SOMALIA

BULLETIN: SECURITY SITUATION IN SOUTHERN AND CENTRAL SOMALIA

Country of Origin Information Service

Date: 17 August 2012
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Preface

i) This Country of Origin Information (COI) bulletin has been produced by COI Service, UK Border Agency for use by officials involved in asylum and human rights decision making process. The bulletin contains information available up to 1 August 2012 and was released on 17 August 2012.

ii) The bulletin provides information on the security situation in southern and central Somalia, focussing on events in 2011 and 2012. It is comprised of three sections: a) an overview of security in 2011 and 2012; b) background on the main actors involved in the conflict; and c) a non-exhaustive list of incidents by region. The bulletin should be read in the context of the general socio-economic, political and human rights situation in Somalia, and users are recommended to consult the Somalia COI ceport, January 2012 for background and the sources referred in Annex B of this bulletin. The bulletin does not contain any UK Border Agency opinion or policy.

iii) The bulletin is a compilation of extracts produced by a range of external information sources, most of which are in the public domain. All information is attributed throughout the text to the original source material. Where the source documents identified are available in electronic form, the relevant weblink has been included together with the date that the link was accessed. Officials are advised to examine the original source documents directly.

iv) In compiling the bulletin no attempt has been made to resolve discrepancies between information provided in different source documents, though where discrepancies exist these have been brought together. The term ‘sic’ has been used in this document only to denote incorrect spellings or typographical errors in quoted text; its use is not intended to imply any comment on the content of the material.

v) The bulletin is largely based upon source documents issued during the previous six months. However, some older source documents may have been included because they contain relevant information not available in more recent documents. All sources contain information considered relevant at the time this bulletin was issued.

vi) In producing this bulletin COI Service has sought to provide an accurate, up-to-date, balanced and impartial compilation of extracts of relevant source material on the themes outlined above. Any comments regarding this bulletin or suggestions for additional source material are very welcome and should be submitted to COI Service as below:

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vii) The Independent Advisory Group on Country Information (IAGCI) was set up in March 2009 by the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration to make recommendations to him about the content of the UK Border Agency’s COI material. The IAGCI welcomes feedback on UK Border Agency’s COI products. Information about the IAGCI’s work can be found on the Independent Chief Inspector’s website at http://icinspector.independent.gov.uk/

viii) In the course of its work, the IAGCI reviews the content of selected UK Border Agency COI documents and makes recommendations specific to those documents and of a more general nature. A list of the COI reports and other documents which have been reviewed by the IAGCI or the Advisory Panel on Country Information (the independent organisation which monitored UK Border Agency’s COI material from September 2003 to October 2008) is available at http://icinspector.independent.gov.uk/country-information-reviews/

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1. **SECURITY SITUATION - OVERVIEW**

Spellings of the names of districts, regions and people may differ between sources due to the variations in translation from Somali, or other languages, into English.

1.01 The introductory ‘Background’ section of the report, ‘Security and human rights issues in South-Central [S-C] Somalia, including Mogadishu, Report from Danish Immigration Service’s fact finding mission to Nairobi, Kenya and Mogadishu, Somalia 30 January to 19 February 2012’, (DIS FFM 2012), published in April 2012, noted:

‘As the [Transitional Federal Government] TFG came under serious threat the President of the TFG appealed for international help, and in 2007 the African Union (AU) deployed its peacekeeping forces known as African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in Mogadishu. AMISOM’s mandate was originally for a six months period, but this period has been extended repeatedly and AMISOM is still the major military force operating in S-C Somalia.

‘Al-Shabaab came under increasing pressure by AMISOM in Mogadishu and in August 2011 Al-Shabaab made what it called a tactical retreat from Mogadishu, and since then the allied forces of AMISOM, the TFG, Ethiopia and Kenya have launched an offensive against Al-Shabaab in many other areas of S-C Somalia. This offensive has so far had the outcome that Al-Shabaab no longer has the military control of Mogadishu and in many other cities and areas in S-C Somalia. Al-Shabaab is continuously being pushed out of its former areas of control, and the allied forces are gaining military influence in an increasingly larger part of S-C Somalia.

‘However, the military gains by the allied forces have not been filled in by a parallel political development, and in many parts of S-C Somalia recovered from Al-Shabaab there are [sic] now a political vacuum. This vacuum is slowly being filled in by various military and political actors, including the TFG, clan-based militias and local self-declared administrations/states.

‘As a result of this development there are now some 20 local, often clan based, administrations, and many of these administration have territories which are overlapping each other. These territorial claims and the ongoing fight against Al-Shabaab pose a serious threat not only to the security situation in S-C Somalia but also to the ongoing political processes in S-C Somalia. The TFG has not been able to fill in the power vacuums in all the areas liberated from Al-Shabaab influence and there is a risk that a return to warlordism will be the reality in many parts of S-C Somalia... As a result of the continuous fighting in S-C Somalia since 1991 a very large number of Somalis have become internally displaced persons (IDPs). There are approximately 184,000 IDPs in Mogadishu and its surroundings alone. The total figure for IDPs in all of Somalia is now estimated to be 1,129,000 persons...’

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The Economist Intelligence Unit, Somalia, Country Report – Main Report, 1 May 2012, in its outlook for 2012-13, observed that:

‘Military gains made by various African forces, in association with troops loyal to the internationally recognised Transitional Federal Government (TFG), have altered the dynamics of the conflict in south and central Somalia. Military superiority is expected to result in further gains, but the defeat of Somalia’s main Islamist militia, al-Shabab, is unlikely in 2012-13. Pro-TFG forces have secured complete control of the capital, Mogadishu, marking a critical juncture for Somalia’s dysfunctional institutions and setting the scene for some progress in completing the “road map” to a new government by August 2012. However, even if all goes to plan, August will not herald the beginning of a new permanent political order because national elections—always an unlikely prospect given the government's limited authority in the country—have been deferred to June 2016. Progress towards economic normalisation will be negligible owing to continued civil conflict and the lack of a credible lasting political settlement. This will be exacerbated by the long-term impact of the most severe drought in recent memory, which has led to livestock deaths, crop failure and famine in parts of Somalia.’

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Human Rights and Democracy 2011 report, Quarterly Update: Somalia, 30 June 2012, noted:

‘The security landscape in Somalia is changing rapidly. Over the last year, Somali defence forces, together with African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Somalia’s neighbours, have driven the militant group Al Shabaab out of a number of urban centres, including Mogadishu, Baidoa, Beletweyn, El Buur and Gedo. In May/June [2012], Afgoye and Afmadow were been recovered from Al Shabaab. The UK and our international partners are now working to deliver urgent stabilisation assistance in the newly-recovered areas. Ultimately this should create the space for improved governance standards and greater protection of human rights.’

A comment in response to the FCO quarterly update, on the same webpage, by David Mepham (UK Director of Human Rights) and Laetitia Bader (Researcher, Africa, Human Rights Watch), dated 18 July 2012, noted:

‘The update notes the taking of key towns from Al Shabaab, and says that this creates space for improved governance and better protection of human rights. However, Human Rights Watch does not see any evidence yet of significant improvement in the human rights situation for the local populations in these towns. In fact, significant abuses by TFG and allied militias have taken place in Beletweyne, Baidoa and Afgooye. Nor has humanitarian access improved in these places, in part because insecurity has increased…The update also omits any mention of civilian
casualties from recent fighting. The UK should be at the forefront in pressuring AMISOM to give priority to the protection of civilians…’

The Armed Conflict Location & Event Dataset document, Conflict Trends (No. 5): Real-Time Analysis of African Political Violence, April 2012, undated, observed that:

‘Somalia’s conflict profile is characterised by a vast number of politically violent actors, among which are a large number of highly fractured, politically violent ethnic militias. Among the most active conflict actors are Al-Shabaab, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), Ethiopian and Kenyan Military Forces, and a large number of highly active Unidentified Armed Groups.

‘Al-Shabaab is fighting on many fronts against the TFG, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), regional forces, and pro-government militias. Al-Shabaab lost hold of much of Mogadishu and several surrounding areas in recent months, with a major offensive in August 2011 by the TFG and allied forces. This significant territorial transfer was followed by a relative lull in violence in September-October 2011, as Al-Shabaab appeared to re-group following losses.

‘2012 witnessed an increase in Al-Shabaab activity following this relative drop, alongside a strategic shift in military tactics. The militant group has increasingly resorted to guerrilla style tactics, characterised by a large number of hit-and-run attacks on armed targets.

‘The group’s geographic focus is also changing: with the loss of ground of Mogadishu in late 2011 and Baidoa in February 2012, Al-Shabaab has re-portedly retreated to rural areas to build up support with sub-clans (Af Con 53/5). Ethiopian, Kenyan and Uganda troops, as well as TFG-aligned militias – including Ahlu Sunna Wal Jamaa (ASWJ) – are assisting in taking and holding key, former Al-Shabaab towns, such as Dhusmareb and Hudur in late March. The Kenyan and Ethiopian forces in particular have been successful in gaining control over territory during the Linda Nchi operation (ARB 19150). Al-Shabaab’s recently declared open alliance with Al-Qaeda suggests that it is now focusing on its regional role in instability (ARB 19150).

‘Conflict activity in Somalia is primarily characterised by Battles between armed combatants. Rates of Violence against Civilians show some volatility over the past 12 months, but this conflict type has consistently constituted a relatively small proportion of overall events.

‘Al-Shabaab appears to concentrate events of Violence against Civilians in and around Mogadishu (in the Banaadir region) and in Lower Shabelle, where the Afgooye Corridor is located. There are comparably few reports of Violence against Civilians by Al-Shabaab in areas over which Al-Shabaab has long-established

control. As TFG-aligned forces make territorial gains into Al-Shabaab areas, this conflict profile may evolve in the coming months.  

1.06 The same source included a graph titled, Conflict events by Type, Somalia March 2011-March 2012, on p6, and is included below:

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**EVENTS OF 2011**

1.07 The US State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism 2011, (USSD CRT 2011) July 2012, Somalia, stated that:

‘In 2011, with the assistance of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Somalia’s neighbors, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) made significant gains in degrading al-Shabaab capability and liberating areas from al-Shabaab

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administration. However, foreign fighters and al-Shabaab members remained in many parts of south and central Somalia and continued to mount operations within Somalia and against neighboring countries.

‘A multi-front offensive commencing in February [2011] by the TFG, AMISOM, and TFG-allied forces against al-Shabaab resulted in significant territorial gains in the capital city of Mogadishu and key cities of southern and central Somalia. Ethiopia, Kenya, and associated Somali forces liberated areas from al-Shabaab control in the Gedo, Lower Juba, and Hiraan regions of Somalia. In August, al-Shabaab withdrew from many Mogadishu districts, leaving the TFG and AMISOM in control of the majority of districts in Somalia’s capital for the first time since the Ethiopians left in 2009. By the end of 2011, the TFG and its allies were poised to make further territorial advances against al-Shabaab in southern and central Somalia.

‘Al-Shabaab remained in control of much of southern and central Somalia, however, providing a permissive environment for al-Qa’ida operatives to conduct training and terrorist planning with other sympathetic violent extremists, including foreign fighters. The capability of the TFG and other Somali local and regional authorities to prevent and preempt al-Shabaab terrorist attacks remained limited.

‘Al-Shabaab’s withdrawal from conventional fighting in and near Mogadishu resulted in a change of al-Shabaab tactics to asymmetrical attacks against AMISOM and the TFG. These attacks resulted in the increased use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) that became more advanced. In late 2011, al-Shabaab with increasing frequency employed IEDs against Kenyan and anti-al-Shabaab Somali forces in South/Central Somalia.’

The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Armed Conflict Database (IISS ACD), Military & Security section, Military developments 2011, undated, accessed on 2 August 2012, stated:

‘Near-daily clashes between al-Shabab and the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia (TFG), backed by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and militias aligned with the TFG, most notably Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a (ASWJ) and Raskambon, took place in 2011. Kenya, quickly followed by Ethiopia, also began its military pursuit of al-Shabab towards the end of the year. Although the TFG claimed a number of military victories, al-Shabab continued to occupy areas in central and southern Somalia, including the strategically important port of Kismayo.

‘Al-Shabab partially pulled out from Mogadishu on 6 August, marking a military breakthrough for the TFG and AMISOM. The TFG was able to gain control of the strategically important Bakara market area, which had provided a large source of revenue for al-Shabab. Sheikh Ali Rage, the official spokesman for al-Shabab, announced the partial pull-out of Mogadishu, claiming that it was ‘tactical’. However, the real reason remains unclear, as Sheikh Aweys, a senior al-Shabab official, further argued that the withdrawal was due to divisions among the leadership, as well as the difficult operating environment presented by the famine in the country. Others suggested the group was short of money, running low on ammunition, was beset with corruption and had lost some of its most effective officers in recent battles. One

particular fatality that may have temporarily weakened al-Shabab, as well as crippled
the group’s links to other al-Qaeda operatives outside Somalia, was the killing of
Fazul Abdullah Mohamed on 8 June. Mohamed was one of the United States’ ‘most
wanted’ individuals for his role in the 1998 US embassy bombings in Kenya and
Tanzania.

‘Al-Shabab’s partial pull-out from Mogadishu did not weaken the strategic threat the
organisation posed for Somalia and the Horn of Africa region in general. Although the
retreat was a tactical victory for the TFG, AMISOM was not been able to fully secure
Mogadishu and on 9 August, it once more called for an additional 3,000 soldiers to
bolster its force. Furthermore, following the pull-out, Mogadishu was continually
attacked by al-Shabab. A suicide attack on 4 October on a compound housing
several government ministries killed over 100 people.

