



## RESPONSES TO INFORMATION REQUESTS (RIRs)

[New Search](#) | [About RIRs](#) | [Help](#)

3 February 2006

### PER101032.E

Peru: Current status and activities of the Shining Path (Senderoso Luminoso); government and police efforts to address Shining Path actions (August 2004 - January 2006)

Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Ottawa

### Status of the Shining Path

Sources indicated that two independent factions of the Shining Path (Senderoso Luminoso) remain active in Peru: one led by Ronaldo Huamán Zúñiga or "Comrade Alipio" in the Ene and Apurimac river valleys in the south, and one led by Alberto Cerrón Palomino or "Comrade Artemio" in the Huallaga valley in the central province of Huánaco (IPS 28 Dec. 2005; *Le Monde* 28 Sept. 2005a; *ibid.* 18 Jan. 2006).

The two factions have maintained their activities despite a call by the imprisoned historic leader of the Shining Path, Abimael Guzman to cease hostilities (*Le Monde* 18 Jan. 2006). *Le Monde* reported that Guzman [translation] "has no contact" with either of the two factions (*ibid.*). *La Republica* confirmed that Artemio's faction, "Faction Proseguir," has refused to lay down arms (24 July 2005).

According to Carlos Tapias, an expert on the Shining Path quoted by the French daily *Le Monde*, in 2005 the organization was present in 10 of 1,800 Peruvian districts, a sharp downturn compared to its presence in 600 districts in 1989 (28 Sept. 2005a).

The number of Shining Path combatants varies according to sources, from 120 to 150 for Alipio's faction (*Le Monde* 18 Jan. 2006; IPS 28 Dec. 2005) and from 60 to 150 for Artemio's (*Le Monde* 18 Jan. 2006; IPS 28 Dec. 2005; Dow Jones International News 21 Feb. 2005). The United States *Country Reports on Terrorism 2004* estimated the total number of Shining Path combatants to be approximately 300 and stated that the group does not receive external aid and is active mostly in rural areas (27 Apr. 2005). The Global Insight Daily Analysis of 5 September 2005 estimated the total number of combatants to be between 100 and 120 and reported fears of increased Shining Path levels of activity in the recent years.

### Shining Path activities

Links with coca growing operations (EFE 12 Dec. 2005; *ibid.* 2 Jan. 2006), drug trafficking (*ibid.*; *ibid.* 12 Dec. 2005; *Le Monde* 28 Sept. 2005a; US 27 Apr. 2005) and other illegal activities, including kidnapping for ransom (*ibid.*) are mentioned by many sources as means the remaining Shining Path factions use to support and "reinvigorate" themselves (EFE 21 Dec. 2005; *ibid.* 2 Jan. 2006; US Apr. 2005).

Other sources insisted on the two factions' involvement in drug trafficking as well as in other smuggling activities (*Le Monde* 18 Jan. 2006; Reuters 22 Dec. 2005; see also Dow Jones International News 21 Feb. 2005). In September 2004, Peru had denounced the protection provided by Shining Path members to international drug traffickers in the Ayacucho and Cusco areas (WMRC Daily Analysis 21 Sept. 2004; see also AP 25 Sept. 2005).

Former Interior Minister, Fernando Rospigliosi, was quoted by EFE News Service as indicating that the rise in cocaine prices and the 14 per cent increase in coca production were linked to a higher level of terrorist activities (21 Dec. 2005). As well, Inter Press Service underscored the relationship between greater security measures against coca production and the cocaine trade and increased levels of violence by the two Shining Path factions in coca production zones (28 Dec. 2005).

Sources reported Shining Path attacks against police forces (EFE 21 Dec. 2005; *The New York Times* 22 Dec. 2005; *Le Monde* 18 Jan. 2006), the military and civilians (EFE 21 Dec. 2005), sometimes in the form of "indiscriminate bombing campaigns and selective assassinations" (US 27 Apr. 2005), "sporadic ambushes on security forces" in the coca producing regions (AP 25 Sept. 2005), "killings and other abuses" (*Country Reports 2004* 28 Feb. 2005). During 2005, approximately 20 policemen or military officers were killed by members of the Shining Path (Reuters 22 Dec. 2005).

On 20 December 2005, eight police officers were killed and one wounded in an attack against their vehicle attributed to Shining Path rebels in the town of Aucayacu, Huallaga valley (EFE 21 Dec. 2005; *The New York Times* 22 Dec. 2005; Xinhua 22 Dec. 2005; IPS 28 Dec. 2005). Shining Path members of Comrade Artemio's group were said to be behind the attack (*ibid.*).

