

Immigration and  
Refugee Board of CanadaCommission de l'immigration  
et du statut de réfugié du Canada

Canada

[Français](#)[Home](#)[Contact Us](#)[Help](#)[Search](#)[canada.gc.ca](#)

## Issue Papers, Extended Responses and Country Fact Sheets

[Home](#)

# Issue Paper IRAQ SELECTED ISSUES June 1996

### Disclaimer

This document was prepared by the Research Directorate of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada on the basis of publicly available information, analysis and comment. All sources are cited. This document is not, and does not purport to be, either exhaustive with regard to conditions in the country surveyed or conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum. For further information on current developments, please contact the Research Directorate.

### Table of Contents

[MAP](#)[GLOSSARY](#)1. [INTRODUCTION](#)2. [BACKGROUND](#)[2.1 Demographic Factors](#)[2.2 Political Structure of Iraq](#)

2.2.1 The Ba'athist Government

2.2.2 Iraqi Opposition Groups

2.2.3 1995 Political Developments

3. [LEGAL CONTEXT](#)[3.1 The Constitution](#)[3.2 The Judiciary](#)

#### 4. [SELECTED ISSUES](#)

##### [4.1 Reports of Human Rights Abuses](#)

- 4.1.1 Torture
- 4.1.2 Extrajudicial Killings
- 4.1.3 Arbitrary Arrest and Detention

##### [4.2 Minority Issues](#)

- 4.2.1 The Kurdish Autonomous Region
- 4.2.2 Kurds
- 4.2.3 Shi'is
- 4.2.4 Other Minorities

##### [4.3 Travel Restrictions](#)

#### [NOTES ON SELECTED SOURCES](#)

#### [REFERENCES](#)

### **MAP**

See original.

Source: Middle East Watch. *Human Rights in Iraq*. 1990. Yale University Press.

### **GLOSSARY**

GNA	Grand National Assembly
IMIK	Islamic Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan
INA	Iraqi National Congress
KDP	Kurdish Democratic Party of Iraq
KRP	Kurdistan Revolutionary Party
NOG	National Opposition Grouping Inside Iraq
NPF	National Progressive Front
PKK	Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkaren-i Kurdistan)
PUK	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan

RCC

Revolutionary Command Council

SCIRISAIRI

Supreme Council Assembly of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq

## 1. INTRODUCTION

In 1991, following the Persian Gulf war and a failed Kurdish uprising, a Kurdish enclave or "safe haven" was established in Northern Iraq (Cook 1995, np; *Third World Quarterly* 1993, 295). Britain, France and the United States, through UN Security Council Resolution 688, established and enforced the safe haven in an attempt to protect the area's inhabitants from the Republican Guards (ibid.; AI 28 Feb. 1995, 7; *Middle East Report* Mar.-Apr. 1995, 4; ibid. Mar.-June 1994, 41; *Third World Quarterly* 1993, 295). The de facto Kurdish state that emerged after 1991 has remained in place, and Iraq continued to be effectively a divided country in 1995 (ibid.). Extended Response to Information Request IRQ22398.E details 1995 developments in northern Iraq while Amnesty International's February 1995 report entitled *Iraq: Human Rights Abuses in Iraqi Kurdistan since 1991*<sup>[1]</sup> provides a detailed account of the human rights situation in the Kurdish enclave to the end of 1994.

This paper will focus on the human rights situation in the areas of Iraq outside of the safe haven in late 1994 and 1995, with particular attention paid to the circumstances of Iraqi minorities, principally the Kurds and the Shi'is of southern Iraq. Please note that due to the fact that most principal groups reporting on human rights conditions in Iraq, namely the UN Special Rapporteur for Iraq, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch Middle East Watch, are not permitted to visit government-controlled regions of Iraq, limited information on the current human rights situation in Iraq is available. The information gathered by the Special Rapporteur, for example, was based principally upon interviews, direct testimony from army deserters and refugees, and the reports of human rights monitors who are regularly dispatched to such locations as London, Geneva, Kuwait and Iran to interview such persons and gather information (UN 15 Feb. 1995, 3; LCHR July 1995, 125; CRS 13 Apr. 1994).

### NOTE

[1] Copies of this report are available at the IRB Regional Documentation Centres. [\[back\]](#)

## 2. BACKGROUND

### 2.1 Demographic Factors

Iraq, a country of approximately 434,924 square kilometres is bordered by Turkey, Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Syria (MEW 1990, xiii; *Europa* 1995, 1556; *The Middle East Review* 1995 1995, 36). Almost entirely landlocked, Iraq is comprised of 18 governorates, including Dohuk, Arbil (Erbil) and Sulaimaniyah, which, in 1995, constituted the protected enclave of Iraqi Kurdistan (*Europa* 1995, 1556, 1560, 1562; USAID 7 Nov. 1995, 1). According to recent estimates the population of Iraq is over 19,000,000 (*Political Handbook of the World 1994-95* 1995, 408; see also *The Middle East Review* 1995 1995, 36; UN 1995, 86; Gulf Information Project 1994, np). Although a predominately Arabic-speaking Muslim country, Iraq is divided into three distinct groups or communities: Shi'i Muslims, who represent a slim majority and live primarily in regions south of Baghdad; Sunni Muslim Arabs, who represent approximately 15 per cent of the population yet dominate the Ba'ath Party and Iraqi politics; and Kurds, who are also Sunni Muslims and live primarily in the northeast regions of the country (CARDRI 1986, ix; *Political Handbook of the World 1994-95* 1995, 408; *Europa* 1995, 1556;

MEW 1990, xiii). There are approximately 4,100,000 Kurds in Iraq (Gulf Information Project 1994, np), the majority of whom live in the protected northern safe haven (*Middle East Report* Mar.-Apr. 1995, 7). Other ethnic and religious minorities in Iraq include Assyrians, Chaldeans, Jews, Yazidis, Persians, Luris, Sabeans, Turcomen, and Armenians (ibid.; CARDRI 1986, ix; *Europa* 1995, 1556; MEW 1990, xiii; *Country Reports 1994 1995*, 1084).

## **2.2 Political Structure of Iraq**

According to the Iraqi Constitution, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) is "the supreme body in the State" (ICJ 1994, 45; Flanz Apr. 1990, 28); legislative and executive power in Iraq rests with both the RCC and the President (*People in Power* July 1995, 90; *The Review* June 1994, 7-8; *Europa* 1995, 1560). September 1995 amendments to the Constitution stipulate that RCC members are to nominate the council's chairman as President, following which the National Assembly considers the nomination (Iraqi Television Network 7 Sept. 1995; Xinhua 14 Oct. 1995; Reuters 11 Oct. 1995). Once a nomination gains approval from the National Assembly it is presented to the population through a popular referendum (Iraqi Television Network 7 Sept. 1995; *The Financial Post* 8 Sept. 1995; BBC Summary 11 Sept. 1995; Reuters 11 Oct. 1995).

In 1995 the RCC was comprised of eight members, including the Chairman, Saddam Hussein, and Vice-Chairman, Izzat Ibrahim (*Europa* 1995, 1560; *People in Power* July 1995, 90). The February 1995 United Nations *Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Iraq* submitted by Special Rapporteur Max van der Stoel states that "the President rules through a Revolution Command Council which has the power to override the Provisional Constitution at any time and without judicial review" (UN 15 Feb. 1995, 6; see also ICJ Feb. 1994, 90).

The Iraqi Council of Ministers is appointed by the President and oversees the daily administrative matters of the country (*Europa* 1995, 1560; *World Encyclopedia of Political Systems and Parties* 1987, 537; *People in Power* July 1995, 90). The 17-member Iraq Regional Command, reportedly the most important group within the Ba'ath Party, also wields significant political influence in the country (*Europa* 1995, 1560; *Political Parties of Africa and the Middle East* 1993, 126).

Iraq has a 250-member National Assembly which shares legislative authority with the RCC (ibid.; *Political Parties of Africa and the Middle East* 1993, 126; *Political Handbook of the World 1994-95* 1995, 414); however, according to *Country Reports 1994* the National Assembly "is completely subordinate to the executive branch" (Country Reports 1994 1995, 1093). The National Assembly is elected for four-year terms through a system of proportional representation (*Political Handbook of the World 1994-95* 1995, 414; *Political Parties of the World* 1988, 288; *People in Power* July 1995, 90). The Ba'ath Party won the majority of seats in the April 1989 general elections of the National Assembly (ibid.), the National Progressive Patriotic Front (see section 2.2.1) secured the remaining seats (ibid.). The first parliamentary elections since 1989 were held in Iraq on 24 March 1996 (Iraqi TV 24 Mar. 1996; AFP 24 Mar. 1996; ibid. 17 Mar. 1996b; MEI 29 Mar. 1996, 13). Over 680 candidates competed in the elections (AFP 24 Mar. 1996; Iraqi TV 24 Mar. 1996; *Libération* 23-24 Mar. 1996, 10). All candidates, independents and Baath party supporters, affirmed their support of Saddam Hussein before the vote (AFP 17 Mar. 1996b).

### **2.2.1 The Ba'athist Government**

The Ba'ath party has been the hegemonic party in the Iraqi political scene since a 1968 coup brought the party to power (*Political Handbook of the World 1994-95* 1995, 412; *Political Parties of Africa and the Middle East* 1993, 129; ICJ Feb. 1994, 148-49). According to the International Commission of Jurists the Iraqi government derives its main source of support from two institutions,

namely the army and the Baath Party ... . The army is the instrument with which the regime suppresses any attempted revolts against itself and the Party constitutes the ideological framework in or through which executive members of the regime and officers in the armed forces are taught to be loyal to the existing regime and its leader (ibid.).

The hegemony of the Ba'ath party is reportedly assured through a number of enactments and decisions proclaimed by the RCC (ibid., 149-50). For example, according to the 1974 Leading Party Act all government departments, agencies and ministries must use the "political report of the Eighth Regional Congress of the Baath Party" as the "functional guideline for the discharge of their duties" (ibid., 149; UN 15 Feb. 1995, 6-7). Furthermore, former Ba'ath Party members are forbidden from joining any other party after leaving the Ba'ath Party; any Ba'ath Party member who either concealed his previous political affiliations or is found to have links with other political factions or parties may face the death penalty (ICJ Feb. 1994, 149). All candidates for the National Assembly must "believe in the principles and aims of the glorious [Ba'athist] revolution of 17-30 July [1968]" (ibid., 150).

According to a 1990 Middle East Watch report, "the Baath party's formidable apparatus was shaped largely by one man, Saddam Hussein, and today it serves to put absolute power in his hands" (Middle East Watch 1990 13). The "cult" of Saddam Hussein "is increasingly used as a means of political control ... observers have noted that taking part in this cult has become the new bench mark of loyalty, as important as joining the Baath party" (ibid., 17). In his 4 March 1996 report, UN Special Rapporteur Max van der Stoep reported that the power structure of the Iraqi lends itself to the concentration of power in an extremely small group, with ultimate power resting in the hands of the President, Saddam Hussein (UN 4 Mar. 1996 5). A February 1996 *L'Express* article, reprinted in the *World Press Review*, indicates that Saddam Hussein remains in firm control: "in Iraq, the embargo has consolidated Saddam's power" (*L'Express* May 1996, 6).

The National Progressive Front (NPF) was formed in July 1973 when the Ba'ath Party and the Iraqi Communist Party endorsed a joint manifesto which envisioned the establishment of a new nationalist front (*Europa* 1995, 1567; *Political Parties of the World* 1988, 289; *Political Handbook of the World 1994-95* 1995, 412-13). Two Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan or Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP)<sup>[2]</sup> and the Kurdistan Revolutionary Party (KRP) and other forces joined the front in 1974 and 1975 (*Europa* 1995, 1567; *Political Handbook of the World 1994-95* 1995, 412-13). The Iraqi Communist Party pulled out of the front in 1979 and sources indicate that the NPF served "almost exclusively thereafter as a means of presenting *Baath*-endorsed electoral candidates who were not permitted to campaign under party labels" (ibid., 413; *Political Parties of Africa and the Middle East* 1993, 129).

### **2.2.2 Iraqi Opposition Groups**

The RCC proclaimed a new Political Parties Act in early September 1991 which nominally permitted the creation of opposition parties, in theory ending over 20 years of "de facto one-party rule" (*Political Handbook of the World 1994-95* 1995, 412; ICJ Feb. 1994, 151; *Country Reports 1994* 1995, 1093). According to this act, the principles of any new party formed must "be clearly defined in regard to the maintenance and defence of the independence, territorial integrity, sovereignty and national unity of Iraq;" in addition the party "must not adopt a hostile attitude towards the legitimate aspiration of the Arab nation to achieve full liberation, solidarity and Arab unity" (ICJ 1994, 152). Parties based on an "atheistic, confessional, racial, regional or anti-Arab basis" are prohibited (ibid., 153; *Political Parties of Africa and the Middle East* 1993, 129). The 1991 Act also disallows any party, other than the Ba'ath, from "engaging in any party-political education, activity or organization within the ranks of the armed forces, the internal security forces and other associated agencies" (ICJ Feb. 1994, 150). *Country Reports 1994* states that "in practice, the law reinforced the preeminent position of the Ba'ath Party by

prohibiting parties that do not support Saddam Hussein and the present Government" (Country Reports 1994 1995, 1093; UN 15 Feb. 1995, 8). In his February 1995 report the UN Special Rapporteur claimed that the 1991 Political Parties Act "fails to provide for free political association or expression;" the Special Rapporteur also stated that the Act remained, as of January 1995, unimplemented (ibid.).