‘Kenya’s military intervention in southern Somalia in October marked another
important moment in the war against al-Shabab, and gained international support. In
an attempt to drive back al-Shabab from border zones, where al-Shabab had often
clashed with pro-government militia, and following a spate of kidnappings of
foreigners from Kenya by groups based in Somalia, Kenyan troops entered Somalia
on 16 October. Some observers believe Kenya’s main goal is to create a buffer zone
in southern Somalia. At the end of October, Somali Prime Minister Abdiweli
Mohamed Ali and Kenyan Prime Minister Raila Odinga held talks and confirmed that
the Kenyan operation in south Somalia was being carried out with the support of and
in close coordination with the TFG and under the leadership of the TFG forces.

‘…Kenya has, however, launched a number of successful attacks and there have
been claims that al-Shabab has ceded 50% of its previously controlled territory in
southern Somalia. On 20 November, Kenyan troops destroyed al-Shabab training
camps in Badade district in Lower Juba. Since Kenya’s military campaign in Somalia,
al-Shabab have been accused of a number of grenade attacks in Nairobi, Kenya, and
have threatened more if Kenya does not pull out its forces.

‘Other international and regional efforts include those made by Ethiopia, who joined
Kenyan troops in November. Ethiopia has had a military presence in Somalia for
years and often crossed the border in pursuit of Ethiopian rebels hiding in Somalia.
On 26 November, Ethiopian troops reportedly reached the Hiraan region of Somalia
and deployed several hundred troops. Amid fears of increasing ties between al-
Qaeda in Yemen and al-Shabab, the US military carried out a number of targeted
drone strikes from a base in Ethiopia, as part of its fight against al-Shabab.’

Somalia, published on 24 May 2012 (USSD 2011), noted that:

‘Conflict-related abuses, including killings, displacement, and restriction of
humanitarian assistance continued to severely impact civilians. According to the UN,
there were 1.36 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the country and
955,000 persons had taken refuge in other countries, primarily due to conflict,

8 International Institute for Strategic Studies, Armed Conflict Database, Somalia, Military &
Security. Military developments 2011, undated accessed on 2 August 2012,
http://acd.iiss.org/armedconflict/MainPages/dsp_ConflictWeapons.asp?ConflictID=198&Yearl
D=1339 (subscription website)
famine, and drought. Approximately 300,000 Somali refugees arrived in Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Yemen during the year. The rule of law was largely nonexistent. Al-Shabaab controlled most of the south and central regions, where it committed human rights abuses including killings, torture, restriction of humanitarian assistance, and extortion. On August 6, al-Shabaab withdrew most areas of Mogadishu, but in the following months it continued attacks in the city [p1]…Before August 6, al-Shabaab conducted almost daily attacks against the TFG and AMISOM in Mogadishu; there were numerous reports of civilian deaths from these attacks and from TFG and AMISOM responses. International human rights observers accused all parties to the conflict of indiscriminate attacks, deployment of forces in densely populated areas, and failure to take steps to minimize civilian harm…After withdrawing from Mogadishu on August 6, al-Shabaab increased asymmetric attacks. On October 4, a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device exploded in a compound housing several TFG ministries. The explosion killed more than 100 people, including several university students who were waiting in line to receive examination results for Turkish government scholarships. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the attack.

The Report of the Secretary General on Somalia to the UN Security Council, dated 9 December 2011, covering events between 30 August and 30 November 2011, observed:

‘21. The Transitional Federal Government and its allied forces made continued gains against Al-Shabaab, although these came at a high human cost and the situation remained extremely fluid. By early in November, the Transitional Federal Government and AMISOM were present across almost all 16 districts in Mogadishu, albeit so thinly stretched that many districts remained insecure. While Al-Shabaab retained little overt combat presence in Mogadishu, its almost daily terrorist attacks, including an attack involving a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device that killed more than 170 people on 4 October, reflected technological improvements and placed all areas of Mogadishu at risk.

‘22. The creation by the Transitional Federal Government of a “Mogadishu security plan” failed to stem the repeated killings perpetrated by some of its armed elements against one another, civilians and internally displaced persons. The threat posed by certain genuine Transitional Federal Government elements was complicated further because some criminals, armed elements and Al-Shabaab fighters wore Transitional Federal Government uniforms when carrying out attacks. Furthermore, civil unrest against Government-instigated aid diversion and mismanagement grew.

‘23. Groups and entities loosely allied with the Transitional Federal Government have expanded their presence in Gedo and Juba Hoose regions, following the start of the Kenyan operation on 15 October.

‘24. In Galguduud and Hiraan, Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama’a, with the support of Ethiopia, continued to fight Al-Shabaab.

‘25. Multiple killings and attacks over clan, criminal, piracy and terrorist issues have taken place in “Puntland”. Actual and threatened abductions of aid workers included

Date accessed 18 July 2012
‘the hostage-taking of two Danish Demining Group staff in southern Gaalkacyo on 25 October.’

Numbers of casualties in 2011

Statistics on casualties because of limits in reporting and differences in methodologies should not be considered comprehensive or exhaustive and are a guide to numbers of casualties and levels of violence. Consideration should also be given to the nature, frequency and location of violence where these data are available.

1.11 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, 30 August 2011 noted on the subject of civilian casualties arising from the conflict that: ‘The protection of civilians remains a major concern. Although not precisely known, the number of civilian casualties is believed to be high. The use of explosives in populated urban areas and suicide attacks by Al-Shabaab accounted for a significant number of civilian casualties.’ The USSD CRT 2011 noted, ‘Al-Shabaab’s attacks continued apace in 2011, and resulted in the deaths of more than 1,000 people.’

1.12 The USSD 2011 stated that:

‘Fighting during the year involving the TFG, its allied forces, and AMISOM against al-Shabaab resulted in the death and injury of thousands of civilians throughout Somalia and caused the displacement of many others. The NGO Elman Peace and Human Rights reported 1,400 civilian deaths in the first six months of the year [2011] in Mogadishu alone. UNICEF reported on November 15 that the conflict killed 100 children and injured 300 during the year...According to a World Health Organization (WHO) assessment, the three main hospitals in Mogadishu treated 7,799 weapon-related injuries between January 1 and December 18.’

1.13 The Somalia Report website’s ‘Casualty report’ for November 2011, published on 1 December 2011, gave a ‘running total’ of 2,088 deaths since the beginning of March. The IISS ACD, Human Security Developments 2011, noted that in 2011, ‘At least 1,950 people were reported killed in conflict-related incidents, but the figure is likely to be much higher.

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15 International Institute for Strategic Studies, Armed Conflict Database, Somalia, Human security developments, January –February 2011, Available in hard copy on request
The DIS FFM 2012, citing information provided by sources interviewed by the Danish fact finding team in section 1.1.3, Civilian casualties in Mogadishu, noted:

‘An international organisation (C) stated that some International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) and NGOs are reluctant to provide data on human rights violations to it, because of fear of reprisals. Data on civilian casualties for example are difficult to access, as they may show lack of compliance with the rules of warfare in certain operations. It was added that Al-Shabaab does not care about these reports, but the TFG and AMISOM are concerned about the numbers of war-related injuries.

‘An international organisation (C) stated that civilian casualties and weapon related injuries in Mogadishu have decreased since August 2011. Mogadishu is now a much safer environment in terms of civilian casualties. However, the international organisation (C) [was concerned] that violence may increase up to the elections and the end of the transition period in August 2012.

‘When asked about the number of casualties during the fighting in S-C Somalia and in Mogadishu Bediako Buahene, OCHA explained that there are no exact figures on this. However, thousands have been injured during these fights and many have been killed. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) may be able to provide more exact figures on the number of causalities in Mogadishu but there are no figures for the country as a whole.

‘ICRC explained that there is generally no exact number of civilian casualties in Mogadishu or in other locations in S-C Somalia due to weak reporting and patient registration in Somalia. However, ICRC supports two medical facilities specialised in war wounded patients in Mogadishu, namely Medina Hospital and Kesaney Hospital and ICRC do have relatively accurate records of persons being admitted to these two hospitals. In 2012 [up to early March 2012], both hospitals have treated some 4,200 war-wounded people.

‘UNHCR Somalia provided the delegation with a overview of protection incidents in Mogadishu, (see Annex 9: Protection incidents affecting civilians in Mogadishu, 1 January to 16 March 2012).’  

For a comparison of casualties in 2009 and 2010, see COI Report Somalia, January 2012 (Security situation).
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(UNSC Report), noted that: ‘The security situation remained volatile as military operations continued on the outskirts of Mogadishu and parts of south-central Somalia. Gains against the insurgency continued, although the period also saw an increasing number of non-conventional attacks by Al-Shabaab Implementation of resolution 2036 (2012) commenced swiftly and support to the Somali security sector has made progress.’

1.16 The same source noted in regard to the security situation that:

‘In the Mogadishu area, Al-Shabaab terrorist attacks remained constant, though many were prevented or failed as pressure mounted from reinforced Government and AMISOM forces. The threat of Al-Shabaab terrorism was heightened by a public statement against UNPOS on 25 January and, more significantly, the announcement on 9 February [2012] of a strengthened alliance with Al-Qaida. Some elements of Al-Shabaab reportedly do not embrace the alliance. The United Nations was directly targeted in three hand grenade attacks against its sites in January, without casualties. Attacks on Villa Somalia, the presidential compound, were carried out on 14 March by an Al-Shabaab suicide bomber and on 19, 20 and 26 March with the firing of mortar rounds, claiming several lives. On 4 April, another Al-Shabaab suicide bomber set off an explosion at the National Theatre of Mogadishu, killing 10 people, including several officials of the Transitional Federal Government.

‘In central Somalia, Ethiopian troops concentrated heavy combat elements around the border towns of Luuq and Dolo in January, and launched an offensive into Bay Region on 18 February, forcing Al-Shabaab out of key strongholds, including the town of Baidoa. Ethiopian troops led the capture of Beledweyne, Xuddur and Ceel Buur. In southern Somalia, despite numerous air strikes in Juba Dhexe and Juba Hoose, military advances were hindered by continuing insurgent hit-and-run attacks.

‘The dispute between “Somaliland” and the newly proclaimed “Khaatumo State”, in addition to clan-related violence, resulted in fatal clashes in Buuhoodle and Sool. While Al-Shabaab continued to lose ground in south-central Somalia, there were reports of it strengthening its alliance with militias in the Galgala mountain area in “Puntland”. Insurgents reportedly aligned with Al-Shabaab clashed with local authorities. “Puntland’s” security situation was also characterized by renewed hostility against foreign involvement in the exploitation of natural resources.

‘… AMISOM troops continued to improve freedom of movement in Mogadishu through the disposal of landmines, explosive remnants of war and improvised explosive devices. From 9 December 2011 to 31 March [2012], 1,098 items of unexploded ordnance and 48 improvised explosive devices were destroyed. As AMISOM troops rotated into the city, training in explosive ordnance disposal was provided by the United Nations for about 100 Burundian and Ugandan troops. The Mine Action Service of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations supported the

Date accessed 22 June 2012
deployment of the force in the new sectors, which requires explosive ordnance
disposal capacities to mitigate explosive threats and meet mobility requirements.'

1.17 The IISS ACD, section on Military & Security Developments, January – February
2012, undated, accessed on 1 August 2012, observed:

‘Heavy fighting between Transitional Federal Government (TFG), Kenyan and
Ethiopian troops against al-Shabab continued in parts of southern Somalia. Although
al-Shabab remained a powerful force and has continued its almost daily hit-and-run
attacks on the capital, it has increasingly assumed a defensive position. Pro-TFG
forces made a number of advances and reportedly killed a number of senior al-
Shabab commanders…According to an International Crisis Group report, al-Shabab
is becoming increasingly unpopular and appears divided following the formal
announcement in February that the group had joined al-Qaeda. The decision was
seen as a tactical move by some of the group’s leaders, such as Ahmed Abdi
Godane, to obtain international financial backing and to encourage a large number of
foreign fighters to support al-Shabab. However, it could also exacerbate existing
divisions within the movement, especially between those with a nationalist Somali
agenda and those who strive to fight a more global jihad.

‘Meanwhile, on 24 January, the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General
(SRSG) for Somalia, Ambassador Augustine Mahiga, moved the SRSG office back
to Mogadishu after 17 years in Kenya. The move is a symbolic triumph for the TFG,
signalling the significant progress in securing the capital. In other developments, on
22 February the UN Security Council authorised an increase in the AMISOM
contingent from 12,000 to 17,730 troops which will allow the troops to expand their
areas of operation outside Mogadishu. The UN Security Council also called on other
AU Member States to contribute soldiers to AMISOM and stressed the importance of
coordinated action in the region to establish peace, security and stability in Somalia.
On 24 February, Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) joined AMISOM forces.’

1.18 The Report of the Chairperson [Jean Ping] of the [African Union] Commission on the
implementation of the mandate of the African Union Mission in Somalia pursuant to
paragraph 21 of Security Council resolution 2036 (2012), undated, accompanying
letter from the Chairperson is dated 1 June 2012, stated:

‘9. During the reporting period, the security situation in the capital, Mogadishu,
significantly improved, although Al-Shabaab elements continue to infiltrate the city
and to carry out assassinations and suicide attacks. It is worth mentioning the suicide
attack at Villa Somalia on 14 March and the 4 April attack during the first anniversary
of the reopening of the Somali National Theatre, which killed 11 people, including the
heads of Somalia’s Football and Olympic Federations.

