do not recognise you then they will ask who you are, where you are going and why you are going there.” 548

**Checkpoints**

26.03 The USSD 2010 report stated that:

“There was a general reduction of checkpoints prevalent in South and Central regions in Somalia since 2009, and Puntland security forces dismantled ad hoc checkpoints run by armed clan militias. However, ad hoc checkpoints operated by armed militias, clan factions, TFG-allied groups, and al-Shabaab and its affiliates inhibited passage and exposed travelers to looting, extortion, and harassment, particularly civilians fleeing conflict.” 549

26.04 The UN Security Council’s Report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in Somalia, published on 9 November 2010, stated that: “Checkpoints and roadblocks are no longer a major problem for the movement of humanitarian personnel in 2010 and 2009, as they were in 2008. Currently checkpoints in most regions are limited to administrative control points at the entrance/exit of the main towns, the only exception being Mogadishu, where there are checkpoints within the city.” 550

26.05 Hiiraan news reported on efforts to halt checkpoints in Galmudug region:

“A public campaign against illegal checkpoints by freelance gunmen on the Galkayo - Galinsor Road has begun in Southern Galkayo, the capital of Galmudug Region of Somalia.

“The campaign, which was organized by members across the social spectrum including Galmudug students, youth groups, the clergy, women groups, scholars and the Galmudug Business Community, is intended to eradicate the menace of gun-totting and trigger happy freelance gunmen who man illegal checkpoints at which they rob people using the road connecting Galkayo with Galinsoor.

“Galmudug leaders have succeeded to dismantle several illegal checkpoints in the past few days and this new campaign to root out the culture of extortion by young gunmen on the Galmudug roads seems to be gathering momentum and building on the progress already made in weening young freelance gunmen off the chance to rob passengers on vehicles plying between the towns in the region.” 551

26.06 Shabelle News further reported on 4 April 2011 that:

“The administrations of Somalia’s moderate Ahlu Sunna Waljama ASWJ and Galmudug state have managed to remove militia checkpoints in the road between Galinsor area and Galka’yo town in Mudug region in central Somalia.

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“After joint operations, Gal-mudug and Ahlu Sunna said they have eliminated all militia checkpoints in those areas where both the passengers and drivers of big trucks and small private cars already complained about the militias there who they said had accustomed to take illegal more money from them.

“Removing the checkpoints was immediately welcomed by the local civilian residents in the region.

“It is not the first time, militia checkpoints were removed in parts of Mudug region in central Somalia.

“Gal-mudug in the part got rid of several checkpoints in the region after complaints from the people have reached at climax.”

Landmines

26.07 Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor noted in their country profile for Somalia, updated 6 August 2010, that

“...Landmines are evidently still being bought and sold at arms markets in Somalia. In June 2009, Reuters reported the continued sale of landmines and other weapons at markets in Mogadishu. It said that one dealer claimed to sell landmines (type unspecified, but likely antivehicle) for approximately US$100 apiece...Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor has not identified any confirmed reports of new use of antipersonnel mines in this reporting period (since May 2009) by government forces or any of the non-state armed groups (NSAGs) operating in Somalia. NSAGs continued to use improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in large numbers, with media sources often referring to command-detected IEDs and bombs as 'landmines.' While all victim-activated mines and other explosive devices are prohibited by the Mine Ban Treaty, command-detected mines and devices are not. Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor analysis of media reports indicates that most, if not all, of the explosive attacks attributed to landmines involved command-detected devices.”

26.08 IRIN News reported on 2 February 2011 that:

“Somalia's self-declared independent region of Somaliland has experienced an increase in landmine and unexploded ordnance (UXO) explosions in the recent past, with officials calling for mine awareness education in schools, as children have been the main victims.

“Child victims of land mines have increased in Somaliland in the past two months,' Ahmed Ali Maah, director of the Somaliland Mine Action Center (SMAC), told IRIN. ‘Some 93 children have been killed by landmines in the past three years.”
26.09 The USSD 2010 report noted that “Land mines throughout the country caused numerous civilian deaths…”\footnote{US Department of State, Report on Human Rights Practices in Somalia, p6, 8 April 2011, \url{http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160144.pdf} Date accessed 30 April 2011} but also stated that: “Few cases of land mines and unexploded ordinance (UXO) were reported during the year compared with 2009.”\footnote{US Department of State, Report on Human Rights Practices in Somalia, p18, 8 April 2011, \url{http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/160144.pdf} Date accessed 30 April 2011}

**Airports**

26.10 The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), in its Somalia Country Profile dated 3 March 2008 reported:

“Private and chartered aircraft use an estimated 61 airports, most with unpaved runways. Ethiopian Airways began twice-weekly flights between Addis Ababa and Hargeisa in March 2001, and the private carrier, Daallo Airlines, links Hargeisa, Mogadishu, Burao, Bossasso and Kismayu with Asmara (Eritrea) and Djibouti. Construction of a new US $9m runway at Bossasso international airport began in November 2006. Control of Somali air space has been conducted from Nairobi since the UN pulled out of Somalia in 1995.”\footnote{Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile, Somalia, 3 March 2008, p15, Available in hard copy on request}

26.11 The UK Border Agency Fact Finding Mission report on Somalia, dated 8 October 2011, noted that:

“A security advisor to the EU Special Representative for the EU Delegation on Somalia noted: ‘African Express flights are viewed as the safest way into Mogadishu. There is a total of around 15-18 flights arriving in Mogadishu per day.

“… Captain Bulhan, Managing Director, African Express Airways stated:

“African Express has confirmed passenger numbers for the year (to end August 2010) into Mogadishu on their various routes…

“Nairobi (NBO)

“Berbera (BBO) - Somaliland

“Aden (ADE) - Yemen

“Galcaio (GLK) - Puntland (border with South Central), new route on 30 seat Umbria aircraft.

“There have been just over 12,000 passengers in 8 months.”\footnote{UK Border Agency, Fact Finding Mission report on Somalia, 8 October 2010, p12-13, \url{http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20101208171359/nds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs10/ffm-somalia-081010.doc} Date accessed 24 May 2011}

26.12 The same report stated that various sources noted that travel between the airport and Mogadishu was possible for civilians using taxis.\footnote{UK Border Agency, Fact Finding Mission report on Somalia, 8 October 2010, p13-15, \url{http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20101208171359/nds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs10/ffm-somalia-081010.doc} Date accessed 24 May 2011}
26.13 *The New York Times* reported on 14 April 2011 that: “For almost 15 years, the United Nations has controlled Somalia’s airspace from a little office in Nairobi, Kenya, where an international staff of air traffic controllers sit quietly in front of computers to make sure the scores of commercial jets that crisscross Somalia each day — usually on their way to somewhere else — do not crash into one another” and that this operation is thought to generate $4 million a year in fees for the United Nations. 560

26.14 BBC News noted that “Mogadishu's airport, of huge strategic importance, is one of the few parts of the capital controlled by forces from the AU and the government.” 561

26.15 The USSD 2010 report stated that “On September 9, AMISOM peacekeepers disrupted an al-Shabaab attack on a meeting of TFG and international officials at Mogadishu airport. Three peacekeepers and several civilians were killed in the gunfire and suicide explosions.” 562

For further information on travel within southern and central Somalia, please see the UK Border Agency Fact Finding Mission report on Somalia, published on 8 October 2010.

27. **INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS (IDPs)**

Please read in conjunction with Humanitarian issues and Security situation.

A UNHCR map of IDPs in Somalia, dated March 2011 is available here.

**OVERVIEW**


“UN agencies estimated that since January 2007 more than 1.2 million persons had fled their homes in Mogadishu and its surroundings as a result of targeted attacks by al-Shabaab and continued conflicts between TFG forces and antigovernment groups. The Somalia office of the UNHCR, based in Kenya, estimated that there were 1.46 million IDPs in the country as a result of internal conflict, flooding, droughts, and other causes going back to the early 1990s but with much higher numbers in recent years.” 563

27.02 The UN Security Council’s *Report of the Secretary General*, published on 28 April 2011, stated that:

“Drought and conflict have been the main reasons for new displacements. Nearly 55,000 people have been displaced owing to drought since December 2010. Many are moving to urban areas in search of assistance. Increased insecurity in many parts of southern central Somalia during the reporting period caused further displacement. The fighting in Bula Hawa


resulted in displacements into Ethiopia and Kenya, although most had returned to Bula Hawa at the time of reporting.

“...The escalation of conflict in southern central Somalia is exacerbating the suffering caused by insufficient rainfall during the period from October to December (Deyr rains). It is expected that rainfall levels will be poor in the period from April to June (Gu rains), possibly resulting in a further deterioration of food security, particularly in southern central Somalia.”

27.03 On 2 March 2011, the UN’s Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights gave a preliminary report of a field visit to Somalia by United Nations Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Somalia, Shamsul Bari, from 21 to 25 February 2011: “The human rights expert warned that ‘the drought is now a cause for displacement in Somalia, in addition to conflict,’ and expressed his deep concerns over its effect on the life of the population in many regions of Somalia, including Hiiraan, Bakool, central regions (Mudug, Galgaduud), Juba and Northern Gedo, as well as Somaliland and Puntland.”

27.04 The UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs noted in an update, published on 3 March 2011 that “Drought – not insecurity – is now the main reason for new displacement in Somalia. More than 52,000 people have been displaced due to drought since 1 December 2010, many of them moving to urban areas in search of assistance.”

27.05 The UN High Commissioner for Refugees reported on 8 April 2011 that:

“UNHCR estimates that clashes between the forces of the Transitional Federal Government and Al-Shabaab militia have displaced about 33,000 Somalis over the past six weeks. More than half of these are people who have been displaced in Mogadishu. Many are in desperate situations with no access to humanitarian help. Mogadishu already shelters some 372,000 displaced.

“In all more than 1.4 million people are displaced inside Somalia. Some of the most recently displaced are people who have fled shelling in Dhoobley, a town just across the border from Liboi in northern Kenya. Dhoobley acts as a final stop-off point for people fleeing Somalia for the Dadaab refugee complex in neighbouring Kenya. According to local sources, the town and its surrounding areas remain tense. Pro-government forces have been consolidating their control of the town, which they took earlier this week.

“In Bulo Hawo, a Somali town across the border from Mandera in north-west Kenya, people are in desperate need of shelter. Our staff report that 150 permanent shelters and some 400 to 500 temporary structures were destroyed during recent shelling. The market area has also been destroyed and many people are sleeping outside.

“Several local non-governmental organizations have carried out rapid assessments in Elwaq and Dhoobley. Security and access permitting, we hope our teams will be able, as part of joint UN assessment missions, to visit these and other towns and villages and plan distributions of aid. At the end of March we were able to distribute some 3,000 aid kits to

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people who had returned to Bulo Hawo after the recent shelling. These kits include plastic sheeting for shelter, blankets, sleeping mats, basic cooking utensils and soap." 567

27.06 The International Committee of the Red Cross reported on 21 April 2011 that:

“Despite recent rains in Somalia's south, livestock and food production in the country as a whole continue to suffer from severe drought. Meanwhile, military offensives launched in late February in Mogadishu and at the frontiers with Kenya and Ethiopia forced thousands to flee their homes….Pastoralists have migrated towards the riverine areas of the middle and lower Jubas to graze and water their livestock. The harsh climate and recurrent droughts are an especially heavy burden for a population already exhausted by two decades of armed conflict. At the end of February, troops of the transitional federal government launched an offensive in the capital Mogadishu, backed by the African Union, and in the central region along the border with Kenya against the Islamic Al-Shabaab. The fighting displaced thousands of people, many of whom temporarily crossed the border into Kenya in search of safety in camps near Mander town and in Liboi…Since the beginning of the latest offensive, about 15,000 people have fled Mogadishu, either towards the Afgooye corridor or towards Daynile, north of the capital. Living conditions in the camps taking them in - which were already overcrowded before the offensive - are extremely difficult.” 568

For updates on the location and number of IDPs within Somalia, please visit the UNHCR website and the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre website. The UN OCHA Somalia website provides weekly situation reports and a monthly humanitarian situation overview that gives up to date information about IDPs and other humanitarian issues.

GENERAL CONDITIONS FOR IDPs

27.07 On 2 March 2011, the UN’s Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights gave a preliminary report of a field visit to Somalia by United Nations Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in Somalia, Shamsul Bari, from 21 to 25 February 2011:”I have visited several IDP camps, in particular in Puntland and must express my utmost concern for the living conditions that such recently displaced population will face,' Mr. Bari said. ‘Insecurity is now the main reason for new displacement of people currently affected by the ongoing severe drought in Somalia, including lack of access to food and clean drinking water’.” 569

27.08 UNHCR reported on its country page for Somalia that:

“Most IDPs live in temporary settlements in already densely populated areas and on privately owned land. They are frequently subjected to abuse from landowners and do not have sufficient access to basic supplies and services. The protection environment for IDPs is precarious, particularly for people displaced from south and central Somalia, who are considered illegal migrants by the authorities in ‘Puntland’ and ‘Somaliland’.

567 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Latest fighting forces more Somalis into displacement, 8 April 2011, http://www.unhcr.org/4d9ee5c69.html Date accessed 28 April 2011

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“The limited livelihood opportunities available to IDPs expose them to additional protection risks. There is a need to expand vocational skills training and self-reliance and livelihood opportunities, especially for vulnerable IDP women.

“In addition to humanitarian and political crises, Somalia has been severely affected by drought. The plastic sheets that IDPs receive are not strong enough to withstand the harsh weather, and need to be replaced frequently. Settlements do not have enough water, and some IDPs resort to buying water of dubious quality. Women have to walk long distances to collect water, exposing them to the risk of rape and other forms of violence.