Dozens of Iraqi opposition groups operate in exile or in the northern Kurdish safe haven (*Political Handbook of the World 1994-95* 1995, 413-24; *Europa* 1995, 1567; *Middle East Report* Mar.-Apr. 1995, 19). Most Iraqi opposition groups reportedly fall into four or five main streams: Islamist, Arab nationalist, Kurdish, democratic socialists or communists and other smaller groups established by minority groups such as the Turcomans or Assyrians (*The Middle East* Dec. 1994, 10; *The Economist* 14 Apr. 1995, 23; see also *Middle East Report* Mar.-Apr. 1995, 19). Each stream is comprised of a number of parties and groups who reportedly agree on four main points:

- They regard the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the group surrounding him as a precondition for change.
- They endorse the territorial integrity of Iraq.
- They notionally accept the principle of democratic elections and constitutional government.
- and they all declare the need for a special status for the Kurds based on a degree of self-government (*The Middle East* Dec. 1994, 10; see also Gulf Information Project 1994, np).

Many exiled opposition groups and parties have joined the Iraqi National Congress (INC), an American-backed umbrella organization designed to unite Iraqi opposition groups (*Middle East Report* Mar.-Apr. 1995, 20; MEI 17 Nov. 1995, 14; *Political Parties of Africa and the Middle East* 1993, 130). The INC was formed in Vienna in 1992 and in 1995 had its headquarters in Arbil, the capital of the Iraqi Kurdish enclave (*The Jerusalem Report* 4 May 1995, 34; *The Middle East Review* 1995 1995, 36; AFP 1 Nov. 1995; *Political Handbook of World 1994-95* 1995, 413; Gulf Information Project 1994, np; *The Middle East* Dec. 1994, 10). Although the INC was initially launched mostly by Kurdish exiles, some 170 representatives from a wide spectrum of Iraqi opposition groups attended the INC's second conference held in Iraqi Kurdistan in October 1992 (*Political Handbook of World 1994-95* 1995, 413; *Middle East Report* Mar.-Apr. 1995, 19). Participants "committed themselves to the nonviolent overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the establishment of a federal system that would permit a substantial degree of ethnic autonomy without partition of the country" (*Political Handbook of World 1994-95* 1995, 413).

However, the INC's unification efforts encountered some obstacles: for example, an article in *Middle East Report* discusses the relationship between Shi'i opposition groups and the INC, noting that the INC "neglected to provide an essential place for the Shi'i religious movement" (*Middle East Report* Mar.-Apr. 1995, 20; see also AFP 1 Nov. 1995). The same article maintains that "the triumvirate presidency [of the INC] acknowledges the three principal Iraqi communities but it does not offer a frame-work for communal coexistence" (*Middle East Report* Mar.-Apr. 1995, 21). Moreover, the internecine fighting between the KDP and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)<sup>[3]</sup> in the northern enclave has hindered the development of the INC and *The Middle East Review* 1995 reports that the group "has not been able to organise large-scale opposition in areas of Iraq still under government control" (*The Middle East Review* 1995 1995, 36; *The Jerusalem Report* 4 May 1995, 35; *The Economist* 14 Apr. 1995, 23).

Principal individual Iraqi opposition groups include the two major Kurdish groups in the Kurdish enclave, the KDP and PUK; the Islamic Movement of Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK), which represents the

Islamist movement in northern Iraq; the Supreme Council (or Assembly) of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI or SAIRI), a group formed in 1982 and based in Iran, which serves as an umbrella groups for several Shi'i groups—SCIRI is reportedly the largest political organization representing Iraq's Shi'is; Al-Da'wa al-Islamiya (Voice of Islam), a Shi'i group formed in 1968 and based in Tehran; the Iraqi Communist Party which was founded in 1934 and was eventually purged after its 1979 withdrawal from the NPF; and finally, the al-Hizbal-'Umma or Nation Party which was formed in 1982 (*Political Handbook of the World 1994-95* 1995, 413-414; IPS 9 Nov. 1995; *Europa* 1995, 1567; *Middle East Report* Mar.-Apr. 1995, 19-20; AFP 1 Nov. 1995). Saad Saleh Jabr, the leader of the Nation Party, became president of the London-based Free Iraqi Council, which has been described as being in "competition" with the INC for Western recognition as the leading external opposition formation" (*Political Handbook of the World 1994-95* 1995, 414).

In early December 1995 the London-based newspaper *Al-Hayat'* announced the establishment of a new Iraqi opposition group called the National Opposition Grouping Inside Iraq (NOG) (Al-Hayat' 3 Dec. 1995). The group pledges to "eliminate the tyrant Saddam and his regime, to coexist peacefully with all the world's peoples within the international community and to build a modern Iraq based on freedom, equality, prosperity and pluralism for all the Iraqi people's factions" (ibid.). The group reportedly includes members of "the people's factions, national and opposition figures and elements from within the regime's administrative, party, military and security organs" (ibid.).

### **2.2.3 1995 Political Developments**

In August 1995 President Hussein's son-in-law and second-in-command, General Hussein Kamel Hassan al-Majid, applied for asylum in Jordan; a second son-in-law, the head of the president's bodyguards, Colonel Saddam Kamel, also defected in August (*The Economist* 19 Aug. 1995, 36; *The Middle East* Oct. 1995, 5; Reuters 11 Oct. 1995). An ongoing power struggle within President Hussein's inner circle reportedly precipitated General Kamel's decision to leave Iraq; *The Middle East* reports that "Gen. Kamel's motivation to leave seems to have less to do with any fear of an imminent collapse of the government, than with concern for his own personal survival"<sup>[4]</sup> (*The Middle East* Oct. 1995, 5; *The Economist* 19 Aug. 1995, 36-37).

A few months later, on 15 October 1995, a referendum was held to re-confirm Saddam Hussein's position as Iraqi President (*The Economist* 21 Oct. 1995, 45; *Libération* 16 Oct. 1995, 9; *The Ottawa Citizen* 16 Oct. 1995, A6; MEI 20 Oct. 1995, 3; *The Middle East* Dec. 1995, 13). Reportedly 99.74 per cent of the population turned out for the vote, and 99.96 voted yes, affirming President Hussein's position for another seven years (*The Economist* 21 Oct. 1995, 45; MEI 20 Oct. 1995, 3). According to a *Los Angeles Times* article reprinted in *The Ottawa Citizen*, many government opponents were "afraid to vote no, fearing retaliation from the government" (*The Ottawa Citizen* 16 Oct. 1995; IPS 9 Nov. 1995). The UN Special Rapporteur, cited by AFP, contended that the referendum "in no way reflects the genuine will of the people" (AFP 27 Nov. 1995). Saddam Hussein was the only person running in the referendum and according to *The Middle East* "even if someone had wanted to [run], it would not have been possible" (*The Middle East* Dec. 1995, 13; see also *Sunday Times* 22 Oct. 1995). Sources agree that the referendum was not so much a display of democracy but an opportunity to "demonstrate to Mr. Hussein's inner circle, split in recent months by defections and personal rivalries, that the dictator remains as firmly in control as ever" (*The Economist* 21 Oct. 1995, 45; MEI 20 Oct. 1995, 3). The referendum was not held in the Kurdish-controlled safe-haven regions of northern Iraq (*Xinhua* 14 Oct. 1995; Reuters 11 Oct. 1995).

### **NOTES**

[2] According to Political Handbook of the World 1994-95 the original KDP splintered into a number of smaller organizations over the course of its existence (*Political Handbook of the World 1994-95* 1995, 413). The KDP which joined the National Progressive Front in 1974 was a "Marxist rump of the original party" (ibid.). [\[back\]](#)

[3] See Extended Response to Information Request IRQ22398.E for further information on the PUK-KDP conflict. [\[back\]](#)

[4] On 21 February 1996 General Hussein Kamel and his brother, Colonel Saddam Kamel, returned to Iraq (*The New York Times* 21 Feb. 1996, A1; see also *The Guardian Weekly* 25 Feb. 1996, 3). General Kamel reportedly wrote a letter to his father-in-law, Saddam Hussein, requesting that he and his brother be allowed to return to Iraq (ibid.; *The New York Times* 21 Feb. 1996, A5). According to *The New York Times*, "General Kamel ... was confident that he would be warmly received" (ibid.). On 23 February, however, both General Kamel and his brother "were killed by clan members who stormed their residence" (*The Globe and Mail* 24 Feb. 1996, A1; *The New York Times* 25 Feb. 1996, A9). According to official Iraqi sources quoted by *The New York Times*, "after being divorced from their wives, they were declared traitors and shot — after being made to kiss Saddam Hussein's shoes, according to accounts of Iraqi dissidents — by their own relatives who wanted to wipe out the shame of their treason" (ibid.). [\[back\]](#)

### 3. LEGAL CONTEXT

#### 3.1 The Constitution

A provisional Iraqi constitution was issued in 1968 and promulgated by the RCC on 16 July 1970 (Flanz Apr. 1990, 21; *Country Reports 1994 1995*, 1084; *Europa* 1995, 1566; MEW 1990, 22; ICJ Feb. 1994, 26). This constitution can be amended by a two-thirds majority vote of the RCC (ibid., n.13; MEW 1990, 22; see also *Europa* 1995, 1566).

The constitution stipulates that Iraq is "a popular democratic and sovereign state with Islam as its state religion and its economy `based on socialism'" (*Political Parties of the World* 1988, 288; Flanz Apr. 1990, 23; *Europa* 1995, 1566). Article 19 states that all Iraqi "citizens are equal before the law, without discrimination because of sex, blood, language, social origin or religion" (Flanz Apr. 1990, 25; ICJ Feb. 1994, 119). Freedom of religion is guaranteed in article 25, while article 26 "guarantees freedom of opinion, publication, meeting, demonstrations and formation of political parties ... in accordance with the objectives of the Constitution and within the limits of the law" (Flanz Apr. 1990, 25; *Europa* 1995, 1566).

The 1970 Constitution is the first to recognize the ethnic identity of Kurds<sup>[5]</sup> and to guarantee Kurdish autonomy (ICJ Feb. 1994, 29; see also Cook 1995, 22-23). According to article 5(b) "the Iraqi people are composed of two principal nationalisms: the Arab nationalism and Kurdish Nationalism" (Flanz Apr. 1990, 23). The constitution states that both Arabic and Kurdish shall be the official languages in Kurdish regions (ibid., ICJ Feb. 1994, 28) and a 1974 addition to the constitution stipulates that "the region in which the majority of the population are Kurds shall enjoy autonomy in the manner provided for by law" (see section 4.2.1 for further information on the 1974 Kurdish Autonomy Law) (ibid.; Cook 1995, 24; *Europa* 1995, 1566).

The Constitution recognizes the RCC as the supreme authority in the State and article 38 states that the RCC exercises its powers by a two-thirds majority (Flanz Apr. 1990, 28; *Europa* 1995, 1566). A new permanent Constitution, which would abolish the RCC and provide for presidential elections, was approved by the National Assembly in 1990 but as of autumn 1995 had yet to be submitted to a nation-wide referendum for approval (*Europa* 1995, 1566; *Political Handbook of the World 1994-95* 1995, 410; MEI 20 Oct. 1995, 3).

#### 3.2 The Judiciary

The Iraqi judiciary consists of a number of religious, civil, criminal, military, juvenile, permanent

and temporary special courts (MEW 1990, 23; *Europa* 1995, 1569; ICJ Feb. 1994, 92). The Court of Cassation, based in Baghdad, is the supreme or highest court in the country (ibid.; *Europa* 1995, 1569). It is comprised of a president, five vice-presidents and at least thirty judges (ibid.; ICJ Feb. 1994, 92). *Country Reports 1994* states that "defendants have the right to appeal to the Court of Appeal and then to the Court of Cassation" (Country Reports 1994 1995, 1087; see also ICJ Feb. 1994, 120).

All citizens are guaranteed the right to "apply to the courts for legal redress" (ICJ Feb. 1994, 88). Civil Courts of First Instance are located in all major towns: each court has a judge who hears civil and commercial cases (ibid.). Misdemeanour and Criminal Courts are also located where there is a Court of First Instance (ibid., 95). "A misdemeanour, as defined in the Iraqi Penal Code, is an offence punishable by imprisonment or penal servitude for a period of three months to five years" (ibid.). According to the International Commission of Jurists, the main town of each governorate "also has a criminal court which hears cases involving felonies. A felony, as defined in the Iraqi Penal code, is an offence punishable by death, life imprisonment or imprisonment for a period of 5 to 20 years" (ibid., 96). The Constitution stipulates that the accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty and maintains that the "right of defence is sacred at all stages of the investigation and trial" (ibid., 120).