18 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, p1 and 7, 1 May 2012,
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_3949.pdf
Date accessed 22 June 2012
19 International Institute for Strategic Studies, Armed Conflict Database, Somalia, Military &
2 August 2012,
http://acd.iiss.org/armedconflict/MainPages/dsp_ConflictWeapons.asp?ConflictID=198&YearI
D=1339 (subscription website)
10. In sector 1 (Lower and Middle Shebelle, including Mogadishu), there were major gains. On 24 May, the Transitional Federal Government and AMISOM forces took control of the strategic town of Afgoye (Lower Shabelle) and secured the Afgoye corridor, which hosts up to 400,000 internally displaced persons. They are now gradually pushing towards Balad (Middle Shabelle). However, there is growing concern about the increasing subversive activities of some former warlords and other individuals who are secretly undermining security in Mogadishu. Their actions include incitement of clan rivalries and influencing soldiers and junior officers to disrespect the hierarchy of the National Security Forces. Furthermore, as internally displaced persons and refugees continue to return in large numbers to their places of origin, several disputes over property and land have been reported.

11. In sector 2 (Lower and Middle Juba), the Transitional Federal Government, backed by the Kenyan contingent, established three subsectors: northern, central and southern. In the northern subsector, the towns of Damasa, Eleweny, Elade, Burahache and Fafadun have been liberated. In the central subsector, the towns of Diff, Dobley, Tabda, Hosingow and Belis Cogani are now in the hands of the Transitional Federal Government. On 30 May, the city of Afmadow fell under the control of the Transitional Federal Government forces and the Kenya Defence Forces. In the southern subsector, the Transitional Federal Government and AMISOM are further consolidating their control of Kolbio, Badhadhe, Burgabo and Ras Kamboni, which were the first to fall following the offensive launched in October 2011 by the Transitional Federal Government forces and the Kenya Defence Forces. The military offensive against the insurgents is advancing well in that subsector. The only towns that remain in the hands of Al-Shabaab are Kismayo, Jamaa, Bu’aaale and Jilib.

12. In Sector 3 [Gedo, Bay and Bakool (Baidoa) and western part of Hiraan regions], there were significant advances by the Transitional Federal Government and the Ethiopian National Defence Forces. Almost all of Gedo, Bay and Bakool have been liberated, with the exception of the Dinsor district, in Bay, and Tayeeglow district and some parts of Wajid, in the Bakool region.

13. Significant gains also continue to be recorded in sector 4 [Galgudud, Mudug and part of the Hiraan regions (Beledweyne)], where the entire region of Hiraan has been recovered by the Transitional Federal Government and the Ethiopian National Defence Forces. Only the towns of Bulla Barde, Jalalqsi and Eel Dheere remain in the hands of the insurgents.

14. Although significantly weakened, Al-Shabaab still has the ability to strike and to receive funds and ammunition from the areas it controls, the diaspora and foreign networks. The group is now withdrawing from major cities and going underground by melting into clans or establishing new hideouts. In recent months, under pressure in south-central Somalia, Al-Shabaab has attempted to establish new bases in the northern Golis Mountains, an ideal hideout with its caves, forested areas and access

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20 UN, Special report of the Secretary General on Somalia, 31 January 2012, p6, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Somalia%20S%202012%2074.pdf Date accessed 1 August 2012
21 UN, Special report of the Secretary General on Somalia, 31 January 2012, p6, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Somalia%20S%202012%2074.pdf Date accessed 1 August 2012
to the coast. Currently, the estimated number of Al-Shabaab elements in the Golis Mountains is between 300 and 400, but that number could grow owing to infiltration from south-central Somalia and access by coast from Yemen. This includes Somalis radicalized in Yemen who are disguised as returnees to Puntland."

1.19 The IISS ACD, Somalia, Military and Security Developments March – June 2012, undated, noted that:

‘There were major strides in the fight against al-Shabaab and in April, African peacekeepers were deployed for the first time outside the capital. One hundred soldiers – 50 Burundian and 50 Ugandan – were deployed as the advance team for 2,500 troops deployed in phases alongside Ethiopian troops. Somali troops backed by African peacekeepers (AMISOM), Ethiopian troops, and pro-government militia Ahlu Sunnah wal Jama’a wrested control from al-Shabaab, village by village. One of the most significant advances occurred towards the end of May, when AMISOM troops crossed the Shabelle River and secured all major roads leading in and out of Afgooye. AMISOM launched a joint military operation with Somali forces, code-named Operation Free Shabelle with the objective of securing the Afgooye corridor, home of 400,000 internally displaced people. Al-Shabaab had used the region to extort revenues from farmers, traders and pastoralists.

‘Ethiopian forces alongside [Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a] ASWJ moved on to liberate El Bur, another key al-Shabaab base in central Somalia in March, having already captured Baidoa and Beledweyn. In mid-May, the Ethiopian force commander in the southern regions of Bay and Bakool said the areas would soon be clear of the al-Qaeda linked group. Towards the end of June, Balad town and Golaley in middle Shabelle were seized, pushing al-Shabaab further north, with pro-government forces now aiming to liberate Jowhar. Ethiopian troops were scheduled to withdraw by the end of April, handing over liberated areas including Baidoa to Somali troops and AMISOM, but Ethiopian officials said in late June that they will remain until Somalia is politically stable and able to fend off al-Shabaab.

‘By the end of June, the attention of the international community was on Kenyan attempts to capture Kismayo, al-Shabaab’s economic hub. The Kenyan troops initially experienced setbacks due to the difficult terrain, but by the end of June, they were inching closer and closer to Kismayo, liberating towns and cities on the way, including Afmadhow, a springboard for troops as they prepared for the assault on the port town. Kenyan troops were often backed up by Ras Kamboni fighters, a militia led by now pro-government and anti-al-Shabaab Sheikh Ahmed Madobe.

‘Despite being pushed out of Mogadishu, al-Shabaab showed its ability to carry out spectacular attacks in the capital. It carried out a suicide attack inside the presidential compound on 14 March, and then another suicide attack on the newly re-opened Somali National Theatre on 4 April that killed several people, including the president of the Somali Olympic Committee. At least seven people were killed on 1 May,

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Date accessed 1 August 2012
including two MPs, as a result of a suicide attack in central Somalia. The attack took place in Dusa Mareb and targeted a group of politicians visiting the Galgudud region to promote reconciliation.

‘The United States, in its semi-annual report to Congress in June, acknowledged for the first time that it has been conducting lethal targeted attacks in Somalia in ‘direct action’ against members of al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) attacks have been widely reported since June 2011…

‘The African Union peacekeepers received a considerable boost in February when its size and mandate was strengthened by the UN Security Council. The mission consists of peacekeepers from Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya and Uganda. On 27 June, Sierra Leonean armed forces personnel completed the training for their upcoming deployment with AMISOM. In mid-May, a small contingent of US marines joined US military contractors in Uganda to train AMISOM troops to fight al-Shabab, drawing on lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan. Earlier in March, the UK sent a team of 27 British soldiers to Uganda to train its forces in cordon and search operations, patrolling and civil-military relations. The EU promised to scale up its funding by €100m to support AMISOM. The added funds are expected to go towards peacekeepers’ wages.

‘In March, the EU agreed to expand its mission Operation Atalanta, allowing its military forces to attack land as well as sea targets. EU defence ministers agreed warships could target boats and fuel dumps. On 15 May, EU naval forces conducted their first raid near the port of Haradhere, a popular onshore pirate safe haven, and several fast attack pirate boats were destroyed. Meanwhile, NATO extended its anti-piracy mission off the coast of Somalia until the end of 2014.‘

1.20 The ACLED Report August 2012 observed that:

‘Somalia saw an increase in July [2012] in both events and fatality levels over the previous month, with a particularly sharp increase in Moga-dishu. Diplomacy, however, is telling a different story: July was the month the UK reported non-combat troops on the ground in Moga-dishu, and a string of international figures visited the capital and reinforce the narrative of stability in which the international community would like to welcome the country’s new constitution. Having boots on the ground - even in a non-combat role - is something of a Rubicon in Somali policy, and while the general exodus from Gigiri is likely to proceed at a trickle rather than a flood, there is an undoubted sense that Somalia is safer.

‘How does this hold up in the data? In the short-term, July appears to be a poor test case, as it witnessed a sharp increase in activity over much of the rest of the year to date… Diffuse attacks by unidentified assailants on government and affiliated targets were particularly common over the past month. Fatalities are quite closely matched to event levels in 2012, indicating that the capital is typically characterised by concomitant increases in low-grade attacks and overall fatality figures, as opposed to

a scenario in which isolated but spectacular attacks are directed at a large number of casualty targets.

‘Turning to a longer-term view of the data, this average rate of fatalities per event has been declining pretty steadily since January 2010 (see Figure 10). The exception to this is a spike in 2011 associated with a high-casualty attack by Al Shabaab on a compound of government ministries in October of that year. In spite of this incident, the trend of average fatality numbers per event in the capital is steadily declining, from 4.32 in January 2010, to 0.77 in July 2012. Also declining is the proportion of events which result in casualties at all, as Figure 11 shows. ACLED data allows users to analyse not only the number of casualties resulting from an event, but also the proportion of events which are fatal, a measure which serves as an additional check for intensity of conflict.’

The same source continued:

‘When we turn to actors involved in conflict in Mogadishu, we see that the TFG is mostly engaged with militia and unidentified armed group violence. Many of the latter may be Al Shabaab agents who are not identified, or may be loosely associated operatives working with relative independence. What is important is that these militia groups and unidentified actors continue to have a critical and destabilising impact on conflict and security in the capital. The secondary focus of TFG activity is rebel groups, exclusively Al Shabaab in this circumstance. Strikingly, in July, the TFG spent almost as much time involved in in-fighting (government - government violence) between various factions within ranks as it did battling Al Shabaab.

‘Outside Mogadishu, battles between Al Shabaab and the TFG and allied forces continued. The number of events in which territory was recaptured by the TFG and allied forces dropped in July from a higher rate in June, although this is disaggregated by event, rather than the size of the territory regained. There were, significantly, fewer events in which Al shabaab captured or regained territory, after some minor successes in May and June which were reportedly linked to a lack of cohesion between Ethiopian and ASWJ forces in the field.

‘Geographically, increased fighting was witnessed in Lower Shabelle in July, while conflict in Gedo, Bakool and Middle Shabelle remained at comparable levels. As the TFG and allied forces continue to advance, the most significant target in their battle against Al Shabaab remains the port city of Kismayo, from which the group draws considerable revenue and strategic advantage. Al Shabaab has here-tofore withdrawn from some of its other strongholds with relatively little resistance, with a preference for conducting scattered, hit-and-run style attacks on targets in the aftermath rather than battling to hold territory. This tactic has proved destabilising and effective, however, particularly when a lack of co-ordination between factions of the same alliance can be exploited. It may be the case, however, that the anticipated battle for Kismayo bears a closer resemblance to the entrenched struggle for

ground in Mogadishu in 2010 and 2011, in which civilian casualty numbers were extremely high due to persistent and sometimes indiscriminate shelling.\footnote{Armed Conflict Location & Event Dataset document, Conflict Trends (No. 5): Real-Time Analysis of African Political Violence, August 2012, undated, p 6-8 http://www.acleddata.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/ACLED-Conflict-Trends-Report-No.-5-August-2012.pdf Date accessed 17 August 2012}

**Numbers of casualties in 2012**

Statistics on casualties because of limits in reporting and differences of methodology should not be considered comprehensive or exhaustive, and are a guide to numbers of casualties and levels of violence. Consideration should also be given to the nature, frequency and location of violence where these data are available.

1.22 The IISS ACD, section on Military & Security Developments, March – June 2012, undated, accessed on 1 August 2012, noted that: ‘A total of 748 fatalities were reported since March [2012], though the real number is likely to be much higher. The reduction in fatalities in May and June corresponds to reports that al-Shabab fighters are surrendering and fleeing towns before the arrival of government troops.’

1.23 The Somalia Report website began publishing a ‘Weekly Security Roundup’ from week commencing 22 April 2012 covering security incidents throughout the country. The website issues the following disclaimer: ‘The TFG [Transitional Federal Government], AMISOM [African Union Mission in Somalia], KDF [Kenyan Defence Forces], ENDF [Ethiopian National Defence Force], ASWJ [Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama’a], various militias, al-Shabaab and other forces fighting in the country often report conflicting casualty numbers. Somalia Report assembles these weekly incidents from a variety of sources and numbers may vary.’ The website gives the total number of reported deaths between 22 April and 29 June 2012 as 457, with 542 reported injuries. The following graph presents their data on a week-by-week basis for the period 22 April 2012 to 29 June 2012. (It should be noted that the report of 22 April covers six days, rather than seven.)


In contrast, the ACLED report, Conflict Trends (No. 5): Real-Time Analysis of African Political Violence, July 2012, undated, provided the graph below, titled ‘Conflict events and fatalities, Somalia, Jan - Jun 2012’ indicating an increase in incidents and fatalities across Somalia in May and June 2012.
However, the ACLED Report August 2012 provided a further graph titled ‘Events by type, Mogadishu, Somalia, Jan - Jul 2012’, which suggested that there were a decline in incidents between May and June but then an increase in July in Mogadishu.

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‘Militarily, Al-Shabaab has generally declined to offer battle to foreign forces, avoiding sustained contacts and relying heavily on asymmetrical warfare techniques. Although the group continues to conduct raids and ambushes with some success in border areas, in Mogadishu its operations have been essentially confined to targeted killings, indirect fire and improvised explosive devices, including suicide bombings.

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Al-Shabaab’s use of improvised explosive devices has been growing increasingly sophisticated, and there is growing evidence to suggest that Al-Shabaab obtains expertise and/or improvised explosive devices components from outside Somalia.  

1.27 The same report noted that, according to interviews with human rights activists in Nairobi and Mogadishu between December 2011 and March 2012, ‘Civilians have borne the brunt of the impact of the ongoing conflict in Somalia, with all major parties guilty of either indiscriminate attacks or disproportionate use of force. Al-Shabaab has been the worst offender: in areas under the group’s control, civilians are routinely arrested, beaten or executed on charges of being “spies”.’  

