CÔTE D'IVOIRE:

Quest for durable solutions continues as the electoral process moves forward

A profile of the internal displacement situation

22 September, 2010

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Through its work, the Centre contributes to improving national and international capacities to protect and assist the millions of people around the globe who have been displaced within their own country as a result of conflicts or human rights violations.

At the request of the United Nations, the Geneva-based Centre runs an online database providing comprehensive information and analysis on internal displacement in some 50 countries.

Based on its monitoring and data collection activities, the Centre advocates for durable solutions to the plight of the internally displaced in line with international standards.

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OVERVIEW

Quest for durable solutions continues as the electoral process moves forward

While the implementation of the Ouagadougou Peace Accord saw some progress in mid-2010, in particular with the announcement of a new date for the elections and agreement on the voter list, fears of renewed violence and further displacement remain. At the same time, internally displaced people (IDPs) continue to struggle for durable solutions.

In the absence of country-wide monitoring mechanisms, it is difficult to obtain a clear estimate of the number of people still displaced. It is similarly unclear to what extent IDPs have been able to integrate locally in their areas of displacement or resettle elsewhere in the country, as only return movements have been (partly) monitored. Assistance to IDPs has been gradually integrated into wider relief and development programmes, although protection concerns have remained especially in the west and in northern areas under the control of the Forces Nouvelles (FN) rebels.

Although return movements have continued both spontaneously and with the support of humanitarian agencies in the course of 2010, obstacles to sustainable returns persist. These include continuing insecurity, rampant criminality, human rights abuses and, especially in the west, longstanding land disputes. As land tensions have continued to cause displacement and to prevent IDPs from accessing their plantations, humanitarian partners and national institutions have moved in 2010 towards a more coordinated approach to preventing and resolving these conflicts.

Côte d'Ivoire signed the African Union Convention on IDPs in November 2009, but had not ratified it by September 2010. National legislation for the protection of IDPs was also waiting to be signed. With the role of the Ministry of Solidarity and War Victims as the national focal point for IDPs being discontinued at the beginning of 2010, prospects for renewed attention to IDP issues were further compromised. At the same time, the international community has continued its shift from humanitarian to recovery and development programmes.

Background and causes of displacement

Internal displacement in Côte d'Ivoire has been caused both by the internal armed conflict that broke out in 2002 following a failed coup by disaffected soldiers, and by localised communal conflicts. Intermittent fighting between government forces and northern-based rebels of the Patriotic Movement of Côte d'Ivoire (Mouvement Patriotique pour la Côte d'Ivoire, or MPCI), later known as the New Forces (Forces Nouvelles or FN), continued until the signing of the Ouagadougou Peace Accord (OPA) in March 2007.

Hundreds of thousands of civilians were displaced in 2002, including civil servants in northern areas under rebel control, and indigenous and migrant communities from the western regions of Moyen Cavally and Dix-huit Montagnes. Many of them sought refuge in the southern city of Abidjan.

The OPA and its supplementary agreements have sought to resolve the crisis in the country by addressing strategic issues such as the identification of the population and registration of voters, the demobilisation and disarmament of both rebel and militia forces, and the reunification of the
country (the north has remained under the control of the FN and the south under government control).

Although the OPA has led to more significant progress in the resolution of the conflict than the five peace agreements which preceded it, its implementation has been continuously delayed. A UN-led technical mission to assess and recommend options for the future of the UN peacekeeping force in Côte d’Ivoire (ONUCI) (UN SC, 28 January 2010, para. 22), found that besides logistical challenges and technical constraints such as the lack of capacity of the national implementing institutions, disagreements on how the most sensitive tasks should be carried out, and a lack of political will have contributed “significantly” to these delays (UN SC, 20 May 2010, para. 12).

Since mid-2009, members of political elites have increasingly made use once again of the xenophobic concept of “Ivoirité” ("Ivorian-ness") in their discourses (ISS, July 2010). In the 1990s, ethnic discrimination became a common practice as “Ivoirité” was increasingly used as a condition of participation in public life, and constitutional amendments designed to restrict the posts of president and vice-president to those whose parents were both Ivorian by origin led the citizenship of all of those who did not belong to certain “core” ethnic groups to be questioned (OSI, October 2009).

In February 2010, plans to remove over a million people from the electoral list because of doubts over their Ivorian nationality, and President Gbagbo’s decision to dissolve and reform the government and the Independent Electoral Commission (Commission Electorale Indépendante or CEI) over the issue, led to violent mass protests in several of the country’s cities (IRIN, 22 February 2010). Both demonstrators and security forces were found to have perpetrated grave human rights abuses and violations in the course of the protests (UNOCI, August 2010).

According to the International Crisis Group, the regions that face a higher risk of electoral violence include the commercial capital Abidjan and those areas where tensions persist between locals, economic migrants from other areas of the country, and workers from other West African countries, over access to land and its economic exploitation (ICG, 5 May 2010). In these areas, the risk of further displacement is also high.

The electoral process
With a new government and electoral commission in place, the new date of 31 October 2010 was announced for the presidential elections (UN News, 5 August 2010). These elections were a central element of process agreed in the OPA, but they have been repeatedly postponed since 2007 although internal and external observers see them as a prerequisite for a durable resolution of the crisis (IRIN, 2 September 2010; Reuters, 25 August 2010; AU, 11 August 2010). At the same time, disputed results could reignite violence (Reuters, 25 August 2010). In particular, issues around the voter list and the disarmament of both rebel and militia elements remain to be addressed if the risk of violence is to be limited.

Côte d’Ivoire’s presidential candidates all accepted the final voter list produced by the new electoral commission at the beginning of September 2010. The list is to be posted in polling stations at the beginning of October (VOA, 7 September 2010). However, analysts have highlighted that the current list does not differ much from the one President Gbagbo last rejected and have expressed concerns that other obstacles could still arise (Reuters, 6 September 2010). In particular, the disarmament of rebel and militia forces is still to be completed.

The FN has not disarmed but has completed the regrouping of its troops into barracks ahead of the October polls, in line with the rules agreed in the Ouagadougou Peace Accord (Reuters, 31 August 2010). The disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme has faced many challenges, ranging from the lack of capacity of the national implementing institution to the
inability of the government to pay the promised demobilisation allowances (UN SC, 20 May 2010). Meanwhile, although the UN again renewed its arms embargo in October 2009, both the government and FN have continued to rearm; despite an international ban, Ivorian “conflict diamonds” have continued to be sold, as illegal mining has continued to grow in 2008 and 2009 in some of the areas under FN control (UNSC, 9 October 2009; PAC, October 2009).

**IDP numbers**

Given the patterns of displacement, with almost all internally displaced people (IDPs) being hosted by friends or relatives, the extreme scarcity of information from the centre-north and the lack of comprehensive monitoring mechanisms on durable solutions, reliable statistics on the current number of IDPs across the country are difficult to obtain.

According to UNHCR, as of June 2010, there were some 519,000 IDPs in the country, more than half of them women (UNHCR, 1 June 2010). The estimate is based on the results of a 2005 survey by UNFPA and the national institute of statistics ENSEA, which found a total of almost 710,000 IDPs in five government-held regions. Since March 2007, IDPs have started returning to their areas of origin or previous residence, including displaced civil servants who have been redeployed. Return monitoring mechanisms have been mostly limited to the western regions of Moyen Cavally and Dix-huit Montagnes. It is unclear how many IDPs have decided to integrate locally or settle elsewhere in the country. Therefore, in the absence of proper country-wide monitoring mechanisms, it is very difficult to make a reliable estimate.

Meanwhile, short-term displacement have continued, mainly as a consequence of inter-communal land disputes (Nord-Sud, 3 June 2010 and 23 April 2010).

**Assistance needs and protection concerns**

With many development indicators worsening across the country (IRIN, 2 September 2010; UN OCHA, 14 July 2010), IDPs’ assistance needs have gradually been integrated into wider relief and development programmes. Assistance has mainly focused on improving food security, as malnutrition indicators have reached alarming levels in some areas in the north (UN SC, 20 May 2010). Excessive rainfall has caused localised flooding (IRIN, 25 June 2010) and conflicts over land have continued to reduce production and cause poor households, including IDPs and returnees, to risk losing their food reserves (FEWSNET, July 2010). Hosts have also been at increased risk: in the western departments of Guiglo and Bloléquin, the 31,000 IDPs reportedly living with host communities have caused resources to be stretched (UN SC, 20 May 2010).

Human rights violations and abuses have continued across the country. Sexual and gender-based violence have continued to be widespread, especially in the west and in the areas under FN control (US DoS, 11 March 2010). Restrictions on internal travel have also frequently limited the movement of people, especially those seeking to travel between towns under FN control or from government-controlled to FN areas (HRW, 20 January 2010).

Travel restrictions have constituted an extra burden for those IDPs who have wanted to regularise the situation of their children, given the necessity to register children’s birth in their place of birth (NRC, March 2010).

**Durable solutions**

The information available on whether IDPs have been able to achieve durable solutions refers essentially to return movements as there is virtually no data on IDPs who have sought to integrate in the place to which they were displaced or resettle in another area. Information on returns is more or less limited to the western regions of Moyen Cavally and Dix-huit Montagnes.
By 30 March 2010, close to 90,000 IDPs had returned to their areas of origin or habitual residence in these two regions (UN SC, 20 May 2010). However, conflicts over access to land and land ownership, rampant criminality, human rights abuses and the prevalent impunity of perpetrators all continue to constitute obstacles to the attainment of durable solutions.

Return movements have mostly been spontaneous (UN OCHA, February 2009), but some IDPs have received support to return. Since the beginning of 2010, humanitarian agencies have organised at least four return convoys to the west and provided returnees with food and non-food items (ICRC, 18 May 2010; UNOCI, 8 April 2010; 26 March 2010). UNHCR has continued its protection monitoring activities in 2010 in areas of return in Moyen Cavally and Dix-huit Montagnes (UNHCR, 1 June 2010). In some villages, peace committees have also facilitated the peaceful return of IDPs and their inclusion into local decision-making processes (UN SC, 20 May 2010).

Obstacles to return
In its 2010-2011 Global Appeal, UNHCR identified as the main conditions for durable returns in 2010 the holding of free, fair and transparent elections, the acceptance by political parties and armed groups of their results, and the improvement of security in areas of return (UNHCR, 1 June 2010). At the same time, it has identified land disputes and poor social cohesion as the main obstacles to sustainable return (UNHCR, 1 June 2010). Migrant communities (originating from other regions of Côte d’Ivoire or from other West African countries) who had been displaced from localities in the west were still targeted at the end of 2009 as they attempted to return to their plantations (HRW, 20 January 2010).

In many cases, while people were displaced the plots they had planted were either sold or leased by others to third parties. When they tried to return, many IDPs found their plantations occupied (IRIN, 27 January 2010). In the absence of a system of restitution or compensation for land, the 1998 Rural Land Law is currently the only legal framework available to settle disputes in rural areas. The Law is designed to recognise and formalise customary rights, and to reduce tensions over land ownership resulting from the uncertainty of customary transactions; however the formalisation of customary rights in the context of displacement complicates land disputes and increases the risk of discord (IDMC, October 2009, p.5). Moreover, the law remains little known in most of the areas of return in the west (IRIN, 27 January 2010) while the implementation capacity of the government remains limited.

Numerous land disputes have also arisen in the protected forest areas where many internally displaced people used to plant their crops. As the 1998 Rural Land Law only applies to the rural land domain and not to the protected forests, there is no legislative framework to resolve these disputes. While solutions to land disputes in both village and protected forests in the west have mostly been ad hoc, humanitarian agencies and national institutions agreed in May 2010 to set up a local platform in Moyen Cavally region to adopt a more consistent approach to the prevention and the resolution of disputes (SODEFOR, 12 May 2010).

National and international responses
Côte d’Ivoire signed the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced persons in Africa (the Kampala Convention) in November 2009 (AU, 6 August 2010), but as of the beginning of September 2010 it had not ratified it. Elements of a national legal framework upholding the rights of IDPs, including a bill defining mechanisms to compensate war victims including IDPs, were still awaiting signature in September 2010, years after they had been drafted. The likelihood of their signature was further reduced by the discontinuation of the mandate of the Ministry of Solidarity and War Victims as the IDP focal point in February 2010, following a government reshuffle (GoCdI, 23 February 2010). The Ministry had taken the initiative of drafting legislation on compensation and restitution issues and had set up an inter-ministerial
committee on IDPs. Its functions were taken over by the new National Secretariat for Solidarity and War Victims (GoCdI, 2010). The Ministry of Reconstruction and Reinsertion, which had been supporting IDP return movements in the course of 2009 (Fraternité Matin, 20 April 2009; Xinhua, 26 August 2009), was also abolished on the same occasion.

The declared overarching goal of the government’s IDP plan is the return of all displaced people to their original homes. The Ouagadougou Accord focuses on the drafting of a national strategy to facilitate the return of IDPs, and remains silent on their right to integrate in the place of displacement or resettle in another part of the country, as prescribed in the Guiding Principles.

The medium-term social objectives of the government, described in its Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), include efforts to promote national reconciliation and social cohesion and the full reunification of the country as well as general economic development (IMF, 20 May 2009). Côte d’Ivoire has turned to the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank for debt relief assistance. In 2010, however, with social development indicators stagnating or deteriorating and a continuing political impasse likely, the World Bank announced the decision to tie debt relief to the holding of elections (Reuters, 29 January 2010).

In line with the PRSP, international donors have prioritised development assistance while government partners have progressively shifted from humanitarian activities to recovery and development projects. There is no humanitarian appeal for 2010, and Côte d’Ivoire is not among the countries to benefit from the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) in 2010. From January to June, the remaining humanitarian activities carried out by UN agencies continued to focus on the reintegration and protection of IDPs and returnees in the west (UN SC, 20 May 2010).

As of 1 July 2010, OCHA transferred its coordination and contingency planning capacities to the office of the UN Resident Coordinator and to its regional office in Dakar. OCHA’s office in Guiglo in the west is the only office to remain open until the end of 2010 (UN OCHA, December 2009).

The UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (ONUCI) launched a local transition fund in July to consolidate its humanitarian activities (APO, 9 July 2010). As of September 2010, only the Swiss government had contributed, with $1 million to finance community rehabilitation programmes.

With Resolution 1933, the Security Council extended to the end of 2010 the mandate of ONUCI to accompany the government in the implementation of the OPA and the holding of the elections (UN SC, 30 June 2010). In this latest resolution, the Security Council has more explicitly included in ONUCI’s mandate its support for humanitarian assistance, including by taking into account the special needs of vulnerable groups including IDPs. The term “displacement” first appeared in Security Council Resolution 1726 in 2006, two years after the establishment of ONUCI, where the Security Council mentions its “serious concern” over displacement in the preamble. It was only in Resolution 1765 of 2007 that displacement was mentioned in the core text: [the Security Council] “invites the signatories of the Ouagadougou political Agreement to take the necessary steps to protect vulnerable civilian populations, including by guaranteeing the voluntary return, reinstallation, reintegration and security of displaced persons, with the support of the United Nations system, and to fulfill in this regard their commitments in accordance with the Ouagadougou political Agreement and their obligations under international humanitarian law” (UN SC, 16 July 2007).

RÉSUMÉ DU PROFIL EN FRANÇAIS
La recherche de solutions durables se poursuit dans un contexte d’avancement du processus électoral

Au milieu de l’année 2010 la mise en œuvre de l’Accord de paix de Ouagadougou a connu quelques progrès, en particulier à travers l'annonce d'une nouvelle date pour les élections et l'accord sur la liste électorale. Cependant, les craintes d'un regain de violence et de nouveaux déplacements demeurent et les personnes déplacées à l'intérieur du pays (PDI) continuent de lutter pour trouver des solutions durables.

En l'absence de mécanismes de suivi couvrant l'ensemble du pays, il est difficile d'obtenir une estimation précise du nombre de personnes encore déplacées. La mesure dans laquelle les personnes déplacées ont pu s'intégrer localement dans leurs zones de déplacement ou ont pu se réinstaller ailleurs dans le pays n’est pas claire non plus. En effet, seuls les mouvements de retour sont (en partie) suivis. L'aide aux personnes déplacées a été progressivement intégrée dans des programmes d'aide et de développement plus larges, mais des problèmes de protection demeurent en particulier dans l'ouest et dans les régions du nord qui se trouvent sous contrôle des rebelles des Forces Nouvelles (FN).

Bien qu'au cours de l'année 2010, les mouvements de retour se soient poursuivis à la fois spontanément et avec le soutien des agences humanitaires, les obstacles à un retour durable persistent. Il s'agit notamment de l'insécurité permanente, d'une criminalité généralisée, de violations des droits humains et, en particulier dans l'ouest, de litiges fonciers de longue date. Les tensions foncières ayant continué de provoquer des déplacements et d'empêcher les personnes déplacées d'accéder à leurs plantations, les partenaires humanitaires et les institutions nationales se sont tournés en 2010 vers une approche plus coordonnée pour prévenir et résoudre ces conflits.

La Côte d'Ivoire a signé la Convention de l'Union africaine sur la protection et l'assistance aux personnes déplacées en novembre 2009, mais en septembre 2010 elle ne l'avait toujours pas ratifiée. La législation nationale pour la protection des personnes déplacées est également en attente d’approbation. Le ministère de la solidarité et des victimes de guerre ayant cessé début 2010 d’être le point focal national pour les personnes déplacées, les chances qu’une attention renouvelée soit portée à la question des déplacés sont encore plus compromises. Pendant ce temps, la communauté internationale a continué sa transition de l’aide humanitaire vers des programmes de reconstruction et de développement.

Contexte et causes des déplacements

En Côte d'Ivoire, le déplacement interne a été causé à la fois par le conflit armé interne, qui a éclaté en 2002 suite à une tentative de coup d’état par des soldats dissidents, et par des conflits intercommunautaires localisés. Les combats sporadiques entre les forces gouvernementales et les rebelles basés dans le nord du Mouvement patriotique pour la Côte d'Ivoire(MPCI), plus tard connu sous le nom des Forces nouvelles (FN), ont continué jusqu'à la signature de l'Accord de paix de Ouagadougou (OPA) en mars 2007.


L’OPA et ses accords supplémentaires ont tenté de résoudre la crise dans le pays en abordant des questions stratégiques telles que l'identification de la population et l'enregistrement des
électeurs, la démobilisation et le désarmement des forces rebelles et des milices, et la réunification du pays (le nord est resté sous le contrôle du FN et le sud sous contrôle gouvernemental).

Bien que l’OPA ait conduit à des progrès plus significatifs pour la résolution du conflit que les cinq accords de paix précédents, sa mise en œuvre a été constamment retardée. Une mission technique dirigée par l’ONU a évalué la force de maintien de la paix des Nations Unies en Côte d’Ivoire (ONUCI) afin de recommander des options pour son avenir (UNSC, 28 janvier 2010, par. 22). Celle-ci a noté que, outre les défis logistiques et les contraintes techniques tels que le manque de capacité des institutions nationales de mise en œuvre, ce sont les désaccords sur la façon dont les tâches les plus sensibles devaient être effectuées et un manque de volonté politique qui ont contribué «de façon significative» à ces retards (UNSC, 20 mai 2010, par. 12).

Depuis mi-2009, les élites politiques font de nouveau de plus en plus usage du concept xénophobe d’«ivoirité» dans leurs discours (ISS, juillet 2010). Dans les années 1990, la discrimination ethnique est devenue une pratique courante, le concept d’«ivoirité» étant de plus en plus utilisé comme une condition de participation à la vie publique. Des amendements constitutionnels visant à limiter les postes de président et vice-président à ceux dont les parents étaient tous deux d’origine ivoirienne ont conduit à la remise en question de la citoyenneté de tous ceux qui n’appartaient pas à certains groupes ethniques « fondamentaux » (OSI, octobre 2009).

En février 2010, le projet de supprimer plus d’un million de personnes de la liste électorale en raison de doutes sur leur nationalité ivoirienne ainsi que la décision du président Gbagbo de dissoudre et de reformer le gouvernement et la Commission électorale indépendante (CEI) ont conduit à de violentes protestations de masse dans plusieurs villes du pays (IRIN, 22 février 2010). Dans le cadre de ces manifestations, il est avéré qu’aussi bien les manifestants que les forces de sécurité ont commis des graves abus et violations des droits humains (ONUCI, août 2010).

Selon l'International Crisis Group, les régions qui font face à un risque plus élevé de violence électorale incluent la capitale commerciale Abidjan et les zones où il y a encore des tensions sur l'accès à la terre et son exploitation économique entre les habitants, les migrants économiques d'autres régions du pays, et les travailleurs en provenance d'autres pays d'Afrique de l'Ouest, (ICG, 5 mai 2010). Dans ces zones, le risque de nouveaux déplacements est également élevé.

**Le processus électoral**

Avec la mise en place d’un nouveau gouvernement et de la commission électorale, la nouvelle date du 31 octobre 2010 a été annoncée pour les élections présidentielles (UN News, 5 août 2010). Ces élections constituent un élément central du processus prévu par l’OPA. Bien que les observateurs internes et externes les considèrent comme une condition préalable à une résolution durable de la crise, elles ont été reportées à plusieurs reprises depuis 2007 (IRIN, 2 septembre 2010; Reuters, 25 août 2010 ; UA, 11 août 2010). Dans le même temps, des résultats contestés pourraient se traduire par un regain de violence (Reuters, 25 août 2010). En particulier, les questions sur la liste électorale et le désarmement des rebelles et des milices doivent encore être réglées pour limiter le risque de violence.

Les candidats à l’élection présidentielle ont tous accepté la liste électorale finale produite par la nouvelle commission électorale début septembre 2010. La liste devrait être affichée dans les bureaux de vote début octobre (VOA 7 septembre 2010). Cependant, les analystes ont souligné que la liste actuelle ne diffère pas beaucoup de celle que le Président Gbagbo a rejeté et ont exprimé la crainte que d'autres obstacles puissent encore se poser (Reuters, 6 septembre 2010). En particulier, le désarmement des forces rebelles et des milices doit encore être complété.
Les FN n'ont pas désarmé, mais ils ont terminé le regroupement de leurs troupes dans les casernes en prévision du scrutin d'octobre, conformément aux règles convenues dans l'Accord de paix de Ouagadougou (Reuters, 31 août 2010). Le programme de désarmement, de démobilisation et de réinsertion a été confronté à de nombreux défis, allant de l'absence de capacité de l'institution nationale de mise en œuvre à l'incapacité du gouvernement de payer les indemnités de démobilisation promises (UNSC, 20 mai 2010). Pendant ce temps, bien que l'ONU ait renouvelé son embargo sur les armes en octobre 2009, le gouvernement et les FN ont continué à se réarmer. Malgré une interdiction internationale, les "diamants de la guerre" ivoiriens ont continué à être vendus, l'exploitation minière illégale n'ayant cessé de croître en 2008 et 2009 dans certaines des zones sous contrôle des FN (UNSC, 9 Octobre 2009; PAC, Octobre 2009).

### Nombre de personnes déplacées

Il est difficile d'obtenir des statistiques fiables sur le nombre actuel de personnes déplacées à travers le pays en raison des habitudes de déplacement - quasiment toutes les personnes déplacées à l'intérieur du pays (PDI) sont hébergées par des amis ou des parents – de l'extrême rareté de l'information sur le centre nord et de l'absence de mécanismes de suivi complet sur les solutions durables.

Selon le HCR, en juin 2010, il y avait 519 000 personnes déplacées dans le pays, dont plus de la moitié sont des femmes (HCR, 1 juin 2010). L'estimation est basée sur les résultats d'une étude réalisée en 2005 par le UNFPA et l'Institut national des statistiques ENSEA, qui a recensé un total de près de 710 000 personnes déplacées dans les cinq régions sous contrôle gouvernemental. Depuis mars 2007, les personnes déplacées ont commencé à rentrer dans leur région d'origine ou d'ancienne résidence, y compris les fonctionnaires déplacés qui ont été redéployés. Les mécanismes de suivi des retours ont été essentiellement limités aux régions occidentales du Moyen Cavally et des Dix-huit Montagnes. On ignore combien de personnes déplacées ont décidé de s'intégrer localement ou de s'installer ailleurs dans le pays. Par conséquent et en l'absence de mécanismes de suivi pour l'ensemble du pays, il est très difficile de faire une estimation fiable.

Pendant ce temps, les déplacements à court terme se sont poursuivis, principalement en raison de conflits fonciers intercommunaux (Nord-Sud, 3 juin 2010 et 23 avril 2010).

### Les besoins d'assistance et problèmes de protection

Avec l'aggravation de nombreux indicateurs de développement à travers le pays (IRIN, 2 septembre 2010; OCHA, 14 juillet 2010), les besoins d'assistance des personnes déplacées ont été progressivement intégrés dans de plus larges programmes d'aide et de développement. L'aide a principalement porté sur l'amélioration de la sécurité alimentaire, les indicateurs de malnutrition ayant atteint des niveaux alarmants dans certaines régions du nord (UNSC, 20 mai 2010). Les pluies abondantes ont provoqué des inondations localisées (IRIN, 25 juin 2010) et les conflits fonciers ont continué à réduire la production et à exposer les ménages pauvres, y compris les personnes déplacées et les retournés, au risque de perdre leurs réserves de nourriture (FEWSNET, juillet 2010). Les communautés d'accueil ont également été exposées à un risque accru. Dans les départements de Guiglo et Boléquin les quelques 31 000 personnes déplacées qui vivaient avec ces communautés d'accueil ont pesé sur leurs ressources (UNSC, 20 mai 2010).

Les abus et violations des droits humains se sont poursuivis à travers le pays. La violence sexuelle et liée au genre a continué à être généralisée, en particulier dans l'ouest et dans les zones sous contrôle des FN (US DoS, 11 mars 2010). Les restrictions sur des déplacements internes ont eu pour conséquence de limiter la circulation des personnes, en particulier les personnes cherchant à voyager entre des villes sous contrôle des FN ou entre des zones contrôlées par le gouvernement et des zones sous contrôle des FN (HRW, 20 janvier 2010).
Les restrictions sur les déplacements ont constitué une charge supplémentaire pour les personnes déplacées qui ont voulu régulariser la situation de leurs enfants, compte tenu de la nécessité d'enregistrer la naissance des enfants dans leur lieu de naissance (NRC, mars 2010).

**Des solutions durables**

Etant donné qu’il n’existe pratiquement aucune donnée sur les personnes déplacées qui ont cherché à s’intégrer dans le lieu où elles ont été déplacées ou à se réinstaller ailleurs, les informations disponibles pour évaluer si les personnes déplacées ont été en mesure de trouver des solutions durables se réfèrent essentiellement aux mouvements de retour. L’information sur les retours est plus ou moins limitée aux régions de l'ouest du Moyen Cavally et des Dix-huit Montagnes. Au 30 mars 2010, près de 90 000 personnes déplacées avaient regagné leur région d'origine ou de résidence habituelle dans ces deux régions (UNSC, 20 mai 2010). Cependant, les conflits liés à l'accès à la terre et la propriété foncière, la criminalité, généralisée, les atteintes aux droits de l’homme et l'impunité des auteurs continuent à faire obstacle à la réalisation de solutions durables.

Les mouvements de retour ont principalement été spontanés (OCHA, février 2009), mais certaines personnes déplacées ont reçu une aide au retour. Depuis le début de l'année 2010, les agences humanitaires ont organisé au moins quatre convois de retour à l'ouest et ont fourni aux rapatriés de la nourriture et d'autres articles non alimentaires (CICR, 18 mai 2010; ONUCI, 8 avril 2010, 10 mars 2010). Le HCR a poursuivi ses activités de suivi de protection en 2010 dans les zones de retour dans le Moyen Cavally et des Dix-huit Montagnes (HCR, 1 juin 2010). Dans certains villages, des comités de paix ont également facilité le retour pacifique des personnes déplacées et leur inclusion dans les processus de prise de décision au niveau local (UNSC, 20 mai 2010).

**Obstacles au retour**

Dans son Appel global 2010-2011, le HCR a identifié les principales conditions pour des retours durables en 2010 : la tenue d'élections libres, justes et transparentes, l'acceptation par les partis politiques et les groupes armés de leurs résultats, et l'amélioration de la sécurité dans les zones de retour (HCR, 1 juin 2010). Dans le même temps, il note que les principaux obstacles à un retour durable sont les litiges fonciers et une faible cohésion sociale (HCR, 1 juin 2010). Fin 2009, les communautés de migrants (originaires d'autres régions de Côte d'Ivoire ou d'autres pays d'Afrique de l'Ouest) qui avaient été déplacées en provenance de localités de l'ouest étaient encore prises pour cible lorsqu'elles tentaient de regagner leurs plantations (HRW, 20 janvier 2010).

Dans de nombreux cas, les parcelles que les personnes déplacées avaient plantées ont été soit vendues soit louées par d'autres personnes à des tiers. De nombreuses personnes déplacées qui ont voulu rentrer ont trouvé leurs plantations occupées (IRIN, 27 janvier 2010). En l'absence d'un système de restitution ou d'indemnisation pour les terres, la loi foncière de 1998 est actuellement le seul cadre juridique disponible pour régler les différends dans les zones rurales. La loi vise à reconnaître et formaliser des droits coutumiers, afin de réduire les tensions sur la propriété foncière résultant de l'incertitude des transactions coutumières. Cependant, dans le contexte du déplacement, la formalisation des droits coutumiers complique les litiges fonciers et augmente le risque de différend (IDMC, octobre 2009, p.5). En outre, la loi reste peu connue dans la plupart des zones de retour de l'ouest (IRIN, 27 janvier 2010) et la capacité de mise en œuvre du gouvernement demeure limitée.

De nombreux conflits fonciers sont également apparus dans les forêts classées, où de nombreuses personnes déplacées avaient pour habitude de planter leurs cultures. La loi foncière de 1998 s'applique uniquement au foncier rural et par conséquent ne traite pas des forêts...
classées. Il n'y a donc pas de cadre législatif pour résoudre ces différends. Pour la plupart des litiges fonciers dans les villages et les forêts classées de l'ouest, la solution a été trouvé ad hoc. En mai 2010 les agences humanitaires et les institutions nationales ont décidé de mettre en place une plate-forme locale dans la région du Moyen Cavally afin d'adopter une approche plus cohérente de la prévention et du règlement des différends (SODEFOR, 12 mai 2010).

Réponses nationales et internationales

La Côte d'Ivoire a signé la Convention de l'Union africaine sur la protection et l'assistance aux personnes déplacées en Afrique (Convention de Kampala) en novembre 2009 (UA, 6 août 2010), mais début septembre 2010, elle ne l'avait toujours pas ratifiée. Les éléments d'un cadre juridique national protégeant les droits des personnes déplacées, y compris un projet de loi définissant les mécanismes d'indemnisation des victimes de guerre, notamment les personnes déplacées, étaient encore en attente de signature en septembre 2010, des années après avoir été rédigés. La probabilité de leur signature a encore été réduite par la suppression du rôle du ministère de la Solidarité et des Victimes de guerre comme point focal des personnes déplacées en février 2010, à la suite d'un remaniement ministériel (GoCdI 23 février 2010). Le ministère avait pris l'initiative d'élaborer une législation sur l'indemnisation et les questions de restitution et avait mis en place un comité interministériel sur les personnes déplacées. Ses fonctions ont été reprises par le nouveau Secrétariat national pour la solidarité et les victimes de guerre (GoCdI, 2010). Le ministère de la Reconstruction et de la Réinsertion, qui avait soutenu les mouvements de retour des personnes déplacées au cours de l'année 2009 (Fraternité Matin, 20 avril 2009; Xinhua, 26 août 2009), a également été supprimé lors de ce remaniement.

L'objectif principal déclaré du plan du gouvernement pour les personnes déplacées est le retour de toutes les personnes déplacées dans leurs foyers d'origine. L'Accord de Ouagadougou se concentre sur l'élaboration d'une stratégie nationale visant à faciliter le retour des personnes déplacées, et reste muet sur leur droit à s'intégrer dans leur lieu de déplacement ou de se réinstaller dans une autre partie du pays, tel que prescrit dans les Principes directeurs.

Les objectifs sociaux à moyen terme du gouvernement, décrits dans son Document de stratégie de réduction de la pauvreté (DSRP), incluent notamment des efforts visant à promouvoir la réconciliation nationale et la cohésion sociale et la réunification totale du pays ainsi que le développement économique général (FMI, 20 mai 2009). La Côte d'Ivoire s'est tournée vers l'Initiative en faveur des pays pauvres très endettés du Fonds Monétaire international et de la Banque mondiale. En 2010, cependant, en raison d'indicateurs de développement social stagnant ou se détériorant et d'une impasse politique, la Banque mondiale a annoncé la décision de lier l’allègement de la dette à la tenue des élections (Reuters, 29 janvier 2010).

Conformément au DSRP, les donateurs internationaux ont accordé la priorité à l'aide au développement alors que les partenaires du gouvernement sont progressivement passés d'activités humanitaires à des projets de reconstruction et de développement. Il n'y a pas d'appel humanitaire pour 2010, et la Côte d'Ivoire ne figure pas parmi les pays bénéficiaires du Fonds central d'intervention d'urgence (CERF) en 2010. De janvier à juin, les activités humanitaires encore menées par les agences des Nations Unies ont continué à mettre l'accent sur la réinsertion et la protection des personnes déplacées et des rapatriés dans l'ouest (UNSC, 20 mai 2010).

À partir du 1er juillet 2010, OCHA a transféré ses capacités de coordination et de planification d'urgence au Bureau du Coordonnateur Résident des Nations Unies et à son bureau régional à Dakar. Le bureau d'OCHA à Guiilo, dans l'ouest est le seul bureau à rester ouvert jusqu'à la fin de l'année 2010 (OCHA, décembre 2009).
En juillet, l’Opération des Nations unies en Côte d’Ivoire (ONUCI) a lancé un fonds de transition local pour consolider ses activités humanitaires (APO, 9 juillet 2010). En septembre 2010, le gouvernement suisse était le seul à avoir fait une contribution s'élevant à 1 million de dollars pour financer des programmes communautaires de réadaptation.

Par sa résolution 1933, le Conseil de sécurité a prorogé le mandat de l'ONUCI jusqu'à la fin de l'année 2010 afin d'accompagner le gouvernement dans la mise en œuvre de l'APO et à la tenue des élections (UNSC, 30 juin 2010). Dans cette dernière résolution, le Conseil de sécurité a plus explicitement inclus dans le mandat de l'ONUCI le soutien à l'aide humanitaire, notamment en prenant en compte les besoins spécifiques des groupes vulnérables, y compris les personnes déplacées. Le terme «déplacement» est apparu pour la première fois dans la résolution 1726 en 2006, deux ans après la création de l'ONUCI. Le Conseil de sécurité mentionne sa «grave préoccupation» en matière de déplacement dans le préambule. Ce n'est que dans la Résolution 1765 de 2007, que le déplacement a été mentionné dans le corps du texte: [le Conseil de sécurité] "invite en outre les parties signataires de l'Accord politique de Ouagadougou à prendre les mesures nécessaires pour protéger les populations civiles vulnérables, y compris en garantissant le retour volontaire, la réinstallation, la réintégration et la sécurité des personnes déplacées, avec l'appui du système des Nations Unies, et à remplir à cet égard leurs engagements conformément à l'Accord politique de Ouagadougou et leurs obligations en vertu du droit humanitaire international"(UNSC, 16 juillet 2007).
CAUSES AND BACKGROUND

Background

A chronology of key events (2010)

**BBC News, 20 July 2010**

*Independence*

1960 - France grants independence under President Felix Houphouet-Boigny. He holds power until he dies in 1993.

1990 - Opposition parties legalised; Houphouet-Boigny wins Ivory Coast's first multiparty presidential election, beating Laurent Gbagbo of the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI).

1993 - Henri Konan Bedie becomes president following the death of Houphouet-Boigny.

1995 October - Bedie re-elected in a ballot that is boycotted by opposition parties in protest at restrictions imposed on their candidates.

1999 - July - Alassane Ouattara, a Muslim, leaves job at International Monetary Fund and returns to run for president in 2000; his plan to challenge Bedie splits country along ethnic and religious lines. Opponents say he is national of Burkina Faso, not Ivory Coast.

**Coup**


2000 October - Guei proclaims himself president after announcing he has won presidential elections, but is forced to flee in the wake of a popular uprising against his perceived rigging of the poll.

2000 October - Laurent Gbagbo, believed to be the real winner in the presidential election, is proclaimed president. Opposition leader Alassane Ouattara, excluded from running in the poll, calls for a fresh election.

2000 October - Fighting erupts between Gbagbo's mainly southern Christian supporters and followers of Ouattara, who are mostly Muslims from the north.

2000 December - President Gbagbo's Ivorian Popular Front (FPI) emerges as the biggest single party in parliamentary elections.

2001 January - Attempted coup fails.

2001 March - President Gbagbo and opposition leader Ouattara meet for the first time since violence erupted between their supporters in October 2000 and agree to work towards reconciliation.

[...]

2001 March - Calls for fresh presidential and legislative elections after Alassane Ouattara's party gains majority at local polls.

[...]

2001 October - President Gbagbo sets up National Reconciliation Forum. General Guei refuses to attend in protest against the arrest of his close aide Captain Fabien Coulibaly.
2001 November - Opposition leader Alassane Ouattara returns, ending year-long exile in France and Gabon.

2002 August - Ouattara’s RDR opposition party given four ministerial posts in new government.

Rebellion
2002 19 September - Mutiny in Abidjan by soldiers unhappy at being demobilised grows into full-scale rebellion, with Ivory Coast Patriotic Movement rebels seizing control of the north.

2002 October-December - Short-lived ceasefire in October gives way to further clashes and battle for key cocoa-industry town of Daloa. Previously unknown rebel groups seize towns in west.


2003 March - Political parties, rebels agree on new government to include nine members from rebel ranks. "Consensus" prime minister, Seydou Diarra, is tasked with forming cabinet.

2003 May - Armed forces sign ceasefire with rebel groups.

2003 July - At a ceremony in the presidential palace, military chiefs and rebels declare that the war is over.

2003 August - Group of suspected mercenaries and their backers detained in France; said to have planned to assassinate President Gbagbo.

[...]

UN deploys
2004 March - Deadly clashes during crackdown on opposition rally against President Gbagbo in Abidjan.

First contingent of UN peacekeeping force deployed.

2004 May - UN report says March’s opposition rally was used as pretext for planned operation by security forces. Report says more than 120 people were killed and alleges summary executions, torture.

2004 November - Ivorian air force attacks rebels; French forces enter the fray after nine of their soldiers are killed in an air strike. Violent anti-French protests ensue. UN imposes arms embargo.

2004 December - Parliament passes reforms envisaged under the 2003 peace accord, including abolishing the need for a president to have Ivorian parents.

2005 April - After talks in South Africa the government and rebels declare an "immediate and final end" to hostilities.

2005 June - Massacres in western town of Duekoue: President Gbagbo says more than 100 people were killed, but contradicts widely-held view that ethnic rifts lay behind violence.

Poll called off
2005 October - Planned elections are shelved as President Gbagbo invokes a law which he says allows him to stay in power. The UN extends his mandate for a further year.

2005 December - Economist Charles Konan Banny is nominated as prime minister by mediators. He is expected to disarm militias and rebels and to organise elections due in October 2006.

2006 January - Violent street demonstrations by supporters of President Gbagbo over what they see as UN interference in internal affairs.

2006 February - Main political rivals meet on Ivorian soil for the first time since the 2002 rebellion. They agree to meet again to iron out differences.
2006 June - Militias loyal to President Gbagbo miss disarmament deadlines.

2006 September - Political, rebel leaders say they've failed to make any breakthrough on the main issues standing in the way of elections - principally voter registration and disarmament.

Government resigns over a scandal involving the dumping of toxic waste in Abidjan. Fumes from the waste kill three people and make many more ill.

2006 November - UN Security Council resolution extends the transitional government's mandate for another year.

Power-sharing deal
2007 March - Government and New Forces rebels sign a power-sharing peace deal, mediated by Burkina Faso. Under the deal, New Forces leader Guillaume Soro is named as prime minister.

2007 April - President Gbagbo declares "the war is over" between his government and northern rebels, as the two sides move to dismantle the military buffer zone. Within days aid workers report an increase in violence.

2007 May - Militia begin to disarm.

2007 June - Prime Minister Soro survives a rocket attack on his plane.

2007 October - UN Security Council votes to maintain sanctions for another year.

2007 December - Rebel, government soldiers pull back from front-line positions as part of process to reunite country.

2008 January - UN renews mandate of 8,000 peacekeepers for six months to ensure polls are held by mid-year.

2008 January - Ten people are arrested and charged for plotting a coup in December 2007. Their alleged ring-leader, Sergeant Ibrahim Coulibaly, denies the charges.

2008 April - President Gbagbo cancels custom duties after a second day of violent protests against rising food costs.

Date of long-awaited presidential elections put back from June to the end of November.

Disarmament begins
2008 May - Former rebels who still control the northern half of the country begin disarming.

2008 July - Ivory Coast complains that a 2004 UN arms embargo is crippling efforts to cut illegal fishing.

The government increases diesel prices by 44% and petrol by 29% in response to rising world oil prices.

2008 August - The government halves ministerial salaries and those of state company managers to pay for a 10% fuel-price cut.

2008 October - The UN extends its arms embargo and sanctions on Ivory Coast's diamond trade for another year, promising to review the embargo once the country holds a presidential election.

2008 November - President Gbagbo and Prime Minister Soro agree to postpone presidential elections yet again, citing delays in voter registration and security concerns.

IMF write-off
2009 April - International Monetary Fund (IMF) agrees to write off $3bn (£2bn) of Ivory Coast's $12.8bn national debt.

2009 May - Former rebels hand over 10 northern zones to civilian administrators, as part of the process of returning the northern part of the country to state control.
2009 October - UN extends ban on Ivory Coast's diamond trade for another year.

2009 November - Presidential elections, due on 29 November, are postponed again.

2010 February - Voter registration is suspended indefinitely after days of violent protests at government handling of process. President Gbagbo dissolves government and electoral commission, triggering further unrest.

Guillaume Soro forms new coalition government including both main opposition parties after crisis talks brokered by Burkina Faso President Blaise Compaore.

2010 March - Newly appointed electoral commission starts work."

**Reuters, 25 August 2010**

“July 23 - Soro quits as rebel party chief.

Aug. 5 - After months of wrangling between political parties, Soro announces Oct. 31 this year as the date for polls that were first meant to take place in 2005.”

**Warring parties involved in the post-September 2002 crisis: an overview**

**AFP, 12 January 2003**

“Following are details of the rebel groups […] operating in the country:

**Ivory Coast Patriotic Movement (MPCI):**

The best known of the three groups which started the conflict with a well-synchronised rebellion on September 19 by disgruntled soldiers facing demobilisation.

Although the MPCI was defeated in the country's main city Abidjan on the first day, they occupied the northern half of the world's top cocoa producer in a lightning campaign.

This movement is headquartered in Ivory Coast's second city Bouake, the main economic hub after the economic capital Abidjan. Its other stronghold is the northern town of Korhogo.

The group now has tens of thousands of fighters in its ranks, which have swelled due to voluntary enlistment by youths living in occupied territory.

The MPCI insists it is not a political movement and claims that none of the country's main political leaders are backing it.

However, it says it is fighting for the rights of the Muslim-majority northerners who have been discriminated against by the government of President Laurent Gbagbo, a Christian based in the south.

The best-known public faces of the MPCI are two soldiers -- Tuo Fozie and Sherif Usman -- but the leaders of their political wing remain shadowy.

Another of the leaders of the political movement is Louis Dakoury-Tabley, ironically one of Gbagbo's closest friends when the latter was an opposition figure and often forced to go into hiding.

The MPCI says it is determined to remove Gbagbo and usher in a new government after holding fresh elections.

It has strenuously denied claims that it is backed by neighbouring Burkina Faso, fingered by the government as the shadowy mastermind of the rebellion, or that it has any links with exiled opposition leader Alassane Ouattara, Gbagbo's arch-foe.
The MPCI signed a West African brokered ceasefire on October 17 which was "accepted" by Gbagbo as well but the truce was shattered late last month when fighting resumed in the country's west, where two new rebel groups emerged at the same time.

The MPCI and the Ivorian government began peace talks in the Togolese capital Lome on October 30 but the negotiations have been deadlocked for weeks.

**Far West Ivory Coast People's Movement (MPIGO):**

The group, which has now pulled out of the Paris talks, made a dramatic appearance on November 28 by taking the key western town of Danane near the Liberian border.

Its fighters are often armed with old-fashioned rifles and essentially comprise soldiers and men close to former military ruler General Robert Guei, killed in Abidjan on the first day of the September uprising.

The MPIGO claims to have around 6,000 fighters and controls a vast swath of the west including Guei's native village of Gouessesso, where Guei withdrew after Gbagbo defeated him in presidential elections in 2000.

The MPIGO accuses the government of killing Guei and says it wants to avenge his murder and to secure a place for Guei's Yakuba ethnic group in Ivory Coast's pluralist society.

The group has repeatedly denied roping in Liberian fighters although witnesses have reported the presence of "English-speaking" combatants who loot and terrorise locals in sharp contrast to the MPCI forces.

Most of their men do not wear uniforms -- another major difference between the MPIGO and the two other rebel groups.

In December, French troops fired on the MPIGO to prevent them from taking the strategic town of Duekoue, on the route to Ivory Coast's cocoa capital Daloa, prompting the insurgents to threaten all-out war against the peacekeepers.

But like the MJP (see below) they have since signed a ceasefire, despite vowing to continue to fight the government forces.

**Movement for Justice and Peace (MJP):**

Surfaced on the same day as the MPIGO, with which it later concluded an alliance, when it took the key western town of Man on November 28.

Also based in western Ivory Coast, the MJP is thought to group some 250 soldiers of whom about one-fifth are traditional 'dozo' hunters who are reputed to possess magical powers.

Its leaders claim the group is a breakaway faction of the main MPCI rebel movement, whom they oppose for agreeing to enter into peace talks with the Ivorian government under the aegis of Togolese President Gnassingbe Eyadema.

The MJP however insists it has no links whatsoever with the MPCI despite maintaining "cordial relations" with the MPCI top brass including Tuo Fozie."

**In December 2002, Soro's MPCI combined with the two other rebel groups to form the Forces Nouvelles (New Forces). Guillaume Soro became secretary-general of the group.**

**In July 2010, Prime Minister, Guillaume Soro, quit as leader of the Forces Nouvelles.**
The manipulation of ethnic factors for political and ideological purposes, 1893-2010

- For many years, ethnic factors in Ivorian society have been subject to political manipulation.
- Since former President Henri Konan Bedie introduced the concept of 'Ivoirité' in 1995, the political and ideological manipulation of issues of nationality and ethno-religious divisions have been exacerbated.
- The cross-border nature of the conflict in Côte d'Ivoire can be also traced back to particular ethnic alliances, in particular with regard to Liberia's involvement.
- Human Rights Watch report describes atrocities committed during presidential and parliamentary elections in October and December 2000, including more than 200 killings, as well as torture, rape and arbitrary detention.
- Flawed election of President Laurent Gbagbo in 2000, based on a blatantly racist agenda, laid the ground for the eventual division of the country into distinct ethnic and religious zones in 2002.
- In 2010, Côte d'Ivoire experienced a resurgence of xenophobic rhetoric and hate speeches in the context of the controversy over the electoral roll for the presidential elections. In February, disputes over the voter list erupted into violent protests. Opposition parties have also denounced calls to exclude people with foreign-sounding names from the electoral roll.

UN Commission for Human Rights, 22 December 2004, paras. 41-42

"Ethnic factors in Ivorian society have for many years - and increasingly - been subject to political manipulation. In Côte d'Ivoire as elsewhere in Africa, the colonial Power frequently exploited ethnic differences to divide and rule, or else, using anthropology and ethnology, ethnicized groups and communities whose relationships had been regulated by traditional values and cultural practices for jointly dealing with ethnic tensions. Economic imperatives such as labour-force mobility did not respond to any desire to promote a genuine, interactive coexistence that might have fostered a national consciousness as opposed to the colonial policy of assimilation. Later, President Houphouët-Boigny found the implicit tensions within Ivorian society relatively manageable and was able to maintain a generally quiescent inter-ethnic coexistence. However, his approach to ethnic tensions, a mix of traditionalist pragmatism, political opportunism and the use of corruption and repression, within a non-democratic, one-party system, did nothing to neutralize the threat of conflict those tensions posed in any deep or lasting way. During his reign, Côte d'Ivoire was the scene of both xenophobic violence targeting foreign groups and political repression directed against particular Ivorian ethnic groups and their leaders.

This tendency finally took political expression in 1990, with the introduction of a multiparty system in which ethnic tension became a decisive political factor. In the forced transition from a paternalistic single-party system to a democratic multiparty one, in the context of multi-ethnic Côte d'Ivoire, it was only too tempting to play the ethnic card in the political manoeuvring, i.e., in the absence of any debate on ideas or substantive platforms, to resort to ethnic considerations to build up a militant political base for the conquest of power. In this context, "ivoirité", or Ivorianess, became the conceptual basis for the construction of an ideology of political manipulation of the ethnic factor."

CASIN, August 2003, p. 26

"Ethnic alliances indicate the complex, cross-border nature of the conflict in Côte d'Ivoire. For instance, Gbagbo's small ethnic group, the Bété, is closely linked to the Liberian Krahn, who form the base of the anti-Charles Taylor rebel groups. Former Liberian President Samuel Doe, who was overthrown by Charles Taylor in 1989, was also Krahn—a fact that automatically indicates antagonism between Gbagbo and Taylor. General Guei and Charles Taylor are
ethnically linked by virtue of their Yacouba and Gio, heritage, respectively (these two groups are closely tied). Additionally, the tension between Gbagbo’s Bété and Guéré supporters and the Dioula in the North has translated into a political FPI-RDR division.

