Zimbabwe: Election Scenarios

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Executive Summary

As the Global Political Agreement (GPA) staggers to an end, continued violations of the agreement, reform deficits, limited institutional credibility and the rejection of a UN election needs assessment mission underscore the continued absence of conditions for peaceful and credible elections, despite the new constitution adopted in March 2013. President Robert Mugabe has been forced to step back from a June vote, but his party still pushes for an expedited process with little time to implement outstanding reforms and new constitutional provisions. The pervasive fear of violence and actual intimidation contradicts rhetorical commitments to peace. A reasonably free vote is still possible, but so too are deferred or disputed polls, or even a military intervention. The international community seems ready to back the Southern African Development Community (SADC), which must work with GPA partners to define and enforce “red lines” for a credible vote.

The Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) is likely to resist further reforms. SADC places particular emphasis on democracy supporting institutions, but the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) faces significant challenges. Limited government funding threatens its capacity building, public outreach and ability to ensure the integrity of the voters’ roll. The chairperson of the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission (ZHRC) resigned, citing the body’s lack of independence and government support, and was replaced by another commissioner with close ties to ZANU-PF. The GPA’s Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC) plays an important role in responding to political conflict, but has insufficient support and addresses symptoms, not causes, of violence and intimidation.

Certain pro-ZANU-PF security officials may seek to influence the polls. Some have demanded greater political representation; they played a pivotal role in the 2008 violence that secured Mugabe’s victory, for which none were held accountable. The Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) has demonstrated some professionalism, but its leaders openly support ZANU-PF and frequently harass Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) formations and civil society, which the MDC-Tsvangirai has been powerless to prevent. The GPA provides no basis for credible investigations of the police (or other security elements), which refuse to answer to the co-ministers of home affairs or JOMIC and expose parliament as largely toothless. Political parties face internal challenges. Within ZANU-PF, “hardliner” and “reformist” camps are fighting over who will succeed 89-year-old Mugabe. MDC-T is struggling with a reported drop in popularity, infighting and limited capacity to mobilise its supporters.

The international community assesses Zimbabwe’s progress positively, demonstrating its support for SADC’s facilitation. The constitutional referendum enabled the European Union (EU) to lift restrictive measures against most of the individuals and entities (excluding Mugabe, his wife Grace, a small group of security officials and the Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation). Zimbabwe and the UK subsequently held their first bilateral talks in over a decade, and a “Friends of Zimbabwe” meeting that offered economic support and the lifting of sanctions against two Zimbabwean banks by the U.S. shows Western commitment to supporting Zimbabwe’s reform.

SADC’s priority is “containment” even more than reforms to maintain stability. This objective remains vague, but the organisation must consolidate its promotion of
reforms in compliance with its election guidelines. Reforms require monitoring, but JOMIC’s capacity for this is limited and ZANU-PF’s resistance to extending its mandate to focus on elections has frustrated SADC. The regional bloc should establish an office in Harare that complements JOMIC but allows it to independently liaise with the government.

If the impasse on election reforms persists, the vote may be rescheduled. Political leaders recognise that to proceed when the risk of large-scale violence is high and when parties and SADC disagree over what constitutes an acceptable threshold for credible elections would be dangerous. Faced with divisions that threaten their performance in the polls, ZANU-PF and MDC-T may back postponement.

Deferral, if accompanied by firm SADC pressure, presents opportunities to promote reforms, on condition that strict timelines are defined, monitoring is enhanced significantly, political parties understand the risks of failure, and institutional weaknesses and the potential for interference by the security sector are reversed. Otherwise, the “winner-take-all” attitude means the election is likely to be hotly disputed. Some in ZANU-PF feel threatened by the erosion of economic opportunities that would come with losing power, while others fear prosecution for human rights violations. For the MDC-T, an electoral defeat would signify a loss of influence. For ZANU-PF, disputing the results could mean increased influence by bringing the country to a standstill.

A conclusive election requires that all parties and their supporters accept results. There are indications that Mugabe and Tsvangirai have agreed to do so and accommodate whoever loses. However, such a deal does not automatically translate into acceptance by their parties. Tsvangirai has agreed to be the GPA principals’ point man on election preparations, which could make it more difficult for him or his party to cry foul or withdraw because of irregularities. The waters are already muddied by the MDC-T’s acquiescence in the referendum, which proceeded according to the interests of the GPA signatories, disregarding the concerns of other political groups and of civil society.

A military takeover is unlikely, not least because of uncertainty about the political allegiance of the rank and file, probable regional censure and international isolation. However, allegations of the army’s bias and complicity in human rights violations raise concerns it may seek to influence the election outcome. It may also present itself as a stabilising force if inter- and intra-party relations deteriorate further.

2013 is a decisive year. Elections in a context of acute divisions are unlikely to provide stability. There is growing sense that the best way forward is further power sharing, though this is only helpful if objectives are established and widely accepted. To note that Zimbabwe is less violent now than in 2008 means little before the campaign – it is the competition for power that generates violence. That the elections are likely to be tense and see some violence and intimidation is clear; what is not yet clear is the nature of the violence, its extent and the response it will generate.
**Recommendations**

*To define and build consensus on the election roadmap*

**To the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC):**

1. Facilitate further discussions among the GPA parties to address the lack of consensus and clarity on reforms following the constitutional referendum.

*To enhance oversight on the political process toward elections*

**To SADC:**

2. Convene a dedicated heads of state summit on Zimbabwe that emphasises roadmap compliance with the SADC “Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections” and that:
   a) establishes a liaison office in Harare to monitor and evaluate electoral preparations and facilitate prompt response when necessary;
   b) defines “red lines”, strict benchmarks and clear measures for non-compliance by the GPA parties to the agreed roadmap; and
   c) establishes clear monitoring and observation roles in the election.

**To the Global Political Agreement principals:**

3. Take a more hands-on role to expedite and ensure implementation of agreements and GPA commitments, as well as the resolution of outstanding disagreements, in particular:
   a) conduct the outstanding annual review of GPA implementation as stipulated in Article 23 relating to the periodic review mechanism;
   b) ensure SADC officials deployed to JOMIC during the constitutional referendum remain in place until after the elections; and
   c) resolve disagreements preventing the deployment of additional JOMIC provincial monitors.

4. Direct JOMIC to independently investigate allegations regarding state security forces’ partisanship and political interference.

5. Extend JOMIC’s mandate to cover the election period (including before and after the vote) and make provision for holding political party leadership accountable to the GPA and the election roadmap.

**To the Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee:**

6. Operationalise additional teams recruited in 2012 to complement existing teams working with the Operation Committee.

7. Increase outreach, cooperation and collaboration with civil society and faith-based organisations.
To preserve and consolidate political coexistence

To GPA principals:

8. Encourage political tolerance and coexistence across party lines through frequent joint press conferences, calling for non-violence, inter-party dialogue and responding to particular concerns and incidents.

To strengthen the electoral process and institutions

To GPA principals:

9. Allow the UN needs assessment mission to return to Zimbabwe to conduct an assessment that can help address the lack of confidence in electoral processes and systems.

10. Resource fully and operationalise the ZHRC so it can discharge its mandate before, during and after elections.

11. Appoint staff to ZEC with a view to addressing concerns about alleged political bias set out in the draft election roadmap.

To address the politicisation of the security services and state institutions

To SADC:

12. Utilise its security structures and processes to facilitate high-level engagement between senior military, police and intelligence officials from the region and Zimbabwe to persuade the security sector not to interfere in the political process.

13. Require an electoral code of conduct for police, military and intelligence services that can be endorsed by SADC heads of state.

To GPA principals:

14. Hold regular National Security Council meetings as the elections draw near to mitigate disagreement and develop consensus.

15. Ensure security officials making partisan public statements are censured or sanctioned.

To build a sustainable democratic transition in Zimbabwe

To SADC:

16. Ensure the country does not rush into elections before there is clarity and consensus on, and practical implementation of, necessary reforms.

Johannesburg/Brussels, 6 May 2013
Zimbabwe: Election Scenarios

I. Introduction

Most will agree that Zimbabwe’s uneasy 2008 power-sharing experiment averted greater political violence and repression. But despite some progress, the inclusive government has not delivered sustainable political or economic stability and significant vulnerabilities remain. The GPA assumed but did not guarantee that its provisions would lay the foundations for democratic consolidation and create the conditions for credible elections in 2013.

A product of negotiation and compromise, a new constitution, delivered over two and a half years behind schedule, could provide the basis for moving forward, despite some serious drawbacks. Its immediate political impact will be limited, however, and it is unlikely to ensure free and fair elections. Other key reforms, including those identified in the 2011 election roadmap, have not been implemented, or remain stymied by ongoing disagreement over their relevance. In addition, the continued arrest and harassment of human rights defenders and MDC political activists reflects the manipulation of the criminal justice system for political ends, raising concerns that the country may not be ready for elections.

Despite these evident drawbacks, elections probably will be held in 2013; the date remains uncertain, but is expected between the end of June and the end of October.¹ SADC is keen to ensure a peaceful and credible process that represents a break with past election violence and fraud. The international community appears to emphasise “credible and peaceful”, rather than “free and fair”, polls. But there is no agreement on what constitutes credible. MDC-T and ZANU-PF are both pursuing “winner-take-all” strategies, which is likely to mean a hotly contested campaign and possible violence, although expectations are high that a new government will accommodate the losing party in some form of reconfigured power sharing.

This report reviews developments in what remains a fluid and inchoate political environment, and describes several possible scenarios for the remaining year. A forthcoming briefing will focus on legislative and technical developments and assess conditions for a free and fair vote.

¹ The timing of elections and repeated calls by ZANU-PF for an expedited process have been the subject of much speculation. Mugabe’s claims since late 2010 that an election is imminent have not materialised, prompting suggestions that such exhortations were “a means of managing the succession issue within ZANU-PF, and made without any actual intention of proclaiming dates”. Mugabe subsequently attempted to utilise a High Court challenge intended to force by-elections to try and conflated this with a general election date. Derek Matyszak, “A date with Mugabe: The timing of the next general election”, Research and Advocacy Unit, 4 April 2013.
II. **GPA Opportunities and Constraints**

A. **Reform and Resistance**

The GPA commits its signatories to “resolving once and for all the current political and economic situations and charting a new political direction for the country” (Article 2). The much-delayed reform centrepiece, the new constitution, was accepted in a 16 March 2013 referendum.\(^2\) It is an important investment in Zimbabwe’s longer-term democratic trajectory,\(^3\) but new legislation will need to be passed and implemented before it can improve the current electoral environment.\(^4\) The legal process to formally adopt the new constitution is still outstanding, though there are efforts to expedite it.\(^5\)

\(^2\) The decision to fast-track the referendum gave Zimbabweans less than a month to analyse and consult on the draft, and with a limited print run and dissemination campaign, most voted without having seen the actual text. Article 6 (viii) of the GPA provides for a three-month period from the end of the parliamentary debate, and civil society groups have raised concerns explaining that an expedited process is unacceptable. See “Constitution Watch 5/2013” and “Constitution Watch 6/2013”, Veritas, 18 February 2013. For more on the reform process, see Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°82, *Resistance and Denial: Zimbabwe’s Stalled Reform Agenda*, 16 November 2011; Report N°173, *Zimbabwe: The Road to Reform or Another Dead End?*, 27 April 2011.

\(^3\) Some see the political compromises as having jeopardised the integrity of the document itself, while many see it as “a step in the right direction”, in the words of Constitutional Affairs Minister Eric Matinenga, quoted in Peta Thornycroft, “Constitution deal puts Zim poll closer”, *Sunday Independent*, 20 January 2013. The intent was to provide a transition from the pre-independence constitution to a more relevant people-driven charter. However, political parties have been primarily concerned about its impact on the next election rather than the longer-term effect on national governance. Crisis Group interview, constitutional law professor, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, 8 August 2012. See also “An analysis of the COPAC Final Draft Constitution of 1 February 2013”, Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights, February 2012; “Of camels, constitutions and elections”, Research and Advocacy Unit, 25 February 2013, pp. 2-3.

\(^4\) The new institutions and legislative framework require revision of the voter rolls, media reforms, freedom of assembly and association, as well as freedom of expression. The GPA parties have asked a team of seven legal experts to develop proposals for such legislation, with a very ambitious 29 June deadline, when the parliament’s term officially ends. Crisis Group email correspondence, constitutional law professor, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, 14 February 2013; “June deadline for Constitution committee”, *Daily News*, 13 February 2013. MDC leader Welshman Ncube argues this deadline cannot be met, because once the constitution has been formally adopted, “the parties have to negotiate and agree on necessary amendments to the Electoral Act to bring it into line with the new constitution. … Once agreed, those amendments have to follow the usual enactment processes such as clearance by the Cabinet Committee on Legislation and cabinet before being presented to parliament where they would have to be scrutinised by the Parliamentary Legal Committee for consistency with the constitution before being debated and passed by both the House of Assembly and Senate. No one can predict with any amount of certainty how long this process will take”. Quoted in “Ncube appeals to Sadc”, *The Standard*, 31 March 2013.