Iraq's special security courts try cases of national security as well as some criminal cases (*Country Reports 1994 1995*, 1087; *Freedom in the World* 1995, 308). The 1994 report on rule of law in Iraq by the International Commission of Jurists remarks that the Iraqi regime has established special security, revolutionary and emergency courts "in recent years" (International Commission of Jurists Feb. 1994, 113-14). These courts reportedly continue to be used as "an instrument designed to protect the existing regime rather than to defend the safety and security of society" (ibid., 115; *Freedom in the World* 1995, 308). Sources indicate that suspects held in these courts are "frequently held incommunicado, confessions extracted through torture are admissible as evidence and there are no procedural safeguards" (ibid.; ICJ Feb. 1994, 121; see also LCHR July 1995, 128). Please see *Iraq and the Rule of Law* prepared by the International Commission of Jurists for more detailed information on Iraq's court system.

Article 60 of the Constitution provides for an independent judiciary: "the judiciary ... is subject to no other authority save that of the law" (Flanz Apr. 1990, 35; MEW 1990, 23). Despite this, however, both Middle East Watch and the International Commission of Jurists caution that Iraq's judiciary "is not an independent authority since its organization and the scope of its jurisdiction are subject to the will of the Revolution Command Council" (ICJ Feb. 1994, 89; MEW 1990, 23). Middle East Watch states that "the judiciary is, in effect, left to fend for itself, at the mercy of an all-powerful executive that appoints and dismisses judges, controls the various police services, and rules unimpeded in all areas" (ibid.). Citing the UN Special Rapporteur's 1994 report, *Country Reports 1994* states that "the executive interferes regularly in `all aspects of normal judicial competence in matters ranging from property and commercial law, to family law and criminal law'" (Country Reports 1994 1995, 1087). *Country Reports 1994* claims that the President has the power to override court judgments (ibid.).

According to the UN Special Rapporteur, the structure of the Iraqi government, including its constitution and judiciary, provides for an environment which has led to "widespread and systematic violations of human rights" (UN 15 Feb. 1995, 6; MEW 1990, 22; see also ICJ Feb. 1994, 88-90). In his previous report, the Special Rapporteur had already stated that "the politico-legal organization of the Republic of Iraq constitutes of itself a systematic cause of human rights violations" (UN 25 Feb. 1994, 58). Middle East Watch reports that Iraq has "a system of government wholly devoid of checks and balances, one in which many fundamental rights and freedoms are guaranteed in word but are

routinely trampled in deed" (MEW 1990, 22).

## NOTE

[5] Kurds were recognized as a "distinct national group", however, in the Iraqi Provisional Constitution of 7 July 1958. This constitution stipulated that "Kurds and Arabs were accepted as associates in the state of Iraq and their respective national rights were guaranteed" (Cook 1995, 23). [\[back\]](#)

## 4. SELECTED ISSUES

### 4.1 Reports of Human Rights Abuses

Throughout 1994 and 1995 Iraq has been denounced as a serious and "systematic" violator of human rights by the UN Special Rapporteur, the US Department of State's *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* and a number of human rights organizations (UN 15 Feb. 1995, 21; *ibid.* 4 Mar. 1996, 16-17; *Country Reports 1994 1995*, 1084; IAC (SM) Newsletter Database 25 Oct. 1995; HRWME June 1995, 2-3; HRW 1995, 282; Cook 1995, 114; Gulf Information Project 1994, 1). Security forces and officials of the Iraqi government have been accused of extrajudicial killings, torture, disappearances, arbitrary arrest and detention, excessive force and repression of ethnic groups (*Country Reports 1994 1995*, 1084; Gulf Information Project 1994, 1-4; AI 1995, 166; HRW 1994, 275; *ibid.* 1995, 282; AFP 13 Dec. 1995). Reports published in late 1995 contend that the human rights situation in Iraq did not improve during the year (IAC (SM) Newsletter Database 25 Oct. 1995; AFP 13 Dec. 1995; *ibid.* 27 Nov. 1995). The UN Special Rapporteur's November 1995 report states that "there are no signs of improvement in the general situation of human rights in Iraq" (UN 8 Nov. 1995, 4). On 13 December 1995 a UN committee "voted to condemn `massive and extremely grave violations of human rights ... resulting in an all-pervasive order of repression and oppression which is sustained by broad-based discrimination and widespread terror'" (AFP 13 Dec. 1995). In his March 1996 report the Special Rapporteur maintained that Iraqis continued to experience widespread abuses in 1995 and early 1996, including arbitrary arrests, amputations and other state-sponsored human rights abuses (UN 4 Mar. 1996, 6-9).

Human Rights Watch asserts that the Iraqi government relies upon the state's security forces, including police, military and intelligence agencies, to "control and intimidate" the Iraqi people (HRW 1995, 275; see also AI 1995, 167). *Country Reports 1994* supports this, stating that

the Government security apparatus includes militias attached to the President, the Ba'ath Party, and the Interior Ministry. Security forces have been responsible for widespread and systematic human rights abuses. They play a central role in maintaining the environment of intimidation and fear on which government power rests (*Country Reports 1995 1995*, 1084).

A 1990 Middle East Watch publication identifies three main security agencies that reportedly operated freely and with impunity (MEW 1990 17). The three agencies are the Amn, or State Internal Security, the Mukhabarat or General Intelligence Departments which is reportedly the Ba'ath Party's chief security apparatus and the Istikhbarat or military intelligence (*ibid.*). Citing the 1994 UN Special Rapporteur's report on human rights conditions in Iraq, the UNHCR claims that most allegations of arbitrary arrest and detention fall onto the Amn and the Mukhabarat (Nov. UNHCR 1994, 13). The same report notes that the al-Amn al-Khas, or the Special Security Forces, operate primarily in southern Iraq (*ibid.*). Amnesty International's 1995 Report also states that both military and special forces "launch deliberate and indiscriminate military attacks on civilian targets" in Iraq's southern marsh region (AI 1995 168).

As detailed below, human rights monitors report that the groups most at risk of human rights violations include suspected government opponents, army deserters and draft evaders, persons accused of theft, members of the Iraqi Communist Party, civilians in the southern marsh regions of Iraq, various ethnic and religious minorities, doctors and medical professionals who denounce or refuse to administer amputations, relatives of government opponents and army deserters, and Shi'i Muslim clergy and leaders (*Country Reports 1994 1995*, 1085, 1087-88; Gulf Information Project 1994, 1-4; HRW 1994, 277; AI 1995 166-68; LCHR July 1995, 128; HRWME June 1995, 9-10; *Freedom in the World* 1995, 308).

#### **4.1.1 Torture**

*Country Reports 1995* contends that Iraqi security forces regularly torture detainees (*Country Reports 1995 1996*, 1162) and the March 1996 and February 1995 UN Special Rapporteur reports support this allegation (UN 15 Feb. 1995, 18; *ibid.* 4 Mar. 1996, 8-9). "Very many allegations of torture ... come regularly to his attention from all parts of the country. Indeed cruelty appears to be the norm in Iraqi detention centres" (*ibid.* 15 Feb. 1995, 18). Documents published throughout 1995 allege that the use of torture remained "systematic" and commonplace in Iraq (AFP 13 Dec. 1995; AI 1995, 166; *Freedom in the World* 1995, 308; HRW 1995, 282; see also AFP 30 Oct. 1995). Iraqi prisons noted for their "notorious" use of torture include the Al-Rashidiya Prison located on the Tigris River near Taji, the Al-Shamma'iya prison in east Baghdad, Al-Radwanayah Prison near Baghdad and Abu Ghraib Prison in Baghdad (*Country Reports 1994 1995*, 1087; *Country Reports 1995 1996*, 1163; see also AFP 30 Oct. 1995; AI 1995, 168).

Common torture methods reportedly employed against detainees in Iraq include

electric shocks administered to the genitals and other sensitive areas, beatings, burnings with hot irons, suspension from ceiling fans, dripping acid on the skin, rape, breaking of limbs, denial of food and water and threats to rape or otherwise harm relatives (*Country Reports 1994 1995*, 1086; see also AI 1995, 167; UNHCR Nov. 1994, 13).

Between June and September 1994 the RCC issued several decrees which amended Iraq's 1969 Penal Code (HRW 1995, 282; HRWME June 1995, 1; *The Review* June 1994, 7; UN 15 Feb. 1995, 9; *Country Reports 1994 1995*, 1086-87; AI 1995, 166). The decrees introduced new punishments including amputation, branding and execution for a number of offences including theft, desertion, currency speculation, draft evasion, monopolizing rationed goods, performing plastic surgery on an amputated limb or removing the mark branded on convicted criminals foreheads (AI 1995, 166; *The Review* June 1994, 7-8; HRWME June 1995, 1-2; UN 15 Feb. 1995, 9-13). *The Sunday Times*, quoting an Iraqi army deserter, reports that 100-200 soldiers line up every day at hospitals in Baghdad, where their ears are mutilated without the use of any anaesthetic (The Sunday Times 22 Oct. 1995; see also Reuters 31 Oct. 1994). The Iraqi government maintains that the new decrees are based on Sharia (Islamic Law) and are a response to a significant rise in crime precipitated by the prevailing harsh economic conditions created by UN sanctions (HRW 1995, 282; HRWME June 1995, 1-3; *Stern* 6 Apr. 1995).

The UN Special Rapporteur summarized some of the new decrees:

Decree N<sup>o</sup>. 59 of 4 June 1994 prescribes: amputation of the right hand at the wrist for a first offence of theft over 5,000 Iraqi dinars (well under US\$ 10 at the present real rate of exchange); amputation of the left foot at the ankle for a second offence; and death for a third offence. Decree N<sup>o</sup>. 109 of 18 August 1994 prescribes the "tattooing" or "branding" ...

with an "X" between the eyebrows of all persons having suffered legally prescribed amputations. Decree N<sup>o</sup>. 115 of 25 August 1994 prescribes the cutting off of the auricle of one ear of each person evading military service, deserting military service, or sheltering any evader or deserter of military service (UN 15 Feb. 1995, 9; see also AI Apr. 1996, 3, 7).

The punishments introduced by the decrees are described by *Country Reports 1994* as "new forms of torture" (Country Reports 1994 1995, 1086) and have been denounced as "cruel, inhumane and degrading" by Amnesty International (AI 1995, 166; see also AI Apr. 1996, 1-2). Human Rights Watch Middle East contends that the decrees "greatly impinge on individual human rights and constitute violations of several international human rights conventions and standards" (HRWME June 1995, 1; HRW 1995, 282). In its journal *The Review*, the International Commission of Jurists denounces the punishments prescribed by Decree 59 as "cruel and inhuman punishment under both international and Iraqi domestic law" (The Review June 1994, 8). The same report maintains that the provisions of Decree 59 violate Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 22(a) of the Iraqi Constitution, which prohibits physical and psychological torture (ibid.).

According to Human Rights Watch Middle East "doctors in Baghdad, Kirkuk, and Basra, and elsewhere have been arrested for refusing to perform the amputations" (HRWME June 1995, 9). A Baghdad doctor, quoted by Reuters, states that "military doctors who dared to refuse to perform the operation were dealt with very severely ... . Some were executed. Those who do the operations fear tribal retribution" (Reuters 31 Oct. 1994; see also HRW 1995, 282; LCHR July 1995, 128). The non-profit organization Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) condemned decree 59 and noted that "the amputations and branding are performed in hospitals, where health professionals are threatened with imprisonment if they refuse to perform the operations" (PHR Feb. 1995, 1,4). According to PHR, "several hundred Iraqi health professionals called off a strike when threatened with jail last year, and at least nine doctors who refused to participate in this inhuman punishment have been arrested" (ibid., 4; see also AI Apr. 1996, 9). A 1996 Amnesty International report states that Iraqi health professionals are being forced against their will to perform amputations and tattooing (ibid., 8). "Amnesty International has received reports of the arrest and detention of scores of health professionals who have refused to carry out the operations" (ibid., 9). Both Amnesty International and Physicians for Human Rights state that use of medical professionals in carrying out these punishments contravenes "internationally accepted norms of medical ethics", including the World Medical Association's Tokyo Declaration and the UN Principle of Medical Ethics (ibid.; PHR Feb. 1995, 4).

On 17 March 1996 Saddam Hussein ordered the cancellation of the ear amputation penalty for draft evaders and deserters (INA 17 Mar. 1996; AFP 17 Mar. 1996a). According to President Hussein's order, deserters and draft evaders are to be released after they pay a 500,000 dinar bail and attend a "27-day military preparation course for psychological, intellectual and national rehabilitation" (INA 17 Mar. 1996; AFP 17 Mar. 1996a). The INA report states that the order "would also apply to current army deserters" (17 Mar. 1996).

