Contents

Preface

Latest News

EVENTS IN ZIMBABWE FROM 7 JUNE 2012 TO 13 JULY 2012

Useful news sources for further information

REPORTS ON ZIMBABWE PUBLISHED OR ACCESED BETWEEN 7 JUNE AND 13 JULY 2012

Background Information

1. GEOGRAPHY .................................................................................................................. 1.01
   Public holidays ............................................................................................................. 1.06
   Map ............................................................................................................................... 1.07
2. ECONOMY ..................................................................................................................... 2.01
   Remittances ................................................................................................................ 2.12
   Military involvement in the economy .......................................................................... 2.17
   Sanctions ...................................................................................................................... 2.18
3. HISTORY (19th CENTURY TO 2010) ......................................................................... 3.01
   Matabeleland massacres 1983 - 87 (aka ‘Gurkurahundi’) ........................................... 3.03
   ZANU-PF win 1990s elections ..................................................................................... 3.07
   Land reform and War Veterans: 1990-97 ................................................................... 3.08
   Land invasions, elections and Operation Murambastvina: 2000 to 2005 ..................... 3.14
   Build-up to 2008 national elections ............................................................................. 3.21
   Parliamentary elections: March 2008 ......................................................................... 3.24
   Presidential elections: March – June 2008 ................................................................. 3.28
   MDC disengages from the GNU ................................................................................... 3.33
   Mr Tsvangirai calls off MDC boycott of GNU ............................................................ 3.35
   GNU reaches an impasse – early 2010 ...................................................................... 3.37
   Revision of the constitution and the Constitutional Outreach Programme (April 2009 to September 2010) ................................................................. 3.38
   The GNU polarises; the Southern African Development Community applies pressure (between early and mid 2011) ................................................................. 3.43

4. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS (12 JULY 2011 – 1 JUNE 2012) ......................................... 4.01
   Election timetable ......................................................................................................... 4.01
   Constitution .................................................................................................................. 4.07
   Mugabe’s health .......................................................................................................... 4.11
   ZANU-PF: the battle for a successor to Mr Mugabe .................................................. 4.15
   Solomon Mujuru’s death ............................................................................................. 4.17

5. CONSTITUTION ........................................................................................................... 5.01

6. POLITICAL SYSTEM ................................................................................................... 6.01
   Executive branch .......................................................................................................... 6.03
   Legislative branch ........................................................................................................ 6.04
   Political parties ............................................................................................................. 6.05
Human Rights

7. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................... 7.01

8. SECURITY FORCES .................................................................................................... 8.01
   Police .......................................................................................................................... 8.06
      Corruption .............................................................................................................. 8.09
      Politicisation of the police ................................................................................... 8.13
   Armed forces ............................................................................................................ 8.23
   Central Intelligence Organisation ............................................................................ 8.26
   Other government forces and pro-ZANU-PF groups ............................................. 8.31
      National Youth Service ........................................................................................ 8.32
      ZANU-PF youth militia ....................................................................................... 8.38
      War veterans ....................................................................................................... 8.41
   Human rights violations by security forces and pro-ZANU-PF groups ................. 8.43
      Impunity ................................................................................................................ 8.46
      Arbitrary arrest and detention ........................................................................... 8.51
      Torture, ill-treatment, harassment and use of excessive force ......................... 8.55
      Extra-judicial killings ......................................................................................... 8.66
      Disappearance and abductions ....................................................................... 8.68

9. MILITARY SERVICE .................................................................................................... 9.01

10. JUDICIARY .................................................................................................................. 10.01

Organisation .............................................................................................................. 10.02
    Independence and fair trial .................................................................................. 10.04
    Penal code .......................................................................................................... 10.12

11. ARREST AND DETENTION – LEGAL RIGHTS ............................................................. 11.01

12. PRISON CONDITIONS .............................................................................................. 12.01

13. DEATH PENALTY ....................................................................................................... 13.01

14. POLITICAL AFFILIATION ......................................................................................... 14.01

Freedom of political expression .............................................................................. 14.05
   Constitutional Outreach Programme ................................................................. 14.12

Freedom of association and assembly ..................................................................... 14.16

Opposition groups and (perceived) political activists ............................................. 14.23
   Movement for Democratic Change ..................................................................... 14.23
   Teachers .............................................................................................................. 14.25
   Students ............................................................................................................ 14.35
   Trade unions ..................................................................................................... 14.37

Politically motivated human rights violations .......................................................... 14.41
   Limitations of quantitative data ........................................................................ 14.42
   Numbers of incidents: 2008 – April 2012 ......................................................... 14.45
   Perpetrators of politically motivated human rights violations ....................... 14.58
   Human rights violations committed by MDC supporters ................................ 14.66
   ZANU-PF calls for elections and associated violence ........................................ 14.68

Distribution of politically motivated human rights violations (2011 to April 2012) ..................................................................................................................... 14.76
   Demography ..................................................................................................... 14.77
   National overview of human rights violations in 2011 and 2012 ..................... 14.78
   Human rights violations by province (1 January to 1 June 2012) ..................... 14.87
      Bulawayo ....................................................................................................... 14.89
      Harare .......................................................................................................... 14.98
      Manicaland ................................................................................................. 14.108
Mashonaland Central ................................................................. 14.124
Mashonaland East ................................................................. 14.131
Matabeleland North ............................................................... 14.142
Matabeleland South ............................................................... 14.148
Mashonaland West ................................................................. 14.153
Masvingo ................................................................................. 14.159
Midlands ............................................................................... 14.173

15. FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND MEDIA ........................................... 15.01
   Media law and monitoring .................................................... 15.08
   Print media ......................................................................... 15.11
   Television and radio ............................................................ 15.14
   Internet .............................................................................. 15.19
   Journalists .......................................................................... 15.21

16. CIVIL SOCIETY AND HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS, ORGANISATIONS AND ACTIVISTS .......................... 16.01
   Human rights defenders/activists ........................................... 16.09
      Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA) .................................... 16.15

17. CORRUPTION ......................................................................... 17.01

18. FREEDOM OF RELIGION ........................................................................ 18.01
   Witchcraft ........................................................................... 18.13

19. ETHNIC GROUPS ......................................................................... 19.01
   Shona .................................................................................. 19.03
   Ndebele .............................................................................. 19.04
   Whites ............................................................................... 19.06
   Asians .................................................................................. 19.13
   Albinos ............................................................................... 19.15
   Other ethnic minorities ........................................................ 19.20

20. SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER IDENTITY .................................................. 20.01
   Legal rights ......................................................................... 20.03
      Gay and bisexual men ...................................................... 20.06
      Lesbians and bisexual women ........................................... 20.11
      Transgender and intersex persons ..................................... 20.14
      LGBTI groups .................................................................. 20.17
   Treatment by, and attitudes of, state authorities ....................... 20.18
      Lesbians and bisexual women .......................................... 20.31
   Societal treatment and attitudes ............................................ 20.34
      Gay and bisexual men ...................................................... 20.49
      Lesbians and bisexual women ........................................... 20.54
      LGBTI social space .......................................................... 20.64

21. DISABILITY ............................................................................... 21.01

22. WOMEN .................................................................................. 22.01
   Overview ............................................................................... 22.01
   Statistics ............................................................................... 22.11
   National machinery for advancement of women, policy and law .... 22.13
   Political rights ....................................................................... 22.20
   Social and economic rights .................................................... 22.26
      Family law: marriage, divorce and inheritance ................. 22.33
      Prostitution ....................................................................... 22.40
      Reproductive rights ............................................................ 22.41
      Access to abortion .............................................................. 22.43
   Violence against women ....................................................... 22.47
      Politically motivated violence ............................................ 22.53

The main text of this COI Report contains the most up to date publicly available information as at 6 June 2012. Further brief information on recent events and reports has been provided in the Latest News section to 13 July 2012.
Annexes

Annex A – Chronology of major events
Annex B – Political organisations
Annex C – Prominent people
Annex D – List of abbreviations
Annex E – Foreign and Commonwealth Office interviews
Annex F – References to source material
Preface

i This Country of Origin Information (COI) Report has been produced by the COI Service, UK Border Agency, for use by officials involved in the asylum/human rights determination process. The report provides general background information about the issues most commonly raised in asylum/human rights claims made in the United Kingdom. The main body of the report includes information available up to 6 June 2012. The ‘Latest News’ section contains further brief information on events and reports accessed from 7 June 2012 to 12 July 2012. The report was issued on 12 July 2012.

ii The report is compiled wholly from material produced by a wide range of external information sources and does not contain any UK Border Agency opinion or policy. All information in the report is attributed, throughout the text, to the original source material, which is made available to those working in the asylum/human rights determination process.

iii The report aims to provide a compilation of extracts from the source material identified, focusing on the main issues raised in asylum and human rights applications. In some sections where the topics covered arise infrequently in asylum/human rights claims only web links may be provided. It is not intended to be a detailed or comprehensive survey. For a more detailed account, the relevant source documents should be examined directly.

iv The structure and format of the report reflects the way it is used by UK Border Agency decision makers and appeals presenting officers, who require quick electronic access to information on specific issues and use the contents page to go directly to the subject required. Key issues are usually covered in some depth within a dedicated section, but may also be referred to briefly in several other sections. Some repetition is therefore inherent in the structure of the report.

v The information included in this report is limited to that which can be identified from source documents. While every effort is made to cover all relevant aspects of a particular topic it is not always possible to obtain the information concerned. For this reason, it is important to note that information included in the report should not be taken to imply anything beyond what is actually stated. For example, if it is stated that a particular law has been passed, this should not be taken to imply that it has been effectively implemented unless stated. Similarly, the absence of information does not necessarily mean that, for example, a particular event or action did not occur.

vi As noted above, the report is a compilation of extracts produced by a number of information sources. In compiling the report no attempt has been made to resolve discrepancies between information provided in different source documents though COI Service will bring the discrepancies together and aim to provide a range of sources, where available, to ensure that a balanced picture is presented. For example, different source documents often contain different versions of names and spellings of individuals, places and political parties, etc. Reports do not aim to bring consistency of spelling but to reflect faithfully the spellings used in the original source documents. Similarly, figures given in different source documents sometimes vary and these are simply quoted as per the original text. The term ‘sic’ has been used in this document only to denote incorrect spellings or typographical errors in quoted text; its use is not intended to imply any comment on the content of the material.
vii The report is based substantially upon source documents issued during the previous two years. However, some older source documents may have been included because they contain relevant information not available in more recent documents. All sources contain information considered relevant at the time this Report was issued.

viii This report and the accompanying source material are public documents. All Reports are published on the UK Border Agency website and the great majority of the source material for the Report is readily available in the public domain. Where the source documents identified are available in electronic form, the relevant weblink has been included, together with the date that the link was accessed. Copies of less accessible source documents, such as those provided by government offices or subscription services, are available from COI Service upon request.

ix Reports are published regularly on the top 20 asylum intake countries. Reports on countries outside the top 20 countries may also be produced if there is a particular operational need. UK Border Agency officials also have constant access to an information request service for specific enquiries.

x In producing this report, COI Service has sought to provide an accurate, up to date, balanced and impartial compilation of extracts of the available source material. Any comments regarding this Report or suggestions for additional source material are very welcome and should be submitted to COI Service as below.

Country of Origin Information Service
UK Border Agency
Lunar House
40 Wellesley Road
Croydon, CR9 2BY
United Kingdom
Email: cois@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk
Website: http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/policyandlaw/guidance/coi/

INDEPENDENT ADVISORY GROUP ON COUNTRY INFORMATION

xi The Independent Advisory Group on Country Information (IAGCI) was set up in March 2009 by the Independent Chief Inspector of the UK Border Agency to make recommendations to him about the content of the UK Border Agency’s COI material. The IAGCI welcomes feedback on UK Border Agency’s COI Reports and other COI material. Information about the IAGCI’s work can be found on the Independent Chief Inspector’s website at http://icinspector.independent.gov.uk/country-information-reviews/

xii In the course of its work the IAGCI reviews the content of selected UK Border Agency COI documents and makes recommendations specific to those documents and of a more general nature. A list of the reports and other documents which have been reviewed by the IAGCI or the Advisory Panel on Country Information (the independent organisation which monitored UK Border Agency’s COI material from September 2003 to October 2008) is available at http://icinspector.independent.gov.uk/country-information-reviews/

xiii Please note: it is not the function of the IAGCI to endorse any UK Border Agency material or procedures. Some of the material examined by the Group relates to
countries designated or proposed for designation to the Non-Suspensive Appeals (NSA) list. In such cases, the Group’s work should not be taken to imply any endorsement of the decision or proposal to designate a particular country for NSA, nor of the NSA process itself. The IAGCI can be contacted at:

**Independent Advisory Group on Country Information**

Independent Chief Inspector of the UK Border Agency
5th Floor, Globe House
89 Eccleston Square
London, SW1V 1PN

Email: chiefinspectorukba@icinspector.gsi.gov.uk
Website: [http://icinspector.independent.gov.uk/country-information-reviews/](http://icinspector.independent.gov.uk/country-information-reviews/)
The main text of this COI Report contains the most up to date publicly available information as at 6 June 2012. Further brief information on recent events and reports has been provided in the Latest News section to 13 July 2012.

**Latest News**

**EVENTS IN ZIMBABWE FROM 7 JUNE 2012 TO 12 JULY 2012**

The Latest News provides a non-exhaustive selection of significant events since 7 June 2012. Further information may also be available from the list of useful sources below.

The Home Office is not responsible for the content of external websites.

9 June 2012  Nyengerai Stanley Makundidze, an organising secretary for the MDC-T Bulawayo Central branch, was arrested on Saturday 9 June 2012 for allegedly insulting Robert Mugabe, after a ZANU PF activist told the police that his phone contained music with lyrics that insulted the ageing ZANU PF leader.

**SW Radio Africa**

MDC-T official arrested for “insulting” Mugabe with music, 11 June 2012


Date accessed 9 July 2012

13 June 2012  It has been reported that police in Mutare have been using MDC activists as ‘bait’ in order to arrest the city’s senator, Keresensia Chabuka, accused by police of assaulting the acting Mayor of Mutare, George Jeryson. Ms Chabuka reported to police in order to secure the release of the ten activists.

**SW Radio Africa**

Police use MDC activists as bait to hunt down Mutare senator, 13 June 2012


Date accessed 9 July 2012

15 June 2012  MDC-T have vowed that those implicated in the violence in the run-up to its congress in Bulawayo in 2011 will be brought before the national disciplinary committee without regard to their status within the party.

**Voice of America News**

Zimbabwe Prime Minister's Party Tackles Violence Within its Ranks, 15 June 2012


Date accessed 9 July 2012

27 June 2012  Police in Bulawayo arrested 101 people during a peaceful demonstration urging the release of the draft constitution organised by Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA), including three minors who were not members of the group. All were released without charge later in the day.

**SW Radio Africa**

Arrested WOZA protesters released without charge, 27 June 2012


Date accessed 9 July 2012
5 July 2012  Nine members of WOZA were arrested by Bulawayo police and held for three days in detention before being charged with daubing anti-government graffiti and then released on bail. WOZA co-leader Magodonga Mahlangu accused police of denying the individuals food and medication while under arrest.

Voice of America News
Zimbabwe Police Arrest Women Activists Over Constitutional Protests, 3 July 2012
Date accessed 9 July 2012

NewsDay
Woza activists released, 5 July 2012
http://www.newsday.co.zw/article/2012-07-06-woza-activists-released/
Date accessed 9 July 2012

9 July 2011   The Media Monitoring Project of Zimbabwe has criticised state media for continuing to show anti-MDC bias. The organisation cited a recent example where the Herald had claimed the the wife of Prime Minister Tsvangirai had left the country to buy jewellery when she was at an event in Harare with Mr Tsvangirai.

Voice of America News
Zimbabwe Watchdog Rebukes State Media for Political Bias, 9 July 2012
Date accessed 11 July 2012

12 July 2011   Constitutional and Parliamentary Affairs Minister Eric Matinenga has said that the final draft of Zimbabwe’s new constitution has been finalised and needs ‘just a polish’ before it can be sent to President Robert Mugabe and Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai. The creation of the constitution is the first step towards a possible removal of EU sanctions, provided it is followed by the adoption of human rights laws, a successful referendum and the conduct of free elections next year.

Business Day (South Africa)
Zimbabwe ‘close to new constitution’, 13 July 2012
http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/Content.aspx?id=176235
Date accessed 13 July 2012

The Telegraph (UK)
Robert Mugabe could be brought in from the cold, 11 July 2012
Date accessed 13 July 2012

USEFUL NEWS SOURCES FOR FURTHER INFORMATION
A list of news sources with Weblinks is provided below, which may be useful if additional up to date information is required to supplement that provided in this report. The full list of sources used in this report can be found in Annex E – References to source material.

AlertNet (Thomson Reuters) http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/index.htm?news=all
All Africa http://allafrica.com/zimbabwe/
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) http://news.bbc.co.uk
Cable News Network (CNN) http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/?fbid=i0gUtrVnUAy
Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN) http://www.irinnews.org/
Kubatana http://www.kubatana.net/
Sokwanele http://www.sokwanele.com/
SW Radio Africa http://www.swradioafrica.com/
Zimbabwe Situation http://www.zimbabwesituation.com/index.html#polis
Reports on Zimbabwe published or accessed between 7 June 2012 and 13 July 2012

The Home Office is not responsible for the content of external websites.

United States Department of State
2012 Trafficking in Persons Report - Zimbabwe, 19 June 2012
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/192598.pdf

Minority Rights Group International
State of the World’s Minorities and Indigenous Peoples 2012 - Zimbabwe, 28 June 2012
http://www.minorityrights.org/download.php?id=1112

Zimbabwe Peace Project
May 2012 Monthly Monitor, 3 July 2012
Background Information

1. **Geography**

1.01 Jane’s ‘Security Risk Assessment, Zimbabwe’, dated 13 September 2011, noted that: “Zimbabwe is a landlocked country located in southeast Africa. It borders Zambia to the north, Mozambique to the east, South Africa to the south and Botswana to the southwest. The country's longest border is with Mozambique (1,231 km), followed by Botswana (813 km), Zambia (797 km) and South Africa (225 km).” [90j] (Geography)

1.02 The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), ‘World Factbook, Zimbabwe’, updated on 18 April 2012, noted that there are: “8 provinces and 2 cities* with provincial status; Bulawayo*, Harare*, Manicaland, Mashonaland Central, Mashonaland East, Mashonaland West, Masvingo, Matabeleland North, Matabeleland South, Midlands.” [56a] (Government) Europa World Online, undated, accessed 13 February 2012, noted that the principal towns (those with a population of over 100,000) are Harare (the capital), Bulawayo, Chitungwiza, Mutare (Umtali) and Gweru (Gwelo). [1b] (Area and Population) Jane’s Sentinel ‘Security Risk Assessment: Zimbabwe’, dated 13 September 2011, noted that: “In 2010, the urban population comprised about 38 per cent of the total population, up from 29 per cent in 1990 … According to the UN Population Fund, Zimbabwe’s average urban growth rate between 2005 and 2010 has been 1.6 per cent. … The urban areas of Harare and Bulawayo have the status of provinces. Other major towns and cities are Mutare, Gweru, Kadoma, Kwekwe, Masvingo, Marondera, Zvishavane, Hwange and Chinhoyi.” [90k] (Demography) The following table provided by Encyclopaedia Britannica, undated, accessed on 1 June 2012, should be considered as a guide to the population of Zimbabwe. The data is based on the 2002 census but since then has experienced significant migration and emigration since 2002.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Capital</th>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sq km</td>
<td>2002 preliminary census</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulawayo</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>479</td>
<td>676,787</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harare</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>872</td>
<td>1,903,510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manicaland</td>
<td>Mutare</td>
<td>36,459</td>
<td>1,566,889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manicaland Central</td>
<td>Bindura</td>
<td>28,347</td>
<td>998,265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland East</td>
<td>Marondera</td>
<td>32,230</td>
<td>1,125,355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mashonaland West</td>
<td>Chinhoyi</td>
<td>57,441</td>
<td>1,222,583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masvingo</td>
<td>Masvingo</td>
<td>56,566</td>
<td>1,318,705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matabeleland North</td>
<td>Lupane</td>
<td>75,025</td>
<td>701,359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Matabeleland South</td>
<td>Gwanda</td>
<td>54,172</td>
<td>654,879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midlands</td>
<td>Gweru</td>
<td>49,166</td>
<td>1,466,331</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[39a]

1.03 The most recent estimate for the size of the Zimbabwean population was made by the United Nations (UN) in 2011 – it estimated that the population was slightly above 12.5 million. [74b] A joint report published by Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations and the World Food Programme, entitled FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to Zimbabwe, dated 9 August 2010, noted that: “About 30 percent of Zimbabwe’s total population lives in urban and peri-urban areas. An
estimated 60 percent of this urban population is concentrated in two urban provinces of Harare and Bulawayo.” [104a] (p22)

Further demographic data on population size and growth and change amongst other things, is available on the UN’s Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division country profile for 2010, available [here](#).

1.04 The majority of Zimbabweans are Shona, making up around 75 per cent of the population. The Ndebele comprise about 20 per cent with the Tonga, Venda and smaller ethnic groups such as the Hlengwe/Shangaan, San, descendants of white settlers and Asians making up the remaining 5 per cent. (Jane’s Sentinel ‘Security Risk Assessment: Zimbabwe’, 13 September 2011) [90k] (Demography)

1.05 Europa noted in an undated entry, accessed 13 February 2012, that: “The official languages are English, ChiShona and SiNdebele. About 55% of the population are Christians. A large number of the African population follow traditional beliefs, while the Asian minority comprises both Muslims and Hindus.” [1a] (Location, Climate, Language, Religion, Flag, Capital)

Please see the sections on Ethnic groups and Freedom of religion for more information.

PUBLIC HOLIDAYS

1.06 Europa World Online, accessed on 13 February 2012, noted the following national holidays for 2012: “1 January (New Year’s Day); 18 April (Independence Day); 6–9 April (Easter); 1 May (Workers’ Day); 25 May (Africa Day, anniversary of OAU’s foundation); 11 August (Heroes’ Day); 12 August (Defence Forces National Day); 22 December (National Unity Day); 25–26 December (Christmas).” [1f] (Public Holidays)
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1.07 UN Map, updated 2004:

The following links provide a selection of different maps of Zimbabwe. The Multimap and Google maps are searchable.

- United Nations - Provincial map of Zimbabwe with district boundaries:
- UN OCHA - Political and Administrative Boundaries, as updated in 2008
  http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4af146d60.pdf

2. ECONOMY

2.01 The US State Department ‘Background Note: Zimbabwe’, updated 14 October 2011, provided the following data:
“Zimbabwe’s wide range of natural resources makes agriculture and mining the main pillars of the economy. Agriculture and industry account for about 17% and 29% of gross domestic product (GDP), respectively. Zimbabwe has an important percentage of the world’s known reserves of metallurgical-grade chromite. Other commercial mineral deposits include coal, platinum, asbestos, copper, nickel, gold, and iron ore. In order to develop these mineral deposits, Zimbabwe relies on foreign investment ... Since the mid-1990s, Zimbabwe’s infrastructure has been deteriorating rapidly, but it remains better than that of most African countries. Political turmoil and poor management of the economy have led to considerable economic hardships. The Government of Zimbabwe’s chaotic land reform program, recurrent interference with the judiciary, and imposition of unrealistic price controls and exchange rates caused a sharp drop in investor confidence. Since 1999 the national economy has contracted by as much as 40%. Foreign direct investment has all but stopped. In July 2007, the government had made a desperate attempt to control inflation, which brought persistent shortages fuel, food, and other goods, by forcing firms and supermarkets to reduce prices by half, which resulted in severe shortages of basic commodities. Inflation vaulted over 200 million percent (year on year) in July 2008, according to official estimates; independent economists estimated inflation was at least in the quadrillions of percent. In January 2009, official recognition of dollarization stopped hyperinflation.” [2i] (Economy)

2.02 With regard to the ‘official recognition of dollarization’, BBC News reported on 29 January 2009:

“Zimbabweans will be allowed to conduct business in other currencies, alongside the Zimbabwe dollar, in an effort to stem the country’s runaway inflation.

“The announcement was made by acting Finance Minister Patrick Chinamasa ... Until now only licensed businesses could accept foreign currencies, although it was common practice ... Mr Chinamasa made the announcement as he delivered the annual budget to parliament.

“In line with the prevailing practices by the general public, [the] government is therefore allowing the use of multiple foreign currencies for business transactions alongside the Zimbabwean dollar,' he said ... Before the announcement, shops in Zimbabwe were increasingly demanding payment in US dollars - a reality acknowledged by Mr Chinamasa.

“In the hyper-inflationary environment characterising the economy, our people are now using multiple currencies alongside the Zimbabwean dollar. These include the [South African] rand, US dollar, Botswana pula, euro and British pound among others.” [3g]

2.03 The US State Department ‘Background Note: Zimbabwe’, updated 14 October 2011 further noted that:

“Investor confidence remains low due to insecurity of land tenure and indigenization laws that require, in theory if not always in practice, 51% of investments to be owned by Zimbabwean citizens.

“Agriculture is no longer the backbone of the Zimbabwean economy. Large-scale commercial farming has nearly collapsed over the course of the last 9 years under the government’s controversial land reforms. Corn is the largest food crop and tobacco had traditionally been the largest export crop, followed by cotton. Tobacco production in
2006, however, slumped to its lowest level—about 50 million kg—since independence, off from a peak in 2000 of 237 million kg, before recovering to 57 million kg in 2009. Gold production, another former key foreign currency source, has also slumped. In 2009, the country produced only 4.2 tons of gold. Poor government management has exacerbated meager corn harvests in years of drought or floods, resulting in significant food shortfalls every year since 2001.” [2i] (Economy)

2.04 The Economist Intelligence Unit’s (EIU) Zimbabwe, ‘Country Report – Main Report’, dated January 2012, noted that:

“… economic policy will continue to be driven by political considerations, with the prospect of elections overshadowing policy reform. The government remains split on proposed indigenisation legislation under which firms would have to ensure that at least 51% of their shares were held by indigenous (black) Zimbabweans, and ministers are unlikely to agree a common position. This suggests that there will instead be a series of bilateral deals between companies and individual ministers’ arrangements that will both raise questions about differential treatment of various players and add to policy unpredictability.” [24k] (p5)

2.05 The EIU Country Report – Main Report, published on 1 June 2012, noted that:

“Inflation accelerated from an official estimate of 3.5% in 2011 to 5.7% in the first four months of 2012. The main inflationary drivers were housing and utilities (up by 13.1% in the year to April 2012), communication costs (12.3%), education (6.2%) and alcoholic beverages and tobacco (6.1%). The steep rise in communication expenses was primarily the result of a 50% rise in postage charges.” [24m] (p8-9)

2.06 The German media website ‘Deutsche Welle’ reported on 30 March 2012 that “The indigenization policy has been hailed by the government as a means of empowering black Zimbabweans. Under the policy, all foreign companies worth more than 374,500 euros ($500,000) have to cede 51 percent of their shares to Zimbabweans. The government argues that the move is necessary to reverse colonial imbalances.” [152a]

2.07 An article written by Dr Kate Adams and published in the British Medical Journal, dated 7 August 2010, noted that: “The average monthly wage is [US]$150 (£95; 110 Euros), 90% of adults are unemployed …” [116a] (p302) The African Travel Guide, dated 4 May 2010, reported that: “More than 75 per cent of Zimbabwe’s 13 million people live on less than US$1 ... a day, according to the Consumer Council of Zimbabwe ….”. [110a] Bulawyo24 reported on 7 June 2011 that the average urban family of six needed US $504 to survive (figure for April 2011). [143a] The US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011, Zimbabwe, released on 24 May 2012, observed that:

“More than 85 percent of the population lived below the government’s poverty line, which was set at [US]$533 a month. In 2008 the [International Labour Organisation] ILO reported that four of five jobs in the country were in the informal sector, 78 percent of which were in agriculture. These jobs generally provided extremely low income and poor working conditions and did not offer adequate worker protections. The [Zimbabwe Congress of Trades Unions] ZCTU reported that more workers moved out of the formal sector during the year [2011] due to the prolonged economic collapse and lack of job creation.” [2g] (section 7d)

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“Despite a sharp fall in formal sector employment since the late 1990s, Zimbabwe’s unemployment rate has remained below 10 per cent. While this figure has been met with disbelief in Zimbabwe … it is based on a consistent application of the international definition of unemployment [see below] … The findings indicate that informal employment, in particular, made a substantial contribution to overall employment and accounted for just over 80 per cent of all jobs in 2004. However, cash incomes of informal workers were generally extremely low and their working conditions poor.” [151a] (Abstract)

The ILO definition of unemployment is:

“Under the labour force framework, employment and unemployment are conceptualized as mutually exclusive categories and the first definitional criterion for unemployment is in fact (a) that a person is ‘without work’ in the sense of the definition laid out above (i.e., neither in paid employment nor self-employed). However, not everyone without work is regarded as unemployed as (b) she must also be ‘currently available for work’. This means that, given the opportunity, a person would be ready and able to work. The availability criterion thus excludes those who cannot (or do not want to) take up work. The third and final criterion of the standard definition is that (c) a person must be actively ‘seeking work’, in the sense of having undertaken ‘specific steps in a specified recent period to seek paid employment or self-employment.’” [151a] (p9)

The UNICEF Annual Report for Zimbabwe for 2010, released in September 2011, noted that:

“The unprecedented economic decline in Zimbabwe resulted in a 50% contraction of GDP and in pushing two-thirds of the population below the poverty line. The Global Political Agreement and the advent of ‘Inclusive Government’ brought relative political stability, and recent fiscal policy decisions have led to some economic growth; however, progress in 2010 remained fragile. The focus of UN agencies and partners in recent years has been less on reaching the MDGs than on mitigating the reversal in key indicators. Major outbreaks of cholera and measles required millions of dollars to stem mortality and, support from partners notwithstanding, took several months to control. Such outbreaks, along with the deterioration in food security, are coupled with massive erosion in basic social service infrastructure and people’s coping mechanisms, especially the poorest. The deterioration in infrastructure, lack of investment, low wages, decreasing civil service motivation and capacity, and absolute shortage of essential supplies and commodities caused a near-collapse of the social sector. The Inclusive Government, supported by UNICEF and development partners, has made major efforts to rebuild the social sectors… However, major challenges remain.” [85g] (p1-2)

The Civil Society Monitoring Mechanism Periodic Report January to March 2012, released on 9 May 2012, in its section, Economic recovery, stated that:

“Since the formation of the [Global Political Agreement] GPA, economic stabilisation, economic growth and inflation management have been key to the government strategy. The period January-March 2012 saw marginal increases in the year-on-year inflation
(largely remaining within the targeted range of 3.5-4.5%) as well as marginal growth performances in all sectors. However, slow growth in the manufacturing sector, poor accountability for diamond revenue as well as the increase in country risk as a result of indigenisation rhetoric continued to be challenges. The poor performance of non-tax revenues, low domestic savings (largely due to the poor distribution of economic gains) and limited foreign capital inflows remain major threats to economic growth. Furthermore, little effort has been made to foster pro-poor growth policies, as shown by a mere allocation of 1% to social protection programmes while over 80% of the budget goes towards recurrent government expenditure, particularly remuneration for civil service.” [48b] (p32)

See also Humanitarian issues for information about the economic and humanitarian situation.

REMITTANCES

2.12 The Inter Press Service News Agency reported on 24 January 2009 that a large number of Zimbabweans rely on remittances (cash/credit) sent by relatives working abroad. It was estimated by the Global Poverty Research Group (attached to the universities of Oxford and Manchester) that “… in 2006, 50 percent of all households surveyed in Zimbabwean cities and towns were regular recipients of money, food and other goods …” [15a] A joint report published by Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, and the World Food Programme, entitled FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to Zimbabwe, dated 9 August 2010, noted that: “Diaspora remittances play a major role in supporting household food needs and alleviating poverty.” [104a] (p23-24) An article in The Zimbabwean dated 24 December 2010, noted that a paper by the International Fund for Agriculture Development (IFAD), an arm of the World Bank, reported that at least US$490 million was sent to Zimbabwe in remittances each year. [99f]

2.13 A report by the Solidarity Peace Trust entitled Gone to Egoli, dated 30 June 2009, found that remittances, far from providing a regular source of foreign exchange and food, was something that only a small proportion of Zimbabweans with family members in the diaspora could count on. The report went on to note that poorer rural families were less likely to receive remittances than the urban middle classes. [65c] (p5&7) A report commissioned by the UK government’s Department for Business Innovation and Skills, entitled ‘Conflict, migration and the environment: the case of Zimbabwe’, by Dr JoAnn McGregor with Luca Marazzi and Dr Busani Mpolu of University College London, and dated 17 October 2011 (DBIS Report 2011), noted: “The class basis of Zimbabweans in Britain and other destinations in the ‘West’ is less varied than those remaining in the region [southern Africa], given the cost of flights and visas (in the UK context costs and constraints rose steeply following new visa controls in November 2002). Populations comprise the educated urban elites, professionals and aspirant middle classes.” [150a] (p6)

2.14 A July 2011 report from the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe noted that, for the period January to June 2011, “Declared foreign currency receipts from the Diaspora through licenced Bureaux de Change amounted to USD135 million as compared to USD110.5
Following the resumption of forced returns of undocumented Zimbabweans from South Africa in late 2011, IRIN reported on 10 February 2012 on the impact of lost remittances: “UN World Food Programme (WFP) country director Felix Bamezon described remittances as ‘an important source of income for vulnerable people, particularly those affected by seasonal food shortages… Most returnees are coming to food insecure hosts or homes and this will certainly put a strain on the already burdened homes,’ he said.”

The DBIS Report 2011 noted that:

“It has become a truism that Zimbabwe is now a remittance economy. These financial inflows are channelled overwhelmingly by private and informal routes rather than via the government or banks… The scale of remittance inflows to Zimbabwe is not clear, but one study cites a figure of US$960 million from Zimbabweans in the UK in the single calendar year of 2007, based on an average monthly sum of £270 per household (Maghuna et al., 2009). The German Global Service estimates that US$1.3 billion came into Zimbabwe between January and September of 2004 (cited in Mawowa and Matongo, 2009). Bloch’s survey showed a relationship between remittances and legal status and earning capacity (those in work or on student visas sent more than asylum seekers; higher earners sent comparatively more)... A study of urban households in low- and middle-income suburbs showed that one out of two households received remittances from abroad (Bracking and Sachikonye, 2007), while a survey in rural Matabeleland South documented 75% of households with members beyond national borders (SPT, 2009). Remittance income has been used for essentials such as food, medical treatment, education and rent. Diaspora remittances have also been channelled into property, inflating costs over the course of the crisis, and into business, particularly transport. The impact of diaspora remittances has decreased since the abandonment of the Zimbabwe dollar and adoption of hard currencies in early 2009 (known as ‘dollarisation’). Those who had access to foreign currency during the years of hyperinflation, particularly those who had access to official exchange rates, were able to profit significantly from dual currency markets.

“... ZimVac surveys have consistently showed families receiving remittances to be less food insecure than those that do not; they also show remittances as counting for a relatively small percentage (2%) of average household incomes. Bracking and Sachikonye (2007) showed that elite/middle-class suburbs of Zimbabwe’s cities were more dependent on remittance flows than the high-density suburbs, and were more likely to receive money from migrants in the West than low-income suburbs, where households were more likely to receive funds from within the region or no remittances at all. A survey conducted in rural Matabeleland argued that the benefits of remittances had been exaggerated: it concluded

“while 59% of Zimbabweans in the diaspora are under the age of 20, only 4% of these send goods or money home on a regular basis – three times a year or more. Goods and money sent home do not lift families out of desperate poverty. 76% of families with members in the diaspora received no money at all in 2008 and many of the remaining 34% received less than R100 [approximately £8] a month. Goods sent home could amount to as little as 2 kg of sugar. When asked to describe the impact of having family
meal members abroad, only 20% spoke of remittances. Most people referred to death, disease, criminal habits, broken marriages and diaspora orphans.” [150a] (p19-20)

MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN THE ECONOMY

2.17 A report by the Crisis Coalition of Zimbabwe titled The Military Factor in Zimbabwe’s Political and Electoral Affairs, dated 3 June 2011, noted that:

“Over the years, in line with an elaborate patronage system, the previous ZANU-PF government controlled by president Mugabe systematically deployed military personnel to strategic positions in various state institutions responsible for governance such as the judiciary, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC), the Delimitation Commission, local government institutions, and state-controlled companies such as the National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ), the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) and the National Oil Company of Zimbabwe (NOCZIM). As a result, the military is deeply entrenched in the economy making their economic interests just as powerful as their fears for accountability for human right abuses.” [43a] (p6)

SANCTIONS

2.18 Voice of America News (VAN) reported on 16 February 2011 that that the European Union (EU) renewed its sanctions targeted against ZANU-PF members of Robert Mugabe’s government, senior government officials, military figures and some businesses with close links to Mugabe. Under the sanctions, key figures in the regime are prevented from travelling to Europe and are subject to an asset-freeze. [83a] BBC news reported on 16 February 2010 that: “The EU sanctions target 200 people and 40 firms …” [3d] However, the VAN article of 16 February 2011 observed that the EU announced that it had “… lifted restrictions against 31 people, mostly wives of those on the sanctions list and a few minor political personalities.” [83a]

2.19 On 17 February 2012, BBC News reported that: “The European Union has lifted some more of its sanctions against top officials and institutions in Zimbabwe. An EU diplomat said the bloc was ending measures against 20 entities and 51 people - including the justice and foreign ministers. However restrictions on President Robert Mugabe continue.” [3j]

2.20 Following a visit to Zimbabwe in May 2012, the UN’s Chief Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, noted the following regarding sanctions in a speech dated 25 May 2012:

“The continuation of sanctions is now opposed by all three parties that make up the Inclusive Government, and I have yet to hear a single Zimbabwean inside the country say they definitely think sanctions should continue. The reason for this is a perception that sanctions, which were targeted at various named individuals and companies, are in fact having a wider impact on the general population. While it is difficult to disentangle the specific causes of Zimbabwe’s major social and economic ills, there seems little doubt that the existence of the sanctions regimes has, at the very least, acted as a serious disincentive to overseas banks and investors. It is also likely that the stigma of sanctions has limited certain imports and exports. Taken together, these and other
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unintended side-effects will in turn inevitably have had a negative impact on the economy at large, with possibly quite serious ramifications for the country’s poorest and most vulnerable populations who have also had to cope with the political instability and violence as well as a severe drought.

“The issues relating to the individuals targeted by the sanctions will I hope – assuming there is sufficient evidence – one day be sorted out in a court of law, which is the proper place to deal with serious crimes. In the meantime, I would urge those countries that are currently applying sanctions on Zimbabwe to suspend them, at least until the conduct and outcome of the elections and related reforms are clear.” [165a]

A full list of EU measures, including list of individuals affected can be accessed here: http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/docs/measures_en.pdf.

The US Commercial Service and Department of State have jointly produced a guide called Doing Business in Zimbabwe which provides background to the economic and commercial environment in Zimbabwe.

3. HISTORY (19TH CENTURY TO 2010)

The following section provides a brief history from 19th century to 2010, with the focus on events in the last 10-15 years. Further information can be obtained from History World and in History of Nations. In addition Annex A provides a timeline of major events taken from the BBC News website. More detailed information can also be provided on request.

3.01 The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) Zimbabwe Country Profile, updated 12 April 2012, noted that:

“Until the 19th century the area was ruled by a succession of Shona kingdoms, including the builders of the famous Great Zimbabwe complex (from which the country takes its name). By the 1820s internal and external pressures had led to the collapse of the Shona polities, laying the country open to occupation. Nguni conquerors from South Africa occupied what is now Matabeleland, and in 1890 Cecil Rhodes' British South Africa Company (BSAC) founded Salisbury (now Harare) and took control of the rest of the country by 1893. The BSAC's defeat of the 1896 Shona and Ndebele rebellion (the 'First Chimurenga') secured the country for widespread European settlement. In 1923, after a referendum which rejected union with South Africa, the country became a self-governing colony. In an attempt to pre-empt black majority rule the white-controlled Rhodesian parliament made a Unilateral Declaration of Independence in 1965, leading to a 15 year guerrilla war ('the Second Chimurenga').” [13d]

3.02 Europa World Online – Zimbabwe, undated, accessed 14 May 2010 noted that following the unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) by Ian Smith in 1965 black nationalists organised the fight for majority rule. The principal nationalist groups were the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), led by Joshua Nkomo, and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), led initially by the Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole and later by Robert Mugabe. ZAPU and ZANU merged their military efforts in 1976 in the uneasy Patriotic Front alliance. In 1979, according to Europa, the UDI administration concluded
an ‘internal settlement’ with some black nationalists, under which Bishop Abel Muzorewa became Rhodesia’s first black Prime Minister. Later in 1979, all parties to the conflict participated in the Lancaster House Conference in London, which agreed an independence settlement. Initially Mugabe adopted a conciliatory stance towards Nkomo but relations became strained and in February 1982 Nkomo was removed from the Cabinet, with two colleagues under suspicion of plotting against the government. [1d] (Recent History)

**Matabeleland massacres 1983–87 (aka ‘Gurkubahundi’)**


“Zimbabwe was a seriously divided country at Independence in 1980. Ten years of war had not only served to liberate Zimbabwe, but had created divisions within it. South Africa was also a hostile neighbour who wanted to weaken Zimbabwe. There were problems between [Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army] ZIPRA and [Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army] ZANLA, and outbreaks of violence in areas surrounding the guerrilla holding camps all over the country. At times this spilled over into serious violence, such as at Entumbane in 1981. By early 1982 there were groups of bandits in Matabeleland. Armed men were killing, robbing, and damaging property.

“The Government responded by launching a double attack in Matabeleland. The first attack was on the dissidents, and the army units used were 4 Brigade, 6 Brigade, the Paratroopers, the [Central Intelligence Organisation] CIO and Police Support Unit. The second attack was on [Zimbabwe African Peoples Union] ZAPU and its unarmed civilian supporters, mainly in rural areas and at times in the cities. The units used for this second, undeclared conflict, were 5 Brigade, CIO, [Police Internal Security and Intelligence] PISI and the ZANU-PF Youth Brigades.

“The Government’s attitude was that the two conflicts were one and the same, and that to support ZAPU meant to support dissidents. ZAPU denied it was supporting dissidents. Whatever the truth of this, it is clear that thousands of innocent civilians in Matabeleland were killed or beaten and had their houses burnt during these years, mostly at the hands of Government forces.” [163a]

**3.04** The Independent reported in an article, Anit-Mugabe artist arrested, on 30 March 2010 that:

“As many as 20,000 civilians died in the Matabeleland uprising between 1982 and 1987 staged by disaffected guerrillas of the minority Ndebele tribe who fought in the bush war that ended white-rule in the former British colony of Rhodesia, as Zimbabwe was known before independence.

“North Korean-trained troops of Mugabe’s majority Shona tribe were accused of the massacre of village communities who allegedly assisted the rebels.” [4b]
3.05 Europa World Online – Zimbabwe report in an undated entry, accessed on 26 June 2012, noted that a unity agreement between ZANU-PF and ZAPU was reached in 1988. The merged party retained ZANU-PF’s name and Nkomo became one of two vice-presidents and took a senior cabinet post. An amnesty in 1988 led to a rapid improvement in the security situation in Matabeleland. Constitutional changes in 1987 ended reserved seats for whites and created an executive Presidency, replacing the ceremonial post of President formerly held by Canaan Banana and incorporating the post of Prime Minister. Mugabe became Zimbabwe’s first executive President at the end of 1987. [1c] (p1255)

3.06 The Independent noted in an article dated 19 October 1999, that at Vice-President Joshua Nkomo’s funeral, President Mugabe expressed his regret for the actions of the Fifth Brigade in Matabeleland during the 1980s. At a memorial service for Nkomo in October 1999, Mugabe announced the willingness of the Government to compensate the families of the thousands of people killed during the insurgency. [4g] Further promises of compensation projects were made in June 2002 by John Nkomo, the then Minister for Home Affairs. [20f]

ZANU-PF WIN 1990 ELECTIONS

3.07 Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment: Zimbabwe (Jane’s SCRA), dated 12 October 2010, noted that:

“A merger between ZANU-PF and ZAPU was finally achieved in December 1989 and Mugabe became leader of the united ZANU-PF party. He then publicly called for a one-party state. Mugabe replaced the bicameral parliament with a one-chamber parliament but had to fight the 1990 elections against four other parties. ZANU-PF’s overwhelming victory, winning 116 of the 120 seats available, led to Mugabe reiterating his call for the introduction of a one-party state while the rest of the continent was rejecting authoritarianism in favour of multi-party politics. In July 1990 the state of emergency that had been in force since 1965 was lifted. In the following year ZANU-PF officially renounced its dedication to Marxism and the one-party system.” [90a] (Internal Affairs)

LAND REFORM AND WAR VETERANS: 1990–97

3.08 The Institute for the Democratic Alternative for South Africa, States in Transition Observatory, noted in a report, The Politics of Land in Zimbabwe, dated 30 May 2011, that:

“During the 1990 elections, both Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo made land into a core election issue. At the time, a newly unified Zanu PF faced a series of corruption allegations and economic challenges, as well as a possible threat from a new political party, the Zimbabwe Unity Movement.

“However, public dissatisfaction and anger ensued as early as 1993 and 1994 when Zimbabwean media disclosed that senior politicians, military officials and ministers received farms well below market value. As Scoones notes [Zimbabwe’s Land Reform: Myths + Realities, 2010], little happened between 1990 and 1996. Only 20,000 households had been resettled.
“It was 1997 when a series of developments began that would culminate in the violent land seizures that characterised the Fast Track Land Reform process.

“In 1997 benefits and payments to War Veterans, had been suspended when it was found that corruption and theft had left the War Victims fund empty.

“As a result, the War Veterans Association applied significant public pressure on Mugabe through demonstrations, vandalising Zanu PF headquarters and publicly heckling Mugabe on a nationally televised event. A group of ranking veterans forced a meeting with Mugabe and demanded that if they did not receive land and other forms of compensation they would begin to seize commercial farms.

“Shortly after, Mugabe, bypassing parliament, unilaterally announced that veterans would receive a one-time payment of Z$4,100 and a monthly life pension of Z$163. The government, at the time, was not able to pay for these unbudgeted benefits… At the Zanu PF party congress at end of 1997, the war veterans dominated the proceedings. Their influence tipped the balance of power within Zanu PF away from the technocrats that had been responsible for reform toward more radical and populist members. The influence of the war veterans reshaped the politics of land and was detrimental to the relationship between commercial farmers and the state.” [9h] (p3-4)

For more detailed information regarding land and politics see section 26; also see a full copy of the above quoted report:


3.09 Jane’s SCRA, updated on 18 April 2012, noted:

“Facing a shortage of funds to finance both land reclamation and financial compensation for the war veterans, in late 1997 the government sought to raise taxes… Already burdened by high taxes and the eroding purchasing power of their money, workers reacted angrily by threatening a general strike. The strike was organised by the ZCTU (Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions) secretary general, Morgan Tsvangirai. Threats by government ministers carried in the media soon hardened attitudes. It was not long before demonstrations turned violent and, in response, the army was mobilised across the country to quell the riots, only returning to barracks in February 1998.” [90e] (Internal affairs)

3.10 Jane’s also noted that:

“It is possible to interpret 1998 as a year of political and economic crisis for Zimbabwe. Despite some positive signs, such as the IMF agreeing to restore USD183 million in aid, which had been suspended in 1995 following governmental failure to achieve first phase economic reform targets, the overall pattern of the economy showed a downward trend. An attempt to halt the economic malaise afflicting the country came in May 1998, when the new Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation (ZIMPREST) reforms were announced at the second National Economic Forum, coinciding with the welcome release of ZWD1 billion (USD59 million) by the IMF.” [90b] (Internal affairs)
3.11 The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Zimbabwe Profile 2008, dated 9 May 2008, noted that sections of the union movement, led by Morgan Tsvangirai’s ZCTU (Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions):

“… eventually formed an opposition political party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), in September 1999.

“It led a successful campaign against Mr Mugabe’s proposed amendment of the constitution (which included some controversial clauses on land reform), which culminated in a ‘no’ vote in a national referendum on the issue in February 2000 that was widely perceived as a vote of no confidence in the government.” [24n] (p4)

3.12 Europa World Online, undated, accessed 9 October 2009, reported that in the aftermath of the failed national referendum, the “… Government embarked on a campaign to restore its popularity prior to the legislative elections, which, it was announced in March 2000, were to be held in May rather than April [2000].” As part of its drive to improve its popularity, the government oversaw the “… illegal occupations of white-owned farms by black ‘war veterans’ (many of whom, too young to have taken part in the war of independence …).” However, “Mugabe repeatedly denied that his administration was behind the occupations, but made no secret of his support for them. The invasions became increasingly violent, and two farmers were killed in April [2000] …” [1d] (Recent history)

3.13 The BBC Timeline for Zimbabwe, last updated on 31 May 2012, noted that Mugabe’s party (ZANU-PF) narrowly fought “… off a challenge from the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) led by Morgan Tsvangirai [in the legislative elections], but lost its power to change the constitution.” [3ag] Europa World Online, undated, accessed 12 June 2009, noted that there were widespread reports of violence and polling irregularities. International observers declared that the elections had not been free and fair. [1d] (Recent history)

LAND INVASIONS, ELECTIONS AND OPERATION MURAMBATSVINA: 2000–05

3.14 Throughout 2000 and 2001 the government issued thousands of notices appropriating white farms, providing farmers with little in the way of a right of appeal. Europa, undated, accessed April 2009, noted that in November 2001 the government “… amended the Land Act by decree. According to the revised legislation, any farm issued with a ‘notice of acquisition’ would become the property of the state with immediate effect; previously, a farm owner had been served 90 days’ notice.” During this time, there were reports of continuing violent land seizures against white farmers by militia groups such as the ‘War Veterans’. [1d] (Recent history)

See also Humanitarian issues, Land reform

3.15 In March 2002 Mugabe was re-elected in presidential elections and was declared the “… winner on 13 March, with 56.2% of the valid votes cast; Tsvangirai secured 42.0%.” Europa World Online, undated, accessed on April 2009, went on to note that the elections were condemned as seriously flawed by the opposition and foreign observers
with reports of “… widespread electoral fraud and intimidation of the electorate and of observers by members of ZANU-PF.” [1d] (Recent history)

3.16 Europa World Online, undated, accessed in April 2009 noted that:

“Immediately after the election the Government enacted the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act [AIPPA], which required all journalists reporting in Zimbabwe to be approved by the state; seven journalists had been detained under the Act by early May [2002]. In April the NCA [National Constitutional Association] organized demonstrations in support of demands for a new constitution and a rerun of the presidential election, at which more than 80 demonstrators were arrested. Violence directed at supporters of the MDC intensified following the election, allegedly committed by ZANU-PF supporters, and more than 50 people were reported to have been killed between the election and the end of April.” [1d] (Recent history)

3.17 Europa World Online, undated, accessed in April 2009, noted that:

“Land seizures … escalated, and in late March 2002 the Government listed almost 400 white-owned farms for compulsory acquisition, bringing the area scheduled for redistribution to the black population to around 85% of total commercial farmland. In June Mugabe issued an order listing some 2,900 white-owned farms for seizure … In September the Land Acquisition Act was amended to allow the eviction of white farmers within seven days, as opposed to the 90 days previously required.” [1d] (Recent history)

3.18 Europa World Online, undated, accessed in April 2009 noted that in Parliamentary elections held in March 2005, Mugabe won two-thirds of the votes allowing him “… to amend the Constitution. International observers from the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) [initially] endorsed the results …” but “… later reversed their opinion and called for investigations into allegations of electoral fraud.” The opposition, US and EU governments again condemned the results citing widespread electoral fraud. [1d] (Recent history)

3.19 Europa World Online, undated, accessed in April 2009 noted that: “In late May 2005 the Government launched Operation Murambatsvina (‘Sweep Away the Rubbish’), which targeted black market trading—principally in foreign currency and fuel—and ‘general lawlessness’. The MDC claimed that it was a punitive action against the urban poor who had voted against ZANU—PF in the elections in March.” Planned and unplanned poor urban developments “… razed to the ground in Harare and other major cities, including Bulawayo and Gweru. The operation attracted widespread international condemnation and, according to a report by UN-Habitat published in late July [2005], some 700,000 people were made homeless …” [1d] (Recent history)

3.20 Europa World Online, undated, accessed in April 2009 noted that:

“In late August 2005 the House of Assembly approved a bill which … provided for the reintroduction of a 66-member Senate (abolished in 1990) as the second chamber of the legislature; senatorial elections were held in late November 2005. The MDC was deeply divided over the issue of participating in the elections. Tsvangirai opposed electoral participation, advocating mass protests and ‘democratic resistance’; however, a faction led by the party’s Secretary-General, Welshman Ncube, fielded 26 candidates. ZANU-PF won 43 of the 50 elected seats, receiving 73.7% of the vote; MDC candidates
took the remaining seven seats with 20.3% of the vote. The MDC effectively split in two, a ‘pro-Senate’ faction electing Arthur Mutambara as its leader in February 2006. The rump [the largest part] of the party re-elected Tsvangirai as its President in late March [2006] …” [1d] (Recent History)

**BUILD-UP TO 2008 NATIONAL ELECTIONS**

3.21 Europa World Online, undated, accessed in April 2009 stated that:

“In mid-February 2007 police used tear gas and water cannon to prevent an MDC rally from proceeding in Harare, despite the organization obtaining a High Court order allowing the rally to take place. In late February anti-Government protesters took control of Budiriro township in Harare for several hours, setting up roadblocks of boulders and burning tyres. Political tensions intensified further when Tsvangirai was arrested in mid-March along with five other members of the MDC after riot police violently dispersed a ‘Save Zimbabwe’ prayer meeting in Harare’s Highfield township. One activist was killed by the police and Tsvangirai suffered severe injuries while in police custody. The Government stated that the rally breached a recently introduced three-month ban on political gatherings. The incident provoked widespread international condemnation and demands for the release of those detained. Following an SADC summit in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, in late March, it was announced that Mbeki had agreed to mediate between the MDC and the Zimbabwean Government; however, there were further reports of the mistreatment of MDC activists in police custody, provoking renewed opposition protests and repeated calls for Mugabe to relinquish the presidency. Nevertheless, in early April ZANU-PF declared that Mugabe would stand as the party’s candidate in the 2008 presidential election.” [1d] (Recent History)

3.22 The same report from Europa noted that:

“In early June 2007 constitutional amendments were proposed that would allow the legislative elections to be brought forward to coincide with the presidential election in 2008, harmonizing the presidential and parliamentary terms of office. The proposals also contained provisions for amendments to the structure of the House of Assembly and the Senate. The MDC opposed the proposals, which would, inter alia, allow the House of Assembly to nominate a new President should the incumbent stand down; under the existing structure, new elections would be required if the presidency were vacated. The MDC continued to be weakened by divisions between party members and in July it was announced that the two factions planned to field separate candidates in the presidential and legislative elections. Meanwhile, South African-led mediation between the MDC and ZANU-PF faltered amid worsening political and economic conditions; however, Mbeki denied that negotiations would collapse.” [1d] (Recent History)

3.23 The same source also stated:

“On 30 October 2007 a number of changes to the Constitution were officially adopted. With effect from the 2008 elections, the House of Assembly was to be enlarged to comprise 210 directly elected members, while the total number of members of the Senate was to be increased to 93 … The presidential term was reduced to five years.
However, talks between ZANU-PF and the opposition failed to produce any agreement on electoral procedures and negotiations continued. ZANU-PF representatives insisted that further negotiations, expected to continue throughout November, would not delay the March 2008 elections.” [1d] (Recent history)


PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS: MARCH 2008


“On 29 March [2008] the country held presidential, parliamentary and local government elections in an environment that was relatively peaceful compared to previous elections. The elections followed a year-long dialogue between ZANU-PF and the two formations of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), facilitated by the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The March elections saw ZANU-PF losing its majority in parliament for the first time since independence in 1980.” [14b] (p360)

3.25 A book entitled Zimbabwe - Years of hope and despair, written by Philip Barclay (a former FCO official in Harare), published by Bloomsbury 2010, noted that:

“Regionally, the MDC-T [MDC–Tsvangirai – the larger of the two MDC parties] dominated [in the national elections] Harare, Bulawayo and other urban areas, as expected. Much more surprisingly, it had made dramatic advances in Masvingo (taking most of the seats around Zaka and Gutu and even achieving gains in Chivi and Bikita) and Manicaland. These areas used to be solidly ZANU-PF, but were now overall MDC provinces. ZANU-PF scored heavily in rural areas of the three Mashonaland provinces and its vote also held up in Midlands. Mutambara’s [MDC-M] successes were in Matabeleland.” [59a] (p78)

3.26 Sokwanele reported on 3 April 2008 that the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) had announced the results for 207 of the 210 parliamentary constituencies. The remaining three constituencies were to be determined by by-elections following the deaths of three candidates prior to the March 29th elections: Pelandaba/Mpopoma, Gwanda South, and Redcliff.

House of Assembly results (ZEC)

(Based on 207 constituencies counted)

MDC Mutambara 10
MDC Tsvangirai 99
ZANU-PF 97

(ZEC: Final results for the House of Assembly, 3 April 2008) [37b]
On 5 April 2008, Sokwanele reported that the ZEC had announced the results for all 60 elected Senate seats. ZANU-PF won 30 seats, the MDC T gained 24 seats and the MDC M took 6 seats. The Senate consists of 93 Senators: 60 directly elected by voters in 60 constituencies; 5 Senators appointed by the President; 10 Provincial Governors; 18 chiefs – 16 elected by fellow chiefs, plus the President and Deputy President of the Council of Chiefs ex officio. (ZEC: Final results for the House of Assembly, dated 5 April 2008) [37a]

Presidential elections: March - June 2008

Human Rights Watch noted in a report entitled ‘Sleight of hand’, dated 20 April 2010, that:

“Results for the presidential elections, which took place the same day [as the parliamentary elections], were not announced until May 2 [2008], when the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) declared that, although MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai had garnered more votes than Mugabe, he had not secured the simple majority (50 percent plus one vote) required to be declared president. A presidential runoff election was set for June 27 [2008] and held, despite Tsvangirai pulling out of the race because of violence against supporters of his party. Mugabe had himself declared winner of the election, which triggered a political impasse. The then president of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, facilitated Southern African Development Community (SADC)-mandated talks between ZANU-PF and MDC with a view to resolving the stalemate.” [69j]

The US State Department report, Background Note: Zimbabwe, updated in 6 April 2011 observed that: “As of early June 2008, over 50 Zimbabweans had been killed, at least 2,000 injured, and over 30,000 displaced as a result of widespread post-election violence, including state-sponsored violence. Due to these and other events, and out of
concern for the lives of his MDC supporters, Tsvangirai announced in late June [2008] that he would not contest the runoff election.” [2i]

The March 2009 update of the Zimbabwe Country Report provides a detailed narrative of the events surrounding the 2008 parliamentary and presidential elections.

http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20101208171359/http://rds.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/country_reports_zimbabwe.html


**3.30** Amnesty International reported in its Annual Report 2009, Zimbabwe, dated 30 May 2009 that increased “Efforts by SADC [Southern African Development Community] to find a political settlement between ZANU-PF and the two formations of the MDC resulted in a political agreement signed in September [2008]. However, negotiations to set up a unity government stalled over allocation of key government ministries including the Ministry of Home Affairs.”) [14b] (p360)

**3.31** Human Rights Watch noted in its report, Sleight of Hand, dated 20 April 2010, that by February 2009 ZANU-PF and the two MDC formations had agreed to form a transitional power-sharing government. Sleight of Hand also noted that “Mugabe retained the post of president, while Tsvangirai became prime minister and Arthur Mutambara, leader of the smaller MDC formation, deputy prime minister.” [69j] (p8) The Human Rights Watch World Report 2010 – Zimbabwe, published 20 January 2010, noted that “…the deal left ZANU-PF with most of its power intact, effectively maintaining the status quo ante: it has kept control of all the senior ministries including justice, security, and defence.” HRW noted that the deal left the MDC without any real power. [69j]

**3.32** Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment: Zimbabwe, updated 10 September 2009, noted that:

“Under the power-sharing agreement concluded by Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the opposition Movement for Democratic Change formations of Morgan Tsvangirai (MDC-T) and Arthur Mutambara (MDC-M), a new constitution is to be drafted and submitted to a referendum. Preparation in this regard began with the creation of a 25-member select committee of members of parliament in April 2009. The provisional time frame for the draft constitution is for February 2010, with a referendum by July of that year.” [90g] (Constitution)

The BBC provided on 15 September 2008 a breakdown of the ‘key points’ of the GPA, details of which can be found through the following link: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7617731.stm The full text of the GPA can be found at the following link: http://www.sokwanele.com/zigwatch

**MDC DISENGAGES FROM THE GNU**

**3.33** Freedom House in its Freedom in the World 2010 report, Zimbabwe, covering events in 2009, released on 3 May 2010, stated that: “The survival of the unity government remained in doubt throughout 2009. … the ongoing crackdown, as well as the rearrest
of MDC stalwart Roy Bennett on terrorism and other charges …” [96b] (p3) and President Mugabe’s failure to implement political agreements, caused Morgan Tsvangirai to announce on 16 October 2009 that he was disengaging the MDC-T from the transitional government. (BBC News, 5 November 2009) [3i] Mr Tsvangirai’s disengagement from the transitional government resulted in the MDC withdrawing representation in the Cabinet and Council of Ministers. (Prime Minister’s Office website, 16 October 2009) [103a]

3.34 Following the MDC’s decision to disengage from the unity government sources noted a stepping up of violence and intimidation against MDC activists and supporters. The Times, dated 30 October 2009, noted that MDC officials and supporters, and civil society activists were arrested and abducted. [82i] Both The Standard (Zimbabwe), dated 31 October 2009, and The Times, dated 30 October 2009, reported that ZANU-PF militias had re-deployed to rural areas and that they were holding political meetings to intimidate MDC and opposition supporters. [70d] [82i] The Standard (dated 31 October 2009) noted that there were reports of MDC activists homes being torched and threats to kill people. There were also reports of youth militia camps being opened and the recruitment of a youth militia was underway. [70d] The States in Transition Observatory report, dated 10 November 2009, noted that in Chiweshe district, 50 homes of MDC supporters were burnt to the ground by ZANU-PF youth militia members. [9f] (p8)

MR TVSANIRAI CALLS OFF MDC BOYCOTT OF GNU

3.35 The BBC reported on 5 November 2009 that Morgan Tsvangirai announced that he was calling off his party’s boycott of the unity government with President Robert Mugabe’s ZANU-PF. Mr Tsvangirai said he was giving Mr Mugabe 30 days to implement the power-sharing agreement on “… the pertinent issues we are concerned about”. [3i] Mr Tsvangirai’s decision to re-engage in the power-sharing government followed discussions at a special Southern African Development Community (SADC) summit brokered by South African President Jacob Zuma. (Monsters and Critics, 8 November 2009) [109a] The summit’s leaders set a 30 day period for Mr Mugabe and Mr Tsvangirai to iron out their differences and prioritise issues of national interest. (Business Day, 6 November 2009) [17a]

3.36 SW Radio Africa reported on 16 November 2009 that the talks between the MDC factions and ZANU-PF were postponed to the last week in November 2009, when the MDC-M negotiators returned to the country. The negotiations were reported to be centred on the appointment of provincial governors, the fate of the Attorney-General and Governor of the Reserve Bank, the swearing-in of Roy Bennett and the National Security Council. [53b]
Zuma continued mediation efforts in Harare to resolve the impasse between the government parties; however, Mugabe demanded the removal of all sanctions prior to any concessions and rejected the MDC’s demands, which were, principally, for Bennett’s inauguration as Deputy Minister of Agriculture, the allocation of five provincial governorships to the MDC, and the replacement of Gono (who had been reappointed as Governor of the Reserve Bank for a further five-year term in November 2008) and the Attorney-General. Despite widespread criticism, Mugabe also remained determined to continue the plans for 51% of shareholdings in all companies operating in Zimbabwe to be transferred to black Zimbabweans. Meanwhile, Mugabe had announced his intention to seek a further presidential term in office. At the end of March 2010 Mugabe inaugurated the country’s first Human Rights Commission, chaired by a former senior Commonwealth official, and a new Electoral Commission; under the terms of the IPA, elections had been scheduled to take place within two years of its signature.‖ [1g] (Recent developments: the Interparty Political Agreement)


3.38 Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment: Zimbabwe, updated 10 September 2009, noted that one of the cornerstones of the Global Political Agreement was the drafting of a new constitution to be submitted to the electorate in a referendum ahead of future national elections. Preparations for the new constitution began in April 2009 with the appointment of a Constitutional Parliamentary Committee (COPAC) to oversee the process. [90a] (Constitution)

3.39 The Economist Intelligence Unit, Zimbabwe Country Report: July 2010 noted that disagreements between the three power-sharing political parties in government delayed the start of the COPAC constitutional outreach process [24a] (p4) and it did not finally begin until mid June 2010. (Amnesty International, 29 June 2010) [14c]


―Seventy (70) outreach teams comprising of (10) ten members each (3 core members – one from each party, 3 rapporteurs, and 4 civics1) plus a technician to operate video and voice recorders were trained and deployed for outreach meetings in June 2010…. The accreditation of the outreach teams was undertaken on 21st June and the induction on 22nd June. The nationwide public consultations commenced on 23rd June. The outreach meetings in Harare, Chitungwiza and Bulawayo were held from the 18th to the 20th September 2010. COPAC also managed to reconvene the meetings which were disrupted in Harare and Chitungwiza on 30th and 31st October 2010.

―Following the conclusion of the outreach meetings the management committee approved the outreach report submitted by COPAC within 90 days after the public consultations, as stipulated by the GPA. The data from outreach meetings is currently being uploaded for discussion in the thematic committees.‖ [48c] (p11)

3.41 Amnesty International reported that violence marred the start of the process with “… a spate of attacks on human rights activists by supporters of President Robert Mugabe’s ZANU-PF party …” [14c] SW Radio Africa reported on 25 June 2010 that: “The Joint Operations Command (JOC), a state security organisation only accountable to Robert
Mugabe, is spearheading ZANU-PF’s campaign to foist the Kariba draft [of the constitution] on the people of Zimbabwe... Armed and uniformed soldiers have been threatening and intimidating villagers to support ZANU-PF views in many districts of Manicaland and Masvingo provinces.” [53e] The Economist Intelligence Unit's (EIU) Zimbabwe October 2010 report noted that: “... the outreach programme … [ran] into problems, with public meetings being abandoned in the capital, Harare, and Mutare because of violence blamed on ZANU-PF youths.” [24h] (p10)

3.42 The Human Rights Watch World Report 2011 – Zimbabwe, published 24 January 2011, noted that:

“... the Constitutional Outreach ... meetings were marked by increasing violence and intimidation, mainly by ZANU-PF supporters and war veterans allied to ZANU-PF. In February police disrupted MDC-organized preparatory constitutional reform meetings, beat participants, and arbitrarily arrested 43 people in Binga, 48 in Masvingo, and 52 in Mt. Darwin. The violence worsened in Harare, the capital, and led to the suspension of 13 meetings in September. …

“On September 19 [2010], ZANU-PF supporters attacked MDC supporters and prevented some from attending an outreach meeting in Mbare, Harare. The meeting ended when violence broke out. ZANU-PF supporters and uniformed police assaulted 11 residents and MDC supporters from Mbare with blunt objects as they left the meeting. One resident, Chrispen Mandizvidza, died from his injuries on September 22.” [69a]


The GNU polarises; the Southern African Development Community applies pressure (between early and mid 2011)

3.43 The Solidarity Peace Trust's report, The Hard Road to Reform, published 13 April 2011, noted that:

“Since 2009 the [Southern African Development Community] SADC facilitation team has struggled to find ways to ensure the full implementation of the GPA [Global Political Agreement], largely due to the refusal of the Mugabe regime to move on the outstanding issues. At the SADC summit in Namibia in August 2010 the parties agreed that the completion of the constitutional reform process and the referendum should be followed by an election … Following this summit there was continued lack of movement on the GPA, with Zanu PF persisting in its refrain that it would make no further ‘concessions’ until sanctions had been lifted. Frustrated with these developments both MDCs expressed frustration with the South African facilitation team in January 2011. Welshman Ncube commented that South Africa’s conduct was ‘nothing short of disgraceful’ and that ‘South Africa rather than SADC should be blamed for the
Zimbabwe crisis.’ Nelson Chamisa, the MDC-T spokesperson agreed noting that the ‘action of our guarantors, SADC and the African Union, is in deficit.’ This seeming lethargy of the SADC facilitation took a dramatic turn at the SADC Trioka summit in Zambia on the 31st March [2011] Noting with ‘grave concern’ the political polarization in Zimbabwe characterised by the ‘resurgence of violence, arrests and intimidation’, the Summit made five resolutions on Zimbabwe:

- “There must be an immediate end of violence, intimidation, hate speech, harassment, and any other form of action that contradicts the letter and spirit of the GPA.
- “All stakeholders to the GPA should implement all the provisions of the GPA and create a conducive environment for peace, security, and free political activity.
- “The Inclusive Government should complete all the steps for the holding of the election including the finalization of the constitutional amendment and the referendum;
- “SADC should assist Zimbabwe to formulate guidelines that will assist in holding an election that will be peaceful, free and fair, in accordance with the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections.
- “The Troika of the Organ shall appoint a team of officials to join the Facilitation Team and work with the Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC) to ensure monitoring, evaluation and implementation of the GPA. The Troika shall develop the Terms of Reference, time frames and provide regular progress reports, the first, to be presented during the next SADC Extraordinary Summit. Summit will review progress on the implementation of the GPA and take appropriate action.

“Without naming Mugabe directly, these resolutions were arguably the most forthright diplomatic criticism that SADC had issued of the Mugabe regime, with the recommendations largely echoing the demands that the MDCs and the civic movement had been making since 2009. Moreover for the first time since SADC began discussing the outstanding issues of the GPA the sanctions issue was not mentioned, an issue that consistently kept the region in solidarity with Mugabe. The style of diplomatic intervention shifted significantly from Mbeki’s ‘quiet diplomacy’, which the Zuma team had largely adopted on taking over the reins of the facilitation. At this point it might be argued that the reasons for the change in SADC’s approach were the result of a combination of factors. These included: increased international pressure in the wake of events in North Africa; the growing frustration of SADC with the obstructive behaviour of the Mugabe regime; and the persistent pressure of the lobbying of the MDCs and civil society in both Zimbabwe and South Africa. It remains to be seen whether SADC has the united political will to follow this through.” [65a] (p17-19)

3.44 The report continued:

“The response to the SADC resolutions by the Mugabe regime was, to say the least, apoplectic. On April 1st Mugabe complained at a Zanu PF Politburo meeting:

“‘The facilitator is the facilitator and must facilitate dialogue. (Zuma) cannot prescribe anything. We prescribe what we should do in accordance with our own laws and our agreement.’

The main text of this COI Report contains the most up to date publicly available information as at 6 June 2012. Further brief information on recent events and reports has been provided in the Latest News section to 13 July 2012.
“[This reaction] … clearly showed that for Zanu PF and Mugabe, who had since 2000 clearly articulated a strategy that sought to displace the Zimbabwe crisis on to the SADC region and the African continent through a discourse of Pan Africanism and anti-imperialism and in so doing tie both into a solidarity pact, the Troika resolutions in Livingstone represented a decisive crack in the strategy.” [65a] (p19-20)

3.45 The Economist Intelligence Unit’s (EIU) Zimbabwe, Country Report – Main Report, dated 1 July 2011 report, (EIU July Report) noted that:

“The Southern African Development Community (SADC) held yet another summit meeting on Zimbabwe in early June. The participants are split, predictably, on just what was achieved, but the South Africans, who are the lead facilitators in the protracted dispute between the coalition partners, Mr Mugabe’s ZANU-PF, Morgan Tsvangirai’s Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) and Welshman Ncube’s small MDC-N splinter group, claim that when the SADC next meets in Angola in August, there will be a final agreement on a road-map for new elections.” [24g] (p9)

3.46 Sokwanele’s ZIG Watch (Zimbabwe Inclusive Government): Issue 28, published 15 June 2011, noted that:

“Polarisation of the three GPA signatories continues to develop. ZANU-PF hardliners pushed for President Mugabe to abandon the GPA and mediation efforts by South African President Jacob Zuma on behalf of SADC with regard to the proposed roadmap to elections. The security forces are seen to be the biggest instigators in this position over fears that an agreed upon document will allow too many concessions to the MDC thereby weakening ZANU-PF’s hold on political and military power.” [37g]

3.47 The EIU July 2011 Report noted that:

“Relations are extremely poor between the two main parties in the country’s power-sharing government, Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and Morgan Tsvangirai’s Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), and there has been little progress towards implementing the conditions of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) signed in September 2008. In fact, there are tensions both within and between the MDC and ZANU-PF, and such friction will clearly increase in the run-up to the polls: ZANU-PF, for example, could face a power struggle should rumours about Mr Mugabe’s health prove accurate and the incumbent decide not to contest the 2012 polls. Political stability is likely to be undermined if there is another ZANU-PF victory in disputed circumstances. It is also questionable whether hardliners within the former ruling party would accept an MDC victory.” [24g] (p4)
“Time is running out for Zimbabwe’s three inclusive-government parties to squeeze all that needs to be done into the months available before the constitutional guillotine drops in March 2013 - formally ending President Robert Mugabe’s term in office.

“It is increasingly unlikely that the three parties - Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai’s majority Movement for Democratic Change (MDC-T), Mugabe’s Zanu-PF, and the smaller MDC-N faction of Commerce and Industry Minister Welshman Ncube - will complete their constitution-making programme and all other conditions imposed by their Global Political Agreement (GPA) in 2008 to ensure conditions conducive to free and fair elections.

“Despite mounting Southern African Development Community (SADC) irritation about the apparent lack of progress over Zimbabwe’s electoral and constitutional reform processes, there is little prospect that a draft constitution will be ready for consideration by parliament on schedule in late November or early December [2011]. Sources close to the pre-drafting process insist ‘not a word’ of the constitution has been drafted.

“The GPA and the current constitution both require popular endorsement of the new constitution by referendum, a process requiring several months.

“SADC leaders who met in Luanda last month chastised Zimbabwe’s leaders for failing to show enough commitment to the country’s reform process. They ‘urged the Zimbabwe [parties] to remain committed to the implementation of the GPA’.” [164a]

4.02 Agence France Presse reported on 15 February 2012 that:

“Zimbabwe’s constitutional affairs minister on Wednesday cast doubt on President Robert Mugabe’s bid to hold elections this year.

“A referendum on a proposed new constitution must take place before the holding of general elections.

“‘My assessment is the earliest we can have a referendum (on the constitution) is August or September [2012],’ Eric Matinenga told journalists.” [115b]

4.03 Voice of America News reported on 9 March 2012 that:

“Zimbabwe Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai says the country's military leaders have told him they will not allow anyone but President Robert Mugabe to rule the country, regardless of who wins an election.

“At a press conference Thursday [8 March 2012] in the capital, Harare, Tsvangirai said he and his MDC party do not want a war, and that is why they are insisting on constitutional reforms before any vote is held.

“‘We are not afraid, ladies and gentleman, of an election, but we will definitely not participate in a war,’ Tsvangirai said. ‘It is because of this that the MDC will not be stampeded into a sham election that is not predicated on the necessary reforms.’” [83o]

4.04 Voice of America News reported on 16 May 2012 that:

“The Zimbabwe Election Support Network has launched a program to empower electoral administrators in the country ahead of possible early elections that President
Robert Mugabe and his ZANU-PF party want held this year, though many believe the polls will only be called next year.

“ZESN is working with the Australian Electoral Commission, the International Foundation for Electoral Reforms, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, UNDP and the United Nations Electoral Assistance Division in this capacity-building program.” [83p]

4.05 The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report Zimbabwe, 2nd Quarter 2012, dated 1 June 2012, observed in its section ‘Outlook for 2012-16: Election watch’, that:

“Zimbabwe’s electoral schedule remains in a state of flux. Members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) have reaffirmed that there should be no elections in Zimbabwe before the terms of the GPA—including the installation of a new constitution—are fully implemented. Given the persistent delays in formulating a new constitution, which must then be ratified by all three members of the government of national unity (GNU) and put to a national referendum, this suggests that polls will not be held until mid-2013 at the earliest. However, the president and ZANU-PF remain keen to hold elections this year, and would probably prefer to do so under the existing constitution. Mr Mugabe has a clear advantage in this area since, in the event of constitutional deadlock, he could use his powers as executive president and call elections under the existing constitution. ZANU-PF is highly unlikely to be able to win free and fair elections, but previous polls in the country have been deeply flawed and there is little guarantee that the next vote will be any more rigorous. In the event of a chaotic and disputed poll, it is feasible that the parties will again be drawn into protracted negotiations that will result in another GNU. While this is clearly preferable to outright conflict between the supporters of the two parties, the experience of the current power-sharing administration suggests that it would not augur particularly well for economic policymaking.” [24m]

4.06 The same source noted in a section titled, ‘Outlook for 2012-16: Political stability’, that

“Political uncertainty is set to rise substantially in 2012-13 in the run-up to and aftermath of elections. Relations are poor between the two main parties in the power-sharing government—Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and Morgan Tsvangirai’s Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)—and there has been little progress towards implementing the conditions of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) signed in September 2008. In previous polls ZANU-PF has used violent and intimidatory tactics against MDC supporters, often via so-called war veterans (many of whom are too young to have served in the country’s liberation war), and the party is likely to do so again. Equally, many high-ranking members of the security forces remain determined to prevent an MDC victory, and while they are not expected to intervene overtly (by staging a coup, for example), it is likely that they will contribute to an environment in which the vote is neither free nor fair, and may also collaborate in (or at least fail to prevent) vote-rigging.

“There is also a clear risk of instability in the latter part of the forecast period. While there is a hardline faction within ZANU-PF that is simply unwilling to countenance losing power, a ZANU-PF victory would not be accepted by a substantial proportion of the population—or much of the international community—increasing the likelihood of persistent (if probably low-level) unrest. Whichever side wins, therefore, disorder is a serious possibility.” [24m]
Constitution

4.07 On 9 March 2012, Agence France Presse reported that:

“Zimbabwe’s draft constitution could be completed within a week, including a clause limiting presidents to two terms in a nation ruled by Robert Mugabe for 32 years, a top official said Friday.

“It is difficult to give an exact date, but everything going well, by Friday we should have a draft constitution,’ Paul Mangwana, co-chairman of the constitutional committee, told a press conference.

“He insisted that the term limits provision was not intended to target Mugabe.

“The people said they want a president to serve for two terms and we will respect that,’ Mangwana said.” [115c]

4.08 SW Radio Africa reported on 25 April 2012 that:

“A deadlock on three contentious issues contained in the draft constitution remains, with no sign of an agreement emerging.

“MDC-T MP and co-chairman of COPAC, Douglas Mwonzora, confirmed to SW Radio Africa on Tuesday that discussions in the last few weeks have ended with no concrete results.

“The issues in dispute are dual citizenship, devolution and the structure of the executive. Last week the president of the smaller formation of the MDC, Welshman Ncube, said the three principals had failed to break the constitutional logjam and called on South African President Jacob Zuma to intervene.

“However, Mwonzora said they will wait for the management committee, which comprises chief negotiators from the three political parties in the unity government, to meet again and look at the outstanding issues.” [53al]

4.09 Voice of America News reported on 2 May 2012 that:

“Zimbabwe’s parliamentary committee drafting the country’s new charter has been given until Friday to polish its draft, which has been described by legal experts as ‘disappointing and half-backed’.

“The committee had finally submitted the long-awaited draft to government, almost two years behind schedule.” [83q]

4.10 Voice of America News reported on 22 May 2012 that:

“Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe expressed frustration in cabinet Tuesday with the slow pace of the new constitution making process and demanded that the incomplete draft be handed over to the principals at the end of the week.

“Cabinet sources told VOA that Mr Mugabe made the remarks after parliamentary and constitutional affairs minister Eric Matinenga presented his report to cabinet on the state of the new constitution.
“The new constitutional effort started three years ago and has stalled several times due to disagreements among the three political parties in the unity government.

“The parliamentary select committee and the management committee were supposed to meet this week to discuss a 29 page document tabled by Zanu PF that analysts say would have altered the draft as the party backtracks on a number of issues such as the powers of the president and the attorney general that had been agreed by the parties.

“The meeting has been postponed to next week. But sources say it hangs in the balance as it remains unclear whether Mr Mugabe now wants the principals to take charge of the process.

“Hardliners in Mr Mugabe's former ruling Zany-PF party and senior army officials backing him are said to be demanding that Mr Mugabe take charge as Copac is delaying the process to frustrate calls for elections this year.

“Matinenga told VOA that Mr Mugabe's demands are unrealistic.” [83r]

MUGABE’S HEALTH

4.11 BBC News reported on 5 September 2011 that:

“Zimbabwe's President Robert Mugabe has prostate cancer which has spread to other organs, according to a leaked US diplomatic cable.

“The cable, published by whistle-blower site Wikileaks, cites central bank governor Gideon Gono as saying Mr Mugabe's doctors had urged him to quit.

“The cable, written in 2008 by the US embassy in Harare, also says 87-year-old Mr Mugabe could die by 2013.

