Country Reports on Terrorism 2013

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COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2013

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Strategic Assessment

Al-Qa’ida (AQ) and its affiliates and adherents worldwide continue to present a serious threat to the United States, our allies, and our interests. While the international community has severely degraded AQ’s core leadership, the terrorist threat has evolved. Leadership losses in Pakistan, coupled with weak governance and instability in the Middle East and Northwest Africa, have accelerated the decentralization of the movement and led to the affiliates in the AQ network becoming more operationally autonomous from core AQ and increasingly focused on local and regional objectives. The past several years have seen the emergence of a more aggressive set of AQ affiliates and like-minded groups, most notably in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Northwest Africa, and Somalia.

AQ leadership experienced difficulty in maintaining cohesion within the AQ network and in communicating guidance to its affiliated groups. AQ leader Ayman al-Zawahiri was rebuffed in his attempts to mediate a dispute among AQ affiliates operating in Syria – al-Nusra Front and al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI), now calling itself the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) – which resulted in the expulsion of ISIL from the AQ network in February 2014. In addition, guidance issued by Zawahiri in 2013 for AQ affiliates to avoid collateral damage was routinely disobeyed, notably in attacks by AQ affiliates against civilian religious pilgrims in Iraq, hospital staff and convalescing patients in Yemen, and families at a shopping mall in Kenya.

Terrorist violence in 2013 was fueled by sectarian motivations, marking a worrisome trend, in particular in Syria, Lebanon, and Pakistan, where victims of violence were primarily among the civilian populations. Thousands of extremist fighters entered Syria during the year, among those a large percentage reportedly motivated by a sectarian view of the conflict and a desire to protect the Sunni Muslim community from the Alawite-dominant Asad regime. On the other side of the conflict, Iran, Hizballah, and other Shia militia continued to provide critical support to the Asad regime, dramatically bolstering its capabilities and exacerbating the situation. Many of these fighters are also motivated by a sectarian view of the conflict and a desire to protect the Shia Muslim community from Sunni extremists.

The relationship between the AQ core and its affiliates plays out in the financial arena as well. As was the case for the last few years, the affiliates have increased their financial independence through kidnapping for ransom operations and other criminal activities such as extortion and credit card fraud. Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) are particularly effective with kidnapping for ransom and are using ransom money to fund the range of their activities. Kidnapping targets are usually Western citizens from governments or third parties that have established a pattern of paying ransom for the release of individuals in custody.

Private donations from the Gulf also remained a major source of funding for Sunni terrorist groups, particularly for those operating in Syria.

In 2013, violent extremists increased their use of new media platforms and social media, with mixed results. Social media platforms allowed violent extremist groups to circulate messages more quickly, but confusion and contradictions among the various voices within the movement are growing more common. Increasingly, current and former violent extremists are engaging online with a variety of views on tactics and strategy, including admitting wrongdoing or recanting former beliefs and actions.
### Key Terrorism Trends in 2013

--The terrorist threat continued to evolve rapidly in 2013, with an increasing number of groups around the world – including both AQ affiliates and other terrorist organizations – posing a threat to the United States, our allies, and our interests.

--As a result of both ongoing worldwide efforts against the organization and senior leadership losses, AQ core’s leadership has been degraded, limiting its ability to conduct attacks and direct its followers. Subsequently, 2013 saw the rise of increasingly aggressive and autonomous AQ affiliates and like-minded groups in the Middle East and Africa who took advantage of the weak governance and instability in the region to broaden and deepen their operations.

--AQ leader Ayman al-Zawahiri experienced difficulty in maintaining influence throughout the AQ organization and was rebuffed in his attempts to mediate a dispute among AQ affiliates operating in Syria, with ISIL publicly dissociating its group from AQ. Guidance issued by Zawahiri in 2013 for AQ affiliates to avoid collateral damage was routinely disobeyed, notably in increasingly violent attacks by these affiliates against civilian populations.

--Syria continued to be a major battleground for terrorism on both sides of the conflict and remains a key area of longer-term concern. Thousands of foreign fighters traveled to Syria to join the fight against the Asad regime – with some joining violent extremist groups – while Iran, Hizballah, and other Shia militias provided a broad range of critical support to the regime. The Syrian conflict also empowered ISIL to expand its cross-border operations in Syria, and dramatically increase attacks against Iraqi civilians and government targets in 2013.

--Terrorist violence in 2013 was increasingly fueled by sectarian motives, marking a worrisome trend, particularly in Syria, but also in Lebanon and Pakistan.

--Terrorist groups engaged in a range of criminal activity to raise needed funds, with kidnapping for ransom remaining the most frequent and profitable source of illicit financing. Private donations from the Gulf also remained a major source of funding for Sunni terrorist groups, particularly for those operating in Syria.

--“Lone offender” violent extremists also continued to pose a serious threat, as illustrated by the April 15, 2013, attacks near the Boston Marathon finish line, which killed three and injured approximately 264 others.

--Many other terrorist groups not tied to AQ were responsible for attacks in 2013, including the People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C), which carried out a number of high-profile attacks last year, including a February 1 suicide plot targeting the U.S. Embassy in Ankara, Turkey.

* * *

While AQ core leadership in Pakistan is much diminished, Ayman al-Zawahiri remains the recognized ideological leader of a jihadist movement that includes AQ-affiliated and allied groups worldwide. Along with AQ, the Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani Network, Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), and
other like-minded groups continue to conduct operations against U.S., Coalition, Afghan, and Pakistani interests from safe havens on both sides of the Afghanistan/Pakistan border, and in Pakistan, terrorist groups and AQ allies, such as TTP, have executed armed assaults not only on police stations, judicial centers, border posts, and military convoys, but also on polio vaccination teams and aid workers. Other South Asian terrorist organizations, including Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LeT), cite U.S. interests as legitimate targets for attacks. LeT, the group responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attacks, continues to pose a threat to regional stability.

AQAP carried out approximately one hundred attacks throughout Yemen in 2013, including suicide bombings, car bombings, ambushes, kidnappings, and targeted assassinations, regaining the initiative it had lost through 2012 as a result of sustained Yemeni government counterterrorism efforts. Of the AQ affiliates, AQAP continues to pose the most significant threat to the United States and U.S. citizens and interests in Yemen. AQAP has demonstrated a persistent intent to strike the United States, beginning in December 2009 when it attempted to destroy an airliner bound for Detroit, and again the following year with a plot to destroy several U.S.-bound airplanes using bombs timed to detonate in the cargo holds. In 2013, AQAP’s leader, Nasir Wahishi, was designated by AQ leader Zawahiri as his deputy, and the group continued to maintain a focus on Western targets.

Some of the thousands of fighters from around the world who are traveling to Syria to do battle against the Asad regime – particularly from the Middle East and North Africa, Central Asia, and Eastern and Western Europe – are joining violent extremist groups, including al-Nusrah Front and ISIL. A number of key partner governments are becoming increasingly concerned that individuals with violent extremist ties and battlefield experience will return to their home countries or elsewhere to commit terrorist acts. The scale of this problem has raised a concern about the creation of a new generation of globally-committed terrorists, similar to what resulted from the influx of violent extremists to Afghanistan in the 1980s.

The violence and disorder in Syria extended to the various violent extremist groups operating amongst the Syrian opposition. In late 2013 and early 2014, violent infighting occurred between al-Nusrah Front and ISIL, resulting in the February death of Ayman al-Zawahiri’s envoy to Syria Abu Khalid al-Soury, who was a member of Ahrar al Sham. Despite this infighting, ISIL is the strongest it has been since its peak in 2006; it has exploited political grievance among Iraq’s Sunni population, a weak security environment in Iraq, and the conflict in Syria to significantly increase the pace and complexity of its attacks. ISIL continues to routinely and indiscriminately target defenseless innocents, including religious pilgrims, and engages in violent repression of local inhabitants.

In 2013, AQIM remained focused on local and regional attack planning, and concentrates its efforts largely on kidnapping-for-ransom operations. While a successful French and African intervention countered efforts to overrun northern Mali by AQIM and several associate groups, these factions continued to pursue attacks against regional security forces, local government targets, and westerners in northern Mali, Niger, and the broader Sahel region in 2013.

Originally part of AQIM, the al-Mulathamun Battalion (AMB), also known as al-Murabitoun, became a separate organization in late 2012 after its leader, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, announced a split from AQIM. AMB claimed responsibility for the January 2013 attack against the Tiguentourine gas facility near In Amenas, in southeastern Algeria. Over 800 people were taken hostage during the four-day siege, which led to the deaths of 39 civilians, including three U.S. citizens. AMB was also involved in terrorist attacks committed in Niger in May 2013, targeting a Nigerien military base and a French uranium mine.
Groups calling themselves Ansar al-Shari’a in Tunisia and the Libyan cities of Benghazi and Darnah also operated in the North Africa space. The three share some aspects of AQ ideology, but are not formal affiliates and generally maintain a local focus. In Libya, the terrorist threat to Western and Libyan government interests remains strong, especially in the eastern part of the country. Libya’s porous borders, the weakness of Libya’s nascent security institutions, and large amounts of loose small arms create opportunities for violent extremists. In Tunisia, Ansar al-Shari’a in Tunisia attempted suicide attacks against two tourist sites in late October 2013 and killed a political oppositionist in July that same year, suggesting the group remains intent on attacking Western and Tunisian interests.

In East Africa, al-Shabaab continued to pose a significant regional threat despite coming under continued pressure by African forces operating under the African Union’s AMISOM command and steady progress in the establishment of Somali government capability. Perhaps because of these positive steps, al-Shabaab targeted its attacks on those participating in the effort to bring stability to Somalia. In September 2013, al-Shabaab struck outside of Somalia (its first external attack was in July 2010 in Kampala, Uganda), attacking the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya. The assault resulted in the death of at least 65 civilians, including foreign nationals from 13 countries outside of Kenya and six soldiers and police officers; hundreds more were injured. Al-Shabaab’s attacks within Somalia continued in 2013, and resulted in the deaths of hundreds of people, including innocent women and children.

Boko Haram (BH) maintained a high operational tempo in 2013 and carried out kidnappings, killings, bombings, and attacks on civilian and military targets in northern Nigeria, resulting in numerous deaths, injuries, and destruction of property in 2013. The number and sophistication of BH’s attacks are concerning, and while the group focuses principally on local Nigerian issues and actors, there continue to be reports that it has financial and training links with other violent extremists in the Sahel region. Boko Haram, along with a splinter group commonly known as Ansaru, has also increasingly crossed Nigerian borders to neighboring Cameroon, Chad, and Niger to evade pressure and conduct operations.

Palestinian terrorist organizations in the Hamas-controlled Gaza continued rocket and mortar attacks into Israeli territory. The number of rocket and mortar launchings on Israel from Gaza and the Sinai was the lowest in 2013 in more than a decade, with 74 launchings compared to 2,557 in 2012. According to Israeli authorities, 36 rocket hits were identified in Israeli territory in 2013, compared to 1,632 in 2012. Of the 74 launchings on southern Israel, 69 were launched from the Gaza and five from the Sinai Peninsula.

Sinai-based groups, such as Ansar-Beit al Maqdis, also continued to pose a serious threat, conducting attacks against both Israeli and Egyptian targets in 2013.

Since 2012, the United States has also seen a resurgence of activity by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Qods Force (IRGC-QF), the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), and Tehran’s ally Hizballah. On January 23, 2013, the Yemeni Coast Guard interdicted an Iranian dhow carrying weapons and explosives likely destined for Houthi rebels. On February 5, 2013, the Bulgarian government publicly implicated Hizballah in the July 2012 Burgas bombing that killed five Israelis and one Bulgarian citizen, and injured 32 others. On March 21, 2013, a Cyprus court found a Hizballah operative guilty of charges stemming from his surveillance activities of Israeli tourist targets in 2012. On September 18, 2013, Thailand convicted Atris Hussein, a Hizballah operative detained by Thai authorities in January 2012. On December 30, 2013, the Bahraini Coast Guard interdicted a
speedboat attempting to smuggle arms and Iranian explosives likely destined for armed Shia opposition groups in Bahrain. During an interrogation, the suspects admitted to receiving paramilitary training in Iran.

On June 22, 2013, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) declared it would treat Hizballah as a terrorist organization. On July 22, 2013, the EU designated the “military wing” of Hizballah as a terrorist organization, sending a strong message to Hizballah that it cannot operate with impunity. Both Hizballah and Iran issued public statements to denounce the EU, demonstrating the impact of the designation. The EU designation will constrain Hizballah’s ability to operate freely in Europe by enabling European law enforcement agencies to crack down on Hizballah’s fundraising, logistical activity, and terrorist plotting on European soil.

Iran remained one of the chief external supporters of the Asad regime in Syria and continued to help ensure the regime’s survival. The IRGC-QF, Hizballah, and Iraqi Shia terrorist groups have all increased the number of their personnel in Syria since the start of the conflict. Iran also continued to send arms to Syria, often through Iraqi airspace, in violation of the UN Security Council prohibition against Iran selling or transferring arms and related materials.

While terrorism by non-state actors related to AQ and state-sponsored terrorism originating in Iran remained the predominant concern of the United States, other forms of terrorism undermined peace and security around the world. In Turkey, the DHKP/C was responsible for a number of high-profile attacks in 2013, including exploding a suicide vest inside the employee entrance to the U.S. Embassy in Ankara on February 1. Anarchists in Greece launched periodic attacks, targeting private businesses, foreign missions, and symbols of the state. In Colombia, there were still hundreds of terrorist incidents around the country. In Northern Ireland, dissident Republican groups continued their campaigns of violence. “Lone offender” violent extremists also remain a concern, as we saw on April 15, 2013, in the United States, when two violent extremists exploded two pressure cooker bombs near the Boston Marathon’s finish line, killing three people and injuring an estimated 264 others.

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To meet the challenges described herein, our response to terrorism cannot depend on military or law enforcement alone. We are committed to a whole of government counterterrorism effort that focuses on countering violent extremism; building the capacity of partner nation security forces to address threats within their own borders and participate in regional counterterrorism operations; and strengthening relationships with U.S. partners around the world to make the rule of law a critical part of a broader, more comprehensive counterterrorism enterprise. See Chapter 5, Terrorist Safe Havens (7120 Report) in this report for further information on these initiatives, which also include designating foreign terrorist organizations and individuals, countering violent extremist narratives, strengthening efforts to counter the financing of terrorism, and furthering multilateral initiatives such as the Global Counterterrorism Forum.
The Africa region experienced significant levels of terrorist activity in 2013. In East Africa, the Somalia-based terrorist group al-Shabaab remained the primary terrorist threat. Somali security forces and the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) continued to make gains against al-Shabaab in 2013, but an inability to undertake consistent offensive operations against the group allowed al-Shabaab to develop and carry out asymmetric attacks, including outside of Somalia. Most notably, al-Shabaab launched an attack against the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya on September 21 that left at least 65 people dead. The attack, which targeted innocent civilians, was claimed by al-Shabaab as a response to the involvement of Kenyan armed forces units in Somalia, who in late 2012 expelled al-Shabaab from the port city of Kismayo, a major revenue source for al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab issued persistent threats to other countries contributing troops to AMISOM. Driven out of major urban areas, al-Shabaab has returned to a strategy focused on asymmetric attacks intended to discredit and destabilize the nascent Federal Government of Somalia. In 2013, the United States continued to support AMISOM and the establishment of a stable Somali government, and worked to enhance counterterrorism capacity in Somalia and throughout the broader region.

Various East African countries continued to detect, deter, disrupt, investigate, and prosecute terrorist incidents; enhance domestic and regional efforts to bolster border security; and create integrated and dedicated counterterrorism strategies. Counterterrorism cooperation across the region picked up following the Westgate attack and nations began to examine their procedures for responding to attacks on soft targets.

In West Africa, conflict in Nigeria continued throughout the northern part of the country, with Boko Haram and related actors committing hundreds of attacks, reportedly resulting in over a thousand casualties in 2013 alone. This violence reportedly spilled over into neighboring Cameroon, Chad, and Niger.

French and allied African forces successfully disrupted and pushed back efforts by al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and other violent extremist groups to control northern Mali. In August, successful elections took place in Mali and a regional African peacekeeping force was installed with Western support to restore stability and governance to the country. France and other international partners continue to contribute forces to the region to assist the Malian government to rebuild and to deter terrorist threats. Western efforts to increase counterterrorism capacity in the region were focused in 2013 on enhanced border security, regional information sharing and cooperation, and countering violent extremism.

TRANS-SAHARA COUNTERTERRORISM PARTNERSHIP

Established in 2005, the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) is a U.S.-funded and implemented, multi-faceted, multi-year effort designed to build the capacity and cooperation of military, law enforcement, and civilian actors across North and West Africa to counter terrorism. Areas of support include: (1) enabling and enhancing the capacity of North and West African militaries to conduct counterterrorism operations; (2) integrating the ability of North and West African militaries and other supporting partners to operate regionally and collaboratively on counterterrorism efforts; (3)
enhancing individual nations’ border security capacity to monitor, restrain, and interdict terrorist movements; (4) strengthening the rule of law, including access to justice, and law enforcement’s ability to detect, disrupt, respond to, investigate, and prosecute terrorist activity; (5) monitoring and countering the financing of terrorism (such as that related to kidnapping for ransom); and (6) reducing the limited sympathy and support among communities for violent extremism.

TSCTP partners include Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon (joined in 2014), Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia.

TSCTP has been successful in building capacity and cooperation despite setbacks caused by coups d’état, ethnic rebellions, and extra-constitutional actions that have interrupted work and progress with select partner countries. For example, U.S. training and equipment have assisted Mauritania in monitoring its border with Mali and sustaining professional units for operations against AQIM. Similarly, training and equipment have supported Niger’s efforts to protect its borders and respond to terrorist incidents. While assistance to Mali under TSCTP was suspended following the March 2012 military coup that overthrew Mali’s democratically elected government, that suspension ended on September 6, 2013, following successful elections in that country.

Several TSCTP programs have worked to counter violent extremist radicalization and recruitment of youth, including educational and training courses in Algeria and Morocco, and extensive youth employment and outreach programs, community development, and media activities in Niger, Burkina Faso, and Chad.

THE PARTNERSHIP FOR REGIONAL EAST AFRICA COUNTERTERRORISM

Established in 2009, PREACT is a U.S.-funded and implemented multi-year, multi-faceted program designed to build the capacity and cooperation of military, law enforcement, and civilian actors across East Africa to counter terrorism. It uses law enforcement, military, and development resources to achieve its strategic objectives, including (1) reducing the operational capacity of terrorist networks, (2) developing a rule of law framework for countering terrorism in partner nations, (3) enhancing border security, (4) countering the financing of terrorism, and (5) reducing the appeal of radicalization and recruitment to violent extremism. PREACT member countries include Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda.

In 2013, the U.S. government, through PREACT, continued to build the capacity and resilience of East African governments to contain the spread of, and counter the threat posed by, al-Qa’ida, al-Shabaab, and other violent extremist organizations. PREACT complements the U.S. government’s dedicated efforts to promote stability and governance in Somalia, including support for AMISOM. For example, training and equipment have assisted Djibouti in monitoring its land and maritime border with Somalia and supporting professional units in operations against al-Shabaab. Similarly, training and equipment for light infantry, technical intelligence, and crisis response units have supported Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda’s efforts to protect their borders and respond to terrorist incidents.

BURKINA FASO

Overview: In 2013, the Government of Burkina Faso aggressively undertook measures to combat the regional danger posed by terrorist organizations, specifically al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). It also responded to potential threats; and continued to stress the importance of international
cooperation in defeating terrorism. The Government of Burkina Faso has recognized the importance of regional stability as an element in the fight against terrorism, and as a result has played an important regional role in finding a political solution to the conflict in Mali.

Burkina Faso is a strong U.S. security and defense partner in the region and continued to receive substantial training and material support for counterterrorism efforts through its participation in the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership and multinational peacekeeping efforts. U.S. assistance facilitated the establishment of a 1,000-person border security task force, and the training and equipping of a military counterterrorist unit. Burkina Faso also contributed a peacekeeping battalion and police unit to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).

As a result of a heightened general threat of retaliation following the French-led military intervention in Mali, the Government of Burkina Faso increased its security posture at diplomatic facilities and at major public events. Unconfirmed reports indicated the possibility of violent extremist elements entering Burkina Faso’s northern region, notably its refugee camps, either for safe haven or to extend their operational reach. In response, the Burkinabè military deployed a joint counterterrorist task force of soldiers and gendarmes to assist in the management of refugees, gather intelligence, secure key infrastructure, and interdict terrorist activity.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Burkina Faso implemented the Terrorism Suppression Law of 2009, modeled after French law, which criminalizes a wide range of terrorism-related activities and imposes criminal punishment of up to life in prison. However, no one had been charged under the law by year’s end.

Burkina Faso’s police and gendarmerie were hindered by a chronic lack of training, specialized tactical equipment, and personnel. There was a lack of interagency coordination and intelligence sharing between the gendarmerie, which falls under the Ministry of Defense, and police agencies, which all operate under the authority of the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Security. The gendarmerie has specialized units which conduct investigations, respond to crises, and protect the nation’s borders, but is too small to be effective throughout the country. The National Police, who are likely to be first responders, lag far behind the gendarmerie in training and equipment. There is a lack of information technology resources to assist criminal investigation, manage cases, and share intelligence.

The Government of Burkina Faso took several steps to improve its capabilities, however. In January, the government ordered the creation of a new police unit charged with counterterrorism; and in March, the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Security announced a 50 percent increase in recruitment of national police in 2014 to respond to growing security issues.

The U.S. government, through the U.S. Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance program, has provided assistance to the National Police since 2010. In 2013, Burkinabè officials were trained in crime scene investigations and post-blast evidence recovery. In 2013, 26 police officers, gendarmes, and criminal prosecutors participated in four International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) courses, including the six-week Law Enforcement Executive Development course. In February, the U.S. government provided non-lethal tactical equipment to the National Police’s Multipurpose Intervention Unit.
With the support of the United States, the Government of Burkina Faso installed the Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES) biometric traveler database at the airport in Ouagadougou.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Burkina Faso is a member of the Inter-Governmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. A recent FATF/GIABA West Africa terrorist finance case study featured a case from Burkina Faso involving cash couriers and arms smugglers operating in Burkina Faso and Nigeria. Burkina Faso has an extremely small formal banking sector which makes cash and other informal value systems significant risks for abuse by terrorists. While the Ministry of Finance’s financial intelligence unit, CENTIF, collects and processes financial information on money laundering and terrorist financing, it lacks adequate human and information technology resources to identify and prosecute significant money laundering, which is likely occurring. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR)*, Volume 2, *Money Laundering and Financial Crimes*: 

**Regional and International Cooperation:** Burkina Faso is active in regional organizations and international bodies, including the UN, AU, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF). In April, Burkina Faso and Denmark co-hosted a regional workshop on countering violent extremism in Ouagadougou to gain insights on concrete programming ideas from partners. In October, Burkina Faso hosted another regional workshop for the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force.

The Government of Burkina Faso played a leading role in finding a political solution to the conflict in Mali. President Blaise Compaore, as ECOWAS mediator, led negotiations between northern Malian groups and the interim government in Bamako that culminated in the Ouagadougou Accord in June, paving the way for successful presidential elections in July.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** Burkina Faso is a majority-Muslim country, where the predominant form of practice of Sunni Islam is not conducive to violent extremism. The country is often mentioned as an example of religious tolerance. Religious leaders regularly denounce violence and call for peaceful coexistence of all religions, and civil society organizations play an active role in mitigating religious conflict. The Burkinabè government encourages regular and ongoing inter-faith dialogues. In 2013, the government of Burkina Faso enthusiastically welcomed several international countering violent extremism efforts, including programs led by the United States, Denmark, and the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation.

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**BURUNDI**

**Overview:** Burundi has demonstrated a commitment to addressing international terrorism and contributed six battalions to the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). A counterterrorism cell, formed in 2010, consists of elements of the police, military, and the National Intelligence Service. In the aftermath of the September 2013 al-Shabaab attack in Nairobi, the Burundian National Police (BNP) conducted several counterterrorism operations throughout the country in an attempt to disrupt and dismantle potential terrorist operations. However, the BNP are hampered by a lack of training, resources, and infrastructure. In addition, the BNP has focused counterterrorism efforts on the Muslim community and foreigners in Burundi, rather than basing actions on operational intelligence. This reflects the BNP’s belief that these groups pose the greatest terrorist threat to Burundi.
Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Burundi has provisions in its penal code defining forms of terrorism. Sentences for acts of terrorism range from 10 to 20 years in prison to life imprisonment if the act results in the death of a person. Burundi continued its participation in the U.S. Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program and the International Law Enforcement Academy. Through ATA, Burundian National Police received training in 2013 to bolster its leadership and management skills and to build investigative capacity.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Burundi is not a member of a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body. This gap prevents any overall assessment of the risks the country faces in regards to terrorist financing. While the government has created counterterrorist financing laws, it has yet to commit funding, provide training, or implement policies. Very few people in the country have access to the formal banking sector. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

Regional and International Cooperation: Burundi is a member of the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism; and as such, has received funding for military and law enforcement counterterrorism training. Burundi has cooperated with neighboring countries to exchange information on suspected terrorists. Burundi has also contributed six battalions to AMISOM to stabilize the situation in Somalia.

CAMEROON

Overview: The Government of Cameroon considers countering terrorism and violent extremism a top security priority, and worked with the United States in 2013 to improve the capacity of its security forces. The Nigerian terrorist group Boko Haram (BH) took advantage of weaknesses in Cameroon’s border security and conducted several terrorist acts in Cameroon’s far north region in 2013, including targeted killings and kidnappings of Cameroonians and expatriates. Cameroon responded to the attacks with an increased security presence in its northern regions.

2013 Terrorist Incidents: In 2013, BH was responsible for targeted killings of Cameroonians and Nigerians living in Cameroon in the villages of Kouseri and Kolofata. The exact number of casualties attributable to BH is unknown. BH operatives were involved in the following incidents:

- In February, BH claimed responsibility for the kidnapping of a family of seven French citizens in the far north region of Cameroon. BH assailants seized the family near Waza National Park and took the hostages to Nigeria before they were eventually released two months later. There were no casualties. The media reported that a ransom was paid to secure their release.
- In November, BH members kidnapped a French priest near the town of Koza, in the far north region of Cameroon. The assailants invaded the priest’s home and took him to Nigeria before releasing him six weeks later. The conditions required to secure his release are unknown.
- In December, BH gunmen attacked civilians in several areas of the far north region.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Cameroon relies on various provisions in its penal code to respond to possible terrorist acts. These include sanctions for efforts to undermine state authority, threats to public and individual safety, the destruction of property, threats to the safety of
Significant political will to combat terrorism exists in Cameroon, but efforts were hampered by limited capabilities, corruption, and a lack of coordination among Cameroonian law enforcement and security forces. Cameroon’s law enforcement entities involved in counterterrorism activities include the general Army, the Battalion d'Intervention Rapide (BIR), and the Gendarmerie. Although recent terrorist threats have targeted the far north region of Cameroon, there is no dedicated border police unit; rather, the border police are rotated into duty from the general police force. Gendarmes and police are often the initial responders to terrorist situations, but the BIR maintains superior counterterrorism capabilities and is often called upon to provide support to potential terrorist incidents. Once the situation is secure, control of security incidents is returned to local police units for appropriate action. Cooperation among law enforcement entities is in need of improvement.

In 2013, Cameroon received U.S. training to improve its counterterrorism and law enforcement efforts. The U.S. government has provided training to Cameroon in counterterrorism tactics, first aid, land navigation, and advanced marksmanship. Training is conducted with Cameroonian security forces, and has contributed to numerous arrests of suspected BH terrorists. The training also emphasizes professionalism of security forces and humanitarian assistance, which leads to trust within the local population.

In August 2013, Cameroon launched production of a regional biometric passport to facilitate the free movement of people and provide enhanced security for residents of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States (CEMAC) zone. In response to terrorist incidents in 2013, Cameroon also reinforced its border security by establishing control posts and deploying additional military units and gendarmes to the far north region of the country.

Cameroonian military and police units proactively confronted and disrupted suspected members of BH in the far north region. Some suspects that fled on motorbike to neighboring Nigeria were arrested or killed by Cameroonian civilians or law enforcement. However, there were no terrorism-related prosecutions by the end of 2013.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Cameroon is a member of the Central African Action Group against Money Laundering (GABAC), which enjoys Financial Action Task Force observer status. Through its membership in CEMAC, Cameroon has adopted a legislative architecture to address the issues of anti-money laundering and financial supervision. It has a financial intelligence unit, the National Financial Investigation Agency (ANIF), which processes suspicious transaction reports and initiates investigations. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: [http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm](http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm).

**Regional and International Cooperation:** Cameroon actively participates in AU peacekeeping operations, and its military schools train soldiers and gendarmes from neighboring countries. Cameroonian naval and special operations forces work with their counterparts from Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria to combat piracy and armed robbery at sea and improve maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. While cooperation with Nigeria had been mainly at the working level between unit commanders, there are increasing signs of willingness to cooperate with Nigeria on counterterrorism, as evidenced by participation in U.S.-sponsored regional exercises.
Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism: Cameroonian authorities have taken a series of measures to address radicalization to violence and to counter violent extremism, including participating in meetings with local administrative and religious officials, and forming partnerships with local, traditional, and religious leaders to monitor preaching in mosques.

CHAD

Overview: The Government of Chad was a strong counterterrorism partner in 2013 and is a member of the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP). Countering international terrorist threats to Chad were priorities at the highest levels of Chad’s government, with a particular focus on countering potential terrorist threats from across the Sahel region. Chad has a counterterrorism strategy, which focuses on promoting regional stability and securing its borders. The Chadian government strengthened border patrols along the border with Sudan and in the Lake Chad region.

The Chadian Army’s Special Antiterrorism Group (SATG), which has received U.S. training, has a national security mandate. The SATG is effective in counterterrorism operations with a specific focus on border security and interdiction of illicit goods trafficking, but faces a number of logistical challenges. In 2013, the SATG increased surveillance of the northern border with Libya and the unit was deployed to Mali and the Central African Republic.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Chadian criminal law does not explicitly criminalize terrorism. However, certain general provisions of the Penal Code (1967) have been used to prosecute acts of terrorism. Chadian law enforcement has demonstrated a limited but effective capacity to detect, deter, and respond to potential terrorist incidents. Some Chadian units have limited investigations, crisis response, and border security capacity. Law enforcement units display basic command and control capacity. Specialized law enforcement units possess some necessary equipment but have many unfulfilled needs.

Border security is a common interest for the U.S. government and Chad. In 2013, Chad participated in the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) Sahel Cross-Border Workshop in Niamey.

In the law enforcement sector, the United States has provided Chad with training and technical assistance through the State Department’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program in the areas of building law enforcement border security, investigations, and crisis response capabilities. Chad also worked with the United States to reduce the threat from Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) and other conventional weapons sought by terrorists.

Chad worked in collaboration with the U.S. government to implement biometric screening as part of the Terrorist Interdiction Program/Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES). In 2013, the United States, working with Chadian authorities, deployed the first state-of-the-art PISCES border security system at the N’Djamena airport, and expanded PISCES systems to additional Ports of Entry in late 2013.

In 2013, Chadian security forces executed several cordon and search operations in the Lake Chad region, extending south to the capital, in an effort to prevent spillover from ongoing security operations on the opposite side of Lake Chad undertaken by the Nigerian government directed against Boko Haram.
The Government of Chad also established the Antiterrorism Brigade in 2013, which has two permanent officers and borrows officers from the organized crime brigade as needed. The Chadian government is currently working with the governments of Sudan, Niger, Nigeria, Cameroon, and Libya to form border commissions and joint task forces to better control their borders. In particular, Chad works in cooperation with Sudan on a mixed-force border patrol, which has enabled the two countries to better monitor and control their joint border.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Chad is a member of the Action Group Against Money Laundering in Central Africa (GABAC), an observer to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) with the same mandate and status as a FATF-style regional body. GABAC works directly with Chad’s financial intelligence unit, the National Financial Investigative Agency (ANIF). ANIF is hindered by serious resource constraints, and law enforcement and customs officials need training in financial crimes enforcement.

Chad’s financial sector is underdeveloped and lacks sufficient capacity to enforce banking regulations. Financial intelligence reporting and analysis is limited. Additionally, law enforcement and customs officials require training in financial crimes enforcement. Several banks voluntarily report suspicious transactions, but the practice is not universal as there is no regulation requiring banks to report them. The national entity charged with monitoring money laundering is understaffed and lacks sophisticated equipment to perform its activities effectively. Although it maintains working relationships with commercial banks, it does not monitor wire transfers, SMS mobile money transfers, or other money transfer channels such as *hawala* brokers.


**Regional and International Cooperation:** Chad participated in the GCTF’s Sahel Region Capacity Building Working Group in October in Niamey, Niger. This included Chad serving on the committee that made recommendations to strengthen capacity building of member states, and the committee on securing land borders. Chad also participated in the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), providing 2,000 troops to assist French and Malian armed forces combat terrorists in northern Mali.

Chad supports counterterrorism capacity building in other states through the GCTF. In January, Chad sent 2,000 troops to participate in the Mali intervention to help French and Malian armed forces defeat a jihadist movement that occupied the northern region. Chad conducted counterterrorist operations including the killing of Abdelhamid Abou Zeid, a senior commander of al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). At year’s end, Chad was still participating in peacekeeping efforts in northern Mali, where it has deployed 1,200 troops.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** Chad participated in targeted projects to counter violent extremism through the TSCTP; specific activities have included building the capacity of national civil society organizations, community engagement, youth empowerment, promotion of interfaith dialogue and religious tolerance, and media and outreach work. President Deby instructs the High Council for Islamic Affairs to monitor religious activities closely in mosques to counter violent extremism and radicalization to violence.
In 2013, many of President Déby’s public addresses advocated for peaceful cohabitation and religious tolerance. For example, during speeches on the Muslim holidays of Eid al-Fitr (August 8) and Eid al-Adha (October 15), the president called for Chadians to reject violent Islamist extremism. Leaders from the country’s principal religious organizations uniformly supported the policies the president articulated.

Weekly community radio broadcasts, sponsored by the USAID-funded Peace through Development (PDev II) program, are aimed at countering violent extremism and encourage moderation, tolerance, and youth engagement. The Government of Chad fully endorses the program and was working to develop a strategy to take over ownership and ensure continuation of CVE broadcasts upon project completion in 2016.

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO

Overview: Despite the limited threat of violent Islamist extremism in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the government has indicated serious concern about the threat of terrorism spreading throughout the region and has responded adequately to concerns. The DRC is a vast country bordered by nine neighbors; the Government of the DRC lacks complete control over some areas of its territory, especially in the East where various armed groups operate.

The three principal foreign armed groups operating in the DRC and posing a threat to security and stability are a Ugandan group called the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (known by its French acronym as FDLR), and the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). For most of 2013, the M23 was the deadliest armed group in the East, assassinating local leaders and killing and otherwise intimidating civilians. The M23 was militarily defeated in November of 2013 by the Congolese military, with UN peacekeeping support. While no longer the military threat to the Rwandan government it once was, the FDLR contributed to the destabilization of the eastern DRC through its atrocities against the local civilian population and residual potential for small-scale attacks inside Rwanda.

2013 Terrorist Incidents: Following a decrease in ADF attacks in 2012 and 2013 during the M23 rebellion, on December 13 and 14, the ADF reportedly killed 21 civilians in Beni Territory, North Kivu by hacking and beheading them with machetes. The ADF is also believed to be responsible for similar attacks on civilians in the same area, primarily women and children, in November. The Government of the DRC remains very concerned about the activities of this group and initiated a military campaign against it in late 2013.

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported 164 presumed LRA attacks in 2013 in the DRC, resulting in 37 deaths and 180 abductions.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The DRC has no comprehensive counterterrorism legislation, but a 2001 presidential decree established a National Committee for the Coordination of Anti-International Terrorism within a counterterrorism office in its Ministry of Interior. The DRC President identified the elimination of the ADF, FDLR, Burundian National Front, and the LRA as the highest security priorities following the end of the M23 rebellion in November. The DRC government has made statements indicating that denying safe haven to the LRA remains a matter of great importance and has contributed to international efforts to eradicate the LRA in the DRC, notably by dedicating 400 FARDC troops to the AU-Regional Task Force.
The DRC government lacks the resources to detect, deter, and prevent acts of terrorism outside of narrow, small scale attacks in the eastern DRC. The national police and the intelligence services are identified as the primary lines of defense against terrorism under 2011 foundational legislation restructuring security services in the DRC.

The DRC government made some progress on its border security management program through training funded by the UN Stabilization Mission in the Congo and the international community in personal identification and recognition systems, border patrolling, and investigative procedures.

The DRC government has shown political will to cooperate with the U.S. on counterterrorism efforts despite a lack of resources.

Though threat of violent Islamist extremism in the country is limited, the government has shown the political will and ability to respond to the small-scale, localized threats that occurred in 2013. The government’s response, however, focused on military action rather than law enforcement, and weaknesses in border security allowed illicit crossing of people and goods.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** The DRC is not a member of any Financial Action Task Force-style regional body. In 2011, the DRC signed a mutual assistance agreement with Belgium’s CTIF (Cellule des Traitements des Informations Financières).

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has legislation criminalizing money laundering and terrorist financing, as well as a financial intelligence unit (CENAREF). Many banks installed new computerized communications and accounting networks, which made it easier to trace formal financial transactions. Limited resources and a weak judicial system hampered the government’s ability to enforce anti-money laundering regulations, however, and local institutions and personnel lacked the training and capacity to enforce the law and its attendant regulations fully.

The DRC is home to a large Lebanese expatriate community, some of whom ran businesses reportedly linked to Hizballah funding. CENAREF received 145 suspicious transaction reports in 2013. CENAREF had 161 files for which the collection of information is continuing. CENAREF has also received 96 cases from other institutions or other sources. In 2013, the Government of the DRC had two money laundering convictions, which are a good reflection of the country’s ability to tackle illicit financial flows. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR)*, Volume 2, *Money Laundering and Financial Crimes*: [http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm](http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm).

**Regional and International Cooperation:** The Government of the DRC continued to cooperate with neighboring states, especially the Central African Republic, South Sudan, and Uganda, to counter LRA threats, as well as with Uganda on the ADF threat.

**DJIBOUTI**

**Overview:** Djibouti remained an active and cooperative counterterrorism partner in 2013. Djibouti hosts Camp Lemonnier, which serves as headquarters to the U.S. Africa Command’s Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa. Enhancing the capacity of its law enforcement agencies and deploying soldiers to the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) were the focus of Djibouti’s efforts to counter terrorism in 2013. Djibouti received significant capacity building assistance in the way of
counterterrorism training and equipment provided by the United States through a variety of courses and programs.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Due to its geographic location and porous borders, counterterrorism remained a high priority for all Djiboutian law enforcement entities. Djibouti has a legal framework for prosecuting terrorism-related crimes and tries terrorists in criminal courts using its penal code. In 2013, Djibouti did not prosecute any terrorism-related cases.

Djibouti’s most visible counterterrorism efforts were ad hoc checkpoints and cordon-and-search operations within the capital city, and an increased emphasis at border control points to screen for potential security threats. In April, Djibouti amended its Technical Committee in charge of the Fight against Terrorism, created in October 2001, by adding an eighth member from the Coast Guard.

Djibouti continued to process travelers on entry and departure at its international airport and seaport with the Personal Identification Secure Comparison Evaluation System (PISCES). While the airport and seaport are important entry points, the vast majority of travelers cross into Djibouti by land at one of three land border points, including one point on the Somali border.

Djiboutian law enforcement personnel acknowledged the difficulty of securing the coast and land borders; however, the Djiboutian Coast Guard’s capacity to patrol the coastline was significantly increased by the donation of two patrol boats by the Japanese government, and a U.S.-funded 33-foot patrol boat. The U.S. government also provided a consultation on Maritime Movement Operations through the U.S. Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance program to augment law enforcement’s ability to patrol its waters. With such training, the new vessels have enhanced the capacity of the Coast Guard, and the U.S.-funded patrol boat has significantly extended the range of coastline that the Coast Guard can patrol. Patrolling the land borders, however, remained a concern. The Djiboutian National Police has control over border checkpoints, and the Djibouti Armed Forces was responsible for patrolling the border. Officials at Djiboutian National Police-manned checkpoints were susceptible to bribes.

Following the Westgate Mall attack in Nairobi, the Government of Djibouti enhanced its protection of potential soft targets throughout the country. While the ability of Djibouti to protect these sites over the long-term will be a challenge, the Djiboutian National Police and Gendarmerie have done an admirable job of developing plans to protect popular hotels and stores in Djibouti City. In 2013, the Government of Djibouti’s ability to respond to a terrorist attack, specifically an improvised explosive device, was significantly enhanced. The Djiboutian National Police and Gendarmes received post-blast investigations training from the International Law Enforcement Academy in Gaborone, as well as from the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Djibouti received significant law enforcement counterterrorism capacity building through the ATA program, including training and equipment on border security issues, leadership and management, and crisis response issues.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Djibouti’s request for observer status at the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force remained pending at year’s end. The country plays an important role regionally and has a more developed formal financial sector than some of its neighbors.

The Central Bank of Djibouti houses a financial intelligence unit (FIU), known as the Fraud Investigation Unit. Given its very limited resources including lack of staff, the FIU is unable to perform its core functions and instead focuses on banking supervision. The FIU has made no case referrals to law enforcement involving suspected terrorist financing. In March, FIU staff attended two
trainings related to regulatory supervision: “Security in the Gulf of Aden” held in Yemen and “Global Counterterrorism” held in Ethiopia. In addition, FIU staff participated in the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Security Sector Program held in April to harmonize counterterrorism laws among IGAD’s eight East African country members.


Regional and International Cooperation: Djibouti is a member of the AU and has deployed troops to AMISOM. In April, Djibouti sent a delegation to Sanaa, Yemen, for the Gulf of Aden Counterterrorism Forum – a regional meeting that brings together counterterrorism officials from Djibouti, Somalia, and Yemen to discuss shared challenges. Djibouti is a member of the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism.

Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism: Most of the Government of Djibouti’s strategic communications efforts are focused on youth. In response to a growing youth violence problem, members of Parliament and representatives of the Ministry of Islamic Affairs held monthly meetings in Djibouti’s low-income neighborhoods. The Ministry of Youth and Sports organized sports leagues to engage youth in positive activities.

ERITREA

Overview: Eritrea did not experience any major acts of international terrorism in 2013. The Government of Eritrea claimed that it sought to be a partner in the war on terrorism. Eritrean officials in Asmara, at the UN, and at the AU issued statements and told U.S officials that they wanted to move out of a long period of regional isolation and animosity. Eritrean officials engaged with some neighboring states, as well as nations in sub-Saharan Africa and the Arabian Peninsula to discuss regional stability, counterterrorism cooperation, and regional initiatives to counter transnational challenges. The Eritrean Foreign Minister expressed public dismay at al-Shabaab’s September 2013 attack on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi. However, Ethiopia and other nations in East Africa continued to accuse Eritrea of sponsoring armed groups destabilizing the region. The Eritrean government, for its part, continued to deny the accusations and, in return, levied charges that Ethiopia-supported groups continued to pursue the violent overthrow of the Eritrean regime. Eritrea’s lack of commitment to regional stability reduced opportunities for counterterrorism cooperation or dialogue.

In May, the United States re-certified Eritrea as “not cooperating fully” with U.S. counterterrorism efforts under Section 40A of the Arms Export and Control Act, as amended. In considering this annual determination, the Department of State reviewed Eritrea’s overall level of cooperation with U.S. efforts to combat terrorism, taking into account U.S. counterterrorism objectives and a realistic assessment of Eritrean capabilities.

The Government of Eritrea has been under UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions since December 2009. UNSCR 1907 (2009) imposed an arms embargo on Eritrea and a travel ban and asset freeze on some military and political leaders, calling on the nation to “cease arming, training and equipping armed groups and their members, including al-Shabaab, that aim to destabilize the region.”

In July, the UNSC called on Eritrea to begin cooperating with the Somalia and Eritrea Monitoring Group (SEMG), so that the body could determine the veracity of regional claims about Eritrean
assistance to regional destabilizers. Refusal of the Government of Eritrea to hold substantive discussions with the SEMG, on grounds that the sanctions regime aimed simply to “humiliate” Eritrea and that the international community had turned a blind eye to Ethiopian misdeeds, prevented international investigations of charges against Eritrea. In December, Eritrean officials met with the SEMG in Paris in what the latter termed a productive meeting; subsequent confidence-building sessions have been scheduled for 2014.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Articles 259-264, 269-270, and 282 of the Eritrean Penal Code, grandfathered into present-day law from 1957, criminalize terrorist methods; measures of intimidation or terror; acts of conspiracy carried out by organized armed bands; use of arms, means, or support from foreign organizations; the use of bombs, dynamite, explosives or other terrorist methods constituting a public danger; genocide; and war crimes against the civilian population. Other sections of Eritrean law could also be used to prosecute terrorism, including acts related to: offenses against public safety, property, the state, national interests, and international interests; attacks on the independence of the state; impairment of the defensive power of the state; high treason; economic treason; collaboration; and provocation and preparation.

Entities including the Eritrean Defense Forces, National Security Agency, Police, Immigration and Customs authorities all potentially have counterterrorism responsibilities. Chain of command may work effectively within some security and law enforcement elements, but there are rivalries between and overlaps of responsibility among the various forces. Many soldiers, police officers, and immigration and customs agents are young national service recruits or assignees, who are performing their jobs without adequate training.

Eritrea closely monitors passenger manifests for any flights coming into Asmara, and scrutinizes travel documents of visitors, but does not collect biometric data. Government officials lack training and technology to recognize fraudulent documents. The Government of Eritrea does not share information gathered at ports of entry with the United States. Eritrea’s borders with Ethiopia and Djibouti are tightly controlled, whereas the border with Sudan is porous in some places, resulting in a considerable amount of unrecorded movement across by persons across the border.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Eritrea is not a member of a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body. This gap prevents any overall assessment of the risks the country faces in regards to terrorist financing. Eritrea’s general lack of transparency on banking, financial, and economic matters made the gathering of definitive information difficult. The United States is unaware of passage and/or implementation of counterterrorist finance-related legislation in 2013. Article 263 of the Penal Code criminalizes economic treason.

The United States is unaware of whether the government routinely distributes UN lists of designated terrorists or terrorist entities to financial institutions. The Government of Eritrea’s longstanding policy of self-reliance and self-imposed isolation predispose it to reject non-indigenous regulatory arrangements and it is reluctant to cooperate with sanctions regimes. In addition, it lacks laws, resources, financial checks and balances, and an independent, properly-trained judiciary.

Regional and International Cooperation: Eritrea is a member of the AU, and would like to reactiviate its membership in the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); however, Eritrea’s return to IGAD is opposed by Ethiopia and by Djibouti, both of whom have had military conflicts with Eritrea in recent years.

ETHIOPIA

Overview: The Government of Ethiopia viewed instability in Somalia as a critical national security threat and maintained a defensive military presence along the Somali border to stem potential infiltration of violent extremists into Ethiopia. Ethiopian military forces continued counterterrorism operations in Somalia in partnership with the Government of Somalia and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and were instrumental in combating al-Shabaab in southern and central Somalia. At the end of 2013, Ethiopia committed to having its troops join AMISOM. The Ethiopian government remained concerned about groups it has designated domestically as terrorist groups, including the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), and Ginbot 7. The Ethiopian government collaborated with the United States on a number of regional security issues.

2013 Terrorist Incidents: On October 13, two suspected al-Shabaab operatives, identified by the Ethiopian government as Somali nationals, detonated an explosives-laden vest while preparing for a suicide attack against an unspecified target in Addis Ababa, killing both operatives. Police immediately detained at least three individuals associated with the plot, and announced in December that five additional suspects had been arrested.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The Ethiopian government passed the Antiterrorism Proclamation (ATP) in 2009, followed by legislation in 2011 designating five organizations as terrorist groups – including al-Qa’ida (AQ), al-Shabaab, the ONLF, OLF, and Ginbot 7. While the ATP has been used to prosecute and convict a small number of individuals associated with terrorist activity, it has also been used to prosecute and convict journalists, opposition political figures, and activists. International observers, including the U.S. government, have also raised concerns over the conduct of other trials against members of Ethiopia’s Muslim community where evidence presented appeared to be indicative of acts of a political nature rather than terrorism.

Ethiopia’s National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) has broad authority for intelligence, border security, and criminal investigations, and is responsible for overall counterterrorism management. The Ethiopian Federal Police (EFP) work with the NISS on counterterrorism issues. To improve its counterterrorism capacity, Ethiopia participated in programs funded through the U.S. Department of State’s Regional Strategic Initiative and Antiterrorism Assistance program (ATA). Through ATA, Ethiopia received training and related equipment to support capacity building on leadership and management, border security, and investigative skill development.

Ethiopia employed biometric security measures at international airports and most major points of entry, and is continuing to add such capabilities at additional border crossings.

Significant law enforcement actions included:

- In February, the Ethiopian government reported that security personnel had disrupted a nascent al-Shabaab offshoot cell in Ethiopia named Hareketul Shebabil Fi Biladel Hijeraiten.
In March, the Ethiopian government announced that security personnel had arrested eight al-Shabaab members accused of plotting to kidnap UN workers.

In April, prosecutors charged 28 individuals (11 of whom were charged in absentia) under the Antiterrorism Proclamation for alleged links to AQ and al-Shabaab. Trial proceedings were temporarily closed to the public in July after prosecution witnesses expressed concerns about their personal safety; legal proceedings were reopened October 29 and were ongoing at year’s end.

Lack of experience among police, prosecutors, and judges with regard to terrorism incidents and cases remained a challenge. The Ethiopian government has expressed interest in and willingness to engage with foreign governments and international bodies to improve its capabilities in these areas.

In November, three Ethiopian police analysts participated in a capacity building program in Kenya to train with regional counterparts to combat al-Shabaab. The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation provided training to Ethiopian counterparts on improvised explosives device analysis, and on techniques and methods used by al-Shabaab.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** In 2013, Ethiopia became a member of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG), an associate member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and a regional FATF-style body. In October, the FATF called attention to the country’s failure to meet its agreed action plan and called for additional work on its deficiencies: to establish and implement an adequate legal framework and procedures to identify and freeze terrorist assets; and improve customer due-diligence measures. Its membership in the ESAAMLG could facilitate the country to conduct a formal risk assessment of its vulnerabilities; the lack of such a strategic approach has been highlighted by experts as a major gap.

Although terrorist financing is criminalized, prosecutions are rare. In 2013, the National Bank of Ethiopia froze and confiscated assets allegedly used in planning terrorist acts. The Charities and Societies Agency is responsible for monitoring NGOs, but has limited expertise in the area of terrorist finance.


**Regional and International Cooperation:** Ethiopia is a member of the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) and the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism. Ethiopia participated in regional and multilateral forums for counterterrorism, including IGAD Security Sector Program trainings, which build the capacity of IGAD member states to mitigate, detect, and deter terrorist activity. Ethiopia was an active participant in AU counterterrorism efforts, which included activities of the Center for Study and Research on Terrorism and meetings of the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa.

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**KENYA**

**Overview:** Kenya is a member of the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism, and is a strong ally of the United States in the fight against al-Shabaab and al-Qa’ida (AQ). The September 2013 al-Shabaab attack on Nairobi’s Westgate Shopping Mall focused the world’s attention on Kenya
and Kenyan counterterrorism efforts, highlighting significant shortcomings in the Kenyan security forces’ response. The attack appeared to strengthen Kenyan resolve to fight al-Shabaab, including increased operations by Kenya Defense Forces units under the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). In October, President Uhuru Kenyatta announced his intention to appoint a commission of inquiry into Westgate “lapses and how we can avoid them in the future,” but no such report had been released publicly by year’s end.

Kenya’s counterterrorism cooperation with the United States and other partner nations remained strong: the Kenyan government welcomed substantial U.S. assistance in the post-Westgate investigation and requested additional support on border security and other issues following Westgate.

2013 Terrorist Incidents: Official figures on the Westgate attack listed 65 civilians, six soldiers and police officers, and four terrorists among the dead. Hundreds more were injured and 27 people were listed as missing by the Kenyan Red Cross. Most Westgate victims were citizens of Kenya, along with multiple victims from the UK, India, Canada and France; and single victims from Australia, China, Ghana, the Netherlands, Peru, South Africa, South Korea, and Trinidad and Tobago. Al-Shabaab publicly claimed responsibility for the Westgate attack, as well as for three attacks in Garissa in May and August, and an attack in Wajir in September. Ten individuals died in these other attacks (including several police officers and a Red Cross official), dozens more were injured, and two police officers were abducted.

Other unclaimed attacks by individuals or groups appearing to be sympathetic to al-Shabaab or AQ included numerous shootings, grenade, and improvised explosive device attacks against security forces, aid workers, civilians, and refugees in hotels, restaurants, mosques, and vehicles. Hardest hit areas were the northeast border counties of Garissa (including the Dadaab refugee camps), Mandera, and Wajir, but attacks also took place in Nairobi, Mombasa, Kilifi, and Lamu counties.