#### **4.1.2 Extrajudicial Killings**

Extrajudicial killings reportedly continued throughout 1995 (AFP 13 Dec. 1995; HRW 1995, 283; *Freedom in the World* 1995, 308; UN 4 Mar. 1996, 6). According to *Freedom in the World*, state control in Iraq is sustained through the use of summary executions, along with torture and arbitrary detention (*Freedom in the World* 1994-95 1995, 308). Citing the UN Special Rapporteur, *Country Reports 1994* states that the Iraqi government's "aim of killing is a political one, with the objective of silencing dissent and suppressing opposition" (Country Reports 1994 1995, 1085). For example, a revolt in the region of Ramadi erupted in June 1995 when approximately 1,000 members of the Dulaimi clan

organized to avenge the death of Air Force Brigadier General Turk Ismail Dulaimi, whose body had been returned to his family a month earlier bearing torture marks (HRW 1995, 283; *Foreign Report* 22 June 1995, 1; *The New York Times* 20 June 1995). Dulaimi had been arrested in April 1995 under suspicion of planning a coup (HRW 1995, 283; COMPASS 16 June 1995). Many of the Dulaimi clan members that participated in the revolt belonged to the Iraqi armed forces and the Republican Guards (*Foreign Report* 22 June 1995, 1; *The New York Times* 20 June 1995). After the Ramadi revolt was put down the Iraqi government reportedly "mounted a campaign of arbitrary detentions, torture and summary executions against persons presumed to have links to the coup plot and protests" (HRW 1995, 283; see also *The Middle East* Dec. 1995, 13; *The New York Times* 20 June 1995). The Voice of the People of Kurdistan reported that at least 300 soldiers and officers of the Dulaimi clan had been executed following the failed insurrection (Voice of the People of Kurdistan 30 June 1995).

The UN Special Rapporteur's March 1996 and February 1995 reports claim that extrajudicial executions continued throughout 1994 and 1995, noting that "extrajudicial executions have been reported in particular in relation to military operations in the southern marsh area of Iraq where civilian settlements are said to have been shelled and razed" (UN Feb. 1995, 6; *ibid.* 4 Mar. 1996, 6). In October 1995 Iraqi forces reportedly attacked villages in Mesan and Basra; the attack resulted in the death or wounding of several civilians (*ibid.*). Moreover, the UN Special Rapporteur noted that specific areas within northern Iraq are subject to indiscriminate shelling by Iraqi forces (*ibid.*).

#### **4.1.3 Arbitrary Arrest and Detention**

Due to provisions in Iraqi law, security officials seldom require warrants to conduct searches (*Country Reports 1994 1995*, 1088; *Freedom in the World* 1995, 308). RCC Decree 74, promulgated in June 1994, gives certain local Ba'ath Party members the power to arrest and detain—for up to five years without trial—alleged offenders who have been charged with purchasing foreign currency or hoarding or monopolizing rationed goods (AI 1995, 167; LCHR July 1995, 128-29; *Freedom in the World* 1995, 308; UN 15 Feb. 1995, 10). The UN Special Rapporteur notes that these new provisions

clearly bestow on non-judicial authority powers of arrest and detention in violation of articles 10 and 11 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and articles 9 and 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It is also to be observed that the absence of prescribed definitions or judicial controls for terms such as "monopolizes" and "hoarding" invites arbitrary arrests and detentions on a wide scale, particularly in the prevailing economic circumstances in Iraq (*ibid.*).

Extensive use of arbitrary arrest and detention continued in 1995 and early 1996 (UN 4 Mar. 1996, 8; *ibid.* 15 Feb. 1995, 7; AFP 27 Nov. 1995; *Country Reports 1994 1995*, 1087; *Freedom in the World* 1995, 308; HRW 1995, 282). The UN Special Rapporteur notes that so long as the 1994 decree which bestows the powers of detention to Ba'ath Party officials remains in place arbitrary arrests and detentions will be prevalent (UN 15 Feb. 1995, 7). Amnesty International reported that "thousands" of government opponents were arrested in 1994, remarking that most arrests were conducted by security and intelligence forces (AI 1995, 167); Amnesty International was not able to determine the fate or whereabouts of these detainees (*ibid.*). *Country Reports 1994* reported that "the authorities subjected the Shi'a religious clergy, Shi'a Muslim inhabitants of the southern marshes, and various ethnic minorities to searches without warrants" (*Country Reports 1994 1995*, 1088).

The majority of arrests allegedly occurred in Baghdad although there were also reports of arrests in Mosul, Kirkuk, al-'Amara and al-Najaf (AI 1995, 167). Amnesty International particularly remarks upon a series of widespread arrests in July and August 1994 in the Imam Qassem, Rahim Awa and

Shorjah districts of Kirkuk; the arrests were reportedly part of a campaign to apprehend army deserters (ibid.).

The Iraqi government issued two general amnesties in 1995, reportedly in an attempt to deal with severe prison overcrowding; the first amnesty was offered to criminal offenders, the second to political prisoners and government opponents living abroad and in hiding (HRW 1995, 283). The amnesties resulted in the release of some political prisoners, although the majority remained incarcerated (ibid.). According to Human Rights Watch "in spite of the amnesty the Iraqi government continued to harass, threaten and arrest people on political grounds" in 1995 (ibid.; see also IAC (SM) Newsletter Database 25 Oct. 1995). In September 1995 the UN Special Rapporteur produced a ten page analysis of the 1995 amnesty decrees. The report concludes that the "the heavy conditions set out in Decrees N<sup>o</sup>. 61 and N<sup>o</sup>. 64 greatly reduce their value. Moreover, in the absence of great change in the legal and political order of Iraq ... [the decrees] warrant virtually no confidence" (UN 4 Sept. 1995, 5-6).

Human Rights Watch states that journalists and writers who openly criticize the regime or government policies are subject to arrest or detention (HRW 1995, 283). The UN Special Rapporteur also reports "severe constraints, indeed virtual prohibitions, on the freedoms of opinion, expression and association" in Iraq (UN 15 Feb. 1995, 7; AFP 13 Dec. 1995). The monitoring of personal communications such as mail and telephone communications, and the use of informers is also reportedly widespread in Iraq (*Country Reports 1994 1995*, 1088; *Freedom in the World 1995*, 308).

In December 1995 Iraqi authorities enacted measures that ban all direct international telephone calls (Voice of Iraqi People 26 Dec. 1995a; Radio Monte Carlo 28 Dec. 1995; AP 16 Jan. 1996). The Iraqi government maintained that it cut all direct international telephone links because it could no longer afford to pay the telephone bills (IPS 2 Jan. 1996). Another report states, however, that "it was widely believed that the government is deliberately restricting telephone contacts between people inside Iraq and foreign-based opposition groups seeking to topple Saddam Hussein's regime" (AP 29 Dec. 1995). According to a Voice of the Iraqi People broadcast, in December 1995 "the regime also increased its jamming of Arab and foreign radio stations, making them more difficult to hear in Iraq than before. This measure seeks to impose a media blackout and prevent Iraqis from listening to news about political developments related to their country" (Voice of the Iraqi People 26 Dec. 1995b).

## **4.2 Minority Issues**

Many documents produced in 1994 and 1995 condemn Iraq's treatment of its ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities (HRW 1995, 284; ibid. 1994, 277; *Country Reports 1994 1995*, 1094; Gulf Information Project 1994, 1-4; UN 15 Feb. 1995, 8-9). Reporting on conditions in 1995, *Human Rights Watch World Report 1996* states that the government sustained its repression of the country's minority groups (HRW 1995, 284). Iraq's Shi'i and Kurdish communities have been "targeted for particular discrimination and abuse, ostensibly because of their opposition to the Government" (*Country Reports 1994 1995*, 1094; see also HRW 1995, 284; UN 15 Feb. 1995, 8). *Country Reports 1994* maintains that Iraq's ethnic and linguistic diversity is not represented in the country's political or economic apparatus (*Country Reports 1994 1995*, 1094) while the UN Special Rapporteur contends that the cultural and educational rights of Iraq's minorities are generally found lacking (UN 15 Feb. 1995, 8).

### **4.2.1 The Kurdish Autonomous Region**

Almost immediately after gaining power in 1968 the Iraqi Ba'athist government set out to accommodate the country's Kurdish population (ICJ Feb. 1994, 141). Principle tenets of a 1970 Kurdish Autonomy Agreement stipulated that one Iraqi vice-president should be a Kurd; Kurdish, along with

Arabic, was to be the official language in areas where the majority of the population was Kurdish; public servants in Kurdish regions must be Kurdish or able to speak Kurdish; Kurdish linguistic and cultural rights were to be protected; and Kurdish regions were to receive further economic assistance and development (Cook 1995, 24-25; ICJ Feb. 1994, 141-42; *The Middle East and Africa 1994* 1993, 440).

Disagreement over the geographic extent of the Kurdish region and what the Gulf Information Project terms "mutual suspicion", however, became serious impediments to any further progress on the question of Kurdish self-government (Gulf Information Project 1994, np; Cook 1995, 26; see also *The Middle East and Africa 1994* 1993, 440).

The Iraqi government refused to consider the inclusion of Kirkuk which was considered essential by the Kurds. Demands by the Kurds for greater political and military authority ... could not be resolved. The Kurds accused the Government of pursuing its policy of arabization, in order to disrupt the demographic balance ... . Negotiations continued during 1973 and 1974 to resolve the deadlock but the situation was fast approaching full-scale armed conflict once more (Cook 1995, 26).

Despite the deadlock, on 11 March 1974 the RCC "promulgated the Kurdistan Regional Autonomy Act N<sup>o</sup>. 33 of 1974 pursuant to the declaration of 11 March 1970" (ICJ Feb. 1994, 142).

The Autonomous Region created by the 1974 law totalled 37,062 square kilometres, approximately half the size envisioned by Mulla Barzani's KDP (see map) (MEW 1990, 73).

Under the terms of the Autonomy Law [1974] the Autonomous Area was to be an integral administrative unit with juridical personality and autonomy within the Republic of Iraq, with Arbil as its metropolitan centre. Kurdish was to be an official language and the language of education, together with Arabic which was also to be taught. The Autonomous area was to have its own budget with financial resources derived from local taxation and other charges and profits as well as appropriations from the central budget. The government structures it established were an elected legislature - the Legislative Council - and an appointed administrative body - the Executive Council. Executive Council members hold ministerial rank and report directly to the Council of Ministers (Cook 1995, 27; see also ICJ Feb. 1994, 144; *World Encyclopedia of Political Systems and Parties* 1987, 543).

The Legislative Council, which consisted of 50 members, was invested with the authority to "adopt decisions relating to the development of the area and the promotion of its local social, cultural and economic aspects" (Cook 1995, 27-28; *Europa* 1995, 1560; ICJ Feb. 1994, 144). Elections for the Legislative Council were to be held every three years; the last election was 10 September 1989 (ibid.).

The Executive Council, which was comprised of "a chairman, a vice-chairman and a number of members equivalent to the number of autonomous departments" (ICJ Feb. 1994, 144), administered the region's education, housing, agriculture, transport, culture, and internal and financial affairs (Cook 1995, 28). "The Executive Council has a much more restricted responsibility for matters relating to the administration of justice, security and public order... " (ibid.).

The administration of the Kurdistan Autonomous Region, as established by the 1974 law, continues to operate within government-controlled regions of Iraq, despite the existence of the protected safe haven in northern Iraq (INA 20 Apr. 1995). In April 1995 the Legislative and Executive Kurdistan Councils rejected United Nations Security Council Resolution 986 (ibid.). This resolution provides the Iraqi government with an opportunity to accept a one-time oil-for-food offer in order

improve rapidly declining living standards in Iraq (ibid.; *MidEast Mirror* 23 Nov. 1995, 10). The councils reportedly declared that the resolution was "a malicious attempt to weaken the Iraqi domestic front" (INA 20 Apr. 1995).

#### 4.2.2 Kurds

Researcher David McDowall, an independent specialist on Kurdish affairs, stated in November 1995 that he is of the opinion that

generally speaking Kurds in government-controlled areas of Iraq may expect the same level of violations of their human and political rights as any other Iraqis.... The key consideration in all cases is whether a challenge or threat has been made verbally or otherwise, explicitly or implicitly, against the regime. ... The one area that must be considered an exception is the fringe area of Kurdistan, particularly the oilfields around Kirkuk. Here the situation is much more difficult for Kurds. ... Many [Kurds] continue to be harassed, and the policy of removing Kurds and Turkomans and replacing them with Arabs still persists, either by harassment or direct expulsion (McDowall 28 Nov. 1995).