1.28 The same report further stated that: ‘In areas controlled by the Transitional Federal Government and affiliated groups, arbitrary executions and indiscriminate retaliation are commonplace, and due process is routinely denied to those accused of working with Al-Shabaab.’  

1.29 An article by the academic Stig Jarle Hansen, commissioned by the Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis (INEGMA) on behalf of the second United Arab Emirates Counter Piracy Conference, ‘A Regional Response to Maritime Piracy: Enhancing Public-Private Partnerships and Strengthening Global Engagement’, organized by the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs in partnership with global ports operator DP World, held in Dubai in June 2012, noted that:

‘In the face of a stronger opposition coalition [following intervention by Kenyan and Ethiopian troops], Al Shabaab took several measures. [Current Al Shabaab leader, Ahmed Abdi Aw Muhammed] Godane announced a change of strategy publicly on an Al Shabaab radio station, claiming that the organization should return to guerilla warfare. Indeed Al Shabaab-style assassinations re-occurred in Baidoa and Mogadishu, and Al Shabaab attacked the logistical lines of their enemies

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‘…the current strength of the Somali government forces and the AMISOM forces is insufficient to militarily secure the countryside, which means Al Shabaab can operate relatively freely there…It is likely that…Al Shabaab will return to its old pattern of assassinations, terror attacks, and guerilla fighting, to remain a dangerous but central player in Somalia.’

For further details of individual events in 2012, see section, Incidents by region… and information on al Shabaab, see Key Actors, al Shabaab.

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2. Key actors

Government and pro-government forces

African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

For background information on AMISOM and the TFG forces in 2011, please see the full COI Report Somalia, January 2012.

2.01 The Special report of the Secretary-General on Somalia, 31 January 2012, to the UN Security Council, provided background to the AMISOM strategic paper of 5 January 2012 and UN support for it. The report noted that:

‘13. At the initiative of the African Union Commission, and against the background of the recent progress on the political and security tracks, African Union and United Nations planners jointly developed a strategic concept for future AMISOM operations in Somalia. The concept aims at joining all ongoing separate military operations in Somalia into a coordinated and coherent effort against Al-Shabaab, which, in turn, would be critical to extend the authority of the Transitional Federal Government beyond the capital and to create space for the effective implementation of the road map…15. Based on a thorough ground assessment, the joint assessment team established that, in order for AMISOM to be able to conduct concurrent offensive operations throughout south-central Somalia, up to 35,500 troop and substantial resources would be required…16. The joint assessment mission recommended the most realistic and cost effective option to achieve the objective of significantly degrading the military capability of Al-Shabaab and creating the security conditions for the implementation of the road map to end the transition. It entails raising the troop level to 17,731 uniformed personnel and a set of enablers and force multipliers aimed at achieving a fine balance between the operational requirements and a realistic level of resources through (a) the prioritization of areas of operation; (b) the phasing of the operation without significantly altering the desired objectives; (c) trading force multipliers and enablers for troop levels by maintaining capability; (d) requesting Ethiopia to continue to provide support to Transitional Federal Government/AMISOM operations in the Bay, Bakool and Hiraan regions; and (e) the


Date accessed 9 August 2012
provision of immediate operational logistics support to the Transitional Federal Government security forces.' 45

2.02 The report also noted that:

‘18. In respect of police operations, the assessment team assumed that the immediate focus of the AMISOM police operations will remain on capacity-building and law enforcement support to the Somalia Police Force. In this regard, the recommended option includes, within the recommended 17,731 uniformed personnel, a guard force, the deployment of 260 individual police officers and 2 formed police units, comprising 140 personnel each. The formed police units would be deployed to provide operational support to the Somalia Police Force, including the protection of international personnel in cooperation with the military guard force and, in exceptional cases, also vital installations. It is important to note that formed police units should not be seen as an extension of the military nor as performing military duties and should be under the command and control of the AMISOM Police Commissioner. Considering the urgent need to re-establish the rule of law in areas recovered from Al-Shabaab, the extent of support required for the Somalia Police Force is expanding, and there is a need to enhance AMISOM police capacity, including through the careful selection of necessary specialized police experts, enablers and multipliers to improve the operational effectiveness. While the deployment of international police officers to Mogadishu and the generation of the formed police units could be expedited, in close coordination with the Police Technical Working Group of the Joint Security Committee, there is an urgent need to develop a revised police concept of operations tailored to operations of the formed police units in this option.’ 46

2.03 The same paper further stated that:

‘… the [African Union] Ministers agreed to reconfigure the sectors identified in the strategic concept by assigning the 17,731 uniformed personnel as follows:

‘(a) Sector 1: Banadir (Mogadishu) and Middle and Lower Shabelle regions: the current troop levels with the Burundian and Ugandan contingents shall be maintained (uniformed personnel strength: 9,500);

‘(b) Sector 2: Middle and Lower Juba regions (Kismaayo): the troops in this sector will consist mainly of the rehatted Kenyan Defence Force (uniformed personnel strength: 4,700);

‘(c) Sector 3: Gedo, Bay and Bakool (Baidoa) and western part of Hiraan regions: the balance of the 12,000 troops to be generated from Burundi and Uganda will be deployed in this sector (uniformed personnel strength: 2,500);

45 UN, Special report of the Secretary General on Somalia, 31 January 2012, p4
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Somalia%20S%202012%2074.pdf Date accessed 1 August 2012

46 UN, Special report of the Secretary General on Somalia, 31 January 2012, p4
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Somalia%20S%202012%2074.pdf Date accessed 1 August 2012
‘(d) Sector 4: Galgudud, Mudug and part of the Hiraan regions (Beledweyne): the Djiboutian contingent will be deployed in this sector (uniformed personnel strength: 1,000).’ 47

2.04 The UNSC Report of May 2012 noted that:

‘Following the adoption of Security Council resolution 2036 (2012) [requesting ‘the African Union to increase AMISOM’s force strength from 12,000 to a maximum of 17,731 uniformed personnel, comprised of troops and personnel of formed police units’ 48], the United Nations held consultations with the African Union and AMISOM to discuss the implementation of the resolution and the revised concept of operations, including the delivery of the expanded United Nations logistical support package for AMISOM. The United Nations Office to the African Union, with the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), supported the African Union Commission’s development of AMISOM operational benchmarks to monitor the implementation of resolution 2036 (2012).…In Mogadishu (Sector 1), UNSOA [United Nations Support Office for AMISOM] focused its efforts on establishing a permanent camp in the north-east of the city. Fuel, water and ration distribution points are in place to reduce the logistic resupply time to the forward troops. Phase 1 of the infrastructure for AMISOM headquarters is almost complete, and other facilities are due for completion by August 2012. Medical clinic infrastructure is complete with equipment installed. UNSOA conducted 23 medical evacuation, transfer and repatriation flights from Mogadishu for a total of 62 AMISOM personnel from 1 December 2011 to 15 April 2012.

‘34. Planning for support in other sectors is ongoing, and designs for logistic hubs have been finalized. Additional equipment and vehicles are being requisitioned to ensure support to AMISOM troops and their deployment outside Mogadishu. Reconnaissance of potential transportation routes and airfields to support Sectors 2 and 3 was completed. Planning for deployment to Sector 3 is complete. As the first deployment of AMISOM outside Mogadishu, an advance party of 100 Burundian and Ugandan troops arrived in Baidoa on 5 April 2012. Planning for the deployment of Djiboutian troops to Beledweyne in Sector 4 is at an advanced stage. On 7 April, UNSOA shipped contingent-owned equipment and basic life support items from Mogadishu to Djibouti for prepositioning.

‘…UNSOA communication activities continued to positively affect the profile of AMISOM and contributed to marginalizing Al-Shabaab. Recent public opinion polling in Mogadishu demonstrates an increasingly favourable trend in public perception and approval of AMISOM, the transitional federal institutions and the international community. The African Union–United Nations Information Support Team was reinforced to ensure support across the sectors. Work continued on the expansion of

47 UN, Special report of the Secretary General on Somalia, 31 January 2012, p6, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Somalia%20S%202012%2074.pdf Date accessed 1 August 2012
the Radio Bar-Kulan transmission network, and on the establishment of a Somali public service radio broadcaster.’

2.05 On 6 July 2012, an AMISOM press release stated:

‘The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) today assumed formal command of the Kenyan forces in Southern Somalia at a colorful ceremony held at the Kenyan Department of Defense headquarters in Nairobi.

‘A total of 4664 Kenyan personnel are being integrated into AMISOM, bringing the AMISOM force strength to slightly over 17,000 troops out of a total authorized strength of 17,731…The Kenyan contingent joins those from Burundi, Djibouti and Uganda, with Sierra Leone due to send a battalion in the near future.’

2.06 An AMISOM press release dated 12 July 2012 noted that:

‘The Police Component of the African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM) is conducting a week-long induction course for thirty-one Individual Police Officers (IPO) from Sierra Leone who arrived in Mogadishu last Friday. The course covers Somali culture, Somali Legal Systems, Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) among others.

‘Speaking during the official opening ceremony in Mogadishu, AMISOM Police Commissioner, Dr. Charles Makono welcomed the thirty-one officers who include six female officers for their commitment to assisting in the rebuilding of the Somali Police Force (SPF) after two decades of civil war.’

2.07 NewsTime Africa noted on 6 July 2012 that: ‘Sierra Leonian troops are scheduled to join [Kenyan Defence Forces] KDF troops in July while Djibouti will control Sector 4 [Hiiraan]. Uganda and Burundi control Sector 1 [‘Lower and Middle Shebelle, including Mogadishu] and 3 [Gedo, Bay and Bakool] in AMISOM’s multi pronged

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attack of the al Qaeda linked insurgents group. Sector 2 [Lower and Middle Juba\textsuperscript{55}] will include areas along the Kenya/Somalia border including Jubaland and Gedo all the way to Kismayu.\textsuperscript{56}

**Ethiopian troops to withdraw from Belet Weyne and Baidoa**

2.08 The Africa Report noted on 17 April 2012 that:

‘Ethiopia announced on Tuesday [17 April 2012] plans to withdraw its troops from Somalia.

‘Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi told parliament that Ethiopian troops will be replaced by soldiers from Djibouti, Uganda and Burundi...Meles announced that Djibouti troops were to take over Beledweyne and surrounding areas, while Ugandan and Burundian troops will take over Baidowa and surrounding areas.

‘He indicated that currently around 200 Ugandan military officers were in Baidowa to arrange the handover.

‘“We are planning to withdraw our troops soon. We are just waiting these countries to take over the places that are currently under control by our forces,” Meles said, in response to questions from legislators, as to when Ethiopian troops will pull out of Somalia.

‘It is not yet clear how many troops Ethiopia deployed to Somalia.’\textsuperscript{57}

**Transitional Federal Government forces**

2.09 The UNSC Report of May 2012 noted that: ‘38. Somali forces will figure prominently in the expanded AMISOM operations, but they still suffer from limited supply and


logistic capabilities.’ 58 Jane’s estimated that the TFG forces numbered 8,000, and reported in an article dated 3 November 2011 that:

‘Amounting to little more than a militia force, the TFG Army is an armed force comprised of militia fighters loyal to those warlord and clan leaders participating in the TFG. The core elements in the current TFG army in Mogadishu are Islamist fighters from the ARS-Djibouti and a few Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jama’ah fighters. The major clan-based fighters are from the Ayr (Indha Adde’s clansmen) and Abgal clans (the President’s clansmen). Discipline is poor and membership fluid as militias enlist and leave with the participation of their leaders in the transitional government. There is no formal order of battle, units or divisions.

‘The establishment of an official national army in traditional terms remains, however, a distant prospect. Even in a more stable context and despite the guises of a formal military structure, it is highly unlikely that the warlords will voluntarily or at least peacefully demobilise their militia or surrender their weapons and control over resources - including those warlord and clan leaders participating in government. However, Somalia does intend to integrate former insurgents into its new national security forces and has called for greater international support to rehabilitate the armed forces. The government has also reiterated pleas for an arms embargo against Somalia to be lifted. 59

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INSURGENT GROUPS

Al Shabaab

For background information on al Shabaab, please see the full COI Report Somalia, January 2012.

2.10 The USSD Country Reports on Terrorism 2011, July 2012, provided a description of al-Shabab and its capabilities:

‘… aka The Harakat Shabaab al-Mujahidin; al-Shabab; Shabaab; the Youth; Mujahidin al-Shaabab Movement; Mujahideen Youth Movement; Mujahidin Youth Movement Description: Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization [by the US government] on March 18, 2008, al-Shabaab was the militant wing of the former Somali Islamic Courts Council that took over parts of southern Somalia in the second half of 2006. Since the end of 2006, al-Shabaab and disparate clan militias have led a violent insurgency using guerrilla warfare and terrorist tactics against the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia. Several senior al-Shabaab leaders have publicly proclaimed loyalty to [al-Qa’ida] AQ. In some camps, AQ-affiliated foreign fighters often led the training and indoctrination of the recruits. Rank and file militia fighters from multiple clan and sub-clan factions that are aligned with al-Shabaab are predominantly interested in indigenous issues. The group’s foreign

fighters were generally intent on conducting attacks outside Somalia and as of late 2011 had seen their operational capacity reduced due to the military campaign against al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab proceeded to develop ties to al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) during 2011.