On 21 December 2005, the Ministry of Defence reported that three smaller attacks by the Shining Path on a military outpost had caused the death of a civilian and injuries to three soldiers (EFE 21 Dec. 2005).

Earlier in December 2005, five police officers were killed in the town of Palma Pampa in the Ene valley (IPS 28 Dec. 2005; see also *Le Temps* 12 Jan. 2006). According to the Inter Press Service, Comrade Alipio's faction was responsible for the killings (28 Dec. 2005).

In July 2005, a Shining Path ambush against a police vehicle left three police officers dead and two injured (*La Republica* 24 July 2005). A "drug-trafficking command" of 15 Shining Path members "acting under the orders of Comrade Artemio" were allegedly behind this attack (*ibid.*).

In February 2005, according to Peruvian officials, three policemen were killed in a Shining Path ambush in the Huallaga valley when their vehicle was machine-gunned (Dow Jones International News 21 Feb. 2005; Reuters 21 Feb.

2005). The faction headed by "Comrade Artemio" was believed to be behind the ambush (ibid.; Dow Jones International News 21 Feb. 2005). Former Interior Minister Fernando Rospigliosi supported this explanation, stating that, a week before this attack, the "Artemio" faction had ordered inhabitants of another area of the Huallaga valley to take part in a 48-hour strike in favour of "unrestricted coca production" (ibid.).

Additionally, the 18 January 2006 edition of *Le Monde* reported intimidations in rural areas, where alleged members of Shining Path threatened personnel from the Defensor del Pueblo (Ombudsman's Office) with death and called for a boycott of the general elections in April 2006.

In August 2005, the leader of one of the factions, "Artemio," indicated that the Shining Path would pursue its actions through [translation] "propaganda, attacks, sabotages and selective assassinations" (AFP 28 Aug. 2005). He also stated that the Shining Path acts in defence of coca growers, rather than drug traffickers (ibid.). Among the measures to address the Shining Path attacks, a reward of US\$50,000 has been offered for Artemio's capture (Reuters 21 Feb. 2005).

### **Efforts to address Shining Path actions**

In response to the December attacks against police forces, President Alejandro Toledo declared a two-month state of emergency in six departments, including the region where the attack occurred (AP 22 Dec. 2005; EFE 21 Dec. 2005; *Le Monde* 18 Jan. 2006; see also IPS 28 Dec. 2005). The state of emergency could be in place till after the general elections of April 2006 (*Le Monde* 18 Jan. 2006). Reporting on the government response to earlier incidents of violence, another source hinted at a long-term state of emergency in areas where the Shining Path is active (WMRC Daily Analysis 21 Sept. 2004). Under a state of emergency, public meetings are prohibited and authorities can make arrests without warrants (Reuters 22 Dec. 2005; AP 22 Dec. 2005).

Furthermore, President Toledo developed a team for the construction of infrastructure in the regions where the Shining Path is active, and promised financing for agricultural projects to replace coca growing (IPS 28 Dec. 2005).

More than once in 2005, Prime Minister Pedro Kuczynski declared that terrorism was on the rise and that it was "a more acute problem" than it had been four years earlier (EFE 21 Dec. 2005). Other Cabinet members and President Toledo himself denied that there was a resurgence in terrorist activities (ibid.; see also *Financial Times* 27 Sept. 2005). At the beginning of 2006, Pedro Kuczynski indicated that 55 "anti-insurgency" military bases in the Ayacucho area should be reinforced (EFE 2 Jan. 2006).

A new trial for Abimael Guzman and other leaders of the Shining Path was opened in September 2005 for the crimes committed during the armed conflict (*Financial Times* 27 Sept. 2005; *Le Monde* 28 Sept. 2005b; AFP 26 Sept. 2005).

In October 2005, the ballerina who hid the historic leader of the Shining Path in her house before his capture in 1992 was sentenced to a 20-year prison term (*The Daily Telegraph* 6 Oct. 2005). As well, in September 2005, a member of the Shining Path received a 30-year jail sentence for a car bombing that killed 10 people in 2002 (Global Insight Daily Analysis 5 Sept. 2005).

In September 2004, Peruvian authorities arrested a group of "17 suspected leftist rebels," among which were members of Shining Path (Resource Center of the Americas.org 30 Sept. 2004). Members of the national teachers' union, a group often accused by the authorities of being "infiltrated by remnants of violent guerrilla groups" were arrested (ibid.).