“Only a limited number of IDP women and girls receive sanitary materials, often in insufficient quantity and on an irregular basis. The lack of domestic and hygiene supplies prevents many women and girls in IDP settlements and host communities from participating in community functions. Furthermore, insufficient funding has prevented the expansion of HIV and AIDS programmes to other parts of Somalia beyond Hargeisa.” 570

27.09 The UK Border Agency Fact Finding Mission on Somalia, published 8 October 2010, stated that “An international NGO noted…‘There is thought to be a hierarchy in the IDP camps, but it is not certain whether this is related to length of residence or based along clan lines. It cannot be guaranteed that majority clan members will not face problems in IDP camps.’” 571

27.10 The USSD 2010 report noted that

“Many of the newly displaced lived without basic services, primarily settling on the Afgooye corridor between Mogadishu and Baidoa. Militia groups aligned with both sides of the conflict restricted IDP access during food distributions. The deterioration in security severely restricted the movement of aid workers and the distribution of urgently needed assistance to IDPs. Increased targeting of aid workers, ‘taxes’ and extortion demands on humanitarian aid, and al-Shabaab’s expulsion of WFP in January made it more difficult to deliver basic services.” 572

27.11 UNHCR reported on its country page for Somalia that:

“Aid agencies face threats and intimidation from insurgents in south and central Somalia. The dangerous and unpredictable environment has forced the suspension of humanitarian operations in some areas, creating more hardship for displaced people. Delivering aid in Somalia is challenging, and UNHCR and its partners take advantage of every opportunity to deliver much needed non-food items (NFIs) and shelter materials to internally displaced persons (IDPs).” 573

27.12 IRIN reported on 28 February 2011 that:

“The situation of those in need in the Afgoye corridor and other Al-Shabab-controlled areas is made worse by the absence of the UN's main aid agency.

570 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR country operations profile – Somalia, undated, http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e483ad6 Date accessed 28 April 2011
“WFP [World Food Programme] beneficiaries are throughout Somalia with the exception of Al-Shabab-controlled areas because of the [Al-Shabab]-imposed ban on WFP operations and personnel there,’ said WFP.

“WFP says it is providing food to one million Somalis in other parts of the country.

“[Abdulkadir Ibrahim] Abkow, the chairman of the Somali Civil Society Forum, said the access question should be dealt with ‘smartly and other avenues for access should be explored’.

“He added: ‘There are Somalis, religious, traditional elders and others, who could deliver assistance anywhere. It is a question of finding the right person or group. I know it is not easy but nothing in this country is easy.’

“A civil society source, who requested anonymity, told IRIN that aid agencies should be ‘more creative and flexible’ if they want to help those in need.

“‘They cannot just say, ‘we give up because the majority of those in need are in areas under Al-Shabab control’; not helping them is tantamount to condemning them to death,’ the source said. ”

For more information on the difficulties faced by NGOs attempting to deliver aid in Somalia, please see Human rights and humanitarian institutions, organisations and activists.

**SOUTH AND CENTRAL SOMALIA**

27.13 IRIN reported on 28 February 2011 that: “According to UN estimates, at least 2.4 million Somalis need help across Somalia. These include IDPs in areas controlled by Al-Shabab: 410,000 in the Afgoye Corridor, 15,200 in the Balad corridor [30km north of Mogadishu] and 55,000 others in Dayniile, northwest of Mogadishu.”

27.14 The UN High Commissioner for Refugees noted, in a news report on 8 April 2011, that:

“…fighting in south and central Somalia between government forces and the Al-Shabaab militia has displaced about 33,000 people in the past six weeks.

“UNHCR is monitoring a deteriorating situation in south and central Somalia where sporadic fighting has continued to be reported in the towns of Doolow, Bulo Hawo, Luuq, Elwaaq, Dhoobley, Dif and Taabdo,’ UNHCR spokesman Adrian Edwards told journalists in Geneva. ‘We are again urging all armed groups and forces in Somalia to avoid targeting civilian areas and to ensure that civilians are not being placed in harm's way,' he added.

“UNHCR estimates that about half of the 33,000 people displaced by the conflict since late February were in the Somali capital of Mogadishu. 'Many are in desperate situations with no
access to humanitarian help,' Edwards said, while noting that Mogadishu already shelters some 372,000 displaced." 576

Mogadishu

A population movement map for IDPs travelling from and within Mogadishu between 1 February and 13 April 2011 is available at Reliefweb. The dashboard for the period 23 February to 18 March is available here. 576

21.15 The UN Security Council’s Report of the Secretary General, published on 28 April 2011, stated that “In Mogadishu, almost 16,000 people were displaced in the first two months of the year owing to heavy fighting. Two cases of cholera were confirmed in Mogadishu in March.” 577

27.16 The UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs noted in their update of 3 March 2011 that:

“Mogadishu in particular has experienced an increased influx of drought-affected pastoralists. Although migration of people and livestock is not unusual during the dry season this appears to be the first time ever pastoralists and their livestock have migrated into the capital, a situation that portrays the severity of the drought situation in the country.

“Based on the consolidated results of six rapid assessments in February, field reports indicate most drought-stricken pastoralists have concentrated in the government-controlled areas of Hodan, Wadjair (Medina) and Dharkenley districts and further along the coastline of Jazzier. As of mid-February, best estimates indicate that 8,365 households, or some 50,190 people, have moved into the city, leading to overcrowding in camps and putting increased pressure on the host population and raising food prices.

“Intervention priorities include: provision of food assistance – since the number of food insecure people may have increased due to the rise in food prices, impacting access on to food brought about as a result of reduced food production due to the poor harvest, and provision of shelter and NFIs as well as scaling up of water, health/sanitation and nutrition interventions. Priorities also include support to the livestock sector with fodder and veterinary services.” 578

27.17 The update further noted that NGOs had focused some activities in Mogadishu as a response to the increased numbers of IDPs:

“During the first two months of the year, humanitarian agencies on the ground have increased response activities due to increased influx into Mogadishu of people displaced by drought from adjacent areas in Lower Shabelle and Middle Shabelle regions. These activities mainly focused on food assistance, nutrition, water and sanitation, health, agriculture and livestock and livelihood support.

● “Food assistance continues to sustain some 250,000 people a month in Mogadishu, including around 17,000 malnourished children under five; 2,150 metric tones of food was distributed in January.”

576 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Fighting in Somalia displaces some 33,000 people over past six weeks, 8 April 2011, http://www.unhcr.org/4d9e6e69.html Date accessed 28 April 2011
UNICEF, Oxfam and local partners are supporting chlorination of 217 water sources and 58 water point outlets benefiting 483,200 residents and IDPs in the city and on the outskirts.

16 nutrition centres are receiving nutrition supplies regularly and 15 Mother and Child Health (MCH) Centres are providing maternal and child health services including routine Expanded Programme on Immunization services to over 290,000 IDPs and drought-affected people.

Two nutrition stabilisation centres (Banadir Hospital and SOS hospital) run by UNICEF are providing regular interventions. There has been an increase in number of admissions of children from 23 to 49 (over 100%) from December 2010 to January 2011.

WFP is supporting 19 wet feeding centres. The feeding programme is implemented by DRC in partnership with three local NGOs including SACCID, Jumbo and IDA. Sixteen of the centres are done in partnership with SACCID, 2 with Jumbo and 1 with IIDA, benefiting a total number of 85,180, mostly women and children. Two centres are suspended due to insecurity.

Supplementary Feeding Centres run by WFP are providing interventions for 20,700 people per day. It is a monthly ration and the figure is for January.

Concern finalised selection of beneficiaries and is to start food voucher intervention targeting 1,400 IDP households on February 26, 2011. The programme is intended to cover the critical six-month period from February to July 2011. Each household will receive 20kgs of rice, 20kgs of wheat flour, 10 kgs of sugar, 11kgs of pulses and 6 litres of vegetable oil.

UNHCR in partnership with NRC has distributed 5000 NFIs to the newly displaced populations in the last few months.

NRC has erected 1416 tents for the newly displaced in the last few months.

Through the Emergency Response window of the CHF, a $500,000 NRC project to construct 1,400 latrines and do hygiene promotion for 70,000 displaced people in Mogadishu has been approved."

Afgoooye ‘corridor’

The Afgoooye ‘corridor’ “stretches some 30 kilometres west [out] of Mogadishu.” (UN) The Guardian noted on 4 October 2010 that: "... the Afgoooye corridor is now the third largest urban area in Somalia after Mogadishu and Hargeisa in Somaliland." The summary prepared by the UN Human Rights Council for the Universal Periodic review in Somalia, dated 21 February 2011, noted that “STP [Society for Threatened Persons] stated that the worsening security situation has led to a withdrawal of many aid agencies. In the Afgoye Corridor near Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu, more than 400,000 IDPs were now supported by a few aid agencies.”


580 UN News Centre, UN agency ramping up aid efforts as clashes drive more Somalis from capital, 12 February 2010, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4b7ba8c71c.html Date accessed 15 February 2010


IRIN reported on conditions in the Afgoye corridor on 28 February 2011:

“‘There have not been any aid agencies providing assistance in the past four to five months, either in the camps on the Afgoye corridor or those in the north of Mogadishu.’ [Abdulkadir Ibrahim Abkow, chairman of the Somali Civil Society Forum (SCSF), told IRIN.]

“An aid worker in the Afgoye corridor, who declined to be named, said vulnerability had increased since the withdrawal of many agencies and the escalation of fighting in Mogadishu in the last couple of months.

“‘More and more people are coming to the camps, including drought-displaced, who are weaker than even those from Mogadishu. The problem is there is no help here. They just have to fend for themselves or rely on help from other [IDPs].’…Roberta Russo, spokeswoman for the UN Refugee Agency, UNHCR, told IRIN: ‘The humanitarian situation in Afgoye [Corridor] is appalling. This area has the highest concentration of IDPs in the whole world and the number of people arriving every day continues to increase.

“‘Hundreds of thousands of desperate families are not even receiving the bare minimal assistance to allow them to survive as the area is very difficult to access by humanitarian agencies, due to insecurity,’ she said… The situation of those in need in the Afgoye corridor and other Al-Shabab-controlled areas is made worse by the absence of the UN's main aid agency.

“‘WFP beneficiaries are throughout Somalia with the exception of Al-Shabab-controlled areas because of the [Al-Shabab]-imposed ban on WFP operations and personnel there,’ said WFP.”

In an update dated 3 March 2011, the UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs noted the following projects taking place in the Afgoye corridor:

- 9,000 IDPs and their host communities from Afgooye corridor are benefiting from Cash for Work projects through the Livelihoods Cluster.
- The NGO Soyda has extended a three-month health care project for Afgooye and Balcad Corridor IDPs for an additional six months with funding from the CHF.
- Lafoole cluster settlement, Afgooye, the construction of one water yard, including drilling a borehole and Operation and Management support to benefit 18,000 IDPs and host communities.
- In Kah Shiqale Operation and Management support for 9 water systems is ongoing

For a map of the settlements in the Afgoye ‘corridor’, please see [OCHA’s website](http://ocha.un.org).

**PUNTLAND AND SOMALILAND**

The USSD 2010 report stated that:
“Authorities in Puntland forcefully repatriated Somalis from South and Central regions allegedly for being behind a spate of insecurity in Puntland cities. Puntland’s political leadership has over the years consistently claimed persons from South and Central Somalia were responsible for increased insecurity in the region; IDPs in general were regarded with suspicion—as al-Shabaab supporters or criminals by locals. At year’s end news reports highlighted the ongoing issue of sexual and gender-based violence against IDP women living in Somalia, primarily around Galkaacyo. The UNHCR acknowledged that perpetrators were primarily young men from the local area who take advantage of weakened clan protection among IDPs to act with impunity. Lack of a proper judicial system and weak police intervention prevented survivors from bringing prosecutions against perpetrators.”

27.22 The Minority Rights Group International report, No Redress: Somalia’s Forgotten Minorities, published on 23 November 2010, (MRGI report 2010) noted:

“The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Somalia has estimated there to be about 35,000 IDPs in Puntland, of which there are 22,000 in the coastal town of Bossaso. A large proportion of IDPs come from minority and other vulnerable groups from south-central Somalia. Harsh conditions in the IDP settlements have been frequently criticized by successive UN Independent Experts, with little improvement to record.

“While Bossaso port benefits substantially from Bantu and Gaboye labour in the construction industry, low-level public service jobs, such as street sweeping and rubbish collection, and the service industry, this work is unregulated and comes with few social benefits.

“MRG researchers found that violations of rights of minority IDP women and children in Puntland were widespread. The most severe human rights violations against IDP minorities reported to MRG’s researchers were rape and denial of access to justice, with lack of protection from police and courts. Their conditions of extreme poverty and indignity are not being addressed by the authorities.”

For further information on treatment of specific types of IDPs, please see Women, Children and Ethnic groups. For more information on the actions of militias, please see Non-state armed groups. For information on Somali refugees once they have left Somalia, please see the chapter below on Somali refugees in the region.

28. SOMALI REFUGEES IN THE REGION

A UNHCR map of Somali refugees in the region is available here.

28.01 Reuters Alertnet reported on 6 May 2011 that “During the first three months of 2011, nearly 50,000 Somali refugees were registered as they crossed the borders to Kenya, Ethiopia, and Yemen. This is more than twice as many refugees fleeing compared to the same period

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last year. In Kenya, the world’s largest refugee camp is now housing more than 320,000 people. It continues to grow and has by far reached the limits.”

**Yemen**

28.02 IRIN noted on 10 March 2011 that there are: “... an estimated 181,561 Somali refugees in Yemen, most of them urban-based and granted prima facie refugee status by a government that has adopted an open door policy.” UNHCR reported on 15 April 2011 that: “So far this year, more than 6,500 Somalis...have arrived in Yemen by boat.”

28.03 IRIN reported in January 2011 on Somalis who flee to Yemen:

“Every year tens of thousands of Somalis risk their lives crossing the Gulf of Aden to reach Yemen in their search for safety and a better life. Many die atrocious deaths - beaten, thrown overboard, eaten by sharks, drowned or asphyxiated in the hold of crowded smuggler boats.

“Most Somalis who make it to Yemen simply disperse on their own, either making their way to the capital, Sanaa, or other urban areas like Basateen shanty town in Aden. But thousands of others end up in Kharaz refugee camp, a derelict military barracks on a dusty, scorching hot plateau in Lahj Governorate about two hours’ drive west of Aden.

“Many of the refugees in Kharaz are marooned there, unable to go back to their insecure homelands or to find work in Yemen.

“Like most refugee camps, Kharaz was meant to be a temporary solution, a place where the basic needs of Somali refugees could be met until the violence in Somalia died down, allowing them to return home. But with tribal violence still raging in Somalia and tens of thousands of African migrants arriving on Yemen’s shores ever year, the population of Kharaz camp continues to grow... Kharaz shelters 14,000 refugees in cinderblock huts. There are schools, clinics and food rations, but no jobs.

“Residents at Kharaz - like all Somali refugees in Yemen - are entitled to work. Some of those who leave the camp during the summer months (when temperatures can rise to 50 degrees Celsius) may find casual work, but many resort to begging for food once they reach the cities.

“... The Basateen slum - a shanty town on the outskirts of Aden - is more squalid than Kharaz, but Somalis there are less isolated and can at least seek casual work in Aden.