The Kenyan judiciary demonstrated increasing independence and competence, but remained hampered by a lack of key procedural tools to allow effective use of plea agreements, cooperation agreements, electronic evidence and other undercover investigative tools. Nevertheless, courts began trying cases under the 2012 PTA for the first time in late 2013. The first prosecutions under the 2012 PTA were four cases against alleged Westgate accomplices, and they remained ongoing at year’s end. Five other alleged co-conspirators were charged but remained at-large.

Kenyan law enforcement was hampered by limited resources, insufficient training, and endemic corruption. Counterterrorism functions were divided between the three branches of the newly-restructured National Police Service: the Kenya Police (including the investigative Antiterrorism Police Unit and the paramilitary General Services Unit), the Directorate of Criminal Investigation and the Administration Police, and non-police agencies such as the National Intelligence Service and elements of the Kenya Defense Forces. Operational effectiveness was sometimes impeded by poor coordination among and within police, intelligence, and military forces; as well as unclear command, control, and overt political interference. Kenyan authorities identified crisis response and border
security as key areas for improvement, and discussed possible additional assistance with partner nations including the United States.

Terrorist screening watchlists, biographic and biometric screening, and other measures were in place at major Kenyan ports of entry. Kenya continued its partnership with the United States to strengthen Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System border controls at major ports of entry, including expanded automatic data transmission capability at frequently traveled sites.

In 2013, Kenya participated in a range of U.S. government-sponsored programs. The U.S. Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance program focused on building law enforcement capacities in the areas of border security, investigations, and crisis response, and on the institutionalization of counterterrorism prevention and response capabilities. The U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement assistance was largely dedicated to building the capacity of Kenya’s new Independent Police Accountability Office. DHS Customs and Border Patrol assistance provided multinational training including Kenya for rural border patrol units such as those in the Kenya Police Service and the Kenya Wildlife Service.

Despite the challenges, Kenyan police, intelligence, and military agencies regularly detected and disrupted terrorist threats large and small. While the Westgate attack showed glaring gaps in Kenyan command and control and the unsuitability of conventional military forces to respond to a civilian incident such as Westgate, the initial response by the Crisis Response Team of the elite General Service Unit Recce Company was more competent.

Kenyan authorities were generally responsive to requests for assistance from the United States, and cooperated with U.S. counterparts on investigations and in securing the safety of U.S. citizens and interests. Even prior to the passage of the 2012 law, Kenyan authorities began prosecutions in high profile cases of plots targeting Western interests, convicting and sentencing to life in prison Iranians Ahmad Abolfathi and Sayed Mansouri on explosives charges in May, and continuing the ongoing trial of British citizen Jermaine Grant on charges of plotting to kill Western tourists on behalf of AQ.

Although allegations of police abuses – including extra-judicial killings and arbitrary detentions – persist, progress continued on police reforms, including the public vetting of police commanders, which began in late 2013 in an effort to combat endemic police corruption and strengthen weak civilian oversight to increase the effectiveness of Kenyan security sector institutions. Mismanagement, corruption, and lack of capacity on border controls and systems for national identification for citizens, residents, and refugees hampered the ability of law enforcement to identify and detain potential terrorists.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Kenya is a member of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group, a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. In October, Kenya was recognized by the FATF for progress in improving its anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime. Key deficiencies remain, however, including: adequately criminalizing terrorist financing; ensuring a fully operational and effectively functioning financial intelligence unit; establishing and implementing an adequate legal framework for the identification and freezing of terrorist assets; and implementing an adequate and effective AML/CFT supervisory program for all financial sectors.

Also in October, the National Assembly passed the 2013 Finance Act containing amendments to the 2012 Prevention of Terrorism Act that strengthened Kenyan legal provision criminalizing the financing
of terrorism. In an October 2013 public statement, the FATF praised Kenya for “steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime” but noted that “Kenya should continue to work on implementing its action plan” to address deficiencies in legislation, operational effectiveness, asset identification and freezing, and financial sector supervision. Kenya’s Financial Reporting Center continued to make progress in becoming fully operational but reported no significant prosecutions or seizures and remained hampered by a lack of essential resources including an electronic reporting system for suspicious transactions.

While the Financial Reporting Center made a good start at addressing the formal financial system and expanded the number of reporting entities that it will serve, those efforts did not yet include informal money/value transfer services and exchange houses. The Central Bank of Kenya took steps to encourage more people to use the formal financial sector in order to increase financial integrity by ensuring regulatory oversight. The Financial Reporting Center monitored mobile money transactions to a degree, especially the popular Safaricom Mpesa service, but did not engage with NGOs to file suspicious transaction reports.


**Regional and International Cooperation:** Kenya is a member of the AU, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development, the Community of Eastern and Southern Africa, and the East African Community. Kenyan law enforcement agencies worked with these organizations and the broader international community, including the United States, to increase their counterterrorism capacity and secure land, sea, and air borders. Kenya also cooperated with the United States and other nations to secure especially dangerous pathogens and enhance the Kenyan government’s capability to prevent the sale, theft, diversion, or accidental release of chemical, biological, or radiological weapons-related materials, technology, and expertise.

Kenya’s primary contribution to supporting counterterrorism capacity building in other nations was its significant troop contribution to AMISOM. In addition, Kenya hosted numerous trainings involving law enforcement professionals from neighboring nations to build counterterrorism capacities and increase regional cooperation.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** Some Kenyan civil society organizations actively worked to address the drivers of radicalization and violent extremism in Kenya, often with assistance from the United States and other international partners; but the Government of Kenya was not engaged in significant efforts in such areas.

**MALI**

**Overview:** The Government of Mali, both while it was led by an interim government following the March 2012 coup d’état and with a newly elected national government in 2013, has been a willing U.S. counterterrorism partner, if constrained by a number of serious challenges. In 2013, Mali was emerging from a series of events including a January 2012 rebellion in the North, a coup d’état, an attempted counter coup, and the loss of control in the northern two-thirds of the country to violent extremist groups. With the help of a French-African intervention force beginning in January 2013, and the democratic election of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita in August 2013, the terrorists were pushed out of the major northern cities, and Mali began to address the debilitating effects of the
multipronged crises facing the country. The newly elected government reaffirmed longstanding support for counterterrorism cooperation and has been an advocate for enhanced regional cooperation, including through its membership in the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP).

The January international military intervention led by French Serval forces enabled the Government of Mali to gradually restore control over major northern population centers and begin to deny safe haven to terrorist groups and prevent them from further imposing extreme interpretations of Islamic law, including al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al-Murabitoun (AMB), the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), and Ansar al-Dine (AAD). French forces have continued working with the Malian government to degrade remaining violent extremist elements in Mali’s vast northern territories. The UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission to Mali (MINUSMA) continued to work with the Malian government to facilitate the redeployment of Malian administrators and security forces to the north. Although the ongoing international military intervention has succeeded in wresting control of the north back from violent extremists, these extremist groups have maintained a foothold there and have continued to launch attacks to undermine the security and stability of Mali and its neighbors.

While assistance to Mali had been suspended following the March 2012 military coup that overthrew Mali’s democratically elected government, that suspension ended on September 6, 2013, when the United States resumed development assistance to the Government of Mali after the restoration of democratic government.

**2013 Terrorist Incidents:** Beginning in January 2013, French Serval forces and the Malian government conducted operations in the northern regions of Kidal, Timbuktu, and Gao to counter major terrorist cells of AQIM, MUJAO, and AAD, who occupied the North of the country, held hostages on Malian soil, kidnapped foreigners, and conducted attacks targeting international and Malian military forces. Incidents linked to terrorism included:

- On September 28, suicide bombers targeting a Malian military camp in Timbuktu detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) that killed Malian civilians and injured six Malian soldiers. AQIM claimed responsibility for the attack through public media.
- On October 7 and 8, MUJAO elements reportedly launched mortar shells on two bridges in Gao. One bridge was destroyed in the attack.
- On October 23, four suicide bombers detonated improvised explosive devices targeting a Chadian contingent of MINUSMA forces near a military camp in the Kidal region. The attack resulted in the deaths of two Chadian soldiers, one Malian civilian, and the four suicide bombers. At least six others were wounded in the attack. AMB claimed responsibility for this attack through the press.
- On October 28, four French hostages who were kidnapped in Niger and held in northern Mali since 2010 were released.
- On November 2, violent extremist elements kidnapped and killed two French journalists in Kidal. AQIM claimed responsibility for murdering the journalists on November 6, through public media.
- On November 14, Sultan Ould Badi, a Malian formerly affiliated with MUJAO and currently affiliated with AMB, claimed responsibility for a VBIED that detonated at the Malian Solidarity Bank in the northern city of Kidal. The explosion killed two Senegalese MINUSMA troops and injured seven Malian Armed Forces who were guarding the bank. The perpetrator died in the bombing.
Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: In May, Mali’s legislature enacted a new penal code intended to help counter terrorism and transnational organized crime. The new law calls for the establishment of a counterterrorism center to centralize all terrorism investigations and prosecutions. The new penal code establishes an interagency investigative brigade, analysts, and specialized prosecutors and investigative judges for terrorism offenses.

Malian law enforcement arrested some 200 individuals for crimes in connection with terrorism and rebellion against the state. No case has been successfully prosecuted as a result of these arrests by year’s end. Resource constraints, a lack of training in investigative techniques, and inexperience with trying terrorism cases rendered the judicial system weak. Coming out of the post-coup environment, the lack of enforcement of laws, training, and capacity resulted in the judiciary not prosecuting terrorism cases.


Other examples of significant French Serval Force actions included:

- On February 25, French Serval and Chadian troops killed Abdelhamid Abou Zeid. An Algerian national and leader in AQIM, Abou Zeid was killed during military operations to eradicate terrorists from northern Mali.
- On December 9, French Serval forces engaged with AQIM elements during a large scale operation that resulted in 19 killed violent extremists in the Kidal and Timbuktu regions.

The Malian Armed Forces and Air Force under the Ministry of Defense are generally responsible for securing Mali against terrorist threats. The General Directorate of State Security under the Ministry of Security has the authority to investigate and detain persons for terrorism offenses. Law enforcement and military units do not coordinate on counterterrorism missions.

Although Mali has basic border security enforcement mechanisms, law enforcement units lack capacity, training, and mobility assets to effectively secure Mali’s porous borders. The gendarmerie and national border police under the Ministry of Defense provide paramilitary support to prevent and deter criminal activity at borders. Customs officials under the Ministry of Economy and Finance monitor the flow of goods and enforce customs laws at borders and ports of entry. Mali receives Interpol notices, but the Interpol database is not available at any point of entry in Mali for law enforcement units to compare travel documents to the Interpol lists. Access to the Interpol list is restricted to senior government officials and is made available to investigators upon request. Mali has rudimentary security features in travel documents. Customs officials have travel forms to collect biographical information from travelers at airports and manifests for information on goods transiting borders. In practice, however, customs officials and border police do not log these forms into databases or compare the biographic data on forms against presented travel documents or manifests against goods possessed.

A major impediment to more effective law enforcement and border security in Mali is that security services, particularly the military, had inefficient command and control capacity after the 2012 coup d’état. Malian law enforcement units remained insufficiently resourced and trained in effective law
enforcement, counterterrorism investigative techniques, and enhanced border security operations through the end of 2013.

Although Mali’s law enforcement capacity needs improvement, the Government of Mali has recognized the importance of having a security force capable of securing its borders against the threats posed by terrorist elements, organized crime, and narco-trafficking. Mali’s Ministry of Internal Security and Civilian Protection initiated an interagency working group December 30 to reform the security sector in Mali. With international support, Mali is working to build security forces that would operate with restored command and control within the military hierarchy. Mali also benefited from international support to enable Mali to proactively detect, deter, and prevent acts of terrorism in its territory. The 2013 EU Training Mission in Mali assisted the Ministry of Defense in elaborating a strategy for defense sector reform and reinforcing command and control within the military. The EU Training Mission provided basic training for more than 2,000 Malian soldiers. French Serval forces, in collaboration with the Malian government, apprehended terrorists during military operations that were transferred to Malian prisons for detention.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Mali is a member of the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), a Financial Action Task Force-style (FATF) regional body. A recent FATF/GIABA West Africa terrorism finance typology featured two case studies from Mali: one examined the abuse of non-profit organizations that fund terrorist groups through complex financial maneuvers; and the second examined kidnapping for ransom as a means to raise funds for terrorist organizations. Kidnapping for ransom is considered a problem in Mali, and AQIM has used ransoms to fund its operations.

Mali’s financial intelligence unit is the National Center for the Treatment of Financial Information (CENTIF). CENTIF is authorized by law to freeze assets for a maximum of 48 hours while conducting an investigation. The 48-hour period can be extended by a magistrate.

On December 23, CENTIF held a workshop for Malian non-profit organizations on money laundering and terrorist financing. The main impediments to improving the Malian law enforcement response to terrorist finance were a lack of coordination between CENTIF and the law enforcement community, as well as insufficient judicial capacity to transform CENTIF investigations into effective prosecutions. Mali’s law enforcement capacity to freeze and confiscate assets remains unclear given that Mali has never identified or frozen any assets under Malian jurisdiction of UN-designated terrorist individuals or entities.

While Mali has the ability to track transactions through formal networks; it lacks the capacity to trace informal networks and alternative money transfer systems such as *hawala*. Like most West African countries, Mali relies on cash for virtually all daily transactions. While businesses are legally required to report cash transactions over US $10,000, most do not. Mali’s new penal code on counterterrorism has a provision to create an interagency investigative brigade, with analysts, specialized prosecutors, and investigative judges for cases specific to terrorist financing.


**Regional and International Cooperation:** During the year, Mali significantly increased its cooperation with regional and international partners both militarily and politically. Mali is active in
regional organizations and international bodies including the Economic Community Of West African States, the UN, and the AU. Mali is a member of the TSCTP and also participated in the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF).

The AU created a follow-up and support group for the political and security situation in Mali and has held six meetings in Mali with international partners on enhancing international cooperation to bring political stability and security in Mali.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** The Government of Mali initiated activities to counter violent extremism. In November, Mali held a National Dialogue on the north in November to foster national reconciliation, address the grievances of populations, and identify measures to reduce instances of violence in the north. As one of the first acts of the newly elected president, Mali established a new Ministry for National Reconciliation and Development of Northern Regions. This third-highest ranking cabinet ministry held inter-community dialogues in northern regions to address inter-ethnic tensions and to resolve local conflict. Mali participated in GCTF meetings and is seeking to become a pilot country for grass-roots projects to counter violent extremism.

Mali used counternarratives to denigrate terrorist propaganda and established a mechanism to amplify voices of victims of terrorism. Malian officials and prominent religious leaders routinely condemn violent extremist ideology and terrorist acts. Most Malians practice a tolerant form of Sufi Islam; as a general matter, violent extremist ideologies have not found a receptive audience among Malians. In October, Malian imams began participation in a five-year Moroccan program to train 500 imams in peace messaging and computer literacy.

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**MAURITANIA**

**Overview:** The Mauritanian government continued to prioritize counterterrorism in 2013, focusing on improving the capacity of security forces and securing the country’s borders. Mauritania is not a safe haven for terrorists or terrorist groups, although regions in the interior are imperfectly monitored due to their geographic isolation from population centers and inhospitable desert conditions. Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) remained a leading threat to Mauritania in 2013. Mauritania is a member of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP). There were no terrorist attacks in Mauritania in 2013.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Mauritania’s counterterrorism legal framework is relatively new. Enacted in 2010, the national counterterrorism laws define terrorism as a criminal act, describe court procedure in terrorism cases, and prescribe punishment for perpetrators. The Mauritanian government continued to send prosecutors and investigative magistrates to terrorism prosecution trainings organized by the United States and other international partners. In 2013, Mauritanian law enforcement participated in the U.S. Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance program, which helped to build capacity in the areas of border security, investigations, and crisis response.

Mauritanian law enforcement has adequate capacity to detect, deter, and prevent terrorism. Although Mauritanian security forces may have successfully deterred or prevented acts of terrorism during 2013, they did not face any great tests of capacity. Mauritania’s National Gendarmerie, a paramilitary police agency within the Ministry of Defense, and the National Guard under the Ministry of Interior are the
primary law enforcement units performing counterterrorism functions. Cooperation and information-sharing between the two organizations occurred sporadically.

Border security is a priority of the Mauritanian government, but it remains far from perfect due to a lack of capacity and a standing policy that delegates responsibility for different sections of the country’s long land borders to different security forces. Mauritania’s border forces employ biometric screening capabilities at some – but not all – ports of entry. Information-sharing efforts within the host government and with other countries are embryonic.

Mauritanian authorities continued to arrest, prosecute, and convict terrorists. In the course of the year, the Mauritanian judiciary handled five individual terrorism-related cases:

- On April 14, the Supreme Court of Mauritania upheld a death sentence imposed on a Mauritanian citizen convicted of murdering a U.S. citizen at the behest of AQIM. It also denied appeals of two prison sentences for the same crime, and returned the cases to the country’s appellate court.
- On May 14, Mauritanian soldiers arrested a Tunisian and an Algerian on suspicion of membership in armed Islamic groups in Bassikounou, a city situated in the country’s southeastern corner along the border with Mali. After transfer to Nouakchott for interrogation, the suspects were placed in pre-trial detention pending the completion of an investigation.
- Also on May 14, Nouakchott’s criminal court sentenced Abdellahi Ould Gheilani, a Mauritanian gendarme, to 10 years in prison for collaborating with AQIM during a suspected reconnaissance of a Mauritanian airbase. On the same day, a judge from the same court sentenced four students from the Islamic University of Aioun to five years in prison apiece for membership in an unspecified group “planning terrorist attacks in Mauritania.”
- On May 19, Mauritanian security forces took into custody Senda Ould Bouamama, the former spokesman of Ansar al-Dine, who voluntarily surrendered and requested trial in Mauritania, his native country. Bouamama has since been placed in pre-trial confinement pending completion of the government’s investigation against him.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Mauritania is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force, a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body, and maintains observer status within the Intergovernmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa. Smuggling and transshipments via the country pose a vulnerability that has been exploited by terrorists. Bulk cash smuggling is another vulnerability given the undeveloped financial markets of the country.

From May 12 to 16 in Nouakchott, Mauritanian investigative magistrates, prosecutors, law enforcement officers, and financial intelligence experts joined counterparts from Niger and the United States to discuss new and innovative ways to enforce laws aimed at countering terrorist financing and money laundering.

Although legislation regulating alternative remittances exists, the Mauritanian government does not have the resources to monitor sizable flows of funds through the informal *hawala* money transfer system.
For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: 

Regional and International Cooperation: Mauritania remained an active member of the UN and the AU. On March 17, the Mauritanian government hosted the AU’s Ministerial Meeting on the Enhancement of Cooperation in Security and the Operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture in the Sahel-Saharan Region. In his opening remarks, Foreign Minister Hamadi Ould Hamadi called for a common strategic vision for the Sahel that could ensure the territorial integrity of Mali and defend against the threat of organized crime.

On November 3, Mauritania co-hosted a meeting of the Global Counterterrorism Forum’s Working Group on Capacity Building (AU, the EU, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Qatar, Russia, Spain, Turkey, the UK, and the International Organization for Migration) in Nouakchott. The conference focused on Mauritania’s civilian capacity gaps, particularly in the civilian criminal justice sector, and on the coordination of donor capacity building efforts in that area.

Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism: The Mauritanian government continued to manage programs designed to counter violent extremism and to offer alternatives to at-risk individuals. In 2013, the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Traditional Education trained over 300 former mahadra (Quranic school) students in vocational subjects at three education centers in Nouakchott, Atar, and Kaedi. The Mauritanian government also continued to collaborate with independent Islamic religious organizations to promote moderation, sponsoring radio and TV programming on the themes of temperance in Islam, and paying monthly salaries of US $170 to 800 imams who fulfilled stringent selection criteria. In September, the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and Traditional Education organized a training seminar for 137 imams across the country in cooperation with the Institute for Islamic Studies in Nouakchott. The program stressed responsibility for encouraging moderate interpretations of Islamic doctrine.

NIGER

Overview: The Nigerien government prioritized counterterrorism but limited capacity constrained efforts. Porous borders and the huge expanse of Niger that lacks a persistent government presence provided terrorist groups with an environment conducive to recruitment of terrorist operatives and acquisition of resources by illegal means such as smuggling and kidnapping. Terrorists committed coordinated, asymmetric attacks in Niger in 2013. Niger is a member of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP).

Historic tensions between the Nigerien state and Tuareg groups traditionally associated with trans-Saharan smuggling contributed to some support for terrorist operatives. Niger sent a force of over 600 troops to intervene against terrorist groups in northern Mali as part of the African-Led International Support Mission in Mali and increased its contribution to over 800 troops in the follow-on UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). Niger also continued its counterterrorism cooperation with other regional partners and organizations.

The presence of the terrorist group Boko Haram (BH) in northern Nigeria, just across Niger’s southern border, remained a threat. The Government of Niger remained committed to fighting al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al-Mulathamun Battalion (AMB), and BH, but needed and welcomed external support and greater regional cooperation.
The United States significantly increased its security sector capacity building programs with Niger in 2013. A U.S. Department of Justice Resident Legal Advisor also worked with the Nigerien Ministry of Justice to: build counterterrorism capacity in the justice sector, provide training to judges and prosecutors on counterterrorism investigations and legislation, focus on the physical protection of government institutions, and on the prison system.

2013 Terrorist Incidents:
- On May 23, a Nigerien military base in Agadez and a French uranium mine in Arlit (both in northern Niger) were simultaneously targeted by terrorists associated with AQIM. The coordinated attacks used vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices followed by explosive vests, grenades, and small arms. All of the attackers were killed, and 12 suspects believed to be facilitators were arrested after the attacks. Even though one of the attacks took place on a military facility, Ministry of Interior forces – trained through the U.S. Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program – were sent to intervene. The attack demonstrated significant gaps in Niger’s ability to detect threats and organize a coordinated response.
- On June 1, prisoners who were associated with BH and AQIM escaped from prison in Niamey, one of whom was indicted for the murder of an American in 2000. Two Nigerien National Guard members and one prisoner were killed in the prison break. Only two of the nine escaped prisoners were recaptured.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Niger has updated its legislation to criminalize acts of terrorism and refine its ability to enact the law through the creation of the new Judicial Counterterrorism Center and the Central Service for the Fight against Terrorism (SCLCT). Law enforcement entities as well as military units have created new crisis response units and enhance their border patrol capacity. Niger’s law enforcement capacity is based on the overall willingness and availability of specialized units such as the Ministry of Interior’s National Police Intervention Group (GIPN) for intervention capacity and the SCLCT for counterterrorism investigation. Nigerien units lack some basic and most specialized equipment needed to complete missions. Niger recognized the importance of a sustained in-country training facility by dedicating 12 acres to a joint training facility located near SCLCT.

During 2013, the SCLCT arrested multiple terrorist suspects on charges that included planning acts of terrorism, association with a terrorist organization, recruitment, and financing terrorism. In response to the terrorist attacks in Agadez and Arlit, Nigerien security services significantly increased security in Niamey and other cities, and specifically areas around Niamey’s Presidential Palace and diplomatic quarter. Arrests included an arms network providing weapons to BH. However, there were no terrorism trials during 2013. Judicial proceedings were often delayed by a lack of resources and investigative capacity.

In October, Niger co-hosted its second Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) Sahel Cross-Border Workshop in Niamey. In October, Niger also signed a security agreement with Nigeria to include joint border patrols aimed at fighting BH. With the support of the United States, the Government of Niger agreed to install an additional three Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Identification Systems (PISCES) at three key border control locations. Additionally, more than 220 Nigerien security service officers received eight training courses from the State Department’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program, as well as other training opportunities. Topics included Critical Response Team Operations, Border Control Management, Precursor-Chemical Introduction, and Post-Blast Investigation.
Resource constraints across the spectrum of basic needs such as electricity, radios, and reliable vehicles made it difficult for the Government of Niger to carry out effective law enforcement and border security.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Niger is a member of the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), a Financial Action Task Force-style (FATF) regional body. A recent FATF/GIABA West Africa terrorism finance typology featured several case studies from Niger that involved bulk cash smuggling and the export of munitions to support Nigerian terrorist activities. Kidnapping for ransom is also a problem, as proceeds from this activity finance terrorist groups in the region.

In 2013, Niger’s financial intelligence unit, known by its French acronym, CENTIF, continued to become fully operational, added staff, and improved its physical infrastructure and information-technology capabilities. In 2013, CENTIF carried out a number of awareness-raising activities for reporting entities, and received a handful of suspicious transaction reports from financial institutions.


**Regional and International Cooperation:** Niger deployed over 800 troops to Mali as part of MINUSMA. Niger continued to work with Mali, Algeria, and Mauritania through a combined counterterrorism center called the General Staff Joint Operations Committee (CEMOC) in Tamanrasset, Algeria. Niger increased efforts to improve joint patrols and operations with Algeria, conducted joint patrols with Nigeria and Chad, and held high-level discussions with Libya regarding border security. The EU continued its support for a 50-person team in Niger to build capacity in countering terrorism and other organized crime.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** Nigerien government-led initiatives to provide employment to released prisoners, especially to returnees from Libya, have sought to counter radicalization to violence and violent extremism. In November, Niger held a conference on strategic communication to counter terrorism.

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**NIGERIA**

**Overview:** The terrorist group Boko Haram (BH), and a splinter group commonly known as Ansaru, carried out kidnappings, killings, bombings, and attacks on civilian and military targets in northern Nigeria, resulting in over one thousand deaths, injuries, and significant destruction of property in 2013. The states where attacks occurred most frequently included Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Kaduna, Kano, Kogi, Plateau, Taraba, and Yobe. No attacks were conducted in the Federal Capital Territory or the southern states of Nigeria. The area of operations of the violent extremists was somewhat limited following the Government of Nigeria’s declaring a State of Emergency in the northeastern states of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe in May. Suspected BH and Ansaru attackers killed Nigerian government and security officials, and BH killed civilians of both the Islamic and Christian faiths. Several citizens from Western nations – although no Americans – were kidnapped and held hostage. Some of the hostages were released and others were killed by their captors. Operations to counter BH and Ansaru were led by the Nigerian military.
In May, President Goodluck Jonathan declared a State of Emergency, with National Assembly approval, in the states of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe in northeastern Nigeria for six months. According to government officials, the declaration gave the government sweeping powers to search and arrest without warrants. The military took over all security operations in those three states. Until August, the military headed up a Joint Task Force in these states to combat the violent extremists. In August, these operations were transferred to the command of a new 7th Army Division, headquartered in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state. The State of Emergency was extended for another six months on November 15, again with National Assembly approval. Despite the drastic measures, BH has continued to conduct a spate of attacks and the Nigerian military has been roundly accused of large numbers of human rights violations in connection with the military operations.

The Government of Nigeria’s efforts to address grievances among Northern populations, which includes high unemployment and a dearth of basic services, made little progress. Some state governments in the North attempted to increase education and employment opportunities, but with almost no support from the federal government. The United States called on the Nigerian government to employ a more comprehensive strategy to address Boko Haram that combines security efforts with political and development efforts to reduce Boko Haram’s appeal, address the legitimate concerns of the people of northern Nigeria, and protect the rights of all of Nigeria’s citizens.

Nigerian-U.S. counterterrorism cooperation increased in 2013; the U.S.-Nigeria Binational Commission Regional Security Working Group was hosted by the Nigerian government in Abuja in August. In June, the United States and Nigeria co-hosted the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) workshop on the Criminal Justice Sector and Rule of Law held in Abuja. Nigeria has also been an active participant in other GCTF events in the region. The Government of Nigeria formally requested assistance from the United States to develop an intelligence fusion cell, the Joint Terrorist Branch (JTAB), in order to streamline coordination and information sharing on counterterrorism matters among key agencies, which includes the State Security Service (SSS), the intelligence agencies, the national police, and the military.

**2013 Terrorist Incidents:** In 2013, BH and Ansaru demonstrated their continuing capability to carry out coordinated attacks carried out attacks primarily in 10 northern states. Notable terrorist incidents committed by elements of BH and factions claiming to be affiliated with BH, included:

- On January 19, a military convoy of buses carrying Nigerian troops to be deployed to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) forces in Mali were bombed by improvised explosive devices (IEDs) placed in the road near Lokoja in Kogi state. Seven soldiers were killed and dozens were wounded in the attack.
- On January 29, the motorcade of the Emir of Kano was attacked by armed men on motorcycles. Four people were killed, including the Emir’s driver and two bodyguards; several more were wounded.
- On February 8, nine Nigerian women working in a polio vaccination campaign in Kano were killed by gunmen riding in three-wheeled motorcycles; several other polio workers were injured.
- On February 16, seven non-Nigerian construction workers employed by Italian firm SETRACO were kidnapped from their company housing compound in Bauchi state and taken hostage. None of the seven hostages had been freed by year’s end.
On February 19, a French family of seven was kidnapped in northern Cameroon near Maroua and taken by their captors into Nigeria. The family was held hostage, most likely in northeastern Nigeria, until they were all safely released on April 29.

On March 18, a Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device attack on two luxury buses at a motor park in the Sabon Gari neighborhood of Kano killed more than 20 persons and wounded scores.

On July 6, over 50 students were killed in their dormitories at Mamudo Government Secondary School in Yobe state.

On August 11, gunmen killed approximately 44 persons praying at a mosque outside Maiduguri and another 12 civilians in a near-simultaneous attack at a nearby location in Borno state.

On September 29, gunmen killed more than 40 students in the dormitory of an agricultural technical school in Yobe state.

On December 2, a coordinated and complex attack by violent extremists on the Maiduguri airport and air force base killed over 24 persons, wounded dozens, and destroyed a large amount of military equipment including several military helicopters.

On December 20, violent extremists assaulted the Nigerian army barracks in Bama, southern Borno state, in a well-coordinated attack that killed approximately 20 military personnel and numerous civilians.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The Terrorism (Prevention) Act, 2011 was revised by a joint Senate-House of Representatives conference committee in December 2012. These amendments were enacted into law on February 21, 2013, and the law subsequently was called the “Terrorism (Prevention) Act of 2011 (as amended).” The law appointed the National Security Advisor (NSA) as the coordinator for all counterterrorism intelligence activities, and the Attorney General as the lead official for enforcement.

The Nigerian government's criminal justice institutions were not significantly strengthened in 2013, although several donor countries, including the UK, worked closely with the Ministry of Justice to assist in prioritizing how to investigate and prosecute suspected terrorist cases.

Among the problems that deterred or hindered more effective law enforcement and border security by the Nigerian government were: a lack of coordination and cooperation between Nigerian security agencies; a lack of biometrics collection systems and the requisite data bases; corruption; misallocation of resources; the slow pace of the judicial system, including a lack of a timely arraignment of suspected terrorist detainees; and lack of sufficient training for prosecutors and judges to understand and carry out the Terrorism (Prevention) Act of 2011 (as amended).

Several government agencies performed counterterrorism functions, including the Nigerian Department of State Security (DSS), the National Police Force (NPF) and the Ministry of Justice. It is important to note that the Nigerian military had primary responsibility for combating terrorism in northeastern Nigeria. While the counterterrorism activities of these agencies and Ministry were ostensibly coordinated by the Office of the National Security Advisor (ONSA), the level of interagency cooperation and information sharing was limited.

In 2013, the Nigerian government participated in or hosted several multilateral efforts. In June in Abuja, it co-hosted a GCTF Sahel Working Group Criminal Justice Sector and Rule of Law workshop, and in October, the UN Counterterrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF) Regional Workshop for West Africa was held in Abuja. The Nigerian government participated in U.S. counterterrorism
capacity programs under the U.S. Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance program, including the training of more than 120 NPF members in the detection and handling of IEDs, which increased the NPD’s awareness and capacity to protect and preserve evidence from the crime scene of a suspected terrorist act. Through the ATA program, Nigerian Police, customs officials, and immigration officers also participated in an interagency rural border patrol training to build the law enforcement sector’s ability to effectively utilize all agencies in tackling rural border security challenges.

The Government of Nigeria instituted the collection of biometric data for passport applications of all Nigerian citizens and upgraded the Nigerian machine-readable passports. Screening at the ports of entry of major airports in Nigeria including Abuja, Port Harcourt, and Kano improved, with passenger name records (PNR) being collected in advance for commercial flights. Border security at rural and extended land borders with Benin, Cameroon, Niger, and Chad were vulnerable to exploitation by BH and Ansaru.

Significant law enforcement actions against terrorists and terrorist groups in 2013 included:

- In May, Mustapha Fawaz, Abdallah Thahini, and Talal Ahmad Roda were arrested after a weapons cache was discovered at a Kano city residence; the individuals were accused of plotting attacks against Western and Israeli targets for Lebanese Hizballah. On November 29, Federal High Court Judge Adeniyi Ademola ruled that there was a lack of evidence to convict any of the suspects on terrorist or money laundering charges. In issuing his ruling, Jude Ademola noted that Hizballah is not an international terrorist organization in Nigeria and that therefore, Hizballah membership was not a crime. Talal Ahmad Roda was found guilty of conspiracy to unlawfully import and store prohibited firearms and sentenced to life in prison.
- In May, Salisu Mohammed, Inusa Mukailu, Danzumi Haruna, and Abdulsalami Adamu were arraigned before a Federal High Court as suspects in the Abuja-based UN Headquarters bombing of August 2011. They had been arrested in September 2011 and charged with four counts of terrorism for the bomb attack that killed 23 persons and wounded 75 others.
- On November 15, a Federal High Court in Abuja sentenced Mustapha Umar, a self-confessed BH member, to life imprisonment with hard labor for the April 26, 2012 bombing of SOJ Plaza in Kaduna State occupied by THIS DAY, The Moment and The Sun newspapers. Umar was found guilty on one count of terrorism by Justice Adeniyi Ademola; the judge also ordered that the federal government pay 150 million naira (about US $1 million) to the relatives of those who lost their lives as a result of the bombing.
- In December, a Joint Investigation Team (JIT) set up by the Nigerian Defense Headquarters recommended the immediate trial of over 500 BH suspects who were arrested during security operations against terrorists in Yobe, Borno, and Adamawa states. The JIT also recommended the release of 167 of the detainees from detention and a review of about 614 inconclusive cases.
- In December, the trial of a suspect accused of the Christmas Day 2011 bombing of a Catholic church at Madalla in Niger state concluded with the conviction of Kabiru Umar, aka Kabiru Sokoto, by a Federal High Court in Abuja. Sokoto, a member of BH, was convicted on two charges related to the bombing under the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) Act and the Terrorism (Prevention) Act, 2011 (as amended). Sokoto was sentenced to life imprisonment.

The Nigerian government actively cooperated with the United States and other international partners to prevent further acts of terrorism in Nigeria against U.S. citizens, citizens of third countries, and Nigerian citizens. In September, Nigeria’s Attorney General, Ministry of Justice and Department of
State Services cooperated with the U.S. government to extradite Lawal Olaniyi Babafemi, a Nigerian citizen. Babafemi was charged by the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of New York with providing material support to al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula and using firearms in furtherance of that crime.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Nigeria is a member of the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. A recent FATF/GIABA West Africa terrorism finance typology featured several case studies from Nigeria. These examined BH’s fundraising through commercial activities such as telecommunications; abuse of the Nigerian financial system; illegal fundraising; extortion; cash couriers, including the use of female cash couriers; and the active assistance of local politicians in raising funds. Kidnapping for ransom was also a source of terrorist financing.

Nigeria made significant progress in its anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) efforts in 2013, relative to its action plan. In October, the FATF removed Nigeria from its list of countries subject to monitoring for anti-money laundering and terrorist financing regulations.

The Government of Nigeria froze and confiscated terrorist assets as designated by U.S. Executive Orders and by UNSCRs; however, delays sometimes occurred. While there is political will to freeze assets, bureaucratic processes occasionally caused delays of up to four weeks before authorities blocked these assets. This is a risk because of the possibility that those whose assets may be frozen will have time to transfer them to other jurisdictions.


**Regional and International Cooperation:** In January, Nigeria committed a battalion of ground forces and logistical support to the ECOWAS effort as part of the African-led International Support Mission to Mali. The Nigerian troops remained in Mali until July when the infantry battalion returned to Nigeria. Some smaller military logistical support elements remained in Mali along with their Formed Police Unit. Nigeria is also a member of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership.

Nigeria, primarily through its Office of the National Security Advisor (ONSA), took a lead role in initiating a multilateral dialogue between regional countries – including through the GCTF and TSCTP activities – on how to better coordinate regional efforts to confront networks of terrorist groups that span international borders.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** The United States has worked with national and local leaders in Nigeria to support programs that expand vocational skills training for youth at risk of violent extremist messaging and recruitment.

In 2013, Nigeria was also involved with the establishment of the Global Fund for Community Engagement and Resilience (GCERF). In November, the ONSA sent two representatives to the Lucerne, Switzerland meeting on the GCERF. ONSA representatives also attended the follow-up meeting in December in Geneva.
Overview: Although Rwanda was not directly threatened by al-Shabaab and associated terrorist groups during 2013, fighting by armed groups along Rwanda’s borders created instability and generated the potential for terrorist transit. Improving the counterterrorism capacity of its security services remained a high priority for the Government of Rwanda; however, no new counterterrorism initiatives were launched in 2013.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Terrorism is subject to prosecution in Rwanda under the 2008 law on counterterrorism. The list of terrorism-related offenses was clarified and expanded in the 2012 penal code reform. Rwanda lacks a counterterrorism strategy and its security services are ill-equipped to detect, deter, or respond to acts of terrorism. It is also unclear which security organ (military, intelligence, or police) would have jurisdiction in the event of a large-scale terrorist attack. An Antiterrorism Unit exists within the Rwanda National Police (RNP); however, the officers have no specialized training, equipment, or mandate.

Relations between the RNP and its law enforcement counterparts in most of the East African Community (EAC) are strong, particularly with Uganda, but counterterrorism collaboration in 2013 was limited. After the Nairobi Westgate Mall attack in October, police chiefs from all EAC states convened in Kampala to discuss better ways to fight terrorism in the region. Measures agreed upon included the establishment of a counterterrorism planning desk, to be hosted and coordinated by Rwanda, and regular EAC meetings on ways to fight terrorism. These commitments had not been implemented by year’s end.

The Directorate of Immigration and Emigration has installed computer systems at Kigali International Airport (KGL), allowing for biometric screening upon arrival. The Directorate has also begun placing computers at its land-border crossings, but at year’s end there were no biometric capabilities; the computers were used strictly for electronic data entry only. Immigration screening systems and databases at points of entry were not able to communicate with each other, making border protection ineffective. The Directorate raised this issue directly with the United States, asking for assistance to implement a proper screening system at its borders and airports, and also asked about establishing a terrorist screening watchlist, which it did not have.

The Government of Rwanda prosecuted 13 Rwandan citizens for terrorism under Article 497 of the 2012 Penal Code in relation to grenade attacks and other alleged activities. Most notably, on November 13, the prosecution of Presidential bodyguard Joel Mutabazi for terrorism began. The United States and other international human rights organizations consider the charges politically motivated, aimed at stifling internal dissent.

A lack of trained and qualified personnel was the main impediment to effective law enforcement and border security within Rwanda. Government interference into investigations and legal proceedings is another major restraint.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Rwanda is not a member of a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body. The county’s financial system is capable of electronic funds transfers, including mobile banking. Rwanda’s 2012 penal code prohibits money laundering and terrorist financing by individuals and entities. The Government of Rwanda investigates and prosecute terrorist finance under the 2008 Prevention and Suppression of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism Act, which established the legislative framework to adhere to international money laundering standards. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 International
Regional and International Cooperation: Rwanda continued to play a leadership role in peacekeeping efforts in Africa. In November, the RNP deployed 140 officers to Mali in support of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), which is currently commanded by RDF Major General Jean-Bosco Kazura. Rwanda is a member of the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism.

Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism: Rwanda continued to carry out programs to welcome returnees to Rwanda, including demobilized combatants from the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR). Over 200 FDLR ex-combatants were reintegrated into Rwandan society in 2013, after receiving training and assistance through the Rwandan Demobilization and Reintegration Commission. Rwanda welcomed back over 20,000 refugees and other citizens expelled from neighboring countries during the year. For both civilian returnees and ex-combatants, the Government of Rwanda carried out extensive public relations campaigns to reach target audiences and encourage their peaceful return.

SENEGAL

Overview: The Government of Senegal is a Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) nation; addressing the crisis in Mali and countering violent extremism were among its highest foreign policy priorities in 2013. It has contributed more than 900 troops to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) and worked to enhance the capabilities of its police, gendarmerie, intelligence, and military forces to fight terrorist threats. In June 2013, Senegal’s Minister of Interior, General Pathe Seck, announced the development of the “Kaaraange Plan” (“Protection Plan” in Wolof) aimed at anticipating and preventing threats from terrorist groups. The three-year plan will be a joint effort between the police and gendarmerie, with training support from France. In November 2013, President Macky Sall also publicly requested that the Senegalese army pay special attention to the fight against terrorism.

The government worked closely with U.S. military and law enforcement officials to strengthen their capabilities in the fight against terrorism. The risk of violent extremism and terrorist activity in Senegal increased in 2013 following public threats against the country by terrorist organizations in northern Mali. While actual terrorist activity remained lower than in other parts of the Sahel, Senegal’s government remained concerned that terrorist organizations were crossing into the country through its porous borders.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: In 2007, the Government of Senegal amended its criminal code to establish criminal offenses for terrorist acts as defined in the Organization of African Unity Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism. In addition, 12 separate articles in the criminal code provide the Government of Senegal the authority to prosecute terrorist activities.

The Government of Senegal’s Ministry of Justice made positive improvements in the effectiveness of the judicial system in 2013, including reinstituting the Court of Illicit Enrichment to try cases of corruption. Efforts to strengthen the criminal justice systems in Senegal included multiple training sessions for law enforcement officers and government executives on such matters as crime scene investigation, border security, cyber criminality, and kidnapping for ransom. Several Senegalese
officers received training in the United States at the Federal Bureau of Investigation Academy, Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, and elsewhere.

Senegal’s gendarmerie, national police, and judicial police have insufficient capacity and resources to detect, deter, and prevent acts of terrorism in their own territory. Senegal worked to improve its law enforcement capacity by participating in multilateral training events organized by the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), AU, and the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS). The U.S. Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program provided training and enabling equipment to build their investigative and border security capacities. Through the Regional Strategic Initiative (RSI), ATA helped establish a Cyber Crime Investigative Unit with the Senegalese National Police, Criminal Investigative Unit. Senegal’s law enforcement officers regularly attended courses at the International Law Enforcement Academy in Gaborone, Botswana, and were active participants in the U.S. State Department-supported training at its Regional Training Center in Accra, Ghana.

Senegalese officials identified a lack of border resources and regional cooperation as security vulnerabilities. In July, Senegal began requiring biometric visas for all individuals entering the country with non-ECOWAS passports. Senegal is implementing a U.S.-supported Automated Fingerprint Identification System, and collects border control cards. The United States provided training to Senegalese border officials and airline representatives on the identification of counterfeit and falsified travel documents.

While Senegal increased its entry requirements at the country’s main airport in Dakar, the remaining land and water crossings have little or no surveillance. The United States provided border security related trainings, including border security interdiction courses held in the United States and West Africa, and counter proliferation pathways training to help identify the potential illicit pathways used by individuals or groups to move illegal commodities across international borders.

Significant law enforcement actions against terrorists or terrorist groups in 2013 included the arrest of Imam Babacar Dianko. An investigation revealed that Dianko had links to the terrorist group Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa.

Corruption and lack of infrastructure act as an impediment to more effective Senegalese law enforcement and border security, as does a chronic lack of equipment and the inability of authorities to maintain their current stocks.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Senegal is a member of the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), a Financial Action Task Force-style (FATF) regional body. A recent FATF/GIABA West Africa terrorism finance typology featured several case studies from Senegal. These case studies included support given to terrorists through abuse of the real estate sector, the abuse of *hawaladars* to finance violent extremists, and the use of politically exposed persons to transfer terrorist funds.

Senegal is exploited by various illicit actors to access West Africa, Europe, and South America. It is likely that trade-based money laundering and the use of mobile payment methods are exploited by a wide range of illicit actors including terrorist financiers.

At the regional level, Senegal implemented the anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) framework by the member states of the West African Economic and Monetary
Union (WAEMU). All member states are bound to enact and implement the legislation. Among the WAEMU countries, Senegal was the first to have the new AML/CFT legal framework in place. The Regional Council for Public Savings and Financial markets is the body responsible for the control of financial markets in the WAEMU.

Senegal established procedures for the freezing of an account and other assets of known and suspected terrorists and terrorist organizations. Article 42 of Act #90-6 (1990) requires banks and financial institutions to notify the Central Bank if such a person should try to open an account. The Central Bank of West African States and national financial intelligence unit (CENTIF) also circulate the consolidated list of the UNSCR 1267/1989 (al-Qa’ida) Sanctions Committee to commercial financial institutions.


Regional and International Cooperation: Senegal is a member of the UN, AU, ECOWAS, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. It is also an active participant in the GCTF’s Sahel Regional Capacity Building Working Group, and participated in its Sahel Cross-Border Workshop in Niamey, Niger in October 2013. Later that month, Senegal and France co-hosted a Sahel Regional Capacity Building Working Group local meeting in Dakar to raise awareness of the terrorist threat in Senegal and to discuss the government’s counterterrorism priorities. Senegal is also a signatory to the Rabat Declaration, and attended the November 2013 Rabat Conference on border security.

Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism: Senegal is a country that is traditionally resistant to violent extremism because of its Sufi mystical religious base. Cultural opposition to intolerance and radicalism is widespread. Senegal is organized around several influential brotherhoods who are generally tolerant and do not preach violent extremist ideology. These brotherhoods are also fairly resistant to external influences. The Government of Senegal continued its outreach to the brotherhoods to build partnerships to counter any violent extremist messaging and recruitment.

SOMALIA

Overview: In 2013, the Federal Government of Somalia – with the support of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and regional and international partners – continued to battle the threat posed by al-Shabaab. While progress was made in some areas, al-Shabaab continued to exploit divisions within Somalia and commit asymmetric attacks to destabilize the country. Compared with previous years, the terrorist group al-Shabaab executed a wider spectrum of attacks in Mogadishu and throughout Somalia, including more sophisticated, asymmetrical attacks and assassinations; and destruction of property. Several larger and more deadly al-Shabaab attacks in Mogadishu involved two-part operations, where attackers targeted first responders and onlookers, producing higher casualties. Al-Shabaab also executed attacks on harder targets in Mogadishu, including international compounds and convoys.

While AMISOM and Somali forces continued to control major population strongholds, al-Shabaab continued to control large sections of rural areas in south-central Somalia, including areas in the Juba, Shabelle, Bay, and Bakol regions. Al-Shabaab also continued to operate in northern Somalia along the Golis Mountains and within the federal state of Puntland’s larger urban areas. Areas controlled by al-Shabaab provided a permissive environment for the group to train operatives and plot attacks. The
ability of federal, local, and regional authorities to prevent and pre-empt al-Shabaab terrorist attacks remained limited. The overstretched AMISOM forces could not take the offensive against al-Shabaab nor liberate new areas controlled by al-Shabaab in 2013. In November, the UN Security Council approved an increase of 4,000 troops for AMISOM to enable increased offensive operations.

Somalia remained a safe haven for al-Shabaab. The group continued to plan and mount operations within Somalia and in neighboring countries, particularly in Kenya. However, despite its successes, al-Shabaab continued to face internal pressure and experience internal leadership disputes. The primary faction, controlled by Moktar Ali Zubeyr “Godane,” wielded increasing influence, and reportedly ordered the deaths of several prominent members, including U.S. citizen Omar Hammami (also known as Abu Mansoor Al-Amriki) outside of Dinsor, Bay region, on September 12, and Somali national Ibrahim al-Afghani in Barawe, on June 19.

2013 Terrorist Incidents: In 2013, al-Shabaab conducted suicide attacks, remote-controlled roadside bombings, kidappings, and killings of government officials, foreigners, journalists, humanitarian workers, and civil society leaders throughout Somalia. Al-Shabaab executed attacks in Mogadishu targeting convoys, and popular gathering places for government officials, diaspora, and foreigners, using beheadings, stonings, and other forms of public executions to instill fear and obedience in communities.

Examples of high-profile al-Shabaab incidents in 2013 included:

- On March 18, al-Shabaab detonated a car bomb targeting and injuring Somali intelligence Chief Kahlif Ahmed Ereg near the National Theater in Mogadishu. Ten civilians were killed and 15 were injured.
- On April 14, nine heavily-armed al-Shabaab suicide bombers raided Mogadishu’s Supreme Court complex – the Benadir Regional Courthouse – and then executed a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) secondary attack on first responders and onlookers, killing more than 30 persons and injuring another 35. Later in the day, al-Shabaab attacked a Turkish NGO vehicle with a VBIED in Mogadishu, killing two Turkish aid workers and other civilians.
- On June 19, al-Shabaab attacked the UN Common Compound, located 100 meters from Mogadishu International Airport, using a VBIED. Attackers entered the compound with a secondary vehicle and used small weapons to kill 22 people, including three international staff, and injured many more.
- On July 12, al-Shabaab struck an AMISOM convoy near Mogadishu International Airport. Al-Shabaab later publicly admitted that they had tried to target U.S. intelligence officials.
- On July 27, al-Shabaab attacked the Turkish Embassy housing complex in Mogadishu, using a VBIED and small weapons. All three al-Shabaab attackers died, along with one Turkish security guard and seven Somali security guards. The attackers also injured 13 others.
- On September 3 and 4, al-Shabaab attacked the convoy of President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud with improvised explosive devices (IED) as the President traveled to Merka, Lower Shabelle.
- On September 7, al-Shabaab executed a two-part VBIED and suicide attack against the popular Villa Restaurant in Mogadishu, killing at least 18 civilians.
- On September 12 and November 5, al-Shabaab targeted the convoy of Interim Juba Administration President Ahmed Madobe with a VBIED outside of the Kismayo airport, killing civilians and slightly injuring Madobe in the September 12 attack.
• On November 8, al-Shabaab failed to detonate fully a sophisticated IED embedded in a laptop at the popular Maka al Mukarama hotel in Mogadishu, frequented by high-level government and security officials. The attack killed six and injured 15, when a secondary VBIED detonated in the parking lot.

• On November 19, al-Shabaab attacked the police station in Beledweyne with a VBIED, grenades, and small weapons, killing 21 Somali police and one Djiboutian AMISOM soldier.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Somalia possessed limited investigative and enforcement capacity to prosecute terrorists effectively. Somalia currently employs an outdated penal code, last updated in 1963. Somalian officials lack the capacity to develop comprehensive counterterrorism laws without substantial international assistance. The Parliament did not approve draft counterterrorism legislation in July 2013; work is ongoing to develop new draft legislation.

Due to lack of civil judiciary capacity, the federal government tried terrorism cases in its military court system. Puntland – a semi-autonomous northeast region in Somalia – also lacked regional counterterrorism legislation and tried terrorism cases in its state military court. On March 21, the Puntland military court convicted 36 people accused of links to al-Shabaab. The court sentenced several individuals to life imprisonment, while others received the death penalty. On April 30, Puntland executed 13 al-Shabaab members and supporters whom the court convicted in March.

Somali law enforcement’s basic capacity needs improvement, including basic investigation skills, cordon and search operations, and coordination with the judicial branch. Somalia also lacks capacity, transparency, and institutions to operate an effective judicial and law enforcement system, which, in turn, hinders the federal government’s ability to develop and enforce the rule of law, prosecute criminals, and serve justice to the Somali population. In 2013, with assistance from the U.S. Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance program, Somali Federal Police received a modest amount of training on crisis response, border security, and leadership and management capacity building.

Somalia’s National Intelligence and Security Agency takes the lead in counterterrorism functions and serves as the rapid-reaction response force to terrorist attacks in Mogadishu. Interagency cooperation and information sharing remained inadequate at all levels on counterterrorism issues, although this year’s appointment of a new National Security Advisor and Council helped bridge some of the coordination gaps. Almost all Somali law enforcement actions against terrorists and terrorist groups were reactive in nature.

Somalia has porous borders. Most countries do not recognize Somali identity documents, leaving Somalia with little to no travel document security. Somalia currently does not have a central or shared terrorist screening watchlist, nor does it have biographic and biometric screening capabilities at ports of entry. Minimal cooperation occurred between the federal and regional governments and U.S. law enforcement to investigate suspected terrorists, kidnappings, and other incidents of terrorism committed inside and outside of Somalia.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Somalia does not belong to any Financial Action Task Force regional body. The Ministry of Interior drafted a counterterrorism law in 2013 with the assistance of a British legal adviser. Parliament did not review or pass the law in 2013 – the draft remained insufficient to provide adequate oversight over the financing of terrorism and did not include provisions to freeze or confiscate terrorist assets. Somalia does not have a commercial banking sector, and the Central Bank lacks the capacity to supervise or regulate the hawala (money service businesses)
Somalia does not have laws or procedures requiring the collection of data for money transfers or suspicious transaction reports. Somalia did not distribute the UN list of terrorists or terrorist entities to financial services. Somalia lacked the funding and capacity to investigate and prosecute incidents of terrorist financing. The supervisory and examining section of the Somali Central Bank attempted to develop procedures to oversee the policies governing the establishment of commercial banks in the country. The section suffered from limited staffing and lacked additional funding to pay the salaries of its staff.