**HRW, August 2001**

“The 2000 presidential and parliamentary elections in Côte d’Ivoire in October and December were marred by political violence which left over 200 people dead and hundreds wounded. In the months preceding the October presidential and December parliamentary elections, political leaders exploited ethnic divisions to oust rivals, used the state apparatus to repress opponents, and incited hatred and fear among populations which had for decades lived in relative harmony. Their actions culminated in two unprecedented waves of violence which shocked Ivorians and members of the international community alike, as well as grimly highlighting the danger of manipulating ethnic loyalties and latent prejudice for political gain. The legacy of the heightened suspicion and intolerance generated during the election period will take determined action to overcome; action which has so far been seriously lacking.

The violence shattered Côte d’Ivoire’s hopes of rapidly regaining its status as francophone West Africa’s economic powerhouse and a regional beacon of stability. This was lost a year earlier when a coup d’état against the corrupt government of incumbent elected president Henri Konan Bédié installed General Robert Guei as a military head of state in December 1999. General Guei had promised to return Côte d’Ivoire to civilian rule, and scheduled elections to do so, but had manipulated the process to such an extent that the legitimacy of the elections was already in doubt before they were held. A new constitution introduced by General Guei and approved by a July 2000 referendum required both parents of any Ivorian wishing to contest the presidential election to have been born in Côte d’Ivoire. This amendment was transparently designed to exclude Alassane Ouattara, the leader of the Rally of Republicans party (*Rassemblement des Republicains*, RDR), the largest opposition party, from the contest. On October 6, 2000, a controversial Supreme Court decision disqualified from running fourteen of the nineteen presidential candidates, including Ouattara, on citizenship grounds, and former president Bédié for not submitting a proper medical certificate. The Supreme Court, headed by General Guei’s then legal adviser, was widely believed to have been hand picked by Guei himself.

On October 24, 2000, after early results showed Laurent Gbagbo, leader of the Ivorian Popular Front (*Front Populaire Ivorien*, FPI), leading in the presidential poll, General Guei dissolved the National Electoral Commission and proclaimed himself the winner. Just two days later, he fled the country, in the midst of violence surrounding protests at his attempts to rig the elections. Laurent Gbagbo was left as the leading presidential candidate.

Despite the very serious concerns surrounding the legitimacy of the elections—both the widespread violence and the exclusion of Alassane Ouattara from the contest—Gbagbo was installed as president. Gbagbo then used the same methods as his predecessor during the December parliamentary elections, in particular to ensure that Ouattara was once again not allowed to run. Since assuming office, he has failed to acknowledge the flawed manner in which he became head of state, to promise new elections, to seek accountability for the violence, or to take adequate steps to ensure that, under his leadership, Côte d’Ivoire would be characterized by the rule of law, not by ethno-religious tension and military impunity.”

**ISS, July 2010**

“There has also been an escalation in xenophobic rhetoric and hate speeches in the country. The increasing militancy of youth groups as well as reports that all sides are rearming has made an already volatile security situation even more tense. […] In the context of the impasse over the electoral process, the country has also witnessed the problematic trend of resurgence in the divisive issue of national identity. Some political actors
have argued that those whose identity and hence eligibility has been questioned are all from the North of Côte d'Ivoire. The use of the concept of Ivoirite, which played a role in igniting the civil war, has also resurfaced in political discourse. There has also been a rise in xenophobic rhetoric from some political elites and particularly the youth group in Abidjan supporting the president. By drawing members of different communities further into the political tension, this undermines the conditions for conducting the electoral process and entrenches the fears and suspicion between them.

**Amnesty International, 25 February 2010**

“The current wave of violence is associated with disputes about the compilation of an electoral roll for the presidential election, which has been repeatedly postponed since 2005. The opposition parties have denounced calls to exclude tens of thousands of people suspected of being foreign nationals because they bear Muslim family names.

On 3 February 2010, several thousand demonstrators organized protest marches in Divo, a town in the centre west of the country, some 200 km from Abidjan, the economic capital, in an attempt to prevent judges removing them from the electoral roll. The security forces opened fire on the demonstrators to disperse them, leaving eight wounded, including several with bullet wounds. Supporters of President Laurent Gbagbo have denounced what they claim to be fraudulent attempts to add to the electoral roll the names of more than 400,000 electors whose nationality has not been fully verified. These suspicions of fraud led President Gbagbo to dissolve the Independent Electoral Commission and the government on 12 February 2010.

Some opposition political parties then called on their supporters “to oppose the Laurent Gbagbo dictatorship by every means possible”, which led to acts of violence and vandalism against premises and goods belonging to the Front populaire ivoirien (FPI), Ivorian Popular Front, the Head of State’s political party.”

**Mercenaries and refugees from Liberia recruited by all parties to the conflict, end 2002-2003**

- MJP and MPIGO and Ivorian government forces accused of using Liberian fighters
- Civilians displaced after attacks by presumed Liberian fighters in the west of war-torn Côte d’Ivoire
- Ivorian and Liberian authorities reported attacks on their common border by groups from each other’s territory
- Liberia accuses Côte d’Ivoire government to back armed groups, which launch attacks from Toulepleu on the Ivorian side of the border
- Côte d’Ivoire asks France to activate bilateral defence pact following alleged raids by Liberian soldiers

**UN OCHA, 3 March 2003**

“Defence authorities in Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia have reported attacks by groups from each others’ territory on locations on either side of their border. However, the claims could not be immediately confirmed by third parties.

Defence authorities in the Liberian capital, Monrovia, said that heavy fighting continued on Monday between Liberian government troops and insurgents in Toe Town, close to the Ivorian border. The town was captured on Friday by the Liberians United for Reconciliation (LURD) rebel group, according to the Liberian government.
Liberian Defence spokesman Philibert Browne told IRIN on Monday that Liberian government troops were "engaging the rebels to regain control of the town" which, prior to the attack, was a transit point for Ivorian refugees and Liberians fleeing armed conflict in Cote d'Ivoire.

Liberian Defense Minister Daniel Chea had told a news conference in Monrovia on Saturday that Toe Town had been attacked by two platoons of insurgents "armed and backed by the Ivorian government". He said the attack had been launched from the town of Toulepleu, on the Ivorian side of the border.

"For the Republic of Cote d'Ivoire to encourage Liberian mercenaries fighting alongside their own troops in their civil crisis to cross the border into Liberian territory is tantamount to a declaration of war," Chea said. "[...] those who want to continue this wave of violence against our people must understand that we reserve the right to self-defense."

However, Cote d'Ivoire's armed forces denied Chea's claims. The armed forces "would like to indicate that no foreign mercenary is fighting alongside it and that the statements of the minister of defence of Liberia constitute groundless accusations," Armed Forces spokesman Lt Col Jules Yao Yao said on Sunday.

"On the other hand," he continued, the Ivorian armed forces "recognise that the situation in the west of Cote d'Ivoire remains worrying since the different actors intervening in the conflict are difficult to identify."

Two rebel groups, the Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix (MJP) and the Mouvement patriotique du Grand Ouest (MPIGO), operate on the Ivorian side of the border between Cote d'Ivoire and Liberia. The MJP has its headquarters in the town of Man, while MPIGO's territory is farther south, around the town of Danane. Like the Ivorian government, both groups have been accused of using Liberian fighters.

**AFP, 24 January 2003**

"They speak English and they kill," said Madeleine Ga Ahou, one of several thousand people displaced after attacks by presumed Liberian fighters in the west of war-torn Ivory Coast.

"Some were in uniform, the others in civvies. We don't know if they were rebels or others," she told AFP in the town of Guiglo, about 120 kilometres (75 miles) east of Toulepleu, the scene of bitter fighting on Wednesday and Thursday. Ga Ahou arrived in Guiglo on Friday with her two children and was lodged at a camp run by the Red Cross.

She cannot say with certitude, like the Ivorian military, that the attackers were regular soldiers from neighbouring Liberia who went on the rampage alongside two rebel movements based in western Ivory Coast.

"All that we saw is that they had guns and they kill people," she said simply. The Ivorian military has accused soldiers from the Liberian army of fighting alongside Ivorian rebel groups and of involvement in a deadly raid Wednesday in the town of Toulepleu which it claims killed at least 29 people.

Ivorian Defence Minister Kadet Bertin said on Thursday that Abidjan had officially asked former colonial ruler France to activate a bilateral defence pact following the alleged raids by Liberian soldiers.
Bertin said he had proof "that it is regular Liberian forces who are attacking us," adding that the attacks may not have been ordered by Liberian President Charles Taylor but "those in higher echelons of power with bad intentions."

Taylor on Friday denied the allegation but stressed that Liberian mercenaries were fighting both for the rebels and the Ivorian troops, albeit without Monrovia's blessings or knowledge.

However, several witnesses have reported the presence of Liberian fighters in Ivory Coast since the end of November.

The people of Guiglo are convinced that Liberians were involved in the attacks in the west, near the prized cocoa belt of Ivory Coast, the world's top producer of the bean.

Ga Ahou said she saw the "Liberians," mostly young men in their twenties, for the first time at the start of December in her campment of Iffa, in the heart of cocoa country near the town of Blolekin.

She said they looted and extorted locals but did not kill them. But on "Tuesday, they returned and started shooting, started demanding money and killing people who did not give them cash."

"They looted, they took food. we didn't understand what they were saying. They took my cycle and my little brother," said Joachim Koffi Kouame.

Kouame, a cocoa planter from central Ivory Coast, came to the region in 1986. But now he is returning to his native region.

Nearly 2,500 people from the Baoule ethnic group, natives of central Ivory Coast like Kouame, have fled during the last 15 days to the relative safety of Guiglo, said Koffi Tanoh, an official looking after the displaced.

Clement Gnan, who is among those who escaped, said "Many fled on foot through thick forests and the journey took several days."

However, most do not have severe wounds and generally suffer from fatigue or have grazes. But they have deep psychological scars. "They spoilt everything. I've lost 10 years of my life, 10 years of my work," a fiftyish-year-old man said his eyes brimming with tears.

\textbf{Reuters, 2 January 2003}

"Villagers who escaped Neka said there were many Liberians among the fighters who struck on Wednesday in an attack claimed by the Ivorian Patriotic Movement of the Far West (MPIGO)." "There were a lot of dead, they killed lots of people," said one woman called Aminata, who had found a truck to San Pedro after escaping into the bush. "We saw the bodies."

Gbagbo's adviser in Europe, Toussaint Alain, accused mercenaries from Liberia's own savage wars of "massacring the inhabitants (of Neka) with machetes and burning their homes".

Fleeing civilians said they saw helicopter gunships and trucks full of Gbagbo's troops heading towards the fighting. Residents of San Pedro said white mercenaries paid by the army had also arrived in town.

"We're advancing on San Pedro," rebel spokesman Felix Doh told Reuters by satellite phone on Thursday.

San Pedro exports about half the cocoa beans from a country producing 40 percent of the world's supply and prices for benchmark March cocoa futures shot up more than five percent in London on Thursday because of the news from Ivory Coast.

A big contingent of troops from former colonial power France is based in San Pedro to protect hundreds of foreigners.
The French have committed helicopters, heavy arms and some 2,500 soldiers to Ivory Coast in their biggest African intervention since the 1980s to try to stabilise the war-torn country, once the region's economic powerhouse.

A first contingent of West African soldiers is also due to arrive this week to help the French in monitoring the ceasefire between the government and main rebel group.

The Ivorian army says Tuesday's helicopter raid on a small village called Menakro near Beoumi followed an attack on its own positions and spokesman Colonel Jules Yao Yao accused the rebels of using civilians as human shields."

“Regional warriors" re-recruited to fight in Côte d'Ivoire, 2004-2005

- Many young fighters, often forcibly recruited as children, have effectively ended up as mercenaries fighting in numerous armed conflicts in the region
- Armed groups have committed gross human rights violations against civilians with impunity
- Testimonies of "regional warriors", documented by Human Rights Watch, confirms that economic deprivation is a key cause of continuing cycle of war crimes throughout the region
- Since November 2004, hundreds of disarmed fighters in Liberia have been recruited to fight in pro-government militias in Côte d'Ivoire

HRW, 13 April 2005

"Since the late 1980's, the armed conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire have reverberated across each country's porous borders. Gliding back and forth across these borders is a migrant population of young fighters – regional warriors – who view war as mainly an economic opportunity. Their military 'careers' most often began when they were abducted and forcibly recruited by rebels in Liberia or Sierra Leone, usually as children. Thrust into a world of brutality, physical hardship, forced labor and drug abuse, they emerged as perpetrators, willing to rape, abduct, mutilate and even kill. Later, as veteran fighters struggling to support themselves within the war-shattered economy at home, they were lured by recruiters back to the frontlines – this time of a neighbor's war. There, they took the opportunity to loot and pillage; an all too familiar means of providing for their families or enriching themselves.

The flow of arms and combatants across the fluid borders of West Africa, paired with the willingness of governments in the region to support the actions of insurgent groups and government militias in neighboring countries has had lethal consequences, particularly for civilians. The armed groups these regional warriors are part of have a well-documented record of committing unspeakable human rights abuses against unarmed civilians and have so far enjoyed impunity for the violations they commit. Efforts by the international community to disarm and reintegrate these fighters into their home communities –including through training – have so far had limited success. At present, the armed conflict in Côte d'Ivoire and the unstable political situation in Guinea appear to be the current theaters into which these regional warriors are being drawn.

The voices of the regional warriors heard in this report clearly illuminate the link between economic deprivation and the continuing cycle of war crimes throughout the region. The regional warriors unanimously identified crippling poverty and hopelessness as the key factors which motivated them to risk dying in subsequent armed conflicts. They described being deeply affected by poverty and obsessed with the struggle of daily survival, a reality not lost on the recruiters. Indeed they were born in and fight in some of the world's poorest countries. Many described their broken dreams and how, given the dire economic conditions within the region, going to war was
their best option for economic survival. Each group with whom these combatants went on to fight with has, to varying degrees, committed serious human rights crimes against civilians, often on a widespread and systematic scale. The brutal armed conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire have resulted in tens of thousands of civilians being killed, raped or maimed.

[...] Aid organizations and United Nations officials working in Liberia say that hundreds of recently demobilized combatants, including children, have since at least November 2004 been re-recruited to fight in Côte d'Ivoire. The majority have, according to their reports, gone to fight alongside militias associated with the Ivorian government.

[...] Deterioration in the military-political situation in Côte d'Ivoire would likely be accompanied by human rights abuses on a massive scale, given the proliferation of militias and level of ethnic tension.

See also UN Office for West Africa, ‘Youth unemployment and regional insecurity in West Africa’, 31 December 2005

UN sanctions Ivorian leaders in wake of orchestrated anti-UN violence, February 2006

- In February 2006, the UN Security Council imposed sanctions on three key Ivorian political figures found to constitute a "threat to peace" in the country
- Two of the individuals were leaders of a pro-government youth militia, and the third a rebel leader
- Sanctions came after a wave of orchestrated anti-UN violence in January, which caused several deaths and widespread damage
- The violence resulted in the withdrawal of UN peacekeepers from the west and the evacuation of humanitarian agencies

IRIN, 8 February 2006

‘The United Nations’ Security Council has slapped a 12-month travel ban and assets freeze on three Cote d'Ivoire political figures it accuses of hampering efforts to bring peace to the divided West African nation.

A Security Council sanctions committee on Tuesday called on member states to ‘prevent the entry or transit’ and ‘freeze immediately the funds’ of the three who it said constituted ‘a threat to the peace and reconciliation process in Cote d'Ivoire.’

Those listed, according to a statement by the committee, are: Charles Ble Goude and Eugene Djue, leaders of the Young Patriots movement loyal to Cote d'Ivoire's President Laurent Gbagbo. Last month, the Young Patriots called supporters onto the streets to demand the departure of UN and French peacekeepers.

The third person is Martin Kouakou Fofie, a commander of the rebel New Forces movement, who was linked by the sanctions committee to human rights violations in the northern city of Korhogo.

Cote d'Ivoire split in two after a failed coup to oust Gbagbo in September 2002. The UN maintains a force of 7,000 blue helmets working alongside 4,000 French peacekeepers.

The UN decided to impose sanctions after hundreds of peacekeepers were forced to retreat as protesters set fire to UN vehicles and offices and ransacked compounds and humanitarian stores. Around 400 civilian staff have been temporarily evacuated and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan
has warned that Gbagbo and his military chief of staff will be held personally responsible for new disturbances.

The Sanctions Committee said in its statement on Tuesday that it ‘will continue to update the (sanctions) list on a regular basis.’

**IRIN, 18 January 2006**

“Five people were killed and hundreds of UN peacekeepers forced to abandon base on Wednesday as anti-UN protests swept government-held southern Cote d’Ivoire for a third straight day.

After repeated attacks on UN compounds, vehicles and offices, a UN official said civilian personnel were being concentrated in central locations. ‘The security of staff remains our primary concern,’ he said.

As angry protesters loyal to President Laurent Gbagbo took over state television and broadcast calls for mass anti-UN demonstrations in the street, Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo, who also heads the African Union, flew in to help defuse the sudden crisis shortly before nightfall.

The main city Abidjan was paralysed for the third straight day by road blocks thrown up by angry youths loyal to Gbagbo.

Cote d’Ivoire split into two more than three years ago and some 10,000 UN and French troops monitor the buffer zone between the government south and the north, which is under rebel control.

In the volatile western region near the Liberian border, hundreds of blue-helmets based in Guiglo and Duekoue were forced to retreat after young protesters invaded compounds and torched UN buildings bearing the distinctive blue flag.

In Guiglo, some 350 km from the main city Abidjan, Bangladeshi soldiers opened fire to repel youths who besieged their barracks overnight. Hours later, the 200-300 men redeployed taking UN civilian personnel with them.

At the local hospital, a doctor who declined to be named told IRIN by telephone that five people were killed and 10 injured from gunshot wounds.

UN officials in Abidjan said four attackers were killed. […]

UN peacekeepers operate under the so-called Chapter VII of the UN Charter enabling soldiers to defend themselves and the local population if they come under direct attack. […]

Youths loyal to President Gbagbo who belong to a movement known as the Young Patriots have been targeting UN facilities since international mediators overseeing a UN peace blueprint backed measures effectively reducing Gbagbo’s powers.

On Sunday, mediators in the ministerial-level International Working Group (IWG) said that parliament, which is packed with Gbagbo’s Ivorian Popular Front (FPI) party members, does not have a mandate.

Parliament’s mandate expired on 16 December and the IWG recommended the mandate not be renewed, effectively disbanding the assembly.
Gbagbo’s ruling FPI on Tuesday announced in protest that it was quitting the peace process and pulling out its seven members in a transitional government headed by Prime Minister Charles Konan Banny.

A spokesman for the New Forces rebel movement, Sidiki Konate, meanwhile warned that the country was on the edge of war and said the UN withdrawal from Guiglo and Duekoue meant local populations had been left with no protection.  

[...]  

At the UN base in Guiglo, as well as at the offices of the aid group Save The Children, looters made away with everything they could salvage.

Western Côte d’Ivoire saw some of the fiercest fighting in the early days of the September 2002 rebellion that split the world’s largest cocoa producing nation in two and brought into being the UN peacekeeping mission in April 2004. The volatile west has also often been the scene of ethnic strife.

Residents told IRIN that at the local radio station in the western town of Daloa, Young Patriots had demanded the station transmit pro-government propaganda. But when workers refused, the station was ransacked and looted.

Some 250 km away in Abidjan, makeshift barricades manned by young men brought activity to a standstill. While the number of Young Patriots roaming the streets was lower than during widely supported 2004 anti-French riots, all businesses were closed and most residents stayed at home.

At a hillside hotel transformed into UN headquarters, UN troops fired tear gas grenades and live bullets to warn off a crowd of protestors that has swollen from several hundred in the morning by over a 1,000 by the afternoon.

Nearly 500 youths meanwhile gathered outside the French military base, according to spokesman Jean-Luc Cotard. ‘So far they are not violent, they are chanting and dancing,’ he told IRIN.

But Young Patriots also massed outside the French Embassy in the lagoon-side business district of Plateau, Abidjan, blocking exits.  

[...]  

The group was especially vocal against France in violence in November 2004 when thousands of French nationals had to be evacuated from the country."

Cocoa trade has contributed to funding the armed conflict and fuel political instability, 2002-2010

- Cocoa trade has provided funding for the war effort.
- On the government side, cocoa institutions have contributed directly with both money and vehicles.
- The Forces Nouvelles have derived substantial financial support from the cocoa trade, notably through escort taxes and cocoa taxes. In February 2008, Global Witness found that the Forces Nouvelles kept perceiving tax revenues on both cocoa and diamonds through the delivery of laissez-passers and the establishment of check points.
- Cocoa continues to be smuggled from northern Côte d’Ivoire despite the Ouagadougou Agreement.
According to the World Bank, reforms in Ivory Coast’s cocoa sector are needed to improve the transparency of the finances. This involves clarifying the assets and liabilities of the organisations running the cocoa sector.

UN Group of Experts continues its investigations in order to assess the measures taken by the Government to improve transparency of cocoa revenues managed by the “Comité de gestion de la filière café-cacao”.

UN Security Council, 9 October 2009, paras. 211-214
"211. [E]conomic networks cut across the north-south political divide in Côte d’Ivoire. The basic structure of these networks, which operate like cartels, is similar for various agricultural and natural resource sectors of the country’s economy, including cocoa, coffee, timber, cotton, cashew nuts and vegetable oil.

212. To provide a detailed overview of one such network, this section of the report presents an analysis of the cocoa sector as an example. The cocoa trade is Côte d’Ivoire’s largest source of revenue (see para. 169 above). As such, the networks of private individuals, businesses and public officials involved in its exploitation and export have the capacity to convey funds to either the Government or the Forces nouvelles. The Group believes that they also have the capacity to exert great political influence in the country.

213. The trade in cocoa can be understood in terms of four hierarchical levels, extending from production to the sale of cocoa on international markets: farmers; trackers or small-scale middlemen ("pisteurs"); contractors or large-scale middlemen ("traitants"); and multinational cocoa importing companies.

214. These four levels in the cocoa trade are ostensibly governed by a regulatory authority, responsible for regulating production, issuing licences, setting prices, establishing quotas, defining the terms of trading and agreeing applicable taxes and rates for the sector. In the Government-controlled south, the organization formerly comprised the para-fiscal agencies of the Filière du café et du cacao. Since the beginning of the 2008/09 cocoa season, however, the Comité de gestion du café et du cacao (Coffee and Cocoa Management Committee) has been the regulatory authority in the south of Côte d’Ivoire. In the Forces nouvelles-controlled north, the regulatory responsibility lies with La Centrale."

Global Witness, 20 March 2008
"Une mission de Global Witness en Côte d’Ivoire en février 2008 a constaté que le groupe des rebelles des Forces Nouvelles (FN) continue de percevoir des taxes sur le cacao et les diamants, malgré le processus en cours de réunification du pays.

Global Witness a notamment constaté que les camions de cacao continuent d’être escortés vers le Burkina Faso par les FN. Ses enquêteurs ont également pu confirmer sur le terrain que les FN continuent de délivrer des laissez-passer pour circuler dans leur zone et de maintenir des barrages routiers, et à cette occasion, commettent fréquemment des abus des droits humains.

« Ce système parallèle et illégitime de taxes, de laissez-passer et de barrages institué par les FN ne fait que favoriser la corruption. C’est de fait une économie de guerre qui retarde la réunification du pays » affirme Patrick Alley, directeur de Global Witness."

Voice of America, 30 October 2007
"Robert Rensi, an Ivory Coast specialist at the European Union, says the story of cocoa sums up the stakes in the country's fitful conflict."
"The whole Ivorian crisis can be translated into a struggle among different forces and the exclusion of part of the population in accessing these resources," Rensi said. "Cocoa has created a land tenure problem, has created a false identity problem. But at the bottom of all this, there's a struggle for control of resources that traditionally have been managed in a non-transparent way.

Meanwhile, the London-based International Cocoa Organization says Ivory Coast's $1.4-billion cocoa industry is coasting on a booming world demand for chocolate. It says that demand is growing at about four percent a year."

Global Witness, June 2007, pp. 24, 33

"Cote d'Ivoire's national cocoa institutions, with the assent of the biggest exporters' union, have directly contributed to the war effort by providing the government with money, vehicles and weapons, using money from cocoa levies. These payments and gifts coincided with a period when some of the worst human rights violations by government forces took place. A World Bank official told Global Witness:"We know that the revenues collected from cocoa are used to fund the military". This is an obvious deviation from the cocoa institutions' official role, which is to regulate the cocoa trade and support cocoa farmers. Today, profits from the sector remain a potential "weapon of war" and little has been done to break the links between the cocoa trade and the armed conflict.

Three cocoa institutions have directly contributed at least 10.6bn CFA (US$20.3m) to the war effort: the Autorité de Régulation du Café et du Cacao (ARCC), the Bourse du Café et Cacao (BCC) - whose board included two representatives of the biggest exporters' union, the Groupement Professionnel des Exportateurs de Café-Cacao (GEPEX), ADM Cocoa SIFCA's general manager and the director of Daçi, at the time owned by French company Bolloré - and the Fonds de Développement et de Promotion des Activités des Producteurs de Café et de Cacao (FDPCC). They have also given vehicles to the Forces de Défense et de Sécurité (FDS, the national security forces). To do so, they used money from levies paid by cocoa exporters. Such initiatives and deviations from the official role of cocoa institutions were facilitated by the lack of transparency and absence of checks and balances in the cocoa sector.

Individuals within the Forces Nouvelles (FN) have enjoyed financial as well as political rewards as a result of the conflict and the country's partition. They have a vested interest in prolonging the crisis: once the country is reunited, they may lose their control over natural resources and financial assets. As a significant source of the FN's finances, the cocoa trade has effectively contributed to delaying a resolution of the crisis.

Cocoa is a substantial source of revenue for the FN. Global Witness estimates that since 2004, the FN have derived an average of around 15.1bn CFA (US$30m) per year from the cocoa trade. This figure was obtained by calculating the total of all the taxes and export agreements as well as the number of trucks taxed (about 3,250 trucks) for the estimated yearly cocoa production. According to FN estimate, annual cocoa production in the FN zone is 130,000 tonnes and is worth 104bn CFA (US$203m). This represents a tenth of Cote d'Ivoire's total production and up to 3.6% of world production. The FN was quick to seize the opportunity to start taxing cocoa.

Initially, from September 2002 onwards, FN troops and rebel commanders developed a survival strategy based on extortion. It was reported that during a single week in August 2003, the FN made 69m CFA (US$136,600) from sales of fuel and taxes on convoys. economic operators were made to pay "protection" taxes to travel in the FN-controlled zone. No truck could travel without an FN escort - usually attacks by bandits (coupeurs de route) and ease the way through the numerous FN checkpoints along the roads. This was later institutionalised as an "escort tax", costing 5,000 CFA (US$9.6) and paid to the escort.
At the end of 2002, in addition to the protection taxes, cocoa was subject to a tax of 50CFA (10 US cents) per kilogramme. The trucks were weighed on a weighbridge in Séguéla and the tax was paid to Séguéla's FN commander, Zakaria Koné. The weighing system in Séguéla was abandoned in early 2003 in favour of a standard payment of 2m CFA (US$3,870) per truck (which works out at approximately the same rate per kilogramme), paid at the start of the route, in Man or Vavoua."

REUTERS, 28 January 2010
"The World Bank urged Ivory Coast on Thursday to capitalise on a more stable post-war climate to reform its ailing cocoa sector, including slashing high taxes on farmers. World Bank President Robert Zoellick was addressing journalists on a trip to Ivory Coast's main commercial city of Abidjan, to support an electoral process aiming to end years of instability and limbo that followed a 2002-3 civil war.

"The country has made great progress after a terrible tragedy," he said. "But just as the World Bank has tried to help support the process of political reconciliation, we now want to use that for a basis for growth."

Instability and repeated delays to presidential polls originally scheduled for 2005 have dogged the country's efforts to retake its place as West Africa's economic hub.

Urgently needed reforms to the cocoa sector in the world's top grower, which supplies 40 percent of the world market, hinge on the polls. The sector is seen as riddled with graft and run by secretive, largely unaccountable agencies.

"We're working ... on trying to improve the performance of that system," Zoellick said.

"That involves audits to make sure one knows the transparency of the finances, it involves clarifying the assets and liabilities of those organisations."

He urged the government to cut taxes on cocoa growers.

"Taxes have been very high on farmers and this has led to underinvestment in new plants. If you get the incentives right you can improve productivity," Zoellick said.

"The cocoa sector ... already employs some 4 million people in the country ... We think it can do better.""

UN Security Council, 9 April 2010, para. 46

"46. First, the Group [of Experts] continues to assess measures that the Government of Côte d'Ivoire has reportedly enacted to improve the transparency of cocoa revenues administered by the Comité de gestion de la filière café-cacao (see S/2009/521, para. 229). In particular, the Group is conducting investigations following reports of extra budgetary expenditures of around US$ 7 million on machinery parts.

See also BICC's "Conflict diamonds and peace process in Cote d'Ivoire" for an account of the role of diamonds in the path to peace.

Conflict diamond phenomenon persists in Côte d'Ivoire (2010)

- Despite the embargo imposed on the export of Ivorian diamonds in by UN Security Council's resolution 1643 (2005) and renewed by resolution 1893 (2009), illicit diamonds continue to flow into the formal trade

- Evidence shows that there is growing mining activity in Forces Nouvelles areas

- The absence of a central authority capable of regulating the extraction and trade of diamonds poses a challenge to the effective implementation of the embargo

- The climate of nor peace nor war contributes to the little international attention given to the phenomenon
"Officially, Côte d’Ivoire remains the only country where the conflict diamond phenomenon continues to exist. Despite a 2005 UN embargo, illicit Ivorian diamonds continue to flow into the formal trade. Continued diamond mining by rebel forces was reconfirmed in 2008 by a joint mission of experts from the United Nations and the Kimberley Process. A year later, satellite photographs provided by the expert group shows that diamond mining seems to have had a rapid growth in some areas. Although the value of contraband Ivorian diamonds is currently estimated at US$25 million annually, it could grow if no measures are taken to remedy the problem.

According to the expert group, the mining is well organized. Although it is artisanal in nature, the photos show that there has been considerable investment in modernizing some of the sites, and in some places, industrial equipment is being used. This underlines two important problems. The first is that there is growing production in areas controlled by the rebel Forces Nouvelles. The second, following from the first, is that these sanctioned Ivorian diamonds are finding an international market."

UN Security Council, 9 April 2010, paras. 57-61

"57. Ongoing diamond mining in northern Côte d’Ivoire, specifically in Séguéla and Tortiya, provides the impetus for exports of Ivorian rough diamonds in violation of the sanctions regime.
58. While the Forces nouvelles zone commanders responsible for each mining area monitor mining very closely, they are unwilling to prevent violations of the embargo. Government authorities, including representatives of the Ministry of Mines, are powerless in this respect.
59. Neighbouring States, specifically Burkina Faso, Guinea, Liberia and Mali, likewise are either unable or unwilling to monitor and enforce the embargo import of Ivorian rough diamonds. Côte d’Ivoire’s neighbours justify their inability to comply with resolution 1893 (2009) by citing a lack of resources. The Group acknowledges these problems, but notes a lack of political will in most cases.
60. Authorities in neighbouring Member States claim that international diamond centres are equipped and resourced to comply with the sanctions regime. Member States with international diamond trading centres, by contrast, expect Côte d’Ivoire’s neighbours to control the inflow of Ivorian diamonds onto international markets. In this regard, the Group notes that resolution 1893 (2009) calls on all Member States, equally, to prevent the importation of rough diamonds from Côte d’Ivoire, regardless of whether these diamonds enter their territories directly or indirectly.
61. The Group asserts that the majority of Member States are not taking the necessary measures to curtail ongoing violations of paragraph 1 of resolution 1893 (2009), by which the Security Council renewed the diamond embargo.

A. Diamond mining in Séguéla
62. Diamond mining continues to be the main economic activity in Séguéla. The rough diamond industry in Séguéla is scarcely affected by the sanctions regime. Extensive diamond mining continues at the primary diamond deposit sites of Bobi, Diarabana, Forona and neighbouring areas. The Group maintains that diamonds from these sites must be entering international markets because there is no domestic stockpiling of Ivorian diamonds.
63. The Group conducted field research in Séguéla and visited the Bobi and Diarabana dykes. The Group also met diamond buyers at Séguéla’s diamond buying office, the Bureau d’Achat.
64. During its visit to the Diarabana dyke, the Group noticed that the mined area had expanded significantly (see annex II) since the visit of the previous Group of Experts in August 2009 (see S/2009/521, para. 270). Diamond mining at Diarabana is artisanal and labour-intensive. However, mining is generally systematic and, despite some alluvial mining at the periphery, it is largely focused on higher yield primary deposits.
65. Likewise, the mined area of the Bobi dyke has also expanded since the last visit by a Group of Experts in August 2009. The mining area is now larger and miners focus their efforts on extracting diamonds from primary, rather than alluvial, deposits."
66. The newly exploited primary diamond deposits in Séguéla have significantly increased Côte d’Ivoire’s diamond production. For example, the Kimberley Process Working Group of Diamond Experts estimates that just three of the newly found primary deposits are responsible for as much as a 50 per cent increase in Côte d’Ivoire’s production of rough diamonds (see annex III). Moreover, the Group has identified a further eight exploited primary sites whose yield is yet to be accounted for.”

For the latest renewal of the diamond trade ban in Côte d’Ivoire, see UN Security Council’s Resolution 1893 (2009) renewing the measures imposed by paragraph 6 of resolution 1643 (2005)

Violence and xenophobia on the rise ahead of the elections (2010)

- Politically motivated violence declined in 2009, but escalated again in 2010 over the question of the electoral list.
- In February 2010, violent demonstrations took place in different cities after President Gbagbo dissolved the government and the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) because of disputes over the electoral roll.
- The main reason behind the February violence is reportedly linked to the effect that removing large numbers of people from the provisional electoral lists would have on their ability to exercise their Ivorian nationality.
- With the help of Blaise Compaoré, Ivorian parties arrived at a consensus on a new composition for both the IEC and the government. The new IEC president is a member of the opposition and 11 out of the total of 27 seats in the government were given to the opposition. This consensus put a halt to the protest and violence.

Human Rights Watch, January 2010

“Politically motivated violence by pro-government groups, such as the Young Patriots and the Student Federation of Côte d’Ivoire (FESCI), declined compared to previous years, but continued impunity for violent crimes fuels fears of unrestrained intimidation and violence at the time of elections. The voter registration process was on several occasions disrupted by attacks, particularly in the west, in which armed men intimidated those standing in line at registration centers, or confiscated briefcases of registration papers.

Members of FESCI and other pro-government groups continue to enjoy impunity for common acts of racketeering, vandalism, and intimidation of perceived opponents. Dozens of armed FESCI members gathered in January to launch an assault on a rival student union, and in August several hundred FESCI members caused property damage and threatened the mayor of an Abidjan suburb.

Media outlets allied to either the government or rebel forces on occasion published provocations to intolerance and violence, but the overall prevalence of hate speech was significantly lower than during the worst years of the crisis.”

ISS, July 2010

“There has also been an escalation in xenophobic rhetoric and hate speeches in the country. The increasing militancy of youth groups as well as reports that all sides are rearming has made an already volatile security situation even more tense.

[...] In the context of the impasse over the electoral process, the country has also witnessed the problematic trend of resurgence in the divisive issue of national identity. Some political actors have argued that those whose identity and hence eligibility has been questioned are all from the North of Côte d’Ivoire. The use of the concept of Ivoirite, which played a role in igniting the civil
war, has also resurfaced in political discourse. There has also been a rise in xenophobic rhetoric from some political elites and particularly the youth group in Abidjan supporting the president. By drawing members of different communities further into the political tension, this undermines the conditions for conducting the electoral process and entrenches the fears and suspicion between them.”

Amnesty International, 25 February 2010

"Amnesty International said it is concerned at the resurgence of electoral violence and xenophobia in Côte d'Ivoire, as supporters of the country's president call for tens of thousands of "foreigners" to be excluded from the electoral roll. Opposition parties have denounced calls by supporters of President Laurent Gbagbo to exclude people suspected of being foreign nationals because they bear Muslim family names. President Gbagbo's supporters meanwhile have condemned what they say are fraudulent attempts to add to the electoral roll over 400,000 people whose nationality has not been verified.

"It is essential to put an end to this xenophobic discourse," said Véronique Aubert, deputy director of Amnesty International's Africa programme. "It is incumbent on the Head of State to clearly indicate that this incitement to hatred, denounced time and time again by the United Nations, will not be tolerated."

[...] On 3 February, several thousand protesters took part in marches in the town of Divo, 200km from the economic capital city Abidjan, in an attempt to prevent judges removing them from the electoral roll.

The security forces opened fire on the demonstrators to disperse them, leaving eight wounded, including several with bullet wounds.”

IRIN, 3 March 2010

"After weeks of protests, some which turned deadly, the opposition has joined a new government and called off any further demonstrations. Ivorians took to the streets following the latest delay in legislative and presidential elections, scheduled to take place in March after six postponements in five years. On 12 February Laurent Gbagbo dissolved government and the Independent Electoral Commission; in response, opposition party leaders stopped recognizing President Gbagbo as head of state. Disputes over the electoral roll – and who is or is not a true Ivorian and thus eligible to vote – continue, creating an increasingly xenophobic and violent atmosphere across the country, according to rights watchdog Amnesty International.


"Many interlocutors stressed that the violent protests in February were not about the dissolution of the Government and the Electoral Commission but against attempts to arbitrarily remove large numbers of people from the provisional voters list, which would have deprived them of Ivorian citizenship."

ONUCI, 26 August 2010, paras. 2-5-6

"2. Les manifestations les plus violentes se sont déroulées à Abidjan, Abouakouassikro (village situé à six km de Yamoussoukro), Bondoukou, Bouaké, Daloa, Divo, Duékoué, Gagnoa, Katiola, Korhogo, Man et Tiébissou (cf. Annexe 1). L'enquête menée par l'ONUCI a révélé que, face aux manifestants, majoritairement des jeunes dont certains étaient armés de pierres, de lance-pierres et de gourdins, les éléments des FDS ont fait usage de la force mortelle à Abidjan, Daloa, Divo et Gagnoa, en violation des Principes de base sur le recours à la force et l'utilisation des armes à feu par les responsables de l'application des lois adoptés en la matière par les Nations Unies.

5. La responsabilité des partis politiques dans ces événements ne fait aucun doute. En effet, certains cadres du Front populaire ivoirien (FPI) ont pris une part active aussi bien par leur discours que par les informations fournies par eux qui ont alimenté les nombreuses demandes de
radiation de la liste électorale provisoire en début de mois. Quant au RHDP, il a invité ses partisans à protester « avec tous les moyens » contre la « dictature de Laurent Gbagbo ».

6. Les enquêtes menées par l’ONUCI ont établi que près de 44.000 personnes ont participé aux 37 manifestations qui se sont déroulées sur l’ensemble du territoire national à la suite de l’appel du RHDP. Vingt-cinq de ces manifestations se sont déroulées pacifiquement tandis que 12 ont été émaillées de violences. Dans certains cas, des mineurs ont pris part à ces manifestations, le plus souvent de façon spontanée. À Bongouanou, Didiévi, Guiglo et Odienné, des élèves ont été contraints de quitter leurs salles de classe pour prendre part à ces manifestations."

**Peace efforts**

**Summary of peace efforts, 2003 - 2005**

- There have been four major sets of peace accords aimed at settling the political grievances behind the conflict: Linas-Marcoussis, Accra, Pretoria and Ouagadougou.
- The first three, signed between 2003 and 2005, have reportedly failed mostly because of the lack of political will of the Ivorian actors behind them.
- The Linas-Marcoussis Accords, signed in January 2003, were based on a power-sharing formula and saw the involvement of France as mediating power. Concluded in record time, the Accords allegedly suffered from a lack of realism, although they included important conditions for sustainable peace.
- The Accra and Pretoria agreements did not add any major changes to the previous one. The most important change with the Pretoria peace talks was the exclusion of minor political Ivorian actors. Once the preconditions for the presidential elections were once more not fulfilled, the peace process derailed once again.

**Conciliation Resources, 2008**

"The international interventions that ensued [the 2002 crisis] fall into a number of categories: the mediation of peace accords; UN Security Council resolutions; arms embargo, travel ban and assets freeze sanctions; investigations of alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity; and the threat of further investigations, including by the International Criminal Court (ICC). Each has been used or threatened at different points in the conflict to bring the conflict protagonists into line with international humanitarian norms or to seek a political resolution to the conflict. As far as the design interventions were strategic or complementary, they formed part of an improvised strategy, but one built on the close attention paid to developments by, in particular, France, the Security Council and ECOWAS.

There have been four major sets of peace accords that aimed at disarming the rebels and redeploying the apparatus of the state in the north, while settling the political grievances said to be behind the conflict, such as the feeling of political exclusion of 'northern' Muslims at both the popular and elite levels. Starting with the French-mediated Linas-Marcoussis Accords of January 2003 (signed just four months after the outbreak of the war), these issues and several others were ostensibly settled by all parties, and their implementation was to be overseen by a government of national unity incorporating representatives of the rebels as well as those political parties that had been excluded from the 2000 elections.

[...]

Subsequent accords mediated under the auspices of the AU and ECOWAS in Accra, Pretoria, and Ouagadougou have each been hailed as the possible solution to the country's underlying problems, though the solutions proposed in each case have been roughly the same: disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of rebel forces; reunification of the national
territory; and identification of those without papers or whose identity had otherwise been called into question. As the existence of armed pro-Gbagbo militias became widely reported, then acknowledged by the government, their dismantling became a further condition of the accords, and after president Gbagbo's constitutional mandate ended in October 2005, transparent elections became the proposed endpoint of this process. [...]

There are several explanations for the failure of these accords, underpinned by the fact that major political actors agreed to them in bad faith in order to give themselves political room for manoeuvre and time to regroup and re-arm themselves. At the insistence of France and in consultation with ECOWAS and the AU, the Security Council has addressed this perception of bad faith in a number of ways. Resolutions 1633 and 1721 attempted to settle questions surrounding Gbagbo's constitutional mandate, whose term ended on 30 October 2005, which the opposition claimed rendered him illegitimate. Gbagbo's supporters claimed that he was entitled to serve indefinitely because of the exceptional circumstances of war and de facto partition of the country. The Security Council attempted to grant a one-time-only extension of one year, simultaneously diminishing the president's powers and transferring them to a new, more powerful Prime Minister."

*Linas-Marcoussis Accords*

**CASIN, August 2003, pp.36-38**


France has faced intense criticism for its role in brokering the peace accords. There is much speculation that the peace agreement was forced upon Gbagbo and the FPI [Front Populaire Ivoirien], especially since under the new governmental regulations, France will be able to maintain the status quo and continue to benefit from its investments and companies in Côte d'Ivoire. The Foreign Minister, Dominique de Villepin, actively advocated the peace negotiations. Though mediators in peace negotiations do not always have to be neutral figures, in this instance a more neutral figure may have been valuable. [...] During peace talks on Côte d'Ivoire, accusations of French bias were quick to emerge. In fact, on 20 January 2003, one member of the round table left the negotiations, accusing France of trying to conduct a "constitutional coup d'état." If the French have been described as “driving” the peace process, it is very likely that they had the end destination clearly in mind.

The weeks following the signing of the peace accords demonstrate that while the main players did sign the document, not all of them signed it in good faith. After signing the accords in Paris at a Special Heads of State Summit following the negotiation process, Gbagbo returned to Côte d'Ivoire and stated publicly that the accords are merely “proposals,” in spite of his professed support for the agreement. Gbagbo’s army refused to accept the accords because of the rebels’ new role in the government, and called the agreement a “national humiliation.” [...]

There were two aspects of the Marcoussis Accords that sparked protest and rebellion in Côte d'Ivoire: the composition of the Government of National Reconciliation and the choice of prime minister. In both instances, Gbagbo’s supporters were the primary dissenters. They —particularly the armed forces— assert that too many concessions were made to the rebels and that they hold too much power in the new government, notably positions in the defense and interior ministries. [...] Another problematic aspect of the peace accords is their reliance on power sharing, a concept that is both applauded and criticized by professionals in the field of conflict resolution. In theory, power sharing is an appealing and logical solution to end a conflict in which several parties are
vying for power. Yet, as one scholar writes, “power sharing has obvious problems: power-sharing agreements are difficult to arrive at, even more difficult to implement, and even when implemented, such agreements rarely stand the test of time.”

GIGA, July 2008, p.26
"The [Linas-Marcoussis] peace plan was put on the table and pushed through in about eight days. As good as the intentions may have been, it was rushed on the Ivorian actors. It lists important conditions for sustainable peace, such as the revision of eligibility rules and the revision of land ownership, but the "implementation rules", that is, the concrete power-sharing formula for a government of national reconciliation in the following meeting, were not realistic at all."

Accra and Pretoria Agreements
GIGA, July 2008, pp.24-25
"A short look at the interim agreements of Accra, July 30, 2004 (in the name of ECOWAS), as well as those of South Africa's President Thabo Mbeki in the name of the African Union (Pretoria I+II, April 6 and June, 29, 2005) should be added. Thirteen heads of state (and the UN Secretary General) participated in the Accra summit. It set specific deadlines to strengthen the dynamics of the peace process. No major change of the preceding agreements could be recorded. Gbagbo was urged to give the prime minister more prerogatives. Shortly afterwards Gbagbo reinstalled three opposition ministers of a reconciliation government he had suspended only in May (one of them being Soro). The calendar of reforms and of the disarmament process was equally revised at Accra. In November a severe crisis of the peace process erupted after attacks by the Ivorian army not only on rebel positions but also on a French military camp in Bouaké. [...] The government of reconciliation continued to exist with rebel ministries mostly absent for security reasons.

The two Pretoria summits in 2005 saw the participation of Gbagbo, Soro, Ouattara, Bédié and Diarra. This meant that minor political parties were no longer part of the game. The most important aspect concerned details of article 35 of the Ivorian Constitution concerning eligibility. Mbeki had found a way to avoid a constitutional referendum by interpreting article 48 of the Ivorian Constitution (exceptional rights of the president) as an instrument for Gbagbo to authorize the candidatures of personalities that would be presented by those who have signed the agreement of Linas-Marcoussis (after consultation with president of the National Assembly and the Constitutional Court). This looked like an apt juridical way out of the deadlock that Gbagbo's stress of constitutionality had created. However, new confrontations of a smaller scale took place even then, and neither the disarmament of the rebels and of pro-government militias nor other preconditions for elections were fulfilled in time to allow them to take place in this year. The South-African mediation lost credibility when the calendar of the peace process could not be kept."

UN peacekeeping mission established in Côte d'Ivoire, 2004-2010

- UN Security Council establishes 6,240-strong Chapter VII peacekeeping mission (UNOCI), for an initial period of 12 months from 4 April 2004
- UNOCI's mandate includes assistance in disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration, repatriation and resettlement, identification of the population, monitoring the arms embargo, support for the organization of open, free, fair and transparent polls and support for humanitarian assistance
- UNOCI's mandate was extended until 31 December 2010 and modified in order to support the parties to implement the Ouagadougou Political Agreement more effectively
UN Security Council, 27 February 2004

“The Security Council this morning, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, established the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) for an initial period of 12 months, from 4 April.

Unanimously adopting resolution 1528 (2004), the Council also requested the Secretary-General to transfer authority from the United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (MINUCI) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) forces to UNOCI on that date, and decided, therefore, to renew MINUCI's mandate until 4 April.

The Council also decided to renew until 4 April the authorization given to the French forces and ECOWAS forces through its resolution 1527, as well as authorized the French forces to use all necessary means to support UNOCI in accordance with the agreement to be reached between UNOCI and the French authorities.

Comprising a military strength of a maximum of 6,240 United Nations personnel, UNOCI's mandate, in coordination with the French forces, will include observing and monitoring the implementation of the comprehensive ceasefire agreement of 3 May 2003 and movements of armed groups; assistance in disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation and resettlement; protection of United Nations personnel, institutions and civilians; support for humanitarian assistance, implementation of the peace process; and assistance in the field of human rights, public information and law and order.”

UN Security Council, 30 June 2010

“16. Decides that, in order to support the parties to implement the Ouagadougou Political Agreement more effectively, UNOCI shall have the following mandate from the date of adoption of this resolution until 31 December 2010:

Contributing to the consolidation of the stability of the country
(a) Monitoring the armed groups
[...]
(b) Protection of civilians
[...]
(c) Monitoring of the arms embargo
[...]
(d) Public information
[...]
(e) Assistance in the field of human rights
[...]
(f) Support for humanitarian assistance
[...]

Contributing to the electoral process and to the identification of the population
(g) Support for the organization of open, free, fair and transparent elections
[...]
(h) Operations of identification of the population
[...]