“Mr Gono, a staunch ally of Mr Mugabe, dismissed the cable as ‘fiction’.” [3c]

4.12 Reuters reported on 11 October 2011 that:

“President Robert Mugabe's failing health has likely forced his ZANU-PF party to press for early elections in Zimbabwe and accelerate a plan compelling foreign firms to surrender majority shareholdings, but it has not so far loosened his grip on power.

“While factions within ZANU-PF are battling to take over from Mugabe, the 87-year-old leader is still the only figure who can unite the party and has so distanced himself from possible successors that no direct challenger has emerged.

“In any case, ZANU-PF would be hard pressed in elections, that must be held by 2013 but which could come next year, if it fielded a candidate other than Mugabe, who has been in power since Zimbabwe gained independence from Britain in 1980.

“But Mugabe has slowed down, diplomats have said. His meetings are fewer while his visits to Singapore for medical checks have increased.
“Over the past few years, he is thought to have spent several weeks abroad for treatment, described as routine and for maladies such as eye trouble by official media. But talk in Zimbabwe of Mugabe’s deteriorating health is taboo and harshly punished.” [75a]

4.13 The Independent (UK) reported on 10 April 2012 that:

“Rumours that Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe is gravely ill are intensifying after he missed last week’s cabinet meeting and the one due today was cancelled.

“President Mugabe, 88, is officially in Singapore dealing with arrangements around his daughter Bona’s postgraduate studies.

“But opposition media, including The Zimbabwe Mail and The Standard, have questioned whether the president would realistically handle his daughter’s university enrolment in person.

“He is reported to have left Zimbabwe on 30 March. Last Tuesday’s cabinet meeting was cancelled, as was a special Politburo gathering last week.” [4d]

4.14 However Reuters reported on 12 April 2012 that:

“Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe returned home from Singapore on Thursday, looking fit and defying reports that he was seriously ill.

“The 88-year-old leader bounded down the stairs of a white chartered plane, accompanied by his wife and was met at Harare’s main airport by senior government officials, including his potential successor, vice president Joice Mujuru.

“Mugabe did not speak to reporters and was whisked away in his official presidential motorcade.” [75b]

ZANU-PF: the battle for a successor to Mr Mugabe

4.15 The ‘Telegraph’ reported on 7 April 2012 that:

“Robert Mugabe has struck a secret ‘gentleman’s agreement’ to hand over power in Zimbabwe to his feared defence minister, Emmerson Mnangagwa, sources close to the two men have revealed.

“Insiders say that Mr Mugabe, aged 88 and now in office for three decades, will stand as Zanu PF’s candidate in elections one last time before handing over to Mr Mnangagwa, a former spy chief nicknamed ‘The Crocodile’ for his ruthless reputation.

“In the clearest sign yet that he is being groomed for the top job, Mr Mnangagwa, 65, was recently dispatched to Tehran where he met Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a key anti-Western ally.”
“Having another Zanu-PF strongman succeed Mr Mugabe would help ensure that other powerful party members avoid any future scrutiny about wealth gained through illegal land seizures, and avoid possible prosecution at The Hague.” [5h]

4.16 The Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report Zimbabwe, 2nd Quarter 2012, dated 1 June 2012, observed in its section ‘Outlook for 2012-16: Political stability’, that:

“There is also speculation that some high-ranking military personnel are seeking to position themselves to take over the leadership of ZANU-PF when Mr Mugabe goes: while the president has given no indication that he intends to stand down, there has been persistent speculation about his health. Given the existing split within ZANU-PF between adherents of the vice-president, Joice Mujuru, and the minister of defence, Emmerson Mnangagwa, a ‘civilianised’ military leader, the latter could feasibly seek to position himself as a compromise candidate. However, compromise is a relative term: any such candidate would still insist on ZANU-PF’s ‘right’ to rule.” [24m]

Solomon Mujuru’s death

4.17 The Guardian reported on 16 August 2011 that:

“One of the most powerful men in Zimbabwe has been killed in a fire at his home, triggering rumours of a conspiracy in the battle to succeed the president, Robert Mugabe.

“Former military chief Solomon Mujuru, 62, was ‘burnt beyond recognition’ in the blaze at his farm about 35 miles south-west of Harare in the early hours of Tuesday morning, police said.

“Under his nom de guerre, Rex Nhongo, Mujuru was a leader of the guerrilla war that swept Mugabe to power and became Zimbabwe’s first black military commander after independence. The general was married to Joice Mujuru, vice-president of Zimbabwe and leader of a moderate faction in Mugabe’s Zanu-PF party.

“Analysts said his death will shake Zimbabwe’s political kaleidoscope and rock Zanu-PF, where Joice Mujuru and other rivals are jostling for position as 87-year-old Mugabe’s heir apparent. This in turn could destabilise the party’s power-sharing agreement with the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC).” [34e]

4.18 Voice of America News reported on 6 February 2012 that:

“An inquest into the death of former army commander Solomon Mujuru last August ended on Monday [6 February] with a Harare magistrate turning down a request by the deceased’s relatives to exhume his remains for further analysis by a South African expert.

“Coroner Walter Chikwanha said he could not grant the request by Mujuru family lawyer Thakor Kewada to exhume his remains because he had not had enough time to review the entirety of the evidence presented by 38 witnesses, including the widow of the late ZANU-PF power broker, Vice President Joice Mujuru, who testified Monday.

“The family wanted the remains to be re-examined by a South African pathologist, Dr. Reggie Perumel, citing failures by local pathologist Gabriel Aguero Gonzalez. … Vice President Mujuru was the last to give evidence in the three week-long inquest. This was
in the form of an affidavit - Kewada said she could not take the witness stand due to her emotional state, and state attorney Clemence Chimbari read the affidavit.

“The vice president said the remains of her husband were still engulfed in fire when she arrived at Ruzambo Alamein farm in Beatrice last August 16. Like other witnesses before her, she said the fire brigade arrived at the accident scene with no water, commenting that the fire-fighters were ‘totally ineffective’ … The closure of the inquest left more questions than answers as testimony did not appear to establish the cause of the fire that destroyed the farmhouse and left charred remains.

“Former freedom fighter Wilfred Mhanda, who once worked with the late general Mujuru, said the way the inquest has been conducted smacks of a ‘cover up’.

“He said that for the magistrate to say his recommendations would be directed to the Office of the Attorney General and the Ministry of Home Affairs ministers was a way of setting up obstacles for the family in its quest to establish the truth.

“It was established that the pathologist did a very shoddy work, that the police did a very shoddy work. How on earth could they present samples to forensic experts almost 10 days after the death? And taking blood samples almost 10 days after the death?’ Mhanda asked.” [83s]

4.19 The Herald newspaper noted on 29 March 2012 that “There was no foul play in the death of Retired General Solomon Mujuru, an inquest into the tragedy has concluded.” [23i] The full findings of the inquest were published on the Nehanda Radio website.

For more recent information, see sources in Latest news

5. CONSTITUTION

5.01 Jane’s Sentinel’s ‘Country Risk Assessment: Zimbabwe’, updated 18 April 2012, noted that:

“The Lancaster House Constitution (agreed to in December 1979 just prior to independence from the UK), together with 16 amendments, has been the fundamental law that determines Zimbabwe’s governmental structure. It provided for a parliamentary democracy with majority rule, the protection of minority rights and three separate branches of government: the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. An incorporated bill of rights affords extensive protection of human rights which, during the first 10 years of independence, could only be amended by unanimous vote of the House of Assembly …

“A constitutional amendment required for the formation of a power-sharing government in Zimbabwe, as per a September 2008 agreement, was passed on 5 February 2009. Under the power-sharing agreement concluded by Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the two opposition Movement for Democratic Change formations, a new constitution is to be drafted and submitted to a referendum.

The main text of this COI Report contains the most up to date publicly available information as at 6 June 2012. Further brief information on recent events and reports has been provided in the Latest News section to 13 July 2012.
“Preparation in this regard began with the creation of a 25-member select committee of members of parliament, known as COPAC, in April 2009. The provisional time frame for the draft constitution was for February 2010, with a referendum to be held by July of that year, but this process has suffered ongoing delays. In June 2010 the constitution-making process got underway again with the launch of a public outreach programme. However, some of the meetings faced disruption, with Human Rights Watch claiming that it was ‘marked by increasing violence and intimidation, mainly by ZANU-PF supporters and war veterans allied to ZANU-PF’.

“The drafting process of the new constitution finally began in December 2011, but was still continuing in April 2012, and had also not escaped controversy. For example, in February 2012, the state-aligned Herald newspaper suggested that a 70-year upper age limit for the presidency and a two-term clause was being included in a draft version of the law, which ZANU-PF unsurprisingly rejected. The party’s COPAC co-chairman subsequently indicated that the executive clause had been ‘rectified’.

“Once the draft law is completed, it must be brought before another stakeholders meeting and parliament before a referendum can be held. Zimbabwe’s minister of constitutional and parliamentary affairs suggested in February 2012 that the referendum was likely at the earliest in August or September. However, ongoing tensions over the draft and other reform issues between the rival parties could still see the referendum suffer further delay, which in turn would postpone the elections that ZANU-PF is pushing to hold in 2012.” [90] (Constitution)


For information on the constitution consultation and drafting process, see also Constitutional Outreach Programme

6. POLITICAL SYSTEM

For information about political rights and freedom of expression in practice see Political affiliation, Freedom of speech and media, and Human rights institutions, organisations and activists.

6.01 The US State Department Background Note: Zimbabwe, updated 14 October 2011, stated that:

“According to Zimbabwe’s constitution, the president is head of state and head of government, and is elected by popular majority vote. Constitutional Amendment 19 requires that the president consult with the prime minister on many key issues of state, including senior appointments. Parliament is bicameral and sits for up to a 5-year term. On October 1, 2007 Constitutional Amendment 18, which provides for significant changes in the country’s electoral dispensation, went into effect. The amendment set out the framework to harmonize presidential and parliamentary elections, to reduce the presidential term of office from 6 years to 5, to increase the number of seats in the
House of Assembly and in the Senate, to empower parliament to serve as an electoral college should the office of president become vacant for any reason, and to empower the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) to delimit parliamentary and local constituencies. The 214-member House of Assembly is filled by direct election in 210 constituencies and the appointments of 4 other MPs. Sixty of the 100 Senators are directly elected by voters. Other Senators include 10 provincial governors, 5 others that are appointed by the president, 7 new appointments created by Constitutional Amendment 19, 16 chiefs that are elected by other chiefs, plus the president and deputy president of the Council of Chiefs.” [2I] (Government)

6.02 Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment: Zimbabwe, updated 12 March 2012, noted that:

“… the unmistakable loss of mass political support for ZANU-PF in the 2008 elections led to a paradigm shift in Zimbabwean domestic politics. Under a regionally mediated agreement signed in September 2008, the former ruling elites were forced to share power with the MDC-T of Morgan Tsvangirai, who is now prime minister, and another smaller MDC faction (currently led by Welshman Ncube), albeit under an arrangement that still appears to favour ZANU-PF. Although a government of national unity was finally inaugurated in February 2009 following months of further deadlock, the tensions at the start of the implementation process highlighted the difficulty the rival sides would have in cohabiting in government. This government still stands three years later, but progress with reforms has lagged significantly, while ZANU-PF’s focus has shifted to holding fresh presidential and parliamentary elections. It is currently pushing for these polls to be held in 2012, although a protracted constitution-making process is meant to be completed first. This could still push the polls into 2013, albeit with a risk that ZANU-PF may yet try to unilaterally announce a poll date as it seeks to secure re-election with an ageing Mugabe at the helm.” [90d] (Executive summary)

See History for more details of the Government of National Unity.
Tsvangirai becoming prime minister. Presidential powers remain largely the same, with the president still head of the National Security Council and the cabinet, although in theory parliament can only be dissolved in consultation with the prime minister. According to the deal, executive authority is also to be shared between the president and the prime minister, with the latter chairing the Council of Ministers.

“The National Security Council also comprises the prime minister and the heads of security services, among others, while the Council of Ministers comprises cabinet ministers. The president chairs the unity cabinet with the prime minister deputising. The executive committee comprises the president, vice-presidents, the prime minister and the deputy prime ministers.” [90e] (Internal Affairs)

**LEGISLATIVE BRANCH**

6.04 The CIA World Fact Book (Zimbabwe), updated on 18 April 2012, noted that the: “… bicameral Parliament consists of a Senate (93 seats - 60 elected by popular vote for a five-year term, 10 provincial governors nominated by the president, 16 traditional chiefs elected by the Council of Chiefs, 2 held by the president and deputy president of the Council of Chiefs, and 5 appointed by the president) and a House of Assembly (210 seats - all elected by popular vote for five-year terms).” [56a]

**POLITICAL PARTIES**

6.05 The CIA World Fact Book, updated on 18 April 2012, noted that the following political parties, with the leaders in square brackets, operated in Zimbabwe:

“African National Party or ANP [Egypt DZINEMUNHENZVA]; Movement for Democratic Change or MDC [Morgan TSVANGIRAI]; Movement for Democratic Change - Ncube or MDC-N [Welshman NCUBE]; Peace Action is Freedom for All or PAFA; United Parties [Abel MUZOREWA]; United People's Party or UPP [Daniel SHUMBA]; Zimbabwe African National Union-Ndonga or ZANU-Ndonga [Wilson KUMBULA]; Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front or ZANU-PF [Robert Gabriel MUGABE]; Zimbabwe African Peoples Union or ZAPU [Agrippa MADLELA]; Zimbabwe Youth in Alliance or ZIYA.” [56a]

See Annex B – Political organisations for more information on political parties.
Human Rights

7. INTRODUCTION


“Zimbabwe is constitutionally a republic, but its authoritarian government was not freely elected and has been dominated by President Robert Mugabe and his Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) since independence in 1980. Presidential and parliamentary elections held in 2008 were neither free nor fair. While the March 2008 election was generally peaceful—and two factions of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) gained a parliamentary majority—violence and intimidation perpetrated by security forces and nonstate actors loyal to ZANU-PF in the months leading up to the June presidential runoff resulted in more than 270 confirmed deaths, thousands of injuries, and the displacement of tens of thousands of persons. Opposing presidential candidate Morgan Tsvangirai withdrew from the runoff contest, and President Mugabe was declared the winner. International condemnation of the presidential runoff election resulted in a mediated solution outlined in the 2008 Global Political Agreement (GPA) signed by ZANU-PF and the two MDC factions led by Morgan Tsvangirai (MDC-T) and Arthur Mutambara (MDC-M). Mugabe retained the presidency, Tsvangirai became prime minister, and Mutambara became deputy prime minister. In January [2011] the MDC-M elected Welshman Ncube as its new president at the party’s congress, changing the party’s acronym to MDC-N. Mutambara retained his seat as the deputy prime minister. There were instances in which elements of the security forces acted independently of civilian control.

“The most important human rights problems in the country remained the government’s targeting for harassment, arrest, abuse, and torture of members of non-ZANU-PF parties and civil society activists, widespread disregard for the rule of law among security forces and the judiciary, and restrictions on civil liberties.

“ZANU-PF’s control and manipulation of the political process effectively negated the right of citizens to change their government. Prison conditions were harsh. Lengthy pretrial detention was a problem. Executive influence and interference in the judiciary continued, and the government infringed on citizens’ privacy rights. Freedoms of speech, press, assembly, association, and movement were restricted, and the government continued to evict citizens, invade farms, and demolish homes and informal marketplaces. The government impeded nongovernmental organization (NGO) efforts to assist those displaced and other vulnerable populations. The government arrested, detained, and harassed NGO members. Government corruption remained widespread, particularly at the local level. Violence and discrimination against women; child abuse; trafficking of women and children; and discrimination against persons with disabilities, racial and ethnic minorities, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) community, and persons with HIV/AIDS were problems. Government interference with labor-related events occurred. Child labor, including the worst forms of child labor, was a problem.

“The government did not take steps to prosecute or punish security force or ZANU-PF supporters who committed abuses, and impunity continued to be a serious problem” [2g] (Executive summary)
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s Annual Report on Human Rights 2011, published in 30 April 2012, noted that:

“Following a worrying rise in political violence and intimidation at the start of the year [2011], Zimbabwe’s human rights situation by the end of 2011 had returned to the relative stability experienced in 2010. The early spate of politically motivated human rights abuses targeting political and civil society groups was believed to have been triggered by calls made by the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) for elections to be held in 2011, but declined as the prospect of early elections receded. Reports by reputable civil society groups continued to show a year-on-year decrease in human rights abuses since 2008.” [13j] (p381)

The same source’s update for the first quarter of 2012, dated 31 March 2012, noted:
“...the peak of abuses witnessed in 2008. However, we received reports from NGOs and civil society groups of continued incidents of politically-motivated violence/harassment targeting Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) activists and civil society.” The quarterly updated further observed that:

“At the 19th session of the UN Human Rights Council in March, the government of Zimbabwe adopted further recommendations made by member states during Zimbabwe’s Universal Periodic Review process in October 2011. Out of 177 recommendations, the government of Zimbabwe accepted 115. We welcome Zimbabwe’s decision to accept three out of the UK’s four recommendations. These were: to take additional steps to ensure that the legislation establishing the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission is fully compliant with the Paris Principles and includes guarantees for independence in order for the Commission to see accreditation with the International Coordinating Committee of National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (ICC); to ratify the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT); to re-issue an invitation to the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture.” [13k]

The Solidarity Peace Trust’s report The Hard Road to Reform, published 13 April 2011, noted that:

“It is likely that the rest of 2011 will be characterized by a continuation of the trends established already this year, in particular the shutting down of democratic spaces. The state is likely to become more directed and more targeted in terms of whom it arrests, and whom it beats. As SADC and others are keeping events in Zimbabwe under scrutiny in the wake of the recent SADC meeting in Zambia, it is NOT likely that Zanu PF will use a sledgehammer at this stage, and will rather intensify intimidation methods. These can be very effective in breeding apathy and fear, and in distancing people from opposition political activities, yet are very difficult to measure forensically.

“The state will concentrate on continuing to harass and wear down those NGOs that it considers most threatening, which are those that document human rights abuses. While intense and widespread state organized violence during 2011 seems unlikely to the authors at this stage, Zanu PF is a party that has regularly shown that when all else fails, violence is considered a good fallback. Mugabe’s uncertain health, and the general uncertainty of Zimbabwean politics as evidenced over the last decade, means that 2011 remains unpredictable in human rights terms. However, the agreement to establish a
SADC committee to work alongside JOMIC in Harare could be an important step towards reducing blatant human rights violations.” [65a] (p46)

7.05 The Economist Intelligence Unit ‘Country Report – Main Report, Zimbabwe’, dated January 2012 stated:

“The Economist Intelligence Unit’s 2011 democracy index ranks Zimbabwe 147th out of 167 countries, putting it among the states considered ‘authoritarian’. This designation includes North Korea, as well as a number of other African states such as Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Zimbabwe scores a zero rating in the electoral process category – unsurprisingly, given the repeated problems with polls in the country. Elections are neither free nor fair, while violence during campaigns is a major problem; even though the former opposition has nominally been in a government of national unity with the ruling party since the last poll – which has contributed to the marginal improvement in the country’s overall score compared with the 2008 and 2010 indices – there is little doubt that power remains with the latter, and that the next election will be similarly fraught with difficulties. The country also scores very poorly in the functioning of government category: the military and paramilitary groups are often used as a tool of suppression, there is endemic corruption and a lack of confidence in government among the electorate. Political participation scores higher: voter turnout at general elections is usually significant, despite understandable scepticism about the process, although rural voters in particular are dependent on government-dominated media for political news.

“Democracy index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regime type</th>
<th>Overall score</th>
<th>Overall rank</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“2011” Authoritarian</td>
<td>2.68 out of 10</td>
<td>=147 out of 167</td>
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<tr>
<td>“2010” Authoritarian</td>
<td>2.64 out of 10</td>
<td>146 out of 167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“2008” Authoritarian</td>
<td>2.53 out of 10</td>
<td>148 out of 167</td>
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“… Political culture is the highest-scoring category, buoyed by the general support that there is among the electorate for democracy, even if they do not actually experience it. The score for civil liberties is predictably low, hindered by the lack of an independent media, the frequent use of violence by the state or its proxies and the partisan nature of the judiciary.” [24k]

Further information about the EIU’s democracy index can be found in its white paper, Democracy index 2011: Democracy under stress, undated but based on information current as of the start of December 2011.

7.06 The Civil Society Monitoring Mechanism (CSMM) report, ‘Mid-year review’, published on 2 November 2011 observed that:

“This cluster found that there continued to be many more cases of non-compliance on the issues of political and civil freedoms than compliance. Compliance is observed in instances where civic education and peacebuilding initiatives were carried out
unimpeded, and peaceful public meetings and discussions allowed to proceed. The repression of: freedom of expression – as demonstrated by the inordinate number of charges of ‘insulting the President’; freedom of assembly and association – as witnessed by the pervasive abuse of POSA legislation; freedom of movement - note the ZANU PF roadblocks springing up in rural areas; and freedom of conscience and political choice – by police banning such congregations on a partisan basis; demonstrate that little reform has taken place. The public continues to fear the heavy arm of the state which has failed to desist from using violence, illegal detentions and harassment. There is urgent need for the depoliticisation of the state security arms, including the police and the army. There is need for all of these to act in accordance with the laws and to acquaint themselves with human rights as enshrined in the Constitution.” [48e] (p5)

7.07 The CSMM report, Periodic Report January to March 2012, dated 9 May 2012, observed in its executive summary:

“The three Principals and other structures in the Inclusive Government (IG) have preached peace and rejection of violence this year, however the prevailing environment on the ground has been politically restive and confrontational leading to violations. Zimbabwe Peace Project recorded an increase in politically motivated human rights violations from January to February, but these are still lower than in previous years. The increase can be directly linked to the rising political tensions as a result of the move to push for elections this year and delays of the constitution making process. Manicaland and Midlands provinces were the most affected, as well as numerous incidents of urban political gang violence. Traditional and community leaders were also frequently perpetrators.” [48b] (p3)

7.08 Sokwanele’s ZIG Watch (Zimbabwe Inclusive Government): Issue 23, published 24 January 2011, noted the views of “Human Rights Watch United Kingdom Director Tom Porteous …” who stated that “… his investigations revealed that revenue from the Marange mines [was] propping up President Mugabe and his cronies …” and was “… concerned that the funds will be used to support political violence by ZANU-PF against their opponents.” [37d] (p3)

7.09 The Solidarity Peace Trust’s report The Hard Road to Reform, published 13 April 2011, noted: “One of the problems with the many commentaries of the GPA [Global Political Agreement] that have been written by the civic groups, is that they have overlooked or underestimated the fact that the agreement, notwithstanding its multiple problems, has provided certain parameters of accountability for ZANU-PF.” [65a] (p8)

7.10 Amnesty international’s ‘Annual Report 2012, the State of the World’s Human Rights’, released in May 2012, covering events in 2011, summarised the situation in Zimbabwe as:

“Discord and mistrust within the Government of National Unity (GNU) continued to undermine delivery on key objectives of the Global Political Agreement. This led to severe delays in drawing up a new Constitution and implementing electoral, media and security reforms that would lead to elections. Elements within the security forces continued to exert pressure on the two Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) parties by ordering the arrest of senior party members or unlawfully disrupting their political activities. Human rights defenders were arrested, detained and tortured in police custody, especially in the aftermath of the protests in the Middle East and North
Africa. The police continued to operate in a partisan manner, failing to take action against members of President Mugabe’s ZANU-PF party when they harassed, intimidated or beat up perceived political opponents.” [141]

Please see the following sections for more information regarding abuses of human rights: Recent Developments, Politically motivated violence, Police/Armed Forces – Extra judicial killings, Abuses by ZANU-PF Youth Militia, and Abuses by War Veterans, Prison conditions

8. SECURITY FORCES


“The Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) is responsible for maintaining law and order. Although the ZRP is officially under the authority of the Ministry of Home Affairs, in practice the Office of the President controlled some roles and missions. The Zimbabwe National Army and Air Force, under the Ministry of Defense, are responsible for external security, but the government sometimes used them for domestic operations. The [Central Intelligence Organisation] CIO, under the Ministry of State for National Security, is responsible for internal and external security.” [2g] (p10-11)

8.02 A report by the Crisis Coalition of Zimbabwe titled The Military Factor in Zimbabwe’s Political and Electoral Affairs, dated 3 June 2011, noted that:

“Through an elaborate patronage system established to reward partisan senior military officials and keep them loyal to ZANU-PF and to President Mugabe, the military has increasingly played a central and critical role in directing production and controlling ownership of the means of production. The military, through political patronage, has become a significant part of the domestic bourgeoisie class and many top commanders have teamed up with politicians and businessmen to form political and economic interest groups venturing into lucrative businesses such as platinum and gold mining. This section examines the extent to which ZANU-PF’s political patronage has entrenched the military in national economic affairs and the likely impact on electoral processes.

“Retired and serving senior military officers have, in the recent past, been appointed in large numbers to run various state-owned companies …Senior military officers were also appointed to lead strategic state institutions including the Zimbabwe Prisons Service (ZPS), the Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP), the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO), the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC), National Railways of Zimbabwe (NRZ) (under retired Air Commodore Michael Karakadzai) and The Department of National Parks and Wildlife. The increased militarization of the state has led to the military taking control of an expanding range of decisions and actions, from political strategy to the formulation and implementation of agrarian and economic policy.” [43a] (p19)

The following link provides details at page 23 of 52 military personnel who have or are currently appointed to key state institutions.
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8.03 The UK Border Agency's Report of the Fact Finding Mission to Zimbabwe: Harare 9-17 August 2010, dated 21 September 2010 (reissued 27 October 2010), reported the views of a representative of the Counselling Services Unit, who stated that:

"Real power lies with the senior military (JOC), with Robert Mugabe as the political front. The military are very aware of the regional pressure to maintain a civilian government, but have developed a powerful structure of control of the political party. At present, Robert Mugabe retains control over all critical decisions, but if one wants to know what is happening in the political sphere one should watch the Joint Operational Command (JOC)." [121a] (p20)

8.04 The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Zimbabwe, Country Report – Main Report, dated 1 May 2011 noted that: “There has also been speculation that the military has usurped the political powers of the government of national unity (GNU)." [24c] (p4) An article published by Voice of America, dated 28 June 2011, reported that Mr Tsvangirai had told supporters in Bulawayo that he believed that the heads of the security services were in charge of the country and “… that rogue elements in the state security services have ‘created a war situation in the country which by its very nature subverts the constitutional order and undermines … civilian authority.’" [83c]

8.05 The Civil Society Monitoring Mechanism report, Annual review of the performance of the inclusive government of Zimbabwe, February 2010 – February 2011, (CSMM Report 2011) released on 21 February 2011, observed that since the formation of the GNU one of the main sticking points has been reform of the Security Sector, where “… there has been utter disregard for the reformist, power-sharing elements of the [Global Political Agreement] GPA, and ZANU PF has continued to use these structures as instruments of the party.” [48c] (p45) The Zimbabwean reported on 6 July 2011 that ZANU-PF continued to refuse “… to countenance security sector reforms.” While negotiators for the ZANU-PF and the two factions of the MDC were reported to have reached agreement on a number of outstanding elements of the GPA, ZANU-PF’s chief negotiator Patrick Chinamasa is reported to have said “… that his party would never agree to security sector reforms and there was nothing the MDC could do about this.” [99n]

POLICE

8.06 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessments – Southern Africa (Zimbabwe), updated 12 October 2011, noted that:

“The [police] force is an armed, quasi-military organisation modelled more along the lines of a military gendarmerie than a civilian police force. It has approximately 20,000 full-time members and is deployed throughout the country. Its presence is most evident in cities and towns, but thinly spread in rural areas. It is responsible to the Ministry of Home Affairs. Following the signing of the power-sharing agreement in September 2008, one of the key portfolios fought over by the political rivals was that of Home Affairs. Subsequently, as per a recommendation of the regional Southern African Development Community (SADC), the portfolio was initially to be co-managed by Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and

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Morgan Tsvangirai’s Movement for Democratic Change formation (MDC-T).” [90c] (Security and Foreign Forces)

8.07 The same source noted that:

“The Police Support Unit (PSU) trains its members to a similar level of competence as enjoyed by military special forces. Used as a de facto counter-insurgency and border patrol force, these well trained policemen are considered the first line of defence for the state in times of peace.

“The PSU is thought to number in excess of 2,000 full-time personnel, part-time numbers having declined since the 1980s.” [90c] (Security and Foreign Forces)

8.08 The USSD 2011 noted that:

“Police were ill equipped, underpaid, and poorly trained, particularly at the lower levels. Although prison authorities had sufficient fuel, police did not, and the lack of fuel and other resources further reduced police effectiveness. Poor working conditions, low salaries, and high rates of dismissal in the [Zimbabwe Republic Police] ZRP resulted in corruption and high turnover. De facto assurances of impunity and a culture of disregard for human rights contributed to police use of excessive force in apprehending and detaining criminal suspects.” [2g] (p11)

Corruption

8.09 The same source stated that:

“Corruption occurred at every level of the police force but took different forms depending on position, rank, or location. At the lower levels, corrupt officers extorted nominal to exorbitant fines from the public for varying claimed offenses to augment their low salaries. Armed police routinely erected roadblocks, claiming to be looking for criminals, smuggled goods, and food. In many cases police arbitrarily seized goods for their own consumption or extracted bribes from commuters.” [2g] (p11)

8.10 The USSD 2011 report also noted that: “There were numerous reports of corrupt police officials investigated and arrested for criminal activity during the year.” [2g] (section 1d)

See also Impunity below

8.11 SW Radio Africa reported on 24 February 2012 that:

“There is a growing suspicion among drivers in Zimbabwe that the police are raising funds to buy new luxury cars, by soliciting bribes from innocent civilians at roadblocks and imposing illegal fines on minibuses.

“The problem has become so widespread that some mini bus drivers are using alternate routes in order to avoid paying bribes of up to $100 per day, which they say are driving them out of business.

The main text of this COI Report contains the most up to date publicly available information as at 6 June 2012. Further brief information on recent events and reports has been provided in the Latest News section to 13 July 2012.
Journalist Zenzele Ndebele, who drove from Harare to Bulawayo on Wednesday, told SW Radio Africa that he counted as many as 15 roadblocks on the trip and was ticketed for violations he did not even understand.

“When I stopped at one of these roadblocks, the guy was asking strange questions like why my car does not have enough body mass. There were also ZBC guys demanding licenses for the car radio,’ Ndebele explained.” [531]

8.12 An article published in The Zimbabwean newspaper and written by the Bulawayo Progressive Residents' Association noted that:

“Motorists have expressed disapproval of unnecessary roadblocks mounted by traffic police officers in the city centre [of Bulawayo]. It is alleged that at robot controlled intersections in the city centre traffic police officers stand in groups of four to six and flag down cars.

“Private taxi operators said that the police abruptly stop cars and find an offence and in some instances the police are said to solicit for bribes in order not to issue tickets to the offending motorists.

“...BPRA has convened meetings where residents have said that they can no longer place their trust in the police force as the uniformed officials are known for corrupt tendencies. This has forced many communities to introduce neighbourhood watch committees, made up of volunteering residents, to police their crime prone residential areas.” [99o]

Politicisation of the police

8.13 A report by AIDS Free World, entitled Electing to Rape: Sexual Terror in Mugabe’s Zimbabwe, published December 2009, noted that the police remained politically biased, stating that during the 2008 elections reports of politically motivated rape were not investigated by the police ensuring impunity for the perpetrators. The report also noted that: “... widespread fear engendered by police reprisals, render[ed] local criminal proceedings practically unavailable to survivors of political rape.” [112a] (p12)

8.14 The USSD 2011 report stated that:

“The continued politicization of the ZRP’s upper echelons, mostly composed of war veterans loyal to ZANU-PF, made it difficult for lower ranking police to remain politically impartial or to show support for non-ZANU-PF parties. Police and army personnel suspected of being sympathetic to the MDC or other political parties were threatened with demotion, suspension, incarceration, or transfer to remote areas. Most low-ranking personnel lived in ZRP-provided housing, which allowed the monitoring of their votes during election years in certain districts.” [2g] (p11)

8.15 The same source also noted that: “… government efforts to reform the security forces were minimal, and there were no reports of disciplinary actions taken against security officers who erred in ZANU-PF’s favor in their official conduct. Training on nonpartisan implementation of the rule of law was rarely provided.” [2g] (section 1d)
8.16 The Zimbabwe Independent reported on 10 February 2012 that:

“Clashes among the principals of the inclusive government over the reappointment of Police Commissioner-General Augustine Chihuri intensified yesterday, with the three leaders issuing conflicting statements on the police chief’s employment status and what transpired from their crucial meetings this week.

“While Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai and deputy prime minister Arthur Mutambara said the principals agreed Chihuri was now working in an acting capacity until the principals decided on his future, President Mugabe insists the issue is resolved because his contract was extended to 2014.” [11c]

8.17 A Voice of America news article dated 24 February 2012 noted that:

“Addressing a news conference in Harare, Mr. Tsvangirai again took exception at Mr. Mugabe’s reappointment of Police Commissioner-General Augustine Chihuri, who has made no secret of his backing for Mr. Mugabe and disrespect for Mr. Tsvangirai.

“Mr. Tsvangirai said he had discussed Chihuri’s re-appointment with President Mugabe in good faith recently and emerged from that meeting to announce that Chihuri would serve only in an acting capacity until further notice. But Mr. Mugabe’s spokesman, George Charamba, quickly announced that Mr. Mugabe had made no such undertaking.” [83g]

8.18 An article titled ‘Zanu PF still abusing security forces — MDC’ in The Independent (Zimbabwe), dated 13 January 2011, reported claims by the MDC that the police were politically biased. The article stated:

“Some elements within Zimbabwe’s security forces continue to allow themselves to be used by Zanu PF to abuse people’s freedoms, the two MDC parties have charged.

“The parties this week made separate claims of incidences where police and the military had allegedly been used by the former ruling party to further its interests while committing human rights abuses and political violence.

“The MDC-T led by Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai charged in a statement on Wednesday that at least one of their supporters was abducted in Masvingo at gunpoint by a known assailant, but the police refused to open a docket on the matter on the grounds that the issue was too political for them to get involved… The MDC faction led by Welshman Ncube also claimed they experienced a lot of unfair treatment from the police during the just-ended MDC National Congress.

“Nhlanhla Dube, the MDC National Media, Information and Publicity spokesperson, said two of his political party supporters were arrested for wearing MDC T-shirts during their national congress last week… Henry Chimbiri, the MDC Provincial Chairperson for Mashonaland Central said police in Guruve were openly partisan.

“He cited an incident which allegedly happened on January 7 [2011] when Zanu PF youths blockaded the road between Mahuwe and Bakasa growthpoint with stones and logs to prevent their supporters from attending the national congress.” [11e]

8.19 The Human Rights Watch report ‘Perpetual Fear – Impunity and Cycles of Violence in Zimbabwe’, published in March 2011, noted that:

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“The failure of police to act has left many communities, in provinces around the country, vulnerable to further violence. Many victims and their family members believe that they remain at risk because of the failure of the police to prosecute perpetrators, some of whom still live in the areas in which they committed the crimes… The police … are severely compromised and have largely ignored calls for investigations into past and recent human rights abuses. Police who fail or refuse to file criminal complaints by victims of political violence are rarely investigated or disciplined.” [69b] (p26 & 27)

8.20 The Solidarity Peace Trust’s report The Hard Road to Reform, published 13 April 2011, noted that:

“ZLHR [Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights] … commented that many of the arrests this year have shown a high level of police planning and preparedness … Arrests have, in keeping with the pattern established over recent years, been very selective. MDC-T MPs and activists have been arrested on malicious charges, and people going to report political violence against themselves, have been arrested instead of a docket being opened in their support. [The report went on to note that] … most perpetrators of violence go unpunished as long as they support the ruling party.” [65a] (p29)

8.21 Commenting about information networks across Zimbabwe, the Solidarity Peace Trust’s report The Hard Road to Reform, published 13 April 2011, noted that:

“Lawyers in Harare and other members of civic organisations have reported a dramatic increase in efficiency in state information networks on the ground across the country. State agents seem to have very good information of any meeting that takes place, whether at the level of a rural community or in the towns, and frequently move to prevent such meetings, even when they are religious in orientation or clearly have nothing to do with politics. The speed with which police in rural centres get to hear about such meetings and respond, points to a very good network of informers across the country – and improved cell phone reception across rural areas.” [65a] (p32)

8.22 The Human Rights Watch ‘World Report 2012’, released on 22 January 2012, (HRW Report 2012) covering events in 2011, stated that “Police and prosecutors have been highly partisan and biased in their investigations and prosecution of acts of violence between supporters of the two parties.” [69e] The same report noted that “Groups allied to ZANU-PF continue to beat and intimidate citizens in the high-density suburbs of Harare with impunity, while MDC activists accused of violence are disproportionately arrested.” [69e]

For information about the human rights abuses committed by the police and impunity (of the police and police inaction against human rights violations perpetrated by other actors) see Human rights violations and Impunity below.
“The Zimbabwe Defence Force has an official authorised strength of 42,000 but there are thought to be only 34,000 troops currently serving. 30,000 men and women serve in the ZNA, which has an authorised strength of 42,000, and 4,000 serve in the AFZ. Financial constraints saw the army reduced to 30,000 from the previous 46,000 in 2006. A major recruitment drive was, however, planned for 2007 to replace retiring personnel. There is only a small unit of naval soldiers, the 40-strong Boat Squadron, which is an engineering sub-unit of the ZNA.” [90f]

8.24 The Jane's report continued that:

“ZANU-PF loyalists from the liberation war dominate the senior echelons of the [armed forces] and have vested interests in perpetuating ZANU-PF's political dominance… Commanders of the army and air force and other senior military personnel vowed they would not salute Morgan Tsvangirai who was appointed prime minister of the new unity government in February 2009. This situation held until the following August when army commander Lieutenant General Philip Sibanda and Air Marshal Perrance Shiri were seen to salute Tsvangirai during Defence Forces Day, an action reported to be a result of negotiations involving Mugabe's and Tsvangirai's political aides. They were still the only officers to show this respect to the prime minister. According to local media in mid 2010, Zimbabwe Defence Forces commander General Constantine Chiwenga and Air Marshal Shiri still refused to meet Tsvangirai unless in the presence of Mugabe. [90b] (Armed Forces)

8.25 The May 2011 Summary on Politically Motivated Human Rights and food Related Violation, published by the Zimbabwe Peace Project on 24 June 2011, noted that there were reports of a “… heavy military presence in most communities … serving and retired soldiers are reportedly spearheading ZANU-PF campaigns ahead of the proposed elections.” [122o] (p2)

See also Recent developments for information about the military's attempts to influence who succeeds President Mugabe as leader of the ZANU-PF.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ORGANISATION (CIO)


“Experts say the most powerful arm of Zimbabwe's security apparatus is the Central Intelligence Organization (CIO). It is the 'brains behind the regime,' ... and [is] deeply feared by Zimbabweans inside and outside the country. There is no public record of the CIO's size, but it is thought to have thousands of operatives. Many Zimbabweans think the organization has a network of informers that extends into the Zimbabwean diaspora. Within Zimbabwe, CIO agents have infiltrated the MDC, and are believed to have covertly taken over two newspapers in 2006. Organizations such as Human Rights Watch have documented systematic acts of violence and intimidation committed by the CIO and the police against opposition members or individuals suspected of allegiance to the opposition.” [31a]

8.27 Jane’s Sentinel Security Risk Assessments – Zimbabwe, updated 12 October 2010, noted that the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO):
“... was formed by the Rhodesian authorities in the late 1960s as the country’s main civilian intelligence agency. It was later taken over by the Zimbabwe government, ideologically re-oriented and placed under the Ministry of National Security in order to adopt a protective role for the new regime. Political direction between 1980 and 1988 came from Emerson Mngagwa, a leading ZANU-PF personality and one of the first Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) cadres from the Liberation War ... From 2000, the CIO was used to spearhead the ZANU-PF political-economic programme. Nevertheless, the CIO has not been immune to the wider crisis of Zimbabwe's economy. In September 2001 it was reported that more than 500 members of the CIO were set to leave over poor working conditions. Subsequently, it was reported that major salary increases had been granted to CIO members to appease them. Libyan intelligence officers were also reported to have been sent to Zimbabwe to improve Mugabe's security and intelligence system and technology supply agreements were reported to have been made with China.” [90m] (Security and Foreign Forces)

8.28 The Times reported on the 7 February 2010 that the CIO holds a privileged position in Zimbabwe that allows the organisation to “circumvent” the usual oversight of the country’s finance minister. The report noted that a number of CIO operatives had been paid significant special allowances when accompanying President Mugabe abroad. [82d] Philip Barclay a former FCO officer in Harare, noted in his book Zimbabwe - Years of hope and despair, published in 2010, that the CIO also worked closely with the police and were often “in charge” of police operations. [59a] (p117)

8.29 Sources have claimed that CIO operatives are working in the UK. (SW Radio Africa, July 2005) [89a] (Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 23 June 2006) [77r] A report in The Independent (UK) also dated 28 June 2008, noted that: “British security sources...” confirmed that the CIO was operating in the UK and was “... waging a highly organised campaign to terrify the 4,000 MDC members living in the UK.” The aim of the CIO’s operations in the UK is believed to be based on preventing or reducing the amount of funds raised for the MDC. [4m]

8.30 Commenting about information networks across Zimbabwe, the Solidarity Peace Trust’s report, The Hard Road to Reform, published 13 April 2011, noted that:

“Lawyers in Harare and other members of civic organisations have reported a dramatic increase in efficiency in state information networks on the ground across the country. State agents seem to have very good information of any meeting that takes place, whether at the level of a rural community or in the towns, and frequently move to prevent such meetings, even when they are religious in orientation or clearly have nothing to do with politics. [This] ... points to a very good network of informers across the country – and improved cell phone reception across rural areas.” [65a] (p32)
“The National Youth Service was accepted as a legitimate part of state educational provision under the [Global Political Agreement] GPA. The GPA allowed for the revival of a non-political NYS, which was to be under the control of the Dept for Youth Development, Indigenization and Empowerment, not the military. It was, therefore, also to be subject to parliamentary scrutiny regarding its budget and curriculum. (See, for example, ‘Committee set up to de-politicise youth service’, Financial Gazette, 07 May 2009). The NYS was, in any case, always supposed to be subject to scrutiny by the Portfolio Committee on Youth Development, Gender and Employment Creation, ie not by the military … in mid-2000s, the youth militias were pretty clearly operated by the military and not answerable to anyone else. The director of the National Youth Service, Permanent Secretary David Munyoro, was a civilian, but the actual training and organisation of the programme was clearly in the hands of the military, including Boniface Hurungudu, a retired brigadier, and Colonel Josphat Shumba, a former director of Military Intelligence.

“However, there were some youth training programmes that also appeared under the NYS auspices that were more clearly controlled by the Ministry. And officially the NYS has been disbanded a few times and then restarted.

“Meanwhile, entirely separately from the NYS programme, one of the leaders of the war vets’ association, Jabulani Sibanda, was accused in February 2011 of training child soldiers in Gutu district… So there are NYS organisations that are not youth militias and there are youth militias that are not part of NYS.” [168a] (p13, paragraph 4.51)

National Youth Service

8.32 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment Country Profile – Zimbabwe, updated 12 October 2010, noted that:

“The National Youth Service programme was established in 2001 and is ostensibly a post-school ideological and vocational training scheme for those who are seeking to enter further education or government service. While initial proposals were for a compulsory programme for all Zimbabwean youth, experience over the first four years demonstrated capacity at five residential camps for just 6,000 youths per year, or about two per cent of each age group.

“Critics of the scheme say that the training camps are effectively ZANU-PF indoctrination facilities aiming to co-opt a new generation of supporters for the ruling party and its third phase of the ‘liberation struggle’, replacing ZANLA veterans lost to age and illness. It has previously been alleged that cadres, nicknamed Green Bombers or ZANU-PF Youth Militia, are trained in intimidation techniques. Training is certainly paramilitary in style, with uniforms and weapons handling.” [90c] (Security and Foreign Forces)

8.33 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessments, updated 15 March 2012, also noted that the “…mission of the National Youth Service is to ‘transform and empower youths for nation building through life skills training and leadership development’. However, members of the service are thought to be taught using ZANU-PF speeches and campaign material and have been condemned by the West and Africa for carrying out gross human rights violations on behalf of the party.” [90b] (Armed Forces)
8.34 The United States Department of Labor report, 2008 Findings on the worst forms of child labor – Zimbabwe (USDL 2008), dated 10 September 2009, noted that: “The minimum age for joining the National Youth Service training is 16 years.” [38a]
However, the most recent edition of the United States Department of Labor report, dated September 2011, noted that: “The National Service Act of 1979 prohibits persons under age 18 from compulsory and voluntary military service.” [38b] (p824)

8.35 Voice of America reported on 24 March 2010 that:

“The Youth Initiative for Democracy in Zimbabwe, a civic group, called Wednesday for sweeping reforms of the country's national youth service scheme to make sure government plans to overhaul such programs do not perpetuate youth militia rights abuses.

“The 2008 Global Political Agreement for power sharing called for a new national youth service to replace the so-called Border Gezi militia - named for a deceased youth minister of the longtime ruling ZANU-PF party - that was implicated in the deadly political violence that occurred during the traumatic 2008 elections.

“Youth Initiative Director Sydney Chisi told VOA [Voice of America] Studio 7 reporter Sandra Nyaira that his organisation wants to see the youth program reformed and reshaped into a non-partisan youth empowerment program.

“Chisi noted that many Zimbabweans speak of the ‘youth militia’ rather than national youth service, which became a virtual wing of President Robert Mugabe’s ZANU-PF and whose members continue to be engaged as ‘youth coordinators’ in many rural communities.

“‘This isn’t surprising given how many youth service graduates have been manipulated into being agents of political violence,’ said Chisi, adding his organisation, as a result, is launching its campaign for the reform of the youth training program into a non-partisan scheme.

“The Zimbabwe National Youth Service Program was established in 2001 with the aim of instilling the nation's youth with patriotism and self-reliance.

“Chisi said that while training at Border Gezi camps has been halted, graduates of such camps continue to carry out partisan political work though they are on the public payroll under vague titles such as ‘youth officers.’” [83n]

8.36 The Independent (Zimbabwe), dated 8 July 2011, reported that ZANU-PF minister with responsibility for Youth Development, Saviour Kasukuwere, had submitted a plan to cabinet to reintroduce the National Youth Service Programme. The plans were reported to have been put on hold after a number of MDC ministers opposed its re-introduction during a high-level government meeting. Mr Kasukuwere’s plan proposed re-launching the project to target ‘youths’ up to 35 years of age with 300,000 going through the scheme annually. The same article noted that a report:

“… by the National Association of Non-governmental Organisations (Nango) this year titled: ‘A critical review of the National Youth Service in Zimbabwe’… says that the weakness of the National Youth Service (NYS) emanated from the way it was implemented.
“It accuses the previous NYS of not adhering to the age limit, using a biased curriculum that promoted Zanu PF’s political agenda and using the majority of the trainers who were war veterans and members of the army and police.

“Nango says the majority of the training camps had poor infrastructure which were designed to imitate military training camps leaving Zimbabweans conclude that the NYS ‘is simply a ruse for a youth militia programme operated by the ruling party.’

“Of concern were the youth militia pregnancies and sexually transmitted infections including HIV/Aids that Nango says were reported to have been rampant.” [11f]

8.37 The USSD 2011 report noted that there had been “… reports that the government assigned soldiers and youth service members to work in government ministries.” [2g] (p35)

ZANU-PF youth militia

8.38 The Institute for the Democratic Alternative for South Africa’s group, States in Transition Observatory, noted in a report, Zimbabwe Government of National Unity Watch (SITO Report) April 2009, that an estimated 29,000 ZANU-PF youth militia were “… receiving government salaries as civil servants.” [9a] (p3)

8.39 The MDC’s Information and Publicity Department reported in an article titled ‘Students forced to register for Zanu PF militia training’, dated 23 November 2010, accessed via the website www.zimbabwe situação.com, that ZANU-PF militia were allegedly involved in the recruitment of male students from Sotisi High School in Gutu, Masvingo Province. The MDC stated that: “All male students in ‘O’ and ‘A’ Levels at the school were forced to supply their names age and names of their headmen … The terrified students were told to prepare for ZANU-PF militia training once they completed their examinations in December.” [12c]

8.40 Freedom House noted in Freedom in the World 2010 – Zimbabwe, covering events in 2009, published on 3 May 2010, that: “ZANU-PF militias operate as de facto enforcers of government policies and have committed assault, torture, rape, extralegal evictions, and extralegal executions without fear of punishment; the incidence of these abuses increased significantly in 2008 and continued, though at a decreased rate, in 2009.” [96b] (p6)

See politically motivated violence, and Recent Developments

War veterans

8.41 Jane’s Sentinel Security Risk Assessment - Zimbabwe, updated 10 September 2009, reported that:

“The Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans’ Association (ZNLWA) emerged as a major pro-government pressure group in the 1990s, leading the occupation of white-owned farms in early 2000 and some forming pro-ZANU-PF militias to attack MDC supporters during the 2000 election campaign. War veterans have been able to act with
impunity as the police have refused to restrain their activities. Indeed, the police, Zimbabwe Defence Force (ZDF) and Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) are all run by veterans of the liberation war and genuine war veterans are technically stipended reserve force members of the ZDF, numbering about 55,000.” [90h] (Internal Affairs)

8.42 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessments, updated 15 March 2012, also noted that: “Some 55,000 registered war veterans from the liberation war have also been included in the reserve force [of the army] and receive a gratuity (increasingly sporadically) from the Ministry of Defence for being technically available for duty.” [90b] (Armed Forces)

See Latest news, Recent Developments, Politically Motivated Violence and Political Affiliation

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS BY SECURITY FORCES AND PRO-ZANU-PF GROUPS

Officials are recommended to read Political affiliation, sub section Politically motivated humans rights violations for more detailed information on the level, nature and distribution of politically motivated human rights violations.

8.43 The US State Department Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2010, Zimbabwe, released on 8 April 2011, (USSD Report 2010), noted that “There were reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings. Police units sometimes organized or participated in political violence. Perpetrators were rarely punished.” [2g] (p2) The same report noted that “There were several credible reports of politically motivated abductions and attempted abductions during the year. Leaders of both MDC factions reported that state security agents and ZANU-PF party supporters abducted and tortured MDC-T and MDC-M members, civil society members, and student leaders as part of an effort to intimidate them. Perpetrators were rarely punished.” [2g] (p4)


“Mugabe’s announcement in December 2010 that elections would be held in 2011 triggered an increase in violence and abuses across the country. The beginning of the year saw ZANU-PF and elements within the security forces resort to old campaign tactics of violence, intimidation, and harassment. State security agents, police, and ZANU-PF supporters have been implicated in beatings, arbitrary arrests, and harassment of members of the MDC, cabinet ministers, human rights activists, and journalists, deepening the pervasive climate of fear in the country. In reaction to the abuses, Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai threatened to withdraw the MDC from the inclusive government in March.” [69e]

8.45 The USSD 2011 noted that “CIO agents and informers routinely monitored political and other meetings. Persons deemed critical of the government were targeted for harassment, abduction, interrogation, and sometimes torture. [2g] (p21)

Impunity
8.46 The CSMM Report 2011 observed that: “State-sponsored violence or intimidation has not ceased as a tactic to ensure compliance with party positions and the structures have not in the least been dismantled. Army, youth militia, war veterans and even police are complicit. None of the perpetrators of human rights violations have been held accountable and the assumption is that they can operate in that way with impunity.”

[48c] (p8) The same source noted that: “Attorney-General has failed to bring to account any of the perpetrators of recent political violence, and was instead occupied with persecuting genuine human rights defenders and political opponents.” [48c] (p9)

8.47 Sokwanele published a report by an anonymous Zimbabwean human rights activist entitled The Anatomy of Terror. The report, dated 9 June 2011, which looks at politically motivated human rights violations in 2008, and specifically at violence that took place in ZANU-PF bases, noted that police were often partisan, and noted that:

“The police in all the constituencies studied [the report looked at 15 constituencies in six provinces] openly show support for the personnel at the Bases or those connected with the structure of violence, and ensure that criminal dockets are either not opened against those who perpetrate violence and other crimes, or, if a docket is opened, that the matter is not pursued. Victims reporting crimes by ZANU PF supporters are simply turned away from the police station, sometimes with the comment that the matter is ‘political’ and that there is nothing that the police can do, even where the crime reported is murder.

“On the few occasions where the police have arrested perpetrators, they have been released shortly thereafter after intervention by those coordinating the Bases or ZANU PF politicians. As a result, in all constituencies there are instances where victims of crime simply do not report the incident as they are aware that nothing will be done. There are also numerous press reports of those seeking to file complaints being themselves arrested as perpetrators, supporting similar information from the field researchers.” [37f] (paragraph 3.4.6)

8.48 The USSD 2011 Report noted that “The government investigated none of the numerous 2010 abductions perpetrated by unidentified assailants who interrogated, assaulted, or tortured victims, some of whom were located in police custody days or weeks later.” [2g] (p5) The same report also noted that:

“… Security forces were rarely held accountable for abuses. Allegations of excessive force and torture were often dismissed by senior government officials, who claimed that such actions were necessary to maintain public order. Court orders compelling investigations into allegations of abuse were routinely ignored by authorities. ZRP leadership loyal to ZANU-PF stifled, derailed, or did not authorize the efforts of those police who sought to investigate political violence. For example, police were reluctant or refused to record reports of politically motivated violence or property destruction perpetrated by ZANU-PF-aligned individuals against political opponents” [2g] (p11)

8.49 The USSD 2011 Report also stated that:

“There were no internal or external entities to investigate security force abuse. In 2009 the National Security Council (NSC) was established to replace the Joint Operation Command (JOC) in ensuring accountability of the country’s security sector. The JOC consists of the army, police, prisons, and CIO. The NSC consists of representatives from the three political parties that constitute the transitional unity government, including
President Mugabe as chair, Prime Minister Tsvangirai, the two deputy prime ministers, six ministers, and the security chiefs. The NSC met during the year, but President Mugabe reportedly continued to meet with the JOC outside the NSC.” [2g] (p11-12)

8.50 The International Crisis Group (ICG) reported on 20 April 2009, that the “… police have repeatedly refused to obey … court orders …” where judges and magistrates ruled against the interests of ZANU-PF. [100a] (p5) The Times (dated 1 June 2009) also noted that court rulings were often ignored by security forces. [82b]

Arbitrary arrest and detention

8.51 The USSD Report 2011 stated that: “The constitution and law prohibit arbitrary arrest and detention, although some laws effectively weakened these prohibitions. Despite the law security forces arbitrarily arrested and detained persons, particularly political and civil society activists perceived to oppose the ZANU-PF party.” [2g] (p10)

8.52 The HRW Report 2012 noted that “Police and prosecutors have been highly partisan and biased in their investigations and prosecution of acts of violence between supporters of the two parties … MDC activists accused of violence are disproportionately arrested … Harassment and arbitrary arrests of human rights defenders have intensified since January 2011.” [69e]

8.53 The Zimbabwe Peace Project’s (ZPP) April 2011 report, published on 28 May 2011, noted that: “State security agents, police officers and soldiers have continued to violate people’s rights with impunity with sporadic cases of selective application of the law being reported. Police officers have been accused of only arresting MDC-T supporters as they are regarded as the enemies of the state leaving known perpetrators of violence roaming freely.” [122n] (p7)

8.54 The HRW Report 2012 provided examples of arbitrary arrest:

“In March [2011] police raided the MDC party headquarters and arrested three MDC officials and seven MDC youth on assault charges. Three days later they were all released. Several MDC parliamentarians and officials are facing various criminal charges, including inciting and participating in violence. In contrast, there have been few arrests or charges laid against ZANU-PF supporters implicated in violence … on February 8, police arrested two employees of the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum as they tried to conduct a survey on transitional justice. In the same period police also raided the offices of a number of human rights NGOs and questioned the employees.

“On May 23, police in Matabeleland North arrested two activists from the human rights organization ZimRights for convening a workshop on torture and its effects. Lawyers were denied access to the activists for three days before they were released... On September 21, police arrested 12 activists from the organization Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA) during a peaceful march commemorating the international day of peace. Ten of the activists were released without charge but two leaders of the organization, Jenni Williams and Magodonga Mahlangu, spent 13 days in custody.
"On February 19, police arrested 45 activists who were meeting in Harare to discuss events in the Middle East. Six of the activists spent three weeks in custody before they were released on bail, initially charged with treason and attempting to overthrow the government by unconstitutional means. On September 14 the trial of the activists began in Harare, but the charges were revised to allegedly conspiring to commit public violence and participating in a gathering with intent to promote public violence." [69e]

For information on politically motivated violence see Latest News, Recent Developments, Perpetrators of political violence, and Political affiliation for more detail on levels, distribution and nature of politically motivated human rights violations committed by the security apparatus and pro-ZANU-PF groups.

**Torture, ill-treatment, harassment and use of excessive force**

8.55 The USSD Report 2011 noted that:

“Although the constitution prohibits torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, security forces continued to engage in such practices with impunity and with the implicit support of officials affiliated with ZANU-PF. Police used excessive force in apprehending and detaining criminal suspects. Security forces assaulted and tortured citizens in custody, particularly perceived opponents of ZANU-PF. In some cases police arrested the victims of violence and charged them with inciting public violence. Police units also organized and participated in political violence affiliated with ZANU-PF.

“Human rights groups reported that physical and psychological torture perpetrated by security agents and ZANU-PF supporters continued. Torture methods included beating victims with sticks, clubs, whips, and cables; burning; falanga (beating the soles of the feet); solitary confinement; and sleep deprivation.

“From January through December, according to one NGO, 549 persons sought treatment for injuries and trauma sustained from security force abuse, compared with 5,051 victims who sought treatment in 2010. Observers attributed the dramatic reduction in violence to a reduction in national political events. Nearly 70 percent of the cases took place in Harare, and approximately 65 percent of the victims were affiliated with the MDC.” [2g] (p5-6)

8.56 The same source noted that: “Police harassed and assaulted citizens for minor offenses … Police use of excessive force to disperse demonstrators resulted in injuries.” [2g] (p6).

8.57 The Human Rights Watch report ‘Perpetual Fear – Impunity and Cycles of Violence in Zimbabwe’, published in March 2011, noted that: “The use of torture by state agents is endemic in Zimbabwe. [The] … state’s failure to investigate and bring perpetrators of torture and ill-treatment to justice can be a violation of the ICCPR [International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights].” [69b] (p31) The Human Rights Watch report, Diamonds in the rough, dated 26 June 2009, noted that the army was implicated in the torture of hundreds of mine workers in the Marange Diamond Fields. [69d] (p4)
Page 13

The main text of this COI Report contains the most up to date publicly available information as at 6 June 2012. Further brief information on recent events and reports has been provided in the Latest News section to 13 July 2012.

8.58 The Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s Human Rights and Democracy: The 2011 Foreign & Commonwealth Office Report, published 30 April 2012, noted that: “Torture is regularly used by the police when interrogating suspected criminals. The security sector continues to use torture during politically motivated interrogations. In 2011, we continued to provide assistance for victims of torture.” [13j] (p389)

8.59 The USSD Report 2011 noted that:

“ZANU-PF supporters – often with support from police – continued to assault and torture suspected and known MDC members and their families, civil society activists, and student leaders. Violent confrontations between various youth groups aligned with either ZANU-PF or the MDC-T continued, particularly in urban areas. Supporters of both parties instigated such incidents.

“During the year ZANU-PF youth attacked scores of people, mainly MDC supporters, in the high-density neighborhoods of Harare, as well as in areas outside the capital such as Chitungwiza, Mbare, and Bikita. Police arrested the victims of the violence rather than the perpetrators.” [2g] (p7)

8.60 The HRW Report 2012 noted that:

“While violence has decreased in the Marange diamond fields over the past year, Human Rights Watch research in June found that Zimbabwe police and private security guards employed by mining companies in the Marange diamond fields were implicated in abuses against local unlicensed miners. Private security guards working with the police routinely beat and set dogs to attack and maul local miners who stray into areas of the fields controlled by the companies. During patrols, police also fired live ammunition at miners as they fled the fields.

“These findings contradict claims by the Zimbabwe government and some members of the international diamond monitoring body, the Kimberley Process, that areas controlled by private mining companies are relatively free of abuses and that diamonds from these companies should be certified and allowed on to international markets. The violence followed claims in June by the government and the chairman of the Kimberley Process, Mathieu Yamba, that conditions in the Marange fields are sufficient for it to be allowed to resume exports of diamonds.” [69e]

8.61 A report by Human Rights Watch as a contribution to the UN Human Rights Committee Universal Periodic Review of Zimbabwe, dated 29 March 2011, noted that:

“Torture and other ill-treatment of activists by police and members of Zimbabwe's intelligence services remain a serious and systemic human rights problem in Zimbabwe. Detainees in police custody are at significant risk of torture. Acts of torture that Human Rights Watch has documented include severe beatings that involved being punched, kicked, and struck with batons; beatings on the soles of the feet; repeated banging of detainees' heads against walls; and the shackling of detainees in painful positions.

“The government has taken no significant action to halt the torture and ill-treatment of individuals, including opposition supporters and civil society activists, in the custody of the police or intelligence services. In some cases torture is an element of coercive interrogations, while in others it is used as a form of punishment for the activists'
perceived leanings or intentions. Allegations of torture by police or intelligence officers are rarely investigated.” [69c]

8.62 A report by AIDS Free World, entitled Electing to Rape: Sexual Terror in Mugabe’s Zimbabwe, published December 2009, noted that it is believed that “hundreds and possibly thousands” of women were raped during the 2008 election campaign, most rapes are believed to have been carried out by ZANU-PF youth militia in collaboration with the Central Intelligence Organisation and ‘War Veterans’. [112a] (p12)

8.63 A report entitled No hiding place: Politically motivated rape of women in Zimbabwe, published by the Research and Advocacy Unit and the Zimbabwe Association of Doctors for Human Rights (IDSA /RAU report), dated December 2010, documented that since 2001 women have been subjected to politically motivated rape as a means of political control. In a sample of rapes committed between 2001 and 2008 the army had been responsible 5 cases out of the 27 women who were interviewed. [127a] (Introduction & p11)

8.64 In a report produced by An Institute for Democracy in Africa, the International Center for Transitional Justice and the Research and Advocacy Unit, Preying on the ‘Weaker’ Sex: Political Violence against Women in Zimbabwe, dated November 2010, based on interviews with 2149 women stated that:

“More than half [of the women interviewed] stated that they had been victims of violence;

“The most commonly reported perpetrators were non-state agents [ZANU-PF supporters, war veterans, youth militia];

“The most common violations reported at the hands of both state officials and non-state agents were assault, threats, and torture in that order;

“2% reported being personally raped…

“45% of the women surveyed indicated that they had witnessed violence against members of their families;

“23% reported that they had witnessed violence against their family members between 2-5 times;

“ 5% witnessed the violence 6-10 times, and 5% reported that this had happened more than 10 times to family members;

“The most frequent violations witnessed by the women against their family members by non-officials were assault, threats, torture and arson, and the first three were also the most common violations witnessed against family members by officials…” [9d] (p2)

8.65 The USSD Report 2011 noted that: “Security forces raped women during the year.” [2g] (p7)

See politically motivated violence, Latest News, Perpetrators of political violence, Violence against women, and Recent Developments for more detail on levels, distribution and nature of politically motivated human rights violations committed by the security apparatus and pro-ZANU-PF groups.
Extra-judicial killings

8.66 The USSD 2011 noted that: “There were reports that the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings.” [2g] (p2)

8.67 Security forces, specifically the army and the police, were also implicated in the murder of hundreds of mine workers in the Marange Diamond Fields, noted the Human Rights Watch report, Diamonds in the rough, dated 26 June 2009. [69d] (p4)

See politically motivated violence, Perpetrators of political violence, and Recent Developments for more detail on levels, distribution and nature of politically motivated human rights violations committed by the security apparatus and pro-ZANU-PF groups.

Disappearance and abductions

Also see the section above detailing arbitrary arrests.

8.68 The USSD Report 2011 noted that “There were several credible reports of politically motivated abductions and attempted abductions during the year. Leaders of both MDC factions reported that state security agents and ZANU-PF party supporters abducted and tortured MDC-T and MDC-M members, civil society members, and student leaders as part of an effort to intimidate them. Perpetrators were rarely punished.” [2g] (p4)

8.69 The following provides total kidnappings and abductions recorded by the Zimbabwe Peace Project for years 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011. *Figures for the first four months of 2012 have also been provided.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yearly totals</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kidnapping / Abduction</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[122j] (p9), [122l] (p8), [122m] (p11), [122n] (p9), [122o] (p10), [122p] (p10), [122q] (p9), [122r] (p9), [122t] (p9), [122u] (p4-5), [122v] (p4-5)

See Politically motivated violence, Perpetrators of political violence, and Recent Developments for more detail on levels, distribution and nature of politically motivated human rights violations committed by the security apparatus and pro-ZANU-PF groups.

9. MILITARY SERVICE

9.01 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – Zimbabwe (Armed Forces, updated 15 March 2012), noted that Zimbabwe does not have conscription but plans to reintroduce some form of compulsory military service were announced in 2000. “Lack of resources modified this plan …” and it is unlikely that this situation will change soon owing to the state of the economy. [90b]
9.02 The United States Department of Labor report, ‘2010 Findings on the worst forms of child labor – Zimbabwe’ (USDL 2010), covering the period January 2010 to December 2010, but also including important developments up to July 2011, dated September 2011, noted that: “The National Service Act of 1979 prohibits persons under age 18 from compulsory and voluntary military service.” [38b] (p824)

9.03 The World Survey of Conscription and Conscientious Objection to Military Service conducted by War Resisters International in 1998, noted that “conscientious objection is legally recognised” in Zimbabwe. Section 24 of the 1979 National Service Act provides for exemption from military service on conscientious grounds, such as religious beliefs, if conscription were to be introduced. It is not clear whether this exemption “applies to professional serving members of the armed forces.” [21]

9.04 The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), in a letter dated 2 June 2005, regarding the termination of military service in the Zimbabwean Army, stated, that it is possible to resign from the Zimbabwean Army although anyone doing so will be required to serve a period of notice. The period of notice will vary depending upon the training that has been provided. “Any man claiming that he has left the Zimbabwe Armed Forces legitimately should have documents of discharge in his possession.

“Terms and conditions of service are very similar to those in the British Army. Other ranks in the Zimbabwe Army sign on for 3, 7 or 20 years service. They can terminate their service at any time provided all their obligations, current at the time, have been met. Obligations might include time-bars for any training paid for by the military in civilian organisations. If the soldier wishes to leave before any time-bar has expired he will first be required to refund the Service all the charges for the course and the military salary paid to him while he attended the course. Early termination of service also brings penalties to pension entitlements.” [13b]

9.05 A Human Rights Watch report, entitled Diamonds in the rough, published in June 2009, noted that the standard period of notice to leave the Zimbabwean Army was three months, although the report noted that because of increasing resignations and desertions, this may have increased to nine months. [69d] (p29)

9.06 The FCO, in a letter regarding the termination of military service in the Zimbabwean Army, stated on 2 June 2005 that:

“If a soldier is absent for more than 28 days he will be charged with desertion upon recapture, or his surrender. Absence for less than 28 days is normally dealt with under the lesser charge of ‘Absent Without Leave (AWOL)’ and can be dealt with summarily by the soldier’s Commanding Officer, with punishment ranging from restriction of privileges, to small fines or short custodial sentences of a few days’ duration. Desertion is a serious charge to be dealt with by Courts Martial and depending on the circumstances, could result in long custodial sentences e.g. years, forfeiture of all benefits and salary and dishonourable dismissal from the Service. In wartime, of course, the penalties of desertion are very severe indeed. Occasionally, a Commander will not follow the ‘book’ and summary punishments will go beyond delegated powers.” [13b]
10.01 The UNESCO website, undated, accessed 27 June 2012, noted the following about Zimbabwean law:

“Zimbabwe’s legal system is a plural system that combines the Roman Dutch Law and English Law imported from the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope on 10 June 1891 with the customary law of the indigenous peoples of Zimbabwe. Customary Law is mainly applied in matters involving personal law; however, both customary law and the imported received law have been considerably revised by statutory provisions promulgated by the Parliament of Zimbabwe. Received law and statute law make up what is termed general law. All law, including customary law and legislation is subject to compliance with the Constitution of Zimbabwe, although customary law is exempt from provisions mandating non-discrimination in § 23 of the Constitution regarding the application of personal law.” [33b]

ORGANISATION

10.02 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – Zimbabwe, updated 12 October 2010, noted that:

“Judicial authority is vested in the Supreme Court, the High Court and subsidiary courts including Magistrates’ Courts, Local Courts headed by traditional chiefs and headmen and Small Claims Courts. The judiciary is headed by the chief justice who, together with other judges of the Supreme and High Courts, is appointed by the president after consultation with the Judicial Service Commission. According to the current constitution, a judge may serve until the retirement age of 65 but this is often extended to 70 when a judge is in good health.” [90a] (Internal Affairs)

10.03 The UNESCO website, undated, accessed on 27 June 2012, noted that:

“While Zimbabwe has a unified systems of courts, customary law and some limited elements of general law are applied by Local Courts (called ‘chiefs’ courts’) by terms of § 15 of the Customary Law and Local Courts Act (Chapter 7:05). The jurisdiction of these chiefs’ courts is predominantly restricted to issues of personal law.

“Magistrates Courts administer both customary law and general law pursuant to the Magistrates Court Act (Chapter 7:10). Criminal and civil matters are heard by Magistrates Courts but they have limited jurisdiction in both areas.

“The High Court has inherent jurisdiction in all matters, regardless of whether customary law or general law applies according to the High Court Act (Chapter 7:06). In practice, High Courts only hear matters of significant substance based on monetary and issue-related criteria.

“The Supreme Court is the final court of appeal but it also has original jurisdiction in constitutional matters as authorized by the Supreme Court Act (Chapter: 7:13) and the Constitution of Zimbabwe. In addition to the above-mentioned courts, there are specialist courts with appropriately limited jurisdiction – such as the Labour Court and the Administrative Court. See respectively Labour Act (Chapter 28:01) Part XI and Administrative Court Act (Chapter 7:1).” [33b]
INDEPENDENCE AND FAIR TRIAL


“The constitution provides for the right to a fair trial, but this right frequently was compromised in practice due to political pressure. Defendants enjoy a presumption of innocence under the law, although this right was not always respected in practice. Trials were held by magistrates or judges without juries and were open to the public, except in cases involving minors or state security matters. Assessors, in lieu of juries, could be appointed in cases in which the offense could result in a death penalty or lengthy prison sentence. Every defendant has the right to a lawyer of his or her choosing, but most defendants in magistrates’ courts did not have legal representation. In criminal cases an indigent defendant may apply to have the government provide an attorney, but this request was rarely granted except in capital cases, where the government provided an attorney for all defendants unable to afford one. Litigants in civil cases may request free legal assistance from the Legal Resources Foundation or ZLHR.

“Attorneys sometimes were denied access to their clients, especially in cases involving MDC members or civil society activists. Defendants have the right to present witnesses and evidence on their own behalf and to question witnesses against them. In practice these rights were not always observed. Defendants and their attorneys have the right to be furnished with all government-held evidence relevant to their cases, although this right was often not respected. Conviction requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and the prosecution bears the burden of proof. The right to appeal against both conviction and sentence exists in all cases, and it is automatic in cases in which the death penalty is imposed. Although these rights apply to all citizens, they often were not respected in politically sensitive cases. Government officials frequently ignored court orders in such cases, delayed bail and access to medical care, and refused to enforce court orders related to land disputes." [2g] (p16-17)

10.05 The USSD 2011 also noted that:

“Magistrates heard the vast majority of cases. In June 2010 the Judicial Services Act (JSA) went into effect. The JSA transfers authority over judicial magistrates and their support staffs from the Public Service Commission to the Judicial Services Commission (JSC), provides that the JSC determine remuneration and other conditions of service for magistrates, and provides for greater independence of magistrates. Legal experts claimed that defendants in politically sensitive cases were more likely to receive a fair hearing in magistrates’ courts than in higher courts, where justices were more likely to make political decisions. In practice, however, the JSA’s impact was limited during the year, particularly in rural areas. ZANU-PF sympathizers continued to successfully use threats and intimidation to force magistrates, particularly rural magistrates, to rule in the government’s favor. Some urban-based junior magistrates, however, demonstrated a greater degree of independence and granted MDC and civil society activists bail against the government’s wishes. Other judicial officers not covered by the JSA, such as prosecutors and private attorneys, also faced political pressure in politically charged cases, including harassment and intimidation.” [2g] (p16)

The police and judiciary are severely compromised and have largely ignored calls for investigations into past and recent human rights abuses.” [69b] (p26)

10.07 The International Crisis Group (ICG) reported on 20 April 2009, that the “… police have repeatedly refused to obey … court orders …” where judges and magistrates ruled against the interests of ZANU-PF. [100a] (p5) The Times (dated 1 June 2009) also noted that court rulings were often ignored by security forces. [82b]

10.08 SW Radio Africa reported on 21 May 2010 that President Mugabe unilaterally, and without the knowledge of his MDC partners, “… appointed a new Supreme Court judge and four High Court judges …” The article went on to note that: “To emphasize his powers Mugabe also promoted retired Brigadier General George Chiweshe as the new High Court Judge President. Chiweshe is the former chairperson of the discredited Zimbabwe Electoral Commission that kept Mugabe in power in 2008 by withholding election results for a month while massaging the figures.” [53f]

10.09 The report of a fact finding mission comprised of the Chairman of the General Council of the Bar of England and Wales, Desmond Browne QC, the President of the Commonwealth Lawyers Association, Mohamed Husain, a representative of Avocats Sans Frontières, Lara Deramaix, a representative of the Belgian and Flemish Bars, Philippe De Jaegere, the Vice-President of Avocats Sans Frontières, Netherlands, Hans Gaasbeek, the Chairman of the Bar Human Rights Committee, Mark Muller QC, the Project Coordinator of the Bar Human Rights Committee, Jacqueline Macalesher, and Ijeoma Omambala and Andrew Moran of the English Bar, undertaken between 24 October and 4 November 2009, titled ‘A place in the sun – Zimbabwe’, dated June 2010, stated:

“… By far the majority of the senior judiciary remains fundamentally compromised by state patronage, grants of land and other gifts given to them by the former government. The present government has not sought to claw-back such inducements from the senior judiciary nor has there been any policy initiative directed at re-establishing the integrity of the senior judiciary in the eyes of the public.

“6. The magistracy is under pressure as it has been for years and magistrates are subject to threats, intimidation, arrest and prosecution when they displease the authorities. In one notorious case referred to in the body of this report a magistrate in Eastern Zimbabwe was himself prosecuted by the authorities as a result of having granted bail to the Deputy Minister designate for Agriculture, Mr Roy Bennett. One interviewee described the magistracy as the unsung heroes of recent years.

“7. The Law Society of Zimbabwe endeavours to represent its membership against a background of intimidation and harassment of, in particular, human rights lawyers. It reflects greatly to the credit of the Law Society that in the absence of government action in relation to the compromising of the senior judiciary, the Law Society has taken the initiative in seeking to open a dialogue with the judiciary. The Law Society stands out as an organisation prepared vocally and committed actively to oppose measures which are anathema to the rule of law and to support its membership in the discharge of their duties as lawyers.

“8. Accounts of harassment and intimidation of lawyers are referred to in the body of the report. Two examples provide illustrations of what confronts the profession in Zimbabwe today. Whilst the mission was present in Zimbabwe a former President of the Law...
Society was arrested apparently for nothing more than having represented his client’s legitimate interests. Lawyers in Manicaland, Eastern Zimbabwe, have been threatened with violence and, in one case, with lethal force by the police and the military in the course of seeking to discharge their professional obligations to their clients.

“9. The physical infrastructure for the teaching of law is crumbling: the mission saw for itself the dilapidated state of the Law Faculty of the University of Zimbabwe. Glimpses of hope for the future of the teaching of law in Zimbabwe are to be found in the dedication of its staff. However, the mission was deeply disturbed by accounts it received that the Central Intelligence Organisation had infiltrated the student body in the Law Faculty with the result that the content of lectures and open debate in seminars was circumscribed by fear of the consequences of candour.

“10. Access to justice is virtually non-existent. The legal aid system is so starved of funds that the Legal Aid Directorate is itself on the verge of collapse. Although small numbers of cases are taken on by certain independent organisations such as the Legal Resources Foundation and Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights who need and deserve more financial support than they receive at present, the picture as regards access to justice is grim.” [107] (p4-5)

Further information about the courts system and the workings of the criminal justice system can be found at the UK Bar Council’s report - A Place in the Sun Zimbabwe: A Report on the state of the rule of law in Zimbabwe after the Global Political Agreement of September 2008, published June 2010. [107]


“Judicial attempts to exercise independence and impartiality are welcomed. Fostered by the Judicial Service Act and encouraging statements at the highest levels; however these are hindered by the other elements, including law enforcement officials and the Attorney-General’s Office, the Legislature and also the Ministry of Justice… [48c] (p9) There have been a number of occasions on which the Judiciary has exercised independence and delivered judgements free of political taint.” [48c] (p46)

Further discussion of the rule of law can be found in the chapter titled Institutional and Legislative Reform in the CSMM Report 2011.

10.11 The Civil Society Monitoring Mechanism report, ‘Mid-year review’, published on 2 November 2011, noted that “The courts have … passed some judgements on sensitive issues that demonstrate considerable judiciary autonomy. Examples include the High Court decision in June 2011 that acquitted Energy Minister Elton Mangoma of graft charges. The acquittal came two days after the High Court had also ordered the release of another MDC-T Minister, Jameson Timba, who had been arrested for allegedly calling President Robert Mugabe a liar.” [48e] (p12)

For information about pre-trial detention, see Arrest and detention – legal rights

PENAL CODE
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13 JULY 2012

10.12 The International Labour Organisation website provides copies of a number of criminal and penal laws.

11. ARREST AND DETENTION – LEGAL RIGHTS

11.01 The US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2011 (USSD 2011), Zimbabwe, published on 24 May 2012, noted that:

“The law stipulates that arrests require a warrant issued either by the court or a senior police officer and that police inform an arrested person of the charges before taking the individual into custody, but these rights were not respected in practice. The law requires a preliminary hearing before a magistrate within 48 hours of an arrest (or 96 hours over a weekend). Police typically made arrests on Fridays, which permitted legal detention until Monday. There were numerous reports that security forces arbitrarily arrested political and civil society activists, interrogated and beat them for information about their organizations’ activities, and then released them the next day without charge.” [2g] (p12-13)

11.02 The USSD 2011 report also noted:

“The law provides for bail, although the attorney general has the power to suspend bail while an appeal is lodged. High court judges at times granted bail independently. The law allows police to hold persons suspected of committing financial crimes for up to four weeks without bail. In some cases those arrested and denied bail were kept detained for weeks or months. In other cases police continued to hold persons in jail even after a judge had granted bail or dropped the charges.” [2g] (p12)

11.03 The same source also noted that:

“Authorities often did not allow detainees prompt or regular access to their lawyers and often informed lawyers who attempted to visit their clients that detainees were not available, especially in cases involving MDC members and civil society activists. Often detainees were moved overnight or on weekends from one police station or prison to another, and police refused to disclose the new location to their families and lawyers. Family members sometimes were denied access unless accompanied by an attorney, and even then were at times denied access in political cases. Detainees, particularly those of high profile, were often held incommunicado. The government also continued to harass and intimidate human rights lawyers when they attempted to gain access to their clients in police custody.” [2g] (p12)

11.04 The USSD 2011 report also stated that:

“Prolonged pretrial detention remained a problem, and some detainees were incarcerated for several months before trial or sentencing due to a critical shortage of magistrates and court interpreters, poor bureaucratic procedures, and political reasons. Other prisoners remained in prison because they could not afford to pay bail, which remained exorbitant given economic conditions in the country. Lawyers reported that juveniles usually spent more time in pretrial detention than adults because they could
not attend court unless a parent or guardian accompanied them, and the government
did not routinely notify parents when a juvenile was arrested.” [2g] (p15)

See also Security forces, Arbitrary and selective arrest and detention, Prison conditions
and Judiciary

12. **PRISON CONDITIONS**

12.01 The International Centre for Prison Studies’ ‘World Prison Brief, Zimbabwe’, (ICPS
Prison Brief 2011) website last modified 8 June 2011, accessed on 1 June 2012. However the data on the page is mostly dated October 2010, provided a statistical
breakdown of the prison estate and population:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>ZIMBABWE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry responsible</td>
<td>Ministry of Justice, Legal and Parliamentary Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prison administration</td>
<td>Zimbabwe Prison Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact address</td>
<td>Private Bag 7718, Causeway, Harare, Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone/fax/website</td>
<td>tel: +263 4 706501/4 or 777384/5 or 710095/7 or 754197 fax: +263 4 754157 Web: <a href="mailto:zps@qta.gov.zw">zps@qta.gov.zw</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of prison administration (and title)</td>
<td>Paradzayi Willings Zimondi Commissioner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prison population total (including pre-trial detainees / remand prisoners)</td>
<td>c.15,000 at October 2010 (national prison administration)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prison population rate (per 100,000 of national population)</td>
<td>c.121 based on an estimated national population of 12.4 million at October 2010 (from United Nations figures)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pre-trial detainees / remand prisoners (percentage of prison population)</td>
<td>c.30% (October 2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female prisoners (percentage of prison population)</td>
<td>3.0% (October 2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juveniles / minors / young prisoners incl. definition (percentage of prison population)</td>
<td>1.8% (October 2010 - under 18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign prisoners (percentage of prison)</td>
<td>0.7% (31.12.2008)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The main text of this COI Report contains the most up to date publicly available information as at 6 June 2012. Further brief information on recent events and reports has been provided in the Latest News section to 13 July 2012.