In 2013, government entities lacked the capacity to track, seize, or freeze illegal assets. The Somali hawalas, most of which operate abroad, employed self-imposed minimum international standards to continue operating in countries with comprehensive anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) laws. In May, Barclay’s Bank in the UK informed all small money service businesses (MSBs), including all Somali hawalas, that the bank would close their accounts. Dahabshil, Somalia’s largest MSB, sued Barclay’s Bank, claiming the decision was discriminatory. The judge awarded Dahabshil a stay until the court hears the case. Barclay’s Bank claimed that U.S. AML/CFT laws prompted the bank to make the decision due to the risk factors associated with bank accounts from Somalia.

For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes:

**Regional and International Cooperation:** Somalia is a member of the AU, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the League of Arab States, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Somalia is also a member of the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism.

Following the al-Shabaab terrorist attack in Nairobi, Kenya, from September 21 to 24, Somalia expressed greater interest in increasing intelligence sharing and conducting joint operations with its Horn of Africa neighbors against al-Shabaab.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** With U.S. and international support, in 2013, the Federal Government of Somalia increased its capacity to deliver public messaging that counters al-Shabaab’s violent extremist messaging. Radio Mogadishu and state-owned TV stations broadcasted programs aimed to counter al-Shaabab’s propaganda and violent extremist messaging. The Somali government continued to air the Islamic Lecture Series (ILS), which began in Mogadishu in 2010, and the reach of its programming has since expanded to include the former al-Shabaab strongholds in Baidoa, Beledweyne, Dhusamareb, and Abudwaq. The ILS employs an hour-long, call-in radio program designed to undercut al-Shabaab’s efforts to acquire religious legitimacy for its violent extremist ideology. The Federal Government of Somalia also began to implement its National Program for Disengaged Combatants and At-Risk Youth, an interagency program to register, de-radicalize, rehabilitate, and reintegrate low-risk fighters that are disengaging from al-Shabaab and associated militias.

**SOUTH AFRICA**

**Overview:** In 2013, South Africa and the United States had minimal formal counterterrorism cooperation. The South African State Security Agency (SSA) appeared unenthusiastic about engaging with U.S. counterterrorism interlocutors. SSA’s Foreign Branch (SSA/FB) is the sole contact for counterterrorism-related coordination and it determines which other entities within SSA or other parts
of the government will be involved. U.S. officials working on counterterrorism issues largely had difficulties engaging counterparts in the South African Police Service Crime Intelligence (SAPS/CI) Division, which has the arrest authority in South Africa that the SSA lacks. There is some cooperation on counterterrorism investigations initiated by the United States, however.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** In 2004, the South African government enacted the Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities Act (POCDATARA), which it used for the first time in 2012. The aim of the Act is “to provide for measures to prevent and combat terrorist and related activities; define the offense of terrorism and other offenses associated or connected with terrorist activities; codify Convention offenses; give effect to international instruments dealing with terrorist and related activities; provide a mechanism to comply with UNSCRs; set out measures to prevent and combat the financing of terrorist and related activities; and define investigative measures in respect of terrorist and related activities.”

South African law enforcement made several arrests and conducted successful prosecutions in furtherance of counterterrorism offenses involving South Africa and other African countries. In March, the South Gauteng High Court sentenced Henry Okah, the leader for the Movement for Defence of the Niger-Delta (MEND), to 24 years in prison on 13 terrorism-related charges. Okah, a South African citizen since 2003, was charged for his role in the twin bombings that rocked the October 2010 Independence Day Anniversary celebrations in Abuja, Nigeria where scores of people were killed and wounded. This case was one of the first to be prosecuted under POCDATARA.

SAPS/CI Division, Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation, and SSA are currently tasked with detecting, deterring, and preventing acts of terrorism within South Africa. The National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) is involved from the beginning of most counterterrorism investigations and prosecutes such cases. All entities possess the knowledge, resources, intelligence capabilities, and sophisticated techniques to effectively implement current counterterrorism legislation. However, problems exist with interagency investigative cooperation and intelligence sharing.

The South African judicial system is effective in assisting U.S. counterterrorism investigations. Appropriate South African entities have exhibited occasional willingness to fully cooperate with prosecutorial and extradition requests.

Overall cooperation with South African law enforcement has gradually improved during the past five years in cases of U.S. government-initiated counterterrorism investigations. However, due to allegations of corruption, attrition, the lack of receipt of timely intelligence requests, and bureaucracy within multiple South African law enforcement entities, challenges remain.

Although the South African government has adequate legislation in place to address counterterrorism offenses, substantial obstacles inhibit the country’s ability to fight terrorism. South African borders remain porous. To address this problem, South Africa took steps in 2013 to address document fraud and other border security vulnerabilities. South Africa’s Department of Home Affairs introduced a new passport with additional security features aimed at eliminating the forging of passports by organized criminal networks. Most recently, there was evidence showing that this vulnerability was exploited by terrorist groups to assume false identities and enable them to move freely throughout Africa.

Training courses at the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) continued for midlevel police managers in a wide range of law enforcement and police programs until September 30.
accepted U.S. training in Maritime Interdiction, Post-Blast Investigations, and Management of Special events. Unfortunately, there was poor participation or participation by officers unaffiliated with counterterrorism activities in these courses.

South African law enforcement currently uses travel document security and has biographic biometric and biometric screening capabilities (secondary interview) at some of its points of entry. The South African government continued to share information and intelligence in relation to flight manifests and entry and exit frequency of identified individuals.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** South Africa is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group, a FATF-style regional body. Its financial intelligence unit is the Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC). Those required to report to the FIC included banks, financial institutions, car dealers, attorneys, gold dealers, gambling establishments, real estate agents, foreign exchange dealers, securities traders, money lenders (to include those who lend against shares, e.g., brokers), entities selling travelers checks, and Johannesburg stock exchange-registered individuals and companies. South Africa's FIC is a member of the Egmont group.

The FIC’s annual report in October cited several efforts by terrorists to exploit the country’s financial sector. Most major urban centers have a multitude of locally owned hawalas – informal unregulated money transfer businesses – to move money to individuals in other countries.


**Regional and International Cooperation:** South Africa is a founding member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) and participates in its working group meetings. The NPA actively participates in regional capacity building on counterterrorism investigation and prosecution, both bilaterally and through the auspices of the 30-member African Prosecutor’s Association, in which South Africa is a driving force. Lawyers from the NPA Priority Crimes Litigation Unit and investigators from the SAPS Special Investigating Unit and Directorate of Priority Crime Investigation teach courses under the auspices of the Institute for Security Studies to lawyers, judges, and police from around the continent.

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**SOUTH SUDAN**

**Overview:** At the end of 2013, fighting broke out between rival political factions in South Sudan, resulting in the death of thousands and displacement of hundreds of thousands of people. Prior to the crisis, South Sudan expressed a commitment to countering terrorism, but suffered from multiple institutional weaknesses that impeded any counterterrorism efforts. The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) remained a threat for communities in Western Equatoria and Western Bahr-el-Ghazal states, and new LRA attacks were reported in late 2013. South Sudan contributed to the AU Regional Task Force (AU-RTF) against the LRA, but many of its forces were redeployed at the end of 2013 in response to the political crisis.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** While dealing with multiple crises, South Sudan continued to have limited capacity to provide effective law enforcement and border security...
with respect to counterterrorism. Additionally, the border with Sudan remained disputed in several locations.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** South Sudan is not a member of a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body. In August, South Sudan passed anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism legislation. The country’s capabilities to implement or enforce the law remained limited. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, we refer you to the 2014 *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR)*, Volume 2, *Money Laundering and Financial Crimes*: [http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm](http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm).

**Regional and International Cooperation:** South Sudan is a member of the UN, the AU, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, Interpol, and the Eastern Africa Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization, a sub-regional organization of Interpol. South Sudan participated in the AU-RTF, a joint military task force to counter the LRA threat that includes forces from Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo. South Sudan is a member of the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism.

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**Tanzania**

**Overview:** Since the bombing of the U.S. Embassy in July 1998, Tanzania has not experienced any other major terrorist attacks. However, the al-Shabaab attack at the Westgate Mall in Kenya served as a reminder that the threat in the region remains. Tanzania’s interagency National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) reported concerns over escalating radicalism, corruption, and inadequate border security.

**2013 Terrorist Incidents:** On May 5, an explosion outside of a Catholic church near Arusha killed three and injured over 40 gathered for the church’s consecration. Shortly after the explosion, President Kikwete released a statement calling the incident “a terrorist act.”

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Regulations for the 2002 Prevention of Terrorism Act were drafted in 2011 and published in August 2012 as the Prevention of Terrorism Regulations 2012. The regulations established the police and the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) as the institutions that are to collect and respond to reports of terrorist activity. The regulations also formalized the process for freezing assets, deeming a person a suspected terrorist, and sharing information between government agencies.

Tanzania’s law enforcement capacity needs improvement. While the NCTC is an interagency unit made up of officers from Intelligence, Police, Defense, Immigration, and Prison organizations who work collectively on counterterrorism issues in Tanzania, the center lacked specialized equipment, especially for securing the borders, and had large unfilled needs such as training in advanced intelligence analysis and crime scene investigation. Moreover, Tanzanian law enforcement was affected by corruption. The 2013 Transparency International report ranked Tanzania’s police, judiciary, and tax agency the most corrupt in the East African Community.

According to Tanzania’s NCTC, violent extremism is on the rise throughout the country.

Examples of law enforcement actions included:
• On October 7, in Mtwara Region’s Makolionga Forest, Tanzanian Police arrested 11 men ranging in age from teenagers through their late 30s. The police reported the men as followers of a violent extremist imam who had been forced out of a mosque in Zanzibar and another in Mtwara. He and his followers reportedly conducted unarmed training and possessed al-Shabaab propaganda. Local villagers informed the police about the suspicious activities of the group.

• On October 23, in Lulago village, Kilindi-Handeni, Tanga Region, a People’s Militia member was killed by a group of men suspected of being violent extremists. Police conducted an investigation and arrested four men.

• Also on October 23, in the neighboring village of Lwande, the Officer in Charge of the police station was shot by another suspect who was also arrested. During the subsequent investigations, police learned from local villagers about a violent extremist group that ran a madrassa. Police went to the madrassa and encountered numerous women and children. The men had run away. The police recovered some violent extremist materials and learned that the leader was conducting martial arts training for the students. Police arrested the leader. Parents from the local village entrusted their children to the madrassa so they could obtain an education and were unaware of the violent extremist teachings.

Tanzania shares borders with eight countries and lacks sufficient resources to adequately patrol those borders. The larger border posts and airports have passport security, including access to watchlists. However, that is not the case in the more rural and coastal regions as their borders are considered porous due to shortages in manpower for patrolling and because electrical power is unreliable or absent – leaving posts without access to communications networks. According to the NCTC, several Tanzanian youth were arrested on illegal immigration charges in Kenya. Once returned to Tanzania, NCTC officers interviewed the young men and reported that they were crossing Kenya in route to Somalia with plans of joining al-Shabaab training camps.

In 2013, the FIU participated in U.S. training on computer forensics and anti-corruption sponsored by the Department of Justice and DHS. Through the U.S. Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance program, Tanzania’s law enforcement community received training and enabling equipment to build their capacities in the areas of border security – particularly maritime security – investigations, and crisis response.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Tanzania is a member of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group, a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. In October, the FATF noted that Tanzania took steps towards improving its anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime but called attention to its remaining deficiency under its agreed action plan: the establishment and implementation of adequate procedures to identify and freeze terrorist assets. Tanzania’s Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) is responsible for combating money laundering and terrorist finance. The FIU applied for membership to the Egmont Group and reported that the application is at an advanced stage.

The FATF again included Tanzania in its October 18 Public Statement for its failure to adequately implement its action plan to address noted AML/CFT deficiencies. Mobile banking services, such as Mpesa and AirtelMoney, continued to expand rapidly in Tanzania, opening up formerly underserved rural areas to formal banking, but also creating new vulnerabilities in the financial sector. The central bank of Tanzania estimated that the equivalent of US $650 million is transferred each month through such mobile transfers. The FIU received 68 suspicious transaction reports in 2013, a significant increase from 2012.
Non-profit organizations must declare their assets when initially registering with the government, but their assets are not subsequently reviewed on a regular basis. In November, a prominent businessman was arrested for providing financial support to al-Shabaab in Kenya.


Regional and International Cooperation: Tanzania is a member of the AU, the South African Development Community, and the East African Community, all of which have initiatives to address counterterrorism. Through the East African Police Chiefs’ Organization and South African Police Chiefs’ Organization, the NCTC maintains more frequent, informal contact with other police forces in the region. The Tanzania Police Force also works closely with Interpol. Tanzania is a member of the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism and participates in Global Counterterrorism Forum events focused on the Horn of Africa.

Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism: The Tanzanian NCTC reported that countering radicalization to violence is a top priority. The NCTC is interested in starting community awareness programs to educate citizens on how to identify and report terrorist activities, and increasing training for the local police on community policing strategies and the appropriate use of force. Police leadership on the mainland and in Zanzibar has shown a keen interest in developing community policing programs. The United States is providing support for Tanzanian efforts to counter violent extremism in youth populations in Zanzibar. The aim is to engage youth and community police with local interfaith and human rights organizations.

UGANDA

Overview: The Government of Uganda effectively collaborated with U.S. counterterrorism efforts, and showed increased political will to apprehend suspected terrorists and disrupt terrorist activity in Uganda. Unfortunately, resource limitations, porous borders, and corruption hampered increased counterterrorism measures and continued to leave Uganda vulnerable to attacks by terrorist groups, particularly al-Shabaab, which killed 76 people, including one American, in Kampala in July 2010.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Uganda passed counterterrorism legislation in 2002, but this legislation does not include key provisions on anti-money laundering and terrorist financing. Although Uganda significantly improved its ability to investigate terrorist acts, additional training and resources are still needed. The Ugandan Police Force (UPF), for instance, needs a modern criminal records management system to replace the outdated system of fingerprint cards police use to identify criminal and terrorist suspects. In late 2013, the Government of Uganda signed a Memorandum of Cooperation with the United States to implement a U.S. government-funded Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) in Uganda. Once implemented, the AFIS project will greatly improve the counterterrorism investigation capabilities of the Ugandan police. In addition, with U.S. assistance, Uganda continued to expand its border control system to additional points of entry and upgrade this system to capture biometric information.

There is strong political will to arrest and prosecute terrorists in Uganda. However, a legal challenge in the Constitutional Court over jurisdiction, extradition, and treatment of the 12 individuals arrested for orchestrating the July 2010 bombings was indefinitely delayed.
The UPF Counterterrorism Directorate (CT) is the lead Ugandan law enforcement entity charged with investigating, disrupting, and responding to terrorist incidents. While Ugandan law enforcement officers assigned to this directorate are highly motivated, the UPF overall has limited capacity to detect, deter, and respond to terrorist incidents due to lack of manpower, resource limitations, and poor infrastructure. Moreover, the bulk of the CT police and other law enforcement elements are centrally located in the capital, which limits the effectiveness of law enforcement in the border regions and all areas outside Kampala. Following the Westgate terrorist attack in Nairobi, the UPF conducted a critical examination of its operations to ensure interagency cooperation among various Ugandan government elements should an attack occur in Uganda. The UPF also lacks basic technology, such as secure computer networks, to conduct comprehensive terrorism investigations in the most effective manner, a lesson discovered after the 2010 terrorist attacks in Kampala.

The U.S. government has provided significant counterterrorism assistance to the UPF. Specifically, through the U.S. Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance program, which expanded in 2013, Uganda’s police received a greater volume than in previous years of training and enabling equipment to build capacity in the areas of investigations, border security, and crisis response.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Uganda is a member of the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group, a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body. With the passage of the Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA) in October 2013, Uganda made significant strides in creating the legal framework to deter, detect, and investigate terrorist financing. The AMLA, which had been pending since 2009, was signed into law on October 2, and brings into force a law that represents an important step in combating money laundering and terrorist financing in Uganda. The AMLA criminalizes money laundering and the aiding and abetting of money laundering, and prescribes penalties, including seizure, freezing, and forfeiture of assets linked to money laundering and terrorist financing. It also creates a regulatory framework aimed at preventing money laundering and the financing of terrorism through a range of institutional measures.

Recognizing the link between money laundering and terrorist financing, the AMLA requires accountable persons – which may include auditors, lawyers, licensed accountants, NGOs, money transfer agents, foreign exchange bureaus, financial institutions, revenue or customs authority – to take measures aimed at controlling terrorist financing, including the detection and reporting of any suspicious transactions possibly linked to terrorist financing. Every accountable person is also required to have a “control officer” charged with overseeing their obligations to report suspicious activities. The Anti-Terrorist Act’s list of terrorist organizations includes only four organizations: al-Qa’ida, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), the violent Islamist extremist Allied Democratic Front (ADF) rebel group based in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and one defunct Ugandan rebel group.

The AMLA attempts to strengthen the country’s ability to monitor and regulate remittance services and wire transfer data by establishing a Financial Intelligence Authority (FIA), which the government aims to implement by the end of 2014. Financial institutions will need to report any suspicious activity to the FIA. Currently, the Bank of Uganda asks local banks to report “suspicious” transactions, but there is no clear implementation mechanism for enforcement or investigation of potentially suspicious activity. The Criminal Investigations Department (CID) of the UPF continues to be responsible for investigating financial crimes. However, the CID remains understaffed and poorly trained, with only limited ability to investigate and prosecute money laundering violations. The CID and other directorates within the UPF have also been plagued by allegations of corruption.

Regional and International Cooperation: Uganda is a strong force for regional stability, security cooperation, and counterterrorism efforts. Uganda is an active member of the AU, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Community of Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community, and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR). Uganda contributed troops to the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), to counter al-Shabaab; continued to pursue the LRA with neighboring countries as part of the AU Regional Task Force; and remained concerned about possible attacks by the ADF. Uganda is a member of the Partnership for Regional East Africa Counterterrorism and participates in Global Counterterrorism Forum events focused on the Horn of Africa.

Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism: Uganda’s population is generally not receptive to violent extremist ideologies. After the July 2010 terrorist attacks, Ugandan police increased outreach to local Muslim youth considered to be at risk for recruitment and radicalization to violence, and the Inspector General of Police has expressed a desire to expand community policing programs in Uganda to counter violent extremism in addition to combat crime. The U.S. government has worked in collaboration with Ugandan law enforcement to establish an effective community policing program. In addition to funding construction of community policing pavilions in Kampala, the U.S. government has worked with interlocutors at the Police Training Academy in Masindi, Uganda to develop a curriculum that will permit more effective community policing and enable the police to continue to counter radicalization to violence.

Since 2000, Uganda has offered amnesty to over 26,000 former rebel combatants, including members of the LRA and the ADF. Although the key components of Uganda’s Amnesty Act expired in May 2012, the Ministry of the Interior reinstated the Amnesty Act in May 2013 for two additional years, following significant outcry among civil society members and northern Ugandan politicians who believed amnesty was still a useful tool to encourage defections from the LRA and positive reintegration of former violent extremists into society.

EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC

Overall, countries in the East Asia and Pacific region continued to weaken the ability of terrorist groups to operate and constrain the activities of large terrorist organizations such as Jemaah Islamiya (JI), Jemaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT), and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). Ongoing concerns remained, however, notably in Indonesia, where terrorist attacks on police continued, and in the southern Philippines, where improvised explosive device (IED) attacks occurred on several occasions in Mindanao and rogue elements of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) conducted a violent three-week siege of Zamboanga City that killed dozens of Philippine Security Force members and displaced thousands. The tri-border region of the Sulu Sea remained an area of concern for cross-border weapons smuggling and kidnapping for ransom.

The Philippine government moved closer to a peace agreement with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) by signing three of the four annexes to the 2012 Peace Framework Agreement on the
Bangsamoro (FAB), but terrorist incidents such as bombings and raids were more frequent in 2013 than in the years preceding the signing.

The trend of violent extremists focusing on domestic targets continued in Indonesia, with numerous attacks on police, including a series of separate high-profile attacks in which four Indonesia law enforcement officials were killed and seven were wounded. Indonesia also experienced its first suicide bombing in two years when a motorcycle-riding bomber targeted a police facility in Poso, Central Sulawesi. Challenges presented by overcrowded prisons and weaknesses in correctional facility management and security were highlighted when inmates, including convicted terrorists, escaped in a series of prison breaks.

Malaysia continued its legal reform efforts in 2013, bringing charges under the new Security Offenses (Special Measures) Act of 2012 (SOSMA). Malaysia arrested former al-Qa’ida operative Yazid Sufaat, who was the first to be charged under SOSMA. In Thailand, two Iranians behind a failed 2012 plot, in which explosives were accidentally set off that allegedly were targeting Israeli diplomats in Bangkok, were convicted.

Australia maintained its position as a regional leader in the fight against terrorism and worked to strengthen the Asia-Pacific region’s counterterrorism capacity through a range of bilateral and regional initiatives in organizations such as ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the Pacific Island Forum. The Japanese government continued to participate in international counterterrorism efforts at multilateral, regional, and bilateral levels through the ASEAN-Japan Counterterrorism meeting and the Japan-China Counterterrorism Consultations.

CHINA (HONG KONG AND MACAU)

**Overview:** China's cooperation with the United States on counterterrorism issues remained marginal, with little reciprocity in information exchanges. China expanded cooperation with countries in the region, however, and conducted joint counterterrorism training exercises with Belarus, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia. China's domestic counterterrorism efforts were primarily focused on the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), which China alleges maintains a presence in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) of northwest China. China has criticized the U.S. response to acts China characterizes as terrorism, alleging that U.S. expressions of concern over the treatment of China's ethnic minorities and deficiencies in rule of law represent a "double standard" on terrorism. China frequently refers to Uighur activists abroad – including those in the United States – as complicit in supporting "terrorist" activity, but it has not provided credible evidence to support those claims.

**2013 Terrorist Incidents:** Chinese authorities labeled several incidents of violence involving members of the Uighur minority as acts of terrorism. In general, Chinese authorities did not provide detailed evidence of terrorist involvement, and restricted the ability of journalists and international observers to independently verify official media accounts.

On October 28, a vehicle carrying three members of a Uighur family careened into an ornamental bridge on Tiananmen Square and exploded, killing two tourists, the vehicle's occupants, and injuring 38 others. The Chinese government announced that the incident was an ETIM plot to create instability in the lead-up to a major Chinese Communist Party political meeting. While an internet video by purported ETIM members mentioned the incident, there was no independent evidence to suggest ETIM involvement.
Chinese authorities characterized several other incidents that took place in the XUAR as terrorist attacks. On June 26, 37 individuals were killed – including several police officers – in a reported attack on a police station in Lukqun township, Turpan prefecture, XUAR, that Chinese authorities called a "violent terrorist attack."

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** China's National People's Congress amended the national criminal procedure law to include measures that provide protection for witnesses, victims, and relatives whose personal safety is at risk because of their testimony in cases involving, among other things, terrorist acts. The new legislation, which came into effect in January, includes controversial measures that strengthen Chinese authorities' ability to arrest and detain individuals suspected of "endangering state security or crimes of terrorism." This legislation has been used to detain dissidents, human rights activists, and religious practitioners.

Although China continued to stress the importance of international counterterrorism cooperation, Chinese law enforcement agencies were reluctant to conduct joint investigations with U.S. law enforcement agencies or provide assistance in cases involving suspected terrorists.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** China is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), as well as the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG) and the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (EAG) – both of which are FATF-style regional bodies.

In May, the Chinese government announced draft measures for freezing assets associated with terrorist activities, putting into practice the legal framework established by the Chinese government in October 2011 for enforcing UN designations listings. This authority provides the legal basis for the establishment of a national interagency terrorist asset freezing body that, if robustly implemented, should strengthen China's implementation of UNSCRs 1267/1989 (1999), 1988 (2011), and 1373. Additional issues remain to be addressed, including guidance for designated non-financial businesses and professions; delisting and unfreezing procedures; and defining the rights of bona fide third parties in seizure/confiscation actions.

The Chinese government has strengthened its preventive measures to counter terrorist finance, with an emphasis on requiring financial institutions to collect and maintain beneficial ownership information and making Suspicious Transaction Reports more comprehensive. In early 2013, the People's Bank of China published new regulations which require Chinese banks to rate clients' risks based on a variety of factors, including a client's location or nature of business.


**Regional and International Cooperation:** Throughout the year, China publicly affirmed its commitment to working with international partners to counter terrorism. China continued to voice support for three UNSC committees – the 1267/1989 (al-Qa’ida) Sanctions Committee, the Counter-Terrorism Committee, and the 1540 Committee. China is a founding member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), and in September announced it would increase its involvement in the GCTF's Sahel and Horn of Africa Working Groups. China also participated in the third APEC workshop on counterterrorist finance and the non-profit organization sector in January.
China cooperated with other nations on counterterrorism efforts through military exercises and assistance. In August, China and Russia held joint border security exercises (Peace Mission 2013) within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. In September, China and 18 South East Asian countries participated in a counterterrorism exercise co-chaired by Indonesia and the United States. For the first time in five years, India and China conducted joint exercises in Chengdu (Hand-in-Hand 2013) in November. Also in November, China and Indonesia held their third round of counterterrorism exercises in Indonesia (Sharp Knife 2013).

**Hong Kong**

Hong Kong largely continued its effective security and law enforcement partnership with the United States, including through the Hong Kong Customs and Excise Department’s successful joint operation of the Container Security Initiative and through participation in U.S.-sponsored training programs.

In ratifying UN Conventions on terrorism, the People’s Republic of China has specified that the treaties would also apply to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, which has subsequently implemented the Conventions through local law.

Counterterrorism remained an operational priority for the Hong Kong Police Force, as demonstrated by existing policies on prevention, protection, and preparedness. The Police Security Wing coordinates potential terrorist threat information with relevant counterterrorism units. The Police Counter Terrorist Response Unit provides a strong deterrent presence, assisting police districts with counterterrorist strategy implementation and complementing the tactical and professional support of existing police specialist units, such as the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Bureau, Special Duties Unit, and VIP Protection Unit.

Hong Kong’s strategic trade regime buttresses U.S. efforts to restrict the transfer of commodities, software, and technology to terrorist organizations or individuals. Hong Kong law enforcement officers attended U.S.-sponsored capacity building training at the International Law Enforcement Academy on border control, cargo targeting and interdiction, personnel and facility security, and post-blast investigations.

Hong Kong is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the Asia-Pacific Group (APG) on Money Laundering—a FATF-style regional body—and the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units. Terrorist financing is a criminal offense in Hong Kong, and financial institutions are required to continuously search for terrorist financing networks and screen accounts using designations lists provided by the United States under relevant authorities, as well as the UNSC 1267/1989 (al-Qa’ida) Sanctions Committee’s consolidated lists. Filing suspicious transactions reports irrespective of transaction amounts is obligatory, and at year’s end Hong Kong was considering mandatory reporting requirements for cross-border currency movements.

Hong Kong emphasized efforts to engage overseas law enforcement and counterterrorism counterparts bilaterally to ensure effective cross-border action against terrorism and terrorist financing, as well as capacity building. Multilaterally, Hong Kong was a regular and active participant in counterterrorism efforts through the FATF, APG, APEC, Interpol, and other security-focused organizations.

**Macau**
Macau’s counterterrorism cooperation with the United States included information exchange and regular capacity building through participation in U.S.-sponsored training programs. In ratifying UN Conventions on terrorism, the People’s Republic of China specified that the treaties would also apply to the Macau Special Administrative Region. The Police Intervention Tactical Unit (UTIP), which falls under the Macau Public Security Police Force, is responsible for protecting important installations and dignitaries, and for conducting high-risk missions, such as deactivation of explosive devices. UTIP’s Special Operations Group’s mission is counterterrorism operations. Macau law enforcement officers attended U.S.-sponsored capacity building training at ILEA on border control, cargo targeting and interdiction, personnel and facility security, and post-blast investigations.

Macau is a member of the Asia-Pacific Group (APG) on Money Laundering – a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body – and the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs). Terrorist financing is a criminal offense in Macau, and banks and other financial institutions are required to continuously search for terrorist financing networks and screen accounts using designations lists provided by the United States under relevant authorities, as well as the UNSC 1267/1989 Sanctions Committee’s consolidated lists. Filing suspicious transactions reports irrespective of transaction amounts is obligatory, and at year’s end Macau was considering establishing mandatory reporting requirements for cross-border currency movements. Macau’s $45 billion-per-year casino industry presents significant risks for the movement of illicit funds.

Macau cooperated internationally in counterterrorism efforts through Interpol and other security-focused organizations, including through FATF and APG. Macau’s Financial Intelligence Office pursued Memoranda of Understanding in 2013 to formalize cooperation with other FIUs, including the U.S. Financial Crimes Enforcement Network.

INDONESIA

Overview: Law enforcement officials successfully pursued terrorists and disrupted their networks, arresting at least 75 suspects in more than 40 separate raids. Indonesia cooperated on a range of counterterrorism issues with international partners, including the United States. On December 3, prosecutors at the South Jakarta District Court indicted three men on terrorism charges related to a planned attack on the Embassy of Burma in Jakarta in May. Three other suspects implicated in the case face related charges. The men claimed they plotted the attack in response to the violence against the minority Rohingya Muslims in Buddhist-majority Burma.

Violent extremists targeted police throughout the year. Most notably, in a series of separate high-profile attacks in August and September, four Indonesian law enforcement officials were killed and seven were wounded. In August, assailants also shot a prison official in the Central Javanese city of Jogjakarta near a corrections facility; he later died. Also in August, an assailant fired a gun at the house of a police officer in Tangerang, south of Jakarta. Authorities linked the perpetrators in the majority of attacks on police to existing terrorist groups. This continued a trend in which violent extremists focused on local law enforcement officials.

Small bands of terrorists were able to gather covertly in some areas, especially the mountainous area near Poso, Central Sulawesi. In addition, authorities have expressed concern about the smuggling of weapons into Indonesia from neighboring countries.

2013 Terrorist Incidents: In addition to the incidents mentioned above, there were a number of other attacks throughout the year:
On February 1, residents near Poso, Central Sulawesi found 12 pipe bombs alongside a road. Authorities defused the bombs, noting similarities to explosives created by the Eastern Indonesia Mujahidin (MIT), a local terrorist network led by the fugitive Santoso. There were numerous other incidents where bombs were found in public places, and explosives and weapons were confiscated by police during raids.

On May 13, two men on a motorcycle threw a pipe bomb at a police post in Tasikmalaya, West Java. One officer was injured in the ensuing chase, and one suspect killed.

On June 3, in the first suicide bombing in Indonesia since 2011, a suicide bomber riding a motorcycle targeted a police facility in Poso, Central Sulawesi. The bomb detonated about 30 feet from the main gate of the police station; the only fatality was the suicide bomber.

On July 20, two men launched a homemade bomb at a police post in Tasikmalaya before escaping on a motorcycle. The device, a rice cooker filled with explosive material, nails, and ball bearings, exploded in a low-intensity blast. No one was injured, in part because of the faulty circuitry of the bomb, according to police.

On August 4, a low-grade explosive device detonated in the Ekayana Buddhist Temple in Jakarta, injuring three and causing minor damage to the building. As in a plot against the Burmese Embassy in May, police suspect that the motivation for this attack was in retaliation for anti-Muslim sentiment in Burma. Authorities said there is no evidence the suspects are linked to established terrorist groups.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Law enforcement officials aggressively and successfully pursued terrorists and disrupted their networks, arresting at least 75 suspects in more than 40 separate raids. In addition, authorities increasingly prosecuted crimes of terrorism under the 2003 counterterrorism law, rather than trying terrorist suspects under other criminal statutes such as those for theft or possession of illegal weapons. In June, the Minister of Law and Human Rights issued a regulation (Number 21/2013) imposing stricter conditions on reductions in prison sentences for certain convicts, including terrorists. The Ministerial Regulation requires that all terrorist prisoners undergo a de-radicalization process before being eligible for a reduction in sentence. Furthermore, the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) must approve the release of any terrorist prisoners.

Detachments 88, the elite counterterrorism unit of the Indonesian National Police, leads terrorism investigations and arrests, and is often able to disrupt attacks before they can be carried out. However, police have difficulty dislodging terrorists from hideouts in remote areas because of terrain and lack of familiarity with local conditions. The BNPT, created in 2010, has the responsibility for coordinating counterterrorism responses among relevant agencies and ministries, but has yet to implement this mandate fully. BNPT officials attributed the lack of progress in many of its plans, in part, to inadequate funding.

Indonesia remained an important partner in the Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program and received significant capacity building training in counterterrorism tactical response and investigative skills. Participants included dozens of Indonesian National Police officers, including members of elite units that regularly conduct operations against terrorist groups in the region.

Although domestic counterterrorism efforts are civilian-led, the Indonesian military maintains counterterrorism units that could be mobilized to support domestic operations if needed. These units train regularly with law enforcement to ensure greater capability and coordination for potential domestic counterterrorism operations. However, the Indonesian military and its counterterrorism units
are primarily responsible for external terrorist threats to the archipelago and in certain other specific situations.

Border security remained a challenge. Authorities have the ability to gather biometric data of travelers, but collection procedures vary widely at ports of entry, and it is not clear how data is coordinated and shared among stakeholder agencies. Indonesia has discussed sharing passenger name records with selected countries in the region, but resource constraints and a lack of training for law enforcement and border security officials hampered coordination.

Law enforcement authorities have had significant success in arresting violent extremists involved in terrorist activity, although terrorists’ carrying of firearms and resisting arrest has resulted in casualties during arrest operations. In early January, during a series of separate raids in Central and South Sulawesi and West Nusa Tenggara, police killed seven suspected terrorists and arrested more than a dozen suspects. Authorities believed the suspects had been involved in a combination of terrorist training and funding. On May 8, during a raid in Kendal, Central Java, Abu Roban was killed, and two suspects were arrested. Roban had a leading role in the Abu Omar terrorist group and also had affiliations with the fugitive Santoso’s group, MIT, in Poso. Roban’s group was suspected of participating in a series of bank robberies that helped fund terrorist activity. The group also possessed illegal weapons. In each case, suspects fired on or threw bombs at police officers.

On June 11, Detachment 88 conducted raids against suspected terrorists in Poso, Central Sulawesi, and Makassar, South Sulawesi. The arrest operation resulted in the at least one death and two arrests. On July 22, during a raid in Tulungagung, East Java, Detachment 88 made two arrests and killed two suspected terrorists.

The Attorney General’s Office has a task force devoted to prosecuting transnational crimes, including terrorism. Specialized training for prosecutors who handle terrorism cases is relatively new, however. Ongoing personnel turnover among terrorism prosecutors limits the ability to develop institutional experience and expertise and dilutes the efficacy of training and capacity building efforts. Although Indonesia has a Witness and Victim Protection Agency (LPSK), some trial witnesses complain of intimidation. The LPSK faced both resource and personnel constraints. The ability to testify in trials remotely via Digital Video Conference is not yet regularized. The provision of courtroom security varies from case to case. For example, police protection may be provided for high-profile terrorism cases but the majority of terrorism cases do not receive it. When protection is provided, it usually applies only to the court environs, not to the residences of police, prosecutors, and judges, nor to their transportation to and from their offices to the courtrooms. However, there were no attempted attacks on any prosecutors or judges involved in terrorist trials in 2013.

Through October, the Attorney General’s Office handled 56 terrorism cases in 2013. One high-profile case involved Abu Hanifah, the leader of a variant of Harakah Sunni Masyarakat Indonesia (HASMI), who was sentenced in August to eight years in prison for violating Indonesia’s 2003 counterterrorism law. Hanifah and nearly a dozen affiliated suspects were arrested in October 2012 for plotting to bomb up to 10 high-profile locations, including U.S. diplomatic facilities in Jakarta and Surabaya.

On December 3, prosecutors at the South Jakarta District Court indicted three men on terrorism charges related to a planned attack on the Embassy of Burma in Jakarta in May. Three other suspects implicated in the case face related charges. The men claimed they plotted the attack because they were incensed by the violence against the minority Rohingya Muslims in Buddhist-majority Burma.
The Ministry of Law and Human Rights faced challenges in overseeing overcrowded prisons that house more than 150,000 inmates, including an estimated 260 terrorist prisoners. A series of prison breaks highlighted weak correctional facility management and security. On July 11, in the most high-profile case, prisoners at the Tanjung Gusta Corrections Center in Medan, North Sumatra, set a fire that caused damage to the facilities and destroyed prison records, and killed two guards and three inmates in the chaos that ensued. At least nine terrorist prisoners were among the 212 who escaped during the July 11 riot, including Fadli Sadama, who was recaptured in late November in Malaysia and transferred to Indonesia, according to Indonesian authorities. Three terrorist prisoners involved in this escape were still at large at year’s end. Nusakambangan, an island off the southern coast of Java that houses seven prisons, is considered to have the most secure corrections facilities in Indonesia, but at least three prisoners escaped in November in two separate incidents.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Indonesia is a member of the Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering, a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. Indonesia’s anti-money laundering framework has been significantly strengthened in recent years. However, gaps in the country’s counterterrorist financing laws remain. In February, Indonesia’s House of Representatives passed Law 9 of 2013, “the Bill on Prevention and Eradication of Crimes of Financing of Terrorism,” which became effective in March. Eighteen Indonesian nationals and four entities were on the UNSC 1267/1989 (al-Qa’ida) sanctions list in 2013. Despite the law, and one known attempt to freeze the assets of a convicted terrorist, Indonesia has not frozen any terrorist assets in accordance with UNSCR 1267, 1373, and 1988. As a result, the FATF continued to include Indonesia on its Public Statement list, noting that Indonesia needs to address certain deficiencies in its terrorist finance law regarding identifying and freezing terrorist assets. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: [http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm](http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm).

**Regional and International Cooperation:** Indonesia actively participated in regional and international fora. A founding member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), Indonesia co-chairs one of the GCTF’s five working groups. Indonesian officials regularly participated in GCTF workshops and shared best practices to help build the capacities of other countries. In September, Indonesia hosted a workshop for first responders to victims of terrorism; and in November, hosted a workshop on “Modern Counterterrorism Policing: Challenges and Responses.” As the 2010-2013 co-chair of the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) Experts Working Group on Counterterrorism (EWG-CT), Indonesia conducted one of the largest-ever counterterrorism coordination and training exercises. Upwards of 900 military and security personnel from the 10 ASEAN countries and the eight non-ASEAN East Asia Summit nations participated in the exercise, held in West Java in September. Indonesia is an active member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Inter-Sessional Meetings on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime (CTTC). In 2013, Indonesia began its term as Chair of the Counter-Terrorism Task Force of APEC, and will continue to chair the task force through 2014. Under Indonesian leadership, the task force has been upgraded to a working group and has generated a five-year plan that focuses on the security of supply chains, travel, finance, and infrastructure.

The Indonesian military regularly conducted counterterrorism training with its ASEAN regional counterparts, and occasional counterterrorism training with Australia, China, and the United States.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** At the end of 2013, BNPT, Indonesia’s National Counterterrorism Agency, was in the process of developing a de-radicalization blueprint. As envisioned, de-radicalization efforts would include efforts of the Indonesian government.
in coordination with civil society organizations and selected academic institutions. In Sentul, near Jakarta, construction continued on a de-radicalization center that authorities expect to open in 2014.

The BNPT opened six additional branches of the Terrorism Prevention Communication Forum, which is now present in the capital cities of 21 of Indonesia’s 34 provinces. Members of each Forum include civic and religious leaders who coordinate outreach, facilitate communication among key stakeholders at the local level, and work closely with communities and families on reintegration programs for released terrorist prisoners.

As part of efforts to counter violent extremist narratives, Indonesia continued to amplify the voices of victims of terrorism as well as former terrorists who have renounced violence. Numerous NGOs and religious organizations sponsored workshops and conferences, emphasizing the need to respect diversity and foster greater tolerance. Indonesia also invited religious leaders, in coordination with civil society and faith-based organizations, to be part of outreach efforts to violent extremists.

**DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA**

**Overview:** The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is not known to have sponsored any terrorist acts since the bombing of a Korean Airlines flight in 1987. In October 2008, the United States rescinded the designation of the DPRK as a state sponsor of terrorism in accordance with criteria set forth in U.S. law, including a certification that the DPRK had not provided any support for international terrorism during the preceding six-month period and the provision by the DPRK of assurances that it would not support acts of international terrorism in the future.

Four Japanese Red Army members who participated in a 1970 jet hijacking continued to live in the DPRK. The Japanese government continued to seek a full accounting of the fate of 12 Japanese nationals believed to have been abducted by DPRK state entities in the 1970s and 1980s. As of the end of December 2013, the DPRK had yet to fulfill its commitment to reopen its investigation into the abductions.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** In May, the United States re-certified North Korea as a country “not cooperating fully” with U.S. counterterrorism efforts pursuant to Section 40A of the Arms Export and Control Act, as amended. In making this annual determination, the Department of State reviewed the DPRK’s overall level of cooperation with U.S. efforts to combat terrorism, taking into account U.S. counterterrorism objectives with the DPRK and a realistic assessment of DPRK capabilities.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** The DPRK is not a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) or the Asia-Pacific Group (APG) on Money Laundering, a FATF-style regional body. North Korea engaged both the FATF and the APG throughout the year and applied to join the latter as an observer, although its application was ultimately unsuccessful. In addition, the DPRK failed to demonstrate meaningful progress in strengthening its anti-money laundering combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) infrastructure, its accession to the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism in July notwithstanding. Although the FATF welcomed DPRK’s engagement, it highlighted a continuing concern about North Korea’s “failure to address the significant deficiencies in its [AML/CFT] regime,” noting the “serious threat this poses to the integrity of the international financial system.” At each of its plenary meetings throughout the year, the FATF renewed its call on members to “apply effective countermeasures to protect their financial sectors” from the “ongoing and substantial [AML/CFT]...risks” posed by the DPRK. For further information

**REPUBLIC OF KOREA**

**Overview:** The Republic of Korea remains committed to its counterterrorism programs and has maintained strong cooperation with the United States and the international community. The Republic of Korea has not faced any major domestic terrorist threats, and the various agencies with counterterrorist responsibilities have remained vigilant in countering what they perceive as emerging threats, such as potential home-grown terrorism through internet recruitment.

The Republic of Korea is becoming more involved in bilateral and international counterterrorism efforts in response to the growing exposure of its citizens living and traveling abroad. South Korean and U.S. law enforcement agencies worked closely on sharing information on known or suspected terrorists, implementing an agreement passed in 2008 on Preventing and Combating Serious Crime (PCSC), and holding joint investigations on known and suspected terrorist encounters that occurred in the Republic of Korea.

In November, the Republic of Korea and the United States held the Fourth Bilateral Consultation on Counterterrorism, where the two countries shared information on ways to enhance bilateral cooperation and expand South Korea’s multilateral engagement.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** The National Assembly failed to pass a comprehensive counterterrorism law, first proposed in 2001, that would have significantly improved the Republic of Korea’s ability to conduct counterterrorist activities. The Republic of Korea derives its authority to perform counterterrorist activities from Presidential Directive 47, which was last revised on May 21, 2013. The revision was mostly administrative and did not add any new authorities.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** The Republic of Korea is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering, a FATF-style regional body. In accordance with UNSCRs 1267 (1999) and 1373 (2001), the Republic of Korea is tightening its existing domestic legislative framework and administrative procedures to combat terrorist financing. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR)*, Volume 2, *Money Laundering and Financial Crimes*: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

**Regional and International Cooperation:** The Republic of Korea is a member of the UN, APEC, ASEAN+3, East Asia Summit, Asia-Europe Meeting, Asia Cooperation Dialogue, Forum for East Asia-Latin America Cooperation, OECD, the G-20, and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia. South Korea is also a partner country of the OSCE and NATO. In October 2013, the Republic of Korea hosted the Conference on Cyberspace 2013, where representatives from 87 countries and 18 international organizations discussed how to combat cyber-attacks and the use of cyberspace for terrorist activities.

To promote capacity building abroad, the South Korean government has launched development assistance initiatives in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the West Bank and Gaza, which include contributions to counterterrorism and stabilization programs. Also, various South Korean ministries provide information and communication technology advancement assistance to developing countries that
includes programs to counter cyber-terrorism and to build a secure information technology infrastructure.

MALAYSIA

Overview: Among Malaysia’s most significant counterterrorism developments in 2013 was the arrest of al-Qa’ida operative Yazid Sufaat, the first person charged with terrorism offenses in Malaysia’s criminal courts under the Security Offenses (Special Measures) Act of 2012 (SOSMA). Previously, Malaysia had detained suspected terrorists without trial under Internal Security Act (ISA), which was repealed with the passage of SOSMA. United States cooperation with Malaysia on counterterrorism and other transnational security issues continued to improve.

Malaysia remained vulnerable to terrorist activity and was likely used as a transit and meeting site for terrorists. Malaysia is not considered a terrorist safe haven, but some violent extremists have been known to operate and hide in isolated littoral areas of the Sulu/Sulawesi Seas between Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines.

Malaysian authorities cooperated closely with the international community on counterterrorism efforts, and regularly participated in capacity building training programs.

2013 Terrorist Incidents: Malaysian officials described a February/March incursion by armed insurgents into the Lahad Datu region of eastern Sabah as a terrorist attack. On February 11, approximately 250 armed insurgents, calling themselves the “Royal Security Forces of the Sultanate of Sulu and North Borneo”, invaded the Lahad Datu region asserting a claim to the territory. Malaysian security forces engaged in negotiations with the insurgents in an attempt to end the incursion peacefully, and the governments of Malaysia and the Philippines remained in contact at senior levels. However, after several weeks of negotiations, fighting broke out on March 1 that resulted in the deaths of nine Malaysian police officers, six civilians, and 72 insurgents. On March 5, Malaysian authorities launched additional security operations. Of the 103 detainees resulting from those operations, 30 were eventually charged under Malaysia’s penal code and SOSMA authority for harboring terrorists (Section 130K), membership of a terrorist group (Section 130K(a)), recruiting terrorists (Section 130E), and waging war against the king (Section 121). These individuals were awaiting trial at year’s end. The other suspects were deported, transferred to immigration holds, or released within the 28-day period mandated by the SOSMA. In August, a 61-year-old veteran of the Royal Malaysia Police Special Branch unit was sentenced to seven years in prison under the SOSMA for withholding information linked to the Lahad Datu incursion.

On November 15, gunmen, allegedly from the Philippines and linked to the Abu Sayyaf Group, raided a resort on Pom Pom Island off the eastern coast of Sabah, killing a tourist from Taiwan and taking his wife hostage. On December 20, Philippine authorities recovered her in a forest near the village of Talipao on the island of Jolo. Some media reports indicated she was released in exchange for a ransom payment. On December 2, Royal Malaysia Police announced the arrest of two Filipino suspects in Semporna, eastern Sabah, allegedly linked to the attack.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The Royal Malaysia Police Special Task Force (Operations/Counterterrorism) has the lead counterterrorism role. Malaysia’s law enforcement capacity is adequate. Malaysian authorities have made efforts to improve inter-agency cooperation and information sharing. This includes participation in regional meetings, Global Counterterrorism Forum
Malaysian authorities, including the Attorney General’s Chambers, viewed Yazid Sufaat’s case as an important barometer for the application of SOSMA to successfully prosecute suspected terrorists. Sufaat, who was originally detained in December 2001 under the ISA and held for seven years for connections with al-Qa’ida (AQ), was arrested on February 3 under SOSMA, along with alleged accomplices Halimah Hussein and Muhammad Hilmi Hasim. Sufaat, an alleged former bioweapons expert for AQ, whom the 9/11 Commission Report linked to the September 11 attacks, was charged with inciting or promoting the commission of terrorist acts under Section 130G(a) of Malaysia’s penal code. Hussein and Hasim were charged under Section 130G(a) with aiding and abetting Sufaat to promote the commission of terrorist acts and Section 109. On May 20, the Malaysian High Court dismissed the charges on constitutional grounds and released all three. One week after the judicial dismissal, authorities rearrested Sufaat and Hasim on new charges relating to the same criminal conduct. Halimah Hussein fled and at year’s end she remained a fugitive, despite multiple Malaysian operations to find her. On June 18, an appellate court overturned the original High Court dismissal, and reinstated the original charges. At year’s end, Sufaat and Hasim remained in custody, but their trials had not yet started.

In November, in cooperation with Indonesian authorities, Royal Malaysia Police captured convicted terrorist Fadli Sadama, who escaped from Tanjung Gusta Penitentiary in Medan, Indonesia in mid-July. Malaysian authorities transferred Sadama to Indonesian custody shortly after his arrest.

Iranian citizen Masoud Sedaghatzadeh, arrested in Malaysia in February 2012 after fleeing failed bombings in Bangkok, remained in Malaysian custody. A Malaysian court had ordered Sedaghatzadeh’s extradition to Thailand in 2012, but his appeal remained pending at year’s end.

Malaysia continued to implement a fingerprint biometrics system at all ports of entry. Immigration authorities announced in December that Malaysia would implement an Advance Passenger Screening System by June 2014, including a no-fly list to prevent suspected terrorists and transnational criminals from entering or transiting the country. Malaysia has liberal visa requirements and does not require an entry visa for citizens of many countries. In October 2013, Malaysia announced it would reduce the validity of visas on arrival for Iranian tourists from 90 days to 14 days.

In response to the aforementioned Lahad Datu incursion, the Malaysian government declared the entire eastern portion of Sabah, consisting of a 1700 kilometer coastline from Kudat in the north to Tawau near the Indonesian border, as the Eastern Sabah Security Zone. In March the government formed the Eastern Sabah Security Command (ESSCOM), a civilian-led entity tasked with coordinating the security efforts of 64 military, police, and civilian agencies.

Malaysia continued to participate in the U.S. Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program. ATA assistance focused on building Malaysian law enforcement capacity to secure Malaysia’s borders, including air and land points of entry, from terrorist transit. Training included a range of border control instruction, including airport security and fraudulent document recognition. Malaysia also participated in the Container Security and Megaports Initiatives.

The Malaysian Attorney General led a delegation of senior law enforcement and prosecutorial officials on a State Department and Justice Department-funded study tour to the United States which focused on land border and port security, and inter-agency law enforcement task force operations. The State Department of State's Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program focuses on building Malaysian law enforcement capacity to secure Malaysia’s borders, including air and land points of entry, from terrorist transit. Training included a range of border control instruction, including airport security and fraudulent document recognition. Malaysia also participated in the Container Security and Megaports Initiatives.

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Department’s Export Control and Border Security (EXBS) program and the Department of Homeland Security also provided document analysis training to Malaysian authorities.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Malaysia is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body. Malaysia’s geography and location make it vulnerable to exploitation by illicit actors. However, Malaysia has a well-developed anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) framework. Law enforcement and customs officials are responsible for examining trade-based money laundering and invoice manipulation and their relationship to underground finance and informal remittance systems.

In response to FATF’s 2012 revised international standards, Malaysia undertook an extensive review of its national AML/CFT framework through the National Coordinating Committee for Countering Money Laundering (NCC). The review, which was ongoing at year’s end, assessed the Anti-Money Laundering and Antiterrorism Financing Act of 2001, as well as analyzed strengthening the NCC as a national body for formulating AML/CFT policy.

In September and October, the Central Bank of Malaysia issued five new AML/CFT guidelines, including more stringent measures to deal with high-risk jurisdictions and enhanced requirements to undertake risk assessment.

In October, Malaysia’s Compliance Officers’ Networking Group organized the fifth International Conference on Financial Crime and Terrorism Financing, a two-day event focusing on countering terrorist finance and anti-money laundering. Over 500 people attended the event, including a speaker from the FBI.


**Regional and International Cooperation:** Malaysia actively participated in ASEAN and APEC forums. In June, Malaysia hosted an APEC Counterterrorism Task Force workshop on major events security. Malaysian officials actively participated in GCTF workshops, including training activities on prisoner rehabilitation, international joint investigations, judicial best practices for handling counterterrorism cases, and assistance to victims of terrorist attacks. Malaysian law enforcement officials routinely met with regional counterparts to discuss counterterrorism issues at meetings such as the ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime in Vietnam in June.

SEARCCCT, which falls under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, hosted 17 training events, including seminars on countering violent extremism; managing terrorist inmates; cybercrime links with terrorism; and chemical/biological/radiological/nuclear response training.

Malaysia continued to facilitate peace talks between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). In December the Philippine government and MILF representatives signed the power-sharing annex to the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro in Kuala Lumpur, an important step toward a final peace agreement to end the conflict which has killed an estimated 150,000 people.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** The Prisons Department of Malaysia implemented a three-phased approach to de-radicalizing violent extremist inmates. The first
The second focuses on counseling, religious training, and behavioral improvement. The final phase includes job skills development and vocational training to facilitate reintegration into society, and provides prisoners with a modest income for work performed while incarcerated. Authorities also allowed NGOs and religious organizations to engage with prisoners. Malaysian prison officials participated in several GCTF workshops focused on countering violent extremism and the role of religious scholars in de-radicalization.