‘Activities: Al-Shabaab has used intimidation and violence to undermine the TFG, forcibly recruit new fighters, and kill activists working to bring about peace through political dialogue and reconciliation. The group has claimed responsibility for several high profile bombings and shootings throughout Somalia targeting African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troops and TFG officials. It has been responsible for the assassination of numerous civil society figures, government officials, and journalists. Al-Shabaab fighters and those who have also claimed allegiance to the group have conducted violent attacks and have assassinated international aid workers and members of non-governmental organizations… Al-Shabaab’s attacks continued apace in 2011, and resulted in the deaths of more than 1,000 people. Among al-Shabaab’s most deadly 2011 attacks were a string of armed assaults in May that killed over 120 people, a June attack on AMISOM peacekeepers that killed 13, and an October vehicle-borne improvised explosive device attack on a government compound in Mogadishu that killed more than 70 people, including nine children. Al-Shabaab also killed the TFG Minister of Interior in June.

‘Location/Area of Operation: After the organization’s area of control expanded in 2010, al-Shabaab lost control of significant areas of territory in 2011. By August, after a multi-front offensive against al-Shabaab, the group left Mogadishu, and the TFG and AMISOM gained control of the majority of districts in Mogadishu for the first time. Despite these losses, al-Shabaab continued to control much of southern Somalia throughout 2011.

‘Strength: Al-Shabaab is estimated to have several thousand members when augmented by foreign fighters and allied clan militias.

‘External Aid: Because al-Shabaab is a multi-clan entity, it receives significant donations from the global Somali diaspora; however, the donations are not all intended to support terrorism; the money is also meant to support family members. The loss of Mogadishu as a source of tax revenue caused al-Shabaab’s revenue to diminish in 2011. However, al-Shabaab leaders and many rank-and-file fighters have successfully garnered significant amounts of money from port revenues and through criminal enterprises, especially in Kismayo.’

2.11 The Crisis Group report, The Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia, Africa Report No184 – 22 February 2012, commented, specifically in regard to the conflict in southern Somalia between Kenyan armed forces and Al-Shabab, that:

‘Although Al-Shabaab has been weakened, it remains a formidable adversary that understands local dynamics better than its foreign foes and can maximise its asymmetric advantage. One tactical change has already become clear. Rather than fight in the open, it has melted into the background, allowing Kenyan mechanised infantry to move deeper into its heartland. Its fighters blend into the civilian population and distribute weapons. This is a result of lessons learned during the December

2006 Ethiopian intervention, when the Union of Islamic Courts deployed many of its combatants, including Al-Shabaab, conventionally in the vast arid plains of southwestern Somalia, and they were decimated by ground and air fire.

‘That almost finished Al-Shabaab, but it adapted, becoming an efficient guerrilla force…Although Al-Shabaab is unpopular, because of its poor handling of the famine and harsh enforcement of Sharia (Islamic law), inter-clan fighting has driven many into its arms, especially in rural areas. The Kenyan intervention is also increasingly questioned in parts of Somalia untouched by the fighting, including Puntland. Resentment of foreign occupation has always been an effective rallying tool.

‘That, together with the perception that Somali refugees in Kenya are badly treated, is stirring up nationalism, on which both Al-Shabaab and TFG President Sheikh Sharif are trying to capitalise.’

2.12 BBC News reported on 10 February 2012 that the ‘Islamist militant group al-Shabab …has released a joint video with al-Qaeda, announcing the two groups have merged. Al-Shabab leader Ahmed Abdi Godane, known as Mukhtar Abu Zubair, said he ‘pledged obedience’ to al-Qaeda head Ayman al-Zawahiri.’

2.13 The report came on the same day the Jamestown Foundation released a paper stating that the ‘popularity of Somalia’s al-Shabaab militants is slowly declining for many reasons, including a growing financial crisis and infighting in the movement’s leadership…’ and that the ‘2012 assignment for the TFG forces backed by African Union peacekeepers is to drive the militants [al Shabaab] from Somalia.’ Despite the reports of declining support, the Foreign Policy website noted on 14 February 2012 that: ‘Hundreds of Somalis gathered on the outskirts of Mogadishu on Feb. 13 to celebrate the union of al Qaeda with its Somali cousin, the insurgent-terrorist group al-Shabab.’

2.14 An article by the academic Stig Jarle Hansen, commissioned by the Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis (INEGMA) on behalf of the second United Arab Emirates Counter Piracy Conference, ‘A Regional Response to Maritime Piracy: Enhancing Public-Private Partnerships and Strengthening Global Engagement’, organized by the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs in partnership with global ports operator DP World, held in Dubai in June 2012, noted that:

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63 Jamestown Foundation, Somalia’s Transitional Government Seeks to Finish Off al-Shabaab This Year, 10 February 2012, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38996&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=13&cHash=eb4a1f8a3ea0ed742e5441ec7f667bef Date accessed 19 July 2012
64 Foreign Policy, Al Qaeda’s Merger, 14 February 2012, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/14/al_queadas_merge Date accessed 19 July 2012
‘In the current situation Al Shabaab is pressured but retains its unity, once again proving all those predicting its collapse to be wrong. However, this does not mean that Al Shabaab lacks candidates for defection. Hassan Dahir Aweys, an old-fashioned clannish Islamist from the Ayr clan that more or less had to join Al Shabaab when his old faction was on the verge of defeat in 2010, has made clear statements at odds with the rest of the organization. The power centralization processes within Al Shabaab also alienated some members of the organization, such as Fuad Khalaf Shongole, although the power of these individuals within the organization is low.

‘Al Shabaab do however enjoy several advantages, the first being that the current strength of the Somali government forces and the AMISOM forces is insufficient to militarily secure the countryside, which means Al Shabaab can operate relatively freely there. The Somali government is scheduled to be reformed in August 2012, and it is not clear what will emerge. The second advantage for Al Shabaab is that it has now expanded – into Kenya, through Kenyan recruits, and Al Shabaab is clearly able to recruit in Uganda and Tanzania as well. Al Shabaab still holds some following in the region and may, as they did in the Kampala bombings of 2010, hit their enemies on their home-turf. The third advantage Al Shabaab has is the growth of their regional allies, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and Ansar al Sharia in Yemen.

‘Some analysts and civil servants have predicted the evacuation of Al Shabaab to the north of Somalia. However, Al Shabaab still has the potential to remain in the south where it is still in full control of large cities such as Merka, Brawa, Jowhar and Kismayo. It is likely that Al Shabaab will remain in control of Kismayo until it is forced out. However, it is also likely that Al Shabaab will return to its old pattern of assassinations, terror attacks, and guerrilla fighting, to remain a dangerous but central player in Somalia.’

Al Shabaab ‘in Puntland’

2.15 BBC News reported on 11 April 2012 that:

‘Al-Shabab militants have moved north to semi-autonomous Puntland after being pushed out of central Somalia, Puntland President Abdirahman Farole says.

‘They are there to strengthen ties with al-Qaeda in Yemen, which lies a short distance across the sea, he told the BBC... The leader of Puntland says al-Shabab fighters and commanders have been arriving over the past few days... The president says they are gathering in Puntland's Galgala mountains and the Golis range that borders the self-declared republic of Somaliland.

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“We believe that these militants and their senior officials are a threat to the security of our region,” President Farole said, adding that he is ready to deploy troops against them.”

2.16 Reuters reported on 11 April that Somalia’s prime minister had made similar comments:

‘Militant leaders and foot soldiers from the militant group al-Shabab are fleeing to hideouts in a mountainous region of northeastern Somalia after facing increasing military pressure around Somalia’s capital, the prime minister said in an interview Wednesday [11 April 2012].

‘The northern flight to the Galgala Mountains in the semiautonomous Somali region of Puntland comes after months of increasing pressure on al-Shabab from the militaries of Uganda, Burundi, Ethiopia and Kenya.

“They are weakened. They are now in tatters. Their fighters are now moving to Galgala Mountains, which is an area with a very difficult terrain,” Prime Minister Abdiweli Mohamed Ali told The Associated Press in an interview at the presidential palace. ‘Al-Shabab high officials are now also relocating to Puntland.”

Al Shabaab reorganisation takes place

2.17 Somalia Report noted on 23 July 2012 that:

‘After four days of meetings in Barawe…the leaders of al-Shabaab reorganized their chain of command and selected new leaders for a variety of key roles. The overall leader remains Sheikh Ahmed Abdi Godane (Muktar Abu-Zubeyr) who commands five regional administrations, each of which is responsible for its own military operations against the allied forces of Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia and African Union peacekeepers…The new shabaab administration covers the entire with the exception of the breakaway region Somailland, from which Sheikh Godane hails, sparking a rift among top leaders.

‘Exacerbating the rift, some of the newly named officials were appointed to a region from which they do not hail…The new structures comes as the militant group loses more ground against allied forces and is preparing to defend their stronghold of Kismayo, in Lower Jubba region.’

3. INCIDENTS BY REGION BETWEEN 1 JANUARY AND 1 AUGUST 2012

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67 Reuters, AP Interview: Somalia PM says fighters flee north, 11 April 2012, http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5q1I8Qy1QIO-fUFpumznSIGitZ9kQ?docid=c79872f3d4da4753ab8992025af4d4c23 Date accessed 21 June 2012
The following section refers to documented security related incidents in south and central Somalia between 1 January and 1 August 2012. Articles are organised by region and then chronologically. The reports referred in this section are not an exhaustive list of security incidents during this period. For further information, the following sources provide updates on security related incidents:

UN Inter-Agency Standing Committee Somalia protection cluster updates:  
http://reliefweb.int/organization/iasc-somalia?search=

UN Office for Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) updates:  
http://www.unocha.org/somalia/reports-media/ocha-reports

Crisis Group, Crisiswatch database updates:  
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/crisiswatch/crisiswatch-database.aspx?CountryIDs=%7b05B5BDAB-4083-4968-830D-08EB00590DD0%7d

UNHCR, refworld database, Somalia:  
http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?page=country&skip=0&coi=SOM&x=10&y=13

SomaliaReport, Streetfight and ReliefSCENE webpages:  
http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/subcategory/12//Conflict////4 and  

Armed Conflict Location & Event Dataset:  
http://www.acleddata.com/research-and-publications/

A map of Somalia is at Annex A. Detailed maps of Mogadishu and Somalia regions are available via the UN OCHA website:  

Mogadishu

Overview

3.01 The Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit – Somalia report, Mogadishu Food Security and Nutrition Situation Trends (July 2011 – April 2012), 19 July 2012, observed in its introduction:

‘For two decades, Mogadishu had been the epicentre of conflict and humanitarian crisis that had ravaged Somalia. Over the past year however, the security situation in the city had improved slightly, following the withdrawal of al-Shabaab in August 2011, since years of fighting with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). In spite of continued episodes of violence that can be attributed to the increasing prominence of political activity, Mogadishu had experienced visible improvements, including greater humanitarian access, increasing economic activity and improved access to markets1. As a consequence, the food security and nutrition situation had improved since August 2011, when the estimated 190,000 Internally Displaced People (IDPs) in Mogadishu were classified in Famine and urban residents in Emergency acute food insecurity phases.2 The improved security situation had also provided space for more thorough
analyses of the food and nutrition situation in the city as a series of assessment had been conducted since August 2011.’

Incidents

3.02 BBC News reported on 19 January 2012 that:

‘Six people have been killed by a suicide bomb attack in a refugee camp in the Somali capital Mogadishu.

‘The victims included a security guard and a local aid worker, witnesses said…The bomb exploded just 20 minutes after a team of international journalists had left the Mogadishu camp.’

3.03 The Independent reported on 21 January 2012 that:

‘African Union (AU) and government troops launched an offensive against Islamist insurgents in the Somali capital yesterday, seizing rebel bases beyond the city’s limits for the first time, the AU force said.

‘Supported by tanks, the AU’s Amisom force said it had driven the insurgents out of Mogadishu University as well as the city’s Barakaat cemetery, leaving the two sites under government control.

““This is the first time Amisom has been able to secure an area outside the parameters of the city, allowing them to defend greater Mogadishu from the exterior,” Paddy Ankunda, a spokesman for the Amisom force, said.”

3.04 Reuters reported on 8 February 2012 that:

‘A suicide car bomber killed at least 11 people Wednesday [8 February] near a hotel where lawmakers gather in the Somali capital, a sign of the fragile security situation in Mogadishu even after Islamist rebels pulled out last year.

‘Police officer Hassan Ali told Reuters the attacker rammed his vehicle into a cafe outside the Muna Hotel, in the heart of areas controlled by government and African Union forces and not far from the presidential palace.

‘Al Shabaab militants claimed responsibility. "We were behind the explosion at the Muna Hotel. We targeted legislators and government officials," Sheikh Abdiasis Abu Musab, spokesman for al Shabaab’s military operations, told Reuters.”

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3.05 BBC News reported on 2 March 2012 that:

‘A major base of Somalia’s al-Shabab militants has been captured on the outskirts of the capital by government troops backed by African Union forces.

“This operation is necessary to consolidate the security of Mogadishu,” AU commander Maj Gen Fred Mugisha said as the offensive began…Somali government forces with the support of AU troops launched the attack on Maslah at dawn, the AU mission in Somalia (Amisom) said in a statement.

‘Al-Shabab said it had voluntarily withdrawn from Maslah, which is 5km (3 miles) north of Mogadishu on one of two main roads out of the city.

‘Amisom said that Maslah was used as an execution ground by al-Shabab.

‘It also said two AU soldiers were wounded during the operation.’

3.06 BBC News reported on 30 March 2012 that:

‘African Union troops in Somalia say they have seized a key militant area, including an airstrip and hospital, on the outskirts of the capital.

‘Islamist fighters have launched frequent attacks on Mogadishu from bases in Deynile to the west.

‘But an al-Shabab spokesman said it was a “failed offensive” and the group still held the area…Residents in Deynile told the BBC they saw troops advancing and heard heavy gunfire early on Friday morning.