“UNHCR and its partner agencies working with Somali tribal elders do their best to combat social stresses in Basateen with micro-credits and self-reliance projects that help some women feed their children, even when their husbands have vanished...Up to 50,000 new refugees arrive in Yemen every year. We should therefore work to improve the camps, and

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to turn them into a starting point for refugees to move towards a better future - integration in
urban areas, and access to schools and jobs." 590

28.04 The Yemen Post reported on 20 March 2011 on how the recent unrest in Yemen had
affected Somali refugees:

“At least 60 Somali refugees fled Yemen due to the unrest situation in country and reached
the port town of Bosasso.

“One of the refugees, told local media reporters that the Somalis were accused by Yemenis
of being mercenaries fighting on behalf of Yemeni leader Ali Abdullah Saleh.

“We fled from Yemen due to poor living conditions, social inequality, instability, lack of
freedom, oppression, current political unrests and many other reasons,’ Mr. Osman told
media outlets.

“According to UN agencies in Somalia, at least 250 Somali refugees returned back to their
native country from Yemen since 26th January when anti-government protests rocked the
country.” 591

KENYA

28.05 UNHCR reported on 8 April 2011 that: “… the number of Somali arrivals in Kenya has been
steadily growing over the past three months. More than 31,000 Somalis have arrived in
Kenya this year alone. Kenya hosts more than half of the 680,000 Somalis who live as
refugees in neighboring countries.” 592

28.06 The Human Rights Watch report, Welcome to Kenya, stated that:

“Two decades after they first started to flee the brutal conflict in their country, Kenya
provides asylum to 325,000 registered Somali refugees [80 percent of whom are women
and children] —and probably an equal number who have not registered… Near Kenya’s
officially closed border with Somalia, police have free rein to intercept as many as possible
of the estimated 10,000 mostly Somali asylum seekers who cross the border every month
with the help of people smugglers. Making no distinction between women, children, and
men, police often use violence, unlawful detention in appalling overcrowded conditions, and
threats of deportation to extort money from them. Some police officers rape women near
the border. During the first ten weeks of 2010, hundreds, if not thousands, of Somali asylum
seekers unable to pay were unlawfully sent back to Somalia.

“The widespread threat of police interception and abuses forces most asylum seekers to
travel on small paths away from the main road between the border and the refugee camps,
where common criminals (often described by asylum seekers as ‘men not wearing uniform’)
also prey upon them, raping women and stealing the little they have.

590 UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Integrated Regional Information Networks, Somali refugees hope for
2011
592 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Latest fighting forces more Somalis into displacement, 8 April 2011,
http://www.unhcr.org/4d9ee5c69.html Date accessed 28 April 2011
“About half of all Somalis fleeing to Kenya register in the world’s largest refugee settlement, made up of three overcrowded refugee camps near the town of Dadaab in north-east Kenya, now hosting almost 300,000 people. The other half make their way to Nairobi, Kenya’s capital, where very few are able to register as refugees due to the limited capacity of the government and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). In the camps, police responsible for protecting refugees sometimes detain, assault, and extort money from them. Police have also failed to investigate cases of sexual violence between refugees, leading to a climate of impunity for those responsible.

“Kenya currently unlawfully confines refugees to camps, denying them their freedom of movement and choice of residence, in contravention of the 1951 Refugee Convention, although thousands have also registered in Nairobi. Under this policy, police arrest refugees travelling without (and at times with) permission, extort money, and sometimes take them to court in Garissa where they are fined or sent to prison.

“Only by handing over money to police—either when intercepted in the border areas, or while detained in the Liboi, Dadaab, and Garissa police stations—can refugees pay their way out of the abuse and intimidation.” 593

28.07 Welcome to Kenya further stated that:

“Over a period of six days in the Dadaab camps in March 2010, Human Rights Watch interviewed 102 refugees about police abuses and sexual violence in and around the camps. Half of the interviewees spoke about police abuses, including excessive force leading to death and miscarriages, rape, whipping, beatings, and kicking. Fifteen said the police had arrested and detained them—together with around 220 other people—soon after they had entered Kenya. Eight said that the police had deported them, and 152 others, back to Somalia after they had failed to pay the police money. Despite the limited time Human Rights Watch had to conduct research in the camps, this number suggests that the abuses documented in this report are systematic and widespread” 594

28.10 The Guardian reported on 24 March 2011 that:

“Today, the three refugee camps – Dagahale, Ifo and Hagadera – that make up the overcrowded and chronically underfunded Dadaab complex are home to more than 300,000 people and three generations of refugees… Refugees aren't allowed to leave the camps unless they receive special movement passes. If caught without a pass, they risk arrest, detention or expulsion. Special buses can be taken between each of the complex's three camps, which are separated from one another by a few kilometres of dust and dry heat…[Dadaab is] Kenya's fourth-largest city, although no Kenyan lives there… The camps were originally designed to house 90,000 people, but with the ongoing crisis in Somalia, official estimates suggest that around 5,000 new refugees arrive each month. Richard Floyer-Acland, the UNHCR representative in Dadaab, put the number closer to 9,000… Three years ago, the UN refugee agency declared the Dadaab complex full, and it continues to lobby Kenyan authorities for access to new land to extend it. For now, new arrivals set up camp where they can, gathering on the outskirts of the complex.” 595

29. **CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONALITY**

29.01 The requirements for citizenship are set out in Law No 28 of 22 December 1962 – Somali Citizenship. 596 As this legislation is not being applied it is not possible to provide information on the acquisition of citizenship.

**PASSPORTS**

29.02 Prior to 2007, there were reports that Somali passports could be readily acquired, and the BBC, in an article dated 18 November 2004, stated: “... the printing of passports has been privatised. For just $80 and in less than 24 hours, I became a Somali citizen, born in Mogadishu. As I had omitted to travel with any passport-sized photos, my supplier kindly left the laminate for that page intact, for me to stick down at home. For a slightly higher fee, I was offered a diplomatic passport, with my choice of posting or ministerial job.” 597

29.03 An Awdal news report of 28 March 2008 reported that from 1 April 2008, Somalis living in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) would be able to be issued with passports. The report stated:

“Earlier, the UAE press reported that the Somali government had selected the UAE-Emirate of Sharjah as the main centre for issuing electronic passports and electronic identification cards for its citizens around the globe... Mr Gafow, however, affirmed that new immigration officers to be based in Somali Embassies would issue the Somali passport while the database will be kept with the passport-printing centre in the Sharjah Airport Free Zone. ... But Mr Gafow affirmed that the Immigration Centre would later move to Mogadishu after ensuring safety and security in all parts of the country. New e-passports will be designed as per international standards defined by the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), using the latest ‘contact less chip technology’, incorporating Facial and Fingerprints Biometric Security Recognition. Passports were to be issued in four colours to various categories – red for diplomatic missions, brown for services, black for the public and light blue for travel documents only. ... ‘Inside the country we have already opened offices in Baidoa, Bossasso, Garowe and Laas Anod,’ he said, underlining that there will be no need for people to come to Mogadishu for a passport as the case used to be under the previous government. Answering a question on whether any foreign visas have been issued to the holders of the new passports, Mr Gafow said: ‘I have entered the UAE with the new passport and a visa has been issued to me, and the American Embassy in Nairobi has been the first to issue visas to the holders of the new Somali passports.’ New passports with electronic national identity cards will cost US$ 150 for Somalis outside Somalia and US$ 100 for Somalis residing within Somalia, making it one of the most expensive passports issued by foreign embassies in the UAE. Passport fees for other nationalities living in the UAE range between US$ 30-50.” 598

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30. FORGED AND FRAUDULENTLY OBTAINED DOCUMENTS

30.01 The Landinfo report, Documents in Somalia and Sudan, published on 5 January 2009, caveated throughout its accounts of documentation from Somalia and Somaliland. The report states in its overview that:

“Although a Transitional Federal Government (TFG) has been established in Somalia, no agencies have been mandated to issue personal documents. Furthermore, there are no registries containing information which can establish the identity of individual citizens. In Somaliland – the breakaway republic in the north-western part of Somalia which has failed to win the recognition of any country in the world – government agencies do however issue various documents. Lack of registration procedures and internal control mechanisms as well as corruption give serious cause to question the reliability of these documents.” 599

30.02 A letter from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, dated 1 November 2010 stated:

“Kenyan travel documents and ID cards are subject to high levels of abuse, particularly by Somali nationals. The abuse is exacerbated by Somalia’s close proximity to Kenya, the difficulties the Kenyan authorities have in determining nationality (especially from the border communities) and widespread fraud and corruption.

“Local newspaper articles have reported abuse of the Kenyan ID card resulting in the temporary closure of the ID card office servicing the Eastern Province of Kenya.” 600

See also: Passports

600 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Letter to COI Service, 1 November 2010, Available in hard copy on request
CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS

See also: History and Recent developments

For a comprehensive account of the conflict in Somalia, please see Accord Issue 21, Whose Peace Is It Anyway?

The IRIN report, In-Depth: Somali National Peace Conference, published in 2000, gave the following information about the history of Somalia, up to 2000. 601

1960
26 June The former British Somaliland Protectorate gains independence.
1 July The former Italian colony becomes independent. The former British (northwest) and Italian (south) colonies unite.

1969
15 October Democratically elected President Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke is assassinated by one of his police bodyguards.
21 October The army under Major-General Muhammad Siyad Barreh overthrows the civilian government, after parliament hits deadlock trying to select a new president. The army suspends the constitution, bans all 86 political parties, and promises to end corruption. Siyad Barreh heads the 25-member Supreme Revolutionary Council, consisting of army and police officers.

1970
21 October The army junta declares Somalia a socialist country and adopts ‘Scientific Socialism’. This signals a shift towards Soviet backing, and security organs and intelligence networks are given greater powers.

1972
21 October A written script for the Somali language is established. A modified Roman alphabet is adopted as the official orthography for the Somali language.

1974
Somalia becomes a member of the Arab League.

1977
July A low-level war of attrition between Somali-backed insurgents and the Ethiopian army becomes an all-out battle between Somalia and Ethiopia, when Somalia declares war on Ethiopia. The war goes down in history as the fiercest Cold War battle on the continent, played out in the Ethiopian Ogaden region.
13 November Somalia expels about 6,000 of Russian, Cuban and other Soviet allies, after the Soviet Union switched sides and allied itself with the Ethiopia.

1978
March The Somali Government announces the withdrawal of its forces from the Ogaden.

8 April

After the defeat of the Somali army, a group of army officers try to topple the Siyad Barreh regime. The attempted coup is crushed and Siyad Barreh tightens his grip further. He begins a process of putting power into the hands of his relatives, and sub-clan, the Darod Marehan. He also empowers the related Dulbahante and Ogadeni sub-clans.

1988

May

The Somali National Movement (SNM) mounts an offensive in the north of the country, as a result of the regime’s brutal post-Ethiopian war policies. Siyad Barreh responds by bombing the area. Hundreds of thousands of civilians are displaced, and many killed. It is the first real challenge to Siyad Barreh’s rule, and the beginning of the proliferation of armed opposition to the regime.

1990

May

A manifesto is published in Mogadishu calling for an all inclusive national reconciliation convention to avert protracted civil war. It is signed by 144 people, including politicians, religious leaders, professionals and business people, representing all Somali clans.

December

Armed uprising erupts in Mogadishu.

1991

27 January

Siyad Barreh flees Mogadishu. Forces loyal to the Hawiye-based United Somali Congress (USC) capture the city.

28 January

The Manifesto Group of USC appoints a hotelier, Ali Mahdi Muhammad, as president. The military wing of USC, led by General Muhammad Farah Aydid, rejects the appointment. Full-scale fighting starts between the two factions of the USC.

3 March

A ceasefire comes into effect between the warring factions in Mogadishu. Fighting erupts in the northeast region between the Al-Ittihad Islamic fundamentalists and militia loyal to the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), lead by Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmad.

18 May: The former British Protectorate of Somaliland declares independence from the rest of Somalia, in the town of Burao.

1992

April


December

UNITAF forces under American leadership land in Mogadishu.

1993

February

A three month conference in Borama seeks a new leader for the self-declared state of Somaliland. Muhammad Haji Ibrahim Egal, a former prime minister, is elected in May.

March

The next serious attempt at peace talks. An Ethiopian initiative evolves into a joint UN-Ethiopian sponsored reconciliation conference held in Addis Ababa.

4 May

UNITAF hands over to UNOSOM II.

5 June

23 Pakistani peacekeepers are killed by Aydid loyalists.

12 July

American helicopter gunships kill over 50 unarmed Somalis holding a meeting in a private house in Mogadishu, increasing local hostility to the international intervention forces.

3 October

American-led forces looking for Aydid's senior aides are involved in a shoot-out, which leaves 18 Americans and hundreds of Somalis dead. The body of a dead American is dragged through the Mogadishu streets, and, caught on camera, sparks an international outcry.
1996
August
Aydid dies of gunshot wounds sustained in operations against his former lieutenant, Osman Ali Atto. His son, a former American marine, Husayn Muhammad Aydid, is chosen by the clan to replace his father.

November
Ethiopian government-sponsored reconciliation conference brings most of the factions together, but it is boycotted by Aydid’s son.

1997
November
All faction leaders met in Cairo, with limited success, leaving Somalia without a national leader and Mogadishu still divided and insecure.

2000
2 May
On the initiative of the Djibouti government, the Somali National Peace Conference brings together more than 2,000 participants in Arta, Djibouti. It is the first conference where the warlords do not have control of the conference agenda.

26 August
A 245-strong Transitional National Assembly, based on clan representation, elects Abdiqasim Salad Hasan as the new president of Somalia.

27 August
President Abdiqasim Salad Hassan is sworn in an inauguration ceremony attended by the heads of governments of Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, Yemen, and the host country Djibouti, along with representatives from the UN, EU, Arab league, OAU, France, Italy, Kuwait, and Libya.

2001
April
Somali warlords, backed by Ethiopia, announce their intention to form a national government within six months, in direct opposition to the country’s transitional administration.

August
UN appeals for food aid for half a million people in the drought-hit south.

2004
August
In 14th attempt since 1991 to restore central government, a new transitional parliament inaugurated at ceremony in Kenya. In October the body elects Abdullahi Yusuf as president.

December
Tsunami waves generated by an undersea earthquake off Indonesia hit the Somali coast and the island of Hafun. Hundreds of deaths are reported; tens of thousands of people are displaced.

2005
February-June
Somali government begins returning home from exile in Kenya, but there are bitter divisions over where in Somalia the new parliament should sit.