**ZIMBABWE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table: Number of Establishments and Prisional Capacities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of establishments / institutions</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2010 - there are also 26 satellite prisons)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Official capacity of prison system</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(October 2010)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Occupancy level (based on official capacity)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c.88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(October 2010)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Recent prison population trend (year, prison population total, prison population rate)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Rate (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>21,212</td>
<td>(191)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>21,212</td>
<td>(180)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>18,977</td>
<td>(155)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>19,376</td>
<td>(156)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>19,608</td>
<td>(157)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>16,429</td>
<td>(131)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12.02 The US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2011 (USSD 2011), published on 24 May 2012, noted that “There were approximately 14,000 prisoners, including 340 women and 130 juveniles; the prison system was designed for a maximum of 17,000 prisoners.” The report also stated that: “Conditions in the 46 main prisons and 22 satellite prisons were harsh, although there were some improvements during the year. Prison guards beat and abused prisoners. While prisons operated below capacity, NGOs reported that overcrowding continued due to dilapidated infrastructure, lengthy pretrial detentions, and prolonged trials. The occupation of cells in each prison by prison guards also contributed to overcrowding.” [2g] (p8)

12.03 The USSD 2011 report also reported that:

“Poor sanitary conditions resulted in disease, including diarrhea, measles, tuberculosis, and HIV/AIDS-related illnesses. Medical care, lighting, and ventilation were inadequate. There were insufficient mattresses, warm clothing, sanitary supplies, and hygiene products. In marked improvement from previous years, however, prisoners received at least two meals a day as a result of the revitalization of the country’s 23 prison farms; prisoners received one daily meal the previous year. Like most citizens of the country, prisoners had no access to potable water. The sale of prison farm products allowed authorities to address some shortages, and each prisoner was provided with two uniforms during the year.

“The Zimbabwe Prison Service (ZPS) tested prisoners for HIV only when requested by the prisoners or prison doctors. Due to inadequate facilities, outdated regulations, and the lack of medical personnel and medication, prisoners suffered from routine medical conditions such as hypertension, tuberculosis, diabetes, asthma, and respiratory diseases. NGOs also reported isolated cases of pellagra, an illness caused by a deficiency in protein and aggravated by poor lighting and ventilation.

“Neither the ZPS nor NGOs provided information on the prisoner death rate during the year. NGOs confirmed that they no longer tracked death rates given the dramatic
decrease in prisoner deaths since 2009, when an estimated 40 prisoners died monthly as a result of malnutrition and disease, particularly HIV/AIDS.” [2g] (p8)

12.04 The Civil Society Monitoring Mechanism report (CSIOMM), ‘Mid-year review’, published on 2 November 2011, noted that “The conditions in State Prisons remained fragile, with water and electricity shortages worsening the situation above the lack of basic necessities such as uniforms and blankets … The county’s major correctional services continue to be in a deplorable state with inmates lacking uniforms and adequate food.” [48e] (p9)

12.05 The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) noted in an operational update entitled Zimbabwe: addressing the essential needs of prisoners, dated 28 October 2010, that: “The situation in Zimbabwe’s prisons is better than it was two years ago…” The ICRC continued, noting that:

“… while still helping to improve the nutritional situation and food supply, the ICRC is also upgrading prison kitchen facilities, supplying blankets and hygiene items, and enhancing prisoner’s access to health care. In addition, it is improving water supply and sanitation, and reinforcing preparedness measures aimed at stemming outbreaks of diseases such as cholera… The ICRC has continued to supplement the Zimbabwe Prison Service diet by providing beans and oil in 17 of the largest prisons, which together hold some 8,300 prisoners, or nearly 65 per cent of the country’s total prison population. Since June 2010, it has also been providing groundnuts so as to help protect against pellagra, a vitamin-deficiency disease causing skin lesions and diarrhoea… The Zimbabwe Prison Service and the ICRC have organized training and workshops aimed at delivering better quality health care. The ICRC also helps the prison service to ensure that basic equipment and essential drugs are available in prison clinics and that sick detainees receive suitable treatment.” [125a]

12.06 An article published by New Zimbabwe on 15 February 2011 reported that:

“The Red Cross announced on Tuesday it is withdrawing food aid to the Zimbabwe Prison Service due to the country’s improved economy.

“The aid organisation said it would help the Zimbabwean authorities to gradually take over full responsibility for meeting the nutritional needs of 8,000 inmates to whom it has been distributing food since April 2009.

“The direct food aid we have been providing in prisons for almost two years was an emergency measure taken in response to a situation in which malnutrition had reached critical levels,’ said Thomas Merkelbach, head of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) regional delegation in Harare.

“He added: ‘An assessment undertaken jointly with the authorities established that the Zimbabwe Prison Service is now far more capable of meeting the dietary needs of inmates.

“During the handover period, which will last until 2012, the ICRC will closely monitor the situation. Together with the authorities, it will ensure that an appropriate diet for detainees is maintained’.” [41e]
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Annual Report (Zimbabwe) 2010, published May 2011, noted that: “During the year, the joint efforts of the ZPS [Zimbabwe Prison Service] and the ICRC contributed to stabilizing inmates’ nutritional status and ensuring a regular food supply to prison.” With regard to health, the report noted that “Detainees have improved health care and hygiene conditions … Dispensaries still lacking drugs and medical items got a regular supply from ICRC … [And] Inmates in prisons also benefited from preventative health measures supported by the ICRC, including the provision of hygiene kits. Nearly 10,000 detainees also received soap, plates, jerrycans and blankets …” [125b]

CSIOMM Periodic Report, January to March 2012, dated 9 May 2012, observed:

“The Zambia Prison Services Commissioner, Percy Kangwa Chatu, who was in the country for a five day official visit, says Zimbabwe Prison Services provides friendly conditions which are suitable for rehabilitation of inmates. In an interview with ZBC News after touring Chikurubi Maximum Prison, Commissioner Chatu said despite economic hardships Zimbabwe offers one of the best correctional services in the region. He said the rehabilitation programmes offered to inmates will go a long way in transforming the prisoners into law abiding citizens. On conditions in the country’s prisons, Senator Obert Gutu (Deputy Minister of Justice) also said that it was encouraging to note that the prison population had been greatly reduced, a move which has eased congestion and the spread of communicable diseases. As of now, prison population stands at 15 241 and there is a holding capacity of 17 000. Harare Central, Chikurubi and Khami maximum security prisons are above their holding capacities however due to the facilities for dangerous D Class prisoners being at these three prisons only.” [48b] (p19)

The ICPS Prison Brief 2011 profile stated that 1.8% of the prison population (around 280 of the estimated 15,000 prisoners) were under 18 years and 3% were women (around 450) as of October 2010. [32a] The USSD 2011 report observed that:

“There were approximately 14,000 prisoners, including 340 women and 130 juveniles; the prison system was designed for a maximum of 17,000 prisoners. Between 20-30 children under the age of three lived with their incarcerated mothers. NGOs reported that female prisoners generally fared better than males, were held in separate prison wings, and were guarded by female officials. Women generally received more food from their families than male prisoners, but children living with their incarcerated mothers were required to share their mothers’ food allocation. Prison officials also appeared to have prioritized food distribution to women. NGOs were unaware of women reporting rapes or physical abuse, which were common among the male population. NGOs suggested that female guards may have been more diligent about protecting female prisoners from abuse or that female prisoners may not have reported abuse. Prisons, with support from NGOs, provided sanitary supplies for women. Pregnant and nursing mothers were not provided additional care or food rations, but the ZPS solicited donations from NGOs and donors for additional provisions.” [2g] (p8-9)
“There was one juvenile prison, but juveniles were also held in adult prisons throughout the country. Officials generally tried to place juvenile inmates in separate cells. Juveniles were generally sent to prison instead of to reformatory homes, as stipulated in the Children’s Act. Juveniles were particularly vulnerable to abuse by prison officials and prisoners, and one church group confirmed two cases of abuse against juveniles by year’s end. In both cases the Department of Social Services took over the investigation.” [2g] (p9)

12.11 IRIN News reported on 11 April 2012:

“Dzimbabwe Chimbga, programme manager of local NGO Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR), said juveniles were jailed for numerous crimes, including armed robbery, theft, fraud, rape and murder, but his organization was ‘alarmed that the minors are lumped up with hard core criminals in cramped conditions’ while awaiting trial, sometimes for six months.

“Zimbabwe has no policy of separating the juveniles, whether they are awaiting trial or have been convicted, and this trend is pervasive throughout the country. It is a fundamental human rights violation as it subjects them to sexual, physical, psychological and emotional abuse, not to mention the fact that the health and food situations are horrible,’ he said.

“Chimbga said ZLHR had received an acknowledgment from the Justice Ministry that there was a need to establish a detention facility specifically for juvenile offenders.” [10j]

13. DEATH PENALTY

13.01 Hands Off Cain profile on Zimbabwe, updated on 28 March 2012, noted that capital crimes were murder, treason and mutiny and that the last execution took place in 2003. [71a] Amnesty International’s report, Death Sentences and Executions 2011, dated 27 March 2012, recorded at least one death sentence in Zimbabwe in 2011 “… [b]ut no executions were carried out for the fifth consecutive year.” [14m] (p53)

13.02 The same report noted that:

“During the [Universal Periodic Review] UPR [by the UN Human Rights Committee] in October 2011, the delegation of Zimbabwe stated that abolition of the death penalty was under consideration as part of the process of writing a new Constitution, which started in 2010 and is supposed to be concluded in 2012. Defense Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa, a former justice minister and Zanu-PF legal secretary himself sentenced to death under colonial rule, and a former High Court judge reportedly have both called for abolition. In June, Acting Secretary for Justice and Legal Affairs Maxwell Ranga was reported to say that the cabinet had not acted for a number of years on execution papers for the then 55 persons on death row – which is a pre-requisite for execution – because of the possibility that the law will be changed in the constitutional review process.” [14m] (p54)

retains the death penalty but has observed a moratorium since 2005 when the last execution was carried out. The last death sentence issued was in 2010. There were 59 people on death row at the end of 2011.” [13j] (p386)

13.04 The US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2011, published on 24 May 2012, noted that: “The right to appeal against both conviction and sentence exists in all cases, and it is automatic in cases in which the death penalty is imposed. Although these rights apply to all citizens, they often were not respected in politically sensitive cases.” [2g] (p17)

Also see Prison Conditions above

14. **POLITICAL AFFILIATION**

In assessing the human rights situation for individuals who are or perceived to be opposed to ZANU-PF and its supporters, officials should consider this section in its entirety in order to understand the prevailing political and human rights environment. Officials should also read the section on the security apparatus, Security forces, and Recent developments, for information about abuses committed by state forces and ZANU-PF supporters, including groups such as the war veterans. For background on the political system see section of the same name. Additionally, for a wider appreciation of freedom of expression see Freedom of speech and media, and Human rights institutions, organisations and activists.

14.01 Jane’s ‘Sentinel Security Risk Assessment’, Zimbabwe, Executive Summary (Jane’s Executive Summary), updated 12 March 2012, stated that:

“The defining feature of Zimbabwe's political situation since 1999 has been the ZANU-PF government's authoritarian response to the emergence of a broad-based opposition party. In June 2000, the MDC won 58 of 120 seats in the 150-member parliament, thereby depriving the government of its habitual two-thirds majority. Thereafter, the political situation worsened, with suppression of opposition rallies, detainment of opposition figures and curtailment of press freedoms. ZANU-PF retained the support of the poor rural population, primarily in the three Mashonaland provinces, and mobilisation of landless rural inhabitants and former ZANLA liberation war veterans has been a major feature of political conflict, including the confiscation of some 90 per cent of white-owned commercial farms. Although Robert Mugabe was returned for another six years as president in March 2002, the ruling party was seemingly caught by surprise in March 2008 when first-round victory in the presidential and National Assembly polls went to the MDC-T. Mugabe subsequently still won the presidency in a run-off election in June which was boycotted by the MDC-T's Tsvangirai. However, stronger regional criticism and pressure forced ZANU-PF into post-poll negotiations with the two MDC formations, culminating in the September 2008 power-sharing pact and the formation of a fragile unity government since February 2009.” [90d]

14.02 The Jane’s Executive Summary further noted that:

“Implementation complaints since the formation of the power-sharing government have included MDC-T objections over issues such as unilateral ministerial and public
appointments by Mugabe, as well as a lack of movement on issues related to the democratisation of the media and rule of law, among others. ZANU-PF, in turn, has claimed that the sanctions imposed on the country by Western powers are an obstacle to full implementation of the power-sharing pact, while also objecting to issues such as security sector reform. The MDC-T meanwhile regards many of the detentions of its officials and members as politically motivated and designed to undermine the workings of the power-sharing government. Although this will be denied by ZANU-PF and the defence and security structures, a summit of the SADC’s Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation had already voiced ‘grave concern’ at a meeting in March 2011 over the ‘polarisation of the political environment as characterised by, inter alia, resurgence of violence, arrests and intimidation in Zimbabwe’. While the summit did not single out any individual parties for criticism, most observers saw it as aimed at ZANU-PF, which has previously used the politicised security forces to contain opposition to it. Further claims of political intimidation and violence are likely to rise as momentum builds towards holding fresh elections.” [90d]

14.03 A paper published by NGO Pulse entitled Zimbabwe: Civil Society and Democracy, accessed, 17 January 2011, discussed the background to the political system. The paper noted that:

“Constitutionally, Zimbabwe is a democracy. However, the existing flawed Constitution, which is amenable to manipulation and abuse by the ruling elites, renders Zimbabwe’s democratic status grossly dysfunctional. Thus, political domination has, since 1980, lent itself more towards authoritarian, than democratic rule … In Zimbabwe, patronage and clientele politics has entrenched authoritarianism. The culture of intolerance and bad governance in the wake of the 2008 Harmonised Elections threatens to block the smooth democratic transition. Since 2000, there exists a fractious relationship between the discourses of democracy and sovereignty, espoused by the self-acclaimed democrats (opposition political parties and Civil Society Organisations) and the so-called nationalists (ZANU-PF and war veterans) … The pervasive patronage politics and these competing discourses explain recent raids on civil society in the context of the unfinished 2008 electoral process in Zimbabwe … Since … [2000], there has been a systematic militarisation and patronisation of all major and strategic state institutions for purposes of defending the ZANU-PF regime. In turn, this has grossly compromised the jurisdictional provisions of a rational-legal bureaucracy that guarantee efficiency and accountability of the government and is currently the greatest threat to democratic transition in Zimbabwe.” [133a] (p1-2)

14.04 The Solidarity and Peace Trust report, Hard Road to Reform, 13 April 2011, observed:

“Since the signing and initiation of the Global Political Agreement in Zimbabwe in September 2008 and February 2009 respectively, the politics of the country has been convulsed with a recurring set of problems even as it has allowed for a certain political and economic stabilization. The agreement, with its attendant Inclusive Government, was set up to establish the conditions for a free and fair election. However it was always clear that, in a more determinate sense, it would provide the site for intense struggles over the state between the contending parties, with Zanu PF always in an advantageous position because of its control of the coercive arms of the state. It is thus not surprising that the Mugabe regime has used its control of the police, security and military sectors to contain the constrained promise of the GPA to open up democratic spaces. It is also clear that both MDCs have made strategic mistakes that have added to the already difficult challenges that confronted them at the outset of the process.”
Moreover the problems of the GPA have, on occasion, been compounded by the different roles of SADC and the West.” [65a] (p6)

FREEDOM OF POLITICAL EXPRESSION

14.05 The US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2011 (USSD 2011), published on 24 May 2012, noted that: “Although the constitution provides citizens with the right to change their government peacefully, this right was restricted in practice. The political process continued to be biased heavily in favor of ZANU-PF, which has dominated politics and government since independence in 1980.” [2g] (p32)

14.06 The USSD 2010 noted with regard to the 2008 parliamentary and presidential elections that:

“International observers characterized the March 2008 harmonized presidential, parliamentary, and local elections and the June 2008 presidential run-off as neither free nor fair ... In the weeks preceding the March 2008 elections, the registrar general and the [Zimbabwe Electoral Commission] ZEC did not ensure an open inspection of voter rolls until they were compelled to do so by a court order. According to a local NGO that examined voter rolls, there were numerous attempts to register voters at ghost addresses, multiple registrations of the same person in different constituencies, and an improbable number of registered voters over the age of 90.

“Numerous restrictions were imposed on non-ZANU-PF party candidates. Although Tsvangirai was allowed to campaign, police did not permit the MDC-T to hold all of its planned rallies, and some MDC-T activists were intimidated and beaten in the weeks before the March election. Foreign journalists were not granted permission to cover the March elections. The domestic media heavily favored Mugabe.” [2g] (p32-33)


“Zimbabwe is not an electoral democracy. President Robert Mugabe and the ZANU-PF party have dominated the political landscape since independence in 1980, overseeing 18 amendments to the constitution that have expanded presidential power and decreased executive accountability. Presidential and legislative elections in March 2008 were marred by a wide-ranging campaign of violence and intimidation, flawed voter registration and balloting, biased media coverage, and the use of state resources—including food aid—to bribe and threaten voters. The period leading up to the presidential runoff in June 2008 featured accelerated violence against the opposition, prompting a UN Security Council resolution declaring the impossibility of a fair poll. Mugabe ultimately ran unopposed, and the vote was declared illegitimate by observers from the African Union and the [Southern Africa Development Community] SADC. Although the September 2008 [Global Political Agreement] GPA called for a new, independent election commission, the body had not been formally constituted by the end of 2010.

“Since the restoration of the Senate in 2005, Zimbabwe has had a bicameral legislature. A 2007 constitutional amendment removed appointed seats from the House of
Assembly, increased the number of seats of both chambers (to 210 in the House of Assembly and 93 in the Senate), and redrew constituency boundaries. In the Senate, 33 seats are still held by traditional chiefs, presidential appointees, and other unelected officials. All elected officials serve five-year terms. A 2009 constitutional amendment stemming from the GPA created the post of prime minister (and two deputy prime ministers) while retaining the presidency, leaving the country with a split executive branch.

“State-sponsored political violence is a serious and chronic problem. MDC-affiliated politicians, activists, and supporters continued to suffer from harassment, assault, and arbitrary detention by security forces and militias in 2010. A February report by Amnesty International alleged that torture and politically motivated prosecutions persisted, as did the intimidation of rural Zimbabweans perceived as supporting the MDC. In 2009, a group of 18 prominent human rights and political activists who had recently been released from jail were indicted on terrorism charges, and an MDC cabinet minister reported that party officials were receiving death threats on a near-daily basis. In October of that year, an audit revealed that over 10,000 ZANU-PF youth militia members were on the payroll of the Youth Development Ministry. According to the independent shortwave radio station SW Radio Africa, the whereabouts of seven MDC activists abducted in 2008 remained unknown at the end of 2010.” [96f]

14.08 The UK Border Agency’s Report of the Fact Finding Mission to Zimbabwe: Harare 9-17 August 2010, dated 21 September 2010 (reissued 27 October 2010), (FFM Report 2010) reported the views of a source that wished to remain anonymous in response to the question, “What have been the main differences in the political environment since the formation of the GNU?”:

“People in Zimbabwe are tentative about the current peace and are aware that it is fragile. There is some optimism, but the uncertainty about the future is evident in the population. It is believed that MDC have little power within the government and there is variable freedom of expression, although in MDC strongholds, it is more open. There was uncertainty about the timing of the next elections. The police interfere less with political action, however, war veterans sometimes interrupt meetings about the constitution. There is intimidation by some war veterans and people allied with Zanu PF in some areas which limits expression and participation. In rural areas there is some fear of reprisal for speaking against Zanu PF. People can talk about politics more freely than previously but are still inhibited by memories of past persecution.” [121a] (p20-21)

14.09 In response to the same question in the same report a major NGO which asked to remain anonymous noted: “The situation now is more permissive but the Source doubts how sustainable this is and is very concerned that the next elections will see a return to the previous more restrictive state of affairs.” [121a] (p21) In the same report and question, activist Anastasia Moyo [based on experiences in Bulawayo] observed that:

“There has been a slight improvement in freedom of expression since the GNU was formed, however people do not trust people they do not know enough to openly discuss politics.

“The organisation has been collecting information for the COPAC process and has found that people are sometimes reluctant to express their views openly in case of reprisals. The organisation attempts to convince people that they are free to discuss whatever they want, however the fear is deeply ingrained and there can be no
guarantees that people are safe. However, the organisation is not aware of any recent arrests for speaking against the government.” [121a] (p21)

14.10 Further comments from other sources in the same report included a major international humanitarian organisation, which stated that: “Generally the source believes that the political space has opened up to allow people to discuss political issues more freely. However, an increase in incidents of violence in connection with the constitutional outreach programme has complicated the picture.” [121a] (p22) While the Zimbabwe Human Rights Association stated:

“The political space has not really opened up at all at the local level. People cannot speak freely about political matters and there have been instances of people in Combis being arrested after being overheard doing so. This is more of a problem in rural areas but applies to some extent anywhere. The space has opened up to some extent for civil society, who can now access previously out of bounds areas although some remain problematic, for example Mutoko and Chiwesha.” [121a] (p24)

14.11 Sokwanele published a report by an anonymous Zimbabwean human rights activist entitled The Anatomy of Terror. The report, dated 9 June 2011, noted that:

“ZANU PF has clearly developed a comprehensive strategy for dealing with other parties competing in elections that strongly draws on its control of the structures and processes operating in the rural areas. Each aspect of a villager’s life, from the very ability to occupy land within the area, access to food, agricultural inputs, and, in some instances, access to his or her church, may be subject to the control of ZANU PF. This is accomplished through the control over formal governmental structures as provided by statute, the adulteration of these structures and legislated procedures, through traditional authorities, and through ZANU PF party structures and personnel in the area in question.

“Any person attempting to evade this control can be swiftly dealt with by restricting the access to resources, and, in the event of the individual having some degree of independence or autonomy, through overt violence. The degree of pressure exerted appears to be adjusted according to the support or lack of support that ZANU PF has in each ward. For the purposes of elections then, ZANU PF is able, for example, to determine whether subtle pressures, using the control of resources can be used in some areas or whether overt violence is required. This is graphically illustrated if one compares the strategies adopted by ZANU PF in the elections of 2000, 2002 and 2008 with 2005. In the latter instance, ZANU PF clearly utilized the more subtle forms of coercion, which this report has intended to show are available, rather than outright violence.

“What is remarkable that, given the power ZANU PF can exercise over villagers, any person living in the rural areas should admit to being an MDC supporter, let alone an activist. That many people still do so is a testimony to their courage and resilience.” [37f] (The anatomy of terror)
The main text of this COI Report contains the most up to date publicly available information as at 6 June 2012. Further brief information on recent events and reports has been provided in the Latest News section to 13 July 2012.

14.12 Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment: Zimbabwe, updated 18 April 2012, noted that one of the cornerstones of the Global Political Agreement is the drafting of a new constitution to be submitted to the electorate in a referendum ahead of future elections. It reported that:

“Preparation in this regard began with the creation of a 25-member select committee of members of parliament, known as COPAC, in April 2009. The provisional time frame for the draft constitution was for February 2010, with a referendum to be held by July of that year, but this process has suffered ongoing delays. In June 2010 the constitution-making process got underway again with the launch of a public outreach programme. However, some of the meetings faced disruption, with Human Rights Watch claiming that it was "marked by increasing violence and intimidation, mainly by ZANU-PF supporters and war veterans allied to ZANU-PF". [90I] (Constitution)

14.13 The FH Report 2011 observed:

“In February 2010, the government launched a new Constitutional Outreach Program to elicit public feedback, and consultations began in June [2010]. According to the civic group Veritas, about 70 outreach teams were dispatched across the country; by year’s end, some 4,000 meetings had been held, attended by over 700,00 people. However, high levels of political violence—overwhelmingly perpetrated by ZANU-PF supporters—marred the meetings. In September, the Zimbabwe Peace Project cited over 1,000 incidents of intimidation, abductions, arrests, and destruction of private property stemming from the consultations. Also that month, Human Rights Watch reported a series of attacks on allegedly pro-MDC villages and civil society monitors by ZANU-PF militants. The MDC claimed that 50 of its members had been arrested, while others had been abducted and assaulted; one MDC member was killed in September. The outreach effort was suspended in October due to violence and lack of funds.” [96f]


“This six month review [first half of 2011] assesses the constitutional reform process according to the benchmarks derived from Article VI of the Global Political Agreement (GPA). It shows that the process registered significant progress after some initial delays. It continues however to be dogged by a plethora of problems and challenges including but not limited to;

“Inadequate resources
“Poor publicity
“Arrest of one of the co-chairpersons
“Poor planning
“Transparency and Accountability

“These challenges have slowed down the process and continue to pose a threat of undermining the final product. According to timelines set by COPAC in January 2011, the referendum should have been held in September [2011]; however the thematic committee phase only ended on the 14th of August 2011.” [48e] (p19)

14.15 The CISSOM Periodic Report, January to March 2012, published on 9 May 2012, noted in its section on constitutional reform that:
“The period January-March 2012 saw the continuation of the constitution making process however it was characterised by slow progress due to a number of challenges including but not limited to; politicisation, draft leakages and political party influence and interference.

“At the end of 2011, the Constitution Parliamentary Select Committee (COPAC) began the drafting stage of the constitution-making process. The drafting stage continued in January 2012 with the first draft proposal completed in early February 2012. The select committee reviewed the draft constitution with assistance from technical experts and adopted changes. There are however outstanding issues remaining which include dual citizenship, compensation for expropriated land, devolution, role of the chiefs in the Senate, Independent Prosecuting Authority and structure of the executive. COPAC has however failed to meet the set timeline of completing the draft constitution within 35 days.

“During the period under review the media was awash with reports of constitution making process and constant updates from COPAC which indicated that the drafting stage is almost complete, drawing the process closer to the 2nd All Stakeholders conference and the Referendum. The public media leaked the draft constitution and ZANU PF officials continued with efforts of discrediting the process and calling for the firing of the drafters and abandoning of the whole process.” [48b] (p6)

For further information about COPAC see History/Events 2008 – 2010/Constitutional Outreach Programme, and limits on freedom of association and intimidation/violence associated with the process see following subsections.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND ASSEMBLY

14.16 The Civil Society Monitoring Mechanism (CISOMM) Periodic Report for January to March 2012, published on 9 May 2012, noted that:

“In relation to political meetings and rallies, the three Principals over this period [January to March 2012 inclusive] agreed in principle to hold joint rallies where they could speak to their supporters, encouraging them to desist from violence. This noble idea was frustrated by reports of the Chipangano group of youths who in early March reportedly disrupted an MDC-T rally in the high density suburb of Mbare, Harare. Yet at the end of February, churches and shops had been closed within the same suburb to allow people to attend a ZANU-PF rally. Given the fact that both parties are together in government there is no rationale to restrict campaign space for one party whilst opening up same for another. Such conduct flies in the face of the message of peace which is apparently espoused by the Principals.

“This period also witnessed an abuse of legal instruments such as POSA and the Criminal Code. To start off with, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Union march to commemorate International Women’s Day was banned on the spurious grounds that it was a political protest. How such a march can be deemed synonymous with a political protest is not clear.
“Further disturbing incidents included the banning of the CPCA Anglican church gatherings in Mashonaland West, notwithstanding the fact that these were not being held in churches to which the Anglican Church of Zimbabwe lays claim. Such a ban seriously interferes with freedom of worship which is guaranteed by the Constitution of Zimbabwe … WOZA was not spared the same abuse as its members were detained for staging a protest for media freedom and fair Zimbabwe broadcasting licensing fees.” [48b]

14.17 The Solidarity Peace Trust’s report ‘The Hard Road to Reform’, published 13 April 2011, noted that:

“[First quarter of] 2011 has been characterised first and foremost, by the closing of democratic space, with a surge of bans on rallies, marches and meetings, accompanied by a large number of associated arrests that peaked in February and early March, and have continued to date. This can be viewed as a direct response to events in North Africa, where several popular revolutions have led to heightened concern among the Zimbabwe military and ZANU-PF about the possibility of an uprising in Zimbabwe. … In terms of POSA, meetings taking place inside a building do not require the police to be informed, but this is being routinely ignored, as even meetings in private buildings are being repeatedly raided and shut down.” [65a] (p23)

14.18 The report continued, noting claims by the MDC-T that the police had infringed its freedom of assembly by banning its political rallies and gatherings. The report noted:

“The Commissioner of Police prepared a report for cabinet in early April [2011], in which he claimed that 94% off MDC meetings had been approved by the police. He confirmed the refusal to allow 38 meetings out of 682 applied for by MDC-T so far this year: he does not indicate when these 38 meetings were disallowed, but it seems likely that all 38 of these refusals were within a short time span in March. Significantly, the refusals affected several attempts by the MDC-T to organise a rally featuring Morgan Tsvangirai, thus denying him a public platform.” [65a] (p25)

14.19 The USSD 2011 noted that:

“The constitution provides for freedom of assembly, but the government restricted this right in practice. The law requires that organizers notify the police of their intention to hold a public gathering--defined as 15 or more individuals--seven days in advance. Failure to do so results in criminal prosecution as well as civil liability. The law also allows police to prohibit a gathering based on security concerns but requires police to file an affidavit in a magistrate’s court stating the reasons behind the denial. Although many groups that held meetings did not seek permits, other groups informed the police of their planned events and were denied permission or received no response.

“Requests by civil society, trade unions, or political parties other than ZANU-PF to hold public events were routinely denied if the agenda contradicted ZANU-PF positions.” [2g] (p27)

14.20 The USSD 2011 report also noted that:

“The constitution and law provide for freedom of association, but the government restricted this right in practice. Although the government did not restrict the formation of political parties or unions, security forces and ZANU-PF supporters continued to
interfere with their activities during the year. ZANU-PF supporters, sometimes with
government support or acquiescence, intimidated and abused members of
organizations perceived to be associated with other political parties. Suspected security
force members visited the offices and inquired into the activities of numerous NGOs and
other organizations believed to oppose government policies. Organizations generally
were free of governmental interference only if the government viewed their activities as
apolitical.” [2g] (p28-29)

14.21 A report by Human Rights Watch entitled Universal Periodic Review of Zimbabwe, a
submission to the UN Human Rights Council, dated 29 March 2011, noted that:

“Zimbabwean citizens who publicly and peacefully express opinions critical of the
government are routinely subject to arrest. The government passed two major pieces of
legislation before presidential elections in 2002, the Public Order and Security Act
(POSA) and the Miscellaneous Offences Act (MOA), which severely limit criticism of
government and public debate.

“The police in Zimbabwe have often used key provisions of these laws, as well as the
Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act, to justify arrests that violate basic rights
and systematically deny civil society activists the right to peacefully assemble and
associate. The police have used provisions in POSA to strictly monitor and prevent
public meetings or disrupt peaceful demonstrations.

“Peaceful protests in Zimbabwe are often violently disrupted by the police. At various
times over the past decade, hundreds of peaceful demonstrators, including student
activists, trade unionists, and human rights activists, have been arrested for exercising
their right to peacefully assemble. On February 19, 2011, police arrested 45 activists
who were meeting in Harare to discuss events in the Middle East.” [69c]

14.22 The International Trade Union Confederation ‘2012 Annual Survey of Violations of
Trade Union Rights – Zimbabwe’, published on 6 June 2012, noted that:

“The [Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions] ZCTU faced continued police harassment,
including a visit to their offices by plain clothes police, the arrest of participants in a
Women’s Day march and the disruption of a women’s education programme. The police
also tried unsuccessfully to ban the ZCTU’s May Day marches and Zanu-PF youths
violently disrupted a ZCTU event. Meanwhile striking teachers faced threats and
beatings while farm workers who organised to press for their pay claim found
themselves jobless, homeless and facing death threats. A child died as a result.” [148b]

OPPOSITION GROUPS AND (PERCEIVED) POLITICAL ACTIVISTS

Movement for Democratic Change

14.23 Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai (MDC-T) and Movement for Democratic
Change-Ncube (MDC-N), agreed to join a government of national unity with President
Robert Mugabe’s ZANU-PF in February 2009. Although, part of the government, both
formations of the MDC are opposed to many of ZANU-PF’s policies. (International
Crisis Group, 20 April 2009) [100a] (p2) To note, MDC-N was previously known as
MDC-M after its original leader, Arthur Mutambara, who was replaced by Welshman Ncube in 2011. Both formations are sometimes simply referred to as MDC.

14.24 There are a number of smaller political parties in Zimbabwe; however, none holds any seats in either of the legislative bodies. More information about these parties can be found at Annex B – Political organisations.

Information about the situation and treatment of the MDC (both ‘formations’), its supporters and others considered to oppose the ZANU-PF is covered in further detail below under Politically motivated human rights violations. Additionally there is relevant information in a number of sections throughout the report. For information about state actors and pro-ZANU-PF groups, including the politicisation of the police, and impunity and human rights violations committed generally by these organisations, see Security forces/Human rights violations by security forces and pro-ZANU-PF groups.

For additional information about the political and human rights situation and freedom of speech, see Recent developments, Political affiliation and Human rights institutions, organisations and activists

Teachers

14.25 The UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), noted in a report entitled Education under attack 2010, dated 10 February 2010, that: “… in recent years students, teachers and academics have been either beaten, arrested, tortured, threatened with murder or shot dead by state forces or state-backed forces in … Zimbabwe …” [33a] (p48) “Teacher trade unionists were [and continue to be [33a] (p48) singled out for assassination, false imprisonment or torture in … Zimbabwe …” [33a] (23)

14.26 Noting the recent situation for teachers, the UNESCO report continued, noting:

“Around 45,000 teachers left Zimbabwe between 2004 and 2008 to escape the economic crisis or political violence. Many thousands more were reportedly afraid to leave their homes in 2008 due to the political violence, which halted education in most schools, particularly in the rural areas. As a result, schools were empty and there were reports of their being used as bases for the Green Bombers and other state forces. The activities of all NGOs were also banned for a long period in 2008, with some staff members facing persecution.” [33a] (p101)

14.27 The Progressive Teachers’ Union of Zimbabwe (PTUZ) published a report, ‘Every School has a story to tell: A Study into Teacher’s Experiences with Elections in Zimbabwe’ in September 2011, which was based on a survey of 1086 teachers carried out by the PTUZ in April-June 2011. In its section on methodology, the report explained that:

“The data presented here has been gathered from a full scale national survey covering all the Provinces in Zimbabwe … the demographic distribution goals were achieved with 51% female respondents compared with 49% male respondents.
“It is also worth noting is that the sample was largely biased towards rural areas. This is explained by the distribution of schools in Zimbabwe. It was also evident in that most of the violations reported in the initial desk study were reported in rural areas, which has been the common finding in all human rights reports since 2000.” [161a] (p2)

14.28 The same report noted:

“An interesting finding from the study is that teachers, whether differing by political or Union affiliation, are all regarded with suspicion in society. Some teachers were attacked because of roles they played in such activities as office bearers in trade unions that are deemed to be anti-ZANU PFF (sic) or because they were perceived to be politically active in opposition political parties, but the majority were attacked simply because they are teachers. 73% of teachers, unsurprisingly, were unwilling to disclose their political party preference.

- 56% stated that the attacks they witnessed were because teachers were suspected to be members or sympathised with the opposition parties;
- 14% stated that the attacks they witnessed were because teachers are deemed influential in society and accused of influencing people to vote for the opposition political parties, especially during the March 2008 Elections;
- The remainder stated that the attacks they witnessed were because teachers were not actively supporting ZANU PF [8%], or because the teacher was a member of PTUZ [4%].” [161a] (p2)

14.29 The study also gave the following statistics:

“51% teachers reported that they have directly experienced political violence of one form or another, and 55% stated that they had been forced to vote for a particular political party because of violence or threats of violence, with the worst election for such intimidation being June 2008. 68% stated that they had experienced violence in the June 2008 election, but high percentages also reported direct experience of violence in 2000 and also the March 2008 election”. [161a] (p2)

14.30 The same report also noted that:

The most frequent violations directly experienced were as follows:

- 79% reported having been forced to attend political meetings;
- 77% reported threats;
- 41% reported some form of extortion;
- 33% reported being assaulted;
- 31% reported being tortured;
- 30% reported having been disqualified from voting;
- 24% reported having been forcibly displaced from their work station and community. [161a] (p2)

14.31 The report listed the following frequencies of perpetrators:

- “War veterans” [27%], ZANU PF supporters [24%], and the Youth militia [20%] were the most frequently identified perpetrators;
The next most frequent perpetrator was the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) [10%], which was a much higher frequency than in most human rights reports over the past decade;

Even fellow teachers [4%] were identified as being involved in violence. [161a] (p3)

The same source stated that:

“56% of teachers reported witnessing political violence. However, whilst there was a strong positive relationship between teachers experiencing violence and being a victim during an election, there was no relationship between teachers being direct victims and witnessing violence. Hence direct victims and those witnessing are two different groups in the sample.

“The violations witnessed were similar in most respects to the violations experienced, but reported at much higher frequencies:

“84% reported threats, the most frequent violation witnessed;

“In rank order, assault [53%], indecent assault [49%], torture [47%], and extortion [43%] were the next most common violations witnessed by teachers;

“However, forced displacement [33%], property destruction [20%], and abduction [18%] were also reported with high frequencies.

“As was the case with those reporting direct experience of violence, ZANU PF supporters [23%] and ‘War veterans’ [27%] were the most frequently identified perpetrators, but, unlike those with direct experience, the CIO [6%] were not as frequently reported and the Youth militia [28%] turned out to be the most frequently mentioned group of perpetrators for those witnessing violations. In identifying the perpetrators, it is evident that separating ZANU (PF) supporters from war veterans and youth militias is a matter of convenience, otherwise it is almost impossible to separate them. This bolsters the argument that political violence against teachers, like any other organised violence during the electoral cycle is largely state-sponsored.” [161a] (p3)


The Zimbabwe Peace Project (ZPP) report, Summary on politically motivated human rights and food related violations: May 2011, (ZPP Report May 2011) published on 24 June 2011, noted that: “Harassment and intimidation of teachers was reported at Nyamandi Methodist School in Gutu District where the headmaster was threatened with unspecified action and accused of being an MDC-T activist.” [122o] (p6)

Zimeye reported on 23 June 2011 that the PTUZ reported that its teachers had been “…harassed in some areas for taking part in the strike action that started Wednesday (22nd June). PTUZ President, Takavafira Zhou, told SW Radio Africa that youth militia, intelligence agents and school heads aligned with ZANU-PF, are intimidating teachers and making threats.” [144a]

See also Latest news, Recent Developments and Political affiliation
Students

14.35 The USSD 2011 report noted:

“The government continued to restrict academic freedom. The president is the chancellor of all eight state-run universities and appoints all vice chancellors. The government has oversight of all higher education policy at public universities. The law restricts the independence of universities, subjecting them to government influence and extending the disciplinary powers of university authorities over staff and students.

“CIO personnel at times assumed faculty and other positions and posed as students at public and some private universities to intimidate and gather intelligence on faculty and students who criticized government policies and actions. CIO officers regularly attended all classes where noted MDC activists were lecturers or students. In response both faculty and students often practiced self-censorship.” [2g] (p26)

14.36 The USSD 2011 report noted that:

“According to the Students Solidarity Trust, a local NGO that provides assistance to student activists, there were three cases in which activist students were abducted and tortured during the year.

“No action was taken against Masvingo security agents who in May 2010 abducted and tortured Alec Tabe and Godfrey Kuraune, two leaders of the Zimbabwe National Students Union. Tabe and Kuraune were organizing a demonstration against high examination fees at Masvingo Polytechnic. They were picked up by Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) agents, who then tortured them on their chests and genitals with a pair of pliers before leaving them at a nearby police station. Tabe and Kuraune were released after paying an admission-of-guilt fine to the police… (p5)

“According to the local NGO Students Solidarity Trust, approximately 30 students were arrested or detained, and approximately seven students were expelled or suspended, for engaging in student activism between January and August [2011]. The NGO also reported three cases of torture and abduction during the same time period… (p14)

“Although the government harassed university student unions for protesting against increased tuition fees, arrests of student demonstrators declined significantly during the year.” [2g] (p28)

Trade unions

14.37 The International Trade Union Confederation’s (ITUC) Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights, Zimbabwe 2012, 6 June 2012, noted that:

“The [Zimbabwe Congress of Trades Unions] ZCTU faced continued police harassment, including a visit to their offices by plain clothes police, the arrest of participants in a Women’s Day march and the disruption of a women’s education programme. The police
also tried unsuccessfully to ban the ZCTU's May Day marches and Zanu-PF youths violently disrupted a ZCTU event. Meanwhile striking teachers faced threats and beatings while farm workers who organised to press for their pay claim found themselves jobless, homeless and facing death threats. A child died as a result.” [148b] (Introduction)

14.38 The same source stated under the heading Reported Violations – 2012, that there have been 10 threats, 21 arrests and 18 dismissals documented (though actual violations may be higher). [148b] (Introduction)

14.39 The ITUC survey also noted that:

“The labour laws pertaining to trade union rights are lacking. Although private sector workers enjoy freedom of association, public sector workers do not have the right to form and join trade unions, to bargain collectively or to strike. The Registrar has the power to supervise trade union elections and can cancel, postpone, or change the venue of the elections. Furthermore, collective bargaining is not the exclusive prerogative of trade unions, as workers’ committees may also bargain at the company level, hence potentially undermining the unions. All collective bargaining agreements must then be approved by the authorities.

“The right to strike is also limited, as the procedures that must be exhausted prior to a strike are excessively long. Employers are not prohibited from hiring replacement workers during a strike, and also have the right to sue workers for liability during unlawful strikes. The penalties for participating in an illegal strike include harsh prison sentences of up to five years. Strikes are banned in ‘essential services’, the list of which exceeds the ILO International Labour Organization. The Minister also has discretionary powers to decide what constitutes an essential service.” [148b] (Legal)

The ITUC Zimbabwe – 2012 report also lists documented rights violations of trade union members: [http://survey.ituc-csi.org/Zimbabwe.html#tabs-5] Further detailed information regarding trade union rights and violations can be found at the International Trade Union Confederation’s website.

14.40 The USSD 2011 report noted:

“The law provides private sector workers with the right to form or join unions without prior authorization, conduct legal strikes, and bargain collectively. These rights were sometimes abrogated by other provisions of law... The government did not effectively enforce applicable laws. The rights to form or join unions, strike, and bargain collectively were not respected in practice. Unions were prevented from holding meetings with their members and carrying out organizational activities, sometimes by the police or ZANU-PF supporters. Although the law does not require unions to notify the police of public gatherings, such notification was required in practice. Often unions that applied for permission were denied. Unions risked suspensions from registration for 12 months for minor infractions, and union members could be fined and imprisoned for participating in union activities.

“The Zimbabwe Federation of Trade Unions (ZFTU), a government-created alternative labor body, continued to exist but did not wield real influence over labor negotiations. The government was disinclined to include the ZFTU in labor-related discussions with employer and labor organizations.
“Police often denied ZCTU’s applications to hold commemorations in particular venues and banned processions from taking place. The police also sought to restrict union activities by prescribing certain conditions.

“On February 19, police arrested and detained 46 labor union and student activists who had gathered for a video presentation and discussion of popular protests in Egypt and Tunisia... Government-imposed delays prevented most employees and their unions from declaring legal strikes, and those who participated in strikes deemed illegal faced government intimidation and sentences of up to five years in prison.

“The ZCTU reported that its affiliates were able to engage in collective bargaining with employers without interference from the government. Collective bargaining agreements applied to all workers in an industry, not just union members. Agreements reached by employers and employees must be gazetted by the Ministry of Labor to go into effect. In practice any agreement could be administratively blocked when left ungazetted over an indefinite period of time.

“Union members faced discrimination and harassment, including dismissal and transfer. There were no reports that union members dismissed as a result of union activities were reinstated during the year.” [2g] (p49-50)

See also section on Employment rights.

Politically motivated human rights violations

To gain a rounded understanding of events when considering politically motivated human rights violations, officials are recommended to read section 14 in its entirety and, for further context, to consider the Security forces section for more information about the conduct of the security apparatus.

14.41 The USSD 2011 report, in its introduction, noted that:

“The most important human rights problems in the country remained the government’s targeting for harassment, arrest, abuse, and torture of members of non-ZANU-PF parties and civil society activists, widespread disregard for the rule of law among security forces and the judiciary, and restrictions on civil liberties. ZANU-PF’s control and manipulation of the political process effectively negated the right of citizens to change their government.” [2g] (Executive summary)

Limitations of quantitative data

14.42 The statistics provided in the following paragraphs are largely based on Zimbabwe Peace Project’s (ZPP) monthly reports on politically motivated human rights violations. The ZPP was, as stated in the introduction of each of its reports (the text below is taken from the March 2012 report dated 24 April 2012):

“… conceived shortly after 2000 by a group of Churches and NGOs working or interested in human rights and peace-building initiatives, and was to become a vehicle for civic interventions in a time of political crisis. In particular ZPP sought to monitor and
document incidents of human rights violations and politically motivated breaches of the peace e.g. violence. Today, ZPP’s co-operating member organizations include, Zimbabwe Council of Churches (ZCC), Catholic Commission for Justice & Peace in Zimbabwe (CCJPZ), Evangelical fellowship of Zimbabwe (EFZ) Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN), Counselling Services Unit (CSU), Zimbabwe Civic Education Trust (ZIMCET), Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR), Zimbabwe Human Rights Association (ZIMRIGHTS), Civic Education Network Trust (CIVNET), Women’s Coalition and the Habakkuk Trust.

“The ZPP is a non-partisan organisation that reports on politically motivated human rights violations without any bias. The information that we publish is verified through a thorough verification process within ZPP.” [122d] (p1)

14.43 The same March 2012 report stated under a heading, Methodology: “This report is based on reports from ZPP long-term community based human rights monitors who observe, monitor and record cases of human rights violations in the constituencies they reside. ZPP deploys a total of 420 community-based primary peace monitors (two per each of the 210 electoral constituencies of Zimbabwe). The ZPP reports are published in retrospect.” [122d] (p2)

14.44 However, COI Service recommends that officials exercise caution in considering and assessing ZPP’s data. While the ZPP may go to reasonable lengths to confirm the veracity of reported cases of politically motivated human rights violations, it does not set out how exactly the events and motivations of the perpetrators are verified. Conversely, ZPP (or indeed other sources referred) does not claim to have documented all incidents of human rights violations; not all will come to the attention of and be documented by ZPP monitors for a variety of reasons including, for example, victims’ fear of reprisal. The quantitative data should therefore not be considered comprehensive or exhaustive but an indication of the levels, nature and distribution of politically motivated human rights violations in Zimbabwe in the period covered.

**Numbers of incidents: 2008 – April 2012**

14.45 The Zimbabwe Peace Project (ZPP) report, Summary on politically motivated human rights and food related violations: May 2011, (ZPP Report May 2011) published on 24 June 2011 that in the election year of 2008 it recorded 23,755 human rights violations. (Violations recorded were: displacement; harassment/intimidation; unlawful detention; torture; malicious damage to property (MDP); discrimination; theft/looting; assault kidnapping/abduction; rape and murder.) The number of violations fell to 14,725 in 2009, then to 10,673 in 2010 before rising slightly to 11,935 in 2011. The large majority of human rights violations in 2010 were for harassment/intimidation (7,630), assault (1919) and discrimination (1312), which in total represented over 90% of incidents (see below). [122o] (p10) To note: ZPP recorded incidents as documented by its monitors or as reported to it, it does not claim to have recorded all incidents that may have happened.

14.46 The following provides a comparison of the total human rights violations for years 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and the first four months of 2012, documented by ZPP.
The main text of this COI Report contains the most up to date publicly available information as at 6 June 2012. Further brief information on recent events and reports has been provided in the Latest News section to 13 July 2012.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Act / Year</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>Jan-Apr 2012</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Murder</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rape</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kidnapping / Abduction</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>200</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assault</td>
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<td>3,296</td>
<td>1,929</td>
<td>1,919</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft/Looting</td>
<td>611</td>
<td>598</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrimination</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>1,314</td>
<td>1,051</td>
<td>1,312</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDP</td>
<td>1,009</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torture</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>42</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unlawful Detention</td>
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<td>284</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Harassment / Intimidation</td>
<td>12,593</td>
<td>7,865</td>
<td>6,839</td>
<td>7,630</td>
<td>823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>680</td>
<td>281</td>
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<td>NA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attempted Murder</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>23,755</td>
<td>14,725</td>
<td>10,673</td>
<td>11,935</td>
<td>1,243</td>
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</table>

[122][p9], [122l][p8], [122m][p11], [122n][p9], [122o][p10], [122c][p4-5], [122d][p10], [122e][p10], [122f][p9], [122p][p10], [122q][p9], [122r][p9], [122s][p8], [122t][p8], [122u][p9]

14.47 The bar chart below has been created using data from the ZPP reports from 2008 to April 2012 and shows the cumulative levels of politically motivated human rights violations (as defined in paragraph 14.45) documented by the ZPP.
14.48 The following table provides figures for human rights violations by type recorded by the Zimbabwe Peace Project in its monthly reports for the period May 2011 to April 2012.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acts</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sep</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Feb</th>
<th>Mar</th>
<th>Apr</th>
<th>Total</th>
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</tr>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
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<td>Kidnapping / Abduction</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault</td>
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<td>130</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>1120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft / Looting</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>885</td>
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<tr>
<td>Discrimination</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>62</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>75</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Harassment / Intimidation</td>
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<td>624</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>577</td>
<td>441</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>5240</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>994</td>
<td>1014</td>
<td>910</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>791</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>599</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>465</td>
<td>524</td>
<td>7717</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* MDP = malicious damage to property

14.49 The FCO’s Human Rights Report 2011, reporting on events in 2011, noted that:

“Following a worrying rise in political violence and intimidation at the start of the year, Zimbabwe’s human rights situation by the end of 2011 had returned to the relative stability experienced in 2010. The early spate of politically motivated human rights abuses targeting political and civil society groups was believed to have been triggered by calls made by the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) for elections to be held in 2011, but declined as the prospect of early elections receded.” [13] (p381)

14.50 The Zimbabwe Civic Action Group, Sokwanele, on its webpage ZIG Watch, undated, accessed on 1 June 2012, described the project:

“Zimbabwe Inclusive Government Watch (ZIG Watch) is tracking articles and reports which provide examples of violations of the agreement between the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (Zanu PF) and the two Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) Formations.

“Signed on 15 September [2008] in Harare, the Global Political Agreement agreement comprises 25 ‘Articles’ and lists the points of agreement reached under each. ZIG Watch involves a daily monitoring of media articles, logging those we believe highlight a
breach of the letter and spirit of the agreement. Direct links are provided to all original sources of information.

“It must be noted that Zimbabwe’s media environment is extremely restrictive, and the economic challenges in the country make it difficult for local journalists to travel to rural areas. This means that the breaches logged in ZIG Watch have to be viewed as a sample of incidents rather than a comprehensive account of what is happening in the country. It is highly likely that this project reflects an underestimate of the scale of the breaches against the GPA.” [37]

14.51 The same source noted in ‘Zimbabwe Inclusive Government Watch: Issue 35 and 36’, published 1 March 2012 (ZIG Watch 35 and 36), that 92 per cent of the breaches it had recorded of the GPA during December 2011 and January 2012, based on analysis of 131 media articles, were attributable to ZANU-PF. [37i] It also noted that:

“With respect to violations of the Global Political Agreement, December followed a similar pattern to the preceding months. There were ongoing reports of widespread violence, legal harassment, the banning of political meetings and the restriction or abuse of freedom of speech by Zanu-PF via its stranglehold on the armed forces…

“During December, a total of 52 media articles were recorded for ZIG Watch, each article representing a unique breach of the terms of the GPA. Categorising these articles by the nature of the breach allows the generation of representative statistics.

“The greatest number of violations involved cases of ‘legal’ harassment of perceived opposition politicians and supporters, followed by cases of violence, intimidation, hate speech, threats, abductions and brutality. Next came cases of denial of the right to freedom of speech, or the abuse of freedom of speech, followed by examples of the denial of freedom of association or assembly. Zanu-PF was either responsible for, or involved in 98 per cent of all breaches recorded.” [37i]

14.52 ‘ZIG Watch 35 and 36’ also noted that:

“In January, the political environment was similar to that of the previous month. The majority violations of the GPA also involved the ‘legal’ harassment of persons perceived to be a threat to Zanu-PF. Strategically co-ordinated, widespread violence by party members and the armed forces continued to keep democracy at bay - assisted by a significantly tainted judiciary which, together with senior security force commanders, is known to be well-compensated for its continued loyalty.

“As Mugabe and his party continue to manufacture reasons for extricating themselves from the terms of the GPA, cases of deliberate non-cooperation with their GPA partners are escalating. Mugabe has disparagingly described the fragile 30-month coalition with the former opposition as an impractical ‘patch on torn trousers.’”

“During the month, a total of 79 media articles were recorded for ZIG Watch. Once again the category with the greatest number of violations involved cases of legal harassment of perceived opposition politicians and supporters. The category with the second-highest number of articles involved cases of violence, intimidation, hate speech, threats, abductions and brutality. Following on were cases of deliberate non-cooperation with the other members of the GPA, while the fourth-highest involved cases of abuse of
the land redistribution program. Zanu-PF was either responsible for, or involved in all of the breaches recorded.” [37]

14.53 Sokwanele’s ‘Zimbabwe Inclusive Government Watch: Issue 37’, published 5 April 2012, (ZIG Watch 37) noted:

“During February, a total of 65 media articles were recorded for ZIG Watch, each article representing a unique breach of the terms of the GPA. Categorising these articles by the nature of the breach allows the generation of representative statistics.

“The greatest number of violations this month involved cases of violence, intimidation, hate speech, threats, abductions and brutality. This was followed by cases of legal harassment of perceived opposition politicians and supporters. Next came cases of denial of the right to freedom of speech, or abuse of freedom of speech, while the fourth-highest involved cases of deliberate or consequential economic destabilisation. Zanu-PF was either responsible for, or involved in, all breaches recorded.” [37]

14.54 ‘ZIG Watch 37’ also noted that: “The month of February was effectively a repeat of the last six months, with the GPA said to be in tatters as Zanu-PF systematically sabotages the foundations of the agreement.” [37]

14.55 The same source also provided a graph of breaches of the GPA by the various political parties as reported in the media between 2008 and April 2012 (based on monitored news reports of human rights violations and violations of the GPA). (To note: in 2010 permission was granted to a number of independent newspapers to operate, increasing the number and range of views expressed in the press, see Freedom of speech and media.):

[37]

14.56 The ZPP March 2012 report, published on 25 April 2012, observed in its summary that:

“Politically motivated human rights violations continued on the upward trend as the talk of holding elections this year gathered momentum. The elections mantra was also laced with attacks on the constitution making process as the Zanu PF leadership threatened to go for an election with or without a new constitution … There was a rise in the number of violations recorded during the month of March to 475 up from the 413 witnessed during the month of February. However, compared to the same period [January to March in 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011] the levels seen so far are still low than in previous periods. The increase could be attributed to the magnified talk of elections and the Zanu PF restructuring exercise.

“An analysis of the violations trends during the month of March over the past five years reveals that the month has always had more incidents compared to the other months.
The highest number of violations during the month of March was witnessed in 2009 with 1,552 cases. This was during the period when people were confused on how the inclusive government was going to work and an upsurge in revenge cases was the result.

“Politically motivated human rights violations in March 2010 eased a bit to 908 cases only to increase in February 2011 to 1,127 as the Zanu PF anti-sanctions petition campaign intensified.

“Cases of politically motivated violence remain high and the atmosphere has remained volatile in the Midlands, Manicaland and Masvingo provinces with a significant rise in Mashonaland West Province.” [122c] (p1)

14.57 The ZPP April 2012 report, published on 24 May 2012, observed in its summary that:

“Politically motivated human rights violations continued on the upward trend as the talk of holding elections this year gathered momentum. Since the beginning of the year ZPP has been witnessing a steady increase in politically motivated human rights violations across the country. The elections mantra was also laced up with controversies around the constitution making process with Zanu PF officials trashing the first draft produced by COPAC.

“The month also saw some government officials suggesting that by-elections, which have been stalled because of the GPA agreements, should be held this year ... There was a steady rise in the number of violations recorded since the beginning of the year. There were 524 incidents during the month under review up from the 475 recorded the month of March.

“However, compared to the same period [April in 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011], the levels seen so far are still low compared to the previous years. The increase could be attributed to the magnified talk of elections and the chaotic Zanu PF restructuring exercise.

“An analysis of the violations trends during the month of April over the past five years reveals that the month has always had more incidents compared to the other months. The highest number of violations during the month of March was witnessed in 2008 with 4,380 cases. This was the period when the Zimbabwe Election Commission ZEC had concealed the presidential results from the March 31 harmonized elections and the period leading to the sham June 27 Presidential election run-off.

“Politically motivated human rights violations in March 2009 eased a bit to 1,490 cases and continued on a downward trend in April 2010 to 959 as the Zanu PF anti-sanction petition campaign gathered momentum.

“Cases of politically motivated violence remain high and the atmosphere has remained volatile in the Midlands, Manicaland and Masvingo provinces with a significant rise in Mashonaland East Province. Although incidents of the politicization of food aid remain very low, the situation on the ground shows that people’s rights will be violated as they seek food aid as a result of a poor food security situation.” [122v] (p2-6)

Further detailed information and statistics about human rights abuses can be found in the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum and the Zimbabwe Peace Project reports:
The main text of this COI Report contains the most up to date publicly available information as at 6 June 2012. Further brief information on recent events and reports has been provided in the Latest News section to 13 July 2012.

See subsection below on Distribution of politically motivated human rights violations in 2011 to April 2012 for more qualitative and quantitative information on levels of violence.

Perpetrators of politically motivated human rights violations

14.58 The following graph has been created to show the perpetrators of politically motivated violence for each month from May 2011 to April 2012, based on ZPP monthly report data:

![Perpetrators Graph]

14.59 The same data gives the following overall breakdown of perpetrators for the year May 2011-April 2012:
The main text of this COI Report contains the most up to date publicly available information as at 6 June 2012. Further brief information on recent events and reports has been provided in the Latest News section to 13 July 2012.

14.60 The CSMM Report 2011 noted that: “State-sponsored violence or intimidation has not ceased as a tactic to ensure compliance with party positions and the structures have not in the least been dismantled. Army, youth militia, war veterans and even police are complicit.” [48c] (p8)

14.61 The HRW Report 2012 noted that “Groups allied to ZANU-PF continue to beat and intimidate citizens in the high-density suburbs of Harare with impunity, while MDC activists accused of violence are disproportionately arrested.” [69e]

14.62 The UK Border Agency’s Report of the Fact Finding Mission to Zimbabwe: Harare 9-17 August 2010, dated 21 September 2010 (reissued 27 October 2010), reported the views of several organisations. The Zimbabwe Human Rights Association, noted: “‘The rural areas are still heavily politicised. ZANU-PF continues to use the army, police, youth militia and war veterans to intimidate’.“ [121a] (p22) In the same report the Commercial Farmers’ Union stated that: “‘... there appeared to be an increase in activity now, and a change from War Veterans to youth militia.’” The Research and Advocacy Unit listed perpetrators:

“In order of involvement in political violence:
1. ZANU-PF supporters.
2. ZANU-PF youth.
3. Youth militia.
4. War veterans.
5. Police.
6. Army (since 2005 a greater involvement of the army in rural violence).
7. CIO (very low involvement in actual violence).” [121a] (p29-30)

More detailed information about politically motivated human rights violations, from a range of NGOs and civil society activists, can be found in the UK Border Agency’s Report of the Fact Finding Mission to Zimbabwe – a copy is available via this link: http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1226_1289391521_zimbabwe271010.pdf
Sokwanele published a report by an anonymous Zimbabwean human rights activist entitled: The Anatomy of Terror. The report, dated 9 June 2011, which looks primarily at politically motivated human rights violations in 2008 that took place in ZANU-PF bases, noted that:

“91% percent of the perpetrators are male. The relatively high percentage (9%) of women that were involved in violence, accords with other studies.

“There is a wide age range of perpetrators, from 20 to 80 years. Nearly half the perpetrators (48%) are between the ages of 20 to 40 years, with another 48% are in the 41 - 60 year age group. Two elderly people, 76 and 80 years old respectively, were involved in violent activities in Makoni South. These two are Chiefs, indicating that, on occasion, the role of traditional leaders in violence is sometimes more than merely facilitative. Younger people appear to be enticed to form part of the system of violence through either cash incentives or the access to resources as detailed below.

“76% of the perpetrators are members of ZANU PF, 7% part of the Army, and 11% war veterans, supporting the view in other studies that the violence is mostly organized by ZANU PF with the active assistance of the security sector. The numbers of village headmen, chiefs, and councillors should also be noted [see Appendix C as well as Section 3.5.3 below].”

**Table 6: Perpetrators by organisation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zanu PF</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zanu PF Youth</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War veteran</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIO</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZRP</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church leader</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Councillor</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headman</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[37f] (paragraph 3.4.6)

The Solidarity Peace Trust’s report: The Hard Road to Reform, published 13 April 2011, provided a bar chart of the perpetrators of politically motivated violence in the Harare area between January and March 2011. The figures are based on reports from 190 victims.
The CSMM report, Periodic Report January to March 2012, dated 9 May 2012, observed in its executive summary:

“...[the] prevailing environment on the ground has been politically restive and confrontational leading to violations. Zimbabwe Peace Project recorded an increase in politically motivated human rights violations from January to February, but these are still lower than in previous years. The increase can be directly linked to the rising political tensions [between ZANU-PF and the MDC] as a result of the move to push for elections this year and delays of the constitution making process. Manicaland and Midlands provinces were the most affected, as well as numerous incidents of urban political gang violence. Traditional and community leaders were also frequently perpetrators.” [48b] (p3)

Human rights violations committed by MDC supporters

The ZPP Monthly Monitor gave details of perpetrators of politically motivated violence by political affiliation. In January 2012, a total of 36 perpetrators (6%) with affiliation to one of the MDC factions were recorded, in February, March and April 2012, that figure was 34 (5%), 73 (11%) and 42 (7%) respectively. [122c] (p6), [122s] (p10), [122t] (p10)

A Radiovop article, Lawyers denied access to detained MDC supporters, dated 1 June 2011 and New Zimbabwe (Cop killers ‘will die by the sword’, dated 31 May 2011) noted that police arrested more than two dozen MDC-T activists following the murder of a
police officer. The murder of the police officer occurred during an operation to break-up what police claim was an illegal political gathering in Glen View (Harare). [28h] [41g] New Zimbabwe noted on the 31 May 2011 that police chief Augustine Chihuri stated that those involved in the murder would “die by the sword” for their actions. [41g] On 16 May 2012, The Zimbabwean reported that the MDC members’ lawyers “have appealed to Justice Chinembiri Bhunu to give their clients a trial date.” [99w] The article further noted that:

“The 29 MDC members have been in remand prison since February [2012] when they were indicted for trial. Others have been in remand prison for nearly a year. This month, Justice Bhunu denied them leave to appeal for bail at the Supreme Court.

“The MDC has expressed serious concerns that the accused are living in inhumane conditions with two of the female inmates, Rebecca Masvikeni and Yvonne Musarurwa, in solitary confinement in the male section at Chikurubi Maximum Prison.” [99w]

**ZANU-PF calls for elections and associated violence**

14.68 The HRW World Report 2012, covering events of 2011, noted that:

“Mugabe’s announcement in December 2010 that elections would be held in 2011 triggered an increase in violence and abuses across the country. The beginning of the year saw ZANU-PF and elements within the security forces resort to old campaign tactics of violence, intimidation, and harassment. State security agents, police, and ZANU-PF supporters have been implicated in beatings, arbitrary arrests, and harassment of members of the MDC, cabinet ministers, human rights activists, and journalists, deepening the pervasive climate of fear in the country. In reaction to the abuses, Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai threatened to withdraw the MDC from the inclusive government in March.

“...After a period of relative calm, 2011 saw an increase in politically motivated violence across the country. Tensions flared between the ZANU-PF and the MDC as a result of the anticipated elections.” [69e] (p197-198)

14.69 The FCO’s Human Rights Report 2011, reporting on events in 2011, noted that:

“Following a worrying rise in political violence and intimidation at the start of the year, Zimbabwe’s human rights situation by the end of 2011 had returned to the relative stability experienced in 2010. The early spate of politically motivated human rights abuses targeting political and civil society groups was believed to have been triggered by calls made by the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) for elections to be held in 2011, but declined as the prospect of early elections receded.” [13j] (p381)

14.70 The same report also noted that:

“Since the 2000 constitutional referendum, which the government lost, calls for elections have tended to result in a rise in political tensions across the country, including state-sponsored violence. This was the case at the beginning of 2011, following ZANU-PF
calls for elections in March, which saw a rise in the targeting of Movement for Democratic Change politicians, including ministers and civil society groups. As the prospect of elections in 2011 appeared less likely, the number of abuses declined. However, at ZANU-PF’s annual conference in December, President Mugabe called for elections in March 2012. While the date has again slipped, the risk of another associated resurgence of political tension remains.” [13j] (p382-383)

14.71 The Voice of America reported on 21 June 2011 that: “The Zimbabwe Election Support Network (ZESN) has issued a report accusing the ZANU-PF party of President Robert Mugabe of setting up militia bases in Mashonaland East, Central and West provinces ahead of elections the party wants this year.” [83d] On 22 June 2011, the ZANU-PF owned The Herald dismissed ZESN’s suggestion that such bases were being set-up. [23c] The ZPP report for March 2011 noted that militia bases had been re-established in Manicaland and Mashonaland Provinces. [122m] (p6, 7, and 8)

14.72 Sokwanele published a report by anonymous Zimbabwean activists entitled: The Anatomy of Terror, dated 9 June 2011, that claimed to note the location of ‘bases’ used by ZANU-PF during the 2008 election violence. Of the 574 identified and listed in the table below (the report only investigated 15 districts in the 9 provinces below), 44 per cent were reported to be active. The report observed that “… almost all Bases are reactivated during election periods.” The report noted that Matabeleland North and South are reported to have only two such bases each. No information was provided for Bulawayo. Provincial breakdown of places where bases are found:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>School</th>
<th>Clinic</th>
<th>Police station</th>
<th>Church</th>
<th>Community hall</th>
<th>Private home</th>
<th>Farm</th>
<th>Bush</th>
<th>Business centre</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Harare</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manicaland</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mash. Central</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mash. East</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mash. West</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masvingo</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mat. North</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mat. South</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midlands</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>86</strong></td>
<td><strong>13</strong></td>
<td><strong>22</strong></td>
<td><strong>14</strong></td>
<td><strong>37</strong></td>
<td><strong>158</strong></td>
<td><strong>38</strong></td>
<td><strong>130</strong></td>
<td><strong>76</strong></td>
<td><strong>574</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percentage:</strong></td>
<td><strong>14.98</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.265</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.833</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.439</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.446</strong></td>
<td><strong>27.53</strong></td>
<td><strong>6.62</strong></td>
<td><strong>22.65</strong></td>
<td><strong>13.24</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[37f] (paragraph 3.3)

14.73 The Zimbabwean in an article dated 14 June 2011 and SW Radio Africa in an article dated 15 June 2011 noted that “scores” of villagers in President Mugabe’s rural home of Zvimba in Mashonaland Central province were reported to have been beaten and forced to leave their homes by soldiers and youth militia. [99i] [53s] According to The Zimbabwean newspaper, soldiers conducted a door-to-door “purge” of MDC supporters in the Zvimba area. At least 5 people were severely beaten and scores have reportedly fled and gone into hiding. [99i] SW Radio Africa reported on 21 June 2011 that video footage believed to date from April 2011 allegedly showed ZANU-PF MP Edward
Raradza telling villagers in his constituency of Muzarabani, Mashonaland Central, that support for the MDC-T would be punished with violence and denial of food. [53q]

14.74 The Financial Gazette, a private business weekly newspaper based in Harare, reported on 30 March 2012 that:

“ZANU-PF’s increased activity and presence across the country has heightened expectations for an election President Robert Mugabe wants with or without a new constitution. This has heightened anxiety among a restive population seemingly weary of the violence that has accompanied previous plebiscites … Harare has seen an increased number of youths moving around town some wearing their Border Gezi Youth Training uniforms or just their party regalia. Some youths have invaded some commuter termini in town, collecting ‘fees’ from every outgoing vehicle.

“Previous elections have been characterised by violence, with the two Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) formations blaming the Border Gezi trained youth militia.

“Last week, some youths in ZANU-PF party regalia could be seen directing kombi crews and collecting money from those ferrying people from the Hatcliffe- Borrowdale termini at the corner of Kwame Nkrumah and Chinhoyi Street in Harare … The youths’ activities might be linked to reports that the party militia had been removed from government payroll and so they are hunting for alternative sources of income.” [130b]

14.75 SW Radio Africa reported on 7 May 2012 that:

“Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai’s MDC says ZANU PF and the security forces in Harare are intensifying a campaign of violence and intimidation against its party member, in advance of elections the former ruling party want this year.

“The MDC-T MP for Kambuzuma, Willias Madzimure, said ZANU PF is in the process of creating a climate of intimidation and political violence that could prevent free and fair voting.

“We had a rally in Kambuzuma which was disrupted by armed police on Sunday. Can you imagine the same police going to a ZANU PF rally and disrupting it for whatever reason?” asked the MP. The legislator added: “It shows there is a hidden hand in what the security forces are doing.”” [53w]
14.77 To provide context to the frequency of violations relative to local population size see the website [http://www.geohive.com/cntry/zimbabwe.aspx](http://www.geohive.com/cntry/zimbabwe.aspx) which provides population statistics by province and district based on the last census undertaken in 2002. The statistics should be considered a guide to the actual population size as, since 2002, there has been large-scale internal migration, emigration, some immigration and population growth. For more recent estimates of the overall population size and distribution, and a table of population by province as of 2002, see sources quoted in the Geography section of this report.

National overview of distribution human rights violations in 2011 and 2012

14.78 The FCO’s Human Rights Report 2011, reporting on events in 2011, noted that:

“Following a worrying rise in political violence and intimidation at the start of the year, Zimbabwe’s human rights situation by the end of 2011 had returned to the relative stability experienced in 2010. The early spate of politically motivated human rights abuses targeting political and civil society groups was believed to have been triggered by calls made by the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) for elections to be held in 2011, but declined as the prospect of early elections receded.” [13j] (p381)

14.79 The USSD Report 2011 noted that “During the year ZANU-PF youth attacked scores of people, mainly MDC supporters, in the high-density neighborhoods of Harare, as well as in areas outside the capital such as Chitungwiza, Mbare, and Bikita. Police arrested the victims of the violence rather than the perpetrators.” [2g] (p7)

14.80 The Daily News reported on 26 January 2011 that ZANU-PF has worked to “… set up campaign bases in various constituencies in … [Harare] … The bases are confined to high density areas.” [132f] The Christian Science Monitor dated 27 January 2011 noted that: “The spread of violence to cities is a recent phenomenon, and a dangerous turn for Zimbabwe politics. In previous election years, political violence was mainly concentrated in those rural areas where ZANU-PF still commands some support… Political analyst Takura Zhangazha says that by unleashing soldiers and militia, ZANU-PF was trying to measure its ability to destabilize the MDC ahead of both the referendum and elections.” [138a]

14.81 The ZPP April 2012 report observed in its summary that:

“Politically motivated human rights violations continued on the upward trend as the talk of holding elections this year gathered momentum. Since the beginning of the year ZPP has been witnessing a steady increase in politically motivated human rights violations across the country. The elections mantra was also laced up with controversies around the constitution making process with Zanu PF officials trashing the first draft produced by COPAC.

“The month also saw some government officials suggesting that by-elections, which have been stalled because of the GPA agreements, should be held this year. ZPP also reported a murder case of an MDC-T activist in the Midlands Province by suspected two Zanu supporters in Gokwe Gumunyu. One of the perpetrators allegedly struck the victim to death with an axe and tried to conceal the evidence by burning the corpse in a burning hut. The two suspects were arrested and detained for two nights at Mutora...
Police Base in Gokwe. However the suspects were released without being charged.” [122v] (p1)

14.82 The ZPP publishes monthly statistics of human rights violations including murder, rape, kidnapping/abduction, assault, theft/looting, discrimination, MDP (malicious damage to property), unlawful detention, harassment/intimidation and displacement. The table below has been created using ZPP statistics for the months May 2011 to April 2012 and attempts to provide an indication of the differences in human rights violations in three different groups of provinces (detailed individual figures can be found in the originating reports). The table below contains aggregated human rights violations based on the ZPP reports covering this period. Officials are advised to look at the original data since the nature of violations needs to be considered as well as the number. See preceding section for a breakdown of total numbers of violations for May 2011 to April 2012 by type. The category harassment/intimidations is the most commonly recorded violation in all months for all provinces.

![Politically Motivated Human Rights Violations May 2011 to April 2012](image)

The main text of this COI Report contains the most up to date publicly available information as at 6 June 2012. Further brief information on recent events and reports has been provided in the Latest News section to 13 July 2012.
Human rights violations by province (1 January to 1 June 2012)

14.87 The information below lists a selection of main incidents identified by COI Service occurring in the respective provinces between 1 January and 1 June 2012. Not all incidents, or reports of human rights violations, will be documented for a variety of reasons. Nor is the list intended, and cannot be, considered to be comprehensive. Rather it is a guide to the levels and nature (which ranges from discrimination to assault and arrest) of reported human rights violations occurring in Zimbabwe by region in the above period. Numbers of violations by province as recorded by the ZPP can be found in the preceding subsection.

14.88 Further information about more recent incidents can be found in previous subsection of Latest news. Useful sources documenting politically motivated human rights violations include:


An African Democracy Institute reports on Zimbabwe: http://www.idasa.org/countries/country/zimbabwe/

Bulawayo

14.89 Electoral returns (2000, 2005 and 2008) published by the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission show that Matabeleland South is one of the MDC’s core areas of support. [140a] [140b] [140c]

14.90 The ZPP’s January 2012 report, published on 13 March 2012, noted that “During the month of January the political situation was relatively peaceful in most of constituencies. Furthermore, there was a marked decline in activities of human rights abuses. In ward 29 of Magwegwe Constituency two political parties, MDC-N and ZAPU held a joint meeting where members of the public were not allowed to attend.” [122s] (p8) The report recorded one incident of unlawful detention in Bulawayo during January. [122s] (p9)

14.91 The Heal Zimbabwe Trust’s ‘Weekly update on the political environment in Zimbabwe’, published 23 January 2012, noted that in Bulawayo, the environment was “tense” and that: “There were reports of harassment and arrests of about 50 MDC youth on 14 January 2012 who had gathered to protest against the continued incarceration of their leader Solomon Madzore. They were later released after about seven hours. Police intolerance has been on the rise as witnessed by the detention and torture of WOZA activists in Bulawayo on 19 January 2012 after a protest march.” [162e]

14.92 The ZPP’s February 2012 report, published on 30 March 2012, noted that:
“Bulawayo Province’s political environment remained calm with only 3 incidents having been recorded up from the 1 witnessed during the month of January. However, the political environment has remained tense with the police relying on draconian laws such as the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) to curtail people’s right to freedom of association and movement.

“A demonstration by Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA) was violently disrupted by the police as they assaulted and arrested the activists for holding a demonstration in the city centre.

“Four suspected Zanu PF youths wearing army uniform allegedly assaulted two MDC-T activists at Luveve 5 Shopping Centre. The victims were accused of having earlier attacked the perpetrators’ workmate. The four are suspected to have come from Ntabazinduna Training Depot.” [122t] (p7-8)

14.93 Sokwanele reported on 27 February 2012 that Paul Chizuze, a prominent human rights activist, had gone missing from his Bulawayo home on 8 February 2012. [37k]

14.94 The ZPP’s March 2012 report, published on 2 May 2012, noted that “The major political activities within the province have been between the two MDC formations that are fighting for space.” [122c] (p5)

14.95 SW Radio Africa reported on 9 March 2012 that “Scores of people were assaulted by armed police and removed from the proximity of the ZANU-PF offices in Bulawayo early on Thursday evening [8 March 2012], after Robert Mugabe addressed traditional chiefs at a convention earlier in the day … about 15 police officers in anti-riot gear assaulted innocent people who happened to be near the ZANU PF building. There was chaos as many ran for safety in different directions.” [53ac]

14.96 The same report noted that:

“Earlier on Thursday [8 March 2012], Bulawayo police officials had banned a march organized by women from labour union, the ZCTU, who were forced to commemorate International Women’s Day at their offices.

“Organizers were told this was due to Mugabe’s arrival in town to address the Chiefs Convention. The women had been threatened by police, who said riot teams would be unleashed if they came close to Drill Hall where the chiefs met.” [53ac]

14.97 The ZPP monthly report for April 2012 noted that there had been one assault in Bulawayo in the month. “About four suspected MDC-T youths allegedly assaulted an (sic) Zanu PF supporter in Luveve 5. The incident happened on the eve of the Independence day where the victim was kicked all over his body before he was rescued from the assault by revellers from Total Counts 1 Kldza’s Sports Bar.” [122v] (p5)
14.99 The ZPP monthly report for January 2012 noted that there were 16 incidents of harassment or intimidation, one of discrimination and one of assault in Harare during the month. \[122s\] (p8) The report also stated that:

“Police officers and state security agents have continued to show their partisan support for Zanu PF in Harare Province when they raided vendors in the Central business District accusing the vendors of being MDC-T activists disguising as vendors.

“More than forty policemen came and rounded vendors around Nelson Mandela and First Street in the [Central Business District] CBD and assaulted them for vending, the vendors fought back and overpowered the police officers who took refuge at a police post along First Street which was destroyed by the vendors. Police had to call for reinforcement of more than two hundred riot police in riot gear who controlled the situation as people were now running away, police arrested about thirteen vendors and came back the following day and raided harvest house and arrested about ten people whom they accused of being MDC-T supporters disguising as vendors.

“There have also been reports of violence by the Zanu PF militia, Chipangano, since last year but they have never been arrested which gives them room to terrorize people at will. Since Zanu PF is advocating for early elections, there are reports of intra party violence within Zanu PF as politicians fight to get an opportunity to represent the party in the next elections.” \[122s\] (p6-7)

14.100 The ZPP monthly report for February 2012 noted that:

“The political situation in Harare Province has remained tense with violations continuing to be recorded and concentrated in Mbare and Epworth. There was an increase in incidents of politically motivated human rights violations from 18 in January to 31 cases during the month under review.

“The Zanu PF Chipangano militia group allegedly stopped the construction of a service station and food outlet in Mbare accusing the businessman behind the venture of belonging to the MDC-T. Chipangano is arguing that only Zanu PF supporters should be allowed to invest in Mbare. This is despite a High Court order ordering the victim to go ahead with the construction.

“President Mugabe’s announcement that elections should be held this year has also triggered conflict with the major political parties of Zanu PF and MDC-T as aspiring candidates jostle for power.

“There are also reports of physical threats of violence and intimidation targeting Caledonia residents by rogue Zanu PF war veterans who continually harass and assault people perceived to support other parties other than Zanu PF. Six uniformed soldiers allegedly assaulted four Msasa residents at Msasa trading Bar on February 26. The victims were assaulted after they were heard joking about President Mugabe’s advanced age.” \[122s\] (p6)

14.101 SW Radio Africa reported on 13 February 2012 that a MDC-T member had been murdered in Mbare:
“On Friday [10 February 2012] the party’s branch treasurer in Mbare, Shepherd Bandau, was murdered by members of the notorious Chipangano gang, a ZANU PF loyal youth gang.

“The MDC-T said that Bandau had been on his way home on Friday when 10 Chipangano members approached and started assaulting him. The party spoke to a witness who said that the gang ‘challenged anyone who tried to intervene with the same fate and we became scared that no-one could even stop the assault.’

“Police were eventually called in and Bandau was transported to hospital. But according to the MDC-T he lost consciousness while on the way and was declared dead on arrival.

“Four of the 10 ZANU PF youths have been arrested and are detained at Mbare Police Station. The witness told the MDC-T that the youths who have been arrested are known under their Chipangano operational names of ‘Zesa’, ‘Paraffin’, ‘Marko’ and ‘Isaac’ but he did not know their real names.” [53aa]

14.102 The ZPP Monthly update for March 2012 noted that there were 25 incidents of politically motivated violence in the month and that: “The political environment in the province is very tense as Zanu PF supporters are going on a door to door campaign mobilising people to take up leadership roles in their restructuring exercise in Epworth. The month also saw Munyaradzi Gwisai [a former MDC MP] and five others being convicted and sentenced for plotting to incite public violence by a Harare Magistrate.” [122c] (p5) ‘The Guardian’ reported on 21 March 2012 that the group were found guilty of “… conspiring to commit public violence during a meeting at which they watched video footage of mass uprisings in Egypt… ” and that the magistrate had ordered the group “… to carry out 420 hours of community service or face a year in jail.” The report also noted that “Gwisai and other members of the group complained they were tortured by police and beaten with wooden planks and iron bars. They said they were also told to confess that they had called for the removal of Robert Mugabe as president.” [34d]

14.103 The ZPP monthly report for April 2012 noted that there had been 26 incidents of politically motivated violations in the month and that:

- “During the month people were again forced to attend Independence celebrations at the National Sports Stadium as they were free buses to ferry people to the venue.
- “People are being threatened with unspecified action or what happened during 2008 presidential elections if they fail to attend the Zanu PF meetings
- “Zanu PF supporters led by District co-coordinating Committee members, allegedly forced Epworth residents of ward 5 to attend Zanu PF meeting where they were forced to accept leadership positions in ongoing Zanu PF restructuring exercise.” [122v] (p5)

14.104 SW Radio Africa reported on 13 April 2012 that:

“The violent ZANU PF youth gang that has terrorised residents of Mbare suburb in Harare has reportedly started campaigning for the party, forcing innocent civilians to reveal their personal details and ordering them to vote for Robert Mugabe in the next election.
“The Chipangano gang, who operate with impunity and with the support of top ZANU PF officials, have been regularly forcing local residents, vendors and passersby to attend ZANU PF rallies held on open grounds in the area.