Several documents report that this policy of "arabization" has persisted in the Kirkuk and Mosul regions of Iraq since 1991 (HRW 1995, 284; ibid. 1994, 277; Gulf Information Project 1994, 4; UN 15 Feb. 1995, 8; Voice of the People of Kurdistan 29 Sept. 1994; ibid. 12 Sept. 1995). The policy sets out to displace Kurds and replace them with Arabs in a effort to create a demographic Arab majority in Kirkuk (HRW 1995, 284; Voice of the People of Kurdistan 12 Sept. 1995). Resident Kurds of Kirkuk and the surrounding regions are given a choice of collecting their belongings and relocating to areas of southern Iraq or moving to the northern safe haven without any of their possessions (ibid.; ibid. 29 Sept. 1994; Gulf Information Project 1994, 4). Other groups, such as Turcomans, Assyrians, Chaldeans and the Kurdish Yazidis<sup>[6]</sup> are also forced to either relocate from the Kirkuk region or are coerced into declaring themselves Arab, thereby increasing the number of Arabs in a census (HRW 1994, 277; ibid. 1995, 284; Gulf Information Project 1994, np; McDowall 28 Nov. 1995). A substantial number of Iraqi Shi'is from southern regions of Iraq have been forced to move to the Kirkuk area, in a further attempt to increase the Arab population in the region (HRW 1995, 284). Moreover, the Iraqi Government has reportedly refused to permit the return of "tens of thousands" of Kurds and Turcomans, currently living in the safe haven, to their homes in Kirkuk and Mosul (*Country Reports 1994 1995*, 1087; UN 15 Feb. 1995, 8; Gulf Information Project 1994, np; see also Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran 31 May 1991). *Country Reports 1994* asserts that this action "amounts to a policy of internal exile" (*Country Reports 1994 1995*, 1087).

According to the Voice of the People of Kurdistan, "tens of thousands" of Kirkuk's Kurds have been replaced with Arabs (Voice of the People of Kurdistan 12 Sept. 1995; see also ibid. 17 May 1995). The Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA), citing a radio broadcast of the PUK, reported in March 1995 that the "Iraqi regime has starting moving 13,000 Kurdish families from the Karkuk region to the southern part of that country" (IRNA 14 Mar. 1995). The report continued, stating that "Iraqi troops have resumed arresting and exiling Kurds of Karkuk, Khanaqin and Jelola regions" (ibid.). A September 1995 broadcast of the Voice of the People of Kurdistan stated that "the authorities recently forced 16 Kurdish families to leave Karkuk and ... to make their way to the liberated areas of Kurdistan" (Voice of the People of Kurdistan 12 Sept. 1995). Kurds in the Laylan area of the Kirkuk governorate have also reportedly been forced to leave their homes (ibid. 29 Sept. 1994).

Several clandestine Iraqi radio programmes reported instances of detentions, arrests and executions of civilians in the Kirkuk and Mosul regions throughout late 1994 and 1995 (Voice of the

People of Kurdistan 27 Dec. 1994; Voice of the Iraqi People 3 Apr. 1995; Voice of Rebellious Iraq 17 July 1995; see also IRNA 14 Mar. 1995). According to one December 1994 report "over 2,600 people have been arrested [in Kirkuk] during the past two months, among them 175 political detainees" (Voice of the People of Kurdistan 27 Dec. 1994); another report broadcast in April 1995 stated that some houses in Kirkuk had been stormed and "scores" of people arrested and charged with cooperation with anti-government forces (Voice of Iraqi People 3 Apr. 1995). Other 1994 and 1995 reports detail an increase in army forces, highway checkpoints, security officials and police in the Mosul and Kirkuk regions (Voice of Iraqi Kurdistan 8 Nov. 1994; Voice of the Iraqi People 3 Apr. 1995; *ibid.* 8 Aug. 1995; Voice of Rebellious Iraq 17 July 1995; *ibid.* 5 Mar. 1995; Voice of the People of Kurdistan 27 Apr. 1995).

#### 4.2.3 Shi'is

Iraqi Shi'is represent approximately 50-60 per cent of Iraq's population and live primarily in southern Iraq, Baghdad and in Saddam City, a satellite town on the outskirts of Baghdad (MEW 1990, 1; *Middle East Report* Mar.-Apr. 1995, 10; *Islam and Islamic Groups* 1992, 111; *Contemporary Religions* 1992, 426; *Los Angeles Times* 24 Aug. 1992). Despite their demographic majority, Iraqi Shi'is have historically played a subordinate role to the country's Sunni population (AI Apr. 1993, 9; Gulf Information Project 1994, np). Shi'i under-representation in government positions persisted after the Ba'athist Party came to power in 1968 (*ibid.*; *Islam and Islamic Groups* 1992, 111-12; *Contemporary Religions* 1992, 426).

During the Iran-Iraq war Sunni suspicion of possible Shi'i sympathy and support for Iran led to the arrest, expulsion and suppression of thousands of Shi'is (AI Apr. 1993, 9; Gulf Information Project 1994, np). Sources indicate that the 1991 uprisings in southern Shi'i regions led to a new wave of suppression (*ibid.*; AI Apr. 1993, 5-7; *The Economist* 8 Apr. 1995, 23). According to an April 1993 Amnesty International report

the uprising began on 1 March [1991] when Arab Shi'a Muslims in southern Iraq rose in revolt against the government ... . In the south opposition forces briefly seized control of several major towns and cities, including al-Najaf, Karbala' and Basra. However, by mid-to late March government forces had largely succeeded in crushing the uprising in this area. Thousands of people suspected of taking part were arrested, some of whom were subsequently summarily executed, while the fate of others remains unknown (AI Apr. 1993 5).

Several sources allege that Iraqi Shi'is have been the victims of arbitrary arrest, detention without trial, disappearance and extrajudicial execution in the months and years following the uprising (*ibid.*; *ibid.* 1995, 168; UN 15 Feb. 1995, 7-8; HRWME June 1995, 2; HRW 1994, 277; MEI 5 Aug. 1994, 15). Citing a document published by the London-based Public Affairs Committee for Shi'i Muslims, a November 1994 UNHCR paper states that "the repression of the Shi'a Moslem majority of Iraq continues unabated since the end of the Gulf War and the March 1991 uprising ..." (UNHCR Nov. 1994 14). Furthermore, the UN Special Rapporteur, quoted by *Middle East International*, "called the events in the south since 1991 'one of the worst cases of massive violation of human rights anywhere in the world since the second world war'" (MEI 29 Apr. 1994, 18).

In response to allegations of human rights violations in southern Iraq the United Nations ordered the creation of a "no-fly zone" south of the 32<sup>nd</sup> parallel in an attempt to protect the inhabitants of southern Iraq (*The Economist* 8 Apr. 1995, 23; CRS 13 Apr. 1994, 1, 3-4; *Country Reports* 1994 1995, 1088). The governments of the United States, Russia, Britain and France established the no-fly zone south in 1992 (*Europa* 1995, 1559; *Country Reports* 1994 1995, 1088; *Middle East Report* Mar.-Apr.

1993, 36). While the zone prevents aerial attacks, Iraqi ground forces are still able to enter the region and launch artillery attacks on inhabitants (CRS 13 Apr. 1994, 4; *Country Reports 1994 1995*, 1088; *The Economist* 8 Apr. 1995, 23).

Since 1991 the Iraqi government has grown increasingly hostile to the Shi'i faith and culture; Shi'i institutions have been closed, shrines destroyed and restrictions have been imposed on the practice of the religion (Gulf Information Project 1994, np; *Freedom in the World* 1995, 308; AI Apr. 1993, 8; see also UNHCR Nov. 1994, 14). Members of the Shi'i clergy have also been targeted for arrest and several have "disappeared" since 1991 (ibid., 5; *Freedom in the World* 1995, 308; Gulf Information Project 1994, np).

Thousands of Shi'is fled to Iran in the aftermath of the 1991 revolt (*The Middle East* Feb. 1994, 37; *Freedom in the World* 1993, 316; AI Apr. 1993, 5; *The Economist* 8 Apr. 1995, 23). Thousands of others, including army deserters and displaced civilians, fled to the marsh regions of southern Iraq (*Middle East Report* Mar.-Apr. 1993, 36; Gulf Information Project 1994, 2; *Freedom in the World* 1995, 307; CRS 13 Apr. 1994, 1; *The Economist* 8 Apr. 1995, 23). The Government's repeated attempts to flush out insurgents in the marshlands has resulted in the destruction of both the region's ecosystem and the way of life of the region's native inhabitants, the Marsh Arabs, or Madan (*Middle East Report* Mar.-Apr. 1993, 36; *Country Reports 1994 1995*, 1088; UNHCR Nov. 1994, 15; CRS 13 Apr. 1994, 1).

"Because the marshes consist of winding networks of waterways bounded by high reeds, the central government in Baghdad has always had difficulty controlling the area" (CRS 13 Apr. 1994). As a result of this inaccessibility vast stretches of marshland have been drained<sup>[7]</sup> in order to facilitate Iraqi government control over the region and to permit easier troop movement into the marshes (*Middle East International* 29 Apr. 1994, 19; Gulf Information Project 1994, np). Inhabitants of the marshes have been targeted by large-scale burning operations, artillery bombardment, arbitrary arrest and killing (*Country Reports 1994 1995*, 1088; CRS 13 Apr. 1994, 1-2; *The Middle East Review* 1995 1995, 37; UNHCR Nov. 1994, 15). According to *Country Reports 1994*

as the marshes dried, military units launched land-based attacks on villages. On March 4 [1994], the military began the largest search-and-destroy operation in the marshes in 2 years. The offensive included the razing of villages and burning operations concentrated in the triangle bounded by Nasiriyah, Al-Qurnah, and Basrah. The magnitude of the operation caused the inhabitants to flee in several directions: deeper into the marshes, to the outskirts of southern Iraqi cities, and to Iran (*Country Reports 1994 1995*, 1088; see also MEI 29 Apr. 1994).

Quoting an October 1994 *The Times* article, a UNHCR report states that "while the marshlands are drained, ground-to-ground missiles and Iraqi tanks continue to assault the remaining inhabitants" (UNHCR Nov. 1994, 15). According to *The Economist* "the Iraqi army flushes them [Shi'i Iraqi rebels] out, together with fishermen and villagers, mercilessly" (*The Economist* 8 Apr. 1995, 23).

Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Marsh Arabs, who are also Shi'i, have been killed since 1991 (CRS 13 Apr. 1994, 2) and thousands of others have been displaced (ibid.; *The Middle East* Feb. 1994, 37; *Freedom in the World* 1993, 316). According to sources, the offensive against Marsh Arabs and other Shi'is in southern Iraq continued throughout 1995 and into 1996 (IAC 25 Oct. 1995; Voice of the People of Kurdistan 6 Mar. 1995; Voice of the Iraqi Islamic Revolution 7 Dec. 1995; ibid. 14 May 1995; *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat* 19 Apr. 1995; KUNA 23 Mar. 1996; *Al-Hayah* 4 Apr. 1996; Voice of Rebellious Iraq 30 Mar. 1996). Reports indicate that the Iraqi government amassed large numbers of new troops in the

region in early 1995 (Voice of Rebellious Iraq 21 June 1995; KUNA 10 Apr. 1995; Kuwait News Agency 10 Apr. 1995; Voice of the Iraqi Islamic Revolution 13 Mar. 1995). Furthermore, the army reportedly launched several attacks on marsh inhabitants in the spring of 1995; according to SAIRI representatives most of the attacks were met with armed resistance from Shi'i opposition forces who maintain strongholds in the marshlands (*Al-Hayah* 7 Mar. 1995; Voice of the Iraqi Islamic Revolution 15 Mar. 1995; *ibid.* 16 Mar. 1995; Kuwait News Agency 10 Apr. 1995; *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat* 19 Apr. 1995). According to the Voice of the Iraqi Islamic Revolution the Iraqi government "stepped up its drive to expel the inhabitants of the marshlands and other southern areas" in early December 1995 (Voice of Iraqi Islamic Revolution 7 Dec. 1995). The same report continues, stating that

the regime has begun to shell residential areas with heavy artillery to force the citizens to flee their homes ... . Several villages in Al-'Amarah [Maysan] Governorate's al-Majarr al-Kabir district have been shelled by regime artillery, causing civilian casualties and forcing dozens of families to escape the area and look for other shelters (*ibid.*; see also Voice of Rebellious Iraq 30 Mar. 1996; *Al-Hayah* 4 Apr. 1996).

There have been reports that Shi'i residents in Baghdad have also encountered difficulties (*The Economist* 12 Nov. 1994, 60). The Iraqi government has reportedly forced people who were not residents of Baghdad before 1991 to leave the city (*ibid.*; *Middle East Report* Mar.-Apr. 1995, 8; UN 15 Feb. 1995, 8). According to one report, this action was precipitated by an overwhelming demand for housing in Baghdad (*Middle East Report* Mar.-Apr. 1995, 8; see also UN 15 Feb. 1995, 8). According to *The Economist*, however, the move is an attempt to consolidate Sunni support in Baghdad and central Iraq (*The Economist* 12 Nov. 1994, 60). Shi'is have been the group principally affected by this policy (*ibid.*; *Middle East Report* Mar.-Apr. 1995, 8). According to *The Economist* those "who cannot prove residency in the city before 1975 can no longer buy property" (*The Economist* 12 Nov. 1994, 60; see also *Middle East Report* Mar.-Apr. 1995, 8). An April 1996 report maintains that the Iraqi government is pursuing a renewed campaign "aimed at reducing the percentage of Shiite and Kurdish inhabitants in Baghdad" (Voice of Rebellious Iraq 15 Apr. 1996).