‘A spokesman for the AU mission in Somalia (Amisom), Paddy Ankunda, told the BBC that African Union troops, backed by interim government soldiers, were now in control of the whole area and had even extended their reach beyond the suburb, which had been the closest militant-held area to the capital.’

3.07 Reuters reported on 14 March 2012 that:

‘A suicide bomber killed at least four people inside the presidential palace compound in the Somali capital Mogadishu on Wednesday, according to the police, the African Union and al Shabaab insurgents…Reports of the number killed by the blast differed.

‘Al Shabaab claimed responsibility for the attack, saying one of its suicide bombers had killed 17 people and wounded 30.'
“What a victory, inside the so-called presidential palace, more explosions and bombers will follow,” Sheikh Abdiasis Abu Musab, spokesman for al Shabaab's military operations, told Reuters.

‘Paddy Ankunda, spokesman for the African Union's AMISOM peacekeeping force in Somalia, said four people, including civilians, had been killed and that there were no AMISOM casualties.

‘Colonel Abdullahi Barise, police spokesman, told Reuters, five had been killed and 10 wounded by a suicide bomber.

‘Abdirashid Mohamed Ali, national security adviser to the prime minister, and Ankunda both said the blast was near the front gate of the presidential compound near a building used by the parliament speaker.’  

3.08 An AMISOM press release noted on 16 March 2012 that:

‘Somali National Forces, supported by AU troops in Mogadishu have advanced for 4km today capturing new areas outside the city. This puts the entire capital under the control of AMISOM and the transitional federal government. The operation launched early this morning met minimal resistance from Al Qaeda backed extremists, al Shabaab.

‘AMISOM Spokesman Lt Col Paddy Ankunda commented that newly liberated areas include Suuqa Xoolaha animal market, which al Shabaab had been levying illegal taxes on civilians.

“Our forces also captured Keeysaneey Hospital and the entire village of Waxara-Cade” he added.

‘Jetemirika hill, which insurgents used to launch mortars at IDP camps is now under government control.’  

3.09 Reuters reported on 19 March 2012 that:

‘At least five people were killed when a salvo of mortars targeting Somalia’s presidential palace missed and landed on a nearby refugee camp overnight, residents and the African Union’s peacekeeping force said on Monday.

‘Somalia's al Qaeda-aligned al Shabaab rebel group said they fired more than a dozen mortars at the heavily fortified presidential compound, their second attempt to strike at the heart of the embattled government in less than a week.

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75 Reuters, Suicide bomber kills 4 at Somali presidential palace, 14 March 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/14/us-somalia-conflict-idUSBRE82D0L720120314 Date accessed 8 June 2012

‘Paddy Ankunda, spokesman for the AU force known as AMISOM, said some mortar rounds crashed into a camp for Somalis displaced by war and famine about 500 meters from the presidential palace.’

3.10 On 20 March 2012, UNCHR ‘expressed concern at a resumption this week in mortar attacks in the Somalia capital of Mogadishu, which claimed the lives of at least four internally displaced people, including two children.’ UNHCR further reported that:

‘In the first such attack since August last year, mortars landed in a small settlement for internally displaced people [IDP] in the Wardhigley district of the city on Monday morning.

“The target of the attack is believed to have been a hostel housing pro-government forces in the nearby Villa Somalia compound, the presidential palace. But the mortars did not reach their target and instead landed among the IDPs,” UNHCR spokesman Adrian Edwards told journalists in Geneva.’

3.11 Reuters reported on 21 March 2012 that:

‘A car bomb exploded in the heart of the Somali capital on Wednesday, wounding two people in an attack Somalia’s al Shabaab rebel group said was carried out by its militants.

‘The blast, which triggered bursts of gunfire in Mogadishu, was the latest in a wave of bomb attacks in the country where the embattled U.N.-backed government is struggling to secure the city against al Qaeda-linked Islamist rebels.

“We were behind the car bomb explosion. We targeted security forces,” Sheikh Abdiasis Abu Musab, a spokesman for al Shabaab’s military operations, told Reuters.

‘The blast happened in Mogadishu’s busy administrative district, near the bustling Kilometer 4 road (K4) junction. Police said four suspects had been detained and that they were investigating a second suspicious vehicle in the city.’

3.12 BBC News reported on 4 April 2012 that:

‘The head of Somalia’s Olympic committee and its football chief are among eight people killed in a bomb attack on a high-profile event in Mogadishu.

‘Prime Minister Abdiweli Mohamed Ali survived the blast unhurt after it struck the newly re-opened national theatre in the capital, Mogadishu.

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77 Reuters, Somali rebel mortars kill 5 near presidential palace, 19 March 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/19/us-somalia-conflict-idUSBRE82I08V20120319 Date accessed 8 June 2012
78 UNHCR, Mortar attacks kill four displaced people in Mogadishu; UNHCR alarmed, 20 March 2012, http://www.unhcr.org/4f6881636.html Date accessed 8 June 2012
79 UNHCR, Mortar attacks kill four displaced people in Mogadishu; UNHCR alarmed, 20 March 2012, http://www.unhcr.org/4f6881636.html Date accessed 8 June 2012
80 Reuters, Car bomb rocks Somali capital, al Shabaab says responsible, 21 March 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/21/us-somalia-conflict-idUSBRE82K0N220120321 Date accessed 8 June 2012
‘Militants from the al-Shabab group say they carried out the bombing.

‘African Union peacekeepers said the “despicable” attack would not deter peace efforts in Somalia.

‘The President of the Somali Olympic Committee, Aden Yabarow Wiish, and the Somali Football Federation chief, Said Mohamed Nur, were both killed. They were among a group of dignitaries who had gathered to mark the first anniversary of the launch of Somalia’s national television station…Three Somali television journalists were also wounded in the blast.’ 61

3.13 The Daily Telegraph reported on 4 April 2012 that:

‘Somalia’s prime minister narrowly escaped assassination when a female suicide bomber blew herself up at a VIP event at the country’s National Theatre, killing herself and the country’s two most senior sports officials.

‘The explosion happened as Abdiweli Mohamed Ali, the Prime Minister took the podium at a ceremony in the capital, Mogadishu, to celebrate the first anniversary of the launch of a national satellite television station.

‘He and other senior officials from the Western-backed transitional government escaped unharmed or with only minor injuries, despite being the targets of an attack orchestrated by al-Shabaab, Somalia’s al-Qaeda-linked jihadists.’ 82

3.14 BBC News reported on 1 May 2012 that:

‘Seven people, including two MPs, have been killed in a suicide attack in central Somalia, authorities in the town of Dusa Mareb have said.

‘Eyewitnesses told the BBC the attack targeted a group of about 20 politicians at an outdoor cafe.

‘They had travelled to Dusa Mareb in Galgadud region - which is controlled by a pro-government militia - to promote reconciliation.

‘The Islamist militant group al-Shabab has said it was behind the attack.’ 83

3.15 Agence France Presse reported on 19 May 2012 that:

‘At least seven people, mostly Somali soldiers, were killed on Saturday in bomb explosions in the Somali capital Mogadishu, officials and witnesses said.

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A roadside bomb planted under a tree killed four soldiers and one civilian in northern Mogadishu's Karan district while at least two soldiers died in a separate grenade attack in Bakara market.

“Four soldiers were killed when a bomb planted in the shade of a tree was detonated. One civilian was also killed in the attack and the security forces are conducting investigations,” Abdirahman Mumin, a Somali security official told AFP from the scene of the blast.

“He attributed the attack to the Somali Islamist extremists who abandoned fixed positions in the capital last August and who have since concentrated on guerrilla tactics.

‘in a second attack, unknown assailants hurled grenades at Somali soldiers who were pulling down illegal buildings near Bakara market, killing at least two of them.

“The there was a heavy explosion in Bakara market as the soldiers were destroying illegal buildings. It was a grenade attack and I saw the dead bodies of two soldiers,” Dahir Moalim, a witness, told AFP.”

3.16 United Nations IRIN News reported on 18 May 2012 that:

‘People are returning and reconstruction is under way. According to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), 3,800 people returned to Mogadishu in March [2012] alone. From afar the city glints with shiny new tin roofs dotted among dust-covered ruins and camps. Private operators are offering electricity in the old town for US$30 a month. Fishermen are enjoying a healthy demand for shark-fins from Dubai and the Middle East, with a shark fetching as much as $500. Building materials lie in piles on street corners, where camel's milk and cappuccino vendors ply their wares.

‘International NGO and diplomatic missions are also coming back - according to a UN source, Britain has already identified the plot for its permanent diplomatic base on the airport compound - and property prices have spiked. According to [Bashir] Osman [a local businessman], a 100-square metre plot near K4 in the city centre sold recently for $2 million.

“The key is security’, said Abdullahi Godah Barre, minister for planning and international cooperation, of the city's renovation. While African Union troops have largely taken Mogadishu and continue to push beyond the city limits to secure outlying areas where Al-Shabab operatives remain obdurately in place, the Somali capital is still in counter-terrorism mode, and kidnap and ransom, improvised explosive devices, and suicide bombers remain an everyday threat.”

3.17 Voice of America News reported on 1 July 2012 that:

Agence France Presse, Seven killed in Somalia blasts, 19 May 2012, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gmytJdeGVBG7WzBS7N3SzYjyVQ1g?docId=CNG.73302069c1cfc1b61f105e55b53bd1ba.7c1 Date accessed 12 June 2012

‘For more than two decades, Mogadishu residents have marked Somalia’s independence day under the threat of chaos and violence; but this year is different. Due to security gains and the return of relative stability to the Somali capital, citizens finally have something to celebrate…This year, Mogadishu residents are breathing in freedom and optimism like never before, following security gains by African Union forces and Somali government fighters against al-Shabab militants.

‘Ahmed Afi, who works with Direct Aid, a Kuwait-based aid agency, says this Independence Day, he has been able to visit places he could not go to the year before.

“It’s somehow different from previous celebration, because now we are celebrating under more peaceful environment, we have access to markets, to main roads and streets, we can move around whenever we can go,” he said. "We can greet our friends, families and relatives.”’

3.18 Shabelle Media Network reported on 16 July 2012 that:

‘A lawmaker in Somalia’s Transitional Federal parliament was assassinated Sunday [15 July] in a roadside bomb in Mogadishu, the Islamist militants of Al shabab tied to Al Qaeda, claimed responsibility for the attack.

‘Mohamud Abdi Ibrahim better known as (Garweyne), the victim who was also former minister for humanitarian affairs and trade for Somali government, has been killed a remote-controlled landmine that struck on his car in Mogadishu’s Hamar-weise district at about 10:30 a.m. local time, according to witnesses.

‘Two others sustained serious wounds in the attack and were rushed to a hospital for medical treatment.’

3.19 An AMISOM press statement released on 16 July 2012 reported that ‘…at least six others [were] injured following a car bomb in front of the Bin Ali Hotel in the capital’s Hamarweyne district,’ and the same report also noted that the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission (SRCC) for Somalia, Ambassador Boubacar Gaoussou Diarra, condemned the attack as ‘deplorable’.

3.20 Reuters reported on 1 August 2012 that:

‘Two suicide bombers attacked a conference in Somalia on Wednesday but failed to stop delegates agreeing a new draft constitution that is meant to help the violence-torn East African country return to stability.

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‘One bomber killed six security officers, while the other was shot and killed before he could detonate his bomb, police said.

‘Al Shabaab, Somalia’s al Qaeda-linked group, said it was behind the attack and that it had succeeded in killing Somali and African Union troops.

“‘The two bombers wore government uniform,’ Colonel Mohamed Ali, a police officer, told Reuters.’

3.21 BBC News reported on 1 August 2012 that:

‘One of Somalia’s best known comedians has been buried after being shot dead at his home in the capital, Mogadishu by two unidentified men.

‘Abdi Jeylani Marshale was popular for his TV and radio shows and was reportedly killed just after leaving a local radio station.

‘It is not clear who was behind the killing but last year he was threatened by militant group al-Shabab.

‘He used to make people laugh by impersonating Islamist fighters.’

3.22 Agence France Presse reported on 16 February 2012 that:

‘African Union [AU] troops attacked holdout Islamist Shebab militia positions on the outskirts of the war-wracked capital Mogadishu.

‘Columns of loaded vehicles [containing displaced people] headed into the city from Elashabiyaha and KM13 districts outside Mogadishu, as AU forces moved into positions they seized from the Al-Qaeda-linked rebels this week after heavy fighting.

‘The neighbourhoods lie on the road to rebel-held Afgoye town, some 30 kilometres (19 miles) northwest of Mogadishu, which the AU forces have said they also plan to attack.’

3.23 Raxanreeb Online (a local Somalia news website) reported on 25 February 2012 that:

89 Reuters, Suicide bombers strike as Somali constitution agreed, 1 August 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/01/us-somalia-conflict-idUSBRE87014H20120801 Date accessed 10 August 2012
91 Agence France Presse, Hundreds flee Mogadishu clashes, 16 February 2012, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5ib-ATE4BwK5cf-33ymHzKf8Y5OGw?docId=CNG.5e7f9005a39de113b5e3d1a5dc717680.6a1 Date accessed 12 June 2012
‘Al-Shabab statement has today confirmed that three foreign fighters in Somalia were killed in air raid in KM-60 location of Lower Shabelle region on Friday.

‘A statement published on Al-Shabab website said that one of the three foreigners was [a] Moroccan migrant who came in Somalia in 2006... Local sources told RBC Radio that air strike in midnight of Friday killed four Al-Shabab members. One of the four killed is believed was holding Kenyan nationality. They were travelling towards Merca, the capital of Lower region when their car was targeted by the raid... U.S. officials were quoted saying that the attack was carried out by a drone,' 92

3.24 BBC News reported on 25 May 2012 that:

‘African Union (AU) forces in Somalia say they have captured the strategic town [of Afgoye] near the capital, Mogadishu, after Islamist militants pulled out.