“The most recent incident occurred last Saturday [7 April 2012] at Number Five grounds near Mbare Netball Complex, where people with no identity documents were told to reveal their details to the group, on the promise that Chipangano would approach the Registrar General for help in registering them to vote… The activist [Givemore Chipere] said violence by Chipangano in Mbare has intensified but there has not been much coverage of incidents in the mainstream media. According to Chipere, the gang has gained so much power that even the police are too scared to interfere.” [53x]

14.105 SW Radio Africa reported on 2 May 2012 that:

“… suspected war vets and party militia besieged the offices of Finance Minister Tendai Biti, threatening to beat him up for allegedly not respecting Mugabe.

“Incensed by reports that Biti had said Mugabe should be confined to an old people’s home, the mob waved banners written ‘Biti show the President respect’. More worrying for the media in the country, the war vets even threatened to burn down independent newspapers for encouraging ‘Biti’s campaign against Mugabe’.” [53y]

14.106 SW Radio Africa reported on 9 May 2012 that:

“Following the disruption of several weekend rallies by the police, as well as ZANU PF sponsored violence against their supporters, the MDC-T has demanded the release of all their detained members and the resignation of Police Chief Augustine Chihuri.

“The demands came as it was revealed that the violent ZANU PF Chipangano gang was involved in some of the weekend assaults on MDC-T supporters. According to the MDC-T, the gang was purposely bussed into Highfields suburb on Saturday with the intention of disrupting planned rallies.

“The gang’s known leader Jim Kunaka, who is a ZANU PF youth chairman, and thugs named only as Gochera, Pasco, Gomwe and Moffart were identified as the gang that assaulted [MDC-T supporter] Shepherd Mumba in Highfields.” [53z]

14.107 The Zimbabwe Standard reported on 6 May 2012 that:

“SIX MDC-T members were hospitalised yesterday after they were brutally attacked by suspected Zanu PF supporters in Harare’s Highfield high-density suburb. According to MDC-T, the six — Thulani Ncube, Shadrick Ngirazi, sisters, Maud and Tsitsi Chinyerere, their two daughters, Rosie and Nomatter — sustained head and body injuries.

“Maud is a provincial executive member of the Women’s Assembly in Harare. Three houses were damaged as a result, MDC-T said in a statement.” [70e]
14.108 Electoral returns (2000 and 2005) published by the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission show that voters in Manicaland supported the ZANU-PF. [140a] [140b] However, in the 2008 parliamentary elections the MDC took a majority of the constituencies in the province. [140c]

14.109 The ZPP Monthly report for January 2012 noted that:

“Manicaland Province had the highest number of politically motivated human rights violations during the month of January. There were 94 recorded incidents up from the 77 cases witnessed during the month December 2011.

“War veterans and traditional leaders have remained the chief violators of the people’s rights across the province as they continued to involve themselves in political matters in contravention of the provisions of the Global Political Agreement (GPA). The right to free expression, association remain the most violated.

“A teacher at Gunura Primary School in Buhera South was reportedly assaulted by Zanu PF supporters for having glowingly credited Prime Minister Tsvangirai for facilitating the availing of school text and exercise books through UNICEF. In another related matter Zanu PF members led by war veterans allegedly invaded Chatindo School in Nyanga North demanding that a number of teachers leave the school since they were suspected of being MDC-T members.

“Zanu PF infighting has already started in preparation of the proposed elections as the current incumbent MPs are fighting off pressure from prospective candidates. The infighting has been recorded to be very serious in Chimanimani and Mutare North constituencies ahead of the party’s primary elections.” [122c] (p4)

14.110 SW Radio Africa reported on 25 January 2012 that:

“Supporters of the MDC in Chimanimani West, who bought ZANU PF cards earlier this year in order to get seeds and fertilizer, were thrilled on Sunday when these items finally arrived from Cashel Valley. But there was one more stipulation.

“The desperate villagers were told to add their names onto a list of people expected to claim disability in the next election, so they can be assisted in the polling booth. Anyone who fails to do this ‘will be dealt with worse than 2008,’ was the threat made, according to witnesses.” [53ad]

14.111 The ZPP Monthly Report for February 2012 noted that:

“Manicaland Province witnessed a serious incident of politically motivated murder and one of torture during the month under review with the highest number of violations throughout the country. There were 89 incidents down from the 94 witnessed during the month of January.

“A 52-year-old man reportedly died on February 26 from injuries sustained during an attack by fellow Zanu PF members at Nyangu Township in Chimanimani. The attack was a result of infighting within the party as three members of Zanu PF are fighting for a ticket to represent the party in the forthcoming elections.

“Victim and colleagues went for a beer drink at a local outlet in the evening wearing their new party regalia donated by one of the prospective candidate Jane Mahoso-Knight.
The main text of this COI Report contains the most up to date publicly available information as at 6 June 2012. Further brief information on recent events and reports has been provided in the Latest News section to 13 July 2012.

While at the pub they were attacked by Zanu PF youths led by one Brighton Muchuwa who was driving an Isuzu truck allegedly belonging to Joshua Sacco. The six victims sustained serious injuries and were all taken to Biriri Hospital. The now deceased victim could not talk for four days due to head injuries. Although he was discharged from the hospital after about seven days, he never fully recovered. He was buried at Machongwe Village in Nyahode Valley. He left behind a wife and seven children. One of the perpetrators, Muchuwa, was briefly arrested by police but was later released.

“A number of people had their rights violated during President Robert Mugabe’s birthday celebrations which were held at Sakubva Stadium on February 25. Commuter bus operators were forced by Zanu PF youths to ferry people to the stadium free of charge between 0700 am to around 1100hrs on the day of the celebrations. The youths were reportedly supported by the Chipangano terror gang from Mbare whose fellow colleagues had earlier on Friday 23 been arrested in Rusape for public violence on their way to Mutare.

“Two residents were allegedly arrested for insulting and undermining the authority of President Mugabe during the week of the birthday celebrations. One of the victims was arrested in Sakubva after he had enquired from a colleague who had attended the celebrations as to who had blown the President’s birthday balloons since he believed that the President was not able to do so himself due to old age. The colleague reportedly went out and returned with a policeman who immediately arrested him.” [122f] (p4-5)

14.112 The Heal Zimbabwe Trust’s ‘Update on the political environment in Zimbabwe’, published 14 February 2012, noted that the environment in Buhera Central was “tense”, and that:

“On 6 February 2012, Seretina Neshumba from ward 23 in Buhera District was assaulted by her relative Margret Ticharima, (a Zanu PF member) and sustained serious head injuries. The incident happened around 10pm. It is alleged that the assault came after Ms Neshumba refused to attend a Zanu PF meeting on the 5th of February at 12 midday which was addressed by a war veteran named Nzuwa. An argument arose between the two where Ms Ticharima accused the victim of exposing the family to victimization by refusing to attend the meeting but the victim argued that she could not attend a ZANU PF meeting since she supports MDC and this infuriated the accused leading to the assault. The victim was referred to Murambinda general hospital where she is receiving treatment.” [162f]

14.113 The Heal Zimbabwe Trust’s ‘Update on the political environment in Zimbabwe’, published 25 February 2012, noted that the environment in Buhera Central remained “tense”, and that:

“More cases of political violence continue to be recorded in Buhera district, [sic] In ward 23, Mr. Sure Manyore was seriously assaulted by 2 unnamed ZANU PF youth from ward 20. Mr. Manyore is a well known MDC activist in the area who was confronted by the two youth on Saturday, 18 February while he was working in his garden. They hit him several times on the head using thick planks and he suffered serious head injuries. He was rushed to Murambinda General Hospital where he received treatment.

“In ward 20, the following day on a Sunday, it is reported that 14 ZANU PF youths led by a war veteran identified as Joshua Chipedzi seriously assaulted one Cephas...
Munyoro and an MDC youth chairperson in the same ward. The two were attacked at a growth point for wearing MDC T-shirts. Cephas Munyoro suffered a broken arm and received medical attention at Murambinda hospital. A police report was made but no arrests have been made so far in connection to this incident.

“Heal Zimbabwe informed JOMIC officials of these cases who promised to look into the incidences and make follow ups with the police.” [162b]

14.114 The ZPP Monthly Report for March 2012 recorded a total of 160 incidences of politically motivated violence in the month, including:

- "The province witnessed a case of kidnapping of a Zanu PF supporter by suspected soldiers in Mutare West constituency"
- "The Zanu PF District Coordination Committee (DCC) elections caused a lot of human rights violations in the province (The elections were between Albert Nyakuedzwa and Nathaniel Mhiripiri in Makoni District)"
- "A number of people had their rights violated during a music gala that was held in Chipinge to celebrate President Robert Mugabe’s birthday"
- "Politicalisation of subsidised food from the GMB was also recorded in Buhera Central, Nyanga South and Makoni North constituencies." [122c] (p4)

14.115 The Heal Zimbabwe Trust’s ‘Update on the political environment in Zimbabwe’, published on 23 March 2012, noted that the environment in Buhera Central was “moderate” and that:

“Villagers of Ward 31 in Buhera Central who reported Honored Ndawana to the police for allegedly assaulting an MDC activist, Mr. Zhanje are reportedly living in fear as they are being threatened and harassed by war veterans and Zanu PF youth for having made the police report. The accused, Mr. Ndawana was expected to appear in Court today facing charges of assaulting Mr. Zhanje whom he accused of being an MDC supporter.” [162c]

14.116 The same update noted that the environment in Nyanga North was “tense” and that:

“On 18 March in Nyanga North ward 4, Mr. Sangoma, the MDC organizing secretary for Nyamudeza branch was heavily assaulted by ZANU PF supporters led by a war veteran identified as Morgan Makaza for failing to produce a ZANU PF party card at a food distribution meeting. There was a Grain Loan Scheme exercise at Nyamudeza grounds where Mr. Sangoma was denied his allotment despite having paid his payment for the allocation of the grain. When he tried to seek for an explanation from the distribution officer, one Makaza and others started assaulting him and chased him away. When he tried to resist they forcefully took him to the police and made a false report that he was disrupting the food distribution exercise and was subsequently arrested for contravening section 89 of the Criminal and Codification Reform Act. He appeared before the Nyanga Magistrate Mr. Ignitio Mhene on Monday 19 March 2012 and was released on condition that he will be summoned back to court should the state find a case against him.

“Cases of politicizing food distribution exercises are becoming rampant. It has become worrying that during most grain loan scheme distribution platforms, beneficiaries are either asked to produce a ZANU PF card in order to benefit or are simply denied access.” [162c]
14.117 The ZPP monthly report for April 2012 noted that there had been 142 incidents of politically motivated violations in the month and that:

- “The province witnessed the highest number of violations during the month under review as a direct result of the ongoing infighting within Zanu PF. The [district co-ordinating committee] DCC elections were the major source of conflict within the province and were eventually declared null and void after reports of massive rigging and vote buying.
- “War veterans and Zanu PF youths allegedly force marched villagers to attend Independence day celebrations in Chimanimani.” [122v] (p4)

14.118 The Heal Zimbabwe Trust’s ‘Update on the political environment in Zimbabwe’, published 20 April 2012, noted that the environment in Nyanga was “tense” and that “There is a reported upsurge in cases of violence which can be attributed to the current call by political parties of a possibility of holding election this year. This has heightened tensions in most rural areas. It is alleged that ZANU PF youths are going around harassing and threatening suspected MDC supporters with unspecified action if ever they see them holding rallies, meetings or any other form of gathering.” [162g]

14.119 The same report also noted that the environment in Buhera was “tense” and that “Tensions are high in the district as a result of irregularities in the distribution of the grain loan scheme which is being done on political grounds thus depriving deserving families.” [162g]

14.120 ‘NewsDay’ reported on 25 April 2012 that there had been “running battles” between factions of ZANU-PF in Mutare. “Nearly 150 disgruntled Zanu PF supporters in Mutare have been camped at the party offices demonstrating against [information Minister] Shamu’s nullification of the DCC [district co-ordinating committee] elections held in the city two weeks ago.” [146d]

14.121 ‘The Zimbabwe Mail’ reported on 9 May 2012 that:

“A tense atmosphere has engulfed Zanu PF Manicaland, with some party members scared to set foot on the party’s headquarters because of potential violence.

“So deep are the differences between faction supporters and leaders that some senior provincial officials often hesitate to visit party offices when members of a different group are present … Zanu PF supporters loyal to different factions have been taking turns to visit the party offices for protests.” [160b]

14.122 The Heal Zimbabwe Trust’s ‘Update on the political environment in Zimbabwe’, dated 10 May 2012, noted that the environment in Makoni South was “tense” and that: “There are reported cases of political violence in Makoni South. It is alleged that on Monday 30 April, unnamed ZANU PF supporters burnt to ashes a house belonging to Makoni South Ward 26 chairlady Ethel Tichawana accusing her of being an MDC supporter. She lost all her belongings in the house. A police report was made but no arrests have been made to date.” [162d]

14.123 ZimEye reported on 18 May 2012 that:

“A Mutare man has been granted bail and will soon stand trial for allegedly making comments on President Robert Mugabe’s sexuality.

120 The main text of this COI Report contains the most up to date publicly available information as at 6 June 2012. Further brief information on recent events and reports has been provided in the Latest News section to 13 July 2012.
“An unidentified ZANU PF youth leader had MDC-T supporter Maxwell Mutsetse, 30, arrested claiming that he heard him stating that Mugabe was castrated and so the ZANU PF leader cannot be his President … The State prosecutor on the case, Fletcher Karombe, said that the case would continue in about a month’s time when it goes before the courts again.” [144b]

**Mashonaland Central**

14.124 Electoral returns (2000 and 2005) published by the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission show that voters in Mashonaland Central supported ZANU-PF, [140a] [140b] In spite of the MDC making some inroads ZANU-PF retained control of the province in the 2008 elections. [140c]

14.125 The ZPP’s Monthly Report for January 2012, published on 13 March 2012, noted that:

“The call for elections in 2012 has increased tensions with the communities of Mashonaland Central Province as traditional leaders have leading to force people attend weekly Zanu PF meetings. The province witnessed an increase in cases of politically motivated human rights violations to 45 in January as compared to the 19 incidents recorded in December 2011.

“Food and other forms of aid related violations were the major sources of conflict in January as the majority of people in the province depend on farming. Accessing subsidised maize seeds and fertilisers was a big challenge particularly to those perceived to be members of the MDC-T.

“A Zanu PF councillor for Ward 15 – Dandamera Township, Mazowe West constituency allegedly denied suspected members of the MDC-T access to residential stands because of their political affiliation. This was despite the fact that some of the members had paid for the respective stands.” [122s] (p5-6)

14.126 The ZPP’s Monthly Report for February 2012, published on 30 March 2012 noted that:

“Politically motivated human rights violations were on the increase in Mashonaland Central Province with the majority of the violations having been perpetrated by political party activists and supporters. The province recorded 65 cases up from 45 incidents witnessed during the month of January.

“Traditional leaders and in particular village heads have been accused of forcing all villagers above the age of 18 to register with them in most of the constituencies around the province. The exercise is reported to have started in December 2011 in Muzarabani and has since spread to other districts.

“About 60 families were evicted from Manzou Farm to pave way for the expansion of First Lady Grace Mugabe’s orphanage in Mazowe. The affected families were moved to Msasa Farm in Concession and the displacement failed to recognise that the farmers had planted crops which were at a ripening stage. The victims are likely to face starvation as they do not have food.
“A group of Zanu PF supporters allegedly invaded Heyshott farm in Mazowe South Constituency with the intention of taking over the farm. The farm is the only remaining white owned farm in Mazowe District. The victim is holding onto the property as the Zanu PF supporters do not have any supporting documents for the takeover.” [122t] (p5-6)

14.127 ZPP’s Monthly Report for March 2012, published on 5 May 2012, noted that there were 64 incidences of politically motivated violence recorded in the month, including:

- Zanu PF intra-party fighting was recorded during the restructuring exercise of the party’s DCC leadership
- Teachers and civil servants from Rushinga have endured threats of eviction and intimidation for their affiliation to the Progressive Teachers Union of Zimbabwe (PTUZ) which the Zanu PF leaders in the province say is an extension of the MDC-T
- Forced meetings were also recorded throughout the province and were prevalent in Guruve, Mt Darwin, Muzarabani and Mazowe districts. [122c] (p4)

14.128 The Heal Zimbabwe Trust’s publication, ‘Political environment in Zimbabwe’, dated 4 April 2012 noted that in Mount Darwin the general environment was “tense” and that: “It is reported that the whole of last week, an unmarked vehicle was seen patrolling at a business centre where some MDC members of the district reside. It is the same type of a car, a Nissan NP200 that was allegedly used to abduct MDC supporters in the 2008 election violence. People are now leaving in fear of being abducted especially under the current calls for elections this year by politicians.” [162a]

14.129 The same report also noted that the general environment was “tense” in Muzarabani North, due to a grain loan scheme which: “.. left many MDC supporters shell shocked last week when they failed to receive the assistance from the scheme after their names were removed from the initial list of beneficiaries. It is reported that the victims tried to seek audience with Hon Mushowe, the Member of Parliament of the area but this did not yield any results as the honorable MP refused to give any explanation. Only ZANU PF card carrying members benefited from the programme.” [162a]

14.130 ZPP’s Monthly Report for April 2012, published on 24 May 2012, noted that there were 47 incidences of politically motivated violence recorded in the month, and reported that:

- “Intra-party fighting within Zanu PF has continued to be recorded in the province as politicians fight to win the ticket to represent the party in the upcoming elections. One notable incident was recorded in Mbire constituency where former MP David Butau is fighting to dislodge incumbent MP Paul Mazikana.
- "Forced meeting (sic) were also recorded in Muzarabani North constituency where villagers were forced to attend Zanu PF organised Independence Day celebrations." [122v] (p4)

Mashonaland East

14.131 Electoral returns (2000 and 2005) published by the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission show that Mashonaland East has previously voted solidly for Mugabe’s ZANU-PF.
In spite of the MDC making some inroads ZANU-PF retained control of the province in 2008. [140c]

The ZPP’s Monthly Report for January 2012, published 13 March 2012, noted that:

“The number of politically motivated human rights violations remained relatively low in Mashonaland East Province. However, there still remain isolated cases of political violence dominated by harassment and intimidation, assaults and looting of farming inputs.

“A senior CIO agent from the province allegedly looted an estimated five tonnes of topdressing fertiliser from Uzumba Maramba Pfungwe, GMB Depot. The agent who is the officer in charge of Murehwa District used political powers to loot the fertiliser which was meant to benefit farmers in the district under the Presidential Farming Inputs Scheme. The CIO agent openly told the GMB depot manager that she was the one with the powers to determine the beneficiaries.

“On January 30, some police officers from Harare Central Police Station and Goromonzi Show-Grounds reportedly assaulted youths from Kadzviti and Murape villages before confiscating 19 wireless radios that had been distributed by the Youth Initiatives for Democracy in Zimbabwe YIDEZ. The police officers managed to get only 19 radios out of the 31 which had been distributed accusing the youths of possessing “pirate radios” that were not cleared by ZIMRA.

“An MDC-T activist had to run away from his homestead on January 5, after getting wind that Zanu PF youth militias had planned to assault him on the day in question. While in hiding the victim was informed that the youths indeed visited his homestead and told his wife that they wanted to teach him a lesson. Since then the victim has not visited his house, leaving behind his wife and children.” [122s] (p6)

The ZPP’s Monthly Report for February 2012 noted that:

“The political situation in Mashonaland East Province has remained relatively calm as compared to last month where the province was among the top three regions with the highest number of politically motivated human rights violations. The province witnessed a notable decline in incidents from 31 to 22 and this could be attributed to the low levels of political party activities.

“During the month under review, victims have had their rights violated at Zanu PF political party meetings and gatherings where suspected members of other parties were assaulted and made to surrender party cards and party regalia. One MDC-T supporter was forced to renounce his political party affiliation as well as surrender his political party card and regalia at a Zanu PF meeting held at Suswe Business Centre in Mudzi West by the Zanu PF District Coordinating Committee (DCC) chairperson David Chibanda. The victim was then forced to write a letter to the Zanu PF headquarters informing them about the latest position.

“The province also witnessed incidents of displacements where victims are evicted from their homes on political grounds. An MDC-T activist was forced to flee his homestead in Mutesva Village in Mudzi North Constituency by Zanu PF supporters. The victim has since sought refuge in Mozambique near the Zimbabwean Border after his goods and property was dumped at the Nyakadecha Road by the perpetrators.” [122t] (p7)
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14.134 The Heal Zimbabwe Trust’s publication, ‘Political environment in Zimbabwe’, published on 25 February 2012, noted that the general environment in Murehwa West was “tense”, and that: “There are reports that one Sergeant Nyabadza, head of PISI at Musani police station (a ZANU PF aspiring candidate) is forcing MDC activists to surrender their party regalia and is threatening them with unspecified action if they fail to do so in the next two weeks. The victims are also being forced to attend ZANU PF meetings and many people in the area are now living in fear.” [162b]

14.135 The ZPP’s Monthly Report for March 2012, published on 5 May 2012, recorded 56 incidents of politically motivated violence for the month, including:

- “The province witnessed a single case of murder of a war veteran who was found dead on March 5, 2012 in Murehwa North constituency. A teacher (an MDC-T supporter) from Nyamashato Secondary was arrested by the police in connection with the murder but was later released without charge.
- “A number of assault cases were recorded during the month. One teacher from Dendera Mission was allegedly assaulted by Chief Goronga who accused the victim of having received a motorcycle form (sic) the MDC-T.
- “The province also witnessed intra-party violence within the MDC-T after party youths attacked the leadership during a rally in Marondera. 18 suspects were arrested in connection with the violence." [122c] (p4-5)

14.136 Further to the violence in Marondera in March 2012, NewsDay reported on 30 April 2012 that:

“MDC-T has reportedly fired Marondera mayor Farai Nyandoro and seven other supporters for inciting violence against fellow party activists including chairman for Mashonaland East, Piniel Deng.

“Nyandoro was recently arrested for inciting violence that saw Deng and scores of other party activists beaten up.

“He was also on suspension from MDC-T for allegedly being too close to Zanu PF leaders in the province, corruption and abuse of office.” [146e]

14.137 The Heal Zimbabwe Trust’s report, ‘Political environment in Zimbabwe’, published on 23 March 2012, noted that the general environment in Wedza was “moderate” and that:

“In ward 6 in Wedza district, there have been reported cases of violence in the area. Chamva a well known ZANU PF supporter and other unidentified war veterans last week on Friday 16 March banned an MDC ward meeting in ward six at Chinei near Zaire. He forced the gathered MDC supporters to displace and warned them not to attempt to hold any meeting in the area as he claimed it was a ‘no go area’ for MDC supporters.” [162c]

14.138 The ZPP’s Monthly Report for March 2012, published on 5 May 2012, recorded 56 incidents of politically motivated violence for the month, and reported that:

- “The recorded politically motivated human rights violations in the province were around the Independence Day celebrations aspiring Zanu PF the major perpetrators.
The main text of this COI Report contains the most up to date publicly available information as at 6 June 2012. Further brief information on recent events and reports has been provided in the Latest News section to 13 July 2012.

- “Mudzi North MP Newton Kachepa was recorded as one of the MPs who instigated violence during the celebrations.
- “Three men from Chikomba Central constituency were assaulted on April 4, 2012 for allegedly refusing to pay US$2 towards the Independence Day celebrations. One of the victim (sic) is a teacher from Zinatsa High School.” [122v] (p4)

14.139 SW Radio Africa reported on 15 April 2012 that:

“The home of an official from the MDC-T in Mashonaland East Province was burned down for a second time by known ZANU PF supporters Tuesday, depriving her of the only shelter she had left.

“According to the MDC-T, the Mash East Secretary for Security and Defence in the Women’s Assembly, Florence Kavhayi, had her entire homestead burnt to ashes by ZANU PF supporters during the run-up to the 2008 presidential election.

“The party said threats on her life have intensified since then and the home burned this week was the last shelter that she had. The incident took place in the Chirinda district of Maramba-Pfungwe.” [53ag]

14.140 The Heal Zimbabwe Trust’s report, ‘Political environment in Zimbabwe’, published on 10 May 2012, noted that the general environment in Mutoko was “tense” and that:

“Cases of victimisation continue to be reported in the area especially after one Assistant Commissioner E. Pfumvuti a serving police officer declared his ambition to be the next Member of Parliament of the area. It is reported that ZANU PF youths in Nyamukosi area are harassing villagers, they allegedly blocked the entrance to the shop of a MDC supporter, Mai Mapuranga threatening people not to buy in a shop owned by a MDC supporter. A police report was made but no arrests have been made so far.

“The food distribution exercise is still being carried out in a partisan manner as reports indicate that ZANU PF shadow councillors have taken over the distribution forcefully from village heads and are only giving the food vouchers to their supporters denying other intended beneficiaries from other political parties. Of the 29 councillors in Mutoko, only 6 are MDC and said to be just ‘ceremonial’ councillors, when it comes to food distribution.” [162d]

14.141 SW Radio Africa reported on 29 May 2012 that:

“At least six ZANU PF activists have reportedly been arrested in connection with the murder of an MDC-T ward official in Mudzi North last Saturday, but already there are concerns that the arrests are simply a ZANU PF ploy to save face, ahead of the SADC summit next week.

“Cephas Magura, the MDC-T chairperson for ward 1, Mudzi North, died from injuries sustained during an assault by ZANU PF thugs at Chimukoko Business Centre. The MDC-T had organised a rally there with permission from the police.

“Graham Nyahada, the MDC-T information secretary for Mashonaland East, said there are unconfirmed reports that Newton Kachepa, the ZANU PF MP for Mudzi North who was implicated in the attack, was arrested at Parliament on Monday afternoon. He allegedly drove the youths to the rally.” [53ak]
Matabeleland North

14.142 Electoral returns (2000, 2005 and 2008) published by the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission show that Matabeleland North supported the MDC. [140a] [140b] [140c]

14.143 The ZPP’s Monthly Report for January 2012, published on 13 March 2012, recorded two incidents of discrimination and one of assault in the month [122s] (p8), and noted that:

“The imminent drought in Matabeleland North Province has seen a rise in activities around food distribution and the majority of the resources are reportedly coming from Zanu PF. This has raised fears that the food resources may be politicised ahead of the anticipated elections this year.

“A village head from Kamaga village in Binga North constituency was reportedly denied maize seed and fertiliser after being accused of supporting the MDC-T. The incident happened on January 3, when the perpetrators threatened the victim by telling him that war veterans will soon visit him.

“A man from Bubi constituency was relieved of his duties on January 10 after his employer an MDC-T activist had discovered he belonged to Zanu PF.” [122s] (p7)

14.144 The ZPP’s Monthly Report for February 2012, published 30 March 2012, noted that:

“The political environment is (sic) Matabeleland North Province remained calm during the month of February with only four incidents having been recorded from the 13 constituencies. However, there is notable growing tension in the province due to the drought that has seen an increase in food aid distribution activities.” [122t] (p7)

14.145 The ZPP’s Monthly Report for March 2012, published on 25 April 2012, noted that there had been four politically motivated violations, and that:

- The political situation in the province has remained relatively calm although tension is rising in some constituencies due to the ongoing distribution of food aid through the government’s grain loan scheme
- Zanu PF has also started campaigning in the province in preparation for the elections resulting in people’s rights being violated. [122n] (p7-8)

14.146 The ZPP’s Monthly Report for March 2012, published on 25 April 2012, noted that there had been nine politically motivated violations, and that:

- “The province witnessed politically motivated human rights violations around the distribution of food and other forms of aid.
- “Hwange Central MP Brian Tshuma was barred from conducting a constitution update meeting by the Officer commanding Hwange Police Station.
- “15 members of the MDC-N who were on a membership recruitment drive in Tsholotsho were picked up by the Zimbabwe Republic Police for violating provisions of POSA. A National Youth Development Trust (NYDT) programs officer was unlawfully detained overnight in Lupane for convening a meeting without police clearance.” [122v] (p5)
14.147 SW Radio Africa reported further on 24 April 2012 about the arrest of the 15 MDC-N members:

“Zimbabwean police on Monday arrested 15 activists from the MDC-N party in Tsholotsho South district of Matabeleland North province, claiming they had conducted an ‘illegal’ meeting.

“But the MDC-N has contradicted the police version, saying their officials were on a door-to-door membership recruitment drive and did not need permission from the police.

“Party spokesman Nhlanhla Dube told SW Radio Africa their officials were working mostly in pairs, and not more than three people would approach each location. He said this does not constitute a meeting and the police are simply trying to frustrate their efforts to recruit.” [53ah]

Matabeleland South

14.148 Electoral returns (2000, 2005 and 2008) published by the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission show that Matabeleland South voted for the MDC. [140a] [140b] [140c]

14.149 The ZPP’s Monthly report for January 2012 noted that:

“The political environment in Matabeleland South Province was calm with only three incidents having been recorded during the month of January. The province also witnessed the continued court case of the MMPZ employees and their regional chairperson at the Gwanda Magistrates’ Court. Other charges have been dropped and they remain with the charge of undermining the authority of the president.

“There was one incident of unlawful detention of three brothers from Mawabeni in Umzingwane on January 28, 2011. The police allegedly arrested and detained the brothers on charges that they had threatened to shoot a member of the Zanu PF following a dispute they had had. The brothers were detained for more than twelve hours before being released for lack of evidence.” [122s] (p7)

14.150 The ZPP’s Monthly Report for February 2012 noted that:

“Matabeleland South Province remained very calm during the month under review with very few incidents of politically motivated human rights violations having been recorded. There were four cases in February up from the three witnessed during the month of January.

“There are reports of suspicion within the Zanu PF after some war veterans were banned from attending future meetings after they were suspected of “spying” for ZAPU. One such incident was recorded on February 2, when a war veteran was verbally attacked by fellow colleagues at a meeting in Insiza North. The victim was accused of double dealing as he was associated with the Dumiso Dabengwa led ZAPU.” [122t] (p7)
14.151 ZPP’s Monthly Report for March 2012 recorded no incidents in Matabeleland South during the month, however the report did state that “tensions are likely to rise as a result of the ongoing distribution of food aid around the province.” [122c] (p5)

14.152 ZPP’s Monthly Report for April 2012 recorded three incidents in Matabeleland South during the month, and reported that:

- “The political environment in the province remained calm during the month under review as the majority of the reported cases were of harassment and discrimination linked to food and other forms of aid distributions
- “Police officers from Gwanda reportedly demanded to know the ZPP’s mandate as well as an MOU with the government on the operations of the organisation. The officers threatened to come back again.” [122v] (p5)

Mashonaland West

14.153 Electoral returns (2000 and 2005) published by the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission show that Mashonaland West has previously voted for Mugabe’s ZANU-PF. [140a] [140b] In spite of the MDC making some inroads ZANU-PF retained control of the province in 2008. [140c]

14.154 The ZPP’s Monthly Report for January 2012 noted that:

“The political situation in Mashonaland West Province has remained the same despite the increase in number of political meetings from Zanu PF and the MDC-T. There were 27 cases recorded as compared to the 28 witnessed during the month of December.

“The Zanu PF intra-party violence was witnessed before and during the party election of the provincial chairperson which was eventually won by John Mafa. One supporter was allegedly assaulted by members of the Mafa faction in Kadoma after he had campaigned for Reuben Marumahoko in the mining town.

“The elections were also marred with harassment and intimidations as ordinary people were forced to go and vote during the elections and this was rampant in Chakari and Makonde. Mafa was accused of vote buying in Hurungwe as he was distributing fertilisers in the run up o the election. He was accused of using his position as a GMB employee to distribute farming inputs to his supporters and other influential people in the province.” [122s] (p6)

14.155 The ZPP’s Monthly Report for February 2012 noted that:

“Mashonaland West Province witnessed a significant rise in incidents of politically motivated human rights violations during the month under review. There were 65 recorded cases up from the 27 witnessed during the month of January. There were many cases of political harassment and intimidation.

“Villagers from Hurungwe West Constituency were allegedly forced to attend a Zanu PF rally where they were threatened by top government officials among them Air Marshall Perence Shiri, Cdes Dzikamai Mavhaire, Ignatius Chombo, Nelson Samkange, John Mafa and Faber Chidarikire. The meeting was reportedly organised by Themba Mliswa who is aspiring to be an MP in the area. The residents were labeled unfaithful for having
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put MDC-T in control during 2008 elections and they were threatened with disciplinary action during the campaign. More than a thousand people were brought from all over Hurungwe for the rally and business people were forced to close their shops to attend the rally.

“A group of soldiers went on a rampage beating and harassing residents at M.D Shopping Centre after one of them had been involved in a fight with a resident of the area. The following day he brought a truckload of soldiers for revenge. The soldiers went on to destroy a pool table owned by a man with disabilities who used the pool table as his source of income.

“A matter of serious concern occurred in Hurungwe East whereby the local MP Sarah Mahoka and the District registrar Mrs Mada have arranged to have mobile registration offices for people to have identity documents. District registry workers feel this is not official as it has not been announced from the national office.” [122t] (p5)

14.156 The ZPP’s Monthly Report for March 2012 recorded a total of 44 politically motivated violations, and noted that:

- “Villagers were being forced to attend Zanu PF meetings where they are forced to buy party cards and these were mainly recorded in Kariba, Norton and Zvimba and Mhangura
- “There were reports of intra-party conflict within the MDC-T in Sanyati as party activists fight to represent the party in the next elections
- “Tensions were also rising within Zanu PF as the party prepared to restructure its leadership in the province
- “The month also saw the resuscitation of the notorious terror group Top Six in Chinhoyi.” [122c] (p5)

14.157 The ZPP’s Monthly Report for April 2012 recorded a total of 46 politically motivated violations, and reported that:

- “As was the case from the other provinces, the Independence Day celebrations were the major source of conflict in Mashonaland West.
- “A terror base was reportedly set up in Sanyati by Zanu PF youths close to Kasiriri Shopping Centre. The police moved swiftly to destroy the base and allowed for the holding of an MDC-T rally in the area.
- “The province also witnessed the existence of the military personnel who continuously harass villagers in Kadoma for belonged to the MDC-T.” [122v] (p4)

14.158 ‘ZimEye’ reported on 24 May 2012 that:

“War veterans leader Jabulani Sibanda has threatened to unleashed a reign of terror across Zimbabwe as he ups his violent campaign to bolster Zanu PF’s image ahead of elections.

“Sibanda has been based in Masvingo for a long time but he has shifted his base to Hurungwe, Mashonaland West province where he is using intimidation tactics to force villagers rally behind Zanu PF.” [144c]
Masvingo

14.159 Electoral returns (2000 and 2005) published by the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission show that Masvingo has previously voted for Mugabe’s ZANU-PF. [140a] [140b] However, in the 2008 parliamentary elections the MDC took a majority of the constituencies in the province. [140c]

14.160 ZPP’s Monthly Report for January 2012 noted that:

“Masvingo Province remained one of the top three provinces with the highest number of politically motivated human rights violations with 59 incidents having been witnessed during the month under review. Most of the violations were still dominated by the distribution of farming inputs from the GMB and the Presidential Farming Inputs Scheme.

“As was with the rest of the provinces, the majority of the violations were incidents of harassment and intimidation. The districts of Zaka, Chiredzi, Chibi and Gutu witnessed the highest number of violations in the province.

“Zanu PF’s Masvingo District political commissar reportedly harassed Chief Murinye on January 22, alleging that the chief’s aide had beaten him earlier and confiscated a Zanu PF vehicle. The chief, however, did not badge and refused to apologise.

“The province witnessed a case of intolerance when an MDC-T supporter allegedly assaulted his would-be son-in-law arguing that the victim cannot marry his daughter as he belonged to Zanu PF. The victim is reported to have left the village as the MDC-T family accused the would-be in-laws of having terrorised them during the 2008 election violence.” [122s] (p5)

14.161 The Heal Zimbabwe Trust’s ‘Weekly update on the political environment in Zimbabwe’, published on 23 January 2012, noted that the ‘general environment’ in Zaka was “tense” and that:

“Zanu PF activists in the area on 18 January barred members of the MDC Zaka West Executive from holding their regular meetings. It is alleged that Esther Bonzo of Manhope village, Faustino Murambatsvina of Mhute village and Joseph Chimunda of Mutsava village, all from ward 17 in Chief Nyakunhuwa’s area are at the forefront of threatening activists from other political parties with unspecified action come election time. The suspected ZANU PF activists claim that they want to get rid of “puppets” and “sell-outs” in Zaka and return all the parliamentarian and council seats which MDC currently occupy. The three are reportedly going around compiling lists of people that attend MDC meetings and gatherings and their latest spat with local villagers was last week where they recorded the names of people going to Charingeno shops to attend a District executive meeting.

“Heal Zimbabwe urged the affected people to lodge a complaint with the police and has given the police one week to bring the hooligans to book.” [162e]

14.162 ZPP’s Monthly Report for February 2012 noted that:

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130 The main text of this COI Report contains the most up to date publicly available information as at 6 June 2012. Further brief information on recent events and reports has been provided in the Latest News section to 13 July 2012.
“Masvingo Province witnessed the banning of 29 NGOs in the province by Governor Titus Maluleke on February 14, 2012. The Governor had since October last year demanded that all NGOs in the province work with his office and sign memoranda of understanding (MOUs). Although the move has been dismissed as a nullity at law since the Governor is not the regulating authority for NGOs, concerns are very high that the move can be reciprocated in other provinces. ZPP is one of the 29 NGOs banned in the province.

“The province witnessed 55 incidents of politically motivated human rights violations, the majority of which being cases of harassment and intimidation. Zanu PF officials threatened serious violence on the people at a meeting that was held Gwindingwi school ground in Bikita if ever they continue to support the MDC-T. The threats were issued on February 12.

“The MDC-T chairperson for Masvingo South was allegedly shot on the upper right arm by unknown assailants near Renco Mine. The incident happened as the victim had just dropped from a truck along Chiredzi Road from Matandamaviri and he spent five days at Chiredzi Hospital. It was however, not clear whether the attack was politically motivated.

“War veterans who had invaded Mteri Lodges owned by Hippo Valley Estates were eventually evicted by the police on February 2. However, the war veterans had eaten all the food, drank all the beer and stolen linen and utensils worth US$2 900.” [122t] (p6)

14.163 SW Radio Africa reported on 13 February 2012 that:

“Last Tuesday [7 February 2012] an MDC-T activist in Masvingo was brutally murdered, allegedly by ZANU PF supporters at his Zaka East home. According to provincial party structures, Sharukai Mukwena woke up on Tuesday night to discover that his granary had been set alight. It’s believed that when he went to investigate what was happening he was confronted by ZANU PF youths who attacked him.

“The MDC-T’s spokesperson Douglas Mwonzora told SW Radio Africa on Monday that Mukwena’s hands were chopped off in the attack, calling it ‘a truly gruesome murder incident.’

‘He was murdered apparently for showing the MDC party symbol which is an open palm. So they severed both palms from his body before they murdered him,’’ Mwonzora said.

“Mwonzora said the motive for the death is ‘clearly political’, explaining how the ‘very partisan police have not done anything about this murder.’” [53aa]

14.164 The Heal Zimbabwe Trust’s ‘Update on the political environment in Zimbabwe’, published 25 February 2012, noted that in Zaka West, the environment was “moderate” and that “In ward 28, it is alleged that village heads aligned to ZANU PF are sidelining people from other political parties from benefiting from the food distribution exercise in the area. The food is being distributed unfairly on political lines leaving many intended beneficiaries in abject poverty. The Member of Parliament in the area has promised to approach the relevant authorities in order to ensure that this anomaly is redressed.” [162b]
14.165 The same update also noted that the environment in Zaka Central was “moderate” and that:

“There are reports that two ZANU PF activists identified as Daniel Mativenenga and Cephas Ganyata all from Ward 18 are intimidating villagers in the area and issuing verbal threats to known members of other political parties. Recently, they disrupted a planned MDC ward meeting warning all those that had attended that they will be their ‘targets’ in the upcoming elections if they do not surrender to ZANU PF. It is alleged that the two are part of the 2008 perpetrators of political violence who contributed to the deaths of many people in the area.” [162b]

14.166 ZPP’s Monthly Report for March 2012 stated that there had been 40 incidents of politically motivated violations, and noted that:

- "Villagers were forced to attend to Zanu PF meetings in preparation for the DCC elections in the province scheduled for April and from Zaka people were forced to provide information on their affiliation to Zanu PF including the year joined and whether the member is a registered voter.

- "Soldiers were also reported to be harassing villagers forcing them to vote for Zanu PF in the upcoming elections. A Major Bedza from Chivi allegedly threatened to beat up an MDC-T official at Chivi Centre on March 2

- "A villager from Gutu was convicted of insulting the President by a Gutu magistrate and was fined US$300 or 3 months imprisonment." [122c] (p4)

14.167 SW Radio Africa reported on 16 March 2012 that:

“A researcher assigned by the MDC-T has reportedly been arrested in Gutu for interviewing victims of the political violence that rocked Zimbabwe in 2008, when Mugabe lost presidential elections to Morgan Tsvangirai.

“A report in the NewsDay newspaper says Shepherd Mazorodze was: ‘Arrested last Sunday in Gutu while compiling a list of army generals accused of terrorising villagers before and after the 2008 disputed polls.’” [53ai]

14.168 The Heal Zimbabwe Trust’s ‘Update on the political environment in Zimbabwe’, published on 23 March 2012, noted that the environment in Gutu was “moderate” and that: “It is alleged that Chiefs are forcing villagers to contribute money for the construction of a ZANU PF provincial office in Masvingo. The most affected villagers are in ward 22 and 20 under Chief Mupata who initiated the programme. His aides are moving door by door forcing the villagers to pay $1 per family and those who fail to pay are being threatened with unspecified action.” [162e]

14.169 The Heal Zimbabwe Trust’s ‘Update on the political environment in Zimbabwe’, published 4 April 2012, noted that the environment in Zaka Central was “moderate”, and that: “In Ward 18, it is alleged that ZANU PF activists continue to intimidate people on political grounds. It is reported that a ZANU PF activist known as Ganyata has banned other political parties from holding meetings in the area threatening them with unspecified action if they carry any political activity.” [162a]

14.170 ZPP’s monthly report for April 2012 noted that there were 81 politically motivated violations in the month, and that:
“The political environment in the province remains tense as Governor Titus Maluleke’s ‘illegal’ ban on NGOs continues to be implemented by state security agents.

“An abduction case was recorded in Zaka West when the MDC-T organising secretary was kidnapped and heavily assaulted by Zanu PF supporters. The victim was later taken to Chiredzi and as ironically charged for robbery and has since appeared in court.

“The major perpetrators of violence in the province have been recorded as Zanu PF supporters and officials.” [122v] (p5)

14.171 The Heal Zimbabwe Trust’s ‘Update on the political environment in Zimbabwe’, published 20 April 2012, noted that the environment in Gutu Central was “moderate” and that:

“It is reported that one Mupata, a suspected ZANU PF member and former member of the army is intimidating councillors in the constituency during the distribution of food relief. It is alleged that he is barring councillors from distributing the food relief citing that the process should go through traditional leaders who have a record of politicizing food aid. Mr. Mupata has gone further to inform AREX officials to follow his directive threatening them with unspecified action if they do not agree. Heal Zimbabwe condemns the interference of political officials in the distribution of food relief which is meant for the needy regardless of political affiliation.” [162f]

14.172 The Heal Zimbabwe Trust’s ‘Update on the political environment in Zimbabwe’, published 10 May 2012, noted that the environment in Zaka was “moderate” and that “No cases of political violence have been reported. The grain loan scheme is still being distributed and only ZANU PF supporters are benefiting. The ZANU PF supporters claim that the maize is from their leaders hence no one should benefit except them.” [162d]

Midlands

14.173 Electoral returns (2000 and 2005) published by the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission show that Midlands has previously voted solidly for Mugabe’s ZANU-PF. [140a] [140b] In spite of the MDC making some inroads ZANU-PF retained control of the province in 2008. [140c]

14.174 The ZPP’s Monthly Report for January 2012, published 13 March 2012, noted that:

“Politically motivated human rights violations remained very high in the Midlands Province with the majority of the violations having been recorded in the Kwekwe, Gweru and Mberengwa districts. The province witnessed 84 cases of politically motivated violence as compared to the 85 recorded in December.

“The bulk of the violations witnessed in the region were mainly of harassment and intimidation with 53 incidents recorded. There were also 15 incidents of assault that were recorded mainly from Gokwe and Kwekwe districts. For refusing to attend a Zanu PF meeting, an MDC-T supporter was heavily assaulted by Zanu PF youths near Magwiro Business Centre in Gokwe Kabuyuni. The incident allegedly took place on
January 5, when the Zanu PF youths were forcing people to attend one of the regular Zanu PF meetings held in the area.

“The majority of the victims of harassment and intimidation had their rights violated for refusing to attend forced Zanu PF meetings, wearing political party regalia and expressing views with regards to the ongoing constitutional making process.

“One MDC-T supporter was threatened with physical assault by Zanu PF youths in Vungu on January 22. The incident happened at a funeral of another MDC-T supporter who had died the previous day. The victim was accused of leading in the singing of MDC-T campaign songs and was also wearing the party’s t-shirt.” [122s] (p4-5)

14.175 NewsDay reported on 7 January 2012 that, following a discovery of gold outside Kwekwe:

“Police armed with guns and dogs were dispatched to the goldfields on Wednesday to control the situation which had become chaotic after groups of vigilantes had taken control of the area and were demanding ‘tax’ from the panners.

“Announcing the takeover of the area at a rally attended by hundreds of panners who had been chased away from the fields by police, Zanu PF Midlands, provincial security officer Owen ‘Mudha’ Ncube said the gold deposits in Sherwood belonged to his party.

“Mudha said Zanu PF had fought in the liberation struggle to ensure that Zimbabweans owned their land and the minerals in it and therefore had rights to control who mined at the fields.

“The Sherwood Block mining claim is now registered to Cornelius Mpereri a close ally of Emmerson Mnangagwa (Zanu PF secretary of legal Affairs) and to Josphats ‘Gold’ Sibanda who also attended the rally.

“Zanu PF has started compiling registers of people who will be allowed to enter the fields to mine the precious metal.

“‘Only the sons of Midlands will be allowed to enter the fields and they will do so through party structures, those that are not known within the party will not have access and those from outside the Midlands will not be allowed here,’ said Mudha after chanting numerous party slogans denigrating the person of MDC-T leader Morgan Tsvangirai.” [146f]

14.176 The ZPP’s Monthly Report for February 2012, published 30 March 2012, noted that:

“The Midlands Province witnessed a relative decline in incidents of politically motivated human rights violations from 84 cases in January to 74 during the month under review. Serious incidents such as murder, rape and attempted murder have not been witnessed in the past two months with the majority of violations being of harassment and intimidation.

“On February 8, an MDC-T activist was assaulted by a Zanu PF supporter after he was seen reading a copy of The Herald at Datsun Mapfumo Store in Zhombe. The perpetrator asked the victim why he was reading a Zanu PF paper and before the victim could respond he was slapped in the face and the paper snatched away from him.
“An MDC-T activist was allegedly assaulted by war veterans at Matabo Secondary School, in Mberengwa West after he was overhead listening to the Voice of America’s Studio 7. After the assault the victim was threatened with eviction the next time he is caught listening to ‘pirate’ radio stations.” [122t] (p5)

14.177 The ZPP’s Monthly Report for March 2012, published on 5 May, noted that there were 77 politically motivated violations during the month and that:

- “A lot of people had their rights violated in the province by being forced to attend to Zanu PF meetings
- “The province had the highest number of people who were discriminated on party grounds during subsidised food distribution exercises mainly from GMB (Zhombe, Chiwundura and Mberengwa west are the most affected constituencies)
- “The political environment however remains calm.” [122c] (p4)

14.178 SW Radio Africa reported on 30 March 2012 that:

“At least six people were hospitalised after a group of ZANU PF thugs went door-to-door in Sanyati district on Tuesday, assaulting people who had taken part in a training session organized by the MDC-T.

“Trena Ruzvidzo, the MDC-T Midlands North Chairperson, said one victim was hit on the head with an axe and others were assaulted with iron bars and garden hoes. Ruzvidzo and other witnesses said the gang was led by a well known war vet named Enias Mapfumo, who came with 20 others.

“Police made no arrests and claimed they had no transport to ferry the victims to hospital in Kadoma. According to Ruzvidzo they even harassed the victims and made no effort to investigate the incident.” [53aj]

14.179 The ZPP monthly report for April 2012 noted that there had been 94 incidents reported in the month, and that:

- “The province witnessed a politically motivated murder case in Gokwe Gumunyu of an MDC-T activist by two suspected Zanu PF supporters. The two suspects were arrested by police and were only detained at Mutora Police Base for two days before being released. The ZPP verified and confirmed the murder case.
- “While the majority of the incidents were of harassment and intimidation, the province also witnessed a rape in Gokwe. There were also 20 cases of assault.
- “The highest numbers of violations were concentrated in Mberengwa, Kwekwe and Gokwe South districts.” [122v] (p4)
This section should be read in conjunction with Political affiliation and Civil society and human rights institutions, organisations and activists, for a more rounded picture of freedom of speech and expression.

15.01 The US State Department 2011 Human Rights Report: Zimbabwe (USSD 2011), 24 May 2012, observed that:

“The constitution provides for freedom of speech and press, but legislation limits these freedoms in the “interest of defense, public safety, public order, state economic interests, public morality, and public health.” Making a false statement prejudicial to the government carries a maximum prison sentence of 20 years. The government continued to arrest, detain, and harass its critics, and journalists practiced self-censorship … Security authorities continued to restrict freedom of speech and arrest individuals, particularly those who made or publicized comments critical of President Mugabe or made political statements opposing the government’s agenda. CIO agents and informers routinely monitored political and other meetings. Persons deemed critical of the government were targeted for harassment, abduction, interrogation, and sometimes torture.

“ … The government continued to restrict freedom of the press. The Ministry of Media Information and Publicity (MMIP) controlled the state-run media. High-ranking ZANU-PF officials, including President Mugabe, used the media to threaten violence against critics of the government. MMIP officials routinely threatened independent news organizations that criticized ZANU-PF and President Mugabe.” [2g] (p21-22)

15.02 The Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s Human Rights and Democracy: The 2011 Foreign & Commonwealth Office Report, published 30 April 2012, noted that:

“Media freedom remains restricted in Zimbabwe. The main source of information available to rural Zimbabweans (who constitute the majority of Zimbabwe’s population) is via radio which remains under the control of ZANU-PF ministers. In November, the Broadcasting Authority of Zimbabwe issued licences to two commercial radio stations. The process has been widely condemned since the two stations concerned have acknowledged links to ZANU-PF and state media. In urban areas there are now a number of lively daily and weekly independent newspapers which continue to challenge the government. However, the operating environment for journalists remains challenging: independent journalists continue to be harassed and several were targeted in 2011 for writing articles critical of ZANU-PF. One such case, for example, resulted in charges of criminal defamation being brought against the journalist in connection with an article seeking to expose corruption among specific ZANU-PF ministers.” [13] (p384-385)

15.03 The Human Rights Watch World Report 2012 – Zimbabwe, published 22 January 2012, noted that:

“There continue to be serious limits on the rights to freedom of expression and information in Zimbabwe, particularly in the form of threats of closure of independent media organizations, as well as the intimidation, arbitrary arrest, and criminal prosecution of journalists. The government’s actions seem primarily designed to inhibit criticism of government officials and institutions, and to muzzle reporting and commentary on the political situation in the country.
While the government has allowed independent local daily papers to resume operations, it has not fully reformed media-related laws as promised. It has also not reviewed criminal defamation laws that impose severe penalties, including prison terms, on journalists. Media laws such as AIPPA give the Zimbabwe authorities discretionary control over which individuals may practice journalism and operate a media outlet, as well as broad powers to prosecute persons critical of the government. Laws such as AIPPA and POSA continue to be selectively used to restrict the media. Journalists and media practitioners routinely face arrest for allegedly violating the state’s repressive media laws. Journalists and media outlets have also been subjected to threats and harassment from the authorities and security forces, creating major obstacles to reporting on Zimbabwe’s political system and continuing abuses by ZANU-PF.” [69e]

15.04 The Committee to Protect Journalists report, Attacks on Press Freedom 2011: Zimbabwe, dated 22 February 2012, (CPJ Report 2011) noted that:

“Although official anti-press harassment continued a gradual decline from its peak after the disputed 2008 elections, a highly restrictive legal framework kept domestic, independent news sources to a mere handful. The fractious coalition between Robert Mugabe’s ZANU-PF and Morgan Tsvangirai’s MDC failed to implement the media reforms they had pledged to undertake in their 2008 power-sharing deal, leaving in place repressive laws such as the Access to Information and Privacy Protection Act.” [30a]

15.05 The Civil Society Monitoring Mechanism report, ‘Mid-year review’, published on 2 November 2011, (CISOMM Mid-year review 2011) observed that:

“During the period under review, media stakeholders bemoaned the piecemeal approach of the coalition government’s media reform agenda. In fact, with enclaves of resistance to genuine media freedom in government strengthening their stranglehold, we will increasingly sound like a broken record unless we heighten our demand for sweeping reforms and strategically engage competent, relevant authorities. Although as media stakeholders we do not wish to lend any legitimacy to the Broadcasting Authority of Zimbabwe (BAZ) licensing board, we will build on the advocacy that resulted in the call for applications for two new broadcasting licenses. However, it is deplorable that there has still been no call for the licensing of community radio licenses.

“Simply granting operating licences to media houses does not translate into full reform and opening up of the media space. The same infrastructure of repressive legislation, which is enforced by paranoid enemies of the free press, remains unchanged, threatening the sustainability of the new publications we have today. The repressive laws include but are not limited to the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA), Public Order and Security Act (POSA), Broadcasting Services Act (BSA) and the Interception of Communication Act (ICA)..” [48e] (p16)

15.06 Reporters Without Borders named Robert Mugabe as a “predator of press freedom” on 2 May 2012. It stated that:

“It is thanks to its president that Zimbabwe’s privately-owned print media are constantly harassed and that the state-owned Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) has a monopoly of radio and TV broadcasting. Robert Mugabe blocks everything, prevents the national unity government from functioning properly, makes sure the independent media are unable to express themselves freely and, with the help of his closest aides, keeps
the state media under tight control. Mugabe stepped up the pressure on the media after his government’s electoral setbacks in 2008. Editors were placed under electronic surveillance to check their loyalty to the party, while opposition activists were abducted and tried for ‘terrorist plots’ in grotesque trials.

“Despite being hailed as a ‘liberator’ when he came to power in the 1980s, Mugabe has no problem with the arbitrary arrests and harassment to which most of the country’s journalists are exposed. In 2002, he was the architect of the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA), the sole aim of which was to finish off the privately-owned press, above all The Daily News, then the country’s most widely-read daily. In 2012, ‘the old man’ was preparing for the next elections – for which a date has yet to be set – by continuing to curtail free speech. While foreign news organizations are not welcome, the harassment of local journalists continues.” [137b]

15.07 The CISOMM Periodic Report, January to March 2012, released on 9 May 2012, noted:

“There may be more media plurality in Zimbabwe today but the Government and the Zimbabwe Media Commission resist reform at every other turn. The two new commercial broadcasting licenses issued are unlikely to increase media independence and diversity and in the meantime, existing foreign-based outlets are under threat. The airwaves and all state media remain dominated by very partisan reporting in favour of ZANU PF. Attempts to curtail media reform and freedom of speech under legislative acts, including of journalists and civilians, are unabated. Encouragingly however, the draft constitution contained positive indications of media and free speech best practices.” [48b] (p5)

See Journalists below.

MEDIA LAW AND MONITORING


“Even with constitutional provisions for freedom of expression, a draconian legal framework continues to inhibit the activities of journalists and media outlets. The 2002 Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) required all journalists and media companies to register, and gave the information minister sweeping powers to decide which publications could operate legally and who is able to work as a journalist. Unlicensed journalists can face criminal charges and a sentence of up to two years in prison. In addition, the Official Secrets Act, the Public Order and Security Act (POSA), and the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act severely limit what journalists may publish and mandate harsh penalties—including long prison sentences—for violators. Authorities continued to exploit these laws to harass and punish journalists in 2010, relying less on AIPPA and POSA and more on the Criminal Law Act.” [96d]

15.09 The same source reported that: “The 2007 Interception of Communications Act allows officials to intercept telephonic and electronic communications and to monitor content to prevent a ‘serious offense’ or a ‘threat to national security.’” [96d]

15.10 The CPJ Report 2011 stated that: “Although the power-sharing agreement of September 2008 allowed private broadcasting, it was only in 2011 that the Broadcasting Authority of Zimbabwe began calling for applications. Of the [15] applications received,
the authority granted licenses to only two radio station applicants, Zimpapers Talk Radio and AB Communications, both closely linked to the ruling ZANU-PF party.” [30a]

PRINT MEDIA

15.11 The BBC News Country Profile of Zimbabwe, updated on 11 July 2011, stated that the following were the main news publications in Zimbabwe:

- “The Herald - government-owned daily
- The Chronicle - Bulawayo-based, government-owned daily
- NewsDay - private daily
- The Financial Gazette - private, business weekly
- The Standard - private, weekly
- Zimbabwe Independent - private weekly
- The Zimbabwean - private weekly, published from UK and South Africa”. [3h]

15.12 The FH Press Report 2011 (covering events in 2010) noted that:

“The government, through the Mass Media Trust holding company, controls the two main daily newspapers, the Chronicle and the Herald. After undergoing a modest shift toward more politically balanced coverage in 2009, state media returned to slavishly supporting Mugabe and ZANU-PF while attacking the MDC in 2010, amid increased jockeying for power ahead of possible elections in 2011. The private Alpha Media Holdings group publishes a number of the country’s independent papers, including NewsDay, the Standard, and the Zimbabwe Independent, though many of their journalists practice extensive self-censorship, particularly regarding stories on corruption or factional fighting within ZANU-PF. The Zimbabwean is produced in South Africa for the Zimbabwean market, and some foreign newspapers, most of them also from South Africa, are available. Distributors of the Zimbabwean were arrested in February 2010 and briefly faced legal charges despite the fact that they have no control over the paper’s content. Newspapers typically have poor distribution networks outside urban areas, and they have been buffeted by soaring prices for newsprint. According to MISA’s African Media Barometer, state-run companies do not advertise in private papers, and state-run media outlets do not accept advertising from companies thought to be aligned with the opposition. Owing to poor economic conditions and salaries that do not keep pace with inflation, journalistic corruption and cash incentives for coverage have become rampant.” [96d]

15.13 The CISOMM Mid-year review 2011, dated 22 November 2011, noted that:

“More than 28 licences have been issued by the Zimbabwe Media Commission (ZMC) in the life of the IG [inclusive government]. The issuing of these print media licenses is commendable and has much improved the diversity of views available in mainly urban areas through the increased print media. Media stakeholders are still greatly concerned with the media law and policy regulatory infrastructure which has not been significantly reformed. This parlous state of affairs continues to shadow the development of the print media in Zimbabwe, as it threatens the sustainability of the new players and the pressures on practitioners.” [48e] (p16)
**TELEVISION AND RADIO**

15.14 Freedom House noted in Freedom of the Press 2011 – Zimbabwe, covering events in 2010, published 27 October 2011, that:

“The state-controlled Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) runs all broadcast media, which are subject to overt political interference and censorship. ZBC coverage, particularly before and during elections, overwhelmingly favours ZANU-PF. In 2009, retired military and intelligence officers loyal to Mugabe were appointed to the boards of state-owned newspapers, the ZBC, and the NewZiana news agency. The Broadcasting Services Act bans foreign funding and investment in this capital-intensive sector, making it very difficult for private players to enter the market. Radio broadcasts are currently the predominant source of information in rural areas. However, access to broadcast media in such areas is hampered by deteriorating equipment and a lack of transmission sites. According to MISA, only 30 percent of the country enjoys radio and television reception, but the government has reached an agreement with China to help upgrade transmission infrastructure. Meanwhile, officials have used Chinese technology to jam the signals of increasingly popular foreign-based radio stations that broadcast into Zimbabwe, including SW Radio Africa, a station run by exiled Zimbabwean journalists in London; the Voice of America’s Studio 7 service; and the Voice of the People. After a lull in 2009, such signal jamming appeared to occur more regularly in 2010. In December, nongovernmental organizations reported that authorities were raiding homes in rural areas and confiscating the shortwave radios used to access these broadcasts. Although satellite television services that provide international news programming remain largely uncensored, their cost places them out of reach for most of the population.” [96d]

15.15 SWRadio Africa reported on 23 November 2010 that the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) “… remains tightly controlled by Robert Mugabe’s party and is used as a machine to churn out ZANU-PF propaganda. Recently George Charamba, the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Information, announced that the government has no plans to issue licences to independent broadcasters, which is contrary to what is required by the global political agreement (GPA).” [53d]

15.16 ‘The Zimbabwean’ reported on 24 March 2012 that Webster Shamu, the ZANU-PF information minister, refused to implement any media reforms, as he claimed that “the boards of the ZBC and Broadcasting Authority (BAZ) are ‘here to stay’ because they were appointed ‘legally’ by government.” [99p]

15.17 The USSD 2011, published on 24 May 2012, noted that:

“Radio remained the principal medium of public communication, particularly for the rural majority. The government controlled all domestic radio broadcasting stations through the state-owned Zimbabwe Broadcasting Holdings. The government continued to jam news broadcasts by radio stations based in other countries, including the Voice of America’s Studio 7, SW Radio Africa, and Voice of the People.

“In May [2011] [Ministry of Media Information and Publicity] MMIP minister Webster Shamu announced that the government had procured equipment to establish eight community radio stations with technical assistance from the Zimbabwean Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC). Nevertheless, no community radio stations had been established by September. In July the Broadcasting Authority of Zimbabwe, the regulatory body that
licenses radio and television stations, invited applications for two national commercial radio broadcast licenses, but no new licenses were issued despite numerous applications submitted from independent prospective broadcasters. The Broadcasting Authority of Zimbabwe [BAZ] was not formally constituted by year’s end.

“The government controlled ZBC, the only domestically based television broadcasting station, which operated two television channels. International satellite television broadcasts were available through private firms but were too expensive for most citizens.” [2g] (p23)

15.18 The CISOMM ‘Mid-year review 2011’ noted that:

“On 27 May 2011 the improperly constituted BAZ called for applications for two free-to-air national commercial radio broadcasting services. A national free-to-air national commercial license refers to a profitmaking broadcasting entity that transmits an unencoded signal throughout Zimbabwe. Notwithstanding the fact that the legality of this board is heavily disputed, one also needs to examine the wide reaching nature and effect of this call for licenses.

“Due to the non-transparent manner in the management of broadcasting administered in Zimbabwe, chances are high that the smokescreen call for the licenses will become an extension of the ZBC’s monopoly. BAZ’s lack of impartiality is likely to result in a selection which advances a state controlled (pro-ZANU PF) media agenda, particularly in advance of elections. For example, among the contesting applicants are Zimpapers and Radio Voice of the People (VOP). Earlier this year, the Zimpapers group was urged to apply by the Permanent Secretary George Charamba. On the other hand, Radio VOP which was bombed by ‘unknown persons’ on 29 August 2002, is also among the applicants for the two commercial radio licenses but is consistently demonized by the state press.

“It is highly regrettable that Zimbabwe seems to be on a broadcasting desert island of its own given the fact that the region has embraced much higher levels of media freedom. Statistics demonstrate how far lagging behind we are. For example, the Democratic Republic of Congo had 41 radio stations and 51 TV stations in Kinshasa alone, out of a total of 381 radio stations and between 81 and 93 TV channels throughout the country. In 2006/7: Benin had 73 radio stations, while Uganda had more than 120, and Mali 200. South Africa has an aggregate of more than 1000 TV and radio stations combined.” [48e] (p16)

INTERNET

15.19 Internet World Stats Usage and Population Statistics’ webpage titled, Internet Usage Statistics for Africa undated, accessed on 1 June 2012, reported that there were 1,445,717 internet users in Zimbabwe, approximately 12% of the population, as of 31 December 2011. [166a] A report published by the OpenNet Initiative (ONI), published on 30 September 2009, noted that: “… ONI found no evidence of Internet filtering in Zimbabwe …” [18a] (Internet)

15.20 However, the USSD 2011, published on 24 May 2012, noted that:
“The law permits the government to monitor all communications in the country, including Internet transmissions, and the government restricted access to the Internet during the year.

“For example, the government blocked Blackberry’s Internet services, including its messaging service. Because these services are encrypted, they are not in compliance with the Interception of Communications Act, which allows the government to intercept and monitor communications.

“On February 24, police arrested Vikas Mavhudzi for subversion after he allegedly posted a remark on Prime Minister Tsvangirai’s Facebook wall allegedly suggesting that the prime minister emulate prodemocracy protests in Egypt. On March 16, a magistrate’s court denied bail to Mavhudzi, citing public security considerations. On March 31, the High Court reversed the bail denial after an appeal. The trial was scheduled to start on August 3 but was postponed after police admitted they could not gain access to the page where the message was posted to use it as evidence in court. On September 20, the magistrate’s court dismissed the case due to lack of evidence.” [2g] (p26)

JOURNALISTS

15.21 The Human Rights Watch World Report 2012 – Zimbabwe, published 22 January 2012, noted that:

“There continue to be serious limits on the rights to freedom of expression and information in Zimbabwe, particularly in the form of … intimidation, arbitrary arrest, and criminal prosecution of journalists … Journalists and media practitioners routinely face arrest for allegedly violating the state’s repressive media laws. Journalists and media outlets have also been subjected to threats and harassment from the authorities and security forces, creating major obstacles to reporting on Zimbabwe’s political system and continuing abuses by ZANU-PF.” [69e]

15.22 A report by Reporters Without Borders, dated 13 May 2011, also noted that journalists, particularly at the independent Daily News and NewsDay, were subject to “… constant harassment … by police, intelligence officials and members of President Robert Mugabe’s ZANU-PF party.” The report went on to condemn ZANU-PF’s use of violence to silence its critics. [137a]

15.23 Freedom House noted in Freedom in the World 2011 – Zimbabwe, covering events in 2010, published on 11 August 2011, that: “The country's draconian legal framework… restrict[s] who may work as a journalist, require[s] journalists to register with the state, severely limit[s] what they may publish, and mandate[s] harsh penalties – including long prison sentences – for violators … Journalists are routinely subjected to verbal intimidation, physical attacks, arrest and detention, and financial pressure by the police and ZANU-PF supporters.” [96f]

15.24 Freedom House noted in Freedom on the Net 2011 – Zimbabwe, published 18 April 2011, that:

“… most charges against journalists in the past few years have either been withdrawn or have resulted in acquittals, continuous harassment of journalists by authorities has often induced self-censorship, even among those writing for online publications. The
country's civil and criminal defamation laws, the Interception of Communications Act (ICA), and the Criminal Law Codification and Reform Act (CODE) all apply equally to online journalists and reporters for traditional media." [96e] (p7)

15.25 The CPJ Report 2011 observed that: “At least six journalists faced criminal defamation charges, including two staffers from the weekly Standard who were detained after covering a politician's arrest ... Official repression drove at least 49 journalists into exile over the past decade, the fifth highest number in the world, according to a CPJ study. Most of the exodus occurred in the first half of the decade.” [30a]

15.26 Freedom House noted in Freedom of the Press 2011 – Zimbabwe, published 27 October 2011, that: “Owing to poor economic conditions and salaries that do not keep pace with inflation, journalistic corruption and cash incentives for coverage have become rampant.” [96d]

For updates and further details of problems faced by journalists see the websites of Committee to Protect Journalists and Reporters without Borders

16. CIVIL SOCIETY AND HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS, ORGANISATIONS AND ACTIVISTS

This section should be read in conjunction with Political affiliation and Freedom of speech and media for a more rounded picture of freedom of expression in Zimbabwe.

16.01 Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment (Zimbabwe), Internal affairs section, updated on 18 April 2012, reported that:

“Between the Matabeleland massacres of the mid-1980s and the onset of the current crisis in the late 1990s, Zimbabwe developed an active civil society looking to protect rights and liberties, in urban areas at least. The principal human rights organisations working in Zimbabwe are the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe (CCJP), Zimbabwe Human Rights Association (ZimRights), Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights and the Legal Resources Foundation (LRF).” [90e] (Internal affairs)

16.02 Jane’s continued:

“...While Zimbabwe has traditionally had one of the most sophisticated civil societies and print media in Africa, the robust criticism of government by many of the numerous civic groups or non-governmental organisations (NGOs) prompted the ZANU-PF government to establish some kind of control over them. This has consequentially led to significant, and often brutal, media suppression since 2000. This position was reinforced by the passage of new legislation in 2004 that enabled the government to monitor and control the activities of NGOs. The Private Voluntary Organisations (PVO) Act was passed in December 2004 and facilitated government efforts to close organisations of which it did not approve. In particular, the PVO Act's restrictions on foreign funding of NGOs evoked protest because many NGOs depend on donations from abroad. Initially 30 NGOs were told to provide accounts of foreign donations or have their registration revoked, and then in April 2007, it was reported that all NGO licences had been revoked.” [90b] (Internal affairs)
16.03 The Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s Human Rights and Democracy: The 2011 Foreign & Commonwealth Office Report, published 30 April 2012, noted that:

“The state has sporadically targeted human rights defenders in 2011, with individuals often arrested on contentious charges, or disrupted while carrying out their activities. Jenni Williams and Magodonga Mahlangu of WOZA were arrested on 21 September on charges of theft and kidnapping and were detained in Mlondolozi Prison in Bulawayo until the Bulawayo High Court granted them bail on 4 October. The trial began on 19 December. We will continue to monitor the proceedings. Another example is of Farai Maguwu, a leading civil society activist who covers Zimbabwe’s involvement in the Kimberley Process. Mr Maguwu was prevented from leaving Harare on 10 September to attend an international conference in Ireland; state security seized his travel documents and personal property. Two days later, a High Court judge ordered state security agents to return his property but the harassment had already prevented Mr Maguwu from presenting civil society’s view at the conference. Mr Maguwu’s camera, laptop and cash have still not been returned to him.” [13j] (p385)


“A number of domestic and international human rights groups operated in the country, investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases. Such groups were subject to government restrictions, interference, monitoring, and harassment. Major domestic independent human rights organizations included the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, ZESN [Zimbabwe Election Support Network], ZLHR [Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights], Zimbabwe Peace Project, the NGO Zimbabwe Human Rights Organization (ZimRights), National Constitutional Assembly, Students Solidarity Trust, and WOZA [Women of Zimbabwe Arise].

“The government harassed NGOs it believed opposed government policies and continued to use government-controlled media to disparage and attack human rights groups. Articles typically dismissed the efforts and recommendations of NGOs that criticized the government and charged that their real agenda was regime change.

“Police arrested or detained local NGO members and harassed their leaders, often in connection with NGO meetings or demonstrations. During the year several NGO members were beaten during arrest and tortured while in custody.” [2g] (p36-37)

16.05 The setting up of a human rights body was part of the agreement signed by the three political parties that make up the Government of National Unity. BBC News reported on 1 April 2010 that: “Zimbabwe’s first human rights … commission …” was sworn in by President Mugabe. The creation of the commission is seen as crucial in moving the country forwards. “The Human Rights Commission will be chaired by Reginald Austin, a law professor and former head of the legal affairs division of the Commonwealth.” [3f] However, the ‘Zimbabwe Standard’ reported on 17 March 2012 that:

“Two years after the swearing in of commissioners, the body is still not operational as political parties in the coalition government haggle over its mandate and scope of work … human rights violators remain scot-free with very few, if any, of them being investigated or prosecuted as Parliament has not yet passed an enabling act to allow ZHRC to do its work … human rights activists believe giving teeth to the commission
would be helpful in stemming violence which has become synonymous with polls in Zimbabwe’s highly polarised political environment.” [70c]

16.06 The ‘Zimbabwean’ newspaper noted on 29 March 2012 that the second reading debated on the Human Rights Commission Bill in the House of Assembly had concluded on 28 March 2012, and that amendments were due to be tabled on 29 March 2012. [99q] An opinion article in ‘NewsDay’, written by John Makamure, executive director of the Southern African Parliamentary Support Trust (writing in his personal capacity), published on 13 April 2012, noted that following the debate:

“The Minister of Justice then took a bit of time responding to contributions from members and recommendations made by the Parliamentary Legal Committee and the Portfolio Committee on Justice.

“The main recommendations arising from the work of the Justice Portfolio Committee and Parliamentary Legal Committee included widening the scope of human rights violations to cover all issues covered by international human rights instruments to which Zimbabwe is a party; non-interference by ministers in the appointment and disciplining of commission staff members; submission of Commission reports directly to Parliament and not via the Minister of Justice; granting the commission retrospective mandate in its investigations and not begin from February 13 2009; and revisiting the clause which gives the Minister of Justice power to refuse information to the commission on the basis of such information being prejudicial to State interests.” [146b]

16.07 The same article noted that the Minister of Justice had agreed to some changes, however:

“…the Minister has not agreed to revisit the definition of human rights violation to include those violations relating to an international human rights instrument even if the law domesticating such an instrument has not been enacted.

“As a compromise, the minister agreed to remove the proviso that the law domesticating the instrument in question must expressly bestow on the commission the jurisdiction to entertain complaints arising from alleged violations of the instrument.

“…The minister has also agreed to give the commission the necessary autonomy to control its budget. Reporting by the commission will now be made both to the minister and Parliament. The minister has, however, not compromised on the retrospective mandate of the commission, meaning investigations by the commission will begin from February 13 2009.” [146b]

16.08 The UK Border Agency’s Report of the Fact Finding Mission to Zimbabwe: Harare 9-17 August 2010, dated 21 September 2010 (reissued 27 October 2010), noted the views of NGOs and civil society groups interviewed for the FFM regarding their ability to operate freely within the country (the following is a selection only – the FFM report should be read in its entirety), noting that:

“An anonymous organisation noted:

“‘We are able to operate relatively freely at the moment but in effect, the situation has not changed as the potential still exists for harassment … ’” (p7)
“The Zimbabwe Association of Doctors for Human Rights (ZADHR) noted:

“Freedom depends on the area and the project. Less politically sensitive projects, for instance training on HIV care, are not restricted or monitored in any areas. However, more sensitive projects, like the current Post Trauma needs assessment, have faced opposition in some areas from local administrators. This has happened particularly in Masvingo and Mashonaland East and Central where focus groups have met with resistance from the District Administrator …” (p7)

“The Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR) noted:

“…We have been able to work fairly normally, some activities have invited interference in the form of monitoring meetings, however there have been no disruptions. There has been some interference from state agents trying to find out about our activities but that has not really affected operations …” (p8)

“An international organisation noted:

“…We face currently no difficulty operating wherever we choose in the country and were also not touched by the 2008 ban that affected other international organisations and the NGOs: As indicated we have been here off and on since 1959 and constantly since 75. …” (p8)

“The Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum noted:

“…There are currently few restrictions on the Forum’s ability to operate beyond those legal restrictions on NGO activity which remain in place. Under this, the police still from time to time use [Public Order and Security Act] POSA to insist that the Forum obtains police permission for its meetings even though they are not political meetings.” [121a]

(p9)

More detailed information about other aspects of the treatment of NGOs and civil society activists is available in the FFM report: http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1226_1289391521_zimbabwe271010.pdf

HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS/ACTIVISTS

16.09 The Human Rights Watch ‘World Report 2012’, published on 24 January 2012, noted that:

“The Zimbabwean authorities continue to use repression and intimidation to silence human rights advocates and to prevent them from exposing abuses and promoting respect for human rights. Harassment and arbitrary arrests of human rights defenders have intensified since January 2011. For example, on February 8, police arrested two employees of the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum as they tried to conduct a survey on transitional justice. In the same period police also raided the offices of a number of human rights NGOs and questioned the employees.

“On May 23, police in Matabeleland North arrested two activists from the human rights organization ZimRights for convening a workshop on torture and its effects. Lawyers were denied access to the activists for three days before they were released.” [69e]
16.10 Amnesty International’s Annual Report 2012 – Zimbabwe, published 24 May 2012, noted that: “Human rights defenders continued to face arbitrary arrests, unlawful detention, politically motivated charges, and even torture in police custody. Community-based activists faced harassment and intimidation by members of ZANU-PF because of their human rights work. Such threats and intimidation increased as ZANU-PF started making pronouncements of a possible election in 2011.” [141]

16.11 The Civil Society Monitoring Mechanism’s (CISOMM) Mid year review dated 22 November 2011 noted that:

“In April [2011], a number of civic society organizations bore the brunt of the hostile actions by the security apparatus. The police raided offices of organizations including Women of Zimbabwe Arise, Zimrights, Crisis for Zimbabwe Coalition and the NGO Forum on the grounds that they were looking for subversive material in the form of Tshirts, flyers etc. Such raids frustrate the operations of these organizations. They also impede the mandate of civil society organizations to provide checks and balances against the excesses of the State.” [48e] (p24)

16.12 A report by Human Rights Watch entitled Universal Periodic Review of Zimbabwe, to be submitted to the UN Human Rights Council, dated 29 March 2011, noted that:

“The Zimbabwean authorities often use repression and intimidation to silence human rights advocates during the course of their daily work and prevent them from exposing abuses and promoting respect for human rights. ZANU-PF officials have routinely accused human rights organizations of being supporters of the opposition and of receiving funds from western donors that the government accuses of trying to destabilize the country. Human rights defenders and lawyers are constantly subjected to harassment, arbitrary arrests, and violent attacks by the police, intelligence agents, and government officials.” [69c]

16.13 SW Radio Africa reported on 20 March 2012 about the ongoing mystery surrounding the disappearance of a human rights activist in Bulawayo:

 “[Paul] Chizuze was last seen around 8pm on 8th February when he left his home, but what happened after this remains a mystery. Friends and family fear he may have been murdered, hijacked or abducted by parties unknown … Organizations led by the Christian group Churches in Bulawayo and the Solidarity Peace Trust have issued several appeals saying they fear Chizuze may have been ‘murdered.’

“Chizuze was well known for his paralegal work with civic organizations like the Amani Trust. Over the last three decades, Paul has been either employed by, or active with, the Legal Resources Foundation, Amani Trust Matabeleland, The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, ZimRights, Churches in Bulawayo, CivNet, and Masakanateni Trust. He also worked closely with Senator David Coltart, the Education Minister.” [53u]
Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA)

16.15 Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA) was founded by Jenni Williams in 2003 and is a protest group that campaigns for equal rights for women in Zimbabwean society. (Kubatana.net, last updated: 27 June 2007) WOZA's website (accessed 12 June 2009) noted that WOZA is an Ndebele word meaning 'come forward'. The movement has a countrywide membership of over 70,000 women and men. The majority of WOZA members are low-income earners from urban high-density suburbs.

16.16 The WOZA website stated that its activities are:

"Based on the principles of strategic non-violence, through our actions, WOZA creates space to allow Zimbabweans to articulate issues they may be too fearful to raise alone. WOZA has conducted hundreds of protests since 2003 and over 3,000 women and men have spent time in police custody, many more than once and most for 48 hours or more. These frontline human rights defenders are willing to suffer beatings and unbearable conditions in prison cells to exercise their constitutional rights and fundamental freedoms." [78a]

16.17 Amnesty International’s Annual Report 2012 – Zimbabwe, published 24 May 2012, covering events in 2011, noted that:

"On 28 February [2011], seven members of the campaigning organizations Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA) and Men of Zimbabwe Arise were arrested in Bulawayo. They were reportedly tortured at Bulawayo Central police station. Two days later they were released on US$50 bail and told to report to the police twice a week.

"On 1 March, another 14 WOZA activists were arrested in Bulawayo while holding meetings on social issues. They were released the same day without charge." [14l]

16.18 Amnesty International’s (AI) report Zimbabwe: Briefing to the pre-session working-group of the UN Committee on the elimination of discrimination against women, dated the 24 June 2011, noted that:

"WOZA members constitute the majority of Zimbabwean activists who have been arbitrarily arrested, unlawfully detained and subjected to torture and other ill-treatment while in police custody. While in detention WOZA members have been subjected to sexist attacks designed to de-legitimize their concerns and activism as women. They have also been subjected to other ill-treatment including denial of food and medical treatment. The detention of women activists has also had a disproportionately negative effect on their own welfare and that of their children and dependents." [14e] (p11)

16.19 The AI report also noted that:

"Women human rights defenders are portrayed as deviant women who have malicious intentions. This form of treatment amounts to sexuality baiting, aimed at undermining the work of women human rights defenders by discrediting their activities and isolating them from the rest of the human rights movement. Amnesty International has information that women who dare to challenge violations of economic and social rights
are subjected to derogatory or sinister accusations by the police, aimed at discrediting their character …

“Amnesty International is concerned about the systematic denial of access to medical care to detained women’s activists as a form of punishment for engaging in peaceful protest. WOZA activists who are arrested and beaten by police are often denied the medical treatment they need for the injuries sustained while in police custody.” [14e] (p12-13)

16.20 The WOZA website reported on 23 September 2011 that:

“WOZA leaders Jenni Williams and Magodonga Mahlangu and 10 other women were arrested in Bulawayo on Wednesday, September 21 while attempting to commemorate the International Day of Peace with hundreds of WOZA women and men. As well as those arrested, over 20 others were injured after being beaten by riot police … The arrested members were all due to be charged with criminal nuisance under the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act … the prosecutor declined to press charges against ten of the women and they were released without charge.