Authorities worked with religious and social counselors, as well as community leaders and family members, to help released ISA detainees re integrate into society. Some Malaysian police participated in community engagement activities to promote trust with at-risk communities. SEARCCT, in partnership with the UN Counterterrorism Committee Executive Directorate, organized a workshop on Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism through Community Policing.

**PHILIPPINES**

**Overview:** The Philippines maintained its strong counterterrorism cooperation with the United States. The ability of terrorist groups, including the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Jemaah Islamiya (JI), and the Communist People’s Party/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA), to conduct terrorist activities inside the Philippines remained constrained. Terrorist group actions included criminal activities designed to generate revenue for self-sustainment, such as kidnapping for ransom or extortion, in addition to bombings for hire. In addition, members of these groups were suspected to have carried out bombings against government, public, and private facilities, primarily in the central and western areas of Mindanao; while others were linked to extortion operations in other parts of the country. Terrorist groups in the southern Philippines actively conducted bomb-making training, small-scale shootings, and ambushes.

The Government of the Philippines continued to implement its 2011–2016 Internal Peace and Security Plan that calls for the transition of internal security functions from the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to the Philippine National Police (PNP). The increasing role and capability of the police to maintain internal security in conflict-affected areas will permit the AFP to shift its focus to enhancing the country’s maritime security and territorial defense capabilities. To date, however, this transition has been slow and ineffective.

In 2013 the peace panels of the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) signed three of four annexes to the 2012 Peace Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB), which lays out a roadmap to a comprehensive peace agreement and calls for the creation of a new, autonomous Bangsamoro entity to replace the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). However, during the year, rogue elements of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) conducted a three-week violent siege of Zamboanga City, a major city in the southern Philippines, killing dozens of Philippine security forces members and displacing thousands of civilians. Also, a number of smaller armed groups in Mindanao conducted bombings, raids, and kidnapping for ransom with increased frequency compared to the years before the MILF signed the FAB.

**2013 Terrorist Incidents:** High-profile terrorist incidents included:

- On January 21, a bicycle-borne improvised explosive device (IED) at Lligan City injured 10 people.
On February 4, an IED placed on a parked motorcycle exploded in front of a restaurant at Tubod Lanao del Norte, resulting in five wounded.

On May 25, ASG militants were involved in an hour-long gun battle near Patikul, Sulu, which killed seven Philippine Marines and injured nine; and killed five ASG and injured 10.

On June 22, ASG kidnapped two sisters who were filming a documentary on Sulu. They were being held in Sulu at year’s end.

On July 26, Khalifa Islamiyah Mindanao (KIM) – one of several emerging small violent extremist groups in Mindanao called the Black Flag Movement – was blamed for conducting an IED attack in Cagayan de Oro (CDO) at the Kyla's Bistro in the Limketkai Commercial Center, which killed six and injured more than 40. Most victims were medical practitioners and pharmaceutical sales representatives in CDO for a national medical convention. Components recovered from post-blast investigation indicated a command-detected IED concealed in a backpack.

On August 5, a vehicle-borne IED (VBIED) detonated on a main street near the center of Cotabato City, killing eight and injuring 34. The VBIED detonated when the Cotabato City Mayor's bullet-proof SUV neared the site. The Mayor was not in the vehicle, but the City Administrator was. A large fire damaged several buildings and vehicles nearby.

On September 9, approximately 250 members of MNLF seized several villages and numerous hostages throughout Zamboanga City in Mindanao. The siege lasted three weeks, leading to the deaths of dozens of Philippines Security Forces (PSF) members and 180 MNLF, and destroyed 344,400 square meters of urban space, resulting in over 100,000 evacuees, several thousand of whom remained homeless at year’s end.

On September 16, two IEDs detonated in cinemas at two different malls in Davao City. Five people were injured. At year’s end, the Philippine government had not identified who was responsible.

On September 23, members of the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) attacked Mlang village in North Cotabato, taking more than 20 civilians hostages at Malingaw Elementary School. The attack resulted in the killing of two individuals and displaced more than 2,000.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** The 2007 Human Security Act is the principal counterterrorism legislation in the Philippines. The law defines terrorism and provides methods for law enforcement to conduct investigations of terrorist suspects. President Aquino has prioritized the adoption of amendments to the Human Security Act in three main areas: revising the definition of terrorism to conform to international standards; easing strict monetary penalties and prison terms against law enforcement officials involved in cases where individuals are wrongly accused and later acquitted; and removing barriers to support investigations.

Despite those legislative efforts, an under-resourced and understaffed law enforcement and judicial system coupled with widespread official corruption resulted in limited domestic investigations, unexecuted arrest warrants, few prosecutions, and lengthy trials of cases. Philippine investigators and prosecutors lacked necessary tools to build strong cases such as clear processes for requesting judicially authorized interception of terrorist communications, entering into plea bargains with key witnesses, and seizing assets of those suspected in benefiting from terrorism.

The United States continued to work with the Government of the Philippines to investigate subjects associated with the development and operations of a JI training camp in the southern Philippines. The Government of the Philippines has arrested multiple persons with suspected ties to ASG and JI.
On June 16, the PNP arrested five suspected ASG members and seized numerous IED-making components.

On July 23, a trial commenced in Cebu City against two members of the MNLF, Ronnie Jamming and Marlon Jilhano, for the IED attack on a U.S. convoy in Kagay, Jolo, in 2009, which killed two U.S. Servicemen and one Philippine Marine. The trial was subsequently postponed for the remainder of 2013 because of a major earthquake that damaged Cebu’s Hall of Justice.

On November 5, Jabide Abdul, a leader of the al-Khabat Group, which the PNP reports had ties with JI and is believed to be responsible for several bomb attacks in Central Mindanao, was arrested by Sultan Kudarat. Abdul was the subject of several arrest warrants for murder, destruction of property, and related crimes.

The Philippines Antiterrorism Council (ATC) provides guidance to agencies responsible for enforcing terrorism laws. In 2013, the UN Office of Drug Control worked with the ATC to develop a manual on Collaborative Intelligence, Investigation and Prosecution of Terrorism-Related Cases in the Philippines. Coordination between law enforcement, investigators, and prosecutors, however, remained sporadic.

The Philippine National Police (PNP) maintains legal responsibility for ensuring peace and security throughout the county, including arresting terrorists and conducting terrorism investigations. In some of the conflict-affected areas, the PNP has relied upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines to conduct counterterrorism operations. The creation of the PNP Special Action Force (SAF) has helped to strengthen law enforcement counterterrorism capabilities; however, the SAF remains a relatively small unit. The SAF has received training through multiple sources including the Joint Special Operations Task Forces – Philippines, and has been designated as a unit that will be given communications equipment through the U.S. Global Security Contingency Fund.

The Philippines remained an important partner in the U.S. Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program, which provided extensive tactical training to PNP officers, including SAF members, to support the transition in the southern Philippines from military to civilian counterterrorism authority. ATA assistance included instruction in areas such as crisis response, hostage negotiation, and explosive ordnance disposal training. The ATA program has also focused on building PNP capacity to conduct counterterrorism-related investigations, including cyber investigations.

The Philippines continued to improve the security of its passports. Beginning in 2007, the Philippines started to issue machine readable passports. Three million non-machine readable passports remained in circulation at year’s end, the last of which expired in 2013. Phase one of the Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) is complete, and the system has been installed at the NBI’s headquarters. Phase one was the build-out of the physical AFIS facility at NBI HQ and the digitization of 850,000 fingerprint records.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** The Philippines is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group (APG) on Money Laundering, a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body. The Philippines has improved its anti-money laundering/counterterrorist finance (AML/CFT) regime. Republic Act No. 10365, which further amended the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, was signed into law on February 15, and took effect on March 7. It expanded the list of predicate crimes under the Philippines’ anti-money laundering regime to include the financing of terrorism (which was made a
stand-alone crime under Republic Act No. 10168 – “The Terrorism Financing Prevention and Suppression Act of 2012”). In June, the FATF recognized the progress that the Philippines has made in improving its AML/CFT regime but noted that the country needed to continue to work on implementing regulations for the casino sector. The country is extremely advanced in the use of cellphones for funds transfer and receives considerable funds from abroad via remittances. Along with trade-based money laundering, these pose possible vulnerabilities for exploitation by illicit actors.

Thus far, the Anti-Money Laundering Council has been able to identify, obtain freeze orders, and obtain forfeiture judgments and writs of execution for bank deposits and real estate assets linked to the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) and the Rajah Solaiman Movement – both listed on the UN 1267/1989 Sanctions List – with a total estimated value of more than US $237,000.

Non-profit organizations are not covered institutions under the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, as amended. There is no single supervisory authority for entities in the non-profit sector. Monitoring is weak due to insufficient coordination and limited resources of regulatory bodies.


**Regional and International Cooperation:** The Philippines participated in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) and supported the ADMM-Plus Experts’ Working Group on Counterterrorism. Through U.S.-sponsored antiterrorism training, the PNP developed contacts with law enforcement agencies in Indonesia and Malaysia. Although the Philippines is not a member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), Philippine officials regularly attend GCTF-organized events.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** The Philippine government continued its counter-radicalization program: Payapa at Masaganang Pamayanan or PAMANA (Resilient Communities in Conflict Affected Communities). The Philippines government worked with the GCTF in an effort to apply the Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders.

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**SINGAPORE**

**Overview:** In 2013, Singapore’s bilateral engagement on counterterrorism law enforcement and intelligence cooperation benefited from improved working level dialogue on many of the issues that had previously impeded the development of more strategic and productive agency-to-agency relationships. Of note, Singapore and U.S. law enforcement agencies worked closely to share information on known or suspected terrorists.

As of December 2013, terrorist suspects detained in Singapore included members of Jemaah Islamiya (JI), who have plotted to carry out attacks in Singapore in the past, and members of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. Two persons with links to terrorist groups were newly detained in 2013, including a self-radicalized Singaporean who intended to join the Muslim insurgency in south Thailand and the son of JI leader Mas Selamat Kastari. In addition, the October 2012 detention of one person, a self-radicalized individual, was announced in March 2013. In 2013, Singapore placed four persons on Restriction Orders (RO) and the ROs of two additional persons were allowed to lapse. Detainees
placed on ROs are monitored by Singaporean authorities and required to report to authorities on a regular basis.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Singapore uses its Internal Security Act (ISA) to arrest and detain suspected terrorists without trial. The ISA authorizes the Minister for Home Affairs (MHA), with the consent of the president, to order detention without judicial review if it is determined that a person poses a threat to national security. The initial detention may be for up to two years, and the MHA may renew the detention for an unlimited number of additional periods up to two years at a time with the president’s consent.

Singapore’s law enforcement demonstrated the capacity to detect, deter, and respond to terrorist incidents. The Internal Security Department (ISD) provides threat assessments and carries out field investigations of suspected terrorist-related activities or incidents. Law enforcement units displayed coordination, command, and control in responding to threat information affecting Singapore’s security. Singapore’s law enforcement actions included:

- In March, Asyrani bin Hussaini was detained for two years under the ISA for attempting to participate in the armed insurgency in south Thailand. He entered south Thailand illegally to join Thai insurgents.
- Abdul Majid, a member of the militant group Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) who was detained under the ISA in June 2011, was placed on RO in June 2013. He had undergone military training at the MILF’s Camp Abu Bakar in Mindanao, and helped the MILF procure funds and weapon components. He cooperated in the investigation and showed significant progress in his rehabilitation. He was assessed to no longer pose a security threat that required preventive detention.
- In September, Singaporean Mustafa Kamal bin Mohammad was placed on Restriction Order for two years. Mustafa was a member of MILF in the Philippines and had undergone military training at the MILF’s Camp Abu Bakar and raised funds for it.
- Jahpar bin Osman and Samad bin Subari, both JI members detained under the ISA in April 2005 and July 2011, respectively, were placed on RO in April 2013 and July 2013, respectively.
- The Restriction Orders against two JI members, Arifin bin Ali and Mohammad Sharif bin Rahmat, and MILF member Ahmad Jalaluddin bin Sanawi, were allowed to lapse between May and August. They had been cooperative and responsive to rehabilitation efforts and no longer required supervision.
- Muhammad Hanif Mas Selamat, son of JI leader Mas Selamat Kastari was deported to Singapore from Indonesia on October 30. He remained under investigation for activities “inimical to the security of Singapore.”

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Singapore is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, a FATF-style regional body. The country’s secrecy protections, lack of routine large currency reporting requirements, the large scale of its private banking sector and relatively large casino sector pose significant risks for exploitation by illicit actors. There were no assets frozen or confiscated for terrorist finance-related crimes. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.
**Regional and International Cooperation:** Singapore was an active participant in ASEAN and is a member of the Proliferation Security Initiative.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** Singapore maintains a de-radicalization program that focuses on countering detainees' violent extremist ideology. Singapore enlists the support of religious teachers and scholars to study JI's ideology, develops teachings to counter the group's spread within Singapore's Muslim community, and provides counseling to detainees. Religious counseling for detainees continues after release. There were no reported cases of recidivism among the individuals released from detention or restrictive order.

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**THAILAND**

**Overview:** Counterterrorism cooperation with Thailand remained strong. Thailand engaged with the United States on investigations into Hizballah and Iranian activities after security incidents involving both groups occurred in 2012. While officials have long expressed concern that transnational terrorist groups could establish links with southern Thailand-based separatist groups, there have been no indications that transnational terrorist groups were directly involved in the violence in the south, and there was no evidence of direct operational links between southern Thai insurgent groups and regional terrorist networks.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Thailand incorporated terrorism offences into its penal code in 2003, but most terrorism prosecutions failed to prove the necessary element of specific intent and therefore resulted in convictions for less serious offenses. In early 2013, Thailand passed the Transnational Organized Crime Act, which grants prosecutors the authority to investigate overseas transnational organized crime activities, including acts of terrorism.

Thailand’s law enforcement units demonstrated some capacity to detect, deter, and respond to terrorist incidents. Interagency cooperation and coordination was sporadic, information sharing was limited, and the delineation of duties between law enforcement and military units with counterterrorism responsibilities was unclear in 2013. Thailand continued to participate in the U.S. Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program and received capacity building training in terrorism prevention, detection, and response. ATA training focused specifically on critical incident response, including canine detection of explosives and police first response to terrorist incidents.

Land borders are relatively porous. In May 2012, the Thai government removed the Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES) from eight ports of entry and installed a locally developed program. As of the end of 2013, the Thai government continued to use PISCES at its main international airport in Bangkok, Suvarnabhumi, while planning for eventual transition from PISCES to the local program.

In August, Thai courts sentenced two Iranian men, one to life imprisonment and one to fifteen years in prison, for accidentally setting off explosives – allegedly intended to target Israeli diplomats – in February 2012. A third Iranian co-conspirator arrested in Malaysia in 2012 was still awaiting extradition to Thailand at year’s end. Separately, a Hizballah operative – who was storing 10,000 pounds of urea-based fertilizer and 10 gallons of liquid ammonium nitrate in a commercial building about 20 miles south of Bangkok when he was detained in January 2012 – was sentenced to two years and eight months in prison in September.
Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Thailand is a member of the Asia-Pacific Group on Money Laundering, a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. In February, Parliament passed the Antiterrorism Financing Act. The new law designated 23 terrorists, whom authorities claim are closely monitored, but the government of Thailand has not frozen any assets under this law or under UNSCR 1267, 1373, and 1988.

In June, the FATF recognized Thailand’s “significant progress” in reforming its anti-money laundering/counterterrorist finance framework. Thai authorities continued to work to address the vulnerabilities the country faces including those faced by a porous border, large scale smuggling, and a growing network of hawaladars – informal value transfer systems.


Regional and International Cooperation: Thai authorities cooperate regionally and with the broader international community on counterterrorism efforts, including APEC, ASEAN, and the ASEAN Regional Forum.

Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism: A range of Thai government agencies, including the Southern Border Provincial Administration Center and the Internal Security Operations Command, continued to organize outreach programs to ethnic Malay-Muslims to counter radicalization and violent extremism. NGOs also reached out to communities in the southern provinces to provide services, identify the underlying causes of the area’s violence, and provide outlets for peaceful political expression.

EUROPE

Terrorist incidents, including deadly attacks, continued to plague Europe in 2013. Some attacks were apparently perpetrated by “lone offender” assailants while others were organized by groups claiming a range of extremist ideological motivations, from nationalism to right-wing and left-wing political theories to various religious beliefs, including violent Islamist extremism. In some cases the boundaries between ideologies were blurred.

A major challenge to Europe was the increasing travel of European citizens – mostly young men – to and from Syria seeking to join forces opposing the Asad regime. Many of them ended up in the ranks of violent extremist groups such as al-Nusra Front or the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). These “foreign fighters” sparked increasing concerns, and actions to address them, by European countries worried about the growing number of their citizens traveling to the battlefield and possibly returning radicalized. European governments, in particular the EU and several member states affected by this phenomenon, took action to assess the problem and to devise an array of responses to discourage their citizens from going to Syria to take part in the conflict. These efforts ranged from new administrative procedures to prevent travel to Syria, to steps to counter recruitment and facilitation efforts, and programs to investigate and/or reintegrate persons returning from conflict zones. In the western Balkans, governments in EU candidate states and aspirants were also committed to responding effectively to the foreign fighter problem, and sought assistance to fill gaps in their capacity to do so from the United States, the EU, and others. European governments also worked with the United States and other international partners in various fora, including the Global
Counterterrorism Forum, to respond to the foreign fighter problem and strengthen general counterterrorism cooperation.

The Bulgarian government continued its investigation of the July 2012 attack in Burgas which left five Israelis and one Bulgarian citizen dead. In February 2013, the government publicly implicated Hizballah in the bombing. A court in Cyprus convicted a Lebanese Hizballah operative of various criminal offenses after he was apprehended surveilling potential Israeli targets on the island. Recognizing the threat posed by Hizballah, the EU in July 2013 agreed to designate what it termed the “military wing” of Hizballah as a terrorist group, a notable step forward.

Europe was the scene of several significant terrorist attacks in 2013. In Turkey, the most significant such incident in the country’s modern history took place in May when 52 people died in a bombing in Reyhanli, on the border with Syria. In the Russian city of Volgograd, an attack on a city bus in October and two more attacks at the end of December claimed a total of 41 lives. The U.S. Embassy in Ankara was the target of a suicide bomb attack by a member of the Revolutionary Liberation People’s Party/Front in February, in which a Turkish citizen on the Embassy guard force was killed. In January, three Kurdish women activists were murdered in Paris, allegedly by a Turkish Kurd now in French police custody, in a crime linked to terrorism although the motive of the killer remains unclear.

Disclosures about alleged U.S. “spying” on European partners sparked concern but did not have a major effect on long-standing and close transatlantic cooperation in combating terrorist threats.

ALBANIA

Overview: Albania held national elections in 2013, with the government changing from a coalition led by the center-right Democratic Party to one led by the center-left Socialist Party. The change in government did not affect Albania’s overall counterterrorism efforts, with the new administration continuing the country’s strong collaboration relationship with the United States.

Albanian government institutions have been aware since 2012 that a small group of Albanians have traveled to fight in Syria.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The Albanian government has prioritized its counter-narcotics effort and directs its limited law enforcement and border security resources against this objective, rather than against terrorism, which it has seen as a less immediate threat. Albania criminalizes terrorist acts; recruiting and training persons to commit terrorist actions; incitement of terrorist actions; and establishing, leading, and participating in a terrorist organization. The Albanian State Police has established a counterterrorism sector within the Directorate for Serious Crimes of the Department of Criminal Investigations.

Overall, while Albania has the political will to cooperate with countries in the region on counterterrorism initiatives, it lacked the capacity to implement effective controls. Corruption coupled with a poorly functioning judicial system continued to hinder Albanian efforts in law enforcement. Albania does not have the capacity to collect biometric data other than that contained on biometric identity cards presented at border crossing points. Fingerprint data from clandestine migrants is collected, but not all border control points are equipped with live scanners, resulting in a delay in fingerprints being included in electronic databases or identification of individuals based on fingerprint data.
The Ministry of Interior maintained a name-based watchlist populated by an Albanian national wanted persons list and lost and stolen travel document information. The database is a component of the U.S. Department of Justice’s Total Information Management System (TIMS), and it is also linked to Interpol databases.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Albania is a member of the Council of Europe Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (Moneyval), a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body; and the Albanian Financial Intelligence Unit is a member of the Egmont Group. Since June 2012, Albania has made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and Moneyval to address its strategic anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism deficiencies. Progress has been made but work remains to enhance the framework for international cooperation related to terrorist financing and to ensure and implement an adequate legal framework for identifying, tracing, and freezing terrorist assets.

Albania adopted a new law on measures against the financing of terrorism to comply with the FATF and Moneyval recommendations; final review of this law by the FATF and Moneyval will occur in 2014. Albania has adopted measures against UNSCR-listed individuals and organizations.

Based on Albanian legislation (the Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism), Albanian non-profit organizations are not obliged to submit suspicious transaction reports. However, non-profit organizations may be considered “clients” of entities subject to the law, and as a result may be subject to extended due diligence if an associated bank or financial institution considers the organization a potential “high risk client” that would require such monitoring. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

**Regional and International Cooperation:** Albania’s counterterrorism participation in multilateral and regional organizations includes the UN, OSCE, NATO, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** The Government of Albania countered violent extremist narratives that attempted to exploit religious beliefs, and also actively engaged the Albanian Islamic Community, the official administrative body of the Albanian Sunni Muslim community.

**AUSTRIA**

**Overview:** Austria was vigilant in its counterterrorism efforts and U.S.-Austrian law enforcement cooperation was generally strong. Concerns over data privacy protection – amplified by public debate about suspected NSA locations and activities in Austria – slowed the implementation of counterterrorism legislation and agreements. A broad and continuing public perception that Austria is safe from terrorist attacks reduced the impetus for counterterrorism efforts. The Agency for State Protection and Counterterrorism (BVT) reported that the threat from transnational violent extremism remained a concern, due in part to a small number of individuals who train in terrorist camps abroad. In addition to violent domestic extremist groups from the right and the left, the BVT monitored Austrian Islamist fighters returning from the civil war in Syria, radicalized individuals among second and third-generation immigrants, and religious converts.
**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Austria has a broad legal framework to combat terrorism. Relevant statutes criminalize training in terrorist camps abroad and allow telephone surveillance of individual suspects or small groups with the permission of an independent judge or ombudsman. In July, the Austrian Parliament passed the country’s new National Security Strategy, which emphasizes international cooperation to fight terrorism and cybercrime. The document also identified “successful integration of immigrants” as a prerequisite to prevent radicalization.

Prosecutors are consulted during investigations and work in coordination with counterparts in other components of law enforcement. Specialized law enforcement units have advanced investigations, crisis response, and border security capacity. There is a streamlined response to terrorism, with a single agency – the BVT – that has jurisdiction over investigations and post incident response. Law enforcement units display clear and effective command and control. Specialized law enforcement units are properly equipped and supported with relevant training, but staffing and funding shortages could hamper their effectiveness. Demarcated missions exist between law enforcement and military units that have a counterterrorism mission, although coordination could be improved.

Border security forces make effective use of security measures including biographic and biometric screening capabilities at ports of entry, terrorist screening watchlists, information-sharing internally and with other EU countries, and collection of advance passenger name records on commercial flights.

Austrian counterterrorism authorities filed criminal charges against 10 Austrian violent extremists who returned from fighting in Syria, but charges were dropped due to lack of evidence. They remained under observation at year’s end.

Austrian Islamist extremist Mohammed Mahmoud al-Shawqi, who burned his Austrian passport and announced his intention to fight in Syria in a video distributed over the “Global Islamic Media Front” network, was arrested in March trying to enter Syria from Turkey. Subsequent to his arrest, Mahmoud applied for asylum. He was in detention in Turkey awaiting extradition at year’s end.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Austria is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and its Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) is a member of the Egmont Group. The country’s banking and financial sector plays an important role within Europe. Legal amendments enacted over the past four years have sought to bring Austria's anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime into greater compliance with FATF standards. Those amendments have strengthened regulatory standards; given more power and responsibility to bank compliance officers, regulators, and Austria's FIU; eliminated bearer shares for domestic non-listed stock corporations; made asset seizure easier in AML/CFT cases; and provided for easier access to banking information.

Non-profit organizations are not required to file suspicious transaction reports as part of their license to operate or as a matter of law.


**Regional and International Cooperation:** Austria maintains security partnerships with several countries in the region and the Ministry of the Interior has counterterrorism liaison officers in a number of Austria’s embassies in southeastern Europe. Austria participates in various regional security
Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism: In an effort to prevent radicalization and the emergence of parallel societies, the Interior Ministry released an educational handbook on the basic tenets of Austrian society, including social, political, and humanitarian values (Wertefibel) to serve as a guide for immigrants. Austria reported initiating a similar project with the EU’s Agency for Fundamental Rights.

AZERBAIJAN

Overview: Azerbaijan maintained its strong counterterrorism cooperation with the United States and actively opposed terrorist organizations seeking to move people, money, and material through the Caucasus. The country continued to strengthen its counterterrorism efforts, prosecuted numerous individuals under statutes related to terrorism, and confiscated sizeable quantities of illegal arms and munitions.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Azerbaijan continued to use counterterrorism legislation, first adopted in 1999, that governs the investigation and prosecution of individuals who have committed or plan to commit terrorist acts. The Ministry of National Security is primarily responsible for combating terrorism, although the Ministry of Internal Affairs also plays a role as the country’s primary law enforcement entity. Both ministries demonstrated the ability to detect and deter terrorist activities.

Officials from the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program met with Azerbaijani officials to discuss the country’s security needs and capacity to respond to terrorism-related events – including infrastructure security capabilities – and began developing a plan to resume the training of Azerbaijani security forces. In late October, ATA delivered a Tactical Management of Special Events course to the Azerbaijani Presidential Protective Service unit.

Significant law enforcement actions included:

- On September 20, a counterterrorism operation resulted in the confiscation of firearms sent from Iran to Azerbaijan.
- On October 31, authorities detained an Iranian national near the Israeli embassy in Baku, suspected of planning to carry out a series of attacks against diplomatic centers. The individual was released after 30 days in detention and returned to Iran.
- On November 23, the Ministry of National Security announced that it had arrested two Azerbaijani citizens suspected of planning to acquire firearms, ammunition, and explosives, as well as preparing terrorist acts aimed at killing a large number of people.
- On November 25 and December 10, 39 individuals accused of plotting terrorist attacks during the 2012 Eurovision contest in Baku received prison sentences ranging from nine years to life.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Azerbaijan is a member of the Council of Europe Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (Moneyval), a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. Azerbaijan has increased its professionalism in anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) since 2009, when it adopted AML/CFT legislation. This legislation created a financial intelligence unit, the Financial Monitoring Service (FMS), and imposed the necessary obligations on
financial institutions to conduct customer due diligence and to report suspicious transactions to the FMS. Institutions from outside the formal financial sector that conduct monetary operations, however, are often not required to report, which presents vulnerabilities.

In order to bring Azerbaijan’s legislative framework into conformity with international standards, including those of the UN, the EU, and the FATF, Azerbaijan continued to implement Moneyval recommendations to address AML/CFT issues. The U.S. government, primarily USAID and Treasury, has been one of the FMS’ leading partners since its formation, working with the Prosecutor General’s Office and others to provide technical assistance and training to improve enforcement capabilities. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

Regional and International Cooperation: At the end of 2013, Azerbaijan concluded a two-year term as a non-permanent member of the UNSecurity Council, supporting various terrorism-related UNSCRs. Azerbaijan remained an active member of the OSCE, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and other regional organizations. Additionally, Azerbaijan took part in working group meetings of Caspian Sea littoral states to coordinate law enforcement efforts aimed at combating terrorism as well as smuggling, narcotics trafficking, and organized crime.

BELGIUM

Overview: Belgium maintains an effective counterterrorism system, overseen by the Ministries of Interior and Justice. Belgium continued to investigate, arrest, and prosecute terrorist suspects and worked closely with U.S. authorities on counterterrorism matters.

Significant numbers of Belgian foreign fighters have travelled to Syria, and in response, the Belgian government formed a task force focused on countering radicalization, preventing prospective fighters from traveling to the region, monitoring returnees, and arresting and prosecuting recruiters, facilitators, and those returnees who represent a clear threat. Belgium has taken a lead role in EU discussions on foreign fighters. A December study by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization estimated that Belgium had the highest per capita number of Syrian foreign fighters of any European country; Belgian government estimates ranged from 100 to more than 200.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Belgian counterterrorism legislation was reinforced in 2003 to enable authorities to investigate and prosecute terrorist suspects more effectively. In February the Parliament passed a modification to the penal code that broadened the definition of incitement to terrorism, enabling authorities to investigate and prosecute individuals who advocate terrorist actions directly or indirectly. This has given authorities broader powers to investigate and prosecute those who call for the violent overthrow of democratic regimes, incite others to hatred of non-Muslims, and recruit fighters for armed conflict abroad.

The primary actors in Belgium’s counterterrorism system are the Belgian Federal Police and its Counterterrorism Division, the Civilian and Military Intelligence Services, Office of the Federal Prosecutor, and the Crisis Unit. Their actions are coordinated and overseen by the inter-ministerial Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis (CUTA or OCAM/OCAD). The Ministry of Interior was in the process of overseeing a number of structural police reforms that, among other things, are designed to streamline information sharing on counterterrorism matters between jurisdictions and with other agencies.
Belgium has been working with other Schengen zone states and with Turkey to improve efforts to share information and interdict prospective foreign fighters en route to Syria. All new Belgian passports now contain biometric data.

Belgian police have made numerous arrests of individuals suspected of recruiting fighters to go to Syria, as well as returnees. Most returnees are connected to the radical Salafist group Sharia4Belgium, which formally disbanded in 2012, although its members remain active in Syria or as recruiters in Belgium. Some of the individuals arrested have been released on parole, subject to police monitoring, while others remained in detention at year’s end, pending trial. The most significant arrests included:

- On April 16, police arrested four suspects charged with directing the efforts of Sharia4Belgium to recruit foreign fighters for Syria: Hakim and Abdelouafi Elouassaki, Walid Lakdim, and former Sharia4Belgium spokesman Fouad Belkacem, who had been arrested in 2012 and was serving a sentence via electronic monitoring. Hakim Elouassaki was arrested after returning from Syria, where he was wounded.
- On October 19, Jejoen Bontinck, a Belgian convert and foreign fighter who returned to Antwerp after spending eight months in Syria, was arrested and charged with participation in a terrorist group. He was released under conditions on December 13.
- On December 9, the Belgian Federal Police arrested five individuals suspected of recruiting foreign fighters to go to Syria. The leader of the group, Jean-Louis Denis, a Belgian convert and former member of Sharia4Belgium, allegedly radicalized and recruited people in the course of his charitable activities distributing food to the poor in Brussels.

Other important law enforcement activities included:

- On April 25, convicted terrorist Lors Doukaev, a Belgian resident of Chechen origin, was sent back to Belgium by Danish authorities to serve the remaining nine years of his sentence for terrorism. In 2010, Doukaev was arrested in Copenhagen after he accidentally set off the bomb he was preparing, allegedly to send to the Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten*, which published controversial cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammed in 2005.
- On September 11, the Antwerp Court of Appeals re-opened the court case against the 14 members of the so-called Hamdaoui cell accused of planning terrorist attacks in Belgium and seeking to fight in Chechnya. Many are being tried in absentia; it is believed that some members of the cell are fighting in Syria. In 2012, a lower court had thrown out the charges against all but one of the suspects (the suspected leader, Hassan Hamdaoui, a Belgian of Moroccan origin), but prosecutors successfully appealed the ruling. On October 19, police arrested Hamdaoui, who turned himself in after having been convicted in absentia in 2012 of violating the terms of his parole.
- On September 24, Belgian Federal police arrested Ismail Abdelatif Allal in Vilvoorde pursuant to an international arrest warrant. Allal was wanted in Spain for his suspected leadership of the so-called Ceuta recruiting and financing cell, which is allegedly linked to al-Qa’ida.
- On October 8, Belgian police in Ghent arrested Maria Natividad Jauregui Espina, aka “Pepona,” an alleged member of Basque Fatherland and Liberty’s Vizcaya commando unit wanted under two arrest warrants for attacks in Spain.

On October 3, Belgium extradited convicted terrorist Nizar Trabelsi to the United States. Trabelsi, a Tunisian national, was arrested in Belgium on September 13, 2001, and later convicted for plotting to...
attack the Belgian Air Force base at Kleine Brogel, where U.S. military personnel are stationed. He
served a 10-year sentence in Belgium prior to his extradition.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Belgium is a member of the Financial Action Task Force. Belgium’s financial intelligence unit, the Cellule de Traitement des Informations Financieres (CTIF) is a member of the Egmont Group. CTIF is tasked with tracking and investigating reports of financial crimes, including money laundering and terrorist financing, and has broad authorities under Belgian legislation to conduct inquiries and refer criminal cases to federal prosecutors. According to the most recent CTIF annual report—which covers 2012— of the 1,506 financial crimes cases that CTIF referred to prosecutors, 20 (1.32 percent) were connected to possible terrorist or proliferation financing, a slight decrease from the previous year (1.63 percent). Of those 20, 17 were being investigated by police at year’s end, and three were dismissed. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: [http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm](http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm).

**Regional and International Cooperation:** Belgium participates in EU, NATO, OSCE, and Council of Europe counterterrorism efforts, and is a member of the advisory board of the UN Counter-Terrorism Centre. In December 2013, Belgian Interior Minister Milquet hosted a ministerial meeting of EU member states affected by the foreign fighter problem, in an effort to develop additional areas of cooperation in border controls, radicalization prevention, and information sharing. (The United States participated in this meeting.)

As an EU member state, Belgium has contributed trainers and capacity-building expertise to EU counterterrorism assistance programs in Sahel countries, including the Collège Sahélien de Sécurité, and the Belgian Federal Police have provided training to counterparts in the Maghreb.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** In 2013, both the Ministry of the Interior and the Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis (OCAM) broadened their strategies to take into account the foreign fighter problem. The Interior Ministry plan contains measures to build community resilience against radicalization to violence, boost anti-discrimination and integration efforts, and counter prison radicalization. OCAM’s “Action Plan Radicalism,” which it coordinates, has been broadened to strengthen efforts to monitor the radicalization to violence and recruitment of young people to travel to Syria, and to develop measures to limit the impact of violent extremist messaging. OCAM and the Ministry of Interior coordinate and facilitate the flow of information between the national and the local level, including the dissemination of best practices and other measures that help to curb the activities of violent extremists.

Among the components of the government’s strategy on preventing radicalization is an effort to counter violent extremist messaging on the internet. The government’s strategy on preventing radicalization to violence also includes an interagency effort in support of local government actors who will work with returnees from Syria to monitor their reintegration into society and provide them with guidance and support.

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**BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA**

**Overview:** Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) continued to make slow progress in increasing counterterrorism capacity and remained a cooperative counterterrorism partner with the United States. The BiH Court and Prosecutor's Office processed cases against perpetrators of acts of terrorism as well as against those who planned to conduct, or otherwise support, acts of terrorism that were carried out
Despite budgetary challenges, BiH’s Joint Terrorism Task Force continued to work toward improving coordination between BiH’s many security and police agencies to better counter potential terrorist threats and to respond better to acts of terrorism. Violent Islamist extremist ideological influences and regional nationalist violent extremist groups represented sources of potential threats in BiH.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: BiH's criminal code and related legal framework is harmonized with UN and EU standards related to combating terrorism. BiH’s law enforcement capacity to detect, deter, and prevent acts of terrorism is hampered primarily by the problem of overlapping jurisdictions, particularly in Sarajevo, where at least three distinct police forces have a role in responding to terrorist incidents: the State Investigative and Protective Agency (SIPA), Bosnia’s state-level police authority; Sarajevo cantonal police; and Federation entity police. In addition, the state-level Directorate for the Coordination of Police Bodies (DCPB) is charged with the protection of diplomatic and certain other public facilities. While state-level laws give DCPB the authority to coordinate the responses of all state-level police agencies, this organization remains underfunded and under-supported by both BiH government authorities and by international organizations, many of which have bilateral relationships with other state-level agencies. In practice, SIPA generally takes a lead role in responding to attacks and the BiH Prosecutor’s Office has the authority to investigate and prosecute acts of terrorism. The Ministry of Security (MoS) continues to consult with state, entity, district, and cantonal police and security agencies to evaluate whether a better legal framework can be created to mandate more coordinated responses to attacks and actions to prevent attacks.

Responding to the relatively large numbers of Bosnian Muslims going to fight in Syria, Minister of Security Fahrudin Radoncic, introduced a bill in November that would punish BiH citizens who return to the country after having fought in a non-recognized militia abroad. The bill also sets forth punishments for those who organize and recruit people for these missions. The bill was making its way through the BiH Parliament at year’s end.

Bosnia’s Joint Terrorism Task Force, led by BiH’s Chief Prosecutor, began operations in January 2011. It includes members from BiH’s state and entity law enforcement agencies and the Brcko District Police. The MoS funds the Joint Task Force, which operates out of SIPA headquarters. The Task Force remains in its formative stages nearly three years after its establishment and primarily acts as an intelligence-sharing mechanism.

Counterterrorism cooperation of local law enforcement with U.S. counterparts is generally good. State Department’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program training to BiH law enforcement included courses in conducting counterterrorism investigations, securing vital infrastructure from terrorism threats, and managing airport security.

To track entries into Bosnia, the BiH Border Police (BP) uses a computerized database and software system to support immigration and passenger information collection. The system, in place since March 2012, links all 55 border crossings and all four airport locations (Sarajevo, Tuzla, Mostar, and Banja Luka) via the State Police Information Network, a network developed and donated by the Department of Justice’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program. In 2013, Foreigners Affairs Service (FAS) field offices became connected to this system. It provides the BP and FAS with immediate access to other supporting databases (including Interpol) to run appropriate checks and cross-checks.
On terrorism-related prosecutions, Bosnia saw two convictions during 2013 in cases related to terrorist planning and acts carried out in previous years. In July, the BiH Appeals Court ordered a new trial for Mevlid Jasarevic, who was convicted of terrorism in December 2012 for the October 2011 U.S. Embassy shooting, on the ground that the original trial panel had committed procedural errors. On November 20, Jasarevic was re-convicted of terrorism and sentenced to 15 years in prison. Jasarevic’s original December 2012 18-year sentence was reduced after the court took into consideration that Jasarevic “has sincerely repented for the act he committed.”

On December 20, the BiH Court convicted Haris Causevic of a terrorist act for the June 2010 bombing of the Bugojno police station, which killed one police officer and injured six others. He was sentenced to 45 years in prison. His co-defendant, Naser Palislamović, was found not guilty and released. The other defendants were freed in January due to a lack of evidence.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** BiH is a member of the Council of Europe Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (Moneyval), a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body; and its Financial Intelligence Unit is a member of the Egmont Group. The country’s geographic position and political structure make it difficult to police its borders and enforce anti-money laundering and counterterrorist finance rules. BiH has implemented UNSCR 1267/1989 sanctions. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: [http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm](http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm).

**Regional and International Cooperation:** BiH law enforcement agencies regularly interacted with their U.S. and European counterparts on counterterrorism investigations. Regional cooperation at the professional law enforcement level with Croatia and Serbia improved in 2013.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** The main religious communities in BiH (Islamic, Orthodox, Catholic, and Jewish) worked together, through the Interreligious Council, to promote tolerance and to confront violent extremism. Some Muslim leaders were particularly active regarding their own congregants. On August 23, in response to reports that Bosnian Muslims were fighting in foreign conflicts, Reis Husein Kavazovic, the leader of the BiH Islamic community, delivered a widely published sermon in which he condemned “the shedding of innocent blood, any form of violence, and calls for threats, because that is not the path of believers.” At the same time, he encouraged believers to think critically and carefully about whose military they are joining and whose guns they are holding.

**BULGARIA**

**Overview:** In 2013, Bulgaria continued its investigation into the 2012 airport bus bombing in Burgas. In September, Gauntlet Challenge, a large, Bulgaria-U.S. interagency counterterrorism exercise, expanded bilateral cooperation to respond to terrorist threats. An influx of asylum seekers from Syria has exacerbated border security challenges, raised interethnic tensions, and challenged underfunded state agencies. There are concerns that this flow of people could allow some foreign fighters to transit in and out of Bulgaria. Bulgaria is slated to receive more than US $7 million in aid from the EU specifically earmarked to assist with the influx of asylum seekers. The United States, in concert with other regional partners, has maintained a regular dialogue with the Bulgarian government to assess and manage this risk.
Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Bulgaria prosecutes suspected terrorists under several provisions of its Penal Code. The basic definition of terrorism is provided for in Article 108a of the code. Over the past several years, the Bulgarian government has attempted to fortify its ability to investigate and prosecute terrorists. The Ministry of Justice drafted a new Penal Code in 2012 to replace the outdated 1968 version; the draft code includes more detailed and specific counterterrorism provisions that implement the major international counterterrorism conventions. The draft Code was being debated in Parliament at the end of 2013.

Law enforcement cooperation between U.S. agencies and their Bulgarian counterparts has historically been strong. However, the government has reshuffled and reorganized key police units, with the resulting reassignment of personnel and imposition of new rules slowing joint casework.

The Interior Ministry continued to host operational units responsible for deterring, detecting, and responding to incidents, including the Specialized Unit for Combatting Terrorism, Security Police, and Special Police Forces. Specialized law enforcement units were properly equipped and supported with relevant training.

U.S. law enforcement and the Bulgarian Ministry of Interior have cooperated on the ongoing investigation into the 2012 bus bombing in Burgas, which – initial investigations indicate – was perpetrated by individuals affiliated with Lebanese Hizballah. In July, the Prosecutor General’s office invited Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) bomb technicians to Bulgaria to review the evidence, including photos, material, and a video re-creation of the event. The team, which arrived in October 2013, praised Bulgaria’s cooperation and the high quality of the re-creation.

The State Department provided Regional Strategic Initiative funding for training to Bulgarian law enforcement in a variety of areas including counterterrorism investigations and explosive countermeasures.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Bulgaria belongs to the Council of Europe’s Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (Moneyval). Bulgaria is implementing its 2003 Law on Measures Against Terrorism Financing. In December 2012, Parliament adopted legal amendments to this law as well as to the Measures Against Money Laundering act. The changes expand on the definitions of terrorist funds to cover those controlled by designated persons and specify the different forms of control. The amendments also introduced a requirement for financial institutions to monitor complex and unusually large transactions. The country’s widescale smuggling and cross-border illicit criminal networks, combined with the free movement of goods and persons as a result of EU membership, present risks to Bulgaria’s financial sector. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

Regional and International Cooperation: Bulgaria is a member and active contributor to counterterrorism initiatives in the UN, EU, Council of Europe, OSCE, Organization for the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, and NATO. Law enforcement officials benefit from joint investigations and training opportunities with international partners.
**Overview:** The Government of the Republic of Cyprus collaborated closely with the United States, the EU, and other countries – bilaterally and multilaterally – in international counterterrorism efforts. The Cypriots successfully prosecuted Hossam Yaacoub Taleb, a Lebanese Hizballah operative, for conducting surveillance activities on Israeli targets in Cyprus. In issuing its opinion, the court declared that Hizballah was a criminal organization with regards to the defendant’s activities in Cyprus, and convicted Yaacoub of a range of criminal charges including participation in a criminal organization, participation and acceptance in committing a crime, and money laundering. This case played an instrumental role in EU designation of the military wing of Hizballah as a terrorist organization. The defense filed an appeal, and the appellate court held a hearing in October. The court’s decision was pending at year’s end. Cyprus' counterterrorism partnership with the United States included regular, routine protection for transiting U.S. military personnel, aircraft, and naval vessels throughout 2013; and participation in the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance and Regional Security Initiative programs, which strengthened the government's capacity to counter terrorism.

Since 1974, Cyprus has been divided de facto into the Republic of Cyprus government-controlled area, composed of the southern two-thirds of the island, and a northern third, administered by the Turkish Cypriots. The Republic of Cyprus government does not exercise effective control over the area administered by the Turkish Cypriots. In 1983, the Turkish Cypriots declared the northern part an independent “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).” The United States does not recognize the “TRNC,” nor does any country other than Turkey. The UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus patrols the buffer zone separating the two sides, but people, narcotics, and other illicit goods routinely cross uncontrolled.

The division of the island has obstructed counterterrorism cooperation between the two communities, and between the Republics of Cyprus and Turkey. Turkish Cypriots lacked the legal and institutional framework necessary to counter money laundering and the financing of terrorism effectively. Within these limitations, however, Turkish Cypriots cooperated in pursuing specific counterterrorism objectives.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** The Republic of Cyprus enacted a National Law on Combating Terrorism in 2010 that incorporates EU Council Framework Decisions. The criminal code has been used to prosecute terrorism-related offenses; for example, the prosecution pursued criminal charges against Yaacoub for his surveillance activities of Israeli tourist targets in Cyprus.

In 2013, the Acting Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Justice and Public Order, in his capacity as Cyprus' National Counterterrorism Coordinator, supervised an ad hoc interagency committee to draft a new National Counterterrorism Strategy for the Republic of Cyprus that will be based on the four pillars of the corresponding EU strategy: “Prevent, Pursue, Protect, and Respond.” The strategy’s aim is to reduce the terrorist threat in Cyprus while safeguarding human rights and fundamental freedoms. The committee consulted relevant government departments of the Republic of Cyprus and cooperated with similar authorities in the UK and the United States to prepare the strategy. The United States funded a seminar on Integrating Counterterrorism Strategies at the National Level. Other U.S. training programs have strengthened the capacity of Cypriot judges, prosecutors, and law enforcement to adjudicate terrorist cases and strengthen border protection.

Cyprus National Police (CNP) created and put into practice a screening watchlist mechanism. On the CNP’s Counterterrorism Office watchlist, among others, are all persons subject to travel bans and asset freezing sanctions by UNSCRs and EU decisions concerning terrorism. The Aliens and Immigration
Unit of the Cyprus Police, in cooperation with FRONTEX, has also prepared a strategic plan to combat illegal immigration and relevant cross-border crime. The plan includes: information exchange with other EU member states and third countries; participation in FRONTEX operations; and activities to train border guards in passport control issues and profiling of immigrants, potential victims, and suspects involved in serious organized crime and terrorism.

Cypriot law enforcement received and examined some reports of suspected terrorist activities, but they found no evidence of terrorism. There was no noticeable activity of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party in 2013. Based on threat information and assessments, proportionate security measures were put in place for the protection of western interests and soft targets.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Cyprus is a member of the Council of Europe’s Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (Moneyval), a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body. Cyprus’ financial intelligence unit (FIU), the Unit for Combating Money Laundering (MOKAS), is a member of the Egmont Group. In April and May, Cyprus was reviewed by a special committee of experts from Moneyval and the IMF as part of a general bailout of the country’s banking sector. Cyprus has pledged to strengthen the regulation of its significant international business sector given the anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) risks this sector poses in its current structure.

Cyprus executed formal requests for legal assistance submitted by other countries (EU as well as third countries), including the recognition and enforcement by Cyprus’ courts of foreign freezing and confiscation orders. Cyprus has ratified and implements international and EU instruments in AML/CFT.

Cypriot authorities have taken legislative steps to counter and suppress AML/CFT activities. Section 8 of the Law on Combating Terrorism of 2010 criminalizes any form of support to terrorist groups, including financing. In 2013, the Prevention and Suppression of Money Laundering Activities Law was amended, mainly to implement recommendations made in the Fourth Assessment of Moneyval. Those amendments do not address terrorist financing exclusively.

The Republic of Cyprus government timely implemented new UNSCR 1267/1989 and 1988 sanctions listings and informally tracked suspect names listed under U.S. Executive Orders. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared, in cooperation with MOKAS, a draft bill imposing penalties in cases of violations or attempts to circumvent sanctions. At year’s end, the bill was pending approval first by the Council of Ministers and then by the Republic of Cyprus’ House of Representatives. The proposed legislation aims to criminalize infringements of UNSCRs and relevant sanctions adopted by the EU, as well as impose effective, proportionate, and dissuasive penalties.


**Regional and International Cooperation:** Cyprus participated in counterterrorism initiatives of the UN, the OSCE, and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs attended meetings of the Working Group on the External Aspects of Terrorism of the Council of the EU (COTER), and is represented at the Global Counterterrorism Forum by the European External Action Service (EEAS), as the EU is a full member of the organization.
The Cypriot Police’s Counterterrorism Office also participated regularly in various regional working groups, including the EU Police Working Group on Terrorism, the Working Group on Terrorism of the EU Council, Europol’s High-level Expert Meetings and First Response Network, and the European Expert Network on Terrorism.

Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism: Cyprus, as a member of the Terrorism Working Party of the Council of the EU, participated in the recent revision of the EU’s Radicalization and Recruitment Action Plan. The Cyprus Police, as well as other services of the Republic of Cyprus, are implementing various measures of the Radicalization and Recruitment Action Plan and are participating in Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN) meetings. The Police’s Counterterrorism Office is focused on the ongoing training of first line police officers and prison employees about radicalization to violence. The Counterterrorism Office participated as a partner in the Community Policing and the Prevention of Radicalization (COPPRA) project. The COPPRA-produced training manuals are fully incorporated into the training programs on radicalization to violence that were created and implemented by the Cyprus Police’s Counterterrorism Office. The prevention of recruitment and radicalization to violence also falls under the first pillar of PREVENT of the National Counterterrorism Strategy of the Republic of Cyprus.

DENMARK

Overview: The Kingdom of Denmark (Denmark, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands) has devoted significant assets to counterterrorism programs, as well as to initiatives that seek to counter violent extremism in Denmark and abroad. Denmark remained a target of terrorist groups, including al-Qaeda, due in part to the Jyllands-Posten cartoon crisis that began in 2005; however, no large-scale terrorist attacks have occurred within Denmark. In 2012 and 2013, a new trend arose of Danish citizens and residents of the Muslim faith voluntarily leaving Denmark to fight in Syria. Danish security services have focused on addressing this trend; there is concern that Danish fighters in Syria could be exposed to terrorist ideology and training before returning to Denmark.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Denmark continued to use its terrorism legislation from 2006, which allowed greater information sharing between the two agencies most involved in countering terrorist threats in Denmark—the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET) and the Danish Defense Intelligence Service (DDIS).

Denmark’s law enforcement agencies are skilled in proactively detecting, deterring, and preventing acts of terrorism on Danish territory. Security and law enforcement organizations have adequate information sharing, thanks to the Danish government’s Center for Terror Analysis (CTA), which was established to share information between PET, DDIS, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Danish Emergency Management Agency. Denmark also has a national police force, to which all Danish police belong.

Denmark has a very competent and professional Customs and Tax Authority (SKAT). As a member of the Schengen Agreement, Denmark has open borders with its neighbors and there are no passport controls at the land borders or in the airport terminals servicing Schengen Visa area flights. As a member of the EU, Denmark abides by the EU’s April 2012 passage of Passenger Name Record (PNR) legislation, which allows passenger names and information to be passed to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, with regulations to protect the privacy of European passengers.
Significant law enforcement actions against terrorists and terrorist groups, including proactive disruptions, arrests, and prosecutions:

- On March 25, two Somali-Danish brothers, aged 19 and 24, were sentenced to three-and-a-half years in prison in Denmark after being found guilty of financing terrorism as well as receiving training at an al-Shabaab training camp in Somalia.
- On May 14, Moroccan-born Danish citizen Said Mansour, known as "the Bookseller from Bronshoj," was arrested and charged with violating Denmark's terrorism laws. The arrest was in connection with police raids on the London home of Abu Qatada. At year’s end, the case remained in the investigative stage and no trial date had been set. Mansour was previously sentenced in April 2007 to three-and-a-half years in prison for producing and distributing graphic videos encouraging participation in terrorist activities.
- On July 3, the Eastern Division of the Danish High Court (Ostre Landstret) found ROJ TV and Mesopotamia Broadcasting guilty of receiving support from the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), and fined the companies US $860,000 each for broadcasting terrorism-related material from 2007 through 2010. This verdict, in response to ROJ TV’s appeal of a 2012 conviction, also revoked the company’s broadcasting license in Denmark. On September 25, Denmark’s Supreme Court rejected ROJ TV’s request for an appeal hearing for its conviction for promoting PKK-related terrorism; the court agreed, however, to hear an appeal of revocation of its broadcasting license. In a related case, a trial began in September of 11 Danish citizens of Kurdish origin charged with raising over $23 million for the PKK in Denmark over five years.