\(^5\) The draft constitution was gazetted on 29 March and will require another 30 days before it is presented for parliamentary debate. The minister of constitutional and parliamentary affairs expects the debate to commence on 7 May and continue for about a week in both chambers. It will require a two-thirds majority in the House of Assembly and Senate and the president’s sign-off, though given the main parties’ support it is expected to pass as a formality. The minister has indicated that the alignment of laws with the new constitution will run concurrently with the parliamentary process for passing the constitution, with priority given to election provisions, especially the Electoral Act and the Local Government Act. “Constitutional Bill gazetted”, *The Herald Newspaper*, 29 March 2013. The new constitution also provides for a 30-day voter registration period after it has been gazetted.
The MDC factions have argued further election-related reforms are necessary, a position the region has endorsed, denying recent media reports that SADC is prevaricating on its position. For its part, ZANU-PF is opposed to more reform. There were some election-related changes in late 2012, but other reforms continue to be blocked, including those intended to address political violence, intimidation and repression; security and law and order deficits; broadcast media restrictions; and hostilities and tension among and between political parties.

Despite a legislative majority, and a strong presence in cabinet, the MDC formations, while broadly in alignment on many issues, have been unable to work together on a reform program to repeal or amend repressive legislation, such as the Access to Information Privacy and Protection Act (AIPPA) and the Public Order and Security Act (POSA). Given past failures to implement agreements between the GPA signatories, many doubt there is sufficient political will to fully implement election provisions of a new constitution.

In a context of radical disagreement between the GPA signatories on what reform is now necessary, the question remains, how much reform is required before peaceful and credible polls can take place, and what can be realistically achieved if elections are to be held within the next six months?

B. A New Constitution and its Import for Elections

Zimbabweans voted overwhelmingly in favour of the new constitution, despite most people not having seen the text. While it represents some progress and has a significant

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symbolic cachet, it has not produced a change in political culture and repressive practices.\(^\text{12}\)

The new constitution offers a number of provisions that could improve the election process. The Bill of Rights contains an article on the right to vote for all adult Zimbabweans, but this is subject to a general limitation clause, which has enabled the GPA signatories to exclude the diaspora.\(^\text{13}\)

Provisions for freedom of assembly and association are strengthened and guarantee free political activities, but remain subject to general limitations previously used to uphold the legality of the POSA.\(^\text{14}\) The document does add detail on access to information and the rights of arrested and detained persons, which should theoretically reduce current ambiguities, but there is no guarantee that the environment for campaigning will be improved.\(^\text{15}\) Provisions for freedom of expression and freedom of the media are significant improvements, including requirements for state media to be “impartial” and to “afford a fair opportunity for the presentation of divergent views and dissenting opinions”.\(^\text{16}\)

A new mixed first-past-the-post and proportional representation (PR) system, combined with an increase in the number of legislators (from 303 to 358) and a quota of seats for women in the National Assembly (for the life of the first two parliaments) and Senate, will have implications for the party primaries and the elections.\(^\text{17}\) But the PR component of the system, which aims to reduce zero-sum competition, applies to only 60 of the 270 seats in the National Assembly.

C. Political Coexistence

SADC and the political parties should be commended for sustaining the GPA and the Inclusive Government (IG).\(^\text{18}\) The agreement fostered interaction and a measure of

\(^\text{12}\) An immediate illustration of the lack of change was the arrest and detention of human rights lawyer Beatrice Mtethwa, who was kept in custody in March 2013 by the ZRP in defiance of a High Court order to release her. The judge who gave the order was subsequently suspended amid a media onslaught on his decision and his granting of search warrants relating to a Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission investigation (see footnote 116). This episode and the arrests and harassment of human rights activists and political opponents of ZANU-PF are interpreted in some quarters as evidence of the security establishment’s confidence that it is “business as usual”. “ZANU-PF wins the referendum”, Africa Confidential, vol. 54, no. 7 (29 March 2013), p. 11.

\(^\text{13}\) Sections 67 (3) (a) and 86, Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013. The MDC formations did not champion the diaspora vote in either the Electoral Amendment Act or the new constitution, despite potential benefits. In September 2012, the MDC-T admitted that the GPA signatories had agreed to leave the diaspora “out for now”. The party also claimed it did not trust regional liberation movements to handle postal votes with integrity. “MDC-T admits blocking diaspora vote”, New Zimbabwe, 17 September 2012.


\(^\text{15}\) There are, however, specific provisions for political party funding, though detail on who benefits (and whether that will include smaller parties) will depend on the content of legislation that will have to be drafted. Section 67 (4), Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013.

\(^\text{16}\) Section 61 (4) (b–c), Constitution of Zimbabwe, 2013

\(^\text{17}\) No agreement has been reached among the political formations about the precise rules for the PR component of the system, and thus the extent to which it would benefit smaller parties. This will also require amendments to the Electoral Act, before parliament officially closes on 29 June. Professor Jorgen Elklit, “What needs to be done prior to elections in Zimbabwe”, Zimbabwe Election Support Network, 15 April 2013.

\(^\text{18}\) In October 2009, the MDC-T withdrew from some government activities to protest ZANU-PF’s reluctance to comply with the agreement. The SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (man-
tolerance across partisan lines, and allowed for some dialogue, necessary should major political conflicts and disputes recur. Yet interaction by party leaders has not promoted much coexistence and cooperation between the grassroots party structures, where tension and intolerance remain significant. Coexistence may be threatened by political party elements pushing a “winner-take-all” strategy. Rumours are circulating, however, that Mugabe and Tsvangirai are promoting a July election date, and have discussed the parameters of engagement to ensure post-election stability, including committing to uphold vote results and accommodate whoever loses. Should they reach consensus, they will still have to secure their respective parties’ buy-in, which is complicated by internal divisions, as well as MDC-T’s general distrust of ZANU-PF. However, Tsvangirai publicly denied any interest in another power-sharing arrangement.

D. Critical Institutions: Capacity and Reforms

Agreement between party leaders will not suffice to ensure credible polls. Re-building confidence in key election and security institutions remains a core challenge.

1. The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC)

Both MDC formations question the composition of the ZEC secretariat and accuse it of partisanship. However, it has continued to engage with civil society, the media, aged on a troika basis and responsible for promoting peace and security in the region), met in November in Maputo, and was instrumental in the MDC-T’s re-engagement. Although some ZANU-PF officials had on several occasions threatened to withdraw from the GPA, the party has remained relatively engaged. Crisis Group interview, ZANU-PF national chairperson, Harare, 9 August 2012. Crisis Group interviews, Western diplomat, Harare, 7 August 2012; MDC secretary general, Harare, 8 August 2012; ZANU-PF national chairperson, Harare, 9 August 2012; ZANU-PF vice president, Harare, 12 November 2012.

This is a crucial difference from 2008, when there was no platform for political coexistence. Crisis Group interview, Western diplomat, Harare, 7 August 2012; ZANU-PF national chairperson, Harare, 9 August 2012.

Elements in ZANU-PF and MDC-T are reportedly promoting post-election scenarios in which their parties will claim total control of government and its institutions. They are frustrated with the current power-sharing arrangements. Crisis Group interview, development studies professor, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, 15 October 2012.

Some suspect ZANU-PF’s ostensible climb-down in the constitution process, as well as rumours of agreement between Mugabe and Tsvangirai, are part of a co-option strategy it has used before. For example, the 1987 Unity Accord, when the Zimbabwe Peoples’ Union (ZAPU) and ZANU merged, co-opted ZAPU’s Joshua Nkomo. Arthur Mutambara has remained deputy prime minister despite losing his MDC leadership position due to what some consider co-option by ZANU-PF. Crisis Group interview, Zimbabwe liberation war veteran, Johannesburg, 8 February 2013. There are also reports of ZANU-PF officials who have attempted to engage and readmit opposition leader Simba Makoni before the next election. “Zanu-PF faction ‘wooing’ party defection leader Makoni”, The Mail & Guardian, 11 January 2013.


The secretariat includes former security sector and intelligence operatives allegedly loyal to ZANU-PF. Crisis Group interview, GPA negotiators, Harare, 6 August 2012. The MDC-T National Executive Council has also reiterated this concern. “National Executive Council meeting resolutions”,

See Section III.A and B.2.
academia and political parties. The commission’s chairperson, Justice Simpson Mutambanengwe, resigned in February 2013 citing poor health, and the GPA principals agreed to recommend Supreme Court Justice Rita Makarau to replace him.

In December 2012, commissioners warned the lack of government funding jeopardised both the constitutional referendum and elections. The government has allocated it $50 million, leaving a $142 million deficit that the finance ministry claims it cannot cover. The MDCs agreed to seek external funding, and notwithstanding ZANU-PF’s reluctance, the government approached the UN Development Programme (UNDP) in February 2013 for assistance. The UN dispatched a needs assessment mission in early April, but it was refused entry to Zimbabwe by Justice Minister Patrick Chinamasa, reportedly on instructions from Mugabe, on the spurious basis that the assessment was overstepping its mandate.

MDC-T, 19 December 2012. The ZEC’s partisanship remains a contested issue in the 2011 election roadmap. This has been repeated by the MDC-T secretary general, Tendai Biti, in January and March. “MDC mulls polls boycott”, Daily News, 31 January 2013; “MDC-T to announce own poll results”, The Zimbabwe Mail, 27 March 2013. This was supported by the MDC-T’s deputy justice minister, Obert Gutu, but contradicted by Morgan Tsvangirai. “Tsvangirai, Gutu clash over ZEC”, NewsdayZimbabwe, 15 March 2013.

28 The South Africa-based Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA) opened an office in Harare in 2011 and signed a memorandum of understanding with the ZEC in 2012 focused on providing capacity building support (in a range of areas including conflict management, media and voter education) in conjunction with other government and civil society stakeholders.

29 Justice Makarau, a former ZANU-PF member of parliament, was also the Judicial Services Commission’s acting chief executive.

30 In mid-December, the ZEC announced it would forfeit the constituency delimitation exercise and had been able to reduce budget projections from $105 million to $85 million for the referendum and from $115 million to $107 million for the national elections. “ZEC forfeits delimitation, slashes poll budget”, New Zimbabwe (www.newzimbabwe.com), 14 December 2012.


32 The government does not seem to have adequate resources in the time required. Crisis Group interview, Joyce Kazembe, ZEC acting chairperson, Harare, 12 November 2012.

33 ZANU-PF is worried about possible interference by donors if they fund elections. “Election funding clashes”, The Zimbabwean, 11 July 2012. This position was subsequently refined, as Justice Minister Patrick Chinamasa argued, “as Zanu-PF, we have no objection if that money comes through Treasury. We will object any assistance that is poured directly to institutions that directly run the electoral process”. “Donor funding must not influence poll results”, Chronicle, 31 January 2013.

34 “Zimbabwe’s request for US$225m for election funds referred to UN headquarters”, Voice of America, 8 February 2013. The UN was unable to respond to the request within the schedule the Zimbabwean government presented, prompting the government to raise $40 million through a “voluntary bond” sold to a local insurer, Old Mutual PLC, and the National Social Security Authority (NSSA). “Zimbabwe: Govt borrows from Old Mutual and NSSA to fund referendum”, SW Radio Africa, 12 March 2013.

35 Chinamasa announced that the proposed terms of reference for the UN team were unacceptable and election funding would be raised from local resources. Whereas the UN team wanted to meet with civil society, as is normal for such an assessment mission, the minister preferred they meet government and political party officials only. “Govt cancels poll funding request”, The Herald, 17 April 2013. Although Tendai Biti, finance minister and MDC-T secretary general, seemed willing to have the UN team meet with civil society, Tsvangirai urged for the UN to accept a mandate that excluded such consultations. This reflects differences between Biti and Tsvangirai and the latter’s apparent willingness to accommodate ZANU-PF’s determination to prevent the UN’s needs assess-
the government must source funds from elsewhere, and its inability to do so could compromise tasks, such as voter registration, that are critical to a credible election.36

Tsvangirai’s position on the ZEC has recently softened; in late 2012 he claimed that the commission could contribute to a conclusive, free and fair election if there is no political interference.37 In his capacity as supervisor of the electoral process, Tsvangirai reportedly exonerated the secretariat, instead blaming “underhand forces” for the debacle around the 2008 polls. He did not, however, clarify if such forces had been reined in.38

The ZEC claims that the way in which it conducted the referendum process is testimony of its capacity to deliver a credible election process.39 However, Tendai Biti, finance minister and MDC-T secretary general, alleges that the voter figures presented by the ZEC in the referendum reflect an inflation of between 10 and 15 per cent compared to his party’s parallel vote tabulation. The Election Resource Centre (ERC) also questioned the high voter turnout, considered the highest in any election since independence in 1980.40 Its report suggests that this could have been due to coercion of voters, especially by ZANU-PF. Those who campaigned for the “no” vote also allege rigging.41 Verification of referendum data in these circumstances is critical and will require access to polling station specific data, which has not yet been released, despite a provision for this in the recently passed Electoral Amendment Act.42

Zimbabwe’s amended electoral legislation gives the ZEC oversight for voter registration and the integrity of the voters’ roll,43 which to date have run – problematic.
cally – by the Registrar General.\textsuperscript{44} The MDC-T claims its supporters are being prevented from registering by officials due to unclear procedures.\textsuperscript{45} A credible voters’ roll is central to a credible election, and continued anomalies would further harm public confidence in the ZEC.\textsuperscript{46} Despite the MDC-T’s continued scepticism as to the reliability of the Registrar General’s recent review and updates to the roll, the ZEC has endorsed both.\textsuperscript{47} The commission should go beyond a simple endorsement and conduct an independent audit of the roll to allay concerns.\textsuperscript{48}

2. Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission (ZHRC)

In October 2012, Mugabe signed the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission Act (ZHRC) with a mandate to investigate post-2009 human rights violations.\textsuperscript{49} The newly amended Electoral Act gives the ZHRC specific responsibilities to address politically motivated violence and intimidation.\textsuperscript{50} However, in January 2013, the commission’s chairperson resigned, denouncing the lack of independence and state support.\textsuperscript{51} This is an inauspicious start for the commission, which has little time to become fully functional before election campaigning heats up.\textsuperscript{52} The ZHRC must be allowed to address

\textsuperscript{44} ZEC is responsible for ensuring the Registrar General of Voters conduct appropriate mobile voter registration. Although it was supposed to commence on 3 January 2013, it still has not started due to limited funding. Crisis Group telephone interview, election expert, 17 April 2013.