‘Afgoye was a major stronghold of the al-Shabab group, giving their fighters easy access to the capital.

‘They might never recover from this,” the spokesman for the AU in Somalia, Lt-Col Paddy Ankunda told the BBC.

‘But a resident told the BBC no troops had entered Afgoye itself and AU tanks were attempting to encircle the town.’ 93

3.25 Voice of America News reported on 27 May 2012 that:

‘Somali and African Union forces have cleared pockets of al-Shabab resistance from Elasha Biyaha, a region west of Mogadishu and home to more than 400,000 internally displaced refugees.

‘Somali and AU fighters seized control Afgoye Friday, a major town in Elasha Biyaha. They have also reopened the road between Afgoye and Mogadishu. Somali officials say 20 al-Shabab militants were killed in the five day operation to take the town.’ 94

3.26 ‘Somalia Report’ stated on 31 May 2012 that:

‘Reports from Afgoye, 30km northwest of Mogadishu, indicate that fighting between al-Shabaab and government forces erupted in the town when dozens of fighters from the Islamic militia group attacked government bases in the town on Thursday night.

‘The fighting spread across the town, according to Hassan Osman, a local resident in Hawo Tako village of Afgoye.'
“The warring sides have been using heavy weapons, small machine guns and GPR (an anti vehicle weapon). We heard they came from villages around Marka. I think more of them are still hiding themselves in parts of the town. The fighting was really heavy,” Osman told Somalia Report.

‘Al-Shabaab sources told Somalia Report that three different government bases were targeted.

‘No casualties have yet been reported but this is the first time that al-Shabaab directly attacked Afgoye since they lost the control of the town over a week ago.’ 95

3.27 BBC News reported on 29 May 2012 that:

‘Somalia’s President Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed has escaped unharmed from an Islamist militant attack after a visit to a newly captured town.

‘His armoured convoy was ambushed on a road between Afgoye and the capital, Mogadishu, which African Union troops said they had made secure on Monday.

‘Officials said the interim president, who was making a rare road trip out of the capital, has returned safely.

‘Al-Shabab, which joined al-Qaeda this year, said it was behind the attack … At least one Somali government soldier was killed and four were wounded when al-Shabab gunmen opened fire as President Ahmed drove down the road between Afgoye and Mogadishu.’ 96

3.28 BBC News reported on 16 June 2012 that: ‘A suicide bomber in Somalia has rammed a vehicle loaded with explosives into the gate of a government base in the town of Afgoye. The militant Islamist group al-Shabab said one of its fighters carried out the attack. Casualties have been reported, but details are unclear.’ 97

3.29 BBC News reported on 11 July 2012 that:

‘Somali government soldiers and African Union troops have seized a major Islamist militant training base, a Somali army commander has told the BBC. Abdikarin Yusuf, deputy army of the Somali military, said al-Shabab fighters withdrew without a fight. Observers say the capture of Lanta-Buro, 40km (25 miles) west of the capital Mogadishu, is a major setback for the al-Qaeda group…Gen Yusuf, known as "Dhagabadan", told the BBC Somali Service that the offensive launched on Wednesday morning had been successful. He said the next target was the al-Shabab-held coastal town of Merka.’ 98


MIDDLE SHABELLE

3.30 BBC News reported on 16 March 2012 that:

‗Somali government troops, backed by the African Union, have for the first time seized an area outside the capital from the Islamist group al-Shabab.‘

‗The BBC’s Mohamed Dhoore, who travelled to the area of Galgalato, 30km (20 miles) north-east of Mogadishu, said it appeared to have been used as a military camp.‘

‗Most al-Shabab fighters seemed to have withdrawn without much resistance.‘ 99

3.31 Voice of America news reported on 26 June 2012 that:

‗Somali government and African Union forces have driven al-Shabab militants from the strategic town of Balad, north of the capital, Mogadishu.‘

‗Balad is on a key road in the Middle Shabelle region, about 30 kilometers from the capital.‘

‗The capture means the roadway between Balad and Mogadishu is under government control for the first time in at least three years.‘ 100

BAY

3.32 A BBC News article dated 23 February 2012 reported that: ‘Ethiopian and Somali troops have taken a strategic stronghold of Islamist militants in south-western Somalia. Eyewitnesses told the BBC that about 50 vehicles, including some 20 tanks, had entered Baidoa, which was not defended. After the southern port of Kismayo, the town was the most important al-Shabab base.‘ 101

3.33 Somalia Report stated on 6 April 2012 that:

‗On Friday, the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) forces, with support from the Ethiopian troops, have captured two districts and more than five villages from al-Shabaab militants in the Bay region of southern Somalia. With only minor fighting, al-Shabaab abandoned the Burhakaba and Qasahdhere districts as well as the villages of Moodemoode, Daynuunay, Manaaas, lidaale and Ufurow. TFG forces advanced and are currently occupying these areas, according to TFG and local sources which spoke to Somalia Report.‘

Abdifatah Gessey, the TFG governor in Bay region, confirmed the advances to Somalia Report and vowed that operations against al-Shabaab militants will increase … The allied forces have seemingly completely captured the whole of the Bay region, except for the Diinsoor district where the insurgents have a large base.\textsuperscript{102}

3.34 BBC News reported on 9 April 2012 that:

‘At least 12 people have been killed and more than 30 badly injured by a bombing in the central Somali town of Baidoa.

‘The governor of the Bay region, Abdifitah Mohamed Gesey, told the BBC that most of the casualties were women and children.

‘Mr Gesey said the bomb was planted in a small basket and hidden in a busy market in the centre of town.

‘It is the worst attack in Baidoa since Ethiopian troops took control from the Islamist group, al-Shabab, in February.

‘Witnesses said the bomb went off shortly after Somali government troops had arrived in the market.’\textsuperscript{103}

3.35 Reuters reported on 17 April 2012 that:

‘A suicide bomber killed at least one soldier in Baidoa, a former rebel stronghold captured by Somali and Ethiopian soldiers during an offensive in February, a government official said.

‘The al Qaeda-backed militants were forced to surrender the strategic city after columns of Ethiopian troops backed by tanks rolled through their bases in Baidoa, since when the militants have resorted to guerilla strikes.

‘Earlier this month, 100 Ugandan troops from the African Union’s AMISOM force in Somalia went to Baidoa, the first AMISOM deployment outside the capital Mogadishu. A total of 2,500 are due to go to Baidoa, so Ethiopian soldiers there can withdraw from Somalia.’\textsuperscript{104}

3.36 Shabelle Media Network reported on 28 July 2012 that:

‘Unidentified Armed groups are reportedly shot and killed a senior Al shabab commander in Ufurow area of Bay region, southern horn of Africa Somalia.

\textsuperscript{102} Somalia Report, TFG and Ethiopia Gain Ground on Al-Shabaab, 6 April 2012, \url{http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/3220/TFG_and_Ethiopia_Gain_Ground_on_Al-Shabaab} Date accessed 20 June 2012
\textsuperscript{103} BBC News, Market bombing in central Somalia kills 12, 9 April 2012, \url{http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17658522} Date accessed 20 June 2012
\textsuperscript{104} Reuters, Suicide bomber kills soldier in Somalia’s Baidoa, 17 April 2012, \url{http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/17/us-somalia-conflict-idUSBRE83G0HB20120417} Date accessed 20 June 2012
‘Witnesses said two masked men armed with pistols have carried out the assignation against the Al shabab agent as he went out from a mosque in Ufurow village after performing the dawn prayer at about 5:00 p.m. local time on Saturday.

‘Sources indicated that the victim, whose name has only been released as Abu Salim was one the top militant leaders in Bay region of southern Somalia and his death is a big blow to the Al shabab insurgents-affiliated with Al Qaeda.

‘The exact motive of the assignation is unclear and the assailants were reported to have escaped from scene of the shooting.‘

3.37 Garowe Online reported on 26 February 2012 that: ‘In the district of Hudur in the region of Bakool clashes sparked between Al Shabaab insurgents and Ethiopian troops who recently entered the region to combat the insurgency. At least 16 people were killed and over 20 injured after many hours of fighting according to residents of the district. Local sources also told Radio Garowe that Al Shabaab agents fled the district after much fighting and the Ethiopian troops stayed behind.’

3.38 Voice of America News reported on 9 May 2012 that:

‘A Somali lawmaker said at least 17 fighters with militant group al-Shabab have been killed in fighting with Ethiopian and Somali government troops.

‘Parliament member Mohamed Mashru told VOA Somali Service the troops attacked an al-Shabab base Wednesday at Agab-Bedey village, near the Somali town of Hudur.

‘Mashru said he saw the bodies of the al-Shabab fighters lying on the ground after the battle ended.

‘His account has not been independently confirmed.’

3.39 Garowe Online reported on 23 April 2012 that:

‘A roadside bomb killed at least 2 Ethiopian troops witnesses say and injured 7 others in Beledweyne and was followed by 3 men being gunned down by Ethiopian

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troops...The roadside bomb was planted by Al Shabaab who shortly after the blast admitted responsibility. The Al Shabaab targeted an Ethiopian convoy that was driving by at the time, two Ethiopian soldiers were killed in the blast.

‘The number of Ethiopian troops killed in the roadside bomb has yet to be confirmed by the Ethiopian military but local sources say that two Ethiopian soldiers' bodies were seen.’ 108

3.40 Mareeg Online reported on 17 July 2012 that:

‘Somali forces in the central region of Hiiraan are reportedly launched Wednesday a heavy house-to-house security operations in Beledweyne, a town just 206 miles (332 km) north of Mogadishu.

‘Sheikh Osman, the district commissioner (DC) for Beledweyne, confirmed that the ongoing operations and said the forces are searching masterminds of yesterday’s deadly roadside attack on Ethiopian troops, killing soldiers.

‘Witnesses said Ethiopian troops have killed at least 10 innocent civilians, including women and children and wounded 9 others, some of them seriously, after opening fire indiscriminately on crowd near the bomb site at a village in eastern Beledweyne town on Tuesday.

“‘The Ethiopians arrested 200 local people over the landmine blast on Tuesday... we don’t know where these people were taken and held by the troops. We shocked and terrified about the army’s behavior and actions,” said a witness who asked anonymity because of his security.’ 109

3.41 Mareeg Online reported on 22 July 2012 that:

‘The second batch of peacekeeping forces from neighboring Djibouti serving under African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) arrived in Somalia’s central town of Beledweyne on Sunday to replace Ethiopian troops.

‘Reliable sources said that man military planes carrying Djibouti soldiers and army officers landed on an airstrip in Beledweyne, 206 miles (332 km) north of Mogadishu, to help bring stability in the troubled Hiiraan region.

‘Military Officers have welcomed the deployment and escorted to their army bases in the town.’ 110


GEDO

3.42 BBC News reported on 7 January 2012 that:

‘The Kenyan army says it has killed 60 Somali al-Shabab militia fighters in air strikes and is determined to "break their spine completely".

‘A further 20 of the Islamist fighters defected in recent weeks, army spokesman Col Cyrus Oguna told reporters in the Kenyan capital.

‘But al-Shabab responded by promising to defeat the Kenyans.

‘It is extremely hard to verify reports from inside Somalia and the two sides' versions of events differ widely.

‘Kenyan air strikes hit al-Shabab positions in Garbaharey in southern Somalia's Gedo region, according to Col Oguna.’

3.43 Garowe Online reported on 26 February 2012 that: ‘In the region of Gedo Al Shabaab insurgents and Transitional Federal Government troops had battled in an area near Luuq. Reports say that 11 people were killed including residents of the districts. Al Shabaab claims they killed many TFG troops in the battle in Gedo region, the TFG has denied the accusations refuting that they had been victorious in the battle.’

3.44 Agence France Presse reported on 10 March 2012 that:

‘An offensive by Somalia's Islamist Shebab fighters on Ethiopian troops on Saturday left many combatants dead, military sources on both sides and witnesses told AFP. ‘

“The fighting around the village of Yurkut was the most intense since Ethiopian forces entered Somalia” in November, said one of the witnesses in the country's southwestern region, Abukar Moalim Yarow.

‘Military sources in both camps gave differing tolls but stressed the fierceness of the fighting, which lasted three hours, according to independent witnesses.

“The mujahideen fighters led their most important military incursion against enemy positions in Yurkut,” Sheikh Mohamed Abu-Fatma, a top Shebab commander in the sector, told AFP by telephone.

“We forced the enemy to temporarily abandon three barracks and we killed more than 40 of their men,” he added.

‘Kalif Adan, a pro-government official, told AFP from Baidoa that the Shebab “attacked Yurkut this morning. Many of them were killed in fierce fighting.


“The fighting is now over and (the Shebab) have been heavily beaten.” 113

3.45 Somalia Report noted on 2 April 2012 that:

‘More than 20 were reported killed in fighting in Gedo region on Monday [2 April 2012], as al-Shabaab launched attacks on Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and Ahlus Sunna wa Jamaa (ASWJ) forces, and the allied forces returned fire, including the use of airstrikes upon al-Shabaab bases nearby. The towns of El-Adde and El-Bur both saw heavy fighting...Locals reported airstrikes carried out by the Kenyan planes, and the ASWJ spokesman confirmed al-Shabaab's bases in the region had been struck. Al-Shabaab's casualties are unknown, but ASWJ and TFG sources claimed more than 20 were killed.

‘At least four people were reported dead in the war from both parties. Six others were reported injured, two of the injured were civilians.’ 114

3.46 Garowe Online reported on 17 July 2012 that:

‘Al Shabaab insurgents have been losing ground in much of south central and southern Somalia, but have concentrated in maintaining the strategic region of Gedo, Garowe Online reports.