Contributing to the other remaining tasks of the peace process
(i) Disarmament, demobilization, storage of weapons and reintegration of former combatants of the two parties and members of militias

41
(j) Support to redeployment of Ivorian state administration and Justice throughout the country

(k) Reform of the security sector

Other tasks

(l) Facilitation

(m) Protection of United Nations personnel

17. Authorizes UNOCI to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate, within its capabilities and its areas of deployment;

18. Calls upon all parties to cooperate fully in the operations of UNOCI and of the French forces which support it, in particular by guaranteeing their safety, security and freedom of movement with unhindered and immediate access, as well as associated personnel, throughout the territory of Côte d’Ivoire, to enable them to fully carry out their mandates;

19. Decides that UNOCI will comprise a maximum of 7392 authorized military personnel, maintaining the current combined total authorized strength at 8650 personnel, including a maximum of 7200 troops and staff officers and 192 military observers, and a maximum of 1250 police personnel and 8 seconded customs officers;

20. Expresses its intention to consider raising for a limited period of time, prior to and after the elections, the level of authorized military and police personnel up to a total of no more than 500 additional personnel, and requests the Secretary-General in this regard to continue to update it on his technical analysis in a timely manner for its consideration;

21. Welcomes the intention expressed by the Secretary-General in paragraphs 97 and 99 of his report S/2010/245 to reconfigure UNOCI to increase its presence in the identified high risk areas and to strengthen the capabilities of its force reserve;

28. Requests the Secretary-General to inform it of the publication of the final voters list and to provide to it a midterm report no later than 22 October 2010 and a full report no later than 30 November 2010 on the situation on the ground, the implementation of this resolution, and on the revised benchmarks referred to in paragraph 26 above and which includes possible adjustments in UNOCI’s structure and strength and requests further the Secretary-General to submit to it recommendations in this regard as appropriate;

30. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

The peace process moves forward thanks to home-grown agreement, March–April 2007

- On March 4, the Government of Côte d’Ivoire and the New Forces (Forces Nouvelles) sign a peace agreement reaffirming the necessity to build peace and stability in the country
- The parties recognize the need for the identification of the population and the registration of voters in view of the presidential elections
- The peace agreement envisages the early formation of a new government, the elimination of the "confidence zone," the eventual departure of foreign troops, and the future reunification of the government and rebel armies

United Nations Security Council, 8 March 2007, para. 17
"On 4 March, President Gbagbo and Mr. Soro signed the new agreement in Ouagadougou, under the facilitation of President Compaoré. The agreement builds upon Security Council resolution 1721 (2006) and previous peace agreements. It addresses key issues that had blocked the implementation of the identification of the population, the disarmament process, the restructuring of the armed forces, the restoration of State authority throughout the country and the preparation of the voters list. The agreement also envisages new institutional arrangements, which are expected to be agreed upon within a month. An annex to the agreement sets out an implementation schedule, which envisages the completion of the key process within a period of ten months. The parties requested the facilitator to submit the agreement to the Security Council, through the African Union, for endorsement."

_GIGA, July 2008, pp.26-27_

"The Agreement of Ouagadougou was signed by Gbagbo and Solro after a month of intense negotiations (and a still longer preparation) in what was called "direct dialogue". The mediator, Blaise Compaoré, president of Burkina Faso, himself the third signatory, is an "insider" in contrast to the mediators of all preceding agreements. He was very close to the rebels (supporting them even militarily in the first place), but gradually became aware of the nefarious effects of the Ivorian crisis to his country. A so-called "permanent concertation framework" consisting of these three persons, but also Bédié and Ouattara, is the other new element that gives all main players a function - and to nobody else (although the latter can be seen as losers of the agreement - they could not even sign). The content of the agreement is rather specific and gives clear indications on two bones of contention: the issuing of identity papers (crucial for voter registration) and the creation of a unified army. On short notice an integrated command center was put into place, an important step to create trust. The signatories at least verbally cared about ongoing local security problems in the confidence zone where impartial forces (UN peacekeepers and French Licorne mission) were not able to stop massive violence by roadblockers. On the other hand, reports by Western NGOs hinted at new attacks after the dismantling of the confidence zone.

Soro was appointed prime minister shortly after the agreement and presented a new government. [...] An assassination attempt against Soro's plane at the airport in Korhogo on June 29, 2007 came as a shock and was attributed to different potential spoilers of the peace process. Soro remained unharmed but four persons of his entourage were killed. It did not change the power-sharing arrangement."

See also, the Government of Côte d'Ivoire, "Accord Politique de Ouagadougou" for the full text of the Peace Accord.

_A report by the International Crisis Group (ICG) of 27 June 2007 provides an analysis of the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement and more background information to its signing._

**Progress in the implementation of the Ouagadougou Agreement, April 2007-December 2010**

- Given initial delays and the impossibility of abiding by the deadlines set in the Ougadougou Agreement, four supplementary agreements were signed between November 2007 and December 2008 providing a new timeline
- UNOCI dismantled the last observation post along the green line on 30 July 2008. On this date, the green line, which had replaced the zone of confidence, officially ceased to exist
- The integrated command centre was installed in its new headquarters in December 2007. In 2009, some progress was achieved thanks to a decree assigning military ranks to some 400
• The disarmament process of government and rebel troops started on December 22, 2007. As of May 2010, the programme was not yet completed. The lack of funding to pay both rebel and militia members continued to remain a big challenge. As a consequence of the integrated command centre’s limited capacity, ONUCI has supported the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme. 1’000 microprojects were implemented by the UN in order to provide reintegration opportunities for former combatants.

• After violence erupted in February 2010, the ruling party has insisted that the disarmament and the reunification of the country take place before the elections. ONUCI’s efforts are therefore focusing on elections and disarmament/reunification.

• Substantial progress with the redeployment of the State administration was achieved although the Forces Nouvelles continued to retain almost full authority in their areas of responsibility especially with regard to tax collection and customs. Delays in re-establishing the judicial system and the police presence in the north of the country have also contributed to hamper the work of redeployed state officials.

• In February 2010, the city of Man experienced violent protest during which the tribunal was ransacked and official documents and computers were stolen, causing another shutdown of the tribunal.

• Mobile court operations for the issuing of legal documents ended officially on 15 May 2008 although supplementary operations were sent in August to areas not sufficiently covered in previous efforts. The identification and voter registration process ended on 30 June 2009. The period for contesting voter lists was extended to January 2010 as fewer than half of the contested cases were processed. Of the six million voters registered, about 1 million were contested. In January 2010, a controversy over the existence of a parallel list of 429’000 persons established by the IEC president ended with the dissolution of the IEC and the government by President Gbagbo and violent protests across the country. On 2 September, the new IEC produced the final list of voters. According to analysts, the list does not differ much from the one which had been rejected by President Gbagbo in 2009.

• The elections that were to be held first on 30 November 2008 and then on 29 November 2009 were once again postponed. Elections are now scheduled for 31 October 2010.


12. The original schedule for the implementation of the Ouagadougou Agreement had envisaged that all tasks set out in the Agreement would have been completed by 4 January 2008. The implementation process, however, has been delayed by a mix of factors, including underestimation by the parties of the time required to implement some complex tasks; lack of capacity on the part of the national implementing institutions; logistical and other resource constraints; and differences that emerged among the parties on the practical modalities for the implementation of the most sensitive tasks, such as the identification operations. The lack of political will has also contributed significantly to the delays.

13. Despite these delays and the frustration with the current impasse, all stakeholders recognized that the Ouagadougou agreements have achieved more progress towards resolving the Ivorian crisis than any of the preceding peace agreements. On the basis of the sustained stability in the country throughout 2007 and 2008, and the confidence that the Ouagadougou agreements had developed among the main Ivorian stakeholders, the parties had reached an understanding to conduct the first round of the presidential election on 30 November 2008, indicating their conviction that elections could be held before disarmament and reunification of the country. However, as indicated in paragraph 6 above, following the violent incidents of February 2010, President Gbagbo and the ruling party are now insisting on disarmament and the reunification of
the country before the elections. Consequently, the efforts to move the peace process forward and complete the implementation of the Ouagadougou agreements are now focusing on two central issues, namely, (1) elections; and (2) disarmament and reunification — which consists of the restoration of State authority with centralization of the treasury, disarmament and integration of Forces nouvelles personnel in the military, gendarmerie and police, as well as the reintegration and dismantling of militias. Many interlocutors, including the Facilitator, advised that the issues surrounding these two processes, which are explained below, must be tackled concomitantly in order to remove any pretexts by any of the parties for not carrying out their obligations.”

**African Union, 28 June 2010, paras. 9-10**

“9. It is noteworthy that 14 of the 20 candidates for the presidential election were retained by the Constitutional Council which published the list on 20 November 2009. The candidates so retained include three key players in the ivorian political arena, namely: President Laurent Gbagbo, Mr. Henri Konan Bédié and Mr. Alassane Dramane Ouattara.

10. On 9 January 2010, the Office of the President of the Republic accused the IEC and its Chairman of manipulating the voters’ register by producing a record of 429,000 persons for inclusion, officially, on the final voters’ register. There followed a period of trial of strength between the IEC Chairman (supported by RHDP) and the presidential camp resulting in the dissolution of the IEC and of the Government on 12 February 2010. Subsequently, the Ivorian parties, with the help of the Facilitator, on 25 February 2010, reached a consensus to reappoint an IEC in accordance with the Pretoria Agreement, but chaired by new personalities, and set up a new government.”

**African Press Agency, 12 August 2010**

“The Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) Commission on Thursday welcomed the decision made by the Ivorian authorities to hold the long-delayed national elections in October 2010 in that country.[…]

“Council paid tribute to the President, the Prime Minister and all the Ivorian stakeholders, including the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) for living up to their commitment to hold elections in 2010 and particularly noted the progress made in the process of exit from the crisis, in particular, the arrangements made, on a consensual basis, for fixing the date of the presidential election to 31 October 2010,” said the PSC statement.

Council also requested the Electoral Commission to publish, as soon as possible, the calendar of all activities leading to the presidential election and urged the government, the political class and all concerned Ivorian parties to make every effort to ensure compliance with the deadline.”

**United Nations Security Council, 8 April 2009, paras. 3-4**

“The Group [of Experts] notes that, while the political situation in Cote d'Ivoire remains relatively peaceful, it would be incorrect to interpret this as a sign of progress towards a peaceful resolution of the crisis. In the north of the country, quasi-privat militias maintain control over natural resources and continue to extract rents from local businesses and the civilian population. Like all such quasi-State economies, that of northern Cote d'Ivoire depends on the availability of foreign markets for the export of natural resources and on relations with foreign suppliers for the importation of strategic goods, including fuel, vehicles and weapons. The economic networks that operate in the north of Cote d'Ivoire extend both north and south. The Group is of the view that economic stakeholders resident in neighbouring States, and in the Government-controlled south of Cote d'Ivoire, benefit from the status quo.

The Group believes that several years of north-south polarization have introduced new political and economic tensions into the crisis. The north of the country is fractured into a series of politico-military commands, which compete (sometimes violently) for control over natural resources and commerce. Should the political situation in the country deteriorate, and the economic interests of some parties be threatened by such events, the Group cannot exclude a situation in which armed violence may escalate rapidly, particularly in the north. Despite the arms
embargo, the parties to the conflict remain sufficiently heavily armed to engage in sustained armed hostilities and some are rearming. In the months ahead, some parties will further entrench their control over the territory and economic resources of northern Côte d'Ivoire - thereby raising the stakes of any future political settlement."

**UN Security Council, 9 April 2010, para. 3-5**

"3. The Group [of Experts] believes that the political assessment provided by the previous Group of Experts (see S/2009/521, paras. 26-44) remains a valid evaluation of the impediments to Côte d'Ivoire’s recovery from crisis.

4. Political tensions escalated following the dissolution on 12 February 2010, by President Laurent Gbagbo, of the Government of Côte d'Ivoire and the Independent Electoral Commission. Despite these heightened tensions, which resulted in riots and deaths, the Group believes that the underlying reasons for the political deadlock remain the same.

5. Put simply, political leaders in the north and the south appear unwilling to reunite the country because they benefit, politically and economically, from a divided country. These are advantages that might be lost in the event of free and fair elections."

**Establishment of the integrated command centre**

**United Nations Security Council, 8 January 2009, paras. 7-8**

"The Ouagadougou Agreement and its supplementary agreements tasked the integrated command centre to police the former zone of confidence and secure the peace process, including the redeployment of State administration throughout the country. The Agreement also tasked the integrated command centre with the responsibility of unifying and restructuring the defence and security forces of Côte d’Ivoire, including by setting up mixed police units. While the mixed police units have been deployed by the integrated command centre into the area formerly covered by the zone of confidence, the unification of the national defence and security forces and the Forces nouvelles remained stalled until the signature of the fourth supplementary agreement on 22 December, mainly owing to continued disagreement on the ranks and numbers of the Forces nouvelles personnel to be integrated into the new national army. Under the fourth supplementary agreement, 4,000 Forces nouvelles personnel are expected to immediately, but temporarily, join the Ivorian police and gendarmerie to provide security during the electoral process, while 5,000 Forces nouvelles elements are expected to join the unified army within the next two years. UNOCI and the Licorne force continued to maintain a support capacity within the integrated command centre, comprised of military, police and civilian personnel, to provide logistical support and assist the centre in its planning and coordination activities."

**United Nations Security Council, 29 September 2009, paras. 8-9**

"On 19 August, Mr. Amani N’Guessan, the Minister of Defence of Côte d’Ivoire, announced that a committee had been established to resolve the impasse on the issue of rank harmonization and allow for the adoption of a presidential decree on the matter. However, discussions on this issue are still ongoing among the parties.

[...]

Following a request from the Minister of Defence, UNOCI provided support to the Integrated Command Centre in the form of bedding and accommodation equipment to facilitate the cantonment operations and the deployment of the mixed brigades."

**MISNA, 18 November 2009**

"Ivory Coast's President Laurent Gbagbo signed a decree assigning military ranks to former rebels of the New Forces who fought against the government in a 2002 failed coup. "This concerns about 400 people, from the lowest grade of corporal to the grade of general", said Defence Minister Michel Amani N’Guessan, adding that the move was “a big step towards peace”. Gbagbo signed the decree in Mankono, north-west of the capital, on the first day of a visit to the Worodougou region, controlled by the New Forces since 2002. The President was
accompanied on the visit by Prime Minister Guillaume Soro, former rebel leader, and the military chief of general staff, General Philippe Mangou. The assignment of ranks is based on a principle of “harmonising” the former fighters with those of the loyalist army, under a peace accord signed last December in Ouagadougou (‘Ouaga IV’) that foresees the fusion of the forces into an 8,000-strong Integrated Central Command (CCI)."


"56. The limited capacity of the Integrated Command Centre remains a serious issue of concern. As at April 2010, only 1,053 (726 Ivorian defence and security forces and 327 Forces nouvelles personnel) out of the stipulated 8,000 had been assigned to the Centre’s mixed gendarmerie brigades and police units. Of the 23 planned mixed brigades, only 11 have been established. The Forces nouvelles have requested assistance to support their elements in the mixed units, noting that whereas the defence and security forces receive a salary, the Forces nouvelles mixed brigade members do not. Several interlocutors also raised the need to properly equip the Integrated Command Centre and the mixed units, especially in logistical, communications and non-lethal crowd control equipment, which would require the Security Council to consider making an exemption to the arms embargo to import riot control gear, including side arms."

Deployment of mixed units and the gradual lifting of the green line

Reuters, 30 April 2007

"Once sworn foes, government and rebel soldiers in Ivory Coast on Monday began their first joint patrols in a "battle for peace" aimed at reuniting the West Africa state split by a 2002/2003 civil war.

The patrols will gradually replace United Nations and French peacekeepers in a 600 km (375 mile)-long buffer zone that has kept the two sides apart since the brief conflict that divided the world's top cocoa producer into two opposing halves.

It is being dismantled under a March 4 peace plan struck between President Laurent Gbagbo and his rebel foes which foresees national reunification and elections within a year."

United Nations Security Council, 2 January 2008, para. 18

"Pursuant to the Ouagadougou Agreement, according to which the mission [UNOCI] was to halve the number of observation posts every two months, UNOCI decided to remove eight observation posts between 30 November and 18 December. The gradual removal of the remaining nine posts will be based on further threat assessments and consultations with the integrated command centre and depend on overall progress made in the implementation of the Ouagadougou Agreement."


"In keeping with the provisions of the Ouagadougou Agreement, UNOCI dismantled the last observation post along the green line on 30 July [2008]. With the removal of all observation posts, the green line that replaced the zone of confidence has effectively ceased to exist. Mixed police units continued to patrol the former zone of confidence, even though their operational capacity remained limited owing to inadequate equipment and financial support."


"On 25 August [2009], during a ceremony in Bouaké, the Defence Minister relaunched the process of deploying mixed brigades; the planned deployment of the mixed brigades in Daloa and Korhogo has yet to materialize. As at 14 September, of the expected 8,000 elements, only 601, drawn from both the Forces nouvelles and the Ivorian national police and gendarmerie services, had been deployed in Abidjan and Bouaké. In addition, the deployed brigades, whose main task
is to provide security for the implementation of the Ouagadougou Political Agreement, in particular the electoral process, still lack the capacities and resources required to effectively carry out that responsibility. Meanwhile, the cantonment of the 5,000 Forces nouvelles elements that should be integrated into the national army remains at a standstill, owing, among other things, to the lack of a legal framework governing the integration process and to the absence of adequate facilities for cantonment. [...] UNOCI continues to work with national authorities to identify and address the obstacles to the cantonment of the Forces nouvelles personnel and the deployment of mixed brigades. Despite the technical and logistical support provided by UNOCI, the lack of adequate financial resources for the integrated command centre and the mixed brigades continued to impede the work of those important security institutions. Those Forces nouvelles personnel who are already serving in the mixed brigades have yet to be paid, while their counterparts from the Ivorian police and gendarmerie received regular salaries.

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

"On 22 December, President Gbagbo, accompanied by Prime Minister Soro, presided over a ceremony marking the launch of the cantonment process in Tiebéssou and Djébonoua, on either side of the former zone of confidence. The President and Prime Minister gave assurances that the necessary measures would be taken so that all combatants would either be integrated into the unified army, join the civic service or take part in reintegration programmes. The ceremony culminated in three national armed forces and two Forces Nouvelles platoons proceeding to their cantonment site in Yamoussoukro, and six Forces Nouvelles platoons moving to their cantonment site in Bouaké."

United Nations Security Council, 13 April 2009, paras. 11-12
"[S]ome progress has been made in the reinsertion of the already registered combatants. The national civic service programme launched its training programme for youth at risk and ex-militias in the west of the country. Operations to profile and dismantle pro-Government militias, conducted by the integrated command centre and the national programme for reinsertion and community rehabilitation, have been launched in the western, eastern and southern parts of the country. Disarmament of militia elements in this phase is being carried out on a voluntary basis, and although sensitization efforts are ongoing to promote the handover of weapons, ammunition and other military items, almost none have been surrendered.

The national institutions established to implement the disarmament and reintegration of former combatants and militias continue to face financial and operational capacity constraints which have hindered their activities. In addition, the parties are yet to formally endorse the results of the profiling operations as there are persisting differences on the number of former combatants and militias in the country. The availability of funds and payment modalities of the $1,000 demobilization package to eligible Forces nouvelles and militia elements remains unclear. Meanwhile, UNOCI, in collaboration with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and with resources from the Peacebuilding Fund, continued to support the reintegration process through the implementation of 335 microprojects benefiting a total of 1,180 ex-combatants, women and youth-at-risk."

"The national programme for reinsertion and community rehabilitation, in collaboration with the Integrated Command Centre, continued to review the preliminary list of 37,451 profiled pro-Government militias. It is expected that 25,000 people will be on the final list of militia personnel eligible for reintegration support. However, less than two months before the election date of 29
November, the disarmament process remains to be fully completed. The main challenge is the unavailability of the $1,000 demobilization allowance for each ex-combatant and militia member.

The national institutions responsible for implementing the reintegration programme continue to lack the resources required to undertake this important task. Consequently, only a portion of the already demobilized ex-combatants have been provided with reintegration opportunities through official Government channels. To address that gap and also contribute to the creation of enabling conditions for the elections, UNOCI, in collaboration with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and with resources from the Peacebuilding Fund, continued to provide short-term reinsertion assistance through 525 micro-projects in 23 locations, benefiting a total of 3,407 ex-combatants, militias, young people at risk and women affected by the conflict. An evaluation of the micro-projects, carried out by my Special Representative, Choi Young-Jin, from 18 to 21 August in Bouaké, Séguéla, Daloa, Issia and San-Pédro, revealed that some 80 per cent of the micro-projects have been successfully implemented and continue to provide income beyond their project life to beneficiaries. A joint review mission by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, UNDP and the Peacebuilding Support Office also travelled to Côte d’Ivoire from 30 August to 5 September to assess the impact of the micro-projects as a part of a review of the Peacebuilding Fund-supported priority plan. The review concluded that the micro-projects had played a critical role in helping to reduce tensions among ex-combatants and contributed to creating a secure environment in many areas in the country. The continuation of those projects is therefore crucial as a stopgap measure pending the full implementation of the Government’s reintegration programmes. However, available funding is insufficient to cover the full caseload of ex-combatants and militias, and it will be imperative that other partners provide financial support to this process."


“63. Under the Ouagadougou Agreement the impartial forces are requested to supervise the disarmament and demobilization and cantonment of Forces nouvelles combatants, the storage of their weapons, and the disarmament and dismantling of the militias. Given the limited capacity of the Integrated Command Centre, which is responsible for the implementation of these tasks, UNOCI has been supporting the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme by, inter alia, constructing cantonment and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration sites, providing planning assistance to the Integrated Command Centre and the National Programme for Reinsertion and Community Rehabilitation, and securing the weapons and ammunition collected so far. The Forces nouvelles and international partners requested UNOCI to assist with further rehabilitation of barracks at the cantonment sites in Bouaké, Séguéla and Man so as to avoid delaying the Forces nouvelles cantonment operations.

64. The Forces nouvelles leadership advised that another issue that could delay the cantonment of the 5,000 former combatants earmarked to join the new army was the lack of funding to sustain them once cantoned, and requested the international community to provide assistance with this. Furthermore, the Forces nouvelles Chief of Staff, General Bakayoko, proposed that UNOCI should assist in providing basic military training to the 5,000 personnel in the cantonment camps.

65. All stakeholders commended my Special Representative’s initiatives to implement 1,000 microprojects, which provide reintegration opportunities for former combatants. The initiative was conceived as a stop-gap measure to accommodate demobilized combatants who had not received the allowance of CFA 500,000 stipulated in the Ouagadougou Agreement; however limited funding has meant that the programme has accommodated only 3,720 ex-combatants. Some interlocutors suggested that the international community should consider payment of the allowance for the remaining caseload of 23,257 demobilized Forces nouvelles combatants and 42,451 militia, which would cost approximately $60 million. Donors, however, indicated that they were not favourable to funding such cash payments because of concern over inflated numbers, as well as the belief that, unlike the microprojects model, such cash payments were unlikely to provide for sustainable reintegration opportunities for the ex-combatants. Moreover, a key issue raised with the technical assessment mission was the need for the Government, which has the
responsibility to pay this allowance, to clarify whether former combatants who benefit from the microprojects would still be entitled to receive the allowance."

**Redeployment of State administration**


"While substantial progress has been made in redeploying the government officials that were displaced from the north during the conflict, those officials, including the préfets, are not yet able to exercise real authority as the Forces nouvelles zone commanders are reluctant to relinquish their administrative, security and financial authority in the areas under their control. The lack of adequate logistical and financial resources, as well as the protracted delays in re-establishing the judicial system and adequate police presence in the north also hampers the work of the redeployed State officials. The Ministry of Justice is considering retaining the judiciary personnel who were deployed in the north to support the electoral process. The effective redeployment of the judiciary and the ability of the préfets to function without impediments will be crucial for the smooth running and credibility of the electoral process.

The Ministry of Justice has submitted to the Government an operational matrix identifying the needs and the stages of redeployment of the justice administration to the north, centre and west that will be presented to the donors for funding. The four main categories of officials to be redeployed include magistrates, correctional officers, court registry and court staff. The Ministry is also drafting decrees for the appointment of magistrates. It would be crucial for the 10 courts located in the affected regions to begin functioning before the provisional electoral list is published, as they would adjudicate the complaints related to the voter registration process."

United Nations Security Council, 13 April 2009, paras. 9-10

"Uneven progress was made in the efforts to restore State authority throughout the country, including the fiscal, customs and judicial administration. On 4 March [2009], Prime Minister Soro inaugurated a "guichet unique" in Bouaké, collocating customs, fiscal and registration services. However, a ceremony to mark the transfer of authority from the Forces nouvelles zone commanders to the corps préfectoral, expected to take place on the same day, was postponed owing to the differences between the parties over the implementation modalities. The Forces nouvelles zone commanders therefore remain, de facto, in control of the local administration.

Meanwhile, nearly all judges and prosecutors were nominated and redeployed to the north, with the exception of six key positions, for which a presidential decree is still pending in spite of an agreement reached between the Ministry of Justice and the Conseil supérieur de la magistrature. The redeployment of court clerks and penitentiary personnel has yet to be completed, although nearly 100 corrections officers have been trained and are available for redeployment. Other factors continue to hamper the effective functioning of the judiciary in the north, including the insufficient presence of police and gendarmerie forces, poorly equipped or secured court premises and the need to rehabilitate court buildings. Eleven detention facilities in the north were rehabilitated and handed over to Ivorian authorities in January 2009. However, conditions of detention, including food and medicine shortages and overcrowding, remained of grave concern throughout Côte d'Ivoire. Public safety continued to be adversely affected by frequent prison breaks, as illustrated by the escape of 98 prisoners from Abengourou prison on 22 February."


"Following the ceremony to transfer authority from the Forces nouvelles zone commanders to the corps préfectoral in May 2009, the prefects have started taking administrative decisions in the northern areas controlled by the Forces nouvelles. However, the authority of the prefects to enforce administrative decisions and maintain public order is still hampered by the absence of operational units from the Integrated Command Centre."
With regard to customs and tax offices, although some personnel have been deployed and office rehabilitation works have started, most facilities remain largely unsuitable for use and lack the required equipment. In the meantime, the Forces nouvelles continued to collect taxes in the north and have requested the inclusion of Forces nouvelles-affiliated personnel in all fiscal and financial services, including customs, treasury and tax offices. To that end, a list of 100 individuals is currently being considered by the Ministry of Finance.

During the reporting period, uneven progress was made in the redeployment of the judiciary to the north. Despite the nomination of two additional chief judges in Bouaké and Korhogo, difficulties persisted at the Korhogo court, which lacked the number of magistrates required to reach the mandatory quorum for handling its regular caseload, including decisions on challenges and appeals related to the electoral list.

The date for reopening all prisons in the Forces nouvelles-controlled areas remains undetermined, as it is contingent upon the redeployment of the judicial police. An order was signed by the Minister of Justice and Human Rights for the redeployment of prison directors to 11 prisons in the north, but it has yet to be implemented. In the meantime, UNOCI trained 102 newly recruited prison officers in law enforcement and crowd control during the reporting period.

AFP, 5 February 2010

"Un nouvel incident a éclaté vendredi autour de la liste électorale ivoirienne, avec le saccage du tribunal de Man (ouest) par des manifestants protestant contre la tenue d’un procès sur une éventuelle radiation d’habitants de la liste, ont rapporté des témoins. Des « centaines » de manifestants se sont attaqués au tribunal et « ont emporté des documents et les ordinateurs, empêchant l’audience de se tenir », a indiqué à l’AFP un habitant joint au téléphone depuis Abidjan, ajoutant que la buvette du palais de justice avait été incendiée. Les commerces et le grand marché ont été fermés, paralysant l’activité de cette ville proche du Liberia, qui avait déjà été ces derniers jours le théâtre de tensions liées à ce procès. « Il s’agit de dénonciations calomnieuses (pour fraude à la nationalité, ndlr) concernant 152 personnes qui devaient passer en audience de radiation », a expliqué Maméry Soumahoro, une personnalité de la société civile locale. La plupart des manifestants qui scandaient « pas de justice aux ordres! » sont originaires du nord musulman du pays, a-t-il affirmé. Une voiture appartenant à des militants du Front populaire ivoirien (FPI, parti du président Laurent Gbagbo) en tournée dans la région a également été brûlée, a déclaré un autre témoin. Les incidents se sont multipliés cette semaine autour de procès pour radiations de la liste électorale, donnant lieu mercredi à Divo (centre-ouest) à de violentes échauffourées entre forces de l’ordre et manifestants. L’opposition a accusé vendredi le FPI de pousser les tribunaux à « opérer des radiations arbitraires, partisanes et illégales » sur la liste, appelant ses militants à les en empêcher. La question de la nationalité est l’une des origines de la crise ivoirienne née du coup d’État manqué en 2002. Reporté depuis 2005, le scrutin présidentiel censé clore cette crise est attendu avant juin par l’ONU."

Identification of the population and elections


"It will be recalled that the Ouagadougou Agreement sought to accelerate the identification of those Ivorians who were eligible to vote. In that regard, the Agreement provided that all individuals who were on the voters’ list in 2000 would be automatically eligible to receive national identity cards and voters’ cards; the ongoing mobile courts would issue duplicate birth certificates to Ivorians aged 18 years and older, whose births had never been recorded in civil registers, to enable them to register to vote; and the civil registers that had been lost or destroyed during the
In my last report, I stated that the fourth round of the mobile court operations officially had ended on 15 May. Following the recommendation of the Permanent Consultative Framework meeting of 9 May, supplementary mobile courts were deployed on 27 August to issue duplicate birth certificates to applicants in areas that had not been adequately covered during the main operation. In that regard, the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights deployed 50 teams to 34 jurisdictions throughout the country. At the conclusion of the operation on 25 September, a total of 35,370 declaratory judgements in lieu of birth certificates had been issued. Of these, 32,239 were issued to Ivorian nationals and 3,131 to foreigners. The number of declaratory judgements issued in lieu of birth certificates since the mobile courts operations were launched in September 2007 stands at 750,000.

The identification of the population and the voter registration processes were launched on 15 September 2008, subsequent to the promulgation of a decree on 14 September which stipulated that these two crucial processes would be conducted over a period of 45 days. As of 1 October, 5,849 Ivorians had been registered as voters. Although the pace of voter registration and identification is expected to increase as more teams are deployed throughout the country, it is unlikely that the process will be completed within the 45 days stipulated in the 14 September presidential decree.

The operation to reconstitute the civil registers and restore birth, marriage and death records that were lost or destroyed during the crisis was launched by the Minister of Justice on 15 May. The initial stages of the exercise involved preparing an inventory of the existing as well as destroyed and lost civil registers. The United Nations Office of Project Services, funded by the European Union, is providing technical assistance to this operation. Article 2 of the presidential decree adopted on 14 September stipulates that registration on the voters’ roll of those applicants affected by the reconstitution operation should not change the time frame of the publication of the provisional electoral list.

United Nations Security Council, 13 April 2009, paras. 13-14
*As of 31 March, a total of 5.9 million Ivorians had been identified and registered as voters at the 10,730 registration centres opened, out of the 11,133 planned, countrywide. The identification and voter registration operations, including for Ivorians living abroad, continued to be marred by significant logistical, financial and procedural obstacles. Launched on 15 September 2008, the process was due to end on 31 March after several extensions, but required further prolongation to allow for the conduct of remedial operations to include areas not yet sufficiently covered and to register those affected by the reconstitution of lost or destroyed civil registers. The administrative phase of the operation for the reconstitution of lost or destroyed civil registers was launched on 27 January, and all but one of the 255 commissions were operational throughout the country by the end of March. Out of a total of 105,000 petitions received, some 41,000 have been approved and some 5,000 rejected thus far. The requests approved by the administrative commissions will be reviewed by judicial commissions following the end of the administrative phase.

On 29 March 2009, the Independent Electoral Commission announced the postponement of the registration of Ivorians abroad to an unspecified date owing to financial constraints encountered by SAGEM, a private French company and technical operator. Moreover, the Commission specified that remedial identification operations countrywide, initially planned for the beginning of April 2009, would take place in mid-April. The Commission also indicated that it had developed a draft electoral timeline during its meeting on 27 February 2009. This timeline is contingent, however, on several prerequisites, which, according to its Chairman, are not within the purview of the Commission, including the need to fill the funding gap in its budget for the holding of the elections, the timeline for completing the reconstitution of lost and destroyed registers and the
effective functioning of the first instance tribunals in the Forces nouvelles-held areas in order to settle legal disputes.”

**United Nations Security Council, 29 September 2009, paras. 18-22**

"Following the completion of the identification and voter registration operations on 30 June, the Independent Electoral Commission released the official results of those operations during the meeting of the Evaluation and Monitoring Committee held on 9 August. A total of 6,552,694 people had registered, including 38,496 Ivorians who registered in operations conducted in 23 foreign countries.

On 23 July, the Independent Electoral Commission published a timeline for the remaining key stages of the electoral process as follows: (a) the publication of the provisional electoral list on 29 August; (b) the publication of the final electoral list following the conclusion of the appeals process between 15 and 21 October; (c) the production of identification and voter cards by 20 October; (d) the distribution of identification and voter cards by 26 November; and (e) the electoral campaign period, from 13 to 27 November.

The operations to process identification and voter registration data and produce the provisional electoral list were launched on 21 July. As reported in my letter to the President of the Security Council (S/2009/446) dated 4 September, the parties missed the deadline to publish the provisional list on 29 August. The office of the Prime Minister subsequently announced that the provisional electoral list would be published on 15 September. However, that deadline was also missed, owing mainly to technical challenges and strike actions by unpaid workers.

On 25 August, President Gbagbo signed legal texts aimed mainly at compressing the timelines of the electoral process and aligning the legal framework with anticipated delays, in order to meet the 29 November election date. These included decree 2009/270, which regularized the duration of the concluded voter registration operations, carried out between 15 September 2008 and 30 June 2009, by amending an earlier decree that had set 30 October 2008 as the deadline for completing the voter registration process; ordinance 2009/268, which compressed the time for displaying the provisional electoral list from three months to 30 days prior to the elections; and ordinance 2009/269, which compressed the time for completing the distribution of voter cards from two weeks to eight days prior to the elections.

In announcing that the new 15 September deadline for the publication of the provisional electoral list had not been met, the Independent Electoral Commission disclosed, on the same day, that 95 per cent of the identification and voter registration data had been processed and that efforts were under way by the Office of the Prime Minister and the technical operators to complete the data processing, indicating that the delay in publishing the provisional electoral list would be limited. One processing centre, in Duekoué, in the western part of the country, had yet to start processing data as at 15 September.”


“2. As indicated in my last report, the voter registration and identification operations, which were officially completed in November 2009, yielded a provisional electoral list of some 5.3 million persons confirmed by the technical operators (commonly referred to as the “white list”) and some 1.03 million persons who remained to be confirmed (referred to as the “grey list”). On 3 December 2009, the Cadre permanent de concertation, composed of the main Ivorian political leaders […] took note of the credible manner in which the identification and voter registration operations had been conducted, and welcomed the provisional voters list. On that basis, the Cadre permanent de concertation endorsed a new electoral timetable providing for the completion of the final voters list
in January 2010, and the presidential election by the end of February or the beginning of March 2010.

3. Early in January, however, reports surfaced about the existence of a separate parallel list of some 429,000 individuals, produced by the President of the Independent Electoral Commission, Robert Beugré Mambé, outside of the established procedures. This controversy abruptly brought the electoral process to a halt as the ruling Front populaire ivoirien (FPI) party maintained that the President of the Commission had committed fraud and that the provisional electoral list had been compromised. They called for Mr. Mambé’s resignation. An inquiry instituted by the Prime minister confirmed that Mr. Mambé had prepared a list of 429,000 persons without following the established procedures. Mr. Mambé rejected the calls for his resignation, insisting that he had developed the parallel list only for the “internal use” of the Commission. […]

The new Government and Electoral Commission were installed on 23 February and 25 February, respectively.”


“60. In keeping with its mandate, UNOCI has provided technical and logistical assistance to the Independent Electoral Commission and other national implementing institutions responsible for operations related to the identification and electoral processes. Specifically, UNOCI has provided transportation for electoral materials to the Commission’s warehouses, refurbished identification and voter registration centres, provided transportation of registration agents, and trained judges and registration agents. All stakeholders recognized that, without the support that UNOCI has provided to date, the technical and logistical challenges encountered by the Commission would have caused even more serious delays to the electoral process. They requested that UNOCI be authorized to continue providing this critical support. Many stakeholders, particularly the international partners, however, expressed concern that the new Commission, which was installed on 25 February, had not started tackling the key issues that are blocking the electoral process and taking steps to complete the outstanding technical processes.

61. A number of proposals were communicated to the technical assessment mission regarding the implementation of the certification mandate of my Special Representative. To date, my Special Representative has defined the certification framework, comprising five criteria as explained in my previous reports, and certified two critical stages of the electoral process, namely, the successful completion of the identification and voter registration operations and the preparation of the provisional voters list, which he described as “balanced and credible” prior to the appearance of the contentious parallel list of 429,000 individuals.

62. While some leaders of the political opposition parties stated that they clearly understood the framework developed by my Special Representative for the certification of the electoral process and welcomed his endorsement of the completion of the identification and voter registration processes and the provisional voters list, they informed the technical assessment mission that they intended to discuss with my Special Representative the certification in the context of the peace and security criteria, especially the role of the State media and the monopoly of access by the ruling party. For their part, the ruling party and the President’s advisers expressed the view that they could not envisage certification of elections that may be held in the north under the current insecure environment as free and fair. Many international stakeholders were satisfied with the manner in which the certification mandate had been dispensed and encouraged my Special Representative to continue to work closely with the Facilitator, who has the arbitration mandate. They also stressed the importance of enhancing the UNOCI public information campaign and constant engagement with the political parties, to clarify any queries they and the public may have on certification. In his letter dated 6 May, the Prime Minister also stressed the importance of clarifying the certification process and methodology to avoid divergent interpretations by the political actors.”

REUTERS, 02 September 2010
"Ivory Coast's electoral commission said Thursday it had produced a final voter list for the first time, raising the chance that an election which has been delayed six times in five years might go ahead. [...]"

"The list is finalized. We are respecting the schedule," electoral commission spokesman Nicolas Coulibaly said. [...]"

"For us, the list is final, but it's the politics which decides if this goes ahead. We're just technicians," said Coulibaly.

The last election date of November 29, 2009 collapsed into political wrangling over the electoral list, ending with Gbagbo dissolving the government and electoral commission in February, triggering mass demonstrations.

The next stage is to print electoral cards, which the commission plans to do until September. In early October, it aims to send the cards and lists to polling stations. The voter roll will then be posted at polling stations from October 10-12. [...]"

The next stage is to print electoral cards, which the commission plans to do until September. In early October, it aims to send the cards and lists to polling stations. The voter roll will then be posted at polling stations from October 10-12.

Gbagbo's supporters have long suspected that the list includes foreign imposters from Burkina Faso and Mali. The opposition says this is a pretext for removing names of people unlikely to vote for him because of tribe, region or religion.

He has stayed silent on the electoral list this time around.

In two speeches broadcast on national radio and TV on Thursday, he said simply that the election would happen as scheduled. His close aides have indicated they are happier with the process this time around. [...]"

But analysts raised eyebrows over the fact that the list has not changed much since Gbagbo rejected it last time. As he has shown many times before, if he doesn't like it, he can easily throw a spanner in the works."

See also:

ISN Security Watch's "Ivory Coast: Flames of Peace" (14 August 2007) for an analysis of the first steps of the implementation of the Ouagadougou Agreement

Carter Center's "General Conclusions on the Cote d'Ivoire Identification and Voter Registration Process" for a review of the identification process.


Main causes of displacement

Xenophobia and anti foreigner sentiments are a root cause of displacement (2004)

- The concept of foreigner stands in negative relief against “ivoirité” and leads to its consideration as the root cause of displacement and exclusion
- Thousands of people have been persecuted, harassed, threatened and evicted from their lands during the past few years because they, or their parents were foreign-born
- In November 1999, the anti-foreigner sentiment resulted in the displacement of 15,000 Burkinabes who were chased from their homes in the southwestern town of Tabou
- The conflation of ethnicity, culture and religion has proved particularly dangerous and several massacres have underscored the pattern of ethnic persecution as Muslims and other
Commission on Human Rights, 22 December 2004, paras. 50, 52, 53
“The outbreak of war in a context so dominated by this heightening of ethnic sensitivities by ideological, political, legal and administrative means helped push the dynamic of xenophobia into a higher gear. Representing as it did a shift from words to action, the war paved the way for pent-up feelings of frustration, fear and exclusion to spill over into acts of violence and other clearly xenophobic behaviours, some committed by the forces of law and order, the police, the armed forces and gendarmerie, or paramilitary groups, others by rebel groups. The next stage was that the various political rivals, appealing now to ethnic rather than democratic legitimacy, began acting and speaking in such a way as to effectively take the population hostage, giving the groups and communities whose interests they claimed to be defending the impression that they had no choice but to go along with their proposals and give them, if not their active support, at least a degree of approval.
[…]
E. The conflation of ethnicity, culture and religion
Côte d’Ivoire is a multireligious country made up principally of animists, Christians and Muslims. Although the north is usually portrayed as mainly Muslim and the south as Christian, Côte d’Ivoire has for a great many years benefited from a rich mix of coexisting faiths. Thus while the majority in the north are indeed the main Muslim north Mande, there are also Gur, who are basically Christians or animists. To the west live the southern Mande, who include Christians (some of them Yacouba and some Gouro), animists (Yacouba, Gouro, and Krou) and Muslims (chiefly Yacouba). The east of the country is inhabited mainly by Akan, for the most part animists or Christians, while to the south live Krou, Lagunaires and Akan, again mainly animists or Christians.

However, during his visit, the Special Rapporteur found that the withdrawal into a core identity had given rise to a tendency to conflate ethnicity and religion, a particularly dangerous shift. Thus it emerges from reports received that northerners, foreigners and those who oppose the President are being termed Muslims. Some of the media have fanned the hatred of certain sections of the population for Muslim communities, who have apparently been accused of wishing to “incinerate Côte d’Ivoire”. The Special Rapporteur has received reports of a proliferation of Islamophobic acts such as damage to places of worship, the destruction of Muslims’ property, as well as violence and torture and even summary executions of members of the Muslim faith. Several imams have allegedly been murdered.”

Alertnet, 23 June 2003
“Since the start of the war in Ivory Coast, approximately 400,000 foreigners have fled the country, including about 200,000 Burkinabes, 70,000 Guineans, 48,000 Malians, and 44,000 Liberians.

These people were not simply fleeing the conflict. Instead, many have run from the hostile xenophobia that has grown rampant in the past year in Ivory Coast. Thousands have been harassed, threatened, and evicted from their homes or their lands.

When I visited Ivory Coast in March I was stunned by what I found. I travelled there expecting to investigate the needs of people fleeing the fighting between the rebels and the government, which had been well documented by NGOs and the media.

Instead I discovered a serious problem that was hardly being reported: many people were fleeing persecution because they, or their parents, were foreign-born. Ivoirian civilians and military have harassed, threatened, and in a few instances, killed those considered foreigners.
Let's parse the term "foreigner". By the government definition, anyone whose parents were not born in Ivory Coast -- both parents, mind you -- is regarded as foreign. This working definition renders about 30 percent of Ivory Coast's 16 million inhabitants foreign, and, thereby, subject to hostility, even though many of these foreigners have never set foot outside Ivory Coast.

The concept of foreigner stands in negative relief against that of ivoirité, or "ivorianness." One's ivoirité is established simply by lacking foreign-born parents, and yet this has become the credential du jour throughout Ivory Coast.

LICENCE TO PILLAGE
For some Ivorians, it has also become a licence to pillage, intimidate and kill. Military and armed local youth have organised outfits of terror in western Ivory Coast.

The 35,000 Liberian refugees that remain in Ivory Coast are in imminent danger of being caught up in the conflict in the west and being targeted by these bands of thugs. In effect, the Liberian refugees who have sought refuge in Ivory Coast in the past decade are again in need of a safe haven.

This campaign of xenophobia comes at a high cost, literally. Ivory Coast, the world's biggest cocoa producer, relied on thousands of foreigners to work in the plantations. The violence inspired by the government has had the effect of dispersing this labour force from the cacao and coffee plantations.

[...]

The origins of ivoirité-based ethnic tension are varied and complex. The notion itself began as a political tactic of former President Henri Konan-Bédié to prohibit some politicians, including prominent northerner Alassane Ouattara, from standing as president.

It has increased tensions among ethnic groups and created a division between the mainly Muslim north, which is where most of those considered "foreigners" are living, and the mainly Christian south.

CHASED FROM THEIR HOMES
In November 1999, the anti-foreigner sentiment resulted in the displacement of 15,000 Burkinabes who were chased from their homes in the southwestern town of Tabou.

In the past eight months of conflict, Burkinabes, along with other foreigners such as Malians and Liberians, have been the targets of hostility. An ethnic massacre at Yopougon, outside Abidjan, in October 2000 and the massacre of gendarmes by northern rebels in the town of Bouaké in October 2002 exemplified ethnic hostility.

The roadblocks to peace in Ivory Coast are legion. Human rights abuses, including forced recruitment, must be stopped immediately. Liberian refugees need to be moved from western Ivory Coast to a safer area.

The government must ensure the protection of immigrants and refugees. It should also establish a new legal framework that liberalises citizenship requirements and protects the rights of foreign nationals living and working in the country.

These measures alone will not suffice. The government must also root out its own hypocrisy on the matter. For a government that has occasionally encouraged anti-immigrant and anti-refugee sentiments by publicly reviling foreigners, taking an active and public role in soothing xenophobic tension is imperative.
National reconciliation in any meaningful sense cannot happen until the government defuses ivoirité, and welcomes its citizens - all of them - to a persecution-free Ivory Coast. Until the people of Ivory Coast scrap the identity politics, there is little hope for a lasting peace.”

Refugees International, 6 May 2003

“Since the start of Ivory Coast's conflict on September 19, 2002, more than one million people have been displaced. In addition to the political turmoil that has impelled their flight, many of these people have fled persecution. In the last seven months of conflict, the Government of Ivory Coast has occasionally encouraged anti-immigrant and anti-refugee sentiments by publicly reviling “foreigners.”

Although a new government of national unity was recently created and a ceasefire was signed this weekend, failure to curb xenophobic laws and attitudes could compromise attempts at peaceful resolution and catalyze further displacement.

The term “foreigners” in this case is a misnomer: many of those being persecuted were actually born or raised in Ivory Coast, and some have never been outside of the country.

But by the government's narrow definition of "Ivoirian," about 30% of Ivory Coast's 16 million inhabitants are considered "foreigners" because both parents were not born in Ivory Coast. Ivoirian civilians and military have harassed, threatened, and in a few instances, killed those designated foreigners. Since the start of the war, approximately 400,000 "foreigners" have fled the country, including about 200,000 Burkinabès, 70,000 Guineans, 48,000 Malians, and 44,000 Liberians.

Members of the international community have highlighted the importance of national reconciliation, and have pointed to the need to address the anti-immigrant sentiment. The United Nations Humanitarian Envoy to Ivory Coast, Carolyn McAskie, and the new National Reconciliation Minister, Sebastien Danon Djedje, discussed xenophobia when they met recently.

On April 24, the UN information network reported that in this meeting with the new minister, McAskie "highlighted the importance of his portfolio, assured him that the international community was willing to help Ivory Coast's government, but noted the need for reconciliation at the government level."

The campaign of xenophobia has already caused massive damage to the country and the region. Thousands have been harassed, threatened, and evicted from their homes or their lands. In addition, damage to the regional economy has been great. Ivory Coast, the world's biggest cocoa producer, relied on thousands of foreigners to work in the plantations. The violence inspired by the government has had the effect of dispersing this labor force from the cacao and coffee plantations. The hostile and intimidating environment may leave the plantation workers reluctant to return even if Ivory Coast is stabilized. Such disruption of planting and harvesting - even for a short time - would deal a severe blow to a major pillar of West Africa's economy.

Neighboring countries have already suffered economic losses. For example, the Humanitarian Envoy reported, "Mali relied on Côte d'Ivoire for over 70% of its imports and exports, and along with Burkina Faso, and to a certain extent Niger, is suffering serious economic setbacks at a time when it is also affected by the drought in the Sahel." The violence and xenophobia in the Ivory Coast have had severe economic consequences: the loss of remittances, a poor agricultural season, and the strain for communities in Burkina Faso and Mali of accepting thousands of returnees. Together, these consequences present a major challenge to the region.
Anti-foreigner sentiment is not new in Ivory Coast. The notion of "ivoirité" or "ivoirianness" started out as a political tactic of former President Konan-Bédié to prohibit some politicians, including prominent northerner Alassane Ouattara, from running for President. It has increased tensions among ethnic groups and created a division between the mainly Muslim north, which is where most of those considered "foreigners" are living, and the mainly Christian south.

In November 1999, the anti-foreigner sentiment resulted in the displacement of 15,000 Burkinabès who were chased from their homes in the southwestern town of Tabou. In the last seven months of conflict, Burkinabès, along with other foreigners such as Malians and Liberians, have been the targets of hostility.

In response to the latest outflow of Burkinabès, a UN worker told RI that "it appears to be rather clear cut that the Burkinabès have left Ivory Coast based on a well-founded fear of being persecuted owing to their nationality."

Several massacres have underscored the pattern of ethnic persecution. A recent Amnesty International report explained that an October 2002 massacre of gendarmes by the northern rebels in the town of Bouaké was reminiscent of an ethnic massacre at Yopougon (outside of Abidjan) in October 2000.

"All the victims of this massacre belonged to the Dioula ethnic group, a name often used to describe Côte d'Ivoire nationals from the north of the country... [Dioula] is also sometimes used to describe nationals of neighboring countries, especially those from Burkina Faso, Mali and Guinea," stated Amnesty. The report added that until the massacre at Yopougon, "[Ivory Coast] had steered clear of ethnically motivated massacres and violence, even though for some years, certain sections of the press and the state media had been regularly publishing xenophobic material promoting the ideology of 'ivoirité.'"

Refugees International has advocated for increased protection of Liberian refugees in Ivory Coast who also face anti-foreigner threats. In March, RI reported, "More than 35,000 Liberian refugees that remain in the Ivory Coast are in imminent danger of being caught up in the conflict in the west or targeted by the military and armed local youth.

These Liberian refugees, who [have] sought refuge in the Ivory Coast over the last decade, are again in need of a safe haven." This safe haven has not been furnished. Furthermore, recent reports from western Ivory Coast state that there is an increase of forced recruitment of these refugees.