As of the end of 2013, Danish authorities announced they had identified 90 Danes who left Denmark in 2013 to fight in Syria for opposition groups, including known terrorist groups. In February, Slimane Hadj Abderrahmane, a Danish citizen and a former Guantanamo detainee (2001-2004), was killed fighting in Syria. In March, a Danish convert to Islam, Kenneth Sorensen, aka Abdul Malik, was also killed fighting in Syria.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Denmark is a member of the Financial Action Task Force, and cooperates closely with other Nordic financial intelligence units (FIU). In September 2012, Nordic countries’ FIU representatives received training at PET’s Headquarters in Denmark from the U.S. FBI’s Terrorism and Financing Operations Section regarding disruption methods for terrorist financing; as a follow on, in June 2013, representatives from Denmark and other Nordic security services traveled to the United States to participate in additional terrorist financing training. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

**Regional and International Cooperation:** The Danish government is a founding member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), and is committed to close cooperation with international organizations, particularly within the UN framework and through the EU, to ensure that it has both the capacity and the support to combat terrorism. Denmark actively participated in: the UN, the EU, the GCTF, the Council of Europe, the OSCE, NATO, Interpol, Europol, the Middle Europe Conference, the Bern Club, and the EU Counterterrorism Group.

- On April 18-19, Denmark and Burkina Faso co-hosted a two day workshop, under the auspices of the GCTF, on terrorism prevention and countering violent extremism in West Africa and the Sahel. Workshop participants created an official action plan with 20 recommendations for
governments, civil society, and the media in the region; Denmark presented the action plan at the GCTF’s Sahel Region Capacity Building Working Group in Oran, Algeria on June 24–25.

- On September 23, the Danish government announced its new Peace and Stabilization Program for the Sahel, funded with $22 million. The fund targets projects where development and security interests overlap, such as in Mali and nearby countries. The program has three pillars: 1) support for dialogue and reconciliation; 2) security sector support; and 3) countering violent extremism and organized crime.
- The Danish government contributed to the French-led military intervention in Mali with limited personnel and air support.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** A government-funded mapping project, which seeks to map anti-democratic and violent extremist circles released the first of its working drafts to the public in September. In November, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration established a National Board for Social Affairs and Integration. The new board is a separate institution from the Ministry, but is under the guidance of the minister. It will focus solely on CVE issues through four structures: an advisory board of young adult volunteers to advise on and promote the board’s projects; a formal network between municipalities and the national board that will meet every six months; an office to review and disseminate best practices to the municipalities; and formal international cooperation.

Danish communications efforts to counter terrorist propaganda are in the nascent stages. In June, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration hosted a one-day conference on addressing online radicalization for government and civil society representatives from Northern Europe and the United States.

PET remains the most active Danish government agency engaged in CVE work. PET officers routinely meet with municipalities on specific violent extremism cases under the broad framework of Denmark’s SSP cooperation (a formal information sharing arrangement between schools, social workers, and police, formed in the 1970s as an anti-crime initiative). PET also continues to lead two CVE projects: prison mentoring and the “Dialogue Forum.” While figures are not available on how many prisoners have participated in PET’s prison mentoring program, PET has released a handbook for prison officials on how to spot violent extremism among prisoners. The PET’s Dialogue Forum, held four times a year, is a roundtable meeting between PET and Denmark’s Muslim community to discuss various issues related to violent extremism.

**FRANCE**

**Overview:** The United States and France maintained a strong counterterrorism relationship in 2013. U.S. government agencies worked closely with their French counterparts for the exchange and evaluation of terrorist-related information, and partnered in fostering closer regional and international cooperation. France’s security apparatus and legislation afford broad powers to security services to prevent terrorist attacks. The Government of France was concerned about the possibility of attacks against its interests inside and outside of Syria, Mali, and across the Sahel. France recognizes the potential threat posed by its nationals traveling abroad to join terrorist organizations or to fight in Syria. Early in 2013 President Hollande raised the “Vigipirate” level (France’s national security alert system) to “red” alert, the second highest level. This decision came after France intervened in Mali. Patrols of public transportation were strengthened country-wide.
The return of French nationals who joined groups fighting in the civil war in Syria is an increasing threat. There were reportedly 184 French nationals fighting among violent Islamist extremist groups in Syria in 2013; 14 were killed in combat there.

**2013 Terrorist Incidents:** In 2013, there were attacks related to terrorism:
- On January 9, in Western Paris, Ömer Gümey, a 30-year-old ethnic Kurd, killed three Kurdish women activists. On January 21, the French police arrested Gümey, and have since held him in solitary confinement.
- On May 26, 22-year-old Frenchman Alexandre Daussy stabbed and critically injured French soldier Cedric Cordiez at the La Défense shopping district in Paris.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** In December 2012, the French government adopted counterterrorism legislation that allows authorities to prosecute French citizens who return to France after committing an act of terrorism abroad, or after training in terrorist camps (notably in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region) with the intention of returning to France to commit terrorist attacks. France passed legislation expanding the scope of the government’s domestic surveillance powers in December, which has raised data privacy concerns by some groups. This legislation, while expanding the scope of the government’s powers to collect data from electronic communications on national security grounds to include counter-espionage activities, is not expected to significantly change France’s already advanced law enforcement capacity or its cooperation with the United States.

France’s main counterterrorism apparatus is its Direction Centrale du Renseignement Interieur (DCRI), which was founded in 2008 and is tasked with counter-espionage, counterterrorism, and the surveillance of potential threats on French territory.

France works diligently to maintain strong border security and implements national and EU border security legislation. Paris’ Charles de Gaulle and Orly airports as well as the Marseille-Provence airport use the Automated Fast Track Crossing at External Borders (PARAFE) system, which, combined with biometric authentication technology, simplifies border crossing and results in an average crossing time of 20 seconds.

France has a system of non-jury courts for terrorism trials and a broad definition of what is considered a terrorist offense – the so-called “association of wrongdoers” offense – which allows it to cast a wide net and imprison a broad range of suspects. Under French law, foreigners can be deported if they are believed to pose a serious threat to public order.

The following high profile arrests took place in 2013:
- In January, France deported three foreign Imams. Interior Minister Valls justified the action as an attempt to deport any foreign born preacher who stressed “…the need to fight against France.”
- On February 5, French police arrested four suspected Islamist militants near Paris as part of an investigation into the recruitment of al-Qa’ida fighters from France to the Sahel region. Three of the men are Franco-Congolese and one man is Malian. The investigation revealed that the men were planning to conduct sabotage in France.
- In late February, French police arrested three Chechens suspected of terrorist activity near Paris. The suspects were identified as Ali Dokaev, Elys Issakov, and Mourad Idrissov.
• On March 13, French police arrested an additional three people in Marignane on suspicion of plotting terrorist attacks after they found a number of weapons and explosives in a police raid on a house. The police said the three men were in their 20s, and they wished to emulate the March 2012 terrorist attacks carried out by 23-year-old Mohamed Merah.

• On June 24, French police arrested six members of an Islamist terrorist cell who were planning attacks on well-known French figures. The group included four French nationals, one from Benin, and another from Comoros. On June 25, French police arrested a 26-year-old webmaster known as Romain for his role as administrator of the Ansaw al Haqq website. Romain translates magazines published by al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

• On July 16, French police arrested Kristian “Varg” Vikernes, a 40-year-old Norwegian neo-nazi who sympathizes with Anders Breivik, the man who killed 77 people in Norway in 2011.

• On August 7, French police arrested a 23-year-old French soldier who planned to open fire on the Minguettes mosque in Venissieux, a Lyon suburb, on August 15, at the end of Ramadan. The French soldier reportedly has ties to the “radical far-right”.

• On September 28, French police arrested a 21-year-old woman in Paris for her alleged connection to AQAP.

• On October 12, France filed charges against Naamen Meziche, age 43, a French-Algerian man who it suspects has links to the terrorist cell that planned the 9/11 attacks. Pakistani authorities deported Meziche to France, where he was arrested upon arrival. He had been arrested in Pakistan in May 2012, along with three other French fighters, all of whom were expelled to France separately.

• On November 16, the DCRI arrested four men aged 22 to 35 on suspicion of sending fighters to Syria.

• Throughout the year, France monitored French citizens wanting to go to Syria to fight against the regime of Bashar al-Asad. Several arrests were made.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** France is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), and belongs to or is an observer in the following FATF-style regional bodies: Cooperating and Supporting Nation to the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, Observer to the Financial Action Task Force of South America, Observer to the Asia Pacific Group, Observer to the Eurasia Group, Observer to the Middle East and North Africa Financial Task Force. The FATF also designated France as a member of the Council of Europe Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (Moneyval), for a period of two years beginning in the fall of 2012. France is a member of the Egmont Group and member of the Anti-Money Laundering Liaison Committee of the Franc Zone.

On January 8, a French court delivered an eight-year jail term to a 53-year-old Turkish-Dutch man named Irfan Demirtas, for helping fund the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Demirtas was also permanently banned from France. Eight others arrested in the same investigation were given jail sentences of up to three years. The group as a whole is said to have sent approximately $390,000 to the border region of Afghanistan-Pakistan.

The French financial intelligence unit Tracfin said that regular "1901 law" non-profit organizations are not obliged to file suspicious transactions reports and are not regulated and monitored. According to the French monetary and financial code only monetary and financial professions, government administrative structures and related non-profit associations are regulated and monitored. This presents a risk factor for those seeking to use non-profit organizations to fund illicit activities.

Regional and International Cooperation: France is a founding member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum. France’s Jean Paul Laborde was sworn in as Executive Director of the UN Counter-terrorism Committee (UNCTC) on July 22. Through the OSCE, France engaged in new measures to counter transnational threats, including terrorism. The French government undertook joint counterterrorism operations with countries including the UK, Belgium, Germany, Italy, and Spain. France also plays an active role in efforts to support counterterrorism capacity building in other countries both bilaterally and within the EU.

Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism: The Government of France considers its integration programs for all French citizens and residents a major tool in countering radicalization to violence and violent extremism in France. Many of these programs target disenfranchised communities and new immigrants. For example, the Ministry of Education works to instill "universal values" in all French pupils, regardless of ethnic origin or country of birth. Ministry regulations mandate that all French public schools teach civic education, and that all students attend school until age 16. The French government also offers adult vocational training for older immigrants and minorities who never attended French schools. The Ministry of the Interior plays a significant role in countering radicalization by increased police presence in disenfranchised areas, neighborhoods, and regions with high criminality and juvenile delinquency rates.

The Ministry of Justice (MoJ) implements rehabilitation and reintegration programs for former criminals. According to the MoJ, as of January 1, 2013, there were 164 Muslim chaplains employed by the French penitentiary system, which the government is hoping will help limit the development of violent extremism in the prison system.

GEORGIA

Overview: Georgia continued its close cooperation with the United States on a wide-range of counterterrorism-related issues. In October, Georgia held a presidential election solidifying the country’s trend of peaceful democratic progress. Cooperation on counterterrorism activities has remained steady following the change in power, and all signs indicate the new government will continue to work closely with the United States and other international partners in the fight against terrorism.

2013 Terrorist Attacks: On September 9, in Georgia’s separatist Abkhazia region, a Russian diplomat was shot and killed. Yusup Lakayev, a suspected violent Islamist extremist, was later apprehended by Georgian authorities in the city of Batumi in connection with the attack. While terrorism is one potential explanation for the attack, the investigation remained ongoing at year’s end.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Georgian counterterrorist legislation was enhanced in 2013. In November, the Chapter devoted to terrorism-related crimes was largely amended to criminalize terrorism-related offenses to a greater extent. The definition of a terrorist act was broadened and the threat of terrorism was criminalized. Liability for involvement in terrorism-related activities was established by law. As a result of the November amendments, a separate criminal code article addressed illegal purchase, storage, transportation, preparation, and sale of weapons for terrorism purposes or the threat of such. The new legislation introduced the concept of technological
terrorism and made the illegal handling of biological and chemical weapons for terrorism purposes a criminal offense with severe penalties. The amendments also criminalized attacks against public officials and their families in relation to their official activities in public office. The crimes of theft, extortion, or falsification of documents in relation to supporting terrorist acts were made separately punishable under the terrorist chapter of the criminal code, with significant criminal penalties.

While the individual counterterrorism units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs are capable of detecting, deterring, and responding to terrorist incidents, there is not an overarching strategy of a national coordinated and collaborative response. There is occasional interagency cooperation and limited information sharing, but the information is restricted to actionable intelligence for immediate prosecution by tactical or investigative units. The counterterrorism response and investigation mechanism is fragmented between several specialized law enforcement units and several Ministries. The Ministry of Internal Affairs has the primacy in the investigations, crisis response, and border security capacity, but there are other units within the Government of Georgia and the Ministry of Defense that have similar functions.

The Georgian government’s lack of control of the Russian-occupied territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia limited its ability to investigate and counter terrorism and other serious crime in these regions and to secure its border with Russia.

The United States assisted Georgia in developing border security capabilities through the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program. Nearly 200 Georgian officers participated in ATA training programs in 2013, which also focused on the management of terrorism-related incidents and cases, formulation of national counterterrorism strategies, and improved Georgian institutionalization of ATA training through instructor development.

The State Department Office of Export Control and Related Border Security and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency continued its programs to strengthen Georgia’s border security and to detect and interdict weapons of mass destruction along Georgia’s maritime border. These activities included support for the establishment of modern export control law consistent with international standards, provision of all-terrain vehicles and related training, and upgrading Georgian Coast Guard facilities and coastal infrastructure.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Georgia is a member of the Council of Europe (COE) Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (Moneyval), a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body. Georgia amended its legislation in 2013 to further bring it up-to-date with international standards. Lawyers were added to the list of the entities required to report suspicious and over threshold transactions. The Georgian Financial Monitoring Service adopted a decree that requires leasing companies and qualified credit institutions to ensure implementation and operation of an electronic data base containing identification details of clients and other relevant persons and information on transactions (operations) subject to monitoring, as well as implementation and operation of the relevant software for revealing suspicious and unusual transactions. On July 1, 2013, Georgia temporarily suspended the visa-free regime it previously maintained with Iran. The Financial Monitoring Service of Georgia signed Memoranda of Understanding with many countries.

The definitions of “terrorist” and “terrorist organization” in the Law of Georgia on the Fight Against Terrorism that were considered unsatisfactory according to Moneyval’s 2012 evaluation, were updated
to bring them up to the international standards. The definition of a terrorist act was broadened and a threat of such was criminalized.

A Governmental Commission on the Matters related to the Enforcement of UNSCRs ensured the freezing of property owned by persons related to terrorism and individuals designated by relevant UNSCRs in order to prevent financing of terrorist or other illegal activities or its support in other forms. The Financial Monitoring Service of Georgia, based on relevant UNSCRs, systematically updated the list of individuals and legal entities associated with terrorist groups.


**Regional and International Cooperation:** Georgia is an active member of the Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation and the GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova) Organization for Democracy and Economic Development. Georgia is also a party to the COE Conventions on the Suppression of Terrorism and the amending protocol. Georgia signed the convention on “Laundering, Search, Seizure, and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and on Financing of Terrorism” and the “Second Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters” with the COE in 2013.

Georgia concluded bilateral antiterrorism and law enforcement cooperation agreements with Israel and Lithuania, bringing the number of bilateral agreements on police cooperation and combating crime Georgia has signed to 22.

**GERMANY**

**Overview:** The threat from violent extremism remained elevated in 2013. Germany investigated, arrested, and prosecuted numerous terrorist suspects and disrupted terrorist-related groups within its borders with connections to al-Qa’ida (AQ) and other violent Islamist extremists, Kurdish nationalist, and neo-Nazi terrorist organizations. Security authorities are concerned about the estimated 240 Islamists that have departed Germany for Syria – some with the intention to hand over donations collected in Germany, others to join violent Islamist extremist groups fighting the Asad regime – because they could be trained in Syria and return with the intent to commit terrorist acts. Bilateral counterterrorism cooperation with the United States remained excellent.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** The German government continued to apply its comprehensive counterterrorism legislation, which criminalizes membership in or support for domestic and foreign terrorist associations. The Criminal Code also makes a range of terrorism-related preparatory actions illegal, such as participating in terrorist training or acquiring weapons or explosives with the intent to commit attacks that endanger the German state.

Germany’s centralized database against visa fraud became operational on June 1. The database is run by the Federal Administrative Office in Cologne and includes information on visa applicants, sponsors, and other persons involved in illegal activities relevant to visa applications. Separately, the Federal Administrative Office is authorized to cross-check the visa warning database with Germany’s counterterrorism database.
Germany’s law enforcement agencies worked effectively at state and federal levels and with international partners to detect, deter, and respond to terrorist incidents. The Federal Criminal Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt, BKA) has primary responsibility for international counterterrorism investigations affecting more than one German state, where there is no connection to a particular state, or where one or more states have requested federal assistance. In practice, BKA cooperation with equivalent bodies at the state level is commonplace and works well. The Federal Police (Bundespolizei) are responsible for border security and aviation security, and the Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, BfV) is the domestic intelligence agency with responsibility for intelligence and analysis pertaining to counterterrorism and countering violent extremism. Counterpart agencies to the BKA and BfV exist at the state level and coordination between federal and state levels was good. There was good interagency cooperation and timely sharing of terrorism-related information. The Joint Terrorism and Defense Center (GTAZ) serves as the central coordination body for information sharing and interagency collaboration on AQ-inspired terrorism.

In November 2012, following the investigations into the right wing violent extremist National Socialist Union (NSU), the German government created a new center focused on right-wing, left-wing, and nationalist violent extremism (GETZ). Both GTAZ and GETZ include representatives of federal and state law enforcement and security agencies as well as those involved in migration and integration affairs. Prosecutors are consulted at early stages of investigations and work in coordination with counterparts in other components of law enforcement.

German border management data systems, equipment, and infrastructure are highly developed. Data on suspected terrorists is shared between federal and state law enforcement agencies. The German passport and other identity documents incorporate strong security features.

Arrests, prosecutions, and trials:

- In January, a Berlin court sentenced German citizen Yusuf Ocak to nine years and Austrian citizen Maqsood Lodin to six years-and-nine-months imprisonment for membership in a foreign terrorist association (AQ, and for Ocak only, the German Taliban Mujahedin). The court found them guilty of traveling to Waziristan, where leading AQ members instructed them to carry out AQ’s mission in Europe.
- In February, the Frankfurt Regional Court sentenced Keramat G., a German of Afghan descent, to three years in prison under Section 89a of the German Criminal Code – “Preparation of a serious violent offense endangering the state” – for attempting to build a bomb.
- The trial against an AQ terrorist cell, which began in July 2012 in Düsseldorf, was ongoing at year’s end. The defendants were accused of conspiring to set off explosives in crowded areas.
- In May, the trial against alleged National Socialist Underground (NSU) member Beate Zschäpe and four accomplices began in Munich and remained ongoing at year’s end. The NSU terrorist cell is suspected of murdering one policewoman and nine people of non-German heritage for racist and xenophobic reasons between 2000 and 2007.
- In May, a Berlin court sentenced Turkish citizen Gülaferit Ü. to six-and-a-half years in prison for membership in a foreign terrorist organization (the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front of Turkey or DHKP-C). According to the court, Ü. led the DHKP-C in Europe from Berlin in August 2002 until November 2003.
- In June, the trial began against Emrah Erdogan for membership in terrorist organizations (AQ and al-Shabaab) and incitement of robbery. He also was accused of lying to German
authorities in 2010 about three planned terrorist attacks, which led to alerts in Germany in 2010 and 2011. He was arrested on June 18, 2012 in Tanzania and extradited to Germany.

- In June, the Federal Prosecutor’s Office indicted German-Afghan citizen Mohammed Salim A. in Frankfurt on charges of support of and membership in the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). He was accused of recruiting members and raising funds for the IMU in 2010 and 2011 and acting as the IMU’s chief representative in Germany since October 2011.
- In June, the Federal Prosecutor ordered the arrest of Turkish citizens Sonnur D. and Muzaffer D. in Lower Saxony as well as Turkish citizens Latife C. and Özkan G. in North Rhine-Westphalia, on suspicion of belonging to the DHKP-C since 2002. Sonnur D. and Muzaffer D. are suspected of belonging to DHKP-C leadership, and all four allegedly collected money for the group.
- In September, the Federal Prosecutor’s Office filed an indictment against Josef D. in Düsseldorf for membership in a foreign terrorist organization. He is accused of traveling to the Afghan-Pakistan border region in 2009, where he then joined the German Taliban Mujahedin in 2010, intending to participate in the armed conflict in Afghanistan.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Germany is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), and an observer to the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, and the Financial Action Task Force of South America against Money Laundering, all of which are FATF-style regional bodies. Germany’s Financial Intelligence Unit is a member of the Egmont Group. German agencies filed 14,361 suspicious transaction reports in 2012 (the latest figures available), designating 302 of them for suspected terrorist financing. Germany remained a strong advocate of the UNSCR 1267/1989 and 1988 Taliban and AQ sanctions regimes. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: [http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm](http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm).

**Regional and International Cooperation:** Germany is a founding member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum and continued to participate in various multilateral counterterrorism initiatives. German cooperation with regional and international organizations on counterterrorism includes the UN and UN Security Council, EU, OECD, OSCE, NATO, Council of Europe, G-8, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, and Interpol.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** Germany has numerous programs to counter violent extremism at the state and federal levels. In North-Rhine Westphalia, Germany’s most populous state with 17 million residents, state authorities introduced the “Pathfinder” initiative to work with communities to engage individuals believed to be susceptible to radicalization to violence. In addition, North-Rhine Westphalia continued programs such as the “Ibrahim Meets Abraham” community relations initiative; the Information and Education Center against Right-Wing Extremism; the former National-Socialistic Center Vogelsang, which is now used for cultural and civic education; the “No Racism in Schools” and “Prevention of Extremism in Sports” efforts; and additional municipal programs. Dortmund has a “Prevention of Extremism in the City of Dortmund” program. The German Soccer Federation awards a prize to organizations and persons who use their positions to work for freedom, tolerance, and humanity and against intolerance, racism, and hatred. Other cities, such as Cologne, host street soccer tournaments to bring together NGOs and at-risk youths. In Berlin, the Violence Prevention Network runs a training program that serves ideologically motivated perpetrators both during and after detention.
At the national conference of state Ministers of Interior in December, Ministers agreed to increase efforts to analyze and counter the appeal of violent extremism, particularly with regard to individuals believed to be considering travel to Syria to fight in the conflict there.

The Federal Ministry of the Interior continued its counter-radicalization assistance center for parents and friends of violent extremists; the center was established in January 2012. Germany continued its HATIF (the Arabic word for telephone) program to assist violent extremists with reintegration. The Interior Ministry also continued a project, first launched in 2001, to prevent radicalization among young right-wing violent extremist offenders. The Ministry expanded the program in 2007 to cover eight states. In 2013, the Interior Ministry also continued a project in three states to counter radicalization of young delinquents influenced by violent extremist ideology.

GREECE

Overview: In 2013, Greece continued to experience intermittent small-scale attacks like targeted package bombs or improvised explosive device detonation by domestic anarchist groups. Generally, these attacks did not appear to aim to inflict bodily harm but rather sought to make a political statement. Overall, Greek government cooperation with the United States on counterterrorism remained strong.

2013 Terrorist Incidents:

- On January 20, two homemade bombs exploded on the first floor of a shopping center near Athens injuring two private security guards. Conspiracy of Fire Nuclei claimed responsibility for the attack.
- On July 30, the Greek coast guard seized a boat near the island of Chios after a routine check revealed illegal arms and ammunition, including anti-tank mortar rounds, hand grenades, guns, bullets, and explosive devices. The Greek police confirmed that among those arrested in connection with the boat seizure was Hasan Bieber, wanted in Turkey for attacks claimed by the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front.
- On November 1, two unidentified persons shot and killed two members of the Golden Dawn political party and injured a third person in front of the party’s office in the Athens suburb Neo Heraklion. The “Militant People’s Revolutionary Forces” claimed responsibility for the attack; police were still investigating it at year’s end.
- On December 24, a group called Informal Anarchist Federation/International Revolutionary Front threatened to poison certain Coca-Cola products in Greece with hydrochloric acid, causing a recall of those products from store shelves.
- On December 30, an unknown group fired approximately 60 rounds at the German Ambassador’s residence in Athens. The attackers remained at large at year’s end.

Greece’s two largest cities, Athens and Thessaloniki, experienced frequent, relatively small-scale anarchist attacks that used inexpensive and unsophisticated incendiary devices against the properties of political figures, party offices, private bank ATMs, ministries and tax offices, and privately-owned vehicles.

One incident was reported against U.S. interests. On January 14, unidentified perpetrators used flammable liquid to attack the Citibank branch office in the Athens suburb Neo Heraklion. Minor property damage was sustained. No one claimed responsibility for the attack.
Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Article 187A of the Greek Penal Code codifies the terrorism statute. In addition, Article 28 (1) of the Greek Constitution subjects Greek citizens to applicable International Laws, to include terrorism. Article 28 (2) and (3) subjects Greek citizens to applicable EU Laws, including the EU law against terrorism. The Police Directorate for Countering Special Violent Crimes (DAEEV) is responsible for counterterrorism in Greece. DAEEV is extremely proactive and attracts highly motivated and educated young police officers. This unit has demonstrated a high capacity to collect information, but it lacks capacity to utilize the volume of data it collects and to share with other services within the Greek police and Coast Guard.

Greece has a weak border document system for its passports. The national ID card is extremely vulnerable to alteration and photo substitution, and it has not incorporated any new security features such as digitized photo and biometrics.

On April 3, five members of Revolutionary Struggle were convicted by an Athens appeals court; three of them received maximum prison sentences. Two of the lead members were convicted in absentia, as they have not been located since they disappeared in 2012, although press reports in October noted police suspicion of their involvement in a series of bank robberies throughout the country. Three other members were acquitted due to lack of sufficient evidence.

The trial of 19 suspected members of Conspiracy of Fire Nuclei, which began in 2011, was repeatedly postponed due to work stoppages by judges and judicial postponements in 2012. The trial continued in 2013 with the last session taking place on October 25.

The porous nature of Greece’s borders is of concern. While Greek border authorities have had success in the past year stemming the flow of illegal migration at the land border with Turkey, their ability to control large-scale illegal migration via sea borders is limited. Recent regional upheavals have intensified illegal migration to and through Greece via the Greek Aegean islands. In June and July respectively, DHS/ICE provided computer security and border security training to Hellenic National Police and the Greek Coast Guard.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Greece is a member of the Financial Action Task Force. The Foreign Ministry’s Sanctions Monitoring Unit is tasked with ensuring that Greece meets its commitments to enforce international sanctions, including terrorism-related sanctions. The Financial Intelligence Unit inspected 3,318 suspicious transactions in 2013, but did not discover evidence of terrorist financing in Greece. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

Regional and International Cooperation: Greece engaged constructively on counterterrorism initiatives in international fora and regularly participated in regional information exchange and seminars through such bodies as the UN, the EU, the OSCE, the Southeast European Law Enforcement Center for Combating Trans-Border Crime, and the Organization of Black Sea Economic Cooperation.

IRELAND

Overview: The United States and Ireland collaborated closely on our bilateral and regional counterterrorism, law enforcement, and information-sharing issues. An Garda Siochana (the local and national police service of Ireland, referred to as Garda in this report) has comprehensive law enforcement, immigration, investigative, and counterterrorism responsibilities and works closely with
American counterparts. In 2013, there were incidents by dissident republican groups (also referred to as criminal terrorist groups by the Irish Department of Justice), that generally targeted intra-republican factions and often involved other criminal activity. Members of dissident groups living in Ireland provided support for some of the violent actions committed in neighboring Northern Ireland. The immediate targets of violence were law enforcement personnel and the security structures of Northern Ireland in an attempt to disrupt the ongoing post-peace process community rehabilitation efforts. Irish authorities handled these legacy issues stemming from “The Troubles,” and were actively involved in dealing with transnational terrorism issues.

On December 3, the report by the Smithwick Tribunal was published. The inquiry was set up in 2005 to examine claims that a member of the Garda had passed information to the IRA which allowed the IRA to ambush Superintendent Harry Breen and Superintendent Bob Buchanan – the two most senior Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) officers killed during the Troubles – after they left a meeting in a Garda station in March 1989. While unable to establish a “smoking gun” or firm evidence, Judge Smithwick assessed that collusion between someone in the Garda and the IRA had taken place. The Irish government issued immediate apologies about the role of the State in the killings.

**2013 Terrorist Incidents:** There were no significant terrorist attacks in 2013, but the Irish Minster for Justice has assessed the threat from criminal terrorist/dissident republican groups as “severe.” In 2013, there were 250 occasions when Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) teams were called in response to a report of an improvised explosive device (IED), which resulted in the discovery of 70 viable IEDs disarmed and analyzed by Ireland’s Army bomb disposal teams. On November 22, a car bomb exploded on a housing estate in County Donegal. There were no injuries and Garda sealed off the scene and evacuated a number of homes in the area.

**Legislation and Law Enforcement:** In 2013, no new legislation was passed exclusively pertaining to counterterrorism. However, on April 18, Minister for Justice, Equality, and Defence, Alan Shatter TD, presented the Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offenses) (Amendment) Bill 2013 to the House.

The Irish Naturalization and Immigration Service works closely with UK immigration authorities on a series of joint data sharing initiatives. The aim of such cooperation is to enhance the protection of the external borders of the Common Travel Area (CTA) and detect and prevent illegal movement within the CTA by persons seeking to exploit the immigration, visa, and asylum systems of either country.

The development of improved biometric visa data sharing arrangements is being prioritized by both Ireland and the UK and work has commenced on a joint project to use the UK’s global network of visa application centers, technical infrastructure, and data network to capture biometrics (fingerprints) of Irish visa applicants on Ireland’s behalf. The project will enable the Irish Naturalization and Immigration Service (INIS) to capture and process biometrics for all visa applications to Ireland – approximately 85,000 per annum - regardless of the geographical origin of the application.

Arrests and law enforcement actions included:

- On February 9, two men from County Limerick appeared in court in Dublin charged with membership of an unlawful paramilitary organization. The two were arrested after police seized rocket launchers and explosives in County Tipperary.
- On March 9, three Dublin men were charged in connection with the fatal shooting of Peter Butterly in County Meath, and charged with membership in an illegal organization.
On April 9, 50-year-old Rose Lynch pleaded guilty in Dublin to killing a man, David Darcy, in November 2011. She had also been accused of IRA membership. She had believed Darcy, an innocent man, had been responsible for the killing of Continuity IRA (CIRA) leader Liam Kenny.

On July 11, Garda seized explosives, firearms, and ammunition in Dublin. The haul was believed to have been stolen from the Provisional IRA in 1998 when the Real IRA split from it. The capture included 15 kilograms of Semtex explosive.

On September 22, Garda made one of the biggest seizures of dissident republican arms and explosives following a search in Meelick, in County Clare. The seizure consisted of a substantial amount of explosives, ammunition, recently manufactured bomb detonators, and a variety of firearms, tear gas containers, magazines, and balaclavas.

On November 2, two men were arrested in County Monaghan in connection with suspected dissident republican activity. Garda stopped the van the men were driving and discovered 200 kg of fertilizer as well as other bomb-making material.

On November 19, an individual who manufactured three mortar launch tubes on behalf of a criminal terrorist/dissident republican network was given a five-year jail sentence.

On December 2, Garda arrested two men suspected of being dissident republicans over the murder of a prison officer in Northern Ireland.

On December 18, a joint operation between PSNI and Garda foiled a plot by dissident republicans to launch a bomb attack. A device was found and two individuals were arrested.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Ireland is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). On June 12, the Irish government enacted the Criminal Justice Bill of 2013, which amends certain provisions of the Criminal Justice (Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing) Act 2010. These amendments make some technical improvements and are aimed to ensure a closer alignment of Irish law with the international standards set by the FATF. Assets worth approximately US $2,041,460 have been frozen in the State’s credit institutions pursuant to EU measures which implement UNSCR 1373 (2001).

The Charities Act, enacted in 2009, provides a comprehensive legislative framework for the regulation of the non-profit sector. Under the terms of the Act, a new independent regulatory agency – the Charities Regulatory Authority – is to be established to regulate the sector.

In June 2013, FATF recognized that Ireland had made significant progress in addressing the deficiencies identified in the 2006 mutual evaluation report and therefore removed Ireland from the regular follow-up process.


**Regional and International Cooperation:** Ireland held the Presidency of the Council of the EU during the first half of 2013. Ireland is a member of all relevant regional and international bodies to combat terrorism. This includes the Council of Europe, the OECD, the OSCE, and NATO’s Partnership for Peace. Garda routinely engages with regional and international entities for training and operational support.
In addition to counterterrorism capacity building in foreign states, it is important to mention counterterrorism efforts in a regional context with Northern Ireland. The Irish Defense Forces provided a robust EOD capability to the civil authority, routinely deploying to investigate and disarm ordnance around the country. The 2nd Brigade, which is responsible for the Dublin area and the northern half of the country, including the entire border with Northern Ireland, responded to over 150 reports of explosive devices in 2013.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** The Government of Ireland continued its efforts to assist with the integration of minority groups in Ireland. These measures included providing social benefits, language training, and the proactive advocacy work of an Ombudsman’s office.

**ITALY**

**Overview:** Italy aggressively investigated and prosecuted terrorist suspects, dismantled terrorist-related cells within its borders, and maintained a high level of professional cooperation with international partners in all areas. Terrorist activity by domestic anarchists and other violent extremists remained a threat.

**2013 Terrorist Incidents:**
- On May 14, NO TAV violent extremists protesting construction of the high-speed railway (TAV) attacked the TAV construction site in Val di Susa, Piedmont. A court later charged four with terrorism.
- On June 18, Giuliano Ibrahim Delnevo, an Italian convert to Islam who had joined a radical faction of the Syrian opposition, was killed in Syria by government forces, according to press reports. Delnevo allegedly had conducted terrorist training and recruiting before joining the Syrian opposition.
- On July 10, NO TAV violent extremists attacked the TAV construction site in Val di Susa, Piedmont, leaving 15 police officers injured. A court later charged 12 of the extremists with terrorism, the first time the Italian state had accused NO TAV protesters of that crime.
- On October 4, a letter bomb addressed to journalist Massimo Numa was delivered to the office of the daily La Stampa in Turin, but the bomb failed to explode. The envelope holding the bomb also contained a letter mentioning NO TAV activities undertaken in September in Val di Susa.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** The Italian government continued to make use of reinforced counterterrorism legislation enacted in 2005 that facilitates detention of suspects, mandates arrest for crimes involving terrorism, and expedites procedures for expelling persons suspected of terrorist activities. Italian law enforcement remained advanced in its capacity to detect, deter, and respond to terrorist incidents.

The Italian Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) continued to implement a Memorandum of Cooperation with the United States, allowing the Transportation Security Administration to conduct aviation security assessments at three Italian commercial airports.

Law enforcement actions in 2013 included:
On April 30, police arrested four Tunisians in Milan, Catania, and Brussels accused of planning terrorist attacks in Italy and abroad as well as hate crimes. One of them, Hosni Hachemi Ben Hassen, was the imam of the Andria mosque in Puglia. Two other Moroccan and Tunisian suspects, identified in Tunisia, were put under investigation for the same crimes.

On May 16, a Brescia court convicted Moroccan national Mohamed Jarmoun to five years and four months in prison for participating in training for terrorist activities in Italy and abroad.

On May 19, the Ministry of Interior expelled Arman Ahmed El Hissini Helmy, alias Abu Imad, an Egyptian who had been imam of a Milan mosque until 2010. Helmy had already served a three-year sentence in a Benevento prison for recruiting and training violent extremist for terrorist activities abroad.

On June 12, Brescia police arrested Moroccan national El Abboubi Anas and charged him with establishing an Italian subsidiary of the radical international network Sharia4, as well as terrorist training and hate crimes. On June 18, a Brescia court ordered Anas’ release because of insufficient evidence. Following his release Anas disappeared from Italy and in November posted pictures on Facebook revealing that he had joined the rebels fighting the Syrian government in Aleppo.

On July 29, police arrested 12 NO TAV violent extremists and charged them with terrorism for attacking the TAV construction site at Val di Susa on July 10.

On September 19, authorities arrested Gianluca Iacovacci and Adriano Antonacci, two affiliates of the Informal Anarchist Federation/International Revolutionary Front (IAF/IRF) near Rome. They were accused of terrorism for a series of 13 attacks against property committed between 2010 and 2013 in the province of Rome.

On November 12, a Genoa court convicted Alfredo Cospito and Nicola Gai to 10 and nine years in prison, respectively, for the 2012 kneecapping attack against Roberto Adinolfi, chief executive officer of the Ansaldo nuclear engineering company. The IAF had claimed responsibility for the incident.

On December 6, a Milan judge sentenced, in absentia, Egyptian national Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr, also known as Abu Omar, to six years in prison for international terrorism. Formerly imam of a Milan mosque, he had established links with international terrorists with the aim of conducting terrorist attacks in Italy and abroad in 2000.

On December 9, police arrested four NO TAV violent extremists and charged them with terrorism for attacking the TAV construction site at Val di Susa on May 14.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Italy is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF); the Council of Europe Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (Moneyval), a FATF-style regional body (FSRB); and has observer status with the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism, an FSRB. Italy cooperated with foreign governments, including the United States, as an active member of the FATF and the Egmont Group. Italy also participated in the UNSCR 1267/1989 and 1988 designation process both as a sponsoring and co-sponsoring nation. There was no change in the approximately US $77,420 that the Government of Italy had frozen as part of its terrorist financing investigations.

Italy has several weaknesses that could make its system vulnerable to abuse by illicit actors. For example, Italy does not require that non-profit organizations send suspicious transaction reports according to the Italian Anti-Money Laundering Law. Reporting entities are, however, required to consider the specific Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing risks when entering in a relationship or carrying out transactions that involve non-profit organizations. In addition,
Italy does not routinely distribute the UN lists of designated terrorists or terrorist entities to financial institutions. Instead, the Italian FIU makes available the UN, EU, and OFAC lists of designated subjects and any subsequent amendments or additions by publishing it on its website.


Regional and International Cooperation: Italy is a founding member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum. Italy also supported counterterrorism efforts through the G-8 Roma-Lyon Group (including capacity building through the Counterterrorism Action Group), the OSCE, NATO, the UN, and the EU.

Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism: The Ministry of Justice Penitentiary Police continued financing counter-radicalization programs to train 120 agents working in the four prisons where persons convicted of international terrorism were incarcerated.

KOSOVO

Overview: The Government of Kosovo continued to cooperate with the United States on counterterrorism-related issues in 2013, and demonstrated progress in improving its counterterrorism measures. Kosovo adopted amendments to legislation, including part of a new Criminal Procedure Code (CPC), and made strides in law-enforcement actions against terrorists. Because the security and political situation in northern Kosovo continued to limit the government’s ability to exercise its authority in that region, the cooperation of the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) and EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) with the Kosovo Police was particularly important to maintaining a safe and secure environment and strengthening the rule of law, including at the borders. Although Kosovo and neighboring Serbia did not directly cooperate on counterterrorism issues, in 2013, the governments implemented an Integrated Border Management (IBM) agreement with joint checkpoints. In April, Kosovo and Serbia signed an EU-facilitated agreement on normalizing relations, which should help address the security situation in the north and improve the ability of the government of Kosovo to exercise its authority there. Kosovo government institutions have been aware since 2012 that a small group of Kosovars have traveled to fight in Syria.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Kosovo’s Criminal Code (CC) allows for prosecution of terrorism crimes, including participation in terrorist groups. It defines a terrorist group as a structured group of more than two persons, established over a period of time and acting in concert to commit terrorism. Kosovo does not have a specific statute that criminalizes participation in or support for a military group that operates outside of Kosovo.

Kosovo’s parliament approved a new CC and Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) in December 2012 that took effect on January 1, 2013. The new CC preserves the UN model on counterterrorism criminal legislation established in the previous code. It raises the punishment for terrorism-related crimes and creates additional terrorism offenses, such as weapons offenses or intrusion into computer systems. In addition, the new CC permits prosecution for attempt to commit a terrorist act. The new CPC grants Kosovo authorities a greater flexibility to investigate criminal acts during the planning stage to prevent crimes and terrorist acts. Furthermore, the CPC includes an integrated confiscation process that should ensure the confiscation of instrumentalities of criminal acts, such as terrorist funds or weapons. Also in January, Kosovo passed the Law on Extended Powers of Confiscation, which gives even greater
powers to confiscate property even if the defendant is deceased or a fugitive. Kosovo courts will admit evidence from other countries more easily, thus allowing prosecution of international counterterrorism investigations in Kosovo.

Kosovo Police (KP), the Kosovo Customs Authority, and the Kosovo Border Police (KBP) have received ample counterterrorism training and equipment from U.S. and European organizations. However, problems exist with communications and information sharing among police units, and KP faces resource constraints that can interfere with its ability to track suspected individuals. Prosecutors have received minimal training in prosecuting terrorism cases.

The KBP monitors entry and exit at all border crossing points (BCPs), including the airport, via the Border Management System (BMS). At the request of Police Directorates, KBP can track suspects’ movements in and out of Kosovo and inform the relevant authorities as necessary. However, BMS does not always function properly and is often offline. The KBP assisted the Directorate Against Terrorism in tracking potential suspects of terrorism activities, including five of seven arrested in November 2013, who were listed in the Kosovo Border System Watch List. (This Watch List contains approximately 200 persons considered to be potential suspects for terrorism.)

Since 2012, Kosovo has issued Biometric Passports. In December 2013, it also began issuing Biometric ID cards. These documents contain advanced biometric data. As of 2013, KBP at Pristina’s Adem Jashari Airport receives the Advanced Passenger Name Record (APNR) list from Turkish Airlines via e-mail. KBP is currently working with the Civil Aviation Agency to receive APNR through an automated database. The Law on Border Control that entered into force in January 2013 requires that air carriers submit the APNR. During 2013, KBP officers attended and completed a number of training events or courses related to detecting and combating terrorism.

Implementation of the 2012 Integrated Border Management (IBM) agreement, under which Kosovo and Serbia jointly manage four crossing points and exchange data related to preventing and detecting criminal activity, has helped strengthen Kosovo’s border security. Despite implementation of IBM, however, much of the traffic into northern Kosovo enters through illegal bypass roads that circumvent the official checkpoints. Despite KFOR, EULEX, and Government of Kosovo cooperation, weak rule of law in the north and a porous northern border limited counterterrorism efforts.

In November, the Government of Kosovo arrested seven people in Pristina and Gjilan/Gnjilane accused of plotting terrorist attacks in Kosovo. Two are believed to have participated in fighting alongside Syrian rebels. Two others are also suspected in an attack against two American missionaries from the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints. Four of the suspects were arrested as they attempted to buy weapons from undercover KP. Weapons and explosives were found in the suspects’ houses.

In 2013, the Directorate against Terrorism opened 10 cases. Most were for terrorism-related offenses, and one was related to preparation of a terrorist act. In two cases, the Directorate filed criminal proceedings against six individuals, resulting in their detention. The Directorate also assisted with six cases in one EU country. Exchange of information with different countries has improved. In several cases, the Directorate assisted and cooperated well with U.S. authorities.

Problems that deter effective host-government law enforcement and border security efforts include the absence of legislation to prosecute foreign fighters. The KP’s Directorate against Terrorism
experienced resource constraints and communications problems in investigating and tracking suspicious individuals.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Kosovo is not a member of a Financial Action Task Force-styled regional body. In December 2012, the Kosovo Parliament adopted revisions to the Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, thus strengthening legislation passed in 2010. The amendments brought Kosovo closer to full compliance with international anti-money laundering and counterterrorist finance standards, created enforcement mechanisms for the examination of reporting entities, and more narrowly defined terrorist financing. Kosovo still lacks an appropriate registration and monitoring system to track NGOs that receive funding from suspicious entities, however. The Central Bank of Kosovo (CBK) and Kosovo’s commercial banks have begun monitoring cross-border banking operations in order to adhere to international oversight requirements. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR)*, *Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes*: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

**Regional and International Cooperation:** Kosovo’s membership in many regional and international organizations has been blocked because many countries do not recognize its independence, which impedes cooperation on many issues, including counterterrorism.

**THE NETHERLANDS**

**Overview:** The Netherlands continued to respond effectively to the global terrorist threat in the areas of border and transportation security, terrorist financing, and bilateral and international counterterrorism cooperation. Cooperation with U.S. law enforcement remained excellent. In its March quarterly terrorism threat analysis, the Dutch National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security (NCTV) raised the national threat level from “limited” to “substantial,” the second highest rank in the Dutch threat system. The main factor for elevating the threat level was the uptick in the number of Dutch nationals or residents travelling to conflict areas (especially Syria) that could constitute a threat when they return to the Netherlands. Other factors related to the threat level included: increased signs of radicalization in small groups of young Muslims domestically, the increase in scope of some terrorist networks in the Middle East and North Africa to operate freely, and that the Netherlands may have been elevated as a target in the eyes of violent extremists because of Dutch involvement in military missions in various Muslim countries, as well as alleged discrimination against Muslims in the Netherlands itself. Domestic lone wolves remained on the radar. Resilience by the Dutch population to terrorism remained high.

The Netherlands was a strong voice on Lebanese Hizballah for a decade, and in 2013 the Dutch Foreign Minister publicly highlighted the dangers the group posed and called on the EU to designate it as a terrorist organization. On July 22 the EU designated Hizballah’s military wing.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** The Netherlands continued to make use of counterterrorism legislation that facilitated arrests and convictions. The Netherlands’ law enforcement institutions demonstrated a capacity to detect, deter, and respond to terrorist threats. There is both good interagency cooperation and national-local municipality cooperation. The main partners in the national Counterterrorism Strategy include the Ministry of Security and Justice, under which the NCTV, Public Prosecutors Office, and National Police fall; local governments (the mayor being responsible for public order); and the Ministries of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (responsible for the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD)); Foreign Affairs, Social Affairs and
Employment, and Defense. The reorganization of the police into one National Police structure came into effect on January 1, 2013. This multi-year, country-wide reorganization effort transitioned the 25 separate regional forces and one national bureau into one national organization overseeing 10 regions.

The Central Criminal Investigations Service (formerly the National Crime Squad) of the National Police focuses on combatting terrorism. The Netherlands issued a new National Cyber Security Strategy on October 28.

The Netherlands continued to improve its border security. Dutch ports of entry have biographic and biometric screening capabilities. One of the country’s main points of entry is Schiphol Airport, where a camera monitoring system is in place. For the purpose of fighting illegal immigration, the Netherlands continued to use Advance Passenger Information (API) at airports to look at inbound passengers coming from some non-EU points of embarkation. The Dutch police continued to use a license plate recognition system to fight illegal immigration. The Netherlands is one of 14 EU member states to receive a European Commission grant to explore how travel information is best used in the fight against terrorism and serious crime, and is coordinating with other member states that received this funding.

The Netherlands remained strongly committed to effective cooperation with the United States on border security. The Port of Rotterdam was the first European port to participate in the Container Security Initiative. The Netherlands generally cooperates with the United States’ “no board” recommendations made regarding certain passengers bound for the United States. In 2012, the Netherlands signed a Letter of Intent with the United States on cyber-security cooperation as well as an agreement on cooperation in science and technology concerning homeland and civil security matters.

Significant law enforcement actions included:

- On July 17, police arrested a 19-year-old woman who allegedly served as a recruiter for the conflict in Syria. She was released two weeks after her arrest without restrictions and traveled to Syria. The investigation was ongoing at year’s end.
- In mid-August, German police arrested two Dutch men in Germany at the request of Dutch police. The two, Mohammed el A. and Hakim B., were traveling in a rental car allegedly en route to Syria. They were extradited to the Netherlands and in custody awaiting trial at year’s end.
- On September 6, convicted terrorist Samir Azzouz was released from prison after having served two-thirds of his sentence. He was arrested in 2004 and was convicted in two separate trials in 2007 and in 2008. In the 2007 case he was charged with preparing for an attack on government buildings and was sentenced to four years. In the 2008 case he was charged with preparing to commit a terrorist attack and for participation in a terrorist organization, and was sentenced to nine years. His release has several restrictions, including wearing an ankle monitor.
- On October 23, a Rotterdam court found Omar H. guilty of incitement and preparation for the criminal act of arson. He was arrested in 2012 while making preparations to depart for Syria. He received a sentence of 12 months, of which four were suspended.
- In May, convicted terrorist Jason Walters, member of the Hofstad group, was released for good behavior after having served two-thirds of his sentence. Walters was arrested in 2004. He was convicted and sentenced in 2010 to 13 years for participation in a terrorist organization and attempted murder of members of the arrest team.
• In 2012, police arrested 55 people at an alleged meeting of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which is listed as a terrorist organization by both the Netherlands and the EU. Those arrested came from Turkey, France, Germany, Syria, Switzerland, Sweden, and the Netherlands. Four of the participants will face trial. Others were released, with a handful handed over to immigration.

On February 1, a suicide bomber attacked the U.S. Embassy in Ankara, for which the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party-Front (DHKP-C) took responsibility. The media reported the DHKP-C leader had issued the order for the attack from the Netherlands. Due to the presence of DHKP-C in the Netherlands, Dutch law enforcement responded to U.S. concerns regarding the security of U.S. and Dutch interests in the Netherlands.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: The Netherlands has been a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) since 1990 and is one of the Cooperating and Supporting Nations of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), a FATF-style regional body. The European Commission sets many rules for countering terrorist finance in directives that EU member states then implement via national legislation. Dutch officials cooperated with the United States in designating terrorist organizations and individuals as well as interdicting and freezing assets.

On January 1, the government of the Netherlands amended the Act on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing. The amended legislation includes the following: specific requirements for customer due diligence (CDD) related to legal arrangements; an exchange of information among supervisory authorities; good faith as a condition for protection from criminal liability; a requirement to immediately obtain information in case of reliance on third parties for CDD; and politically exposed person (PEP)-related requirements that include non-Dutch PEPs resident in the Netherlands. This amendment was in line with recommendations from the FATF.

On September 1, new legislation that made the financing of terrorism a separate criminal offense under the Dutch criminal code came into effect. Prior to this it had been punishable as preparation for a criminal act. The maximum penalty for financing terrorism is eight years in prison. This legislation is in line with FATF recommendations and EU directives.

Dutch citizens leaving to join foreign fighters has the potential to result in increased financial support for terrorist groups originating from the Netherlands. Dutch authorities are involved in monitoring this and have made changes to their anti-money laundering/counterterrorist finance framework to address it.


Regional and International Cooperation: The Netherlands is a founding member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF). The Dutch cooperated with EU and OSCE counterterrorism efforts and contributed to the counterterrorism work of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime. The Netherlands continued to chair the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism's Nuclear Detection Working Group.

The Netherlands’ international approach is focused on countering radicalization and strengthening the counterterrorism capacity of other countries with special attention to human rights and the rule of law. In 2013, the Dutch focus increasingly turned to national security and the foreign fighter issue; the
The Netherlands sought bilateral, multilateral, and international opportunities for exchanging information and experiences. In September, the Netherlands and Morocco proposed a Foreign Terrorist Fighters Initiative working group under the GCTF, which will begin to meet in early 2014. The Dutch also cooperated in an informal, ad hoc basis with other EU member states interested in how EU systems could better manage the traveling foreign fighter problem. The Netherlands participated in the ad hoc European Policy Planners Network on Countering Polarization and Radicalization, which was occasionally attended by the United States. The Netherlands was one of the founding members and hosted the secretariat of the EU’s Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN), which issued a document on good practices on foreign fighters in 2013.

The Middle East, North Africa, and the Sahel are priority areas for the Netherlands. The Netherlands funded counterterrorism capacity building projects in Pakistan, Yemen, Morocco, Algeria, Kenya, and Indonesia in 2013. It supported the organization Free Press Unlimited in its project “Radio Life Link Somalia,” and also supported a program on rule of law and criminal justice capacity and cooperation in North Africa that was implemented by the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation. Government support also went to the International Centre for Migration Policy Development and programs related to terrorism and countering terrorist finance carried out by the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate.

The government worked with the International Centre for Counterterrorism (ICCT) – an independent body established in The Hague in 2010 with Dutch government encouragement – on implementing programs related to the collection and use of evidence collected by the military in the criminal prosecution of terrorist cases, the role victims can play in counter-radicalization, and rule of law capacity building projects in the criminal justice sector. In 2011, the ICCT and the International Crime and Justice Research Institute organized an international conference on prison radicalization, rehabilitation, and reintegration of violent extremist offenders, which contributed to the adoption in 2012 of a document on rehabilitation and reintegration at the GCTF Ministerial in Istanbul. Related projects continued in 2013.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** The resilience of the Dutch population to violent extremism is high. In general, efforts by political and religious leaders to promote violent extremism seemed to have little effect on Muslim communities or the general population as a whole. In 2013, however, there were indications of increasing radicalization, and some increasing radicalization to violence, among small groups of young Muslims and a sharp rise in the amount of propaganda on the internet – including social media – that openly promoted participation in the Syrian conflict. The government assessed that the open manifestation of pro-jihadist sentiments by young people suggested increased self-confidence and militancy.

After completing the 2007-2011 Action Plan: Polarization and Radicalization, the Netherlands shifted from a broad, general, catch-all effort on countering radicalization to violence to a more narrowly focused, localized method. There were no major communication efforts or public awareness campaigns. The main focus areas of countering violent extremism efforts were persons who travel to combat zones and identifying lone actors.