‘After Ethiopian and Somali troops captured central regions in Somalia, attacks or armed resistance by Al Shabaab who formerly controlled the region have been minimal.

‘Nevertheless Al Shabaab have directed an extensive amount of defense in Gedo Region.

‘On Tuesday, the district of Bardheere became a battlefield as Somali forces battled with Al Shabaab insurgents.

‘Local sources on the ground said that both sides were using mortars and heavy artillery with the fighting continuing for many hours.

‘It is still unclear how many casualties were sustained by allied forces during the clash on Tuesday.

‘The clashes resulted when TFG forces mounted an attack on the district in hopes to capture Bardheere, which after Tuesday's clashes looks to be still in the hands of Al Shabaab.’ 115

3.47 Garowe Online reported on 29 July 2012 that:

113 Agence France Presse, Somalia Islamists attack Ethiopian troops, 10 March 2012, http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gUzhSCygpxnOXemcU2XOz4FTV6rg?docid=CNG.60a46b5ad4c156088937194d4e02e6ce.191 Date accessed 20 June 2012
‘Clashes sparked Saturday night [28 July 2012] in the southern region of Gedo between Al Shabaab and Somali government forces backed by Ethiopian troops, Garowe Online reports.

‘According to local sources, the clashes sparked after Al Shabaab agents ambushed allied forces stationed in Yurkud.

‘Government officials in the region of Gedo reported that the allied forces successfully repelled the ambush.’ 116

LOWER JUBA

3.48 A BBC News article dated 2 February 2012 noted:

‘A key town in southern Somalia has been captured by Kenyan troops and government forces from Islamist militants, Kenya's army says.

‘Badhadhe - some 180km (110 miles) south of Kismayo - fell after heavy fighting, according to local residents.

‘The fall of the inland town is a major loss to al-Shabab because it cuts off their main supply line from the sea, a Kenyan army spokesman told the BBC.’ 117

3.49 In an interview with Somalia Report, published on 3 February 2012, Colonel Warfa Sheikh Adan, the spokesman for the Transitional Federal Government's (TFG) efforts in Gedo and Lower Juba regions, stated that: ‘…we have made our final push into their final stronghold of Bardhere. We are expecting less resistance because our sources are indicating they have already started to retreat because they have heard the Ethiopian troops who have left Luuq for Bay and Bakool are on their way to cut a route for Kismayo. We believe our troops in Gedo will join the ones from Badhade so that we can lodge a joint offensive on Afmadow.’ 118

3.50 Somalia report stated on 4 April 2012 that:

‘At least 57 people were killed and even more were injured in fighting between the allied forces of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF) and Raskamboni militias fought against al-Shabaab militants the in Lower Juba region on Wednesday, according to TFG officials.

‘At 5am local time (0200UTC), al-Shabaab militants attacked bases belonging to the allied forces in the village of Hosingow. According to reports from locals, both sides used heavy gunfire, including artillery and machine guns.

Mohamed Dahir Farah, a TFG spokesman in the Lower Juba region, confirmed the fighting to Somalia Report and claimed that 52 al-Shabaab fighters had been killed, and four insurgent military vehicles had been destroyed. He also stated that three TFG soldiers were killed and five injured, and two Kenyan soldiers were killed.  

3.51 ‘Somalia Report’ noted on 28 May 2012 that:

‘At least three people have been killed and more than seven were injured after al-Shabaab militants attacked Somalia Transitional Federal Government (TFG) bases, shared with Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF), in Lower Juba region.

‘Witnesses reported the heavy fighting started overnight when al-Shabaab fighters attacked military bases in Qoqani and Tabta settlements, killing three from both sides.

‘No civilian casualties have been reported, according to Adan Hirsi, a government officer in Qoqani, who vowed to keep pressure on the militant group.

‘“We will continue the war against al-Shabaab so they can’t reach Kismayo, the only strategic town al-Shabaab still controls,” he told Somalia Report.”

‘TFG forces, which are 3-4kms outside Afmadow launched a massive security operation are going village-to-village searching for al-Shabaab militants. Officials added they also plan to proceed with their push towards re-taking the entire Lower Jubba region.

‘Reports indicate that al-Shabaab officials, after fleeing Afgoye in Lower Shabelle region, have reached Gedo region and are making their way towards their stronghold in Kismayo in Lower Jubba.’

3.52 BBC News reported on 31 May 2012:

‘African Union and Somali government forces have captured the town of Afmadow, a strategic militant base in the south of the country.

‘Commanders say the Islamist al-Shabab group abandoned the town without a fight as their troops approached.

‘Afmadow is the second largest town in the south and only 115km (71 miles) from Kismayo, al-Shabab's headquarters.’

3.53 The Guardian reported on 1 June 2012 that:

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Kenyan and Somali government forces have captured a key town in Somalia, 75 miles from the headquarters of Islamist militants linked to al-Qaida.

Commanders said the al-Shabaab group surrendered the town of Afmadow without a fight as their troops closed in.

Mohamud Farah, a spokesman for Somali government forces in the Juba region, told Reuters: “There were no casualties. Al-Shabaab fled and no fighting took place. We are going to consolidate security for now.”

Al-Shabaab acknowledged that it had been forced to retreat. Sheikh Abdiasis Abu Musab, a spokesman for its military operation, admitted to Reuters: "The Kenyan and Somali troops have now entered Afmadow. No fighting took place inside the town.

“First we fought fiercely outside the town and then our fighters left the town as part of our tactics. However, we shall not stop fighting.”

Shabelle Media Network reported on 1 July 2012 that:

At least seven people are reportedly killed and indefinite number of others were injured in a fierce battle between Somali government forces backed by Kenyan army and Al shabab militants in southern Somalia.

According to the local residents, the skirmish sparked at Qoqani town in Lower Juba region, after Al shabab agents armed with rocked and automatic machine-guns attacked overnight on military positions in the town that manned by the coalition forces, killing 7 combatants on both warring sides.

Somali military chiefs in the region said, they repelled the attack and killed many militants during the assault in Qoqani town which is one of areas controlled by TFG and its allied forces from Kenya.

Locals reported that the situation has returned into normal on Sunday morning and the area remains in full control of Somali and Kenyan army.

Kenyan newspaper The Star reported on 2 July 2012 that:

Somalia elders from lower and middle Juba and Gedo region have resolved to establish an interim regional federal authority to administer the region liberated from al Shabaab by Kenya Defence Forces. The elders from Ras Kamboni, Ahlu-Sunna Wal Jamaa, Harti, Azaania and officials from the Transitional Federal Government

122 The Guardian, Kenyan and Somali forces capture town from al-Shabaab, 1 June 2012, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jun/01/kenyan-somali-forces-al-shabaab
Date accessed 21 June 2012

Date accessed 12 July 2012
who have been meeting at the KCB Ledership Centre in Karen in Nairobi yesterday evening signed a document for the establishment of the regional authority.

‘The three-day meeting, which was attended by Kenyan and Ethiopian government officials, was held under tight security. The process will be conducted within the Inter Governmental Authority on Development and Transitional Federal Government framework on grand stabilisation plan. The regional authority will be established before the end of Somalia’s TFG mandate in August and is expected to peacefully co-exist with its neighbours in Somalia and neighbouring countries including Kenya and Ethiopia.

‘The elders agreed to establish a regional authority comprising Lower Juba, Middle Juba and Gedo in line with the national federal constitution which is yet to be adopted. The authorities representation, which will be based on districts and regions, will comprise the executive, legislature and judiciary. It will have unified security arrangements to fill the vacuum left by al Shabaab.’  

Annex A – Map of Somalia

UN Cartographic Section map, December 2011

Annex B – Further reading (reports released between January and July)

Amnesty International
Annual Report 2012 - Somalia, 24 May 2012

Armed Conflict Location & Event Dataset
ACLED Trend reports (April 2012 onwards)
http://www.acleddata.com/research-and-publications/

Committee to Protect Journalists
Attacks on the Press in 2011, 22 February 2012

Danish Immigration Service
Security and human rights issues in South-Central Somalia, including Mogadishu Report from Danish Immigration Service’s fact finding mission to Nairobi, Kenya and Mogadishu, Somalia 30 January to 19 February 2012, published April 2012

Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Human Rights and Democracy 2011, 30 April 2012
http://fcohrdreport.readandcomment.com/

Quarterly update, Somalia, April – June 2012

Freedom House
Worst of the Worst 2012: The World's Most Repressive Societies, 2 July 2012
http://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Worst%20of%20the%20Worst%202012%20final%20report.pdf

Human Rights Watch
No Place for Children: Child Recruitment, Forced Marriage, and Attacks on Schools in Somalia, 20 February 2012

Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
Overview 2011: People internally displaced by conflict and violence, 19 April 2012

International Committee of the Red Cross
Annual report 2011, 25 June 2012

International Crisis Group
The Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia: Crisis Group Africa Report N°184, 15 February 2012

Somalia: An Opportunity that Should Not Be Missed: Africa Briefing N°87, 22 February 2012

International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association
State-sponsored homophobia, 30 May 2012

Refugees International
Somali Refugees: Ongoing Crisis, New Realities, 20 March 2012
http://refugeesinternational.org/sites/default/files/032012_Somali_Refugees%20letterhead.pdf

Reporters Without Borders

Predators of Press Freedom: Al-Shabaab, 4 May 2012

UN High Commissioner for Refugees
Addendum to 2010 UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum-Seekers from Somalia, relating specifically to the city of Galkacyo, 16 March 2012
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4f675c5e2.html

United Nations Human Rights Council
Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, Rashida Manjoo - Mission to Somalia, 12 May 2012
http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_4027.pdf

United Nations Security Council

United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF)
http://www.uscirf.gov/images/Annual%21260Report%20of%20USCIRF%202012(2).pdf

United States Department of State
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?dynamic_load_id=186241
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/irf/religiousfreedom/index.htm?dlid=192757

Country Reports on Terrorism 2011, 31 July 2012
Annex C – A note on sources

This annex provides brief background information from the websites of less well known sources. For further information on the sources, please visit the links below the descriptions.


‘ACLED (Armed Conflict Location and Events Dataset) is designed for disaggregated conflict analysis and crisis mapping. This dataset codes the dates and locations of all reported political violence events in over 50 developing countries. Political violence includes events that occur within civil wars or periods of instability. Although civil war occurrence is decreasing across African countries, new forms of political violence are becoming more common. ACLED is directed by Prof. Clionadh Raleigh (Trinity College Dublin). It is operated by senior research managers Andrew Linke (University of Colorado) and Caitriona Dowd (Trinity College Dublin). Senior research analysts Annie Ngwira, Charles Vannice and Olivia Russell oversee regional coding.’ [http://www.acleddata.com/about-acled/](http://www.acleddata.com/about-acled/)

‘The information in this issue of ACLED Conflict Trends was compiled from a variety of sources. Sources include ACLED data, compiled from local, regional, national and continental news reports, NGO reports, and Africa-focused news reports integrated to supplement daily media reporting. Additional sources include Africa Research Bulletin (ARB), Africa Confidential (Af Con), and reports from the NGO Safety Pro-gramme (NSP), specifically for information concerning Somalia. Further information on sources, coding procedures and data can be found online at [www.acleddata.com/data](http://www.acleddata.com/data).’


**Mareeg Online** [http://www.mareeg.com/](http://www.mareeg.com/)

‘Mareeg.com provides World news and information, In particular somalia and African current events posting articles daily both in English and Somali and offering reliable and diversity of multi-lingual streaming programming as well as more articles in our searchable archive (which includes the archive of Somali old News and more). Educational, cultural and environmental issues are the most important to us. The Mareeg.com family includes all Somali Regional correspondents in and out of Somalia. Our main goal is to connect the Somali society to the global society.’ [http://www.mareeg.com/about_us.html](http://www.mareeg.com/about_us.html)

**Raxanreeb Online** [http://www.raxanreeb.com/](http://www.raxanreeb.com/)

‘Raxanreeb Online is leading news site for Somali news and information in the Somali community Around the world. It is member-supported, professionally-staffed, Since 2006, RBC has provided latest headlines in Somali news, politics and society programs to a growing audience inside and outside Somalia.'
‘Raxanreeb Online Deeply committed to Somali news around the world and specializes in publishing objective and timely Somali news from direct sources inside Somalia. Raxanreeb.com is updated on a minute-by-minute basis and offers our global audience all the latest developments in Somalia on a bilingual platform English, Somali.

‘Raxanreeb.com does not support any particular political movement or party, and we also do not believe the modern political context can easily be divided up into either times in the image captions, this is not deliberate and we aim to bring you the news as it happened.’
http://www.raxanreeb.com/about-2/

Somalia Report http://www.somaliareport.com/

‘Somalia Report is a privately funded, non-partisan website that hires Western editors to work with over 140 Somali journalists inside the country to cover all aspects of the region: piracy, conflict, terrorism, government, local news, culture and key issues. The hour-by-hour coverage is targeted to professionals who need expertise, situational awareness and in-depth background to breaking news.’

Stig Jarle Hansen, Norwegian University of Life Sciences

‘Stig Jarle Hansen specialize (sic) in studies of war economy, security, political islam, crime, and religion and development. His area of specialization is the Horn of Africa and Arabia Felix (middle east) He also has an interest in political philosophy, especially islamic, and the british idealists.

‘Hansen is frequently used as an expert commentator in the media and has appeared on global news channels as the BBC, CNN, Al Jazera, as well as Chinese channel 4.’
http://www.umb.no/noragric/ansatte/stig.hansen

Voice of America http://www.voanews.com/

‘The Voice of America (VOA), a dynamic multimedia broadcaster funded by the U.S. Government, broadcasts accurate, balanced, and comprehensive news and information to an international audience.’
http://www.insidevoa.com/info/about_us/1673.html