#### **4.2.4 Other Minorities**

As previously noted, Iraq's population is largely Muslim; approximately 90-95 per cent of all Iraqis are Sunni Arab, Sunni Kurd or Shi'i (*Europa* 1995, 1569; *Islam and Islamic Groups* 1992, 111). The remainder of the population is comprised of a number of small religious and ethnic minorities (*ibid.*). The Turcomans, the largest of these minorities, are predominately Sunni Muslim (*Europa* 1995, 1569; *Islam and Islamic Groups* 1992, 111) although there exists a small community of Shi'i Turcomans (Gulf Information Project 1994, np; UNHCR Nov. 1994, 16). The Turcomans are concentrated in northern Iraq, principally in the governorates of Kirkuk (the main centre of the Turcoman population), Mosul, Arbil, and Diyala (*ibid.*). Population estimates of the Turcomans range from 300,000 to as high as one million (Sellier 1993, 73; Gulf Information Project 1994, np).

The Iraqi National Turkmen Party, based in Ankara and led by Muzaffer Aslan, (*Political Handbook of the World 1994-1995* 1995, 414) and the Turkoman Islamic Union, formed in July 1991, (*Islam and Islamic Groups* 1992, 112) reportedly represent Iraq's Turcoman population (*ibid.*; *Political Handbook of the World 1994-1995* 1995, 414). According to *Country Reports 1995*, however, "the Government does not recognize the various political groupings and parties that have been formed by ... Turcoman and other Iraqi communities. These political groups continued to attract support notwithstanding their illegal status" (*Country Reports 1995* 1996, 1168).

According to the UN Special Rapporteur, cited by the UNHCR, Turcoman linguistic, cultural and

proprietary rights have been restricted in Iraq (UNHCR Nov. 1994, 16; see also Gulf Information Project 1994, np). In addition, "since 1975, directors of ... [Turcoman] societies have been replaced by pro-government Ba'ath party members" (UNHCR Nov. 1994, 16). Shi'i Turcomans, alleging "double discrimination," report that they have been specifically targeted for harassment by the Ba'athist government (Gulf Information Project 1994, np). The Gulf Information Project reports that the Turcomans "allege they have suffered oppression and persecution by the Ba'athist government ... . In particular, this was related to attempts by the regime to 'arabize' the Kirkuk governorate" (ibid.). As noted previously in this report, Turcomans, along with Kurds and Assyrians, continued to be forcibly deported from northern cities and villages, especially around Kirkuk, in 1995, as the government pushed ahead with its bid to increase the Arab percentage of the population (see section 4.2.2) (*Country Reports 1995* 1996, 1167-68; HRW 1995, 284; McDowall 28 Nov. 1995; Gulf Information Project 1994, np).

Estimates of Iraq's Christian population vary greatly. According to the *Atlas des peuples d'Orient*, Christians (Assyrians and Chaldeans) represent three percent of Iraq's population of over nineteen million (Sellier 1993, 73; *Contemporary Religions* 1992, 426). Other sources estimate the Assyrian population to be between 30,000 and 77,000 (Gulf Information Project 1994, np; *Contemporary Religions* 1992, 426; *Ethnologue* 1992, 643). The Chaldean population is approximately 190,000 to 250,000 (*Contemporary Religions* 1992, 120; Gulf Information Project 1994, np; *Europa* 1995, 1569). *Ethnologue* notes that the terms Chaldean and Assyrian are occasionally used to refer to both groups as a whole (*Ethnologue* 1992, 644).

*Europa* reports that Christian communities can be found in most major Iraqi cities, "but their principal villages lie mostly in the Mosul district" (*Europa* 1995, 1569; see also Gulf Information Project 1994, np). The Chaldean Patriarchate, formerly based in Mosul, is now located in Baghdad (*Europa* 1995, 1569; Sellier 1993, 73; *Contemporary Religions* 1992, 121).

Iraqi Christian communities are represented in Saddam Hussein's government and in the Republican Guards; according to a UNHCR report Hussein "apparently finds [Christians] more trustworthy than either Shi'i or Sunni Moslems" (Nov. 1994, 17). Tarek Aziz, member of the RCC and Deputy Prime Minister, is a Chaldean (Sellier 1993, 73; Gulf Information Project 1994, np; *People in Power* Jan. 1996, 89). Despite this, however, the Gulf Information Project notes that the "influence of Christians in the Ba'athist government has been small" (Gulf Information Project 1994, np).

Under the Iraqi constitution, Christians are free to practice their religion (ibid.; MEW 1990, 35; *Encyclopaedia of the Third World* 1992, 897), although one source notes that "Iraq's Christian minority exists under severe disabilities" (ibid.). According to *Freedom in the World*, "Christian minorities can generally practice without harassment" (*Freedom in the World* 1995, 308). A 1994 Associated Press report states that "Christians say they face no official discrimination. ... [although] on the local level, Christians can face obstacles" (Associated Press 21 Nov. 1994).

The fates of Christians and Kurds have been closely linked in the past; Assyrian "fears of persecution stem from Iraqi government policies toward the Kurdish areas ... . In the *anfal* operations of 1988 in particular, Assyrians, along with Kurds had their homes and churches destroyed, and many people were deported from their homes areas, or killed" (Gulf Information Project 1994, np; MEW 1990, 35). Assyrians have been forced to declare themselves Arab in Iraqi census' and according to the UN Special Rapporteur, Assyrians have experienced incidents of arbitrary arrest, detention, torture and extrajudicial execution (UNHCR Nov. 1994, 17). Chaldeans and Assyrians are among those minorities in Kurdish controlled regions of northern Iraq who have not been permitted to return, or are simply afraid

to return, to their homes in Kirkuk (LCHR Apr. 1992, 5). *Country Reports 1995*, citing the Special Rapporteur, stated that Assyrians continued to face discrimination throughout 1995 (*Country Reports 1995 1996*, 1170). Furthermore, "according to opposition reports, many Assyrian families were forced to leave Baghdad" in 1995 (*ibid.*, 1170-71).

Assyrians residing in areas of northern Iraq controlled by Kurdish factions are represented in the Kurdish parliament (*Political Handbook of the World 1994-1995 1995*, 413-14; Gulf Information Project 1994, np; Reuters 9 Apr. 1995). According to one source, Assyrian schools are operating in the Kurdish-controlled regions (*ibid.*).

Most of Iraq's Jews have immigrated to Israel, leaving only 200 to 300 Jews in Iraq, principally in Baghdad and Basra (MRG 1991, 194; *AntiSemitism World Report 1995 1995*, 261). According to *Freedom in the World* Jews are free to practice their religion, although they face "restrictions in travelling abroad and in contacting Jewish groups outside the country" (*Freedom in the World 1995*, 308).

### 4.3 Travel Restrictions

Iraqi citizens are restricted in their freedom of movement, both with regard to internal and external travel (UN 15 Feb. 1995, 8; *Freedom in the World 1995*, 309; *Country Reports 1994 1995*, 1091). According to *Country Reports 1994*, anyone entering border areas or security zones is at risk of arrest and detention (*ibid.*). Checkpoints are reportedly common in Iraq, and several late-1994 and 1995 reports note an increase in road-blocks and checkpoints throughout the country, in particular along major highways between Baghdad and the Jordanian border and on highways between Baghdad and the cities of al-'Amarah, al-Basrah and Kirkuk (*ibid.*; Voice of the Iraqi People 3 Apr. 1995; *ibid.* 30 Nov. 1994; AFP 21 Aug. 1995; Radio Monte Carlo 15 Mar. 1995; Kuwait News Agency 10 Apr. 1995). According to a 4 November 1995 report, security at the Syrian border has been increased, reportedly the result of a series of Iraqi military defections to Syria (Voice of the People of Kurdistan 4 Nov. 1995). Another report states that at each barrier along the highway between Baghdad and the Jordanian border "soldiers mark the names of all the travellers, the license plate numbers of the vehicles and then pass them along to the next check point" (AFP 21 Aug. 1995).<sup>[8]</sup> The same report notes that inspection procedures have been tightened since the defection of General Hussein Kamel Hassan al-Majid in August 1995 (see section 2.2.3 for further information on the defection) (AFP 21 Aug. 1995).

The RCC passed a decree on 14 March 1995 which saw an increase in the travel fee which must be paid by all citizens who travel outside of the country (Al-Qadisiyah 26 Mar. 1995). Another increase ordered in December 1995 stipulates that adults must pay 400,000 dinars, or approximately US\$150.00 to \$180.00, to travel outside the country (Radio Monte Carlo 28 Dec. 1995; *Al-Urdun* 1 Jan. 1996; Voice of the Iraqi People 26 Dec. 1995a). The average monthly salary in Iraq was reported in 1995 as being between 4,000 and 6,000 dinars (AFP 24 Aug. 1995). According to one source "the measure is tantamount to a ban on Iraqis' travel abroad without explicitly announcing it" (Voice of Iraqi People 26 Dec. 1995a). Furthermore, the cost of renewing an Iraqi passport increased to 50,000 dinars in December 1995 (*ibid.*), and as of January 1996 it takes one month for Iraqis to obtain approval to leave Iraq (*Al-Urdun* 1 Jan. 1996).

Medical doctors, dentists, retired professionals, government employees, university professors and, according to *Freedom in the World*, Jews, are reported to be severely restricted in their ability to travel outside the country (*Freedom in the World 1995*, 308; UN 15 Feb. 1995, 8; 1995, 308; HRW 1995, 283). Women under the age of 45 cannot leave Iraq unless accompanied by a male relative (UN 15 Feb.

1995, 8; *Country Reports 1994* 1995, 1092). According to *Country Reports 1994*, students who wish to study abroad must provide the government with a guarantor; if the student fails to return to Iraq the guarantor and the student's parents may have to reimburse the government financially (ibid.). In 1995 President Hussein issued an order requiring all government employees and officials to obtain "presidential authorization" before they are permitted to travel outside of Iraq (AFP 21 Aug. 1995; HRW 1995, 283). President Hussein's office issued a decree in May 1996 which prohibits all journalists, members of the media, authors and all employees of the Information Ministry from travelling abroad (Voice of Iraqi People 5 May 1996).

*For information updates, please consult the Refinfo database and sources available at IRB Regional Documentation Centres.*

## NOTES

[6] The Yazidis are a Kurmanji-speaking group and are exclusively Kurdish (Van Bruinessen 1992, 24; MRG Sept. 1991, 10). Yazidi beliefs incorporate aspects of several major religions in the region, including Zoroastrianism, Islam, Nestorian Christianity, Judaism and Manichaeism (Bulloch and Morris 1992, 224; MRG Sept. 1991, 10). According to one source cited by Middle Eastern Studies, there are currently over 200,000 Yazidis (Yezidi, Ezidi) worldwide, of whom the bulk of 120,000 are found in Iraq (*Middle Eastern Studies* Oct. 1992, 994). Other sources indicate that the Yazidis number only 70-100,000 and live predominately in the Mosul region of Iraq (More 1984, 38; Bulloch and Morris 1992, 225; see also Van Bruinessen 1992, 24)

[\[back\]](#)

[7] According to *Middle East International* by April 1994 6,000 square miles of marshland had been deliberately drained (MEI 29 Apr. 1994, 18). *Europa reports* that the government had drained "some 70% of the southern marshlands" by August 1993 (Europa 1995, 1559) while the Voice of Iraqi Islamic Revolution reported in May 1994 that "90 percent of the marshlands in the south have been dried up" (Voice of Iraqi Islamic Revolution 7 May 1994). [\[back\]](#)

[8] According to Human Rights Watch, Iraqi asylum seekers who entered Jordan were still not free from surveillance as "for several months in 1995, Iraqi agents occupied an apartment across the street from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) offices in Amman in order to monitor and photograph Iraqis seeking asylum" (HRW 1995, 283). [\[back\]](#)

## NOTES ON SELECTED SOURCES

### **Cook, Helena:**

Helena Cook is an international lawyer, Fellow of the Essex University Human Rights Centre and former head of Amnesty International's Legal and Intergovernmental Organisations Office. Her book *The Safe Haven in Northern Iraq: International Responsibility for Iraqi Kurdistan*, published jointly by the Essex University Human Rights Centre and the Kurdistan Human Rights Project, is a study of the status of the Kurdish safe haven in Northern Iraq from the standpoint of international law.

### **Country Reports on Human Rights Practices:**

The United States Department of State prepares an annual volume of reports on human rights conditions around the world. The United States does not have an embassy in Iraq, therefore, the entry on Iraq in *Country Reports* draws much of its information from non-US government sources. The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (LCHR) publishes a yearly critique of the Department of State's *Country Reports* (LCHR July 1995, 125). Regarding the 1994 report on Iraq, the LCHR notes that access to reliable information on Iraq remains limited, and while the report on Iraq "does for the most part specify the sources of its information, ... it would have been helpful for the reader to be made fully aware of the constraints under which the report is compiled" (ibid.) Furthermore, the LCHR states that "the role of the international community and the human rights consequences of its interventions in Iraq since 1990 continue to be played down or left unexplained [in the report].... Given that the United States has been a key player in decision-making within the UN Security Council on issues relating to

Iraq during this period, this perspective would seem very relevant" (ibid.).