Under the localized approach, the national government serves in advisory and capacity-building roles. The NCTV develops tools and training and offers them to schools, social workers, and other stakeholders, both directly and through an online database. Local partners are expected to build upon the knowledge and experiences generated in the past. National support of the local approach is focused on: identifying high-priority areas that are of interest to, or might host, radicalized individuals;
and developing specific plans and approaches. However, in 2013, the NCTV and AIVD stepped up support to local authorities and partners due to municipalities being less familiar with the problem of foreign terrorist fighter travel. The NCTV invests in information systems that combine reports and red flags from different parties in order to: distill signals about potential actions by violent extremists; and develop a tailored approach. The police extended and expanded a two-year pilot program from 2011, targeting potential lone wolves. The project, called “Threat Management,” mapped out all known potential lone wolves and included detailed profiles as well as individually tailored approaches. The approach is based on similar action plans from the UK, Sweden, and the United States.

Programs are tailored by local governments around individuals of concern and focus on identification, investigation, and prosecution. There are a handful of programs, administered to individuals, which focus on disengagement and rehabilitation. Multidisciplinary case conferences are held in relevant municipalities with a view to finding the best approach. Partners involved may include, but are not limited to: the municipal government, police, the public prosecutor’s office, youth care, and child protection services. Interventions are case-specific and vary in intensity and design.

NORWAY

Overview: Norway’s internal security service continued to assess that violent Islamist extremism remained the primary threat to the security of Norway. A small but outspoken group of violent Islamist extremists were active in Oslo, although they were not responsible for any attacks. In 2013, a number of prominent cases raised concern about Norwegians radicalizing at home and traveling abroad to participate in terrorist activities. The Police Security Service (PST) publicly stated that approximately 30 to 40 Norwegian residents had traveled to Syria to fight. However, it was the 2011 attacks by right-wing lone offender terrorist Anders Behring Breivik that prompted a number of changes to Norway’s terrorism laws and emergency preparedness, many of which were implemented in 2013.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: In June, the Parliament passed a number of changes to Norway’s counterterrorism laws. These included provisions to close the “lone offender” loophole (which required proof of a large conspiracy for a terrorist conviction) and to criminalize the receipt of terrorist training.

The PST is responsible for domestic security, including counterterrorism activities. During the year, the government established a joint analysis cell with participants from the PST and the Norwegian Intelligence Service, the external security service.

Norway is a party to EU border control data sharing arrangements. In 2013, Norwegian immigration authorities began using biometric equipment for the fingerprinting of arrivals from outside the Schengen area.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Norway is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and held the FATF presidency for the first half of 2013. The Government of Norway adopted and incorporated FATF standards and recommendations, including the special recommendations on terrorist financing, into Norwegian law. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.
**Regional and International Cooperation:** Norway continued its support for the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF)’s project to facilitate counterterrorism technical assistance in two pilot countries – Nigeria and Burkina Faso – and CTITF’s efforts to implement the regional counterterrorism strategy for Central Asia. Norway also provided US $80,300 to a joint project led by the UN’s Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate and the Center on Global Counter-Terrorism Cooperation to promote regional counterterrorism cooperation in South Asia. Furthermore, Norway renewed its agreement with the University of Pretoria’s Institute for Strategic Studies to build counterterrorism capacity in the police and judiciary systems of African countries. Norway will provide US $1.1 million from 2013 to 2015 for the project. Norway agreed to provide US $150,000 through 2014 to the AU’s counterterrorism center, the African Center for the Study and Research on Terrorism, located in Algiers, for the project to strengthen controls over the cross-border movement of terrorists in spaces between official border posts. The project will focus on states in the Sahel and Maghreb.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** The issue of radicalization became publicly prominent in late 2013, due in part to media attention to several Norwegians citizens or residents who had traveled to Syria or East Africa to fight in conflicts. The government established an interagency working group, led by the Ministry of Justice, to provide recommendations for a new national strategy to prevent violent extremism. The new strategy, to be drafted by the Ministry of Justice, with input from a range of government ministries, will replace Norway’s current strategy, drafted in 2010. The government announced that its priorities in the new plan would be to: improve knowledge and competence; strengthen existing preventative measures; prevent recruitment to violent extremist groups; prevent the internet from being used as an arena for recruitment and radicalization to violence; and strengthen international cooperation. The group will also study specific measures to prevent recruitment and radicalization to violence, including internet controls, travel bans, and confiscation of passports.

Norway remained a member of the EU’s Radicalization Awareness Network, an umbrella network of practitioners and local actors involved in countering violent extremism that is designed to enable the members to share and discuss best practices in spotting and addressing radicalization and recruitment leading to acts of terrorism.

**RUSSIA**

**Overview:** Russia was willing to work bilaterally with the United States and other governments within multilateral organizations on specific counterterrorism issues, but significant challenges remain. The Boston Marathon bombing led to an uptick in U.S. and Russia counterterrorism cooperation.

A number of terrorist attacks continued to be committed in the volatile North Caucasus region of Russia. Separatism, inter-ethnic rivalry, revenge, banditry, and violent extremist Islamist ideology were the primary motivating factors for terrorism-related violence. Occasionally, violence originating in the North Caucasus spilled into other areas of Russia, as seen most notably in October and December with the suicide bombings in Volgograd, a large city in southeastern Russia. Terrorists not directly related to events in the Caucasus also carried out attacks in 2013, including an unsuccessful rocket attack by separatists in Tatarstan on a Russian petrochemical plant. On December 20, President Putin reported that in 2013, Russian security services prevented 12 terrorist acts in Russia, killed 255 terrorists, and arrested 500 terrorists and their supporters.
The level of cooperation and bilateral operations between the Governments of Russia and the United States showed some improvements in 2013. Specifically, relations between the Russian Federal Security Services (FSB) and the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation saw an increase in both frequency and substance of information exchanges. After the Boston Marathon bombing, the FSB provided information aiding the FBI’s investigation and approved and facilitated the travel of FBI investigators to Dagestan to conduct follow-up interviews related to the Boston investigation. Russia also continued to cooperate in a yearly conference with the U.S. intelligence community. Additionally, some operational and intelligence information connected to terrorism-related threats was shared among the agencies on a regular basis, with senior leaders meeting in Moscow and in Washington.

The Counterterrorism Working Group (CTWG) of the Bilateral Presidential Commission (BPC) made progress on transportation security issues and law enforcement matters, as well as in other areas. The CTWG also contributed to the cooperation of Russia and the United States in multilateral fora such as the UN, the G-8, the OSCE, and the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF).

**2013 Terrorist Incidents:** The North Caucasus region remained Russia’s primary area of terrorist activity. The majority of terrorist attacks in the North Caucasus targeted law enforcement and security services with suicide bombing devices and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) placed in vehicles. The largest such attack in the region occurred on May 20, when two explosions struck the town of Makhachkala, Dagestan, killing four civilians and injuring 52. Incidents have also taken place in neighboring regions, and the Volga region, including Tatarstan. Indeed, three of Russia’s most significant terrorist incidents of 2013 occurred in Volgograd:

- On October 21 a female suicide bomber detonated a device on a public bus in Volgograd, killing seven civilians and injuring 32 others.
- On December 29-30, two suicide attacks occurred within the space of 24 hours, at Volgograd’s main railway station and on a city trolleybus, killing 34 and injuring at least 65. No group immediately claimed responsibility for the Volgograd attacks.

Terrorists unconnected to fighting in the Caucasus carried out attacks in 2013, as well. On November 16, unknown assailants launched four missiles with the presumed intention to hit an oil chemical plant in Nizhnekamsk, Tatarstan. One missile fell on a penal colony, while the other three missed their target. A Tatar separatist leader later claimed responsibility for the attack, saying his group wanted to attack Russian petrochemical interests as well as “infidels.” The same day, also in Nizhnekamsk, security forces found and defused two homemade bombs left by unknown assailants.

The Russian Ministry of the Interior reported 576 crimes of a “terrorist nature” (a reported drop of 1.4 percent from 2012) and 833 crimes of an “extremist nature” from January to November 2013.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** The National Antiterrorism Coordinating Committee is the main government body coordinating the Russian government’s response to the terrorist threat. In November, Russia enacted the “Compensation for Terrorist Acts Law,” which is composed of amendments to counterterrorism legislation with the following provisions:

- Broadens investigations of suspects’ assets to include the assets of family members and an undefined circle of “close ones.”
- Assets determined to be derived from terrorist activities, including the assets of family members and “close ones,” can be forfeited as compensation for victims of terrorism. The
legislation is intended to disrupt the ethnic clan system that continued to create problems for law enforcement, but has been criticized by human rights groups as a form of collective punishment.

- Makes punishable the acquisition of knowledge and skills for the sole purpose of committing terrorist acts with a 10-year prison sentence and a fine of approximately $15,000.
- Increases the prison sentence for the creation of terrorist networks from 10 to 15 years to 15 to 20 years and adds a US $30,000 fine.
- Introduces a six-year prison sentence for Russian nationals participating in anti-government militias abroad when the activities contradict the interests of the Russian Federation.

The Russian Federation uses a machine-readable passport for foreign travel, and citizens have the option of purchasing a more expensive biometric passport. The biometric passports contain robust security features and are valid for 10 years. Among Russian applicants for U.S. visas this year, an increasing number used the new Russian biometric passport.

Cooperative relationships continued to develop between the heads of the State Border Guard Service of the FSB and the U.S. Border Patrol. Similarly, the U.S. Coast Guard enjoyed a close working relationship with the Coast Guard of the FSB Border Guard Service. Discussions about the exchange of information and best practices between Russian border services and U.S. law enforcement with regard to counterterrorism and drug interdiction were ongoing at year’s end.

In the lead-up to the Winter Olympics in Sochi, Russian media reported that federal and local security organs had intensified counterterrorism operations in the neighboring north Caucasus. These operations, although occurring throughout the Caucasus, were mostly focused in Dagestan, Chechnya, and Kabardino-Balkaria. Operations included roadblocks, raids of public venues such as cafes, and larger-scale military-style operations, especially in rural areas. There was an uptick in law enforcement operations in Tatarstan as well, with several convictions of alleged militants on terrorism charges.

Law enforcement actions and prosecutions included:

- On May 13, the trial of Ali Taziyev began in Rostov-on-Don. Taziyev is a former police officer who allegedly joined North Caucasian militants; he was charged with setting up an armed militant group, illegal arms trafficking, inciting a rebellion, attempted murder of a law enforcement officer, and 24 counts of terrorism.
- On May 21, the Russian National Antiterrorism Committee (NAC) announced that Dzhamaleil Mutaliev, believed to be a leading figure of the Imarat Kavkaz terrorist group, was killed by security forces in Ingushetia.
- On June 6, FSB forces arrested Yulay Davletbayev, alleged leader of a terrorist cell for plotting major attacks in Moscow.
- On July 8, NAC spokesmen announced that security forces had killed Rustam Saliyev, who served as a bodyguard for Imarat Kavkaz leader Doku Umarov, in Chechnya.
- On July 22, two homemade bombs were discovered near a mosque in Khusavyurt, Dagestan.
- On September 3, a cache with ammunition, an explosive device, and a schematic view of a school was found in the Dagestani city of Buinaksk.
- On September 26, the Supreme Court of Russia’s Republic of Tatarstan sentenced Taufik Baibekov, 23, to nine-and-a-half years in jail on terrorism charges for an August 2012 incident in which four of Baibekov’s associates accidentally detonated explosives they were transporting and were killed.
On October 4, a Tatarstan court sentenced two Islamist militants on charges of planning to detonate IEDs at a shop selling mobile phones and a local police station in the city of Chistopol, central Tatarstan. The court found that the principal defendant had trained in Pakistan, formed a terrorist network upon his return to Tatarstan, and then recruited his co-defendant.

On October 15, Russian authorities arrested two men, identified as Islamist radicals from the North Caucasus, for allegedly planning an attack on the Maradykovsky chemical weapons storage and disposal facility in the Kirov region, 620 miles northeast of Moscow.

On October 26, police in Dagestan destroyed a large bomb-making workshop containing homemade explosives and suicide belts.

On November 16, the NAC announced security forces had killed Dmitry Sokolov, alleged partner of the female suicide bomber responsible for the October Volgograd bus bombing, and four of his alleged accomplices in Makhachkala.

On December 31, the government increased police presence in public areas around the country, and police arrested 87 following the December 29-30 attacks in Volgograd. The detainees allegedly had resisted police or could not produce proper identification or registration documents.

Endemic corruption remained a problem that created vulnerabilities within law enforcement, border control officials, and the judiciary. Although Russia has taken some steps to reform its law enforcement structures and cooperates in a variety of international efforts to combat corruption – including being a State Party to the UN Convention Against Corruption and an aspirant to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention – much work remains to address these vulnerabilities.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Russia is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and is serving as FATF president from July 1, 2013 to June 30, 2014. Russia also belongs to two FATF-style regional bodies: the Council of Europe Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (Moneyval) and the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (EAG), where it is a leading member and primary funding source. Through the EAG, Russia provides technical assistance and other resources towards improving legislative and regulatory frameworks and operational capabilities.

Russian banks must report suspicious transactions to the Financial Monitoring Federal Service (Rosfinmonitoring), a financial intelligence unit whose head reports directly to the President. The Central Bank can access these transaction reports after requesting them from Rosfinmonitoring. Rosfinmonitoring is a member of the Egmont Group.

In 2013, Russia amended its primary anti-money laundering legislation and strengthened its counterterrorist finance framework. One element of this amendment created a system for freezing terrorist assets, bringing Russian legislation in-line with UNSCR 1373 (2001). Financial institutions are obliged to freeze any assets of individuals or entities designated through a newly established interagency system. Any financial institution freezing assets or funds must report their actions to Russia’s financial intelligence unit. The amendment also created a mechanism for adjudicating de-listing requests, for unfreezing funds of a non-designated individual or entity that inadvertently had their assets frozen, and for implementing freezing designations made in other countries.

Grey markets and the underground economy continued to thrive in Russia. Combined with a significant migrant worker population that sends remittances through a variety of licit and illicit means,
there are risks that the country could be exploited by illicit actors. The presence of large-scale organized criminal groups and the large sums of money which they launder could also be vulnerable to exploitation by terrorist groups.


Regional and International Cooperation: Russia has been an active member of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) Ad-Hoc Working Group on the Terrorist Threat to the Euro-Atlantic Area. Russia also worked with other regional and multilateral groups to address terrorism, including with the EU, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the GCTF, the G-8 Counterterrorism Action Group, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and the OSCE. Russia has also engaged with the “Istanbul Process” working group on combating terrorism in Afghanistan.

In July, CSTO member countries in Rostov conducted an exercise to practice skills in disarming and neutralizing criminal armed groups and terrorists. Approximately 500 regular and special police personnel attached to the CSTO’s Collective Operational Reaction Force (CORF) practiced spotting and neutralizing terrorists in the interoperability drill. The CSTO also conducted the Interaction 2013 counterterrorism training exercise in Belarus from September 20-25, as part of a major bilateral Russia and Belarus military exercise, Zapad-2013. About 600 personnel from the CSTO’s CORF, coming from Belarus, Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, participated in the exercise, which focused on command and control and the use of aviation in special and joint operations.

At its October 30 Ambassadorial meeting, NATO and Russia assessed this year’s work on counterterrorism projects and looked at possible new areas of cooperation. Both the Stand-Off Detection of Explosives (STANDEX), an effort by NATO and Russian scientists to develop technology to detect concealed explosives on a suicide bomber from a distance and in a crowd, and the Cooperative Airspace Initiative (CAI), which allows nations to send air traffic information to each other across shared borders in the case of a suspected hijacking of a civilian aircraft, were successfully tested in live exercises this year.

The 2014 Sochi Olympics took place in proximity to the North Caucasus, where ongoing violence and extremist activity created a heightened concern over potential terrorist activity targeting the Games. In July 2013, Doku Umarov, leader of the Caucasus Emirate, called for attacks on the Olympic Games. In response, the Russian security services stated publicly that they would implement necessary security measures to ensure the safety of the Games. The security services have also held a series of working group meetings with foreign law enforcement and intelligence agencies, and with security representatives from Olympic sponsors and National Olympic Committees.

Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism: The Russian government continued constructive relations with established Muslim organizations that promote a non-violence dialogue. The United States and Russia continued ongoing dialogue through existing mechanisms to discuss and exchange best practices for combating domestic radicalization to violence and violent extremism issues.

SERBIA
Overview: Serbia continued its efforts to counter international terrorism and remained focused on harmonizing its law enforcement protocols with EU standards. The Serbian government continued to welcome U.S. government-provided counterterrorism training and assistance to police and security agency counterparts. Authorities confirmed that a small number of citizens from the country's Sandzak region had been recruited to join violent extremist movements in Syria, Libya, and other countries.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Changes to the Serbian criminal code in December 2012 criminalized a broader range of terrorist activities, including recruitment and training of future terrorists. Authorities remained vigilant against efforts by local terrorist groups and international terrorists seeking to establish a presence in, or transit through, the country. Counterterrorism police and prosecutors began preliminary investigations into several possible terrorist incidents during the year, including open gunfire at the border with Kosovo, and have acted upon reports received from foreign partners, including U.S. authorities.

The Criminal Procedure Code adopted in September 2011, which introduced prosecutor-led investigations and other innovations, such as plea agreements, took effect nationwide in all courts on October 1, 2013. In November, the Parliament passed a set of four structural laws reforming the nationwide court and prosecutor networks, which were intended to increase efficiency and improve the administration of justice.

Serbia's law enforcement and security agencies, particularly the Ministry of Finance's Customs Administration, the Ministry of Interior's Directorate of Police, and the Security Information Agency, continued bilateral counterterrorism cooperation. Serbia's two main specialized police organizations, the Special Anti-Terrorist Unit and the Counter-Terrorist Unit (PTJ), operate as counterterrorism tactical response units. Overall, Serbian law enforcement units have demonstrated their capacity to detect, deter, and respond to terrorist incidents. There was good interagency cooperation and timely sharing of terrorism-related information; prosecutors were consulted at early stages of investigations and worked in coordination with law enforcement counterparts.

Serbian points of entry are connected to a centralized system, with a majority connected to Interpol databases, and have biographic and biometric screening processes in place. Border Police also shared information with other countries via bilateral agreements. Although Serbian authorities do not receive passenger name records (PNR) on a regular basis, they requested PNR directly from airline companies if they deemed a flight to be of particular risk.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Serbia is a member of the Council of Europe (COE)Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (Moneyval), a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body. Serbia's Administration for the Prevention of Money Laundering (APML) has developed a draft law on restricting property disposal, with the aim of preventing terrorist financing, which if passed would strengthen Serbia's legislative framework on freezing terrorist assets. According to the Prosecutor's Office for Organized Crime, Serbian police did not arrest anyone involved in terrorist finance activities, nor were any cases related to terrorist financing prosecuted in 2013.

As part of Serbia's efforts to meet EU standards and advance its EU accession effort, several conferences and workshops connected to the Project against Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing in Serbia (MOLI-Serbia Project) took place. MOLI-Serbia, which is co-sponsored and funded by the EU and the COE, principally benefitted APML and supported Serbian efforts to establish a more robust legislative and operational capacity to counter money laundering and terrorist

**Regional and International Cooperation:** Serbia is a member of the UN, the OSCE, and the COE. Serbia participated in the UN Office on Drugs and Crime Regional Program to promote rule of law and human security in South East Europe (SEE), which focuses primarily on increasing member states' counterterrorism capacities. Serbia was the first country in the SEE region to adopt the National Action Plan for the implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2004) and hosted the first Regional Workshop on its implementation. In April, Serbia became a full member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which controls the export of nuclear materials and dual-use goods that could be exploited by terrorist organizations.

**SPAIN**

**Overview:** Spain was an active partner with the United States in efforts to track and disrupt transnational terrorism. Spain deepened its cooperation with Algeria, Mali, and Mauritania to combat and contain the threat posed by al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

The domestic terrorist group Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) has not launched any attacks since it announced a “definitive cessation of armed activity” in October 2011, although the group had not formally disbanded or given up its weapons arsenal by the end of 2013.

No terrorist attacks occurred in Spain in 2013, but three Spanish journalists were kidnapped in Syria and remained in captivity at year’s end. Marc Marginedas was kidnapped by violent extremists on September 4, and Javier Espinosa and Ricardo Garcia Vilanova were kidnapped by the al-Qa’ida in Iraq/Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, on September 16. The Government of Spain is working to secure their release.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** The Spanish Criminal Code specifically punishes any act of collaboration with the activities or purposes of a terrorist organization. Spain’s law enforcement units focused on counterterrorism have effectively demonstrated their capacity to detect, deter, and respond to terrorist incidents. Specialized law enforcement units possess the necessary and clear chain of command to effectively carry out their mission.

Spain’s counterterrorism capabilities, coordinated by the National Counter-Terrorism Coordination Center (CNCA), have proven effective. The National Police and Civil Guard share responsibility for counterterrorism and cooperate well, with strong information sharing and joint threat assessments. On December 5, Spain approved a national cyber security strategy to safeguard its critical information systems, and created the Cyber Defense Committee to coordinate its cyber security across the various government departments.

Spain continued to focus on improved security and the detection of false documents at its borders. Spain participated in the U.S. Immigration Advisory Program, which maintains staff at Madrid-Barajas International Airport. The program allows for coordination between Customs and Border Protection and Immigration and Customs Enforcement officials, airline security personnel, and police regarding high risk passengers traveling to the United States. Spain continued to roll out an automated system to read EU passports with biometric data. Explosive trace detection equipment was also deployed at
Spain's five largest airports at passenger checkpoints. Spain continued to use a network of radar stations, known as the Integrated External Surveillance System, along its maritime borders. Spain maintained its participation in the Megaports and Container Security Initiatives. In September 2012, the Civil Guard began integrating Europol information in its fight against terrorism and organized crime. Previously, only the Spanish National Police had access to the Europol data.

In a joint operation on June 21 in Ceuta, the Spanish National Police and Civil Guard detained eight members of a network recruiting, indoctrinating, facilitating travel, and funding violent extremists being sent to fight in Syria. The network, which operates in the Spanish enclave of Ceuta and across the border in Fnideq, Morocco, is believed to have links to AQ.

A number of ETA members were apprehended in 2013, both in Spain and abroad:

- On January 11, Andoni Lariz Bustinduy and Urtzi Etxeberria Aierdi were arrested in France.
- On April 18, in the Basque Country, six members of Segi, the youth branch of ETA, were apprehended by the regional police.
- On June 11, the Civil Guard arrested ETA members Jon Lazarribar Lasarte and Rubén Geldent González.
- On September 20, Asier Guridi was apprehended in Venezuela with the support of Venezuelan and French security forces.
- On October 8, Belgian police arrested Natividad Jáuregui Espina.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** A longtime member of the Financial Action Task Force, Spain continued to demonstrate leadership in the area of anti-money laundering and counterterrorist finance. Spain enacted its current law on Preventing Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism in 2010; the law entered into force immediately. However, implementation of regulations remained underway in 2013. The regulations will greatly enhance authorities' capacity to counter terrorist financing by placing greater requirements on financial institutions and other businesses, with stiffer penalties for non-compliance; and, by strengthening monitoring and oversight. The government diligently implemented relevant UNSCRs and had the legal authority to impose autonomous designations. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR)*, Volume 2, *Money Laundering and Financial Crimes*: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

**Regional and International Cooperation:** Spain is a founding member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), and on October 29-30, hosted a workshop on de-radicalization in prisons. Spain formed the G-4 in January, composed of France, Morocco, Portugal, and Spain, which synchronizes efforts to jointly combat terrorism, drug trafficking, and illegal immigration, with a focus on their shared maritime borders. Spain also continued its leadership role in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and served as Coordinator of its Implementation and Assessment Group, a working group of technical experts.

Spain signed several bilateral counterterrorism agreements. In June, Spain announced plans to create a network to exchange information with Ameripol, the Community of Police of America, to efficiently fight terrorism and organized crime. On September 30, Spain and France signed a declaration to strengthen the countries’ bilateral judicial cooperation to fight terrorism. The agreement will promote information sharing as well as exchanges and joint training of judges and prosecutors from both
countries. On December 1, Spain also announced plans to create a joint police panel with Morocco to help fight terrorism and organized crime.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** Spain participated in several international meetings focused on countering violent extremism (CVE) and provided funding for CVE programs in countries such as Mali and Mauritania. On October 29-30, Spain hosted the GCTF Ministerial meeting in Madrid on the role of religious scholars in rehabilitation and reintegration programs for violent extremists. Spanish efforts to counter radicalization to violence were tied closely to the fight against illegal immigration and the integration of existing immigrant communities. Through grants offered by the Foundation for Pluralism and Co-existence, a public office created to support the integration of minority religious communities in Spain, NGOs received funds to develop programs and activities aimed at social cohesion and the integration of minorities.

**SWEDEN**

**Overview:** According to the Swedish Security Service (SÄPO), the most significant threat to Sweden is al-Qa’ida (AQ)-inspired individuals or groups. AQ-inspired violent extremists in Sweden and abroad continued to see Sweden as a target for attacks. Perceived insults to Islam and Sweden’s military presence in Afghanistan remained motives. Individuals associated with AQ-inspired violent extremist groups in Sweden continued to have contacts with foreign terrorist networks. The contacts included financial and logistical support as well as recruitment of individuals to travel to conflict areas to attend terrorism-related training and combat. SÄPO is concerned by the numbers of foreign fighters who have left Sweden to join violent extremist groups in Syria and confirmed that at least 75 individuals have traveled to Syria, which is more than the combined travel to all other conflict zones, and saw no indication that the travel is decreasing. The Swedes view returnees as a particular concern as these individuals have the potential to plan an attack in Sweden or radicalize and recruit others for travel. The travelers are mostly men aged 18 to 30, but there also have been women who traveled to support the fight in Syria. The Swedish foreign fighters frequently use social media to circulate photos of “martyrs” and recruitment videos that target a Swedish audience.

The National Threat Advisory level in Sweden has remained “elevated” since it was first raised in October 2010. Since then, several plots have been disrupted, hence the reason for the elevated threat.

Swedish citizen Johan Gustafsson, who was kidnapped by al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) when visiting Mali in November 2011, remained in AQIM’s detention at year’s end. Gustafsson was last seen in a September 19 video released by the group.

The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) continued to carry out significant support activities such as recruitment and financing in Sweden.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Sweden’s original counterterrorism legislation was passed in 2003 and was supplemented in 2010 when incitement, recruitment, and providing terrorism training were criminalized. Sweden has a specialized division at the Prosecution Authority that deals with all terrorism-related cases. SÄPO has the main responsibility to counter terrorism in Sweden and has demonstrated the capability to detect, deter, and respond to terrorist incidents. Sweden’s interagency counterterrorism cooperation takes place mainly within the Counterterrorism Cooperative Council that includes 13 government agencies, as well as in the National Center for Terrorism Threat Assessment that produces long- and
short-term strategic assessments of the terrorist threat against Sweden and Swedish interests. There is timely sharing of terrorism-related information and prosecutors are consulted at early stages of investigations and work in coordination with counterparts in other components of law enforcement. Law enforcement units have a record of accountability and respect for human rights. Sweden continues to cooperate with the United States on terrorism-related cases.

Sweden is a participant of the EU’s Schengen cooperation and uses the Schengen Information System II for information sharing, port of entry screening, lost and stolen passport information, and watch listing. Under the auspices of the PNR agreement between the EU and the United States, Sweden collects and shares PNR information from commercial flights.

Sweden is facing challenges with foreign fighter travel since there is no legislation that criminalizes the travel, which makes it hard to put a stop to it. Sweden is working together with a group of likeminded EU member states to push for an EU PNR system that would enhance member states’ ability to keep track of when individuals travel and return.

Resolution and continuation of cases from 2011 and 2012 include:
- Swedish-Lebanese citizen Hussein Atris, arrested at Bangkok International Airport on January 12, 2012 for suspicion of plotting a terrorist attack, was convicted of illegal possession of explosive material and sentenced to two years and eight months in prison.
- Swedish-Lebanese citizen Hossam Taleb Yaacoub, arrested in Cyprus on July 7, 2012 for suspicion of plotting a terrorist attack for Lebanese Hizballah against Israeli tourists, pled not guilty but was convicted and sentenced by a Cypriot court to four years of prison for his criminal activities.
- Swedish-Somali citizens Ali Yassin Ahmed and Mohamed Yusuf, arrested in Djibouti in August 2012 while traveling from Somalia to Yemen and transferred to the United States in November 2012, were still facing charges for providing material support to al-Shabaab. Their trial was pending at year’s end.
- The pre-investigation related to the December 11, 2010 suicide bombing carried out by Taimour Abdulwahab in Stockholm was still being conducted in 2013 by the prosecutor for national security cases.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Sweden is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and was evaluated by the FATF in October 2012. Authorities believe that large scale currency movements occurred from Sweden to the United Arab Emirates, Nigeria, and other potentially risky jurisdictions. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR)*, Volume 2, *Money Laundering and Financial Crimes*: [http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm](http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm).

**Regional and International Cooperation:** Sweden contributed to counterterrorism capacity-building projects through its development aid work carried out by the Swedish International Development Agency, and also via funding to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime-Terrorism Prevention Branch and the OSCE. Sweden also supported the EU’s work with capacity-building projects in Pakistan, Yemen, the Horn of Africa, Maghreb, and the Sahel. Sweden provided trainers to the EU Training Mission in Mali. Sweden was a large donor to the UN’s Counter-Terrorism International Task Force (CTITF), with special focus on the CTITF working group that works to strengthen human rights in counterterrorism work. Although not a member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), Sweden participated in its CVE working group.
**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** On December 16, an expert group presented its report that examined how Sweden’s work to prevent violent extremism could be carried out more efficiently. In June, the National Media Council presented its study on the presence of Swedish violent extremist groups on the internet, how youth are influenced by what they read, and how to improve internet literacy for youth. In March, the Swedish National Defense College delivered its report on the issue of foreign fighter travel, how Sweden is dealing with the challenge, and recommendations to enhance preventive work.

The Minister responsible for countering violent extremism (CVE) issues instructed the Dean of the Swedish National Police Academy to conduct a study to define the presence in Sweden of AQ-inspired and left- and right-wing violent extremism.

Under the auspices of the EU’s Community Policing Preventing Radicalization and Terrorism (COPPRA) project, the Swedish National Police Academy continued to work to increase its knowledge to detect radicalization. About 30 police officers from across Sweden went through the week-long COPPRA training, which certifies officers to return to their home counties to “train the trainers.”

**TURKEY**

**Overview:** Turkey is a long-standing counterterrorism partner of the United States. It co-chairs the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) with the United States. It received U.S. assistance to address the terrorist threat posed by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in 2013, although ongoing peace talks mitigated violence between the PKK and Turkish government forces in 2013. Largely because of the ongoing conflict in Syria, Turkey has voiced increasing concern about terrorist groups currently near its border. These groups include al-Qa’ida in Iraq/Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and al-Nusrah Front. Turkey was often used as a transit country for foreign fighters wishing to join these and other groups in Syria.

In 2013, Turkey continued to face significant internal terrorist threats and has taken strong action in response. Increased activity by the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C), a terrorist Marxist-Leninist group with anti-U.S. and anti-NATO views that seeks the violent overthrow of the Turkish state, threatened the security of both U.S. and Turkish interests. A number of attacks occurred, including a suicide bombing of the U.S. Embassy in February that killed the bomber and a Turkish guard, while injuring a visiting Turkish journalist.

Also prominent among terrorist groups in Turkey is the PKK. Following three decades of conflict with the PKK terrorist organization, in late 2012 the government and PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan began talks for a peace process. In January and February, 28 PKK members were killed in clashes with the military, according to the Human Rights Association (HRA), but there were no conflict-related deaths after February. The PKK called for a ceasefire in March, which both sides largely observed, apart from small-scale PKK attacks in late 2013.

Another terrorist group in Turkey is Turkish Hizballah (unrelated to the similarly-named Hizballah that operates in Lebanon). The Government of Turkey also considers the Turkish Workers’ and Peasants’ Liberation Army (TKP-ML-TIKKO), although largely inactive, to be a threat.
Another Syria-based group, Mukaveme Suriyyi (Syrian Resistance), under the leadership of Mihrac Ural (formerly head of the Turkish Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front – DHKP/C), is believed by Turkish authorities to be behind the two largest terrorist attacks of 2013 in Turkey.

2013 Terrorist Incidents: Of the approximately 20 terrorist attacks that occurred in Turkey in 2013, the following five garnered particular attention and condemnation:

- On February 1, a DHKP/C operative exploded a suicide vest inside the employee entrance to the U.S. Embassy in Ankara. Aside from him, the explosion killed a Turkish guard and injured a visiting Turkish journalist.
- On February 11, a car bomb exploded at the Bab al-Hawa border crossing between Turkey and Syria, killing 13 people, including three Turkish citizens. At least 28 others were injured in the blast, which occurred after a Syrian-registered minivan was detonated close to a customs building on the Turkish side of the border. Mihrac Ural, an Alawite Turk from Hatay Province who has been an important pro-Damascus militia figure in the conflict in Syria, was widely blamed for the bombing.
- On March 19, three members of the DHKP/C coordinated hand grenade attacks on the Ministry of Justice and used a light anti-tank weapon (LAW) on the headquarters of the ruling party. There were no casualties.
- On May 11, Turkey suffered the deadliest terrorist attack in its modern history when 52 people were killed in twin car bombings in Reyhanli, a town in Hatay Province close to the Syrian border. Turkish authorities strongly believe that Mihrac Ural was behind the bombings.
- On September 20, two members of the DHKP/C attacked Turkish National Police (TNP) headquarters and a police guesthouse with LAWs. There were no casualties at the scene, but one of the attackers was killed while attempting to flee. The other attacker was wounded and arrested.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Counterterrorism law enforcement efforts in Turkey remained focused on the domestic threat posed by several terrorist groups, including the PKK. Turkey’s methodology and legislation are geared towards confronting this internal threat. Efforts to counter international terrorism are hampered by legislation that defines terrorism narrowly as a crime targeting the Turkish state or Turkish citizens. This definition of terrorism can be an impediment to operational and legal cooperation against global terrorist networks.

On April 11, Turkey’s Parliament approved amendments to the country’s counterterrorism legislation to bring the legislation more in line with EU freedom of expression standards. With these amendments, Turkey narrowed its definition of terrorism propaganda. Amendments to Article 6 outline punishment for people who propagate or publish declarations of an illegal organization only if the content legitimizes or encourages acts of violence, threats, or force. The amendments also clarify that publishers of such declarations are not automatically deemed members of the illegal organization making the declaration. Despite this improvement, Turkey continued to detain and prosecute thousands of politicians, reporters, and activists through its broad-reaching and broadly applied counterterrorism legislation.

The Government of Turkey compiles a “travel ban list” with a view to prevent travel into Turkey by individuals identified by foreign governments and internal security units. Although the Turkish government does not have an automated Advanced Passenger Information/Passenger Name Record
(API/PNR) system, it has approached the Department of Homeland Security for technical assistance in developing an improved and automated system.

In 2013, the TNP conducted numerous investigations in which several cells of AQ-inspired individuals were arrested and detained. Likewise, there were large-scale investigations and detention of over 200 individuals thought to be associated with the DHKP/C.

In the aftermath of the 2011 TNP arrest of 15 people involved in an AQ cell who were likely targeting the U.S. Embassy in Ankara among other locations, U.S. Embassy officials have been denied any additional information regarding the conduct of the case. Similarly, although Turkish security forces provided a rapid and thorough response to the February 1 suicide bombing of the U.S. Embassy, U.S. investigators received limited access to evidence gathered at the crime scene.

Criminal procedure secrecy rules prevent TNP authorities from sharing investigative information once a prosecutor is assigned to the case, which occurs almost immediately. Article 157 of the Turkish Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) states: “Unless provided otherwise by the code and under the requirement to not harm the defense rights, procedural interactions during the investigation phase shall be kept a secret.” This language has been interpreted by Turkish prosecutors and police to require an investigation to remain secret once a prosecutor becomes involved in a criminal case. After the investigation, the evidence and files are transferred from the prosecutor to the court where they are also sealed. Only parties to a case may access court-held evidence. This legal interpretation has resulted in limited information sharing on criminal cases between U.S. and Turkish law enforcement officials.

The Department of State continued to provide counterterrorism assistance to the Turkish national police through the Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program. ATA assistance focused on institutionalizing advanced skills into Turkey’s law enforcement infrastructure, and included training in terrorist interdiction and crisis management. In addition, due to Turkish law enforcement’s considerable advancement in counterterrorism techniques, the ATA program provided training in instructor development to build police officers’ capacity to train their fellow officers in antiterrorism skills and methods.

The TNP has highly developed counterterrorism capabilities in a number of areas and is planning to expand its law enforcement training for other countries in the region.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Turkey is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and an observer of the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, a FATF-style regional group. The Turkish Parliament passed countering terrorist finance (CFT) legislation in February and its implementing regulation came into force in May.

In October, FATF cited improvements in Turkey’s CFT regime but called for Turkey to take further steps to implement an adequate legal framework for identifying and freezing terrorist assets under UNSCRs 1267 (1999) and 1373 (2001) and ensure that terrorist financing has been adequately criminalized. The FATF encouraged Turkey to address the remaining strategic deficiencies and continue the process of implementing its action plan.

The nonprofit sector is not audited on a regular basis for counterterrorist finance vulnerabilities and does not receive adequate anti-money laundering/CFT outreach or guidance from the Turkish government. The General Director of Foundations issues licenses for charitable foundations and oversees them, but there are a limited number of auditors to cover the more than 70,000 institutions. It
is likely that bulk cash is being smuggled across its borders helping to fund violent extremists in neighboring countries.


Regional and International Cooperation: Turkey is a founding member of the GCTF and is co-chair along with the United States. Foreign Minister Davutoglu co-chaired the fourth GCTF Ministerial in New York City in September. As co-chair, Turkey provided extensive secretariat support. Turkey also participated actively in the OSCE expert meetings on the Prevention of Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism organized by the OSCE/Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and the OSCE Secretariat. Turkey is an active member of the UN, NATO, and the Council of Europe’s (COE) Committee of Experts on Terrorism (CODEXTER).

Turkey increased its cooperation with European countries regarding the status of members of the DHKP/C. It also worked closely with European, North African, and Middle East countries to interdict the travel of potential foreign fighters planning to travel through Turkey to Syria, although it remains a transit route for foreign fighters.

In 2011, the TNP created a multilateral training organization, the International Association of Police Academies, to increase sharing of policing research and best practices in the field of police education. The TNP offered 18 counterterrorism-related training programs in 2013 at its Antiterrorism Academy that are designed primarily for law enforcement officers from Central Asian countries.

Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism: The Government of Turkey has two significant programs to counter radicalization to violence and violent extremism. The first, administered by the TNP, is a broad-based outreach program to affected communities, similar to anti-gang activities in the United States. Police work to reach vulnerable populations (before terrorists do) to alter the prevailing group dynamics and to prevent recruitment. Police use social science research to undertake social projects, activities with parents, and in-service training for officers and teachers. Programs prepare trainers, psychologists, coaches, and religious leaders to intervene to undermine violent extremist messages and to prevent recruitment.

The second program, administered by the Turkish government’s Religious Affairs Office (Diyanet), works to undercut violent extremist messaging. In Turkey, all Sunni imams are employees of the Diyanet. In support of its message of traditional religious values, more than 66,000 Diyanet imams throughout Turkey conducted individualized outreach to their congregations. The Diyanet similarly worked with religious associations among the Turkish diaspora, assisting them to establish umbrella organizations and providing them access to instruction. The Diyanet supported in-service training for religious leaders and lay-workers via a network of 19 centers throughout Turkey.

UNITED KINGDOM

Overview: In 2013, the UK continued to play a leading role in countering international terrorism. The UK government continued to implement its updated counterterrorism strategy, CONTEST, which was released in 2011. This update of CONTEST set out the UK’s strategic framework for countering the terrorist threat at home and abroad for 2011-2015. In 2013, the conflict in Syria proved to be a galvanizing force for UK-based Muslim individuals and organizations. The threat of European fighters
traveling to Syria and then returning home radicalized to violence and dangerous drew significant attention and resources.

Northern Ireland continued to experience a persistent level of security incidents, including attempted bombings, violent protests, and the placement of hoax explosive devices. Many of the devices were relatively crude but occasionally viable. Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) officials reported an upsurge in dissident republican (Irish nationalist) attacks for 2013, as evidenced by letter bombs, under-car booby traps, blast bombs, and hijackings. While security forces and facilities continued to be the primary targets of violence, a few attempts were aimed at political officials and commercial centers within Belfast's city center.

In October 2012, the British Security Service downgraded the threat to Great Britain from dissident Irish republicans from "substantial" to "moderate." The decrease shows the authorities regard an attack on London and other British cities from such groups as possible, but not likely. Previously it was deemed a strong possibility. The threat level in Northern Ireland has not changed. It remained "severe" with an attack still highly likely. On its website, MI5 said: "The threat level for Northern Ireland-related terrorism is separate from that for international terrorism. It is also set separately for Northern Ireland and Great Britain."

2013 Terrorist Incidents: While terrorist groups were active throughout the UK in 2013, the majority of attacks occurred in Northern Ireland. Dissident republican groups: the Real IRA (RIRA), Continuity IRA (CIRA), and Óglaigh na hÉireann (ONH) remained actively opposed to the peace settlement in Northern Ireland. The UK's Northern Ireland Office recorded 30 national security attacks in Northern Ireland in 2013, "broadly comparable with previous years."

- On March 3, police intercepted a van containing four live mortar bombs in Londonderry; police suspected the target was a Londonderry police station. The van had its roof cut back to allow the mortars to be fired. It was the first time dissidents attempted this type of mortar attack. Two men were arrested at the scene, the driver of the van and a motorcyclist travelling behind. Both men were charged with having explosives with intent to endanger life, conspiracy to cause an explosion, and possessing a van for terrorist purposes.
- On May 22, British Army Soldier, Drummer (Private) Lee Rigby was attacked and killed near Woolwich in southeast London. Two men of Nigerian descent were convicted for the murder by stabbing and hacking Rigby to death with knives and a meat cleaver. During the incident and trial the accused stated that they killed a British soldier to avenge the killing of Muslims by British Armed Forces.
- On October 29, a letter bomb addressed to Northern Ireland Secretary of State Theresa Villiers forced the closure and evacuation of Stormont Castle and nearby Parliamentary buildings. The Royal Mail sorting offices also intercepted devices addressed to Chief Constable of the Police Service of Northern Ireland Matt Baggott and Chief Inspector John Burrows on October 25, while the Londonderry regional office of the Public Prosecution Service received a device on October 28.
- On November 8, a former policeman and his daughter escaped harm from a booby-trap placed on his car in Dundonald (near Belfast). The target discovered the device on the under carriage of his vehicle in a routine security check.
- On November 20, two masked men delivered a bag that contained a viable bomb on board a Translink bus and ordered the driver to take it to the Londonderry police headquarters. The bus driver instead called authorities to render it safe.
On November 24, a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device partially detonated near Victoria Square, the largest and busiest shopping mall in Belfast’s city center. A driver, carjacked by three masked men in the predominantly Catholic Ardoyne district, was forced to deliver the vehicle laden with 60 kg of explosives to the shopping center’s parking garage. He then abandoned the vehicle and notified authorities. The area was evacuated and cordoned off, but the detonator, which failed to trigger the actual device, went off before army experts could examine and render it safe. The vehicle sustained damage, but there were no casualties. On December 18, two men were arrested for questioning.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: UK laws allow the government to investigate and prosecute terrorists using a variety of tools. On April 25, a key piece of security legislation, the Justice and Security Act, was passed into law. The bill closed a significant legal loophole in the UK government’s ability to protect classified information; allowed “closed material proceedings” in civil courts, thus enabling the government’s use of classified information to defend itself in civil cases; and strengthened parliamentary oversight of the intelligence community.

The UK has a highly capable network of agencies involved in counterterrorism efforts. The Metropolitan (Met) police lead the UK’s national counterterrorism law enforcement effort. The Met police work closely with local police, MI5, and other agencies in terrorism investigation, prevention, and prosecution. On October 7, the National Crime Agency (NCA) launched and absorbed its predecessor, the Serious Organized Crime Agency (SOCA). While the NCA is not the lead counterterrorism agency, its organized crime, cybercrime, and border policing remit involved it in some counterterrorism issues.

The UK has issued machine readable passports with an imbedded electronic chip since 2006. UK travel documents and visas contain a number of security features to prevent tampering and fraud. The UK has advanced biometric screening capabilities at some points of entry, but at others there is no screening at all. The UK has no statutory ability to collect advance passenger name records (PNR). It is against EU regulations for the UK to collect PNR information on commercial flights originating from within the EU.

2013 law enforcement actions included:

- On January 9-10, four men were arrested as part of an investigation into people traveling to Syria in support of alleged terrorist activity. A 33-year-old man was arrested at Gatwick Airport as he attempted to take a flight out of the UK. Three other men, aged 18, 22, and 31, were arrested at separate addresses in east London. The arrests were linked to a July investigation in which two other men were arrested and charged over the kidnapping of British photographer John Cantlie and his Dutch colleague Jeroen Orelemans in Syria.
- On July 7, Omar Mahmoud Othman, known as Abu Qatada, was extradited to Amman, Jordan, after almost a decade-long saga of efforts to transfer him to Jordan, where he faced terrorism charges that he was convicted of in absentia.
- Between September 16 and 18, four people were arrested as part of an investigation into suspected terrorism in Syria. A 27-year-old man and a 26-year-old woman were detained on September 18 in Essex, east of London. On September 16, two men, aged 29 and 22, were arrested just after entering the country at the southern English port of Dover, according to officials. The arrests were made in relation to what police called "the commission, preparation, or instigation of acts of terrorism" in Syria.
• On October 13, four people were arrested at three sites in an operation coordinated between Scotland Yard and the security service MI5. All four of the arrests were made “on suspicion of the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism under the Terrorism Act 2000 (Section 41-1B).”

• On October 23, Anton Duffy, Martin Hughes, and Stacy McAllister, from Glasgow; Paul Sands from Ayr; and Edward McVeigh from Portpatrick, Dumfries, and Galloway, were arrested in an operation led by Police Scotland and involving the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) and the security service. The five suspects appeared in court and were charged with conspiring to commit acts of terrorism.

• On November 21, a court ruled that there was insufficient evidence to support the charges against Sharon Rafferty and Sean Kelly for directing the activities of a terrorist organization. Rafferty and Kelly were linked to an alleged dissident republican terrorist training camp, a secret firing range uncovered by police in County Tyrone on May 19, 2012.

• Also on November 21, Marian McGlinchey (aka Marian Price) pled guilty to providing property for the purposes of terrorism. McGlinchey purchased the mobile phone used by the Real IRA to claim responsibility for the attack on the Massereene Army barracks in March 2009, during which two soldiers died and four were injured. The attack marked the first British military fatalities in Northern Ireland since 1997.

• On December 2, a 19-year-old man was arrested on suspicion of Section 57 of the Terrorism Act after a device believed to be a nail bomb was found at a house in Salford.

• On December 18, Colin Duffy, Alex McCrory, and Henry Fitzsimmons were arrested and charged with conspiracy to commit murder, possession of firearms and explosives with intent to endanger life or cause serious damage to property, and IRA membership. The charges were linked to events on December 6 and 7, when assailants fired shots at police vehicles patrolling in predominantly Catholic areas of Belfast. Police reported no injuries. The weapons used were military grade and police reported that the chances of injury to police and innocent bystanders had been significant.

• Also on December 18, Keith McConnan, 19; and Orla O'Hanlon, 18; of Dundalk in the Republic of Ireland, were arrested by An Garda Síochána, the police service of the Republic of Ireland, and the PSNI at a house just north of the border in south Armagh. PSNI officers discovered a timer power unit, grinders, and fertilizer used for making an explosive mix for a car bomb at the property. The arrests were the result of a cross-border security operation involving surveillance of the house. Armed officers from the Garda later arrested a 43-year-old man at separate premises in Dundalk. The discovery of the bomb-making items was described as a “very significant” find by security sources in the Republic of Ireland.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** The UK is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and an active participant in FATF-style regional bodies to meet evolving money laundering and terrorist financing threats, and has a wide range of anti-money laundering and counterterrorist finance laws. The UK has been a leader on pointing out the dangers of paying kidnappers’ ransom payments and developing the linkages of ransom payments to increased financial support for terrorist organizations and further kidnappings. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

**Regional and International Cooperation:** The UK is a founding member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum and co-chairs its Countering Violent Extremism Working Group. The UK cooperates with other nations and international organizations on counterterrorism, including the UN
Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism: In 2007, the UK launched its Prevent strategy to counter radicalization. Prevent is part of the government’s overall national counterterrorism strategy, CONTEST. In 2011, Prevent was revised to correct several perceived problems. There had been complaints from members of Muslim organizations that UK government interaction with their communities was focused solely on security concerns. As a result, the UK divided the responsibilities for various strands of Prevent among different government organizations. The Department of Communities and Local Government took over responsibility for “integration” work, designed to ensure that Muslim communities received all the government services to which they were entitled and that immigrants were given assistance to integrate into British society. The Home Office focused on countering the ideology of violent extremism, including the identification of at-risk youth and their referral to counseling programs. The revised strategy called for a much more focused effort to target those most at risk of radicalization. Finally, the government decided that organizations that hold “extremist views,” even those that are non-violent, will not be eligible to receive government funding or participate in Prevent programs.

Following the May murder of soldier Lee Rigby, the UK government launched a taskforce to determine whether the government was doing all it could to confront violent extremism and radicalization to violence. The task force suggested further actions that could be taken to disrupt violent extremists, promote integration, and prevent radicalization, particularly in schools and prisons.

Under the Northern Ireland constitutional settlement, the UK government is responsible for Northern Ireland’s national security and is covered by CONTEST. Following the devolution of policing and justice matters in April 2010, the Northern Ireland Minister of Justice is responsible for policing and criminal justice policy matters.

As a society emerging from conflict, Northern Ireland contains many divisions and grievances, and is home to a significant number of ex-prisoners. At the grassroots level, much of the countering violent extremism work in Northern Ireland is implemented by local community organizations. The majority of youth organizations, community safety projects, restorative justice programs, and neighborhood renewal programs have partnership working arrangements with PSNI; some of these programs are directed and staffed by former combatants. Many NGOs, including some that work on a cross-border/all-Ireland basis, are engaged in efforts to prevent young people from becoming involved in “ordinary” crime, gang membership, and sectarianism. One such program, PEACE III (2007-2013), is a distinctive EU structural funds program with an emphasis on youth and unemployment, reinforcing progress toward a peaceful and stable society, and promoting reconciliation. The program has a total budget of approximately US $500 million, and covers Northern Ireland and the border region of Ireland.

THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

The Near East region experienced significant levels of terrorist activity in 2013, with instability and weak governance in North Africa, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen continuing to have ramifications for the broader region. Al-Qa’ida and its affiliates exploited opportunities to conduct operations amid this fragile political and security climate.
In Libya, lack of countrywide security coverage contributed to a high threat environment. Libya’s weak security institutions, coupled with ready access to loose weapons and porous borders, provided violent extremists significant opportunities to act and plan operations.

Reflecting its greater regional ambitions, al-Qa’ida in Iraq changed its name in 2013 to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and stepped up its attacks across Iraq. Iraqi security forces demonstrated some ability to confront this challenge in terms of protecting larger installations and events, and finding and arresting terrorist suspects. ISIL also took advantage of the permissive security environment in Syria. The Syrian government historically had an important role in the growth of terrorist networks in Syria through the permissive attitude the Asad regime took towards al-Qa’ida’s foreign fighter facilitation efforts during the Iraq conflict. Syrian government awareness and encouragement of violent extremists’ transit through Syria to enter Iraq for many years, for the purpose of fighting Coalition Troops, is well documented – Syria was a key hub for foreign fighters en route to Iraq. Those very networks were the seedbed for the violent extremist elements that terrorized the Syrian population in 2013.

Shia militants continued to threaten Iraqi security in 2013, and were alleged to have been responsible for numerous attacks against Mujahadin-e Khalq members that continued to reside at Camp Hurriya near Baghdad. Hizballah provided a wide range of critical support to the Asad regime – including clearing regions of opposition forces, and providing training, advice, and logistical assistance to the Syrian Army – as the regime continued its brutal crackdown against the Syrian people.

Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has also taken advantage of the instability in the region, particularly in Libya and Mali. In January, an AQIM offshoot led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar attacked an oil facility near In Amenas, Algeria, resulting in the deaths of 39 foreign hostages including three Americans. Kidnapping for ransom operations continued to yield significant sums for AQIM, and it conducted attacks against members of state security services within the Trans-Sahara region.

In Tunisia, the terrorist group Ansar al-Shari’a in Tunisia (AAS-T) precipitated a government crisis by assassinating, among others, two secular politicians in February and July 2013. Ansar al-Shari’a was designated a Terrorist Organization by the Tunisian government in August.

The Government of Yemen continued its fight against al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), although struggling somewhat in this effort due to an ongoing political and security restructuring within the government itself. AQAP continued to exhibit its capability by targeting government installations and security and intelligence officials, but also struck at soft targets, such as hospitals. President Hadi continued to support U.S. counterterrorism objectives in Yemen, and encouraged greater cooperation between U.S. and Yemeni counterterrorism forces.