November
Prime Minister Ali Mohammed Ghedi survives an assassination attempt in Mogadishu. Gunmen attack his convoy, killing six people.

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Date accessed 9 May 2011
2006
February  Transitional parliament meets in Somalia - in the central town of Baidoa - for the first time since it was formed in Kenya in 2004.
March & May  Scores of people are killed and hundreds are injured during fierce fighting between rival militias in Mogadishu. It is the worst violence in almost a decade.
June-July  Militias loyal to the Union of Islamic Courts take control of Mogadishu and other parts of the south after defeating clan warlords.
July-August  Mogadishu's air and seaports are re-opened for the first time since 1995.
September  Transitional government and the Union of Islamic Courts begin peace talks in the Sudanese capital, Khartoum.
October  About 35,000 Somalis escaping drought, strict Islamist rule and the possibility of war have fled to Kenya refugee since the start of 2006, the UN reports.
December  UN Security Council resolution endorses African peacekeepers, specifies that neighbouring states should not deploy troops. Islamist leaders react by saying they will tackle foreign forces as invaders.

2007
January  Islamists abandon their last stronghold, the port town of Kismayo.
President Abdullahi Yusuf enters Mogadishu for the first time since taking office in 2004.
US carries out air strikes in southern Somalia which it says targeted al-Qaeda figures, and which reportedly kill an unknown number of civilians. It is the first known direct US military intervention in Somalia since 1993. The strikes are defended by President Yusuf. They are condemned for killing innocent civilians.
Interim government imposes three-month state of emergency.


March  African Union peacekeepers land at Mogadishu amid pitched battles between insurgents and government forces backed by Ethiopian troops. The Red Cross says it is the worst fighting in 15 years.

April  UN says more than 320,000 Somalis have fled fighting in Mogadishu since February.
Hundreds of people are reported killed after several days of fierce clashes in the capital.

May  The World Food Programme says a resurgence of piracy is threatening food supplies.

June  A US warship shells suspected Al-Qaeda targets in Puntland.
Prime Minister Ghedi escapes a suicide car bomb attack on his compound.
Ethiopian Premier Meles Zenawi visits Mogadishu, pledging to withdraw his troops once peace takes hold.

July  National reconciliation conference opens in Mogadishu and comes under mortar attack. Islamist leaders stay away from the talks.
Refugee exodus grows amid an upsurge in violence.

August
Human Rights Watch accuses Ethiopian, Somali and insurgent forces of war crimes, and the UN Security Council of indifference during the recent conflict.

September
Opposition groups form a new alliance to campaign for a military and diplomatic solution to the Somali conflict. They meet in Asmara, Eritrea.

October
Ethiopian forces fire on demonstrators in Mogadishu protesting at the presence of what they call foreign invaders.
Heaviest fighting in Mogadishu reported since April. Ethiopians move reinforcements into the city.
Prime Minister Ghedi resigns.
Aid agencies warn a catastrophe is unfolding in Somalia.

November
Government shuts down Radio Shabelle, Radio Simba and Radio Banadir.
UN special envoy Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah describes Somalia's humanitarian crisis the worst in Africa, suggests using international justice to curb the violence.
Nur Hassan Hussein, also known as Nur Adde, sworn in as new prime minister.
Number of Somali refugees hits one million, with nearly 200,000 fleeing the capital in the past two weeks, the UN reports.

December
Ethiopian troops leave key central town of Guriel.

2008

January
Burundi becomes the second nation to contribute troops to the African Union peacekeeping force, sending 440 soldiers to Mogadishu.

March
US launches missile strike on southern town of Dhoble targeting suspected al-Qaeda member wanted for 2002 bombing of Israeli-owned hotel in Kenya.
Islamist-led insurgency continues to spread.

April
EU calls for international efforts to tackle piracy off the Somali coast after a series of hijackings and attacks on vessels.
US air strike kills Aden Hashi Ayro, a leader of the Al-Shabab insurgent group.

May
Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi says he will keep troops inside Somalia until "jihadists" are defeated.
The UN Security Council unanimously votes to allow countries to send warships into Somalia's territorial waters to tackle pirates.

June
Government signs three-month ceasefire pact with opposition Alliance for Re-Liberation of Somalia. The deal, which provides for Ethiopian troops to leave Somalia within 120 days, is rejected by Islamist leader Hassan Dahir Aweys, who says Union of Islamic Courts will not stop fighting until all foreign troops have left country.

July
Head of the UN Development Programme in Somalia, Osman Ali Ahmed, killed by gunmen in Mogadishu.

September
Somali pirates’ hijacking of a Ukrainian ship carrying 33 tanks prompts widespread international concern. The US and other countries deploy navy ships to Somali waters.

October
Nato agrees to despatch a naval force to patrol to waters off Somalia by the end of 2008, in an effort to control piracy.
A wave of coordinated bombings across the self-governing and relatively peaceful regions of Somaliland and Puntland, in Somalia’s north, kill at least 27 people.

November
Somali pirates hijack an oil-laden Saudi super-tanker and demand a 25m dollar ransom for its return.

December
Ethiopia announces plans to withdraw all forces by end of 2008.
President Abdullahi Yusuf tries to sack Prime Minister Nur Hassan Hussein over his attempts to draw moderate Islamists into the government. Parliament declares the dismissal unconstitutional and passes a vote of confidence in Mr Nur. Mr Yusuf resigns.
2009

January  Ethiopia completes the withdrawal of its troops. Fighters from the radical Islamist al-Shabab militia take control of the town of Baidoa, formerly a key stronghold of the transitional government.

Meeting in neighbouring Djibouti, Somalia's parliament swears in 149 new members from the main opposition Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia. It elects a moderate Islamist, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, president, and extends the transitional government's mandate for another two years.

February  President Ahmed selects Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke as prime minister. Mr Sharmarke, a former diplomat, is widely seen as a bridge between Islamists within the Somali government and the international community.

May  Islamist insurgents launch onslaught on Mogadishu.

June  Somalia's security minister and more than 20 other people are killed in a suicide bombing at a hotel in Beledweyne, north of the capital Mogadishu. President Ahmed declares a state of emergency as violence intensifies. Somali officials appeal to neighbouring countries to send troops to Somalia, as government forces continue to battle Islamist insurgents.

September  Al-Shabab proclaims allegiance to Al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden.

October  Al-Shabab wins control over the southern port city of Kismayu after defeating the rival Hizbul-Islam Islamist militia, which withdraws to villages to the west. At least 20 are killed and 70 injured in fighting that threatens to spread to the rest of the Islamist-controlled south.

November  Pirates seize a supertanker carrying oil from Saudi Arabia to the US, one of the largest ships captured off Somalia. The Greek-owned Maran Centaurus was about 1,300km (800 miles) off Somalia when it was hijacked. Kidnappers released journalists Amanda Lindhout and Nigel Brennan after 15 months in captivity.

December: Al-Shabab denies being behind suicide attack that killed 22 people in Mogadishu, including three ministers.

2010

January  Al-Shabab declares it is ready to send fighters to support Islamist rebels in Yemen.

February  Al-Shabab formally declares alliance with al-Qaeda, begins to concentrate troops in southern Mogadishu for a major offensive to capture the capital.

March  Up to half of food aid being diverted to contractors, militants and local UN staff, says UN's Monitoring Group on Somalia. Findings denied by President Sharif and UN's World Food Programme.

May  UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon calls on world to support current Somalia government as best chance to stabilise the chaotic country.

July  Al-Shabab says it was behind twin blasts which hit Ugandan capital Kampala, killing 74 people watching the World Cup football final on TV.

September  Prime Minister Sharmarke quits. He is replaced by Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed.

2011

January  Pirate attacks on ships worldwide hit seven-year high in 2010, with Somali pirates accounting for 49 of 52 ships seized.

First government executions since 1991.

February  Parliament votes to extend its mandate for another three years.

Kenya closes border to Somalia after nearby fighting between Al-Shabab rebels and government-backed forces.
### Annex B

**TIMELINE OF RECENT EVENTS (FEBRUARY TO MAY 2011)**

The following is a non-exhaustive list of events in Somalia between February and May 2011. All information is from the International Institute of Strategic Studies Armed Conflict Database (available in hard copy on request). The events are listed in reverse chronological order.

**4 May**

**Armed clashes/Violent incidents:** A TFG convoy of senior military commanders is attacked by al-Shabab fighters in southern Somalia. Eight people are killed, including senior commanders of Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a.

**3 May**

**Armed clashes/Violent incidents:** Hassan Dahir Aweys, a senior al-Shabab official, says the death of Osama bin Laden will not stop the Islamic movements of al-Qaeda and al-Shabab, and calls on these groups to launch more attacks on Western countries.  
**Human security:** UNHCR says around 50,000 civilians fled the Somali conflict in the first quarter of this year, an almost 100% increase on the first quarter of 2010.

**1 May**

**Armed clashes/Violent incidents:** As the heavy fighting in the south-western region of Gedo comes to an end, both al-Shabab and the Somali government claim victory.

**30 April**

**Human security:** An estimated 20 children die of disease on the outskirts of Mogadishu.

**28 April**

**Armed clashes/Violent incidents:** Gedo’s state capital is captured by government forces after fighting with al-Shabab militants. A Somali military spokesman estimates that 36 al-Shabab rebels are killed, and five government soldiers are severely wounded.  
**Political developments:** The TFG calls on the international community and international aid agencies to provide assistance to Gedo and Juba regions, which have recently experienced intense conflict and soaring levels of drought.  
**Armed clashes/Violent incidents:** Al-Shabab attacks pro-government military vehicles in Gedo state, killing five and injuring many.  
**Military developments:** Plans to deploy 4,000 AU troops to support the Somali military are finalised, with Uganda to deploy 3,000 troops and Burundi to deploy 1,000 troops.

**27 April**

**Armed clashes/Violent incidents:** There is incessant fighting between forces loyal to the government and al-Shabab in south-western Somalia. A spokesman representing Ahlu Sunnah wal Jama’a says around 20 al-Shabab fighters have been killed.  
**Human security:** According to the UN, an estimated 2.4 million Somalis are in dire need of humanitarian assistance. In addition to the ongoing conflict, severe drought is killing livestock, making subsistence farming untenable.  
**Foreign relations:** The African Union calls on the international community to place sanctions on the perpetrators of the ongoing conflict in Somalia, in an attempt to curb the violence.
26 April  Armed clashes/Violent incidents: At least eight civilians are killed and 13 are wounded when a public service vehicle hits a land mine in southern Somalia. Al-Shabab is suspected of planting landmines targeting civilians.

Armed clashes/Violent incidents: Ahlu Sunnah wal Jama’a issue a warning stating that they will attack the al-Shabab controlled regions of Gedo and Bay in southwestern Somalia.

25 April  Armed clashes/Violent incidents: Three people are killed and four are wounded in a clash between two groups of government soldiers in Mogadishu. The group under attack was allegedly robbing bus passengers and extracting money from the drivers.

Human security: Aid workers say an increasing number of child soldiers is being recruited by various fighting groups in Somalia.

22 April  Foreign relations/Political developments: IGAD (The Intergovernmental Authority on Development) and EAC (East African Community) announce their support for the TFG’s decision to postpone the elections scheduled for August 2011 to August 2012, in the hope that the delay will enable Somalia to achieve sufficient security and stability for holding elections.

20 April  Armed clashes/Violent incidents: Clashes break out between al-Shabab and government forces in south-western Somalia after four people were killed in an attack on government military bases.

Human security: Ten people die in southern and central Somalia as the prolonged drought continues to claim people’s lives and livelihoods, contributing to the rising numbers of refugees and IDPs.

18 April  Armed clashes/Violent incidents: Unidentified gunmen attack two mosques in Puntland, killing six and wounding six others.

Political developments: The Somali prime minister calls on the Somali diaspora to fund and support the government to build institutions to enable a smooth transition at the end of TFG rule.

Military developments: Nine al-Shabab militiants surrender to government forces in southern Somalia.

Armed clashes/Violent incidents: Intense fighting between Somali government troops backed by AMISOM/AU soldiers and al-Shabab fighters in Mogadishu kills 11 and wounds 10.

17 April  Political developments: The TFG says it will take control of the entire country, following criticism from international actors and other internal political groups.

Law enforcement: Government officials announce that riots and demonstrations without a permit are banned in Mogadishu.

16 April  Armed clashes/Violent incidents: A landmine attack in central Somalia claims the life of the Regional Coordinator of Puntland’s Ministry of Justice and Religious Affairs, Sheikh Ismail and his bodyguard, according to reports from Radio Gaalkayo.

Armed clashes/Violent incidents: Al-Shabab kills Hared Ali Durbar, an ex-politician, according to reports from Lower Juba region.

Kidnappings/Abductions/Disappearances: Al-Shabab detains two ICRC aid workers in Baidoa, south-western Somalia. It is unclear why they were detained.
15 April

Law enforcement: 12 youths are arrested for criminal and un-Islamic behaviour by al-Shabab forces in Kismaayo, southern Somalia.

Law enforcement: Forces loyal to the TFG arrested 12 people in Southern Somalia over alleged links to al-Shabab.

Armed clashes/Violent incidents: Eyewitnesses say three people are killed and five are wounded in a demonstration in Mogadishu.

Human security: The protracted drought in Puntland leads to ten people dying from lack of access to food and water.

14 April

Military developments: According to government officials, 10 al-Shabab fighters surrender in Dhobley district.

Political developments: Following the TFG’s one-year extension of its mandate last month, the UN’s special representative to Somalia says the transition needs to be ended as previously agreed. However, the high levels of insecurity and instability mean it may be impossible to conduct safe presidential elections.

Human security: Some areas of southern Somalia receive rains after a protracted drought that engulfed the whole region.

Political developments: Following the recent tensions over the UN-led meeting in Nairobi, Somali government officials say they will host an internal constitutional meeting in Mogadishu in June. The disunity is having a direct negative impact on military operations against al-Shabab, thus threatening to take the focus off one of the main reasons for instability in Somalia and the Horn of Africa region.

Military developments: African Union peacekeepers gain ground, and are now in control of about half of Mogadishu.

13 April

Political developments: The UN-led meeting for Somali political groups held in Nairobi ends without achieving the mandatory objectives.

Armed clashes/Violent incidents: Al-Shabab detonate a bomb in Mogadishu as the Somali government commemorates the 51st anniversary of Somalia’s armed forces. At least three people are killed and over 45 are wounded in the attack.