\textsuperscript{45} “Voter registration exercise in shambles”, \textit{Zimbabwe Independent}, 15 February 2013.

\textsuperscript{46} Crisis Group telephone interview, election expert, 30 March 2013.

\textsuperscript{47} According to the ZEC, the Registrar General has registered 60,000 new voters and removed 345,000 deceased persons since December 2012. “Over 300 000 off voters’ roll”, \textit{The Sunday Mail}, 14 April 2013. Other reports claim the voter rolls were pruned of 345,000 names between the 2008 elections and November 2012, and the additional 60,000 names have been added since then. “Voters’ roll: the puzzle remains unsolved”, \textit{Zimbabwe Independent}, 26 April 2013. Despite this, on the basis of available data, very real concerns remain about levels of both over and under-registration that continue to compromise the integrity of the rolls. Crisis Group telephone interview, civil society researcher, Harare, 27 April 2013. Serious anomalies have also surfaced as parties make their own verification efforts of the rolls. “Zanu PF, MDCs fight over voters’ roll”, \textit{Zimbabwe Independent}, 26 April 2013.

\textsuperscript{48} In terms of building confidence in the integrity of the rolls, this would be an essential complement to the announcement by the ZEC and Registrar General of an intensive three-week mobile voter registration drive commencing in late April, in response to a cabinet intervention to address bottlenecks in the registration process. This development is welcomed, but related challenges, such as securing proof of residence, require a more flexible approach to registration, as provided for in the Electoral Act. “Towards an improved voter registration system in Zimbabwe”, Press Release, Elections Resource Centre, 30 April 2013.

\textsuperscript{49} Section 9 (4) (a), Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission Act (No. 2), 2012.

\textsuperscript{50} Section 133 (h–j), Part XVIIIIB, Electoral Amendment Act (No. 3), 2012, enables the ZHRC to establish provincial Special Investigation Committees (SIC), comprising members of political parties and the Zimbabwe Republic Police. The SICs will deal with complaints of electoral violence, which will be investigated by the police. This seems to undermine ZHRC’s independence, as the committees must rely on the willingness and effectiveness of both the police and the political parties. Section 12 (6) and (7) of the ZHRC Act grants the justice minister discretion to stop the commission’s work on “grounds that [its investigation of a complaint] may prejudice the defence, external relations, internal security or economic interests of the State”.

\textsuperscript{51} “Statement from Professor Reg Austin, Chairperson ZHRC”, Harare, 26 December 2012.

\textsuperscript{52} Crisis Group email correspondence, civil society researcher, Harare, 15 January 2013. Austin has been replaced by politburo member and former ZANU-PF parliamentarian and provincial governor for Matabeleland North Jacob Mudenda. Tsvangirai’s acceptance of his appointment has been heavily criticised. “Scandal: Tsvangirai accepts former ZANU-PF chairman as new Human Rights Chief”, \textit{The Zimbabwe Mail}, 19 February 2013.
impunity and deter violence effectively.53 Given current resource constraints, this seems implausible. It also reflects the government’s failure to acknowledge the nature of the challenge and its limited commitment to promoting accountability.

53 Crisis Group interview, political researcher, Harare, 16 October 2012.
III. Internal Political Party Dynamics

Machinations within the parties will have a direct bearing on the elections. All the parties are deeply fragmented, and rifts may grow as politicians compete for nomination in the primaries.

A. ZANU-PF and the Centralisation of Power

1. Factionalism and succession battles

ZANU-PF has little internal democracy and Mugabe’s leadership has largely remained unchallenged. Struggles over who would succeed the ageing party president previously surfaced in 1998 and at the 2004 party congress, when Joice Mujuru was elected vice president ahead of Emmerson Mnangagwa. Mugabe’s endorsement of Mujuru was interpreted as disapproval of Mnangagwa, who was demoted both in the party and the executive. But his star was to rise again in 2008, when he was rewarded with the defence ministry for his central role in Mugabe’s victory in the presidential run-off. He is touted as a serious contender to succeed Mugabe, though some commentators point to his limited grassroots support and military backing and believe his chances are overrated.

At the beginning of 2012, ZANU-PF began preparations for national elections, which involved restructuring the grassroots support base, but elections for the party’s District Coordinating Committees (DCCs) were bedevilled by tensions and clashes between those perceived as Mnangagwa supporters and those perceived as Mujuru loyalists. Several ZANU-PF leaders, including Mugabe, have become more critical

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54 Since its founding in 1963, ZANU-PF held regular internal elections for membership of its top decision-making structure, the Dare reChimurenga. When Mugabe became leader in 1976, he instituted “guided democracy” and centralised power in the politburo (which replaced the Dare re-Chimurenga) that he dominates. Crisis Group interview, civil society researcher, Harare, 10 August 2012. A detailed analysis of succession and ZANU-PF’s constitution is provided in Derek Matyszak, “Après moi, le deluge: Succession and the ZANU-PF Party Constitution”, Research and Advocacy Unit, July 2012.

55 ZANU-PF parliamentarian and chairman for Masvingo province Dzikamai Mavhaire moved a motion for a new constitution and also called on Mugabe to resign. He was subsequently suspended from the party for five years. Farai Muguwu, “From war to peace: breaking the cycle of violence in Zimbabwe”, master’s degree thesis, European University Centre for Peace Studies, October 2006, p. 12.

56 Joice Mujuru was elected under the party’s 1999 Women’s League resolution to have female representation in the presidency. Chris Maroleng, “Zimbabwe’s 2005 Elections: Overture or Finale?”, Institute for Security Studies (ISS) (March 2005), p. 7. Mnangagwa, as ZANU-PF’s then legal secretary, was forced to draft the amendment enabling this in the party’s constitution.

57 He has always wielded limited power, since Mugabe exerts strong and direct influence in the security sector as commander-in-chief. He also lost parliamentary elections in the Kwekwe constituency in 2000 and 2005. Crisis Group interview, Zimbabwe liberation war veteran, Johannesburg, 8 February 2013.

58 Both Mnangagwa and Mujuru publicly deny presidential ambitions, which is not surprising since the succession subject is taboo. Other possible contenders include Sydney Sekeremayi, the state security minister, and Constantine Chiwenga, the defence force commander, though they are not considered serious candidates by most. Mugabe is ZANU-PF’s most valuable national asset and only Mujuru is believed to have any kind of countrywide support.

59 The DCCs were very influential, and in 2012, they became the battleground for factions tussling for control of the party. Mnangagwa’s known loyalists won most of the DCC elections. The party’s politburo, citing voting irregularities, conducted re-runs in some provinces, but its efforts to quell disputes and violent demonstrations were largely unsuccessful. In June 2012, on the basis of a politburo recommendation, the central committee disbanded all DCCs because they were “causing un-
of factionalism and succession battles, stressing the importance of unity at this critical time.\textsuperscript{60} The official position is that Mugabe remains the party’s leader and presidential candidate, that he is not considering stepping down and even if he was, the party would observe its official hierarchy.\textsuperscript{61}

This move was seen as part of broader efforts to contain factionalism and assert Mugabe’s leadership.\textsuperscript{62} This now also means addressing allegations of corruption and the leakage of sensitive party documents.\textsuperscript{63} But succession and factionalism concerns, influenced by an array of fixed and evolving variables,\textsuperscript{64} including ethnic,\textsuperscript{65} economic, political and security interests, will not disappear.\textsuperscript{66}

necessary divisions and tensions”. Mugabe also expressed concern that “the DCC has become a weapon used to divide the party”. “Zanu-PF DCCs disbanded”, \textit{The Herald}, 30 June 2012. While some considered the dissolution as favouring Mujuru’s succession bid, others presumed it was Mugabe’s strategy for consolidating his power in the party. Crisis Group interview, political science professor, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, 15 October 2012.


\textsuperscript{61} According to ZANU-PF national chairperson, Simon Khaya Moyo, in the official party hierarchy, the vice presidents (Mujuru being one of the two), national chairperson and secretary for administration are part of the top leadership, known as the Praesidium, while Mnangagwa is secretary for legal affairs and ranked eleventh in leadership order. Crisis Group interview, ZANU-PF national chairperson, Harare, 9 August 2012.

\textsuperscript{62} Crisis Group interviews, political analyst, Harare, 9 August 2012; political science professor, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, 15 October 2012.

\textsuperscript{63} “Explosive Zanu (PF) Politburo meeting”, \textit{The Zimbabwe Mail}, 27 March 2013.

\textsuperscript{64} Reserve Bank governor Gideon Gono, in a briefing to a former U.S. ambassador, “cautioned against assuming anything about individual loyalties in the ruling party’s opaque factional battles since ethnicity, clan, totem, personal ambition and old rivalries created a very complex and crosscutting web of ties”. “Gono on policy frustrations, succession tensions, collapse”, U.S. Harare embassy cable, 16 February 2006, as made public by WikiLeaks.

\textsuperscript{65} Ethnicity has been used by some as a political tool in the battle for power. Within ZANU-PF the main ethnic groups are the Karanga (predominantly from the Midlands and Masvingo regions), the Zezuru (from the Mashonaland region), which fall under the Shona tribe, the Ndebele (from Matabeleland), and Manyika and Nda (from Manicaland). Some have suggested that ethnic divisions were responsible for power tussles during the liberation struggle that led to the assassination in Zambia of former ZANU leader, Herbert Chitepo (a Manyika), in 1975 and the ouster of founding ZANU member Ndabaningi Sithole (a Nda) in 1976. Crisis Group email correspondence, civil society researcher, Harare, 14 February 2013. The emergence of Zezuru (Mugabe’s clan) dominance in the party threatens to marginalise others. Mujuru, a Zezuru, is seen as perpetuating the group’s dominance and those supporting her along ethnic lines have been referred to as the “Super Zezuru”. Supporters of Mnangagwa, a Karanga, are referred to as the “south-south” group, who is mobilising members aggrieved by Zezuru dominance, including the Manyikas, Nda, Karangas and Ndebeles. James Muzondidya and Sabelo Ndlovu-Getsheni, “Echoing Silences: Ethnicity in post-colonial Zimbabwe, 1980-2007”, \textit{African Journal on Conflict Resolution}, vol. 7, no. 2 (2009), pp. 275-297. Ethno-political fault lines remain deep ahead of the elections, but whether, and to what extent, these considerations will influence voters remains to be seen. Marko Phiri, “Ethnic politics on the Zimbabwean campaign trail: do voters really care?”, \textit{African Arguments} (africanarguments.org), 20 February 2013.

\textsuperscript{66} Factionalism may also be driven by members supporting whoever they feel will preserve the party’s dominance. Crisis Group interview, civil society researcher, Harare, 10 August 2012.
These dynamics have a direct import for the forthcoming elections, possibly influencing who will lead the country, as well as the party’s approach to the polls. If it fails to address factionalism – mainly driven by succession battles – it may not be ready to contest a free and fair election.

Mugabe is seen as the only presidential candidate able to unite ZANU-PF’s emerging factions. This may explain why some elements, worried by his declining health, are pushing for elections sooner. While some say Mugabe’s failure to quell these power struggles reveals his control is waning, others see it in his political interest to maintain uncertainty around his succession.

2. “Hardliners” and “reformists”

Anti-reform elements are often associated with Emmerson Mnangagwa and security chiefs, while party leaders more open to reforms are assumed to be associated with Joice Mujuru. Hardliners are accused of fomenting resistance to full GPA implementation, pushing back on SADC facilitation efforts, delaying the adoption of the draft constitution, and blocking security sector reform. They are seen as willing to pursue extreme, high-risk tactics to deliver an election victory. They are reportedly driven by fear of prosecution for suspected human rights violations and concerns of economic losses should the MDC-T win. Economic interests have mushroomed in the mining sector, especially around gold and diamonds.

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67 According to Section 101 (1) of the new constitution, if the president dies or is incapacitated, the first vice president assumes office until expiry of the former president’s tenure.

68 Factions in the party are allegedly pushing against Mugabe’s candidacy in light of doubts he may not have enough popular support to stand against Tsvangirai. “Zanu PF headaches mount ahead of poll”, Newsday, 15 April 2013.

69 However, a united party is no guarantee it will want to hold elections. Crisis Group interview, development studies professor, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, 15 October 2012.