This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim for refugee protection. Please find below the list of additional sources consulted in researching this Information Request.

### References

Agence France-Presse. 26 September 2005. "Ouverture au Pérou du procès du chef du Sentier Lumineux Abimael Guzman." (Factiva)

\_\_\_\_\_. 28 Aug. 2005. "Le chef d'un groupe du Sentier lumineux assure poursuivre la lutte au Pérou." (Factiva)

Associated Press (AP). 22 December 2005. Rick Vecchio. "Peruvian President Targets Shining Path." (ABC News Website).  
<<http://abcnews.go.com/International/print?id=1432408>> [Accessed 26 Jan. 2006]

\_\_\_\_\_. 25 September 2005. "A Look at the Retrial of Shining Path Founder Abimael Guzman." (Factiva)

*Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2004*. 28 February 2005. "Peru." United States Department of State.  
<<http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrprt/2004/41771.htm>> [Accessed 26 Jan. 2006]

*The Daily Telegraph*. 6 October 2005. Jeremy McDermott. "Ballerina Who Hid Rebel Chief Is Jailed for 20 Years." (Factiva)

Dow Jones International News. 21 February 2005. "Peru Rebels Kill Three Police in Jungle Ambush." (Factiva)

EFE. 2 January 2006. "Peruvian Points to Growing Links Between Drugs, Rebels." (Factiva)

\_\_\_\_\_. 21 December 2005. "More Vigorous Action Urged Against Resurgent Peruvian Rebels." (Factiva)

*Financial Times*. 27 September 2005. Hal Weitzman. "Peru Seeks Damages from Guerrilla Group." (Factiva)

Global Insight Daily Analysis. 5 September 2005. Kate Joynes. "Shining Path Guerrilla Sentenced in Peru." (Factiva)

Inter Press Service (IPS). 28 December 2005. Angel Páez. "Peru: Shining Path

Lashes Out Against Coca Eradication." (Factiva)

*Le Monde*. 18 January 2006. Chrystelle Barbier. "Des attaques attribuées au Sentier lumineux inquiètent les Péruviens." (Factiva)

\_\_\_\_\_. 28 September 2005a. Chrystelle Barbier. "Vingt-cinq ans après sa création, la guerrilla péruvienne du Sentier lumineux a presque disparu." (Factiva)

\_\_\_\_\_. 28 September 2005b. "Un 'mégaprocès' pour les dirigeants." (Factiva)

*The New York Times*. 22 December 2005. Juan Forero. "World Briefing: Peru: Rebels Kill 8 Policemen." (Factiva)

*La Republica* [Lima, in Spanish]. 24 July 2005. "Shining Path Rebels Ambush Police Vehicle Killing Three in Peru." (BBC Monitoring/Factiva)

Resource Center of the Americas.Org. 30 September 2004. "Suspected Rebels Arrested." <[http://www.americas.org/item\\_16711](http://www.americas.org/item_16711)> [Accessed 26 Jan. 2006]

Reuters. 22 December 2005. "État d'urgence dans le centre du Pérou après une attaque rebelle." (Factiva)

\_\_\_\_\_. 21 February 2005. "Trois policiers tués par la guérilla dans la jungle péruvienne." (Factiva)

*Le Temps* [Genève]. 12 January 2006. "Éclairages: Situations détériorées." (Factiva)

United States (US). 27 April 2005. *Country Reports on Terrorism 2004*. <<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/45323.pdf>> [Accessed 26 Jan. 2006]

WMRC Daily Analysis. 21 September 2004. Kate Joynes. "Peru Publishes Links Between Latin Drug Tsars and Shining Path Rebels." (World Markets Research Centre/Factiva)

Xinhua. 22 December 2005. "Peru President Says Shining Path 'Will Pay' for Killing Police." (Factiva)

#### Additional Sources Consulted

**Internet sites, including:** Amnesty International (AI), Centro de Información de Naciones Unidas para el Perú, Comisión Andina de Juristas, Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos del Perú (CNDDHH), Defensoría del Pueblo del Perú, Human Rights Watch (HRW), The Human Security Gateway, International Crisis Group (ICG), Latin America Regional Report, Latin American Working Group, Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA).

**The attached reproduction is a copy of an official work that is published by the Government of Canada. The reproduction has not been produced in affiliation with, or with the endorsement of the Government of Canada.**