Political developments: The TFG in Mogadishu strongly urges the parliamentary speaker to leave the UN meeting in Nairobi. Cabinet members believe the discussions in Nairobi will cause further schisms in Somalia’s constitution.

Political developments: According to Radio Shabelle, the Somali moderate Islamic group Ahlu Sunnah wal Jama'a is attending the UN-led conference in Nairobi with the intention of taking over the Somali government. The spokesman of Ahlu Sunnah wal Jama'a in Europe says they are ‘multicultural and not based on a clan. We are hoping to take the presidency, the premiership and the majority in parliament’.

Foreign relations: Somali President Sharif Sheik Ahmed accuses the international community of overlooking the long-running problems in Somalia, saying that other countries that call on help are assisted almost immediately.

Armed clashes/Violent incidents/Law enforcement: TFG forces detain 30 people in Mogadishu after unknown men attack police stations with grenades.

Political developments: Several invited participants are said to be absent from the United Nations-led consultative meeting for Somalia in Nairobi, Kenya. Meanwhile in Mogadishu, cabinet ministers insist that the speaker of parliament leave the meeting as it does not represent the Somali government’s views.

11 April

Political developments: Around 300 parliamentarians are opposed to Speaker Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan’s decision to attend the UN conference in Nairobi. The members of parliament are currently devising a motion against Hassan.
Political developments: At another conference held in Mombasa, Kenya to deliberate the work and development of AMISOM troops, a senior AMISOM commander says that ‘Somalia is currently at a crucial stage’.

10 April

Political developments: Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama’a declares that it will not attend the UN conference on Somalia in Nairobi, Kenya. This is in contrast to their 5 April statement that they would attend the meeting.

International aid: The Ministry of Women’s Affairs deliver humanitarian aid from the Iranian Red Crescent Society to IDPs in Mogadishu.

9 April

Armed clashes/Violent incidents: According to news reports, at least two people, including a police officer, are injured in an attack by unidentified perpetrators in Las Anod.

Foreign relations: The Speaker of Parliament and the presidents of Somalia’s semi-autonomous states of Puntland and Galmudug fly to Nairobi, Kenya to attend a UN-led meeting on Somalia. The Transitional Federal Government of Somalia calls on regional administrations not to attend the UN conference.

8 April

Military developments: Fighting is expected to break out in Beledweyne, Hiiraan region, due to tension between al-Shabab and the Shabelle Valley administration.

7 April

Military developments: Fifteen former al-Shabab fighters surrender to the Shabelle Valley regional administration in Hiiraan region, central Somalia.

Armed clashes/Violent incidents: Two government soldiers are killed in an ambush by armed men in Dharkenley district, Mogadishu.

Armed clashes/Violent incidents: Senior al-Shabab official Hasan Gumarey and two others are killed in a clash between government forces and al-Shabab insurgents in control of Dhobley, Lower Juba region.

Human security: Officials say 10 people have died of hunger in Hiiraan region.

6 April

Political developments: Somalis in Galkaya and Mudug demonstrate against the UN-led conference on Somalia’s future that is to be held in Nairobi, Kenya this month.

Armed clashes/Violent incidents: Two civilians are injured in an attack on government forces by al-Shabab in Mogadishu.

Armed clashes/Violent incidents: An officer working for the Puntland Development and Research Centre is killed in the capital of Puntland.

4 April

Political developments: The United Nations Special Representative for Somalia, Augustine Mahiga, calls on all Somali political groups to attend the Somali Conference to be held this month in Nairobi. The Transitional Federal Government of Somalia vowed not to attend, as it does not agree on the venue.

International aid/Political developments: The United Nations offers to increase its funding to Kenya to alleviate the burden of hosting the world’s largest refugee camp, and to help put an end to the recruitment of youth into Somali militias. The UN refugee agency plans to budget for more police officers, improved infrastructure, including police posts and cars at Dadaab camp, 100km (62 miles) from the Somali border.

Armed clashes/Violent incidents: Al-Shabab is allegedly driven out of Dhobley town as a result of continuous fighting with forces loyal to the government. However, reports suggest that the situation in Dhobley town is still very tense.

Armed clashes/Violent incidents: Five people are killed in overnight fighting between al-Shabab and Somali government forces. According to local residents,
the fighting started after al-Shabab fighters attacked government and AMISOM military positions in Hodan and Howlwadag districts.

Armed clashes/Violent incidents: Two people are killed and three others injured in crossfire in Dharkenley, Mogadishu, according to an eyewitness.

Law enforcement: According to reports, two journalists and six youths are arrested by police in Awdal region, a breakaway state.

International aid/Political developments: UN officials based in Nairobi are given 90 days to relocate to Mogadishu by the Somali government, due to the high costs of frequent trips between Kenya and Somalia.

Political developments: President Sharif speaks at a ceremony in Mogadishu to launch a Somali National Television for the first time in 20 years.

3 April

Political developments: Former Somali Defence minister Mohamed Abdi Gandhi is sworn in as president of the newly created semiautonomous region of Jubaland. The region includes the three sub-regions of Lower Juba, Middle Juba and Gedeo, and is estimated to have a population of 1.3 million people.

Military developments/Foreign relations: Kenya dispatches a large number of troops along its border with Somalia over fears that the fighting between the Somali government and the al-Shabab militias could spill over into Kenya.

Political developments: Somali politicians create the new state of Azania, on the border with Kenya. Somalia's government criticises the move, saying it will further weaken the country. Kenya supports the new state, as it is seen as a buffer zone between it and Somalia.

Human security: UNHCR chief Antonio Guterres laments the increasing number of refugees, now roughly 314,000, fleeing the Somali conflict to Kenya.

Military developments: Kenyan-trained Somali government forces take control of Dhobley, a border town near Kenya, from al-Shabab.

Political developments/Foreign relations: The Transitional Federal Government bans several United Nations officials from entering and working in Somalia, accusing them of failing to meet their objectives and carry out their official responsibilities.

2 April

Armed clashes/Violent incidents: At least 38 people are killed in heavy clashes between Somali government troops backed by African Union forces and al-Shabab fighters in Mogadishu.

International aid/Human security: The head of the World Food Programme says the agency is facing a great shortage of funds required to continue assisting more than five million people in the Horn of Africa, who are experiencing severe food shortages due to a protracted drought.

Law enforcement: Aidid Abdulahi Ilka Hanaf, a former lawyer and MP, is appointed chief of the Supreme Court.

1 April

Political developments: Parliamentary Speaker Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adam announces the formation of three new committees designed to bolster the effectiveness of the Somali parliament, and calls on the international community to support them. The new groups are an election committee, a strategic planning committee and a parliamentary reform committee.

Military developments: Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’a receives threats from Al-Shabab fighters saying they will take over of the whole of Galgudud region in central Somalia. The Galgudud region has been in under Ahlu Sunna wal Jama’a’s control, however, leadership disputes may be faced as a result of the recent threats.

Foreign relations: The Kenyan government issues a warning to Somalia’s al-Shabab militia group to stay out of Kenya.
31 March  Political developments: The UN will hold a conference on Somalia’s transition process in Nairobi next month, bringing together the TFG, Somaliland, Ahlu Sunna wa Jama’a and Galmudug. The TFG says it will not take part, arguing that security must be increased before any transition can be discussed.
Economic developments: AMISOM says that roads linking to Bakaara market, Mogadishu’s busiest and largest market, will be re-opened.
Foreign relations: The UN representative to Somalia, Augustine Mahiga, states that Somali leaders will attend the upcoming conference in Nairobi, Kenya, after speaking to President Sharif, the prime minister, and the speaker of parliament.
Armed clashes/Violent incidents/Foreign relations: According to the Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya, 10 Kenyan youths who were recruited by al-Shabab from Ukunda are killed in Somalia. The council calls on the government to take action against militia recruiters.
Law enforcement: Ahlu Sunnah wal Jama’a detain 10 people in connection with bombings in Gedo region.
Human security: IDPs living in camps near the former US embassy protest due to lack of services. The protesters claim that aid and services meant for the camp has been misallocated.
Foreign relations/Military developments: Kenyan security forces are on high alert after receiving warnings of possible attacks by al-Shabab linked terrorists.

29 March  Human security: Elders from Cadalle district in Middle Shabelle say that 50 people have died due to regional drought.
Armed clashes/Violent incidents: Two soldiers are killed and four civilians injured in simultaneous explosions targeting army bases in Mogadishu’s Darkenley district.

28 March  International aid: The European Union announces an additional €65.9 million in assistance to the peacekeeping force in Somalia.
Political developments: Somalia's UN-backed government extends its mandate for another year despite criticism from donors and attacks by Islamist extremists.
Armed clashes/Violent incidents: Fourteen people die and 25 are wounded in heavy fighting between government troops backed by AU peacekeepers and al-Shabab in Mogadishu. The fighting escalates after AU troops with armoured vehicles attack al-Shabab bases.
Armed clashes/Violent incidents: Fighting breaks out between al-Shabab and fighters loyal to the Shabelle Valley administration in parts of Hiiraan. At least six people are killed, and more than ten are injured.

27 March  International aid/Military developments: Burundi and Uganda, whose soldiers are serving in the African Union Mission in Somalia, call for the deployment of an additional 4,000 troops.
Political developments/Military developments: Prime Minister Mohamed Abdullahi states that the government made progress in its first 100 days, as the army has captured many districts in the capital and Gedo in the southwest.

26 March  Military developments/Human security: The transitional government warns Somali soldiers not to harass civilians. Defence minister Abdi Hakim Hajji Mohamoud Fiqi also urges the army to redouble their efforts in the battle against al-Shabab.
Armed clashes/Violent incidents: Heavy fighting between al-Shabab and government forces backed by AMISOM takes place in Hodan and Howl Wadag districts, killing three and injuring a number of others.
24 March

Human security: A committee in the semi-autonomous region of Puntland provides assistance to drought victims by distributing food and other relief supplies.

Political developments: President Ahmed once again calls on al-Shabab fighters to surrender.

Political developments: A written statement from Somali president Sheikh Sharif Ahmed’s office states that it is illegal for the Somali parliament speaker and parliament itself to consider organising a presidential election when the current president's term has not yet ended. The speaker, Sharif Hasan Sheikh Adan, says the parliament will hold elections in August when the transitional period ends, adding that members of the house will elect both a parliament speaker and a president for the parliament.

Armed clashes/Violent incidents/Foreign relations: A contingent of Kenya’s General Service Unit officers cross into Somalia, killing a dozen al-Shabab militants in a clash at the Liboi border. The militants allegedly fired across the Kenyan border, damaging a water tank at a GSU camp on the border.

Armed clashes/Violent incidents: At least eleven soldiers are killed and dozens injured in two heavy land mine explosions that rocked a district north of the Somali capital, Mogadishu. No one has claimed responsibility for the attacks.

Military developments: An AMISOM top official states that security in Somalia is improving tremendously, and that the AMISOM troops are trying to restore peace in recently captured areas.

23 March

Foreign relations: Instability in Somalia is now a global security issue that requires the concerted efforts of the international community, says an EU senior official.

Political developments: The Somali government says its forces weakened al-Shabab’s power in its latest assault against the Islamist group.

Law enforcement: Police forces start search operations in Mogadishu. The aim of the security operations is allegedly to assure peace in government-controlled districts.

International aid: The European Union pledges support for AMISOM, and commits €215 million over the next three years for the development of Somalia.

Military developments: AU spokesman Maj. Barigye Bahuko says that AMISOM troops are to increase the number of bases in Mogadishu, with the goal of driving al-Shabab from the capital.

Military developments: A TFG official in Gedo states that seven al-Shabab fighters have surrendered to their forces. Additionally, the police urges those who have already joined the group to re-consider their decision.

Armed clashes/Violent incidents: At least five people are killed and 21 are injured after Bakara, Mogadishu’s most popular market, is hit by artillery fire.

22 March

Armed clashes/Violent incidents: According to Somali army commander Abdikarim Adan, government forces take over the control of Bondhere District after stand-off between government forces and al-Shabab leave ten dead and many wounded.


Human Security/Military developments: Al-Shabab announces that it will forbid residents of Bardhere to travel to Luq, Elawk and Beledhawo districts, which are under the control of forces supporting the government.

Political developments: The Somali government accuses al-Shabab of setting up a military base in a marketplace from which they launch attacks.
Political developments: Several members of parliament call for an end to the 4.5 clan power-sharing agreement, which the Transitional Federal Government is based on. After long discussions, the MPs argued that the agreement should be ended to ensure the just treatment of citizens.

Human security: Reports from Sol indicate that the droughts in the region have affected both livestock and humans, mainly in rural areas. A thousand litres of water reportedly costs $12 in drought-stricken areas. Local NGOs may soon commence water distribution in the Sanag region and other parts of Somaliland affected by the drought.

Armed clashes/Violent incidents: Two businessmen are beheaded by al-Shabab in Beledweyne. The two men, who were transporting water to IDPs in Jawil village, were suspected to be working with TFG forces.

Armed clashes/Violent incidents: At least three people are killed, and around 15 are wounded following clashes between al-Shabab and Somali government forces backed by AMISOM in Mogadishu.

Political developments: The TFG signs a one-year contract with US lobbying firm Park Strategies LLC to provide consulting, advisory and advocacy services to the government.

Military developments: Sentencing five Somali soldiers to jail, the military court of the TFG warns Somali soldiers against committing arbitrary murder or other offences against innocent Somali civilians.

Armed clashes/Violent incidents: A bomb explodes near a police station in Beled-Hawo, killing at least three policemen.

21 March

Armed clashes/Violent incidents: At least 24 people are killed in Mogadishu, following heavy shelling of residential areas in the north of the city by AU forces.

Military developments: Al-Shabab militants announce the opening of a militia training camp for 460 elders in Lower Shabelle.

Human security/Military developments: With fighting escalating across Somalia, armed groups reportedly recruit more child soldiers to their ranks, even forcing teachers to enlist their pupils.

20 March

Political developments: PM Muhammad Abdullahi tells radio Mogadishu that government forces will crush al-Shabab within 90 days and take full control of the country.

International aid/Military developments: The Ministry of Defence announces that more peacekeepers are expected to arrive in Mogadishu.

Armed clashes/Violent incidents: Government forces attack an al-Shabab base in Dhobley, killing 12 people and leaving 25 injured.

Human security: Residents reportedly return to their homes in Beled-Hawo, which was recently taken over by al-Shabab fighters.

Armed clashes/Violent incidents: Fighting between government forces backed by AMISOM and al-Shabab kills one and leaves seven injured in Mogadishu.