**Government and rebel forces cause mass displacement in Abidjan and provinces in aftermath of failed coup of September 2002**

- In September 2002, a failed coup by disaffected soldiers marked the beginning of the worst crisis in Côte d'Ivoire's post-independence history
- Hundreds of thousands of people were displaced by fighting which left rebels in control of much of the predominantly Muslim north of the country
- At least 200,000 people were estimated to have fled the rebel-held northern town of Bouake, and several thousands were made homeless in the economic capital Abidjan by a government demolition policy aimed at rooting out dissidents
- Fierce fighting between government forces and two new rebel factions in the west of the country, as well as systematic human rights abuses against civilians displaced more than one million people, including some 150,000 who fled to neighbouring countries
UNHCR, 8 October 2002

“UNHCR remains concerned about the ongoing developments in Cote d'Ivoire amid reports of growing internal displacement following renewed fighting after the collapse of cease-fire negotiations on Sunday. A government-sanctioned program to raze shanty towns in Abidjan is also continuing, displacing thousands of local residents and foreigners, including refugees.

As a result of the renewed fighting in Bouake, a humanitarian inter-agency needs-assessment mission (OCHA, UNICEF, WFP, WHO and UNHCR) that was heading towards Bouaké yesterday (Monday) to assess the dire humanitarian situation there was turned back on the outskirts of Abidjan for security reasons. An advance team left Abidjan again this morning to the capital, Yamoussoukro. Depending on security conditions, the planned inter-agency mission to Bouake could take place in the next few days.

Worsening conditions in Bouake, including lack of water, electricity and food supplies, have prompted many residents to flee. According to the Red Cross, between 150,000 and 200,000 residents of Bouaké (pop. 600,000) have fled in recent days to escape fighting and insecurity. Most of them are believed to have sought shelter with families of relatives in other parts of the country.

In Abidjan, meanwhile, the demolition of houses in the city's shanty towns continues, affecting thousands of Abidjan's local and foreign inhabitants, including refugees. The governor of Abidjan announced on Friday that the burning of shanty towns in Abidjan is expected to be completed in one month. During a visit to UNHCR's office in Abidjan on Friday, however, the Minister of Human Rights said the razing of shanty towns would be suspended for ten days. There is still no suspension, however. Such a suspension would be welcomed because it would give humanitarian agencies some more time to find alternative accommodation for the thousands of people, including migrants, refugees and Ivorians, who are being displaced on a daily basis. The minister told UNHCR that this is not an operation against foreigners, as many Ivorians are also affected. She reiterated that refugees have always been welcome in Cote d'Ivoire and remain so.”

UN OCHA, 15 October 2002

“According to mission members, the city of Bouake has partially become a ‘ghost town’ with several neighbourhoods completely empty of its residents. Shops, banks, pharmacies and commercial businesses remained closed since the 19th of September. The inability of Bouake's remaining residents to withdraw money from the banks is creating an increasingly untenable situation. The few open markets have very limited produce with only onions and yams available in some quantity. In addition, the prices of these basic commodities have increased three to four times from their original price since the beginning of the conflict. Cooking gas or charcoal has also become very scarce and expensive.

While hospitals and other social services are barely functioning, most of the medical personnel have either left the city or are unable to leave their homes.

The mission witnessed an estimated influx of more than 32,000 people fleeing Bouake in the direction of Brobo, M'Bahiakro, Sakassou, Didievi and Yamoussoukro. This brings to about 200,000 the number of people estimated to have left Bouake and become internally displaced persons [IDPs]. The figures, collected from some of the transit centers in the region of Bouake, are partial and need to be verified. After leaving Bouake some of the IDPs proceeded to their villages of origin or towns located further south of the ‘ghost town’. Women and children are the most affected, exhibiting signs of extreme exhaustion and fatigue including swollen feet, after two to three days of walking to safety. The Catholic Church has been instrumental in providing shelter and food, and in some instances transportation for the displaced. Their capacity to continue this level of services will be stretched to the limit should the flow of displaced persons continue to increase.”
IRIN, 29 January 2003

“The UN children's agency, UNICEF, has appealed for US $5.7 million for emergency health, nutrition and education to cover over the next two months needs of more than one million people displaced by conflict in Cote d'Ivoire, over the next two months. At least 150,000 of the displaced had crossed into neighboring countries, straining already weak social service systems.

'Four months after the attempted coup in Côte d'Ivoire, the country is teetering on the brink of a catastrophe that threatens to trigger massive population upheaval if fighting between rebels and government forces continues,' UNICEF said. 'The political turmoil has unleashed an anti-immigrant sentiment affecting millions of foreigners in Côte d'Ivoire that likely will linger even if a solution to the current military standoff can be found. Vigilante groups, often acting with total impunity, continue to target immigrants from the sub-region.'

Abuses in rebel-held areas cause renewed displacement following November 2004 crisis (2004-2005)

- Rebels in northern Cote d'Ivoire have reportedly increased human rights violations against civilians since November 2004, including kidnapping for ransom, which has caused new displacement
- Thousands of IDPs sheltering at various sites and with host families following attacks and harassment by Forces nouvelles rebels remain too afraid to return to the north
- In Abidjan, the humanitarian situation of IDPs continues to deteriorate and little assistance is provided

IRIN, 25 November 2004

"Government bombs may have stopped falling on towns in the northern half of Cote d'Ivoire, but now rebels are taking residents hostage for ransom, reports of human rights violations are on the increase, and the price of essential items such as bread and fuel has doubled.

Rebel forces, who hold the north of the country and were hit by Ivorian airplanes when an 18-month ceasefire was shattered on 4 November, are reported to be raiding villages to demand cash.

Some commentators in the Abidjan press see this as part of a drive by the rebels to strengthen their war chest in case full-scale conflict resumes.

An Ivorian women, who asked not to be identified, told IRIN on Thursday that rebels fighters had stormed her home village of Konaklo in early November, looking for money.

All the young men in Konaklo, which lies about 50 km from the main rebel stronghold Bouake, fled into the bush as the rebel fighters arrived. The gunmen began breaking into houses to search for hidden notes and beat up many of the people they found inside, who pleaded that they had nothing left to give.

The woman said her own mother, who is aged over 70, also fled. She was smuggled over the frontline by a young nephew, who carried her on his bicycle.

Four middle-aged men were not so lucky. They were taken hostage by the rebels, who imprisoned them in containers seven kilometres down the road in the town of Sakassou, pending the payment of a 1.5 million CFA ($3,000) ransom.
The New Forces rebel movement have used containers as makeshift prisons before in the northern city of Korhogo.

A UN human rights investigation into clashes between rival rebel factions in Korhogo in June reported that dozens of people were arrested and held in hot airless containers. A medical examination of 99 bodies discovered in mass graves on the outskirts of the city showed that many of them had suffocated to death.

Race to raise funds

With their neighbours languishing in custody, the remaining Konaklo villagers were only able to raise one million francs between them, the woman said. They therefore sent an envoy to Abidjan at the end of last week to raise the remaining 500,000 CFA ($1,000) from people who had left the farming community to seek jobs in Cote d'Ivoire's economic capital.

The woman said the rebel fighters gave no reasons for demanding money and did not accuse the villagers, who are mostly from the Baoule ethnic group of former president Felix Houphouet Boigny, of siding with the government.

But she said the rebel gunmen threatened bluntly to kill the hostages and burn down the entire village unless the money was paid. One of her relatives, who witnessed the scene first-hand, quoted the leader of the rebel fighters as saying: ‘If you don't give us the money, you won't see them again. They will be dead.’

UN OCHA, 17 January 2005

“Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) remain a particularly vulnerable group in Côte d'Ivoire. It is expected that more humanitarian assistance will be needed in 2005 as many IDPs and their host families have exhausted their resources and no longer have the capacity to cope with a third year of crisis. In the meanwhile, new displacements have taken place since the November crisis, also demanding humanitarian assistance.

Between August and December 2004, IOM has registered 1,233 new arrivals at the IDP centre in Guiglo since August 2004. There are now a total of 6,648 IDPs at the centre. Many of the new arrivals are IDPs who until recently were living with host communities in and around Guiglo, who have come to the centre to benefit from the humanitarian assistance available at the camp. It is expected that more families will arrive at the camp in 2005 as many no longer have the coping mechanisms to deal with a third year of little revenue and limited food stock. IOM is concerned, as the IDP centre does not have the capacity to deal with this growing population. In December the centre received 15 new tents and 2 kitchens in order to cater for the new arrivals.

Over 3500 IDPs, the majority of them children and women, remain sheltered at various sites and with host families in the towns of Priko and M'Bahiakro situated within the zone of confidence. The many IDPs gathered here following attacks and harassment by the Forces Nouvelles in early November. Humanitarian aid agencies have provided assistance and are currently reviewing the possibility of facilitating their return to the North. A joint mission including ONUCI, FANCI and Licorne went to Priko and M'bahiaakro to encourage the return of IDPs to the village of Bonguera, so far 35 IDPs in M'Bahiaakro returned to Bonguéra, however many are still wary of the security situation and prefer to wait. UNICEF has ensured the supply of water and sanitation to these two towns as well as conducted a vaccination campaign against measles and provided vitamin A supplements for the children. WFP has distributed 30 days of ration benefiting 2109 IDPs.

UNHCR has commenced its repatriation programme for 2005. In early January 100 Liberian refugees from Blolequin were voluntarily repatriated to Liberia with the support of GTZ and
SAARA. Another 50 refugees will be flown to Liberia by UNHCR on 18th January. UNHCR plans to repatriate approximately 45,000 Liberian refugees by the end of 2005. It is estimated that there are currently 72,000 refugees living in Côte d'Ivoire.

OCHA Korhogo, has received reports from the local NGO ARK, that a group of Ivorian refugees from Mali have returned to the border town of Pogo in Côte d'Ivoire and are in need of assistance. OCHA Korhogo is currently organising an assessment/verification mission to the site.

The Mie N'Gou centre in Yamoussoukro, will remain open until further notice. The centre was scheduled to close by the end of the year 2004. The 479 IDPs residing there have refused to leave following the November crisis as they are concerned about the security situation in the North. The local NGO ASAPSU continues to provide medical assistance to the IDPs at the centre and WFP provides food assistance.

The number of refugees in the Tabou refugee camp has increased by 128 people since September 2004. The new arrivals previously lived with host communities, but had come to the camp for assistance due to increased vulnerability from sickness and/or poverty. WFP distributes food aid to the refugees at the camp, in September WFP distributed aid to 3,369 refugees, in January 3,497 people benefited from assistance.

In Abidjan, the humanitarian situation of IDPs continues to deteriorate and little assistance is provided. A local association for IDPs from Bouaké, has reported that many of those who had returned to the North have now come back to Abidjan following the crisis of November. In Abobo, there are 11,631 IDPs from the North of which 2,412 are children. Enfance Meurtrie Sans Frontières (EMSF) is the only international NGO currently providing assistance to this group."

Resumption of armed clashes and mob violence in Abidjan causes displacement and mass evacuation of expatriates (November 2004)

- In November 2004 government warplanes bombed the rebel stronghold of Bouake in an operation to retake the north, killing nine French peacekeepers and an American aid worker
- France's response of destroying Côte d'Ivoire's airforce sparked widespread mob violence in Abidjan, targeting mainly French citizens as well as opposition politicians and immigrants
- Several thousand expatriates were evacuated amid accusations that France was supporting Ivorian rebels

**AFP, 5 November 2004**

“The Ivory Coast military on Friday resumed air strikes on positions held by former rebels, after 24 hours of air raids and political violence targeting opposition parties in Abidjan raised fears of a collapse back into civil strife.

Regional leaders prepared talks to cool the situation, with African Union leaders calling a crisis meeting for Saturday, while UN agencies suspended relief and humanitarian work in response to the fighting.

On Thursday, military aircraft attacked strongholds of the ex-rebel New Forces (NF) at Bouake in central Ivory Coast and Korhogo in the north, leading NF officials to describe a shaky peace pact as ‘defunct’.
The Ivorian military said Thursday's raids -- in which three people died and at least 40 were wounded -- had achieved their objectives, destroying ex-rebel camps and strategic targets in both cities.

Overnight arson attacks on opposition party buildings in Abidjan and belligerent language from both sides have added to tensions in the divided country.

Radical young supporters of Ivory Coast President Laurent Gbagbo ransacked the Abidjan offices of two main opposition parties late Thursday, also torching the offices of three pro-opposition newspapers.

Targeted were the Ivory Coast Democratic Party (PDCI), the country's former ruling and now main opposition party, and the Rally for Republicans (RDR) which is led by exiled former prime minister Alassane Ouattara.

IRIN, 7 November 2004
“Militant supporters of President Laurent Gbagbo rampaged through Abidjan's streets overnight, looting and burning French homes, schools and businesses and forcing France's military to airlift more than 150 foreigners to safety and send in troops to restore calm.

The violence erupted in Cote d'Ivoire's commercial capital after France destroyed almost the entire airforce of its former colony, following the Ivorian army's bombardment of a French base in the north. Nine French peacekeepers and one American civilian died in Saturday's bombing on the rebel town of Bouake.

Pro-Gbagbo militants, some wielding machetes and sticks, set fire to three French schools and the offices of the Orange mobile phone company. French-owned restaurants, hotels and homes were also looted as militant leader Charles Ble Goude called on his Young Patriots group to 'go and liberate Cote d'Ivoire'."

IRIN, 8 November 2004
“France sought on Monday to reassure thousands of angry Ivorian demonstrators that it was not trying to topple President Laurent Gbagbo, after a weekend of mob violence forced more than 2,000 foreigners to flee their homes.

As French troops tried to restore calm to the streets of the West African nation, French diplomats scurried to push a resolution through the UN Security Council that would impose penalties on Cote d'Ivoire, while South African President Thabo Mbeki prepared to fly into Abidjan to kick-start the battered peace process.

Ivorian youths began setting fire to French schools and businesses, looting homes and threatening foreigners on Saturday after the French army destroyed almost the entire Ivorian air force in retaliation for the killing of nine of its peacekeepers in an aerial bombardment in the northern town of Bouake.

At least 2,050 foreign residents were sheltering in French and UN military bases in Abidjan on Monday, many having been plucked by helicopter from their homes as they came under attack from angry mobs, some armed with sticks, stones and machetes.

The International Committee of the Red Cross said well over 400 people had been treated on Sunday, some for wounds from live ammunition and it appealed to be allowed to continue its activities unharmed.
Gbagbo made his first television appearance late Sunday, appealing to protesters to head home and not let themselves be provoked, but on Monday around 5,000 demonstrators lined up opposite French tanks stationed outside the Hotel Ivoire in the upmarket suburb of Cocody.

Screaming anti-French slogans and carrying banners branding the French assassins, the protesters rallied at the hotel following a morning appeal on state radio to form a human shield to protect Gbagbo, whose residence is nearby.

A diplomat at the hotel said French troops had fired shots in the air to disperse the protesters. Ivorian state television broadcast images of injured people getting to hospital. Over the weekend, it also showed the bodies of protesters who, it said, had been killed by French forces.

However it was unclear how many casualties there were.”

Inter-communal clashes displace civilians, 2002-2010

- Inter-communal violence in western Cote d'Ivoire has been on the increase since the failed coup of September 2002, continuing into 2010, displacing many hundreds of people
- Violence in the western regions of Moyen-Cavally and Dix-Huit Montagnes had originally been provoked by indisciplined bands of Liberian militiamen, but more recently has involved villagers of the local Guere tribe and settlers from Burkina Faso, Guinea and other parts of Cote d'Ivoire who grow cocoa in the region
- Thousands of immigrants were chased off their land during and soon after the crisis in 2002, and many sought refuge at the already overburdened camps in Guiglo and Nicla
- Complicated property issues in cocoa-growing areas and the proliferation of small arms have contributed to the ongoing tensions in western Cote d'Ivoire although land conflicts were also registered in the south and in the north, mainly because of tensions between farmers and cattle-breeders
- There are also examples of inter-communal violence between pastoralists and agriculturalists

UN Human Rights Council, 18 October 2006, para. 10

"The Representative of the Secretary-General concludes from various discussions he had that the causes of population displacement today are basically related to the conflict that broke out in September 2002. According to the information he received, displacement has many causes. First, people have fled areas of conflict following attacks on military facilities in Abidjan, Bouaké and Korhogo. The Representative of the Secretary-General was also informed about displacements that occurred between October 2002 and March 2003 in Abidjan after the destruction of some of the poorest districts there. In the west of the country and in the ‘zone of confidence’, which are under the control of the neutral forces of Operation Licorne and UNOCI, inter-community conflicts are also a cause of population displacement. The Representative of the Secretary-General notes, moreover, that a general sense of insecurity with regard to political developments, fear of reprisals from one of the two parties to the conflict, the dismantling of the public administration and the destruction of infrastructure in the area controlled by the Forces Nouvelles and in the zone of confidence, as well as the economic consequences of the conflict, are at the root of some of the more recent cases of displacement."

United Nations Security Council, 7 July 2009, para. 32

"Recurrent conflicts in the north between farmers and cattle-breeders over the destruction of the former’s crops by the latter’s cattle, as well as intercommunity violence fuelled by the resistance of the native population to the return of
non-native internally displaced persons, particularly in the western part of the country, threatened social cohesion in several villages. UNHCR deployed a team of 23 monitors in various parts of the west to monitor tensions and work on measures to prevent or respond to conflicts through interventions with local authorities and key partners.

**Centre-north Côte d'Ivoire (regions: Bafing, Zanzan)**

UNOCI, 8 September 2008

"Eight people were killed, 21 wounded and 400 displaced after violent confrontations between villagers from Assandogo and Marahui, 86 km from Bondoukou in eastern Côte d'Ivoire, on 3 and 5 September 2008. According to information received by a UNOCI patrol which went to Marahui yesterday, trouble started when a group of about 60 people from the Lobi community from Assandogo went to Marahui to attack members of the Koulangou community on 3 September 2008. They attacked them with machetes, 12 calibre rifles and knives and burnt down their houses. Two days later, on 5 September 2008, a larger group of Lobis returned to Marahui and carried out a second attack. Most of the displaced are taking refuge in a school in Bondoukou. UNOCI's Ghanaian battalion, which is based in the town, has donated medicines and food to the injured in hospital. The Gendarmerie is providing security to the displaced people and the National Armed Forces of Côte d'Ivoire (FANCI) has promised to send reinforcement to provide security in the village."

UN OCHA, 8 July 2007

"La cohabitation entre les éleveurs peuhls et les agriculteurs de Touba, est de plus en plus difficile. Les agriculteurs ont souvent manifesté leur mécontentement face à la dévastation des champs et des récoltes par les bœufs. Un conflit qui s'est déclenché dans la semaine du 25 au 30 juin 2007 suite au refus d'un jeune peuhl de répondre à une convocation des autorités villageoises Toranou S/P de Booko, s'est vite répandu dans 9 autres villages de ladite sous-préfecture. Les peuhls de ces villages ont été chassés, 2 cases ont été saccagées et des troupeaux de bœufs dispersés. Il faut ajouter qu'il y a eu des pertes d'argent et autres biens matériels chez les peuhls. Ce sont environ 120 personnes qui ont quitté leurs cases. Vingt déplacés se sont réfugiés à Touba et 100 autres se sont rendus à Odienné où ils vivent chez leurs compatriotes dans conditions de forte promiscuité."

**Western Côte d'Ivoire (regions: Moyen-Cavally, Dix-Huit Montagnes, Haut-Sassandra)**

Nord-Sud, 3 June 2010

descente aux environs de 16 h chez Laba Camara. Ils le somment de quitter le campement avec ses parents baoulé. Ils le rouent de coups. Son fils âgé de 23 ans est grièvement blessé. L’alerte est donnée dans les villages de Bologhélé et Bowali. Depuis hier nuit, les hommes ont décidé d’évacuer les femmes et les enfants dont des élèves à la sous-préfecture de Daloa. Au dire de Camara Moriba, d’importants dégâts ont été enregistrés à Bowali : portes fracturées, biens emportés, animaux domestiques tués et emportés. A 20 h 30, une dizaine de femmes et d’enfants a rejoint les premiers réfugiés. Le sous-préfet central, Ouasselou Gnepa a promis d’envoyer des éléments des forces de l’ordre pour sécuriser la zone.”

Nord-Sud, 23 April 2010

“Des conflits fonciers se signalent dans le département de Danané. Le 2 avril 2010, des affrontements entre jeunes autochtones et planteurs burkinabé ont fait 12 blessés à l’arme blanche dans les rangs des planteurs burkinabé. Selon les autorités locales, l’exploitation des forêts classées du Cavally et de Tiépleu sont à l’origine de cette situation qui a mis à mal la cohésion sociale dans le département. Aux dires de certains planteurs burkinabé, des cadres des villages situés dans les périphéries des deux forêts classées, notamment des localités de Gopoupleu et Konhouleu auraient armé des jeunes de machettes et de fusils calibre 12 pour faire sortir de force tous ceux qui occupent des parcelles dans ces forêts classées. « Pendant l’opération, plusieurs dégâts matériels ont été constatés.

L’origine du conflit

Des cases détruites, une cinquantaine de vélos et motos, plus de cent téléphones portables et la somme de 3.500.000 Fcfa ont été emportés » révèlent nos sources. Les Burkinabé, selon eux, n’ont pas riposté. Néanmoins, ils pointent un doigt accusateur sur un cadre en la personne de Sohou Vassi. Pendant le déguerpissement initié par les cadres, des dérives ont été constatées. « Des commerçants ont été priés de fermer leur boutique et de quitter le village. Des planteurs qui exercent en dehors des forêts classées n’ont pas été épargnés. Des pillards en ont profité pour emporter nos biens », dénonce un planteur burkinabé venu de Konhouleu. Les autorités politiques et administratives du département, saisies de l’affaire, ont alerté l’ambassadeur du Burkina Faso, SEM Emile Ilboudo par l’intermédiaire du ministre de l’Intérieur, Désiré Tagro. Le diplomate s’est rendu immédiatement sur les lieux pour constater les faits et trouver une solution à cette situation conflictuelle. SEM Emile Ilboudo, lors de sa rencontre avec les populations, a demandé à ses compatriotes qui occupent des parcelles dans les forêts classées de les quitter. « Tous ceux qui, de manière cavalière et clandestine, ont profité de la crise pour s’infiltrer dans les forêts classées doivent immédiatement quitter ces forêts. Nous n’allons pas vous encourager à y rester surtout que les autorités vous demandent de quitter ces lieux. Une forêt classée, selon la législation ivoirienne et même du Burkina ne doit en aucun cas être infiltrée ou exploitée par qui que ce soit. Elle doit être protégée et nul ne doit l’agresser. En un mot, il est formellement interdit de pénétrer ces forêts. Je demande au préfet d’avoir des rencontres avec les différents responsables pour que nos discours ne souffrent d’aucune ambiguïté. Parce que nous voulons la paix aujourd’hui et demain pour nous, nos enfants et nos petits enfants », a souligné le diplomate burkinabé.

Le préfet du département de Danané, Konaté Sékou, s’est dit heureux de cette visite de l’ambassadeur qui lui permet désormais d’avoir les coudées franches pour résoudre ce problème d’occupation des forêts classées qui menace la paix sociale dans son département. « Je voudrais demander à la communauté burkinabé que quelle que soit la frustration qu’elle aurait subie, qu’elle garde son sang-froid et saisisse les autorités administratives afin qu’ensemble, l’on puisse trouver une solution pacifique. Je vais donner des instructions au commandant de secteur, le capitaine Eddy Meddi, afin qu’il puisse conduire ces opérations de libération des forêts classées. Les agents des eaux et forêts et la Sodefor n’étant pas redéployés ici. Aux autochtones, vous devez comprendre que nul ne doit se faire justice », a indiqué le préfet. Tous les problèmes seront résolus de manière pacifique comme le recommande le maire Delly Jacques par ailleurs chef de province de Danané.
Les solutions
« Nous voulons que tous ceux qui, d’une manière ou d’une autre, occupent des parcelles dans la forêt quittent. Mais le déguerpissement doit se faire de manière pacifique et sans heurts. Les Burkinabé ont toujours vécu en parfaite harmonie avec nous et c’est seulement pendant cette période de crise que ces migrants agricoles qui s’attaquent aux forêts classées sont venus mener ces actions de nature à troubler la paix », rappelle le premier magistrat. « Nous devons préserver la fraternité et l’amitié qui nous lient au peuple burkinabé », recommande-t-il. Le porte-parole des cadres, Sohou Vassi, a dénoncé « l’occupation inacceptable des forêts classées par des individus qui sont en train de la transformer en jachère sans valeur ». Il reconnaît tout de même qu’il existe plusieurs communautés dans les forêts classées dont des autochtones Yacouba. « Ce sont eux qui seront les premiers à être déguerpis sans équivoque », a-t-il martelé. La communauté burkinabé de Danané, par la voix de son porte-parole, Zougrana François, a demandé pardon à la communauté Dan pour l’offense qu’elle aurait subie de sa part. Elle a par ailleurs exprimé sa reconnaissance et sa gratitude au corps préfectoral, aux chefs traditionnels et religieux qui ont œuvré à éviter un bain de sang. « Nous nous engageons devant notre ambassadeur à travailler dans le sens de la consolidation de la paix sociale dans les localités où nous vivons », a-t-il assuré.

Après la rencontre avec les populations, l’ambassadeur Emile Ilboudo a eu un tête-à-tête avec les chefs de la communauté burkinabé à qui il a demandé de vulgariser son message selon lequel ses compatriotes doivent travailler à la consolidation de la paix par le respect des lois de leur pays d’accueil. Pour ceux qui ont perdu leurs biens et les innocentes victimes, le diplomate a indiqué qu’il entend saisir les autorités compétentes afin de résoudre leurs préoccupations au cas par cas. »

UN OCHA, 6 October 2008
“En réponse à la situation de conflit intercommunautaire latent qui prévaut à Seoun Guiglo entre autochtones et allochtones/allogènes, une mission conjointe CARE international et OCHA s’est rendue le 29 septembre 2008 dans le village de Seoun Guiglo et dans le campement Petit Guézon. Il ressort de cette mission que la cohésion sociale est en mal dans la zone entre les communautés sus citées. Un problème foncier serait à la base de ce malaise. En effet, aux dires des autochtones guéré du village de Seoun Guiglo, les populations allogènes exploient illicITEMENT leurs forêts. Les allogènes quant à eux, estiment exploiter légalement ces forêts qu’ils ont achetées avec les autochtones et que ces braquages sont des manœuvres pour les obliger à fuir les forêts. Les braquages et tueries orchestrés par un gang qui serait installé dans la forêt depuis trois ans, ont envenimé la situation vu que les victimes seraient uniquement des allogènes/allochtones. D’où des suspicions de part et d’autre, les uns estimant que les braquages/tueries sont organisés pour dissuader les populations de poursuivre l’exploitation de la forêt, les autres se disant innocents estimaient que des représailles seraient en cours de préparation.

Compté tenu de la tension perceptible entre les autochtones et allogènes et dans la crainte des représailles, des mouvements de populations (Nombre non encore déterminé) seraient constatés dans le village de Seoun Guiglo depuis le 21 septembre 2008 en direction des localités de Dioureuzon, Guéhiéblo, Guinglo Sropan, Dah Zagna et Bangolo. Le dernier braquage (voir sitrep n°39 du 22 au 28 septembre 09) qui a coûté la vie à 3 personnes et la disparition de 4 autres serait l’élément de trop qui a amené les populations étrangères dans leur ensemble, à prendre des dispositions pour leur propre sécurisation. La mission a effectivement constaté que les populations de Seoun Guiglo ont quitté le village, pour se réfugier dans les villages voisins.”

US Department of State, 11 March 2008
"New population displacements continued on a regular basis in the western region, particularly in the area around Guiglo and in the former ZOC, although on a much smaller scale than had occurred in previous years. Persons who had settled on abandoned plantations during the crisis were themselves displaced by returning landowners. During the year confusion over land tenure caused significant tension in the region as ethnically different returning communities and those who were never displaced were required to negotiate a new and delicate balance of power.

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Although the origin of most disputes appeared to be economic, generally resulting from issues of land tenure and access to arable farmland, most of these conflicts also cut along ethnic lines."

**UNOCI, 29 January 2008**

"A group of forty people led by a local militia leader made death threats against villagers in Douekpé, western Côte d'Ivoire, on 25 January 2008, forcing them to flee into the bush. According to Military Observers who visited the village, members of the group had allegedly provided security in the village during the Ivorian crisis, and deliberately threatened the villagers in order to draw the attention of government to their grievance: they claim they have not been paid by the authorities for the work they did. The village chief has requested protection from the Bangolo Mixed Brigade and increased patrols by the Impartial Forces. MORBATT is closely monitoring the situation."

**UN Human Rights Council, 18 October 2006, para. 11**

"Many observers have drawn attention to the land-related conflicts that have given rise to a large number of displacements, especially in the west, a highly agricultural area. Many people are reported to have been chased from their homes in Moyen Cavammy region since 2003, often by gangs of youths or by village or ethnic-based self-defence committees. Recent events in late 2004 and in 2005 have also given rise to displacements in the regions of Guiglo, Bôléquin and Duékoué. In this region, the land issue continues to give rise to further displacements following inter-community clashes and criminal attacks. The Representative of the Secretary-General also observed that, while the recent crisis in the country has had an impact on internal displacement, especially as a result of political groups exploiting the problem for political ends, the land issue and subsequent inter-community conflicts predate the crisis."

**OCHA, 13 March 2006**

"L'Ouest du pays reste le théâtre de déplacements des populations en raison des affrontements entre les différentes communautés ethniques. Dans la nuit du 05 au 06 février 2006, le campement de Peehapa du village Mona, situé à environ 17 km de Guiglo a été attaqué par des individus non encore identifiés. Au total, 12 personnes appartenant aux communautés Guéré et Gnaboua (ethnie minoritaire ivoirienne) ont été tuées et il y a eu plusieurs autres blessées. Cette attaque a provoqué un mouvement de population dans la zone. Une vingtaine des familles déplacées a été signalée par le comité de crise de la mairie de Guiglo. Les familles déplacées ont trouvé refuge dans des familles d'accueil. Les autorités politico-administratives et militaires de Guiglo ont ouvert une enquête qui se poursuit.

Suite à l'attaque de Peehapa, un groupe des jeunes des villages de Zouan et de Monan situé à une dizaine de kilomètres à l'ouest de Guiglo se sont mobilisés le 13 février 2006, pour aller attaquer le Centre d'Accueil Temporaire (CATD) à Guiglo. Selon les rapports des FDS, les jeunes voulaient se venger de l'assassinat de leurs douze (12) parents dans le campement de Peehapa une semaine avant. Ils accusaient les burkinabés d'être les auteurs de ce massacre. Les autorités locales (mairie, préfecture et FDS) informées des menaces, se sont rendues sur le lieu et ont contenu les jeunes. Les autorités locales restent en contact avec le comité de déplacés et ont promis de continuer à assurer leur sécurité. "

**Human Rights Watch, 3 June 2005**

"In the past week alone, renewed clashes between local indigenous groups and farm workers from the north and neighbouring countries have brought the total number of dead in western Côte d'Ivoire since February to at least 89. Ethnic tension in this fertile cocoa-producing region predates the civil war between northern-based rebels and the Ivorian government, which is primarily composed of officials from the south and west.

Despite the end of the war in 2003, tension has remained high between indigenous groups in the west and the northern and foreign-born workers who for decades have worked on the local cacao
plantations. In recent years, this tension has been both exploited and exacerbated by the country’s political and military divisions.

[...]
At least three waves of communal violence have broken out in Côte d’Ivoire in the last four months. On February 28, an attack by government-backed militia on the rebel-held town of Logoualé sparked ethnically motivated attacks between the indigenous Wê tribe and immigrant farm workers, mostly from Burkina Faso, that caused some 16 deaths. The violence also caused more than 13,000 villagers to flee, and left several villages in flames. In late April, several days of interethic fighting around Duékoué resulted in the death of at least 15 people from the indigenous Guéré and Northern Dioula tribes.

The latest wave began one week ago when Guéré tribesmen allegedly killed at least four farmers from the Senoufo ethnic tribe, which originates from the northern part of the country. On May 31, unidentified men attacked the two largely Guéré villages of Guitrozon and Petit Duékoué, shooting, stabbing or burning to death at least 41. This in turn triggered more attacks against Dioulas and Burkinabe (those originally from Burkina Faso), which on June 1 claimed at least another 11 lives.

[...]
The western region of Côte d’Ivoire, the heart of the country’s vital cocoa and coffee industry, is a zone of smoldering instability which, if ignited, could engulf the whole sub-region. For decades, immigrants from Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Guinea have provided cheap labor for local landowners, which helped turn Côte d’Ivoire into the world’s leading cocoa producer.

However, competition over land rights, economic decline and the 2002-2003 civil war resulted in ever-increasing ethnic tension. As a result, both indigenous groups and immigrant farmers have organized themselves into militias and self-defense groups resulting in a lethal tit-for-tat dynamic between the groups. Western Côte d’Ivoire saw the heaviest fighting in the months after the September 2002 rebellion.”

Southern Côte d’Ivoire (regions: Bas-Sassandra, Agnéby)

UNOCI, 21 September 2007, paras. 47-48
"Le mercredi 30 août, le corps sans vie d’Olivier Ayekoué Kouadio a été découvert dans un puits près du quartier Dioulakro, à Moapé, village situé dans la Sous-Préfecture d’Adzopé. Les autochtones ont aussitôt organisé une expédition punitive contre les allogènes qu’ils ont accusés d’être à l’origine de ce drame. Ce conflit a entraîné le déplacement interne de plus de 100 familles qui se sont réfugiées à la gendarmerie d’Adzopé avant d’être accueillies par leurs communautés respectives. La situation étant redevenue calme, les familles ont commencé à regagner le village de Moapé au mois de septembre.

Une personne de l’ethnie Abouré a été tuée le dimanche 10 septembre au cours d'affrontements entre les communautés Abouré et Gwa, dans la localité d’Alépé. Ce décès a été confirmé par le Commandant Guy Tanny, de la Compagnie de la Gendarmerie nationale d’Alépé. Il s’agirait selon lui, de vieux conflits interethniques qui éclatent de façon sporadique.”

OCHA, 13 March 2006
"En janvier 2006 le département de Tabou a connu les mouvements importants des populations suite aux tensions inter-communautaires. Les affrontements inter-communautaires à Yakro le 19 janvier 2006, entre les lobi (groupe ethnique du nord de la Côte d’Ivoire avec des ramifications au Burkina Faso) et les populations considérées comme « allogènes » (baoulé et abron) et « autochtones » (krumen), ont fait 09 morts et plusieurs blessés. Face à la dégradation de la situation sécuritaire, les populations de Yaokro ont fui leur campement pour se réfugier dans les villages voisins et ensuite à la mission catholique de Tabou. Pendant les premiers jours, 153 déplacés avaient été enregistrés sur le site de la mission catholique. Les déplacés étaient pris en
charge par le HCR et la mission catholique. La mission du PAM sur le terrain les 26-28 janvier 2006 a confirmé les faits.

A la fin du mois de février 2006, les déplacés ont quitté le site de la mission. Toutefois, IRC-Tabou a rapporté que le village de Niplou (approximativement 35 km de Tabou) reste toujours vide de presque toute sa population (environ 289 personnes) qui a trouvé le refuge dans les villages environnants, notamment à Béséréké (25 km de Tabou) pour des raisons de sécurité. Selon les autorités locales de Déholinké, les populations n’ont pas accès à leurs champs parce que des hommes armés (apparemment des lobis) les empêchent d’y accéder.

POPULATION FIGURES AND PROFILE

Global figures

Total number of IDPs is undetermined (May 2010)

UNHCR estimates the number of remaining IDPs in June 2010 at 519’100. However, available statistics on the number of remaining IDPs only refer to the West and no data is available on the some 300,000 to 440,000 who had been displaced to Abidjan. Moreover, there are no comprehensive statistics on return movements. Therefore the total number of people still internally displaced in Cote d’Ivoire remains unknown.

UNHCR, Global Report 2009, UNHCR Fundraising Reports, 1 June 2010

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<td>Returnees (refugee)</td>
<td>Various</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>710,810</td>
<td>710,560</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

UNHCR Global Appeal 2010-2011, December 2009

Planning figures

“As at the end of March 2010, a total of 89,668 internally displaced persons had returned voluntarily to their areas of origin. A remaining caseload of approximately 31,000 persons continued to live with host families, primarily in the departments of Bôleëquin and Guiglo in the west.”

OCHA in 2010, December 2009
“Out of 120,000 IDPs in the western regions of the country, more than 80,000 have returned but still have protection and social cohesion needs.”
"The remaining caseload of approximately 40,000 internally displaced persons continued to live with host families, particularly in the departments of Bloléquin and Guiglo."

**Basic humanitarian indicators for Côte d'Ivoire**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>20.8 million (26% immigrants)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under-five mortality</td>
<td>125 p/1,000 (DSRP 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maternal mortality</td>
<td>543/100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV/AIDS estimates</td>
<td>Adults aged 15 to 49 prevalence rate: 3.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>480,000 people living with HIV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>38,000 deaths due to AIDS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>420,000 orphans due to AIDS aged 0 to 17 (UNAIDS 2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy at birth</td>
<td>48 years (World Bank 2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevalence of under-nourishment in total population</td>
<td>17.5% global acute malnutrition in the North (SMART survey July 2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross national income per capita (Atlas method)</td>
<td>$910 (World Bank 2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %)</td>
<td>2.7% (World Bank)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of population living with less than 1 Euro per day</td>
<td>48.9% (ENV 2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of population with sustainable access to an improved drinking water source</td>
<td>61% (2008 &amp; DSRP 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDPs (number and percentage of total population) in west Côte D'Ivoire</td>
<td>Approximately 42,000 persons (OCHA 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>In-country: 24,811 refugees of which 98% Liberian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>297 others (UNHCR December 2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007/2008 UNDP Human Development Index score</td>
<td>0.432: 166th of 177 – low (UNDP HDR 2007/2008)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Some 600,000 people are still displaced (April 2009)

There are no comprehensive statistics on return movements and therefore no clear number of people still internally displaced in Cote d’Ivoire. The estimate of around 600,000 is obtained by subtracting the number of registered IDPs who have returned to western Cote d’Ivoire (77,860) and that of redeployed civil servants (18,343) from the figure calculated by ENSEA in 2006 (709,377). It is unclear how many of the new displaced are currently still so.

UN OCHA, April 2009:

UN SC, 15 April 2008, para. 24

"Out of the 24,437 civil servants who had been displaced during the conflict, only 6,094 have yet to return to their posts throughout the country."

IDP number remains 709,000 for planning purposes (January 2008)

- UNFPA-funded study published in March 2006 puts total number of IDPs at 709,377 in five key government-held zones (Abidjan, Daloa, Duékoué, Tôubè and Yamoussoukro).
- Figure subsequently revised to 750,000 in the Mid-Year Review of the UN Consolidated Appeal
- In their planning exercises for 2008, humanitarian agencies keep the IDP figure of 709,000.

There are no country-wide statistics on the number of IDPs in Cote d’Ivoire nor comprehensive data on return movements. Humanitarian agencies are therefore retaining the number for 709,000 for planning purposes.
UNHCR, 24 January 2008, p.24
"UNHCR will further reinforce its leadership role to pursue protection on behalf of some 700,000 IDPs in the centre, western, south-western and northern Cote d'Ivoire."

UN OCHA, 10 December 2007, p.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>15,366,000 persons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under five mortality</td>
<td>195 p/1,000 (UNICEF 2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Life expectancy</td>
<td>45.9 years (UNDP Human Development Report 2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevalence of under-nourishment in total population</td>
<td>13% (FAO Statistical Division 2004 estimate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross national income per capita</td>
<td>$870 (World Bank Key Development Data and Statistics 2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of population living on less than $1 per day</td>
<td>14.8% (WHO Statistical Information System 2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of population without sustainable access to an improved drinking water source</td>
<td>84% (MDG 2004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDPs (number and percent of population)</td>
<td>709,380 (4.6%) (UNHCR 2006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>In-country: 24,155 Liberians and 453 others (UNHCR August 2007)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abroad: 15,000 (UNHCR 2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECHO Vulnerability and Crisis Index score</td>
<td>3/3 (most severe rank)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006 UNDP Human Development Index score</td>
<td>0.421: 164 of 177 – low (UNDP Human Development Report 2006)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

UNHCR, 23 March 2007, p.6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of population</th>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Dec 2007</th>
<th>To be assisted by UNHCR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total in country</td>
<td>Total in country</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Western, northern and central Cote d'Ivoire</td>
<td>709,000</td>
<td>509,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returnees (IDPs)</td>
<td>Western, northern and central Cote d'Ivoire</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>200,000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>709,300</td>
<td>709,000*</td>
<td>235,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*200,000 IDPs are expected return only if political stability and the reunification of the country are reached.

UN, 18 July 2006
"One of the main challenges in Côte d’Ivoire at present is to extend and diversify humanitarian responses to better address the needs of returning IDPs and host communities at a time when, each year, an additional 2% of the population is falling below the poverty line. According to a new baseline survey, the total figure of IDPs in Côte d’Ivoire – originally believed to be close to 500,000 – is now estimated at 750,000 with less than 10% living in transit camps and more than 90% being hosted by families. Each host family on average cares for about six IDPs, while about 30% of displaced children are not attending school."
More than 1 million Ivorians were estimated to be displaced at the height of the conflict (2003)

UN OCHA 8 May 2003
“Relief agencies estimate that between 700,000 and one million people were forced to flee their homes by the fighting and seek refuge in other parts of the country - mainly the government-held south.”

UN OCHA, 10 January 2003
“The scale of displacement in Cote d’Ivoire is both large and rapid. Out of a population of 16 million, an estimated 600,000 were displaced internally by the end of November. Fighting in the west since then has caused further population movements, currently estimated at an additional 500,000. The total number of IDPs topped 1.1 million by the beginning of January.”

Geographical distribution

Some 31,000 IDPs in the West by the end of March 2010 (May 2010)

“As at the end of March 2010, a total of 89,668 internally displaced persons had returned voluntarily to their areas of origin. A remaining caseload of approximately 31,000 persons continued to live with host families, primarily in the departments of Bloléquin and Guiglo in the west.”

UN OCHA, 21 July 2009, p. 2
“Basic humanitarian indicators for Côte d’Ivoire

- Population: 20.8 million persons (of which 26% immigrants) [DSRP 2009]
- Under-five mortality: 125 p/1,000 543/100,000 [DSRP 2009]
- Maternal mortality: Adults aged 15 to 49 prevalence rate: 3.9% 480,000 people living with HIV 38,000 deaths due to AIDS 420,000 orphans due to AIDS aged 0 to 17 [UNAIDS 2008]
- Life expectancy at birth: 48 years [World Bank 2007]
- Prevalence of under-nourishment in total population: 17.5% global acute malnutrition in the North [SMART survey July 2008]
- Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %): 2.7% [World Bank]
- Percentage of population living with less than 1 Euro per day: 48.9.8% [ENV 2008]
- Proportion of population with sustainable access to an improved drinking water source: 61% [ENV 2008 & DSRP 2009]
IDPs (number and percentage of total population) in west Côte d'Ivoire

- Approximately 42,000 persons [OCHA 2009]

Refugees

- In-country: 24,811 refugees of which 98% Liberian
- 297 others [UNHCR December 2008]

2007/2008 UNDP Human Development Index score

- 0.432: 166th of 177 – low [UNDP HDR 2007/2008]

OCHA, 13 January 2009:

"According to the statistiques done by IRC/CARE return and reintegration 2006-2008 project in the province of Montagnes and Moyen Cavally delivered on 20 November 2008, there were 27,457 registered IDPs and welcome in the following locations (by geographical area): Zou (44.72%), Diéouzon (39.62%), Duékoué (15.66%)."

Up to some 440,000 people still displaced in Abidjan, highest proportion in Yopougon and Abobo (2008)

- A survey conducted in June 2007 in Abidjan found between 299,937 and 440,414 IDPs living in the city.
- The estimate is likely to be conservative given the number of households used for the sampling and the fact that the survey did not include in the questionnaire IDPs hosted by non-IDPs.
- IDPs were found in all of the communes of Abidjan except in Treichville, with higher proportions in Yopougon and Abobo.

Tufts University/IDMC, September 2008, p. 33

"We used our proportion of 9.7% to estimate the number of IDPs in Abidjan, based on the available census population estimates. The last national census was conducted in 1998, when the ten communes of Abidjan were found to have 577,258 households and 2,877,948 individuals. The official estimate for 2003 was 3,660,682 (which included the three sub prefectures outside of Abidjan City, not included in the 1998 count), and the 2006 estimate was 3,796,677.

Using the 2006 household estimate, we divide the expected population of Abidjan by our calculated proportion of IDPs to get (3,796,677/0.097) = 368,277. Using a confidence interval of + or - 1.85%, and our expected range of 7.9 and 11.6, we calculate that IDPs are in the range of 299,937 - 440,414.

This compares with the UNFPA/ENSEA study, conducted in 2005, which estimated a total number of 495,783 IDPs for Abidjan. Our estimates occurred two years later, and in the context of some return movements that had already started.

Based on using a household number of 8, as indicated in our sample, the IDP household estimate is thus 46,034, in the range of 37,492 - 55,051.

Our estimate is likely to be conservative for two reasons. First, we used a household number of 8 based on our sample findings; if we used the census number of 5, the number of households would be much higher.

Second, IDPs are also hosted in non-IDP households, but we did not include them in our estimate because unfortunately we realized the importance of this factor only after we had begun the survey, and thus could only ask the question of a subset of respondents. One third of our sample (n= 332), in four communes were asked whether any member of their households were IDPs and
if so, how many. Of the 37 who said they were hosting IDPs, 11 were themselves IDPs according to our criteria. This means 26 or 7.8% of the sub-sample of 332 were non-IDPs hosting IDPs, as shown in Table 4.1. These non-IDPs hosted a total of 105 IDPs, or a mean number of 3 IDPs per non-IDP household. This would add a substantial number to our estimate of IDPs, if not IDP households.

If we added these IDPs to our total IDPs in the sample, we would get an increased proportion of individuals in the sample, but since we are using IDP households as our unit of analysis to obtain the estimate, we will simply bear this number in mind.

p. 31

As shown in Table 3.2 and Chart 3.1, we found IDPs in all of the communes of Abidjan except Treichville. The communes with the highest proportion were Yopougon and Abobo, and those with the lowest proportion were Port Bouet and Marcory.

Table 3.2 IDPs by commune in Abidjan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Attacoube</th>
<th>Cocody</th>
<th>Marcory</th>
<th>Koumassi</th>
<th>Adjame</th>
<th>Abobo</th>
<th>Yopougn</th>
<th>Treichville</th>
<th>Prtbet</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of IDPs</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% IDPs in commune</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of all IDPs</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>12.6%</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>25.3</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chart 3.1 Distribution of IDPs in communes of Abidjan

Abidjan hosts almost 70 per cent of IDPs in government-held south (November 2006)

- IDPs are generally concentrated in urban areas with almost 70% in Abidjan
- Rural IDPs are more numerically relevant in the other departments
"Au total, environ 709 377 personnes ont été accueillies dans des ménages avec une proportion relativement importante (67,5 %) pour le département d’Abidjan. Cette population déplacée est composée de 48 % d’hommes et de 52 % de femmes. La supériorité numérique de la population féminine est constatée dans tous les départements. Les PDIs sont dans l’ensemble concentrées en milieu urbain (81% des déplacés) : ceci est lié au poids démographique de la ville d’Abidjan et des possibilités offertes pour les accueillir. En revanche, la population rurale des déplacés est numériquement plus élevée dans les autres départements exception faite de Duékoué (43%) : Daloa 68%, Toulépleu 71%, Yamoussoukro 55%. Un quart des PDIs sont des enfants de moins de 10 ans. Les jeunes de moins de 25 ans représentent 62% des déplacés. Par ailleurs, parmi les 709 377 PDIs, 51 037 sont des enfants nés après le déplacement des parents. Par conséquent, l’ajustement de l’estimation des Personnes Déplacées Internes, après déflation de l’effectif de ces enfants, conduit à 658 340 déplacés internes."

The table below presents recent statistics on displaced persons registered in the zone [west] by various sources:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Locality of origin of IDPs</th>
<th>Current places of residence in the West Zone</th>
<th>Total Number Registered</th>
<th>Source/Observations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zarabaon County (Zou)</td>
<td>San Pedro</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>IOM Figures, Extract summary table, registered on July 2006.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Duekoué</td>
<td>1,161</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bangolo</td>
<td>220</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Guiglo</td>
<td>6,987</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Blolequin</td>
<td>1,003</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Abidjan</td>
<td>1,907</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>11,549</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Natives</td>
<td>Duékoué-Guiglo-Blolequin</td>
<td>46,958</td>
<td>8,426 families IOM Figures, April 2006.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Natives and Foreigners</td>
<td>CATD</td>
<td>7,092</td>
<td>1,107 families; IOM Figures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various Localities</td>
<td>Bangolo</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>ICRC, August 06 Displaced persons and affected families.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Centre d’Accueil Temporaire des Déplacés in Guiglo closes but IDPs still remain (October 2008)

- In mid-2003, Guiglo's local authorities and Moyen Cavally's Prefect granted the use of a piece of land close to the village of Nicla for the construction of an IDP camp
Between August and December 2003, the 8,000 IDPs who were occupying public buildings in Guiglo were all transferred to the Centre d'Accueil Temporaire des Déplacés (CATD).

The Centre was officially closed in July 2008 although at the end of September there were still 90 families living there.

**OCHA, October 2008**
"Since the official closure of the CATD at the end of July 2008, the inter-agency coordination meeting has decided to make an assessment/identification of IDPs who did not choose to return to their village of origin and listen to better document the reasons for their decision and desire in terms of support. The result was given to a small group (UNHCR, OCHA, UNOCI/DH, OIM) under the protection cluster and said that 190 families, about 777 people, were still present."