“However, further charges were laid against Williams and Mahlangu. They now face the astonishing charges of kidnap and theft. These are based on allegations made by a former WOZA employee who had been previously dismissed. He later returned to WOZA premises, broke in, and stole a substantial amount of property, some of which was recovered when a sympathetic relative led WOZA members to the place where the property was being kept.” [78b]

16.21 The FCO first quarter 2012 update noted:

“In early February [2012], Jenni Williams and Magodonga Mahlangu of Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA) met with members of Zimbabwe’s Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC) to complain about abuses committed by the Police. While this meeting was taking place, WOZA members were commemorating the 10th anniversary of WOZA and demonstrating outside the JOMIC office against the injustices against their members. Police intervened to break up the demonstration and as Mrs Williams and Ms Mahlangu were leaving the JOMIC building they were arrested along with seven other WOZA members and five bystanders. The nine arrested were charged with criminal nuisance and are facing trial.

“In another WOZA case, there were credible reports that seventeen members were arrested on 19 January and tortured by officers at Donnington police station. Six members were made to sit on ‘air chairs’ and police put a plastic bag over the head of one member. After being held for about eight hours, the WOZA members were released without charge.” [13k]

16.22 SW Radio Africa reported on 18 January 2012 that during the case, “A magistrate in Bulawayo ruled on Monday that activists Jenni Williams and Magodonga Mahlangu will have to defend themselves against kidnap and theft charges, even though the key witnesses denied the incident ever happened and contradicted police statements.” [53v] An Amnesty International USA blog post, ‘Zimbabwe’s Continuing Struggle for Freedom’, dated 18 April 2012, noted that Ms Williams and Ms Mahlangu were still on trial facing the charges. [14j] In March 2012, Amnesty International gave Jenni Williams
the Gineta Sagan Award for “… inspiring Zimbabweans to stand up for freedom and basic rights”. [14k]

The WOZA website provides regular reports of its activities. See also Latest news, Recent developments, Political affiliation, Politically Motivated Violence, Security forces, Women, and Violence against women

17. CORRUPTION

17.01 The US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2011 (USSD 2011), published on 24 May 2012, noted that:

“Although the law provides criminal penalties for official corruption, the government did not implement the law effectively or impartially, and officials frequently engaged in corrupt practices with impunity. World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators reflected that corruption was a severe problem.

“Corruption occurred at every level of the police force but took different forms depending on position, rank, or location. At the lower levels, corrupt officers extorted nominal to exorbitant fines from the public for varying claimed offenses to augment their low salaries. Armed police routinely erected roadblocks, claiming to be looking for criminals, smuggled goods, and food. In many cases police arbitrarily seized goods for their own consumption or extracted bribes from commuters.” [2g] (p34-35)

17.02 The same report noted that:

“Corruption was particularly pervasive in local government, where officials abused their positions and government resources openly and with impunity. Local councilors’ control of the designation and allocation of new land lots for residential and commercial use led to numerous allegations of bribe attempts and rent-seeking opportunities. Local government officials also demanded bribes or excessive fees for “expediting” paperwork, including birth certificates, passports, and licenses.

“Councilors practiced nepotism in the hiring of general council workers and in the allocation of lands. Allegations of corruption continued regarding both ZANU-PF and MDC-T councilors.

“Prosecutions for corruption continued but were selective and generally seen as politically motivated. The government targeted MDC-T officials, persons who had fallen out of favor with ZANU-PF, and individuals without high-level political backing.” [2g] (p35)

17.03 The Institute for War and Peace Reporting noted in a report on corruption, dated 11 April 2008, that President Mugabe’s government has been reluctant to curb corruption, which has allowed it to flourish. His “… failure to act on [a] … long series of corruption has created a widespread perception that there is a tacit acceptance of corruption in high places, and that even pledges of resolute action will come to nothing. [77c]

NewZimbabwe reported on 11 December 2009 that Zimbabwe’s economic troubles are
in part due to “… unprecedented corruption in all facets of … society … [and a lack of] political will to tackle corruption.” [41a]

Also see sections on Police, Journalist corruption, and Forged documents

18. **FREEDOM OF RELIGION**

18.01 The US State Department ‘July-December 2010 International Religious Freedom Report’, Zimbabwe, (USSD RFR 2010), covering events between 1 July 2010 and 31 December 2010, released on 13 September 2011, stated that the population was estimated to be 12 million. Of these:

“The country has an area of 150,760 square miles and a population of 12 million. According to the Evangelical Fellowship of Zimbabwe (EFZ), 84 percent of the population is Christian, primarily Roman Catholic, Anglican, and Methodist. In its 2004 census, the EFZ estimated there were four million Catholics; five million evangelicals and Pentecostals; two million Anglicans, Methodists, and Presbyterians; and more than one million members of apostolic groups. There are a significant number of independent Pentecostal and syncretic African churches. While the country is overwhelmingly Christian, the majority of the population also believes, to varying degrees, in indigenous religions. Religious leaders reported a continued increase in adherence to indigenous religious practices, often simultaneously with the practice of formalized Christianity.

“Muslims account for 1 percent of the population and are primarily immigrants of Mozambican and Malawian descent who came to the country as farm laborers. The Muslim population is concentrated in rural areas, where Muslim-led humanitarian efforts were often organized, and also in some high-density suburbs. The remainder of the population includes small numbers of practitioners of Greek Orthodoxy, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and the Bahai faith.” [2a] (Section I)

18.02 The Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Survey 2010-2011, carried out by the Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency and results of which were published in March 2012, noted that “The majority of the respondents (74 percent of men and 93 percent of women) are Christians. Men (22 percent) are more likely than women (6 percent) to report no religion. Men are also more likely to practice traditional religion than women (4 percent and 1 percent, respectively).” [153a] (p29)

18.03 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – Zimbabwe, updated 18 April 2012, noted that:

“More than half of Zimbabwe’s population are Christians, with the churches being influential in their various communities. The strongest group of churches is the African independent or indigenous churches, followed by the Roman Catholic Church and the various Protestant churches, among which the Anglican Church of the Province of Central Africa (Botswana, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe) is the largest. The rest of the population are mostly adherents of traditional African religious practices.” [90e] (Church Groups)

18.04 The Freedom House report, Freedom in the World 2011, Zimbabwe, covering events in 2010, published on 11 August 2011, noted that:
“While freedom of religion has generally been respected in Zimbabwe, church attendance has become increasingly politicized, with church groups such as the Solidarity Peace Trust and the Zimbabwe Christian Alliance at the forefront of opposition to the Mugabe government. Other groups, such as the Zimbabwe Council of Churches, are widely perceived as pro-Mugabe. However, there were fewer instances of state interference in religious affairs in 2010 compared with previous years.” [96f]

18.05 The USSD RFR 2010 observed that while the Government continued to maintain good relations with most religious groups:

“ …in certain instances, government officials harassed religious leaders who were critical of government policies, or individuals who spoke out against human rights abuses committed by the government, and organized public rallies centering on social and political issues. Generally the government employed these tactics to maintain a stronghold in politically contested areas. As talk of elections in 2011 intensified during the reporting period, there were more reports of police using the Public Order and Security Act (POSA) as a pretext to prevent or disrupt rallies. Taking sides in an internal dispute between factions of the Anglican Church, the government arrested, harassed, and prevented church attendance by Anglican clergy and parishioners of the Church of the Province of Central Africa (CPCA).” [2a] (Introduction)

18.06 The report added that:

“The 2002 Public Order and Security Act (POSA) restricts freedoms of assembly, expression, and association. Although not specifically aimed at religious activities, the government invoked the act to interfere with religious and civil society groups organizing public prayer rallies. While POSA exempted religious activities and events, influential persons in the government viewed any public gathering that is critical of ZANU-PF as political.” [2a] (Section 2)

18.07 The report also stated that: “The government did not require religious groups to register; however, religious organizations that operated schools or medical facilities were required to register those institutions with the appropriate ministry regulating their activities. Religious institutions may apply for tax-exempt status and duty-free privileges with the customs department, which generally granted these requests.” [2a] (Section 2)

18.08 The USSD RFR 2010 also stated that:

“The country has a long history of Catholic, Anglican, Methodist, Salvation Army, Lutheran, Presbyterian, and Seventh-day Adventist churches building and operating primary and secondary schools. The United Methodist Church, Catholic Church, and Seventh-day Adventist Church all operated private universities. The government did not regulate religious education in private schools but played a role in approving employment of headmasters and teachers. Since independence, there has been a proliferation of evangelical basic education schools. Christian schools, the majority of which are Catholic, constituted one-third of all schools. Islamic, Hindu, and Jewish primary and secondary schools were also in major urban areas such as Harare and Bulawayo.” [2a] (Section 2)

18.09 The Afrol Gender Profile – Zimbabwe undated, accessed on 10 June 2009, noted that “Indigenous African churches that combine elements of established Christian beliefs with some beliefs based on traditional African culture and religion generally accept and
promote polygyny and the marriage of girls at young ages; they also generally approve of healing only through prayer and oppose science-based medicine including the vaccination of children.” [73a]

18.10 The USSD IRF 2010 report observed:

“There were continuing reports of tensions between indigenous religious groups and mainstream Christian churches on issues of polygamy, modern medicine, and political exclusion. Indigenous religious groups, particularly the apostolic community in Chipinge, were largely blamed for exacerbating measles outbreaks in the country by not allowing immunization of their children. Christian church leaders and the government reached out to the apostolic groups on this issue. Religious leaders from a wide spectrum of groups continued to discuss these matters productively in interfaith council meetings.” [2a] (Section 3)

18.11 The Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s ‘Human Rights in Countries of Concern: Quarterly Update on Zimbabwe, Quarter two update, June 2011’, dated 30 June 2011, noted that:

“The harassment of Zimbabwe’s Anglicans, as reported last quarter, has continued. Sixteen Anglicans were arrested in Harare for resisting eviction and protecting their homes from intruders associated with a rival church. They were initially charged with unlawful entry, then theft, then public nuisance. The Anglicans have faced repeated harassment since self-proclaimed bishop Nolbert Kunonga was excommunicated by the Church of the Province of Central Africa in May 2008. Mr Kunonga still claims ownership of the diocese’s Anglican churches.” [13i]

18.12 The same source noted in its update for the fourth quarter of 2011, dated 31 December 2011, that:

“The Archbishop of Canterbury visited Zimbabwe in October to show support and solidarity for the Anglican Church which, as previously reported, has faced serious persecution by former Bishop Nolbert Kunonga. The Archbishop, together with other Archbishops from Zambia, Southern Africa and Tanzania, visited Harare and Manicaland in recognition that these areas have been hit worst by harassment with the closure of churches, eviction of clergy and their families and disruption to schools, orphanages and hospitals run by the Church. The delegation met President Mugabe and handed over a dossier detailing the oppression of the Anglican Church in Zimbabwe.” [13i]

WITCHCRAFT

18.13 The USSD IRF report 2010 noted that:

“The Criminal Codification and Reform Act criminalizes any practice ‘commonly associated with witchcraft,’ but only if that practice is intended to cause harm. It also criminalizes witch hunts, imposes criminal penalties for falsely accusing others of witchcraft, and rejects the killing of a witch as a defense for murder. Attacks on individuals in witchcraft-related cases appeared to be prosecuted under laws for assault, murder, or other crimes. In practice the government did not detain or prosecute persons for allegedly practicing witchcraft. A few cases of witchcraft were brought to trial and prosecuted under laws on indecency.” [2a] (Section 2)
19. **ETHNIC GROUPS**

19.01 The US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2011 (USSD 2011), Zimbabwe, published on 24 May 2012, noted that:

“According to government statistics, the Shona ethnic group makes up 82 percent of the population, Ndebele 14 percent, whites and Asians less than 1 percent, and other ethnic groups 3 percent. There was tension between the white minority and other groups, which ZANU-PF leaders often manipulated to further their political agenda. Historical tension between the Shona majority and Ndebele minority resulted in marginalization of the Ndebele by the Shona-dominated government.” [2g] (p46)

19.02 The Genocide Watch website, undated, noted on 7 February 2012 that:

“According to the **8 stages of genocide**, Zimbabwe is currently at stage 5: ‘polarization’. Like many other African countries, the tensions within the country have much to do with the country’s ethnic and colonial history. Polarization has always been high between the Shona and the Matabele and between the black population and the white minority. Robert Mugabe has ruled the country since 1980, after years of guerrilla war against harsh white minority rule. After taking power, Mugabe’s party (ZANU-PF) has tried to eliminate all sources of opposition in order to stay in power.” [58a]

**SHONA**

19.03 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – Zimbabwe, updated 13 September 2011, noted that:

“The Shona are a group of culturally similar peoples living in the eastern half of Zimbabwe, north of the Lundi river. The number of Shona speakers is estimated at more than nine million, or 75 per cent of the estimated total population in 2003. In addition, there are several million Shona speakers in Zambia and especially in central Mozambique. The main tribal/dialect groupings are the Karanga (Midlands and Masvingo; about 40 per cent), Zezeru (central Mashonaland; about 31 per cent), Manyika (Manicaland; about 10 per cent), Ndau (Manicaland and Masvingo; about seven per cent) and Korekore (northern Mashonaland; about six per cent). Most of the Ndau and Manyika sub-groups live in Mozambique. A smaller, more distinct group of Shona, the Kalanga (about three per cent), lives near Plumtree and the border with Botswana and is divided from the main body by broad areas of Ndebele settlement. Descent, succession and inheritance are largely patrilineal. Chiefdoms, wards and villages are administered by hereditary leaders.” [90k] (Demography)

For information on the traditional Shona systems of succession and how they relate to women, please see the chapter on [Women](#).

**NDEBELE**

19.04 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – Zimbabwe, updated 13 September 2011, noted that:
“The Ndebele of Zimbabwe, or Matabele, are a different group to the Ndebele of South Africa, and are closely related to the Zulu. The Zimbabwean Ndebele numbered about 2.5 million or 20 per cent of the estimated total population in 2003. A husband will allocate land and livestock to his wives; the eldest son of the first wife is the principal heir and inherits this property. They practise the custom of levirate marriage, in which men inherit the wives and children of their deceased brother.” [90k] (Demography)

19.05 Freedom House’s report, Freedom in the World 2011, covering events in 2010, Zimbabwe, published on 11 August 2011, reported that: “People living in the two Matabeleland provinces [who are predominantly Ndebele] continue to suffer political and economic discrimination, and security forces often target these areas as MDC strongholds.” [96f]

WHITES

19.06 The number of whites remaining in Zimbabwe is estimated to be between a few thousand (Economist Intelligence Unit – Zimbabwe Country Profile 2008) [24n] (p10) and 40,000 (Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 13 January 2009) [77g] having dropped from a peak of about 275,000 in the mid-1970s. [24n] (p10)

19.07 The historical injustice over the allocation of land in Zimbabwe gave Robert Mugabe a scapegoat with which to boost his popularity. “Until 2002 about 30% of agricultural land was … white-owned …” Farm invasions and confiscations have ensured that few farms are now in white ownership. (Economist Intelligence Unit: Zimbabwe Country Profile 2008) [24e] (p15)

19.08 The USSD 2011 reported that “The government continued its attempts to attribute the country’s economic and political problems to the white minority and Western countries. ZANU-PF supporters seldom were arrested or charged with infringing upon minority rights, particularly the property rights of the minority white commercial farmers or wildlife conservancy owners targeted in the land redistribution program.” [2g] (p46)

19.09 The Institute for War and Peace Reporting noted on 13 January 2009 that:

“Embattled Zimbabwe president Robert Mugabe is piling more pressure on the country’s dwindling white community, with a campaign of intimidation and arrests.

“Mugabe, who, of late, has been using warlike demagoguery to frighten critics, alleges that the opposition Movement for Democratic Change, MDC, is taking instructions from its ‘white masters’. He has repeated his mantra that the MDC will never rule ‘my Zimbabwe’, and says he will not surrender the country to white colonialists.

“Mugabe’s government has stepped up a propaganda campaign against … whites … [accusing them] of training hit squads to overthrow Mugabe and undermine the September 15 power-sharing deal.

“At the same time, the security forces are stepping up verbal and physical threats against whites, jailing some for allegedly fomenting unrest against the regime.” [77g]

19.10 On 24 November 2010 Eyewitness News reported that:

“As the political climate in Zimbabwe worsens, state media has published a call for whites to leave the country. The Herald and the national broadcaster are becoming
increasingly critical of perceived opponents of President Robert Mugabe in the run-up to next year’s polls. The Herald decided to publish a four-line SMS, which says whites should ‘go back to where they come from and stay for good.’ … As elections loom next year, the pro-Mugabe media is getting increasingly critical of supporters of Morgan Tsvangirai – now it seems – of whites.” [129a]

19.11 The Zimbabwe Peace Project’s Summary on politically motivated human rights and food related violations: March 2011 report, published 26 April 2011, noted that: “Many white owned companies in Kariba are likely going to close following spates of intimidation from ZANU-PF youths and war veterans. The talk of indigenisation has pushed some ZANU-PF supporters to claim for shareholding in the white owned companies.” [122m] (p8)

19.12 The Economist Intelligence Unit’s (EIU) Zimbabwe, ‘Country Report – Main Report’, dated March 2012, noted that “… economic policy will continue to be driven by political considerations, with the prospect of elections overshadowing policy reform. The government remains split on proposed indigenisation legislation under which firms would have to ensure that at least 51% of their shares were held by indigenous (black) Zimbabweans, and ministers are unlikely to agree a common position.” [241] (p5)

See also Land reform and Economy.

ASIANS

19.13 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – Zimbabwe, updated 13 September 2011, noted that there were around 15,000 Asians living in Zimbabwe. [90k] ‘The Independent (UK)’ reported on 10 April 2000 that, during the violence of the campaign for the June 2000 elections, there were reports that racial intimidation was spreading beyond the White-owned farms to include the Asian business community. Pamphlets were reportedly circulated in Bulawayo threatening Indians. [4a]

19.14 The Zimbabwe government has in the last few years pursued a ‘Look East’ policy, concentrating on building-up trade relations with India and China. The Herald, Zimbabwe’s main government owned (ZANU-PF supporting) newspaper, published an article on 25 March 2008 noting that the country could expect a rise in tourists from emerging economies in India and China. The report noted that Zimbabwe had a lot to offer Asians, specifically Indian tourists, as the country had “… a vibrant south Asian community… a lot of local expertise, restaurants and even the temples and mosques that will allow a religiously-minded visitor to keep up their obligations of public worship.” [23a]

ALBINOS

While not an ethnic group, albinos face discrimination in Zimbabwe based on their appearance. Albinos have been included in this section purely for ease of reference by users.

19.15 Zimbabwe Community Radio reported on 12 July 2010 that there were around 15,000 people living with albinism in Zimbabwe, [93a] SNNi.org (Smart News Network

The main text of this COI Report contains the most up to date publicly available information as at 6 June 2012. Further brief information on recent events and reports has been provided in the Latest News section to 13 July 2012.
International) noted on 7 January 2006 that albinos in Zimbabwe face a great deal of social stigmatization. “Discrimination against albinos, especially women, is rampant in all sectors in Zimbabwe. ‘Most employers call you for an interview and when they see you they just tell you there is no job,’ says Brenda Savanhu, a qualified secretary. ‘They do not tell you the reason, but we know why they are doing it.’” [62]

19.16 SNNi.org also noted that many albinos have difficulties affording sun creams and sunglasses needed to protect their sensitive skins, rendering them more prone to skin cancers. [62] A report published by UNICEF in April 2010 noted that: “In Zimbabwe, albino women are victims of rape, because according to local belief, HIV can be cured by having sex with an albino woman.” [85b] (p28)

19.17 IRIN reported on 16 February 2006 that: “About 65 percent of people with albinism in Zimbabwe are aged under 20. ‘Mortality is incredibly high – most of our people are aged between 33 to 50 years – very few people live beyond that, and it is sad because skin cancer is curable,’ commented John Makumbe [founder of the Zimbabwe Albino Association (ZIMAS)].” The IRIN article also noted that across southern Africa most people with albinism are regarded as “unnatural and even cursed” with discrimination in the workplace being common. [10b]

19.18 The Zimbabwean, in an article dated 27 May 2009, reported John Makumbe, chairman of ZIMAS, condemning the recent murder of albino people in east Africa where a belief that body parts such as:

“… genitals, limbs, breasts, fingers and tongue[s] can bring magic powers … although they haven’t received any cases of albino killings for ritual purposes in Zimbabwe, ZIMAS has received several reports of killing of albino babies at birth by parents and sexual abuse of albino women.

“In Zimbabwe we have received many cases of albino babies being killed by their parents who don’t like them. There is also sexual abuse of albino women by HIV positive men who believe that if you sleep with these women the virus will disappear,’ he said.” [99a]

19.19 An article by ‘The Zimbabwean’ dated 16 June 2011 noted that ZIMAS were providing sunscreen lotions to albinos for free, and that “… rural folk were receiving monthly grants to access free education under the Basic Education Assistance Module (Beam) and free medical treatment”. [99r] The same article noted that:“A teacher at a primary school in Avondale, who requested anonymity due to professional reasons, said there was a decline in stigmatisation of albinism. “There is a decline in cases of harassing people with albinism due to peer education in schools. Many pupils are now informed on what albinism is all about. The ministry now has exam papers with large font for albinos as most are short-sighted,’ he said.” [99r]

OTHER ETHNIC MINORITIES

19.20 The Lemba or Lembaa [also know in Zimbabwe as the Remba] are a small group of people in southern Africa who while speaking languages similar to their neighbours (the Shona/Ndebele), have specific religious practices similar to those in Judaism, and a tradition of being a migrant people with clues pointing to an origin in the Middle East or North Africa. (Haruth.com, 15 October 1999) [60] Afrol Gender Profile – Zimbabwe (accessed on 31 August 2006) noted that: “The Remba [or Lemba] ethnic group
practice infibulation, the most extreme form of Female Genital Mutilation (FGM).” [73a] (p2)

19.21 The World Directory of Minorities (published 1997), noted that, the Shangaan, Venda and Tonga peoples make up about two per cent of the population. The Shangaan and Venda live mainly in the far south of Zimbabwe. In 1985–86 the Government introduced teaching in primary schools in these groups’ own languages. In 1995 the national radio station began broadcasting programmes in the three minority languages. [16] [27] (Tribal map)

19.22 Mulonga.net reported in an article dated 27 December 2005 that the Tonga form “… the third largest ethnic and language group after the Shona and Ndebele and the most marginalised in the country.” [40a] The World Directory of Minorities noted that the Tonga live in north-western Zimbabwe. In the 1950s about two-thirds of their population, some 57,000 people (in both Zimbabwe and Zambia) were moved from their ancestral lands to make way for the Kariba Dam. Tonga leaders claimed that central government investment and relief, including “cultural support such as primary school instruction in the Tonga language” was “inadequate”. [16] [27] (Tribal map) IRIN reported on 5 September 2007 that since the construction of the Kariba dam the Tonga suffer from some of the highest levels of unemployment and poverty in Zimbabwe. [10p]

20. SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND GENDER IDENTITY

20.01 The information in this subsection refers to the situation of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex (LGBTI) persons in general. Where possible information specifically relating to gay and bisexual men, lesbians and bisexual women, transgender and intersex persons, has been provided under discrete subheadings. In looking at the position of lesbians, bisexual women and transgender women, consideration should be given to the status of women in Zimbabwean society generally – see Women.

20.02 In August 2011 the First Secretary (Migration) at the British Embassy in Harare interviewed representatives of non-government organisations, Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe (GALZ), Women’s Action Group (WAG), Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA), Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR) and CONNECT – Zimbabwe Institute of Systemic Therapy, to obtain information about the situation for LGBTI persons in Zimbabwe. The interviews covered the legal position of and treatment by the state and societal attitudes to LGBTI persons. Officials are recommended to read these interviews alongside information in the sections below. The notes of these interviews can be found at Annex E.

LEGAL RIGHTS

20.03 The International Lesbian and Gay Association report, State-sponsored Homophobia 2012, dated 5 May 2012, listed laws relating to same-sex sexual relations and gender identity. These laws that are ‘negative’ – that prohibit behaviour – and ‘positive’ – those which protect from discrimination or recognise entitlements. ILGA website’s country profile for Zimbabwe, undated, accessed on 1 June 2012, noted that there is no law stating same-sex partnerships are legal (or illegal) and same-sex couples cannot adopt
children. The law prohibits “homosexual” sex (for men but not women – see subsection on Lesbians and bisexual women below) and has no ‘positive’ laws listed in regard to either sexual orientation or gender identity. [81b] The Zimbabwe Civil Society’s Shadow Report to the CEDAW Committee 2012, produced by the Zimbabwe Women Lawyers Association, January 2012, (ZCSS Report 2012) observed that: “There is no protection provided for in Zimbabwean law on discrimination against lesbian, bisexual and transgender women, or their male counterparts.” [167a] (p10)

20.04 The Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe (GALZ) website, undated, accessed on 24 April 2012, noted that:

“There is a common misconception amongst many Zimbabweans that it is illegal to be homosexual in Zimbabwe. This is a myth since it is not possible to legislate against what people think, only against what people express or do. Nevertheless, with ordinary Zimbabweans and law enforcers being given carte blanche by national leaders to arrest homosexuals on the streets, many [lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex] LGBTI people in Zimbabwe live in fear of blackmail and being arrested for consensual sexual acts. GALZ has successfully provided legal assistance to many members who have been victims of state harassment or extortion.” [42c] (GALZ and the law)

20.05 ‘Voice of America News’ reported on 11 January 2012 that:

“Co-chairmen of the parliamentary select committee in charge of overhauling Zimbabwe’s constitution before new elections said Wednesday that the interim draft constitution on its way to a referendum does not contain language protecting gay and lesbian rights.

“Such an outcome was a foregone conclusion for many observers given strong opposition to such protection by President Robert Mugabe and signals from Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai and his Movement for Democratic Change that neither he nor his party would champion the inclusion of such language in the new basic document.” [83h]

Gay and bisexual men

20.06 The International Lesbian and Gay Association report, State-sponsored Homophobia 2012, dated 1 May 2012, (ILGA Report 2012) observed that sexual relations between men are illegal. The report set out the laws on sodomy, as found in the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act, which was effective from July 2006:

“Section 73. Sodomy

“(1) Any male person who, with the consent of another male person, knowingly performs with that other person anal sexual intercourse, or any act involving physical contact other than anal sexual intercourse that would be regarded by a reasonable person to be an indecent act, shall be guilty of sodomy and liable to a fine up to or exceeding level fourteen or imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year or both.

“(2) Subject to subsection (3), both parties to the performance of an act referred to in subsection (1) may be charged with and convicted of sodomy.
“(3) For the avoidance of doubt it is declared that the competent charge against a male person who performs anal sexual intercourse with or commits an indecent act upon a young male person—

“(a) who is below the age of twelve years, shall be aggravated indecent assault or indecent assault, as the case may be; or
(b) who is of or above the age of twelve years but below the age of sixteen years and without the consent of such young male person, shall be aggravated indecent assault or indecent assault, as the case may be; or
(c) who is of or above the age of twelve years but below the age of sixteen years and with the consent of such young male person, shall be performing an indecent act with a young person.” [81b] (p21)

20.07 GALZ’s website, on its GALZ and the law webpage, undated, accessed on 24 April 2012, observed that: “Most importantly, whereas previously [prior to the implementation of the Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act 2004], consensual and non-consensual anal sex between men were both regarded as sodomy, sodomy now only refers to consensual sex between men. In addition, sodomy only previously referred to anal sex. Sodomy now includes any sexual contact between men …” [42c]

20.08 The same source explained, in regard to the law for non-consensual same-sex sexual acts, that:

“… it is GALZ’s experience that most cases are reported to the police as being non-consensual, usually contrary to the facts. Accordingly, it is necessary for us to include here the law relating to non-consensual sexual acts. Non-consensual male-to-male anal sex is now called ‘aggravated assault’ which is defined as follows;

“Any person who, being a male person, commits upon a male person anal sexual intercourse or any other act involving the penetration of any part of the other male person’s body or of his own body with indecent intent and knowing that the other person has not consented to it or realising that there is a real risk or possibility that the other person may not have consented to it, shall be guilty of aggravated indecent assault and liable to the same penalty as is provided for rape.’

“The penalty provided for rape is a maximum of life imprisonment, though generally the sentence is usually between seven and ten years.

“Any other male-to-male non-penetrative, non-consensual sexual act is now called ‘indecent assault’ which is defined as follows:

“A person who, being a male person, commits upon a male person any act involving physical contact that would be regarded by a reasonable person to be an indecent act, other than anal sexual intercourse or other act involving the penetration of any part of the male person’s body or of his own body with indecent intent and knowing that the other person has not consented to it or realising that there is a real risk or possibility that the other person may not have consented to it, shall be guilty of indecent assault and liable to a fine not exceeding level seven or imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years or both.” [42c]

“Sodomy carries a penalty of up to one year in prison or a fine up to [US]$5,000. There were no known cases of sodomy charges being used to prosecute consensual same-sex sexual activity. Common law prevents gay men … from fully expressing their sexual orientation and, in some cases, criminalizes the display of affection between men.

“Leadership in both ZANU-PF and MDC-T, including President Mugabe and Prime Minister Tsvangirai, publicly denounced the LGBT community and warned against the inclusion of LGBT rights in the constitution. Mugabe publicly blamed the LGBT community for Africa’s ills and declared its members to be worse than ‘pigs and dogs.’ However, in an apparent shift of position, Tsvangirai declared in an October 24 press interview that LGBT rights were a human right that should be enshrined in the country’s new constitution.” [2g] (p47)

20.10 Following the rape of a 10-year-old by a senior police officer, the African Activist reported on 23 June 2011 that GALZ were concerned that: “… the current laws lack distinction between consensual same sex conduct and rape for LGBTI persons. This lack of distinction in the law and the media ‘promotes the dangerous myth that homosexual men are automatically rapists and abusers of children.’” [66b]

Lesbians and bisexual women

20.11 The ILGA Report 2011 stated that same-sex sexual acts between women were legal. [81] (p33) The GALZ website, undated, accessed on 24 April 2012, noted that: “The common law prohibiting consensual lesbian sexual acts had previously fallen into disuse and this law has not been revived by the codification and modification of the criminal law.” [42c] (GALZ and the law) The same source noted on an undated webpage, accessed on 24 April 2012, that: “… there is nothing under the law which criminalises sex between women. At best, the police can charge lesbians with indecent exposure.” [42j] (Blackmail) The USSD Report 2011 noted that: “Common law prevents gay men, and to a lesser extent lesbians, from fully expressing their sexual orientation…” [2g] (p47)

20.12 An article posted on Kubatana.com titled, The position of lesbian and bisexual women, by Fadzai Muparutsa of GALZ, dated January 2008 noted that:

“… no law exists here [Zimbabwe] which prohibits sexual relations between women: but, by the same token, protection of the rights of women to bodily integrity and ownership of their own sexuality is minimal. This means that, although richer lesbian women may be in a better position to buy their freedoms and independence, those who are poorer are still required to subjugate themselves to the control of men and poorer lesbian women, who tend to be less aware of their rights and whose position depends on the sanction of men, have fewer choices still.” [55p]

20.13 The Zimbabwe Civil Society’s Shadow Report to the CEDAW Committee, January 2012, observed that: “There is no protection provided for in Zimbabwean law on discrimination against lesbian, bisexual and transgender women, or their male counterparts. It is not addressed in the constitution, however lesbian, bisexual and transgender women experience discrimination both because they are women and because of their sexual orientation.” [165c] (p10)
Transgender and intersex persons

20.14 Asylum Law report, Sexual Minorities and the Law: A World Survey, updated July 2006, observed in connection with transgender persons that there was: “No data or legal situation unclear.” [50a] (p14) The ILGA Report 2012 noted that there was no law prohibiting discrimination in employment based on gender identity nor on gender recognition after gender reassignment treatment. [81b]

20.15 The Zimbabwe Civil Society’s Shadow Report to the CEDAW Committee, January 2012, observed that: “There is no protection provided for in Zimbabwean law on discrimination against… transgender women, or their male counterparts. It is not addressed in the constitution, however… transgender women experience discrimination both because they are women and because of their sexual orientation [and/or gender identity].” [165c] (p10)

20.16 COI Service was unable to find information specifically on intersex persons in Zimbabwe during the period this report was updated having consulted the sources referred to in this section.

LGBTI groups

20.17 The GALZ website, undated, accessed on 8 July 2011, noted that: “The Zimbabwean constitution provides for freedom of association. There is nothing illegal about forming an association to cater for the needs and interests of LGBTI [Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex] people in Zimbabwe. Government would, therefore, have to resort to illegal means to close down GALZ.” [42b] (FAQ)

TREATMENT BY, AND ATTITUDES OF, STATE AUTHORITIES

20.18 In August 2011 the First Secretary (Migration) at the British Embassy in Harare interviewed representatives of Zimbabwean non-government organisations Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe (GALZ), Women’s Action Group (WAG), Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA), Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR) and CONNECT – Zimbabwe Institute of Systemic Therapy to obtain information about the situation for LGBTI persons in Zimbabwe. The interviews included questions on the position and attitudes of the state to LGBTI persons. Officials are recommended to read these interviews alongside information in the sections below. The notes of those interviews can be found at Annex E.

20.19 The Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s Human Rights and Democracy: The 2011 Foreign & Commonwealth Office Report, published 30 April 2012, noted that: “… the state generally prefers to turn a blind eye to the LGBT community. Homophobic comments are not unusual in media coverage and public speeches by ZANU-PF, but no serious cases of abuse against the community were recorded in 2011. Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai spoke positively about LGBT rights, which led one state-sponsored newspaper to ridicule his position.” [13j] (p387)

20.20 A report by the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission entitled Nowhere to turn: Blackmail and extortion of LGBT people in sub-Saharan Africa, dated 15 February 2011, noted that:
“… Robert Mugabe and other senior government officials … have repeatedly defined homosexuality as anti-Zimbabwean and ‘whitewashed’ it as a ‘sickness’ imported by white settlers. Mugabe has frequently referred to homosexuality as a threat to the moral fabric of society; he berated ‘sodomists’ for ‘behaving worse than dogs and pigs’ and proclaimed are turn to ‘traditional’ culture, saying, ‘We have our own culture, and we must rededicate ourselves to our traditional values that make us human beings.’ His vituperation is evidence of attempts to reject homosexual behaviour as extrinsic to Zimbabwean culture, relying on the notion that it is mainly done by whites and is alien to the Zimbabwean society in general.” [80a] (p28)

20.21 A representative of the Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe (GALZ), interviewed as part of the UK Border Agency’s Fact Finding Mission to Zimbabwe (see Report of the Fact Finding Mission to Zimbabwe: Harare 9-17 August 2010), dated 21 September 2010 (reissued 27 October 2010), stated that, in regard to GALZ’s treatment by the state, that:

“GALZ has a resource centre in Milton Park in Harare. They work well with the local police in Milton Park. There was a raid on the GALZ offices in May 2010 by Harare Central Police and the Source’s home was searched at the same time. The Source was not at his home at the time but the police harassed the people who were there. No-one was hurt. GALZ attributes these raids to their active involvement in the constitutional outreach programme … Gay rights activists may be targeted by the police, CIO and CID. This will generally be in the form of harassment - these agencies will typically approach an activist and try to impart a sense of fear that what they are doing is wrong, is not acceptable and they shouldn't be encouraging others. There have been isolated cases of arbitrary arrest of gay men and gay rights activists and searches of their properties and person, often in an attempt to find such things as membership lists. Detention following such arrests tends not to be for very long - when it hears of such cases GALZ works with Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights. The longest that a GALZ activist has been detained is for 6 days. Ordinary gay men are as far as GALZ is aware never detained for longer than 48 hours. GALZ is not aware of any incidents of official violence against gay men since the formation of the GNU.

“GALZ attributes the police attitude to a misunderstanding of GALZ’s role - they sometimes think it is an underground organisation and have suggested that it is used as a channel by the UK and USA.” [121a] (p70)

20.22 The GALZ website, undated, accessed on 8 July 2011, noted that: “Zimbabwe is not the worst place in the world in which to be gay or lesbian even though the President, government officials and church leaders have whipped up a climate of hysterical homophobia…” [42b] (FAQ)

20.23 The USSD 2011 report observed that:

“Leadership in both ZANU-PF and MDC-T, including President Mugabe and Prime Minister Tsvangirai, publicly denounced the LGBT community and warned against the inclusion of LGBT rights in the constitution. Mugabe publicly blamed the LGBT community for Africa’s ills and declared its members to be worse than ‘pigs and dogs.’ However, in an apparent shift of position, Tsvangirai declared in an October 24 press interview that LGBT rights were a human right that should be enshrined in the country’s new constitution.” [2g] (p47)
20.24 However, New Zimbabwe reported on 26 October 2011 that PM Tsvangirai’s “… new stance set the stage for testy exchanges in Parliament on Wednesday in his inaugural British-style Prime Minister’s Questions”. [41d] The article further noted that:

“… Dorcas Sibanda, an MP from his MDC-T party, who raised the issue even as Tsvangirai’s aides were trying to draw a line over the controversy.

“Sibanda wanted to know if Tsvangirai had been quoted correctly, calling for a constitution that favours gay rights.

“My personal view does not matter,’ Tsvangirai began, showing no appetite to repeat what he had told the BBC just three days earlier.

“This is an elitist debate when people have no food, when people have no jobs, when people have so many problems. It is a diversionary attitude, to try and put this issue at the focus of the nation is a real diversionary. There are more important issues to deal with.’” [41d]

20.25 Pink News reported on 29 December 2011 that:

“A Zimbabwean MP who was arrested last week after saying President Robert Mugabe had sex with other male politicians has been released on bail of [US]$200 today, the state newspaper says.

“Lynette Karenyi, of the Movement for Democratic Change, was arrested after reportedly saying: ‘Zanu PF members have been attacking MDC president Tsvangirai alleging he is pro-homosexuals yet Robert Mugabe has practised homosexuality with Jonathan Moyo and Canaan Banana.’

“The government-owned Herald newspaper reported that the statement was made at an MDC rally on 9 December [2011] at Nhedziwa football grounds in Chimanimani … Neither Karenyi and nor MDC has commented but the newspaper said she was ‘denying the allegations being levelled against her.’” [29c]

20.26 The ‘Independent’ newspaper (South Africa) reported on 26 February 2012 that President Mugabe “… told British Prime Minister David Cameron ‘to hell with you’ over his calls to respect gay rights…” and again referred to homosexuals as “… worse than pigs and dogs because pigs know there are males and females.” [154a]

20.27 Pink News reported on 9 April 2012 that Mr Gay Zimbabwe had withdrawn from the 2012 Mr Gay World competition:

“The Zimbabwean representative, Taurai Zhanje, had to withdraw from the event after his family were pressured by his country’s government over the issue.

“Coenie Kukkuk, the contest’s director in Africa said, ‘There was relentless pressure on the delegate from Zimbabwe to withdraw. His family was followed by agents of the regime in Zimbabwe. His mother is employed by the government, she surely would have lost her job. And with 80 per cent unemployment, she was looking after a lot of people.’” [29d]

20.28 Associated Press reported on 25 May 2012 that:

The main text of this COI Report contains the most up to date publicly available information as at 6 June 2012. Further brief information on recent events and reports has been provided in the Latest News section to 13 July 2012.
“Zimbabwe's president said Thursday [24 May 2012] that homosexuality doesn't belong in Zimbabwe and it violates women's rights by denying the union of men and women needed to bear children.

“Robert Mugabe, 88, speaking at a women's HIV/Aids and gender rights conference in Harare, said the ‘gay world’ goes against nature.

“After earlier remarks by UN human rights chief Navi Pillay referring to the criminalization of homosexuality in some countries, Mugabe said Zimbabwe and Africa won't recognize same-sex marriage because it leads to human ‘extinction.’” [139b]

20.29 An article in New Zimbabwe, titled Interview: GALZ's Fadzai Muparutsa, dated 13 April 2010, recorded Ms Mupartsa’s response to a question over the police’s role in abuse and discrimination of LGBT persons:

“… one of the things that happens is that if you experience any kind of violence, violations or any kind of abuse, particularly relating to a sexual orientation, if you go and report that matter to the police, they either don’t take any action, they ridicule you, you are paraded in front of anyone or everyone who is at that police station… there are selective citizens who will be assisted and other citizens won’t be assisted and gay, lesbian people are amongst those people who aren’t assisted by law enforcement agents in any kind of way.” [41c]

20.30 GALZ published a report on 5 April 2011 in which it noted “… with grave concern, cases related to arbitrary detentions, harassment and intimidation of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) members of the organisation by law enforcement agents, family and community leaders.” The report noted that:

“… on the 23rd March 2011, law enforcement agents stormed the house of a male member who was in the company of four male friends. The law enforcement agents conducted a search of the premises without a search warrant. After the search, the agents took the names of all present and detained them at a police post. The five were taken to the police station and charged with disorderly conduct. Whilst at the police station, the police abused and ridiculed the five. All five were fined US$10 with an extra charge of US$30 to entice the officer into receipting the fines.” [42d]

Lesbians and bisexual women

20.31 In its the report, Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Zimbabwe, dated 23 March 2012, the Committee was “… also concerned about acts of violence perpetrated by State and non-State actors, against lesbian, bisexual and transgender women.” [165b] (p5)


“Most of the harassment and the cases of [so-called ‘corrective’] rape of which GALZ is aware have taken place in the high density areas. For women who have been raped, shame often prevents them from reporting the crime to the police and if they do, the police are often reluctant to act. This means that for lesbians who are raped, counselling may be the best that they can hope for.
“GALZ is not aware of any active police persecution of lesbians nor of any cases of lesbians being detained, but there is a lack of police protection.” [121a] (p69-70)

20.33 GALZ noted in a report dated 5 April 2011 that:

“On the 25th March 2011, law enforcement agents detained two female members of GALZ after they were taken to the police station by relatives on allegations of practising homosexuality. The two members were interrogated separately and threatened with arrest if they denied the charges. Police officers seized the members’ mobile phones and called people in the contacts list to ascertain the nature of the two member’s relationship. While at the police station, members were verbally abused and had photographs taken by law enforcement agents who threatened to send the photographs to a local tabloid.

“Again on 25 March, two female members were threatened by a local ward councillor who alleged that they were homosexuals. All cases have been referred to the Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights.” [42d]

SOCIETAL TREATMENT AND ATTITUDES

20.34 In August 2011 the First Secretary (Migration) at the British Embassy in Harare interviewed representatives of Zimbabwean non-government organisations Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe (GALZ), Women’s Action Group (WAG), Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA), Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR) and CONNECT – Zimbabwe Institute of Systemic Therapy to obtain information about the situation for LGBTI persons in Zimbabwe. The interviews included questions on societal attitudes to LGBTI persons. Officials are recommended to read these interviews alongside information in the sections below. The notes of those interviews can be found at Annex E.


“Sexually intimate relations between males can be attested in Zimbabwe from time immemorial … Such relationships were disapproved, at least beyond the age of adolescence, and constrained by the imperatives of the pre-modern political economy. During the colonial era, however, homosexual behaviours among African men flourished in some contexts. While still disapproved, pederastic ‘marriages’ known as ngotshana had already become ‘common’ or ‘prevalent’ in some of the developing cities and labour camps as early as 1907… homosexual behaviours among black men remained deep in the closet (secret, compartmentalised, unmentionable) until the late 1980s. Only then did openly gay identities begin to be expressed through events such as the Jacaranda Queen contest (now showcasing mostly black drag queens). Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe (GALZ, established in 1990) and other local solidarity groups have meanwhile emerged with the goal of educating Zimbabweans about the nature of homosexual orientation and the humanity of people so inclined. GALZ’s attempts to display its educational material at the Zimbabwe International Book Fair (1995 and 1996) and the lodging of sodomy charges against the former president of the country (Canaan Banana in 1997), brought the existence of homosexual behaviours among indigenous blacks even more forcefully to public attention.
“Despite these developments many black Zimbabweans maintain that homosexual behaviour is ‘un-African’, a foreign ‘disease’ that was introduced by white settlers and that is now principally spread by foreign tourists and ambassadors. This belief underlies recent state and church rhetoric about expunging homosexuals from the body politic and returning to ‘traditional’ family values.” [87a] (p631-2)

20.36 An article published by The Press Institute, dated 4 December 2009, noted that: “In Zimbabwe, there is an ingrained cultural, religious and political prejudice toward lesbians and gays. People who are openly gay or lesbian are often forced to endure degrading verbal assaults.” The article went on to note that “Some doctors even provide counselling to gays and lesbians in an effort to rehabilitate them.” [79a]

20.37 Kubatana published a paper in January 2008 titled, The position of lesbian and bisexual women, by Fadzai Muparutsa of GALZ, dated January 2008, which observed that: “It is not possible to generalize about Zimbabwean culture but, on the whole, Zimbabweans of both sexes are expected to follow the predetermined path of marriage and the production of children. For both lesbians and gay men, whose relationships are not recognized, this often poses a serious barrier to freedom of choice.” [55p]

20.38 The Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe (GALZ) website, undated, accessed on 8 July 2011, noted that:

“… there is growing tolerance of LGBT in Zimbabwe especially amongst younger people in urban areas who have grown up with the knowledge that gay and lesbian people exist within their midst.

“The problems facing lesbian and gay people are, by and large, the same as those facing Zimbabweans as a whole… The general lack of tolerance of sexual difference is just one more challenge that lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex people have to face in Zimbabwe.” [42b] (FAQ)

20.39 The USSD Report 2011 noted that:

“Members of the LGBT community reported widespread societal discrimination based on sexual orientation. In response to social pressure, some families reportedly subjected their LGBT members to ‘corrective’ rape and forced marriages to encourage heterosexual conduct. Such crimes were rarely reported to police. Women, in particular, were subjected to rape by male members of their own families. LGBT members often left school at an early age due to discrimination and had higher rates of unemployment and homelessness. Many persons who identified with the LGBT community did not seek medical care for sexually transmitted diseases or other health issues due to fear that health providers would shun them.” [2g] (p48)

20.40 With regard to the constitutional outreach process, the Africa Legal Brief website noted in a report dated 26 February 2012 that:

“The final Zimbabwe draft constitution, earmarked to replace the Lancaster House Constitution, will criminalise homosexuality and ban same-sex marriages according to the views of the majority of Zimbabweans, it has emerged. In an interview, Constitution Select Committee (Copac) co-chair Mr Edward Mkhosi (MDC) said Zimbabwe had unequivocally affirmed that homosexuality should be outlawed.
“During the outreach programme, everyone said ‘no’ to gays and lesbians and, as the drafters, we heed what people say,’ he said. ‘Contrary to media reports that the homosexuality issue was causing infighting, the people were clear; we did not waste time on it.’

“Mr Mkhosi said the non-inclusion of so-called gay rights was always expected as Zimbabwe is a nation founded on Christianity and tradition.

“The new constitution will be built upon our past and traditions. Homosexuality is a foreign concept. Our culture, our tradition and our increasingly Christian outlook do not permit us to legalise homosexuality and same-sex marriages.

“That is the reason why homosexuality is illegal and will remain illegal.” [155a]

20.41 The Institute for the Democratic Alternative for South Africa, noted in its States in Transition Observatory (SITO report) - Zimbabwe Government of National Unity Watch, April 2010, dated 14 May 2010, that: “Corrective rape against gay men and lesbians is on the rise. Victims are particularly vulnerable given the stigma attached to homosexuality in Zimbabwe which makes it difficult for them to report crimes or seek medical attention.” [9g]

20.42 An article in New Zimbabwe, titled Interview: GALZ's Fadzai Muparutsa, dated 13 April 2010, recorded the response of Ms Muparutsa's to the question of “…has your Association [GALZ] actually received such reports [of ‘corrective’ or ‘curative’ rape]?: ‘Yes we have. We have received [sic], there aren’t that many, we can’t say it is on the increase but what’s happened of late is that people are talking a lot more about it and so people will come to the office and report cases that they have experienced and particularly at the hands of either their families, because this kind of rape usually happens in private spaces, in the homes or in close knit societies that our members stay in.” [41c]

20.43 Ms Muparutsa in the same interview was asked what civil/human rights she/GALZ were asking for. She responded:

“The right to health is something that is very big in its definition – as human beings we all have the right to the highest attainable health. The highest attainable health to me means that I can go to my clinic and say I would like to get treatment for an STI that I have and my partner who is a female would also like to get treatment for that same STI, but that doesn’t happen in Zimbabwe. I can’t go into a clinic and do that there because like I said, exactly the same situation like the law enforcement agents – you will get ridiculed and that means that I am unable now to go to a practitioner and ask for assistance. So what does that mean about my right? I cannot access it, that is one thing.

“If you look at the right to housing for example, if someone finds out that I’m gay and I’m lodging at their house, the chances of me getting kicked out without the due procedures being taken into consideration are very high. I can’t go and challenge those because in any kind of court or any kind of civil court, people will actually look at my sexual orientation before they look at the case that’s before them and then it gets mishandled.

“The right to education – my parents will kick me out, will stop paying my school fees only because I’m gay or lesbian or my sexual orientation is different from their one, of
someone who is heterosexual so my education becomes a problem. I don’t have an education. I could go one, the list is long, I could highlight all of them in exactly that way and that’s why we’re saying that we want gay and lesbian rights to be considered and it’s actually not, we’re not calling for gay rights – what it is that we’re calling for at GALZ is non-discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.” [41c]

20.44 An article published by The Press Institute, dated 4 December 2009, noted that the country’s health policies effectively discriminate against LGBT groups and sex workers as it fails to address their specific health challenges. The article went on to note that one of the problems was that “Homophobia is … rampant in the health sector.” [79a]

20.45 A representative of the Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe (GALZ), interviewed on the UKBA FFM 2010 stated that: “Bulawayo is more open and tolerant and has a very different atmosphere from Harare. People in Bulawayo are more politically active and willing to push for their rights. There is a gay nightclub in the middle of town. GALZ thinks this different attitude may be related to proximity to South Africa.” [121a] (p70)

20.46 A report by the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission (IGLHRC) entitled Nowhere to turn: Blackmail and extortion of LGBT people in sub-Saharan Africa, dated 15 February 2011, noted that pejorative public statements by President Mugabe and government ministers in the 1990s coincided with “… a marked increase in incidents of extortion and blackmail aimed at persons on account of their sexual orientation… Evidence from Zimbabwe makes clear that those who are open about their sexual orientation continue to be subject to, and may even become more visible targets for, blackmail …” [80a] (p29 & 32)

20.47 The report continued, noting that:

“In Zimbabwe the readiness of certain police officers to profit from a case of extortion that comes to their attention means that victims are reluctant to report the offence, as to do so significantly increases the likelihood of their own arrest and may compound the pressure on them to hand over even more money. There are numerous instances where the police have become actively involved in the extortion, often seeking to displace the original extortionist or to obtain a share of the money being extorted. In some cases, the police have actively sought out gay men and lesbians on their own initiative for the purpose of extortion.” [80a] (p31)

More information about blackmail and extortion can be found in the IGLHRC report - http://www.iglhrc.org/binary/data/ATTACHMENT/file/000/000/484-1.pdf


**Gay and bisexual men**

20.49 A representative of the Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe (GALZ), interviewed as part of the UKBA FFM 2010 stated that:

“It is possible for a man to be openly gay in Zimbabwe. In high density areas openly gay men may face violence,* taunting and harassment and may also face discrimination in the provision of services on account of their sexuality. The situation is more permissive in middle class areas, where gay men enjoy respect as they are generally successful.
Levels of tolerance of gay men and understanding of LGBT issues has generally increased among the public. "The source made the following comment: ‘Although isolated, it is important to highlight its [violence] occurrence [sic].” [121a] (p69)

20.50 GALZ also noted that: “It is difficult for gay men to access health services including STI and HIV/AIDS treatment in public health facilities. This is believed to be because the service providers are intimidated by the attitudes of the President to homosexuality. This is not a problem for middle class gay men as the middle classes generally use private healthcare where there is no such discrimination.” [121a] (p69)

20.51 The Press Institute article dated 4 December 2009 reported the case of a gay couple whose relationship was discovered by family members. The mother of one of the gay men reportedly arranged for the two men to be beaten unconscious. The resulting injuries “… required emergency medical attention.” One of the men was reported to have lost his job and to have been shunned by the local community. [79a]

20.52 An article posted on the Behind the Mask’s website dated 13 June 2008 noted: “Although homosexual men (including transgender men) are spurned by society, they still maintain the privileges that automatically accrue to them as biological males.” [55s]

20.53 The GALZ representative interviewed in the UKBA FFM 2010 noted on the issue of internal relocation within Zimbabwe that: “It would be harder for a gay man to reintegrate into a new area than it would be for a heterosexual man. The tolerance comes from familiarity and people are more tolerant of members of their own community.” [121a] (p69)

Lesbians and bisexual women

20.54 Amnesty International’s Annual Report 2012 – Zimbabwe, published 24 May 2012, noted that: “Persecution of people based on their sexual orientation continued.” [14I]

20.55 A report by the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission entitled Nowhere to turn: Blackmail and extortion of LGBT people in sub-Saharan Africa, dated 15 February 2011, noted that:

“A woman’s ability to choose her partner … [may be seen as a threat to traditional societal norms], for under customary law marriage entails the transfer of a bridewealth payment (lobola) from the groom to the bride’s male guardian (father, brother, uncle, etc.). Thus, if a woman declares herself to be a lesbian who will not marry and gain lobola, her brothers will have fewer resources with which to secure the wives whom they themselves desire. A woman’s declaration of lesbianism therefore represents a challenge to the normative patriarchal structures of lineage, to the economic base of reproductive culture, and to the status of those men to whom she is supposed to owe allegiance. It is not just a symbolic challenge but a declaration that has significant economic and social consequences. At the same time, it is clear that a woman’s ability to choose her partner and have autonomous ownership of her sexuality is fundamental to her recognition as a fully entitled legal subject. It is this real conflict that allows homosexuality to be so convincingly characterised as contrary to Zimbabwean culture.” [80a] (p27-28)

Homosexualities in Zimbabwe: Mapping a Blindspot in an African Masculinity, by Marc Epprecht, noted that:

“The coercive powers of the extended family should not be underestimated in enforcing conformity to heterosexual norms. With girls, the customary expectation/obligation to submit to male desire was so strong that a girl who refused could in the eyes of the community legitimately be kidnapped or ‘eloped,’ not uncommonly with the connivance and even active participation of family members. Cases of forced and violent sexual intercourse with recalcitrant girls which were in effect condoned by family or community can also be found in the historical record.” [87a] (p635)

20.57 The GALZ representative interviewed in the UK Border Agency FFM 2010 reported in relation to the situation for lesbians that:

“The situation is much more difficult for lesbians [than gay and bisexual men] and hasn’t really improved significantly. It is very difficult for lesbians to ‘come out’ and those that do risk harassment and worse, ranging from taunts such as ‘you just haven’t found a good man yet’ to rape. It has also been difficult for women to participate fully in GALZ in the past because it was dominated by men, although lesbians now command more respect within the organisation. All this has meant that the number of lesbians who are ‘out’ is much lower than the number of gay men.

“Most of the harassment and the cases of rape of which GALZ is aware have taken place in the high density areas. For women who have been raped, shame often prevents them from reporting the crime to the police and if they do, the police are often reluctant to act. This means that for lesbians who are raped, counselling may be the best that they can hope for.

“GALZ is not aware of any active police persecution of lesbians nor of any cases of lesbians being detained, but there is a lack of police protection.” [121a] (p69-70)

20.58 An article posted on Kubatana.net titled The position of lesbian and bisexual women, by Fadzai Muparutsa of GALZ, dated January 2008 noted that lesbian and bisexual women often face far more severe discrimination because of the traditional lower status of women in Zimbabwean society. The report noted that:

“Although homosexual men (including transgender men) are spurned by society, they still maintain the privileges that automatically accrue to them as biological males. By contrast, lesbian and bisexual women suffer multiple forms of oppression, some of which relate to their sexuality but most of which relate to the general position of women in society… the position for men is made significantly easier [than women]: men enjoy much greater access to public space and, both before and after marriage, are able to move freely in society and socialize. This advantage is automatically extended to gay and bisexual men simply because of their biological sex.

“With freedom of movement, gay men are at an advantage when it comes to identifying and establishing relationships with other gay men and seeking support without the knowledge of or interference from their families and heterosexual friends. They have better access to conducive environments where their sexuality is affirmed and where they can take control over the processes of coming to terms with their sexuality and coming out. Women, on the other hand, are generally protected behind the chastity belt of the home and most are not at liberty to mix with whom they please and establish
unsupervised relationships. This makes it more difficult for lesbian and bisexual women to meet with others like themselves whilst keeping their sexuality hidden from their families. Those who do come out are either extremely brave and highly determined or economically independent and belonging to those few families that are more tolerant of sexual difference.” [55s]

20.59 The same source also noted that:

“In the rural areas lesbian and bisexual women [have little access to a support network] … With no support network and no information, these women are far more likely to internalise their oppression and believe that they should conform to cultural norms of heterosexual marriage and the bearing of children. Although these women may outwardly concur with their position, they are still forced to accept a lifestyle, which runs entirely contrary to their emotional and psychological needs.

“Although spaces for lesbians and gay men remain limited, men are once again at an advantage. Whilst gay men are generally more accepting of lesbian and bisexual women as social equals and do not view women as sex objects, many still carry with them unconscious prejudices of heterosexual socialisation … [one] potential source of sanctuary for lesbian and bisexual women is the women’s movement but, in Zimbabwe, this is deeply divided by conflicting ideologies.” [55s]

20.60 The source further stated that the traditional and invented African traditions of many of these organisations further restrict a woman’s freedoms. In addition, “The conservative wing of the women’s movement is… heavily influenced by fundamentalist Christian thinking which finds no room for the inclusion of lesbians… [lesbians] may even be perceived as a threat since many [women’s] organisations fear to associate with those unpopular both with government and the Christian church.” [55s]

20.61 The source continued:

“A woman is not thought of as owning a sexuality independent of the needs of men and the idea of sexual expression not involving penetration is entirely alien to the machismo mentality. For these reasons and others related to the general invisibility of lesbian and bisexual women in public spaces, the majority of Zimbabweans believe that it is illogical for lesbians to exist in African cultures. Those who profess to be lesbian are simply not believed. Women who claim to be independent of men, even for sex, arouse intense anger in those men with deep-seated insecurities about sexual rejection and the need to control. In more traditionally conservative circles, homosexuality may be thought of in terms of illness brought on by demon possession. The cure for a man is exorcism but often the cure for a woman is … rape.” [55s]

20.62 Because of the additional problems faced by lesbian and bisexual women in Zimbabwe, GALZ noted on its website, undated, accessed 21 February 2011, that in recent years, it has focussed on making itself more accessible to women by setting up a specific “Gender Department” to “… encourage lesbian and bisexual women to join the association and to ensure that women are free to become actively involved at all levels within GALZ and be included and visible in positions of leadership… The Gender Department organises an annual retreat where women are free to discuss issues away from the interference of men.” The website also noted that: “In August 2002, when GALZ hired its first Programme Manager for Gender, Fadzai Muparutsa, the association had only 8 women members out of a total of nearly 400. Within 4 months, women’s
The main text of this COI Report contains the most up to date publicly available information as at 6 June 2012. Further brief information on recent events and reports has been provided in the Latest News section to 13 July 2012.

**LGBTI social space**

20.63 An article posted on Kubatana.net titled, The position of lesbian and bisexual women, by Fadzai Muparutsa of GALZ, dated January 2008, noted that:

“It is generally agreed that lesbians are at least risk of contracting HIV if they remain within exclusively lesbian relationships. However, because of gross generalisations within the HIV and AIDS movement relating to lesbian sexual behaviours, African lesbians are placed on the lowest rung when it comes to risks associated with acquiring or transmitting the HIV virus ... In Zimbabwe, where women do not enjoy control over their bodies or their sexuality and are forced into marriages and into having children, lesbians are put at the same high risk of contracting HIV as their heterosexual counterparts.” [55s]

Additional information about sexual violence against lesbians, and HIV/AIDs can be found at [Women](#) and [Children](#)

20.64 The GALZ website, undated, accessed 1 May 2012 observed that “General homophobia and restrictive legislation make it difficult for LGBTI people in Zimbabwe to feel safe about being open about their sexuality in public spaces ...” [42a] (Zim Pride)

However, GALZ noted that:

“The traditional international Gay Pride month of June is generally observed in Zimbabwe by throwing a large party, but the home-grown ZimPride takes place in October in the week running up to the big event of the Zimbabwean gay and lesbian calendar, Miss Jacaranda Queen Drag Pageant, named after the exotic jacaranda tree which comes into vivid purple bloom around this time... Traditionally, Jacaranda Queen is held in a public hall although this is becoming increasingly difficult because of acts of violence perpetrated by homophobes, and last-minute cancellations by nervous venue managers.” [42a] (Zim Pride)

20.65 A news article published by The Zimbabwean, dated 18 April 2011, noted that Zimbabwe had a “flourishing” gay community. [99l]

20.66 A representative of the Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe (GALZ), interviewed as UKBA FFM 2010 stated that: “Bulawayo is more open and tolerant and has a very different atmosphere from Harare. People in Bulawayo are more politically active and willing to push for their rights. There is a gay nightclub in the middle of town. GALZ thinks this different attitude may be related to proximity to South Africa.” [121a] (p70)

20.67 International Gay guide, Spartacus 2009 edition, stated that there were still two gay friendly nightclubs in the Borrowdale area of Harare. [26b]

20.68 According to the African Activist website dated 26 June 2011, which carried an article originally published by Bulawayo24 News, noted that: “Zimbabwe police are investigating Book Café in Harare after a group of LGBTI persons showed up for a 4 June concert by afro-pop artist John Pfumojena.” The report went on to note that: “Some members of the group were dressed in drag and showed public signs of affection Criminal Investigation Department (CID) spokesperson Inspector Zimbilili said, ‘The law
is very clear on that matter; if there was a gay parade or festival at that mall, we are going to carry [out] a full investigation.” [66a]

20.69 The GALZ website, undated, accessed 1 May 2012, stated that it regularly held social events for its members [42f] (Joining GALZ) [42g] (The GALZ Centre)

20.70 In addition to the above mentioned main office and social centre in Harare, GALZ also noted that “… by the end of 2004, 9 Affinity Groups had registered with GALZ:

“Bulawayo – Melga, Prime Times
Chipinge – Harmony
Chitungwiza – Rainbow
Marondera – Eastlove
Masvingo – Good Hope
Mutare – Eastern Networking
Penhalonga – The Edge
Victoria Falls – Mosi oya Tunya.” [42h] (Affinity Groups)

Further information about GALZ and updates/reports produced by the organisation are available on its website and on Kubatana.net: www.galz.co.zw and http://www.kubatana.net/html/sectors/gay001.asp?sector=SEXUAL&year=0&range_star t=1

21. DISABILITY

21.01 The US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2011 (USSD 2011), published on 24 May 2012, noted that:

“The constitution and law prohibit discrimination against persons with disabilities in employment, access to public places, and the provision of services, including education and health care. Nevertheless, the law was not widely known or implemented by government institutions. The lack of resources devoted to training and education severely hampered the ability of persons with disabilities to compete for scarce jobs. The law stipulates that government buildings be accessible to persons with disabilities, but implementation was slow. NGOs continued to lobby to include persons with albinism in the definition of ‘disabled’ under the law. Persons with disabilities faced harsh societal discrimination. Traditional belief viewed persons with disabilities as bewitched and, consequently, as persons who should be locked away. Children with disabilities often were hidden when visitors arrived.

“Children with disabilities were discriminated against in educational institutions. The unavailability of essential services, including sign language interpreters, Braille
materials, and ramps, prevented children with disabilities from attending school. Many schools refused to accept children with certain disabilities.” [2g] (p45)

21.02 The USSD 2011 continued: “According to the National Association of Societies for the Care of the Handicapped, persons with disabilities were a forgotten and invisible group in society. The organization also reported that only 33 percent of children with disabilities had access to education.” [2g] (p45)

21.03 The National Association of Societies for the Care of the Handicapped (NASCOH) noted in a disability update published on 20 February 2007 that over 1,200,000 people, around 10 per cent of the population of Zimbabwe, were considered to be disabled in some way. The disabled population were reported to be among the poorest in society with over 70 per cent of people with disabilities without employment. Many in Zimbabwe still believe that disability is a punishment caused either by angry “… spirits for a wrong committed by a family to another family, bewitching by vindictive or aggrieved parties, a curse for wrongdoing, use of magic gone awry within the family, or use of the disabled member as a sacrificial pawn …” [91a]


“Government support to people with disabilities, particularly in the mid-1990s, is an example of Government commitment to supporting the most vulnerable, with an effective community rehabilitation program providing trained staff in district hospitals and equipping resource rooms in schools with specialised staff. These important schemes, as well as the Enhanced Social Protection Program launched in 2000, have suffered from a severe lack of human and financial resources in the last decade and are in urgent need of review and revival to meet the growing needs of children.” [85d] (p15)

Also see Children: Education – Special needs education

22. WOMEN

For more information on the position of girls, this section should be read alongside Children. Additionally, for more detail on the situation for lesbian, bisexual and transgender women, see section on Sexual orientation and gender identity.

OVERVIEW

22.01 A document entitled Dossier for Claims: Zimbabwe, dated 5 March 2010, on the website of Africa For Women’s Rights noted that:

“ … Zimbabwe has ratified the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (Maputo Protocol), it has not yet ratified the Optional Protocol to CEDAW … The Coalition of the Campaign remains particularly concerned by the following violations of women’s human rights in Zimbabwe: the persistence of discriminatory laws; discrimination within the family;
violence against women; obstacles to access to employment; under-representation in political life; and inadequate access to health services …

“Women in Zimbabwe generally have lower incomes and less job security than men. Most women are employed in the agriculture, forestry, farming industries and the domestic sector, in which salaries tend to be low.

“Women remain underrepresented in decision-making positions. Despite ratification of the South African Development Community (SADC) Protocol on Gender and Development, which sets a target of 50% representation of women in all decision making bodies by 2015, women are poorly represented in the government of national unity of Zimbabwe. Only 4 women were nominated amongst the 35 members of the new government. Following the 2008 elections, women represented 15% of members of the lower House of Parliament and 24% of the upper House.

“HIV/AIDS is particularly prevalent amongst women. The 2005/2006 Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Survey (ZDHS) revealed an average prevalence rate among young people of age 15 to 24 of 11.25% among females and 4.45% among males. Other studies show that young women make up almost 80% of all infections in the 15 to 24 years age group. The rate of maternal mortality remains very high (880/100,000 births), in part due to the practice of non-medicalised abortions. Abortion is criminalised. Women in rural areas face major obstacles to accessing health services, including having to travel long distances.” [47a]

Regarding the UN CEDAW, the Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Zimbabwe, dated 23 March 2012, (CEDAW Report 2012), reported: “11. The Committee is concerned that although the State party ratified the Convention in 1991, without reservations, it has not yet been incorporated into the domestic law. The Committee notes with concern that the relevance of the Convention and its direct domestic application have not yet been established in the State party.” [165b] (p3)

The same report also noted:

“9. The Committee is concerned at the general lack of awareness of the Convention, its concept of substantive gender equality and of the Committee’s general recommendations in the State party, in particular, among the judiciary and other law enforcement officials. It is further concerned that women themselves, especially those in rural and remote areas, are not aware of their rights under the Convention, and thus lack the necessary information to claim their rights.” [165b] (p2-3)

Freedom House’s report, Freedom in the World 2011, Zimbabwe, covering events in 2010, published on 11 August 2011, reported that:

“Women enjoy extensive legal protections, but societal discrimination and domestic violence persist. Women serve as ministers in national and local governments and hold 32 and 24 seats in the House of Assembly and Senate, respectively. The World Health Organization has reported that Zimbabwean women’s ‘healthy life expectancy’ of 34 years is the world’s shortest. Sexual abuse is widespread, including the use of rape as a political weapon. A Prevention of Domestic Violence Bill has lingered in Parliament for 10 years without passage. Female members of the opposition often face particular
brutality at the hands of security forces. The prevalence of customary laws in rural areas undermines women’s civil rights and access to education.” [96f]

22.05 The Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s Human Rights and Democracy: The 2011 Foreign & Commonwealth Office Report, published 30 April 2012, noted that:

“There has been selective domestic implementation of international human rights obligations relating to gender equality in Zimbabwe, and the government has taken some steps to promote women’s rights. Women are represented in many high profile positions in Zimbabwe, including in politics, the civil service and commerce. Zimbabwe has achieved gender parity in primary school enrolment, but at secondary school fewer girls than boys proceed to or complete post O level education.

“However, many women still suffer both direct and indirect discrimination, particularly in the private spheres such as marriage, inheritance, adoption and guardianship. Large disparities remain between men and women in Zimbabwe in terms of access to health, education (at higher levels), participation in the economy, governance and decision-making processes, and access to legal protection against abuse and gender-based violence.” [13] (p386-387)

22.06 The US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2011 (USSD 2011), published on 24 May 2012, noted that:

“The Ministry of Women’s Affairs, Gender, and Community Development continued its efforts to advance women’s rights. The ministry, through collaboration with local NGOs, continued training workshops for traditional leaders in rural communities to create more awareness of women’s issues. The government gave qualified women access to training in the armed forces and national service. Although there were advances for women within the armed forces in recent years, they continued to occupy primarily administrative positions. In recent years women progressed in health and education but in general were concentrated in the lower echelons of the workforce, especially in the financial industry.” [2g] (p41)

22.07 The same source also stated that:

“Despite laws aimed at enhancing women’s rights and countering certain discriminatory traditional practices, women remained disadvantaged in society. Economic dependency and prevailing social norms prevented rural women in particular from combating societal discrimination. Despite legal prohibitions, women remained vulnerable to entrenched customary practices, including pledging young women to marry partners not of their choosing and forcing widows to marry the brothers of their late spouses.” [2g] (p41)

22.08 The Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Zimbabwe, dated 23 March 2012, (CEDAW Report 2012), observed:

“21. The Committee recognizes the rich culture and traditions of the State party and their importance in daily life. However, the Committee expresses its serious concern about the persistence of harmful norms, practices and traditions, patriarchal attitudes and deep-rooted stereotypes, regarding the roles, responsibilities and identities of women and men in all spheres of life, as well as the State party’s limited efforts to address such discriminatory practices directly. These include, in particular, polygamy, bride price (lobola) and, in certain regions, virginity testing and witch hunting. The
Committee is concerned that such customs and practices perpetuate discrimination against women and girls and that they are reflected in the disadvantageous and unequal status of women in many areas, including education, public life, decision-making, and in the persistence of violence against women. It is concerned that, thus far, the State party has not taken sustained measures to modify or eliminate stereotypes and harmful practices.” [165b] (p5)

22.09. The CEDAW report 2012 also commented the geographical variation in the situation for women, and stated:

“35. The Committee expresses its concern at the disadvantaged position of women in rural and remote areas, who form the majority of women in the State party, and who experience poverty, difficulties accessing health and social services and lack of participation in decision-making processes at the community level. The Committee is also concerned at the prevalence of discriminatory customs and traditional practices which particularly prevent rural women from inheriting or acquiring ownership of land and other property and accessing credit facilities and community services. While noting that the Government has set aside a 20 per cent quota for women under the Fast Track Land Reform Programme, the Committee is concerned that the access to land by rural women is limited compared to ownership of rural land by men, and that only 10 per cent of the land covered by the programme was allocated to women.” [165b] (p9)

22.10 The Department for International Development’s Country Overview of Zimbabwe undated, accessed 17 August 2010, noted that women living in Zimbabwe had the lowest life expectancy of any country in the world. The report noted that AIDS and poor economic conditions had contributed towards an average life expectancy in the country to drop to 34 years. [45f]

All documents submitted to the UN CEDAW, including the Zimbabwe government’s report and submissions by the NGOs, is available on the CEDAW website: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/cedaws51.htm

Statistics


22.12 The Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Survey 2010-11, produced by the Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency, released in March 2012, based on surveys of 11,000 households between September 2010 and March 2011 (pXV), provides data on a variety of subjects, including: marriage and sexual activity; fertility; family planning; maternal healthcare; HIV prevalence; Women’s empowerment and demographic and health outcomes; domestic violence; and adult and maternal mortality.

NATIONAL MACHINERY FOR ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN, POLICY AND LAW

22.13 The same report noted:
“The Committee welcomes the progress achieved since the adoption of its previous concluding observations in 1998, including the legislative reforms that have been undertaken and the adoption of a range of legislative measures. Specific reference is made to:

“(a) The National Gender Policy (2004), to mainstream gender in all sectors and promote equal advancement of women and men;

“(b) The Domestic Violence Act (2006);

“(c) The Gender Implementation Strategy 2007-2010;

“(d) The First Schedule of the Public Service Regulations (2000), prohibiting sexual harassment;

“(e) Amendments to the Labour Act (Act 7 in 2002 and Act 17 in 2005) prohibiting the demand of sexual favours in return for recruitment for employment, promotion or any other related activities.

“5. The Committee notes with appreciation the initiatives taken by the State party to promote gender equality and protect women’s rights, such as the establishment in 2007 of the Women’s Development Fund and the Community Development Fund to assist women in various income generating projects, the adoption of the Tourism Policy, which promotes women’s participation in the sector by reserving a 30% quota, and the reservation of a 30% quota for women in the mining mechanization that is run by the Ministry of Mines and Mining Development.

“6. The Committee welcomes the ratification of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography, on 14 February 2012.” [165b] (p1-2)

22.14 The same source noted:

“13. While noting that Section 23 of the Constitution of the State party prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, tribe, place of origin, political opinions, colour, creed, sex, gender, marital status or physical disability, the Committee expresses its concern at the absence of a specific prohibition of discrimination against women as defined in article 1 of the Convention. The Committee is also concerned that section 23.3 of the State party’s Constitution represents a ‘claw back clause,’ which allows for the application of discriminatory customary law in respect of personal laws. The Committee notes the State party’s willingness, as expressed in the report and during the dialogue, to review its Constitution. However, it remains concerned at the fact that no action has been taken to repeal the discriminatory provisions from the Constitution, even as the constitutional review process is awaited.” [165b] (p3)

22.15 The source additionally noted:

“15. While welcoming the establishment of a fully fledged Ministry of Women’s Affairs, Gender and Community Development in 2005 and the fact that most key positions in the Ministry are held by women, the Committee is concerned about the lack of information on its authority, human and financial resources and its capacity to ensure that gender equality policies are properly developed and fully implemented throughout the work of all ministries and Government offices.” [165b] (p3)
The USSD 2011 report stated: “The constitution and law provide that no person can be deprived of fundamental rights, such as the right to life, liberty, and security of person, based on … [among other things] gender … Nevertheless, the constitution allows for discrimination, primarily against women, on the grounds of ‘customary law.’ Discrimination against women … persisted.” [2g] (p38)


“Legislation has been passed which has raised the status of women, through the attainment of majority, the equitable devolution of matrimonial property and making the surviving spouse and children the primary beneficiaries in a deceased person’s estate. However, these provisions do not apply equally to all women … and the benefits and protections of such legislation can be negated through the primacy of customary law and certain clauses within the Constitution. Other discriminatory legislation remains, reinforcing potentially harmful customary views, for example the Guardianship of Minors Act which provides a married father with the legal right of guardianship for the children, whereas the mother only has a right to be consulted.

“Zimbabwe is signatory to a number of international and regional agreements on gender equality and development. A National Gender Policy 2008-2012 was developed and approved in 2007 but challenges remain for its implementation, as with the draft National Gender Based Violence Strategy 2010-2015.

“Despite these advances, there remain some critical gaps in the domestication of international conventions, including the [African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child] ACRWC, the [UN Convention on the Rights of the Child] CRC and the CEDAW, leaving children and women unable to claim their rights or adequately seek redress when their rights are violated.” [85d] (p17)

The CEDAW Report 2012 stated that: “While noting the establishment in 2007 of the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission (ZHRC), whose mandate covers the protection of women’s rights, the Committee is concerned that the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission Bill has not yet been enacted.” [165b] (p4)

In addition to the above sources, the UN Secretary General’s database on violence against women webpage, Zimbabwe profile, undated, accessed on 1 June 2012, lists and provides background information on Zimbabwe’s legal framework; policies, strategies and programmes; and institutional mechanisms for supporting women: http://webapps01.un.org/vawdatabase/countryInd.action?countryId=1438

For more information on the situation of women see Socio-economic rights (marriage, divorce and inheritance) and laws protecting women, Violence against women.

**POLITICAL RIGHTS**

A report published by the United Nations Development Programme in October 2010 entitled 2010 Millennium Development Goals: Status Report Zimbabwe, noted that:

“Although approximately 52% of the population in Zimbabwe is female, women are disproportionately represented in politics … The target of increasing the participation of
women in decision-making in all sectors, and at all levels, to 50:50 by 2015 is seriously off-track and may be difficult to achieve. The trend in increasing women’s participation in decision making in all sectors shows a slight increase in the number of women representation [sic] in parliament from 14% in 1990 to 19% in 2008. This is below the 2005 target of 30%.” [124a] (p17)

22.21 The report continued:

“Zimbabwe has had a female Vice President since 2005 and a female Deputy Prime Minister, President of the Senate, Deputy Speaker of the House of Assembly … with the exception of a co-minister at the Ministry of Home Affairs, women ministers are found in what might be termed ‘soft’ ministries, such as those dealing with gender, social services, and small and medium enterprises… Moreover, the constituency-based electoral system is viewed as highly competitive and does not easily allow for holding of seats in parliament by women. Politics is an expensive business and women in Zimbabwe seldom have access to resources to fund their election campaigns.” [124a] (p17-18)

22.22 The USSD 2011 report observed that following the 2008 elections:

“Of the 270 elected positions in the House of Assembly and the Senate, 55 were filled by women, constituting 21 percent of the total. The president of the Senate was a woman, as well as one vice president, one deputy prime minister, five ministers, and two governors. The ZANU-PF congress allotted women one-third of party positions and reserved 50 positions for women on the party’s 180-member central committee, which was one of the party’s most powerful organizations.” [2g] (p34)

22.23 A report entitled Progress of the World’s Women 2011-2012 – In Pursuit of Justice, dated 2011, by the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UNWomen Report 2011), noted that all Zimbabwean women gained the right to vote in 1957. 18 per cent of the legislature in 2011 was made up of women, and 19 per cent held ministerial positions in government – this was an increase on 1997 when only 15 per cent of women held ministerial posts. [63a] (p125)

22.24 The CEDAW Report 2012 noted that:

“While welcoming the fact that 30 per cent of the State party’s ambassadors are women, the Committee notes with concern that the same level of progress has not been achieved and obstacles to the advancement of women still remain in other areas of public and professional life, as well as in decision-making positions, including the judiciary, local government, and the private sector. The Committee is also concerned that systematic barriers such as negative cultural attitudes, lack of quota systems, insufficient capacity building for potential candidates, limited financial resources and lack of logistical support impede the equal participation of women in political life.” [165b] (p7)

22.25 The CEDAW Report 2012 stated that:

“27. While welcoming the fact that 30 per cent of the State party’s ambassadors are women, the Committee notes with concern that the same level of progress has not been achieved and obstacles to the advancement of women still remain in other areas of public and professional life, as well as in decision-making positions, including the
judiciary, local government, and the private sector. The Committee is also concerned that systematic barriers such as negative cultural attitudes, lack of quota systems, insufficient capacity building for potential candidates, limited financial resources and lack of logistical support impede the equal participation of women in political life.” [165b] (p7)

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RIGHTS

22.26 An article posted on Kubatana.net The position of lesbian and bisexual women, by Fadzai Muparutsa of GALZ, dated January 2008, noted that women traditionally hold a lower status in society: “Women ... are not at liberty to mix with whom they please and establish unsupervised relationships. ... Women who claim to be independent of men, even for sex, arouse intense anger in those men with deep-seated insecurities about sexual rejection and the need to control.” However, women were often able to lead an economically independent life in Zimbabwe’s larger towns and cities. [55s]

22.27 The USSD 2011 noted that:

“Despite laws aimed at enhancing women’s rights and countering certain discriminatory traditional practices, women remained disadvantaged in society. Economic dependency and prevailing social norms prevented rural women in particular from combating societal discrimination. Despite legal prohibitions, women remained vulnerable to entrenched customary practices, including pledging young women to marry partners not of their choosing and forcing widows to marry the brothers of their late spouses.” [2g] (p41)

22.28 The CEDAW Report 2012 stated that: “31. While noting with appreciation that chapter 28:01 of the Labour Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of gender at all stages of employment, the Committee is concerned at the continuing vertical and horizontal occupational segregation and the persistent wage gap between women and men. The Committee is also concerned about the concentration of women in the informal sector, where there is no social security or other benefits.” [165] (p8)

22.29 The USSD 2011 report also stated that:

“Women and children continued to be adversely affected by the government’s forced evictions, demolition of homes and businesses, and takeover of commercial farms. Many widows who earned their income in the informal economy or by renting cottages on their property lost income when their market stalls or cottages were destroyed. Widows faced particular difficulties when forced to relocate to rural areas.