70 Crisis Group interview, development agency governance adviser, Harare, 17 October 2012.

71 Crisis Group interview, political science professor, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, 15 October 2012.

72 In 2009, after facing internal pressure to address the succession issue, Mugabe formed a committee to recommend the best possible solution. His decision to appoint interested parties, Emmerson Mnangagwa and the late Solomon Mujuru (Joice Mujuru’s husband), to the committee was seen as a ploy to suppress grumblings without really addressing the issue. The committee failed to devise a succession plan and was dissolved by the politburo in January 2010. Crisis Group interview, development agency governance adviser, Harare, 17 October 2012.

73 It should not be automatically assumed that loyalties and positions of those associated with these respective camps are coherent or consistent, however. Interests are fluid, sometimes overlapping and at other times contradictory. Crisis Group interviews, Harare, July, September 2012.

74 This includes resisting the deployment of SADC officers to JOMIC. See Section V. MDC formations must also assume responsibility for failures to review GPA implementation. Article XXIII provides for an annual review by the periodic review mechanism, but since the formation of the IG in February 2009 this has happened only once, in January 2011.


76 After a three-year constitution drafting process, ZANU-PF disowned it in October 2012 and attempted to unilaterally amend it. The party’s resistance is seen as the main reason for referendum delays. Crisis Group email correspondence, civil society researcher, Harare, 15 January 2013.

77 This group is widely accused of orchestrating the violent 2008 presidential re-run campaign and seen as responsible for continued impunity, intimidation and violence. Crisis Group interviews, security sector analysts, political commentators and civil society violence monitors, Harare, July, August, September and November 2012. Hardliners are allegedly pushing for reactivation of the political violence machinery that the party employed in the 2008 presidential election re-run while reformists
ZANU-PF reformers focus on the need for political stability and party renewal, which they recognise is necessary to regain their legitimacy (within the party, in the country and internationally) and provide for economic recovery.\(^7\) They also have economic interests to protect, but many operate in parts of the economy, like finance or hospitality, that are compromised by current economic policies, and their businesses are “haemorrhaging”.\(^8\) This group reportedly understands political stability underwrites longer-term economic opportunities, and may require further accommodation.\(^9\)

Speculation about a possible convergence between reformist ZANU-PF elements and the MDC-T has been percolating, but has cooled considerably in the run-up to the elections. For ZANU-PF politicians to advocate for greater collaboration in the current environment would be political suicide and would not be countenanced by hardliners who continue to portray MDC-T as a puppet of foreign regime change agendas. Whether reformists have engaged seriously with MDC-T in discussions around future power sharing thus remains unclear.\(^10\)

The party has previously been able to unite its factions when the risk of collective loss is imminent,\(^11\) and its grassroots mobilisation capacity, though coercive, is effective.\(^12\) But the extent to which interests within ZANU-PF will converge in a coordinated strategy for the elections is uncertain.\(^13\) The party’s internal divisions have forced postponement of primary elections meant to select candidates for the parliamentary polls.\(^14\) The push by younger party members to replace the old guard, as well as tension are wary of possible censure by SADC and the AU. Crisis Group interview, security sector analyst, Harare, 15 March 2013. A forthcoming Crisis Group briefing will provide a detailed assessment of political violence and intimidation, and its potential impact on the elections.

\(^{78}\) MDC officials and others claim that economic opportunities mainly in agriculture, mining and tourism have been heavily exploited by ZANU-PF members and certain security officials. They are believed to increasingly fear that should there be a change in political leadership, these interests will be expropriated by the new government as a way of recovering what will be considered to have been acquired illegally. Crisis Group interview, political science professor, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, 15 October 2012. “Marange diamond fields in Zimbabwe: Zanu-PF’s enrichment project?”, NewsTime Africa, 13 January 2013; “Zanu PF bigwigs wreak havoc in Gwayi”, Zimbabwe Independent, 22 February 2013; “Biti lashes out at Zanu PF mine grabbers”, NewsDay, 15 March 2013

\(^{79}\) Crisis Group interview, civil society researcher, Harare, 10 August 2012.

\(^{80}\) Crisis Group interview, businessman, Harare, 30 July 2012.

\(^{81}\) Crisis Group interview, development studies professor, University of Zimbabwe, 15 October 2012.

\(^{82}\) The media speculate about a possible Mujuru/Tsvangirai understanding to prepare for ZANU-PF and MDC-T to continue to share power in a post-Mugabe government. Evidence for such engagement has been limited and party leaders have denied this. Crisis Group interviews, MDC-T Standing Committee member, Harare, 6 August 2012; ZANU-PF central committee, Harare, 12 October 2012.

\(^{83}\) Crisis Group interview, ZANU-PF central committee, Harare, 12 October 2012. There has been some convergence in the party around the primary objective of winning the elections, but differences remain over the most appropriate tactics, as shown by equivocal positions on reform. Significant divisions also reflect a weakening of central control. “ZANU-PF at break point in Manicaland”, The Zimbabwe Mail, 24 January 2013.

\(^{84}\) While the MDC parties are complaining the nationwide voter registration process did not start on 3 January 2013, ZANU-PF has been mobilising its supporters to register at the few open registration centres. Crisis Group interview, senior MDC official, Johannesburg, 8 February 2013. ZANU-PF also used the constitution drafting process to mobilise supporters. The Constitution Parliamentary Select Committee (COPAC) final report shows the outreach process had greater public participation in rural areas, especially in ZANU-PF strongholds, than in the generally pro-MDC urban areas. “Report of COPAC presented to Parliament”, COPAC, 7 February 2013, p. 14.

\(^{85}\) Crisis Group interview, development studies professor, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, 15 October 2012.

\(^{86}\) “ZANU-PF cancels politburo meeting”, Daily News, 4 April 2013.
between factions, undermine the party’s unity and threaten to fragment its strategy for the elections.87

B.  **MDC-T: Challenges of Capacity and Cohesion**

Many MDC-T members still question the benefits of entering the GPA.88 It has delivered mixed results for the party. Most MDC-T leaders joined the government and this has distracted from the task of rebuilding the party.89 Disorganisation and weak structures have hurt MDC-T in its competition with the more effective ZANU-PF. However, the GPA has enhanced the party’s stature and acceptance as a key political player in Zimbabwe by SADC and its member states.90

In August 2012, the U.S. non-governmental organisation Freedom House released an opinion poll report indicating the MDC-T had lost overt popular support, declining from 38 to 20 per cent between 2010 and 2012.91 Several factors may have influenced this, including allegations of corruption in MDC-T-run urban councils,92 perceived enrichment by the party’s leaders in government,93 lack of clear party policies,94 failure to promote reform within government and limited time for party business.95

88 Some party members think the GPA has benefited ZANU-PF more than MDC-T, while others justify the arrangement as necessary to eventually dislodge ZANU-PF. Crisis Group interview, MDC-T provincial executive member, Harare, 28 December 2012.
89 Crisis Group interview, MDC-T provincial executive member, Harare, 6 August 2012.
90 Over the last three years, Morgan Tsvangirai has met with presidents from Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland and Tanzania. The MDC-T secretary for international relations, Jameson Timba, has also met with regional heads of state in his diplomatic efforts to communicate the party position on various GPA-related issues. Crisis Group interview, development studies professor, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, 15 October 2012. Before this the MDC-T was regionally disdained and regarded as a Western proxy. Crisis Group interview, civil society researcher, Harare, 10 August 2012. Such suspicions have not been completely displaced, and concerns remain that the MDC-T has not developed a consolidated regional strategy to further build its contacts and credibility, and that the leadership still prefers to spend its time in Western, rather than regional, capitals. Crisis Group interview, South African political analyst, Johannesburg, 20 January 2013.
91 Susan Boysen, “Change and ‘New’ Politics in Zimbabwe”, interim report, Freedom House, July 2012, p. 5. Conversely, support for ZANU-PF had increased from 17 to 31 per cent. Significantly, 47 per cent of respondents refused to declare their voting intention. The following month, another survey delivered relatively similar results with 31 per cent declaring support for the MDC-T and 32 per cent for ZANU-PF, and 33 per cent said they would not vote or were unable or refused to say who they would vote for. Michael Bratton and Eldred Masungure, “Voting intentions in Zimbabwe: A margin of terror?”, Afrobarometer Briefing Paper no. 103, August 2012, p. 2. Although some have interpreted these results as indicators of (re)ascendancy and victory for ZANU-PF, the results reflect that the elections are likely to be far closer than many had predicted. Crisis Group interviews, political researcher, Harare, 16 October 2012; PhD candidate, Johannesburg, 2 November 2012.
92 In April 2011, the party launched the National Evaluation and Inspection of Local Authorities Committee to investigate reported cases of corruption in MDC-T-run urban councils, leading over a year later to the expulsion of the Harare deputy mayor and twelve other councillors from the party. “Corrupt MDC-T councillors expelled from party”, SW Radio Africa, 30 August 2012. There have been some strong denials of the allegations. “Chirote defiant”, *Financial Gazette*, 5 September 2012
1. Factionalism and infighting

The 2011 MDC-T congress exposed deep internal divisions and resulted in violence over leadership positions. Factional fighting in Bulawayo in late April 2011 triggered internal investigations, including incidents of violence at its head office and in the provinces of Bulawayo, Chitungwiza, Mashonaland East, Mashonaland West, Masvingo and Midlands North.\(^96\) A report was handed to Tsvangirai, and though the National Executive Council (NEC) decided to act against those implicated in the incidents in June 2012, divisions within the council about the report’s findings have prevented any action being taken.\(^97\) It is a worrying sign and suggests the party will not stamp out a culture of violence – especially among youth elements – that has taken hold since the internal strife that led to the 2005 split.\(^98\)

The party also has been accused of inconsistency and “multiple messaging”, both in its approach to negotiations and reform, suggesting internal struggles over policy.\(^99\) Speculation is rife that despite imminent national elections, certain members are already looking to the party leadership vote in 2016.\(^100\)

\(^94\) Some analysts berate MDC-T for criticising ZANU-PF policies, such as economic empowerment and indigenisation and land reform, without offering clear alternatives. The party has also lacked clear policies in ministries it controls: public services, home affairs, state enterprise and parastatals, labour and social welfare, national housing and social amenities, and water resources and development. Crisis Group interview, political analyst, Harare, 9 August 2012.

\(^95\) The party’s Standing Committee is the National Executive Council’s (NEC) secretariat and is responsible for its day-to-day operations. Of its thirteen members, nine are also government executives, leaving limited time for party business. The MDC’s secretary general and national organising secretary are also the finance minister and the information, communication and technology minister respectively. This has depleted the MDC-T’s leadership capacity. Crisis Group interview, MDC-T provincial executive member, Harare, 6 August 2012. While party leaders claim this is no longer an issue, no evidence suggests these concerns have been addressed. Crisis Group interviews, MDC-T national executive member, Harare, 24 July 2012; MDC-T provincial executive member, Harare, 12 November 2012; telephone interview, MDC-T national executive member, 27 January 2013.

\(^96\) Clashes at the head office in April 2011 saw members who claimed allegiance to party president Morgan Tsvangirai face off against supporters of secretary general Tendai Biti. Crisis Group interview, MDC-T provincial executive member, Harare, 6 August 2012. In March 2012, the provincial chairperson for Mashonaland East was severely assaulted by youths at a party meeting. In June, the party suspended its Hurungwe (Mashonaland West) parliamentarian for setting up a terror gang that targeted his party rival. Crisis Group interview, political analyst, Harare, 9 August 2012.

\(^97\) Crisis Group telephone interviews, MDC-T national executive member, 19 July 2012, 29 January 2013. A resolution to punish party officials and leaders involved in violence and factionalism was passed at the NEC meeting held at Harvest House, Harare, on 15 June 2012, after senior party officials were implicated by the “Trust Manda commission” created to investigate violence in the party. “Violence: MDC-T drags feet on action”, *Zimbabwe Independent*, 16 November 2012.


\(^99\) For example, in December 2012, some senior party leaders, including Finance Minister Tendai Biti, declared the constitution process deadlocked, while Tsvangirai reported progress. On that occasion, Tsvangirai claimed a decent working relationship with Mugabe, but other senior party members derided it. Crisis Group interview, newspaper editor, Harare, 14 December 2012.

\(^100\) Although Tsvangirai and Biti have denied major differences, the perception that there are two centres of power runs deep. Crisis Group telephone interview, MDC-T national executive member, January 2013. There are some provincial groups who are already calling for Tsvangirai’s replacement at the 2016 congress. Crisis Group interview, MDC-T provincial executive member, Harare, 28 December 2012. A 2013 election defeat by MDC-T may provide a silver lining for those who want to challenge
2. Fractured internal democracy

Competition in the party has intensified, exacerbating existing rifts and contributing to new internal fault lines. MDC-T leaders, including parliamentarians, have been accused of “ring fencing” their positions by resisting party leadership elections, which are critical to functional internal democracy. In October 2012, a letter from Harare province supporters to Tsvangirai warned of voter apathy in the next national election should the party abandon primaries. It also highlighted incompetence, corruption and lack of commitment by some MDC-T parliamentarians to justify the need for leadership renewal. Disagreement about the primaries has also reportedly reached the senior echelons. This has raised questions about the party’s capacity and willingness to promote democracy, development, human rights and security.