**IOM, 1 August 2008**
"IOM’s Centre for Assistance to Temporarily Displaced Persons (CATD) in the western town of Guiglo has closed its doors exactly a year after the official reunification of the country.

The centre, which opened in December 2003, provided humanitarian assistance to thousands of mostly West African migrant workers who fled ethnic strife in 2002 and 2003. At its peak, it hosted up to 7,900 internally displaced people (IDPs), whom IOM subsequently helped to return and reintegrate in Western Côte d’Ivoire."

**IOM, October 2007, p. 2**
"A la moitié de l’année 2003, les autorités municipales de Guiglo ainsi que le Préfet de la Région du Moyen Cavally, dont les bâtiments administratifs étaient occupés par les déplacés, ont octroyé un terrain de 8 ha proche du centre de transit du HCR (5 ha) sur la route du village de Nicla pour construire un centre d’accueil des déplacés. L’aménagement de ce nouveau site a été financé par le HCR et l’UNICEF, tandis que la réalisation a été confiée à la GTZ. Ces deux sites mitoyens constituent le Centre d’Accueil Temporaire des Déplacés (CATD) de Guiglo.

Entre août et décembre 2003, les 8,000 déplacés qui occupaient les sites de la Mairie, de la Préfecture de Région et de la mission catholique de Guiglo, ont été installés sur le CATD. En décembre 2003, le recensement effectué par les partenaires humanitaires sur place, établissait : Nicla 1 (centre de transit du HCR), 4800 personnes; Nicla 2 (nouveau centre), 3 200 personnes, soit un total de 8 000 PDI dont 95% originaires du Burkina Faso et particulièrement stigmatisées, dans un grand dénuement et ayant été victimes, pour certaines, de violences, de vols et de viols.

Dès la réunion de coordination du 23 septembre 2003 à Abidjan à laquelle participaient, outre OIM, OCHA, ECHO, HCR, PAM, UNICEF, GTZ, CICR, Coopération belge, MERLIN, l’évaluation de la situation des personnes déplacées de Guiglo faite par les participants, a conclu au besoin d’un gestionnaire du CATD. Il a été alors demandé à l’OIM d’organiser le CATD et d’en assurer la gestion au quotidien, y compris l’approvisionnement des populations en vivres et non – vivres, l’achèvement des infrastructures minimales (notamment eau & assainissement), la coordination des activités des différents intervenants humanitaires, les relations avec les autorités locales... La gestion quotidienne du CATD et par conséquent l’assistance aux déplacés du CATD par l’OIM, a donc débuté en décembre 2003 sur un financement ECHO. Cette assistance d’urgence conduite par l’OIM depuis, se fait avec les apports du PAM, de l’UNICEF, de MSF et de Save The Children-UK (SCUK)."

**Disaggregated data**
Demographic data of IDPs (June 2010)

- According to UNHCR statistics, more than half of the 519,100 remaining IDPs in June 2010 are women.
- In Abidjan, the average age of IDP men is 37 while IDP women are on average 36 years old.
- IDPs are more likely to be married or co-habiting with another person.
- IDP households tend to have more children than non-IDP households (nine to eight).

UNHCR, 1 June 2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of population</th>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Of whom assisted by UNHCR</th>
<th>Per cent female</th>
<th>Per cent under 18</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>24,000</td>
<td>24,000</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asylum-seekers</td>
<td>Various</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>519,400</td>
<td>519,400</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returned ex-IDPs including returned IDPs</td>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>166,800</td>
<td>166,800</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returns (refugees)</td>
<td>Various</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>710,810</td>
<td>710,560</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tufts University/IDMC, September 2008, pp. 34-35

"As shown in Table 5.1, IDPs did not differ statistically from non-IDPs in age or marital status. For both groups the average age of men was 37, and for women there was slight variation - 35 years for non-IDP women and 36 for IDP women. Approximately half of the sample (49% of non-IDPs, 53% of IDPs) was married or co-habiting with another person.

IDP households tended to have more children. Although the table indicates that IDPs have slightly larger households, with an average of nine members compared with eight for non-IDPs, it is not a statistically significant difference.

Table 5.1 Demographic comparison of IDPs and non-IDPs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Non-IDPs (n=879)</th>
<th>IDPs (n=95)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent male respondents</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean age (Std dev: 13)</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td>35.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marital status</td>
<td>% married or living with someone</td>
<td>49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Children</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>2.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Std dev</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Range</td>
<td>0-17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number in household</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>8.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SD</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>range</td>
<td>1-45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ethnicity of IDPs in Abidjan (2008)

- IDPs in Abidjan tend to be Baoule (from central Cote d'Ivoire), Guere (western regions), Yacouba (western regions), Bete (west-central Cote d'Ivoire) and Agni (eastern regions)

Tufts University/IDMC, September 2008, pp.31-32

"As shown in Table 3.3, ethnic groups with the highest proportion of IDPs are the Baoule (26% of our IDPs were Baoule, and of those who identified themselves as Baoule, 17% were IDPs), the Guere (20% of the IDP group and 38% of Guere respondents), Yacouba (14% of the IDP group and 43% of Yacouba respondents). By contrast, the Agni comprised 6% of the IDP sample (which was close to their proportion of the total sample) and only 9% of the Agni "qualified" as IDPs. The Bete, also a significant ethnic group in Abidjan (9% of total sample), comprised only 6.3% of the IDP sample and 5.6% of Bete respondents were IDPs.

Table 3.3. Ethnicity of IDPs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>% of total sample (n=974)</th>
<th>% of IDP sample (n=95)</th>
<th>% of Ethnic group that are IDPs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baoulé</td>
<td>15.1%</td>
<td>26.0%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guéré</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yacouba</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bété</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agni</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chart 3.2 shows the breakdown of the four main ethnic groups in Abidjan. The other ethnic groups comprised smaller percentages of IDPs, ranging from 0-5%.
Our IDP variable combined people who had been displaced from the conflict zones with those who had been displaced as a result of government forced relocation within Abidjan. When we analized only those who had been displaced from the conflict zones north of Abidjan, our results did not differ significantly.

Demographic data of IDPs in government zones (March 2006)

- The majority of IDPs surveyed were aged between 0-4 years and 15-19 years (13 per cent in each category)
- 50 per cent of host family members were aged between 15-30 years
- One in five heads of household (of host families) were women
- The vast majority of IDPs were directly related to the head of their host family

ENSEA, March 2006

* Structure par sexe et âge

Les groupes d’âge dominants dans la population des déplacés sont ceux compris entre 0 et 4 ans et 15 et 19 ans (13% chacun). Au sein de ces âges, les effectifs par sexe sont quasiment identiques (13% de femmes contre 12% d’hommes). En outre, une personne sur deux a moins de 20 ans. En considérant la population non déplacée, il apparaît une faible proportion d’enfants âgés de 0 à 5 ans. Elle est deux fois moins importante que dans la population déplacée. Par ailleurs, la majorité des personnes non déplacées se situe dans la tranche de 15 à 30 ans (50% de la population non déplacée). Par ailleurs, avant 30 ans, il existe plus de femmes que d’hommes parmi les déplacés ; cette tendance est inversée chez les non déplacés.

Caractéristique des ménages
Les ménages de plus de 8 membres sont majoritaires (16%), suivis de ceux comportant 3 personnes (14%) et des unités regroupant 5 individus (13%). L’âge moyen des chefs de ménage est de 45 ans ; 39,5% d’entre eux n’ont jamais été scolarisés. À Daloa et à Toulépleu, cette proportion est relativement importante et atteint 47%. Il ressort qu’une femme sur cinq est chef de ménage. C’est à Yamoussoukro que cette proportion est la plus élevée (31% des chefs de ménage). Chez les déplacés, les personnes sans lien de parenté avec le chef de ménage et son épouse sont en faible proportion dans l’ensemble (2%). Toutefois, le département de Toulépleu reste une exception avec 19% dans l’ensemble et 27% dans son milieu rural. Enfin, la proportion de chefs de ménage occupés a connu une baisse significative de 12%. La baisse la plus importante (25%) est survenue à Duékoué suivie d’Abidjan (13%).
PATTERNS OF DISPLACEMENT

General

Vast majority of IDPs live with host families or communities (May 2010)

- Of the estimated 700,000 IDPs in Côte d'Ivoire, only a small number have been housed in camps. The vast majority of IDPs have and continue to live with host families or communities.
- In Abidjan, a survey conducted in June 2007 found that non-IDP households were hosting 3 IDPs each on average. The question, however, was not included for all of the communes investigated.
- IDP movements have been mainly registered around conflict areas where IDPs have settled in villages and towns nearby their areas of origin.
- In general, displaced men from ‘Vallée du Bandama’ have relocated to urban areas while those from ‘Haut Sassandra’ have preferred to remain in rural areas.

“A remaining caseload of approximately 31,000 persons continued to live with host families, primarily in the departments of Bloléquin and Guiglo in the west.”

Tufts University/IDMC, September 2008, pp. 33-34
“IDPs are also hosted in non-IDP households, but we did not include them in our estimate because unfortunately we realized the importance of this factor only after we had begun the survey, and thus could only ask the question of a subset of respondents. One third of our sample (n= 332), in four communes were asked whether any member of their households were IDPs and if so, how many. Of the 37 who said they were hosting IDPs, 11 were themselves IDPs according to our criteria. This means 26 or 7.8% of the sub-sample of 332 were non-IDPs hosting IDPs, as shown in Table 4.1. These non-IDPs hosted a total of 105 IDPs, or a mean number of 3 IDPs per non-IDP household. This would add a substantial number to our estimate of IDPs, if not IDP households.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Non-IDPs hosting IDPs by commune</th>
<th>Atecoube</th>
<th>Cocody</th>
<th>Mar-cory</th>
<th>Koumassi</th>
<th>Adjame</th>
<th>Abobo</th>
<th>Yopougon</th>
<th>Treichville</th>
<th>Port-Bouët</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of IDPs (%IDP)</td>
<td>6 (7.5%)</td>
<td>12 (9%)</td>
<td>3 (4%)</td>
<td>7 (6%)</td>
<td>10 (13%)</td>
<td>24 (12.5%)</td>
<td>30 (16%)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-IDPs housing IDPs</td>
<td>Not asked</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7 (9%)</td>
<td>14 (12%)</td>
<td>Not asked</td>
<td>Not asked</td>
<td>Not asked</td>
<td>7 (17.5%)</td>
<td>8 (10%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

UNHCR, 23 March 2007, p.4
“Apart from IDPs staying with host families or renting accommodation, there are about 8,000 IDPs in camps, of which approximately 7,000 are in Guiglo and 1,000 in Yamassoukrou. The fact that most IDPs are not in camps has made their plight less visible to the humanitarian community and has made it more difficult to reach them and assess their situation.”
UN Human Rights Council, 18 October 2006, para. 13

“The representative of the Secretary-General notes with interest that only a small number of displaced persons are housed in camps or shelters; most of them are in Guiglo, where there are two centres that hold about 7,100 people. Most of the displaced persons – about 98 per cent of them – have been taken in by families, which shows the generosity and solidarity of the Ivorian people. However, their social integration complicates the job of monitoring and assisting displaced persons.”

ENSEA, March 2006, pp. 38-39 ; p.45

“Le mouvement des personnes déplacées a été gui dé plutôt par le souci de retrouver un endroit plus sécurisant. Les plus chanceux d’entre eux ont trouvé refuge, dès leur arrivée, auprès de parents, d’amis, de collègues, etc... Les autres ont transité par des camps aménagés avant de trouver une famille d’accueil. L’insertion des personnes déplacées dans un ménage d’accueil s’est réalisée selon différentes approches (Tableau 25).

Tableau 25 : Répartition des familles d’accueil selon l’organisation de l’arrivée des déplacés

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Decision du CM</th>
<th>Entente CM et PDI</th>
<th>Famille ou communauté</th>
<th>Initiative PDI</th>
<th>Autre</th>
<th>Effectif</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abidjan</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>31.1</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>44.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>43.9</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dalol</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>41.9</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>26.6</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doussoumé</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>60.5</td>
<td>8.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tounkple</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>57.1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>55.8</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yamoussoouro</td>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Type De Ménage

|         | Non accueil | 20.9          | 17.1          | 12.1          | 42.1          | 1.8 | 2203 | 2203 |
|         | Accueil     | 33.1          | 13.3          | 9.5           | 41.6          | 2.5 | 2383 | 2383 |

Statut du chef de ménage

|         | Non déplacé | 24.4          | 13.8          | 13.0          | 45.9          | 3.0 | 3229 | 3229 |
|         | Déplacé     | 45.7          | 14.3          | 4.7           | 36.9          | 3.4 | 1357 | 1357 |
| Total   | 31.3        | 13.9          | 9.9           | 42.5          | 2.4           |    | 4556 | 4556 |

Source : ENSEA – PDI 2005

Dans la plupart des cas (43%), c’est le déplacé lui-même qui a entrepris les démarches d’hébergement auprès des familles d’accueil. Les chefs de ménage ont pris eux-mêmes l’initiative d’héberger les déplacés dans 31% des cas. Peu de situations ont nécessité une entente entre chefs de ménage et déplacés (14%) ou l’intervention de la famille ou d’une communauté (10%) à laquelle appartient le déplacé. Le recours à la famille ou à une communauté comme intermédiaire dans la recherche d’une famille d’accueil se rencontre principalement en milieu rural (16% contre 6% en milieu urbain).

Depuis le déclenchement de la crise, les départs des zones de conflits ont été organisés par vagues successives. La durée des conflits est un facteur important dans le changement de comportement car certains ménages ont pu se reconstituer et accueillir les nouveaux déplacés. Les déplacés installés dans leur propre ménage se montrent plus sensibles à la situation des autres déplacés. En effet parmi les personnes ayant facilité l’accueil des déplacés dans leur ménage, 43 % (contre 24 %) sont des chefs de ménage eux-mêmes déplacés.
Le conflit armé a provoqué des mouvements de population fuyant prioritairement les régions de combat mais venant également de diverses zones du pays pour différentes raisons. C’est ainsi que les localités situées en lisière des zones ayant connu les conflits, ceux situés dans l’Ouest, le département du Haut Sassandra et la Vallée du Bandama, ont reçu une des vagues importantes de personnes déplacées. Les personnes rendues nécessiteuses du fait de la guerre, viennent ainsi principalement des zones peu éloignées des régions d’accueil. On note en effet une relative concentration des personnes déplacées dans les villes ou villages proches de leur localité de départ. La solidarité de proximité a été ainsi largement développée lors de la crise. A l’ouest, Duékoué et Toulépleu ont recueilli la quasi totalité des réfugiés venant de l’Ouest (97% et 83% respectivement). De même à Yamoussoukro, on note une prépondérance des déplacés issus de la Vallée du Bandama : 78% en milieu urbain et 64% en milieu rural (Tableau 32). Quant à Daloa, ville située au Centre Ouest, elle a accueilli essentiellement des déplacés venant de la Région du Haut Sassandra et de l’Ouest. Abidjan, située loin des zones d’hostilités, connaît une situation moins tranchée. On y compte une majorité de déplacés venant de la Vallée du Bandama mais aussi une part importante de réfugiés qui résidaient dans la partie septentrionale du pays ou dans l’Ouest.

D’une manière générale, on observe que les hommes déplacés provenant de la Vallée du Bandama se sont surtout installés en zone urbaine (51%). Par contre, ceux issus du Haut Sassandra ont préféré le milieu rural (2% de destination vers les villes) (Annexe Tableau E.2.1). Chez les femmes, le comportement reste identique. En effet, celles en provenance de la Vallée du Bandama et de l’Ouest ont préféré les villes contrairement à celles issues du Haut Sassandra (3% de destination vers les villes) (Annexe Tableau E.2.2)."

**Continuous violence causes repeated short-term displacement (2008)**

- Inter-communal clashes continue to flare up around the country causing temporary population movements, lasting from days to a few months
- Families lose all their goods and find refuge in the bush or in public buildings or in neighbouring villages
- Sometimes, like in the case of the northeastern town of Marahui, reconciliation ceremonies pave the way for IDPs to return

*Médecins Sans Frontières, 2007, p. 7*

"When violence flares, people flee their village and seek refuge in larger towns or in the bush. The pattern of attacks and counter-attacks results in repeated short-term displacement lasting anywhere from days to months. Families lose their goods, abandon their fields and are exposed to malnutrition and disease.

*When the war started, my in-laws fled to the bush to save their lives. They only returned to the village after one and a half years. But sometimes, even now, they spend the night in the village and the only return to the bush during the day- especially when they hear some rumour and are afraid.*

*This year, many people fled to other villages to stay with their family and friends. When we heard about the recent attack [in July 2005], we fled to the bush- but not for long because the attack was farther away. We stayed in the bush for three days because we wanted to be careful.*
We are always on the run, fleeing people who might attack. We sleep on the bare floor. We don’t eat well. When we are thirsty, we drink whatever water we can find. There is no time for us to nourish our children well— but it was not like this before the war. We are eating food from the old manioc fields that my in-laws planted in the bush when they were there over a year ago. Woman from the zone of confidence, interviewed in August 2005.

Another example from northeastern Côte d’Ivoire

UNOCI, 17 September 2008

“An UNOCI patrol which yesterday went to Marahui village, 75 km from Bondoukou, to provide security following the violent clashes between Lobis and Koulangos on 3 and 5 September 2008, was told that a reconciliation meeting had been held there on 13 September 2008. The meeting, which was organised by an Ivorian human rights NGO, brought together various leaders from the two communities. The two communities agreed to bury their differences, and as a gesture of peace, the Lobis made a symbolic donation of 70,000 FCFA and food items to the Koulangos in Marahui and promised to send more items. The patrol also observed that most of the displaced were returning to the village.”

Chain displacement affects the West (July 2007)

- There are occurrences of displacements in series especially in the south-west and west of the ex-Zone of Confidence
- Displaced communities occupy land belonging to other IDPs while they are at their turn chased away again

US Department of State, 6 March 2007, section 2.d

“The displacement patterns often complicated the return of IDPs. For example, the displaced Burkinabe and other settlers living in the Guiglo IDP camp said that their plantations around the western town of Blolequin, south of the Zone of Confidence, were being occupied by indigenous Guere populations, who themselves had been displaced from their land in the Zone of Confidence at the beginning of the crisis. The government had not addressed this situation by year’s end.”

UN Human Rights Council, 18 October 2006, para. 37

“The Representative of the Secretary-General observed during his mission that people continue to be displaced in Côte d’Ivoire, particularly in the south-west, which is under government control and in the west of the zone of confidence, which is under the control of neutral UNOCI and Licorne forces. These areas are characterized by high levels of insecurity that led to displacement. The land issue, which is sometimes related to intercommunity conflicts, is also a source of insecurity for inhabitants. The Representative of the Secretary-General observed that displacements occur in series in these areas, when one population group chases away another and is then itself chased away. In the district of Zouan, for example, the people chased out of Zou occupied villages belonging to communities that had to flee their homes. Shortly after the visit by the Representative of the Secretary-General, the new arrivals were themselves attacked.”

Cases of multiple displacements with final destination in Abidjan and Grand Bassam
UNHCR/GoCdL, July 2007, pp.9-10

"3,602 ménages (32%) ont effectué des mouvements transitoires dans d'autres localités avant d'atteindre leurs destinations finales qui deviennent leurs lieux de déplacement actuels. Les principales régions de transit identifiées sont les régions de la Vallée du Bandama (49%), des 18 Montagnes (26%), le Moyen Cavally (8%) et les Savales (5%).

Les principales villes de transit ont été Bouaké, Korhogo, Bondoukou, Yamoussoukro, Daloa et Abidjan (pour les déplacés de Grand Bassam en provenance du centre nord et de l'ouest)."
PHYSICAL SECURITY & FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT

Physical security

Human rights abuses against IDPs and returnees in the West (January 2010)

- Human rights violations and abuses against IDPs and returning populations have been common especially in the West
- The presence of armed newly-arrived immigrants constitute a threat to the security of IDPs, returnees and local population in the areas around the protected forests in the West
- The malfunctioning of the judicial system has also exacerbated violence over land disputes in the north and west of the country. Non-indigenous IDPs returning to their land are often victims of such violence.

Human Rights Watch, January 2010
"Violent conflicts over land rights, particularly in the north and west, were exacerbated by the chronic failure of the judicial system to resolve disputes, and persistent xenophobia toward those perceived as non-Ivorian nationals. In the west, perpetrators of violence often targeted non-indigenous internally displaced persons returning to their land."

OCHA, 21 July 2009, p.7
"[T]he presence of armed newly arrived immigrants in state-owned protected forests constitutes a permanent threat to the populations living in neighbouring areas. This is particularly the case in the Mont Peko (Bangolo) and Mont Tia (Kouibly) areas, among others. Elements of the joint command (Commandement Intégré) have not been able to disarm these groups. Some local populations have, due to the increase in the circulation of arms, enlisted the protection of traditional hunters. Such is the case in Phing Beoua, in the Zou area."

OCHA, 22 January 2009, pp. 1,16:
"There are continued concerns about human rights violations against displaced and returning populations, and the non-functional judiciary system allows for widespread impunity. Cases of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) are increasing and children’s vulnerability has also increased in areas of return. [...] The number of security incidents, particularly ambushes and armed robberies has significantly increased from June to July 2008 in the west. The Duékoué-Bangolo axis is now considered to be one of the most dangerous areas because of ambushes, which involve killings, rape, other violence and robberies. High levels of insecurity and lack of administrative structures in some areas of return have made it difficult for victims to fully exercise their right to legal recourse after such abuses."

Rapes are on the increase but perpetrators are rarely prosecuted (May 2010)

- Reported cases of rape have been on the increase since 2007, especially in the West and in the former zone of confidence. There has also been an increase in sexual assault cases against children in the West.
Of particular concern is the fact that sexual violence is increasingly taking on an ethnic dimension.

Investigations over sexual violence and prosecution of suspects are limited. This is due to a lack of political will and the malfunctioning of the judicial system.

Rapes have most often gone unpunished as families prefer to pursue amicable solutions to legal recourse.

Incidence rate of SGBV against women and girls has risen up to 41% in Man and 35% in Duekoue in the course of 2009.


"37. Violations of human rights continued across the country, in particular in the west and in the former zone of confidence, where unidentified armed individuals and members of militia groups operate with impunity. Prominent among the violations are sexual violence, racketeering and theft. A particularly disturbing feature of the human rights situation in the west is the frequency of sexual violence against children, which most interlocutors believed to be on the rise. Furthermore, women and young girls continue to suffer from harmful traditional practices such as female genital mutilation and forced and early marriage.

[...]

Of particular concern is the reported increase in sexual violence, including against children, which some interlocutors believed was increasingly taking on an ethnic dimension.

[...]

I remain concerned about continuing reports of impunity for widespread human rights violations, particularly sexual and gender-based violence including against children, and that national forces perpetrated violations during the violence in February."

Human Rights Watch, January 2010

"As in previous years, there were frequent incidents of sexual violence against women and girls, particularly in the north and west, and incidents of harassment and rape persisted at checkpoints run by government security forces and rebels. Survivors' access to health and legal services is extremely limited. Efforts at investigating and prosecuting cases of sexual violence are hampered by a lack of political will among police and court officials, and aggravated by severe deficiencies in the justice system, particularly in the north.

Early in 2009 a New Forces action plan, developed in cooperation with the UN Security Council Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict, to combat sexual violence committed by its troops and in its region showed some promise. However, the New Forces failed to implement it. The Ivorian government, for its part, failed to adopt a similar national action plan to combat sexual violence in government-held areas, despite pressure from the UN and other actors."

OCHA, 21 July 2009, p. 8

"[I]n addition to displacement, the socio-political crisis has led to significant increases in the number of cases of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) against children and women. The Resolution 1612 Monitoring Reports highlights 34 reported cases of children being raped between January and April 2009 (50% of these rape cases were located in the western region of the country).

Those responsible for these egregious violations are rarely brought to justice. The situation is further compounded by the continuance of harmful traditional practices. Incidence rates of SGBV against women and girls even rise up to 41% (in Man) and 35% (in Duekoue). Among the victims, 21% were able to access adequate psycho-social and medical care during their life, compared to only 7% in 2007. Because of the taboo issue around sexual violence, and lack of community and professional awareness concerning protection and rehabilitation needs of the victims, access and quality response are unequal. Efforts to have perpetrators prosecuted and..."
sentenced by a court are limited by out-of-court settlements reached between families of victims and perpetrators, while fees for medical certificates prevent victims from presenting legal evidence. Furthermore, the judiciary is not fully functional in all areas of the country as the redeployment of the administrative apparatus is still underway."

**US DoS, 25 February 2009:**

"The law prohibits rape and provides for prison terms of five to 10 years; however, the government did not enforce this law in practice. Claims were most frequently brought against child rapists. A life sentence can be imposed in cases of gang rape if the rapists are related to or hold positions of authority over the victim or if the victim is under 15 years of age. The law does not specifically penalize spousal rape. Rape was a problem. Since January 2007, for example, the Court of Abidjan has received an average of 16 cases of child rape per month.

Women's advocacy groups continued to protest the indifference of authorities to female victims of violence. Women who reported rape or domestic violence to the police were often ignored. Many female victims were convinced by their relatives and police to seek an amicable resolution with the rapist rather than pursue a legal case. The Ministry of Family and Social Affairs sought justice on behalf of rape victims, but as of September 30, only nine persons had officially been convicted and sentenced for rape. Twenty-one additional persons accused of rape were sentenced for "immoral offense."

There were increased reports of unidentified highway bandits raping and sexually assaulting women in the western part of the country, especially along the Duekoue-Bangola road."

**IRIN, 21 October 2008**

"Rapes of women and girls are common in western Côte d'Ivoire and generally go unpunished, said residents of the region.

“These days nearly every time we hear of armed robberies in homes, on the roads or on plantations, we hear of rape,” said a resident of the western town of Duékoué some 500km from the commercial capital Abidjan, who wanted to remain anonymous.

“We hear of two, three, four rapes every day.”

[...]

Monika Bakayoko-Topolska, gender-based violence coordinator with the International Rescue Committee (IRC) in Côte d’Ivoire, told IRIN: “We certainly are seeing increased reports of rape over the past year and a half or so.” She called rape “one of the biggest problems in the west,” adding that sexual violence is a problem throughout the country.

Bakayoko-Topolska said it is not clear whether rape cases have risen sharply in the west or whether more people are reporting the crime after an expansion of education campaigns in the region.

She and some residents of western Côte d’Ivoire told IRIN perpetrators of rape are rarely prosecuted.

“Rapes are encouraged,” the woman in Duékoué said, “Because there is no punishment.” Residents of Duékoué and the nearby city of Man told IRIN that in some cases authorities harassed or ignored women who reported rape, and that even if pursued, alleged attackers are generally released after a brief detention."
Protection concerns for children (March 2010)

- Children remain particularly vulnerable to displacement, sexual violence and loss of life. A large number of the people displaced in the attacks on Marahui in September 2008 were children for example
- The culture of impunity for cases of sexual violence against children as well as the breakdown of law and order constitute the major obstacles for the enjoyment of children's rights
- Particularly concerned by the absence of the administration in the areas covered by the Forces Nouvelles in the west is birth registration
- Child protection committees have been created in all the villages in the west targeted by NGOs' activities with the aim of promoting a participatory approach
- There has been an increase in the number of street children and those aged between 9 and 14 years are particularly vulnerable. In Abidjan, in particular, children as young as 10 years old exchange sex for money in order to survive
- The rise in poverty has also caused an increase in the exploitation of child labour.

Norwegian Refugee Council, March 2010, p. 26-31
D/ DEPARTEMENT DE MAN
[…]
1) Les pratiques locales de la déclaration
Le cas de la sous-préfecture de Gbagbégoûiné est typique des nouvelles sous-préfectures créées sans que l'équipement ne suive. Alors qu'elles sont rattachées à une circonscription de l'état civil, les populations sont obligées de s'addresser à une autre qui est censée enregistrer les déclarations pour le compte de la sous-préfecture non fonctionnelle ; ce qui, naturellement, accroît la confusion et les réseaux parallèles.
[…]
Concernant la date de la déclaration :
Le moins qu'on puisse dire, c'est que les enfants ne sont pas déclarés dans les délais. En effet, les chiffres scolaires font état d'un taux de 0% d'élèves ayant un extrait d'acte de naissance en classe de CP1 dans les deux villages visités. Les parents montrent un peu plus d'intérêt à la « déclaration » des élèves en classe de CM2, même si les chiffres restent très bas (24%). A l'évidence, donc, les enfants ne sont « déclarés » que très tard.
Concernant les jugements supplétifs :
A l'instar de Korhogo et d'Odienné (départements situés eux aussi en zone CNO), les audiences foraines « spécial enfant » sont organisées principalement pour les enfants nés pendant la période d'absence de l'Administration. Cependant, dans leur application, ces audiences, initiées par l'administration territoriale, prennent en compte tous les enfants situés dans une fourchette de 0 à 13 ans. La participation villageoise est de 4000F CFA en plus du prix de timbre dont le nombre est égal à celui des copies.
[…]
E/ DEPARTEMENT D'ODIENNE
[…]
1) Les pratiques locales de la déclaration à l'état civil
Les villages de Ziévasso et de Gbèredougou, choisis dans la sous-préfecture d'Odienné, abritent principalement une population autochtone de Malinké et des allogènes peuls.
[…]
Concernant la date de la déclaration.
Comme dans les autres zones, les parents « déclarent tardivement » les enfants puisque selon les chiffres des deux écoles visitées, seulement 14,7% des enfants scolarisés ont un extrait d'acte de naissance (classes de CP1 à CE1confondues), l'absence de certains pères (travaillant
en basse côte) au moment de la naissance, et le manque de moyens financiers nécessaires au déplacement et aux frais d'obtention d'un extrait d'acte expliquent le dépassement des délais.

**Concernant les jugements supplétifs.**
Tout comme à Korhogo, le département d'Odienné situé en zone CNO connaît un taux important d’enfants nés pendant la période de crise et dont les enregistrements (pour ceux qui furent « déclarés ») l’ont été dans des registres de fortune non cotés et paraphés. Face au refus des juges de prendre individuellement la décision de cautionner et de légaliser ces registres, il reste aux parents la voie du jugement supplétif dont le coût de 4000 francs pour les audiences foraines « spécial enfant » est à ajouter à celui des timbres (dont le nombre est égal au nombre de copies demandées).

**IRIN, 21 December 2009**

"Sharply rising poverty is causing exploitative child labour to increase says NGO Save the Children in its report “It’s there it’s difficult: exploitative child labour in Côte d’Ivoire,” launched today.

It is estimated that one quarter of all children work in Côte d’Ivoire and eight out of 10 of them are exploited according to the government. Harmful activities include sex work, cutting down trees, burning fields, climbing trees to collect palm oil, carrying heavy loads, working as unpaid domestics or market vendors far from their families.

With a deteriorating economy and shrinking government services, more of these children end up working, says Save the Children. Country-wide the number of people living on less than US$1.25 a day has risen from 10 percent in 1985 to 49 percent in 2008, according to the World Bank.

Most children forced to sell sex to survive in Abidjan told local NGO Cavoeqeqiva they were brought to the capital by relatives or family friends. Côte d’Ivoire, alongside many West African countries, has a long-standing practice of families sending their children to relatives in towns to be schooled or find work or apprenticeships.

Save the Children’s child protection adviser Mark Canavera told IRIN: “The practice of relatives taking care of children or using children for light, legitimate labour have changed and become more exploitative as poverty increases.”

The report studies child labour practices in 18 Montagnes region in the west and in the Adjamé neighbourhood of Abidjan.

**Rural risks**
In 18 Montagnes – the country’s primary cocoa-producing area – children have traditionally helped their families in the fields, partly as a means of learning how to farm, says Save the Children.

But with rural poverty increasing and cocoa prices still relatively low, farmers have to produce more to survive and are forcing children to work longer hours, the report says."

**IRIN, 12 June 2009**

"In Côte d’Ivoire girls as young as 10 years old are exchanging sex for money, rights activists say.

"On the streets of Yopougon [the commercial capital Abidjan's largest neighbourhood] we recently rounded up 36 girls. Most of them were around 10 years old," said Fanta Coulibaly, director of the committee to fight violence on women and children in the Ministry of Family, Women and Social Affairs.

"Many of them said they were after money for school fees or for food." She said many girls are lured to bars or restaurants by a promise of work, then they are offered money for sex.

The exploitation of girls for sex has long existed in Côte d’Ivoire, Coulibaly said. "But poverty has fed this phenomenon."

[...]

94
Local NGO Centre Féminin pour la promotion des droits humains et de la démocratie en Côte d'Ivoire (CEFCI) is doing a study on young sex workers in the northwestern town of Odienné, 850km from Abidjan, where the group says many girls ages nine to 13 years old are exchanging sex for money.

In most cases people who work with local bar or restaurant owners approach the girls' families, usually in other parts of the country, promising they will give the girls work, Traoré Nathalie, CEFCI director, told IRIN.

Nabaulsy Véronique, head of CEFCI's office in Odienné, said: “The girls soon find out that the restaurant owners do not pay them for their work serving drinks or washing dishes. They see that this is not what they came for. Customers begin soliciting them for sex.”

Traoré said given that they have no other way to earn money and are often far from any family support, the girls start to see the sex work as the only way to survive."

**UNOCI, 7 September 2008**

"On 3 and 5 September, two violent attacks took place against Marahui village situated 78 km from Bondoukou on the Sorobango Axis. [...] The attackers were reportedly from the village of Assondoou and belong to the Lobi ethnic group. [...] An estimated 400 people are displaced within the village and an unknown number are reportedly displaced to surrounding villages, including Tagadi, Kamala and Bandole, a very high percentage of which are children. 33 persons, including 14 children, are reportedly seeking shelter in Laoudi-Ba, on the Bouna-Boundoukou Axis. An unknown number of persons are also believed to be missing. [...] Children represent a large percentage of the displaced and are living under very precarious conditions. They are sleeping outside on the bare earth and other basic needs, including clothing and food, are not met. [...]"

Child Protection Officers also noted continued security and protection concerns for children, in particular because they are sleeping outside and exposed. Despite the presence of security forces, the village remains vulnerable to additional attacks, particularly during the night. Furthermore, the situation at the school compound [where most of the displaced are hosted] is chaotic and in such a context it is more difficult for parents to keep track of their children, rendering them even more vulnerable in the event of an attack."

**UN OCHA/EU-Cote d'Ivoire, September 2007, pp. 134-135**

"2.3.2 Activités de déclaration des naissances

L'UNICEF a conduit avec les ONG partenaires une action vigoureuse de sensibilisation des familles et des communautés à la déclaration des naissances. Ces initiatives ont buté contre une très faible réception. Dans les Zones FN, l'absence de toute administration a été un facteur limitant. Mais là où elle existe, dans le Moyen-Cavally, l'éloignement des campements, les procédures pour parvenir à l'extrait de naissances ne motivent pas les populations.

See also Save the Children's "No One to Turn To. The under-reporting of child sexual exploitation and abuse by aid workers and peacekeepers" (May 2008) for accounts of sexual exploitation of children in Cote d'Ivoire by aid workers and peacekeepers."
Displaced women and girls are most vulnerable to sexual violence and sexual exploitation (October 2008)

- IDP population consists largely of West African immigrants, among whom women and girls remain most exposed to abuse, especially sexual violence
- Protection needs of these groups are great, but support is practically non-existent.
- Although with the departure of Liberian and Sierra Leonean fighters in 2003, the situation improved, sexual assaults continued to be one of the major protection concerns in the country. Especially in western Côte d’Ivoire there have been increased reports of rapes since the signing of the Ouagadougou Accord in March 2007
- Displacement has fueled an increase in prostitution, sexual violence and sexual exploitation of women and girls, especially in urban settings like in Abidjan

IRIN, 21 October 2008

“Rapes of women and girls are common in western Côte d’Ivoire and generally go unpunished, said residents of the region.

“These days nearly every time we hear of armed robberies in homes, on the roads or on plantations, we hear of rape,” said a resident of the western town of Duékoué some 500km from the commercial capital Abidjan, who wanted to remain anonymous.

“We hear of two, three, four rapes every day.”

With the proliferation of arms since conflict broke in 2002, unprecedented violent crime continues to plague many areas of Côte d’Ivoire where a March 2007 peace deal marked a formal end to fighting.

In some parts of the north, attacks by Kalashnikov-wielding men – nearly unheard of before the conflict – are frequent, residents say.

Monika Bakayoko-Topolska, gender-based violence coordinator with the International Rescue Committee (IRC) in Côte d’Ivoire, told IRIN: “We certainly are seeing increased reports of rape over the past year and a half or so.” She called rape “one of the biggest problems in the west,” adding that sexual violence is a problem throughout the country.

Bakayoko-Topolska said it is not clear whether rape cases have risen sharply in the west or whether more people are reporting the crime after an expansion of education campaigns in the region.”

In Abidjan

IRIN, 29 September 2008

"According to a November 2007 Save the Children study of displaced children in Abidjan, displaced 10-14 year old girls often work as waitresses in bars or nightclubs where they are more easily sexually exploited, according to Joanna Macveigh, a protection adviser at Save the Children.

“Cities provide the kind of networks that draw young girls into something they can make a living out of very quickly,” Macveigh said, “the more opportunities there are for girls to get an immediate income through, say sex work, the more likely it is to be a force for disaster in these girls lives.”
The law offers these girls little comfort – rather than protecting them, the police often used intimidation and violence against them, the girls reported."

**Human Rights Watch, 2 August, 2007, pp. 51-52, 73, 83**

"When French and UN troops began patrolling the buffer zone between northern rebels and government forces in the south, active fighting came to a halt, ushering in the political and military stalemate of 2004-2007. This period has often been characterized as the period of "no peace, no war." While abuses against civilians were more concentrated in the period of active hostilities, serious violations including massacres, extrajudicial executions, torture, harassment, pillaging, and intimidation have nevertheless continued to take place.

Human Rights Watch documented fewer cases of sexual abuse committed by the New Forces rebels during the period of 2004-2006 than was the case during the 2002-2003 war or ensuing periods of active combat. This improvement was also noted by civil society representatives and humanitarian workers active in rebel-held Côte d’Ivoire.

Absent more substantial data on patterns and prevalence, it is impossible to be sure why sexual and other attacks have decreased since 2004. However, local observers and civil society members attribute the decrease in sexual attacks first and foremost to the departure in 2003 of Liberian and Sierra Leonean fighters (who had been the most egregious perpetrators of sexual assaults against women and girls); second to the French peacekeepers’ impact while controlling a buffer zone known as the “Zone of Confidence” and conducting regular patrols into rebel territory; third to the arrival of ONUCI troops who also conduct regular patrols in rebel-held areas; and fourth to an effort on the part of rebel leadership to address the problem. For example, after the UN-imposed sanctions on rebel commander Martin Kouakou Fofié for major human rights violations in February 2006, New Forces leader Guillaume Soro ordered a reduction in checkpoints, partly in recognition of the many incidents of human rights abuses at such locations. […] Some cases of sexual violence against women originating from neighboring West African countries have taken place within the context of interethnic conflicts over land, particularly in the southwest. Indeed, southwestern Côte d’Ivoire remains beset by ethnic tensions and violence, characterized by armed gangs and militias attacking villages, destroying homes, schools, wells, and health centers, resulting in ongoing cycles of displacement. Killings, rapes, and a few massacres have continued up until the present, long past the end of active hostilities, and even within the Zone of Confidence. […] The protracted nature of the Ivorian political-military crisis has appeared to increase girls’ and women’s vulnerability to various forms of sexual violence and exploitation including non-conflict-related rape, prostitution of children, sexual abuse by teachers, forced and early marriage, and domestic violence. Many women and girls described being driven to commercial sex work or locked into abusive relationships as a result of the increased poverty caused by the conflict.

Rates of rape where perpetrators are unknown and appear to be civilians or simply armed men without overt government or rebel affiliation are reportedly high. Many cases of sexual assault and exploitation appear to have been facilitated by the breakdown of the legal system, proliferation of arms, and general climate of impunity.

Displacement and poverty caused by the conflict have fueled a major increase in prostitution, sexual exploitation, and sexual abuse of women and children in Côte d’Ivoire. The war is estimated to have displaced an estimated 1.7 million people within the country and additional hundreds of thousands abroad, often splitting up families, undermining the networks that traditionally protect them and leaving women or children to deal alone with responsibility for managing household finances and supporting children. Internally displaced persons appeared to be particularly vulnerable to sexual abuse."
Amnesty International, 15 March 2007, para. 3.1

“Although accurate statistics are difficult to obtain, it is estimated that hundreds, possibly thousands of women were victims of sexual violence as a result of the armed conflict. Large movements of IDPs and refugees fleeing the conflict have resulted in increased vulnerability for IDP and refugee women, particularly Liberian women, in Côte d’Ivoire. Recent information gathered by Amnesty International shows that women continue to suffer sexual assault committed with complete impunity by members of the security forces as well as by members of armed opposition groups. Civilians and militia members benefiting either from the political backing of government authorities in the south, or from the support of the New Forces in the territory under their control, also commit sexual violence against women with total impunity.”

Levels of insecurity remain high especially in Moyen Cavally and Vallée du Bandama regions (May 2010)

- The number of security incidents have generally remained high in the Moyen Cavally and Vallée du Bandama regions throughout 2008
- With delays in the DDR process and in the dismantlement of the militias, tensions over allowances have frequently escalated both among the Forces Nouvelles and militia groups
- In the western regions of Moyen Cavally and Dix-Huit Montagnes land and other inter-communal disputes have continued to constitute a cause for concern
- Banditry is quite common especially on road axes around Bangolo and in the ex-zone of confidence
- Reasons for insecurity in the north include the absence of national law enforcement agencies and a functioning judicial system

United Nations Security Council, 20 May 2010, para. 31-76

“31. Côte d’Ivoire is still rife with armed militia groups, in particular in the west. Although their actual strength and military capabilities cannot be assessed accurately, they form a well structured organization.

[...]
Other long-standing sources of insecurity in the west could fuel any violence that may erupt as a result of the current political stalemate. These include banditry and armed criminality, which are still commonplace, and the frequent inter- and intra-community clashes in that area, particularly over land.

[...]
The situation is particularly serious in areas of the south and west where law enforcement agencies have limited means to address armed criminality.”

United Nations Security Council, 7 January 2010, para. 2

“2. During the period under review, the overall security situation in the country remained stable, despite an upsurge in armed robberies and other criminal activities, particularly in the west. Attacks by bandits armed with assault rifles and machetes resulted in the deaths of 16 persons and contributed to a sense of persistent insecurity in the areas of Duékoué, Guiglo and Bangolo specifically.”

UN OCHA, 3 July 2008, p. 5

"IDPs continue to face reintegration and protection-related problems including land ownership, nationality and citizenship issues, and lack of security."
UN Security Council, 13 October 2008, paras. 6-9

“The overall security situation in the country remained generally stable. However, a number of worrying security incidents occurred in Abidjan in early October. On 4 October, groups of youths loyal to the ruling party reportedly prevented the identification and voter registration process from proceeding at Cocody in Abidjan, citing the absence of officials from the National Institute of Statistics. On 6 October, armed assailants attempted to enter the residence of the Minister of Construction and Housing, Marcel Amon Tanoh, who is also the campaign coordinator of the Rassemblement des républicains opposition party.

In other areas, the main security incidents reported during the period under review emanated from demonstrations by disgruntled personnel of the Forces nouvelles and the national Defence and Security Forces. The Forces nouvelles elements continued to express discontent over arrangements for their integration into the envisaged new army and reintegration opportunities. On 18 August, over 200 cantoned Forces nouvelles combatants demonstrated in Bouaké demanding payment of monthly allowances, while Forces nouvelles elements who were previously securing mobile court hearings demanded payment of outstanding bonuses. Protests continued intermittently until the end of August. On 26 July, elements of the mixed brigade at N’Gattadolikro demonstrated over outstanding allowances. On 26 September, elements of the Ivorian Defence and Security Forces in Daoukro and Yamoussoukro protested over the Government’s failure to pay war bonuses. High-level interventions by Forces nouvelles officials and Prime Minister Soro helped to restore calm in Bouaké.

In other areas, tension between communities over land and other disputes, especially in the west, as well as strikes and demonstrations to protest against the rising cost of living in urban areas, continued to be a source of concern. In the western part of the country, attacks by armed highway robbers created an acute sense of insecurity. On 10 July, two members of the integrated command centre’s mixed brigade stationed in Famienkro were killed in an ambush by unidentified individuals, while patrolling in the area. Following the incident, the mixed brigade elements vacated Famienkro and refused to return. On 19 July, UNOCI and the Licorne forces intervened to separate elements of the Forces nouvelles and a youth group, who had clashed in Bouna, in the north-east of the country. From 12 to 15 August, members of a civil society organization demonstrated violently against the exploitation of natural resources by Forces nouvelles elements in the Bondoukou area, in the east. Also, violent inter-community clashes were reported at a village in the north-east on 3 September, resulting in the death of eight people and several injured.

There is still an atmosphere of insecurity in the western part of the country, as well as in parts of the former zone of confidence, as a result of continuing indiscriminate attacks by unidentified highway robbers, coupled with violence, including rape of women. The situation remains particularly serious in towns and villages along the Duékoué-Bangolo road, notably in Biao near Bangolo, as well as Blody and Toazeo near Duékoué.”

UN Security Council, 10 July 2008, paras. 7-10

"[R]ecurrent protests by cantoned Forces nouvelles combatants over non-payment of their allowances underscored the risk of possible setbacks if adequate resources are not provided to support key aspects of the peace process. On 16 June, more than 200 demobilized Forces nouvelles combatants blocked the main road in Bouaké and discharged their weapons into the air to protest the delay in the payment of their monthly allowances. Forces nouvelles authorities intervened to restore order, while promising the protestors that their grievances would be addressed. UNOCI and Licorne forces deployed to the area to assist in bringing the situation under control. The Forces nouvelles military leadership also requested UNOCI support to defuse the situation during a second demonstration of demobilized combatants in Bouaké on 18 June that resulted in damages to public and private properties.
In mid-May, tensions in Séguéla escalated following the dismissal of Major Zakaria Koné, the Forces nouvelles zone commander of the area, who had opposed the plan to demobilize his combatants, with Forces nouvelles elements loyal to Major Koné discharging their weapons on 18 and 19 May. At the request of the Forces nouvelles leadership, UNOCI increased its military presence in the town. Calm returned to the area following a reconciliation ceremony held on 26 May, during which some 300 Forces nouvelles combatants pledged allegiance to Major Issiaka Ouattara, the newly appointed zone commander who is also the Forces nouvelles deputy chief of staff.

The situation in Séguéla and Vavoua, also within Major Ouattara’s area of responsibility, deteriorated further in late June, with Forces nouvelles combatants loyal to the deposed zone commander staging violent demonstrations in both cities on 28 June to protest against the ongoing cantonment operation. At least two soldiers from the opposing sides of the Forces nouvelles were killed and several wounded during the exchange of fire that ensued between the factions. In Séguéla, the demonstrators attacked Major Ouattara’s residence, while those in Vavoua took hostage a Forces nouvelles official and two soldiers. The hostages were released on 30 June following negotiations with the Forces nouvelles Chief of Staff, General Soumaïla Bakayoko. At the request of the Forces nouvelles, UNOCI and Licorne troops intensified the patrolling of both towns and provided protection for the main Forces nouvelles camp in Séguéla.

Meanwhile, localized criminality continued to be a growing concern in the area of the country under the control of the Forces nouvelles. On 24 April, 200 students in Bouaké held a peaceful demonstration to protest against mounting insecurity in the city."

Small arms
UN Security Council, 9 October 2008, para. 103
"The Group considers that the factors illustrated above demonstrate that movements of small-calibre weapons persist in Côte d'Ivoire, in both the Government territories and those under the administrative control of the Forces nouvelles, especially in the western region of the country. Both the introduction of new weapons and the lack of credible disarmament clearly hinder progress in the disarmament of the Forces nouvelles ex-combatants and the dismantling of the militias. These factors represent a serious potential risk for peace and stability in the near future and could contribute to increased civil disobedience and heightened local tensions."

For a more detailed account of the role of small arms proliferation in the intensification of grave human rights abuses see also Amnesty International’s "Blood at the Crossroads: Making the case for a Global Arms Treaty" (17 September 2008).

Freedom of movement

Human trafficking in Côte d'Ivoire (June 2010)

- Côte d'Ivoire is a source, transit and destination country for women and children trafficked for forced labour and sexual exploitation
- Women and girls are trafficked for domestic servitude, restaurant labour and sexual exploitation
- Boys are trafficked within the country for agricultural and service labour
- There are no government shelters for victims of trafficking who are normally referred to NGOs and international organisations for care
Côte d'Ivoire has not ratified the 2000 UN Trafficking in Persons Protocol. Efforts of the Ivoirian government to prevent, fight and eliminate human trafficking have been limited and ineffective.