“NGOs reported anecdotal evidence indicating that women experienced economic discrimination, including in access to employment, credit, pay, and owning or managing businesses.” [2g] (p41)

22.30 Afrol’s Gender Profiles: Zimbabwe, undated, accessed 2 February 2009, noted that societal attitudes towards women’s rights had improved in recent years. It noted that “… gender issues, which belonged to the private and family sphere, are now discussed in public and abuse is starting to be taken to court.” [73a] (p1)
22.31 A report published by the United Nations Development Programme in October 2010 entitled 2010 Millennium Development Goals: Status Report Zimbabwe, noted that: "Zimbabwe’s society is strongly patriarchal and is thus scaling-socialised and conditioned to the subordination of women to men and to their confinement to traditional and multiple gender roles that are inclusive of care work." However, the report noted that the recent “… Constitution-making outreach process is showing signs that attitudes are changing. This has been evident in the public expression of both men and women demanding 50:50 representation in decision-making, education, and employment opportunities." [124a] (p19)

22.32 The UNWomen report noted that women in Zimbabwe were entitled by law to maternity leave of 98 days’ duration. [63a] (p129)

Family law: marriage, divorce and inheritance

22.33 Africa For Women’s Rights document dated 5 March 2010 noted that:

“Zimbabwe has a hybrid legal system composed of statutory and customary law. Whilst statutory law tends to conform to CEDAW, discriminatory customary laws continue to apply, especially in rural areas.

“The law recognises three types of marriage: civil marriage, registered customary marriage and unregistered customary marriage. The predominance of registered and unregistered customary marriages contributes to the vulnerability of women within the family:

- “Early and forced marriages under customary law are widespread. In 2004, the United Nations estimated that 23% of girls between 15 and 19 years were married, divorced or widowed.
- Although polygamy is prohibited under statutory law, it is authorised under customary law and continues to be practised in rural areas.
- Whilst civil marriage grants spouses equal rights to parental authority, under customary marriage men have the right to custody of children.
- The custom of the bride price (lobola), which is authorised under statutory law, also contributes to women’s vulnerability within the family.
- Under the rules of customary marriage, widows cannot inherit their husband’s property and daughters can inherit from their father only if there are no sons.” [47a]

22.34 IRIN reported on 23 July 2004 that Child Protection Society (CPS) advocacy manager, Busi Bhebhe, estimated that 80 per cent of women are in “unregistered customary law marriages, where lobola or bride price was paid for the mother but there is no documentation to prove it.” [10k]

22.35 The USSD 2011 also noted that: “The law recognizes a woman’s right to own property, but many women were unaware of their property and inheritance rights. Divorce and maintenance laws were equitable, but many women lacked awareness of their rights. Women have the right to register their children’s births, although in practice either the fathers or male relatives must be present.” [2g] (p41)
22.36 Afrol noted in an undated article, accessed on 2 February 2009, that:

“The Legal Age of Majority Act (LAMA) and the Matrimonial Causes Act recognize women’s right to own property independently of their husbands or fathers. While unmarried women may own property in their own names, women married under customary law are not allowed to own property jointly with their husbands. During the September land conference, women’s rights organizations effectively lobbied the Government to agree to create legislation giving married women joint spousal title to property offered under the resettlement program; however, no such legislation had been enacted by year’s end … The Administration of Estates Amendment Act, which came into effect in October 1997, removed inheritance laws unfavourable to widows. Women’s groups regard the act as a major step toward ending the unfair and unequal distribution of inherited assets for women. The President signed the new Inheritance Amendment into law. However, in February [2006] the Supreme Court upheld a magistrate court decision that, under customary ethnic law (sic), a man’s claim to family inheritance takes precedence over a woman’s, regardless of the woman’s age or seniority in the family; the Court cited Section 23 of the Constitution, which allows discrimination against women under customary law. Divorce and maintenance laws are favourable to women, but women generally lack awareness of their rights under the law.” [73a] (p1-4)

22.37 The UNICEF Report 2011 noted that:

“Traditions and customs, most of which (such as the prioritisation of family and respect for the elderly) serve to protect children and women from harm and promote their social development, remain important to all Zimbabweans. As in all countries, however, some traditional views and customs continue to encourage and permit violence, abuse and discrimination. For example, women and children continue to experience a lower status to that of men within many private and public realms, which reduces and limits their access to resources and constrains their influence in decision making at all levels. Polygamy is still legal and the payment of lobola (bride price/wealth) is still widespread, although opinions are divided on whether lobola decreases or increases the status of the bride. Similarly, custom in some communities precludes women and girls from inheriting family resources and this practice remains protected by the Constitutional provision that permits discriminatory practices if they are based on established custom. There is no legal age for marriage within the Customary Marriages Act and early marriage before the age of consent remains normalised in some communities.” [85d] (p20)

22.38 The Zimbabwe Demographic and Health Survey 2010-2011, carried out by the Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency and results of which were published in March 2012 (Zimbabwe DHS 2010-2011), noted that the “Median age at first marriage among women is 19.7 years; median age at first marriage for men is 24.8 years … Eleven percent of currently married women are married to men who are in a polygynous union; 5 percent of currently married men are in a polygynous union.” [153a] (p47)

22.39 The CEDAW Report 2012 noted that:

“The Committee is concerned about the persistence of discriminatory customary laws and practices, especially in rural areas and remote communities, with regard, inter alia, to marriage and its dissolution, inheritance and property rights. The Committee is deeply concerned that the customary and religious laws and practices that discriminate against
women in the area of marriage and family relations, such as polygamy and bride price (lobola), are being upheld due to the State party’s preservation of both civil and customary marital regimes, and the adoption of legislation such as the Customary Marriages Act.” [165b] (p10)

Prostitution

22.40 The US State Department 2009 Human Rights Report: Zimbabwe, 13 March 2010, noted that:

“Prostitution is illegal, and several civil society groups offered anecdotal evidence that the country’s economic problems continued to force women and girls into prostitution. Police often tolerated prostitution at nightclubs, truck stops, and bars in urban areas. Clients were rarely arrested. The maximum penalty for soliciting for prostitution is a fine of $200 or imprisonment up to six months. According to local lawyers, the maximum penalty was rarely imposed; those found working as prostitutes typically were forced to pay a fine at a police station. Although police occasionally arrested prostitutes, they usually paid small fines and were not detained at length … There were reports that girls as young as 12 worked as prostitutes for soldiers and illegal miners in the Chiadzwa diamond fields. There continued to be reports that women and children were sexually exploited in towns along the borders with South Africa, Botswana, Mozambique, and Zambia … Police arrested both prostitutes and their clients during the year.” [2h] (Section 6)

Reproductive rights

22.41 The USSD Report 2011 noted that: “Couples and individuals have the right to decide freely and responsibly the number, spacing, and timing of their children and to have the information and means to do so free from discrimination, coercion, and violence … According to UNICEF’s 2009 Multiple Indicators Monitoring Survey (MIMS), 65 percent of women who were married or in a domestic union used modern methods of contraception” [2h] (p40)

22.42 The Zimbabwe DHS 2010-2011 noted that:

- Knowledge of contraception is nearly universal in Zimbabwe; 98 percent of women and 99 percent of men report knowing about a contraceptive method.
- Fifty-nine percent of currently married women use a contraceptive method, and 57 percent report using a modern method. This represents a small decline relative to the 2005-06 ZDHS in which corresponding values were 60 percent and 58 percent, respectively [ … ]
- Government-sponsored facilities remain the chief providers of contraceptive methods in Zimbabwe; 73 percent of users of modern contraceptive methods obtain them from the public sector. [153a] (p77)

Access to abortion

22.43 The UNWomen Report, ‘Progress of the World’s women 2011-2012. In pursuit of justice’ noted that abortion was only permissible in Zimbabwe under the following circumstances:

- to save life;
- to preserve physical and mental health;
186 The main text of this COI Report contains the most up to date publicly available information as at 6 June 2012. Further brief information on recent events and reports has been provided in the Latest News section to 13 July 2012.

- in cases of rape or incest;
- in cases of foetal impairment;
- abortion is not permissible for economic or social reasons. [63a] (p133)

22.44 The United Nations Population Division (Department of Economic and Social Affairs) noted, in the document, Abortion policy: Zimbabwe, 23 November 2005, that:

“A legal abortion must be performed by a physician in a designated institution with the permission of the superintendent of the institution. If the pregnancy resulted from unlawful intercourse, a magistrate of a court in the jurisdiction where the abortion will be performed must certify that the alleged intercourse was reported to the police and that pregnancy may have resulted from it. When the abortion is requested because the pregnancy poses a threat to the life or physical health of the pregnant woman, or on grounds of foetal impairment, two physicians that are not members of the same practice must certify to the relevant hospital superintendent that one of these conditions exists. However, if the woman’s life is in danger, a physician can perform the abortion in a place other than a designated institution and without a second medical opinion.” [74] (p189)

22.45 IRIN news reported on 30 March 2005 that the protracted process of satisfying the conditions of the ‘Termination of Pregnancy Act (1977)’ “… coupled with the fact that legal abortions are not free, have led to a growing ‘black market’ for the procedure, where back street terminations are often performed by unskilled personnel in unhygienic surrounding.” As a result it was reported that 70,000 illegal abortions take place in Zimbabwe every year. One consequence of illegal abortions was a large number of young women (usually between the ages of 15 and 24) seeking post abortion medical assistance. [10m]

22.46 The Herald reported on 23 November 2009 that ‘backyard abortions’ were very common in Zimbabwe, with the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare estimating that there were “… 273 abortions … performed daily …”, or approximately 100,000 per year. [23f] The Herald also reported (10 March 2010) that while non-medical or ‘backyard abortions’ were illegal, social and cultural taboos about older women (specifically grandmothers) having children meant that unofficial abortions were accepted in traditional communities. [23g] ‘The Zimbabwean’ reported on 11 November 2010 that: “Some doctors at government hospitals in Bulawayo are allegedly conducting illegal backyard abortions … the practise was rampant at Mpilo and United Bulawayo Hospitals (UBH) where doctors charge between US$100 and US$300 … In most cases the abortionists are referred to the doctors by nurses … Most of the clients are school and college going girls and pregnant HIV positive women …” [99m] The Zimbabwean also reported on 21 November 2011 that:

“Some medical practitioners in the country are willing to administer abortions for an extortionate fee, but the majority of women cannot afford it, so they seek help elsewhere. High density suburbs are awash with illegal abortion clinics, many of which are run from people’s homes … Many come to collect concoctions prepared by the ‘midwives’ that the women can take at home.

“With no standard of cleanliness or legal monitoring of these institutions, many women die from infections.” [99s]
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN

It is recommended that officials read this subsection in its entirety to understand violence against women more fully.

22.47 The Africa For Women’s Rights document dated 5 March 2010 noted that:

“Despite the adoption of legislation, including the Domestic Violence Act 2007 and reforms to the Criminal Law Act in 2006, violence against women, particularly domestic violence, remains widespread and perpetrators continue to benefit from impunity. The lack of training of law enforcement personnel, the lack of awareness of women’s human rights, the fear of social stigma and reprisal contribute to the ineffectiveness of such laws. Since the criminalisation of marital rape, only one case of marital rape has been tried in court.” [47a]

22.48 The CEDAW Report 2012 noted that:

“While noting the adoption of the new Domestic Violence Act in 2006, the Committee expresses its concern at the high prevalence of violence against women in the State party, in particular domestic and sexual violence, which remains, in many cases, underreported, as well as at the lack of statistical data disaggregated by sex, and also at the absence of an expressed political will to give high priority to eliminating violence against women. While welcoming the enactment of the Sexual Offences Act in 2003, which recognizes marital rape as an offence, the Committee is deeply concerned that despite the enactment of the Domestic Violence Act in 2006 and the establishment of an Anti-Domestic Violence Council, responsible for the implementation of the Act, its effectiveness has been hampered, as the State party has not allocated the required monetary and human resources thereto. The Committee is further concerned at the State party’s failure to address politically motivated violence against women. The Committee is again concerned that there is only one State-established shelter for women victims of violence (the two other shelters were established by NGOs), and that it is not exclusively for women victims of domestic violence. The Committee is also concerned about acts of violence perpetrated by State and non-State actors, against lesbian, bisexual and transgender women.” [165b] (p5)

22.49 The Zimbabwe DHS 2010-2011 noted that: “The critical problems that women face are many and diverse. One of these, and among the most serious, is the issue of violence against women. It is described as the most serious because it concerns the personal security of women, and the right of personal security is fundamental to all other rights. If violence against women is tolerated and accepted in a society, its eradication is made more difficult.” [153a] (p242)

22.50 The UNICEF Report 2011, dated 18 March 2011, noted that:

“Some communities and families in Zimbabwe condone violence as a means of resolving disputes and exercising control, to the extent that violence against women is seen by the perpetrator, the survivor, the community and the state to be the norm. However, there is a growing movement to address gender inequities and challenge behaviours and attitudes that condone violence. The Ministry of Women's Affairs, Gender and Community Development is now playing a coordinating role within government for all gender based violence programming … As with all attitude and
behaviour change efforts, this requires concerted, resourced and coordinated advocacy by government, civil society and partners.” [85d] (p22-23)

22.51 The UN Women report 2011 noted that there were laws in place against domestic violence, sexual harassment and marital rape. [63a] (p137) The USSD Report 2011 observed that: “Labor legislation prohibits sexual harassment in the workplace, and an employer may be held liable for civil remedies if found to be in violation of provisions against 'unfair labor practices,' including sexual harassment. Penalties for these violations are not specified in the law. Women commonly faced workplace sexual harassment, government enforcement was not effective, and there were no reports of any prosecutions during the year.” [2g] (p40)

22.52 Afrol, undated, accessed 2 February 2009 noted that Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) is still practised by a small ethnic group called the Remba [or Lemba]. [73a] (p2)

Politically-motivated violence

22.53 A report by the Research and Advocacy Unit entitled ‘Zimbabwe women and their participation in elections’, dated December 2011, noted that:

“There is no doubt that women in Zimbabwe have a strong interest in the political life of their country. Based on the findings of a national poll of 2158 women, drawn from all 10 Provinces, in mid-November to early-December 2009, Zimbabwean women indicated this interest.

“Women believe that they should participate in politics and increasing numbers of women are voting, although in less numbers than are actually eligible to vote … There were a variety of reasons for not participating, some of which were purely administrative, such as failure to register or the inability to acquire a national ID. However, there other reasons, and here women report that they have become increasingly unsafe during elections, and very large numbers report that they have experienced violence during elections … the numbers of women feeling unsafe during elections has been rising steadily since 2002, with nearly 70% reporting being unsafe in 2008.” [127b]

22.54 The same report noted that:

“ … the assertion that women feel unsafe is not the same as actually being unsafe, but it is clear that these feelings are supported by women’s actual experience …

Table 2: Experience of violence during election since 1980

Source: RAU.2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>0.3</td>
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<td>0.3</td>
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<td>0.2</td>
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</tbody>
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The main text of this COI Report contains the most up to date publicly available information as at 6 June 2012. Further brief information on recent events and reports has been provided in the Latest News section to 13 July 2012.
“It is evident that there is a dramatic increase in political violence experienced by women since 2000, and that, according to women, political violence against women was rare in all elections prior to 2000, which corresponds exactly to the known facts about Zimbabwean elections. It is also striking that the number reporting feeling unsafe during elections in 2008 is very similar to the number reporting experiencing violence in the same year.” [127b]

22.55 A report entitled No hiding place: Politically motivated rape of woman in Zimbabwe, published by the Research and Advocacy Unit and the Zimbabwe Association of Doctors for Human Rights, dated December 2010, noted that:

“Politically motivated sexual violence against women in Zimbabwe takes many forms. … In some of the instances … rape is committed at the instigation of a military leader or war veteran, showing that it is a strategy to intimidate political opponents. Often used during election periods or periods of national importance, it is quite evident that the rape is used as a psychological weapon in order to humiliate the opposition and undermine their morale…The phenomenon of violations against women is not a new thing in Zimbabwean politics; it has been reported in the majority of human rights reports produced both locally and internationally since 2000 when the political landscape changed with the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) posing a serious threat to the Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU PF)’s power-base in the June 2000 parliamentary elections.” [127a] (p3&4)

22.56 Peacewomen noted in a briefing entitled, On gender based violence during elections in Zimbabwe, dated 10 December 2010, that: “Women have been victims, perpetrators and agents of violence throughout electoral processes in Zimbabwe… [but while] there have been significant steps to fight against domestic violence in Zimbabwe through the enactment of the Domestic Violence Act, gender based violence still manifest itself in Zimbabwean society particularly in the election and post-election period.” [126a]

22.57 A report titled A Preying on the ‘Weaker’ Sex: Political Violence against Women in Zimbabwe, dated November 2010, produced by An African Democracy Institute (IDASA), the International Center for Transitional Justice and the Research and Advocacy Unit, noted that:

“Violence against women in the context of ‘political conflict, repression and resistance’ in Zimbabwe is a feature that has been seen in every election since 2000, and it is a frequent experience for women whether they are politically active or not. It can happen to women merely because they are perceived to be an opponent of ZANU-PF, as was so clearly seen in the Presidential run-off in 2008: women who were MDC members, or merely perceived to be a supporter of the MDC, were 10 times more likely to report a human rights violation than a female member of ZANU-PF. However, female supporters of ZANU-PF were 40 times more likely to have been reported as a perpetrator, where women were 16% of the total victims in 2008 according to the Solidarity Peace Trust and 21% according to the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum.
“However, as indicated above, 2008 was not an aberration. In 2006, the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum [the Human Rights Forum] described 448 cases of violations against women, covering the period 2000 to 2006, with assault and political intimidation the most common violation. It is important to note that during this period Zimbabwe had had three national elections (2000, 2002 and 2005) and it is well documented that violence increased during election years. Rural women were more likely than urban women to report property destruction, displacement, rape, and torture, whilst urban women reported assault, unlawful detention, and death threats more frequently. A similar contrast between rural and urban women emerged in a study of Zimbabwean women victims in the refugee population in South Africa. As was the case with the Human Rights Forum report, ZANU-PF supporters and ZANU-PF youth were cited as the most common perpetrators … Political violence against women is common in Zimbabwe, with assault, torture, threats, intimidation, displacement and property destruction frequently reported. The perpetrators are usually non-state agents, and reported to be ZANU-PF supporters, ZANU-PF Youth, and war veterans, but there are also high numbers of reports involving state agents such as the ZRP and the Zimbabwe National Army [ZNA].” [9d] (p5-6)

22.58 Womankind noted on its Zimbabwe page, undated, accessed 14 July 2011, that: “The political environment is marred with violence, which makes it increasingly difficult for women to participate as candidates or voters. … Over 2,000 women and girls were raped at militia camps during the 2008 elections.” [142a]

22.59 Amnesty International’s Annual Report 2010, Zimbabwe, covering events in 2009, released 28 May 2010, noted that security forces continued to disrupt demonstrations by the Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA) group, further noting that WOZA activists continued to be arrested and beaten whilst in custody and denied medical treatment. [14g] (p3) The USSD 2010 noted that the police used “excessive force" to break-up and disrupt WOZA demonstrations. [2b] (Section 1c)

22.60 The Zimbabwe Peace Project lists in its monthly reports on politically motivated human rights and food related violations incidents of rape (it is presumed that this is for rape of women, not men, although the reports do not explicitly make this clear). For numbers of recorded rapes during the period May 2011 to April 2012, see Political affiliation, Politically motivated human rights violations. A report published by AIDS Free World, entitled Electing to Rape: Sexual Terror in Mugabe’s Zimbabwe, published December 2009, provides details of politically motivated sexual offences against women. The joint report by the Research and Advocacy Unit and the Zimbabwe Association of Doctors for Human Rights entitled No hiding place: Politically motivated rape of woman in Zimbabwe, published December 2010, provides details of politically motivated sexual offences against women. Preying on the ‘Weaker’ Sex: Political Violence against Women in Zimbabwe, dated November 2010, produced by An African Democracy Institute (IDASA), the International Center for Transitional Justice and the Research and Advocacy Unit, has more detail about politically motivated violence based on interviews with 2,149 women.

For more information about politically motivated violence see the section on WOZA (Women of Zimbabwe Arise), Latest news, Recent developments, Security forces, Political affiliation, Political freedom and Human rights institutions, organisations and activists

Domestic violence
For information about spousal rape, see following subsection.

22.61 The USSD 2011 noted that:

“The law criminalizes domestic violence, but it was a serious problem, especially wife beating. Domestic violence is punishable by a fine and a maximum prison sentence of 10 years, but authorities generally considered domestic violence to be a private matter and usually arrested an offender only if there was physical evidence of abuse. Most cases of domestic violence went unreported, due to traditional sensitivities, victims’ fear of abandonment without support, and police reluctance to intervene. There were newspaper reports of wife killings, and there were a few reports of prosecutions and convictions for such crimes.

“An Anti-Domestic Violence Council was created in 2009 to educate women about their legal rights and to protect victims of abuse. The council was ineffective due to lack of funding and the unavailability of statistics and information on prevailing trends of domestic violence.

“The government continued a public awareness campaign against domestic violence. Several women’s rights groups worked with law enforcement and provided training and literature on domestic violence as well as shelters and counseling for women. However, the high turnover rate within the police force demanded a continuous level of training that could not be met. While public awareness increased, other problems emerged. For example, the police form required to report domestic violence was difficult to complete, and victims were often required to make their own photocopies due to police budgetary constraints.” [2g] (p39-40)

22.62 The UN Women report 2011 annex providing statistics on violence against stated that 30 per cent of women had been subject to physical violence and 19 per cent had been subject to sexual violence by an “intimate partner”. In the previous 12 months, 25 per cent of women had been subject to physical violence, 13 per cent sexual violence, by an intimate partner. [63a] (p137)

22.63 The Zimbabwe DHS 2010-2011 noted that in its ‘Key Findings’ on domestic violence:

- Thirty percent of women age 15-49 have experienced physical violence since age 15; 18 percent of women have experienced physical violence within the past 12 months.
- The most common perpetrator of physical violence against women is the woman’s current or former husband or partner.
- Twenty-two percent of women who have had sexual intercourse reported that their first experience was forced against their will.
- Overall, 27 percent of women reported that they have experienced sexual violence. In nine of ten cases, their current or former husband, partner, or boyfriend committed the act.
- Only 37 percent of women who experienced physical or sexual violence have sought help. Most turned to family (58 percent), in-laws (36 percent), and friends or neighbours (13 percent) for assistance.” [153a] (p251)

22.64 The Zimbabwe DHS 2010-2011 also noted that:
“To assess women’s and men’s attitudes towards wife beating, respondents were asked whether a husband is justified in hitting or beating his wife in each of the following five situations: if she burns the food; if she argues with him; if she goes out without telling him; if she neglects the children; and if she refuses to have sexual intercourse with him … Forty percent of women believe that a husband is justified in beating his wife for at least one of the five specified reasons … 34 percent of men age 15-49 believe that a husband is justified in beating his wife for at least one of the five specified reasons … Remarkably, for each of the specified reasons that respondents were asked about, men were less likely than women to agree that wife beating was justified.” [153a] (p242-243)

Rape and other forms of sexual violence

22.65 The USSD 2011 noted that:

“The law criminalizes rape, including spousal rape; however, the law was not effectively enforced, and rape remained a widespread problem. Sexual offenses, including rape, are punishable by life imprisonment. However, few cases of rape were reported due to social stigma, and rape victims seldom received protection in court. Even fewer cases of spousal rape were reported, due to victims’ fear of losing economic support, fear of reprisal, unawareness that spousal rape was a crime, police reluctance to interfere in domestic disputes, and bureaucratic hurdles involved.

“The government media frequently published stories denouncing rape and reporting convictions. However, police seldom acted on reported rape cases if the perpetrators were aligned with ZANU-PF or if the rape was used as a political tool against non-ZANU-PF members, as occurred during the 2008 election.

“Children born from rape suffered stigmatization and marginalization. The mothers of children resulting from rape were sometimes reluctant to register the births, and such children were denied access to social services.” [2g] (p38-39)

22.66 The Zimbabwe DHS 2010-2011 noted that “… overall 27 percent of women reported that they have experienced sexual violence at some point in their lives. The percentage of women who have ever experienced sexual violence increases with age, from 18 percent among women age 15-19 to 33 percent among women age 25-29 and then declines.” [153a] (p256) The survey further noted that “Overall, the large majority (92 percent) of women reported that the sexual violence was committed by their current or former husband/partner or boyfriend. Eighty-six percent of ever-married women reported that the perpetrator was a current or previous husband/partner, and 62 percent of never-married women reported that the perpetrator was a current or former boyfriend.” [153a] (p258)

22.67 The report by AIDS Free World (published December 2009) notes that some NGOs believe that hundreds, or possibly thousands of women may have been raped by ZANU-PF supporters during the 2008 elections. However, the report notes that “… inaction on the part of the police and prosecuting authorities, and widespread fear engendered by police reprisals, renders local criminal proceedings practically unavailable to survivors of political rape.” [112a] (p34)
For information about assistance given to victims of rape, see following subsection.

** Trafficking **

22.68 The US State Department Trafficking in Persons Report 2011, (USSD TIP Report 2011) released 27 June 2011, noted that:

“Zimbabwe is a source, transit, and destination country for men, women, and children subjected to forced labor and sex trafficking. Women and girls from Zimbabwean towns bordering South Africa and Zambia are subjected to sex trafficking in brothels that cater to long-distance truck drivers. Recent reports indicate that young women from rural areas are recruited into forced prostitution through the guise of beauty pageants held in cities. Some victims of forced prostitution are subsequently transported across the border to South Africa where they suffer continued exploitation. Zimbabwean men, women, and children are subjected to forced labor in agriculture and domestic service in rural areas, as well as domestic servitude and sex trafficking in cities and towns.” [2c](Country Narratives: Countries N Through Z)

22.69 The CEDAW Report 2012 stated that:

“25. The Committee remains concerned at the continuing prevalence of trafficking in women and girls in the country, at the lack of statistical data sex disaggregated, as well as at the low reporting rate. The Committee is also concerned at the State party’s failure to address the root causes of trafficking and prostitution, including poverty, which impede the State party’s efforts to address these issues in a serious way. While noting the existence of the reception and support centres at Beitbridge and Plumtree border posts which receive returnees and deportees from neighbouring countries, the Committee is concerned at the lack of shelters and counselling services in the State party for victims of trafficking and prostitution, as well as at the lack of information on the existence and implementation of regional and bilateral memoranda of understanding and/or agreements with other countries on trafficking.” [165b] (p6)

For more information on trafficking generally, see section 24: Trafficking

** Assistance to Women **

22.70 An article published by Zimintransition, dated 21 October 2010, noted that the Musasa Project – a local women’s NGO – provided assistance to 1,606 women victims of domestic violence during the previous year. The “Musasa Project provides the only shelter in Harare where women facing danger as a result of gender violence have no alternative place to go which is safe. The accommodation is temporary and is also offered to all the children excluding boys who are aged above 12 years.” [7a] The Director of the Musasa Project stated in a letter (published on website Kubatana), dated 30 June 2009, noted that the organisation had made every effort to meet the needs of it’s clients by providing assistance 24 hours a day. [55a] The Musasa Project can be contacted via its office in Harare – 64 Selous Avenue, Cnr 7th Street, Harare. [55d]

22.71 In addition to the Musasa Project above, Amnesty International (USA) reported in 2008 that the Zimbabwe Girl Child Network, a local NGO set up in 1998, has assisted 500,000 girls of all ages. Amongst the services the Network provided was a number of “safe houses”. [14d] The Kubatana NGO Directory provides contact details for the organisation: [http://www.kubatana.net/html/sectors/gir001.asp?like=G&details=Tel](http://www.kubatana.net/html/sectors/gir001.asp?like=G&details=Tel)
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Amnesty International’s report ‘Zimbabwe: Briefing to the pre-session working-group of the UN Committee on the elimination of discrimination against women’, dated 24 June 2011, noted that regarding access to antenatal care, “Most people generally cannot afford healthcare fees in Zimbabwe.” Amnesty gave an example of women living at Hopley Farm outside Harare, noting that:

“Most pregnant women and girls at Hopley are deprived of the benefits of antenatal care because they cannot afford the fees charged. The nearest maternity clinic, run by the Harare city council, charges USD 30 to register for both antenatal care and delivery. Before December 2010 the council was charging USD 50. The reduction was a positive step towards broadening the accessibility of maternal health care. However, for many women the USD 30 fee is still prohibitive … At present the formal unemployment figure in Zimbabwe stands at over eighty per cent and the community at Hopley are reliant on food aid. The inability to afford antenatal fees forces pregnant women and girls at Hopley to delay seeking care, quite often until they are in labour or experiencing complications, increasing the risk of death or damage to health.

“Antenatal care can help to reduce maternal and neonatal mortality by alerting women and their families to symptoms that signal medical care is urgently needed. Antenatal care also serves numerous other critical functions; for example, it can help to ensure the prevention of HIV transmission from mother to child. The inadequate access to antenatal care services in Hopley contributes to the risk of preventable death and ill-health for women and newborns.

“Several of the women interviewed by Amnesty International gave birth on their own, in conditions which may have put both the lives of the woman and the baby at risk. Some of the women were unaware at the time of delivery that they were carrying twins and suffered complications, including breech deliveries, and the babies died.

“Zimbabwe’s Deputy Prime Minister Thokozani Khupe who is also the Chair of the Parliamentary Cluster on Social Services, visited Hopley settlement in December 2010, a week after Amnesty published its findings on neonatal mortality at the settlement and in response to lobbying by Amnesty International. During the visit the Deputy Prime Minister made a public commitment to the community to scrap the registration fee for maternal health care. However, this is yet to be implemented.” [14e] (p9)

The CEDAW Report 2012 stated that:

“33. While welcoming the establishment in 2011 of a Health Transition Fund to provide free maternal and child health services by all public health facilities, the Committee is concerned that the right to health is not enshrined in the Constitution or the Public Health Act. While noting the launch in 2010 of the campaign Accelerated Reduction of Maternal Mortality (CARMMA), the Committee is also concerned at the high maternal mortality rate (725/100,000 live births). The Committee is further concerned that the restrictive abortion law and the lengthy procedures for authorizing abortions according to the exceptions allowed by law lead women to seek illegal abortions which are often unsafe. The Committee is also concerned at women’s limited access to quality reproductive and sexual health services, especially in rural and remote areas. The Committee is further concerned that the HIV/AIDS epidemic continues to be a health challenge in the State party, despite reports of a significant fall in the rates of infection.” [165b] (p9)
22.78 The Zimbabwe DHS 2010-2011 reported that:

- “Ninety percent of women age 15-49 who gave birth in the five years preceding the survey received antenatal care from a skilled provider during pregnancy for their most recent birth. However, only 19 percent of the women received any antenatal care during their first trimester.
- Fifty-four percent of the women who gave birth in the five years preceding the survey had sufficient tetanus toxoid injections to ensure that their most recent birth was protected against neonatal tetanus.
- Sixty-five percent of live births in the five years preceding the survey took place in a health facility; 66 percent of live births were delivered by a skilled provider.
- Among women who gave birth in the two years preceding the survey, 27 percent received a postnatal checkup in the first two days after birth.” [153a] (p107)

See also Medical issues for information about healthcare generally. Statistics relevant to measuring women’s health are available in the subsection on Statistics above.

23. CHILDREN

OVERVIEW

23.01 The UNICEF Zimbabwe Child Protection website, undated, accessed on 31 May 2012, noted that:

“As poverty and inequalities in Zimbabwe deepen, children continue to face threats to their well-being. Although reliable national data are not available, child labour, child sexual abuse and child trafficking remain major issues of concern, as is the capacity of legal, security and welfare professionals to respond to the needs of vulnerable children.

“The once renowned social welfare system of Zimbabwe has also deteriorated and reached a state of collapse in late 2008, though certain improvement has been undertaken by the formation of the new Government. Protocols and policies protecting children have not been updated in several years, and almost no social welfare professionals are active in Government to take up their statutory duties. The result is an increasing number of vulnerable children who are living alone, caring for large family networks and working in unsafe practices to try to bring their families a form of livelihood, all by themselves.

“Continued capacity shortages within national social welfare and justice for children systems is also impacting on data collection with the result that many vulnerable remain ‘invisible’ to child protection service delivery. Displaced children, trafficked children and those in institutional care (estimated at more than 5,000 in more than 60 institutions in 2006) are known to be increasing in number but are as yet unable to access quality social welfare services such as counseling, reintegration and rehabilitation services.” [85f]

23.02 UNICEF, undated, accessed 2 May 2012 reported that there were 5,866,000 children under the age of 18 in 2010. Of that figure, 1,692,000 were under the age of 5. [85a]

Statistics


Basic legal information

23.04 Avert.org, undated, accessed on 2 May 2012, noted that the age of consent in Zimbabwe for males and females was 16 years old. [19a] The Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, noted in a report on Women’s Rights, undated, but accessed on 5 July 2010, that: “The Marriages Act [Chapter 5:11] discriminates against women … Under this legislation, a man may marry at the minimum age of eighteen while a woman may marry at the minimum age of sixteen. This makes the girl child more vulnerable to early marriages, early pregnancies and premature motherhood.” [35i]


“The traditional practice of offering a young girl in marriage as compensatory payment in interfamily disputes continued, as did arranged marriages of young girls. The legal age for a civil marriage is 18, but girls ages 16 and 17 also could marry with parental approval. Customary marriage, recognized under the Customary Marriages Act, does not require a minimum marriage age for either boys or girls; however, the criminal code prohibits sexual relations with persons younger than age 18. According to UNICEF one-third of women married when under age 18, and 5 percent of women married when under age 15. Approximately 21 percent of young women between the ages of 15 and 19 were married or in a union. Child welfare NGOs reported that they occasionally saw evidence of underage marriages, particularly in isolated religious communities or among HIV/AIDS orphans who did not have relatives willing or able to take care of them.” [2g] (p43)

23.06 The Zimbabwe Ministry of Youth Development and Employment (accessed 29 May 2009) noted that the age of majority was 18 and that “… the legal minimum age for employment is 15 and employed children cannot work for more than 6 hours a day.” [106a] The United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child reported on 17 June 1996 that the age of criminal responsibility was 15. Children under the age of 7 years of age are considered incapable of committing a crime with a ‘rebuttable presumption’ that children between 7 and 14 years of age were incapable of committing crimes. [25b] (p2)

23.07 The United States Department of Labor report, ‘2010 Findings on the worst forms of child labor – Zimbabwe’ (USDL 2010), covering the period January 2010 to December 2010, but also including important developments up to July 2011, dated September...
2011, noted that: “The National Service Act of 1979 prohibits persons under age 18 from compulsory and voluntary military service.” [38b] (p824)

LEGAL RIGHTS


“Zimbabwe is governed by a comprehensive legal and regulatory framework that includes legal protections that it has committed to provide through ratification of the [African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child] ACRWC, the [UN Convention on the Rights of the Child] CRC and the [UN Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women] CEDAW. The government is yet to ratify the two optional protocols of the CRC, including on Children and Armed Conflict and Child Trafficking. A review of the national legal framework conducted in 2004 concluded that Zimbabwe’s legislation 'meets most of the standards of the CRC'. The administration of statutory child protection services is covered by the Children's Act and the Criminal Code criminalises many forms of abuse and violence against children … However, these provisions do not apply equally to all … children and the benefits and protections of such legislation can be negated through the primacy of customary law and certain clauses within the Constitution. Other discriminatory legislation remains, reinforcing potentially harmful customary views …” [85d] (p17)


VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN

In considering the situation of children and the violence they experience, officials should set this against the wider backdrop of the polarised political climate and politically motivated human rights violations as well as the prevailing economic situation. Children may or may not be the targets of politically motivated violations but they are likely to be affected directly or indirectly.

In considering the situation of girls, officials should also look at the section on Women to better understand the position of and difficulties faced by females more generally in Zimbabwean society.

23.11 The UNICEF Report 2011 noted that:

“Although comprehensive data is lacking on the prevalence and incidence of sexual and physical violence against children in Zimbabwe, emerging anecdotal evidence and local studies by UN agencies and NGOs suggest that violence of all types is a significant issue, particularly for girls and other vulnerable children, including orphans and children
living away from their family, children on the move, children with disabilities and children who come into conflict with the law.” [85d] (p15)

23.12 UNICEF’s Annual Report for Zimbabwe, covering 2010 and released in September 2011 (UNICEF Annual Report 2010), observed:

“Vulnerability is not limited to orphans; experience of violence and abuse is widespread. At least 21% of girls’ first sexual encounter is forced and the perception that family violence is acceptable is shared by both women and men (48% and 37%, respectively). Corporal punishment is legally administered. Two-thirds of children report experiencing such punishment at school. The combination of poverty, neglect and violence contributes to the large number of children on the move, resulting in unsafe migration and child exploitation.” [85j] (p2)

23.13 The USSD 2011 noted that:

“Child abuse, including incest, infanticide, child abandonment, and rape, continued to be serious problems. According to Childline, an NGO that ran a crisis hotline for children, nearly 250,000 calls were received in 2010, compared with approximately 116,000 calls in 2009. Most of the calls related to sexual and physical abuse, generally inflicted by a relative or someone who lived with the child. Childline attributed the increase in calls to the hotline being more available to children, improved telephone access with upgraded mobile phone signals across the country, and the expansion of its community-based drop-in centers. Girl Child Network reported that girls believed to be virgins were at risk of rape due to a belief that having sex with a virgin would cure men of HIV/AIDS.

“Despite a 2009 campaign launched by the government and an NGO to eradicate child abuse in schools, it remained a problem. The campaign began after a study found that many children had been victims of unreported sexual and physical abuse by their teachers and peers. Students were also subjected to corporal punishment, which is a legal form of discipline for parents, teachers, and magistrates. While the law stipulates strict regulations in the execution of corporal punishment, most teachers and parents were not aware of them.

“Government efforts to combat child abuse were inadequate and underfunded. The country had a ratio of one social worker per 50,000 children. During the year two baseline studies were initiated to address the problem more effectively. UNICEF, in partnership with other UN agencies, NGOs, and the government, began setting up a national database for the Department of Social Services to integrate existing data and reporting standards for all entities documenting abuses of children. In addition the government launched a national baseline survey on abuses occurring in households.” [2g] (p42-43)


“The latest official poverty statistics indicate that approximately 3.5 million children live below the food poverty line in Zimbabwe, and are in urgent need of quality protection and free access to basic services. Recent research indicates that between 220,000 and 250,000 rural households in Zimbabwe live in extreme poverty and are food insecure. These households include between 620,000 and 700,000 vulnerable children.
These children struggle to access basic services, such as health, education and social protection. As a result, many children, particularly adolescents, are forced to work, often under exploitative conditions, to meet their basic needs. Unsafe migration, child trafficking, child prostitution, child labour and other forms of abuse pose special challenges for this marginalised community of children.” [85d] (p13)

23.15 The UNICEF report 2011 provided the following statistical snapshot of violence against children:

- "25 per cent girls affected by HIV are exposed to sexual violence before their 18th birthday.
- 22 per cent of children report experiencing abuse by a caregiver.
- 13 per cent of girls report being sexually harassed by teachers and/or fellow pupils. Of these, 7 per cent report having been forced into sex at least once.
- 25 per cent of boys living and working on the streets of Harare are victims of sexual abuse, and only 8 per cent of these boys were able to report that the perpetrator had been arrested.
- The Police recorded 3,448 child abuse cases in 2009, the Victim Friendly Courts heard 1,222 cases of child sexual abuse and it is widely recognised that a majority of abuse is not reported to authorities.
- 67 per cent of children and 35 per cent of teachers concur that corporal punishment is used by all teachers at one point or another during school time.” [85d] (p15)

23.16 The Guardian reported on 10 November 2009 that the poor state of Zimbabwe’s economy was breaking traditional family structures, and this had led to a significant rise in the numbers of reported cases of child abuse. The economic migration of parents and the fact that many more children are being orphaned by HIV/AIDS has seen more children placed in vulnerable positions where they are more easily exploited. The report noted that a single clinic in Harare was “… seeing an average of 20 child abuse victims a day.” Local NGO, the Girl Child network, estimated that “… on average a man can rape 250 children before his crimes become public knowledge.” [34a]

23.17 Regarding child abuse, the UNICEF report 2011 noted that:

“Childline, in partnership with UNICEF and the Collaborative Centre for Operational Research and Evaluation (CCORE), collected data on all 6,118 calls and visits handled by Childline in 2009. Forty-one per cent constituted actual cases falling into at least one of the categories of child abuse as illustrated in Figure 12: [Sexual, Physical, Neglect, Emotional, and Bullying] Rates of reported abuse against boys and girls. There was little difference in proportion between girls and boys for neglect, physical abuse and bullying, but a significant difference for sexual and emotional abuse, with girls nearly six times more likely to be sexually abused than boys …

“The significant findings from the report included:

- “91 per cent of all cases of sexual abuse were classified as ‘rape’, with 46 per cent of the children reporting the abuse had occurred on multiple occasions.
- “74 per cent of the child survivors of sexual abuse reported that they knew the perpetrator, with 24 per cent of perpetrators originating from the immediate family and 37 per cent of perpetrators living in the same house as the survivor.
“24 per cent of alleged perpetrators from reported cases were arrested. A court hearing date was obtained in 23.5 per cent of the cases, but only 8 per cent of the cases went to trial. The perpetrators were sentenced in 3.5 per cent of cases and imprisoned in 1.2 per cent of cases.” [85d] (p16)

See also Women, Violence against women, and Trafficking.

Child labour

23.18 The United States Department of Labor report, ‘2010 Findings on the worst forms of child labor – Zimbabwe’ (USDL 2010), covering the period January 2010 to December 2010, but also including important developments up to July 2011, dated September 2011, noted that: “The Government of Zimbabwe has a steering committee to address child labor issues. However, children work in a variety of the worst forms of child labor, including dangerous work in agriculture and diamond mining. The Government has not dedicated sufficient resources for labor inspections or enforced laws against child labor or child trafficking.” [38b] (p823)

23.19 The report continued:

“The Labor Relations Act sets the minimum age for employment at 15. However, a child as young as age 13 may work as an apprentice or perform work in a school or a technical or vocational institution. The Act prohibits employers from hiring a person younger than age 18 to perform hazardous work. Hazardous work is defined in the Children’s Protection and Adoption Amendment Act of 2001 as any work that jeopardizes or interferes with the education of a child; involves contact with hazardous substances, electronically powered hand tools, cutting tools or grinding blades; involves underground mining; exposes a child to extreme heat, cold or noise; or requires a child to work at night.” [38b] (p825)

23.20 The USDL 2010 also noted that:

“Children in Zimbabwe are engaged in the worst forms of child labor primarily in agriculture and diamond mining. In agriculture, working children face occupational health and safety risks such as using potentially dangerous machinery and tools, carrying heavy loads and applying toxic pesticides. Some children reportedly encounter these dangers working in the production of tea, cotton and tobacco.

“There are reports of children working in diamond, gold, chrome and tin mines and extracting material from underground passages and quarries. Children perform such work in the Marange diamond fields of Eastern Zimbabwe.

“According to UNICEF, approximately 100,000 of Zimbabwe’s 1.3 million orphans survive on their own in child-headed households, some working as street vendors. Children working on the streets may be exposed to many dangers including severe weather, vehicle accidents and criminal elements. Although information is limited, there are reports that children engage in other illicit activities, such as drug smuggling and gambling.

“Children are trafficked within Zimbabwe to border towns and to neighboring countries where they suffer forced labor in agriculture, domestic service and commercial sexual exploitation. Girls as young as age 12 are trafficked along the Zambezi River to the
Mozambican port of Beira and to Central Mozambique. Children from Zimbabwe are sexually exploited by taxi and truck drivers in exchange for transportation to and across unofficial border crossings with South Africa.” [38b] (p823)

**CHILD Care AND PROTECTION**

23.21 The UNICEF Report 2011 noted that:

“The MoLSS [Ministry of Labour and Social Security] is responsible for overall implementation of the Children’s Act. The Zimbabwe Republic Police … and the Ministry of Justice and Legal Affairs, administer the formal legal system, including law and order, and correctional services. Each of these services is functioning, albeit to varying degrees. For example, there are currently only 96 district social workers nationwide performing all government social work and probation functions. These professionals are situated in Harare or the provincial or district capitals and other urban areas. With around more than a million children affected by HIV/AIDS and hundreds of other abused children undocumented and in need of specialised social welfare support the reach of government services is highly limited. Indeed, the ratio of care workers to children is amongst the lowest in the region.” [85d] (p24)

23.22 The USSD 2011 report noted with regard to displaced and street children that:

“UNICEF estimated that at least 10,000 children were displaced in election-related violence in 2008. Several thousand were also displaced with their parents as a result of farm-related violence and evictions in 2009. At year’s end NGOs were uncertain how many children remained affected. Various government-sponsored studies between 1999 and 2009 indicated that approximately 12,000 children were living on the streets. Economic hardships and the government’s lack of support for social welfare institutions contributed to a highly vulnerable population of street children throughout the country. NGOs operated training centers and homes for street children and orphans, and government officials referred children to these centers.” [2g] (p44)

23.23 The UNICEF report 2011 noted that:

“… a majority of essential services are still being delivered by non-governmental organisations with little government oversight, preventing the delivery of a standardised and comprehensive service delivery model … The Victim Friendly System is a long running and potentially national scale service for vulnerable children and women. This system seeks to deliver comprehensive, specialised psychosocial care and medical, legal and referral services to survivors of sexual abuse through Victim Friendly Police Units (VFU), Courts and Clinics. In 2009, 5,768 children were reached directly through the Victim Friendly Courts, police and hospital clinics.

“Currently Victim Friendly Police Units are situated in 10 provincial headquarters, 43 districts offices and 267 police stations at sub-district level. The majority of reported cases to this police unit involve children (64 per cent of 3,239 cases in 2009).” [85d] (p24)

23.24 Kubatana.net, undated, accessed 3 May 2012 listed over 100 organisations working in the children and youth sector in Zimbabwe. Many of these organisations specifically champion children’s rights and provide assistance in the form medical care, education and accommodation and shelter for orphaned children. [55o] The Firelight Foundation
The main text of this COI Report contains the most up to date publicly available information as at 6 June 2012. Further brief information on recent events and reports has been provided in the Latest News section to 13 July 2012.

(accessed 3 May 2012) [72a] and Save the Children (website accessed 3 May 2012) [86a] were active in providing a range of support services for orphans and other children. Services included arranging accommodation for orphaned children, providing food, medication and funding for education. Save the Children noted that in 2010, they “provided protection, care, advice and training to more than 130,000 children orphaned by HIV and AIDS”. [86a]

23.25 With regard to orphans, the UNICEF report 2011 noted that:

“… 98 per cent of orphans are cared for by their extended families or communities. … National Orphan Care Policy, developed in 1995, states ‘It is the policy of the government to move away from institutional care and children's homes. Children's homes should only be used as a last resort and as a temporary measure in transit to a more permanent placement in a family or family type environment.’ … the number of institutions and institutionalised children has doubled over the last ten years. … Faith-based organisations are responsible for 90 per cent of the new institutions and with most new homes being built in remote rural locations, outside the reach of existing probation services, oversight remains minimal.” [85d] (p25-26)

23.26 The same report on the subject of orphans (defined as a child who has lost one or both biological parents) stated that:

“The HIV epidemic remains one of the largest drivers of widespread poverty in Zimbabwe and one of the most devastating effects is the large number of orphans. Estimates suggest that a quarter of all children in Zimbabwe, around 1.6 million, have lost one or both parents due to HIV and other causes. As a result, many orphans are cared for by their extended families, including grandparents (generation gap households), or are living in one of the 100,000 child headed households.” [85d] (p13-14)

The following link provides details of NGOs, including childrens NGOs, in Zimbabwe: [http://www.devdir.org/files/Zimbabwe.PDF](http://www.devdir.org/files/Zimbabwe.PDF)

23.27 The USSD Report 2011 stated that:

“According to UNICEF more than one-fifth of the country’s children were orphans, 77 percent of whom lost their parents to HIV/AIDS. Orphans and vulnerable children (OVC) together constituted 37 percent of the country’s children, and approximately 80 percent of OVCs did not receive any form of government support. The vast majority of orphans were cared for by the extended family. An estimated 100,000 children lived in child-headed households.

“Orphaned children were more likely to be abused; not to be enrolled in school; to suffer discrimination and social stigma; and to be vulnerable to food insecurity, malnutrition, and HIV/AIDS. Extended families and communities often refused to take orphans due to fear that they or their own children might contract HIV. Some children were forced to turn to prostitution for income.

“As of February 2010, more than 800,000 OVCs received comprehensive support and protection under the 2005-10 National Action Plan for OVCs. The goal of the plan is assist approximately one million children and their families throughout the country.” [2g] (p44)
23.28 The UNICEF Annual Report 2010 stated in its executive summary: “Revitalisation of the Basic Education Assistance Module (BEAM) was another key education sector achievement, which assisted 514,000 Orphans and Vulnerable Children (OVC) to access school through fee payments ... the Programme of Support (PoS) continued to support 500,000 OVC with a basic package of multi-sectoral services through 180 partners.” [85g] (p1)

**EDUCATION**

23.29 The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) noted in a briefing about the education system in Zimbabwe, accessed 16 August 2010, that:

“In Zimbabwe there are three types of schools - Primary, Secondary and Tertiary education. Primary school students range in age from 5-12 years old. At the primary level, all students are required to wear school uniforms.

“Secondary school students are from 13 to 18 years old. Most Secondary school pupils wear uniforms but there are private colleges that allow pupils to dress in their formal clothing as they choose. The entry age for tertiary education is 16 years for the youngest but most students enter at the age of 19 and 20 years, just after their secondary school.

“On average, primary schools cost approximately US$5.50 per term, with secondary education in cities/towns costing approximately US$10.70 per term (three months).” [51b]

23.30 The UNICEF report 2011 noted that: “The Education Act, which is supported by statutory instruments and policy circulars, is the main piece of legislation governing education. Section 4 of the Act states; ‘every child in Zimbabwe shall have the right to school education’. The Act provides grounds on which no child can be refused admission or be discriminated against, and primary education is compulsory.” However, while primary education had formerly provided free of charge, the law was amended in 1991 and “… section 6 of the Education Act now states tuition should be provided for ‘the lowest possible fees’. Although the Basic Education Policy states that no school head should refuse admission of pupils even whose school fees was not paid, in reality, education is no longer a right which is accessible to all children.” [85d] (p53)

23.31 The USSD Report 2011 stated that:

“Primary education is not compulsory, free, or universal. According to MIMS 92 and 90 percent of female and male children of primary school age, respectively, attended primary school. In most regions of the country, fewer girls than boys attended secondary school. If a family was unable to pay tuition costs, it was most often female children who left school or never began. Girls were more likely to drop out because they were more readily employable, especially as domestic workers. Due to a lack of central government funding, some schools began to charge levies of up to several hundred dollars for the school year, which prevented many students from attending school. Some families continued to pay school fees and levies with crops and livestock if they did not have adequate hard currency. Despite a directive from the minister of education that no child should be refused education for not paying school fees, there were reports that students with unpaid fees were turned away from schools.” [2g] (p42)
Freedom House noted in Freedom in the World 2011, Zimbabwe, published on 11 August 2011, that: “Academic freedom is limited. All schools are under state control, and education aid has often been based on parents’ political loyalties. Security forces and ZANU-PF thugs harass dissident university students, who have been arrested or expelled for protesting against government policy.” [96f] (p5)

‘Voice of America News’ reported on 1 September 2011 that:

“The Progressive Teachers' Union of Zimbabwe has accused the former ruling ZANU-PF party of hijacking and abusing the history syllabus taught in primary schools. The union says Zimbabwean history is being distorted and some teachers are too frightened to teach material with a slant contrary to the preferred ZANU-PF version.

“Progressive Teachers Union President Takavafira Zhou said district-level officials have summoned history teachers to reorientation meetings and are ordering them to invite liberation war veterans to teach history classes in their schools.

“[Progressive Teachers Union President Takavafira] Zhou told VOA Studio 7 reporter Violet Gonda that what is happening in schools is similar to the instruction once offered in the national youth service Border Gezi training schools, where the curriculum was based on ZANU-PF campaign materials and speeches, and that such pressures are destabilizing the education system.” [83k]

However the same report also noted that:

“Zimbabwe Teachers Association General Secretary Richard Gundane confirmed that what he called history curriculum reform is going on in schools – but he said it is driven by consensus within the government and not the views of one political party.

“He said most of the history books being used in Zimbabwe's schools were written by foreigners, who have not emphasized key aspects of the country's history.” [83k]

See also Freedom of speech and media/Academic freedom and students

The Solidarity Peace Trust report, Walking a thin line, published on 30 June 2009, noted that:

“Zimbabwe has previously been considered as one of the best nations in Africa in providing blanket access to education for children, including in rural areas. This position has been drastically undermined in the last ten years … Apart from the lack of teachers, schools have fallen into dramatic disrepair, and textbooks are now in a ratio of one book to more than 30 pupils. There are entire schools without a stick of chalk, no exercise books to write in, and little in the way of classroom furniture.” [65b] (p32)

A report published by the United Nations Development Programme in October 2010 entitled 2010 Millennium Development Goals: Status Report Zimbabwe, noted that:

"The economic situation for the average Zimbabwean family has worsened during the past decade. This has had a direct negative impact on their ability to send their children to school and pay for school fees and uniforms. In this worsened economy, there is greater pressure on children to contribute to the family economy in order to make ends meet… Zimbabwe has consistently maintained relatively high levels of primary school enrolments. The net enrolment ratio (NER) increased from 81.9% in 1994, peaking at
98.5% in 2002 ... Since 2003, however, there has been a gradual decrease, with the 2009 Multiple Indicator Monitoring Survey (MIMS) recording an NER of 91%. In urban areas the NER is 94% compared to 90% in rural areas. Gender equality at primary school level is good; in fact, 2009 saw a pro-female enrolment rate of 50.5%. Although enrolments have remained high, completion rates deteriorated between 1996 and 2006, falling from 82.6% in 1996 to 68.2% in 2006. In 2009, the dropout rate was around 30% and slightly higher for boys than it was for girls.” [124a] (p10)

23.37 The UNICEF report 2011 noted that:

“Net enrolment ratios (NER) increased from 81.9 per cent in 1994 to a peak of 98.5 per cent in 2002, before experiencing a gradual decline since 2003... It is estimated that about 30 per cent of children are unable to complete primary education and that only about half of those eligible go on to secondary education ... Whilst enrolment in primary schools has remained stable, enrolment in secondary schools is falling, a situation which may be due in part to the rising cost of secondary education ...” [85d] (p58 & 59)

23.38 The UNICEF Annual Report 2010 stated:

“In education, although net attendance rates for primary school have remained high (>90%), the declining grade 7 examination pass rates (39%) demonstrate deterioration in education quality. More than 1 million children and young people of secondary age are out of school, with few educational or employment options. Disparities in education are growing; children from the top wealth quintile are three times more likely to attend secondary school than children from the bottom quintile. Although there is gender parity at primary levels, girls represent only 35% of pupils in upper secondary. Financial barriers are increasingly constraining access for the disadvantaged.” [85g] (p2)

23.39 On the subject of girls within the education system, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), in its report, Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Zimbabwe, dated 23 March 2012, stated that:

“Committee is concerned at the high dropout rate and the low retention and completion rates for girls, especially at the secondary and tertiary levels, due to early marriage, teenage pregnancy, discriminatory traditional and cultural practices and poverty, especially in rural areas. The Committee is further concerned that the traditional views of both students and teachers orient female students into areas of study perceived as appropriate to their social roles and participation in public life. The Committee also expresses its concern at the high number of girls who suffer sexual abuse and harassment in school by both teachers and classmates, as well as the high number of girls who suffer sexual violence while on their way to or from school. The Committee notes that education is key to the advancement of women, and that the low level of education of women and girls remains one of the most serious obstacles to their full enjoyment of their human rights.” [165b] (p8)

23.40 The UNICEF report 2011, which noted that there was “widespread use of corporal punishment” in schools, stated that:

“In 1990, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe described juvenile whipping as 'inherently brutal and cruel' and ruled that it was an inhuman and degrading punishment, which violated the Constitution. However, Constitutional Amendment number 11, adopted the
following year, revised the relevant section of the Constitution to expressly allow moderate corporal punishment for males under the age of eighteen. The United Nations Committee on the Rights of Children has since recommended the Government of Zimbabwe to 'adopt appropriate legislative measures to forbid the use of any form of corporal punishment within the family and in any school'. There are regulations that limit the use of corporal punishment in schools, but the enforcement of these regulations remains inconsistent.” [85d] (p19)

23.41 The UNICEF report 2011 also noted:

“The breakdown of government and non-government schools shows that community, church and private schools play a significant role in the provision of education in Zimbabwe. Of the total number of over 5500 primary schools, 94 per cent are run by nongovernment organisations. At the secondary level a similar trend exists whereby 88 per cent of the 1,644 schools are registered as non-government. These schools function with significant government financial support, including salaries for teachers, and are governed by MoESAC standards and regulations.” [85d] (p58)

23.42 ‘The Guardian’ noted in a report on “satellite” schools on redistributed farmland, published on 24 April 2012, that:

“The education minister, David Coltart, admits that Zimbabwe’s satellite schools – 1,363 facilities out of a total 8,000 primary and secondary schools – are ‘problematic’. But he denies his ministry, which is controlled by the opposition Movement for Democratic Change, is reluctant to support schools on formerly white-owned land.

“Coltart says his ministry lacks money to maintain and improve mainstream schools, let alone ones that have sprung up as a result of land reform. ‘We have done as much as we can in the short term. We have ensured that all children in Zimbabwe have textbooks and teachers. We simply do not have the resources to ensure they have adequate buildings and facilities. That would require the government to cut back on foreign travel and defence spending.’” [34c]

The UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation published a report entitled, Education under attack - Zimbabwe, dated 10 February 2010. The report provides a commentary of events since September 2007 noting intimidation and attacks against teachers and the education system.

Special needs education

23.43 The USSD 2011 report noted that: “Children with disabilities were discriminated against in educational institutions. The unavailability of essential services, including sign language interpreters, Braille materials, and ramps, prevented children with disabilities from attending school. Many schools refused to accept children with certain disabilities.” [2g] (p45)

23.44 Regarding the provision of special needs education, the UNICEF report noted that:

“The Government aims to provide special needs education in order to bridge the gap for learners with special needs. According to 2004 data, there were 14,115 students with intellectual disabilities, 50,000 children with learning disabilities, 1,634 children with hearing impairment, and 2,635 students with blindness or visual impairment attending
school. Zimbabwe is estimated to have 300,000 children of school age with a disability, yet the enrolment figures indicate that a large proportion of children with disabilities do not attend school.

“While it is the policy of the Government to not discriminate against any child regardless of race, religion, gender, creed and disability, in reality, these children face serious access issues related to teachers inability to support their special learning requirements. Due to resource constraints, MoESAC provides limited in-service training and support for teachers in special needs education.” [85d] (p61)

23.45 The United States based organisation ‘Autism Support Network’, undated, website accessed 3 May 2012, noted the contact details for the Zimbabwe Association of Occupational Therapists, which is based in Avondale, Harare. [88a]

HEALTH AND WELFARE

23.46 The UNICEF country website on Zimbabwe undated, accessed 3 May 2012, reported: “The population of Zimbabwe is estimated at 12.2 million (Census 2002) with over 49% of this being children between 0-17 years. The national population growth is estimated at 1.4%.” [85c] The UNICEF report, ‘State of the World’s Children 2012: Children in an Urban World’, published on 13 March 2012, (UNICEF SOWC) noted that in 2010, the under 5 mortality rate was 80 per 1000 live births, and the under 1 mortality rate was 51 per 1000 live births. [85e]

23.47 The UNICEF report 2011 noted that:

“The Government is signatory to a number of international instruments that support delivery of equitable health services [to children and women], including:

- The Millennium Declaration (2000)
- The Abuja Declaration (2000)
- The Ouagadougou Declaration (2008) on Primary Health Care and Health Systems in Africa

“In addition to the National Health Strategy for Zimbabwe (2009-2013), the Government has adopted a wide range of legislation, policies and strategies that promote children and women’s health and welfare including:

- “Public Health Act
- Children’s Act
- Maternity Act
- Comprehensive Multi-year Plans for EPI (2009-2013)
- Health Sector Investment Case (2010-2012)
Further detailed information about children’s healthcare issues, including child mortality, and nutrition, can be found in Chapter 4 of the UNICEF report – link here: http://www.unicef.org/media/files/SitAn_2010-FINAL_FINAL_01-02-2011.pdf

HIV/AIDS

23.48 Avert.com, undated, accessed on 3 May 2012, noted that: “With around half of the people living with HIV in Zimbabwe becoming infected during adolescence or young adulthood, education campaigns have primarily targeted young people. As a result, knowledge about HIV and AIDS is higher than the average for sub-Saharan Africa. A greater understanding and awareness of HIV and AIDS is thought to lead to changes in sexual behaviour, which has been shown to reduce the number of new HIV infections.” [19c]

23.49 The UNICEF Annual Report 2010 observed that: “Although the prevalence of HIV has steadily declined from 25% in 2003 to 14% in 2010, the epidemic continues to have a devastating impact on development. Girls and young women are two-to-three times more likely to contract HIV than boys and young men. Lower educational status is also a risk factor. Zimbabwe has one of the highest rates of orphaning in the world (25% of all children).” [85g] (p2)

23.50 The UNICEF report 2011 noted that:

“HIV is a major determinant of child and maternal health in Zimbabwe, and is most likely one major factor responsible for the rise in both child and maternal mortality since the early 1990s. HIV-related causes contribute indirectly to 26 per cent of maternal deaths and directly to 21 per cent of under 5 mortality… The Prevention of Mother-to-Child Transmission (PMTCT) program began as a three-site pilot in 1999, and was rolled out in 2002, with full integration into antenatal care services. PMTCT services are currently offered in over 1,560 health facilities. Of these, 940 facilities are comprehensive PMTCT sites (that is, they offer both HIV testing and antiretrovirals (ARVs), while the remaining 620 are basic PMTCT sites (that is, they have ARVs but do not do on-site HIV testing.) Two hundred sites offer the more efficacious PMTCT prophylaxis regimen (MER), while the remainder still only give single-dose Nevirapine.

“In 2009, 59 per cent of pregnant women received ARVs to reduce risk of vertical transmission; compared to only 46 per cent of HIV exposed infants who received prophylactic ARVs. Consequently, an estimated 10,000 infected infants (out of an estimated 50,069 HIV exposed births) were expected in 2009. In addition, only 54 per cent of HIV exposed infants seen in the programme received cotrimoxazole, a simple antibiotic that can save HIV positive children's lives.” [85d] (p35-36)

See also Medical issues, HIV/AIDS

DOCUMENTATION
23.51 The UNICEF State of the World’s Children Report 2012 noted that 38% of children under five in Zimbabwe in 2010 had had their birth registered. [85e]

Please see Forged and fraudulently obtained documents for more information about various official documents and forged and fraudulently obtained documents.

24. TRAFFICKING

24.01 The US State Department’s Trafficking in Persons Report 2011, (USSD TIP Report 2011) dated 27 June 2011, covering events of 2010, placed Zimbabwe in tier 3. The US State Department defined tier 3 as: “Countries whose governments do not fully comply with the minimum standards and are not making significant efforts to do so.” This is the second year that Zimbabwe has been categorised as Tier 3. [2c] (Tier placement)

24.02 The USSD TIP Report 2011 noted that:

“Zimbabwe is a source, transit, and destination country for men, women, and children subjected to forced labor and sex trafficking. Women and girls from Zimbabwean towns bordering South Africa and Zambia are subjected to sex trafficking in brothels that cater to long-distance truck drivers. Recent reports indicate that young women from rural areas are recruited into forced prostitution through the guise of beauty pageants held in cities. Some victims of forced prostitution are subsequently transported across the border to South Africa where they suffer continued exploitation. Zimbabwean men, women, and children are subjected to forced labor in agriculture and domestic service in rural areas, as well as domestic servitude and sex trafficking in cities and towns. Children are also utilized in the commission of illegal activities, including gambling and drug smuggling. Although security forces still maintain control of Marange district, sources indicate that forced labor abuses, including Zimbabwean security services forcing young men and boys to mine for diamonds, have ended.” [2c] (Zimbabwe introduction)

24.03 On the subject of protection for victims of trafficking, the report noted:

“The Zimbabwean government provided trafficking victims with some protection and continued to ensure victims’ access to shelter and care services provided by NGOs and international organizations. Although the government sustained its employment of a formal process for referring some types of trafficking victims to international organizations and NGOs for services, it continued to rely on these organizations to identify most trafficking victims. During the reporting period, IOM and local NGO partners identified and assisted at least eight Zimbabwean trafficking victims during the reporting period with safe shelter, psycho-social support, family tracing, and reunification; in contrast to 2009, the Zimbabwean police and Department of Social Services did not refer any victims to these organizations for care in 2010. IOM and NGO partners referred six alleged child trafficking victims to the Department of Social Welfare for care and case evaluation. Government-run shelters are in place to assist vulnerable and orphaned children, including trafficking victims, through their provision of longer-term shelter; it is unknown whether they provided such services to trafficking victims during the year. The Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare operates programs in three districts to provide orphans and vulnerable children with counseling, as well as other
services; it is unknown whether they provided such services to trafficking victims during the year ... With the exception of deportees from South Africa and Botswana, the government’s law enforcement, immigration, and social services authorities did not have formal procedures with which to proactively identify victims of trafficking among vulnerable populations, such as women in prostitution and irregular migrants. The lack of formal identification procedures impaired the government’s ability to ensure that trafficking victims were not inappropriately incarcerated or otherwise penalized for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of being trafficked.” [2c] (Protection)

24.04 Regarding prosecution, the report noted:

“The Government of Zimbabwe did not record or release information on the number of trafficking investigations, prosecutions, or convictions it pursued over the year and the country remained without a comprehensive anti-trafficking law. Zimbabwean law does not prohibit all forms of trafficking in persons, though existing statutes prohibit forced labor and sex trafficking. The Labor Relations Amendment Act prohibits forced labor and prescribes punishments of up to two years’ imprisonment, a fine of between $5 and $400, or both; these penalties are not sufficiently stringent. The Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act also prohibits procuring a person for unlawful sexual conduct, inside or outside of Zimbabwe, prescribing insufficiently stringent penalties of up to two years’ imprisonment, a fine up to $5,000, or both; if the victim is under 16, the sentence is increased to up to 10 years’ imprisonment. The Act also prohibits coercing or inducing another person to engage in unlawful sexual conduct with another person by threat or intimidation, prescribing sufficiently stringent penalties of one to five years’ imprisonment, a fine, or both. Pledging a female for forced marriage or to compensate for the death of a relative or any debt or obligations, is punishable under the Act, prescribing penalties of up to two years’ imprisonment, a fine up to $5,000, or both. None of these penalties are commensurate with penalties prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape. In 2010, the attorney general and the Ministry of Home Affairs finalized draft anti-trafficking legislation and, in September 2010, it was introduced in the Council of Ministers for debate; however, neither the Ministry of Home Affairs or the Council of Ministers have transferred the bill to the Cabinet, which is the first step in introducing it for parliamentary consideration. The Prime Minister’s Office, however, identified the draft anti-trafficking bill as priority legislation and it was included on the 2010-2011 legislative agenda. Despite these legislative plans, high level officials in the Ministry of Justice, including the minister, publicly denied the existence of the trafficking problem in Zimbabwe.” [2c] (Prosecution)

24.05 And with regard to prevention, the USSD TIP Report 2011 noted that:

“The government demonstrated minimal efforts to prevent trafficking. The inter-ministerial task force on trafficking, made up of senior government officials, met at least once during the reporting period, did not execute any anti-trafficking programming, and continued to lack a national plan of action. The government did not conduct any anti-trafficking awareness campaigns during the reporting period; however, NGOs and international organizations developed and aired an anti-trafficking information campaign around the World Cup in South Africa on state-run television and radio. State-run media continued to print and air stories about the dangers of illegal migration, false employment scams, under age and forced marriages, engaging in prostitution, and exploitative labor conditions. Information regarding any potential measures adopted by the government to ensure its nationals deployed to peacekeeping missions did not facilitate or engage in trafficking was unavailable. The government did not make efforts
to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts. Zimbabwe is not a party to the 2000 UN TIP Protocol.” [2c] (Prevention)

See also Children and Women, Prostitution

25. MEDICAL ISSUES

OVERVIEW OF AVAILABILITY OF MEDICAL TREATMENT AND DRUGS

25.01 The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Annual Report (Zimbabwe) 2010, published May 2011, noted that: “People in Zimbabwe have improved access to health care.” The report noted in particular that improved access to health care in Harare’s suburbs was available in 12 polyclinics in the city which covered a catchment population of 1.2 million people.

“The ICRC began downsizing its support to the polyclinics in 2010, with donations covering 75% of the requirements for drugs, compared with nearly 100% in 2009; the remaining 25% was met by the National Pharmaceutical Company of Zimbabwe and UNICEF… In January [2010], the health authorities in two districts in Masvingo and Matabeleland North took over the supply of drugs and medical materials to 6 of the 11 rural health centres and 1 of the 2 referral hospitals supported by the ICRC since 2006. Following a final ICRC donation, they also started supplying the remaining six health facilities by the end of the month.” [125b] (p204)


“The mean travelling distance to the nearest health service centre is 8.7 kilometres. This distance is usually covered on foot or using an ox-drawn cart and disproportionately affects health service access for vulnerable groups such as infants, the elderly and pregnant women. The distance to health services, for example, is a contributing factor to the 39 per cent of pregnant women who do not deliver their child in an institution. The distance also presents a barrier to mothers taking infants to clinics for post-natal care.” [85d] (p100)

25.03 The Civil Society Monitoring Mechanism report, ‘Mid-year Review’, published on 22 November 2011, noted that “In the period under review [up to mid-2011], the Ministry of health in partnership with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) succeeded in controlling the cholera epidemic”. [48e] (p9) However, the same report noted that:

“The health-system infrastructure in Zimbabwe is in a state of severe disrepair as a result of under-funding and a lack of maintenance. Hospital equipment such as laundry machines, kitchen equipment and boilers are also non-functional. Thus most institutions are not able to sterilize theatre and maternity equipment, to cook, or to provide clean linen. The hospitals have not even been able to provide hot water for patients. Water shortages across the country renewed fears of cholera outbreaks as City Councils failed
to supply adequately water to major towns. This negatively impacted households, businesses and health delivery as well.” [48e] (p9-10)

25.04 A report by the ‘Africa Review’, published on 2 March 2012, noted that:

“Zimbabwe will from May [2012] start offering free health care to pregnant women, children and the elderly in what has been described as a giant leap for a country still emerging from a decade long economic recession.

“The European Union (EU) this week donated $5.2 million towards the Health Transition Fund, which is expected to cover for the free treatment.

“A target of [US]$10 million was set to kick start the scheme.

“Health and Child Welfare minister Dr Henry Madzorera said since the formation of a power sharing agreement in 2009 funding for the health sector had been improving with each year.

“But user fees remained beyond the reach of many in a country where about 80 per cent of the population is unemployed.” [156a]

25.05 The UK Border Agency’s Report of the Fact Finding Mission to Zimbabwe: Harare 9-17 August 2010, dated 21 September 2010 (reissued 27 October 2010), (UKBA FFM Report 2010) noted that a representative of the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum stated that:

“There have been major improvements in the health sector. People are getting drugs, many provided by humanitarian organisations. However, the cost of healthcare even in public hospitals puts it beyond the financial reach of many.

“There is some politicisation in healthcare provision. If a patient is a victim of a human rights violation they cannot get treatment without a police report, which the police will often decline to provide, thus effectively barring treatment in public hospitals. In rural areas the senior people in charge of healthcare facilities will usually be controlled by ZANU-PF supporters and there is concern that this may lead to denial of treatment for those who are known to be MDC supporters. However the Forum has received no reports of this happening and it is likely to apply only to those who have a known profile as a political or human rights activists.

“In the major cities, there is no political discrimination in the provision of healthcare and in fact most of the healthcare workers would probably be more inclined to discriminate against ZANU-PF supporters, but it doesn’t happen, possibly because of higher literacy rates and political awareness.

“The Source also explained that ‘high profile’ will mean different things in urban and rural areas. In the latter a Ward Chairperson would be a high profile figure but in the cities such a person would be a nobody.” [121a] (p18)

25.06 An article documenting the personal observations of Dr Kate Adams, a British general practitioner, who visited Zimbabwe in May 2010, published in the British Medical Journal, dated 7 August 2010, noted that since the formation of the Government of National Unity improvements in the economy and assistance from international NGOs had meant that the public “… health system is starting to function again.” Hospitals that
only two years previously had been empty and understaffed are now operating successfully with good levels of staffing, service, and care. More complex testing and treatments, such as dialysis, CD4 counts, and bone marrow biopsies, are also being offered. While there were no significant problems obtaining Anti Retrovirals for the treatment of HIV/AIDS, there continued to be shortages of other essential drugs. The article noted that a significant concern for medical staff was the “fragile” political situation. While “… healthcare professionals are beginning to return …”, they remain “… anxious about the country’s stability and their own prospects, given the ongoing political situation and human rights abuses.” [116a] (p302)

25.07 The Voice of America reported on 13 September 2010 that intensive care wards were re-opened at Harare’s Central Hospital after having been closed for eight years. A new renal centre was also reported to have opened at the hospital. [83f]

25.08 The UNICEF Annual Report 2010, released in September 2011, stated that:

“The UNICEF essential medicines programme provided 90% of the national requirement of all essential medicines and also responded to the measles outbreak in which 5 million children were vaccinated … The Inclusive Government, supported by UNICEF and development partners, has made major efforts to rebuild the social sectors, including the initiation of a national health worker retention scheme, a national essential drugs programme, a water and sanitation urban rehabilitation and risk-reduction programme, a national campaign against measles … However, major challenges remain.” [85g] (p1-2)

PRIVATE HEALTH CARE FACILITIES

25.09 IRIN reported on 5 August 2009 that: “Private hospitals in Zimbabwe still maintain high standards, but at a premium …” [10a] A report by Hospital Management, dated 22 December 2009, noted that: “… most of the private [healthcare] institutions are operating on a US dollar system charging fees out-of-reach for the majority of the country’s 13 million people.” [102a]

25.10 Zimbabwe has a number of private hospitals, the two main hospitals in Harare are the Avenues Clinic and St Anne’s Hospital (US State Department, accessed 3 May 2012) [2f] (St Anne’s Hospital, accessed 3 May 2012) [64a]. The Australian Department of Immigration and Citizenship website, accessed 3 May 2012, noted that the Baines Imaging Group had radiology clinics in Bulawayo and Harare. The Diagnostic Imaging Clinic, based in Harare also has a radiology clinic in the city. [68a] St Anne’s Hospital provided the following treatments:

- Oncology (cancer diagnosis/treatment),
- General surgery,
- Urology (Urinary tract, including kidneys),
- Orthopaedic surgery,
- Paediatrics medicine/surgery,
- Neurology and Neurosurgery,
- Radiology,
- Gynaecology,
- Cardio-thoracic surgery (heart and lungs),
- Ear, nose and throat surgery,
- Pharmacy. (St Anne's Hospital, undated, accessed 3 May 2012) [64a] [64b]

25.11 The Commercial and Industrial Medical Aid Society (CIMAS) website (last modified on 24 May 2010) noted that its medical partners are able to offer chemotherapy through the St Clements Centre in Harare. [54a]

See Economy for information about average income and Health care professionals below.

**HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS**

25.12 ZimOnline reported on 10 February 2010 that: “Nurses and doctors earn below [US]$200 a month and use mostly sub-standard equipment, while public hospitals do not have adequate stocks of medicines. These conditions have shattered the health personnel’s morale and the government has said it does not have money to raise civil service salaries by a substantial amount.” [49e] The Herald reported on 6 April 2011 that public service salaries were increased in April, but while union demands of a minimum of US$502 were declined, the government had agreed to raise salaries to around US$250 per month. [23b]

25.13 A report by Dr Kate Adams on a private visit to Zimbabwe published by the British Medical Journal, dated 7 August 2010, noted that in spite of a fragile political system people were more optimistic about the future: “Some healthcare professionals are beginning to return, though people remain anxious about the country’s stability and their own prospects, given the ongoing political situation and human rights abuses.” The article noted that in one public hospital in Bulawayo, medical staff salaries were being topped up by the Global Fund to Fights AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. The topping up of salaries ensures that staff earn a living income. [116a] (p302)

25.14 The ‘British Medical Journal’ article also observed that: “Zimbabwe has just 900 working doctors, including only 19 paediatricians, for a population of about 10 million …” [116a] (p302) The Institute for the Democratic Alternative for South Africa, noted in its States in Transition Observatory (SITO report) - Zimbabwe Government of National Unity Watch, April 2010, dated 14 May 2010, that “The Surgical Society of Zimbabwe … revealed that there are only 47 surgeons left in the country.” [9g]

25.15 A response to Dr Kate Adams’s article in the British Medical Journal, dated 11 August 2010, by a consultant physician and Kings College Hospital, London, stated that “… the Department of Medicine in the medical school in Harare … continues to produce 170 medical graduates every year.” [116b]

25.16 The Civil Society Monitoring Mechanism report, ‘Mid-year Review’, published on 22 November 2011, noted that:

“Although Zimbabwe has the capacity to train the majority of its health professionals to the highest level of competency both at graduate and post-graduate levels, currently the health training institutions are not producing sufficient health professionals to fill vacant
posts, while at the same time the quality of training has deteriorated as a result of scarcity of qualified trainers. According to the World Health Organization, in order to achieve its Millennium Development Goals, Zimbabwe needs at least 250 doctors, nurses and midwives per 100,000 population. In the current situation, this equates to more than doubling the present numbers of health staff.” [48e] (p9)

ACCESS TO DRUGS

25.17 The UKBA FFM report 2010 recorded the comments of a representative of the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum: “There have been major improvements in the health sector. People are getting drugs, many provided by humanitarian organisations.” [121a] (p18) A report by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Zimbabwe: addressing the essential needs of prisoners, dated 28 October 2010, noted that: “… 92 per cent of the rural clinics and 87 per cent of the urban ones are no longer experiencing shortages of essential drugs.” [125a]

25.18 The UKBA FFM report 2010 noted the comments of an organisation that asked to remain anonymous: “… aid is increasingly delivered not to individuals, but to organisation[s] such as hospitals … making discrimination against individuals more difficult.” [121a] (p15)

25.19 With regard to drugs for HIV/AIDS, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office produced a report entitled Availability of Treatment for HIV/AIDS in Zimbabwe (FCO HIV/AIDS report), published 11 February 2010, which noted that there was no evidence of political manipulation in the distribution of Anti Retrovirals (ARVs). The report noted:

“Most respondents stated that they had seen no evidence of the availability or otherwise of Antiretroviral Treatment being dependant on political affiliation. All of those interviewed stated that they were not aware of any issues around the withholding of drugs by the Government in MDC areas. Some of those interviewed said that it was difficult to see how ZANU (PF) would be able to orchestrate the withholding of drugs to particular areas as they would not have the access to the relevant mechanisms, for example, they have 'no control over procurement, which is handled by NGO’s and International Organisations etc'.” [13f] (p19)

25.20 Local NGO, HIV/AIDS Zimbabwe, noted on 12 May 2011 that the National Aids Council (NAC) announced that it would be introducing an anti retroviral card system to monitor distribution and access to ARVs and to curb “double dipping” abuse to increase overall access to the drugs. [141a]

25.21 Business Monitor International, Zimbabwe Pharmaceuticals and Healthcare Report Q3 2010, noted that counterfeit drugs had become a problem in Zimbabwe. The report stated that:

“… counterfeiting has grown. While a laudable effort to seize substandard medicines has been run by the authorities, the weak legal framework prolongs the time taken to grant permission to destroy consignments and prosecute offenders. With no real deterrent in place, and an increasing demand for medicine from the population, addressing counterfeit drugs in Zimbabwe will be difficult, despite international

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from Zimbabwe’s public health system, leaving a treatment gap of about 340,000 …” [10d]

25.26 The Southern Africa HIV and AIDS Information Dissemination Service (SAfAIDS) noted in a guide published in December 2009, entitled An HIV Treatment Roadmap for Zimbabwe, that treatment for HIV/AIDS was available across Zimbabwe with dozens of hospitals and clinics offering treatment in each of the country’s provinces. The guide provided detailed information regarding accessing of treatment, costs for testing and drugs, and the location of public and mission hospitals, clinics, and counselling centres. Unless subsidised by a charity or mission hospital, all tests and HIV medication (ARVs – AntiRetroVirals) will need to be paid for at the point of delivery. [52a]

25.27 IRIN News reported on 12 April 2011 that:

“Zimbabwe’s government adopted new guidelines set by the World Health Organisation (WHO) for treating people living with HIV almost a year ago, but funding constraints have made it difficult to implement then – until now.