C. Other Political Formations: The Plague of Fragmentation

The other political formations, the MDC faction led by Welshman Ncube; the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) led by Dumiso Dabengwa; and Dawn/Mavambo/Kusile led by Simba Makoni, have each experienced splits since 2008.

MDC has mainly focused on establishing its presence in Matabeleland and parts of Midlands region where it is expected to challenge MDC-T dominance. This has reinforced perceptions in some quarters that the party does not have a national footprint. Dumiso Dabengwa relaunched ZAPU in 2009 (after resigning from ZANU-PF in 2008). Faced with internal unrest, the party expelled one of the founders, Ray Ncube. Dabengwa has been criticised for failing to establish a significant party presence in his Matabeleland home province. For his part, Makoni, who received the incumbent leadership. Crisis Group interview, development studies professor, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, 15 October 2012.


102 Some have been parliamentarians since 2000, prompting calls for “new blood”. Jostling for nomination to “safe seats”, mostly in pro-MDC-T urban areas, is rife. The party youth wing is also pushing for a quota system to have reserved seats for them. Crisis Group interview, MDC-T provincial youth wing executive member, Harare, 12 November 2012. Article 15 (11) of the MDC-T constitution provides for primary elections, but the NEC has endorsed a system in which sitting parliamentarians confirmed by a three-quarter majority of their constituency do not need to face primary elections. Some have allegedly coerced constituency members to support their confirmation. Crisis Group interview, MDC-T provincial executive member, Harare, 28 December 2012.

103 “Impose candidates at your peril”, Zimbabwe Independent, 26 October 2012.


105 Crisis Group interview, political analyst, Harare, 4 January 2013.

106 At its 2011 congress, the party replaced Arthur Mutambara (deputy prime minister) with Welshman Ncube (industry and commerce minister) as president. Mutambara challenged the congress’s constitutionality in court but lost the case in early 2012. The matter is currently awaiting appeal before the Supreme Court. He has, however, continued as deputy prime minister without a political party, complicating matters both within the government and more broadly in the GPA. Mutambara is a GPA signatory, which Mugabe (ostensibly with the support of Tsvangirai) has used as justification for not replacing him with Ncube, in defiance of SADC’s endorsement of Ncube at its August 2012 heads of state summit in Maputo. Crisis Group interview, newspaper editor, Harare, 14 December 2012.

107 A former Zimbabwean army colonel, Ncube was ZAPU’s provincial chairman for Bulawayo and was accused of “conspiring to create, and indeed succeed in forming a parallel party”. “Zapu expels chairman”, NewsDay, 6 October 2012.

8.3 per cent of the vote in 2008, has not established a strong party infrastructure. Despite confident public statements about the party’s prospects, he is not expected to make a significant impact in the forthcoming elections.109

D. Inter-party Alliances: The Unclear Narratives

Prospects for election pacts or coalitions are complicated by personal rivalries and competing claims for positions.110 A possible MDC-T/MDC alliance is predicated on the relationship of Tsvangirai and Ncube, who continue to trade accusations of incompetence and irrelevance.111 MDC is reportedly in discussions with ZAPU and the Patriotic Union of Matabeleland (PUMA) to form a coalition.112 These parties have a major presence in Matabeleland region, where the MDC-T currently holds 50 per cent of parliamentary seats and received 60 per cent of the popular vote in the 2008 presidential election. Makoni has indicated a willingness to form a coalition with other parties, and denies reports of a possible return or continuing links to ZANU-PF.113

The absence of an election pact may split the anti-ZANU-PF vote to the advantage of ZANU-PF, and increase the possibility of hung parliament and a presidential run-off (needed if no candidate secures over 50 per cent of the vote). Were elections deferred and the renewal or extension of the GPA to become a possibility, parties outside the current power-sharing arrangement would be likely to demand a seat at the table.114 This may create a more credible transitional mechanism than the exclusive GPA.115

Party dynamics are increasingly complex and intertwined. An unprecedented investigation of senior ZANU-PF ministers and parastatals by the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission (ZACC) appears to be linked to the arrest of several staff members from Prime Minister Tsvangirai’s office, as well as the arrest of the ZACC chairperson on corruption charges. The probes have been halted, but speculation has been rife that ZACC’s energetic focus reflected high-level endorsement for the investigation within ZANU-PF that was most likely related to ongoing succession battles.116 The MDC-T


111 Ibid.


114 Crisis Group interview, opposition party secretary general, Harare, 25 October 2012. Also see Section II.E.

115 “There is hope in Zimbabwe .... Nothing is permanent except change”, Crisis Coalition of Zimbabwe: Dialogue and Transition Conference report, 5 July 2003, p. 3.

116 Crisis Group email correspondence, civil society researcher, Harare, 29 March 2013. “ZANU-PF succession battle spills to indigenisation probes”, The Mail & Guardian, 28 March 2013. The probe involves ministers Obert Mpofu (mines), Nicholas Goche (transport and infrastructure) and Saviour Kasukuwere (indigenisation and youth), as well as the Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation (ZMDC) and the National Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Board. It is seen as unprecedented, as the ZACC has to date steered clear of high-profile ZANU-PF figures. “Zimbabwe:
officials arrested were allegedly involved in a parallel investigation building dossiers on these and other ZANU-PF loyalists. Their arrest spurred further questions as to whether their alleged involvement might show a measure of inter-party collaboration by factions and groups pursuing a mutual objective – namely the weakening of political rivals – or was a completely distinct endeavour.117

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Where did ZACC get its teeth?”, AllAfrica.com, 15 March 2013. It is alleged that the splits within ZANU-PF led factions to leak documents to both the ZACC and MDC-T, implicating their rivals in corrupt activities.

117 “Corruption’s unasked questions”, The Financial Gazette, 28 March 2013. A senior staff member in Tsvangirai’s office was previously a senior ZANU-PF member aligned with efforts to promote Mnangagwa to the vice presidency of the party in 2004.
IV. The Security Sector: Unyielding to Reforms?

A. Politics and the Elections

The evolution of political-military relations has been shaped by pre- and immediate post-independence developments. In 1980, then-Prime Minister Mugabe was also defence minister, establishing direct oversight and control and limiting the possibility of rebellion within the newly integrated force. As Zimbabwe approaches the election, evidence of the military’s involvement in the political arena has grown, and the close political-military relations in ZANU-PF will likely remain intact.

The security sector’s interest in elections can be traced to statements made by senior officials before the March 2002 presidential polls. They declared allegiance to Mugabe and vowed not to recognise any winner lacking liberation war credentials, a reference to Morgan Tsvangirai. In 2008, the delayed announcement of the presidential results was allegedly orchestrated by the Joint Operations Command (JOC), which had exerted significant influence over the ZEC’s responsibilities and ZANU-PF’s campaign.

118 In 1976, during the liberation struggle, Mugabe called for combining military and political roles and responsibilities without a distinct separation. Each military unit included combatants and political commissars. The military was also well represented in ZANU’s politburo structures. Terence Ranger, “The Changing of the Old Guard: Robert Mugabe and the Revival of ZANU”, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, vol. 7, no. 1 (1980), p. 83. After independence, ZANU wanted to maintain primary control over the new Zimbabwe Defence Forces, especially given its distrust of other forces – the former Rhodesian forces and members of ZAPU’s armed wing, the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) – integrated into the new army. Crisis Group interview, Zimbabwe liberation war veteran, Harare, 7 August 2012.


122 The statement was made on 9 January 2002 by Commander of Zimbabwe Defence Forces, Lt. General Vitalis Zvinavashe; then army commander, Lt. General Constantine Chiwenga; air force commander, Air Marshall Perence Shiri; then-head of the Central Intelligence Organisation, Brigadier Elisha Muzonzini; and prison services commissioner, Maj. General Paradzai Zimondi. They formed the Joint Operations Command’s core and had “re-emerged as the real managers of Zimbabwean politics”. Knox Chitiyo, “The Case for Security Sector Reform in Zimbabwe”, Occasional Paper, Royal United Services Institute (September 2009), p. 8.

123 The JOC has become increasingly prominent since the late 1990s. By 2008, it consisted of the chiefs of the army, police, prison service, air force, intelligence services, the Reserve Bank governor and Mugabe. It became the highest decision-making body, replacing the cabinet. Stephen Chan, *Old Treacheries, New Deceits* (Johannesburg, 2011), pp. 188-189. Colin Felsman, “(JOC) keying for power: The Joint Operations Command and the Viability of a Transitional Arrangement in Zimbabwe”, Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa (IDASA), 7 August 2008, p. 1. The JOC initially split on how to proceed after Mugabe lost the first presidential election round to Tsvangirai, but eventually decided to convince him to run again and guaranteed him victory. There are indications the military ran the country during this period and reports it even considered taking over if Mugabe decided not to run again. Crisis Group Africa Briefing No.51, *Negotiating Zimbabwe’s Transition*, 21 May 2008.
Throughout the GPA period, the MDC formations have complained about security sector partisanship. In November 2012, the army deployed along the Mozambican border, with reinforcements in April 2013, in response to instability in that country,124 but civil society groups and the MDC-T suspect the increased military presence in Manicaland, a key swing province, will help ZANU-PF win back ground it lost to the MDC-T in the last election.125 The same month, the army launched a history project deploying military personnel and war veterans across the country, reportedly to gather oral, archaeological and recorded histories of the liberation struggle, but it has prompted suspicions the project is a smokescreen for growing intimidation campaigns ahead of the elections.126

At the beginning of 2012, the army and police began an unbudgeted national recruitment drive.127 Army officials justified it as necessary to strengthen national security,128 but standard recruitment criteria were allegedly ignored and most of those selected were ZANU-PF supporters, including former youth militia.129

Elements within the security sector have pushed for greater representation in ZANU-PF structures and a role in selecting candidates for the elections.130 This does not necessarily reflect a militarisation of Zimbabwe, but rather the politicisation of the security establishment. Security chiefs are worried by ZANU-PF’s faltering political fortunes, and are taking advantage of a broader-based concern (among both veteran and servicemen) about their diminished political representation, especially within

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124 Mozambique’s official opposition, Resistência Nacional Moçambicana (RENAMO), has threatened to return to civil war unless the ruling Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO) ensures a more equitable distribution of the country’s wealth. In November 2012, RENAMO president, Afonso Dhlakama, and 700 followers returned to their former guerrilla base, Casa Banana, in the Gorongosa Mountains, along the country’s border with Zimbabwe. “Zim troops deploy along Moza border”, Daily News, 30 November 2012. RENAMO attacked police officers and killed civilians in April 2013. “Dhlakama vows fresh attacks”, Newsday, 12 April 2013. The army has been deployed in other suspicious circumstances. For example, in Zimbabwe in 2005, during Operation Maguta, which nationalised formerly white-owned farms, the government deployed soldiers, ostensibly to provide technical assistance and oversee improving food production. A network of operational bases was established across the country and, according to the MDC-T and others, was intimidating and providing cover to support ZANU-PF's local political control. “Operation Maguta castigated”, The Zimbabwean, 1 October 2011.

125 Crisis Group interviews, civil society violence monitors and analysts, Harare, July 2012.

126 The military denies this, claiming it is a bona fide project designed to build an accurate historical account of the liberation struggle. Crisis Group email correspondence, civil society researcher, Harare, 15 January 2013. Several security sector officials reportedly are interested in standing for parliament in this province. “Commanders enter poll race”, Daily News, 13 January 2011.

127 The police and army were signing up a total of about 400 recruits every six weeks. Crisis Group interview, MDC-T standing committee member, Harare, 20 December 2012. The police defied this, claiming it is a bona fide project designed to build an accurate historical account of the liberation struggle. Crisis Group email correspondence, civil society researcher, Harare, 15 January 2013; Crisis Group interview, MDC-T standing committee member, Harare, 20 December 2012.

128 Recruiters relaxed the requirement for five ordinary level passes and mainly operated in rural areas, which are considered ZANU-PF strongholds. Crisis Group interview, government minister, Harare, 20 April 2012.

the party.\textsuperscript{131} With Mugabe’s advanced age, they are concerned that their interests will not be safeguarded by a successor and the current uncertainty presents opportunities for reconfiguring representation within ZANU-PF in their favour.\textsuperscript{132} Their increased involvement may prompt the MDC-T to call for election deferral or lead to a disputed outcome.\textsuperscript{133}

\section*{B. GPA and Security Sector Reform}

The MDC-T and others are concerned the security sector will prevent a transfer of power should ZANU-PF lose.\textsuperscript{134} Over the last eighteen months, several senior ZANU-PF and security officials have made statements about the military rejecting or having difficulty in accepting election results, and warning of a “bloodbath” should Tsvangirai win.\textsuperscript{135} Mugabe did not disavow any of these, despite his command responsibility and the blatant violation of a GPA commitment to “charting a new political direction for the country”.\textsuperscript{136} The extent to which this reflects broader sentiments within the security establishment is unclear. A significant, albeit relatively limited, number of members of the security forces have been directly involved or implicated in political violence.\textsuperscript{137} Consequently, whether they could be mobilised en masse to defy a legitimate vote remains uncertain.\textsuperscript{138}

The GPA did not provide explicitly for security sector reform. The National Security Council (NSC) it established with a broad mandate “to review national policies on security, defence, law and order and recommending or directing appropriate action”...
has not fulfilled its mission. At the council’s first meetings in 2009, the MDC parties – which have struggled to develop relations with the military, notwithstanding efforts to do so – insisted on the need for reforms. ZANU-PF and security chiefs dismissed their calls as beyond the NSC’s mandate and construed it as an attempt to push for regime change. This is a well-worn and self-serving argument that contradicts ZANU-PF’s commitments to the draft constitution that explicitly prohibits the security services’ involvement in politics. As a result, the NSC has failed to develop an inclusive national security policy, or a meaningful platform for discussing security reform. This, in turn, has reinforced allegations that the JOC was never disbanded and continues to clandestinely coordinate security in alignment with ZANU-PF interests.