Despite these persistent threats, governments across the region continued to build and exhibit their counterterrorism capabilities, disrupting the activities of a number of terrorists. Although AQ affiliate presence and activity in the Sahel and parts of the Maghreb remains worrisome, the group’s isolation in Algeria and smaller pockets of North Africa grew as partner efforts in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia increased.

In Egypt, significant political instability presented various security challenges for the government, leading to an increase in violent extremist activity in the Sinai and parts of lower Egypt, including Cairo. Government security forces aggressively targeted violent extremist activity in these areas.
In Gaza, sporadic rocket attacks launched by Hamas and other Gaza-based terrorist groups continued, as well as ongoing and related smuggling activity by these groups along the Gaza-Sinai border region. Israeli officials expressed concerns about the smuggling of long-range rockets from the Sinai Peninsula through tunnels into Gaza, but also recognized the positive impact of increased Egyptian government efforts to fight smuggling through such tunnels in preventing weapons and dual-use materials from reaching Gaza.

In 2013, Iran’s state sponsorship of terrorism worldwide remained undiminished through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF), its Ministry of Intelligence and Security, and Tehran’s ally Hizballah, which remained a significant threat to the stability of Lebanon and the broader region. The U.S. government continued efforts to counter Iranian and proxy support for terrorist operations via sanctions and other legal tools. The United States also welcomed the EU’s July 2013 designation of Hizballah’s military wing as a terrorist organization.

ALGERIA

Overview: Algeria remained a key U.S. counterterrorism partner. Within Algeria, al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) remained the most active terrorist threat. AQIM attacked Algerian security forces, local government targets, and westerners in the Sahel, operating primarily in the mountainous areas east of Algiers and in the expansive desert regions near Algeria’s southern border.

The security situation in neighboring countries, the threat of retaliatory attacks following the international military intervention in Mali, the proliferation of weapons smuggled out of Libya, low-intensity violence in the south central and northeast border zones and along the Algeria-Tunisia border all contributed to the terrorist threat to Algeria.

Once part of AQIM, the al-Mulathamun Battalion (AMB) became a separate organization in late 2012 and its sub-battalion, “Those Who Sign in Blood,” led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, claimed responsibility for the January 16, 2013 attack against a gas facility near In Amenas, Algeria. In August 2013, the Mali-based Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and AMB announced that the two organizations merged and adopted the name al-Murabitoun.

Algeria has a long history of fighting terrorism, and continued its aggressive campaign against AQIM. In 2013, Algerian security forces decreased the number of successful terrorist attacks, sustained pressure on the group’s Algeria-based leadership, seized equipment and arms caches, and further isolated AQIM in the north, in the area east of Algiers, and in the southeast. Press sources reported 27 terrorists surrendered under the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation in 2013, in exchange for amnesty measures.

Algeria’s sustained military, security, and policing efforts undercut AQIM’s capabilities in northern Algeria, largely limiting the group’s operations to more rural areas. However, AQIM’s Sahel-based battalions have increasingly taken advantage of regional instability to expand their areas of control and assert autonomy after long serving as support nodes for Algeria-based AQIM. The Algerian government sees AQIM and its affiliates as posing a threat comparable to violent criminal organizations, and has frequently cited links between AQIM and narco-traffickers in the Sahel.

The Government of Algeria maintains – and advocates that others also maintain – a strict “no concessions” policy with regard to individuals or groups holding its citizens hostage. Algeria played a
leadership role in the Global Counterterrorism Forum’s (GCTF’s) efforts to raise awareness among governments to prevent the payment of ransoms to terrorist organizations.

**2013 Terrorist Incidents:** AQIM continued attacks using improvised explosive devices (IEDs), bombings, false roadblocks, kidnappings, and ambushes in areas east and south of Algiers. The press reported at least 196 terrorist acts in 2013. As in years past, Algeria experienced a spike in terrorist incidents during Ramadan. In 2013, however, the Algerian government observed AQIM’s yearly Ramadan offensive was significantly reduced relative to the past decade.

On January 16, AMB attacked the Tiguentourine gas facility (a joint venture among Algerian, British, and Norwegian companies) near In Amenas, in southeastern Algeria. Over 800 people were taken hostage for four days and the attackers killed 39 foreign hostages, including three U.S. citizens. The group’s leader, Algerian national Mokhtar Belmokhtar, remains a threat and was at-large in the region, at year’s end.

There is a high threat of kidnapping in isolated parts of Algeria. Although much lower profile than the kidnappings of westerners by AQIM in neighboring Mali, kidnappings of Algerian citizens continued to occur within the country’s borders. In October, Foreign Minister Lamamra said the four Algerian diplomats kidnapped in April 2012 from the Algerian consulate in northern Mali are alive and that the government is fully mobilized to ensure the diplomats’ release. MUJAO claimed responsibility for the kidnapping.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Algeria amended Article 87 of the Penal Code in 2013 to define terrorist acts in accordance with relevant international terrorism conventions. In 2013, Algeria made efforts to build the capacity of the National Gendarmerie’s National Institute of Forensic Science and Criminology to eventually obtain International Organization for Standardization certification. Algeria also acquired the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) – a milestone in creating a platform for future sharing of DNA data with other Algerian and international partners.

The Government of Algeria has multiple law enforcement, intelligence, and security agencies with delineated responsibilities to address counterterrorism, counter-intelligence, media monitoring, investigations, border security, crisis response, and anti-corruption. These include the National Gendarmerie, the Department of Intelligence and Security (DRS) and the Department of National Security (DGSN). In 2013, the Algerian President reorganized parts of the DRS, removing some judicial police authority to units under the control of the Deputy Defense Minister and Chief of Staff.

The Government of Algeria has demonstrated that it has the will and capability to investigate and to disrupt terrorist and criminal activity. Since 2010, the Algerian government has increased the number of police officers from 166,348 to 200,000, and has worked to professionalize and modernize its police force.

Algerian security forces, primarily the Gendarmerie under the Ministry of National Defense, continued to conduct periodic sweep operations in the Kabylie region southeast of the capital to capture AQIM fighters. Algerian law enforcement has been effective in protecting diplomatic missions and strengthening security assets when necessary.

Algerian security forces made a number of arrests in 2013. As of November, press reported that security forces arrested 545 individuals on terrorist charges, although it is difficult to confirm the
accuracy of this number. As of mid-December, 220 terrorists were killed in 2013, according to the President of the Judicial Unit for the Application of the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, a consultative body to the Algerian Office of the Presidency.

In 2013, Algerian law-enforcement personnel participated in a variety of U.S. Department of State Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program courses that were designed to enhance investigative and screening capacities, strengthen border security, prevent terrorist transit or operations, and build response capacity to critical incidents. The majority of these courses combined students from different ministries in an effort to promote inter-ministerial cooperation and coordination in law enforcement.

In 2013, the U.S. Department of Justice’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program and the Algerian Gendarmerie Nationale focused on targeted capacity-building consultations and training in forensics, criminal investigation, and border security.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Algeria is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF), a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. In July 2013, Algeria was admitted as a member of the Egmont Group, an informal network of financial intelligence units. In October 2013, the FATF called on Algeria to continue working on its action plan and address its remaining deficiencies: adequately criminalizing terrorist financing and establishing and implementing an adequate legal framework for identifying, tracing, and freezing terrorist assets. Despite the FATF action in October, the Algerian government maintained that it had taken measures sufficient to meet international standards. Measures included building on 2012 legislation regarding the prevention of money laundering and terrorist financing, and authorizing judges to freeze or seize funds belonging to terrorist organizations. Algeria has a cash-based economy and a vast informal sector that poses challenges to monitoring and regulating money and value transfer services. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes*: [http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm](http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm).

**Regional and International Cooperation:** Algeria is a founding member of the GCTF and co-chairs the group’s Sahel Working Group (SWG), in which capacity it championed the development of the Algiers Memorandum on Good Practices on Preventing and Denying the Benefits of Kidnapping for Ransom by Terrorists. In September, the Governments of Algeria and Canada announced that they would seek to renew their terms as co-chairs until 2015. Algeria hosted the GCTF-SWG’s second plenary meeting in June. Regional and international experts discussed donor coordination and programming in the Sahel and the evolution of local terrorism-related threats. Also in June, with the active support of the United States and the United Kingdom, the G-8 Summit expressed support for the principles contained in the Algiers Memorandum.

In September 2010, Algeria in collaboration with Mali, Mauritania, and Niger, formed the *Comité d’État-Major Opérationnel Conjoint* (CEMOC). Algeria participated in CEMOC meetings in March and November. Algeria is home to the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (CAERT) of the AU and CEMOC’s Liaison and Fusion Center for information sharing. The Algerian government supported CAERT’s Seventh Annual Focal Points Meeting in December that examined current and future CAERT Strategic Plans, terrorist threats in Africa, radicalization to violence and violent extremism, and terrorist financing.

Algeria also participates in the 5+5 Defense Initiative, which brings together five European and five North African countries to address security issues in the Western Mediterranean.
The Algerian Prime Minister and his Libyan and Tunisian counterparts met in January 2013 to enhance security along their common borders to reduce the flow of arms and drugs and organized crime. Measures included new joint checkpoints and patrols along the frontiers, which stretch for miles through sparsely-populated desert. In September, Algeria participated in a two-day workshop in Tripoli on enhancing operational land border security cooperation in the Sahel-Saharan region. In November in Rabat, Algeria participated in the second conference on regional border security with counterparts from the Sahel and Maghreb countries.

While Morocco and Algeria both participated in the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership and the GCTF, the level of their bilateral CT cooperation did not improve. Algeria and Morocco’s political disagreement over the Western Sahara remained an impediment to bilateral and regional counterterrorism cooperation in 2013.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** Algeria's 2006 Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation offered amnesty to former terrorists who laid down their weapons and disavowed violence. Perpetrators of particularly egregious acts, such as rape and bombings, were excluded from this amnesty. The program was controversial but succeeded in demobilizing a number of former militants.

The Algerian government appoints, trains, and pays the salaries of imams. The penal code outlines strict punishments, including fines and prison sentences, for anyone other than a government-designated imam who preaches in a mosque. The Algerian government monitors mosques for possible security-related offenses and prohibits the use of mosques as public meeting places outside of regular prayer hours. The government has the authority to pre-screen and approve sermons before they are delivered during Friday prayers, but more often it provides preapproved sermon topics prior to Friday prayers. In practice, each province and county employed religious officials to review sermon content. The Ministry of Religious Affairs' educational commission is responsible for establishing policies for hiring teachers at Quranic schools and ensuring that all imams are well qualified and follow governmental guidelines aimed at stemming violent extremism.

**BAHRAIN**

**Overview:** Amid a third consecutive year of political and social unrest, Bahrain developed its counterterrorism capacities while taking some steps to better protect human rights in the conduct of its counterterrorist effort. Violent opposition groups’ use of real and hoax improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and increasingly sophisticated weapons and detonators remained a key threat to security services. Bahrain-U.S. counterterrorism cooperation remained strong.

**2013 Terrorist Incidents:**
- On February 15, a policeman died from injuries he sustained from an improvised-projectile launcher fired by rioters.
- During April 12-15, three separate bombs detonated, injuring one police officer and damaging both a police vehicle and a girls’ school.
- On May 30, a device exploded in Bani Jamra village, injuring several policemen.
- On July 6 in Sitra, a homemade bomb exploded, killing one policeman and severely injuring two others.
On July 17, a gas cylinder exploded inside a parked car outside a mosque in Riffa without any injuries.

On August 17, an explosion in the village of Al-Dayr injured five policemen, one of whom later succumbed to his injuries.

In October, two separate explosions injured at least five policemen.

On December 17, a homemade bomb exploded in the town of Dimistan, injuring two police officers. A vehicle-borne gas cylinder exploded on December 23 near a shopping mall in Seef without causing injuries.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Penalties for terrorism-related acts are spelled out in the Antiterrorism Law of 2006 and Articles 155 and 168 of the Penal Code. King Hamad issued royal decree-laws in July amending the 2006 law to increase penalties for some terrorism-related offenses. Separate royal decrees issued in August and September amended the Charity Fundraising Law of 1956 to tighten terrorist finance monitoring and penalties, to increase penalties for parents of juveniles involved in terrorism, and to strengthen the ability of the Minister of State for Communications to monitor and impede the use of social media to facilitate or promote terrorism. The royal decrees were in response to a July 28 special joint session of parliament, which sent 22 recommendations to the King for strengthening laws and state powers to counter terrorism and violent extremism.

The Ministry of the Interior (MOI) is the lead government agency regarding the detection and prevention of acts of terrorism and the arrest of suspects in terrorist-related acts. The Bahrain National Security Agency provides intelligence support. The Bahraini Coast Guard monitors and interdicts the seaborne movement of weapons and terrorists into and out of the country.

The Bahraini authorities stepped up border security in recent years primarily in response to terrorist threats, and in November 2013 announced that they will introduce biometric testing at all ports of entry within the next couple of years. Deterrents to more effective law enforcement and border security are the lack of both interagency coordination and training to develop requisite law enforcement skills.

Bahrain’s ongoing investment in border control and security yielded some major successes in 2013, including:

- In February, a MOI explosives team defused a two kilogram bomb placed on the King Fahd Causeway linking Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.
- On July 4, police discovered and seized a large weapons cache in the Tubli area of Manama containing rifles, ammunition, silencers, and material used to make explosives.
- On July 26, police and firefighters foiled an attempt to detonate a vehicle-borne gas cylinder.
- On September 24 in Bani Jamra, a police raid yielded two homemade bombs.
- On December 28 and 29, an MOI operation uncovered a large cache of arms and explosive materials and interdicted a boat heading to Bahrain loaded with explosives, including C4 and TNT.
- On December 29, police defused an explosive-laden vehicle.

Prosecutions in 2013 included:

- In March, Bahraini criminal courts convicted and sentenced more than 30 individuals to 15 years in prison for bombings in April 2012 and January 2013.
- In June, a court handed down 10-year sentences for six people involved in a 2012 bomb blast.
- On September 30, the government sentenced two men to 15 years in prison for being part of an Iran-backed terrorist cell.
- In early October, sentences were handed to more than 25 individuals convicted of planting explosives in November 2012, hiding weapons caches uncovered in June 2012, and for attending terrorist training in Syria, Iraq, and Iran.
- On November 3, four men received life sentences and six men were sentenced to 15-year terms from their role in the “Imam Army” terrorist cell police uncovered in February 2013.
- On December 29-30, six men were sentenced to five- to 15-year terms for their role in hoax and live IEDs discovered in April and November 2012.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Bahrain is a member of the Middle East North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF), a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body. The country is an important regional financial hub, which makes it vulnerable to large cash flows through the Gulf region to support various terrorist and violent extremist groups. The United States is not aware of any public prosecutions of terrorist finance cases in 2013, although the Bahraini government did not formally reply to multiple requests for information on prosecutions. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

**Regional and International Cooperation:** Bahrain worked closely and cooperatively with international partners throughout the region. Since formally endorsing the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism in March 2008, Bahrain has proactively worked to expand air, sea, and causeway border control points. On December 30, the Bahraini Cabinet endorsed a Gulf Cooperation Council collective security agreement, which outlines mutual responsibilities to preserve regional security and stability and help combat terrorism and transnational and organized crime through information exchanges and coordination.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** The Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs (MOJIA) heads Bahrain’s efforts to counter radicalization to violence and violent extremism, in part by organizing regular workshops for clerics and speakers from both the Sunni and Shia sects. The MOJIA also undertakes an annual review of schools’ Islamic Studies curricula to evaluate interpretations of religious texts.

### EGYPT

**Overview:** During 2013, Egypt witnessed an increase in terrorism and violent extremism following the July 3 removal of the elected government. Although the majority of attacks were concentrated in northern Sinai, some significant incidents occurred in the eastern Nile Delta between Cairo and the Suez Canal city of Ismailiya. This violence was primarily directed against Egyptian government security forces and rarely targeted Egyptian civilians, foreigners, or foreign economic interests, although there were several bombings or attempted bombings of public buses in Cairo in late December. The Sinai-based terrorist organization Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM) claimed responsibility for the majority of the more complex attacks on the security services.

While Egyptian security services struggled in July and August to contain the wave of violent extremist attacks, close coordination between the National Security Sector (NSS), the Egyptian General
Intelligence Service (EGIS), and the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) ultimately led to a reduction in the number of terrorist attacks in the Sinai. By the end of 2013, the EAF were continuing an aggressive military campaign in northern Sinai in an effort to disrupt the smuggling of arms and explosives between Gaza and Egypt, as well as to kill suspected militants and deny extremist groups a place from which to plan attacks. In an effort to restore internal security and combat violent extremism, the interim Egyptian government focused its 2013 efforts on protecting critical infrastructure and restoring basic security.

The Egyptian government also cracked down on those opposed to the interim government throughout the country. This crackdown targeted the Muslim Brotherhood and non-violent secular political opponents, as well as violent Islamist extremist elements. On December 25, the Government of Egypt designated the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) as a terrorist organization, but did not provide any substantiating evidence that the MB was directly involved in the terrorist attacks that followed President Mohamed Morsy’s removal.

2013 Terrorist Incidents: Egypt witnessed hundreds of terrorist attacks in 2013, the vast majority occurring after the July 3 removal of the elected government, within the north Sinai and the eastern Nile Delta region. The Egyptian military and police forces were the primary targets of these attacks. A majority of the attacks in July through September employed rudimentary tactics, such as drive-by shootings and crude explosives, but since September, an increasing number have used more lethal and sophisticated tactics, including rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and suicide vehicular-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) attacks.

Significant attacks included:

- On July 7, unknown assailants attacked the Sinai pipeline that transports natural gas between Egypt and Jordan. This was the first attack on the pipeline since June 2012.
- On August 19, unknown gunmen stopped two police buses carrying Central Security Forces (CSF) conscripts to a base in Al-Arish in Northern Sinai and killed at least 24. On August 31, the al-Furqan Brigades launched two RPGs at a merchant vessel transiting the Suez Canal.
- On September 5, a suicide VBIED attack attempted to target Egyptian Minister of Interior Muhammad Ibrahim in the Nasr City neighborhood of Cairo, resulting in one dead and over twenty injured. Ibrahim was not hurt. ABM claimed responsibility for the attack.
- On September 11, near simultaneous suicide VBIED attacks targeted the Egyptian Directorate of Military Intelligence office in Rafah, wounding 20; and an armored personnel carrier at an Army checkpoint nearby, killing nine.
- On October 7, the al-Furqan Brigades launched two RPGs at a NileSat uplink facility’s satellite dish in the Maadi neighborhood of Cairo.
- On October 7, ABM launched a suicide VBIED attack against the south Sinai security directorate in al-Tor, killing five security force personnel and wounding 50.
- On October 10, a suicide VBIED attack at an Al-Arish checkpoint killed four and injured five security personnel.
- On October 19, ABM launched a suicide VBIED attack against an Egyptian Directorate of Military Intelligence building in Ismailia, wounding six.
- On November 18, ABM launched a VBIED attack against an Army transport bus east of Al-Arish killing 11 soldiers and wounding 35 others.
- On December 24, ABM launched a VBIED attack against the Daqahlia Police Directorate in the eastern Nile Delta city of Mansura, killing 16 and injuring over 130 others.
• On December 26, a small, rudimentary IED exploded next to a bus in the Nasr City neighborhood of Cairo, wounding five; a second IED was discovered in the vicinity and dismantled.
• On December 29, a VBIED went off near the military intelligence headquarters in Sharqiya injuring four.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Egypt’s most recent State of Emergency (SoE) declaration expired on November 14, 2013, ending implementation of the Emergency Law that had been reinstated since August 14, 2013. On June 2, the Supreme Constitutional Court declared warrantless searches and arrests, even under the Emergency Law, unconstitutional.

Interim government officials insisted that all arrests since July 3, when the 2012 constitution was suspended, were made in accordance with the Penal Code and denied any warrantless arrests, although these were reported by human rights groups. Warrantless searches and arrests did occur under an SoE in early 2013, following a January 27 decision by then-President Morsy to declare a 30-day SoE in Port Said, Suez, and Ismailiya after violent clashes on the anniversary of the January 25, 2011 revolution, left more than 50 people dead in those governorates.

Egyptian law enforcement entities continued to take proactive measures against identified terrorist cells. While Egypt appeared to have limited its counterterrorism exchanges with some foreign partners, it continued to participate – with periodic interruptions due to security concerns and instability – in the Department of State's Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program in 2013. ATA training and equipment deliveries for Egypt were shaped to try to meet objectives and needs specific to Egypt amid the country's evolving political landscape, specifically in the areas of leadership and management, border security, and building investigative capacity.

Egypt continued its efforts to improve border security. This included achieving significant control over the illicit border trade, including weapons, through tunnels beneath northeastern Sinai and Gaza. In response to unrest through the year, Egypt reinforced its security and protection measures at airports, ports, and the Suez Canal. While Egyptian border officials maintain a watchlist for suspected violent extremists, it is not shared with the relevant agencies involved in the processing of people and goods. The United States provided some technical assistance at the Rafah border crossing with Gaza; however, the Egyptian Customs Authority lacks a central database to track the movement of cargo and passengers and to establish patterns and trends across all of Egypt. The Egyptian Ministry of Defense continues to coordinate with the U.S. Department of Defense for the procurement of border security items such as ground monitoring sensors and cameras.

To combat weapons and explosives smuggling, the Egyptian government completed installation of nonintrusive inspection equipment at the Ahmed Hamdi tunnel site near Suez; additional sites on the Suez Canal, the Sinai, and in western Egypt were under development. Due to the July change of government, there has been little progress to enhance the capabilities and modernize the Border Guard Forces. The Ministries of Defense, Finance, and Interior, who all contribute to border security, share border-related information minimally.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Egypt is a member of the Middle East North Africa Financial Action Task Force, a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. The country has a well-developed financial sector, but a significant amount of funds moves through the informal sector, raising the risks for abuse by terrorist groups. Egyptian authorities have accused its main political opposition, the MB, of funding al-Qa'ida, although they have not provided substantiating
evidence. Egypt’s terrorist finance regulations are broadly in line with relevant UNSCRs regarding terrorist financing. Egypt regularly informed its own financial institutions of any individuals or entities that are listed by UNSCRs 1267/1989 and 1988 sanctions committees, and its Code of Criminal Procedures and Penal Code adequately provides for the freezing, seizure, and confiscation of assets related to terrorism.

With regard to implementation of the UNSC 1267/1989 (al-Qa’ida) sanction regime, the Egyptian notification process falls short of FATF standards, particularly with respect to authorities to freeze or seize assets without delay. According to current procedures, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs receives the UN lists and sends such lists to the Egyptian Money Laundering Combating Unit, which then directs concerned agencies to take the required actions. There are no specific procedures related to the un-freezing of assets.


Regional and International Cooperation: Egypt is a founding member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum and together with the United States, co-chairs its Rule of Law and Justice Working Group. Egypt participated in the Arab League’s Counterterrorism Committee.

Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism: The Ministry of Islamic Endowments (Awqaf) is legally responsible for issuing guidance to imams throughout Egypt, including how to avoid extremist language in sermons. Al-Azhar University cooperated with international programs to help train imams who promote tolerance and non-violence, interfaith cooperation, and human rights. The Ministry of Islamic Endowments is also required to license all mosques; however, many operate without licenses. The government has the authority to appoint and monitor the imams who lead prayers in licensed mosques and pays their salaries. In practice, government control over mosques decreased after the 2011 revolution, but strengthened following the removal of former President Mohamed Morsy in July. In September, the ministry issued a decree banning imams who are not graduates of Al-Azhar from preaching in mosques. The decree prohibited holding Friday prayers in mosques smaller than 80 square meters, banned unlicensed mosques from holding Friday congregational prayer services, and required that Friday sermons follow government “talking points” that preach tolerance and non-violence. Local media reported that the ministry did in fact stop some non-Azharite preachers from delivering sermons in mosques later in the year.

IRAQ

Overview: The terrorist organization previously known as al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) changed its name in 2013 to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). ISIL remained an al-Qa’ida (AQ) affiliate in 2013, despite continued disputes between its leaders and AQ senior leadership. The group and its affiliates are herein referred to as al-Qa’ida in Iraq/Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (AQI/ISIL) to account for attacks carried out during the year under both names.

Despite a significant increase in the level of terrorist violence, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) made some progress combating AQI/ISIL and other Sunni insurgent groups in 2013. The Iraqi government largely succeeded in securing large religious gatherings at holy sites in Najaf and Karbala and high-profile government events, but terrorist bombings and other attacks continued to occur against provincial level interests, the ISF, and some soft targets. The number of both large-scale terrorist
attacks aimed at soft targets, which have become the hallmark tactics of groups like AQI/ISIL, and smaller-scale tactics such as small arms fire and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), reached levels not seen since 2007. There were no significant attacks on U.S. interests and no U.S. fatalities in 2013 from these attacks.

AQI/ISIL significantly increased the lethality, complexity, and frequency of terrorist attacks in Iraq in 2013. According to UN estimates for 2013, more than 7,800 civilians (including civilian police) and over 1,000 ISF personnel were killed in acts of terrorism and violence – an average of 24 deaths per day. Press, host nation reports, and other public sources of information compiled for the time period from January through November estimated the death toll of civilians and ISF due to terrorist and criminal violence at 7,058 (4,817 civilians, 2,241 security personnel). Throughout the year, AQI/ISIL grew increasingly indiscriminate in its attacks and demonstrated increasing capabilities to plan, coordinate, and conduct large-scale attacks effectively. AQI/ISIL carried out numerous high-profile suicide bombings and vehicle-borne explosive device (VBIEDs) attacks on government and civilian targets, aiming to increase tensions among Iraqi sectarian groups and ethnic minorities and undercut public perceptions of the government’s capacity to provide security. In addition to targeting government facilities and the ISF, the group targeted Shia places of worship, large religious processions such as the Shia pilgrimage to Karbala, funerals, schools, minority groups, journalists, critical infrastructure, and public spaces such as parks, cafes, and markets.

While AQI/ISIL continued to rely predominantly on suicide bombings and VBIEDs, it has increasingly relied on gunmen using assault rifles or silenced weapons to carry out targeted assaults on government and security officials, as well as against Sunnis affiliated with the government through the Sahwas (Sunni Awakening Councils), in areas where the group exercised greater control, such as Anbar, Ninawa, and Salah ad Din Provinces. The police and judiciary continued to face threats to their personal safety and that of their families. Terrorists increasingly targeted families of ISF who were operating within their home provinces. Journalists were also increasingly targeted by terrorist groups.

Jaysh Rijal al-Tariqah al-Naqshabandiyah (JRTN), a Sunni nationalist insurgent group with links to the former Baath Party, also continued attacks during 2013, largely targeting the ISF in northern Iraq.

The ISF proved to have some capability in finding, arresting, and charging terrorism suspects. In October, the ISF arrested at least 560 people, mostly under the Antiterrorism Law of 2005, according to media and host government reports. In addition, the ISF found and cleared at least 135 IEDs of various types and found and cleared 32 weapons caches. Among the confiscated items were 48 IEDs, almost 400 mortar and artillery of varying caliber, 42 rockets, 21 rocket-propelled grenade rounds, several kilograms of C-4 explosives, over 30 kilograms of TNT, over 120 hand- and stun-grenades, and two landmines. As of the end of September, Iraq’s Counterterrorism Service (CTS) had made over 700 terrorism-related arrests, based on the service’s own reporting.

In October, the Government of Iraq established the JointOperations Command (JOC). The JOC was designed to facilitate intelligence coordination among the various national security ministries and agencies. Each ministry or agency had a senior representative at the JOC headquarters. The representatives submitted actionable information to the JOC commander regarding terrorist threats, who in turn ordered the relevant provincial Operations Commands to carry out operations against specified targets.

Iraq-U.S. counterterrorism cooperation remained strong but limited to training, advisory, and information-sharing programs.
2013 Terrorist Incidents: Terrorist groups significantly increased the number of attacks throughout the country in 2013, many of which involved suicide bombs, VBIEDs, and targeted shootings, hallmark tactics of AQI/ISIL. In 2013, an average of 68 suicide and VBIED attacks per month were attributed to AQI/ISIL. Terrorist groups grew more indiscriminate in their attacks and increasingly targeted schools, oil infrastructure, and public spaces such as parks, cafes, and markets. Following is a partial listing highlighting some of the most egregious incidents:

- On March 4, the Ministry of Defense issued a statement claiming that terrorists from Syria had entered Iraq and killed 48 unarmed Syrian soldiers. The 48 Syrian soldiers had fled to Iraq following clashes on March 1-2 between Syrian Army and Free Syrian Army forces on the Syrian side of the Rabiah border crossing that connects to Ninewa Province. The ISF were escorting the 48 Syrian soldiers back to Syria when their convoy came under attack in Anbar Province. Nine Iraqi soldiers were also killed in the attack, with many more wounded. The Free Syrian Army denied any involvement in the attack. Iraqi press speculated AQI/ISIL involvement in the attack.
- On July 21, AQI/ISIL conducted well-coordinated simultaneous attacks against Taji and Abu Ghrabi prisons. At least 10 ISF personnel were killed and more than 500 suspected AQI/ISIL prisoners reportedly escaped.
- On July 29, a wave of coordinated VBIED attacks in rapid succession targeted predominantly Shia areas in Southern Iraq, killing more than 50 people and wounding an estimated 190. At least 17 VBIEDs detonated, including at least nine in Baghdad, and six in the southern provinces of Muthanna, Basrah, and Wasit.
- On July 31, an IED blast in a café in Diyala Province left 20 people dead and wounded.
- On September 21, two VBIEDs were employed in an attack on a Shia funeral in Sadr City. The coordinated attack killed at least 50 and wounded at least 120.
- On September 29, AQI/ISIL carried out a complex attack involving VBIEDs and small arms fire against the Asayish (the Kurdistan Regional Government’s internal security force) headquarters in Erbil. The attack killed six security personnel and wounded more than 60 bystanders.
- On October 6, in Ninewa Province, two VBIEDs were detonated in the al-Aiyathiya neighborhood. The first VBIED was detonated near an elementary school and the second one targeted an Iraqi Police checkpoint. The attacks killed up to 13 school children and one Iraqi police officer. Another 140 were wounded, mostly students from the school. On October 17, near the end of the Eid al-Adha holiday, a suicide bomber detonated a VBIED in a Shabak minority neighborhood in eastern Mosul, killing 15, including seven children, and wounding more than 50 others.
- On December 1, unidentified gunmen killed a Sunni tribal leader in Fallujah, Anbar Province.
- On December 3, a VBIED outside the mayor’s office in Tarmiya, Baghdad Province, killed at least 14 and wounded 40 others.
- On December 6, gunmen attacked local area mayors in Diyala and Salah ad Din provinces. The attack in Diyala resulted in the mayor’s death, while the official in Salah ad Din sustained injuries.
- On December 23, five people were killed in a suicide bombing after armed militants stormed a television complex in the city of Tikrit. The violence unfolded when a car bomb exploded outside Salah ad Din TV and the local offices of al-Iraqiyya State TV. Militants then stormed the offices of Salah ad Din TV and a suicide bomber killed the chief news editor, a copy editor,
Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Iraq’s Antiterrorism Law, Number 13, of 2005, is the primary means of prosecuting terrorism crimes. Iraqi Courts use various provisions of the Penal Code, Number 111, of 1969, to address crimes that do not fall squarely within the Antiterrorism Law. The U.S. government engaged with judicial and law enforcement authorities in numerous activities designed to strengthen criminal justice institutions and promote the rule of law.

Draft legislation for a law that formalizes the CTS as a ministerial-level organization and codifies the Service’s mission and authorities under Iraqi law has been under consideration by the Council of Representatives since 2009. The CTS relies on the Ministry of Defense for its budget.

Violent sectarian strife was one of the greatest deterrents to effective law enforcement and border security. Iraq’s law enforcement capacity as it pertains to proactively detecting, deterring, and preventing acts of terrorism strengthened in 2013 but needs improvement.

Iraq has a number of counterterrorism units that fall under the Ministries of Interior (MOI), Defense, and other agencies. However, there is no mechanism to determine which agency should lead or respond to particular counterterrorism incidents. This leads to a significant lack of coordination and cooperation among the Iraqi entities that lessens Iraq’s effective response to the overwhelming threat from terrorism.

The Iraqi government is working to improve its law enforcement capacity via U.S.-assisted training in various areas of border control, chemical weapons threat mitigation, explosive incident countermeasures, post-blast investigations, vital infrastructure security, protection of national leaders, maritime port and harbor security, crisis response, police leaders’ role in combating terrorism, fraudulent document recognition, and forensic examination of terrorist crime scenes. Other projects sponsored by the United States included financial investigation training to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, as well as capacity building in the Iraqi judiciary, corrections service, and police. In October, a U.S.-funded program helped the Iraqi government open a free legal clinic at its Rusafa court complex in Baghdad. The help desk was a critical link between the Iraqi government and its citizenry, and served as a mechanism for assisting some of Iraq’s more vulnerable segments of society, such as women who suffered from domestic violence and juveniles who were exposed to sexual or other abuse.

Iraq’s MOI and Ministry of Transportation continued to strengthen their border security capabilities, and information-sharing within the Government of Iraq regarding travel documents is improving. For example, Iraq uses the Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES) System, which registers and screens travelers entering and exiting the country. As of the end of 2013, Iraq’s PISCES system was operational at six international airports, 11 land border locations, and one seaport. This program is run and coordinated by the Iraq National Information Service.

In 2013, the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program worked to improve Iraqi law enforcement capabilities in the areas of investigations, border security, and crisis response. ATA provided courses in border control management, maritime port and harbor security, and identifying fraudulent document recognition.
The deteriorating security situation in Syria has made it increasingly difficult for the ISF to secure Iraq’s 400-mile border with its western neighbor. Since 2012, terrorist groups have gained greater access to weaponry as a result of increased smuggling and ease of movement along Iraq’s border with Syria. In an effort to improve security along the border, the government formed the al-Jazirah and al-Badiyah Operations Command.

During 2013, the Syrian refugee population in Iraq soared from approximately 68,000 on January 1 to 148,000 in mid-May, when the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) closed the unofficial border crossing that most refugees had used to enter Iraq. The KRG authorities reopened the border from August 15 through September 22, during which time as many as 75,000 more Syrian refugees entered the Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR). In the wake of the September 29 attack against Asayish headquarters in Erbil, officials in the IKR maintained tight controls on refugee flows and tightened restrictions on Iraqi Arabs attempting to enter the region from other provinces of Iraq. The UN estimated the Syrian refugee population to be at 210,000 in December. However, the total Syrian refugee population in 2013 is estimated to possibly have reached as high as 225,000.

Iraq’s Higher Judicial Council reported an estimated 2,252 terrorism cases in 2013. Of those, 363 resulted in convictions, with the remainder dismissed. The Federal Court of Cassation reviewed 2,225 of the decisions. Arrests in Iraq are often used as a means to corral potential offenders, but the counterterrorism conviction rate does not correlate with the number of arrests.

In 2013, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation submitted more than 35 requests for information regarding a variety of counterterrorism investigations to the Ministry of Interior’s (MOI) Federal Intelligence and Investigations Agency (FIIA). FIIA’s responses have been sporadic; nevertheless, FIIA continued to articulate its need for counterterrorism investigative training and its intent to provide more comprehensive responses. A Statement of Intent was drafted and passed to FIIA which would structure and reinforce communication with FIIA, and at year’s end was awaiting approval from the MOI.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Since 2005, Iraq has been a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF), a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. Late in 2013, Iraq assumed the presidency of MENAFATF for a period of one year. In November 2012, MENAFATF adopted Iraq’s first-ever mutual evaluation to review compliance with international anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) standards. The report identified significant risks and Iraq agreed on an action plan to address its vulnerabilities. In September 2013, the Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) submitted an interim report to the MENAFATF Secretariat. Iraq also underwent a FATF Targeted Review, negotiating an action plan to address deficiencies in its AML/CFT regime. The international community, including the United States, provided subject matter expertise to assist Iraq.

In June, CBI Acting Governor Abdul Basit Turki replaced the previous director of the Iraqi financial intelligence unit (the Anti-Money Laundering Unit or AMLU). The AMLU is not independent of the CBI and suffers from lack of capacity and human and material resource constraints.


Iraq acceded to the Terrorist Financing Convention in November 2012. In March 2013, the Government of Iraq published in its official gazette the Arab Agreement to Combat Money Laundering
and Terrorism Finance, which the Government of Iraq previously signed in Cairo in December 2010. There was no formal mechanism in place to implement UNSCR 1267/1989 (al Qa’ida) sanctions and no mechanism at all to implement UNSCR 1373 (2001). Further, neither the CBI nor the AMLU has legal grounds to impose freezing of assets.

Iraq’s implementation of UNSCRs pertaining to CFT depends on the approval of the draft law by the Cabinet and the Parliament. The delay is due to a combination of lack of institutional capacity, political consensus, and a backlog of pressing political and economic reform issues. The Iraqi government had requested technical assistance to finalize the law by September 2015. The nationwide criminalization of terrorist financing in accordance with international standards and the establishment and implementation of appropriate procedures to freeze terrorist assets in line with international standards depend on the passage of the draft law.

The CBI and AMLU lack the institutional capacity to monitor money and value transfer services (MVTS) effectively. The Government of Iraq has imposed few penalties for non-compliance and issued no enforceable regulations regarding internal AML/CFT controls to the MVTS sector. The CBI and AMLU do not require such data collection because there is no provision in Iraqi law that requires the inclusion of the originator’s account number in all segments of wire transfers. It is unclear if banks and other financial institutions are monitoring for compliance regarding the inclusion of full originator and beneficiary information in wire transfers.

Iraq’s suspicious transaction report requirement is inadequate due to the delay and the threshold for reporting. While the Government of Iraq has required non-profit organizations (NPOs) to file suspicious transaction reports, which it has monitored and regulated, there has been no review of the adequacy of existing laws and regulations regarding exploitation or abuse of NPOs by terrorists or terrorist organizations. It is likely that the Government of Iraq lacks the institutional capacity and resources to enforce and prevent NPO exploitation by terrorist organizations.


**Regional and International Cooperation:** Iraq continued to engage with its neighbors through the Arab League. Iraqi Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) experts from the Ministry of Defense attended a “Train-the-Trainer” course on “Countering the Threat of Home-made Explosives.” The course was held at the NATO-accredited EOD Centre of Excellence in Slovakia in November 2013. This training was the first activity with Iraq funded under the NATO Science for Peace and Security Program.

Iraq hosted its first International Conference for Counterterrorism on November 27-28. Representatives from the UN Assistance Mission for Iraq, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Japan, and China attended.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** Various U.S. entities offered programs to the Government of Iraq during 2013 aimed at helping it counter radicalization to violence and violent extremism. The programs varied from those rooted in economic development to community engagement. The active members of the more than 5,000 alumni of U.S. government exchange programs in Iraq conducted a variety of community development programs targeting marginalized populations in Iraq.
Overview: Israel continued to be a committed counterterrorism partner in 2013. Israel again faced terrorist threats from Hamas, the Popular Resistance Committees, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), particularly from Gaza but also from the West Bank; and from Hizballah in Lebanon. According to Israeli government sources, six Israelis were killed as a result of terrorist attacks in 2013. Three individuals were stabbed, two were killed by sniper fire, and one was abducted and murdered.

Gaza-based Palestinian terrorist organizations continued rocket and mortar attacks into Israeli territory, and multiple terrorist attacks were launched along the Gaza security fence. Gaza also remained a base of operations for several Salafist splinter groups. 2013 saw the lowest number of rocket and mortar launchings on Israel from Gaza and the Sinai in more than a decade with 74 launchings compared to 2,557 in 2012. According to Israeli authorities, 36 rocket hits were identified in Israeli territory in 2013 compared to 1,632 in 2012. Of the 74 launchings on southern Israel, 69 were launched from Gaza and five from the Sinai Peninsula. Only 36 of the total launchings were identified as landing in Israeli territory – others either landed in Gaza territory or in the Mediterranean Sea.

The Government of Israel responded to these threats with operations directed at terrorist leaders, infrastructure, training facilities, and rocket launching sites. Arms smuggling from Iran through Egypt into Gaza to Palestinian terrorist organizations significantly decreased. Israeli officials continued to be concerned about the smuggling of weapons from Libya and via Sudan into Gaza.

Israeli experts noted that militants successfully smuggled long-range rockets from the Sinai Peninsula through tunnels into Gaza and subsequently began producing rockets in Gaza. However, these experts recognized the positive impact of increased Egyptian government efforts to fight smuggling through such tunnels in preventing weapons and dual-use materials from reaching Gaza.

Israeli counterterrorism officials said Gaza militants made significant quantitative and qualitative advances in capabilities in the five years since Operation Cast Lead (December 2008-January 2009). The Government of Israel continued to hold Hamas, as the dominant organization in effective control of Gaza, responsible for attacks emanating from Gaza, and Israeli officials pointed to these attacks as proof that Hamas has not abandoned terrorism.

Over the course of the year, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) discovered several tunnels from Gaza into Israeli territory. These tunnels are believed to have been designed to undertake kidnappings or attacks on Israeli border communities. The most intricate of these tunnels, a reinforced concrete structure over one mile long and up to 59 feet deep, was discovered in October and destroyed by the IDF a few weeks later.

Israeli security officials and politicians remained concerned about the terrorist threat posed to Israel from Hizballah and its Iranian patron, highlighting that Iran, primarily through the efforts of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF), continued to transfer arms to Hizballah. Also, Israeli officials were concerned about the proliferation of conventional and non-conventional weapons from Syria to terrorist organizations. According to the Government of Israel, Hizballah has stockpiled some 60-70,000 missiles in Lebanon since the 2006 Lebanon War, some of which are capable of striking anywhere in Israel, including population centers.
The Israel Security Agency (ISA, or “ShinBet”) reported a total of 1,271 of what it defined as terrorist attacks originating in the West Bank against Israeli citizens in 2013. Of these, 858 involved firebombs, but the attacks also included shootings, stabbings, grenade and IED incidents, and rock throwing. The ISA identified an additional 126 attacks in Jerusalem, 122 of which involved firebombs. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) and ISA continued to conduct operations in the West Bank, in part to maintain pressure on Palestinian terrorist organizations and their supporters. The improved capacity of Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF) also constrained those terrorist organizations' ability to carry out attacks.

In November, Israel and the United States held an interagency counterterrorism dialogue to discuss the broad range of threats in the region and to determine areas of collaboration to address these challenges.

In 2013, Israel engaged with the United States, Canada, the UK, Germany, and France on preventing possible terrorist attacks by foreign fighters (especially those fighting in Syria) once they return home.

### 2013 Terrorist Incidents:

Israel faced a variety of terrorist attacks and threats in 2013, including: rocket and mortar fire from Gaza; a bus bombing; attacks along the Gaza security fence; and limited rocket fire from Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula towards the southernmost city of Eilat, and from southern Lebanon into northern Israel. Rocket and mortar fire emanating from Gaza continued to be the most prevalent form of attack by Palestinian terrorist organizations, albeit at a significantly reduced rate from previous years.

Attacks included the following:

- On July 14, two masked gunmen in the Sinai fired across the border at IDF soldiers just west of the town of Nitzana. They then retreated from the border area and continued exchanging fire with Egyptian forces.
- In November, there were two politically-motivated stabbing attacks within the Green Line area, which the ISA characterized as terrorism. One Israeli soldier was stabbed to death in Afula (November 13), and a female soldier was slightly injured in Jaffa (November 22).
- On December 22, an abandoned bag left on the rear seat of a bus in a south Tel Aviv suburb Bat Yam exploded after a passenger alerted the driver, who parked the bus on the side of the street and evacuated the passengers from the vehicle, according to the Israeli military radio station. One policeman was slightly injured when the medium-sized explosive went off. Initial Israeli investigations indicated that it was an act of terrorism.
- During 2013, five rockets were launched from Sinai toward Israel according to data released by the ISA. Remnants of three of the rockets fired were located in areas surrounding Eilat and one rocket was intercepted by the Iron Dome missile defense system. The remaining rocket was not located in Israeli territory and may have landed in neighboring Aqaba, Jordan.

### Incidents along the Gaza Security Fence:

- In March, the IDF uncovered and defused three explosive devices adjacent to the Gaza security fence.
- On May 1, IDF soldiers came under fire near the security fence in the central Gaza; two armored vehicles were damaged.
- On June 1, an Israeli soldier was killed when a terrorist attempting to enter Israel from southern Gaza opened fire on IDF soldiers.
On October 23, an IDF officer was injured in an IED attack on the Gaza border. Israeli forces subsequently uncovered additional explosive devices near the security fence.

On October 31, five IDF soldiers were injured by an explosive device, which exploded in an attack tunnel leading from central Gaza into Israel while the soldiers were demolishing the tunnel.

On October 31, five IDF soldiers were injured while demolishing a tunnel leading from central Gaza into Israel. The tunnel contained an explosive device which exploded, injuring the soldiers.

On November 9, explosives in a tunnel on the Gaza border detonated during an operational activity by the IDF.

On November 10, an anti-tank missile was fired at an IDF patrol along the security fence in the northern Gaza, injuring four Israeli soldiers.

Explosive devices were also located near the Gaza border on two separate occasions in January, once in February, and once in September.

Incidents of Rocket Fire from Lebanon:

On August 22, four rockets were fired from southern Lebanon towards communities in northern Israel. One rocket was intercepted by the Iron Dome system, two rockets fell in Israeli territory in open areas without causing damage or injuries, and the remaining rocket did not reach Israeli territory. The IDF reported that global jihadists were responsible for the attack.

On December 29, at least five rockets were fired from southern Lebanon towards Israel. One rocket landed near the community of Kiryat Shmona on Israel’s northern border.

Hizballah-linked incidents:

Since the Bulgaria attacks in July, 2012, there have been no serious overseas incidents targeting Israelis or Israeli interests. However, in Nigeria, a case involving Hizballah planning against Western and Israeli targets underwent local investigation and led to a conviction on criminal charges.

In Azerbaijan, an October arrest of an Iranian, possibly Quds Force, was investigated by local Azerbaijan police before the suspect was released.

Previously reported cases of terrorist attacks or plots targeting Israeli interests and citizens abroad have advanced within legal systems in Bulgaria, Cyprus, India, and Thailand, and in many cases led to convictions and sentencing. See individual country reports for details regarding the investigations and legal proceedings about these cases.

Price Tag Attacks:

“Price tag” attacks (property crimes and violent acts by extremist Jewish individuals and groups in retaliation for activity they deemed to be anti-settlement) expanded into Israel from the West Bank in 2013. The Israeli government formed a new unit of the national police designated specifically to investigate these crimes in both Israel and the West Bank and in June the Security Cabinet authorized the Ministry of Defense to classify groups that perpetrated “price tag” attacks as “illegal associations,” which allowed security authorities greater leeway in collecting information on and seizing the property of groups, and of their members, that perpetrated “price tag” attacks. Incidents included:
In July, gravestones in a Christian Orthodox cemetery in Jaffa were vandalized with the words “revenge” and “price tag.” Price tag graffiti was also found on a residential building near the cemetery.

In August, the Beit Jamal Monastery near Jerusalem was firebombed and spray-painted with the words “death to the Gentiles” and other slogans.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Israel has a robust legal framework to combat terrorism and promote international legal assistance in the investigation and prosecution of terrorists.

On January 2, Israel's Security Cabinet updated its list of foreign terrorist organizations and individuals involved in terrorism in order to better align with the UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions lists. As part of this update, the Security Cabinet designated eight organizations as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs), repealed the terrorist designation of 23 other organizations, declared 119 foreign individuals to be terrorists, and canceled the terrorist designation of nine other individuals. The update was issued pursuant to Israel’s Prohibition of Terror Financing Law, 2005, which allows the Israeli Security Cabinet to declare a foreign association to be an FTO on the basis of a relevant determination by a foreign country or by the UNSC. This is the first terrorist designation process that has taken place since this law was amended to authorize the Security Cabinet to designate FTOs and individual terrorists solely on the basis of UNSCRs (prior to this, an Israeli examination of the evidence was also required).

In December, the Minister of Defense approved the designation of 16 Hamas-related entities, 12 individuals, and four institutions, all operating out of Europe on fundraising, radicalization, recruitment, or incitement. Other than compliance with UNSCR 1267/1989 (al-Qaeda) sanctions regime, this is the first time that Israel designated individuals.

On the law enforcement front, the ISA and Israel National Police (INP) continued to cooperate with U.S. law enforcement agencies on cases involving U.S. citizens killed in terrorist attacks, as well as other counterterrorism initiatives of mutual interest.

The Israeli Ministry of Interior maintains a voluntary biometric passport control system at Tel Aviv’s Ben Gurion International Airport, which is available for Israeli passport holders over the age of 18. The system facilitates both entry into and exit from Israel via an automatic kiosk for Israeli citizens who successfully pass a background check and provide a scan of the back of their hand. In July, Israel began issuing its new biometric passport via a voluntary pilot program and has been rolling out the initiative in stages to select geographic locations. The new passport has been available for residents of Tel Aviv since September 2013. Israel recently completed construction of a border fence along the length of its border with the Sinai Peninsula to stem the flow of illegal immigrants into Israel, but it has been augmented with cameras and sensors to reduce the threat of terrorism as well. Israel does not collect advance passenger name records on commercial flights.

Iranian and Belgian dual-national Ali Mansouri, 55, was arrested September 11 in Tel Aviv’s Ben Gurion Airport as he attempted to leave the country. The state prosecution charged him with espionage and aiding an enemy in war. According to the indictment, Mansouri had been recruited by Iranian intelligence services, visited Israel three times, and passed along to Iran information about starting a company in Israel, about security procedures at Ben Gurion International Airport such as security checks and the kinds of questions asked, as well as photographs of the airport, the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv, and a classified security installation.
On January 2, the military advocate general’s office filed an indictment with the West Bank Military Court against Ahmed Salah Ahmed Musa for his role as the alleged mastermind of the November 21, 2012 bombing of a bus in central Tel Aviv. The bomb exploded in a city bus on Shaul Hamelech Street in central Tel Aviv, near the headquarters of the Ministry of Defense, wounding 26 Israeli civilians. On October 22, 2013, Muhammad Asi, suspected as one of the planners of the bus bombing, was killed in an exchange of fire with Israeli security forces near the West Bank village of Bil’in when they attempted to capture him. On December 2, 2013, 19 year old Israeli Arab Muhammad Abed Al Jfar Nasser Mafarja pleaded guilty to planting the bomb on the bus and was convicted of attempted murder, attempting to assist the enemy, and assault. His sentencing is set for February 17, 2014. According to the ISA, the cell planned additional attacks against soldiers in various locations, including drive-by shootings.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Israel is a member of the Council of Europe's Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures (Moneyval), a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body. While the Ministry of Foreign Affairs says that Israel received high marks on its fourth round Moneyval evaluation in 2013, at year’s end that report was not available on the website for public consultations.

The Israeli financial intelligence unit, known as the Israeli Money Laundering and Terror Finance Prohibition Authority, is a member of the Egmont Group. Israel's counterterrorist finance regime continued to be enhanced through enforcement operations and the inclusion of new groups under national terrorist finance laws. The well-regulated Israeli banking industry worked to address suspected terrorist activity. Financing of Hamas through charitable organizations remained a concern for Israeli authorities, as did the funding of Hizbollah through charities and criminal organizations.


**Regional and International Cooperation:** Israel continued its counterterrorism cooperation with a range of regional and international institutions, including the UN, the OAS, and the OSCE. In 2013, Israel conducted strategic dialogues that included counterterrorism discussions with the United States, Canada, Russia, the UK, Germany, India, and Singapore. Israel also engaged on counterterrorism with the EU, France, Greece, Cyprus, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Nigeria, Kenya, Japan, Thailand, South Korea and Australia, and hosted a delegation of prosecutors from Kazakhstan. After changes to the Global Counterterrorism Forum’s (GCTF) procedures for non-member states’ participation, Israel took part in GCTF activities. Israel continued to cooperate with the OAS Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE) to assist Latin American states in counterterrorism efforts. Israel also deepened its cooperation with the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF). As a full member of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), Israel presented a proposal for hosting a seminar on legal aspects of counterterrorism. Israel also engaged with the EU on transportation and aviation security efforts and sought to deepen its counterterrorism cooperation with NATO.

**The West Bank and Gaza**

The Palestinian Authority (PA) continued its counterterrorism efforts in the West Bank. Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) remained present in the West Bank, although the improved capacity of PA Security Forces (PASF) significantly
constrained those organizations’ ability to carry out attacks. The PA exercised varying degrees of authority over the West Bank due to the IDF continuing presence in certain areas per Oslo-era agreements. The IDF and Israeli security service (ISA or “Shin Bet”) continued arresting members of terrorist organizations operating in the West Bank, including some who were reportedly planning to kidnap Israeli soldiers and civilians.