United States Department of State, 14 June 2010

"Cote d'Ivoire is primarily a country of destination for children and women subjected to trafficking in persons, specifically forced labor and forced prostitution, though it also serves as a country of transit and origin. Trafficking within the country's borders is more prevalent, with victims primarily trafficked from the north of the country to the more economically prosperous south. Boys from Ghana, Mali, and Burkina Faso are subjected to forced labor in the agricultural sector, including on cocoa, coffee, pineapple, and rubber plantations; boys from Ghana are forced to labor in the mining sector; boys from Togo are forced to work in construction; and boys from Benin are forced to work in carpentry and construction. Girls recruited from Ghana, Togo, and Benin to work as domestic servants and street vendors often are subjected to conditions of forced labor. Women and girls are also recruited from Ghana and Nigeria to work as waitresses in restaurants and bars and are subsequently subjected to forced prostitution. Trafficked children often face harsh treatment and extreme working conditions. The Government of Cote d'Ivoire does not fully comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is making significant efforts to do so. Despite these significant efforts, such as the conviction of one sex trafficker, the government's overall efforts to combat trafficking were limited and ineffective; therefore, Cote d'Ivoire is placed on Tier 2 Watch List for a third consecutive year. The government remained hampered by the absence of a cohesive government, limited resources, and insufficient knowledge of the human trafficking phenomenon among law enforcement officials and judges. The country has never reported a prosecution of forced child labor in the agricultural sector. Police demonstrated a weak understanding of human trafficking by characterizing children found in a brothel raid as "voluntary prostitutes," rather than presumptive victims of human trafficking. Cote d'Ivoire also failed to investigate for a third consecutive year NGO reports that police harass undocumented foreign women in prostitution by demanding sex in exchange for not arresting them. Recommendations for Cote d'Ivoire: Increase efforts to investigate, prosecute, and convict trafficking offenders, particularly those who exploit children in the commercial sex trade or in forced labor, including in the agricultural sector; develop a formal procedure through which law enforcement and other government officials identify trafficking victims among women and girls in prostitution; train law enforcement officials to follow established procedures to identify potential trafficking victims and refer them to protective services; and investigate reports that police harass undocumented foreign women in prostitution, rather than screening for trafficking victims, and prosecute and punish those police officers involved, as appropriate. Prosecution The Government of Cote d'Ivoire's legal statutes do not prohibit all forms of trafficking and there is no specific law punishing such offenses. However, Penal Code Article 378 prohibits forced labor, prescribing a sufficiently stringent penalty of one to five years' imprisonment and a fine of approximately $800 to $2,200. Penal Code Article 376 criminalizes entering into contracts that deny freedom to a third person, prescribing a sufficiently stringent punishment of five to 10 years' imprisonment and a fine. Penal Code Articles 335 to 337 prohibit recruiting or offering children for prostitution, prescribing penalties of one to 10 years' imprisonment and a fine; these penalties are sufficiently stringent, but not commensurate with penalties prescribed for other serious offenses, such as rape. Ivoirian law does not criminalize the trafficking of adults for commercial sexual exploitation. During the reporting period, the government convicted one trafficking offender. A Nigerian woman promised two girls from Nigeria a trip to the United States, but instead transported them to Cote d'Ivoire and forced them to engage in prostitution in Vavoua. In May 2009, a court in Daloa convicted and sentenced the trafficker to three years' imprisonment and a $2,000 fine, and the Nigerian Embassy in Abidjan assisted the victims in returning home. The following child trafficking cases were also identified and investigated by law enforcement agencies during the reporting period. [...]"
Protection
The Ivorian government made inadequate efforts to protect victims of trafficking during the last year. Law enforcement authorities did not demonstrate adequate efforts to proactively identify trafficking victims among vulnerable groups, such as foreign children entering the country without their parents, though some victims were identified during the year. During the reporting period, the government did not offer any specialized training to law enforcement and immigration personnel on identifying and treating victims of trafficking. However, in partnership with the ILO, the Ministry of Family held a workshop for 25 families who volunteered to take in trafficking victims intercepted in their communities. The government had no care facilities for foreign or domestic trafficking victims. There was no witness protection or restitution program for trafficking victims. The government neither encouraged nor discouraged victims from assisting in the investigation and prosecution of trafficking offenses. The Ministry of Family identified some existing government structures that could be converted to shelters, and in the meantime referred victims to NGOs that offered suitable lodging. While the Ministry of Family and the National Police employed a small team of social workers to assist trafficking victims after they were identified, the government relied on NGOs for medical and psychological assistance to victims, giving the organizations no financial or material support in return. The Ministry of Family had responsibility for seeking temporary residency status in Cote d’Ivoire for victims who did not want to return home. During the reporting period, the ministry assisted in the repatriation of 20 trafficked children, including nine from Cote d’Ivoire, two from Burkina Faso, three from Benin, three from Ghana, and three from Togo. All of the children had been forced to work in the informal sector. In June 2009, Ivorian police participated in a foreign law enforcement agency-funded raid on farms growing cocoa and palms in the Aboisso area, discovering more than 50 children working on the premises. Ivorian officials determined that four of these children were trafficking victims and returned them to their families, while transferring the fourth to the Ministry of Family for care. Following raids on brothels and bars, police vice squad members asked women in prostitution if they were victims of traffickers, but did not investigate further if the answer was negative. Regulations protected child victims by not permitting police to interview suspected child victims without a case worker present. Child victims were assigned a Ministry of Family case worker with responsibility for informing victims about judicial proceedings, and these case workers allowed children to decide whether they wished to testify against their alleged traffickers.

Prevention
The Government of Cote d’Ivoire demonstrated sustained and modest efforts to prevent trafficking during the reporting period, primarily through public awareness campaigns, which the Ministry of Family estimated reached 11,000 residents of the country. The Ministry of Interior disseminated anti-trafficking awareness materials to police and gendarmes at border points, along with guidance on investigating those who were attempting to bring children into Cote d’Ivoire. In an effort to reduce demand for commercial sex acts, police continued periodic raids on brothels and bars suspected of exploiting children in the sex trade. Cote d’Ivoire is not a party to the 2000 UN TIP Protocol.

For more information on transnational trafficking more broadly in West Africa, please see UNODC’s "Transnational Trafficking and the Rule of Law in West Africa: A Threat Assessment" (July 2009)

Roadblocks continue to hinder free movement of people and goods (January 2010)

- Displaced persons without identity papers are particularly limited in their freedom of movement
• Roadblocks in both government and rebel-held areas continue to impede freedom of movement, limit the provision of basic supplies to the north, and ultimately contribute to the economic downturn of the country
• The Ivorian government made little efforts to deal with widespread extortion and racketeering. This phenomenon is most acute in the North.

Human Rights Watch, January 2010
"The government took no meaningful steps in 2009 to address the problem of widespread extortion and racketeering by government security forces—including the police, gendarmerie, military, and customs officials—as well as by government militia and New Forces rebels. Individuals who refused to pay bribes to corrupt officials were often beaten or arbitrarily detained. Although checkpoints remained throughout the country, extortion was most severe in the north, where New Forces rebels continued to exert almost complete economic control, extorting the equivalent of millions of US dollars annually at checkpoints and through other rackets.

US DoS, 25 February 2009:
"Persons living under FN authority continued to face harassment and extortion when trying to travel between towns and to and from the government-controlled south. Security forces also victimized northerners when they tried to cross into the zone under government control. The cost of either paying one’s way through the various barricades or hiring a money runner to do so was substantial. Government officials reported the roundtrip cost for citizens in the north to travel from Bouake and other cities to Yamoussoukro to cash paychecks to be between 20,000 to 30,000 CFA ($40-60). A money courier or informal banking service cost either 5000 CFA ($10) or a flat percentage of the amount transferred."

Refugees International, 31 January 2007
"Numerous security and identity checkpoints subject the population not only to physical risks but also to lost income and work opportunities. Detained individuals experience endless delays, constant harassment, and extortion from armed elements on both sides, who frequently confiscate or destroy papers, seize goods, arrest travelers, or physically abuse and even rape vulnerable travelers. A person might be pressed to give between $1-10 (of a $30 monthly income) to regain freedom of movement. Human rights workers told RI, “Checkpoints are places where women are set aside and sexually assaulted. The bus leaves and they are alone. This is a hidden problem, but is increasing.”

IRIN, 2 August 2007
"The economic damage [of these roadblocks] is bad enough,” Ivorian Chamber of Commerce President Jean-Louis Billon told IRIN from the commercial capital, Abidjan. “But the most revolting part of this is the human rights violations. There are invasive body searches, including of women. We heard of cases of rape.” He added: “And this, from those the citizens should be able to count on for security.”

[...]
Koffi, who lives in the northwestern town of Odienne, recently travelled to his home town in central Côte d’Ivoire for his father’s funeral. It was his first time making the trip from rebel-held to government territory since before the conflict. “It’s the height of humiliation,” he said. “The way these officers shake us down for money and abuse people – and it’s all done as if it’s completely normal. Nothing is hidden.”

He spent 7,000 CFA francs (about US$15) just on bribes at roadblocks – at least several days’ work driving his taxi in Odienne. “These days, I could even go a week without making that.” At one point he was running out of money and he pleaded with a gendarme. "I told him, ‘Please –
I’m travelling to my home village for my Dad’s burial.’ The gendarme shrugged and said, ‘I don’t give a damn.’ All he cared about was getting money from me.”

[...]
Many say the hateful and pitiless behaviour on the part of those manning roadblocks mirrors the very kinds of social division and abuse that were integral to the causes of Côte d’Ivoire’s rebellion. One factor that gave rise to the rebellion was northerners’ exasperation over what they called blatant discrimination and abuse on the part of government security forces. At roadblocks people with names from northern ethnic groups would be singled out and made to pay bribes.

[...]
Social cohesion aside, the racket on Côte d’Ivoire’s roads continues to batter families economically.

The extra tariffs hauliers must pay on the roads force up the prices of goods. “Five years ago, three yams [a staple in Côte d'Ivoire] cost between 300 and 500 CFA francs ($US0.62 to 1.04). Today, they cost about double that,” said Aly Cisse, who sells yams in a Bouake market. The price of most items in the market has gone up by 30 to 50 percent, he said.

[...]
Officials with the government and former rebel forces say things are getting better. “This racketeering is certainly a reality,” military prosecutor Ange Kessi Kouame told IRIN. “But we’re committed to fighting this.” He said things are starting to improve, and added: “Especially since it ruins the economy, we must fight this to the end.”

Commander Losseni Fofana of the former rebel New Forces said his forces provided passes for vehicles to travel throughout the north. At the road barriers, he said, “there are formalities to take care of”. He added: “If this racket still exists, these are isolated acts that we will fight.”
SUBSISTENCE NEEDS

General

Poverty on the rise since 1985 (May 2009)

- Poverty has continued to rise since 1985.
- Poverty is more severe in rural than urban areas.
- The North is the region most affected by poverty.
- Distribution of income is highly unequal.
- The poverty rate in households headed by internally displaced persons and in households accommodating internally displaced persons is lower than the national rate.

International Monetary Fund, May 2009, para 15-19

"Today, one out of every two people is poor compared to one out of ten in 1985 and the number of poor people has been multiplied by 10 in the space of a generation. Poverty has, therefore, increased on a steady trend, going from 10.0% in 1985 to 36.8% in 1995 and to 33.6% in 1998 before increasing further to 38.4% in 2002 and eventually to 48.9% in 2008, as a result of the successive socio-political and military crises.

16. Poverty is more acute in rural areas than in urban areas. The poverty rate increased from 49% in 2002 to 62.45% in 2008 in rural areas as against 24.5% and 29.45% over the same period in urban areas. The increase of poverty is greater in the city of Abidjan, with about a 50% increase, compared to other towns where the rate of increase is a little below 20%. As at the national level, poverty increased considerably at the level of the development poles (regions) and over 50% as against four in 2002. Among these poles, that of the North is most affected by the phenomenon of poverty, with nearly 4 out 5 persons being poor in 2008. This pole is followed by the West (63.2%); the Center-West (62.9%); the North-West (57.9%); the Centre-North (57.0%) and the North-East (54.7%). Although they have high poverty rates, the two poorest poles in 2002, the West and the North, registered in 2008 a slight decline of 1.3 and 1.9 percentage points respectively, thanks to the humanitarian economic corridors.

17. The phenomenon of poverty affects, everywhere, both men and women without distinction, but it is globally lower among households headed by women. Indeed, the poverty ratio in 2008 was 48.4% among men and 49.5% among women against respectively 38.1% and 38.7% in 2002. But, poverty according to the gender of the head of family shows significant differences. As in 2002, the level of poverty is higher in households headed by a man (49.6%) than those under the responsibility of a woman (45.4%) in 2008, at the national level.

18. Concerning the distribution of incomes, it is highly unequal like in other African countries. Globally, the Ivorian economy virtually stagnated between 2002 and 2007, whereas the country’s population continued to increase at a rate close to 3%; as a result, the average real income rather declined in the recent period, and this decline was all the more important as the income of the household rises. The slight redistribution of relative incomes only partially compensated the strong negative effect of the average income over poverty. Eventually, poverty increased by 10 points between 2002 and 2008.

19. The military political crisis of September 2002 has had a negative outcome on the living conditions of households. Hence, nearly half of the total population said they were directly affected by the crisis. 70.1% of them mentioned feeding problems, 68.1% affirmed having difficulties paying for their health care, 28.4% said they lost their economic activity and 26.3% faced accommodation problems. At the level of incomes, 67.6% of the population affirmed having
suffered from salary reductions against 6.5% who said they received salary increments. The rest of the population (25.9%) did not observe any increase in their salaries. In addition to the decline in incomes, 6.7% of the population affirmed having suffered damages to their properties with, on the average, 42.6% of total destruction for some and 35.4% of partial destruction for others.

70. In the broad southern region, the poverty rate in households headed by internally displaced persons is 36.5%; it is 36.0% in households accommodating internally-displaced persons. These rates, lower than the national rate of 48.9%, could be explained by the efficient integration of the displaced persons or by the peaceful atmosphere prevailing in the countryside since the signing of the various agreements, notably that of Ouagadougou in March 2007.”

**Health**

**Reduced access to health in areas of displacement and return (September 2010)**

- Poor Governance and the lack of investment in public services caused a deterioration of basic indicators and access to health services.
- The slowing down of progress on the “Zero Tolerance” national campaign to eliminate female genital mutilation or cutting is due to the deterioration of health and education services. According to government statistics, FGM/C is most prevalent in the north and west of the country.
- Despite the results achieved in the health sector with the redeployment of more skilled health personnel in former FN areas, access to health in areas of displacement and return remains critical.
- In the Moyen Cavally and 18 Montagnes regions few are the public health centres and it is more common to find private ones.
- The major obstacle is constituted by the distance to the closer health centre as it normally takes about 1 hr to reach them.
- The problem of distance is exacerbated by the lack of means of transport and of financial resources.

**IRIN, 2 September 2010**

“Continued election delays and political turmoil have for years been used as excuses to justify poor governance and the lack of investment in public services, say civil society groups and public sector workers.

“The current political crisis is often used to justify a lack of investment in public services,” Traoré Drissa, an Abidjan-based human rights lawyer and head of the Ivorian Movement for Human Rights, told IRIN.

Many basic indicators are worsening across the country. The number of women dying in pregnancy or childbirth rose from 459 per 100,000 in 2003 to 810 in 2009; while primary school enrolment amongst boys and girls in 2009 fell to 81 percent and 64 percent compared to 92 percent and 70 percent in 2003, according to the UN.

Both the government and opposition have vowed to restore state infrastructure and services in their electoral campaigns but basic services are increasingly out of reach for ordinary citizens, teacher and regional government adviser Abdul Koné, and medic Emmanuel Kouadio, told IRIN.

**State hospitals**
“There shouldn’t need to be an election for a state hospital to be well-equipped,” Kouadio, who has worked for 20 years at CHU Treichville Hospital in the commercial capital, Abidjan, told IRIN. “There is always talk of funds, rehabilitation and upgrades to the hospital being blocked because there are no elections,” he said.

“The buildings in this hospital are fine, but that’s because they were well-built in colonial days. It’s the materials the government doesn’t provide, and it’s hard to understand that, when we know how much money the hospital is bringing in,” Kouadio said.

The hospital, Abidjan’s second-largest, collects US$29,000-38,000 per month in patient fees and charges, he said. “But we’re missing basic working materials. We doctors often buy our own gloves to carry out operations.”

Many of his former patients have stopped coming as they cannot afford to pay for care, given their deepening poverty and unemployment, he pointed out.

Another doctor at the same hospital told IRIN when women need Caesarean sections, their families have to go out and buy the needles themselves, as hospitals cannot provide them.”

IRIN, 31 May 2010
Progress on a “Zero Tolerance” national campaign in Côte d’Ivoire to eliminate female genital mutilation or cutting (FGM/C) by the end of 2010, has been slowed down by health and education infrastructure, aid groups said.

Since the campaign began, 180 villages in Marandallah prefecture, in the north-central Worodougou region, no longer practise FGM/C and the aim is to double this by the end of the year. and UN Population Fund (UNFPA), according to Ministry head Euphrasie Yao.FGM/C rates have declined since the civil conflict ended in 2007, but not quickly enough. "FGM is decreasing, but one in three women in this country is still mutilated, and that is too high," Laetitia Bazzi, child protection officer for UNICEF in Côte d'Ivoire, told IRIN.

In 1998 some 49 percent of women and girls aged 10 to 45 were subjected to FGM/C, but by 2006 the number had dropped to around 36 percent.

Deteriorating health and education services fuel persistently high rates, said Bazzi. Schools were the best places to make girls aware of the dangers of FGM/C, and medical personnel were in the best position to tell them about the health dangers of the practice, but both sectors were facing severe staff shortages and inadequate resources.

According to government statistics, FGM/C is most prevalent in the north and west of the country, controlled by Forces Nouvelles, where health and education services have deteriorated most quickly since the conflict, due to lack of resources and the flight of skilled staff to the economic capital, Abidjan.

In the mainly Islamic north, almost 90 percent of women undergo the procedure, and once girls have passed this initiation they are seen as being ready to prepare for marriage and are usually not expected to return to school.

[…]

FGM/C poses numerous physical and mental health risks, including birth complications, maternal death, infertility, urinary incontinence and tetanus.”

UN OCHA, 22 January 2009, p. 11:
"Emergency relief initiatives have achieved substantial results in the health sector. The Government, with support from its partners, managed to redeploy more skilled health personnel in zones previously under FN control, including in the central, northern and western regions. The number of doctors in these regions is now even higher than it was before the crisis (261 doctors are now posted in these regions compared to 235 before, and 170 during, the crisis). The presence of skilled personnel enabled the Government to re-open 567 primary health centres: by September 2007, 95% of primary health centres were operational countrywide. UN agencies and NGOs also provided equipment to health districts and trained health workers on integrated management of childhood illness, safe motherhood and disease surveillance, etc."
"Peu de localités enquêtées possèdent des structures de soins de santé publiques. Pour compenser cette absence de structures étatiques, quelques-unes disposent d’offices privées. Diebly de Dieouzon est la seule localité qui paraît complètement dépourvue de services des soins de santé. Le problème majeur qui semble se poser est toutefois celui de la distance (temps de marche) pour se rendre aux structures de santé les plus proches.

En effet, bon nombre de localités semblent se trouver à plus d’une heure de marche. Cependant, ce sont les campements de Biłéquin qui semblent les plus éloignés, avec certaines localités se trouvant parfois à plus de 3 heures : Zéhípleu (252 min), N'Toñen 2 (238 min), N'Toñen 1 (203 min), Diekro (184 min) et Tiassale (165 min) en tête. D’autres localités qui méritent une attention particulière sont Bably (288 min), Zérégbo (256) et Douaipleu (220 min) de Zou.

Le problème de l’éloignement se justifie d’avantage par la rareté des moyens de transport et le manque de ressources financières qui constituent un sérieux handicap dans l’accès des populations aux centres de santé. Elles s’orientent par conséquent, vers des structures privées, avec des coûts souvent plus élevés, ou bien traditionnelles, dont la qualité des soins est souvent remise en cause. Le problème de coût existe d’ailleurs dans la quasi-totalité des localités visitées.

En outre, la mauvaise qualité des prestations dans les structures sanitaires publiques (insuffisance du personnel médical qualifié, vétusté et insuffisance du matériel médical existant, manque de médicaments) est un problème soulevé surtout à Saguipleu (43%) de Sangouiné; à Diaplean (43%), Gohouo Zagna (33%), ainsi que le chef-lieu (29%) lui-même de Zéo; Souéblé (46%) de Facobly. Également à Danhandrou/CIB (36%) de Biłéquin et à Gouessesso (33%) de Bloléquin la question de qualité est remise en question(*).

Dans la majorité des localités visitées, un grand nombre d’entretiens soulève avec une proportion élevée d’autres types de problèmes, tels qu’une certaine appréhension vis-à-vis des Agents de Santé Communautaires (ASC) non-qualifiés, ainsi que l’insuffisance ou la non-existence des équipements et/ou médicaments, parfois aussi périmés.

(*) Le fait que ces proportions de mentions soient parfois relativement faibles ne reflète pas nécessairement la véritable ampleur du problème. En effet, il arrive assez souvent que les interrogés évitent de soulever le problème et, par conséquent, la réalité est souvent plus importante que ne le montrent les résultats.”

**IDPs with HIV face particular difficulties (April 2008)**

- Health centres are still facing shortages of qualified staff a year after the signature of the Ouagadougou Agreement and many services, including HIV/AIDS services, are still unavailable
- ARV adherence is more difficult among IDPs with HIV because of their mobility
- IDP’s vulnerability to HIV has been aggravated by the war as IDP women and girls are more vulnerable to sexual violence
- IDPs with HIV have less access to services because of their impoverishment due to displacement and marginalisation

**IRIN, 28 April 2008:**
“More than four and a half years after the political crisis that split Côte d’Ivoire in two started, the situation is far from resolved. The Ouagadougou agreement, signed in March 2007 between Laurent Gbagbo, Côte d’Ivoire’s president, and the ex-rebel leader, Guillaume Soro, should have marked the resumption of state administration in areas under rebel control, but many services, including HIV/AIDS services, are still unavailable.

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Like many state institutions, CHU [Centre hopitalier universitaire] is experiencing a severe staff shortage. CHU officials have estimated that about 70 nurses are needed for the hospital to function properly, but less than half that number struggle to deal with urgent medical issues. Routine consultations had yet to start up again, said Prof N’Dri N’Guessan, CHU’s medical director.

The university hospital centre in Abidjan is providing care for people living with HIV and prescribing antiretrovirals (ARV), but the centre in Bouake is unable to offer these services. “We already have a shortage of staff; we can't assign doctors or nurses [to HIV/AIDS issues],” N’Guessan said.

“We have been delayed by the war,” Bao agreed, who said he hoped to reintroduce these services once CHU had "found its feet". N’Guessan said, "We have organised training sessions for doctors in CNO areas [central, northern and eastern areas under control of the former rebels] on HIV care, and one pharmacist has already been trained."

Only one laboratory in Bouake is processing HIV tests for 40 patients a week, and there are hundreds of patients on the waiting list.

A ministry devoted to the fight against HIV/AIDS is based in Abidjan, but does not have representation all of the country's 19 administrative regions. The process of recruiting new doctors from a pool of 1,200 applicants has begun, according to Dr Massagnon Soro, the ministry's inspector general."

UNHCR, 25 April 2007, p.7:
"They found increased vulnerability to HIV due to impoverishment, increased unemployment, family fragmentation and disruption of social networks, and dependence. The assessment also found that there was an increase risk of HIV due to increases in sexual trading for financial support, sexual exploitation, early sexual relations and unsafe sex (documented by a growth in the number of child mothers). Additionally, only minimal health services were available at most sites, since the many of the health workers had gone to Abidjan to work.

Key vulnerability and risk factors and corresponding recommendations were highlighted during the presentation, including the need to develop a strategy to ensure social and economic independence among IDPs, targeted HIV prevention for children and increased prevention interventions for students, improved quality and dissemination of information on HIV, increased availability of condoms, improved voluntary counselling and testing (VCT) access, quality, confidentiality and referral, and ensured access to treatment, care and support for PLWHs. Dr. Diabate stated that there were no specific programmes for IDPs, and that in many instances the IDPs had integrated within the existing populations, making existing services insufficient to cover the overall needs of the community. She also noted that issues of stigmatization and
discrimination had left many fearful of seeking services. She emphasized the need for services to be distributed fairly within the community."

UNHCR/GoCdI/UNAIDS, 28 March 2007, pp. iv-v:
"The internally displaced people interviewed who for the most part had had stable financial and familial conditions, have been stripped of their homes and income. They describe how financial strain of their extended stay with relatives has worn out family ties and social networks. Parental loss and impoverishment has fractured households as case studies illustrate, where children have either chosen or been forced to leave home and fend for themselves. Parents, humiliated by destitution and degrading events during their displacement express that they have lost their authority over their children, who are engaging in unrestrained sexual activity.

People living with HIV share that even in times of peace they can face financial difficulties when needing to pay for opportunistic infection treatment and prophylaxis. They state that the unemployment, undernutrition, deterioration of health care and unavailability of drugs and reagents they have experienced as a result of the war further aggravates their financial situation. ARV adherence among displaced people living with HIV is noticeably more difficult by their mobility. Moreover, HIV counselors suggest that the proximity of their new living conditions is a further barrier to medication adherence, because suspicious behaviour could reveal their positive status and lead to rejection from family members and/or the host.

Death, financial strains and liaisons with transient men were some sources of fracture among displaced and impoverished families. Women, children and even men were found to be vulnerable to sexual exploitation or trading. The UN peacekeepers were cited as a main source of sexual exploitation in Bouaké. The scale of the violence perpetrated by other men in uniform and paramilitaries could not be documented, although a first hand account of sexual exploitation by a militia was recorded. Teachers’ sexual exploitation of students reportedly rose with the vulnerability of their students.

Forced sexual relations were not the only factor increasing risk of HIV. In one case, the separation of spouses after displacement also encouraged unprotected extramarital sexual relations, with voluntary HIV testing never considered. Here, lack of knowledge and displacement combined to raise risk of HIV infection.

Overall, knowledge of HIV was inadequate. Sexual transmission and discriminatory practices towards PLWH were commonly stated. Condom use was not systematic in any site, but appeared to be more frequent in Abidjan than in other towns according to the sex workers interviewed and their clients.

In all four sites, HIV interventions and services were inadequate, and sometimes absent. Displaced people’s risky sexual behaviour and vulnerability to HIV have been aggravated by the war; they have poor access to protective mechanisms and HIV services due to their impoverishment, lack of information and marginalisation."

Food

High malnutrition rates across the country (December 2009)

- Chronic malnutrition has risen to “critical levels” in the northern and western regions.
The categories at most risk of malnutrition daily workers, farmers and those who depend on small agricultural subsistence living

The level of food insecurity seems to be correlated with both income and the level of education of the head of the household

The global financial crisis and rising food prices combined with structural problems in the agricultural sectors have contributed to a worsening in living conditions of most households

In the areas affected by the conflict insecurity and displacement have equally contributed to low living conditions

IRIN, 18 December 2009

“Fewer children suffer acute malnutrition in northern and western Côte d'Ivoire than in recent years, but chronic malnutrition has risen to “critical levels”, says a report by the government and UN.

In the north acute malnutrition – 7.2 percent among children under five – is down from 18 percent in 2008, but chronic malnutrition has risen from 30.6 percent in 2008 to 44.7 percent, according to preliminary results of a 2009 nutrition study by the Ministry of Health, with the UN Children’s Fund, World Food Programme and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). The study showed chronic malnutrition is at 40 percent in the west.

“If these malnutrition levels are not dealt with, the next hit will be a drama,” Eric Gerard, head of NGO Merlin told IRIN. “The Ministry of Health is well-intentioned [when it comes to nutrition] but it is overwhelmed and is struggling to cope.”

The reasons for such high chronic malnutrition in the north and west are partly developmental, said Julie Bélanger, head of OCHA in Côte d'Ivoire, who pointed to a lack of education, poor diets and feeding practices, and reduced access to land due to conflict.

Just 11 percent of women in five of the eight districts studied practice exclusive breastfeeding, according to the report. And between 5.3 percent and 19.2 percent of households can access safe water.

In 18 Montagnes region in the west, 9 percent of households regularly feed their children meals representing the four necessary food groups, the study found. Government hospital director Paul Kouhon in Danané, 80km from the regional capital Man, told IRIN: “Children here may eat three times a day but there is nothing nutritious in the food.”

FAO/WFP/Gov of CdI, October 2009, pp. 1-3

"A l'échelle nationale, 12,6% des ménages ruraux sont en insécurité alimentaire dont 2,5% en insécurité alimentaire sévère et 10,1% en insécurité alimentaire modérée. Si l'on rapporte ces proportions à la population rurale, l'insécurité alimentaire toucherait environ 1.269.549 personnes dont 232.602 seraient en insécurité alimentaire sévère.

L'analyse de la diversité de la consommation alimentaire des enfants de 6 à 23 mois montre qu'environ 2 enfants sur 3 dans cette tranche d’âge ont une alimentation pauvre et nondiversifiée.

Les taux d’insécurité alimentaire sévère les plus élevés sont enregistrés dans les régions suivantes :
Moyen Cavally (11,9%) ; Montagnes (7,2%) ; Bafing (5,6%) ; Fromager (5,5%) ; Savanes (3%) ; Zanzan (2,7%) ; Bas Sassandra (2,6%).

Les taux d’insécurité alimentaire modérée sont particulièrement élevés dans les régions suivantes :
Bafing (24,3%) ; Bas Sassandra (18,9%) ; Moyen Cavally (17,2%) ; Montagnes (16,1%) ; Savanes (14,3%) ; Haut Sassandra (11%) ; Zanzan (10,5%).
Les régions qui affichent des taux d’insécurité alimentaire sévère et modérée les plus élevés sont les suivantes :
Bafing (29,9%) ; Moyen Cavally (29,1%) ; Montagnes (23,3%) ; Bas Sassandra (21,5%) ; Savanes (17,3%) ; Zanzan (13,2%) ; Fromager (13,2%).

Les enfants de 6 à 23 mois ont une alimentation peu diversifiée dans les régions du Nord (Savanes), de l’Ouest (Moyen Cavally et Montagnes) et du Sud-ouest (Bas Sassandra). Ces régions sont également celles où les taux de malnutrition des enfants de moins de 5 ans sont les plus élevés selon les résultats des évaluations disponibles.

Les catégories de ménages les plus touchées sont tout d’abord les travailleurs journaliers, les ménages qui dépendent de l’agriculture vivrière de subsistance et les éleveurs. Ces catégories de ménages présentent des taux d’insécurité alimentaire au-dessus de la moyenne nationale. Viennent ensuite les ménages sans activité spécifique, ceux qui dépendent de l’agriculture de rente ainsi que ceux qui exercent dans le domaine de l’artisanat ou des petits métiers. Les ménages exerçant le petit commerce et les salariés sont les moins touchés.

L’analyse des données collectées montre par ailleurs que les ménages les plus pauvres présentent des niveaux d’insécurité alimentaire significativement plus élevés. L’analyse selon le genre révèle globalement qu’il n’existe pas de différence significative selon le sexe du chef de ménage.

Le niveau d’insécurité alimentaire semble être également lié au niveau d’instruction du chef de ménage. Le taux d’insécurité alimentaire est deux fois plus élevé chez les ménages dont le chef est analphabète ou dont le niveau d’instruction ne dépasse pas le primaire que parmi les ménages dont le chef a un niveau d’instruction secondaire ou supérieur.

La conjoncture mondiale défavorable, la hausse du prix des denrées alimentaires et des principaux facteurs de production combinés avec les problèmes structurels que connaissent les principales filières agricoles (notamment le coton, le café, le cacao et les cultures vivrières) ont contribué à la dégradation des conditions de vie des ménages au cours de ces dernières années. Dans les zones de conflit, les problèmes d’insécurité et de déplacements des populations y ont également contribué. Il convient par ailleurs de préciser qu’un peu plus de la moitié des ménages enquêtés (56,5%) ont été affectés par des chocs divers au cours des 12 derniers mois. Les résultats indiquent également que 47,4% des ménages sont endettés et que dans 20,3% des cas, ces prêts ont été contractés pour acheter de la nourriture.

UN OCHA, 22 January 2009, pp. 1-2, 10:
"High malnutrition rates were revealed in July 2008 by the Standardised Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transitions (SMART) survey, conducted jointly by the National Nutrition Programme (PNN), WFP and UNICEF. The survey concluded that the food security situation in the north had deteriorated, following a poor maize and rice harvest in 2007, erosion of the means of production with the loss of oxen, and general loss of purchasing power as a result of the high food prices. Furthermore, the survey concluded that the global acute malnutrition (GAM) rate is 17.5% in the north, well above the emergency threshold of 10%, and a marked deterioration from the 2006 multiple indicator cluster survey which concluded a GAM of 12.5% in that region.

In 2008, WFP, in close collaboration with FAO, undertook an assessment to monitor household food security in the Savanes and Moyen Cavally Regions, which are the most vulnerable regions in the country. The results of the assessment show significant food insecurity in the Savanes region where 12% of rural households were severely food-insecure and 15% were moderately food-insecure. Likewise, 15% of those in Moyen Cavally were moderately food-insecure.
In July, a nutrition survey was carried out by UNICEF, WFP, and the PNN in the north and in peri-urban areas of Abidjan to establish the nutritional situation of children under five and to measure the impact of the food crisis on malnutrition. This survey showed the following: (i) an alarming rate of 17.5% of children under five are undernourished (with 4% severely undernourished) in northern Côte d’Ivoire; (ii) 5% undernourished in peri-urban areas of Abidjan; (iii) 65.3% of children under five with global anaemia (moderate and severe) in the north; (iv) and 61.5% with global anaemia in peri-urban areas of Abidjan.*

**Shortfall of funding for Agencies supporting food needs (March 2010)**

- Severe acute malnutrition and chronic malnutrition rates in return areas in Dix-huit Montagnes region have been above WHO’s critical threshold
- The United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) has been facing funding shortfalls in 2010, which has been hampering food distribution to malnourished children

**WFP, 05 March 2010**

“The United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) said today it had halved the size of school meals for almost 430,000 children in Côte d’Ivoire because of funding shortfalls and announced that it urgently needed US$6 million to restore full rations and keep feeding malnourished children.

In February, WFP cut the size of food rations to half the normal quantity for primary school children. WFP said rations would be cut even more then stopped altogether at the beginning of April unless new contributions are received.

“This sharp reduction in food rations is most unfortunate since it takes place at a time when the country is on a critical path in the peace process,” said Thomas Yanga, WFP’s Regional Director for West Africa.

More funding would be needed to cover any potential emergency needs such as political unrest in the country, he said. “Should the current situation deteriorate, WFP will not have the local resources to respond appropriately,” said WFP Representative Alain Cordeil in Côte d’Ivoire.

Severe acute malnutrition and chronic malnutrition rates in the northwestern Worodougou region and the western Montagnes region are above the World Health Organization’s critical threshold. In addition to the problems funding school meals, WFP will have to cut supplementary feeding to 10,000 malnourished children who presently receive a nutritious ration micronutrient fortified corn-soya blend if it does not receive US$300,000 by March. And assistance to 22,500 children who are affected by HIV Aids and presently receive a family food ration is also in jeopardy.

“WFP food assistance is vital to combat the situation that could worsen into a nutritional crisis on a wider scale. It is urgent to prevent high malnutrition rates during the lean season from May to September,” said Dr. Patricia N’Goran, director of the National Nutrition Programme.

WFP aims to feed more than 1 million people hit by conflict in Côte d’Ivoire, particularly in the northern and western regions.”

**Shelter**

**IDPs’ housing characteristics (2006)**

- Most of the IDPs in the five departments studied live in compounds or ‘simple houses’
- An important number of IDPs have also found shelter in shacks or adjoining houses
"Sur l'ensemble des cinq départements, la majeure partie des ménages vivent dans des 'maisons simples' ou des concessions. En effet, quels que soit le département et le milieu, ces deux types de construction sont plus nombreux. Aussi enregistre-t-on trois ménages sur six dans les 'maisons simples' et deux ménages sur six dans les concessions.

Les maisons en bande et les baraques abritent également une partie relativement importante de ménages. Les autres types de construction, les immeubles et le villas modernes, abritent très peu de ménages (tableau 17).

### Tableau 17 : Répartition des ménages selon le type de construction et le milieu (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Département</th>
<th>Milieu</th>
<th>Type de construction</th>
<th>Effectifs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Villa moderne</td>
<td>Maison simple</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abidjan</td>
<td>Urbain</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>48.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>30.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ensemble</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>40.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daloa</td>
<td>Urbain</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>39.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ensemble</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>35.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duékoué</td>
<td>Urbain</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>42.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>50.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ensemble</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>44.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Touleple</td>
<td>Urbain</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>67.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>79.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ensemble</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>72.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yamoussoukro</td>
<td>Urbain</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>58.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>89.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ensemble</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>73.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensemble</td>
<td>Urbain</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>47.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>53.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ensemble</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>43.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Le nombre total de ménages dans les cinq départements est estimé à 754 604. Le gap est imputable aux non-réponses. Source : ENSEA – PUI 2005

**Water and Sanitation**

**Efforts are carried out to improve access to water and sanitation (January 2009)**

- A sizeable proportion of the rural population does not have access to toilets nor drinking water
- Soaring food prices and ineffective redeployment of technical staff from the state water service has had an impact on water and sanitation habits
- Agencies have carried out efforts to improve access to water and sanitation also among returnees
- Particular problems with regard to the quality of water were registeres in Facoby, Blenkouma and Zéo
"One third of the rural population has no access to toilets and only 55% of the population has access to drinking water, with a significant regional gap in access between urban areas and rural areas, favouring urban areas. Furthermore, the redeployment of technical staff from the state water services and local governments is not yet effective. The situation has been exacerbated by the food crisis and soaring prices which has reduced household resources to ensure consumption of potable water and ensure that hygienic conditions are maintained.

More than 200,000 persons, including 40,000 living in shanty districts near Abidjan (Ayakro, Boribana, Vridi three and Avocatier) and 160,000 returnees in the villages of Zuenoula, Zouan Hounien, Boléquin, Bangolo, Duékoué Danané, Kouibly departments (western region), were sensitised on basic hygiene throughout the year. These populations now have improved access to potable water and basic sanitation facilities through a series of rehabilitation programmes and maintenance of boreholes with water pumps and drinking fountains. Sanitation campaigns were also organised to clean the environment by destroying unsuitable latrines, shower units and cesspools. Basic sanitation facilities including household latrines, lavatories and public washhouse were also made available.

A total of over 500,000 persons now have improved access to potable water and basic sanitation facilities through a series of rehabilitation programmes, including 200 village pumps and 150 new water points projects run by UNICEF, Government partners and local and International NGOs in the Moyen Cavally, 18 Montagnes, Worodougou, Marahoué and Vallée du Bandama Regions.

Moreover, UNICEF provided many hospitals and health centres with water-storage equipment to ensure they could provide in water for patients, particularly for women. More than 100 water treatment stations belonging to the private water distribution company, in the Central, Northern and Western Zones, received purification materials and were also provided with technical support to keep them in good working order.

Furthermore, IRC’s “Return and Reintegration Programme” rehabilitated, in coordination with the village water and sanitation committees, a total of 11 water pumps not covered by any other actions in the Department of Bloléquin (west), as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>N°</th>
<th>Sub-Prefecture</th>
<th>Villages</th>
<th>Population in Village</th>
<th>Population in Temporary Camps These people are newly returned and living just outside the village in temporary shelters in the bush.</th>
<th>Number of Men</th>
<th>Number of Women</th>
<th>Total Population</th>
<th>Number of repaired pumps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Dieouzon</td>
<td>Bouobly 464</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>639</td>
<td>639</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Goénie Tahouaké</td>
<td>1,226</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>802</td>
<td>619</td>
<td>1,421</td>
<td>1,421</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Baïbly</td>
<td>2,207</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>1,340</td>
<td>1,319</td>
<td>2,629</td>
<td>2,629</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Diébly</td>
<td>1,553</td>
<td>474</td>
<td>1,116</td>
<td>911</td>
<td>2,027</td>
<td>2,027</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tota l</td>
<td>5,450</td>
<td>2,952</td>
<td>3,144</td>
<td>6,716</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Zou Banguiéhi</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>1,493</td>
<td>1,058</td>
<td>863</td>
<td>1,921</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Zou</td>
<td>3,485</td>
<td>2,952</td>
<td>3,380</td>
<td>3,057</td>
<td>6,437</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3  Pinhou  3,226  231  1,962  1505  3,467  2
4  Béoua   175   665  453  387  840  1
Tota l  7,314  5,341  6,853  5,812 12,665  7
Grand total  12,764  6,637 10,455  8,956 19,381  11

NRC, December 2008, Moyen Cavally et 18 Montagnes, pp. 23-24:
"En ce qui concerne l’accès à l’eau, le problème principal porte sur la qualité surtout à Facobly, Biankouma et Zéo. Nombreuses sont les localités enquêtées de ces trois sous-préfecture affectées par la mauvaise qualité de l’eau ; les mentions sont particulièrement élevées à Tiessan (85%), Sandrou (75%) et Zouata 2 (71%) de Facouby ; Mangouin (100%), Gbombelo 1 (86%), Gbablasso (80%) et Yégolé (75%) de Biankouma ; Diéou-Zibiao (82%), Ghouou Zagna (73%), Glodé (67%) et Diaplean (64%) de Zéo. Les populations de certaines localités des sous-préfectures de Diéouzon et Sémien semblent également déprécier la qualité de l’eau : Bibita et Sémien (71%), Mané (54%) de Sémien méritent une attention particulière, ainsi que Boulobly (80%) de Diéouzon et Tiassalé (70%) de Bloléquin.

Ensuite, à l’exception des localités visitées à Kouibly et Bloléquin, le temps de marche pour accéder aux points d’eau excède assez souvent une moyenne de 10 minutes dans bon nombre de localités des autres sous-préfectures. A Facobly, dans toutes les localités, les distances moyennes s’inscrivent entre 11 et 29 minutes de marche ; à Zéo ce sont notamment Goya Zibiao, Ghouou Zagna et Diou-Zibiao qui se trouvent éloignés à plus de 15 min de marche ; de même pour le chef-lieu de à Sanguiné, ainsi que Nionle Gouepleu et Logoualé ; Mané et Siambly de Sémien et, enfin, Gbablasso de Biankouma où la population met en moyenne 31 minutes de marche pour trouver l’eau.

Les populations ont désigné la brousse comme le principal lieu pour leur toilette. En effet, la quasi-totalité des entretiens dans les sous-préfectures visitées ont signalé ce mode comme étant le plus fréquemment utilisé. Toutefois, il existe quelques latrines familiales dans certaines localités“

Water and sanitation facilities remain precarious for IDPs and host communities (December 2007)

- Access to clean water is still poor for IDPs and other vulnerable populations, particularly in the west and in rebel-held areas and in peri-urban areas of large cities
- Limited access to potable water has resulted in the resurgence of endemic diseases and indirectly had a negative impact on education

UN, 10 December 2007, p.40
"The socio-political crisis in Côte d’Ivoire has had a serious impact on water supply and sanitation services in the Centre, North and West due to the absence of qualified operational staff that fled the areas. This resulted in a high rate of breakdown of water infrastructures. The recent peace process may eventually contribute to a substantial improvement as some managers of the Hydrology Department (DHH) are being redeployed, but as this redeployment is still in the early stages large-scale or systemic improvements have yet to be seen.

The situation in urban areas in the mentioned regions remains precarious, with water quality affected by frequent power cuts, often the result of poor cost recovery on energy bills. ICRC
continues its support of 115 water treatment plants in the Centre, North and West of the ex-ZOC. A campaign of 500 new boreholes in the North East region is ongoing. Many displaced families have returned to their places of origin, in particular in the Western region. Nevertheless, a large number of IDPs have not moved yet and the sanitary situation of the peri-urban areas of large cities where the majority of them have settled remains precarious.

In rural areas, where people rely mostly on hand-pumps for their water supply, the number of broken-down pumps continues to decrease due to large-scale repair campaigns carried out both by DHH and international aid organisations. DHH is involved in the repair of 7,500 pumps throughout the country. Pump mechanics are also being trained and equipped, while spare-parts are made available in regional stores. Aid organisations have intensified their efforts in the Western regions, where the largest number of returnees have started to settle. The International Rescue Committee and CARE have water and sanitation projects in the Bangolo area (Diozon and Zou) whilst Solidarités/UNICEF are active in Toulepleu. UNICEF, through Caritas, also runs a project further north in Odienné. CARE also has water projects in the Duékoué and Man departments, but their sustainability is uncertain as it relies on volunteers, who are members of water management committees which are being re-activated.

Sanitation and hygiene activities focused mostly on rural areas where promotion of latrines and better hygiene practices has been carried out. In urban areas, efforts concentrated on solid waste management with projects run by CARE in the Central and Northern cities of Bouaïché and Korhogo. As a measure of the success of these projects, significant outbreaks of waterborne or excreta related diseases have not been observed in the last twelve months."

IRIN, 21 March 2007

“It hasn’t rained since December in the region of Duékoué, about 400km west of the main city, Abidjan. The southwest is where much of the country’s rice, yams and manioc are produced, as well as the leading cash crops: cocoa, coffee and rubber.

Rains should have begun falling in February, but instead the dry season only persisted.

As a result, agricultural production is down and at least half of all local households are suffering from water shortages. Residents are forced to trek hours from where they live to rivers and wells to find water.

Problem compounded

The water shortage in the southwest is exacerbated by an infrastructure that has deteriorated since a brief civil war erupted in 2002, leading to the division of the country between a rebel-held north and a government-run south. Residents wonder whether a new peace accord signed last month will provide better results than previous agreements that have faltered. The new accord makes no reference to the country’s various humanitarian crises.

The problems in the southwest are so grave that the state-run Water Distribution Company of Côte d’Ivoire (SODECI) has to alternate its supply of water between neighbourhoods within Duékoué and Guiglo and can only sporadically truck in water to outer villages.

“The boreholes we have are not enough,” said a SODECI water technician in Guiglo who asked not to be named. “Every day almost 600 cubic metres of water are required for Guiglo and the surrounding area but we cannot extract more than 300 cubic meters so we cannot satisfy everyone.”

He said the water problems would likely worsen in the coming months. “We will just have to wait for the rainy season to solve the problem but in the meantime I am extremely doubtful we can stop the taps and wells from completely drying up,” he said.
No water in schools
The lack of water increases the risk of disease, particularly among children. In all but one of the 20 schools in Duekoué and the surrounding area, children have no access to drinkable water.

“They have to drink something in the course of the day and so they look for what water they can get,” including from unsafe sources, said a teacher in Duekoué.

Children at school don’t even have water to clean themselves, Pascal Niando, the assistant treasurer of one of the schools, told IRIN."

UNICEF, 29 January 2007, p.213

“In the water and environmental sanitation sector, North, West and Central Côte d’Ivoire suffer from a chronic lack of drinking water: 50 per cent of rural populations do not have access to drinking water, and 40 per cent of rural pumps are out of order. In the cities that have received the most significant number of IDPs (Abidjan, Yamoussoukro, Daloa, Duékoué), the still functioning hydraulic infrastructures and sanitary facilities (68 per cent have broken down countrywide) are at the verge of collapsing due to over-exploitation.”

United Nations, 30 November 2006, pp. 15-16

“The water and sanitation is one of the most affected sectors, with strong pressure exerted on potable water resources of towns that received many displaced persons (Daloa, Duékoué, Yamoussoukro, Abidjan) resulting in the decline of the level and even shortages of water supply in some districts. Worse still, in towns in the interior a section of the population, which has increased with the crisis, has no access to any sanitation system or continue to use non-potable water wells and other sources. In both cases, the situation has serious health consequences. Water infrastructures and sanitation facilities, already marked by regional disparity and major breakdown rates (68%), are strained by overexploitation in zones with high concentrations of displaced persons. Contrary to towns in the interior, Abidjan has a sanitation system of public gutters of more than 990 km for evacuation of wastewater and matter, including the combined sewerage system. This main system covers nearly 70% of the city. However, only 45% of households are connected to the system (Sanitation Department, 2005). Until quite recently, it drained all wastewater and matter into the Ebrié Lagoon. Presently, many households (about 55%) have opted for an individual sanitation system (septic tanks in residential areas and latrines elsewhere). Despite these different types of sanitation, many families continue to discharge water from washing of plates and clothes into streets and gutters.

The Centre, North and West suffer from chronic shortages of potable water. Bouaké, the second largest city with a current estimated population of 400,000 inhabitants, was without water supply for more than one month (2 May-15 June 2006). During this period, humanitarian agencies assured emergency supplies following the breakdown of one of the two engines of the only water station that was still operational. The breakdown was caused by lack of maintenance. Thanks to the action of humanitarian agencies and organisations that supplied water to health centres, public social services and helped with the sanitation of water sources, a major humanitarian crisis was averted. In fact, continuing advocacy contributed to the repair of the pumps at the beginning of June 2006.

In Odienné and Danané, the population has, since the beginning of the first semester of 2006, been suffering from frequent power cuts and interruptions of water supply. SODECI provided a partial solution to these technical problems by repairing the water supply pumps. It is estimated that 50% of the rural population of these zones has no access to potable water Field evaluation by agencies of the UNS and humanitarian NGOs. and that 40% of the rural pumps remain out of service, which represent 3,000 pumps to be rehabilitated nationwide CI 2006, Mid-Year Review (MYR)/OCHA., after the rehabilitation of nearly 6,000 pumps in 2006."
ACCESS TO EDUCATION

General

Displacement has led to major differences in access to education in the north and in the south of the country (March 2010)

- Education in the zones controlled by the rebels has been more affected by the internal armed conflict that broke out in 2002
- Schools in the South are overcrowded after the enrollment of a large number of IDP children

USIP, March 2010

“Due to the massive displacements caused by the civil war, the education system in the rebel-controlled zones in the northern and southwestern regions has experienced severe problems. It was estimated in 2004 that as many as 700,000 children had been out of school since the beginning of the crisis. Even university students were not exempt from this mass exodus. Soon after rebels took control of Bouaké, a major northern city, its university was looted and closed down. A temporary campus was later opened in Abidjan for the thousands of students who fled the rebel-held North; those students who could not leave saw their education interrupted. Concern has grown that with this many out of- school children and youth Côte d’Ivoire may be developing a ready pool of malleable youth who could contribute to further instability. In November 2004, riots against the French force in Abidjan—after the French bombing of Ivorian military aircraft—destroyed numerous schools, which has had long-term repercussions for the education-sector infrastructure.