The fears and interests of the security sector are often assumed and remain largely undefined. This is predicated on a widespread belief that certain security chiefs’ hardened positions are motivated by concerns of possible prosecution, the desire to preserve businesses and newly-gained wealth, and in some instances ideological zeal. Civil society initially called for transitional justice provisions, but failed to identify strategies specific to Zimbabwe’s complex transition. Discussions over prosecution may close down options for exploring a conditional amnesty, which could potentially have been used to unblock security sector obstruction to a sustainable democratic transition. The GPA provisions for holding perpetrators of political violence accountable have not been executed, and the new draft constitution makes no explicit commitment to investigate such crimes.

Since mid-2012, the SADC facilitator has stressed the need for security sector reform, most recently in March 2013 when he called for security sector “realignment”.

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142 Crisis Group interview, MDC-T Standing Committee member, Harare, 6 August 2012.
143 Crisis Group interview, political science professor, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, 7 August 2012.
144 Section 208 (2) (a), (draft) Constitution of Zimbabwe, 1 February 2013. Defence Minister Mnangagwa told senior military personnel that there would be no reforms as long as he remained in government. “No military reforms – Mnangagwa”, Daily News, 8 February 2013.
145 The NSC has met less than six times since 11 February 2009. The last known meeting was in December 2012. Crisis Group interview, senior government official, Johannesburg, 9 February 2013.
147 Crisis Group interview, senior aide to one of the GPA principals, 3 January 2012.
149 Since the signing of GPA, ZANU-PF has resisted security sector reform, claiming that the security sector is professional and that its competence is highlighted by its involvement in international assistance to other regional forces. Security sector realignment is a terminology that has been adopted to reflect the need for the sector to comply with, and reinforce, the GPA framework rather than introduce wholesome changes. Crisis Group telephone interview, security sector expert, 16 April 2013. Record of Troika Summit of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, Luanda, 1 June 2012, Decisions 7, pp. 11-12. “The Report of SADC Facilitator on the Zimbabwe Inter-Party Political Dialogue”, SADC, 9 March 2009, p. 7.
Ensuring these calls translate into action remains a challenge. The Zimbabwe military’s diplomatic efforts in the region are seen as part of a strategy to resist reform.150

C. Economic Interests

While some claim the security sector is becoming part of the “domestic bourgeoisie”,151 its economic interests are probably more limited than often alleged.152 Nevertheless, the reported involvement of security sector personnel with commercial entities and the lack of transparency have fuelled concerns, particularly in the diamond sector but also in other areas.153

Much controversy has centred on diamond revenues. The finance ministry projected an income of $650 million from such revenues in the 2011-2012 national budget, but in November 2012, the Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation (ZMDC) revised the projection by 75 per cent downward.154 The finance minister and MDC-T secretary general, Tendai Biti, has blamed revenue deficits on the lack of transparency in revenue flows, and production and sales details. He suggested that illicit diamond revenues are enriching individuals and financing parallel government structures and activities.155 These allegations are supported by domestic and international NGOs.156

150 At the April 2013 graduation of 100 Mozambican army officers who completed their training at Zimbabwe’s Defence College, the Zimbabwean army commander, Phillip Valerio Sibanda, urged security forces to defend regional countries against Western-backed “regime change”. Zimbabwe also has strong bilateral joint military cooperation with SADC countries. “Zimbabwe: 100 Mozambican soldiers graduate”, The Herald, 13 April 2013.
151 Pedzisai Ruhanya, “Why the army is important to ZANU-PF survival”, Zimbabwe Democracy Institute, 20 December 2012, p. 1.
152 Despite the assumption that the security sector is broadly benefiting from businesses, most reported cases are about individuals pursuing personal interests. Individual behaviour should not be confused with the responsibility of the security institutions as a whole. Crisis Group interviews, security sector analysts, Harare, 28 and 30 July 2012; senior Zimbabwe army official, Harare, 25 October 2012.
153 There were, for example, allegations in mid-2012 of security sector involvement in a potential deal with Russia to exchange Zimbabwe’s platinum mineral concessions for military helicopters. “Technologies can pay for a platinum mine in Zimbabwe arms”, Kommersant, 27 June 2012; “Zim free to buy arms from Russia: US ambassador”, Zimbabwe Independent, 5 July 2012; and “Zim mortgages minerals for arms”, Zimbabwe Independent, 16 July 2012. There also has been considerable focus on the security sector’s involvement with diamond mining company Anjin Investments. According to 2012 reports by Global Witness, Anjin is a joint venture between Anhui Foreign Economic Construction Group (AFECG), a Chinese construction company also building the new $98 million Zimbabwe Defence College, and Matt Bronze (Pvt) Ltd. Anjin’s executive board reportedly includes members from the police, army, defence ministry and ZANU-PF, though the company denies that it has ever been controlled by the military or police. “Financing a parallel government”, Global Witness, June 2012, pp. 13-18; and “Diamonds: A good deal for Zimbabwe?”, February 2012. See also “Inside Zimbabwe’s controversial Marange diamond field”, CNN, 16 March 2012; “2011/2012 National budget statement”, finance ministry, Harare, November 2011. “Diamond revenue revised downwards”, The Herald, 7 November 2012.
154 In May 2012, the finance minister claimed that diamond companies’ year-to-date (January to March 2012) exports contributed $30.4 million to government treasury against a target of $122.5 million. He singled out Anjin Investments as the largest culprit in failing to remit to government, an allegation that the company denied. The minister claimed that the money was being routed to parallel government structures. “Chinese company taking all diamond money – Biti”, Zim Eye News, 18 May 2012; “Zimbabwe: Anjin not remitting diamond proceeds – Biti”, Zimbabwe Independent, 18 May 2012; “Anjin denies stockpiling diamonds”, The Zimbabwean, 21 August 2012; “Financing a parallel government”, op. cit.
The ZANU-PF mines and mining development minister, Obert Mpofu, has dismissed these claims, blaming low prices and sanctions and denouncing the finance ministry’s ineffectiveness in revenue collection. Diamond pricing structure and trading channels remain obscure, exacerbating perceptions of corruption.

Although the Zimbabwe diamond policy (ZDP) approved in 2012 outlines directives that can enhance transparency in the industry, its full and immediate implementation is unlikely ahead of the elections, because MDC-T will not push and ZANU-PF is not interested. Profound concerns remain about off-budget government financing and possible vote-buying.

157 Obert Mpofu, “Transparency in the Mining Sector”, speech to Centre for Public Accountability, 11 June 2012.
158 Others claim under-pricing of Zimbabwe’s diamonds, mainly because of corruption and unofficial trading channels, is the main reason for depressed income. See “Calls to regulate diamond sales to plug leaks, graft”, The Mail & Guardian, 22 June 2012. Some EU member states argued against renewing restrictive measures imposed on the ZMDC, suggesting access to European diamond businesses would mitigate risks of under-pricing and its effects. The EU did not support this position, but has suspended restrictions on several individuals and reaffirmed a commitment to suspend all measures if there is a “peaceful and credible constitutional referendum”. “Council conclusions on Zimbabwe”, 3222nd Foreign Affairs Council Meeting, Brussels, 18 February 2013.
159 “There shall be access to diamond trade and financial records of all companies by the ministry of mines and mining development, treasury, Zimbabwe revenue authority (ZIMRA) and the Environmental Management Authority (EMA). Ministry of mines and mining development will ensure that all diamond revenue is collected and remitted accordingly to treasury”. “Zimbabwe Diamond Policy”, November 2012, Section 6.
160 In November 2012, Mugabe launched a $20 million agricultural input facility for rural farmers, seen as part of his election campaign. Its funding source has not been disclosed, leading to wide speculation it comes from diamonds. Crisis Group interview, economic researcher, Harare, 11 November 2012.
V. The Role and Capacity of GPA Guarantors

SADC and the AU are GPA guarantors, but interpretations and expectations of their responsibilities are mixed.\(^{161}\) For some, SADC’s role is to guide the country to a free and fair election.\(^{162}\) The absence of “red lines” for compliance in the run-up to elections is worrying.\(^{163}\) There is no clarity, for example, as to whether the guarantors’ roles extend beyond observing the elections, to more intrusive monitoring.\(^{164}\) The deployment of SADC monitors to JOMIC has long been delayed. Their presence, which has been endorsed by regional heads of state, would help determine responsibilities and promote accountability of GPA parties while functioning as the eyes and ears of SADC’s facilitation team. To be effective, they must not only rely on JOMIC for interpreting developments on the ground, but also be independent and objective in their analysis.\(^{165}\)

During the first half of 2011, SADC encouraged GPA parties to work towards a narrowed down reform agenda that focused on finalising the constitution and an election roadmap.\(^{166}\) They developed a draft roadmap, which SADC endorsed, although key areas of disagreement remain.\(^{167}\) Despite SADC’s calls for full GPA implementation,\(^{168}\) there is a strong sense that it has shifted from a broad reform agenda to a strategy of containment and deterrence, intended primarily to avert widespread violence and ensure elections are reasonably credible.\(^{169}\) What this means in practice remains unclear. The regional bloc has managed to push back against ZANU-PF demands for early polls, but this has not ensured renewed attention to the reforms laid out in the election roadmap.\(^{170}\) Instead, calls for reform have focused on the draft constitution, effectively diverting attention from an array of practical election challenges, as well as inauspicious conditions on the ground.\(^{171}\)

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\(^{161}\) ZANU-PF’s position was that SADC had no mandate to be directly involved in GPA monitoring and evaluation, whereas MDC parties expected the regional bloc to do so. Crisis Group Report N°191, *Implementing Peace and Security Architecture (II): Southern Africa*, 15 October 2012, pp. 16-17.


\(^{163}\) Given the limited reforms that have so far been implemented in the GPA era, the chances of holding a free and fair election are remote. Only a “credible” election now seems possible, but there is no agreement on criteria for credibility: benchmarks, or consensus from GPA parties on standards they all need to comply with, and remedial and punitive measures for violating the rules, are all absent. Crisis Group interview, constitutional law professor, University of Zimbabwe, 8 August 2012.

\(^{164}\) For more on the difference between election observation (to collect information and make judgment without interfering in the process) and monitoring (to observe the electoral process and intervene if laws and regulations are being violated), see “Election observation, monitoring and supervision”, at http://bit.ly/fPXAhc.

\(^{165}\) Crisis Group interview, development agency governance adviser, 10 January 2013.

\(^{166}\) Crisis Group interview, political analyst, Harare, 9 August 2012.

\(^{167}\) Areas of disagreement include: the ZEC secretariat’s composition; the role of the security sector in politics and their deployment in local communities; repealing of legislation infringing on freedom of association and of assembly; and the participation of foreign electoral observers and monitors. Crisis Group interview, political analyst, Harare, 9 August 2012.

\(^{168}\) “Communiqué of the extraordinary summit of SADC heads of state and government”, Luanda, Angola, 1 June 2012; 32nd Summit of SADC heads of state and government, Maputo, Mozambique, 18 August 2012; extraordinary summit of SADC heads of state and government, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 8 December 2012; Summit of the SADC troika of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 11 January 2013.

\(^{169}\) Crisis Group interview, political analyst, Harare, 4 January 2013.


\(^{171}\) Crisis Group interview, GPA negotiator, Johannesburg, 9 February 2013.
In December 2012, Mugabe declared elections would be held in March 2013. It was an unconvincing display of bravado rejected by SADC and other GPA principals in the absence of reforms. As the constitutional referendum took place on 16 March, an election in June or July may in theory be possible, but an election this early seems unlikely, with September or October a more reasonable prospect.

SADC is increasingly frustrated by JOMIC’s “unimpressive performance”, a body it regards as central to delivering appropriate conditions for the elections. Despite positive anecdotal evidence of cooperative responses by political representatives and the ZRP to alleged violence, it has been unable to translate these local successes at a higher level. Analysts and civil society express frustration that the JOMIC is not realising its potential, with ZANU-PF accused of aiming to “delegitimise the secretariat of JOMIC on the grounds that it was in alliance with the MDC formations and was assisting them to extend their organisational presence throughout the country”.

At its 9 March troika (Organ for Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation) meeting, SADC identified key election-related issues that need attention after the referendum. These include: the need to speedily implement the election roadmap; security sector realignment; immediate deployment of the regional bloc’s officials and participation of its facilitators in JOMIC; cleaning of voter rolls; consensus on the election roadmap within 30 days of the referendum; and timely deployment of observers with mandate to also monitor elections. These objectives are sought despite the absence of agreement on “red lines” for compliance to the GPA and the election process. With elections expected in the next three to six months, the chances of implementing these recommendations are remote.