19 March

Law enforcement/Foreign relations: The Somaliland government announces plans to deport ethnic Oromos back to Ethiopia.

Human security: IDPs in Bardere receive aid from traders, who donate food, clothes and tents to more than 60 families.

Political developments/Foreign relations: The UN Special Representative for Somali Political Affairs, Ambassador Augustine Mahiga, holds talks with Somali parliament speaker Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan in Nairobi, Kenya to help resolve the differences between the speaker and president Sheikh Sharif.
Military developments: Officials of Ahlu Sunnah wal Jama’a confirm that 25 al-Shabab fighters have surrendered to them.

Political developments/Military developments: Abdirashid Mohamed Hidig, Deputy Minister of Labour and Sports Affairs, defends the closing down of Bakara Market by TFG and AMISOM forces, arguing that it is an al-Shabab stronghold.

Armed clashes/Violent incidents: Al-Shabab officials in Kismayo confirm that one of their leaders is killed by AU forces in Kismayo.

18 March

Military developments: The al-Shabab administration in Kismayo calls on students to be ready to fight alongside the group against the TFG.

17 March

Armed clashes/Violent incidents: Exchanges of heavy fire between al-Shabab and TFG and AU forces leave at least 17 civilians dead in Mogadishu.

Political developments: Prime Minister Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed states that he will not run for president after the transitional period is over in August, in an interview with VOA.

Armed clashes/Violent incidents: At least 20 people are killed and others wounded in Mogadishu as fighting resumes between AMISOM and al-Shabab.

16 March

Law enforcement: Al-Shabab arrests ten traders in Sakow district, Shabelle region.

Armed clashes/Violent incidents: At least 20 people are killed and 30 wounded in Mogadishu in an artillery exchange between al-Shabab and AU forces. An eyewitness reports that al-Shabab attacked the Somali presidential palace with mortars.

Law enforcement: Three Ugandan AMISOM soldiers are sentenced to two years in prison for injuring civilians in two shooting incidents in Mogadishu.


Military developments: Al-Shabab fighters retake control of Diif in Lower Juba, near the Kenya-Somalia border, without bloodshed.

Armed clashes/Violent incidents: Authorities say 13 people are killed during fighting between insurgents and government troops in Mogadishu.

15 March

Foreign relations: The US expresses disappointment with the lack of political progress made by Somalia’s interim government and with the country’s parliament for unilaterally extending its term. However, the US also states that good military progress is being made by AMISOM, as they now control 60-70% of Mogadishu.

Human security: Two children and their mother die from drought in a village on the outskirts of Hargeisa.

Political developments: Somaliland MP’s and professionals hold a press conference in Hargeisa supporting the formation of more political parties in the breakaway region. There are currently three main parties: Kulmiye, Uid and Udub.

Armed clashes/Violent incidents/Foreign relations: Al-Shabab militants bomb a checkpoint at the border of Mandera district in Kenya. No casualties are reported.

Military developments: The TFG retains control of the strategic town of Beledhawo, as heavy fighting calms down in the region.

Law enforcement: As part of efforts to stop illegal border crossings, security personnel in Fafi arrest 16 Somalis who are carrying 29 ID cards in a box.

Military developments: Al-Shabab fighters in Bay’s Bardale district are reported to be deserting in fear of an attack by government forces.

Armed clashes/Violent incidents: Clashes between government soldiers backed by AU forces and al-Shabab fighters leave over 60 people dead in southern Somalia.
Political developments: The president of the TFG, Sheikh Sharif, meets with senior officers and AMISOM troops and asks them to continue operations against al-Shabab, praising the troops for their latest offensive in Mogadishu.

14 March

Armed/Violent Incidents: There is sporadic fighting between Al-Shabab forces and Somali government forces backed by AMISOM in Mogadishu. No casualties have been reported so far.

Human security: According to local elders in Lower Shabelle, four children die of hunger and thirst due to drought.

Armed clashes/Violent incidents: Al-Shabab forces are said to be conducting operations in areas surrounding Beledweyne, and setting up a number of checkpoints towards Kalabeyrka junction. There is increasing concern over a possible confrontation with TFG forces in the town.

Armed clashes/Violent incidents: At least three people die, and dozens more are injured in a fierce battle between al-Shabab and Shabelle Valley fighters. In a separate incident, at least four people are killed and nine injured by al-Shabab militants in Shabelle, as al-Shabab militants open fire on a public service vehicle on its way to Hiraan.

Military developments: Six al-Shabab militants are captured after fighting in Mogadishu.

Armed clashes/Violent incidents: A Chief Magistrate of Sool, Ahmed Saleman Geele, is gunned down near Jama mosque in Las Anod. The shooting is carried out by masked men with AK-47 rifles.

Human security: In Hudun, hundreds of people affected by the drought are migrating to urban centres. Complaining of water scarcity, some livestock keepers abandon their animals.

13 March

Political/Military Developments: Speaking at the UN Headquarters in New York, Somali Prime Minister Muhammad Abdullahi requests the international community to provide military assistance to his government.

Armed/ Violent Incident: Pro-government forces capture the Dif area near Dhobley district close to the Kenya-Somalia border in lower Juba region after a heavy battle between them and Al-Shabab.

Armed/ Violent Incident: At least one person is killed and 5 others injured (both civilians and soldiers) after forces loyal to the TFG clashed themselves in the vicinity of KM4 junction at Waberi district, Mogadishu.

Armed/Violent Incident: An explosion in Lanta Buro village in the Lower Shabele region kills five Al-Shabab fighters. One of the five who died is reported to be a foreign fighter. The fighters were in a vehicle carrying explosions.

12 March

Regional Developments: Kenyan police in Mandera district free over 20 detained Somalis, the release came after the elders and intellectuals of Bula-Hawo district made efforts.

Security Developments: Al-Shabab's administration in Gedo region imposes a night time curfew in Baardheere district, commercial and public movements restricted during night; sources say the curfew is meant to prevent any ambush attack from pro-government troops.
11 March

Humanitarian/ International Development: In the face of instability, terrorism and a deteriorating humanitarian situation worsened by drought, the UN Security Council calls for a comprehensive strategy to seek peace and security in Somalia. UN Chief, Ban Ki-moon warns that disagreements on the transition in the region could have a "negative impact on the security situation and stabilization efforts."

International Developments: Ambassador David Dunn, U.S. Alternate Representative to the United Nations, thanks the Somali President Sheikh Sharif at a Security Council Debate on Somalia, for convening this open debate and seeking to bring a comprehensive perspective to the situation in Somalia. Dunn states that the United States does not support the unilateral three-year extension of the Transitional Federal Parliament. Similarly, they oppose any assertion that the current TFG should simply be extended past August 2011 absent a clear Somali roadmap for how the TFG would make the transition into a representative government within a defined timeframe.

Armed/ Violent Incidents: Nine more al-Shabab insurgents die from sustained injuries from the previous land mine blast in Beledweyne.

Armed/ Violent Incidents: Heavy fighting between government troops and Al-Shabab has been reported around ex-control Afgoye checkpoint and parts of Hodan district in Mogadishu. Witnesses say 5 people including civilians are killed during the fighting and many others are injured.

10 March

Armed/ Violent Incidents: AU peacekeepers reportedly shelled Al-Shabab bases in Mogadishu after receiving information about the group's activities in the area.

Military/ Security Developments: 30 al-Shabab fighters defect from the group during recent security operations conducted by government forces and the African Union Peacekeepers in Mogadishu.

Sheikh Mohammed Farah Al-Ansari, a member of those that defected from the group expects the government will create job opportunities for those youths who defect Al-Shabab.

Political/ Security Developments: The Government of Somalia calls on residents of Beled-hawo to return to their homes and resume normal life. Abdirasid Hussein Abdinur, the district commissioner of Dolow, urges business owners to resume operations and residents are encouraged to return to their homes in Beled-hawo. He says government forces are ready to establish security in Gedo region.

Abdinur also pointed out discussions with the Kenyan government about reopening the border between the two neighbouring East African nations are on-going.

Humanitarian/ Regional Developments: Somali refugees who recently fled the fighting in Belt Hawo district of the Gedo region and settled in Mandera, Kenya hold a demonstration asking the United Nations Refugee Agency to offer them shelter and food, as the refugees are currently staying on a football pitch in Mandera.

Humanitarian/ Military Developments: AMISOM spokesman Major Brigye Bahoku tells reporters in Mogadishu that his forces are committed to attacking all militia-held regions in Somalia and flush them out of areas still under their control, adding that it would soon launch a full-scale offensive against the group to deliver what he called the final blow.

9 March

Armed/ Violent Incidents: Nine al-Shabab militants are killed and 14 others injured after a land mine they placed in a bridge at the outskirts of Beledweyn exploded.

Security Developments: In a conducted security operation the security department of Puntland in Eastern Somalia states that it apprehended four Al-Shabab fighters within their territory.
Humanitarian Developments: The UN World Food Programme (WFP) and its partners begin an emergency distribution of food to an additional 50,000 people in Mogadishu in response to the drought gripping much of the country.

Armed/ Violent Incident: Somalia’s defence minister says that intelligence reports indicate that an American, Omar Hammami from Alabama who joined a dangerous militant group may have been killed during an anti-insurgent offensive.

Humanitarian Developments: The UN Security Council holds a special meeting against the backdrop of a major land push against the Al-Shabab militia in which dozens of African Union troops have been killed, while an international flotilla battles pirates.

The statement calls on the government to promote "broader political dialogue and participation" and for UN member states to bolster the 8,000 African Union troops from Uganda and Burundi propping up the government.

8 March

Armed/ Violent Incidents: A fresh round of clashes rocks Mogadishu, leaving at least ten civilians dead and more than a dozen others injured, witnesses say. Fierce clashes break out in the northern district of Hodan, pitting al-Shabab fighters against the government soldiers backed by the African Union forces. Witnesses told Press TV that seven civilians, including three women, are killed in the shelling that rocked the busy Bakara market.

Three other civilians also lose their lives in crossfire in Hodan where Al-Shabab fiercely engaged Somali troops in gun battle.

Regional Developments: Somalia calls upon neighbouring countries to tighten security along its borders with Somalia.

Political Developments: Somalia welcomes a release of polling data from Mogadishu; this represents a big step on the path to true democracy in the country.

Military Developments: Somali police officers who completed their training in Kenya's Manyani Camp return to Mogadishu today.

Armed/ Violent Incident: A suicide bomber dies in an explosion close to Mogadishu's Hotel Wehliye; it is suspected that the bomber intended to attack Hotel Wehliye.

Military Developments: More al-Shabab fighters complete military training in Lower Shabelle Region, southern Somalia, at a time when the group is facing heavy offensive from the government forces, AMISOM and Ahlu Sunnah wal Jama’a.

Humanitarian Developments: A demonstration in protest against WFP takes place in Galguduud Region in central Somalia, accusing the UN organization of not helping people affected by the drought in the region and not distributing food aid meant for residents.

7 March

Armed/ Violent Incidents: Eight people are killed and dozens more wounded after Puntland forces launch an attack on Somaliland military in Ganbar village in Sool region in northern Somalia.

Somaliland forces repulse the attacking Puntland troops and four of their military vehicles are captured, said Osman Abdillahi, a spokesperson for Somaliland military. Officials of Somalia's semi-autonomous state of Puntland claim they had the upper hand.

Military Developments: Ethiopian forces together with forces from Somalia's moderate Ahlu Sunnah wal Jama’a (ASWJ) are approaching Elbur district, an Al-Shabab stronghold in central Somalia.

The forces establish a military base in Berhuteye a village about 60 KM from Elbur district. For their part, Al-Shabab is reportedly gathering in the district of Elbur and other villages in an attempt to fight off ASWJ and the Ethiopian forces.
International/ Humanitarian Developments: An adviser to the United Nations on the conflict in Somalia warns the country's on-going crisis is encouraging terrorism activities in Kenya and other neighbouring countries, which he says could destabilize the entire Horn of Africa.

Regional Developments: The Kenyan Police release photographs of four people who they say are Al-Shabab officials operating in Kenya.

Political Development: President Sheikh Sharif issues a circular in which he sacks all commanders of the security organs, following suggestions by concerned ministers led by Prime Minister Muhammad Abdullahi.

Armed/ Violent Incidents: Four Members of al-Shabab militia group from Somalia are reportedly killed and two others injured in Buulo Hawa due to fighting between government forces and al-Shabab.

Kenyan forces manning the border arrest nine suspected members from Al Shabab group as they try to sneak into the country through the troubled Kenya-Somalia border.

Armed/ Violent Incidents: Four members of Al-Shabab are reportedly killed and two others are seriously injured during the week-end in Bulla Hawa.

Armed/Security Developments: Al-Shabab abandons Garbaharey (the provincial town) and Ceel Waaq in Gedo region. In addition, the Shabab loses control of Buulo Xaawo district, in Gedo Region two days ago following intense fighting. Reports suggest that al-Shabab is currently in Buur Dhubo district, 40 km east of Garbaharey town.

Military Developments: Somali government forces and Ahlu Sunnah wal Jama'a take control of Luuq district in Gedo Region, without any resistance from al-Shabaab. Reliable sources have informed radio Shabelle that a significant number of soldiers with military tanks have set up a base at Xero Kowaad in the district. Pro-government soldiers are mounting search operations near Luuq Bridge looking for explosives that may have been left behind. The whereabouts of al-Shabab remain unclear causing many families to flee the town because of fear over possible clashes.

Armed/Violent Incidents: Al-Shabab executes two men at Ex-Maslah camp in Hilawa district in Mogadishu for allegedly working with TFG forces. One of the men is found guilty by Al-Shabab officials for joining the TFG in Dharkenlay district while the other is guilty of spying against the al-Shabab. Residents of Suka-holaha are forced to watch the execution of the 'criminals'.

Political Development: The president of the TFG Sheikh Sharif announces that the government troops will continue to fight until the rule of the government is spread all over the country.

Regional Development: Ethiopian troops reportedly enter Somali Central region. Military movement and tension are felt at the outskirts of Beledweyn, Hiiraan Region, after units from the Ethiopian troops with armoured vehicles deployed at Kalabayr and Ceel Gaal areas.

Armed/Violent Incident: Al-Shabab militants in Somalia force several local Somali elders from Banadir, Lower Shabele, Middle Shabele, Bay, Bakol, Gedo and Juba regions to take part in the ongoing fighting in Somalia.
5 March  Armed/ Violent Incidents: Dozens of African Union soldiers are killed in two weeks of fierce fighting in Mogadishu, which resulted in significant gains against local and foreign extremists, according to an AU official familiar with the scale of those losses.