### **Gulf Information Project:**

The Gulf Information Project provides information on refugees, displaced people and vulnerable groups in the aftermath of the 1991 Persian Gulf War. It was established by the British Refugee Council and is supported by British NGOs.

### **International Commission of Jurists (ICJ):**

The International Commission of Jurists is a non-governmental organization devoted to promoting the understanding and observance of the Rule of Law and the legal protection of human rights throughout the world. Its activities include publishing *The Review*; organizing conferences and seminars; conducting studies or inquiries into particular situations or subjects concerning Rule of Law; and sponsoring proposals within the United Nations and other international organizations for improved procedures and conventions for the protection of human rights.

### **McDowall, David:**

David McDowall is an independent specialist on Kurdish and Middle Eastern Affairs. Based in Surrey, UK, Mr. McDowall has written extensively on the Kurds and Palestinians, including several reports for the London-based Minority Rights Group. His book entitled *A Modern History of the Kurds* was published in late 1995 by I.B. Tauris.

### **United Nations Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Iraq:**

The United Nations Human Rights Commission passed a resolution in 1991 that requested Mr. Max van der Stoep, a respected Dutch jurist, to a thorough study of the violations of human rights by the Government of Iraq, based on all information the Special Rapporteur may deem relevant. The Special Rapporteur is to present his reports to sessions of the General Assembly and the Commission on Human Rights. The Iraqi government has refused Mr. van der Stoep permission to enter Iraq since 1992.

## **REFERENCES**

Agence France Presse (AFP). 24 March 1996. "Opposition Condemns Iraqi Elections." (NEXIS)

\_\_\_\_\_. 17 March 1996a. "Amnistie en Irak pour les deserteurs de l'armee." (NEXIS)

\_\_\_\_\_. 17 March 1996b. Farouk Choukri. "Election Fever Sweeps Iraq." (NEXIS)

\_\_\_\_\_. 13 December 1995. "UN Committee Condemns Human Rights in Iraq, Iran." (NEXIS)

\_\_\_\_\_. 27 November 1995. "No Human Rights Improvement in Iraq, UN Says." (NEXIS)

\_\_\_\_\_. 1 November 1995. "Le Congrès national irakien, une opposition hétéroclite et divisée." (NEXIS)

\_\_\_\_\_. 30 October 1995. "Des prisonniers morts sous la torture en Irak, selon des ex-détenus." (NEXIS)

\_\_\_\_\_. 24 August 1995. "Iraq Doubles Price to Get Out of Military Service." (NEXIS)

\_\_\_\_\_. 21 August 1995. "Saddam's Approval Needed to Travel; Border Reinforced." (FBIS-NES-95-161 21 Aug. 1995, 31)

*Al-Hayah*<sup>[9]</sup> [London, in Arabic]. 4 April 1996. *Salamah Ni'mat*. "Iraq: Al-Khazraji Joins 'Accord'; 'Vast Forces' Reportedly Mass in South." (FBIS-NES-96-066 4 Apr. 1996, 25)

- \_\_\_\_\_. <sup>[10]</sup>[London, in Arabic]. 7 March 1995. "Military Developments in North, South Reported." (FBIS-NES-95-047 10 Mar. 1995, 29)
- Al-Hayat'* [London, in Arabic]. 3 December 1995. "London-based Arabic Paper Announces Formation of New Iraqi Opposition Group." (BBC Summary 5 Dec. 1995NEXIS)
- Al-Qadisiyah [Baghdad, in Arabic]. 26 March 1995. "RCC Decree Sets New International Travel Fees." (FBIS-NES-95-063 3 Apr. 1995, 32)
- Al-Sharq Al-Awsat* [London, in Arabic]. 19 April 1995. "Resistance to Marshlands Offensive Continues." (FBIS-NES-95-077 21 Apr. 1995, 32)
- Al-Urdun* [Amman, in Arabic]. 1 January 1996. "Travelers Cited on Border Controls With Jordan." (FBIS-NES-96-001 2 Jan. 1996, 37)
- Amnesty International (AI). April 1996. *Iraq: State Cruelty: Branding, Amputation and the Death Penalty*. (AI Index: MDE 140396). London: Amnesty International.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1995. *Amnesty International Report 1995*. New York: Amnesty International.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 28 February 1995. *Iraq: Human Rights Abuses in Iraqi Kurdistan Since 1991*. (AI Index: MDE 140195). London: Amnesty International.
- \_\_\_\_\_. April 1993. *Iraq: 'Disappearance' of Shi'a Clerics and Students*. (AI Index: MDE 140293). London: Amnesty International.
- Antisemitism World Report 1995*. 1995. London: The Institute of Jewish Affairs and the American Jewish Committee.
- The Associated Press (AP). 16 January 1996. Jamal Halaby. "International News." (NEXIS)
- \_\_\_\_\_. 29 December 1995. "International News." (NEXIS)
- \_\_\_\_\_. 21 November 1994. PM Cycle. Neil MacFarquhar. "Wars, Sanctions Push Christian Minority Out of Iraq." (NEXIS)
- BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. 11 September 1995. "Opposition Reports: General Husayn Kamil and Others Criticize Constitutional Amendments." (NEXIS)
- Bulloch, John and Harvey Morris. 1992. *No Friends but the Mountains: The Tragic History of the Kurds*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Committee Against Repression and for Democratic Rights in Iraq (CARDRI). 1986. *Saddam's Iraq: Revolution or Reaction?* London: Zed Books, Ltd.
- COMPASS Newswire. 16 June 1995. "Saddam Crushes Mutiny, But More Trouble Likely." (NEXIS)
- Congressional Research Service (CRS). 13 April 1994. Kenneth Katzman. "Iraq: Marsh Arabs and U.S. Policy."
- Contemporary Religions: A World Guide*. 1992. Edited by Ian Harris et al. The High, Harlow, Essex: Longman Group UK.
- Cook, Helena. 1995. *The Safe Haven in Northern Iraq*. London: Kurdistan Human Rights Project and the

Human Rights Centre, University of Essex.

*Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1995*. 1996. United States Department of State. Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office.

*Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994*. 1995. United States Department of State. Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office.

*The Economist* [London]. 21 October 1995. "King of a Sad Castle."

\_\_\_\_\_. 19 August 1995. "A Family Dispute."

\_\_\_\_\_. 8 April 1995. "Iraq: Down But Not Out."

\_\_\_\_\_. 12 November 1994. "Iraq: King Saddam."

*Encyclopedia of the Third World*. 1992. 4<sup>th</sup> ed. Vol. 2. Edited by George Thomas Kurian. New York: Facts on File.

Esman, Milton J. & Itamar Rabinovich, Eds. 1988. *Ethnicity, Pluralism and the State in the Middle East*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.

*L'État du monde édition 1995*. 1995. Montréal: Éditions du Boréal.

*Ethnologue: Languages of the World*. 1992. 12<sup>th</sup> ed. Edited by Barbara F. Grimes. Dallas: Summer institute of Linguistics.

*The Europa World Year Book 1995*. 1995. 36<sup>th</sup> ed. Vol. 1. London: Europa Publications.

*The Financial Post* [London]. 8 September 1995. "Saddam Renominated Unanimously." (NEXIS)

Flanz, Gisbert H., Fouad Fahmy Shafik and Kerry M. Boyle. April 1990. Vol. 8. *Constitutions of the Countries of the World*. "Iraq." Edited by Albert P. Blaustein and Gisbert H. Flanz. Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications.

*Foreign Report* [Coulsdon, Surrey]. 22 June 1995. N<sup>o</sup>. 2356. "Nearing the End in Iraq: Will Saddam Hussein's Regime Survive the Next Coup Attempt?"

*Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights & Civil Liberties 1994-1995*. 1995. Edited by James Finn. New York: Freedom House.

*Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political Rights & Civil Liberties 1992-1993*. 1993. New York: Freedom House.

*The Globe and Mail* [Toronto]. 24 February 1996. Graham Fraser. "Hussein Sons-in-Law Killed After Returning."

*The Guardian Weekly* [London]. 25 February 1996. Jamal Halaby. "Defector Decides to Return to Baghdad."

Gulf Information Project. 1994. *Information Pack*. Sarah Graham-Brown, Coordinator. London: British Refugee Council.

Human Rights Watch (HRW). December 1995. *Human Rights Watch World Report 1996*. New York:

Human Rights Watch.

\_\_\_\_\_. December 1994. *Human Rights Watch World Report 1995*. New York: Human Rights Watch.

Human Rights Watch Middle East (HRWME). June 1995. Vol. 7, N<sup>o</sup>. 3. *Iraq's Brutal Decrees Amputation, Branding and the Death Penalty*. New York: Human Rights Watch

IAC (SM) Newsletter Database. 25 October 1995. "The White House: Text of Letter from Pres. to Speaker of House of Reps & Pres. of the Senate." (NEXIS)

Inter Press Service (IPS). 2 January 1996. Dilip Hiro. "Iraq—Sanctions: Mixed Signals Confuse Sanctions Renewal Issue." (NEXIS)

\_\_\_\_\_. 9 November 1995. Darius Bazargan. "Iraq-U.N.: Iraqi Opposition Fears Sanctions are Backfiring." (NEXIS)

International Commission of Jurists (ICJ). February 1994. *Iraq and the Rule of Law*. Geneva: International Commission of Jurists.

Iraq Television Network [Baghdad, in Arabic]. 7 September 1995. "RCC Issues Decrees Amending Constitution." (FBIS-NES-95-174 8 Sept. 1995, 30)

Iraqi News Agency (INA) [Baghdad, in Arabic]. 17 March 1996. "Other Reports: Saddam Orders Cancellation of Ear Amputation Penalty for Deserters." (BBC Summary 17 Mar. 1996 NEXIS)

\_\_\_\_\_. 20 April 1995. "Kurdistan Councils Meet, Reject Resolution." (FBIS-NES-95-077 21 Apr. 1995, 30)

Iraqi TV [Baghdad, in English]. 24 March 1996. "Baghdad TV Says Eight Million Iraqis Took Part in Parliamentary Elections." (BBC Summary 25 Mar. 1996 NEXIS)

*Islam and Islamic Groups: A Worldwide Reference Guide*. 1992. Farzana Shaikh, Editor. London: Longman Current Affairs.

Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) [Tehran, in English]. 14 March 1995. "Regime Reportedly Transferring Kurds South." (FBIS-NES-95-050 15 Mar. 1995, 26)

*The Jerusalem Report*. 4 May 1995. Alistair Bell. "With Enemies Like These ..."

KUNA [Kuwait, in Arabic]. 23 March 1996. "Iraq: Opposition Claims Regime's Forces Repelled in South." (FBIS-NES-96-058 25 Mar. 1996, 41)

\_\_\_\_\_. 10 April 1995. "Regime Reportedly Deploys Forces in South Amid Unrest." (FBIS-NES-95-069 11 Apr. 1995, 29)

Kuwait News Agency [Kuwait City, in Arabic]. 10 April 1995. "Iraqi Troop Deployment in Southern Border Region: Kuwaiti Report." (BBC Summary 12 Apr. 1995 NEXIS)

Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (LCHR). July 1995. *Critique: Review of the Department of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994*. New York: LCHR.

\_\_\_\_\_. April 1992. *Asylum Under Attack: A Report on the Protection of Iraqi Refugees and Displaced Persons One Year After the Humanitarian Emergency in Iraq*. New York: LCHR.

*Libération* [Paris]. 23-24 March 1996. N<sup>o</sup>. 4616. "Législatives dimanche en Irak."

\_\_\_\_\_. 16 October 1995. "100% de `oui' pour Saddam Hussein."

*The Los Angeles Times*. 24 August 1992. Home Edition. Robin Wright and Kim Murphy. "U.S. Bets on Shiites to Tip Balance Against Hussein; Iraq: Repressed Muslims Represent 55% of Population. With Coalition Help, They May be Ready to Revolt."

McDowall, David [Richmond, UK]. 28 November 1995. Fax received by the DIRB.

*The Middle East* [London]. December 1995. N<sup>o</sup>. 251. Mariam Shahin. "One Man, All Votes."

\_\_\_\_\_. October 1995. N<sup>o</sup>. 249. Roddy Scott, Mariam Shahin and Kirk Albrecht. "Saddam's Fate in the Balance?"

\_\_\_\_\_. December 1994. N<sup>o</sup>. 239. Mariam Shahin and Karen Dabrowska. "Saddam Plays Poker."

\_\_\_\_\_. February 1994. N<sup>o</sup>. 231. Andrew North. "Flight of the Marsh Arabs."

\_\_\_\_\_. October 1993. N<sup>o</sup>. 227. Andrew North. "New Evidence Shows Marshlands Draining Away."

*Middle East International* (MEI) [London]. 29 March 1996. N<sup>o</sup>. 522. Andrew North. "Iraq: Another Defection: Parliamentary Elections."