How election scenarios unfold will also depend on SADC’s will and capacity, not only to influencing the timing of the polls, but also to promoting the reforms necessary to deliver a credible vote. But SADC and by extension the AU need to ensure a greater physical presence, to fulfil their guarantor role, increasingly being undermined by ZANU-PF, as well as to build confidence in the electoral institutions and the pro-

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172 Robert Mugabe, speech to the 90th ordinary session of the ZANU-PF central committee, Harare, 12 October 2012.
174 Ibid. This resonates with assertions made to Crisis Group by a ZANU-PF politburo member in August 2011 that JOMIC would be used as a backdoor mechanism to promote regime change, and that the party would prevent this. Crisis Group interview, ZANU-PF politburo member, Harare, 1 August 2011.
176 SADC sent officials to work with JOMIC in 2011. The new proposal from Zuma includes the participation of his facilitation team and a Namibian official to boost the regional bloc’s representation. The original SADC official team included Tanzania and Zambia; Namibia is now being proposed as the incoming chair of the organ for politics, defence and security cooperation (in August 2013). ZANU-PF is opposed to an extension of SADC involvement within JOMIC, including attendance at the full JOMIC meetings, claiming that this would undermine Zimbabwe’s sovereignty and the GPA parties’ modus operandi of dispute resolution. “Zanu PF, Sadc on warpath”, *Zimbabwe Independent*, 22 March 2013.
177 Some of these issues have remained outstanding since the GPA was signed four years ago. The latest legal timeframe by which elections can be held is October 2013 and it is unlikely that issues the GPA partners failed to resolve in four years can be fully addressed before then. Crisis Group interview, political analyst, Johannesburg, 28 March 2013.
178 Since the conclusion of the referendum, ZANU-PF is openly challenging SADC’s role and parameters of involvement in Zimbabwe, including by boycotting SADC facilitation meetings. “Muga-
cess itself. The regional bloc has also recommended that it support electoral funding efforts.\textsuperscript{179} However, it remains to be seen whether SADC can push through and implement its recommendations – the establishment of a temporary SADC liaison office in Zimbabwe, as in Madagascar, could help it do so – or if habitual resistance to reforms by political parties will prevail.\textsuperscript{180}


\textsuperscript{180} The liaison office in Harare would complement JOMIC monitors, provide SADC’s facilitation team with a permanent secretariat in country, and prevent the regional bloc being bogged down in the detail of micro-JOMIC dynamics. The office should remain in Zimbabwe for at least six months after the elections. Its establishment, which requires the support of the three GPA signatories, should be presented as a complement to strengthen SADC’s role in promoting the peace and security framework, rather than as an intervention that undermines Zimbabwean sovereignty.
VI. Election Scenarios: Multiple Possibilities

Under the current constitution, the president and legislature are directly elected. ZANU-PF and MDC-T will retain their dominant status, but other smaller political actors may once again affect the balance of power, as in 2008. SADC’s position is especially pivotal.  

A. A Deferred Election

Although SADC demanded an election be held within twelve months of June 2012, several factors, including the interminable delays around agreement and implementation of reforms, soon confirmed that any insistence on this schedule would be unwise. At its March 2013 summit, the SADC troika endorsed Zuma’s call for the implementation of reforms “so that adequate preparations are made for a level playing field for the forthcoming elections”. Much depends, however, on whether delaying the process would realistically enable a resolution of the challenges identified.

1. What could prompt postponement?

A continuing impasse between ZANU-PF and the MDC factions, as reflected by the election roadmap gridlock, could justify deferring elections beyond October 2013. The MDC-T has stated that it will not participate in an election that does not meet its reform demands. However, Tsvangirai has agreed to be the GPA principals’ point

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181 Crisis Group interview, political analyst, Harare, 4 January 2013. Parliamentarians are elected by constituency, whereas the president requires 50 per cent plus one support from the entire voting population. In 2008, voters in several constituencies returned their local ZANU-PF parliamentarian but did not vote for Mugabe. In the presidential election, Simba Makoni won 8 per cent of votes, forcing a run-off between Mugabe, who received 43.2 per cent, and Tsvangirai, who had 47.9 per cent. In the parliamentary polls, the smaller MDC won 7.5 per cent of the seats, making it an important legislative power broker.

182 “Communiqué of the extraordinary summit of SADC heads of state and government”, Luanda, 1 June 2012. The parliament’s term expires on 29 June 2013 and transitional constitutional arrangements provide for elections to be held within four months (late October 2013). If elections are deferred beyond October 2013, a constitutional amendment will be required to extend government and parliament. “GNU II and how to get there”, Zimbabwe Independent, 21 December 2012.

183 Crisis Group interview, political science professor, University of Zimbabwe, 7 August 2012.


185 There are growing concerns that parliament will not have enough time to ensure the required legislative changes if it is dissolved on 29 June 2013. The legislature could be extended by constitutional provision, (see “Of camels, constitutions and elections”, op. cit., p. 5) and political pressure is reportedly mounting to explore this option. “Poll date: Tsvangirai, Ncube propose constitution amendment”, NewZimbabwe, 28 April 2013.

186 The party is mindful of its 2002 mistake, when it participated in the presidential election it had earlier dismissed as flawed, only to subsequently challenge the outcome in court. Its participation seemed to legitimise the exercise and result, making the subsequent legal challenge in effect futile. For the MDC-T, the 2008 presidential election re-run proved the substantial impact of withdrawing when conditions are unfavourable, since this led to a refusal to recognise poll results and to the
man on election preparations, and it would thus be difficult to cry foul or withdraw unless clear reform benchmarks have been violated.187

If parties cannot agree on the post-referendum reforms, SADC risks supporting an election with a discredited process and institutional deficits. Security sector influence in politics could also make it difficult to secure free and fair conditions for elections by October 2013.188 SADC will be guided by its facilitators’ recommendations, but deferment is only realistic if there is consensus on the need for reform to guarantee a credible election.189 Some media reports suggest SADC’s facilitators may let elections go ahead without further reform.190 This would represent a significant U-turn from the region’s current position.

Internal challenges facing political parties, if unresolved, will hamper their performance in the election, and may also prompt some to push for a deferral beyond October 2013.191 This would, however, require a significant convergence of opinion within fragmented parties, and even a consolidated position within party leadership would not necessarily gain sufficient traction among respective support bases.

The deterioration of existing fault lines within MDC-T may affect its readiness for elections and trigger calls for deferral, especially as such divisions would also undermine its ability to dispute election results.192 Its position could be either complicated or strengthened by Tsvangirai’s role as the government’s point man on election preparations.193 For ZANU-PF, uncertainty about the election outcome may prompt the party to accept or engineer a deferral.194 Historically ZANU-PF has always called for elections under conditions and timing that provided some guarantee for victory. In 2000, the party pushed elections from March to June after the February constitutional referendum had indicated declining support for its positions. The move enabled the party to mobilise war veterans to drive its campaign.195 In 2008, against the advice of the intelligence community, it decided to contest the elections; it will be keen to avoid making a similar mistake.196 A range of options are available to political parties to force a delay in the vote, including boycott, instigating widespread violence, or deliberately sustaining the election roadmap deadlock.197

AU’s call for negotiations that produced the GPA. Crisis Group interview, MDC-T standing committee member, Harare, 6 August 2012.

188 See Section IV.
190 “Zimbabwe: Mugabe softens Zuma”, op. cit.
193 Tsvangirai will have to construct a careful and empirically sound basis for determining whether preparations are satisfactory to ensure a peaceful and credible, if not a free and fair, vote.
194 Historically ZANU-PF has always called for elections under conditions and timing that provided some guarantee for victory. In 2000, the party pushed elections from March to June after the February constitutional referendum had indicated declining support for its positions. The move enabled the party to mobilise war veterans to drive its campaign. Crisis Group interview, political science professor, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, 7 August 2012.
196 During the 2008 presidential run-off campaign, violence forced MDC-T to withdraw. If similar levels of violence are expected in 2013, SADC is unlikely to risk supporting an election. The MDC parties have also threatened to withdraw should that transpire. Crisis Group interview, civil society researcher, 10 August 2012. A detailed assessment of violence and intimidation in the lead-up to elections will be provided in a forthcoming Crisis Group briefing. The parties can attempt to exploit SADC’s enforcement weaknesses by being inflexible on their election roadmap demands with an intention to defer the election. Crisis Group interview, MDC-T standing committee member, Harare, 10 November 2012.
Consequences of a postponed vote

Rescheduling the elections beyond October 2013 will require either an extension of the GPA or a reconfigured power-sharing arrangement, described by some as "GPA 2". Any extension should be specifically tailored to transitional objectives, including reconciling Zimbabwe’s laws with the new constitution and implementing key reforms. Such an agreement should specify minimum conditions for key reforms – “red lines” – critical for democratic elections, strict timelines, effective monitoring and assessment capabilities, clear consequences and measures for failure to comply, unambiguous executive power-sharing mechanisms and the specific roles for the guarantors in the entire process.

JOMIC’s role must extend beyond monitoring and evaluation of GPA compliance at political party grassroots levels, and include the national leadership. Its legitimacy and effectiveness would be enhanced by a more inclusive approach, incorporating other parties, civil society actors, faith-based organisations, NGOs, as well as business representatives. Its mandate should also be extended to election preparations and activities.

Addressing security sector concerns and rebuilding public confidence in state institutions are crucial to extended power sharing, as well as any election preparations. These tasks should not be delegated exclusively to signatory parties, who have largely failed to address these issues, and efforts should be explored to develop a more inclusive arrangement focused on stability and accountability. Election deferral will only be beneficial if SADC displays willingness and capacity to truly guarantee an agreement that includes these conditions.

A Disputed Election

A disputed election would be most likely to arise from the political parties’ reaction to a range of unexpected or unfavourable circumstances, blamed on real or perceived irregularities.

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197 Derek Matyszak, “GNU II?”, Research and Advocacy Unit, 19 December 2012. Extension could prove complex with ZANU-PF attempting to retain its unilateral power and the MDC parties seeking to address that imbalance. Other parties (ZAPU; Mavambo/Kusile/Dawn) may demand inclusion, further complicating a conclusive outcome. Crisis Group interview, political science professor, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, 7 August 2012.

198 Although Article 20.1.1 of the GPA provides for shared executive powers between the president, prime minister and cabinet, ZANU-PF claims the former has vested dominant executive powers. The GPA also specifies the prime minister is the cabinet’s deputy chairperson, but ZANU-PF ministers have refused to hold cabinet meetings with Tsvangirai presiding when Mugabe was absent. These ministers have also boycotted council of ministers meetings chaired by Tsvangirai, in defiance of powers conferred to him by the GPA. Crisis Group email correspondence, civil society researcher, Harare, 14 February 2013.

199 Crisis Group interview, Zimbabwe liberation war veteran, Johannesburg, 8 February 2013.

200 Crisis Group interview, Zimbabwe government minister, Johannesburg, 8 February 2013.

201 This can be achieved through realigning mandates to the draft constitution, and may include redeployment of human resources and offers for a conditional amnesty to security personnel.

202 See Section I.D.

203 Crisis Group interview, political analyst, Harare, 4 January 2013.
1. A “winner-take-all” election

An election that excludes the other side increases the chances of the losing party disputing the results. If ZANU-PF loses, the implications of its removal from power, fear of prosecution for alleged past human rights violations and loss of economic interests and opportunities could trigger a dispute. In April 2008, the party disputed vote counts in 21 constituencies and blamed the ZEC for procedural problems that led to the arrest of some election officials. This demonstrates the party’s readiness to turn against electoral institutions when it deems it necessary to do so, a prospect that cannot be ruled out should the next election results suggest a total loss of power. A dispute provoked by ZANU-PF could include mass mobilisation of party youth, war veterans and the general membership.

The MDC-T considers its inclusion in the GPA as a stepping stone to winning an election and consolidating its power. If the party loses the next vote, and ZANU-PF pushes for a “winner-take-all” strategy, the prospect of a return to the opposition benches may prompt the MDC-T to dispute results. However, the effectiveness of such a protest will be contingent on the quality of the evidence and may be limited if ZANU-PF continues to control the security institutions, the judiciary and bureaucracy.

2. The new constitution and the powerful presidency

ZANU-PF regards the presidency as sacrosanct, given its vested executive powers. It will be more determined this time to avoid the type of loss it suffered in the first round of the 2008 vote, which it blamed on its own complacency and internal divisions.

The president’s prerogative powers vested in the previous constitution were used to override the independence and functions of other institutions. Although the MDC parties have the majority of elected members in parliament, special provisions allowed the president to directly or indirectly appoint 33 senators. This significantly diluted elected legislators’ power. Even with the adoption of the new constitution the president retains significant powers and this will sustain the high-stakes
competition, regardless of who controls parliament. ZANU-PF has learned from its GPA experience that it can retain effective control and pursue its own agendas without a parliamentary majority. Therefore, a loss in the parliamentary election would be more tolerable than in the presidential vote.

Under current conditions, election disputes are unlikely to be resolved conclusively, but could rather lead to negotiations for further power sharing or provoke a “power vacuum”. Any dispute is likely to gain traction only if SADC and the AU condemn the election as flawed, and provisions for election dispute resolution do not deliver a credible remedy.