Armed/ Violent Incidents: Somalia's pro-government forces seize the control of Bula Hawa town in southern Somalia from al-Shabab after fierce fighting which killed at least 25 combatants, according to witnesses.

Armed/ Violent Incidents: More than 5 civilians are killed and scores wounded as fierce clashes between Somali army backed AU peacekeepers and Al-Shaaab fighters in Mogadishu following a failed suicide attack by al-Shabab on the former building of Ministry of Defence.

Humanitarian/ Violent Incidents: At least 43 Burundian soldiers are killed in Somalia as reports emerged of a web of deception used by militias to lure Kenyan youth to join their ranks.

4 March  Military Developments: The administration of al-Shabab in Bay and Bakol regions in southern Somalia deploy more fighters to Mogadishu. According to Shabelle, hundreds of al-Shabab fighters are deployed to Mogadishu after completing training in southern Somalia.

Sheikh Mahad Omar Abdi Karim, al-Shabab's chairman in Bay and Bakol regions say that fighters have been sent to Mogadishu to reinvigorate the fighting, which continues in Mogadishu.

3 March  Political Developments: The transitional federal government announces that al-Shabab, the radical Islamist group opposing its rule, is a terrorist group opposing peace in Somalia. Prior to this assertion, the Somali government had always offered a window of opportunity, calling the radical Islamists to the negotiating table for national reconciliation.

"The Somali government urges the international community to add al-Shabab leaders to the lists of the individuals leading terror groups," said the ministerial statement. The US, Australia, Canada and some other western countries have already listed al-Shabab as a terrorist group with links to al-Qaeda. The government also decides to blockade ports in Somalia controlled by al-Shabab.

Political/Military Developments: The transitional federal government of Somalia will uproot and eradicate selling the weapons of Somali government to the enemy (al-Shabab), a military official said on Thursday.

General Yusuf Mohammed Siad better known as Indha'ade said in an interview with Shabelle Media Network that that there are a number of government officials involved selling Somali army weapons to al-Shabab who are struggling to topple Somalia's fragile UN backed government.

Humanitarian Developments: Fighting between the TFG forces and al Shabaab have spread to areas near the Kenyan border, forcing some 5,500 residents of the Kenyan border town of Mandera to flee their homes, exacerbating the plight of people affected by drought, the UN humanitarian office reported yesterday.

Law Enforcement: The court martial, Hasan Muhammad Husayn, sentences a number of individuals in connection with smuggling arms to al-Shabab. Speaking to the media after the arrests, General Yusuf Muhammad Siyad Indhacade said the suspects are arrested after a tip off.

2 March  International Developments: The UK’s Secretary of State for International Development, Andrew Mitchell says it will increase its aid from 26 million Euro to 80 million Euros every year to assist security, humanitarian and development programs in Somalia.
Human Security: At least two people die of hunger and thirst in parts of middle Juba region in southern Somalia.

Political Developments: The Minister of Information, Abdikarim Hasan Jama, holds a meeting with local and international journalists in Mogadishu. The two sides are discussing ways of working together and how the Somali media could play a role in the reconstruction of the country. The minister urged the local media outlets to check the accuracy of reports before airing them.

Jama says they need not demoralize the Somali people but bring positive changes in the country. He said the government would assist the independent media in terms of training and other assistance that may be required.

Political/ Humanitarian Development: Somali parliamentarians accuse the World Food Program of not providing aid to internally displaced people in Mogadishu. The MPs hold a session to discuss the drought and its impact on internally displaced persons in Mogadishu. Abdilahi Sheikh Ismael, an MP stated that UN aid agencies should provide reports outlining their activities to assist those who need help in Mogadishu.

Armed/Violent Incident: Al-Shabab is accused of burning residential homes in Beled Hawo. According to the commissioner of Gedo region, Mohamed Abdi Kalil, al Shabaab wants to force people out of their homes.

Thousands of people have been forced to flee the border town of Beled Hawo to the Kenyan border town of Mandera since the TFG and al-Shabab began fighting last week.

Armed/Violent Incident: Some 16 foreign soldiers are airlifted to Mombasa, Kenya for medical treatment as the heavy fighting between al-Shabab and the Somali transitional government forces intensify.

This brings the number of admitted foreign soldiers to 30, after another group of troops was airlifted to the town over a week ago.

Military/Violent Incident: Sheikh Mukhtar Abu Zubeyr, the leader of al-Shabab has released a statement urging Burundi forces to withdraw from Somalia. In an audio taped message, Abu Zubeyr said they had captured a number of Burundian soldiers in recent fighting in Mogadishu that had forced them to abandon some of their key military positions.

"This message is to inform the Burundians that their forces in Somalia don't know the facts about this country. You know that many forces from the world and from Ethiopia have failed to do anything in Somalia and the dragging of AU soldiers in Mogadishu is a clear sign of their failure."

He reiterated that the Burundian forces will leave Somalia having failed to reach attain their goals.

Humanitarian Developments: With Aid groups pulling out of camps for IDPs and more people fleeing the violence in Mogadishu, the plight of IDPs is at its most extreme, say civil societies and local aid workers.
28 February  
Regional Developments: The Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission for Somalia, Ambassador Boubacar Gaoussou Diarrra has congratulated AMISOM peacekeepers for their bravery and professionalism in the recent offensive to pacify Mogadishu.
Armed/Violent Incident: Spokesman for Burundian forces (part of the AU peacekeeping) in Mogadishu claimed victory over the war against Islamist militias killing 80 Shabab fighters. One Burundian soldier was killed.

Security Enforcement: Al-Shabab in the Lower Juba region announces that they have established a new immigration office at the Kenya-Somali border, ordering all the road transport service operators at the border to pass by their office and they are under orders to not carry more than ten people.

Humanitarian/Security Developments: Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan, the speaker of the Federal Somali Parliament asked the international community to support the TFG forces and AMISOM who are currently fighting al-Shabab.
Regional Developments: An estimated number of 400 Somali refugees flee to Mandera, Kenya; following days of gunfight between al-Shabab and Somali troops near the Kenyan border.

27 February  
Law Enforcement: Sheikh Basher Ahmed Sala, the chairman of the organization of Somali clerics say they have tried to persuade al-Shabab to accept direct negotiations with the transitional federal government of Somali led by President Sheikh Sharif Ahmed to stop Somalia conflict.

Political Developments: The Somali cabinet holds a meeting in Mogadishu to discuss the ending transition period of the Somali government. Minister for information Abdikarim Hassan Jama says the cabinet has prepared a new plan to embark on for a smooth transition.
Part of the plan is to consult different government departments, civil society groups and the international community.

Humanitarian Developments: The delegation led by the UN representative for Humanitarian Affairs, Mark Bowden is in Bosaso to assess the humanitarian situation in the country. The delegation is expected to visit camps in Khardo where hundreds of people who have been displaced by on-going conflict in Somalia have settled.
The UN previously announced that over two million people in Somalia are in need of humanitarian aid due to ravaging drought and the escalating violence.

26 February  
Humanitarian/Political Development: The president of the TFG Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed reiterates his call on helping the drought affected Somalis in South-Central Somalia.

25 February  
Armed/Violent Incident: Ten people killed and many others wounded as fighting rages in Wardhumale in Galgudu region, central Somalia, between the pro-government moderate Islamic group Ahlu Sunnah wala Jama’a and al-Shabab.

24 February  
Humanitarian or Armed/Violent Incident: Somali rebels kill six Burundian peacekeepers during an offensive against Islamist insurgents.
Armed/Violent Incident: Somalia, working with neighbouring allied nations, launches a coordination offensive against al-Qaeda –linked militants in the capital, Mogadishu. At least 39 civilians are killed and more than 120 wounded in four days of fighting.

23 February  
Armed/Violent Incident: Heavy fighting breaks out between al-Shabab and Ethiopian troops in Ceelgaal locality of Hiiraan Region, central Somalia.
Armed/Violent Incident: Heavy fighting breaks out in Mogadishu involving government forces backed by AU peacekeepers and al-Shabab militants.
Armed/Violent Incident or Military Developments: Colonel Ahem Hasan Ma’alin, the commander for the Somali police in Mogadishu, says they have learned of fresh suicide plots targeting police officers in Mogadishu and that their forces are now on high alert.

Armed/Violent Incident: Somali government forces backed by AU troops launch a fresh offensive against al-Shabab, seizing three rebel bases in Mogadishu. At least forty people, mainly soldiers, are killed and 70 others are wounded in fresh clashes of capturing positions in different parts of the country. Meanwhile, the fighting in south-central Somalia (Beledweyn and Beled Xaawo) bordering Kenya and Ethiopia killed 15 people and injured a dozen others.

20 February
Armed/Violent Incident: At least 15 civilians, two African Union soldiers and 6 foreign fighters killed in Mogadishu.

19 February
Law Enforcement: The Transitional Federal Government’s Deputy Minister of Public Works, Mr. Abdirashid Mohammed Ali, is jailed after arriving in Hargeisa without the Somaliland government’s permission.
Political Developments: Officials say Somaliland deserves to be ‘recognised’. Dr Mohammed-Rashid Shaykh Hassan, from the Office of International Affairs and Recognition of Somaliland, makes an encouraging call to work together and focus on the future for a better Somaliland.

13 February
Political Development: Somaliland representatives attend an international conference on Somalia held in Wilton Park Conference, West Sussex, United Kingdom, on strategies for Somalia’s transition to peace and post conflict reconstruction. For the first time Somaliland’s Foreign Minister, H.E. Mohamed A. Omer, was invited to attend and represent Somaliland.
Peacekeeping/ UN Activities: The United Nations envoy for Somalia said that the international community will continue supporting the beleaguered government despite differences over extension of the parliament mandate.
Military Developments: The Prime Minister of Somalia, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, visits the Martini hospital; and provides soldiers with salaries for the first time since the fall of Mohamed Siad Barre.

12 February
Security: Somali police pledge to beef up security in Mogadishu. This statement made by the police spokesperson comes at a time when the bases of government forces in Mogadishu came under explosion attacks recently.
Military Developments: The Ministry of Interior in Somaliland partnering with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), has started a new program to train 300 Somaliland police recruits in the town of Mandera, in the Sahil region. The police recruits will undertake training on human rights rules and humanitarian law principles; along with various techniques on how to handle internal tensions including national protests.

11 February
Military Developments: The Somali police parades several Al-Shabab fighters captured in yesterday’s fighting between the group and government forces at a police station in Mogadishu’s Hamar Jajajab District. The fighters were captured by government forces after they attacked the station.
Political/Military Developments: The prime minister of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed aka Farmajo, urges government forces not to harass civilians.
Political Developments: The Somali government imposes a curfew on Mogadishu’s Dharkeenley district, following the increased killings and explosions against officials and the public. The curfew will be from 1900h local time and last till dawn.

Security: Fighters loyal to Al-Shabab Islamic Movement in Afgoye district of Lower Shabelle region, southern Somalia, arrested ten people accused of using drugs after conducting anti-drug operations.

10 February
Military Development: The prime minister of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, calls on government forces to prepare to drive out Al-Shabab from the country. He said government forces need to liberate the country from Al-Shabab and foreign fighters from Afghanistan, Pakistan and Chechnya, who invaded the country.

7 February
Political Development: The Somali speaker, Sharif Hasan Shaykh Adan, is reportedly running for president when the term of the current government ends in 22 August 2011.

3 February
Human/Food Security: Aid agencies struggle to access remote food insecure communities as drought looms. An estimated 2.4 million Somalis require emergency humanitarian assistance as a result of civil unrest and food insecurity, according to the UN Food Security and Analysis Unit- Somalia.

2 February
Human Security: There is a rising number of child landmine victims in Somaliland.
Annex C

POLITICAL ORGANISATIONS

Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia - Djibouti faction (ARS-D)
This group incorporates various clans but is dominated by the Hawiye clan. Led by Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and an integral part of the TFG. 603

Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia - Asmara faction (ARS-A)
Led by Sheikh Hussein Dahir Aweys, this group are based in Asmara, Eritrea and are informally aligned with Al-Shabaab and JIS as a part of the insurgency against the TFG. 604

Al Shabaab
“Al-Shabaab (aka the Harakat Al-Shabaab al-Mujahidin, al-Shabab, Al-Shabaab, the Youth, Mujahidin al-Shabaab Movement, Mujahideen Youth Movement, Mujahidin Youth Movement), is an Islamic organization that controls much of southern Somalia, excluding the capital, Mogadishu. It has waged an insurgency against Somalia’s transitional government and its Ethiopian supporters since 2006. Originally the militant wing of the Islamic Courts Union, the group that controlled Somalia prior to the country’s invasion by Ethiopian forces, al-Shabaab leaders have claimed affiliation with al-Qaeda since 2007.” (Council on Foreign Relations) 605

Al Shabaab has been led by Ibrahim al-Afghani since December 2010. 606

“Estimates of al-Shabaab’s size vary, but analysts generally agree that the group contains several thousand fighters, many of whom are from the Hawiye clan…Shabaab has engaged in forced recruitment among Somalis… Foreign fighters have traveled to Somalia to fight with Shabaab, as have Somalis from the United Kingdom and the United States.” (Council on Foreign Relations) 607

“The group is divided into three geographical units: Bay and Bokool regions, led by Mukhtar Roobow ‘Abu Mansur,’ the group’s spokesman; south-central Somalia and Mogadishu; and Puntland and Somaliland. A fourth unit, which controls the Juba Valley, is led by Hassan Abdillahi Hersi ‘Turki,’ who is not considered to be a member of al-Shabaab, but is closely aligned with it.” (Council on Foreign Relations) 608 Al Shabaab pledged allegiance to Al Qaeda in February 2010, and were proscribed under the UK Terrorism Act 2000 on 1 March 2010. 609

Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for twin bombings that killed more than seventy people in Kampala, Uganda during the World Cup final on July 11, 2010. It was their first attack outside of Somalia. 610

See also: Non-state armed forces, Al Shabaab

603 Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment, Internal Affairs, updated 29 April 2009, Available in hard copy on request
604 Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment, Internal Affairs, updated 29 April 2009, Available in hard copy on request