Additionally, schools in the South are burdened with the large numbers of IDP children who have fled the violence in the North to continue their education in the southern school system. This overcrowding has placed a stress on the system and has brought the politics of displacement and conflict inside the school walls, undoubtedly influencing classroom dynamics and student behavior.

Education in the North has been affected more severely than education in the South, however. While the numbers of children deprived of schooling during the crisis are high nationwide, the Ministry of Education in 2004 estimated that 50 percent of the children in the North had been deprived of education. Clearly, this acute education crisis parallels the political crisis of the country. Further, the Ministry of Education estimated that only 20 percent of the government-paid teachers stayed at their posts in the North or have returned since the fighting has subsided. Since then, the return of teachers has been stymied by the lack of security and the occupation and destruction of education infrastructure. There is concern that because the voluntary return of teachers has been so slow, the government’s redeployment of school staff will also be slow. In the meantime, schools in the North will continue to suffer from teacher shortages as they struggle to get the education system back on track.”

Lack of qualified teachers in areas of return remains a serious concern (July 2008)

- The lack of qualified teachers in areas of return remain a major constraint in guaranteeing access to education for children
- Teachers' strikes over improved conditions of service have also affected the academic year
In the west, the concentration of IDPs in cities like Duékoué and Guiglo has saturated secondary schools.

Children associated with the armed forces, those separated from their parents, orphans and those lacking birth certificates have been marginalised within the school system.

The Fast Track Initiative (FTI), a global partnership between donors and developing countries to accelerate progress towards the Millennium development goal of all children completing primary school by 2015, is not yet been considered for Côte d’Ivoire.

UN OCHA, 3 July 2008, p. 14
"The conflict has severely degraded the level of education for children, which was already poor in 2001/2002 with a school attendance level reaching only 56.3% (girls 45.4%). In 2006, despite the combined efforts of Government, local communities, humanitarian actors and other partners to provide education in the most affected zones (Centre, North and the West, and zones hosting refugees), the level of participation in classes had still not reached pre-crisis levels (estimated at 55%, with girls’ attendance attaining 51%). The 2006 MICS indicates a precarious situation in rural areas, with school attendance reaching only 48.2% against 66.6% in urban areas.

As a result of the crisis, education has in many instances become a secondary concern given the level of poverty and the emergence of other priorities for families. This situation hinders the achievement of the “Education for All” and Millennium Development Goal objectives, and undermines the fundamental right of children to education. While 588,976 children attended classes at the beginning of the 2002/2003 school year in the Central, Northern and Western zones of the country, only 384,116 received education in 2005/2006, after a campaign directed at advocating for the return of children to schools. By 2006-2007 this number had increased to 686,071, 41% of which were girls.

Weak attendance rates are noted in rural areas where unfortunately schools remain closed, mainly due to a lack of teachers. Moreover, numerous children of school-going age do not have access to school or dropped out as a result of the crisis. Their return or reintegration into the school system constitutes an important challenge. Efforts carried out over the last two years, which included the organisation of exams in the Central, Northern and Western zones, and a single starting date for the school year on 16 October 2006 throughout the country allowed for the progressive return to a unitary national school system.

Response to date

The OPA, which foresees in the redeployment of the national administration in the Central, Northern and Western zones, also anticipates the return of displaced persons and the regular functioning of schools. 17 September 2007 was fixed as the start of the new academic year. However, one of the main constraints in the zones of return remains the lack of teachers. According to available estimates, only 30% of the teachers that have been redeployed in the zones mentioned above have proper qualifications."

UN Security Council, 2 January 2008, para. 31
"Since the beginning of the school year in September, teachers in many parts of the country have been on strike to demand improved conditions of service. The action has generated widespread and frequent demonstrations by students protesting the continued absence of teachers from their schools. The situation might improve as a result of reopening in November of financial services in the north, in particular in Bouaké and Korhogo, which will facilitate the payment of salaries and pensions to current and retired civil servants in that part of the country."

Save the Children, 3 June 2008, p.10
"Some CAFS [Conflict-Affected Fragile States] are scheduled for FTI [Fast-Track Initiative] endorsement in 2008 (Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Haiti and Uganda) and
2009(Angola, DRC, Republic of Congo, Eritrea and Nigeria [three or four states]). Given the Liberia experience, however, endorsement may not necessarily mean they receive extra resources through the Catalytic Fund. In addition, Afghanistan, Cote d'Ivoire, Myanmar (Burma), Nepal, Nigeria (other states), Pakistan, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan and Zimbabwe (countries with high numbers of out-of-school children) are not yet even scheduled to be endorsed."

In the West
UN OCHA/EU-Côte d'Ivoire, September 2007, p.86
"Le secteur de l'éducation est particulièrement sinistré par la guerre. Les conflits ont provoqué la fuite des enseignants titularisés en zone gouvernementale et des administrations (la DREN s’est délocalisée à Duékoué). Les infrastructures scolaires et les équipements ont été en partie pillés (toits, portes, tables/bancs) parfois détruits ou se sont simplement dégradés. Le pillage, l'occupation épisodique des structures par les combattants, l’abandon et le manque d’entretien n’ont fait qu’aggraver une situation qui n’était pas forcément brillante avant la crise. En 2004, jusqu’à 25 % des établissements primaires de la zone CNO n’étaient toujours pas fonctionnels.

Les déplacements de populations des zones de guerre vers dans les zones refuges telles que Duékoué et Guiglo ont saturé les capacités d’accueil et d’enseignement des établissements, particulièrement les établissements secondaires. Les classes déjà saturées de certains établissements secondaires ont vu leurs effectifs d’élèves doubler.

Enfin, la crise a généré un groupe d’enfants marginalisés du système éducatif. On y trouve les enfants associés aux forces combattantes, les enfants qui ont dépassé l’âge requis, les enfants séparés de leurs parents, les orphelins ou ceux dont les parents sont sans revenu ou malades. Beaucoup d’enfants ne disposent pas de l’extrait de naissance nécessaire à l’inscription à l’école et au passage des examens. Ce groupe d’enfants encore jeunes ne peut pas de surcroît avoir accès à l’apprentissage d’un métier.

1.1 Activités d’urgences
En réponse au manque d’enseignants et de structures, il faut tout d’abord saluer la volonté des parents d’élève et des COGES de maintenir les activités d’enseignement, en recourant aux enseignants volontaires pour travailler dans des salles de classe fortement délabrées et sous équipées ou avec des écoles « communautaires » improvisées. Par ailleurs, les réponses des humanitaires ont été axées sur la réhabilitation d’infrastructures scolaires, la fourniture en équipements et en kits, ainsi que l’appui au corps enseignants, administratif et aux dynamiques villageoises. Des solutions intermédiaires de classes passerelles, d’écoles informelles et d’alphabétisation ont permis à environ 700 enfants exclus du système éducatif de retrouver un niveau leur permettant de réintégrer un cycle scolaire. Enfin, des campagnes ont été menées, visant à la scolarisation des filles et le maintien des enfants à l’école, ainsi que la relance des examens en 2005."

For an analysis of the link between lack of access to education and risks of trafficking, see UNICEF's "Child trafficking in Côte d’Ivoire: Efforts under way to reverse a tragic trend" (14 June 2007)

Summary of education data on IDPs (March 2006)

- IDPs living in urban areas have more access to education
- Less IDP girls are sent to school than boys
- Reasons for not attending school include lack of financial means and not having attended earlier for those aged under ten
*Education*

Les déplacés vivant en milieu urbain semblent plus scolarisés que ceux du milieu rural (70% en ville contre 60% en zone rurale). Les enfants et les jeunes dont les âges se situent entre 6 et 24 ans révolus sont en majorité encore inscrits à l’école (75%). Lorsque l’on s’intéresse aux enfants déplacés de moins de 15 ans, il ressort que 70% d’entre eux poursuivent leur scolarité.

Cependant, les filles déplacées sont moins scolarisées que les garçons. Ce sont en moyenne 59% d’entre elles qui sont encore à l’école entre 6 et 24 ans contre 69% de garçons. Cette configuration est peu satisfaisante, néanmoins, elle est appréciable comparativement à la situation à Duékoué où à peine trois filles sur dix ont la chance d’être scolarisée. Les départements ayant les taux de scolarisation les plus élevés sont Abidjan et Yamoussoukro avec des niveaux respectifs de 71% et 67%.

Les principales raisons évoquées par les déplacés qui ne fréquentent plus l’école sont le manque de moyens financiers surtout parmi ceux de 10-24 ans (34%) et le fait de n’avoir jamais été à l’école chez les moins de 10 ans (64%). En général, les frais de scolarité des déplacés scolarisés sont pris en charge par leurs parents biologiques. Ce qui est confirmé par les propos de plus de 70% d’entre eux.”
ISSUES OF SELF-RELIANCE AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

Self-reliance

Employment strategies used by IDPs (2008)

- Survival mechanisms vary according to gender
- A great number of IDPs are registered as students
- Those IDPs who are employed work in commerce, administration, craft industry and agriculture
- For those IDPs who were business owners before displacement, lack of credit is an obstacle to return
- The ENSEA survey found two times less employed people among IDPs than the general population
- A good number of IDPs, especially in Abidjan, maintained government salaries during displacement

United Nations, 30 November 2006, p. 55

“The survival mechanisms developed in the rural areas vary according to gender. The men look for small contract jobs that are often scarce and poorly paid in the farms. But, once the work is completed, payment of salaries is often a source of misunderstanding. The women buy products on credit and resell them on the market to earn some profit, sell firewood (after asking for permission from the host), local materials used for roofing ("papos") and snails.”

ENSEA, March 2006

“Emploi

De manière générale, la structure de l’occupation dans la population des personnes déplacées indique une prépondérance des élèves (38%). Ce constat est nuancé dans les départements de Duékoué et de Toulépleu où la majorité des déplacés est occupée. Les actifs occupés (26%) viennent ensuite suivis des chômeurs et des personnes en quête de leur premier emploi (25%). Les personnes actives occupées travaillent essentiellement dans le commerce (34%), l’administration (31%), l’artisanat (19%) et l’agriculture (16%). La structure de l’occupation dans la population des non déplacées est quelque peu différente. En effet, les occupés sont dominants (42%) suivi des élèves (33%), des chômeurs et personnes en quête de leur premier emploi (14%). Dans l’ensemble, les populations déplacées renferment deux fois moins de personnes occupées que dans la population non déplacée.”
US Department of State, 11 March 2008

"More than 90 percent of IDPs lived with host families, and almost 70 percent were located in Abidjan. However, other humanitarian organizations and donors noted that these statistics included IDPs who maintained access to their government salaries even after their displacement."

IRIN, 14 May 2008

"In an attempt to return to normality, humanitarian workers are trying to help people displaced by the war to return home. Aka said they would have to resolve the issue of reintegration, but economic reconstruction was a priority."

"Some displaced persons were working for companies where business is now very slow. Shops and industries have reduced their activity and there is no longer any work," he said.

"Another issue is that their homes and belongings have been looted, and some people no longer have the means to send their children to school. They arrive and have to start a new life, but for that you need a certain amount of money. Displaced persons have come back and then left again for this reason," he pointed out.

"Some displaced persons receive help from organisations, and they would like to move away from this dependency, but you need some money to get started."

This is also true of Josette. None of her children has found a job, and she also dreams of working again. "I want to do something with hands, I want to work but I have to get everything given to me," she said sadly. "The only thing that works here is credit."

Income generating activities in the West suffer from displacement and little support by humanitarian actors (2007)

- Socio-economic infrastructures in rural areas in western Cote d'Ivoire have been heavily destroyed during the conflict
The problem of income-generating activities are particularly brought forward by women and youth.

Inter-communal conflicts and consequent waves of displacement have had complex effects on the economy based on coffee and cacao.

Support for income-generating activities has been limited having humanitarian organisations focused on humanitarian assistance.

Humanitarian agencies and NGOs have developed agricultural activities aimed at IDP returnees in the departments of Touleupleu, Man and Bloléquin.

UN OCHA/EU-Côte d'Ivoire, pp. 22, 96, 98

"Les infrastructures socio-économiques rurales ont été fortement endommagées. Les efforts menés par les agences humanitaires, ONG, entreprises agricoles et forestières et l’ONUCI pour maintenir fonctionnel un minimum de pistes et ponts sont encore insuffisants, de nombreuses pistes étant presque impraticables. Dans les villes, les marchés et les artères principales sont aussi délabrés.

S’il existe des potentiels d’insertion des jeunes et des femmes dans l’agriculture, tels que la cacao-culture, l’élevage, la pisciculture, l’hévéaculture, etc., les structures gouvernementales sont sous-équipées en matériel et personnel pour offrir un encadrement répondant aux besoins actuels (ANADER, Ministère de l’Agriculture).

Les problèmes des AGR sont particulièrement posés par les jeunes et les femmes. Les jeunes font prévaloir l’isolement et le manque d’opportunités de financement de leur projet, l’absence de soutien de l’État et des Conseils Généraux ainsi que le manque de terre, pour justifier leur présence dans les milices et leur récupération par les hommes politiques. Les coopératives de femmes dans le domaine du vivrier se sont désagrégées par suite aux déplacements de leurs membres et le manque de ressource à l’investissement demeure un frein majeur à la reprise d’AGR.

[...]

Des centaines de milliers d’exploitants agricoles, en particulier les étrangers et les Baoulés ont ouvert dans la région de nombreuses plantations sur la base de conventions foncières de teneur très variée avec les autochtones Guéré. Les rixes inter-communautaires ont eu des effets complexes sur l’économie du café et du cacao. Elles ont entraîné le départ massif des populations étrangères à la région et l’impossibilité pour celles-ci d’accéder à leur exploitation. Les autochtones parties prenantes à ces conflits n’ont pas pu exploiter ces plantations en raison du départ de la main d’œuvre étrangère. Aux effectifs importants de travailleurs déplacés, rendus au chômage ou à la sous activité, s’ajoute le nombre de jeunes urbains et ruraux sans emploi.

[...]

Le soutien aux AGR a été pratiquement inexistant, l’attention ayant été accordée en général aux secours d’urgence aux populations. Dans les zones de Zouan-Hounien, dans les départements de Man, Toulepleu et Bloléquin, les agences et les ONG ont développé des activités de relance agricole auprès des PDI retournées, notamment pour les cultures vivrières. Cette relance vise plus à pallier le déficit de vivres et le risque d’insécurité alimentaire qu’à produire des revenus. Quelques AGR ont bien été entreprises sous la forme de micro-projets communautaires. C’est ainsi qu’ont été initiées des activités communautaires autour de projets ponctuels de pisciculture, d’élevage de porcs ou de moulin de manioc, etc."
DOCUMENTATION NEEDS AND CITIZENSHIP

General

The identification process aims at addressing the needs of the undocumented (May 2010)

- The new identification process started on 25th September 2007
- Mobile courts and tribunals can issue birth certificates or substitute judgments only to people born within their jurisdictions or based on birth registration for those outside
- Claimants need to have at least one witness to attest their birthplace
- The government is parallely engaged in the reconstitution of civil registries lost or destroyed during the conflict
- Due to a failure to prepare the ground properly, the geographical coverage of the mobile courts has been limited and the turnout relatively low in the first few weeks of the process
- The fourth round of the mobile court operations ended on 15 May 2008 but supplementary mobile courts were deployed on 27 August 2008
- The identification of the population and the voter registration processes were launched on 15 September 2008 to last for 45 days but a number of delays were recorded since the start.
- Voter registration and identification operations were officially completed in November 2009. However, in January 2010, a controversy over the existence of a parallel electoral list of 429'000 persons established by the IEC president erupted into violent protests. The non-registration of a person on the voters list deprives him from Ivorian citizenship.
- Identification is essential as it is a prerequisite to owning land and accessing social services.

Reuters, 17 September 2007

"Exclusion of any community is precisely what the identification process is aimed to fix, as Côte d'Ivoire fights its way back from five years of unrest and economic decline, triggered by a rebellion calling in part for an end to discrimination against northerners.

After several failed launches, the identification process is scheduled to start on 25 September. Teams of judges and legal experts will travel around the country to furnish those who do not have birth certificates with special documents that will serve for obtaining national ID and voter cards. A person seeking the documents must show up with at least one witness to attest to his or her birthplace.

The identification process is particularly important to residents of the northwestern Denguele region, who say they have long been cast as foreigners and discriminated against because they share names and ethnicities with communities of neighbouring Mali and Burkina Faso.

Odienne acting mayor Kourouma said local authorities had not yet received a breakdown of how many teams will be in the region and in how many places they would set up shop. Given the lack of road access to so many areas he thought it would be best to hold tribunals in a few central towns rather than in a larger number of towns and villages."

Click here to access the operating rules of the mobile courts
**UN Security Council, 13 October 2008, paras. 27-30**

"It will be recalled that the Ouagadougou Agreement sought to accelerate the identification of those Ivorians who were eligible to vote. In that regard, the Agreement provided that all individuals who were on the voters’ list in 2000 would be automatically eligible to receive national identity cards and voters’ cards; the ongoing mobile courts would issue duplicate birth certificates to Ivorians aged 18 years and older, whose births had never been recorded in civil registers, to enable them to register to vote; and the civil registers that had been lost or destroyed during the conflict would be reconstituted to enable all other Ivorians who might not have been included on the 2000 voters’ list to register to vote.

In my last report, I stated that the fourth round of the mobile court operations officially had ended on 15 May. Following the recommendation of the Permanent Consultative Framework meeting of 9 May, supplementary mobile courts were deployed on 27 August to issue duplicate birth certificates to applicants in areas that had not been adequately covered during the main operation. In that regard, the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights deployed 50 teams to 34 jurisdictions throughout the country. At the conclusion of the operation on 25 September, a total of 35,370 declaratory judgements in lieu of birth certificates had been issued. Of these, 32,239 were issued to Ivorian nationals and 3,131 to foreigners. The number of declaratory judgements issued in lieu of birth certificates since the mobile courts operations were launched in September 2007 stands at 750,000.

The identification of the population and the voter registration processes were launched on 15 September, subsequent to the promulgation of a decree on 14 September which stipulated that these two crucial processes would be conducted over a period of 45 days. As of 1 October, 5,849 Ivorians had been registered as voters. Although the pace of voter registration and identification is expected to increase as more teams are deployed throughout the country, it is unlikely that the process will be completed within the 45 days stipulated in the 14 September presidential decree.

The operation to reconstitute the civil registers and restore birth, marriage and death records that were lost or destroyed during the crisis was launched by the Minister of Justice on 15 May. The initial stages of the exercise involved preparing an inventory of the existing as well as destroyed and lost civil registers. The United Nations Office of Project Services, funded by the European Union, is providing technical assistance to this operation. Article 2 of the presidential decree adopted on 14 September stipulates that registration on the voters’ roll of those applicants affected by the reconstitution operation should not change the time frame of the publication of the provisional electoral list."

**United Nations Security Council, 20 May 2010, paras. 2-3**

"2. As indicated in my last report, the voter registration and identification operations, which were officially completed in November 2009, yielded a provisional electoral list of some 5.3 million persons confirmed by the technical operators (commonly referred to as the "white list") and some 1.03 million persons who remained to be confirmed (referred to as the "grey list"). On 3 December 2009, the Cadre permanent de concertation, composed of the main Ivorian political leaders […] took note of the credible manner in which the identification and voter registration operations had been conducted, and welcomed the provisional voters list. On that basis, the Cadre permanent de concertation endorsed a new electoral timetable providing for the completion of the final voters list in January 2010, and the presidential election by the end of February or the beginning of March 2010.

3. Early in January, however, reports surfaced about the existence of a separate parallel list of some 429,000 individuals, produced by the President of the Independent Electoral Commission, Robert Beugré Mambé, outside of the established procedures. This controversy abruptly brought the electoral process to a halt as the ruling Front populaire ivoirien (FPI) party maintained that the President of the Commission had committed fraud and that the provisional electoral list had been compromised. They called for Mr. Mambé’s resignation. An inquiry instituted by the Prime
minister confirmed that Mr. Mambé had prepared a list of 429,000 persons without following the established procedures. Mr. Mambé rejected the calls for his resignation, insisting that he had developed the parallel list only for the “internal use” of the Commission. […] The new Government and Electoral Commission were installed on 23 February and 25 February, respectively. […] Many interlocutors stressed that the violent protests in February were not about the dissolution of the Government and the Electoral Commission but against attempts to arbitrarily remove large numbers of people from the provisional voters list, which would have deprived them of Ivorian citizenship."

"Identification, beyond elections, is fundamental to relations between the State and society. Documentary proof of identity is needed to own land, but also to access social services such as national school exams. Most people cannot obtain such documentation at a reasonable time and cost, fuelling their insecurity."

Click here to access the standard procedures for the identification process

See also NRC, "Rapport d'étude sur les obstacles à la déclaration à l'état civil", March 2010

Life for the undocumented is difficult (May 2010)

- Customary marriages and lack of birth certificates have contributes to create between three and five million undocumented people
- The people of the sub-prefecture of Bloléquin in the West and Bonieredougou and Katiola in the North appear to be particularly affected by the lack of documentation
- Addressing documentation needs will contribute to addressing the root causes of the conflict
- Lack of documentation prevents formal employment, access to education, access to social services and land ownership. It also makes people more vulnerable to racketeering and corruption.

"46. Beyond the socio-economic sector, other State services are not meeting their potential to build peace. Law and order as a service is not being adequately provided. Identification, beyond elections, is fundamental to relations between the State and society. Documentary proof of identity is needed to own land, but also to access social services such as national school exams. Most people cannot obtain such documentation at a reasonable time and cost, fuelling their insecurity."

NRC, December 2008, Moyen Cavally et 18 Montagnes, p. 21:
"Le constat général est que la proportion des sans documents reste assez notable dans la majorité des localités. La sous-préfecture de Bloléquin se distingue avec les fréquences les plus élevées essentiellement rencontrées dans ses campements, à savoir N’tobéri1 (91%) ; Sakassou et Djékro (80%) ; N’tobéri2 et Tiassalé (70%) ; Allakabo (60%) ; Douaïpleu et Golou (33%). Mais il existe également à Zéo dans les localités de Diaplean (50%), Glodé (34%) et Zéo (29%) ; Pombly (36%) et Tacourably (31%) de la sous-préfecture de Kouibly ; Dainé (33%) et Sangouiné (31%) sont les plus affectés à Sangouiné, comme le sont également Goéné Tahouaké (54%) et Bouhobly (33%) à Diéouzon. De même, Klángbolably (25%) et le chef-lieu de Sémien (21%) ; Koulouan (50%) ; Phing Béoua (33%) et Pélé Zarabaon (27%) de Zou et Gbombélo1 (29%) et Yégolé (25%) de Biankouma et, enfin, Zouata 2 (29%) de Facobly."

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(*) Le fait que ces proportions de mentions soient parfois relativement faibles ne reflète pas nécessairement la véritable ampleur du problème. En effet, il arrive assez souvent que les interrogés évitent de soulever le problème et, par conséquent, la réalité est souvent plus importante que ne le montrent les résultats.

NRC, December 2008, Vallée du Bandama, pp. 20-21:
"Il est à noter que ce n’est qu’à partir du mois de mars 2008 que ce thème s’est rajouté dans les entretiens effectués. Par conséquent, il n’existe pas de données pour les localités visitées avant cette période, à savoir l’ensemble des localités de la sous-préfecture de Sakassou et quelques-unes des localités de Béoumi sous-préfecture, excepté Affotobo et Konsou.

Toutefois, dans bon nombre des localités où la question sur les documents administratifs a été soulevée, il ressort que la proportion des sans documents reste assez significative. En effet, pour la quasi-totalité des localités visitées en font mention à plus de 20% de mention. Dans les sous-préfectures de Bonieredougou et Katiola, la mention varie entre 36% et 75%.

A Toumodi-Sakassou les proportions sont particulièrement élevées à Alikadô (82%) et Sambakoutoubou (73%). A Ayaou Sran ce sont à Tongodaga (62%), Sran-Bodossou (54%) et Kati (50%) qui note des taux de mentions significatifs. Ensuite, à Ando Kekrenou ce sont notamment pour les populations des localités de Bongôfia (100% de mention), Mangredan-Kenefouè et Tiessou (54% chacune) qui ressort ce problème. Et enfin, on note 65% dans le chef-lieu Bodokro.

Refugees International, 15 February 2007:
"The government’s wish to issue new identity documents to the entire population is unquestionably an administrative challenge but the effort is essential to resolve the critical questions facing this country with large migrant populations. Who is a citizen of the country and who rightfully should be? Who should own land? One international worker told RI, “People have been living for decades without documents; now it is even harder to get them. Everyone understands the problem cannot be solved in six months, but it is important to advance the operation.” Residents are expected to return to their place of birth, which is difficult while the conflict is unresolved."
Some government officials claim there are over three million undocumented (some estimates are as high as five million) West African immigrants (about half from Burkina Faso) living in the country with questionable eligibility for citizenship. Birth on Ivorian soil does not automatically confer citizenship, but only one parent must be a citizen for the child to become one. Blurring the issue further are family ties and intermarriage that stretch across borders. Most marriages in the country are customary and unregistered with the state, and many lack birth records, thus proving an Ivorian parent may be difficult. There may also be some migrants in Côte d’Ivoire who do not wish citizenship. The pilot program on documentation found that approximately 16 percent of those seeking nationality documentation were ineligible and thus at high risk of statelessness.

Life for the undocumented is difficult. Some displaced lost their documents during flight, others have had them confiscated. Still others lost their proof of citizenship when government buildings were destroyed during the conflict. Northerners complain they’ve been marginalized, denied jobs, citizenship and identity cards, and harassed because of their northern names. RI was told that the police and military personnel routinely abuse and harass those they deem non-citizens or to be northerners. One humanitarian worker reported, “Checkpoints make life almost impossible. Every couple of kilometers travelers assumed to be foreign have to get down from the vehicles and pay.” Another source said, “Individuals are harassed, sometimes taken to jail, and if they can’t pay, their documents may be taken away. They become stateless.” Lack of documentation prevents formal employment not only for individuals who were born in Côte d’Ivoire but also for those who are citizens of member countries of the Economic Community of West Africa, even though they have the right to live and work in any ECOWAS member country.”

**Renewal of national identity cards and inclusion on the voter list is made difficult because of religious or ethnic affiliation (February 2010)**

**Amnesty International, 25 February 2010**

“The current wave of violence is associated with disputes about the compilation of an electoral roll for the presidential election, which has been repeatedly postponed since 2005. The opposition parties have denounced calls to exclude tens of thousands of people suspected of being foreign nationals because they bear Muslim family names.”

**US Department of State, 25 February 2009, para. 2.c:**

“Some Muslims believed that their religious or ethnic affiliation made them targets of discrimination by the government with regard to both employment and the renewal of national identity cards. As northern Muslims shared names, style of dress, and customs with several predominantly Muslim neighboring countries, they sometimes were accused wrongly of attempting to obtain nationality cards illegally to vote or otherwise take advantage of citizenship. This created a hardship for many Muslim citizens.”

**US Department of State, 6 March 2007, para. 2.c:**

“Some Muslims believed that their religious or ethnic affiliation made them targets of discrimination by the government with regard to both employment and the renewal of national identity cards. As northern Muslims shared names, style of dress, and customs with several predominantly Muslim neighboring countries, they sometimes were accused wrongly of attempting to obtain nationality cards illegally to vote or otherwise take advantage of citizenship.”
PROPERTY ISSUES

General

The case of the protected forests in the West (April 2010)

- Parts of reserved forests in the West were sold to migrant workers with the complicity of traditional chiefs and local authorities
- Tensions between local groups and migrant workers started arising in 1998 and with the war in 2002 people were forced to abandon their plantations and displaced
- As the 1998 rural land law does not cover disputes arising over land in the protected forests, many disputes remain outside of the mechanism for the recognition of customary rights, leaving many migrants uncertain as to their rights over the plantations that they have developed in these forests
- As many of these migrants have been displaced, the uncertainty tends to restrict their chances of returning home. The absence of a systematic approach exposes them to ad hoc and unpredictable solutions
- Violent tensions over the exploitation of reserved forests continued in 2010.

Nord-Sud, 23 April 2010

"Des conflits fonciers se signalent dans le département de Danané. Le 2 avril 2010, des affrontements entre jeunes autochtones et planteurs burkinabè ont fait 12 blessés à l’arme blanche dans les rangs des planteurs burkinabè. Selon les autorités locales, l’exploitation des forêts classées du Cavally et de Tiépleu sont à l’origine de cette situation qui a mis à mal la cohésion sociale dans le département. Aux dires de certains planteurs burkinabè, des cadres des villages situés dans les périphéries des deux forêts classées, notamment des localités de Gopoupleu et Konhouleu auraient armé des jeunes de machettes et de fusils calibre 12 pour faire sortir de force tous ceux qui occupent des parcelles dans ces forêts classées. « Pendant l’opération, plusieurs dégâts matériels ont été constatés.

L’origine du conflit

Des cases détruites, une cinquantaine de vélos et motos, plus de cent téléphones portables et la somme de 3.500.000Fcf a ont été emportés » révèlent nos sources. Les Burkinabè, selon eux, n’ont pas riposté. Néanmoins, ils pointent un doigt accusateur sur un cadre en la personne de Sohou Vassi. Pendant le déguerpissement initié par les cadres, des dérives ont été constatées. « Des commerçants ont été priés de fermer leur boutique et de quitter le village. Des planteurs qui exercent en dehors des forêts classées n’ont pas été épargnés. Des pillards en ont profité pour emporter nos biens », dénonce un planteur burkinabè venu de Konhouleu. Les autorités politiques et administratives du département, saisies de l’affaire, ont alerté l’ambassadeur du Burkina Faso, SEM Emile Ilboudo par l’intermédiaire du ministre de l’Intérieur, Désiré Tagro. Le diplomate s’est rendu immédiatement sur les lieux pour constater les faits et trouver une solution à cette situation conflictuelle. SEM Emile Ilboudo, lors de sa rencontre avec les populations, a demandé à ses compatriotes qui occupent des parcelles dans les forêts classées de les quitter. « Tous ceux qui, de manière cavalière et clandestine, ont profité de la crise pour s’infiltrer dans les forêts classées doivent immédiatement quitter ces forêts. Nous n’allons pas vous encourager à y rester surtout que les autorités vous demandent de quitter ces lieux. Une forêt classée, selon la législation ivoirienne et même du Burkina ne doit en aucun cas être infiltrée ou exploitée par qui...
que ce soit. Elle doit être protégée et nul ne doit l’agresser. En un mot, il est formellement interdit de pénétrer ces forêts. Je demande au préfet d’avoir des rencontres avec les différents responsables pour que nos discours ne souffrent d’aucune ambiguïté. Parce que nous voulons la paix aujourd’hui et demain pour nous, nos enfants et nos petits enfants », a souligné le diplomate burkinabé.

Le préfet du département de Danané, Konaté Sékou, s’est dit heureux de cette visite de l’ambassadeur qui lui permet désormais d’avoir les coudées franches pour résoudre ce problème d’occupation des forêts classées qui menace la paix sociale dans son département. « Je voudrais demander à la communauté burkinabé que quelle que soit la frustration qu’elle aurait subie, qu’elle garde son sang-froid et saisisse les autorités administratives afin qu’ensemble, l’on puisse trouver une solution pacifique. Je vais donner des instructions au commandant de secteur, le capitaine Eddy Meddi, afin qu’il puisse conduire ces opérations de libération des forêts classées. Les agents des eaux et forêts et la Sodefor n’étant pas redéployés ici. Aux autochtones, vous devez comprendre que nul ne doit se faire justice», a indiqué le préfet. Tous les problèmes seront résolus de manière pacifique comme le recommande le maire Delly Jacques par ailleurs chef de province de Danané.

Les solutions
« Nous voulons que tous ceux qui, d’une manière ou d’une autre, occupent des parcelles dans la forêt quittent. Mais le déguerpissement doit se faire de manière pacifique et sans heurts. Les Burkinabè ont toujours vécu en parfaite harmonie avec nous et c’est seulement pendant cette période de crise que ces migrants agricoles qui s’attaquent aux forêts classées sont venus mener ces actions de nature à troubler la paix », rappelle le premier magistrat. « Nous devons préserver la fraternité et l’amitié qui nous lient au peuple burkinabé », recommande-t-il. Le porte-parole des cadres, Sohou Vassi, a dénoncé « l’occupation unacceptable des forêts classées par des individus qui sont en train de la transformer en jachère sans valeur ». Il reconnaît tout de même qu’il existe plusieurs communautés dans les forêts classées dont des autochtones Yacouba. « Ce sont eux qui seront les premiers à être déguerpis sans équivoque », a-t-il martelé. La communauté burkinabé de Danané, par la voix de son porte-parole, Zoungrana François, a demandé pardon à la communauté Dan pour l’offense qu’elle aurait subie de sa part. Elle a par ailleurs exprimé sa reconnaissance et sa gratitude au corps préfectoral, aux chefs traditionnels et religieux qui ont œuvré à éviter un bain de sang. « Nous nous engageons devant notre ambassadeur à travailler dans le sens de la consolidation de la paix sociale dans les localités où nous vivons », a-t-il assuré.

Après la rencontre avec les populations, l’ambassadeur Emile Ilboudo a eu un tête-à-tête avec les chefs de la communauté burkinabé à qui il a demandé de vulgariser son message selon lequel ses compatriotes doivent travailler à la consolidation de la paix par le respect des lois de leur pays d’accueil. Pour ceux qui ont perdu leurs biens et les innocentes victimes, le diplomate a indiqué qu’il entend saisir les autorités compétentes afin de résoudre leurs préoccupations au cas par cas. »

IDMC, October 2009, p.28

“By defining the rural land domain as beyond urban perimeters and outside the protected forests domain (Article 1), the 1998 law does not cover disputes over land in the protected forests, between migrants and local people who had sold them a parcel of forest land. Hence the 1998 legal framework for resolving land disputes is not applicable where customary transactions have been carried out in protected forests. Yet the exploitation of these forests is at the root of numerous conflicts in the western forest area. Many disputes remain outside of the mechanism for the recognition of customary rights, leaving many migrants uncertain as to their rights over the plantations that they have developed in these forests. Since many of them have been displaced, the uncertainty tends to restrict their chances of returning home. The absence of a systematic approach exposes them to ad hoc and unpredictable solutions.

[...]

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Most of the migrant workers in the areas studied only knew from the 1990s onwards85 that these were protected domains. Following the 2002 crisis, the displacements and abandonment of plantations in protected forests became general and widespread86. In certain cases, other displaced people occupied these plantations, while in others, the indigenous inhabitants concluded agreements with newly-arrived migrants, so that they worked in the plantations of the displaced people. Meanwhile, the clearing and exploitation of new areas of protected forests increased87. Considering the particular status of the plots in the protected forests and the fact that they have been the object of sustained recriminations on the part of the indigenous inhabitants, the return of the displaced people to their plantations in these areas has been opposed by local populations and has given rise to ad hoc arrangements."

OECD, February 2007, p. 41
"The colonial State had made forest exports an economic priority. The forest decree of 1912 confined indigenous farming activities and reserved most of the forest for colonial exploitation. The protection of reserved forests (6,915,000 ha in 1949) was the principal means of expropriating customary lands. Until the 1950s, indigenous entrepreneurs were excluded from the sector by colonists. They consequently invested in plantation farming, thereby contributing to deforestation. Protecting the development of indigenous family plantation farming was a far more important political challenge for african political elites. From independence onwards, a large part of the reserved forest was returned to farming purposes.

State permanent property includes 202 reserved forests, 8 national parks and 3 reserves. The only land open for exploitation is the forest found south of the eighth parallel (34% of the area of the country). Although forest exploitation provides a few direct jobs, a certain number of young people are nevertheless used as " Coxers" to mark the valuable trees situated in cultivated areas. Obtaining concessions, permits and preferential favours encourages corruption, while "cleaning" reserved forests of their illegal farmers gives rise to targeted blitz operations on small farmers. The implementation of a participative "farmers-forest" co-management policy for progressively managing the scattering of illegal farmers has not yielded conclusive results.

[...]
The war economy [...] encourages mining-type exploitation of forest resources. On the government side, the search for a rapid means of financing the war effort has led the para-State company responsible for the exploitation of the forests to remove protection from reserved forests since 2003. In the far west, war chiefs and also young militiamen have turned to forest exploitation, especially in the Guihol region. Intercommunity violence seems to be fuelled by the pillaging of a few reserved forests and parks, with the complicity of forest companies and certain officials of the army (the reserved forests of Scio and Goin Débé in the Guihol department, the Mount Peko national park in the Bangolo department). The Forces Nouvelles fighters are also exploiting resources in the protected northern area, with the complicity of forest companies established in the area under government control."

In the Moyen Cavally region, migrant workers coming from centre-west Côte d'Ivoire and West African countries (in particular Burkina Faso) were sold parcels of land in the reserved forests that they quickly transformed into coffee or cocoa plantations. The majority of IDPs state that it is since 1998 that problems arose. With the eruption of the conflict in 2002, more and more people were displaced and forced to abandon their plantations in the reserved forests. IDPs from the Zou, however, settled in turn on these plantations vacated by their owners.

UN OCHA/EU-Côte d'Ivoire, September 2007, pp. 124-125
"Avant la guerre, des populations « étrangères » ont occupé les forêts classées, comme la forêt d'IFA au Sud de Bloléquin, pour y ouvrir de grandes plantations. Elles y sont demeurées jusqu'à ce que la guerre les conduise à les quitter. Ces plantations ont été reprises par des autochtones
PDI venant du Zou. L’expulsion de ces PDI du Zou par les autorités préfectorales - expulsion qui s'inscrit dans le cadre des retours actuels – restent incomprises par les jeunes autochtones, qui n'admettent pas pourquoi l’administration expulse leurs « frères » pour y faire retourner les «étrangers». Pour eux, l’interdiction d’occupation doit être égale pour tous."

The 1998 Rural Land Act poses implementation challenges in the context of displacement (January 2010)

- The legal framework regulating land issues in Cote d'Ivoire is composed of the 1998 Rural Land Act, promulgated in January 1999 and three decrees and fifteen implementation order adopted between 2000 and 2002
- The law reserves land ownership to Ivorian nationals
- The 1998 law foresees a period of 10 years since its entry into force (January 2009) during which all land-rights holders (excluding tenant farming methods) have to have their rights recognized through a land certificate, be it either individual or collective
- Passed this deadline, the land is registered in the name of the State and the farmer becomes a tenant on the land. After a second period of three years, all Ivorians holding land certificates must apply for individual land registration resulting in the issuing of definitive private land titles
- The 1998 Rural Land Act is little-known and little-used in the West. Civil society activists use other mechanisms to help Ivorians settle their land disputes
- Since 2002, pilot projects to delimitate villages' land and to establish land certificates were launched but the full implementation of the law will require several more years
- The implementation of the 1998 land reform suffers from a lack of human and material resources
- The peace protocols established in the context of IDPs’ return largely ignore the 1998 law and risk conflicting with it once this will be applied
- The modalities for the issuing of land certificates are not adapted to the situation of returning IDPs and risk not including people who are still displaced at the time of the issuing
- Prerequisites for the recognition of customary land rights, such as the “certified statement of the continuous and peaceful existence of customary rights” could prevent IDPs who have been absent from asserting their rights
- Similarly, the law provides that the request to formalise ownership must be made at the site where the plot of land is situated, obliging IDPs to undertake costly and potentially difficult or dangerous journeys

IRIN, 27 January 2010

"Many of the displaced who have recently tried to return to their farms have found their land occupied by others, according to officials in Man, 450km west of the capital, Abidjan.

Now access to cocoa and coffee plantations – long a source of inter-ethnic tensions in the country – is at the heart of unrest in the west, particularly as more people return, say workers with the International Rescue Committee (IRC), which has an office in Man.

A 1998 law that might have helped resolve disputes – vetoing verbal land agreements, converting customary rights to formal deeds and providing a conflict resolution framework – is little-known and little-used, experts say.
Most residents in the west have never heard of the law or have no idea how to apply it, Man magistrate Kroman Lahassani told IRIN.

Fewer than half of adults in Côte d'Ivoire can read and write so cannot read the document, he noted.

"It [the law] is still applicable and it abrogates other laws, but so far no one has come forward with a case," he said.

Instead, land agreements are still predominantly verbal or noted down with the help of a village chief, or people enter into temporary pacts, according to UN Special Representative to the Secretary-General in Côte d'Ivoire, Georg Charpentier.

Civil society activists say the law is not yet effective on a practical level so they are helping villagers resolve land disputes in other ways.

The government could soon begin to educate the population about the existing law. While administrative and security tasks in the west are still split between former rebels and the state, the Justice Ministry was reinstated in Man in late 2009 and is building up its team of magistrates, Lahassani told IRIN.

Given deadlines set in the 1998 law, it is important to educate the public now, he said. "If people don't officially administer land sales with a magistrate and get a decree, then the land will pass over to government in several years' time – few [people] know this," Lahassani said."

IDMC, October 2009, p.5

"Côte d'Ivoire has not developed a system of restitution or compensation for properties which IDPs were forced to abandon due to the conflict. Instead, the government intends to settle disputes over the ownership of this land through an existing mechanism designed to recognise and formalise customary rights. Before a law on rural land was passed in 1998, no legislation gave customary land transactions any form of legal weight and only transactions witnessed by a notary were recognised. The 1998 law broke new ground by recognising customary rights on a transitional basis, before converting these into formal individual rights. It was particularly ambitious, considering that 98 per cent of rural land is subject to customary management, with only one to two per cent held under title deed in accordance with statutory law. Recognising the role that custom still plays in land transactions, the law confers transitional property rights based on customary rights and transfers, and translates these into title deeds in the case of citizens of Côte d'Ivoire, or into long-term leases for non-Ivorians.

Although the aim of the 1998 law is to reduce tensions over land ownership resulting from the uncertainty of customary transactions, the formalisation of customary rights in the context of displacement complicates land disputes and increases the risk of discord. Effectively, as well as recovering the land they left behind, returnees must also assert their existing customary rights and ensure formal legal recognition of these rights.

Certain provisions of the law that would normally be insignificant have a negative impact on these IDPs, and it is essential to adapt the law to their specific situations, to avoid discrimination. Prerequisites for the recognition of customary land rights, such as the "certified statement of the continuous and peaceful existence of customary rights" could prevent IDPs who have been absent from asserting their rights. One way to avoid this would be for the government to give
clear directives for interpretation, emphasising that absence due to conflict cannot be taken into account in determining continuous and peaceful existence.

Similarly, the law provides that the request to formalise ownership must be made at the site where the plot of land is situated, obliging IDPs to undertake costly and potentially difficult or dangerous journeys. In this case, facilitating the transport of displaced people or other applicants could be considered, so that all parties may be heard and represented. Due to the distance of IDPs from their usual place of residence, a system also needs to be set up to inform them of any requests that concern them which are filed in their home villages, so that they can defend their rights.

UN OCHA/EU-Cote d'Ivoire, September 2007, pp. 26, 122

"Les problèmes de la question foncière se déclinent sous plusieurs formes. Le cadre juridique est encore méconnu et non appliqué. Aujourd'hui quelques avancées ont été réalisées, mais la mise à disposition des titres fonciers réclame encore plusieurs années. Depuis 2002, la mise en place du dispositif opérationnel et des opérations tests de délimitation des terroirs villageois et d'établissement de certificat foncier ont été initiées. Des comités sous-préfectoraux et villageois ont été constitués seulement dans une vingtaine de départements et une centaine de délimitations de terroirs ont été réalisées. La mise en application de la loi est encore quasi-inexistante et souffre d'une insuffisance en moyen humain et équipement et de l'absence de plan cadastral.

La loi foncière et les procédures d'obtention du Certificat Foncier ne sont pas connues, tant au niveau des services techniques comme l'ANADER, qu'au niveau des collectivités territoriales et locales et des paysans. Les agents de terrain des ONG impliqués dans la gestion des conflits et la cohésion sociale ignorent également le contenu de la loi. Les protocoles de paix établis entre les autochtones et les «étrangers» dans le cadre des retours des PDI ignorent tout de la loi foncière. Ils risquent d'être confligènes à moyen terme lors de l’application de la loi.

Les modalités d'établissement de Certificats Fonciers sont inadaptées à la situation de retour actuel des PDI. Elles souffrent de manque de personnel, de lourdeur administrative, de l'absence de relevé et de plan cadastral. Les délais de mise en œuvre ne répondent pas aux priorités d'apaisement et de stabilisation de la gestion foncière à l'ouest.

[...]


«La loi réserve la propriété foncière rurale aux Ivoiriens. Elle prévoit une première phase de dix ans (après sa promulgation, soit la limite de janvier 2009) durant laquelle tout détenteur de droits fonciers impliquant une appropriation de la terre (à l'exclusion des modes de faire-valoir indirects) doit faire reconnaître ses droits pour obtenir un certificat foncier (individuel ou collectif). Passé ce délai, la terre est immatriculée au nom de l'Etat et l'exploitant en devient le locataire. Au terme
d’une seconde période de trois ans, les certificats fonciers détenu par des Ivoiriens doivent donner lieu à une immatriculation individuelle et aboutir à la délivrance d’un titre de propriété privée définitif. Les exploitants non-ivoiriens ne peuvent aspirer qu’à une promesse de bail emphytéotique, soit auprès des titulaires autochtones de certificats fonciers, au cas où ceux-ci les auraient fait figurer parmi les « occupants de bonne foi », soit auprès de l’Etat si la terre est immatriculée au nom de celui-ci.»

La loi et décrets prévoient que l’établissement du Certificat Foncier passe par une enquête impliquant les autorités sous-préfectorales et coutumières, le comité de gestion du foncier rural sous-préfectoral, le comité villageois de gestion du foncier rural, et autres agents administratifs, tels qu’un commissaire enquêteur. Son établissement requiert également un relevé des parcelles, le levé de plan du bien foncier et la pose de délimitation physique par layonnage en accord avec les membres de l’équipe d’enquête.

Click here to access the Rural Land Act, law n.98-750 of 23 December 1998
Click here to access the decrees regarding the implementation of the 1998 land reform

Aujourd’hui, quelques avancées ont été réalisées, mais la mise à disposition des titres fonciers réclame encore plusieurs années. Depuis 2002, la mise en place du dispositif opérationnel et des opérations-tests de délimitation des terroirs villageois et d’établissement de certificat foncier ont été initiées. Des comités sous-préfectoraux et villageois ont seulement été constitués dans une vingtaine de départements et une centaine de délimitations de terroirs ont été réalisées. La mise en application de la loi est encore quasi inexistante et souffre d’une insuffisance en moyen humain et équipement et de l’absence de plan cadastral.

Le Plan Foncier Rural a tenté des expériences de recensement du parcellaire, mais ce plan ne couvre pas encore le territoire. Des projets de délimitation des parcelles et de terroirs soutenus par l’UE sont en cours sur les axes Tabou- San Pedro- Sassandra et Daloa.*

Land issues are at the heart of the displacement situation (2008)

• The complexity of land ownership is linked to both economic and demographic reasons and political manipulation
• A key to the economic development of the country between 1960 and 1980 was the availability of foreign labour, which was further encouraged by introducing liberal land ownership laws in this period, under which the land belonged to those cultivating it
• The economic recession at the end of the 1980s not only had an impact on general standards of living but also exacerbated tensions between locals, West African workers and internal economic migrants
• Several types of conflicts are linked to the land: conflicts among autochtones, intergenerational conflicts, conflicts between autochtones and migrant workers
• The 1998 Rural Land Act as amended in 2004 currently regulates land rights
• The authorities are responsible for recovering property illegally occupied and where possible provide compensation in consultation with IDPs
• In the western regions of Moyen Cavally and Dix-Huit Montagnes land conflicts are a recurrent problem for most of the villages, in particular around Logualé, Bangolo and Gueyebly

UN OCHA/EU-Cote d'Ivoire, September 2007, pp. 123, 25-26, 121-122

"Les conflits récents entre communautés d’origines différentes sont les manifestations d’enjeux fonciers aussi anciens que les mouvements de colonisation agricole en Côte d’Ivoire.

Dans les années 50, suite aux mouvements massifs migratoires spontanés ou encouragés par une politique de développement de la culture du café-cacao, les mécontentements autochtones durent déjà être régulés par l’administration coloniale. A partir de l’indépendance, la systématisation de la mise en valeur des forêts au profit des agricultures pérennes s’est accompagnée d’appel à la main d’œuvre étrangère et de l’établissement massif de colons agricoles, baoulés ou voltaïques. Les conflits récurrents se manifestaient alors sur les droits fonciers et sur les modes de cohabitation entre les différentes communautés. Ces conflits fonciers évoluaient dans un contexte de « négociation conflictuelle permanente qui impliquait des groupes diversifiés et des coalitions variées, parties prenantes de ce processus : les autochtones cedeurs (…) de terre, les ‘étrangers’ accédant à celle-ci sous la protection (…) de l’administration, les agents locaux de l’Etat en relation de patronage (…) avec les migrants, (…), les ‘cadres’ et les politiciens (…) ».

Lors des années 60, l’interventionnisme de l’Etat dans la mise en valeur rationnelle et accélérée des terres s’est manifesté par le mot d’ordre lancé par Houphouët-Boigny en 1963 « La terre appartient à celui qui la met en valeur », qui a pris force de loi. Les colons agricoles purent bénéficier d’une protection administrative efficace pour accéder à la terre. Face à la pression administrative, les autochtones s’efforçaient de maintenir un minimum de maîtrise foncière sur les terres cédées aux étrangers « en préservant la fiction du tutorat traditionnel ». L’institution du tutorat est une convention qui donne à tout bénéficiaire d’une délégation de droits fonciers un devoir de reconnaissance à son « tuteur », se manifestant par des contre–prestations, telles que le versement d’une partie de la production ou la participation aux dépenses exceptionnelles du tuteur, etc.