“On 1 April 2011, Zimbabwe started phasing out the combination antiretroviral treatment (ARV) Stavudine, Lamivudine and Nevirapine as its first-line option for the national programme, replacing it with the less toxic Tenofovir-based regimens for adults and Zidovudine-based regimens for children, as recommended by the 2010 WHO guidelines. Stavudine is widely used in developing countries because of its lower cost, but produces more serious side effects.” [10d]

25.28 The same report noted that:

“Following the new WHO guidelines, the National Drug and Therapeutics Policy Advisory Committee and the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare’s AIDS and Tuberculosis (TB) Unit revised and produced the National Guidelines for ART Therapy in Zimbabwe in May 2010.

“These suggest starting ARV therapy at a CD4 cell count of 350 for adults, while pregnant women and infants living with the virus should begin treatment regardless of their CD4 count and clinical stage.

“In a circular to implementing partners, Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare, Gerald Gwinji, said due to resource constraints the implementation of the new guidelines would be phased in over three years from April [2011].

“Gwinji said because the country still had a lot of Stavudine stock, all new patients would continue to be initiated on the drug while those already experiencing side-effects would be moved to the new drug regimen until stocks were finished.

“However, Gwinji said all HIV-positive pregnant women eligible for ART would be immediately placed on the new ARV regimens. Children eligible for treatment would be given paediatric Stavudine until stocks at national and facility levels are finished because of the high stock levels … the new guidelines mean that at least half a million people will now qualify for treatment, at a cost of US$7 per person per month.” [10d]

The 2010 revision of the World Health Organisation document ‘Antiretroviral therapy for HIV infection in adults and adolescents: recommendations for a public health approach’ is available here.
The ‘Zimbabwe Standard’ reported on 10 March 2012 about access to anti-retrovirals (ARVs) treatment for women in rural areas:

“Shamiso Mavheneke (34) of Tamandai village in Chipinge district of Manicaland Province was diagnosed HIV-positive immediately after the death of her husband from an Aids-related illness three years ago.

“She was placed on anti-retroviral drugs (ARVs) treatment but she is failing to access the drugs because the nearest health centre is several kilometres away … She is one of the several thousands of HIV-infected women living in rural areas that are finding it increasingly difficult to access ARVs.

“Anna Nyakurimwa, another HIV-positive villager from Tamandayi, said high transport costs to travel to referral hospitals to collect the drugs were forcing patients to default from their treatment plan.

“Most of them end up dying of treatable infectious diseases …Zimbabwe Aids Network senior official, Tariro Kutadza, confirmed that most women in the country’s rural areas were finding it difficult to access ARVs.

“‘Rural women who need ARVs find themselves in a quandary because levels of income for a rural household tend to be low,’ said Kutadza …A recent research conducted by the Zimbabwe Women’s Resource Centre Network says three-quarters of women on ARV treatment are from urban areas although the majority of women who need the drugs live in rural areas.

“As a result, the majority of them have resorted to using herbal remedies …A Chipinge medical doctor, Moses Dambakurimwa, confirmed the increase in the number of people living in rural areas, especially women, failing to access ARV drugs.

“‘This is linked to the current collapse of the health delivery system and broader issues of governance,’ said Dambakurimwa, who added that political instability in rural areas had worsened the plight of HIV-positive rural women.” [20a]

IRIN PlusNews recorded 19 HIV organisations in Zimbabwe providing assistance to people with HIV/AIDS. (IRIN PlusNews – Country Profile: Zimbabwe, 2009) [10bm] The following link provides details of the different WHO Clinic Staging System:
http://www.avert.org/stages-hiv-aids.htm

Avert also provides a useful overview of HIV/AIDS in Zimbabwe:
http://www.avert.org/aids-zimbabwe.htm

The Zimbabwe government’s, Global AIDS Response Progress Report 2012, undated, provides further background on prevalence and treatment / care:

Waiting time for treatment

The FCO HIV/AIDS report (published 11 February 2010) noted that the waiting time for access to public treatment for those not deemed to be priority cases was reported to be typically around 6 months. [13f] (p14) However, those returning to Zimbabwe, who were already receiving treatment, would be prioritised and should be able to access treatment
in about two to four weeks at a government hospital, and only a few days at a private clinic. [13f] (p11&12) IRIN News reported on 12 April 2011 that adults with a CD4 cell count of 350 or below, or pregnant women and infants would begin treatment immediately and with less toxic ARV regimens. [10d]

**Funding for and shortage of ARVs**

25.32 The FCO HIV/AIDS report (published 11 February 2010) noted that the majority of ARVs (around 90%) are supplied by NGOs and International Organisations. A number of NGOs and International Organisations provide their own transport to ensure drugs reach regional clinics and treatment centres. [13f] (p20)

25.33 NewsDay reported on 28 March 2012 that the Global Fund (GF) will not be able to supply money for future rounds of funding ARV treatment:

“… 238 500 patients … will be affected by the withdrawal of GF funding to the country in 2015 if the country fails to secure money from an alternative source.

“The Zimbabwe National Network for People Living with HIV and Aids chairperson Sebastian Chinhaire said the withdrawal of funds to fight the pandemic will be catastrophic.

“Chinhaire said more than half of patients in the country are taking ARVs made available through donor funding.

“‘The National Aids Council said it will do something about the withdrawal of funds, but this is going to be a disaster. There is need for advocacy from the government and affected people,’ he said … Co-ordinator of the GF in Zimbabwe, Rangarirai Chiteure, however, said the fund had not withdrawn its services yet, but had cancelled proposals for Round 11 for all qualifying countries in 2011 due to lack of money.

“‘There are no immediate implications on the country since Round 11 implementation was targeted to start in the last quarter of 2013 at the earliest.

“‘The impact on programme funding will be felt starting in 2013 since it is the year the Round 11 was envisaged to start flowing,’ Chiteure said.

“He said the overall impact will be felt at the end of phase two in January 2015.” [146c]

25.34 IRIN PlusNews reported on 3 February 2012 on the government’s attempts to raise money for ARVs via an AIDS levy:

“With global funding for HIV/AIDS on the decline, Zimbabwe's innovative AIDS levy - a 3 percent tax on income - has become a promising source of funding for the country, with a dramatic increase in revenue collected in the past two years.

“The levy was introduced in 1999 to compensate for declining donor support, but low salaries and the poor performance of industry meant not enough money had been collected - until recently. In its 2010 report on Zimbabwe's progress in implementing the Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS, adopted by the General Assembly in 2001,
the government admitted the levy was ‘essentially non-existent in 2007-2008 due to economic challenges the country was facing’.

“According to the organization’s recently published audited financial statements for the year ending 31 December 2010, a total of US$20.5 million was collected in 2010 against $5.7 million the previous year.” [10g]

**Political influence in the availability of ARVs**

25.35 The FCO HIV/AIDS report noted that its contacts had not reported any evidence of political manipulation in the distribution of ARVs, even in MDC areas. [13f] (p19) A report published by the Civil Society Monitoring Mechanism, covering events during January and February 2010, that noted that the “Distribution of ARVs continues without discrimination.” [48a] (p4)

25.36 The Zimbabwe Standard in an article dated 10 March 2012 that:

“A Chipinge medical doctor, Moses Dambakurimwa, confirmed the increase in the number of people living in rural areas, especially women, failing to access ARV drugs.

“This is linked to the current collapse of the health delivery system and broader issues of governance,’ said Dambakurimwa, who added that political instability in rural areas had worsened the plight of HIV-positive rural women.

“He said although some international donors were still supplying Zimbabwe with ARVs it was unfortunate that most of the drugs and other forms of financial support do not reach the intended beneficiaries.

“Much of the aid is hijacked by councillors and chiefs who then divert the drugs to their relatives and friends who are not open about their status,’ said Dambakurimwa, who is regularly hired to assist in government hospitals.” [20a]

**Cost and availability of ARVs**

25.37 Sokwanele reported on the 11 July 2011 that while ARV’s are “free”, people in rural areas were often at a disadvantage because clinics were often some distance from their homes, the resultant transportation costs making it difficult for the rural poor to attend clinics. [37h] IRIN, dated 12 April 2011, noted that newly adopted treatment “… guidelines mean that at least half a million people will now qualify for treatment, at a cost of US$7 per person per month.” [10d]

25.38 A guide produced by the National Drug and Therapeutics Policy Advisory Committee and the Zimbabwe Ministry of Health and Child Welfare, dated July 2007, noted that the following ARVs were available in Zimbabwe:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NRTIs</th>
<th>NNRTIs</th>
<th>PIs</th>
<th>NNRTIs</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zidovudine</td>
<td>Nevarapine</td>
<td>Saquinavir (SQV)</td>
<td>Tenofovir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ZDV, AZT)</td>
<td>(NVP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Didanosine</td>
<td>Efavirenz</td>
<td>Ritonavir (RTV)</td>
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<tr>
<td>(ddi)</td>
<td>(EFV)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
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In addition, the FCO reported that the following ARVs were available privately:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NRTI's</th>
<th>NNRTI's</th>
<th>PI's</th>
<th>NtRTI's</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zidovudine</td>
<td>Nevarapine</td>
<td>Saquinavir</td>
<td>Tenofovir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ZDV, AZT)</td>
<td>(NVP)</td>
<td>(SQV)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Didanosine</td>
<td>Efavirenz</td>
<td>Ritonavir</td>
<td>Truvada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(ddl)</td>
<td>(EFV)</td>
<td>(RTV)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emtricitabine</td>
<td>Inidavir</td>
<td>Inidavir</td>
<td>Truvada/Nevarapine</td>
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<td>Stavudine</td>
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<td>Lamivudine</td>
<td>Lopinavir/ritonavir</td>
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<td>(3TC)</td>
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<td>Abacavir</td>
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<td>(ABC)</td>
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Combination ARVs

- Triomune (Lamivudine + Stavudine + Nevarapine)
- Duovir (Lamivudine + Zidovudine + Nevarapine)
- Didanosine + Ritonavir
- Lamivudine + Stavudine
- Combivir (Lamivudine + zidovudine)

[113a] (p9)

[13f] (p15-17)
25.40 The Medical Advisor’s Office (BMA) of the Netherlands Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, Immigration & Naturalisation Service stated in a response provided through the MedCOI service (European Commission funded project to share medical information in countries of origin) on 24 January 2012 that the following anti retrovirals were available at that time:

- Ritonavir + Lopivir
- Zidovudin
- Emtricitabine + tenofovir
- Emtricitabine. [157a]

25.41 The same response noted that Ritonavir, Fosamprenavir and Tenofovir were not available as individual medications. [157a] A further response issued through MedCOI on 2 May 2012 noted that Darunavir was not available at that time in Zimbabwe. [157b]

Women and children

25.42 Avert noted on their country page for Zimbabwe, undated, accessed on 4 May 2012, that:

“There are large social and economic gaps between women and men in Zimbabwe, and these inequalities have played a central role in the spread of HIV. Constrictive attitudes towards female sexuality contrast with lenient ones towards the sexual activity of men, resulting in a situation where men often have multiple sexual partners and women have little authority to instigate condom use. Sexual abuse, rape and coerced sex are all common, and as the economy deteriorates more women are turning to sex work as a means of survival.

“Prevention campaigns that emphasise safe sex and abstinence often fail to take into account these realities, and are more applicable to the lives of men than those of women. Women are likely to be poorer and less educated than men, predisposing them to HIV infection and making it harder for them to access treatment, care and information.

“According to Zimbabwe’s National AIDS Council, an estimated 60% of Zimbabwean adults living with HIV at the end of 2009 were female. This gender gap is even wider amongst young people – women make up around 77% of people between the ages of 15 and 24 living with HIV.” [19c]

25.43 IRIN News reported on 12 April 2011 that the Zimbabwe’s government had adopted new guidelines set by the World Health Organisation (WHO) which means that “… pregnant women and infants living with the virus should begin treatment regardless of their CD4 count and clinical stage.” [10d]

25.44 The Inter Press Service (IPS) reported on 26 July 2010 that:

“Under government policy, care for pregnant women, new mothers and infants receive free care. But the country’s rapid economic decline in the past decade has compelled health institutions to raise their own revenue to meet costs … Expecting mothers are required to pay a 50 U.S. dollar booking fee at clinics and government hospitals, but this is equivalent to about a third of a low-ranking civil servant’s monthly salary, an amount many here cannot afford.” [15b]
25.45 The IPS article noted that the high costs at public hospitals had driven many mothers to seek health care assistance from traditional healers, potentially exposing mother and child to “… unnecessary life threatening conditions.” [15b] The Voice of America, dated 29 July 2010, noted that fees at public hospitals were preventing women from accessing professional maternity services and that this had caused “… maternal deaths, particularly in rural communities …” [83e]

25.46 The IPS article noted that many mothers “disappear” to avoid paying all or some of the fees, however, “… mothers who fail to pay their fees are denied the necessary documents needed to get birth certificates for their newborns.” [83e]

25.47 Avert.com updated 23 August 2010 noted that:

“In Zimbabwe, more than 17,000 children are infected with HIV every year, the majority through mother to child transmission. As with VCT [Voluntary Counselling and Testing], the provision of services to prevent the transmission of HIV between mothers and their children during pregnancy is gradually being scaled up. The prevention of mother-to-child transmission (PMTCT) pilot programme was launched at four sites in 1999 and today the programme is nationwide. It aims to provide pregnant women with free VCT and give them access to nevirapine, a drug that significantly reduces the chances of transmission occurring.

“The provision of drugs to prevent MTCT rose from 4% in 2006 to 29% in 2007. Although this is an encouraging scale-up, the provision of PMTCT services remains severely limited by a lack of funding, and access to nevirapine remains low. Around 120,000 children are living with HIV in Zimbabwe, most of whom became infected through mother-to-child transmission. AVERT is calling for rapid improvements in PMTCT in our Stop AIDS in Children campaign.” [19c] (p5)

25.48 A study carried out by Rashida Ferrand et al. in 2009 and published in the Bulletin of the World Health Organisation, volume 88, in June 2010, found that:

“Nationally, 115 (88%) facilities responded. In 98 (75%) that provided complete data, 196 032 patients were registered and 24 958 (13%) of them were children. Of children under HIV care, 33% were aged 0–4 years; 25%, 5–9 years; 25%, 10–14 years; and 17%, 15–19 years. Staff highlighted differences in the problems most commonly faced by younger children and adolescents. For younger children, such problems were malnutrition and lack of appropriate drugs (cited by 46% and 40% of clinics, respectively); for adolescents they concerned psychosocial issues and poor drug adherence (cited by 56% and 36%, respectively).” [158a]

25.49 Zimbabwe News Online, dated 1 April 2011, noted that: “The National Aids Council recently revealed that children as young as 12 years of age in Matabeleland North are resorting to commercial sex in both Victoria Falls and the nearby mining town of Hwange. These may include women, young girls, men and transgender people …” The report went on to note that because the men who use the prostitutes often refuse to use condoms, the risks of contacting HIV were increased and that “… trying to fight the spread of HIV had become like chasing the wind.” [98a]

See also sections on Women, Health and welfare, and Children, Health and Welfare.

**KIDNEY DIALYSIS**

The main text of this COI Report contains the most up to date publicly available information as at 6 June 2012. Further brief information on recent events and reports has been provided in the Latest News section to13 July 2012.
25.50 Voice of America News reported on 28 March 2011 that:

“Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe has promised to change health policies so that renal or kidney failure is approached like other chronic ailments including HIV/AIDS with treatment offered free to those suffering from such diseases.

“The president made his comments while opening the Sally Mugabe Renal Training Institute at Chitungwiza Hospital on the weekend.

“Mr. Mugabe said many renal patients are dying because they can't afford the high cost of kidney dialysis in a government hospital of some [US]$1,200 a month.

“The president, whose first wife Sally died of kidney failure in 1992, said the Finance Ministry is working on a scheme whereby kidney patients will pay only administrative fees while the government will reimburse hospitals for other costs.” [83i]

25.51 However, the state-owned Herald newspaper reported on 28 September 2011 that:

“Major public hospitals are facing an acute shortage of dialysis machines with major referral centres excluding renal patients living with HIV and Aids from treatment.

“Also excluded are those suffering from Hepatitis B.

“Harare Central and Parirenyatwa hospitals have 20 machines and the measure was effected to avoid cross-contamination by HIV and Hepatitis B.

“Every four to five hour dialysis session costs at least US$200.” [23e]

Mental Health

25.52 The US State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2011 (USSD 2011), published on 24 May 2012, noted that:

“Persons with mental disabilities also suffered from inadequate medical care and general provision of health services. There were eight centralized mental health institutions in the country with a capacity of more than 1,300 patients, in addition to the three special institutions run by the ZPS for long-term patients and those considered to be dangerous to society. Inpatients in the eight centralized institutions received cursory screening, and most waited for at least one year for a full medical review. A shortage of drugs and adequately trained mental health professionals resulted in patients not being properly diagnosed and not receiving adequate therapy. There were fewer than 10 certified psychiatrists working in public and private clinics and teaching in the country. There was a 50 percent vacancy rate for psychiatric-trained nurses. More than 90 percent of the available psychiatric services were provided at the mental institution in Bulawayo. NGOs reported patients subjected to deplorable living conditions due in part to shortages of food, water, clothing, and sanitation. Budgetary constraints and limited capacity at these institutions resulted in persons with mental disabilities being kept at home and cared for by family, normally in chains and without treatment.” [2g] (p45-46)

25.53 ‘The Standard’ (Zimbabwe), dated 12 June 2011, noted that:

“Government only provided US$6,000 to the mental health sector last year, signalling a lack of will to help people suffering from mental illnesses, experts have said.
Contributing to [a] debate on mental health facilitated by the Humanitarian Information Facility Centre in Harare last week, the stakeholders said the lack of commitment had also hampered the country’s capacity to deal with mental health issues … ‘Lack of funds is negatively affecting procurement of medication and admissions for psycho-social services,’ said Mercy Kamuzunguze of Healthwatch Welfare Organisation Trust. ‘Sometimes patients run out of medication and that negatively affects the progress made in rehabilitating them.’ … Lovemore Pasina of Tariro Halway Homes … said Zimbabwe only had 10 psychiatrists, which made it difficult to properly care for patients.” [20e]

25.54 Kubatana, last updated 25 July 2009, noted that national NGO Zimbabwe National Associations for Mental Health (ZIMNAMH), campaigns for assistance for people with mental health problems. The organisation is based in Harare. [55b]

25.55 The Zimbabwean reported in the article ‘Mental health incidents on the rise’, published on 21 September 2011 that:

“Dr Henry Madzorera, Minister of Health and Child Welfare, said public and private hospitals across the region had recorded an increase in mental health incidents.

“Gordon Chavunduka, president of the Zimbabwe National Traditional Healers Association, told The Zimbabwean there were more and more people consulting traditional doctors about mental health disorders. He attributed it to economic pressures, mainly the scarcity of forex and rising joblessness … The rise comes at a time public mental hospitals lack the facilities to handle the caseload. At Ingutsheni Central Hospital, Zimbabwe’s national referral centre for psychiatric patients, the lack of food, clothes and supplies remains a problem. Mental hospitals also receive limited support from donors, Madzorera said.

“… Elizabeth Matare, director of the Zimbabwe National Association for Mental Health, said Zimbabwe had a mental health policy adopted in 2004 which prescribes increased budgetary allocations for the sector. She lamented the fact that the policy was gathering dust somewhere, largely unimplemented.

“‘The policy has largely remained a statement of intention on the part of the ministry of health. We would like to see the policy put into action - Zimbabwe has a long history of coming up with acts and working documents that are never implemented,’ she said.” [99t]
water shortages across the country put the population at risk in a number of ways." [48e] (p3)

26.02 CSIOMM Periodic Report January to March 2012, released on 9 May 2012, observed that:

“The humanitarian situation in Zimbabwe has stabilized but retains key vulnerabilities that need to be addressed. The main humanitarian needs in Zimbabwe relate to food security, the continued threat of disease outbreaks, and requirements relating to specific needs of a wide range of highly vulnerable groups, such as child- or female-headed households, the chronically ill, internally displaced people (IDPs), returned migrants, and refugees and asylum-seekers. The food security situation improved slightly in 2011 thanks to joint and concerted efforts by the Government and the humanitarian community in timely provision of agricultural inputs and increased acreage planted, plus extension support. However, food and others forms of aid-related violations were reported throughout the country, with citizens being denied access to the resources on political grounds.

“It is projected that 1.026 million people (12% of the population) will still require food assistance at the peak of the 2012 lean season. Rates for chronic and acute child malnutrition still stand at 34% and 2.4% respectively. A third of rural Zimbabweans still drink from unprotected water sources and are thus exposed to water-borne diseases. Although cholera incidence is significantly decreased compared to past years localized outbreaks continued in 2011, due to poor infrastructure for water, sanitation, hygiene and health. The low coverage of basic health care has led to rising maternal and child mortality and overall excess morbidity and mortality. The HIV/AIDS prevalence stands at 13.7% and substantially increases vulnerabilities.” [48b] (p18)

See also Economy

LAND REFORM

26.03 A report published by the United States Congressional Research Service entitled Zimbabwe: The Power Sharing Agreement and Implications for U.S. Policy, dated 27 October 2009, noted that:

“At the time of Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980, the country’s white minority, which composed less than 5% of the population, owned the vast majority of arable land. Many observers considered the country’s commercial farms crucial to the country’s economy, although there was a general recognition that reforms were necessary to provide greater equity in land distribution. Britain initially funded a ‘willing buyer, willing seller’ program to redistribute commercial farmland, offering compensation to white farmers amenable to leaving their lands. Dissatisfaction with the pace of land reform grew and led in the 1990s to spontaneous and often violent farm invasions. Facing rising political and economic challenges, the Government of Zimbabwe began to implement aggressive land expropriation policies, leading Britain and other donors to begin withdrawing financial support for resettlement. In 2000, the government held a referendum to approve changes to the constitution that would allow land seizures without compensation. The referendum was rejected by 55% of voters. Within days of
the vote, however, so-called veterans of the independence struggle and ruling party supporters moved onto an estimated 1,000 white owned farms, and, months later, the President invoked emergency powers to expropriate land without compensation. There were numerous attacks against white farmers and their employees.” [6a] (p15)


“Land seizures remained a serious problem. A 2005 constitutional amendment transferred title of all land previously acquired for resettlement purposes to the government, prohibited court challenges to the acquisitions, and allowed the government to acquire any agricultural land for any purpose simply by publishing a notice of acquisition. A 2006 law requires all farmers whose land was forcibly seized by the government and who were not in possession of an official offer letter, permit, or lease to cease to occupy, hold, or use that land within 45 days and to vacate their homes within 90 days. Only a small number of farmers received an offer letter or lease. Failure to comply is a criminal offense punishable by a fine and a maximum prison sentence of up to two years. The act was primarily used to target the approximately 4,500 large-scale and primarily white-owned farms in the country for seizure and redistribution to black Zimbabweans, particularly ZANU-PF supporters.” [2g] (p19-20)

26.05 The USSD 2011 noted that:

“Some of the approximately 400 remaining white commercial farmers continued to be targeted, harassed, and threatened with eviction by farm beneficiaries, unemployed youth, and individuals hired by those who stood to benefit. Invasions also took place on privately owned wildlife conservancies in Masvingo Province, reportedly with the collusion of Titus Maluleke, the provincial governor. There were reports of farmers forced off their farms at gunpoint, despite being in possession of a court order allowing them to remain on the property, and denied the opportunity to collect their personal belongings. Black farm workers on white-owned farms were beaten, intimidated, or displaced. Police, in most cases, did not intervene while invaders and looters carried on their activities.” [2g] (p20)

26.06 The USSD 2011 noted that “Farmer unions and NGOs believed that invasions intensified after the SADC’s May decision to suspend its tribunal until May 2012.” [2g] (p20)

26.07 A report by the Crisis Coalition of Zimbabwe, entitled The Military Factor in Zimbabwe's Political and Electoral Affairs, dated 3 June 2011, noted that:

“President Mugabe has gone to great lengths to ensure the military’s continued loyalty, including distribution of land… Senior military officials rank among the top beneficiaries to the violent and chaotic commercial farm invasions that began at the instigation of ZANU-PF in February 2000. An investigation by a Zimbabwean online publication revealed that of the 200 army officers from the rank of Major to Lieutenant General of the Zimbabwe National Army, at least 90% benefited from farm invasions and have farms in most fertile parts of the country.” [43a] (p20)

For more detailed information regarding land and politics see the Institute for the Democratic Alternative for South Africa, States in Transition Observatory, report, The
Politics of Land in Zimbabwe, dated 30 May 2011 [9h]:

Also see Ethnic Minorities: Whites


“President Mugabe’s violent land reform programme continued to cause suffering to many of the remaining white commercial farmers as well as a smaller number of black commercial farmers who are not aligned to ZANU-PF, and their families. Many such farmers faced sustained intimidation and harassment by those who claimed to have been allocated their land. Farm invasions are illegal under Zimbabwean law and contravene the terms of the GPA, as well as the SADC Tribunal ruling of 2008.” [13j] (p387)

26.09 SW Radio Africa reported on 29 November 2010 that Zimbabwe’s “... Supreme Court has effectively given the all clear for unlawful land invasions to continue across the country, after dismissing an urgent application for a moratorium on farm seizures to be put in place.” The article continued:

“The application was filed by the Commercial Farmers Union (CFU) in an attempt to halt the land seizures, by asking the Court to stop the ongoing prosecution of white farmers, whose only crime has been to remain on the properties they own. The CFU’s President Deon Theron explained to SW Radio Africa on Monday that there are only a handful of white farmers left in Zimbabwe, and the moratorium was to give them breathing space until the land issue in the country was sorted out.

“The remaining commercial farmers have been under almost constant siege despite the formation of the unity government, which promised to protect the property rights of all Zimbabweans. Farmers have continued to lose land and have been hauled before the courts time and time again, facing accusations of refusing to leave so called ‘State land’. … The Chief Justice also made it clear that the 2008 regional ruling, declaring the land grab campaign unlawful, held no power in Zimbabwe, saying the Supreme Court’s decision was final and was not bound or influenced by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Tribunal.” [53g]

26.10 The Zimbabwean noted on 2 September 2011 that:

“Prominent Centenary [Mashonaland Central] farmer Colin Zietsman has been murdered in what the Commercial Farmers Union [CFU] described as a ‘callous and savage attack’.

“According to the CFU, Zietsman died instantly while his wife Phillipa is recovering in hospital after being bludgeoned by a blunt object … They were attacked and ruthlessly beaten by two individuals with blunt objects whilst they slept in their upstairs bedroom on their farm at 2 am this morning (Friday [2 September 2011]) … The union said although the homestead was fitted with alarms, these were ‘bypassed’ by the attackers who entered through a window on the second floor… The union urged all farmers and their families to be extremely vigilant at all times, saying this was the second incident of its type using similar tactics that were used on a farm only one farm away last year.
26.11 The Zimbabwe Peace Project noted in its Summary on politically motivated human rights violations and food related violations - May 2011, published 24 June 2011, noted that: “On May 12 [2011], a group of war veterans invaded a farm in Guruve South and ordered the white farm owner to vacate the premises as they were moving to evict all the remaining white commercial farmers. The farm manager of Mwembezi 1 Farm reported the incident to the District Administrator whose interventions have failed to stop the war veterans’ actions.” [122o] (p6)

For recent developments on land reform/evictions see Latest news and the Zimbabwe Peace Project monthly political and human rights reports.

FOOD SHORTAGES


“Agricultural production has suffered as a result of weak support services, lack of credit, acute shortages of essential inputs, and the impact of HIV. These conditions are exacerbated by poor soil fertility and low water availability. Many rural areas have not recovered from the impact of erratic rainfall, as recurrent droughts make it difficult for people to improve their situation. Regular shocks have wiped out savings and productive assets, increased people’s vulnerability and reduced their productivity. Loss of livestock has resulted in loss of draught power and reduced productivity. With increased frequency of dry spells, women and young girls walk long distances to collect water.” [85d] (p99)

26.13 The United Nations World Food Programme noted in its Zimbabwe Country Profile - Overview, accessed 8 May 2012, noted that:

“In Zimbabwe, food production has been devastated by economic and political crises as well as by natural disasters … This situation has necessitated large-scale humanitarian food assistance operations in the country… The 2010 Food and Crop Supply Assessment (CFSAM) report estimated the national cereal deficit and food gap at 428,000 tons against a national requirement of 2.1 million tons. Liberalization of the grain market means that commercial traders have been able to fill some of this gap but a substantial international humanitarian assistance programme has still been necessary and will continue until the harvest.

“The CFSAM estimated that around 1.68 million food-insecure people would continue to need assistance during the 2010/11 consumption year, the time between harvest and the next harvesting season. Under the Seasonal Targeted Assistance (STA)
programme, WFP plans to reach as many as 1.1 million people out of a total of 1.3 million nationwide during the 2010/2011 hunger season (the lean period between October and March just before the harvest). Additionally, WFP will continue with the implementation of its year-round health and nutrition and social safety net programmes, such as support to HIV/AIDS patients and their households, home-based care, as well as assistance to orphans and vulnerable children, and internally displaced people. These programmes target some 400,000 people.” [111a]

26.14 The United States funded Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWSNet), noted in its Zimbabwe Country profile, accessed 8 May 2012, that: “The southern half of the country was most affected by the 2011/12 seasonal drought. The national cereal production estimate for the 2011/2012 season is 1.1 million MT, which is 33 percent less than the 2010/11 season harvest and 15 percent below the 2006-2011 average of 1.3 million MT. The reduced harvest was mainly due to a poor rainfall and fertilizer shortages.” [94a]

More details can be found via the following link to the FEWSNet website: 
http://www.fews.net/Pages/country.aspx?gb=zw&l=en

26.15 An International Displacement Monitoring Centre report, dated 21 May 2010, noted that there were large differences across the country as to how people obtained their food, with many in the most fertile areas of the country relying on their “own production” of food, people in other areas, such as more arid and urban areas, relied upon purchasing food. The report noted that while “Diaspora remittances play[ed] a major role in supporting household food needs …” very poor households, such as “… elderly-headed households, families hosting orphans or with disabled or chronically ill members, those with high levels of dependants, child-headed households and the destitute who lack any resources …“ were unable to “… purchase sufficient food, even at regulated prices …” [104a] (p23-24&28) An earlier report by the Solidarity Peace Trust entitled Gone to Egoli, dated 30 June 2009, found that poorer rural families were less likely to receive remittances than the urban middle classes. [65c] (p7)
appear to be systematic and politicisation is not really a problem at the moment.” [121a] (p17)

26.17 The UKBA FFM report 2010 went on to report that a number of organisations noted that there was some evidence of continued political manipulation of aid. A major NGO who asked to remain anonymous stated that it had witnessed “… some political interference in the distribution of aid, notably in Mashonaland Central and East and Manicaland.” The NGO “… pointed to a pilot initiative in Mashonaland Central which has seen the Government of Zimbabwe seeking to link the provision of food aid and other forms [of] assistance to ‘voluntary’ work in the community. The GoZ has sought to justify this on the grounds that it reduces the risk of culture of dependency developing. However, the Source is greatly concerned that in the hands of government that is inclined to do so, it is potentially a tool of manipulation of aid.” [121a] (p16)

26.18 The UKBA FFM Report 2010 noted the views of the Counselling Services Unit which observed that: “Aid organisations were able to operate much more freely immediately after the formation of the Government of National Unity. But the environment has become more restrictive of late, particularly in the rural areas. Local Chiefs are increasingly regaining control of their areas. Everything has to be done through local ZANU-PF structures who will use lists to manage the distribution of aid.” The Zimbabwe Human Rights Association stated that while “The population is generally able to access aid now. … Food aid is the most politicised aid and it is not only ZANU-PF that is guilty of that.” However, an NGO who asked to remain anonymous stated that aid distributed by NGOs and international organisations stood “… a better chance of getting to the people who need it.” [121a] (p13-14)

26.19 The Daily News reported on 30 June 2011 of ZANU-PF sensitivity regarding the distribution of food aid. The article noted that ZANU-PF Masvingo provincial chairman, Lovemore Matuke, was reported to have threatened unnamed NGOs (believed to include international relief organisations) with expulsion from the province after he accused them of dabbling in politics by using food handouts to support the MDC-T. [132c]

26.20 On 18 January 2012, The Zimbabwean noted that:

“The United Nations has asked the government for permission for a team to monitor food distribution in order to ensure impartiality and allay fears by international donors … Diplomatic sources told The Zimbabwean this week that the World Food Programme had made a formal request for a monitoring team to President Robert Mugabe … A spokesman for the local UN humanitarian office said: ‘This is a matter that is still being discussed and therefore we cannot comment.’

“But the diplomatic sources said the WFP, alarmed by growing donor indifference to appeals for food donations for Zimbabwe, had told Mugabe that only a UN monitoring team would let the international community fears.” [99v]

26.21 Voice of America News reported on 24 April 2012 that:

“Zimbabwe’s cabinet was on Tuesday [24 April 2012] pre-occupied with the unfolding hunger crisis in the country following complaints by Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai’s MDC formation that most needy families were being denied food aid by ZANU-PF activists.
“The MDC says the situation in most rural communities is becoming untenable with allegations that President Robert Mugabe’s ZANU-PF party activists were politicizing food aid ahead of elections that Mr. Mugabe wants this year.

“After intense debate, the cabinet mandated its task force on food security to ensure there is no politicization of food aid on the ground as details emerged the food crisis had also been underestimated.” [831]

26.22 The March 2012 Monthly Monitor published by the Zimbabwe Peace Project (ZPP) on 25 April 2012, noted that:

“Although incidents of the politicization of food aid remain very low, the situation on the ground shows that people’s rights will be violated as they seek food aid as a result of a poor food security situation.

“Politicization of food and other forms of aid continue to be encountered in all the 10 provinces of Zimbabwe. A total of 78 cases related to partisan distribution of food and other forms of aid were recorded in the period under review. There was no significant change in the number of violations compared to the 77 cases witnessed during the month of February.

“Trends and patterns keep pointing to political parties mostly ZANU PF followed by MDC-T, war veterans and traditional leaders persisting in the manipulation of distribution of food and other forms of aid processes, using the commodities as a bait to lure support of their respective groupings ahead of the proposed elections.” [122c] (p3)

26.23 Regarding the distribution of food aid violations, the ZPP monthly reports include data on the number of aid distribution violations reported to them. In April 2012, the ZPP report published the following graph [122v] (p3):

![Provincial Violations - FMR April 2012](image)
For recent developments on food security and food aid see Latest news, see also the section on Political Affiliation.

27. **FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT**

27.01 The US State Department Report on Human Rights Practices 2011 (USSD 2011), published on 24 May 2012, stated that:

“The constitution and law provide for freedom of movement within the country, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation; however, the government restricted these rights in practice. The government generally cooperated with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in providing assistance to refugees, asylum seekers, stateless persons, and other persons of concern, but it interfered with some humanitarian efforts directed at IDPs.” [2g] (p29)

27.02 Freedom House, in Freedom in the World 2011, dated 11 August 2011, noted that: “The state has extensive control over travel and residence. The government has seized the passports of its domestic opponents, and foreign critics are routinely expelled or denied entry. High passport fees inhibit legal travel. At the same time, badly underfunded immigration and border authorities lack the capacity to effectively enforce travel restrictions.” [96f]

**INTERNAL RELOCATION**

27.03 As part of the UK Border Agency’s Fact Finding Mission to Zimbabwe (see Report of the Fact Finding Mission to Zimbabwe: Harare 9-17 August 2010, dated 21 September 2010 (reissued 27 October 2010)) a representative of a major NGO who asked to remain anonymous stated that there were:

“… no express legal restrictions [on internal relocation … [but] the intelligence systems of the main political parties are sophisticated and it would not be possible for those who have come to the adverse attention of a party to avoid that risk by relocating within Zimbabwe.

“This applies equally to rural and urban areas. Thus, once a low level but influential supporter had been singled out for attention in a rural area had been identified as such, it would not be possible for that person to avoid the threat by relocating to an urban area because that knowledge would follow them to the city, even though someone with a similar profile in the city would be unlikely to attract the same level of interest and so would probably not be at risk.” [121a] (p45)

27.04 Also interviewed, the Research and Advocacy Unit (RAU) noted that while internal relocation was possible, there were potential difficulties in registering to vote. The RAU noted that: “It is difficult to change the area a person is registered to and they may therefore have to return to a rural area to vote. The Registrar General’s Department requires a large amount of documentation to alter a person’s voter registration area.” [121a] (p46-47)
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION

27.05 A report published by the Solidarity Peace Trust entitled Gone to Egoli, dated 30 June 2009, noted that:

“The phenomenon of diasporisation … is … a very recent one for Zimbabwe: prior to 2000, there was not much of a Diaspora community. However the implosion of the Zimbabwean state since then, including the shrinking of the GDP by around 50% owing to the collapse of local industry and agriculture, has pushed Zimbabwe from the second biggest economy in SADC to the smallest, behind Swaziland and Lesotho. The economic collapse, combined with the political crisis, has pushed Zimbabweans across the borders and all over the world, looking for a means of survival.” [65c] (p6)

27.06 The UK Border Agency’s Fact Finding Mission to Zimbabwe (see Report of the Fact Finding Mission to Zimbabwe: Harare 9-17 August 2010, dated 21 September 2010 (reissued 27 October 2010)) interviewed a representative of the Counselling Services Unit as part of the mission. On the subject of migration the Counselling Services Unit noted that: “… it was the aim of every family to have one family member in the UK and one in South Africa to send back remittances which have always been an extremely important part of the rural economy.” [121a] (p44)

27.07 The Solidarity Peace Trust report Gone to Egoli, noting that most research into diasporan movements had concentrated on the “…‘urban middle and upper class’ Zimbabwean families … [who] have the capacity and the qualifications that make diasporisation out of Africa possible.” The report noted that it was “… only Zimbabwe’s elite who make it to the UK …” The report noted that the rural poor, “… who make up 70% of Zimbabwe’s population …[lack] the money or connections to organize for family members to fly overseas …” are reported to make up a “… substantial proportion of the southern African diaspora population.” [65c] (p6&12)

Migration to South Africa

27.08 An analysis article in the South African newspaper New Age, written by Jonathan Crush (chair in Global Migration and Development at the Balsillie School of International Affairs and honorary professor at the University of Cape Town), dated 7 May 2012, noted that:

“South Africa is increasingly seen by Zimbabweans as a place to try to build a new life, rather than a place of temporary respite and quick income.

“Migration from Zimbabwe since 1990 has consistently increased over time, and can be broken into three ‘waves’ with distinctive drivers of migration patterns and migrant profiles.

“The first wave occurred in the 1990s, the second from around 2000 to 2005 and the third in the years since.

“The defining characteristic of migration from Zimbabwe in the 1990s was that the vast majority of migrants spent only short periods in South Africa, returning home frequently and showing very little inclination to remain in South Africa for any length of time.
“The change since then has been dramatic. Less than 1% of migrants who have come here in the past five years return once a month and only 9% return once every few months.

“As many as 46% of recent migrants have not been back to Zimbabwe since coming to South Africa. The same proportion say they want to remain in South Africa ‘for a few years’. Another 13% say they wish to remain ‘indefinitely’ and another 8% want to remain ‘permanently’. In other words, two-thirds of the migrants view a long-term stay in South Africa as desirable.

“These findings are based on a late 2010 survey by the Southern African Migration Programme of Zimbabweans in Cape Town and Johannesburg. All the respondents had come to South Africa for the first time in 2005 or more recently.” [159a]

27.09 IRIN News reported on 2 August 2011 that:

“South Africa’s Department of Home Affairs announced yesterday that it had met its 1 August deadline for processing 275,000 applications from undocumented Zimbabweans, but that applicants would have a further one month grace period in which to pick up their permits, only about half of which have so far been issued … Based on estimates by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) that between 1 and 1.5 million Zimbabweans migrants are living in South Africa, the majority were not covered by the ZDP.” [10h]

27.10 IRIN News further reported on 7 October 2011 that:

“After months of rumour and speculation, South Africa’s Department of Home Affairs appears to have quietly lifted a moratorium on deportations of undocumented Zimbabweans who did not apply for legal status through the Zimbabwe Documentation Process (ZDP).

“The move contradicts recent assurances from the director-general of home affairs, Mkuseli Apleni, to parliament that deportations would not resume until the ZDP was completed and Home Affairs Minister Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma had pronounced the end of the special dispensation allowing Zimbabweans to enter and remain in the country without documents … Earlier this week, media outlets in Zimbabwe quoted a senior immigration official based at Beitbridge, Zimbabwe’s border with South Africa, saying that South Africa’s Home Affairs Department had notified them of plans to resume deportations ‘with immediate effect’.” [10i]


Also see sections on Exit and Return and Remittances.

28. INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS (IDPs)

According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center’s 2009 estimate, between 600,000 and one million persons remained displaced within the country as a result of government policies, including state-sponsored election-related violence, land reform, and Operation Murambatsvina (the government’s evictions of citizens from nonfarming areas in 2005). According to a 2010 IDP assessment report, approximately one-third of the IDPs interviewed cited Murambatsvina as the cause of displacement. More recent estimates were unavailable due to the government’s sensitivity on the issue; until 2009 the government denied the existence of any IDPs.

Most recent documented displacements were from disputed farming areas. Since 2010 approximately 2,180 new household displacements were documented. In September 2010 alone, the government evicted approximately 1,750 households from resettled former commercial farm lands. At year’s end another estimated 15,000 households in disputed farming areas were at risk of displacement due to verifiable threats or eviction notices. Most of those displaced had resided on their land for years without formal offer letters or title deeds. Eviction notices were served often in the presence of police or army personnel.

A report, Zimbabwe: Unknown numbers of IDPs still need humanitarian assistance as well as support for long-term durable solutions, by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), dated 20 December 2011, noted that:

“The situation of internally displaced people (IDPs) in Zimbabwe varies widely, depending on the reasons for their displacement and the length of time they have been displaced. Accordingly, their needs range from emergency humanitarian assistance to interventions aimed at securing durable solutions. A significant proportion of IDPs would choose to integrate in the place they were displaced to, but their lack of security of tenure presents a major obstacle to this.

“Since the formation of the Government of National Unity in February 2009, the government’s approach to internal displacement has begun to improve. While previous governments did not acknowledge internal displacement in the country, in August 2009 the government participated in a rapid IDP assessment with the United Nations, and has called for a more comprehensive nationwide survey of IDPs to be conducted. This has not yet taken place and is one cause of the lack of information on the scale of continuing internal displacement. Meanwhile, under the new government, the access of humanitarians to IDPs has improved considerably.

“Displacement occurred as a result of different government policies and actions. The two largest groups of IDPs are farm workers and their families who have been displaced as a result of losing their employment on farms which were seized and reallocated during the fast-track land reform programme, and people displaced as a result of evictions in Zimbabwe’s towns and cities. Others were displaced by government campaigns against informal mine workers, and by politically-motivated violence. Of the last group, most were able to return home after the 2008 elections, while many of the first three groups have been able to find other durable solutions. There has been an increase in 2011 in initiatives by the government and civil society organisations to promote durable solutions, in which IDPs and host communities have actively participated.
“In October 2009, President Mugabe was the second head of state to sign the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of IDPs in Africa (the Kampala Convention).” [104c] (p1)

28.03 The IDMC report further noted that:

“Internal displacement in Zimbabwe is to a large extent an unrecognised phenomenon, but the new government has acknowledged it. It conducted a preliminary IDP assessment, albeit limited in scope, with the United Nations in August 2009 (Government of Zimbabwe and UN, February 2010) … In the absence of a comprehensive survey the only IDP figures are estimates based on past sectoral needs assessments (ZimVAC 2007; OCHA, 10 December 2007, p.36). Estimating the total number of IDPs in Zimbabwe is made more difficult by the fact that a significant number have been displaced more than once, in different waves of displacement (see for example Solidarity Peace Trust, 30 July 2010), and many have settled, either locally, or elsewhere in the country or through return. An estimate for the current total number of IDPs can therefore not simply be obtained by adding up the estimates for the number of people displaced by each of the different causes of displacement. Moreover, up to four million Zimbabweans are estimated to have left the country for political and economic reasons, mostly to neighbouring countries (IOM, 19 January 2011): these refugees and migrants may have been internally displaced in Zimbabwe before they went abroad.” [104c] (p3-4)

28.04 The UK Border Agency’s Report of the Fact Finding Mission to Zimbabwe: Harare 9-17 August 2010, dated 21 September 2010 (reissued 27 October 2010), noted that a major NGO which had asked to remain anonymous, stated that it had experienced some problems with its work with IDPs in some areas of the country. However, they noted that most problems had been overcome through negotiation, but warned that there was potential for problems as elections drew nearer. [121a] (p10)

**OPERATION MURAMBATSVINA**

28.05 On 18 July 2005, the United Nations (UN) published the findings of its fact-finding mission to Zimbabwe which found that Operation Restore Order or Operation Murambatsvina (meaning, “drive out rubbish”) began on 19 May 2005. [25a] (p7) International Crisis Group reported that: “Operation Murambatsvina (Restore Order) cost some 700,000 Zimbabweans their homes or livelihoods or both and otherwise affected nearly a fifth of the troubled country’s population.” (Zimbabwe’s Operation Murambatsvina: The Tipping Point? 17 August 2005) [100c]

28.06 Amnesty International’s Annual Report 2012 – Zimbabwe, published 24 May 2012, noted that:

“The government failed to provide education for thousands of children affected by the 2005 mass forced evictions, known as Operation Murambatsvina. In Hopley and Hatcliffe Extension, two settlements created by the government to rehouse the victims of the evictions in Harare, more than 2,000 children were attending unregistered primary schools, in inadequate buildings without trained teachers or stationery. More than six years after the forced evictions, most victims have been driven deeper into poverty because of the government’s failure to find effective remedies.” [14l]

29. MARANGE DIAMOND FIELDS

29.01 Noting the background to the situation in the Marange diamond fields, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office’s Annual Report on Human Rights 2009, published in March 2010, noted that:

“In 2006, large deposits of diamonds were discovered in the Marange area in eastern Zimbabwe. As a result, thousands of jobless and homeless Zimbabweans went to the region to pan illegally for diamonds. State forces took control of the illegal diamond mining activity, reportedly using forced labour, violence and extrajudicial killings. Between November 2008 and January 2009, the Zimbabwean government stepped up efforts to control mining areas by launching ‘Operation Hakudzokwi’ (you will not return), and an estimated 200 people were killed.” [13e] (p173)


“In August the BBC reported the existence in 2008 of a torture camp run by police and military personnel in the Marange diamond fields. Police and military personnel reportedly recruited civilian workers to illegally dig for diamonds. According to witnesses workers who were caught mining for themselves or who demanded too large a share of the profits were tortured, raped, and sometimes killed. In addition to beatings and sexual abuse, prisoners were mauled by dogs, and at least one woman reportedly died after such a mauling.” [2g] (p4)

29.03 Noting the importance of the Marange diamond fields on politics in Zimbabwe, Global Witness noted in a report entitled Return of the blood diamond, published 14 June 2010, that:

“The efforts of the Zanu PF and military elite to seize control of Marange’s diamonds through a combination of abusive military operations and suspect deal-making could have serious consequences for the peace and stability of Zimbabwe. It gives some of Zanu PF’s most recalcitrant elements a means of financing renewed campaigns of political violence against their opponents if the current power-sharing arrangement with the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) ceases to serve their interests.

“In light of the systematic killing and harassment of opposition supporters following the 2008 elections, this risk should not be under-estimated. MDC leaders have recognised the danger the situation poses and have expressed concern about the lack of transparency in the management of Marange’s diamonds.” [120a] (p3)

29.04 A report by Human Rights Watch entitled Universal Periodic Review of Zimbabwe, dated 29 March 2011, noted that:
“Human Rights Watch published a report in June 2009 detailing diamond-smuggling, corruption, and widespread serious human rights abuses-including killings, torture, beatings, and child labor-in the Marange diamond fields of eastern Zimbabwe. The report highlighted the army's seizure of control of the diamond fields in October 2008 and its killing of more than 200 people in the same month. Zimbabwe's government has failed to investigate or prosecute these abuses.

“Soon after the release of the report, the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), a global body that governs the diamond industry and to which Zimbabwe belongs, sent a review mission to investigate. The mission confirmed Human Rights Watch's findings and assessed that the abuses violated KPCS minimum standards. In an interim report, the mission recommended the withdrawal of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces from Marange, as well as an end to abuses and smuggling. Civil society groups active in the Kimberley Process demanded Zimbabwe's suspension until it complied with KPCS standards.

“The government of Zimbabwe has so far failed to fully comply with the KPCS recommendations, despite initial government indications of a willingness to do so. While beatings, torture, forced labor, and other abuses decreased in 2010, corruption is rife, and smuggling of diamonds by soldiers in the fields is prolific. The government has not withdrawn the military from Marange, but has instead rotated new units into the area.

“Diamond revenue, particularly from the Marange diamond fields in eastern Zimbabwe, is providing a parallel source of revenue for ZANU-PF and its repressive state apparatus. The diamond revenues continue to benefit a few senior people in the government and their associates rather than the people of Zimbabwe.” [69c]

29.05 Human Rights Watch reported on 30 August 2011 that:

“Zimbabwe police and private security guards employed by mining companies in the Marange diamond fields are shooting, beating and unleashing attack dogs on poor, local unlicensed miners.

“The evidence gathered by Human Rights Watch contradicts claims that areas controlled by private mining companies, instead of by the Zimbabwe government alone, are relatively free of abuses… Local civil society activists told Human Rights Watch that the government has granted six international mining companies concessions in the Marange fields. The companies’ private security guards carry out joint patrols of the mining areas with Zimbabwe police. Local miners said that most of the companies have built electric fences around their mining concessions, while security guards with dogs regularly patrol the concessions. However, local miners are still able to reach the fields and sometimes stray into areas under the companies’ control.” [69f]

29.06 Global Witness reported on 2 November 2011 that:

“The Kimberley Process (KP) has thrown away its main point of leverage over the Zimbabwean government by allowing it to export diamonds from the controversial Marange region without first fulfilling previous commitments to reform its diamond trade, said the Kimberley Process Civil Society Coalition of NGOs today.

“‘The Kimberley Process has effectively given up on Zimbabwe,’ said Alfred Brownell, President of Green Advocates, Liberia. ‘KP member governments and the diamond
industry seem ready to turn their back on the interests of Zimbabwe's citizens, the public good and the principles on which the Kimberley Process was founded.’

“… A previous agreement between the Kimberley Process and Zimbabwe gave local civil society representatives the official status of Local Focal Point, allowing them to access Marange and formally report back to the Kimberley Process. This status promised protection for activists who have previously been arrested and harassed over their work on Zimbabwe's opaque diamond industry.

“The new agreement, while maintaining that civil society organisations retain access to the Marange fields, strips the Local Focal Point of its official status.” [120b]

29.07 Following the decision of the Kimberley Process to allow trading of Marange diamonds, Global Witness left the consortium. [120c]

29.08 Voice of America News reported on 8 March 2012 that inspections of Marange had begun:

“After visiting the controversial Marange diamond fields for the first time Wednesday [7 March 2012], Zimbabwean non-governmental organizations expressed satisfaction at what they called state-of-the-art infrastructure and security systems guarding the area - but said they still had unanswered questions over the handling of proceeds and human rights issues.

“Several groups affiliated to the National Association of Non-governmental Organizations, other civil society groups, and members of the private and public media, were able to explore the mining area which has been a no-go zone since coming under control of the military in 2008.

“Director of the Center for Research and Development Farai Maguwu, who has consistently campaigned for the protection of human rights in Marange, told VOA’s Violet Gonda the visit was ‘very technical’ and that the touring group was not given the opportunity to speak to affected communities or artisanal miners.

“They only managed to inspect the process of production, he said.

“The fiery diamond activist said there was general satisfaction following the visit that Harare seemed to meet the minimum standards required by the diamond watchdog, the Kimberley Process, in terms of security, safety, health and transparency within the production chain in Marange.’” [83m]

Further detailed information about human rights abuses in the Marange diamond field can be found in the Human Rights Watch reports, False Dawn, dated 31 August 2009, and Diamonds in the rough, dated 26 June 2009. The February 2012 Global Witness report, Diamonds: A Good Deal For Zimbabwe? discussed two of the companies that have gained some control over Marange. For more information about behaviour and conduct of security forces, including the policy, see section 8, Security forces.
30. **CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONALITY**

30.01 The US State Department Report on Human Rights Practices 2011 (USSD 2011), published on 24 May 2012, stated that the Citizenship Act:

“... requires all citizens with a claim to dual citizenship to have renounced their claim to foreign citizenship by January 2002 to retain their Zimbabwean citizenship. The act also revokes the citizenship of persons who fail to return to the country in any five-year period. In 2002 the High Court ruled that this interpretation did not take into account that persons are not automatically assured foreign citizenship merely because their parents were born in a foreign country, as some countries require persons to confirm their citizenship, in which case they could be rendered stateless. The court further held that it is incorrect to presume that, when persons have a parent or parents born out of the country, they are citizens of the other country by descent. In addition some countries, including countries in southern Africa, do not have a means to renounce citizenship. Independent groups estimated that as many as two million citizens may have been disenfranchised by the law, including those perceived to have anti-ZANU-PF leanings, such as the more than 200,000 commercial farm workers from neighboring countries and approximately 30,000 mostly white dual nationals. During the 2008 elections, some persons were denied the right to vote — despite having voted previously—because they could not adequately demonstrate their citizenship.” [2g] (p28-29)

30.02 However, correspondence from the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office dated 2 October 2006, noted that they had consulted a lawyer in Harare who was of the opinion that: “Only those who had acquired their citizenship by registration can be deprived of it after 5 years continuous absence outside the country, i.e. categories of citizenship obtained through “... birth or descent, cannot be deprived of their citizenship regardless of how long they remain outside the country.” [13g]

31. **FORGED AND FRAUDULENTLY OBTAINED OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS**

31.01 Official documents could be obtained either by payment of bribes to corrupt officials (Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 1 June 2007) [77b], or through unofficial contacts on the black market. (The Herald, 21 March 2007) [23h]

31.02 The Solidarity Peace Trust reported on 30 June 2009 that even where genuine documents are issued correctly, some public officials are demanding large amounts of foreign currency before handing them over. The report noted that one public official demanded 200 South African Rand (about £17 at June 2009 exchange rates) for a death certificate. [65b] (p22)

31.03 An article published by the United Nation’s IRIN news service, dated 2 November 2010, noted that bribes of between US$70-250 were reported to have been asked by civil servants for processing passport applications. One civil servant at the Registrar General’s office in Harare admitted to pocketing up to US$500 a day. An economist stated that some poorly paid officials “... would seize the slightest opportunity to get money …” [30e]
31.04 An entry on the Kubatana website, dated 29 October 2010, stated that bribes totalling US$160 were often required to obtain a provisional licence and then a driving test pass. [55c]

31.05 The Zimbabwean reported on 17 February 2010 that:

“South African authorities have confiscated over 5,000 fraudulently-acquired [South African] passports from Zimbabweans … In December last year, the neighbouring country’s Home Affairs ministry launched a crackdown on foreigners using fraudulently-acquired South African travelling documents.

“A large number of Zimbabweans [SW Radio Africa, dated 9 June 2010, estimated 3 million Zimbabweans were living in South Africa [53k] who have lived in the neighbouring country for more than five years, especially those from Matabeleland, use South African national registration documents and passports, which are fraudulently obtained by either misrepresenting facts with the assistance of some locals, or paying officials at the Home Affairs offices.” [99c]

ID CARDS AND OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

31.06 CNN reported on 22 November 2001 that the National Registration Act and the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act make it compulsory for people to carry a national ID card, a passport or a driver's licence. People stopped without these documents are liable to a fine or a term of imprisonment. [8a]

31.07 ZimOnline, dated 29 November 2006, noted that the Zimbabwe Registry Office had stopped issuing metal ID cards and had replaced them with plastic cards. [49a]

An example of a Zimbabwe ID Card

(Zimbabwe Ministry of Home Affairs, accessed 1 September 2010) [108a]

31.08 The Foreign and Commonwealth Office reported on the 20 April 2009 that the word Alien on ID cards indicates that the holder is not a citizen of Zimbabwe but is a non-Zimbabwean national living in the country. [13c]

31.09 The US Department of State’s Travel.gov website noted the following on its country reciprocity schedule:

“Birth Certificates
“Available from the Registrar General, Central Registry for Passports, Citizenship, Births, Deaths and Marriages, P. Bag 7734, Causeway, Harare. Full name of the applicant, date and place of birth, and birth registry number should be furnished.

“Marriage Certificates

“Available. (See Birth Certificate) Full names of both parties and the date and place of marriage should be furnished.

“Divorce Certificates

“Available. Certified true copies of divorce decrees are obtainable from one of the following addressees, depending on where the divorce took place:

For Harare divorce:
Registrar of the High Court
P.O. Box 8050
Causeway, Harare
For Bulawayo divorce:
Assistant Registrar of the High Court
P.O. Box 579
Bulawayo

“Death Certificates

“Available. (See Birth Certificate) Full name of the deceased and date and place of death should be furnished.” [2e]

31.10 IRIN News reported on 13 May 2010 that the Zimbabwean government had earlier in the year introduced a new Temporary Travel Document (TTD). The new TTD cost US$37 and is valid for six months. The TTD was introduced because of a huge backlog in passport applications and because a full passport is too expensive for many people costing US$170. [10c]

32. **EXIT AND RETURN**

32.01 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessments noted in an update of 12 October 2010 that: “The Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) has taken over immigration security at Harare International Airport.” [90m] (Security and Foreign Forces) The Telegraph noted in an article dated 22 May 2006, that the details of every person passing through airport immigration is fed into a central computer system. [5c] (p1) However, Peta Thornycroft, a Zimbabwean journalist, questioned the effectiveness of security processes at Harare Airport stating that the processes were “... not terribly efficient ... despite their electronic scanning.” (NewZimbabwe.com, 17 January 2007) [41d]

32.02 On 8th May 2009 Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai encouraged exiled Zimbabweans at a meeting in South Africa to move beyond political divisions and help in the rebuilding of the country. Mr Tsvangirai stated that while Mugabe and ZANU-PF had been part of the
problem, they were also part of the solution and asked Zimbabweans in exile to be prepared to reconcile their differences so that the country could be rebuilt. [40a]

32.03 A joint report published by Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, and the World Food Programme, entitled FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to Zimbabwe, dated 9 August 2010, noted that between 2006 and 2009 the IOM had assisted 314,000 Zimbabwean to return to Zimbabwe via the Beitbridge border post with South Africa. The source continued, noting that “… over 57,000 migrants returning from Botswana were assisted at the Plumtree reception centre between June 2008 and June 2009.” [101a] (p6)

32.04 IRIN News further reported on 7 October 2011 that:

“After months of rumour and speculation, South Africa’s Department of Home Affairs appears to have quietly lifted a moratorium on deportations of undocumented Zimbabweans who did not apply for legal status through the Zimbabwe Documentation Process (ZDP).

“The move contradicts recent assurances from the director-general of home affairs, Mkuseli Apleni, to parliament that deportations would not resume until the ZDP was completed and Home Affairs Minister Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma had pronounced the end of the special dispensation allowing Zimbabweans to enter and remain in the country without documents … Earlier this week, media outlets in Zimbabwe quoted a senior immigration official based at Beitbridge, Zimbabwe’s border with South Africa, saying that South Africa’s Home Affairs Department had notified them of plans to resume deportations ‘with immediate effect’.” [101i]

Returns from the UK

32.05 The Home Office document, Immigration Statistics January – March 2012, released on 24 May 2012 includes data on the number of Zimbabweans, including failed asylum seekers, who have voluntarily or by force left the UK for Zimbabwe (and other countries) since 2004. The data can be accessed on the Home Office website: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/science-research-statistics/research-statistics/immigration-asylum-research/immigration-q1-2012/removals-q1-2012 (See in particular statistical documents titled, Removals vol. 1: Tables rv.01 to rv.04.q and Removals vol. 2: Tables rv.05 to rv.08.q)

32.06 The UK Border Agency’s Report of the Fact Finding Mission to Zimbabwe: Harare 9-17 August 2010, dated 21 September 2010 (reissued 27 October 2010), reported the views of the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum* (ZHRNGOF), who noted that:

“The Forum has not come across any cases of returnees from the UK being mistreated and would expect to know of any such cases because its member organisations are represented across the country. It works closely with the Zimbabwe Association in London and is alerted where there are concerns a returnee might be at risk but has not come across any cases where that is happened. They are unable to say that there have been no such cases but if there have been they have been isolated examples. They do however have concerns that those who are known to have claimed asylum in the UK would be considered necessarily to have been disloyal to Zimbabwe and may therefore face additional problems reintegrating because the fact that they had claimed asylum would become known. This would not apply to returning economic migrants unless their
families were known to be political activists. The Forum considers that the abolition of hate speech against asylum seekers returning from the UK is central to creating a more conducive environment.” [121a] (p44)

* During the hearing before the UK Immigration and Asylum Chamber, Upper Tribunal (IACUT), in the former country guidance case EM and Others promulgated on 14 March 2011, Sarah Harland of the Zimbabwe Association contested what was actually stated (or meant) by the ZHRNGOF representative. Ms Harland stated that the source had been misrepresented by the Fact Finding Mission delegation and had in fact referred to the “systematic ill-treatment” of returnees. The UK Border Agency did not accept that the delegation’s notes of the interview with the ZHRNOF misrepresented the source or were inaccurate. The IACUT considered the arguments of both parties in paragraphs 106-109 of the judgement in EM and Others. Ms Harland’s oral evidence, as recorded by the court, can be found in Appendix D, Summary of Oral Evidence, paragraphs 23 to 41. See also comments made by Mark Walker of the UK Border Agency in paragraph 143 of the same Appendix in response to Ms Harland. At the timing of writing, EM and Others had just been quashed by the Court of Appeal and remitted to the IACUT for reconsideration.

32.07 The FFM report also recorded the comments of Anastasia Moyo, an activist. She was “… aware of four people who had returned to Zimbabwe from the UK, one of whom was a failed asylum seeker, although this was not common knowledge. She was not aware that any of them had faced any difficulty on return to Zimbabwe.” [121a] (p45)

32.08 To gain an impression of the experiences of a sample of returnees the UK Border and Immigration Agency’s Fact Finding Mission to Zimbabwe in August 2010 met with seven Zimbabweans who had claimed asylum in the UK but subsequently voluntarily returned to Zimbabwe in 2009 and 2010. The interviewees were identified and selected by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM). A copy of the interview notes can be found here: http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1226_1289391521_zimbabwe271010.pdf

33. **EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS**

33.01 The US State Department Report on Human Rights Practices 2011 (USSD 2011), published on 24 May 2012, stated that:

“There is no national minimum wage, except for agricultural workers ($85 a month) and domestic workers ($176 a month). The maximum legal workweek was 54 hours, and the law prescribes a minimum of one 24-hour rest period per week. No worker is allowed to work more than 12 continuous hours. The law prescribes that workers receive not less than twice their standard remuneration for working on a public holiday. The government sets safety and health standards on an industry-specific basis. The public service commission sets conditions of employment in the public sector. Workers have a legal right to remove themselves from dangerous work situations without jeopardy to continued employment. The government did not effectively enforce these laws.” [2g] (p52)

33.02 The same report noted that:
The law provides private sector workers with the right to form or join unions without prior authorization, conduct legal strikes, and bargain collectively. These rights were sometimes abrogated by other provisions of law. The law grants the labor minister extensive powers to regulate union activities. For example, the minister has the authority to veto collectively bargained agreements perceived to be harmful to the economy or to appoint an investigator who can, without prior notice, enter trade union premises, where any person employed can be questioned and any books, records, or other documents can be inspected and copied. The law denies public sector employees the right to form unions, strike, and bargain collectively. Procedural requirements—including 14-day advance-notice requirements, mandated 30-day reconciliation periods, and possible and mandatory referral to binding arbitration—further curtailed the right to call a legal strike. Essential services employees are prohibited from striking, and the law allows that any nonessential service may be declared an essential service if a strike is deemed a danger to the population. Managers are prohibited from striking, and in some industries, the government defined most employees as managers. Collective bargaining agreements applied to all workers in an industry, not just union members. Agreements reached by employers and employees must be gazetted by the Ministry of Labor to go into effect. The law prohibits antiunion discrimination, provides that the labor court handle complaints of such discrimination, and may direct that workers fired due to such discrimination be reinstated. There are no export processing zones. Migrant workers can join unions if they work in industries for which there are unions, and their rights are covered. Domestic workers are neither organized nor unionized but are protected by labor laws.

The government did not effectively enforce applicable laws. The rights to form or join unions, strike, and bargain collectively were not respected in practice. Unions were prevented from holding meetings with their members and carrying out organizational activities, sometimes by the police or ZANU-PF supporters. Although the law does not require unions to notify the police of public gatherings, such notification was required in practice. Often unions that applied for permission were denied. Unions risked suspensions from registration for 12 months for minor infractions, and union members could be fined and imprisoned for participating in union activities.” [2g] (p49-50)

Further detailed information regarding trade union rights and violations can be found in the Political Affiliation section of this report, and also in the International Trade Union Confederation’s report.
Annex A

CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS

A major portion of the information in this section is taken from the BBC Timeline [3ag]
Other sources have also been used, and additional information, including links to the original sources, can be found at Annex E – Reference to Source Material.

1889 Rhodes' British South Africa Company (BSA) gains a British mandate to colonise what becomes Southern Rhodesia. [3ag]

1953 Britain creates the Central African Federation, made up of Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi). [3ag]

1963 The UK dissolves CAF; Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland granted independence by the UK under majority rule administrations, as Zambia and Malawi respectively. [3ag]

1965 Rhodesia Front Prime Minister, Ian Smith, makes illegal unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) for Southern Rhodesia from the UK, renaming the territory Rhodesia. [3ag]

1972 Guerrilla war against white rule intensifies, with rivals Zanu and Zapu operating out of Zambia and Mozambique. [3ag]

1976 ZAPU and ZANU combine their military efforts in the Patriotic Front (PF) alliance. [90l]

1978 Smith yields to pressure for negotiated settlement. Elections for transitional legislature boycotted by Patriotic Front made up of Zanu and Zapu. New government of Zimbabwe Rhodesia, led by Bishop Abel Muzorewa, fails to gain international recognition. Civil war continues. [3ag]

1979 Ian Smith’s administration concludes an ‘internal settlement’ with some Black nationalists; Bishop Abel Muzorewa becomes first Black Prime Minister of ‘Zimbabwe-Rhodesia’. [90l]
December: Lancaster House constitutional conference in London, attended by all parties including the PF produces independence settlement for Rhodesia; Whites to be guaranteed 20 seats in new 100-seat parliament. [90l]

1980 February: Robert Mugabe’s ZANU-PF party wins 57 out of 80 ‘common roll’ seats and Nkomo’s PF (ZAPU) wins 20 seats; Bishop Muzorewa’s UANC party wins only three seats and Rhodesia Front wins all 20 seats reserved for Whites. [1d]
April: Independence of Zimbabwe – Robert Mugabe of ZANU-PF becomes Prime Minister and Reverend Canaan Banana becomes President, with ceremonial duties only. [1d]

1982-87 Matabeleland Massacres; Government sends mainly Shona Fifth Brigade to quell dissent – thousands killed during Gukurahundi pacification campaign, causing resentment of Government by the Ndebele. [1d]
1987  Reconciliation between ZANU-PF and ZAPU ends Matabeleland conflict; ZANU-PF and ZAPU merge, keeping ZANU-PF name; reserved seats for Whites abolished; Prime Minister Mugabe becomes executive President. [1d]

1988  Amnesty proclaimed in Matabeleland, leading to rapid improvement in security; Edgar Tekere expelled from ZANU-PF for persistent denunciation of party leadership and policies. [1d]

1990  Mugabe wins Presidential election, polling 2.03 million votes against ZUM’s Edgar Tekere’s 413,840; ZANU-PF wins 117 of the 120 contested seats in parliamentary elections, with ZUM taking 20% of the vote and two seats. [90l]

1990  August: Joshua Nkomo becomes Vice-President, in addition to existing Vice-President Simon Muzenda. [90l]

1995  April: ZANU-PF wins decisive victory in general elections, although eight opposition parties boycott polls – ZANU-PF takes 118 seats and Sithole’s ZANU-Ndonga two. October: Sithole charged with conspiracy to assassinate Mugabe. [90l]

1996  March: Mugabe wins Presidential elections with nearly 93 per cent of the vote, but turnout less than 32 per cent. [1d]

1997  July: Criminal charges brought against former President Canaan Banana for alleged sexual assault against a former male employee. [1d] December: Sithole found guilty of plotting to kill Mugabe and sentenced to two years’ imprisonment, but released on bail pending appeal. [1d]

1999  July: Vice-President Joshua Nkomo dies. [90l] September: Movement for Democratic Change formed. [90l]

2000  February: President Mugabe suffers defeat in referendum on draft constitution. [3ag] Squatters seize hundreds of white-owned farms in an ongoing and violent campaign to reclaim what they say was stolen by settlers. June: Parliamentary elections: Zanu-PF narrowly fights off a challenge from the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) led by Morgan Tsvangirai, but loses its power to change the constitution. [3ag]

2001  May: Defence Minister Moven Mahachi killed in a car crash - the second minister to die in that way in a month. [3ag] July: Finance Minister Simba Makoni publicly acknowledges economic crisis, saying foreign reserves have run out and warning of serious food shortages. Most
western donors, including the World Bank and the IMF, have cut aid because of President Mugabe's land seizure programme. [3ag]

2002
February: Parliament passes a law limiting media freedom. The European Union imposes sanctions on Zimbabwe and pulls out its election observers after the EU team leader is expelled. [3ag]
March: Mugabe re-elected in presidential elections condemned as seriously flawed by the opposition and foreign observers. Commonwealth suspends Zimbabwe from its councils for a year after concluding that elections were marred by high levels of violence. [3ag]
April: State of disaster declared as worsening food shortages threaten famine.
June: 45-day countdown for some 2,900 white farmers to leave their land begins, under terms of a land-acquisition law passed in May. [3ag]

2003
March: Widely-observed general strike is followed by arrests and beatings. [3ag]
June: Opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) leader Morgan Tsvangirai is arrested twice during a week of opposition protests. He is charged with treason, adding to an existing treason charge from 2002 over an alleged plot to kill President Mugabe. [3ag]
November: Canaan Banana, Zimbabwe's first black president, dies aged 67. [3ag]
December: Zimbabwe pulls out of Commonwealth after organisation decides to extend suspension of country indefinitely. [3ag]

2004
March: A group of mercenaries allegedly on the way to Equatorial Guinea to stage a coup is intercepted after landing at Harare airport. Their leader, British national Simon Mann, is sentenced to seven years in prison for attempting to buy guns. [3ag]
October: Opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai is acquitted of treason charges relating to an alleged plot to kill President Mugabe. However he continues to face a further separate treason charge. [3ag]

2005
January: The US labels Zimbabwe as one of the world's six "outposts of tyranny". Zimbabwe rejects the statement. [3ag]
March: Ruling Zanu-PF party wins two-thirds of the votes in parliamentary polls. Main opposition party says election was rigged against it. [3ag]
May-July: Tens of thousands of shanty dwellings and illegal street stalls are destroyed as part of a "clean-up" programme. The UN estimates that the drive has left about 700,000 people homeless. [3ag]
August: Prosecutors drop remaining treason charges against opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai. [3ag]
November: Ruling Zanu-PF party wins an overwhelming majority of seats in a newly-created upper house of parliament, the Senate. [3ag]
The opposition MDC splits over its leader’s decision to boycott the poll.
December: UN humanitarian chief Jan Egeland says Zimbabwe is in “meltdown”. [3ag]

2006

The main text of this COI Report contains the most up to date publicly available information as at 6 June 2012. Further brief information on recent events and reports has been provided in the Latest News section to 13 July 2012.
May: Year-on-year inflation exceeds 1,000%. New banknotes, with three noughts deleted from their values, are introduced in August. [3ag]

September: Riot police disrupt a planned demonstration against the government's handling of the economic crisis. Union leaders are taken into custody and later hospitalised, allegedly after being tortured. [3ag]

December: Ruling ZANU-PF party approves a plan to move presidential polls from 2008 to 2010, effectively extending Mr Mugabe's rule by two years. [3ag]

2007
February: Rallies, demonstrations banned for three months. The ban is extended in May. [3ag]

March: Opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai is hospitalised after his arrest at a rally. One man is shot dead as riot police move to disperse the gathering. [3ag]

June: Ruling ZANU-PF and opposition MDC hold preliminary talks in South Africa. [3ag]

2008
March: Opposition MDC claims victory in presidential and parliamentary elections. [3ag]

May: Electoral body says Tsvangirai won most votes in presidential poll, but not enough to avoid a run-off against Mugabe. [3ag]

June: Run-off goes ahead despite calls from around the world. Mugabe declared winner. Tsvangirai pulled out days before poll, complaining of intimidation. Russia, China veto a Western-backed UN Security Council resolution to impose sanctions. [3ag]

July: EU, and US widen sanctions against Zimbabwe's leaders. [3ag]

Sept: Mugabe and Tsvangirai sign power-sharing agreement. Implementation stalls over who gets top ministerial jobs. [3ag]

December: Zimbabwe declares national emergency over a cholera epidemic and the collapse of its health care system. [3ag]

2009
January: Government allows use of foreign currencies to try stem hyperinflation. [3ag]

February: Tsvangirai is sworn in as prime minister, after protracted talks over formation of government. [3ag]

March: Susan Tsvangirai, wife of Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai, was killed following a car crash on 6th March that also injured Mr Tsvangirai. Officially, Mr Tsvangirai claimed that the crash was an accident [53a], although senior members of the MDC expressed doubts, with many other MDC activists believing that the crash was planned by a clique within Zimbabwe’s security forces. [5a]

May: The Zimbabwean African People’s Union (ZAPU), a wing of ZANU-PF, announced that it had formally split from the ruling party. [67a]

June: Morgan Tsvangirai announces that the ‘acrimony is over’ between him and President Robert Mugabe and urges Zimbabweans to put their differences behind them to rebuild the country. [3v]

Constitutional review begins. Tsvangirai tours Europe and US to drum up donor support. [3ag]

September: One year after power-sharing deal, MDC remains frustrated and alleges persecution and violence against members.
Arrival of EU and US delegations seen as signs of thaw in foreign relations. Both maintain stance on targeted sanctions. IMF provides $400 million support as part of G20 agreement to help member states. [3ag]

October: Mugabe calls for new start to relations with West. [3ag] Prime Minister Tsvangirai announced that the MDC was withdrawing co-operation with the government in the Cabinet and Council of Ministers. Mr Tsvangirai points to continuing abuses and a lack of co-operation from ZANU-PF. [103a]

2010
January: Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai urges the easing of targeted sanctions, saying the unity government’s progress should be rewarded. Zimbabwe’s High Court rejects a regional court ruling against President Mugabe’s land-reform programme. [3c]
March: New rule forces foreign-owned businesses to sell majority stake to locals. [3c]
June: Commercial farmers say they are under a renewed wave of attacks. [3c]
August: Zimbabwe resumes official diamond sales, amid controversy over reported rights abuses at the Marange diamond fields. [3c]
September: Premier Tsvangirai alleges ruling party instigating violence at public consultations [COPAC] on new constitution. [3c]
December: Deputy Prime Minister Arthur Mutambara, leader of the smaller formation of the MDC, announces that he will not stand for re-election at the party’s congress in January 2011. Mr Mutambara’s announcement followed repeated criticism of his leadership. [28b]

2011
January: President Mugabe unexpectedly flies to Malaysia for an emergency operation after problems with his prostate are diagnosed. [5g] Sources suggest that Mugabe is suffering from cancer. [34b] The Smaller faction of the MDC announced that it had elected Welshman Ncube as leader of the party. Ncube replaces Arthur Mutambara as leader of the faction, but Mutambara retains the post of Deputy Prime Minister. [131a] Sources reported a surge in political violence, particularly in Zimbabwe’s cities, as ZANU-PF set-up campaign bases in MDC areas. [138a] [139a]
March: Prime Minister Tsvangirai says unity government rendered impotent by ZANU-PF violence and disregard for power-sharing deal. [3c]
April: ZANU-PF minister Stan Mudenge, told onlookers at the opening of a conference centre that party youths and the military would “fish out” and “punish” voters who had swapped sides and voted for the MDC in 2008. [160a]
August: Retired General Solomon Mujuru, husband of ZANU-PF Vice President Joice Mujuru, was killed in a fire at his farm. His death sparked rumours of foul play. [5d]
September: The trial of a man accused of subversion for an alleged Facebook post collapsed due to a lack of evidence as the post could not be retrieved. It was the first trial in Zimbabwe to be based on a Facebook post. [3m]
October: In an historic visit to Zimbabwe, Anglican Archbishop of Canterbury Rowan Williams presented President Mugabe with a dossier of human rights abuses committed by the Zimbabwean government. [3n]
November: The Kimberley Process approves the sale of diamonds from the Marange diamond fields. [120b]
December: ZANU-PF officially endorse Robert Mugabe as their candidate for the next presidential elections. [30]
Annex B

POLITICAL ORGANISATIONS

ZANU-PF
The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Zimbabwe Country Profile, 2008, noted that since independence from the United Kingdom in 1980 the country has been ruled by Robert Mugabe and ZANU-PF. The report stated that:

“At independence ZANU-PF’s ideology was initially Marxist-Leninist, but from the late 1980s in line with the fall of communism the president did reluctantly allow a move towards market-oriented economic policies. As the political crisis in Zimbabwe has intensified in recent years, Mr Mugabe has reverted to more revolutionary language, notably the need to complete the chimurenga (the revolution by which he came to power) through the redistribution of land. He has also at various times called for the nationalisation of mines and industries.” [24h]

Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment: Zimbabwe, dated 18 April 2012, noted that:

“ZANU-PF holds five-yearly congresses as its primary decision-making mechanism. Its congress in early December 2004 led to the appointment of a new ZANU vice-president, Joyce Mujuru. The event was closely managed by Mugabe and left open the question of his succession. This question continues to dominate the party’s internal politics, with competing interests developing. Some had expected that Mugabe would retire in 2008, thereby opening the way for a new leadership. ZANU-PF factions had already starting competing for influence ahead of this potential power vacuum, but were thwarted by Mugabe’s decision to stand for another term in office.

“The party again endorsed Mugabe as its presidential candidate for the 2008 elections, but divisions were apparent with the incumbent not only facing his old opposition foe of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), but also an unprecedented challenge from within the ruling party’s own ranks, in the form of former ZANU-PF minister and party stalwart Dr Simba Makoni. Makoni announced his intention to run as an independent in the polls in February 2008.

“ZANU-PF appeared to have been unprepared for its defeat in the first round in March in the National Assembly and presidential polls. …” [90e] (Internal Affairs)

The Zimbabwe Independent reported on 29 October 2009 that ZANU-PF is due to hold its next party Congress in December. One of the main issues for discussion and for the party to vote on is a replacement for the late Vice-President Msika. The report noted that ongoing power struggle within the party will have an influence over who obtains the post. “So far four senior members, Naison Ndlovu, Cain Mathema, Ambrose Mutinhiri and Obert Mpofu have openly declared their interest in the post. [11a] The States in Transition Observatory, noted in the report, Zimbabwe Government of National Unity Watch – October 2009 (dated 10 November 2009), that ZANU-PF chairman John Nkomo had been nominated to take the post of vice president, but dissent within the party became apparent after ‘War Veterans’ in Bulawayo rejected his nomination and Commissar Richard Ndlovu stated that the process was null and void because the correct nomination procedures had not been followed. [9f] (p4)

Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment: Zimbabwe, dated 18 April 2012, noted that “Succession in a post-Mugabe era remains a potential future source of instability. For now, the issue has been postponed, with ZANU-PF re-electing Mugabe as its leader and presidential
flagbearer. Having failed to achieve elections in 2011 amid the delayed constitution-making process, the party is currently pushing for the polls to be held in 2012.” [90e]


**MOVEMENT FOR DEMOCRATIC CHANGE (MDC-T AND MDC-N)**

“Founded in September 1999, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) emerged from … a coalition of civil society groups, the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA)” and the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) to fight a constitutional referendum in February 2000. “The MDC, led by former ZCTU leaders Morgan Tsvangirai and Gibson Sibanda, campaigned for a 'No' vote that carried the day.”

The MDC went on to contest the June 2000 parliamentary elections and only narrowly missed out on gaining a majority. “By then the government had unleashed a campaign of intimidation against the MDC, including manipulation of the electoral rules.” Morgan Tsvangirai contested the 2002 presidential election, and lost to Robert Mugabe. Shortly afterwards, Tsvangirai and other prominent members of the party were charged with treason - charges that were later dropped.

In 2005, “Mugabe's decision to introduce a Senate … plunged [the party] into crisis when Tsvangirai opposed the MDC's participation in the senate polls.” The MDC formally split in two, with the smaller faction fielding candidates in the Senate elections. The bulk of the party remained loyal to Morgan Tsvangirai.