238
Ahlu Sunna Waljama

Ahlu Sunna Waljama are a Sufi Islamist group, founded in 1991 and led by Sheikh Omar Sheikh Muhammad Farah. They are “comprised of a number of Sufi clerics based in the Somali capital Mogadishu. The group’s founders aimed to unify the three main Sufi religious orders in the country, with the objective of protecting Sufism in Somalia from the encroaching influence of militant Islamist groups. Initially the group adopted non-violent strategies, however, with the emergence of Shabab in early 2007 the group faced a more direct and violent challenge, and responded by forming a number of local self-defence militias. While remaining committed to non-violence in principle, since late 2008 the group has played an increasingly prominent role within the Somali conflict. After a number of months battling both Hizbul Islam and Shabab in early 2010, the group announced on 15 March that it had formally joined the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) under President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed.” (Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment) 611

See also: Ahlu Sunna Waljama

Hisbul Islam

Led by Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, this group are fighting the TFG and are concerned with local and national issues, rather than engagement with international actors. 612 They are reported to have merged with Al Shabaab in December 2010 613 although the consequences of this are, as yet, unknown. 614 Following the merger, some factions within Hisbul Islam opposed the move and defected to the TFG. 615

See also: Hisbul Islam

Islamic Union Party (al-Ittihad al-Islam)

Islamist group which aims to unite ethnic Somalis from Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti in an Islamic state. 616

Jabhooda Islamiyya Somalia (JIS)

Led by Sheikh Abdulqadir (Kudmandoos), this group are aligned with ARS-A and Al Shabaab. 617

Juba Valley Alliance (JVA)

Grouping of Ogaden, Marehan and Abar Gedir clans. Founded in 1999, its President is Bare Adan Shire. 618

Puntland Regional State

The dominant faction in Puntland, led by Abdirahman Mohamed Mohamud (Puntland president) and Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed (former TFG president). 619

611 Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment, Non-state armed groups, updated 23 July 2010, Available in hard copy on request
615 Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment (JSCRA), Somalia, Security, updated 9 February 2011, available in hard copy on request
616 Europa World Online, Somalia, Directory: Government and politics, Political organisations, Available in hard copy on request
617 Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment, Internal Affairs, updated 29 April 2009, Available in hard copy on request
618 Europa World Online, Somalia, Directory: Government and politics, Political organisations, Available in hard copy on request
619 Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment, Internal Affairs, updated 29 April 2009, Available in hard copy on request

239
Rahawayn Resistance Army (RRA)
A guerrilla force active around Baidoa. 620

Somali African Muki Organisation (SAMO)
Represents Bantu minority population. The leader is Mowlid Ma’a ne. Also part of the G8 at the
Nairobi peace talks. 621

Somali Democratic Movement (SDM)
Represents the Rahanwin clan; movement split in early 1992, with this faction in alliance with
Ali Mahdi Mohamed. 622

Somali National Alliance (SNA)
Founded 1992 as alliance between the Southern Somali National Movement (which withdrew in
1993) and the factions of the United Somali Congress, Somali Democratic Movement and Somali
Patriotic Movement. 623

Somali National Front (SNF)
Founded 1991; guerrilla force active in southern Somalia, promoting Darod clan interests and
seeking restoration of Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP) Government. A rival faction (led
by Omar Haji Masaleh) is active in southern Somalia. Its leader is Gen Mohamed Siad Hersi
‘Morgan’. 624

Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM)
Darod group formed in 1989. Represents Ogadenis (of the Darod clan) in southern Somalia; this
faction of the SPM has allied with the SNF in opposing the SNA. Its Chairman is Gen Aden
Abdullahi Noor (‘Gabio’). 625

Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC)
Founded 2001 by faction leaders opposed to the establishment of the Hasan administration; aims to
establish a rival national government. 626

Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP)
Founded in 1976 as the sole legal party; overthrown in January 1991. Conducts guerrilla operations
in Gedo region, near border with Kenya. Secretary General position is vacant; Assistant Secretary
General is Ahmed Suleiman Abdullah. 627

Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF)
Founded 1981 as the Democratic Front for the Salvation of Somalia (DFSS), as a coalition of the
Somali Salvation Front, the Somali Workers’ Party and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of
Somalia; operates in cen. Somalia, although a smaller group has opposed the SNA around Kismayu
in alliance with the SNF. Chairman is Mohamed Abshir Monsa. 628

620 Europa World Online, Somalia, Directory: Government and politics, Political organisations, Availabe in hard copy on request
621 UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Integrated Regional Information Networks, SOMALIA: Peace talks
2011
622 Europa World Online, Somalia, Directory: Government and politics, Political organisations, Availabe in hard copy on request
623 Europa World Online, Somalia, Directory: Government and politics, Political organisations, Availabe in hard copy on request
624 Europa World Online, Somalia, Directory: Government and politics, Political organisations, Availabe in hard copy on request
625 Europa World Online, Somalia, Directory: Government and politics, Political organisations, Availabe in hard copy on request
626 Europa World Online, Somalia, Directory: Government and politics, Political organisations, Availabe in hard copy on request
627 Europa World Online, Somalia, Directory: Government and politics, Political organisations, Availabe in hard copy on request
628 Europa World Online, Somalia, Directory: Government and politics, Political organisations, Availabe in hard copy on request
Transitional Federal Government (TFG)
Dominated by Hawiye, Darod, Rahanwein and Abgal clans, headed by President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. The TFG incorporates many different political groups such as ARS-D and RRA. 629

Transitional National Government (TNG)
The TNG was formed in 2000 of 225 members, mostly Dir, Hawiye, Darod and Rahanweyn clans. It was supported by the UN and several Arab states but it failed to win the backing of Ethiopia or the confidence of major donor governments. The TNG was succeeded by the TFG in November 2004. 630


United Somali Congress (USC)

Union of Islamic Courts also referred to as Islamic Court Union (UIC)
Founded in 2003 by Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed. Its main body is the Islamic Supreme Consultation Council of Islamic Courts, known as the Shura (council). It is made up of 91 members, and functions as an advisory body for the local courts. The Council is headed by Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys. The UIC has also established a 15-member executive council, with Sheikh Sharif as its Chairman, which acts as an executive branch of government and implements decisions. The UIC was expelled from Mogadishu in December 2006, and its organisation within Somalia has been effectively shattered; in light of this, there is little information on its present make-up or organisation. 632

Political organisations in Somaliland

Democratic United Peoples’ Movement (UDUB)
“The UDUB is the party of former president Dahir Riyale Kahin and his predecessor, Mohamed Ibrahim Egal. Although it does not have an ideologically defined political programme, the party's electoral campaigns always focuses on the continuity of governance structures, stability and experience of government. This lends the UDUB some of the character of a conservative party. Its party structure is weak, and seemingly it has two important factions, one around the former president and another around the speaker of the upper house, Suleiman Mahmoud Adam.” (Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment) 633

Peace, Unity and Development Party (Kulmiye Nabad, Midnimo iyo horumar: Kulmiye)
“Kulmiye has several political factions among its membership. One comprises a group of former SNM military commanders who were associated with a Marxist tendency within the movement and are commonly referred to as the 'Red Flag' (Calan Cas). The party also contains a smaller religious group, led by the deputy speaker of the house of representatives, Abdulazis Samale. A third group

629 Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment, Internal Affairs, updated 29 April 2009, Available in hard copy on request
631 Europa World Online, Somalia, Directory: Government and politics, Political organisations, Available in hard copy on request
633 Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment, Somaliland, Political parties, updated 9 February 2011, Available in hard copy on request
including members of the 'Hargeysa Group' of civil activists famous for their stand against the Barre regime. The Somali word 'kulmi' implies meeting, focusing or drawing together and hence the party name suggests the effective incorporation of disparate tendencies. However the existence of these tendencies nevertheless presents a challenge to party discipline for party leader and president, Ahmad Muhammad Silaanyo.” (Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment) 634

**Party for Justice and Democracy (UCID)**
Led by Faisal Ali “Waraabe”, a civil engineer who spent many years in Finland, and obtains much of its support from the ‘Iidagale clan and other groups in the Hargeysa area. 635

**Qaran**
Political organisation in Somaliland whose leaders have been imprisoned, and then released, for holding illegal political meetings. 636
**Annex D**

**PROMINENT PEOPLE**

**TRANSITIONAL FEDERAL GOVERNMENT**


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Name</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President</td>
<td>Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed Farmajo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Prime Minister</td>
<td>Abdiweli Mohamed Ali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Prime Minister</td>
<td>Abdihakim Mohamoud Haji-Faqi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Prime Minister</td>
<td>Mohamed Abdullahi Omaar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Agriculture &amp; Livestock</td>
<td>Yusuf Moallim Amin Badiyow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Commerce &amp; Industry</td>
<td>Mohamud Abdi Ibrahim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Constitution &amp; Federalism</td>
<td>Mohamud Mohamed Boonow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Defense</td>
<td>Abdihakim Mohamoud Haji-Faqi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Education &amp; Culture</td>
<td>Abdinur Sheikh Mohamed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Finance &amp; Treasury</td>
<td>Hussein Abdi Halane</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Fisheries, Marine Resources, &amp; Environment</td>
<td>Mohamed Moallim Hassan Mohamed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>Mohamed Abdullahi Omar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Health &amp; Human Services</td>
<td>Aden Haji Ibrahim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Information, Post, &amp; Telecommunications</td>
<td>Abdul Kareem Hassan Jama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Interior &amp; National Security</td>
<td>Abdishakur Sheikh Hassan Farah</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Justice &amp; Religious Affairs</td>
<td>Abdullahi Abyan Nur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Labor &amp; Social Development</td>
<td>Abdinur Moallim Mohamud</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of National Planning &amp; Intl. Cooperation</td>
<td>Abdiweli Mohamed Ali</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
MINISTER FOR PORTS, MARINE, AIR, & LAND TRANSPORTATION
Ahmed Abdirahman Abade

MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS & RECONSTRUCTION
Abdirashid Hashi

MINISTER OF WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT & FAMILY WELFARE
Maryan Qasim Ahmed

PUNTLAND

Information taken from the Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment, Puntland, updated 6 May 2011 (available in hard copy on request).

PRESIDENT:
Abdirahman Mohamed Mohamud (Farole)

VICE-PRESIDENT:
General Abdisamad Ali Shire

MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE AND WATER DEVELOPMENT:
Mohamud Haji Salah

MINISTER OF ANIMAL HUSBANDRY AND PASTURES:
Ahmed Hussein Yusuf

MINISTER OF AVIATION AND AIR TRANSPORTATION:
Ahmed Ali Gamute

MINISTRY OF COMMERCE:
Mohamed Farah Mohamud

MINISTER OF EDUCATION:
Abdi Farah (Juha)

MINISTER OF FINANCE:
Farah Ali Jama

MINISTER OF FISHERIES AND MARINE RESOURCES:
Saleban Isse Ahmed

MINISTER OF HEALTH:
Abdullah Warsame

MINISTRY OF INFORMATION, TELECOMMUNICATION, HERITAGE AND CULTURE:
Ahmed Ali Askar

MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR, LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT:
General Abdullahi Ahmed Jama (Ilkaajir)

MINISTER OF JUSTICE, RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, AND REHABILITATION:
Abdirisak Yasin Abdulle

MINISTRY OF LABOUR, YOUTH AND SPORTS:
Abdiweli Hersi ’Indha Gurun’

MINISTRY OF LIVESTOCK, ENVIRONMENT AND TOURISM:
Abdiqani Yusuf Hadde

MINISTER OF PLANNING AND INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION:
Daud Mohammed Omar

MINISTER OF PORTS AND SEA TRANSPORTATION:
Sacid Mohammed Rage

MINISTRY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND LAND TRANSPORTATION:
Dahir Khalif Farah

MINISTER OF SECURITY:
General Yusuf Ahmed Khery

MINISTER OF WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT AND FAMILY AFFAIRS:
Asha Ghele Dirie
SOMALILAND

Information from Garowe Online, dated 28 July 2010 637 except where stated.

President: ABDIRAHMAN ABDILLAHI ISMAIL (SAYLICI) 638

Vice President: ABDIRASHID MUHAMMAD HIRSI

Speaker of Parliament: COLONEL SAID ABDI FARAH (TUTAWEYN)

Commander of the Puntland Police and Special Forces (Darawish): COLONEL SAID ABDI FARAH (TUTAWEYNE)

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638 Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment, Somaliland, Leadership, updated 9 February 2011, Available in hard copy on request
MINISTER OF TRADE, INDUSTRIES AND TOURISM
CABDIRISAAQ KHALIIF AXMED.

DEPUTY MINISTER OF EDUCATION AND HIGHER EDUCATION
CAALI CAAMUD JIBRIIL.

DEPUTY MINISTER OF FINANCE
WARSAME SIGIID CABDI.

DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MAXAMED YOONIS CAWWAAL.

DEPUTY MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
CISMAAN GARAAD SOOFEE.

DEPUTY MINISTER OF HEALTH
NIMCO XUSEEN QOWDHA.

DEPUTY MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORTATION
CAALI CABDI SAA'IQ.

PROMINENT PEOPLE OUTSIDE OF THE GOVERNMENT

Ibrahim al-Afghani
Replaced Abdi Godane as al Shabaab’s Emir at the shura meeting on 25 December 2010, and thought to be an ally of Sheikh Muktar Robow. 639

Hassan Dahir ‘Aweys’
Former leader of Hizbul Islam, now with an uncertain role in al Shabaab. 640

Sheikh Muktar Robow
Head of Al Shabaab’s activities in Bay and Bakool. 641

Fuad Shongole
Head of Al Shabaab’s activities in Puntland. 642
## Annex E

### List of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AI</td>
<td>Amnesty International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission to Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEDAW</td>
<td>Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPJ</td>
<td>Committee to Protect Journalists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU NAVFOR</td>
<td>European Union Naval Force Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>FCO</td>
<td>Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FGM</td>
<td>Female Genital Mutilation</td>
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<tr>
<td>FH</td>
<td>Freedom House</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV/AIDS</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HRW</td>
<td>Human Rights Watch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAG</td>
<td>Illegal Armed Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee for Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally Displaced Person</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFRC</td>
<td>International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organisation for Migration</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSF</td>
<td>Médecins sans Frontières</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>OHCHR</td>
<td>Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSF</td>
<td>Reporters sans Frontières</td>
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<tr>
<td>STC</td>
<td>Save The Children</td>
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<td>TB</td>
<td>Tuberculosis</td>
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<tr>
<td>TFC</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Charter</td>
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<tr>
<td>TFG</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government</td>
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<td>TFP</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Parliament</td>
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<td>TI</td>
<td>Transparency International</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNAIDS</td>
<td>Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS</td>
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<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSD</td>
<td>United States State Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
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