Dans un contexte d’imprécision des délimitations des terroirs, les autochtones pouvaient marquer leur maîtrise foncière vis-à-vis des villages voisins par ce processus d’aliénation de terres aux étrangers. Au cours des années 70, la pression foncière et le changement de génération ont transformé la relation de tutorat en une « entreprise de négociation permanente ». A partir des années 90, le tutorat a perdu de sa légitimité sous l’effet des revendications des jeunes, des citadins de retour au village et des cadres citadins.

• Les conflits entre autochtones

Les conflits entre les familles autochtones portent principalement sur les limites de leur domaine foncier. Ces problèmes sont particulièrement sérieux, car compte tenu de l’abondance de la ressource foncière aucune des familles n’a une idée précise des limites de l’étendue des terres. Ces problèmes de limite se posent presque toujours après contractualisation des terres pour leur exploitation par des « étrangers ». Le conflit s’étend alors aux exploitants et vise à déterminer les droits de tutorat et de rente des allogènes.
• Les conflits intergénérationnels au sein des familles autochtones

Ces conflits sont relatifs aux modalités d’association ou de prise en compte des jeunes dans le partage ou la réservation des ressources. Les jeunes se plaignent que leurs parents vendent ou donnent la terre aux étrangers sans les concerter ou qu’ils n’ont plus de terre parce que tout a été vendu.

• Les conflits entre autochtones et étrangers

L’ambiguïté des conventions passées entre tuteur et étranger entretient une situation conflictuelle permanente réglée à l’amiable par des compromis. La remise en question entre générations, les positions politiques et discours extrêmes de certains cadres, les revendications d’appropriation de terres et le clivage ethnique de la logique de guerre ont exacerbé les tensions conduisant à des règlements violents, meurtres et déplacements de populations.

[...]

Les conflits autour du foncier sont de nature inter et intra-communautaires. Ils sont entretenus par l’ambiguïté des conventions coutumières, la remise en question de légitimité entre générations, les positions politiques et les discours extrêmes de certains cadres, les revendications d’appropriation de terres et les clivages ethniques exacerbés par la logique de guerre. Les structures de médiation et de gestion des crises tant coutumières qu’administratives sont insuffisantes.

[...]

Le foncier est régulièrement cité comme cause de la crise dans la région Ouest. D’aucuns considèrent que les conflits ne sont pas fonciers mais participent plutôt d’un banditisme de spoliation des terres et des récoltes. Certains préfets et sous-préfets en charge de suivre les règles de conflits à l’Ouest concluent néanmoins que 90% des conflits sont d’origine foncière, mais concernent en majorité les familles autochtones et ne sont pas intercommunautaires. Enfin, d’autres estiment que ce ne sont que des problèmes de cohabitation, sur lesquels viennent se greffer secondairement le foncier. Néanmoins, lors de l’étude, les évaluations d’IRC et CARE menées dans les départements de Bangolo et Duékoué n’étaient pas encore dépouillées de façon à définir une typologie des conflits ou d’attribuer la part du foncier.

Une étude récente sur le foncier [Modes d’accès à la terre, marchés fonciers, gouvernance et politiques foncières en Afrique de l’Ouest. J.-P. Chauveau et al. Avril 2006, IIED - CLAIMS Africa] estime qu’en Côte d’Ivoire, la dimension foncière de la crise en milieu rural est évidente. La crise de l’économie de plantation accentue les tensions entre exploitants, les planteurs burkinabés ayant souvent de meilleures performances, du fait de leur accès à une main-d’œuvre peu coûteuse, parfois de leur contrôle des filières. Rentrant au village en échec d’insertion urbaine, les jeunes autochtones de la zone forestière ont trouvé des terroirs saturés et remettent en cause les droits accordés aux ‘étrangers’ par leurs pères.(…) Les situations sur le terrain sont en pratique très contrastées. Aux situations ‘d’arrachage’ de terres s’opposent des cas où les migrants n’ont pas été inquiétés. Par ailleurs, les migrants ivoiriens (Baoulés en particulier) sont fréquemment plus mal considérés que les Burkinabés, qui respectent davantage les normes locales et le devoir d’assistance à leur tuteur » (p.75)

En tout état de cause, les problèmes fonciers sont récurrents dans les régions et se posent en termes très diversifiés. Ils restent associés à des dynamiques conflictuelles qui débouchent...
régulièrement sur des morts d'homme et des rixes inter- communautaires suivies de déplacements de population et de la déstabilisation des systèmes de production. Par ailleurs, la méconnaissance des acteurs de terrain gouvernementaux ou des ONG du cadre foncier d'une part et le décalage entre le cadre légal foncier et les pratiques informelles de régulation locale d'autre part ne font qu'amplifier la confusion des situations conflictuelles."

**IRIN, 13 November 2006**

"Authorities this year completed a pilot programme to record rights to land after lengthy consultations with villagers, elders, chiefs and local officials. The consultations include reviewing existing territorial agreements between individuals, families and communities.

Competition for land and the lack of official identity documents are partly behind the political impasse that has divided Cote d'Ivoire since a failed coup in September 2002 triggered a brief civil war. The conflict resulted in the exodus of millions of West Africans who for years had considered Cote d'Ivoire their home after they or their parents immigrated to work the country’s fertile land.

The government effort has aimed to clarify land tenure and safeguard it through formal registration. The boundaries of 105 villages in the southwestern cocoa belt and the southeast were mapped out and at least 20 land disputes have been resolved since 2004, analysts said.

"People were very happy. All the operations went well," said one analyst, speaking on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of land issues in Cote d'Ivoire. "Villagers and farmers are hungry for official documents and contracts. They need concrete and visible marks accepted by everyone because sometimes they simply don't know that this is not their parcel of land but the neighbour's one."

**Door closes**

Founding president Felix Houphouet-Boigny, who ruled Cote d'Ivoire for 33 years after independence from France, had decreed that "land belongs to the person who cultivates it" and encouraged West Africans from Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and other neighbouring countries to farm in the fertile west and southwest of Cote d'Ivoire to help develop the country's economy.

As the population grew, swathes of virgin rainforest were slashed and burned to create more land to grow coffee, fruit and cocoa. The immigrants helped transform Cote d'Ivoire into the world's largest cocoa exporter and the most successful economy in West Africa.

But falling world prices for cocoa led to an economic downturn in the 1980s. Many Ivorian youths left the economic hub of Abidjan on the coast and returned to their villages only to find there was not enough farmland to go around.

Politicians, including former president Henri Konan Bedie, began talking of “Ivoirite” or “Ivorianness” after Houphouet-Boigny’s death in 1993. Then a 1998 law recognising customary land rights in Cote d'Ivoire effectively ended the country's open-door immigration policy by preventing migrants and their offspring from having land rights.

The introduction of nationalism, coupled with the country’s economic problems and competition for land, triggered attacks on West African migrants. "The Ivorian political context favours the explosion of [land] conflicts, feeds them and prevents their resolution," one Abidjan-based analyst said.

**UN Human Rights Council, 18 October 2006, paras. 58-60**
The problems related to land in rural areas are one of the major challenges facing the Ivorian authorities. This is a complex issue and raises questions about the scarcity of arable land, demographic pressures, the economic crisis that dates from the beginning of the 1980s following the collapse of coffee and cocoa process on the world market, and the exploitation of the issue for political ends.

Rural land is governed by the 1998 Rural Land Act, the prime purpose of which was to clarify land rights by providing a legal framework for them and to modernize customary land rights. Under article 1 of the Act, only the State, public authorities and individual Côte d'Ivoire nationals can own rural land. This provision represents a break with the past policy of President Houphouet-Boigny, under which the land belonged to the person cultivating it. Against a background of political tension linked to the power struggle, the Act aroused a sense of injustice in many non-Ivorian owners, some of whom had been cultivating the land for several generations. They were especially worried that their non-Ivorian descendants would not be able to become owners of the land. In response to their fears, and in implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, the 1998 Act was modified by a law dated 14 August 2004, under which rights to rural land ownership acquired before 2004 can be transmitted to descendants. The owners concerned by this derogation must be on a list drawn up by the Council of Ministers. At a time when the question of identifying Ivorian citizens is at the heart of the discussions, the Representative of the Secretary-General is concerned about the risks that the law will either not be applied or will be applied in a discriminatory fashion.

The authorities have a responsibility to help displaced persons recover their property and possessions and, where possible, to provide appropriate compensation or another form of just reparation (Principle 29). The process of adopting legislation to provide a framework for the provision of such compensation should be speeded up. In cases where the property of displaced persons is occupied by unauthorized individuals- especially in the north- the necessary steps should be taken to enable the property to be returned to them. In this connection, the Representative of the Secretary-General has taken note of the communiqué from the secretary-general of the Forces Nouvelles announcing the establishment of a special committee to address this question in territory under the control of the Forces Nouvelles. All these matters, like every other issue related to the situation of displaced people, should be addressed in consultation with the people most affected- displaced persons themselves."

In the west

NRC, September 2008/Moyen Cavally et Dix-Huit Montagnes, pp. 26-27

"Les disputes de propriétés et les conflits fonciers semblent être des questions récurrentes pour la majorité des localités. D’abord, la question des disputes de propriété porte notamment sur l’occupation illégale de certaines concessions, telles que les maisons ou les appartements. Ces disputes sont particulièrement étendues à Bahé-Sebon de Gueyebly, avec 40% de mention. Les proportions sont aussi élevées parfois dans d’autres localités de Gueyebly et Duékoué, mais celles-ci incluent la notion de conflits fonciers qui sera analysée par la suite.

Concernant la question des conflits fonciers, les fréquences de mention commencent à partir de 54% (43% si l’on considère les localités prises en compte par l’ancienne interprétation) pour l’ensemble des localités, mais atteignent souvent entre 90 et 100% de mention telles qu’à Dinegounié, Soapleu Dazeré, Yapeu, Kouinlé (100% chacune), Gouekangounié (94%), Dioulé
Property restitution poses problems in the North (2007)

- The conflict has engendered different types of damage including to property.
- Most of the damage concerns property and/or goods in the areas of origin or habitual residence of the IDPs.
- Property restitution is particularly difficult in northern Côte d'Ivoire where rebels occupy the houses of the IDPs.

UNHCR/GoCiD, July 2007

"La crise a occasionné des dommages physiques, moraux, psychologiques et matériels. Les principaux dommages subis sont le traumatisme et les violences physiques (les agressions physiques, et les tortures), ainsi que la destruction des biens, notamment les maisons d'habitation. Des biens ont été confisqués, notamment les maisons, ateliers et voitures principalement aux ressortissants togolais, ivoiriens, béninois et nigérians (Tableau (h) dans Annexe A).

Il est important de reconnaître que la plupart de ces actes ont été commis dans les zones d'origine ou de résidence habituelle des déplacés. En comparaison, les dommages subis dans les zones d'accueil ont été négligeables, ce qui amène à penser que les déplacés y ont rencontré beaucoup moins de problèmes de protection."

IASC, 15 August 2007

"The North is characterised by marginalisation, an 80% unemployment rate and tensions in the population. Groups or whole communities that fled during the crisis are now coming back, and in particular women have reported cases of assaults by returnees. Property restitution poses another problem, as many rebels have occupied the houses of the fled IDPs, who do not dare claim their property back upon their return. The Ministry of Reconciliation, which is in charge of IDP related issues, has set up an antenna, and with the current redeployment of the administration in the North things are expected to move forward."
PATTERNS OF RETURN AND RESETTLEMENT

General

Overview of returns (June 2010)

- In the course of 2008 and 2009, the spontaneous return of IDPs intensified reaching some 80,000 people only in the western regions. However, few IDPs were willing to return to the north-western region, due to the increase of insecurity and tensions after the postponement of elections in 2008 and 2009.
- As many as 7580 people have spontaneously returned on the axis Guiglo - Toulepleu
- To allow IDPs from the Centre d'Accueil et de Transit des Déplacés (CATD) to return, the IDPs from the Zou occupying their plantations were displaced again and were waiting to return. The CATD closed on 31 July 2008 although a residual caseload of IDPs still remained onsite
- To facilitate returns, government agencies and humanitarian actors have focused on reconciliation activities
- Given the important number of spontaneous returns, follow-up on social cohesion in the areas of return, however, is not always included in the plans of the humanitarian agencies

UNHCR, 1 June 2010
“...The presidential elections were postponed both in 2008 and 2009 due to financial and logistical constraints as well as problems with voter registration. This has given rise to serious insecurity and tension, especially in the north-western areas from where Ivorians had previously fled to neighbouring countries. As a result, few Ivorian refugees or IDPs were interested in returning to their areas of origin.
[...]
The delay in holding the presidential election and establishing a stable Government hampered the return and the identification of durable solutions for Ivorian refugees and IDPs, further deterring donor support.
[...]
The protection challenges were great, especially with regard to the return of IDPs, and the issue of statelessness.”

UN Security Council, 20 May 2010, para. 38
“38. Humanitarian activities remain focused on reintegration and protection of internally displaced persons and returnees in the west, as well as on malnutrition and food security issues that have reached alarming levels in areas in the north. As at the end of March 2010, a total of 89,668 internally displaced persons had returned voluntarily to their areas of origin. A remaining caseload of approximately 31,000 persons continued to live with host families, primarily in the departments of Bloléquin and Guiglo in the west. In some return areas, land disputes and impunity continued to affect prospects for sustainable socio-economic reintegration.”

IRC, Programme G&R, 14.09.2010 (ADD)

Statistiques des Personnes Retournées dans les localités d'Intervention (en 2010)
Communautés ethniques | Bangolo (Zou & Diéouzon) | Localités de Kouibly | Localités de Duékoué | Total cumulé
--- | --- | --- | --- | ---
Autochtones | 1628 | 411 | 335 | 2374
Allochtones | 466 | 12 | 32 | 510
Allogènes | 85 | 00 | 74 | 159
PDI's Retournées | 2179 | 423 | 441 | 3043
Total

Sources : IRC- M&E, au 31 Juillet 2010

UN OCHA, April 2009:

**Répartition des retournés en fonction des localités de May 08 - Mars 2009**

UN Security Council, 13 October 2008, para. 12:
"The general humanitarian situation in the country continued to improve during the reporting period, owing in part to the continued positive evolution of the peace process as well as the ongoing resettlement of internally displaced persons. In a major breakthrough, on 31 July the Humanitarian Coordinator in Côte d'Ivoire officially closed the transit centre for displaced persons in Guiglo."

UN OCHA/EU-Cote d'Ivoire, September 2007, pp. 28-30:

2.7.1 Les retours des PDI du Moyen-Cavally (axe Guiglo-Toulepleu) : Il s’agit de populations allogènes et étrangères. À partir de la réinstallation d’un climat de paix à l’issue des accords de Ouagadougou, l’option a été prise par le IAHCC de sécuriser les PDI dans le CATD et d’encourager leur retour. Après avoir respecté les précautions préalables (visites « Go & See », processus de rapprochement communautaire, établissement de comité de paix), les retours se sont amorcés. Fin juin 2007, six cantons des départements de Bloéquin et Toulepleu ont déjà accueilli 1359 personnes. OIM a organisé de nouveaux retours vers d’autres cantons dans la

- **D’importants retours spontanés sur l’axe Guiglo-Toulepleu:** Des effectifs de l’ordre de 7580 personnes étaient retournées spontanément dans le sillage des retours organisés du CATD. Elles proviendraient de groupes en attente dans les villes de la région ou de retournés du Burkina Faso. Ces populations n’étaient pas prises en compte dans les estimations des besoins par les acteurs humanitaires.

- **De nouvelles populations en phase de transit:** Pour permettre aux PDI du CATD de réintégrer leurs plantations, l’administration militaire a poussé à la libération de plantations occupées par les déplacés du Zou, avec l’accord de leurs frères d’accueil guérés. Ces expulsions engendrent de nouvelles populations déplacées en attente de retour et installées en familles d’accueil sur l’axe Guiglo-Blolequin. Ces PDI ne bénéficieraient ni d’un appui sur place, ni d’un programme de retour. Elles étaient estimées fin juin 2007 à 700 personnes et pourraient voir leur effectif s’accroître au gré des expulsions des plantations.

- **Le manque de suivi et d’encadrement de la phase post-retour:** Du fait du nombre important de retours spontanés, le suivi de la cohésion sociale en situation de post-retour échappe à l’encadrement prévu pour les effectifs d’OIM. Les renforts attendus des agences en termes d’appui à la cohésion sociale, de suivi de la fonctionnalité des infrastructures socio-collectives dans les zones d’accueil font encore défaut hormis les appuis combinés FAO/PAM et les activités «Vivres contre Travail » du PAM.

- **L’établissement de protocoles de paix ou de protocoles conflagrées ?** : Des protocoles de paix contraires aux droits humains selon les Principes Directeurs Relatifs aux PDI ont été signés par les autochtones et les PDI étrangères comme manifestes de paix. Ces protocoles ne prennent pas en compte la loi foncière nationale. Ils sont en réalité une nouvelle convention foncière et du travail qui autorise les autochtones guérés à s’accaparer les biens et le travail des retournés.

2.7.2 **Les retours dans l’ex-zone de confiance (Zou, Diéouzon, Guéyibly)**

Au mois de Décembre 2006, on dénombrait environ 78.000 déplacés de la zone de confiance à Duékoué, Guiglo et Blolequin. Ces PDI autochtones proviennent notamment du Zou, Diéouzon et Guéyibly. Ces populations souhaitent retourner chez elles tout en exigeant le retour à la sécurité, la réhabilitation des infrastructures collectives et individuelles, la récupération de leurs forêts et de leurs plantations accaparées par les résidents et les nouveaux «étrangers».

Les programmes des ONG IRC et CARE, en charge de la préparation au retour des PDI ont été amorcés. En juin 2007, si les diagnostics des conflits sociaux et des besoins en réhabilitation des infrastructures ainsi que la mise en place des comités de paix étaient en partie achevées, acteurs humanitaires et populations s’accordaient pour conclure que l’insécurité et l’absence des autorités, de l’administration, de la police ne permettaient pas d’encourager les populations au retour. Ces activités présentaient certaines limites:

- Le rapprochement entre communautés n’incluait pas les PDI en attente dans le Moyen-Cavally, dont les moyens sont limités pour s’engager à explorer leurs villages. Les comités de paix risquent de devoir être reconstitués au retour de ces PDI dans leurs villages d’origine.
- Les délais nécessaires de traitement des résultats des diagnostics sociaux qui risquent de rendre caduques des informations dans une situation très labile.
- L’absence de plan de contingence des humanitaires d’accompagnement au retour en cas de restauration subite des autorités et de la sécurité dans le Zou (définition des besoins, dénombrement, apport de vivres, transport, appuis sanitaires, apport de kits, etc.)
Return processes (May 2010)

- Many return movements have been spontaneous, but in some instances assisted by humanitarian agencies through the organisation of return convoys and the distribution of food and non-food items
- IDP focal points and IDP leaders have been involved in "go-and-see" visits and in informing the displaced communities of the possibilities to return

ICRC, 18 May 2010

"Le Comité international de la Croix-Rouge (CICR) a entamé aujourd'hui la distribution de semences et de petit matériel agricole à quelque 12 000 personnes dans 37 villages du département de Zouan-Hounien, à l'ouest de la Côte d'Ivoire.
À la suite du conflit qui a sévi dans le pays, la zone ouest de la Côte d'Ivoire a connu un déplacement de population vers d'autres régions du pays et vers des pays voisins. Cette population retourne depuis 2006 dans ses villages d'origine mais elle ne parvient toujours pas à couvrir ses besoins essentiels. Elle se trouve donc souvent à la charge de ceux qui l'accueillent, ce qui réduit les moyens de subsistance de ces derniers.
L'assistance, composée au total de 40 tonnes de semences de riz, de 20 tonnes de semences de maïs et de 2 000 houes, bénéficiera aux personnes déplacées récemment rentrées chez elles, aux veuves de guerre, aux veuves rendues plus vulnérables par la guerre et aux familles d'accueil.
« Depuis 2008, nous fournissons aux populations qui reviennent de leurs lieux de déplacement, une assistance sous forme de semences et de matériel agricole, afin de leur permettre de relancer leurs activités agricoles et de satisfaire leurs besoins essentiels », déclare Christian Bosson, coordonnateur du CICR chargé de la sécurité économique. Le CICR assurera le suivi de ces activités jusqu'à la récolte."

ONUCI, 26 March 2010

Mardi 23 mars, des membres de la Force de police constituée (FPU) bangladais ont assuré la sécurité du convoi, organisé par l'ONG catholique Saint Viateur, d'Abidjan à Issia. Le lendemain, le FPU pakistanais a pris la relève, accompagnant les déplacés internes jusqu'à Guiglo. Les bureaux de la police de l'ONU (UNPOL) situés sur le trajet - ceux d'Abidjan, de Divo, de Daloa et de Duékoué - ont également contribué aux patrouilles pour la sécurisation du convoi.
Les anciens déplacés ont reçu des vivres pour plusieurs mois ainsi qu'une aide financière avant de regagner leurs villages d'origine.
Die Sylvain, père de 5 enfants, avait quitté Bagohouo, dans le département de Duékoué, en 2003. A Abidjan, il avait vécu d'abord chez un ami, avant de louer une maison à Yaosehi, dans le quartier de Yopougon. « C'était vraiment difficile, » dit-il. « Comment revenir quand tu sais que tu n'as plus rien derrière toi. Heureusement, l'an dernier, mon neveu, parti au village, a construit une
maison. Aujourd'hui encore Saint Viateur et l'ONUCI nous aident à rentrer. Je suis vraiment content. Je ne sais même pas comment l'exprimer. »

Doué Yolande, veuve de guerre, s'est dit soulagée de pouvoir rentrer. « Mon rêve s'est enfin réalisé, » a-t-elle dit. « Revenir au village avec un minimum. En tout cas dès demain je vais me lancer dans mes activités, mon commerce de galettes. »

Depuis 2005, l'ONG Saint Viateur aide les familles déplacées à retourner dans leurs régions d'origine. Elle était à son huitième opération de retour. 

**ONUCI, 08 April 2010**

“The Pakistani formed police unit and the UN Police on Wednesday, 7 April 2010, escorted a convoy of 107 war-displaced persons who returned to their villages in Moyen Cavally Region.

The convoy, organized by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), in collaboration with NGO CARITAS, was composed mainly of people from Zou District (526 km west of Abidjan), who had found refuge in Guiglo and Blolequin, 506 km and 575 km west of Abidjan respectively.

Before going back to their villages, the former displaced persons assembled at the public primary school in Guiglo 2, where they were given kitchen utensils and basic cleaning products.

UNHCR and CARITAS have been helping to facilitate the return of internally displaced persons since December 2009. This is the fourth convoy they have organized this year.”

**UN OCHA, 22 January 2009, p. 12**

"In June 2008, a workshop in Bloléquin provided an opportunity to address some of the issues that were constraining the returns process. After major obstacles were addressed during the workshop, some developments in the returns process were achieved, including the closure of the International Organization for Migration (IOM)-administered CATD camp in Guiglo on 31 July 2008. In September 2008 the estimated number of returnees to the west, according to OCHA figures, was 69,933 people.

However, it is worth noting that, some setbacks have been experienced during IDPs returns. In Zéaglo there were clashes between returnees and host communities over property rights in the beginning of 2008, which prompted the secondary displacement of some IDPs. There were also ambushes and assaults, including murders and rape, targeting returnees, which has disrupted the returns process.

The total number of IDPs living on the Guiglo-Bloléquin axis had reached 7,829 persons from Zou and Diéouzon according to the International Rescue Committee’s (IRC) "Return and reintegration Programme" figures and IOM. Wherein an around Guiglo, IDPs now have one focal point in each place, who is assisted by IDPs leaders. A total of five IDPs focal points (two in the Department of Guiglo, two in the Department of Bloléquin and one in the Department of Duékoué) and 16 IDPs leaders (six in the Department of Guiglo, eight in the Department of Bloléquin and two in the Department of Duékoué) were trained on basic protection and techniques to enhance social cohesion. These focal points have enhanced local decision-making processes and they are in frequent contact with OCHA and other humanitarian actors to increase IDPs’ participation in dialogues on humanitarian needs. The IDPs focal points and leaders took part in an IRC-organised Round Table held in Abidjan in February 2008 which addressed the issue of IDPs in the area of Zou, supported by UNDP, OCHA, and the Ministry of Solidarity and Victims of War.

The IDPs leaders also supported activities related to information sharing on areas of return in adherence to the guiding principles on internal displacement. With the leaders, IRC initiated a Go & See Visit in Bloléquin in March 2008. This provided an opportunity for six communities (three autochtones, two hallogènes, one allochtone) from Zou (place of origin) to travel to Bloléquin (place of displacement) to meet with IDPs from Zou and exchange information on living conditions and the situation in their places of origin. The exchanges have helped IDPs make decisions about returning, based on objective and reliable information."
Tensions remain high between returning IDPs and local communities (January 2010)

- In western Côte d’Ivoire, many local communities have been frightened by the return of IDPs due to continuing ethnic tensions and violence, and this has itself caused further displacement.
- Access to land has been one of the major causes of friction between returning IDPs and local communities.
- In some cases IDPs have been unwilling to return before armed elements were disarmed.
- Efforts for conflict resolution and reconciliation have been taken place in the villages at the initiative of both the government and the international community. However, in northern and western Côte d’Ivoire, land conflicts persist and are exacerbated by the malfunctioning of the judicial system.

Human Rights Watch, January 2010

“Violent conflicts over land rights, particularly in the north and west, were exacerbated by the chronic failure of the judicial system to resolve disputes, and persistent xenophobia toward those perceived as non-Ivorian nationals. In the west, perpetrators of violence often targeted non-indigenous internally displaced persons returning to their land.”

UN OCHA, 28 April 2008

"On the Humanitarian Coordinator’s request, the Ministers of National Reconciliation and Solidarity and War Victims hosted a meeting on 15 April to discuss the latest developments related to difficulties affecting peace and reconciliation among local communities along the Guiglo – Bétélon axis, and prospects for durable solutions, particularly in Zéaglo area. The meeting agreed on the need to organize a meeting in Bétélon during May 2008 with the participation of concerned parties, to try to resolve the remaining obstacles affecting the access of IDP returnees to their plantations, which forced some of them to return to their previous Transit Centre (CATD) in Guiglo. Community leaders, the youth, humanitarian actors and donor representatives will attend the gathering, which will be jointly organized by the above mentioned ministers, with support from the UN.

Authorities in Bétélon held meetings on 12 and 13 April 2008 and discussed the issue of allowing returnees to access their farms at Zéaglo with the youth and traditional chiefs of Beoué, Douandrou, Pohan, Zéaglo, Dahandrou and the adjacent settlements. An agreement in principle was reached, although the youth maintained their position, denying non-autochthon communities returning in the area to access their farms.”

Peace process promotes return but obstacles remain (January 2010)

- Land and property rights are among some of the main challenges faced by returnees. Many IDPs who tried to return to Man found their land occupied. With the return movements, tensions over access to cocoa and coffee plantations increase.
- Returns were recorded throughout 2010 but because of lack of land access secondary displacement has also taken place.
- There are no comprehensive figures with regard to returnees.
- Insecurity remains the major obstacle to return.
IRIN, 27 January 2010
“Many of the displaced who have recently tried to return to their farms have found their land occupied by others, according to officials in Man, 450km west of the capital, Abidjan. Now access to cocoa and coffee plantations – long a source of inter-ethnic tensions in the country – is at the heart of unrest in the west, particularly as more people return, say workers with the International Rescue Committee (IRC), which has an office in Man.”

IRIN, 5 April 2007
“The new peace deal may bring a new set of problems. “Now they say we are going to return but will we have the right to our plantations?” asks Kouassi.

Michel Tia, head of the regional IOM bureau in Duekoué, said the agency was trying to accelerate the return process to further help people like Kouassi and his family who do not receive the same assistance as those in the displaced camp in Guiglo.

Humanitarian organisations held negotiations with landowners to help ease people back into their communities but many challenges remain.

“Houses are nonexistent in the villages they are returning to,” said Tia. “Everything was destroyed. We have thought of putting up tents. The displaced [at the Guiglo center] are used to that and afterwards we will think about rehabilitating the houses to settle them definitively.”

Amadou Malgré Ouédraogo, 60, is one of the leaders of the Burkinabe community at the Guiglo camp. He said his garden of peppers, beans and eggplant is embarrassing compared to the hectares he once farmed. But he is resolved to restart his life once he returns to his village.

“I lost everything and now in the name of peace we are obliged to accept the situation,” he said. “But that will not be easy if they do not guaranty us a minimum of land to cultivate.”

UNHCR, 23 March 2007, p. 6
“There are no reliable figures on the return movement, which has already started on a small scale. One figure, which was collected by IOM and the NGO Cap Anamur in June 2006, concerned 300 IDPs who returned to their places of origin from Duékoué and Yamoussoukro. Some of these returnees have, however, recently moved again following insecurity in Blody and Fengolo in the Zone de Confiance.”

US Department of State, 6 March 2007, para. 2.d
“During the year an estimated 40,000 IDPs returned to their areas of origin, some without external assistance. UN agencies and local authorities also facilitated the small-scale return of IDPs to several locations in the west of the country with varying degrees of success. The displacement patterns often complicated the return of IDPs. For example, the displaced Burkinabe and other settlers living in the Guiglo IDP camp said that their plantations around the western town of Blolequin, south of the Zone of Confidence, were being occupied by indigenous Guere populations, who themselves had been displaced from their land in the Zone of Confidence at the beginning of the crisis. The government had not addressed this situation by year’s end.

[...]
The Catholic Mission permitted a number of IDPs to remain until alternative arrangements were made."

UN Human Rights Council, 18 October 2006, para. 53
"Everyone who spoke to the Representative of the Secretary-General, particularly displaced persons themselves, stressed that all displaced persons would like to return to their region of origin. The Representative of the Secretary-General was unable, however, to collect reliable information on the number of people who had already returned to their place of origin. In most cases, displaced persons believe that the conditions for their return are not in place, especially with regard to security. Many of the individuals questioned spoke of material problems related to their possible return – basically their increasing poverty and problems related to the destruction or occupation of their homes in their place of origin. The total absence of State organizations in the zone of confidence and the absence of the government administration in the north of the country are also obstacles to return."

Summary of data on IDPs’ wishes to return or resettle (September 2008)

- In Abidjan, IDPs are more likely to be wanting to return to their region of origin than non-IDPs. Only a minority of IDPs, in fact would like remain where they are or move somewhere else in the city
- Results from a survey conducted in 2005 found that the majority of the IDPs planned on going back to their homes once the situation will be normalized
- Wishes to return changed according to area of origin with only a minority of men from the north wanting to return
- Support in material resources constitutes an extra incitement for IDPs to return

Tufts University/IDMC, September 2008, pp.- 39-40
"We asked respondents whether they and their families hoped to return to their place of habitual residence, resettle elsewhere in the country or remain in Abidjan. As shown in Table 5.7 and Chart 5.7, there were several significant differences between IDPs and non-IDPs. IDPs were more likely to want to return home than non-IDPs (44% vs. 4%), and less likely to want to remain where they were in Abidjan. Whereas 77% of non-IDPs wanted either to remain where they were or move elsewhere in Abidjan, this was the case for only 34% of IDPs. Of all our respondents only two (less than 1%) said they wanted to migrate to North America or Europe."
Volonté de retour des PDIs vers leurs lieux d’origine et les raisons de leur sédentarisation dans leur lieu de résidence actuelle.

En règle générale, les déplacés ne sont pas retournés dans leur zone de résidence d’avant la crise pendant toute la durée de celle-ci. C’est le cas de 8 personnes déplacées sur 10. Aussi, 83% des déplacés qui ont refusé de faire un tel voyage ont avancé la raison de l’insécurité qui règne toujours dans le pays.

La majorité des PDIs (72%) font le projet de quitter les ménages d’accueil et de retourner dans leur zone de provenance à la fin de la crise, après que la situation se soit complètement normalisée. Cependant, cette situation d’ensemble n’est pas uniforme et change parfois considérablement selon la zone de provenance du déplacé. Ainsi, les hommes déplacés venus de la zone nord qui souhaitent y retourner ne sont que 17 % alors que, la proportion de femmes venant de cette zone et ayant manifesté le même désir s’élève à 43 %. Ce sont les proportions les plus faibles des volontés de retour exprimées. Les réfugiés en provenance de la Vallée du Bandama manifestent également une assez forte réticence à retourner dans leur zone de départ : 46 % des hommes et 57 % des femmes seulement ont exprimé le désir de retour. En revanche, plus de 4 personnes sur 5 souhaitent retourner lorsqu’elles proviennent du Haut Sassandra ou de l’Ouest (82 % et 77 % respectivement au niveau des hommes, 74 % et 77 % respectivement pour les femmes).
Une proportion significative de 13 % des déplacés interrogés (autant chez les hommes qu’au niveau des femmes) refuse obstinément le retour dans leur ancienne localité de résidence quelle que soit l’incitation.

Des attentes matérielles ont été avancées comme incitation pour le retour dans leurs localités d’origine par certaines PDIs. Elles souhaitent une aide au retour et d’autres pensent que la réhabilitation des logements endommagés et leur évacuation seraient les conditions préalables. Les premiers constituent 14 % de l’ensemble et les seconds 10%.*
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES

National response


Côte d'Ivoire signed the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced persons in Africa (the Kampala Convention) in November 2009 (AU, 6 August 2010), but as of the beginning of September 2010 it had not ratified it. Elements of a national legal framework upholding the rights of IDPs, including a bill defining mechanisms to compensate war victims including IDPs, were still awaiting signature in September 2010, years after they had been drafted. The likelihood of their signature was further reduced by the discontinuation of the mandate of the Ministry of Solidarity and War Victims as the IDP focal point in February 2010, following a government reshuffle (GoCdI, 23 February 2010). The Ministry had taken the initiative of drafting legislation on compensation and restitution issues and had set up an inter-ministerial committee on IDPs. Its functions were taken over by the new National Secretariat for Solidarity and War Victims (GoCdI, 2010). The Ministry of Reconstruction and Reinsertion, which had been supporting IDP return movements in the course of 2009 (Fraternité Matin, 20 April 2009; Xinhua, 26 August 2009), was also abolished on the same occasion.

The declared overarching goal of the government’s IDP plan is the return of all displaced people to their original homes. The Ouagadougou Accord focuses on the drafting of a national strategy to facilitate the return of IDPs, and remains silent on their right to integrate in the place of displacement or resettle in another part of the country, as prescribed in the Guiding Principles.

The medium-term social objectives of the government, described in its Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), include efforts to promote national reconciliation and social cohesion and the full reunification of the country as well as general economic development (IMF, 20 May 2009). Côte d'Ivoire has turned to the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank for debt relief assistance. In 2010, however, with social development indicators stagnating or deteriorating and a continuing political impasse likely, the World Bank announced the decision to tie debt relief to the holding of elections (Reuters, 29 January 2010).

The National Human Rights Commission is not fully functional (2009)

- The National Human Rights Commission was formally established in 2005 but started working only between 2007 and 2008
- It is composed of elected people, representatives from the civil society and the relevant ministries as well as people who are known for their expertise in the domain of human rights
- The current composition of the Commission is the fruit of political negotiations and will have to be revised after the general elections in conformity with the Paris Principles
- The Commission has received a small budget and has few resources
Government of Cote d'Ivoire, 3 September 2009, paras. 22-24
"La Commission nationale des droits de l'homme de Côte d'Ivoire (CNDHCI) a été créée par la décision n° 2005-08/PR du 15 juillet 2005, et elle est a démarré effectivement ses activités depuis janvier 2007. Composée d'élus, de représentants de la société civile et des ministères concernés en charge des questions liées aux droits de l'homme, ainsi que des personnalités connues pour leur compétence dans le domaine, la CNDHCI jouit de l'autonomie financière et d'une réelle liberté d'action et d'orientation. La CNDHCI dont les membres sont appelés «commissaires», dispose de pouvoirs de veille stratégique, d'investigation, de recommandation, voire d'injonction à l'égard du gouvernement sur les questions se rapportant aux droits de l'homme. Elle est également chargée de veiller à la promotion et au développement de la culture de ces droits humains au sein de la population.

Pour l'accomplissement de ses missions, la CNDHCI dispose d'un pouvoir d'auto-saisine; elle peut également être saisie par tout citoyen victime ou témoin de violations des droits de l'homme. Dans la conduite de ses enquêtes, la Commission peut assigner tout témoin à comparaître et exiger toute assistance de la part des organismes de l'État, pour permettre la manifestation de la vérité. Enfin, elle peut procéder également à la visite des établissements pénitentiaires et tout lieu de garde à vue; et au terme de ses investigations, favoriser le déclenchement de poursuites judiciaires ou interpeler toute autorité ou tout détenteur d'un pouvoir de coercition, pour la protection et la défense des droits de l'homme, ou proposer toutes mesures susceptibles de mettre fin à des violations de ces droits.

La composition actuelle de la CNDHCI, qui est le résultat de négociations politiques dans un contexte de crise politique, sera revue et mise en conformité avec les principes de Paris, après le retour à la normalité en Côte d'Ivoire."

US DOS, 25 February 2009
"After seven years of attempts to get a functional and independent human rights commission off the ground, the country launched its National Commission for Human Rights in July. The commission is made up of 44 members, 10 of whom are from political parties that were signatories to the 2003 Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. The commission received a small budget and had few resources."

National developments on the issue of children and armed conflicts (2008)

- Positive national developments have been recorded on the issue of children and armed conflicts. Côte d'Ivoire was among the conflicts designated by the UN Security Council for the setting up of a Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM) on six grave violations of children’s rights (including child recruitment and use) established by its Resolution 1612 (2005) on children and armed conflict.
- The government promised the UN Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict in September 2007 to create an inter-ministerial structure to co-ordinate work on the protection of children associated with armed groups and armed forces.

Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, May 2008, p.120
"Côte d'Ivoire was among the conflicts designated by the UN Security Council for the setting up of a Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism (MRM) on six grave violations of children’s rights (including child recruitment and use) established by its Resolution 1612 (2005) on children and armed conflict. The action plans by FAFN and pro-government militias for ending the use of child soldiers were the first such action plans to be negotiated by the UN under the framework established by Resolution 1612 (2005)."
The UN Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict visited Côte d’Ivoire in September 2007. Although the Ouagadougou agreement made no explicit reference to children, the Special Representative obtained firm commitments from the government and non-government actors with regard to the protection of children associated with armed groups and armed forces. In particular, the government promised to create an inter-ministerial structure to coordinate work on these issues. The Special Representative also stressed the importance of ending the use and involvement of youths in political violence.

There were allegations of other serious violations of children’s rights, including the trafficking of children and the use of child labour particularly in cocoa plantations. In June 2007 UNICEF reported that it was working with the co-operation of the government and the Forces nouvelles, particularly along the borders, to curtail trafficking, and had intercepted 100 children. Sexual violence against women and girls by members of, or persons affiliated to, government forces, armed groups and pro-government militias took place in a climate of widespread impunity. There were also allegations of UN peacekeepers involved in sexual exploitation and abuse of women and girls.

At a February 2007 ministerial meeting in Paris, Côte d’Ivoire and 58 other states endorsed the Paris Commitments to protect children from unlawful recruitment or use by armed forces or armed groups and the Paris Principles and guidelines on children associated with armed forces or armed groups. The documents reaffirmed international standards and operational principles for protecting and assisting child soldiers and followed a wide-ranging global consultation jointly sponsored by the French government and UNICEF.

Government sets up committee for IDP protection (2007)

IDMC, 8 February 2007

"The Ivorian government set up an inter-ministerial committee to coordinate the protection of and assistance to the country’s estimated 750,000 IDPs, at the end of January in Abidjan. This followed the recommendations of the First Conference on Internal Displacement in West Africa, held in Abuja in 2006. With the country’s economic, social, humanitarian and security situation deteriorating, the consultative committee is charged with proposing strategies and drafting a national action plan on IDP protection. While the Ivorian government and the rebels hold talks in Burkina Faso, IDPs are in an increasingly precarious situation. Insecurity, impunity and lingering tensions based on nationality and voting issues have prevented large-scale returns. The most challenging areas are government-controlled parts of the west and the Zone of Confidence patrolled by UN and French forces, whose mandate was extended until the end of June 2007. Human rights violations, including killings, disappearances and death threats, are a common occurrence, according to Refugees International."

Click here to access the text of the decree creating the inter-ministerial committee
Click here to access the minutes of the meetings (January to May 2007) of the committee

International response


In line with the PRSP, international donors have prioritised development assistance while government partners have progressively shifted from humanitarian activities to recovery and
development projects. There is no humanitarian appeal for 2010, and Côte d'Ivoire is not among the countries to benefit from the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) in 2010. From January to June, the remaining humanitarian activities carried out by UN agencies continued to focus on the reintegration and protection of IDPs and returnees in the west (UN SC, 20 May 2010).

As of 1 July 2010, OCHA transferred its coordination and contingency planning capacities to the office of the UN Resident Coordinator and to its regional office in Dakar. OCHA’s office in Guiglo in the west is the only office to remain open until the end of 2010 (UN OCHA, December 2009).

The UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (ONUCI) launched a local transition fund in July to consolidate its humanitarian activities (APO, 9 July 2010). As of September 2010, only the Swiss government had contributed, with $1 million to finance community rehabilitation programmes.

With Resolution 1933, the Security Council extended to the end of 2010 the mandate of ONUCI to accompany the government in the implementation of the OPA and the holding of the elections (UN SC, 30 June 2010). In this latest resolution, the Security Council has more explicitly included in ONUCI’s mandate its support for humanitarian assistance, including by taking into account the special needs of vulnerable groups including IDPs. The term “displacement” first appeared in Security Council Resolution 1726 in 2006, two years after the establishment of ONUCI, where the Security Council mentions its “serious concern” over displacement in the preamble. It was only in Resolution 1765 of 2007 that displacement was mentioned in the core text: [the Security Council] “invites the signatories of the Ouagadougou political Agreement to take the necessary steps to protect vulnerable civilian populations, including by guaranteeing the voluntary return, reinstallation, reintegration and security of displaced persons, with the support of the United Nations system, and to fulfil in this regard their commitments in accordance with the Ouagadougou political Agreement and their obligations under international humanitarian law” (UN SC, 16 July 2007).

**Various funding mechanisms have been used to support return movements and IDPs (2009)**

- Both the CAP and the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) have proved useful funding mechanisms in support of activities benefitting IDPs and returnees
- For 2010, the UN will not make a country-specific humanitarian appeal but funding requests will go through the regional one
- A transition fund has been set up to bridge the gap between aid and development
- In 2008, $6.4 million were allocated in support of humanitarian operations from the under-funded emergencies window of CERF
- With regard to early recovery programmes, UNDP has set two trust funds to facilitate and accelerate reception and disbursement of external funding
- Before granting additional funding, the World Bank has requested better transparency in the cocoa sector

IRIN, 17 December 2009

“Nearly three years from the signing of a peace agreement in Côte d’Ivoire, emergency operations are slowing but humanitarian needs remain, aid workers say. More funds are needed to support the transition from humanitarian to development.”
Côte d’Ivoire, like many other post-conflict states, faces an ill-defined period when the emergency has waned but needs remain acute and the people’s living conditions precarious, said Julie Bélanger, head of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).

"Developmental actors are not yet here in full force and many humanitarian agencies have pulled out," she said. "We are still trying to bridge the gaps, make sure things don’t explode, and ensure people are seeing the dividends of peace."

The UN will not make a country-specific humanitarian appeal in 2010, but rather will request US$54 million through a regional appeal, according to UN humanitarian coordinator and deputy UN representative in Côte d’Ivoire Georg Charpentier.

OCHA is pulling out of Man and Zou in the west, Korhogo in the north and Bouake in the centre in December. In Guiglo OCHA will continue to support the UN refugee agency UNHCR’s protection monitoring role, according to Bélanger.

[...]

The need to keep a humanitarian pipeline open prompted the UN to push for a transition fund. Donors backed the idea at a July UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) meeting but so far have not committed any funding.

Lucien Houedanou, spokesperson for the European Commission, the biggest donor in Côte d’Ivoire, told IRIN the EC’s focus has firmly shifted to development. The EC humanitarian aid department (ECHO) pulled out in 2007. The commission will give $319 million to reinforce social cohesion and build up government structures from 2008-13.

UN OCHA, 3 July 2008, pp. 5-6

"Since the 2007 Mid Year Review (MYR) relief assistance to, and protection needs of, IDPs has remained a strategic priority, which the 2008 Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP) further emphasised. As a result, humanitarian actors continued to provide effective and coordinated support (balanced and inclusive between intervention sectors) to ongoing return movements, especially in the western parts of the country, thanks to the funds received from the under-funded window of the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF). On 1 February 2008, the Emergency Relief Coordinator allocated an amount of $6.4 million in support of humanitarian operations in Cote d’Ivoire from the under-funded emergencies window of the CERF.

Under the leadership of the Humanitarian Coordinator, humanitarian actors decided to use the grant to strengthen the humanitarian response in support of return dynamics in the western parts of the country, in line with the strategy of the 2008 Consolidated Appeals Process for Cote d’Ivoire.

[...]

As humanitarian interventions focus on providing response to existing relief and protection needs of IDPs, returnees, refugees and other vulnerable groups in host communities, needs related to early recovery and sustainable development are being addressed by the appropriate actors through the relevant programming and funding mechanisms including the Government-led "Programme de Sortie de Crise" (PSC) and two United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) administered Trust Funds (one for the PSC and one for Elections) established to facilitate and accelerate reception and disbursement of external funding."

UN OCHA, 19 September 2007, pp.18-19

*CERF response: CERF provided rapid response funds to address the relapse of violence in the West of the country in 2006 and address IDP flows. It served as a mechanism to fill gaps in the under-funded CAP and provided funds for vaccination campaigns.
**CERF Allocations for Ivory Coast (March 2006 – April 2007)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Appeal</th>
<th>CERF funding (window)</th>
<th>Comments</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Epidemic Outbreaks</td>
<td>$US 2.7M (rapid response)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP crisis</td>
<td>$US 750K (rapid response)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$US 4M (under funded 2006)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$US 4.5M (under funded 2007)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$11.95 M</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: CERF Secretariat

**Decision-making:** The CAP is formulated by all participating UN agencies and organisations and forms the basis for coordinated (humanitarian) response. CERF proposals were formulated by UN agencies and endorsed by UNCT and RC/HC.

**Other funding mechanisms:** There is also a small ERF of £15,000.”

*On the other hand, the Government needs to provide better reassurances on its governance before other funding mechanisms open up.*

Reuters, 6 September 2008

"The World Bank has ordered Ivory Coast to tackle "serious corruption" in its lucrative cocoa industry, saying it will not lend money to the country unless it sees better governance of the sector.

Obiageli Ezekwesili, World Bank vice president for the Africa region, said it would be "absolutely unacceptable" to support reducing poverty while the poor were being denied adequate reward for their work.

On Friday, Ezekwesili said Ivory Coast could reach the World Bank's debt relief decision point by the end of the year and then have more than $3 billion of external debt written off by mid-2009, pending an assessment by sister organisation the International Monetary Fund.

Over the next three years, some $800 million of Bretton Woods funding could be available to the world's top cocoa producer, which is struggling to organise elections in November, aimed at ending a crisis sparked by a brief war in 2002-2003."

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**References to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement**

**Known references to the Guiding Principles**

- References to the Guiding Principles in the national legislation
- Other references to the Guiding Principles (in chronological order)
- Availability of the Guiding Principles in local languages
- Training on the Guiding Principles (in chronological order)

**References to the Guiding Principles in the national legislation**

None

**Other references to the Guiding Principles (in chronological order)**

*As of October 2008, a draft bill on IDP protection with references to the Guiding Principles remained in draft form.*
Strategy for the Assistance and Protection of Internally Displaced Persons, developed by UN OCHA in Côte d'Ivoire in 2007, sets out immediate and mid-term priorities for ensuring durable solutions along the lines of the Guiding Principles.

Source: UN OCHA
Date: 20 December 2007 (draft awaiting input from the relevant ministries)
Document: Les PDIs en Côte d'Ivoire - priorités immédiates et à moyen terme

Availability of the Guiding Principles in local languages

Guiding Principles in French

Training on the Guiding Principles

OCHA and UNICEF-CI training workshop: OCHA and UNICEF-CI jointly organised a workshop in Abidjan on 14 and 15 May to develop a Code of Conduct for all humanitarian workers in Côte d'Ivoire, as well as a strategy to improve assistance and protection of vulnerable groups, including refugees, the sick and wounded, minorities, the elderly, handicapped individuals, women and children, and particularly IDPs. The workshop, which was part of the effort to increase complementarity between humanitarian and military initiatives, was attended by Government Ministries, UN agencies and local and international NGOs as well as the FANCI (Ivorian national armed forces), ECOMICI and French Operation Licorne representatives.

Sources: UN OCHA; UNICEF
Date: 14-15 May 2003
Document:
“On the basis of the consensus reached during the seminar, humanitarian actors will soon finalise a Code of Conduct for all humanitarian workers in Côte d'Ivoire and will revise their strategies for assistance to and the protection of vulnerable populations, particularly internally displaced populations (IDPs)” (UN OCHA, 16 May 2003).

OCHA and UNICEF-CI training workshop: OCHA and UNICEF-CI jointly organised a workshop in Abidjan on 16 May directed to the impartial forces ECOMICI and the French Operation Licorne Forces to sensitize them on humanitarian intervention.
<table>
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<td>Date: 16 May 2003</td>
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<td>&quot;On the basis of the consensus reached during the seminar, humanitarian actors will soon finalise a Code of Conduct for all humanitarian workers in Cote d'Ivoire and will revise their strategies for assistance to and the protection of vulnerable populations, particularly internally displaced populations (IDPs)&quot; (UN OCHA, 16 May 2003).</td>
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