\_\_\_\_\_. 17 November 1995. N<sup>o</sup>. 513. Hugh Pope. "Iraqi Kurdistan: Peace Talks Resume."

\_\_\_\_\_. 20 October 1995. N<sup>o</sup>. 511. Najm Jarrah. "Is Saddam Opening the Way for Change?"

\_\_\_\_\_. 5 August 1994. N<sup>o</sup>. 481. Andrew North. "Iraq: No Let-up in the Marshes."

\_\_\_\_\_. 29 April 1994. N<sup>o</sup>. 474. Michael Woods. "Saddam's Killing Fields: Genocide in the Marshes."

*Middle East Report* [London]. March-April 1995. Sarah Graham-Brown. "The Iraq Sanctions Dilemma: Intervention, Sovereignty and Responsibility."

\_\_\_\_\_. March-June 1994. Ronald Oferinger and Ralf Backer. "A Republic of Statelessness: Three years of Humanitarian Intervention in Iraqi Kurdistan."

\_\_\_\_\_. March-April 1993. Joost R. Hilterman. "Diverting Water, Displacing Iraq's Marsh People."

*The Middle East Review* 1995. 1994. 20<sup>th</sup> Edition. London: Kogam Page Ltd.

Middle East Watch (MEW). 1990. *Human Rights in Iraq*. New York: Human Rights Watch.

*Middle Eastern Studies* [London]. October 1994. Vol. 30, N<sup>o</sup>. 4. Andrew Mango. "Turks and Kurds."

*MidEast Mirror* [London]. 23 November 1995. Vol. 9, N<sup>o</sup>. 227. "Iraq Says it is Ready to Consider an Amended Version of UNSCR 986."

Minority Rights Group (MRG). September 1991. N<sup>o</sup>. 915. David McDowall. *The Kurds*. London: Minority Rights Group.

\_\_\_\_\_. 1991. *The World Directory of Minorities*. The High, Harlow, Essex: Longman Group UK.

More, Christiane. 1984. *Les Kurdes aujourd'hui*. Paris: Éditions L'Harmattan.

*The New York Times*. 25 February 1996. Youssef M. Ibrahim. "Family Feud in Baghdad: Fate of Sons-in-Law Sealed Day They Fled."

\_\_\_\_\_. 21 February 1996. Douglas Jehl. "Iraqi Defector Goes Home Again With a Father-in-Law's Blessing."

\_\_\_\_\_. 20 June 1995. Late Edition. Youssef M. Ibrahim. "Iraq Reportedly Cracks Down on Clan that Tried a Coup." (NEXIS)

*The Ottawa Citizen*. 16 October 1995. Final Edition. Scott Kraft. "Iraqis Give Saddam Predictable Yes; Vote Gives Dictator Seven More Years of `Legal' Power." (NEXIS)

*People in Power*. January 1996. Release N<sup>o</sup>. 52. Cambridge: CIRCA Research and Reference Ltd.

\_\_\_\_\_. July 1995. Release N<sup>o</sup>. 49. Cambridge: CIRCA Research and Reference Ltd.

*Physicians for Human Rights Record* [Boston]. February 1995. Vol. 8, N<sup>o</sup>. 1. "Iraq: Cruel Policy Puts Doctors at Risk."

*Political Handbook of the World 1994-1995*. 1994. Edited by Arthur S. Banks. Binghamton, New York: CSA Publications.

*Political Parties of Africa and the Middle East: A Reference Guide*. 1993. Edited by Roger East and Tanya Joseph. The High, Harlow, Essex: Longman Group UK.

*Political Parties of the World*. 1988. 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition. Edited by Alan J. Day. Chicago: St. James Press.

Radio Monte Carlo [Paris, in Arabic]. 28 December 1995. "Travel Fees Doubled; Direct Calls Abroad Banned." (FBIS-NES-95-250 29 Dec. 1995, 22)

\_\_\_\_\_. 15 March 1995. "`Very Strict' Measures at Border with Jordon Noted." (FBIS-NES-95-051 16 Mar. 1995, 31)

Reuters. 11 October 1995. BC Cycle. Leon Barkho. "Iraq Gears up for Saddam Referendum." (NEXIS)

\_\_\_\_\_. 9 April 1995. BC Cycle. Alistair Bell. "Assyrians Left to Face Saddam After Turks Withdraw." (NEXIS)

\_\_\_\_\_. 31 October 1994. BC Cycle. Suna Erdem. "Iraq Army Deserters go North to Escape Mutilation." (NEXIS)

*The Review* [Geneva]. June 1994. N<sup>o</sup>. 52. Editor Adama Dieng. "Iraq Introduces Corporal Punishment."

Sellier, Jean and André Sellier. 1993. *Atlas des peuples d'Orient : Moyen-Orient, Caucase, Asie centrale*. Paris: La Découverte.

*Stern* [Hamburg, in German]. 6 April 1995. "`Aziz Discusses Kurdish Issue, Regional Peace." (FBIS-NES-95-067 7 Apr. 1995, 25)

*The Sunday Times* [London]. 22 October 1995. Sue Lloyd-Roberts. "Saddam Torture Victims Shown in Grisly Parade."

*Third World Quarterly* [London]. 1993. Vol. 14, N<sup>o</sup>. 2. Michael M. Gunter. "A *de facto* Kurdish State in Northern Iraq."

- United Nations (UN). 4 March 1996. Economic and Social Council. *Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Iraq, Submitted by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Max van der Stoel, in Accordance with Commission Resolution 199576*. (ECN.4199661). New York: United Nations.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 1995. Series 5, Number 16. *World Statistics Pocketbook*. New York: United Nations.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 8 November 1995. General Assembly. *Situation of Human Rights in Iraq: Note by the Secretary-General*. (A50734). New York: United Nations.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 4 September 1995. Economic and Social Council. *Situation of Human Rights in Iraq: First Periodic Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Iraq Submitted by Mr. Max van der Stoel, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Pursuant to Paragraph 15 of Commission Resolution 199576*. (ECN.4199612). New York: United Nations.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 15 February 1995. Economic and Social Council. *Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Iraq, Submitted by Mr. Max van der Stoel, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, in accordance with Commission Resolution 199474*. (ECN.4199556). New York: United Nations.
- \_\_\_\_\_. 25 February 1994. Economic and Social Council. *Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Iraq, Submitted by Mr. Max van der Stoel, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, in accordance with Commission Resolution 199374*. (ECN.4199458). New York: United Nations.
- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). November 1994. *Background Paper on Iraqi Refugees and Asylum Seekers*. Geneva: UNHCR Centre for Documentation on Refugees.
- US Agency for International Development (USAID), Bureau for Humanitarian Response (BHR), Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). 7 November 1995. Situation Report N<sup>o</sup>. 1. *Northern Iraq—Displaced Persons*.
- Van Bruinessen, Martin. 1992. *Agha, Shaikh and State*. London: Zed Books, Ltd.
- Voice of Iraqi Kurdistan [Clandestine, in Arabic]. 8 November 1994. "Explosion Reported Near Mosul Governorate House." (FBIS-NES-94-218 10 Nov. 1994, 24)
- Voice of Iraqi People [Clandestine, in Arabic]. 5 May 1996. "Iraq: Media Employees, Journalists Reportedly Banned from Travel." (FBIS-NES-96-088 6 May 1996, 35-36)
- \_\_\_\_\_. 26 December 1995a. "Regime Doubles Travel Fee, Jams Radios." (FBIS-NES-95-248 27 Dec. 1995, 23)
- \_\_\_\_\_. 26 December 1995b. "Other Reports: Government Reportedly Increasing Jamming in an Attempt to Impose `Media Blackout'." (BBC Summary 5 Jan. 1996NEXIS)
- \_\_\_\_\_. 15 November 1995. "Regime Said Willing to Accept `Amended' 986." (FBIS-NES-95-221 16 Nov. 1995, 22)
- \_\_\_\_\_. 8 August 1995. "Regime Forces from South Reportedly Reinforce Karkuk." (FBIS-NES-95-153 9 Aug. 1995, 28)
- \_\_\_\_\_. 3 April 1995. "Regime Reportedly Arrests Citizens in Karkuk." (FBIS-NES-95-064 4 Apr. 1995,

30)

\_\_\_\_\_. 30 November 1994. "Armed Roadblocks, Passenger Checks Said to Increase." (FBIS-NES-94-231 1 Dec. 1994, 28-29)

Voice of the Iraqi Islamic Revolution [Clandestine, in Arabic]. 7 December 1995. "Regime Forces Said Harassing Marshland Inhabitants." (FBIS-NES-95-236 8 Dec. 1995, 37)

\_\_\_\_\_. 14 May 1995. "Opposition Claims Government Attacks." (FBIS-NES-95-096 18 May 1995, 29)

\_\_\_\_\_. 16 March 1995. "Army Reinforcements Reported in al-Basrah." (FBIS-NES-95-052 17 Mar. 1995, 52)

\_\_\_\_\_. 15 March 1995. "Government Forces Reportedly Shell Southern Villages." (FBIS-NES-95-051 16 Mar. 1995, 37)

\_\_\_\_\_. 13 March 1995. "Regime Reportedly Masses Troops, Equipment in South." (FBIS-NES-95-049 14 Mar. 1995, 31)

\_\_\_\_\_. 7 May 1994. "Marshlands Said Almost Dry: Residents Leaving." (FBIS-NES-94-091 11 May 1994, 62)

Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran [Tehran, in English]. 31 May 1991. "Kurds Said Prevented from Returning Home." (FBIS-NES-91-107 4 June 1991, 16)

Voice of the People of Kurdistan [Sulaymaniyah, in Arabic]. 6 March 1995. "Reaction; PUK Commentary Urges Army of `Despised Regime' to Become `Army of People'." (BBC Summary 7 Mar. 1995NEXIS)

Voice of the People of Kurdistan [Clandestine, in Arabic]. 4 November 1995. "Measures Said Tightened on Syrian Border." (FBIS-NES-95-214 6 Nov. 1995, 24)

\_\_\_\_\_. 12 September 1995. "PUK Radio: Authorities Expel Kurds from Karkuk." (FBIS-NES-95-178 14 Sept. 1995, 30-31)

\_\_\_\_\_. 30 June 1995. "Kurdish Paper Says 450 Executed After Ramadi and Abu Ghurayb Incidents." (BBC Summary 3 July 1995NEXIS)

\_\_\_\_\_. 17 May 1995. "Paper Reports Eviction of Kurdish Families from Kirkuk." (BBC Summary 19 May 1995NEXIS)

\_\_\_\_\_. 27 April 1995. "Regime Reportedly Sends Force to Karkuk." (FBIS-NES-95-082 28 Apr. 1995, 19)

\_\_\_\_\_. 27 December 1994. "Government Said to Arrest 18 in Karkuk: 3 Executed." (FBIS-NES-94-249 28 Dec. 1994, 27)

Voice of the People of Kurdistan [Clandestine, in Arabic]. 29 September 1994. "Government Orders Kurds Near Kirkuk to Leave." (FBIS-NES-94-190 30 Sept. 1994, 30)

Voice of Rebellious Iraq [Clandestine, in Arabic]. 15 April 1996. "Iraq: Regime Reportedly Planning to Expel Shiites from Baghdad." (FBIS-NES-96-075 17 Apr. 1996, 29)

\_\_\_\_\_. 30 March 1996. "Iraq: Army Reportedly Attacks Marshland Civilians." (FBIS-NES-96-063 1 Apr.

1996, 33).

\_\_\_\_\_. 17 July 1995. "Army Reportedly Kills `More Than 50' Citizens in Mosul." (FBIS-NES-95-137 18 July 1995, 46)

\_\_\_\_\_. 21 June 1995. "Troops Said Reinforced Along `Several Axes' in South." (FBIS-NES-95-121 23 June 1995, 20)

\_\_\_\_\_. 5 March 1995. "Reports of Fighting: SAIRI Radio Correspondent Reports on Troop Movements, Shelling of Kurdish Areas." (BBC Summary 7 Mar. 1995 NEXIS)

*World Encyclopedia of Political Systems & Parties*. 1987. 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition. Vol. 1. Edited by George E. Delury. New York: Facts on File Publications.

*World Press Review* [New York]. May 1996. Vol. 43, N<sup>o</sup>. 5. Jeanne Assouly and Christian Hoche. "Sanctions, Shortages and Savagery: Suffering for Saddam.

Xinhua General Overseas News Agency. 14 October 1995. "Iraq Says Ready for Presidential Referendum." (NEXIS)

**The attached reproduction is a copy of an official work that is published by the Government of Canada. The reproduction has not been produced in affiliation with, or with the endorsement of the Government of Canada.**

## NOTES

[9] This is an incorrectly transliterated name that refers to the same newspaper as the one listed below as *Al-Hayat*'. [\[back\]](#)

[10] This is an incorrectly transliterated name that refers to the same newspaper as the one listed below as *Al-Hayat*'. [\[back\]](#)



  
[Top of Page](#)

[Important Notices](#)