C. A Conclusive Election

A conclusive election is not merely a product of a credible process but also the acceptance of results by key stakeholders. The complex nature of internal party dynamics and the political environment, as well as the multiple, often competing interests involved, are likely to make a broad acceptance of electoral outcomes more challenging.

If Mugabe and Tsvangirai agreed to unconditionally accept results, and accommodate losing parties, prospects for a conclusive election would be improved. The challenge will be the wider acceptance and implementation of such a pact. Of late Tsvangirai has indicated that such a pact would be possible, provided parties agree to a strict electoral code of conduct supervised by regional and international observers. Mugabe’s spokesperson, George Charamba, publicly stated that the GPA principals have an understanding on complying with election results. ZANU-PF, however, is opposed to election observers outside of SADC and the AU, as reflected by the impasse over the election roadmap.

To further chances for a conclusive election, the GPA parties must agree to a well-defined post-referendum reform process. There must also be ample time and independent mechanisms for implementation before the polls, with SADC taking an active role.

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215 Crisis Group interview, political analyst, Johannesburg, 1 September 2012.
216 Crisis Group interview, constitutional law professor, University of Zimbabwe, 8 August 2012.
218 Crisis Group interview, Western diplomat, Harare, 7 August 2012.
219 In terms of dispute resolution, the amended Electoral Act makes provision for the establishment of multiparty liaison committees to facilitate conflict management (Part XXIA), an investigative responsibility and capacity in cases of politically motivated violence and intimidation (Part XVIIIIB) and the establishment of an Electoral Court.
220 Crisis Group interview, Zimbabwe government minister, Johannesburg, 8 February 2013.
221 See Section I.B.
222 It is unclear if Tsvangirai was referring to an electoral code separate from and replacing the election roadmap. This reflects possible multiple interpretations about elections should a new constitution be adopted. Tawanda Karombo, “Tsvangirai expects ‘free vote’ in July”, Timeslive (www.timeslive.co.za), 14 February 2013.
lead role.225 Key stakeholder interests and fears, especially the security sector, will also need to be addressed.226

D. Security Sector Intervention

Whether a military coup is possible remains unknown because of uncertainties over the allegiances of the security sector’s rank and file,227 and the risk of political pressure and international isolation.228 Security chiefs and some ZANU-PF leaders assert that they would not respect an MDC-T victory. Although a scenario in which the military seizes power is generally dismissed as unlikely, it cannot be entirely ruled out, especially if a disputed election leads to a power vacuum and if SADC and the AU then fail to intervene effectively.229

Perhaps more likely is that the security sector attempts, in the face of projections that ZANU-PF might lose, to influence the election process itself – as in 2008. It could also support a sustained dispute by ZANU-PF of any election outcome, which could also create conditions for a military takeover.230 In such a scenario, the security sector is not expected to take control itself, but rather to champion certain political leaders to restore order.

Military chiefs have always considered Mugabe as a safeguard for their economic interests and against prosecution for past human rights violations.231 An election result that threatens these benefits could encourage them to intervene. Such action would probably not be taken without the consent of some politicians, and especially the president himself if he remains part of the political equation.232 SADC’s role in shaping a credible electoral process and its readiness to apply sanctions in response to an unconstitutional takeover of power, or to a prevention of a constitutional handover of

225 Besides other support legislation, the 2012 Electoral Act will need to be aligned to the new constitution should it be adopted. This would have to be done before the end of parliament’s term on 29 June 2013, and would also have to be implemented. Given the history of resistance to reforms and current party differences, further delays are expected before a credible election can be held. SADC’s role in pressing for reforms and their implementation will be central. Crisis Group email correspondence, constitutional law professor, University of Zimbabwe, Harare, 14 February 2013. SADC will need to ensure the GPA parties agree to a clear election process and put in place an implementation mechanism. It will also need to be involved in early observation of election conditions, as well as in the post-election period. Crisis Group interview, Zimbabwe liberation war veteran, Johannesburg, 8 February 2013.
226 Ibid.
227 See Section IV.B.
228 Crisis Group interview, SADC member state diplomat, Harare, 11 November 2012.
230 Justice Minister Patrick Chinamasa asserted that ZANU-PF “would not accept a foreign-sponsored victory for PM Tsvangirai and neither would the military because the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC-T) leader had allegedly promised to reverse the gains of independence”. “Zimbabwe: Chinamasa rattles the cage”, Financial Gazette, 17 October 2013. The ZRP’s role, with primary responsibilities for domestic safety and security, is pivotal around elections. In 2008, it failed to deter violence or react appropriately. Less than 10 per cent of those affected reported violations to the police, reflecting low levels of confidence, which many believe has not been restored during the lifetime of the GPA. Crisis Group interviews, civil society analysts and monitors, Harare, September and November 2012, March 2013. The ZRP leadership in recent weeks has openly demonstrated its partisanship. “People lose hope in ZRP as Chihuri campaigns for Zanu (PF)”, The Zimbabwean, 14 March 2013.
231 Crisis Group email correspondence, civil society researcher, Harare, 24 March 2013.
232 See Section IV.B and C.
233 Crisis Group interview, constitutional law professor, University of Zimbabwe, 8 August 2012.
power, would be a significant deterrent. The independence of institutions, especially
the ZEC, will also be central to resist security sector interference in election tallying
and results declaration.\textsuperscript{234}

\textsuperscript{234} In the 2008 presidential election, the military, through JOC, is alleged to have tampered with
the electoral figures as well as the announcement of the outcome. See Section IV.A.
VII. Conclusion

Amid rising political tensions and parties’ determination to capture power, Zimbabwe is facing a high-stakes election. Despite past limitations, SADC remains central to shaping a credible vote and legitimising its outcome. The GPA parties are unlikely to resolve the election roadmap deadlock and advance other reforms on their own, with disagreements escalating as the election draws near.

To help create a credible election process and environment, SADC needs to increase its monitoring capacity, as well as its ability to respond in a timely manner to remedy any concerns. By setting up an in-country liaison office, as in Madagascar, and being more assertive on the outstanding JOMIC deployments, the regional bloc can address these constraints. Beyond that, it also needs to define its “red lines” and demand compliance to its democratic principles and guidelines. Despite inflammatory statements by some politicians, ample evidence shows that all GPA signatories regard SADC’s involvement in Zimbabwe as crucial to political stability and legitimacy of the election result.

Progress is possible, but only if fundamental contradictions between the parties’ interpretation of what is now required are resolved. Whereas the MDC formations have called for the full resolution of outstanding election roadmap issues even after adoption of a new constitution, ZANU-PF says the new constitution should supersede the roadmap. Without agreement on such important issues, Zimbabwe is not ready for elections. At the same time, without a more concerted effort, there is no guarantee that deferring the election further will indeed lead to reform.235 At the very least, more robust engagement of civil society and citizens with SADC facilitators and GPA mechanisms, such as the JOMIC, is required to develop confidence in Zimbabwe’s battered institutions, especially through the deployment of an expanded monitoring presence.

With the risk of a disputed, violent or illegitimate election looming, SADC may promote a postponement as the best, albeit short-term, option for maintaining some measure of political stability.236 This should only be considered if an extension is tied to minimum conditions for key reforms – “red lines” – critical for democratic elections, strict timelines, effective monitoring and assessment capabilities, clear consequences and measures for failure to comply, an unambiguous executive power-sharing mechanism and specific roles for the guarantors in the entire process.

Johannesburg/Brussels, 6 May 2013

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235 Crisis Group interview, constitutional law professor, University of Zimbabwe, 8 August 2012.
236 Crisis Group interview, political analyst, Harare, 4 January 2013.
Appendix A: Map of Zimbabwe
Appendix B: Glossary

**AFECG** – Anhui Foreign Economic Construction Group – a Chinese construction company with shareholding in Anjin Mining.


**AU** – African Union.

**Central Committee** – ZANU-PF’s top decision-making body in between congresses.

**COPAC** – The Constitution Parliament select Committee set up to coordinate the writing of a new constitution.

**DCC** – District Coordinating Committees – ZANU-PF’s structure responsible for coordinating district-level political activity.

**EISA** – Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa – an independent, not-for-profit organisation established in 1996 with a mandate to promote credible elections in Africa.

**ERC** – Election Resource Centre – a civil society organisation specialising in electoral developments.

**FRELIMO** – Frente de Libertação de Moçambique – Mozambique’s ruling political party and former liberation movement.


**GPA** – Global Political Agreement – signed on 15 September 2008 (by Robert Mugabe representing ZANU-PF; Morgan Tsvangirai representing the MDC-T; and Arthur Mutambara representing the MDC) leading to the formation of the inclusive government.

**IG** – Inclusive Government – formed in 2009 by the signatories of the Global Political Agreement.

**JOC** – Joint Operations Command – a supreme body responsible for coordinating state security; it was formed by the Rhodesian government before independence and continued to exist in the post-independence era. It was expected that it would be disbanded and replaced by the National Security Council under the 2008 Global Political Agreement.

**JOMIC** – Joint Operation, Monitoring and Implementation Committee – a Global Political Agreement structure, constituted by the three signatory parties, responsible for ensuring implementation of the agreement.

**Mavambo/Dawn/Kusile** – Zimbabwean political party formed in 2010, led by Simba Makoni, a former senior member of ZANU-PF.

**MDC** – Movement for Democratic Change – Zimbabwean political party now led by Welshman Ncube; it was led by Arthur Mutambara when it signed the GPA.

**MDC-T** – Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai – Zimbabwean political party led by Morgan Tsvangirai and signatory to the GPA.

**MIC** – Media and Information Commission – an independent media regulatory and oversight body, it became the Zimbabwe Media Commission in 2009.

**NSSA** – National Social Security Authority – state-owned pension and social security organisation.

**POSA** – Public Order and Security Act – a contested law in Zimbabwe, enacted in 2002, broadly seen as restricting freedom of association and assembly.

**NEC** – National Executive Council – top decision-making structure in the MDC-T in between congresses.

**NSC** – National Security Council – a structure of the GPA created to oversee national security related concerns.

**Operation Maguta** – An operation run by the military, launched in 2005 and which the government claimed was targeted at increasing agricultural productivity in farms taken over through the land reform program.

**Poliburo** – ZANU-PF’s highest structure that functions as the secretariat of the Central Committee.

**PUMA** – Patriotic Union of Matabeleland – Zimbabwean political party led by Bancinyane Ndiweni and mainly dominant in Matabeleland region.

**RENAMO** – Resistência Nacional Moçambicana – Mozambique’s official opposition party that waged a civil war against government forces from 1977 to 1992.

**SADC** – Southern African Development Community – regional bloc composed of fifteen countries.

**Steering Committee** – MDC-T’s highest structure that functions as the secretariat of the National Executive Council.

**ZACC** – Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission – independent commission established in 2010.
ZANLA – Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army – the armed wing of Zimbabwe African National Union party that participated in the liberation war.

ZANU-PF – Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front – Zimbabwean political party led by President Robert Mugabe and signatory to the GPA.

ZAPU – Zimbabwe African People’s Union – Zimbabwean political party that merged with ZANU in 1987 to form ZANU-PF. Some party members led by Dumiso Dabengwa re-launched the party in 2010 outside of ZANU-PF.

ZDF – Zimbabwe Defence Forces.


ZEC – Zimbabwe Electoral Commission.


ZIMRA – Zimbabwe Revenue Authority.

ZIPRA – Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army – the armed wing of Zimbabwe African People’s Union party that participated in the liberation war.

ZMDC – Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation – a company through which the Zimbabwe government holds shares in mining ventures, including in the diamonds sector; it remains on the U.S. and EU sanctions list.
Appendix C: About the International Crisis Group

The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation, with some 150 staff members on five continents, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict.

Crisis Group’s approach is grounded in field research. Teams of political analysts are located within or close by countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violent conflict. Based on information and assessments from the field, it produces analytical reports containing practical recommendations targeted at key international decision-takers. Crisis Group also publishes CrisisWatch, a twelve-page monthly bulletin, providing a succinct regular update on the state of play in all the most significant situations of conflict or potential conflict around the world.

Crisis Group’s reports and briefing papers are distributed widely by email and made available simultaneously on the website, www.crisisgroup.org. Crisis Group works closely with governments and those who influence them, including the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate support for its policy prescriptions.

The Crisis Group Board – which includes prominent figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business and the media – is directly involved in helping to bring the reports and recommendations to the attention of senior policy-makers around the world. Crisis Group is chaired by former U.S. Undersecretary of State and Ambassador Thomas Pickering. Its President and Chief Executive since July 2009 has been Louise Arbour, former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and Chief Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda.

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CAR: Keeping the Dialogue Alive, Africa Briefing N°69, 12 January 2010 (also available in French).
Burundi: Ensuring Credible Elections, Africa Report N°155, 12 February 2010 (also available in French).
Libya/Chad: Beyond Political Influence, Africa Briefing N°71, 23 March 2010 (only available in French and Arabic).
Congo: A Stalled Democratic Agenda, Africa Briefing N°73, 8 April 2010 (also available in French).
Chad: Beyond Superficial Stability, Africa Report N°162, 17 August 2010 (only available in French).
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Resistance and Denial: Zimbabwe’s Stalled Reform Agenda, Africa Briefing N°82, 16 November 2011.
Zimbabwe’s Sanctions Standoff, Africa Briefing N°86, 6 February 2012 (also available in Chinese).

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