The smaller faction of the party elected its own leader in Arthur Mutambara, becoming know as the MDC-M. The main faction is know as MDC-T (Tsvangirai). “The MDC-T - as the original MDC faction - also continued to enjoy the support of the National Constitutional Alliance, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions and the Zimbabwe Students Organisation.” [90l]

**MDC-M becomes MDC-N**

Radiovop reported on 18 December 2010 that Deputy Prime Minister Arthur Mutambara, leader of the smaller formation of the MDC-Mutambara (MDC-M), announced that he would not stand for re-election at the party's congress in January 2011. [28b] In January 2011 the Smaller faction of the MDC elected Welshman Ncube as leader of the party. Bloomberg reported on 10 January 2011 that Ncube replaces Arthur Mutambara as leader of the faction, but Mutambara retains the post of Deputy Prime Minister. [131a]

The same source reported on 30 January 2011 that President Mugabe stated that Arthur Mutambara could “… stay on in government as long as he want[ed] …” and that he would not remove him as deputy prime minister. However, “A meeting of the party's [MDC-M] national standing committee last week decided to recall Mutambara and re-assign him to the portfolio of Regional Integration Minister, while naming [Welshman] Ncube as Deputy Prime Minister in the coalition government.” But the source noted the opinion of legal experts who believe that “… only Mugabe can force Mutambara to move …” [131c]
The Economist Intelligence Unit’s (EIU) Country Report – Main Report, Zimbabwe, dated 8 February 2011, noted that: “The third party to the GPA - the MDC-M - will from now on be known as the MDC-N …” [24j] (Monthly review)

MDC party symbols and slogans

The MDC’s symbol is an open hand, palm outstretched. The party’s slogan during the June 2000 parliamentary election campaign was ‘Chinja Maitiro, Maitiro Chinja’ in Shona and ‘Guqula Izenzo, Izenzo Guqula’ in Ndebele. The closest English translation is ‘Now is the time, fight for change, support the Movement’. [12b]

Movement for Democratic Change99 (MDC99)

BBC Monitoring, dated 8 May 2010, noted that: “Maverick politician Job Sikhala recently broke ranks with the smaller formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) following sharp policy differences two weeks ago formed a third splinter group.” Mr Sikhala claimed that MDC99 was not a new political party but later described himself as the interim president of MDC99. [118a]

Mavambo/Kusile/Dawn (MKD)

Simba Makoni, a former finance minister within ZANU-PF [BBC News, 31 May 2012] [3ag], who ran against President Mugabe in the 2008 presidential election, announced that he was formally launching “… a new opposition political party, vowing to ‘clean up the politics of Zimbabwe’ and to uphold human rights and democracy if elected to power.” The Africa Research Bulletin, covering events between 1-31st July 2009, noted that Mr Makoni announced that the new party would be called Mavambo/Kusile/Dawn (MKD) “… meaning ‘The beginning of a new dawn’ in Shona, Makoni said, ‘Our vision is a stable, united and responsive governance system that will provide genuine empowerment, not a government that accumulates wealth among the few at the expense of others.’ … Makoni is interim president of the MKD while former spokesman Godfrey Chanesta is interim chairman.” [76a] (18035)

ZANU-Ndonga

The late Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, who led ZANU before Robert Mugabe, set up ZANU-Ndonga. The party held two seats in Parliament prior to the elections in June 2000. (The Telegraph, 14 December 2000) [5a]

ZAPU (ZIMBABWE AFRICAN PEOPLE’S UNION) [ZAPU 2000]

ZAPU, or ZAPU 2000, was formed as a resurgent group of the former ZAPU party of the late Joshua Nkomo in 1999. The party advocates a federal system for Zimbabwe, with considerable powers devolved to Matabeleland. The party was unable to agree an electoral alliance for the June 2000 elections with the MDC, as the latter does not support a federal structure. ZAPU candidates stood in most constituencies in Matabeleland and Bulawayo in June 2000 but failed to win any seats.

In early January 2002, ZAPU leader Agrippa Madlela announced that he would not contest the March 2002 presidential election. His decision split ZAPU into two factions. Paul Siwela, leader of a splinter group, announced his candidature for the presidency, standing for ZAPU.
On 17 May 2009 ZWNews reported that the Zimbabwean African People’s Union (ZAPU), a wing of ZANU-PF, had announced that it had formally split from the ruling party. [67a] ZAPU, which was effectively forced to merge with ZANU following the Matabeleland Insurgency (See 3.04 for further details of the Matabeleland Insurgency) [28] (Chapter 7) voted in favour of the de-coupling of the two parties at a special party congress, attended by around 1,000 delegates at McDonald Hall in Mzilikazi. Dumiso Dabengwa was appointed the interim chairman of the party. [67a]

The Solidarity Peace Trust report, ‘Walking a thin line’, published on 30 June 2009, noted that: “... the revived Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), decisively marginalised by the MDC as a political opposition since 2000, and effectively emasculated in the terms of the GPA, formerly withdrew from the Unity Accord signed with Zanu PF in 1987, on the 16th May 2009.” [65b] (p13)

**UNITED PARTIES (UP)**

The United Parties (UP) grouping was established by Bishop Muzorewa, leader of the UANC, in 1994 after UANC’s merger with the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM). UP boycotted the 1995 general elections. In the presidential elections in 1996, Bishop Muzorewa was denied permission to withdraw his candidacy prior to the ballot and received 4.7 per cent of the vote. UP has failed to win any seats in subsequent elections. (Europa world, September 2000) [1g] (BBC News, 16 June 2000) [3b]
Annex C

PROMINENT PEOPLE

Under the terms of the power sharing agreement Robert Mugabe remains head of state as President. Morgan Tsvangirai (leader of the larger opposition group MDC-T) was sworn in as prime minister on February 11th 2009 with Arthur Mutambara (leader of the splinter opposition group MDC-M) being sworn in as deputy prime minister on the same day. Zimbabwe’s new cabinet was sworn in on February 13th 2009. (Economist Intelligence Unit, 13 February 2009)

[24f] Bloomberg Businessweek reported on 10 January 2011, that the Smaller faction of the MDC announced that it had elected Welshman Ncube as leader of the party. Ncube replaces Arthur Mutambara as leader of the faction, but Mutambara retains the post of Deputy Prime Minister. [131a]

THE CABINET

Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment – Zimbabwe, last updated 18 April 2012, provided the following list of government ministers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Minister</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President:</td>
<td>Robert Gabriel Mugabe (ZANU-PF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>Morgan Tsvangirai (MDC-T)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Vice-President:</td>
<td>John Nkomo (ZANU-PF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Vice-President:</td>
<td>Joyce Mujuru (ZANU-PF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Prime Minister:</td>
<td>Arthur Mutambara (MDC-N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Prime Minister:</td>
<td>Thokozani Khupe (MDC-T)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Agriculture, Mechanisation and Irrigation Development:</td>
<td>Joseph Made (ZANU-PF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Constitutional and Parliamentary Affairs:</td>
<td>Eric Matinenga (MDC-T)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Defence:</td>
<td>Emmerson Mnangagwa (ZANU-PF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Economic Planning and Development:</td>
<td>Tapiwa Mashakada (MDC-T)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Education, Sport and Culture:</td>
<td>David Coltart (MDC-N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Energy and Power Development:</td>
<td>Elton Mangoma (MDC-T)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Environment and Natural Resources Management:</td>
<td>Francis Dunstun Nhema (ZANU-PF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Finance:</td>
<td>Tendai Biti (MDC-T)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Foreign Affairs:</td>
<td>Simbarashe Mumbengegwi (ZANU-PF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Health and Child Welfare:</td>
<td>Henry Madzorera (MDC-T)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Higher and Tertiary Education:</td>
<td>Stan Mudenge (ZANU-PF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Home Affairs:</td>
<td>Kembo Mohadi (ZANU-PF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Industry and Commerce:</td>
<td>Welshman Ncube (MDC-N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Information Communication Technology:</td>
<td>Nelson Chamisa (MDC-T)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Justice and Legal Affairs:</td>
<td>Patrick Chinamasa (ZANU-PF)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The main text of this COI Report contains the most up to date publicly available information as at 6 June 2012. Further brief information on recent events and reports has been provided in the Latest News section to 13 July 2012.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministry</th>
<th>Minister Name and Party (political affiliation)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Labour and Social Welfare:</td>
<td>Paurine Gwanyanya-Mpariwa (MDC-T)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Lands and Rural Settlement:</td>
<td>Herbert Murerwa (ZANU-PF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Local Government, Urban and Rural Development:</td>
<td>Ignatius Chombo (ZANU-PF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Media, Information and Publicity:</td>
<td>Webster Shamu (ZANU-PF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Mines and Mining Development:</td>
<td>Obert Mpofu (ZANU-PF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of National Housing and Social Amenities:</td>
<td>Giles Mutsekwa (MDC-T)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Public Service:</td>
<td>Lucia Matibenga (MDC-T)</td>
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<td>Minister of Public Works:</td>
<td>Joel Gabuza (MDC-T)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minister of Regional Integration and International Co-operation:</td>
<td>Priscilla Mihairambwi-Mushonga (MDC-N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Science and Technology:</td>
<td>Heneri Dzinotyiwei (MDC-T)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Small and Medium Enterprises and Co-operatives Development:</td>
<td>Sithembiso Nyoni (ZANU-PF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of State Enterprises and Parastatals:</td>
<td>Gordon Moyo (MDC-T)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Tourism and Hospitality Industry:</td>
<td>Walter Mzembi (ZANU-PF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Transport and Infrastructural Development:</td>
<td>Nicholas Goche (ZANU-PF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Water Resources and Development:</td>
<td>Samuel Sipepa Nkomo (MDC-T)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Women's Affairs, Gender, and Community Development:</td>
<td>Olivia Muchena (ZANU-PF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of Youth Development, Indigenisation and Empowerment:</td>
<td>Saviour Kasukuwere (ZANU-PF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of State for National Security in the President's Office:</td>
<td>Sydney Sekeramayi (ZANU-PF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of State in the Prime Minister's Office:</td>
<td>Jameson Zvidzai Timba (MDC-T)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of State in the President's Office:</td>
<td>Didymus Mutasa (ZANU-PF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of State in the President's Office (Healing):</td>
<td>John Nkomo (ZANU-PF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of State in the Prime Minister's Office (Healing):</td>
<td>Sekai Holland (MDC-T)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of State in Vice-President Nkomo's Office:</td>
<td>Flora Bhuka (ZANU-PF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister of State in Vice-President Mujuru's Office:</td>
<td>Silvester Nguni (ZANU-PF)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) also provides an up to date list of current ministers: [https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/world-leaders-1/world-leaders-z/zimbabwe.html](https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/world-leaders-1/world-leaders-z/zimbabwe.html)
PROMINENT PEOPLE

General Constantine Chiwenga
“General Chiwenga succeeded General Vitalis Zvinavashe as commander of the Zimbabwe Defence Force (ZDF) in December 2003. Chiwenga was born in 1955 into the Zezuru (Shona) sub-group. He joined the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), the military wing of Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), while still a youth and rose through the ranks until he was a member of ZANLA’s High Command.

“Following Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980, when he was still just 24 years old, Chiwenga was appointed to command the army’s First Brigade. In 1984, he replaced Colonel Perence Shiri as commander of the Fifth Brigade. In 1996, Chiwenga became head of the Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA), which functioned separately from the Air Force of Zimbabwe under Air Marshal Shiri.

“Some senior security officials may seek to influence the eventual ZANU-PF succession decision. The two factions most often reported on in the succession question is that around the Mujururs, and those seen as being aligned to Emmerson Mnangagwa, who is currently minister of defence. However, other names have also been raised in the media as potential future presidential contenders, including more recently Chiwenga.” (Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment, Zimbabwe, updated 18 April 2012) [90n] (Political leadership)

Emmerson Mnangagwa
“He helped direct Zimbabwe’s 1970s war of independence and later became the country’s spymaster during the 1980s civil conflict.

“He is currently minister of rural housing, a relative backwater after spells as minister of national security and speaker of parliament.

“In 2005, he also lost his post as Zanu-PF secretary for administration, which had enabled him to place his supporters in key party positions. This followed reports that Mr Mnangagwa, 60, had been campaigning too hard for the post of vice-president, backed by his close ally, former Information Minister Jonathan Moyo.

“Mr Mugabe sacked Mr Moyo from both party and government but Mr Mnangagwa seems to be back in the president’s good books. The president has instead reportedly become alarmed at the activities of Joyce Mujuru, who got the vice-president’s job, and her powerful husband, former army chief Solomon Mujuru. …

“Mr Mnangagwa’s [has a] fearsome reputation … made during the civil war which broke out after independence between Mugabe’s Zanu party and the Zapu of Joshua Nkomo.

“As National Security Minister Mr Mnangagwa was in charge of the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO), which worked hand in glove with the army to suppress Zapu. Thousands of innocent civilians - mainly ethnic Ndebeles, seen as Zapu supporters - were killed before the two parties merged to form Zanu-PF. …” (BBC News Profile: Emmerson Mnangagwa, updated 30 March 2007) [3a]

The Daily Telegraph noted on 7 April 2012 that “Mr Mnangagwa, the former head of Zimbabwe’s Central Intelligence Organisation, was appointed campaign manager by Mr Mugabe during the 2008 presidential election and was widely blamed for the brutality unleashed
after his rival, Morgan Tsvangirai, edged ahead in the first round of voting.” [5e] The article also noted that in April 2012, Robert Mugabe had “struck a secret ‘gentleman's agreement’ to hand over power in Zimbabwe to his feared defence minister, Emmerson Mnangagwa, sources close to the two men have revealed.” [5e]

President Robert Mugabe
“Robert Gabriel Mugabe was born on 21 February 1924 at Kutama Jesuit Mission in the Zvimba area of what is now Mashonaland West province, to a Zezuru (Shona) family. He is a teacher by profession and has several university degrees. He joined the National Democratic Party in Zimbabwe in 1960, after a brief spell teaching in Kwame Nkrumah's Ghana. In 1963, he was a founder member of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), a party set up to oppose Joshua Nkomo. Arrested in the same year, he escaped to Tanzania only to be imprisoned again when he returned to Rhodesia, this time for 10 years.

“Released in 1974, he later negotiated independence for Zimbabwe and became the independent country’s first prime minister. His election to the chairmanship of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1986 was considered the pinnacle of his international career. Following constitutional changes, Mugabe became executive president of Zimbabwe in 1987. The ruling party also became known as ZANU-PF, following a merger with the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) in the late 1980s, of which Mugabe became the president.

“Mugabe has managed to stay on as president since then, seemingly adept at playing party factions off against each other in order to balance ZANU-PF and prevent any obvious successor from gaining pre-eminence. Despite his age, he was again endorsed by ZANU-PF as its presidential candidate for the 2008 election. However, the election, held in March that year, failed to produce an outright winner, and Mugabe trailed with 43.24 per cent of the votes to Morgan Tsvangirai's 47.87 per cent. He subsequently still secured re-election in a one-man run-off in June, after Tsvangirai boycotted the vote over security concerns. He retained the presidency in the September 2008 power-sharing deal agreed with Tsvangirai's Movement for Democratic Change (MDC-T) - which had won the lead in the National Assembly polls in March 2008 - and a smaller MDC faction.

“Mugabe also remains ZANU-PF's presidential flagbearer for the next elections, but his advancing age arguably adds impetus to the party’s calls for the polls to be held in 2012. There has also been increasing speculation about his health in recent years, but the official line continues to be that the president is ‘fit as a fiddle’. Succession in a post-Mugabe era remains a potential source of instability.” (Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment, Zimbabwe, updated 18 April 2012) [90n] (Political leadership)

The Daily Telegraph reported on 7 April 2012 that Robert Mugabe had “struck a secret ‘gentleman's agreement' to hand over power in Zimbabwe to his feared defence minister, Emmerson Mnangagwa, sources close to the two men have revealed.” [5e]

Vice President Joyce Mujuru

Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment, Zimbabwe, updated 18 April 2012, noted:

“Joice Mujuru was appointed as one of Zimbabwe’s vice-president's at the ZANU-PF congress in December 2004, filling a vacancy created by the death of Simon Muzenda in September 2003. She has taken responsibility for various cabinet portfolios since independence in 1980, most recently as minister of water affairs and infrastructural development. She is the country’s
leading female war veteran and was married to an influential former commander of the Zimbabwe Defence Force (ZDF), Solomon Mujuru, who died in a fire on a farm in August 2011.

“Born in Mount Darwin in 1955, she joined the liberation struggle in the early 1970s while still at school, and fought as a soldier for the Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA). She rapidly rose through ZANLA’s ranks to become a member of the organisation’s leadership and commander of ZANLA’s women's force. In this period she married Mujuru, a fellow Zezuru (Shona), who led the ZANLA forces. General Mujuru, or Rex Nhongo as he was known during the liberation war, retired from the ZDF in 1992, but was still a member of ZANU-PF’s Politburo and Central Committee. He became absorbed in business ventures, while Joice furthered her career in government.

“Having been re-appointed vice-president along with Joseph Msika (who died in August 2009) in the unity government that included the two Movement for Democratic Change formations in 2009, Mujuru remains well-placed to continue exerting influence. Nevertheless, following Solomon Mujuru's death, there was speculation among observers that succession jostling could intensify and that his death may lend more strength to the harder-line factions. The Mujuru faction has been considered more moderate-minded, in terms of working with the MDC-T.

“Joice Mujuru was meanwhile among those who raised questions about her husband's death. Although an inquest concluded in March 2012 that no foul play was proven, the Mujuru family, likely many among the public, are left with unanswered questions amid the lack of clarity over how the fire started, among other issues. The Mujurus had previously wanted a second post-mortem to be conducted by a South African pathologist, and it seems likely that the late general's death will remain the subject of suspicion for some within the country despite the inquest’s verdict.” [90n] (Political leadership)

**Vice President John Nkomo**

“John Landa Nkomo, born in August 1934, is one of the relatively few Ndebele functionaries in the ruling party. He is a cousin of another late vice-president, Joshua Nkomo, who had his major support base in Matebeleland. John Nkomo was born in the same area and became a teacher there in the 1960s.

“After clashing with the Rhodesian authorities, he became seriously interested in politics, joining Bishop Abel Muzorewa's African National Council (ANC) in the early 1970s. Having made his mark as a party administrator, Nkomo was made minister of state in the deputy prime minister's office on independence in 1980. He had been elected as a Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) member of parliament in a Matabeleland constituency at the pre-independence elections. In 1988, following ZAPU's merger with the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), Nkomo became minister of labour and, in 1995, minister of local government and rural development. In 1997 his rural development portfolio was replaced with housing.

“Nkomo was elected national chairperson of the ZANU-PF National People's Congress in 1999. After the June 2000 general election, Mugabe appointed him minister of home affairs with responsibility for the Zimbabwe Republic Police. However, in the cabinet reshuffle of August 2002, Mugabe moved Nkomo to the president's office, where he was responsible for special affairs. In a February 2004 reshuffle, he was additionally given responsibility for overseeing the land redistribution programme. Following the March 2005 legislative elections, he was elected as speaker of parliament.
“Nkomo was appointed minister of state in the new unity government cabinet in 2009. He subsequently became one of Zimbabwe's two vice-president's in December that year after Joseph Msika's death earlier in August 2009.” (Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment, Zimbabwe, updated 18 April 2012) [90n] (Political leadership)

Prime Minister Morgan Tsvangirai

“Morgan Tsvangirai, the original president of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), was born to a Karanga (Shona) family on 10 March 1952 in Gutu in Buhera District, southern Manicaland, in what was then Southern Rhodesia. After his first full-time job at a textile mill in Umtali (now Mutare), Tsvangirai moved to a nickel mine in Bindura, where he worked as a supervisor and became a miners’ union organiser. Tsvangirai successfully served as a negotiator during a strike in 1980, was elected to the executive of the mining union in 1983, became the union's vice-president two years later and general secretary of the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) in 1988. Tsvangirai became disappointed with the lack of democracy in the country and, shortly after persuading the ZCTU to cut ties with the ZANU-PF government, he led the country's first general strike in 1997, an event that shook both the government and country. Tsvangirai and the rest of ZCTU leadership threw their weight behind the opposition movement working for a new and more democratic constitution during 1998-1999, an effort that gave birth, in September 1999, to the founding of the MDC, an opposition party, backed by the ZCTU.

“The MDC, led by Tsvangirai, spearheaded the successful 'no' vote to the government's constitutional proposals in a referendum held in February 2000. The MDC won 57 of 120 elective seats in the parliamentary election of June 2000, the largest number ever captured by an opposition party in Zimbabwe. Tsvangirai unsuccessfully stood against Mugabe in the March 2002 presidential election that was declared as neither free nor fair by election observers.

“The Mugabe government brought Tsvangirai to court in February 2003 on charges of treason, based on a television interview, conducted in Canada, that allegedly implied that the MDC leader was conspiring to have Mugabe assassinated in the run-up to the 2002 presidential election. In early June 2003, while this trial progressed, new charges of treason relating to an MDC-sponsored general strike and calls for mass protests - were brought against him.

“In October 2004 Tsvangirai was acquitted on the first treason charge and his passport was returned. However, he still had to stand trial on the second treason charge. His immediate action was to commence an international tour of Southern and West African and European states to lobby for free and fair legislative elections in Zimbabwe in March 2005. In August 2005, the second treason charge against him was also dropped. In the 2005 parliamentary election, however, the MDC lost significant ground to ZANU-PF, winning only 41 seats.

“By late 2005, there were severe divisions within the MDC over whether the party should participate in the November Senate election. It led to a party split, with the pro-Senate faction (MDC-M) appointing Arthur Mutambara as its leader in February 2006. Tsvangirai was later re-elected president unopposed by his faction (MDC-T) during the March MDC Congress.

“In the 2008 elections, the MDC-T and Tsvangirai scored victories over ZANU-PF, taking the lead in the National Assembly and first-round presidential poll. However, Tsvangirai subsequently boycotted the June election run-off, with Mugabe retaining the presidency. Increased regional criticism of the government and pressure for negotiation led to the signing of a power-sharing deal in September 2008, although the inclusive government was not formed until February 2009 owing to months of division and deadlock between the rivals over issues
such as the division of ministries. Tsvangirai was subsequently appointed prime minister on 11 February 2009.

“By late 2009, a lack of resolution of outstanding issues agreed under the power-sharing deal had already led Tsvangirai and his MDC-T to temporarily disengage from cabinet, but the government of 'national unity' remained in place into 2012 despite ongoing tensions. Tsvangirai has reiterated that credible elections need to be predicated by reforms, as ZANU-PF seeks to hold elections in 2012.” (Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment, Zimbabwe, updated 18 April 2012) [90n] (Political leadership)
Annex D

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AI
CEDAW
CPJ
EU
FCO
FGM
FH
GDP
HIV/AIDS
HRW
ICG
ICRC
IDP
IMF
IOM
MSF
NGO
OCHA
RSF
STD
STC
TB
TI
UN
UNAIDS
UNESCO
UNHCR
UNICEF
USAID
USSD
WFP
WHO

Amnesty International
Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
Committee to Protect Journalists
European Union
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (UK)
Female Genital Mutilation
Freedom House
Gross Domestic Product
Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
Human Rights Watch
International Crisis Group
International Committee for Red Cross
Internally Displaced Person
International Monetary Fund
International Organisation for Migration
Médecins sans Frontières
Non-Governmental Organisation
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
Reporteurs sans Frontières
Sexually Transmitted Disease
Save The Children
Tuberculosis
Transparency International
United Nations
Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
United Nations Children’s Fund
United States Agency for International Development
United States State Department
World Food Programme
World Health Organization
Annex E – Foreign and Commonwealth Office interviews

The following notes are of interviews undertaken by the First Secretary (Migration Delivery Officer), British Embassy, Harare, in August 2011 with five local non government organisations: Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe, Women’s Action Group, Women of Zimbabwe Arise, Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights and CONNECT – the Zimbabwe Institute for Systemic Therapy. The notes of the interviews were approved by the interlocutors in September and October 2011.

The interviews were undertaken to provide information about the situation of gay, lesbian and bisexual people in Zimbabwe for a country guidance case being considered by the UK Immigration and Asylum Chamber, Upper Tribunal.

Each interview note is prologued by a covering letter from the First Secretary, explaining which organisation was contacted and why.

All text below, with the exception of the main headings and information in square brackets, is taken from the cover letters and notes provided by the First Secretary. Not all of the questions asked were answered by the interlocutors.

COVER LETTER AND INTERVIEW WITH GAYS AND LESBIANS OF ZIMBABWE (GALZ)

[Details of First Secretary’s address and addressee redacted.]

4 October 2011

[Redacted]

On 21 July [redacted] commissioned me to consult local organisations about the current situation of gay, lesbian and bisexual (LGB) persons in Zimbabwe for use in a UK court case.

The following is a note of an interview with representatives of Gays and Lesbian of Zimbabwe (GALZ) based on a list of questions supplied by Country of Origin Information Service, part of the UK Border Agency. GALZ is generally acknowledged as the primary gay support and advocacy organisation in Zimbabwe.

Yours sincerely

[Redacted]
First Secretary
Migration Delivery Office

Interviewee/source: Gay and Lesbians of Zimbabwe - GALZ
Role/title: Director and Gender Programme Officer
Organisation: Gay and Lesbians of Zimbabwe - GALZ
Date of interview: Wednesday 3 August 2011
Interviewer/author: [redacted], 1st Secretary British Embassy, Harare
The following note is based on information provided from the above named source during the above specified interview(s). The note is based on discussions on the identified themes set out below. This note is not a verbatim account of the interview but the author(s) considers it reflects accurately the information provided.

The note has been shared with the source and approved by them. The identified interviewee/source is aware that the information provided may be used in the refugee status determination process in the United Kingdom, and is content for this note to be placed in the public domain and used as a source of Country of Origin Information (COI).

1. Background

[Redacted] is the First Secretary Migration based at the British Embassy, Harare, Zimbabwe since October 2010. On 21 July [redacted] was asked by the UK Border Agency Country of Origin Information Service (COIS) to provide responses to a number of questions on the current situation for homosexuals in Zimbabwe. [Redacted] contacted GALZ who are generally acknowledged as the primary gay support and advocacy organisation in Zimbabwe, and provided them with the list of questions sent by COIS. GALZ agreed to an interview with [redacted] at the GALZ office in Harare on Wednesday 3 August 2011.

The following is an agreed record of the question and answer discussion that took place on 3 August 2011.

GALZ asked that individual officers not be named and be referred to by their posts only

2. Interview Record

1  Sodomy in Zimbabwe is only defined in relation to men, have any lesbians been arrested/harassed on this basis?

GALZ responded that the law as it stands is defined towards men, and there is no reference to sexual acts towards women. The law however targets all same-sex relationships as it speaks of ‘unnatural acts’, and is used primarily for harassment.

2  Have there been any convictions for sodomy? – 2009, 2010 & 2011

GALZ responded that there have been a number of cases, mainly with reference to the rape of minors, but no cases of consenting adults. In 2010 there was a case in Bindura where a male gay couple were reported to the police by their landlady. The couple were subsequently acquitted. GALZ do not hold specific records on convictions, but felt that Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR) might have the figures.

3  GALZ has provided legal assistance and support – Do we have any stats on this? How many individuals they have provided legal assistance to etc?

GALZ receive reports of harassment, threats of, and actual arrests from their members, and GALZ then put them in touch with legal representatives, including ZLHR who they have worked with for the past two years. GALZ does have a consultant lawyer who specialises in advising members on blackmail issues.
GALZ normally provides services to its membership only but will consider taking up a case from a non-member, with their agreement if it has potential as a test case.

4. Do we have any evidence on Zimbabwean police using the threat of arrest to harass gays and lesbians? Numbers?

GALZ responded that they receive around 3 to 4 cases a month from members, mainly threats of arrest and actual police detention of up to 48 hours without charge. It is not unusual that family members will report gay family members to the police.

5. Arrests of gay people – random or do we know more about it? Figures for male? Female?

GALZ responded that in the last two years this has increased and cuts across both males and females. When there is a public statement, there tends to be an increase in harassment. Patriotic days such as the forthcoming Hero’s Day can lead to an increase in acts of harassment.

GALZ responded that acts of harassment tend to be more random than directed.

GALZ responded that in 2010 the GALZ offices were raided by the police with search warrants searching for drugs and pornography. Two employees were arrested and computers, banners and other material was (sic) seized. GALZ suspected the police were particularly interested in the GALZ membership list. The Director of GALZ’s home was also searched whilst he was away. The two employees were subsequently acquitted, but the seized material is yet to be returned, and there remain threats from the police that they will resume their investigation. The incident led to a number of the GALZ membership move into hiding for fear their association with GALZ become public.

6. There have been recent negative comments from the President and other leading figures concerning Gays and Lesbians – What impact, if any does this have on public attitudes towards gays and lesbians in ZWE?

GALZ responded that these can tend to work people up to anti gay attitudes, but can also generate support as an unintended outcome, such as the President’s comments in 1995 that led to a significant increase in black GALZ membership. Before then GALZ was a mainly white organisation, but now the majority (99%) are black.

7. Any high profile gay cases in Zimbabwe now proceeding through the courts?

GALZ responded that there none at the moment. GALZ had hoped that the case of the VP John Nkomo who was accused with sodomy in 2009, would have been a good high-profile test case but the case was dropped by the state.

8. Any convictions for non state agents who have perpetrated violence/hate crime on gays and lesbians?

GALZ responded that they were not aware of any convictions for hate crimes reported by homosexual complainants. GALZ believe these are often encouraged by the State. Even when hate crimes against homosexuals are reported to the police, the police attitude is that the complainant deserved it for being gay, and no action is taken.

9. How many reported incidents in the last year?

268 The main text of this COI Report contains the most up to date publicly available information as at 6 June 2012. Further brief information on recent events and reports has been provided in the Latest News section to 13 July 2012.
GALZ responded that they have no figures available on this. The GALZ members are felt to be running out of steam for fear of further harassment.

GALZ responded that there was a case in 2010 where five gay complainants were arrested and charged with disorderly conduct. ZLHR represented the case and obtained an acquittal.

10. Any convictions for family members who have perpetrated violence/hate crime/honour killings on gays and lesbians?
GALZ responded that they were not aware of any such convictions.

11. Any stats or further info in relation to rape as a method of ‘curing’ sexual orientation – both gays and lesbians as targets? Which areas? Any convictions for those non state agents who have raped gays or lesbians in order to ‘cure’ sexual orientation?
GALZ responded that GALZ members have reported few such cases, usually at the counselling stage, but the members have not sought to progress the complaint further. GALZ felt there might be an increase in such cases as a cross-cultural “ripple effect” from South Africa where there were such cases. GALZ were aware of two Zimbabweans “curatively” raped in South Africa in the last two years, but believe no further action was taken.

GALZ responded that GALZ have working level links with other organisations such as the Coalition of African Lesbians and For the Emancipation of Women based in South Africa.

12. Are there any shelters for victims of violence who are gay/lesbians?
GALZ responded that there were no shelters available. GALZ sought to engage with Musasa, an organisation in Zimbabwe who provides shelters for women victims of gender based violence two years ago. Musasa were however reluctant to become involved with lesbian/gay cases possibly for fear it would raise their profile and attract harassment.

13. Open gay scene? Which areas? Level of violence?
GALZ responded that there is an open gay scene, often where homosexuals will claim certain spaces, mainly in the urban areas, but the degree and level of openness may vary with the location. GALZ believed that Bulawayo had a more vibrant homosexual scene than Harare, and was significantly more relaxed towards open homosexuality, possibly because of its proximity to South Africa.

GALZ responded that GALZ were aware of the underground gay scene, but felt it was more isolated with fewer contacts.

15. Where are the gay/lesbian clubs/bars located?
GALZ responded that these tend to change but are mainly in the urban areas, and are often the bars used by younger people, who are generally more tolerant of the gay scene. Most bars used by the open gay community are straight bars where the owner has welcomed or at least made space available for gays to meet.

16. Do we know if there is any violence in and around these bars/clubs regularly?
GALZ responded that there are isolated incidents of violence, especially around times of national days when there are likely to be anti gay comments by public figures. Most of the gay community will tend to avoid those bars likely to attract violence.
17. Is there any ‘open’ adverts or dating agencies for gays/lesbians? - What is the public perception for this?
GALZ responded that GALZ were clear that this did not happen in Zimbabwe. The gay community in Zimbabwe made use of on-line agencies and social networking sites.

18. Any information on Gay material/magazines and its publication? Where distributed? How many copies sold?
GALZ responded that GALZ publishes Galzette and Whassup for its membership regularly. They believed there were no other local gay magazines as such but that information and research material would be exchanged between their members.

19. Any information on the size and influence, impact of GALZ?
GALZ responded that GALZ were formed in 1990 with a mainly white membership, but following the President’s anti gay comments in 1995 towards GALZ, their black membership increased, and currently varies between 300 and 500 members.

GALZ responded that GALZ are involved in advocacy and lobby for gay issues at a national level, and in particular seeking the insertion of a submission on gay rights into the national constitution, and which is proving particularly problematic.

GALZ responded that GALZ have a number of constructive programmes and have sought to work in collaboration with other civil society groups.

20. Any information on the size, influence, impact of GAY ZIM?
GALZ responded that they believed GAYZIM, an on-line gay forum founded by ex GALZ membership was no longer active since its founder had left for South Africa. GAYZIM was primarily a social forum rather than an activist group.

21. How regularly are gay/lesbian campaigns/demonstrations held? Where held? How many people? What is the response from police/government?
GALZ responded that they have not held any demonstrations on its own, but have participated in activity co-ordinated by other civil society groups, particularly with the Crisis Coalition, the Women’s Coalition and The Musasa Project.

GALZ responded that GALZ have been targeted during such activity; in 2010 GALZ members took part in a “16 Days of Activism” event at the sexual rights centre in Bulawayo. The police threatened to stop the march if GALZ, clothed in pink took part. GALZ eventually agreed to withdraw and the march was permitted to take place.

22. Are the younger generation more accepting of gays/lesbians?
GALZ responded that they agreed this was the case and referred to their response to question 15.

23. Is there any distinction made in public attitude between transgender individuals and gay/lesbians?
GALZ responded that they had started to have a few members come out as transgender rather than gay. They cited the case of a male to female transgender individual who had come out in the conservative province of Masvingo and whose family were seeking to come to terms with the transition.
GALZ responded that even within the gay community there was a lack of understanding of transgender issues, and they chose not to focus a great deal on it to avoid confusion and keep their message simple.

GALZ responded that they felt however that there was possible a more favourable public perception towards transgender individuals than towards gays.

24 Are there any discussion forums publically or on TV/Radio on gay/lesbian issues? GALZ responded that there used to be more in the 1990s with Radio 1.

GALZ responded that there were a few programmes on the vernacular stations; particularly with a presenter Tilda Moyo who has addressed homosexual issues on her radio programmes. Other stations such as Power FM generally presented a negative image of gay issues.

GALZ responded that the public reaction tends to come from ignorance and a lack of information. There were however some callers who understood the issues and were tolerant, but these were in the minority.

GALZ responded that the negative religious message seemed to be driving the message, particularly with the current Anglican Church issues in Zimbabwe and the church position on same sex marriages.

25 Is it socially acceptable for two men to live together? Or do they experience societal discrimination as perceived gays? GALZ responded that it really depended on where the people were living. They felt it could be more difficult for those living in the high density areas where there was more concentrated interest on activities by neighbours.

GALZ responded that the age of the men might be relevant, as men expected to marry early, around 22, so there would be speculation as to why they were not yet married.

26 Is it socially acceptable for two women to live together? Or do they experience societal discrimination as perceived lesbians? GALZ thought this might be slightly more acceptable and women were seen as have much closer relationships with female friends.

27 Is a manly appearance a risk factor for those that may be perceived to be lesbians? GALZ responded that GALZ thought it would because they become a target and exposed them to men who were attracted to butch women, out of either a sense of curiosity or to assert dominance. Where the woman was known to be gay, or sought to resist then a possible “curative” element might come in to play.

28 In general, is it correct that younger women who are not yet settled may be at less risk, does the risk increases with age? GALZ responded that they thought that the risk did increase with age.

29 Do we know roughly how many lesbians have ‘come out’, numbers who have faced societal discrimination as a result? Any harm by state actors/police etc? and

30 Any information on whether open or perceived lesbians are at risk thorough Zimbabwe?
GALZ responded that it was difficult to measure but estimated that of possibly 150 lesbian members in GALZ, around 60% had “come out”. Most of these were students, the middle class, or professionals.

GALZ responded that a large number of women involved in sports, and in particular soccer were more open about their lesbianism within the sporting community where it was acknowledged and more tolerated.

GALZ responded that that there was increased risk, particularly from the “ripple effect” of South African attacks on perceived lesbians, and especially towards those presenting as butch. Often family members took the lead either seeking detention of partners, or taking daughters to traditional healers to cure their homosexuality.

GALZ responded that family honour was an issue, particularly where there were expectations of marriage, white weddings and children from the family.

31 While the greatest risk is in the metropolitan areas, outside the cities does gossip about a woman with no children or male friends (unless there is an obvious good reason) entails risk? Or additional risk?

GALZ responded that that there was not very much interaction with gay groups in rural areas. However GALZ felt for those that had grown up in the rural area there was a greater acceptance of a person’s homosexuality

32 Do we have any information on those who are naturally discrete, have children and/or are willing to present a heterosexual narrative for family or societal reasons? Whether they may live as discrete lesbians without persecutory risk, provided that they are not doing so out of fear?

GALZ responded that it was more acceptable for lesbians who could present a heterosexual narrative – particularly as women’s friendships were often perceived to be very close.

33 Single women with no male partner or children – what do we know about their risk of being perceived as lesbian? Are they at risk unless they present a heterosexual narrative and behave with discretion?

GALZ responded that they would be at risk dependent upon age and appearance – repeating that those of butch appearance would be at greater risk.

34 If a woman has no male friends, what is the reaction of local men? Would their actions indicate their availability and would their reactions to rejection be unpredictable? Or violent? Does it range between walking away and violence and even murder?

GALZ responded that that society perceived single women above a certain age or single mothers as possible prostitutes. If they then rejected the advances of men who expected sexual relations, they would then be perceived as lesbians and therefore at increased risk.

GALZ responded that some single women and lesbians developed male friends that acted as “escorts” or “partners” to deflect criticism or attention whilst out. Whilst this was often an effective tactic, GALZ said there were reports of such male friends attempting assault, usually fuelled by alcohol or drug use.

35 Could jobs be lost and people driven out of their homes if they were perceived to be gay or lesbian?
GALZ responded that this was definitely the case and they were aware of a number of such cases but could not provide figures. They said that rarely did a person lose a job on explicitly homosexual grounds, but often another reason was offered such as inefficiency. Trade Unions had said they would be prepared to represent such cases but few people chose to take up this route.

GALZ responded that it was common for openly gay couples to be forced from their accommodation with little legal recourse.

36 Do we have any information on whether rejection of suitors – whether this would be a risk factor?
GALZ responded that there would be an increased risk factor in these circumstances and could be compounded by the age and appearance (if particularly butch) of the woman.

37 Because the risks arise from perceived as well as actual lesbian sexual orientation, does internal relocation enhance safety or not?
GALZ responded that this was not necessarily an option. GALZ said that the homosexual’s home communities were often more accepting of their sexuality and discrete sexual activity. When a person moved into a new area, and in particular high density areas, there was often less tolerance and potentially increased risk.

38 Do we know whether newcomers in rural communities will be the subject of speculative conclusions, derived both by asking them questions and by observing their lifestyle and unless they can show a heterosexual narrative, will they risk being identified as lesbians? Or gays?
GALZ responded that any new arrival to a rural area would attract attention, and that their sexual orientation would become a topic of speculation unless a specific heterosexual narrative was established.

39 Are women expected to become sexually active early and remain so into their sixties, unless there is an obvious reason why they do not currently have a partner such as recent widowhood?
GALZ responded that this was the case; that women were expected to become sexually active at a young age (around 16-18) if they had a steady or regular partner. Those that were not, with no clear reason would be viewed as unusual. Similarly women who were sexually active with a number of partners could face social stigma as promiscuous.

40 What about men? Are they expected to be sexually active at an early age?
GALZ responded that men were expected to become sexually active at an even younger age, from their early teens and to be sexually active for a longer period

41 What is the treatment of men who appear single for a long period of time and do not form sexual relationships?
GALZ responded that they would be viewed as strange by the community they lived in; that there was something wrong with them. GALZ said that whilst possible, it was not certain that their sexuality would be speculated upon.

42 Are members of the social elite better protected because they are able to live in gated communities where their activities are not the subject of public scrutiny?
GALZ responded that this very much the case that such accommodation afforded a degree of privacy not found in most communities.
The main text of this COI Report contains the most up to date publicly available information as at 6 June 2012. Further brief information on recent events and reports has been provided in the Latest News section to 13 July 2012.

GALZ responded that on a smaller scale, as gay individual's economic position improved, they could move out of their family home, and into rented accommodation that allowed them a greater degree of privacy.

The above has been seen and agreed by the Director of Gay and Lesbians of Zimbabwe (GALZ) as an accurate record of the discussion that took place on Wednesday 3 August 2011, and may be disclosed in full to assist the Upper Tribunal of the Immigration Asylum Chamber in hearing a Country Guidance case on the risk to gays and lesbians in Zimbabwe.

Date record was agreed: 3 October 2011

COVERING LETTER AND INTERVIEW WITH WOMEN’S ACTION GROUP (WAG)

[Details of First Secretary’s address and addressee redacted.]

12 October 2011

On 21 July [redacted] commissioned me to consult local organisations about the current situation of gay, lesbian and bisexual (LGB) persons in Zimbabwe for use in a UK court case.

The following are notes of an interview with representatives of Women’s Action Group (WAG) based on a list of questions supplied by Country of Origin Information Service, part of the UK Border Agency. I was advised by Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe (GALZ) to speak to WAG who are a leading women’s rights support and advocacy organisation in Zimbabwe.

Yours sincerely

[redacted]
First Secretary
Migration Delivery Office

Interviewee/source: Women’s Action Group - WAG
Role/title: Programme Officer
Organisation: Women’s Action Group - WAG
Date of interview: 19 August 2011
Interviewer/author: [redacted], 1st Secretary British Embassy, Harare

The following note is based on information provided from the above named source during the above specified interview(s). The note is based on discussions on the identified themes set out below. This note is not a verbatim account of the interview but the author(s) considers it reflects accurately the information provided. The note has been shared with the source and approved by them. The identified interviewee/source is aware that the information provided may be used in the refugee status determination process in the United Kingdom, and is content for this note to be placed in the public domain and used as a source of Country of Origin Information (COI).

1. Background

[Redacted] is the First Secretary Migration based at the British Embassy, Harare, Zimbabwe since October 2010. On [redacted] was asked by the UK Border Agency Country of Origin Information Service (COIS) to provide responses to a number of questions on the current
situation for homosexuals in Zimbabwe. [Redacted] contacted WAG (Women’s Action Group) an organization which advocates for gender issues in Zimbabwe and holds Special Consultative Status with United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).

The following is an agreed record of the question and answer meeting that took place on 19 August 2011

WAG asked that individual officers not be named and be referred to by their posts only.

2. Interview Record

1. Sodomy in Zimbabwe is only defined in relation to men, have any lesbians been arrested/harassed on this basis?

2. Have there been any convictions for sodomy (2009, 2010 & 2011)?

3. GALZ has provided legal assistance and support. Do they have any stats on this? How many individuals they have provided legal assistance to etc.

4. Do we have any evidence on the Zimbabwean police using the threat of arrest to harass gays and lesbians? If possible, an indication of the numbers would be helpful.

5. Arrests of gay people; random or do we know more about it? If possible, provide figures for male and female arrests.

6. There have been recent negative comments from the President and other leading figures concerning Gays and Lesbians. What impact, if any, does this have on public attitudes towards gays and lesbians in ZWE?

7. Are there any high profile gay cases in Zimbabwe now proceeding through the courts?

8. Have there been any convictions for non state agents who have perpetrated violence/hate crimes against gays and lesbians?

9. How many reported incidents of violence/hate crimes against gays and lesbians have there been in the last year?

10. Has there been any convictions for family members who have perpetrated violence/hate crime/honour killings against gays and lesbians?

11. Any stats or further info in relation to rape as a method of ‘curing’ sexual orientation? Are both gays and lesbians targets? Are there any specific areas where this might happen? Has there been any convictions for those non state agents who have raped gays or lesbians in order to ‘cure’ sexual orientation?

12. Are there any shelters for victims of violence who are gay/lesbians?

13. Is there an open gay scene in Zimbabwe? Which areas?

14. Is the gay scene more underground than open? If so, what areas of Zimbabwe?
15 Where are gay and lesbian clubs/bars located?

16 Do we know if there is any violence in and around these bars/clubs? If there is any violence, is this sporadic or regular?

17 Are there any ‘open’ adverts or dating agencies for gays/lesbians? What is the public perception for this?

18 Is there any information on Gay material/magazines and its publication? Where are they distributed, and how many copies are distributed?

19 Any information on the size and influence, impact of GALZ?
WAG responded that from the information they have, there are very few lesbians as part of WAG. WAG was aware that GALZ have been involved in lobbying COPAC (the Zimbabwean Select Committee of Parliament on the New Constitution) to get sexual orientation on the constitution.

20 Any information on the size, influence, impact of GAY ZIM?

21 How regularly are gay/lesbian campaigns/demonstrations held? Where are these held? How many people have attended? What is the response from police/government?

22 Are the younger generation more accepting of gays/lesbians?
WAG responded that they felt the younger generation has become more accepting of gays and lesbians despite social backgrounds. There were however a number of influences upon young people including church, school, and society that frowned upon homosexuality, bringing with it a fear of family and social ostracism.

23 Is there any distinction made in public attitude between transgender individuals and gay/lesbians?

24 Are there any discussion forums publicly on TV/Radio about gay/lesbian issues?
WAG responded that this was not the case, and that it would be very unlikely to have any public discussion of homosexuality in the Zimbabwean media unless the discussion is on attacking the group.

25 Is it socially acceptable for two men to live together? Would they experience societal discrimination as perceived gays?
WAG responded that it would be quite acceptable for two men to live together, and would generally be seen as two men providing support for each other, such as widowers or men from the same community in a strange town. It would not normally be questioned.

26 Is it socially acceptable for two women to live together? Would they experience societal discrimination as perceived lesbians?
WAG responded that it would be not normally be questioned, and would generally be viewed as women supporting a relative or a friend. It would not be unusual for a woman to live with an aunt or sister, and socially it would be condoned as offering support and care. If however the relationship became overtly lesbian, possibly through public demonstration of affection that went beyond the support role, then it is possible attitudes might become more critical.
27 Is a manly appearance a risk factor for those that may be perceived to be lesbians? WAG responded that this was not the case. Zimbabwean women often had short hair, wore jeans and other masculine clothing. However as young women passed their late teens, they would be expected to settle down and conform; a masculine appearance would not normally suggest a woman was a lesbian or place her at greater risk.

28 In general, are younger women who are not yet settled more at risk; does the risk increases with age? WAG responded by stating that generally Zimbabwean society was more supportive of single women, and would seek to address a problem rather than to criticise. Women now go to school up to University level and may remain single till they complete their education. In the olden days if a woman was 25 and remained single or appeared uninterested in men, it might be ascribed to a problem in the women’s ancestral background and traditional elders would be consulted. The woman’s aunts would traditionally be expected to take the lead in helping the woman, with the wider support of her family. The single woman would rarely be perceived as a lesbian unless she demonstrated over homosexual behaviour.

29 Do we know roughly how many lesbians have ‘come out’, numbers who have faced societal discrimination as a result? Any harm by state actors/police etc?

30 Is there any information about whether open or perceived lesbians are at risk in Zimbabwe? WAG responded that as an organisation they felt openly gay individuals were at risk in Zimbabwe. By this they explained that overt homosexuality was not tolerated within Zimbabwe society or culture. Gays were likely to be denied access to healthcare and other services, and were at increased risk from HIV/AIDs.

31 While the greatest risk is in the metropolitan areas, outside the cities does gossip about a woman with no children or male friends (unless there is an obvious good reason) entails risk, or additional risk? WAG responded that single women can live alone in the village and the village people do not generally suspect any lesbianism.

32 Is there any information about lesbians who are naturally discrete, have children and/or are willing to present a heterosexual narrative for family or societal reasons? Whether they are able to live as discrete lesbians without persecutory risk, provided that they are not doing so out of fear? WAG responded that this was possible, as long as the husband remained unaware of the lesbian activity.

33 With regard to single women with no male partner or children: what is known about their risk of being perceived as lesbian? Are they at risk unless they present a heterosexual narrative and behave with discretion? WAG responded that there was little risk if they did not present openly homosexual behaviour.

34 If a woman has no male friends, what is the reaction of local men? Would it be assumed by the wider community that a lack of male friends suggest that a woman is sexually ‘available’? Would a rejection of advances by men be accepted or is there a chance of a violent response? What type of response would women get - would she be able to walk away, or would there be a likelihood of violence or even murder?
WAG responded that it was likely single women would attract sexual advances from men, but that men would quickly lose interest if the advances were rebuffed. In some cases the men might become verbally abusive, but little more. In a few cases the men might remain friends with the woman after rebuff, but that this was not the norm.

35 Is it likely that someone would lose their job and be asked/forced to leave their home if they were perceived to be gay or lesbian?
It is very likely that this would happen. Zimbabwe remains strongly rooted in cultural belief. Within African societies, homosexuality is a taboo. If anyone is found to be homosexual, they would be harassed or persecuted. Even if there is no persecution or harassment, there is likely to be isolation

36 Do we have any information on whether rejection of suitors by single women would be a risk factor?
WAG responded that this was possible but unlikely and would depend upon the circumstances such as whether alcohol or drug abuse had occurred. WAG said they were aware of the phenomena of curative rape, and that it occurred throughout African culture; that sexual intercourse with a virgin was believed, for example to be a cure for epilepsy and HIV/AIDS. WAG was not aware of specific cases of corrective rape in Zimbabwe, but was aware of press reporting of the phenomena in South Africa.

37 Because the risks arise from perceived as well as actual lesbian sexual orientation, does internal relocation enhance safety or not?

38 Are newcomers in rural communities subject to speculation about their sexuality (derived from asking questions and observation)? In this case would they be at risk of being identified as lesbians or gays?

39 Are women expected to become sexually active early and remain so into their sixties, unless there is an obvious reason why they do not currently have a partner such as recent widowhood?
WAG responded that they felt Zimbabwe remained conservative with their expectations of sexual cultural norms. A woman was expected to be a virgin upon marriage, and that if not it would have significant implications upon the “lobola” (bride price) her family could expect. WAG felt the general marriageable age of a woman was 16 to 25, but that in some rural societies they could be expected to marry once the girl completed grade 7 schooling aged around 13. were traditionally expected to become sexually inactive after menopause, but felt that this was beginning to change and that women were seeking to remain sexually active beyond the menopause.

40 What about men? Are they expected to be sexually active at an early age?
WAG responded that men were expected to become sexually active from an early age and to remain sexually active until old age as a demonstration of strength and power. It was not unusual for a prominent man to have a “woman in the small house” (a mistress). Boys and young men that appeared to lack sexual appetite would be looked after by their uncles, who might seek the assistance of traditional healers who would undertake manhood tests on the boy.

41 What is the treatment of men who appear single for a long period of time and do not form sexual relationships?
42 Are members of the social elite better protected because they are able to live in gated communities where their activities are not the subject of public scrutiny?

The above has been seen and agreed by WAG as an accurate record of the interview that took place on 19 August 2011, and may be disclosed in full to assist the Upper Tribunal of the Immigration and Asylum Chamber in a Country Guidance case on the risk to gays and lesbians in Zimbabwe.

Date record was agreed: 3 October 2011

COVERING LETTER AND INTERVIEW WITH WOMEN OF ZIMBABWE ARISE (WOZA)

[Details of First Secretary’s address and addressee redacted.]

5 October 2011

On 21 July [redacted] commissioned me to consult local organisations about the current situation of gay, lesbian and bisexual (LGB) persons in Zimbabwe for use in a UK court case.

The following are notes of an interview with representatives of Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA) based on a list of questions supplied by Country of Origin Information Service, part of the UK Border Agency. I was advised by Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe (GALZ) to speak to WOZA who are a leading women’s rights support and advocacy organisation in Zimbabwe.

Yours sincerely

[redacted]
First Secretary
Migration Delivery Office

Interviewee/source: WOZA – Women of Zimbabwe Arise

Role/title: Programme Director
Organisation: WOZA – Women of Zimbabwe Arise
Date of interview: Tuesday 23 August 2011
Interviewer/author: [redacted], 1st Secretary British Embassy, Harare

The following note is based on information provided from the above named source during the above specified interview(s). The note is based on discussions on the identified themes set out below. This note is not a verbatim account of the interview but the author(s) considers it reflects accurately the information provided. The note has been shared with the source and approved by them. The identified interviewee/source is aware that the information provided may be used in the refugee status determination process in the United Kingdom, and is content for this note to be placed in the public domain and used as a source of Country of Origin Information (COI).

1. Background

[Redacted] is the First Secretary Migration based at the British Embassy, Harare, Zimbabwe since October 2010. On 21 July [redacted] was asked by the UK Border Agency Country of Origin Information Service (COIS) to provide responses to a number of questions on the current
situation for homosexuals in Zimbabwe. [Redacted] contacted WOZA, the acronym of Women of Zimbabwe Arise, an organisation formed in 2003 with a claimed membership of 75,000. WOZA lobby and advocate on those issues affecting women and their families.

The following is an agreed record of the question and answer interview that took place in Bulawayo on 23 August 2011.

WOZA asked that individual officers not be named and be referred to by their posts only.

2. Interview Record

1. Sodomy in Zimbabwe is only defined in relation to men, have any lesbians been arrested/harassed on this basis?

2. Have there been any convictions for sodomy (2009, 2010 & 2011)?

3. GALZ has provided legal assistance and support. Do they have any stats on this? How many individuals they have provided legal assistance to etc.

4. Do we have any evidence on the Zimbabwean police using the threat of arrest to harass gays and lesbians? If possible, an indication of the numbers would be helpful.

5. Arrests of gay people; random or do we know more about it? If possible, provide figures for male and female arrests.

6. There have been recent negative comments from the President and other leading figures concerning Gays and Lesbians. What impact, if any, does this have on public attitudes towards gays and lesbians in ZWE?

7. Are there any high profile gay cases in Zimbabwe now proceeding through the courts?

8. Have there been any convictions for non state agents who have perpetrated violence/hate crimes against gays and lesbians?

9. How many reported incidents of violence/hate crimes against gays and lesbians have there been in the last year?

10. Has there been any convictions for family members who have perpetrated violence/hate crime/honour killings against gays and lesbians?

11. Any stats or further info in relation to rape as a method of ‘curing’ sexual orientation? Are both gays and lesbians targets? Are there any specific areas where this might happen? Has there been any convictions for those non state agents who have raped gays or lesbians in order to ‘cure’ sexual orientation?

12. Are there any shelters for victims of violence who are gay/lesbians?

13. Is there an open gay scene in Zimbabwe? Which areas?

14. Is the gay scene more underground than open? If so, what areas of Zimbabwe?
15 Where are gay and lesbian clubs/bars located?

16 Do we know if there is any violence in and around these bars/clubs? If there is any violence, is this sporadic or regular?

17 Are there any ‘open’ adverts or dating agencies for gays/lesbians? What is the public perception for this?

18 Is there any information on Gay material/magazines and its publication? Where are they distributed, and how many copies are distributed?

19 Any information on the size and influence, impact of GALZ?

WOZA responded that they were aware of the activities of GALZ but were unable to offer an opinion on their influence.

20 Any information on the size, influence, impact of GAY ZIM?

WOZA responded that they were unaware of GAY ZIM.

21 How regularly are gay/lesbian campaigns/demonstrations held? Where are these held? How many people have attended? What is the response from police/government?

22 Are the younger generation more accepting of gays/lesbians?

WOZA responded that it was difficult to say as most Zimbabweans including younger people were more interested in fundamental issues such as food, housing, education and jobs. Generally Zimbabweans did not tend to openly discuss their sexual activity.

23 Is there any distinction made in public attitude between transgender individuals and gay/lesbians?

24 Are there any discussion forums publically on TV/Radio about gay/lesbian issues?

WOZA responded that as far as they were aware there had not been any such discussions on Zimbabwean TV or radio.

25 Is it socially acceptable for two men to live together? Would they experience societal discrimination as perceived gays?

WOZA responded that generally it would be acceptable for two men to live together, and that it would be assumed they were relatives, friends or from the same village. It would not necessarily be assumed they were homosexual.

26 Is it socially acceptable for two women to live together? Would they experience societal discrimination as perceived lesbians?

WOZA responded that generally it would be acceptable for two women to live together, and that similar to men, it would be assumed they were friends, relatives or from the same village. It would not necessarily be assumed they were homosexual.

27 Is a manly appearance a risk factor for those that may be perceived to be lesbians?

WOZA responded that they did not feel this was the case.
28 In general, are younger women who are not yet settled more at risk, does the risk increases with age?
WOZA responded that perceptions and expectations were changing in Zimbabwe culture, across both urban and rural societies. In the past women would have been expected to marry young and produce a family, but the onset of HIV/AIDS pandemic has seen an increase in young widows or the early death of young women leaving orphaned children. Women were now being encouraged to delay marriage and sexual activity to lessen the risk. WOZA said they had done a great deal of work in the communities educating women on their rights and value in society.

29 Do we know roughly how many lesbians have ‘come out’, numbers who have faced societal discrimination as a result? Any harm by state actors/police etc?

30 Is there any information about whether open or perceived lesbians are at risk in Zimbabwe?
WOZA responded that it depended upon the individual. Whilst they felt that high profile persons perceived to be gay might be at risk from increased interest and speculation in their sexuality primarily in the media, ordinary persons were less likely to be at similar risk or risk of violence.

31 While the greatest risk is in the metropolitan areas, outside the cities does gossip about a woman with no children or male friends (unless there is an obvious good reason) entails risk, or additional risk?
WOZA responded that they did not believe this to be the case.

32 Is there any information about lesbians who are naturally discrete, have children and/or are willing to present a heterosexual narrative for family or societal reasons? Whether they are able to live as discrete lesbians without persecutory risk, provided that they are not doing so out of fear?
WOZA responded that this was a difficult question to answer as Zimbabweans rarely openly discussed their sexual activity. They believed a lesbian woman presenting a heterosexual narrative might be able to avoid speculation.

33 With regard to single women with no male partner or children: what is known about their risk of being perceived as lesbian? Are they at risk unless they present a heterosexual narrative and behave with discretion?
WOZA referred me to their response to question 32.

34 If a woman has no male friends, what is the reaction of local men? Would it be assumed by the wider community that a lack of male friends suggest that a woman is sexually ‘available’? Would a rejection of advances by men be accepted or is there a chance of a violent response? What type of response would women get - would she be able to walk away, or would there be a likelihood of violence or even murder?
WOZA responded that it would depend upon the woman’s activities. If a woman selected a number of sexual partners she might be viewed as promiscuous. It was unlikely any rejection of sexual advances would result in physical violence, but there might be some verbal abuse.

35 Is it likely that someone would lose their job and be asked/forced to leave their home if they were perceived to be gay or lesbian?

WOZA responded that it could depend upon the nature of the employment. If a person were employed in the civil service or in a government job, then it was very possible they might lose
their jobs if their employer became aware the individual was homosexual. It might be less likely in other jobs. WOZA were not aware of a person losing accommodation because of their sexual orientation.

36  Do we have any information on whether rejection of suitors by single women would be a risk factor?
WOZA responded that it would depend upon individual circumstances, but that generally it would be unlikely this would put the women at increased physical risk.

37  Because the risks arise from perceived as well as actual lesbian sexual orientation, does internal relocation enhance safety or not?
WOZA responded that internal relocation from rural to urban locations might be more successful as it would be likely there were larger gay communities in the urban areas. Relocation from urban to rural would be unlikely to succeed as there would no open gay community.

38  Are newcomers in rural communities subject to speculation about their sexuality (derived from asking questions and observation)? In this case would they be at risk of being identified as lesbians or gays?
WOZA responded that the most likely reaction to newcomers to rural areas would be curiosity. They felt it was unlikely speculation would be made upon their sexual orientation.

39  Are women expected to become sexually active early and remain so into their sixties, unless there is an obvious reason why they do not currently have a partner such as recent widowhood?
WOZA responded that Zimbabweans both in the urban and rural areas were becoming more cautious about their sexual activity since the onset of the HIV/AIDS pandemic.

40  What about men? Are they expected to be sexually active at an early age?

41  What is the treatment of men who appear single for a long period of time and do not form sexual relationships?

42  Are members of the social elite better protected because they are able to live in gated communities where their activities are not the subject of public scrutiny?
WOZA responded that there might be more speculation in the media on the sexual orientation of high profile figures and referred to the case of Canaan Banana (the first President of Zimbabwe 1980-1987) that was publically charged with sodomy in 1997 and significantly fell from prominence. WOZA stated that generally Zimbabweans were little concerned with sexual orientation despite the negative statements from prominent Zimbabwean figures, and were more concerned with issues of health, education, employment and the economy.

The above has been seen and agreed by Women of Zimbabwe Arise as an accurate record of the interview that took place on 23 August 2011, and may be disclosed in full to assist the Upper Tribunal of the Immigration Asylum Chamber in hearing a Country Guidance case on the risk to gays and lesbians in Zimbabwe.

Date record was agreed: 5 October 2011
COVERING LETTER AND INTERVIEW WITH ZIMBABWE LAWYERS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

[Details of First Secretary’s address and addressee redacted.]

6 October 2011

On 21 July [redacted] commissioned me to consult local organisations about the current situation of gay, lesbian and bisexual (LGB) persons in Zimbabwe for use in a UK court case.

The following are notes of an interview with representatives of Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR) based on a list of questions supplied by Country of Origin Information Service, part of the UK Border Agency. I was advised by Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe (GALZ) to speak to ZLHR who are a leading legal rights support and advocacy organisation in Zimbabwe.

Yours sincerely

[Redacted]
First Secretary
Migration Delivery Office

Interviewee/source: Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights - ZLHR
Role/title: Director and Gender Programme Officer
Organisation: Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights - ZLHR
Date of interview: Friday 26 August 2011
Interviewer/author: [redacted], 1st Secretary British Embassy, Harare

The following note is based on information provided from the above named source during the above specified interview(s). The note is based on discussions on the identified themes set out below. This note is not a verbatim account of the interview but the author(s) considers it reflects accurately the information provided. The note has been shared with the source and approved by them. The identified interviewee/source is aware that the information provided may be used in the refugee status determination process in the United Kingdom, and is content for this note to be placed in the public domain and used as a source of Country of Origin Information (COI).

Record of Interview

1. Background

[Redacted] is the First Secretary Migration based at the British Embassy, Harare, Zimbabwe since October 2010. On 21 July [redacted] was asked by the UK Border Agency Country of Origin Information Service (COIS) to provide responses to a number of questions on the current situation for homosexuals in Zimbabwe. [Redacted] contacted ZLHR, a legal firm who could provide further details on the legal situation for gays in Zimbabwe. ZLHR agreed to an interview with [redacted] at their Harare offices on Friday 26 August 2011.

The following is an agreed record of the question and answer discussion that took place on 26 August 2011.
ZLHR asked that individual officers not be named and the comments attributed only to an officer with ZLHR.

2. Meeting Record

1. Sodomy in Zimbabwe is only defined in relation to men, have any lesbians been arrested/harassed on this basis?  
ZLHR responded that they were not aware of any cases where lesbians in Zimbabwe have been arrested on this basis. ZLHR said that most cases involved a threat of arrest, but were rarely pursued by the police on sodomy or unnatural acts grounds. ZLHR provided an example of 5 men known to be homosexuals who were arrested in a private home on the basis of criminal nuisance.

2. Have there been any convictions for sodomy (2009, 2010 & 2011)?  
ZLHR responded that they were not aware of any convictions for sodomy in 2009, 2010 or 2011.

3. GALZ and ZLHR has provided legal assistance and support. Do they have any stats on this? How many individuals they have provided legal assistance to etc.  
ZLHR has assisted at least 10 people who have been victimised in this manner.

4. Do we have any evidence on the Zimbabwean police using the threat of arrest to harass gays and lesbians? If possible, an indication of the numbers would be helpful.  
ZLHR responded that the threat of arrest was regularly used to harass both homosexual men and lesbians. ZLHR provided examples of a lesbian who had been threatened with arrest after her family had asked the police to intervene. ZLHR said they were unable to provide exact figures.

5. Arrests of gay people; random or do we know more about it? If possible, provide figures for male and female arrests.  
ZLHR responded that police harassment and arrest of homosexuals was rarely undertaken on a random basis, but more usually as the result of a tip-off. There was no real pattern of who provided such tip offs, but ZLHR were aware of cases where parents and landlords provided information to the police.

6. There have been recent negative comments from the President and other leading figures concerning Gays and Lesbians. What impact, if any, does this have on public attitudes towards gays and lesbians in ZWE?  
ZLHR responded that such comments had significant impacts on public perceptions. The harassment of GALZ was directly associated with comments made by the President. If a person were publicly identified as a homosexual, they could lose public face/credibility.

7. Are there any high profile gay cases in Zimbabwe now proceeding through the courts?  
ZLHR responded that they were not aware of any such cases.

8. Have there been any convictions for non state agents who have perpetrated violence/hate crimes against gays and lesbians?  
ZLHR responded that they were not aware of any such convictions. They believed there was a generally negative public reaction towards homosexuals, that crossed all political hues and it was unlikely the police would take action in these cases.
9 How many reported incidents of violence/hate crimes against gays and lesbians have there been in the last year? ZLHR responded that they were unable to provide figures for such cases.

10 Have there been any convictions for family members who have perpetrated violence/hate crime/honour killings against gays and lesbians? ZLHR responded that they were not aware of any such convictions.

11 Any stats or further info in relation to rape as a method of ‘curing’ sexual orientation? Are both gays and lesbians targets? Are there any specific areas where this might happen? Have there been any convictions for those non state agents who have raped gays or lesbians in order to ‘cure’ sexual orientation? ZLHR responded that they were not aware of any convictions for such cases. They said that victims of rape and sexual violence were generally reluctant to pursue complaints fearing hostile and obstructive police reactions, and even more so if their sexual orientation were made public knowledge.

12 Are there any shelters for victims of violence who are gay/lesbians?

13 Is there an open gay scene in Zimbabwe? Which areas?

14 Is the gay scene more underground than open? If so, what areas of Zimbabwe?

15 Where are gay and lesbian clubs/bars located?

16 Do we know if there is any violence in and around these bars/clubs? If there is any violence, is this sporadic or regular?

17 Are there any ‘open’ adverts or dating agencies for gays/lesbians? What is the public perception for this?

18 Is there any information on Gay material/magazines and its publication? Where are they distributed, and how many copies are distributed?

19 Any information on the size and influence, impact of GALZ? ZLHR were unsure of the overall size of GALZ, but were aware that their profile had grown and they were slightly more visible, working with other human rights organisations.

20 Any information on the size, influence, impact of GAY ZIM?

21 How regularly are gay/lesbian campaigns/demonstrations held? Where are these held? How many people have attended? What is the response from police/government? ZLHR responded that there were very few such demonstrations by gays and lesbians in Zimbabwe, but GALZ did participate in wider demonstrations and protests.

22 Are the younger generation more accepting of gays/lesbians? ZLHR responded that this was not really the case. Whilst the younger generation might be exposed to wider influences through the external media, and more exposure to homosexual lifestyle through satellite TV, there were still strong cultural pressures hostile to homosexuals.
The main text of this COI Report contains the most up to date publicly available information as at 6 June 2012. Further brief information on recent events and reports has been provided in the Latest News section to 13 July 2012.

23 Is there any distinction made in public attitude between transgender individuals and gay/lesbians?

24 Are there any discussion forums publicly on TV/Radio about gay/lesbian issues? ZLHR responded that they were not aware of such discussions on Zimbabwean media, but thought it unlikely.

25 Is it socially acceptable for two men to live together? Would they experience societal discrimination as perceived gays? ZLHR responded that it was not unusual for two men or women to live together, and that they would not necessarily be considered homosexuals. If they were to openly cross-dress or demonstrate homosexual behaviour, then they might attract discrimination.

26 Is it socially acceptable for two women to live together? Would they experience societal discrimination as perceived lesbians? ZLHR responded that it was not unusual for two men or women to live together, and that they would not necessarily be considered homosexuals. If they were to openly cross-dress or demonstrate homosexual behaviour, then they might attract discrimination.

27 Is a manly appearance a risk factor for those that may be perceived to be lesbians? ZLHR responded that this would not necessarily be the case. If the lesbian were very openly cross-dressing then she might attract adverse attention.

28 In general, are younger women who are not yet settled more at risk, does the risk increases with age? ZLHR responded that this was not necessarily the case and that risk increased more with the degree of the openness of the homosexual behaviour.

29 Do we know roughly how many lesbians have ‘come out’, numbers who have faced societal discrimination as a result? Any harm by state actors/police etc? ZLHR responded that openly lesbian women were at risk in Zimbabwe from police and other harassment, detention, and possible physical abuse; they risked losing their jobs and homes; they risked losing their credibility and reputation.

30 Is there any information about whether open or perceived lesbians are at risk in Zimbabwe? ZLHR responded that they considered the homosexuals might find larger gay communities in the larger towns and cities. They felt men tended to move towards the urban areas for work, women tended to remain in their rural areas.

31 While the greatest risk is in the metropolitan areas, outside the cities does gossip about a woman with no children or male friends (unless there is an obvious good reason) entails risk, or additional risk? ZLHR responded that they considered the homosexuals might find larger gay communities in the larger towns and cities. They felt men tended to move towards the urban areas for work, women tended to remain in their rural areas.

32 Is there any information about lesbians who are naturally discrete, have children and/or are willing to present a heterosexual narrative for family or societal reasons? Whether they are able to live as discrete lesbians without persecutory risk, provided that they are not doing so out of fear? ZLHR felt this would not be the case as both the wife and husband’s families would become involved and could inflame the situation.
33 With regard to single women with no male partner or children: what is know (sic) about their risk of being perceived as lesbian? Are they at risk unless they present a heterosexual narrative and behave with discretion?

ZLHR responded that it would be unlikely that such single women would be identified as lesbians. Depending on belief and whether the family of the woman is Christian or not, if the family is not religious and believe in African religion, it would be more likely that the woman’s family would identify the perceived problem as something in the family past (“Ngozi”), and would seek the assistance of traditional healers.

34 If a woman has no male friends, what is the reaction of local men? Would it be assumed by the wider community that a lack of male friends suggest that a woman is sexually ‘available’? Would a rejection of advances by men be accepted or is there a chance of a violent response? What type of response would women get - would she be able to walk away, or would there be a likelihood of violence or even murder?

35 Is it likely that someone would lose their job and be asked/forced to leave their home if they were perceived to be gay or lesbian?

ZLHR responded that this was a very likely scenario, and felt that in many cases the parents would ask their gay children to leave the family home.

36 Do we have any information on whether rejection of suitors; would this be a risk factor?

37 Because the risks arise from perceived as well as actual lesbian sexual orientation, does internal relocation enhance safety or not?

ZLHR responded that this would really depend on how openly gay the individual is; their appearance and behaviour. The larger urban areas might offer a degree of anonymity, whilst in the smaller towns and rural areas openly gay individuals would attract negative reaction.

38 Are newcomers in rural communities subject to speculation about their sexuality (derived from asking questions and observation)? In this case would they be at risk of being identified as lesbians or gays?

39 Are women expected to become sexually active early and remain so into their sixties, unless there is an obvious reason why they do not currently have a partner such as recent widowhood?

40 What about men? Are they expected to be sexually active at an early age?

41 What is the treatment of men who appear single for a long period of time and do not form sexual relationships?

42 Are members of the social elite better protected because they are able to live in gated communities where their activities are not the subject of public scrutiny?

The above has been seen and agreed by ZLHR as an accurate record of the meeting that took place on 26 August 2011, and may be disclosed in full to assist the Upper Tribunal of the Immigration Asylum Chamber in hearing a Country Guidance case on the risk to gays and lesbians in Zimbabwe.

Date record was agreed: 5 October 2011
COVERING LETTER AND INTERVIEW WITH CONNECT

[Details of First Secretary’s address and addressee redacted.]

4 October 2011

On 21 July [redacted] commissioned me to consult local organisations about the current situation of gay, lesbian and bisexual (LGB) persons in Zimbabwe for use in a UK court case.

The following are notes of an interview with representatives of CONNECT based on a list of questions supplied by Country of Origin Information Service, part of the UK Border Agency. CONNECT is a counselling service recommended and used by Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe, the primary gay support and advocacy organisation in Zimbabwe.

Yours sincerely

[Redacted]
First Secretary
Migration Delivery Office

Interviewee/source: [redacted]
Role/title: Director
Organisation: Connect – The Zimbabwe Institute of Systemic Therapy
Date of interview: Monday 15 August 2011
Interviewer/author: [redacted], 1st Secretary British Embassy, Harare

The following note is based on information provided from the above named source during the above specified interview(s). The note is based on discussions on the identified themes set out below. This note is not a verbatim account of the interview but the author(s) considers it reflects accurately the information provided. The note has been shared with the source and approved by them. The identified interviewee/source is aware that the information provided may be used in the refugee status determination process in the United Kingdom, and is content for this note to be placed in the public domain and used as a source of Country of Origin Information (COI).

1. Background

[Redacted] is the First Secretary Migration based at the British Embassy, Harare, Zimbabwe since October 2010. On 21 July [redacted] was asked by the UK Border Agency Country of Origin Information Service (COIS) to provide responses to a number of questions on the current situation for homosexuals in Zimbabwe. [Redacted] contacted CONNECT, an independent counselling service who could provide further perspective on the situation of gays and women in Zimbabwe. CONNECT agreed to an interview with [redacted] at their Harare Offices on Monday 15 August 2011.

The following is an agreed record of the question and answer discussion that took place on 15 August 2011.

2. Interview Record
1. Sodomy in Zimbabwe is only defined in relation to men, have any lesbians been arrested/harassed on this basis?

2. Have there been any convictions for sodomy (2009, 2010 & 2011)?

3. GALZ has provided legal assistance and support. Do they have any stats on this? How many individuals they have provided legal assistance to etc.

4. Do we have any evidence on the Zimbabwean police using the threat of arrest to harass gays and lesbians? If possible, an indication of the numbers would be helpful.

5. Arrests of gay people; random or do we know more about it? If possible, provide figures for male and female arrests.

6. There have been recent negative comments from the President and other leading figures concerning Gays and Lesbians. What impact, if any, does this have on public attitudes towards gays and lesbians in ZWE?

7. Are there any high profile gay cases in Zimbabwe now proceeding through the courts?

8. Have there been any convictions for non state agents who have perpetrated violence/hate crimes against gays and lesbians?

9. How many reported incidents of violence/hate crimes against gays and lesbians have there been in the last year?

10. Has there been any convictions for family members who have perpetrated violence/hate crime/honour killings against gays and lesbians?

11. Any stats or further info in relation to rape as a method of ‘curing’ sexual orientation? Are both gays and lesbians targets? Are there any specific areas where this might happen? Has there been any convictions for those non state agents who have raped gays or lesbians in order to ‘cure’ sexual orientation?
CONNECT said that they were aware of persecution towards Gays and Lesbians in Zimbabwe but could not comment directly on such attacks.

12. Are there any shelters for victims of violence who are gay/lesbians? CONNECT responded that they believed that GALZ at present offered the only real shelter specifically for Gays in Zimbabwe. Connect felt that the Musasa Project might offer assistance to lesbian women.

13. Is there an open gay scene in Zimbabwe? Which areas? CONNECT responded that they did not feel it was quite open. They felt there was a degree of ignorance on gay issues that help propagate prejudice.

14. Is the gay scene more underground than open? If so, what areas of Zimbabwe?

15. Where are gay and lesbian clubs/bars located?
16. Do we know if there is any violence in and around these bars/clubs? If there is any violence, is this sporadic or regular?

17. Are there any ‘open’ adverts or dating agencies for gays/lesbians? What is the public perception for this?

18. Is there any information on Gay material/magazines and its publication? Where are they distributed, and how many copies are distributed?

19. Any information on the size and influence, impact of GALZ?

20. Any information on the size, influence, impact of GAY ZIM?

21. How regularly are gay/lesbian campaigns/demonstrations held? Where are these held? How many people have attended? What is the response from police/government?

22. Are the younger generation more accepting of gays/lesbians? CONNECT responded that they felt that this true to a certain degree, but that there were still very strong cultural and religious pressures that supported prejudice.

23. Is there any distinction made in public attitude between transgender individuals and gay/lesbians?

24. Are there any discussion forums publically on TV/Radio about gay/lesbian issues?

25. Is it socially acceptable for two men to live together? Would they experience societal discrimination as perceived gays? CONNECT responded that it was still very difficult, and particularly so if they were identified as practicing homosexuals.

CONNECT responded that people would generally come to a quick decision without considering all the information.

26. Is it socially acceptable for two women to live together? Would they experience societal discrimination as perceived lesbians? CONNECT responded that there was some, but only little acceptance of two women living together, and that there would be a risk they would be perceived as lesbians.

27. Is a manly appearance a risk factor for those that may be perceived to be lesbians? CONNECT responded that this could be the case, but considered effeminate looking men were at a greater risk.

28. In general, are younger women who are not yet settled more at risk, does the risk increases with age? CONNECT responded that this was the case and that Zimbabwean society had very negative image of women who did not conform to expectations of marriage and childbearing.

29. Do we know roughly how many lesbians have ‘come out’, numbers who have faced societal discrimination as a result? Any harm by state actors/police etc?
30 Is there any information about whether open or perceived lesbians are at risk in Zimbabwe?
CONNECT responded that there was a degree of physical risk, but that mainly the risk came from harassment under the law. CONNECT went on to explain how they had made a contribution to changing attitudes within society through training counsellors in the security services.

31 While the greatest risk is in the metropolitan areas, outside the cities does gossip about a woman with no children or male friends (unless there is an obvious good reason) entails risk, or additional risk?
CONNECT responded that there was a lesser, especially for the professional classes, risk in the urban areas. The more rural areas were considered a much tighter community, and more concerned with the activity of others.

32 Is there any information about lesbians who are naturally discrete, have children and/or are willing to present a heterosexual narrative for family or societal reasons? Whether they are able to live as discrete lesbians without persecutory risk, provided that they are not doing so out of fear?
CONNECT responded that they had little knowledge about women in such situations. They felt their experience was that more men established a heterosexual narrative to conceal their homosexuality.

33 With regard to single women with no male partner or children: what is known about their risk of being perceived as lesbian? Are they at risk unless they present a heterosexual narrative and behave with discretion?
CONNECT responded that rather than be perceived as lesbians, they would be considered strange, failing to meet family and cultural expectations. They felt that the community would generally seek a variety of other reasons for the person’s single status, possibly medical or perhaps due to the woman’s professional status that might be seen as deterrent to suitors.

34 If a woman has no male friends, what is the reaction of local men? Would it be assumed by the wider community that a lack of male friends suggest that a woman is sexually ‘available’? Would a rejection of advances by men be accepted or is there a chance of a violent response? What type of response would women get - would she be able to walk away, or would there be a likelihood of violence or even murder?
CONNECT responded that it would depend more upon the woman’s particular circumstances, and how she portrayed herself. She could possibly attract the attentions of men who would be attracted to an unmarried woman. CONNECT said they had no information on whether this would amount to a risk of rape or murder.

35 Is it likely that someone would lose their job and be asked/forced to leave their home if they were perceived to be gay or lesbian?
CONNECT responded that that this was a very real risk, and that a number of their clients were concerned about coming out as they feared they would lose their jobs or homes. CONNECT said that employers would not fire an employee on grounds of their sexuality, but would look for alternative grounds such as inefficiency.

36 Do we have any information on whether rejection of suitors; would this be a risk factor?
CONNECT responded that they had no firm information on this, and believed it would depend upon the particular circumstances.
37 Because the risks arise from perceived as well as actual lesbian sexual orientation, does internal relocation enhance safety or not? CONNECT responded that that internal relocation from a rural to an urban location might offer an improved situation where there might be a degree of anonymity.

CONNECT further responded that the same could not be said for a move from an urban to a rural location where they would be a great deal of scrutiny on the behaviour of newcomers.

CONNECT further responded that they believed it would be very difficult for an individual to be openly gay in the rural areas.

38 Are newcomers in rural communities subject to speculation about their sexuality (derived from asking questions and observation)? In this case would they be at risk of being identified as lesbians or gays? CONNECT referred me to their response to question 37.

39 Are women expected to become sexually active early and remain so into their sixties, unless there is an obvious reason why they do not currently have a partner such as recent widowhood? CONNECT responded that they believed this was correct, and based upon their observations, women would be expected to become sexually active at a younger age than men.

CONNECT further responded that there were a lot of family, community and cultural expectations on women in Zimbabwe, and that in generally they were treated more harshly that men in these regards.

40 What about men? Are they expected to be sexually active at an early age? CONNECT responded that this was the case and referred to their response to question 39.

41 What is the treatment of men who appear single for a long period of time and do not form sexual relationships? CONNECT responded that Zimbabwe society places great expectation on men to get married and father children, and the family place a great deal of effort in ensuring this happens.

CONNECT further responded that when this does not happen it is often explained medically, and families will seek the assistance of doctors and traditional healers.

CONNECT further responded that the message for men in Zimbabwe was very much “get married to be a man”.

42 Are members of the social elite better protected because they are able to live in gated communities where their activities are not the subject of public scrutiny? CONNECT responded that this was the case, as they were generally better protected by position/status and wealth.

The above has been seen and agreed by CONNECT as an accurate record of the discussion that took place on Monday 15 August 2011, and may be disclosed in full to assist the Upper Tribunal of the Immigration Asylum Chamber in hearing a Country Guidance case on the risk to gays and lesbians in Zimbabwe.

Date record was agreed: 3 October 2011
The main text of this COI Report contains the most up to date publicly available information as at 6 June 2012. Further brief information on recent events and reports has been provided in the Latest News section to 13 July 2012.
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13 JULY 2012

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