Gaza continued to be administered by Hamas. Hamas, PIJ, and other Gaza-based terrorist and militant groups launched attacks against Israel from Gaza. Hamas continued to consolidate its control over Gaza, eliminating or marginalizing potential rivals. Hamas and other armed groups in Gaza continued to smuggle weapons, cash, and other contraband into Gaza through an extensive network of tunnels from Egypt, although the Egyptian government severely curtailed smuggling from the Sinai in the second half of the year. Gaza remained a base of operations for several Salafist splinter groups, such as the Mujahideen Shura Council; and clan-based terrorist groups that engaged in or facilitated terrorist attacks.

Palestinian militants initiated attacks against Israelis inside the West Bank and Israel. In April, for the first time in the previous 18 months, an Israeli was killed in the West Bank when a Palestinian stabbed settler Evyatar Borovsky at Tapuach Junction, south of Nablus. Also in September, an Israeli soldier in Hebron City died from a bullet wound; the identity and nationality of the perpetrator are unknown. Additional incidents in the West Bank and Gaza included:

- In January, a Palestinian from Ramallah stabbed a 17-year-old Israeli at a hitchhiking post near Tapuach Junction (an Israeli settlement in the West Bank), who sustained light to moderate wounds.
- In April, Israeli settlers, suspected to be from Yitzhar settlement, vandalized and attempted to set fire to a mosque and staged multiple attacks against civilians in the Palestinian village of Urif in response to the killing of Israeli settlers at Tapuach Junction.
- In April, an Arab Jerusalemite was stabbed and critically injured in the Me’a Shearim section of West Jerusalem shortly after the murder of a settler at Tapuach Junction.
- In October, a Palestinian crashed a tractor through the perimeter fence of an Israeli military base in the village of al-Ram; the IDF shot and killed him.
- In October, per press reports, PA security forces in Hebron disrupted a cell attempting to construct a drone aimed at launching attacks on Israel.
- In November, Israeli security personnel killed three Salafist Jihadist militants leading a cell in the West Bank who reportedly took “inspiration” from al-Qa’ida, but were not affiliated with the group. According to press reports, PA security officials also detained a number of other suspects in the ring.
- Shin Bet reported a total of 918 of what it defined as terrorist attacks originating in the West Bank against Israeli citizens from January through November. Of these, 760 involved firebombs, but the attacks also included shootings, stabbings, grenade and improvised explosive device incidents, and rock throwing. Shin Bet further identified an additional 360 attacks in Jerusalem, 312 of which involved firebombs.
- In December, a Palestinian stabbed an Israeli policeman stationed at a traffic circle outside Ramallah.

Attacks by extremist Israeli settlers against Palestinian residents, property, and places of worship in the West Bank continued and were largely unprosecuted according to UN and NGO sources. The UN Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs reported 399 attacks by extremist Israeli settlers.
that resulted in Palestinian injuries or property damage. Violent extremists, including Israeli settlers, vandalized five mosques and three churches in Jerusalem and the West Bank, according to data compiled by the UN.

The United States continued to assist the PA's counterterrorism efforts through programs that continued to strengthen the capacity of the PASF, primarily through training, equipping, and the provision of infrastructure to PA personnel in the West Bank. U.S.-funded training of PASF primarily took place at the Jordan International Police Training Center, and the PASF’s Central Training Institute in Jericho. Concurrently, the United States continued to assist the larger PA criminal justice system to conduct more thorough investigations and prosecutions of terrorist related activity, and to ensure safe incarceration of those being held for trial or convicted of such crimes.

Israeli authorities, among others, have noted continuing improvements in the capacity and performance of PASF as a leading contributor to the improved security environment in the West Bank, and a dramatic reduction in terrorist incidents in and emanating from the West Bank over the past seven years. For example, in early October, PASF personnel conducted a large-scale crackdown in the restive Jenin refugee camp aimed at arresting PIJ members and criminal elements, including rogue members of the ruling Fatah party.

PA President Mahmoud Abbas consistently reiterated his commitment to nonviolence and recognition of the State of Israel. He continued to support a security program involving disarmament of fugitive militants, arresting members of terrorist organizations, and gradually dismantling armed groups in the West Bank. President Abbas’s Fatah party also continued efforts to end the division resulting from Hamas’s control of the Gaza. In February, Hamas permitted the Central Elections Commission to register voters in Gaza for national elections, a precursor for reconciliation. In May, Fatah and Hamas agreed on a timeline to form an interim Palestinian government and hold elections, but implementation stalled because of disagreements between the factions, and there have been no formal talks since then.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The PA continues to lack legislation that is specifically tailored to counterterrorism, although existing Palestinian laws criminalize actions that constitute terrorist acts. Presidential Decree No. 3 of 1998, titled “Enhancement of National Unity and Prohibition of Incitement,” prohibits incitement to violence, illegal associations, and acts against Palestine Liberation Organization agreements with other states (an indirect reference to the Oslo Accords with Israel). PA officials frequently enforce Presidential Decree No. 17 of 2007, which criminalizes armed militias and any assistance to such militias, as well as carrying unlicensed weapons and explosives. Presidential Decision No. 257 of 2007 bans “all Hamas militias” and states that any affiliation therewith will be punished in accordance with the laws and regulations in effect. The PA’s parliament, the Palestinian Legislative Council, has not met since 2007 due to the Hamas-Fatah rift, and is unable to pass new legislation.

The PA continued to detain terrorists in the West Bank, and PA authorities tried some detainees in civilian and military courts. Despite on-again, off-again factional reconciliation talks between Hamas and Fatah, PASF personnel continued to detain Hamas elements, operations often protested by Hamas officials. The PA continued to develop its civilian justice institutions (e.g., judiciary, police, prosecutors) to improve both investigative and prosecutorial functions. In partnership with international donors, the PA has made efforts to reduce case backlogs, improve warrant executions, and forensic services.
After 2007, many terrorism and security-related cases were processed through the Palestinian military (security) court system. Following numerous objections by civil society groups, the PA decided in 2011 to prosecute all cases involving civilian suspects in the civilian court system. In 2013, a committee formed by the PA drafted legislation to govern the military court system which, in part, confirms that its jurisdiction is limited to members of the security services. The draft legislation was completed in December 2013 and was awaiting submission to the Council of Ministers for consideration.

The key PA institution by mandate and law that works to prevent internal terrorist events and investigates security-related criminal conduct is the Preventive Security Organization (PSO). The PSO conducts investigations in coordination with public prosecutors, but this cooperation could be improved, especially the PSO’s ability to conduct criminal investigations and gather evidence usable in civil court. PA law enforcement units display mediocre command and control. PA security forces have a mixed although steadily improving record of accountability and respect for human rights. International donors, primarily the United States and the EU, continued to provide assistance to the PA to improve its capacity in this field. Since the PA committed to moving the prosecution of all civilian cases, including those involving terrorism and security-offenses, to the exclusive jurisdiction of the civilian courts, increased efforts are needed to: enhance cooperation between security service investigators and civilian prosecutors and improve the ability of the security forces to conduct investigations that produce evidence for use in civilian prosecutions; and strengthen the ability of selected civilian judges and prosecutors to deal with security-related cases.

Per the Oslo-era Accords, Israel controls border security in the West Bank.

The primary limitation on PA counterterrorism efforts in Gaza remained Hamas’ control of the area and the resulting inability of PASF to operate there. Limitations on PA counterterrorism efforts in the West Bank included restrictions on the movement and activities of PASF in and through areas of the West Bank for which the Israeli government retained responsibility for security under the terms of Oslo-era agreements.

The PA continued to lack modern forensic capability. The Canadian International Development Agency, through the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, announced a multi-year project to initiate forensic criminal capacity within Palestinian law enforcement and project activity commenced in late 2012. The project progressed slowly in 2013 in the areas of training, facilities development and the initiation of the equipment procurement process. Eight physicians were sent to Jordan for a four-year course of forensic training.

PA justice and security leaders continued to participate in regional conferences and meetings to combat terrorism. PASF personnel attended a variety of international training courses related to counterterrorism at training facilities in Jordan, Europe, and the United States.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** The PA is an observer to the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF), but in 2013 the Palestinian Monetary Authority postponed the submission of its membership application to that body. The PA continued to increase its capacity to combat illicit finance in 2013. The Palestinian financial intelligence unit, known as the Financial Follow up Unit (FFU), added staff and continued building its technical capacity, while conducting outreach to other parts of the PA. Presidential Decree No. 9 of 2007 and subsequent regulations issued in accordance with the law in 2009 established a regime for the prevention, investigation, and prosecution of money laundering. The banking sector in Gaza continued to repel
Hamas attempts to influence and tax the sector. The PA Interior and Awqaf and Religious Affairs Ministries monitored the charitable sector for signs of abuse by terrorist organizations.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** The PA has taken significant steps to ensure that official institutions in the West Bank that fall under its control do not create content that leads to incitement to violence. According to the PA’s Palestinian Broadcasting Company’s code of conduct, no programming is allowed that encourages “violence against any person or institution on the basis of race, religion, political beliefs, or sex.” The PA maintains control over the content of Friday sermons delivered in over 1800 West Bank mosques to ensure that they do not endorse incitement to violence. Weekly, the PA Minister of Awqaf and Religious Affairs distributes approved themes; the guidance is that no sermon can discuss politics or lead to incitement to violence. The PA’s ability to enforce these guidelines varies depending upon its location and it has limited authority to control the context of sermons in Israeli-controlled Area C. As part of a policy codified in 2003, the PA provided significant financial packages to Palestinian security prisoners released from Israeli prisons in 2013 in an effort to reintegrate them into society.

**JORDAN**

**Overview:** In 2013, Jordan remained a strong ally in combating terrorism and violent extremist ideology. Jordan’s geographic location renders it susceptible to a variety of regional threats, while also making it a natural regional leader in confronting them. During 2013, the radicalization of segments within the Syrian opposition further entrenched terrorism as a top concern for Jordanian security services. Jordan continued to provide diplomatic and political support to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, in addition to its support for a political resolution to the Syrian conflict. Jordan also continued to assist Palestinian Authority law enforcement institutions through training at the Jordan International Police Training Center, where both advanced-level and refresher courses were offered to Palestinian security services, in addition to basic-level courses.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** The State Security Court (SSC) is the primary legal apparatus for prosecuting terrorist suspects, although its role continued to be an issue of parliamentary and public debate during 2013. The SSC oversees the prosecution of civilians charged with crimes considered to touch on national security. Civil society organizations have criticized the SSC’s jurisdiction as too broad and its procedures as opaque.

In December, the Parliament amended the SSC Law to conform to 2011 Constitutional Amendments. The amendment would restrict the SSC’s jurisdiction to try civilians for crimes pertaining only to terrorism, treason, espionage, drugs, and counterfeiting. However, Article 149 of the penal code defines the term “terrorism” in part as “undermining the political system.” This language infers that the SSC can prosecute cases of political expression or other acts typically considered outside the realm of terrorism. The bill was still being debated at year’s end.

Jordan has advanced capabilities to proactively detect, deter, and prevent acts of terrorism within its territory. Comprehensive training programs, detailed planning, and recurring surveys of key facilities have enabled Jordan to engineer a coordinated national response to crises. The General Intelligence Directorate (GID) has legislative authority to investigate acts of terrorism. The Public Security Directorate (PSD) has authority over non-terrorism-related crimes, but frequently supports GID counterterrorism activities through the PSD Special Branch, the intelligence branch of PSD. The GID also occasionally coordinates with the Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) and its intelligence branch, particularly on cases involving border security, which the JAF oversees. The division of authority is
clear, and the different agencies communicate and coordinate effectively during emergencies. Prosecutors typically are not consulted until the back end of investigations, when terrorism cases are referred to the SSC.

Jordan remained committed to securing its borders and denying safe haven to terrorists. Jordan continued to develop its border security infrastructure, largely through the Jordan Border Security Program (JBSP), which began in 2009. JBSP consists of a sophisticated package of sensors to help improve situational awareness along the border and prevent infiltrations into Jordan or unauthorized departures. Phase 1B neared completion at the end of 2013.

During 2013, Jordanian authorities took legal action against individuals deemed to be terrorists under local law. The following legal procedures took place in 2013:

- In September, the SSC sentenced five Jordanians to five years in prison for attempting to join al-Nusrah Front. Jordanian border guards originally arrested the men in February 2012 when they were trying to cross the Syrian border carrying AK-47 assault rifles.
- In November, the longtime terrorist Raed Hijazi was detained by Jordanian authorities. Hijazi, a U.S.-Jordanian national, was jailed from 2001 to 2011 for his role in al-Qa’ida’s planned Millennium attacks in Jordan. Authorities did not make public the reasons for Hijazi’s most recent detention.
- In November, authorities charged 15 university students from Al-Balqa University with carrying out “terrorist acts” following a tribal fight on campus that resulted in five injuries. The students were subsequently released, although it is unclear whether the charges were dropped or changed.
- In December, the public trial began of Abu Qatada, a radical Muslim cleric who was deported from the UK in July 2013. The SSC previously convicted Qatada in absentia for his involvement in conspiring to carry out acts of terrorism in 1998 and another foiled attempt in 2000 against Western and Israeli targets during Millennium celebrations.
- Throughout the year, the State Security Court moved swiftly to detain, and in some cases, charge individuals who illegally entered Syria with the intention of joining the armed opposition. Individuals illegally entering Syria were charged with either the misdemeanor of illegal border entry or a major felony of illegal border crossing with the intent to destabilize regional security.

On October 1, the Government of Jordan signed a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty with the United States.

Jordan is a key participant in the State Department’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program. Close to 1,000 Jordanians participated in the ATA program in 2013; key areas of focus included strengthening law enforcement investigative capacity and border security capacity, and institutionalizing counterterrorism law enforcement capacities in Jordan’s own training programs.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Jordan is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force, a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body; its financial intelligence unit has been a part of the Egmont Group since 2012. The country’s anti-money laundering/counterterrorist finance framework has been significantly strengthened in the last several years. While Jordan’s Anti-Money Laundering Law does not oblige non-profit organizations to file suspicious transaction reports, the country has reportedly monitored charitable contributions to ensure
they are not being diverted to fund terrorists. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

Regional and International Cooperation: Jordan is a founding member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum, and is also a member of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and the Arab League.

Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism: Jordan has sought to confront and weaken the violent ideology that underpins al-Qa’ida and other violent extremist organizations. Jordanian prisons have a religiously based de-radicalization program that seeks to re-engage violent extremist inmates into the peaceful mainstream of their faith. Based upon the individual needs of the inmate, this program can include basic literacy classes, employment counseling, and theological instruction.

The Royal Aal al-Bayt Institute for Thought, under the patronage of Prince Ghazi bin Mohammad, promotes religious tolerance and coexistence. Building upon the foundations of the 2005 Amman Message, this institute continued its sponsorship of a series of ecumenical events promoting interfaith dialogue. Jordanian officials, including King Abdullah II, strongly condemned extremist violence and the ideology that promotes it.

Jordan hosted events geared toward rejecting terrorism and sectarianism. In November, Islamist leaders, researchers, academics, and politicians participated in a two-day event titled “Political Islam Movements” which stressed the need to create a democratic atmosphere to achieve political reforms, justice, and development in the Arab world. Prince Ghazi also convened two conferences in Jordan this year highlighting challenges facing Arab Christians and the importance of religious tolerance.

KUWAIT

Overview: Kuwait is an important non-NATO ally located in the critical Gulf region and a valued partner in promoting policies that strengthen regional security and stability. While Kuwait passed comprehensive anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) legislation in 2013, there were also increased reports of Kuwait-based private individuals funneling charitable donations and other funds to violent extremist groups outside the country, particularly to Syria.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Prior to the May 26, 2013, passage of Kuwait Law 106/2013, the Government of Kuwait lacked a clear legal framework for prosecuting terrorism-related crimes, often having to resort to other legal statutes to try suspected terrorists, which hampered enforcement efforts. The 2013 law includes a definition of terrorism, which may provide better legal grounds for prosecuting all terrorism-related crimes.

Some specialized law enforcement units have the capacity for investigations and crisis response, but multiple agencies have jurisdiction, and inadequate legislation made prosecution of terrorism-related offenses a challenge.

Following the 2012 application of a biometric fingerprinting system to include all land and sea entry points, the government began the third phase of an integrated border security system that will link to law enforcement databases.
On May 6, Kuwait’s Court of Cassation upheld the life sentences given to four defendants (two Iranians, a Kuwaiti, and a stateless man) convicted of belonging to an Iranian espionage cell. The cell’s seven members (four Iranians, a Kuwaiti, a Syrian, and a stateless man) were apprehended in May 2010 on charges of espionage, terrorist plotting, and vandalism. The rulings of the Court of Cassation are final.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Kuwait is a member of the Middle East North Africa Financial Action Task Force, a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. Kuwait Law 106/2013 was drafted in consultation with the International Monetary Fund to address the FATF recommendations. Law 106/2013 provides new mandates and powers to the government including the criminalization of the financing of terrorism, the requirement to report suspected terrorist financing, and the ability to freeze terrorist assets without delay. In October, FATF noted that Kuwait had made progress but called for the country to continue its effort to establish and implement adequate procedures to identify and freeze terrorist assets, ensure its financial intelligence unit (FIU) is effective, and ensure that institutions file suspicious transaction reports to the FIU. At year’s end, Kuwait was still operationalizing its FIU; the first chairman of the FIU was named in December. In preparation, Kuwaiti financial and designated non-financial institutions were reportedly upgrading their systems and processes and preparing to train their personnel to implement the new law.

The law also includes an article that calls for the implementation of UNSCRs 1267/1989 and 1373 (2001) and their successor resolutions with respect to freezing terrorist assets, although this has not yet been implemented.

In 2013, however, there were increased reports of Kuwait-based private individuals funneling charitable donations and other funds to violent extremist groups outside the country, particularly to Syria. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor is responsible for monitoring and supervising government-authorized charities, including enforcing the ban on cash donations except during Ramadan; implementing an enhanced receipt system for Ramadan cash donations; and coordinating closely with the Ministry of Islamic Affairs to monitor and prosecute fraudulent charitable operators.


**Regional and International Cooperation:** As in previous years, the Kuwaiti Armed Forces, National Guard, and Ministry of Interior conducted a number of exercises aimed at responding to terrorist attacks, including joint exercises with regional and international partners.

Kuwait also cooperated regionally and internationally on counterterrorism issues. Kuwait is a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and holds the rotating GCC presidency for 2014. Kuwaiti officials issued statements encouraging enhanced cooperation among GCC and Arab League states on counterterrorism issues, including following the U.S.-GCC Strategic Cooperation Forum in New York in September 2013.

Throughout the year, Kuwaiti security professionals regularly participated in joint training programs around the world. In addition to Kuwait’s bilateral cooperation with the United States, Kuwaiti officials also worked with other international counterparts to conduct missions and exchange information.
Overview: Lebanon’s security situation deteriorated in 2013 as a result of the spillover from the violence in Syria, the involvement of Lebanese fighters in the conflict (including Hizballah, which openly backed the Asad regime, as well as Sunni individuals and groups supporting various opposition forces), and continuing internal political deadlock that prevented formation of a new Lebanese government that is fully empowered to respond to these challenges. Prime Minister Najib Mikati resigned on March 22 amidst political disagreements over the leadership of the Internal Security Forces (ISF) and timing of parliamentary elections. The Lebanese caretaker government is headed by a centrist caretaker Prime Minister, but the cabinet remains dominated by the Hizballah and pro-Syrian regime-aligned March 8 coalition. PM Mikati and his cabinet remained in caretaker status following the resignation while Prime Minister-Designate Tammam Salam tried to form a new government. Although the Lebanese Parliament extended its term for 17 months in May, Parliament did not reconvene for the remainder of the year due to a boycott by various political parties. Although various branches of the Lebanese state, including the Central Bank, ISF and Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), continued to cooperate with international partners in combating terrorism, the political stalemate in Beirut has hindered progress on many fronts such as rigorous prosecution of long-standing and new terrorism-related cases.

The challenges emanating from the Syrian spillover include issues dealing with border security, internal stability, and terrorism. Lebanese towns and villages near the border with Syria regularly experienced shelling from Syria – both by the Syrian regime and Syrian opposition forces – because of regime allegations that opposition fighters use Sunni-dominated areas as safe havens and opposition allegations that Hizballah uses Shia-dominated areas to enter Syria or launch attacks. Lebanon, a country of approximately four million, now hosts nearly a million refugees from Syria. Lebanese authorities are challenged not only by the significant burden the refugees place on its financial and natural resources, but also by concerns over potential terrorists hiding within the refugee population who may perpetrate violent acts in both Lebanon and Syria.

Although Hizballah, with considerable support from Iran and Lebanon’s Shia population, remains the most capable and prominent terrorist group in Lebanon, radical Sunni groups based in Syria but operating in Lebanon constitute a visible and growing terrorist threat. Al-Nusrah Front announced in December its presence in Lebanon and al-Qa’ida in Iraq/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant has threatened to enter Lebanon because of Hizballah’s involvement in the Syrian conflict. At the same time, other groups, including Hamas, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine General Command (PFLP-GC), Asbat al-Ansar, Fatah al-Islam, Fatah al-Intifada, Jund al-Sham, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Abdullah Azzam Brigades, and several other splinter groups, continued to operate within Lebanon's borders, although primarily out of Lebanon’s 12 Palestinian refugee camps. The LAF did not maintain a daily presence in the camps, but it conducted operations and patrols near the camps and across Lebanon to counter terrorist threats, including attempts to launch rockets against Israel from south Lebanon. In November, the UN Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL) reported that there has been no progress in efforts to dismantle military bases maintained by the PFLP-GC and Fatah al-Intifada, which are primarily located along the Lebanese-Syrian border.

Despite Lebanon’s official disassociation policy regarding the Syrian conflict, Hizballah dramatically increased its military role in support of the Syrian regime in 2013, including openly participating in major armed offensives against Syrian opposition forces, which exacerbated the already tenuous
security situation inside Lebanon. Various radical Sunni groups and individuals from Lebanon actively participated in the Syrian conflict as well. Hizballah and its Sunni extremist rivals had largely kept their fighting limited to Syria, but Lebanon was increasingly affected by spillover violence originating from Syria.

2013 Terrorist Incidents: Attacks conducted in Lebanon included:

- On January 18, a convoy carrying the Lebanese Minister for Youth and Sports, Faisal Karame, was attacked in Tripoli, wounding five. Tripoli continued to suffer from armed clashes between the pro-Syrian Alawite community of Jabal Mohsen and various Sunni groups in Bab al-Tabanneh throughout 2013. In March at least six people were killed during such clashes, and a weeklong round of violence commenced on May 19, killing at least 36 and injuring over 200.
- On May 26, following a speech by Hizballah Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah announcing Hizballah’s military role in support of the Syrian regime, the Shia-dominated areas of south Beirut were hit by rockets.
- On May 28, in the northern Bekaa Valley town of Arsal, unknown assailants killed three soldiers at a LAF checkpoint. On June 23, followers of Sunni extremist preacher Sheikh Ahmed al-Asir killed two soldiers at a checkpoint in the southern city of Sidon. The LAF responded to the Sidon attacks by conducting a military operation against al-Asir and his followers, during which at least 17 soldiers and over 20 armed al-Asir supporters died. Al-Asir escaped and was hiding in an undisclosed location at year’s end.
- On July 9, a car bomb exploded in Bir al-Abed, a predominantly Shia neighborhood in the southern suburbs of Beirut, wounding at least 53. On August 1, two rockets also landed near the Presidential Palace.
- On August 9, two Turkish Airlines pilots were kidnapped near Beirut International Airport, reportedly by relatives of Lebanese Shia who were held for several months by groups in Syria allied with the Syrian opposition. The Lebanese citizens and Turkish pilots were released on October 19.
- On August 15, a car bomb targeted Rouweiss, another Shia neighborhood in the southern suburbs of Beirut, killing at least 24 and wounding over 200.
- On August 22, two car bombs hit two different Sunni mosques in Tripoli, killing over 40 and wounding several hundred.
- Also on August 22, four rockets were fired towards Israel from the outskirts of the southern Lebanese city of Tyre, at least three of which landed inside Israeli territory. Although the Abdullah Azzam Brigades later claimed responsibility for these rockets, Israel responded on August 23 by striking sites reportedly belonging to PFLP-GC near the city of Sidon.
- On November 19, two suicide bombers from the southern city of Sidon attacked the Iranian Embassy, located in the Shia neighborhood of Bir Hassan in the southern suburbs of Beirut. Abdallah Azzam Brigades took responsibility for this attack that killed at least 25, including an Iranian diplomat and four guards, and wounded several dozen.
- On December 25, a car bomb exploded in the Ein al-Hilweh Palestinian refugee camp. The blast reportedly targeted a supporter of Sheikh Ahmed al-Asir, but it resulted only in material damage to the car and surrounding area.
- On December 27, Mohammad Chatah, former ambassador to the United States and advisor to former Prime Minister Saad Hariri, was assassinated in downtown Beirut using a remote-controlled car bomb. At least seven other individuals were killed by the bomb blast.
Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Several articles of Lebanon’s criminal code deal with terrorism, but their implementation has at times been hindered by Lebanon’s complex political and confessional system, and also at times by Hizballah restricting access to attack sites that were within areas under its control. By definition, the caretaker government’s legislative power is circumscribed, but the fully empowered cabinet before PM Mikati’s March resignation did not consider legislative initiatives that could potentially threaten Hizballah’s operations, as Hizballah and its allies were members of the cabinet.

Neither the caretaker cabinet nor the parliament considered counterterrorism initiatives in response to the EU’s July terrorist designation of Hizballah’s military wing.

The LAF and ISF remain functional in combating terrorism, but they would benefit from stronger political support from state institutions, including a fully functional cabinet and parliament.

Several agencies focus on combating terrorism, including the LAF, ISF, and the Directorate of General Security (DGS). Lebanon has been a participant in the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program since 2006, and this assistance focused on border security as well as building law enforcement’s investigative and leadership capabilities. Lebanon has also been working with Department of State’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) to improve the capabilities of the ISF through a multi-year program.

Lebanon has a Megaports and Container Security Initiative program, and it participated in Export Control and Related Border Security programs. Through INL and the Criminal Justice Information Service (CJIS), a biometric assessment will be conducted for the ISF. The LAF also partnered with several friendly nations on a bilateral basis to conduct training programs that focused on strengthening its counterterrorism capabilities.

Lebanon did not have biometric systems in place at the official points of entry into the country. Lebanese passports were machine readable, and the government was considering the adoption of biometric passports. The DGS, under the Ministry of Interior (MOI), controls immigration and passport services, and it uses an electronic database to collect biographic data for travelers at all points of entry. The Lebanese government maintained bilateral agreements for information sharing with Syria.

Although the case against Michel Samaha, a former Lebanese Minister of Information arrested on terrorism charges in 2012, made some progress, a Lebanese court in June postponed trial proceedings until December. On February 4, Lebanese authorities also issued an arrest warrant for General Ali Mamlouk, the head of the Syrian National Security Bureau, due to his ties to the Samaha case.

On October 14, the State Commissioner to the Military Court announced the indictment of seven suspects alleged to have been involved in the August 22 Tripoli bombings, at least three of whom had been arrested.

Lebanese authorities maintained that amnesty for Lebanese involved in acts of violence during the 1975-90 civil wars prevented terrorism prosecutions of concern to the United States.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Lebanon is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force, a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body. Lebanon’s Central
Bank, the Banque du Liban, issued circulars to improve its anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime:

- Basic Circular No. 128 dated January 12, 2013 – and amended by intermediate Circular No. 338 dated September 23, 2013, requested that banks establish an AML/CFT Compliance Unit
- Intermediate Circular No. 325 dated June 6, 2013, regulated electronic funds transfers
- Intermediate Circular No. 337 dated September 20, 2013, regulated cash transfers in the hawala system.

From January 2013 to November 20, 2013, the ISF prepared files on three suspected cases of terrorism and was in the process of investigating each of these cases at year’s end. The Special Investigation Commission (SIC), Lebanon’s financial intelligence unit, is an independent legal entity empowered to investigate suspicious financial transactions and freeze assets. The SIC is a member of the Egmont Group, and reported that there were no allegations of terrorist financing in 2013, and that no related accounts were found and frozen in Lebanon’s banking sector.

Hizballah continued to use its Lebanese connections to further its agenda. Lebanese nationals in Latin America and Africa continued to provide financial support to Hizballah, including through the laundering of criminal proceeds using Lebanese financial institutions. In June, the Lebanese Canadian Bank paid a fine of US $102 million to U.S. regulators for laundering drug profits that also benefitted Hizballah. Requests for designation or asset freezes regarding Hizballah and affiliated groups are sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but the Lebanese government does not require banks to freeze these assets, because it does not consider Hizballah a terrorist organization.

Only NGOs are subject to enhanced due diligence from the banking sector, which reports suspicious transactions to the SIC. Monitoring the finances and management of all registered NGOs is the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior, but it was inconsistent in applying these controls. The deficiency could be attributable to an absence of laws, lack of political will to effectively prosecute cases, corruption, and lack of training for effective CFT law enforcement.


Regional and International Cooperation: Lebanon continued to voice its commitment to fulfilling relevant UNSCRs, including 1559 (2004), 1680 (2006), and 1701 (2006). The Special Tribunal for Lebanon, an international body investigating the 2005 assassination of PM Rafiq Hariri, received Lebanon’s annual contribution of approximately US $40 million on December 30. Lebanon is a member of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.

LIBYA

Overview: Libya is a willing partner in the fight against international terrorism, but the country continued to lack a coherent national security bureaucracy to develop a comprehensive counterterrorism plan and functional and capable national security forces to implement it. Numerous factors contributed to Libya proving a permissive environment for terrorists: a central government with weak institutions and only tenuous control over its expansive territory; the ubiquity of uncontrolled weapons and ammunition; porous and inaccessible borders; heavily armed militias and tribes with
varying loyalties and agendas; high unemployment among young males along with slow-moving economic improvement; divisions between the country’s regions, towns, and tribes; political paralysis due to infighting and distrust among and between Libya’s political actors; and the absence of a functioning police force or national army. The central government and municipalities have largely failed to provide services to their constituencies, thereby providing fertile soil to terrorist organizations, such as Ansar al-Shari’a (AAS) Benghazi and AAS Darnah, to fill that void and recruit. This confluence of factors has allowed violent extremist elements to use platforms in Libya to conduct short-term training for Libyan and third-country recruits en route to terrorist attack destinations in the region and to Syria. Libya-based violent extremists continued to supply arms throughout the region and to fighters in Syria. Regional terrorist organizations exploited the vulnerabilities of the relatively isolated and ungoverned border regions to the south and west to launch the In Amenas attack in Algeria in January.

Although the government is making efforts and cooperates with the international community to improve its counterterrorism capabilities, progress has been hampered by a lack of trust among stakeholders, in particular between the central government, the General National Congress (GNC), militia groups, and civil society. The only notable initiatives to curb or prevent terrorist activities were the deployment of militia notionally under government control to secure Tripoli – which itself created complications due to the separate agendas and varying degrees of professionalism of those forces; the dispatch of a security coordinator and Special Forces (Sai’qa) to try to evict AAS from Benghazi; efforts to destroy the country’s declared stockpile of chemical weapons; a declaration of intent to increase cooperation in law enforcement investigations and fulfill international crime-fighting obligations; a request to the United States and other international partners to train a General Purpose Force; and the stated ambition to build or improve a domestic intelligence service, the diplomatic police, and law enforcement, in general.

2013 Terrorist Incidents: The list of incidents below highlights terrorist attacks by violent extremist groups acting against U.S., Western, and Libyan government facilities and interests. It is not exhaustive and excludes many incidents in an ongoing campaign of bombings and assassinations – committed at least in part by AAS Darnah and AAS Benghazi – of dozens of security forces, government officials, and civilians, and peaking during the Ramadan and Eid al-Fitr holidays. Most of those attacks have gone without claims of responsibility, although the attacks below were all presumably launched by violent extremists. The goals of these attacks appear to be undermining the fragile democratic transition and spreading fear.

- On January 12, the vehicle of the Italian Consul General was attacked in Benghazi, purportedly by terrorists that had a role in the 2012 attacks against U.S. facilities in Benghazi. No one was injured.
- On March 14 and 28, assaults on Christian Coptic Churches in Benghazi and damage to a major Sufi shrine followed an explosion in the Tajoura neighborhood near Tripoli. There were no injuries or casualties.
- On April 23, a car bomb rumored to be in retaliation for the French military mission in Mali, detonated in front of the French Embassy before working hours, injuring two people, and significantly damaging the Embassy.
- On July 23, an improvised mortar hit a high-rise apartment building located between the Corinthia Hotel, which houses the Prime Minister, Western businessmen, the Qatari Embassy, and Tripoli Towers – home to the British, Canadian, and Maltese Embassies – as well as western companies. There were no injuries or casualties.
On July 30, a bomb attached to an Italian embassy car detonated near the Italian embassy, destroying the vehicle. No one was injured.

On August 17, unidentified masked assailants threw a small briefcase bomb toward the Egyptian Consulate General in the Fuwaihat District of Benghazi. One Egyptian security guard sustained minor injuries as the explosion damaged the front of the consulate, neighboring buildings, and nearby automobiles.

On October 11, in Benghazi, a car bomb caused severe damage to the building housing the joint honorary consulates of Finland and Sweden, private commercial offices, and a number of apartments. There were no injuries or casualties.

On October 15, 26, and 28, as well as November 3, large bombs exploded outside of a municipal office, a wedding hall, a hospital, and café in Benghazi, but caused no casualties.

On November 27, an explosion triggered presumably by violent extremists, targeted the shrine of Murad Agha in the area of Tajoura and caused serious damage, but no injuries.

On December 5, an American teacher was assassinated in Benghazi by gunmen who remained at large at year’s end.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Libya continued to work on establishing a functioning framework of laws in all areas of governance, but does not have a comprehensive counterterrorism law. However, Title 2, Section 1, Chapter 1, Article 170 and Title 2, Chapter 2, Article 207 of the Libyan penal code provides for crimes or offenses prejudicial to state security, and for felonies to the state including terrorism, the promotion of terrorist acts, and the handling of money in support of such acts. Libya has ratified the Organization of African Unity’s Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, which requires states to criminalize terrorist acts under their national laws. In 2013, the GNC adopted two laws (Nos. 27 and 53) as part of a security plan to disband all non-state militia groups, including through their integration as individual members into the State’s official institutions. Implementation continues to prove challenging, although some progress has been made, in particular in Tripoli. The Libyan interim parliament also passed a Transitional Justice Law late in the year, which will provide some means to address grievances underlying groups opposing the State.

Libyan law enforcement personnel demonstrated a limited capacity to detect, deter, and respond to terrorist incidents. Law enforcement agencies and officers do not have adequate training – particularly in the area of collecting and managing evidence, do not have delineated roles, lack coordination, and are fearful of retribution. Prosecution of terrorism-related crimes was nearly non-existent, with poorly-trained prosecutors and judges often afraid to pursue cases. Although the government has successfully assumed control over a large number of previously militia-controlled prisons, several remain outside of the government’s aegis.

The Libyan government is increasingly seeking to take advantage of training opportunities and other assistance offered by the international community to improve its counterterrorism capabilities, although that assistance is only slowly having an impact on the performance of the country’s security institutions, in part due to absorptive capacity challenges across Libya’s security institutions. Government forces acted in a concerted manner as the bombing and assassination campaign became a chronic feature of life in Benghazi, with additional Special Forces deployed to establish security and combat violent extremist elements theretofore operating with few constraints. Results of the deployment of the additional forces was mixed, however, and violence in Benghazi continued.
Libya’s vast territory and thousands of miles of uncontrolled desert border continued to present a massive security challenge for the government. Border security at Libya’s airports is minimal, with no collection of passenger name records, biometric screenings, or thorough travel document screening, and only limited biographic screening or use of terrorist watchlists. At land crossings, border security is normally either provided by poorly trained, underpaid, and ill-equipped government border guards or by local brigades or tribes with tenuous loyalties to the State and often themselves involved in illicit cross-border trade. As a result, there are considerable illicit flows of goods, people, and weapons across Libya’s porous borders, as evinced by the many refugees sailing from the shores of Libya, by foreign fighters coming to train in Libya, and by the vast number of illicit weapons transiting Libya for the Maghreb, Sahel, and places beyond.

In fulfillment of plans developed at the February 2013 Paris ministerial meeting, Libya has been striving to improve its border management capabilities, notably by working with the EU Border Assistance Mission to Libya that was established during the year, and through cooperation with other partners, including the United States. Progress has been slow, however, as weak national institutions have struggled to absorb this assistance. The Libyan authorities have intensified regional cooperation with their neighbors, especially Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, to exert better control over shared borders. They have agreed on joint checkpoints, coordinated border patrols, increased information exchanges about movements in the border zones, and regular meetings for security staff. Libya has also agreed to set up a joint border security training center in Libya with an eye to promoting regional cooperation in North Africa and the Sahel region, boosting security, and tackling organized crime, smuggling, and illegal migration. Libya has actively participated in regional ministerial dialogue on border security, the latest in Rabat in November, and endorsed its objectives and plans for strengthening practical cooperation, and has sought opportunities to enhance regional links and build the capacity of its officials and institutions.

Despite its limited capacity, Libya is cooperating in the investigation of terrorist attacks against U.S. citizens and interests and its political leadership has repeatedly pledged to do everything possible to arrest and bring perpetrators to justice. The Libyan government is cooperating with the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation’s probe and conducting its own investigation into the September 2012 killing of Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens and three other Americans at U.S. government facilities in Benghazi. The Ministry of Interior also opened an investigation into the December 5 murder of Ronald Thomas Smith II, an American teacher working at an international school in Benghazi; the gunmen who carried out the killing remain at large.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Libya is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force and has committed to the implementation of a national identification database to improve transparency in government salary and programs. Libya has asked for IMF technical assistance for its anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime. Since the fall of the Qadhafi regime, there has been little reliable data on Libya’s AML/CFT efforts. In 2013, Libya did not pass new legislation or add significant new tools to prevent terrorist financing.

Libya’s Central Bank has established a Financial Information Unit (FIU) as an independent body directly reporting to the Central Bank Governor. Additionally, Libya has had discussions with international donors to provide technical assistance to the FIU and other government entities in combating money laundering, terrorist financing, and other financial crimes; and reorganizing law enforcement and financial entities to help better detect, investigate, and prosecute complex international financial crimes. Libya is also looking to become a member in the Egmont Group’s
network of FIUs that are supporting governments in the fight against money laundering, terrorism financing, and other financial crimes. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

Regional and International Cooperation: Libya has shown considerable engagement in regional and international counterterrorism fora, participating in a Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) and UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) conference on regional cooperation in criminal matters related to terrorism in the Maghreb and the Sahel, and a GCTF Sahel Working Group meeting to discuss international crime, arms trafficking, and terrorism. Libya has also supported counterterrorism initiatives by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the AU, the AU’s African Center for Studies and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), and the UN General Assembly, where then-Libyan Prime Minister Ali Zeidan reiterated the government’s commitment to work with the international community to address weaknesses in the security and justice sectors and expressed support for the completion of a comprehensive UN convention on terrorism. Meanwhile, Libya has welcomed international efforts to build counterterrorist capacity, in particular following the In Amenas attacks staged from its territory. Libya’s neighbors have reported difficulty in addressing security and counterterrorism issues with the Libyan government, principally due to an inability to identify reliable and sustainable avenues for cooperation.

Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism: Although Libya does not yet have a comprehensive strategy for countering violent extremism, then-Prime Minister Zeidan publicly criticized violent extremist ideology, and the Ministries of Culture and Youth and Sports have launched ad campaigns against violent extremism. The Ministry of Interior and the Warriors Affairs Commission also launched educational and mental health campaigns to assist in the reintegration of former revolutionaries into society and the State, thus providing an alternative to violent extremist ideology. Libya has also been working with the ACSRT in developing strategies for preventing and countering terrorism, and has participated in an ASCRT and UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute regional workshop on the rehabilitation of violent extremist offenders.

Libya’s population is predominantly Muslim, and the society is deeply religiously conservative. Most religious leaders have repeatedly and strongly advocated for a “moderate” Islam to counter the rise of violent extremism, and have publicly denounced violence and criminal groups.

MOROCCO

Overview: Morocco has a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy that includes vigilant security measures, regional and international cooperation, and counter-radicalization policies. In 2013, Morocco’s counterterrorism efforts effectively mitigated the risk of attack, although the country continued to face threats, largely from numerous small, independent violent extremist cells. Those groups and individuals, referred to collectively as adherents of the so-called Salafiyya Jihadiyya ideology, remained isolated from one another, small in size, and limited in both capabilities and international connections. Morocco and the United States continued robust counterterrorism collaboration, and both countries committed to deepening that relationship during the November visit by King Mohammed VI to Washington, DC.

During the year, authorities disrupted multiple groups with ties to international networks that included al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). AQIM continued its efforts to recruit Moroccans for combat in other countries, calling for attacks against the Moroccan monarchy and against French and
U.S. interests in Morocco and the region. There were reports of Moroccans attempting to join AQIM and other violent extremists in Mali and Syria, and the government was concerned about the return of those individuals to Morocco. The government was also concerned about veteran Moroccan violent extremists returning from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya to conduct terrorist attacks at home, and about Moroccans radicalized during their stays in Western Europe.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** The government views counterterrorism as a top policy priority. The country experienced suicide attacks in Casablanca in 2003 and 2007 and in Marrakech in 2011. Additionally, Moroccan nationals were implicated in the 2004 attacks in Madrid. The government continued to enforce the 2003 counterterrorism law, which supplements the criminal code. That law defines terrorism broadly to include incitement to terrorism, but does not penalize participation in terrorist training, communication with a terrorist group, or intimidation of foreign governments and populations. The law also sets strict penalties for active participation in terrorism. The 2003 counterterrorism law and the criminal code were used in several convictions in terrorism-related cases. The government has publicly committed itself not to use the struggle against terrorism to deprive individuals of their rights. It has emphasized adherence to human rights standards and the increased transparency of law enforcement procedures as part of its approach.

Morocco aggressively targeted and effectively dismantled terrorist cells within the country by leveraging intelligence collection, police work, and collaboration with regional and international partners. The National Brigade of the Judiciary Police – the investigative arm of the General Direction of National Security (DGSN), the national police force – is the primary law enforcement entity responsible for counterterrorism efforts. It works closely with the internal security service, the General Directorate of Territorial Surveillance (DGST). The DGSN is the body primarily responsible for border security, handling border inspections at established ports of entry such as the Mohammed V Airport in Casablanca, where most border crossings occur. Law enforcement officials and private carriers work regularly with the United States to detect and deter individuals attempting to transit illegally. Government authorities work directly with U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Regional Carrier Liaison Group to address watch-listed or mala fide travelers. Government airport authorities have excellent capabilities in detecting fraudulent documents but lack biometric screening capabilities.

Morocco’s counterterrorism efforts led to numerous disruptions of alleged terrorist cells and prosecutions of associated individuals, including the cases highlighted below:

- **In January,** the Rabat Court of Appeals reviewed the case of 12 individuals convicted under the counterterrorism law of recruiting young men to fight abroad with AQIM. Those arrests reportedly resulted from the investigation of two individuals said to have been detained in facilities at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. According to a Ministry of Interior (MOI) statement, the cell operated in Al Hoceima, Fnideq, Meknes, and Tangier and had recruited more than 40 Moroccans to fight in Syria.
- **In May,** the DGST and BNPJ dismantled two cells in the suburbs of Nador. Investigations connected the cells with elements fighting in Mali, and to a network charged with recruiting and sending volunteers to fight in the Sahel region. According to an MOI statement, those arrested included former prisoners, held under the counterterrorism law, who had ties to international violent extremist circles.
- **In August,** authorities dismantled an al-Qa’ida-linked cell active in the central cities of Fez, Meknes, Taounate, and Tiznit following investigations by the DGST. Four to seven suspects were arrested for having ties to AQIM leaders and intentions of plotting attacks against Morocco. According to the investigation, the suspects were commissioned to hire new recruits
and to carry out targeted operations against foreign missions in Morocco, particularly against the AFRICAN LION joint military exercise and against French military flights that allegedly originated from Guelmim airport in support of the intervention in Mali. Press reported that the cell was composed of several teachers of Islamic studies and one student who had allegedly joined one of the Ansar al-Shari’a groups operating in Libya in 2012.

- In August, the Salé Criminal Court of Appeals sentenced nine individuals belonging to Ansar al-Shari’a to one to six years in prison. According to an MOI statement, the group was planning attacks against strategic sites in several Moroccan cities. The group had been dismantled in November 2012 after an ongoing investigation.

- In December, the Salé Criminal Court of Appeals sentenced 17 to 20 individuals to two to 20 years in prison for affiliation with the Moroccan Mujahedin movement, a terrorist cell with connections to the 2003 Casablanca bombers and AQIM, according to the MOI. The individuals were arrested in May 2012.

- In December, authorities dismantled a terrorist cell allegedly operating in several cities. The largest group arrested included at least 13 people in the city of Sidi Slimane near Meknes. According to an MOI statement, the suspects had received training in weapons and explosives and were preparing to go to Syria to fight. According to press reports, several of the individuals arrested had links to the “Sham al-Islam” movement, a group of Moroccans fighting in Syria under Moroccan ex-detainees at Guantanomo. Several of those individuals had allegedly returned from Syria through Turkey and were raising funds in preparation to return with new recruits.

Morocco, a long-standing and effective partner, continued to participate in the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program, which provided DGSN and the Royal Gendarmerie with training in cyber forensics, crime scene forensics, and executive leadership. Morocco also participated in Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) and Department of Justice programs to improve technical investigative training for police and prosecutors.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Morocco is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force, a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. Its Financial Intelligence Unit is a member of the Egmont Group. In April, Parliament amended the penal code to criminalize money laundering and terrorist financing, bringing legislation in line with international standards. Those amendments fulfilled the last remaining requirements that the FATF had identified in a 2010 action plan. As a result, the FATF announced in October that Morocco was no longer subject to ongoing compliance monitoring, and in November, removed Morocco from its follow-up process. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: [http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm](http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm).

**Regional and International Cooperation:** Morocco maintained cooperative relationships with European and African partners by sharing information, conducting joint operations, and participating in military, security, and civilian capacity-building events. Morocco is a founding member of the GCTF. In April, it hosted the UNODC/GCTF conference on regional cooperation in terrorist criminal matters. In September, it hosted the GCTF Criminal Justice Sector/Rule of Law Working Group meeting. Morocco also chairs the UNSC’s Counter-Terrorism Committee and is a member of the Global Initiative to Counter Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT).

Morocco is a Mediterranean Dialogue (5+5) partner of the EU’s Barcelona Process and a Major Non-NATO Ally. Morocco participates in multilateral peacekeeping operations in Africa as well as in

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training exercises such as maritime-focused PHOENIX EXPRESS, the FLINTLOCK regional security cooperation exercise, and special operations exercises. It is also host to the annual AFRICAN LION exercise. These engagements, coupled with Morocco’s initiative to modernize its force through Foreign Military Sales, have enhanced border security and improved capabilities to counter illicit traffic and terrorism. Morocco also participates in the 5+5 Defense Initiative, which brings together five European and five North African countries to address security issues in the Western Mediterranean. During the year, Morocco was active in the efforts of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to address the conflict in northern Mali. In November, it hosted the second regional ministerial conference on border security, which brought together 17 countries to improve border security in the Sahel; however, cooperation among countries in the region remains inconsistent. Specifically, while Morocco and Algeria participate in the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and the GCTF, the level of bilateral CT cooperation did not improve. Algeria and Morocco’s political disagreement over the status of the Western Sahara remained an impediment to bilateral and regional counterterrorism cooperation in 2013. Finally, Morocco, a long-standing and effective partner in counterterrorism, seeks to play a more prominent role in the training of its neighbors in North and West Africa, an effort which the State Department seeks to support in the coming years.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** Morocco has a three-pillar strategy for countering violent extremism (CVE). First, the government takes a law and order approach to CVE, working closely with the United States and other international and regional partners to strengthen its security and counterterrorism capabilities. Second, Morocco has accelerated its rollout of education and employment initiatives for youth and expanded the legal rights and political empowerment of women. Finally, to counter what the government perceives as the dangerous importation of violent Islamist extremist ideologies, it has developed a national strategy to confirm and further institutionalize Morocco’s widespread adherence to the Maliki school of Sunni Islam.

The Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) funds a program to improve the overall management of Morocco’s corrections system to stanch potential radicalism and the recruitment of prisoners to terrorist ideology.

Every year during the month of Ramadan, the King hosts a series of religious lectures, inviting Muslim speakers from around the world to promote peaceful interpretations of Islam. In the past decade, and particularly since the Casablanca and Madrid terrorist bombings, Morocco has focused on countering youth radicalization, upgrading places of worship, promoting the teaching of moderate Islam, and strengthening the Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs (MEIA). The MEIA has developed an educational curriculum for Morocco’s nearly 50,000 imams in the Maliki school of Sunni Islam. To counter the radicalization of Moroccans living abroad, the Moroccan Council of Ulema for Europe and the Minister Delegate for Moroccans Living Abroad also undertook similar programs to promote religious moderation among Moroccan expatriate communities in Europe. In September, Morocco expanded its regional counter-radicalization efforts by agreeing to train 500 Malian imams.

**OMAN**

**Overview:** Oman is an important regional counterterrorism partner and worked actively to prevent terrorists from conducting attacks within Oman and using the country for safe haven or to transport terrorists, weapons, and materiel. The Omani government actively sought training and equipment from U.S. government and commercial entities as well as from other countries to support its efforts to control its land and maritime borders. At the request of the Government of Bahrain, Omani authorities
arrested three members of the alleged terrorist group “Army of the Imam” in February, according to regional press reports. Oman used U.S. security assistance to improve counterterrorism tactics, techniques, and procedures. Omani officials engaged regularly with U.S. officials on the need to counter violent extremism and terrorism.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Omani criminal law does not explicitly criminalize terrorism. However, certain general provisions of the Penal Code may be used to prosecute acts of terrorism. Oman’s criminal procedure law permits those suspected of posing a threat to national security to be held for 30 days without a charge.

Although there was strong U.S.-Omani cooperation, there was little interagency coordination among the many Omani agencies with jurisdiction over counterterrorism. Roles and responsibilities between law enforcement and the armed forces were not clearly delineated.

The Government of Oman recognizes the need to improve its capabilities and participated in the State Department’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program in 2013. FY 2012 was to be the final year of funding for the ATA program in Oman, but as a result of the growing security challenges in the Arabian Peninsula, the program was extended. Priorities for the ATA program in Oman are to build border security capacity and enhance investigative capacity. U.S. Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) training included land border training for Omani security forces responsible for securing Oman’s border with Yemen.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Oman is a member of the Middle East North Africa Financial Action Task Force, a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body. A 2010 Royal Decree, number 79/2010, is the country’s main legislation on Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT). The Royal Oman Police Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), a member of the Egmont Group, is responsible for enforcing AML/CFT laws and regulations. Oman has increased the funding for its FIU. However, the country lacks any statistics on the number and nature of its suspicious transaction reports and has not had any apparent investigations or prosecutions for money laundering or terrorist financing.

The Government of Oman and its Central Bank have a high degree of oversight of its commercial banking sector. In 2012, Oman formally introduced Islamic banking services into the financial system through Royal Decree 69/2012. *Hawalas* are not permitted in the financial service sector and Omani authorities have acted to shutter attempted *hawala* operations.


**Regional and International Cooperation:** Oman cooperated in the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and the Arab League.

### QATAR

**Overview:** Terrorist activity historically has been low in Qatar; restrictive immigration policies and security services capable of monitoring and disrupting nascent violent extremist activity have helped to maintain that status quo. However, Qatar’s monitoring of private individuals’ and charitable associations’ contributions to foreign entities remained inconsistent. Qatari-based terrorist fundraisers,
whether acting as individuals or as representatives of other groups, were a significant terrorist financing risk and may have supported terrorist groups in countries such as Syria. The ascension of the new Emir, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani did not result in any political changes that would affect the Government of Qatar’s ability to counter terrorism.


The State Security Bureau maintains an aggressive posture toward monitoring internal violent extremist or terrorism-related activities and the Ministry of Interior is well-positioned to respond to incidents with rapid reaction forces and trained internal security forces that routinely pursue and engage in structured counterterrorism training and exercises. Qatar also maintains an interagency National Antiterrorism Committee (NATC) within the Ministry of Interior composed of representatives from more than 10 government ministries and official institutions. The NATC is tasked by law with formulating Qatar’s counterterrorism policy, ensuring thorough and transparent interagency coordination within the government, fulfilling Qatar’s obligations to combat terrorism under international conventions, and participating in international or UN conferences on terrorism. Qatar’s Office of the Public Prosecutor is tasked with prosecuting all crimes, including any related to terrorism.

Qatar maintains a watchlist of suspected terrorists that it uses to screen passengers on international flights. Qatar also conducts extensive vetting and background checks on all applicants for work visas. The Qatari Government uses biometric scans for arrivals at Doha International Airport. Qatari officials have indicated an interest in adding fingerprinting to the tracking measures they use at entry points.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Qatar is a member of the Middle East North Africa Financial Action Task Force, a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. The Government of Qatar routinely engages with international interlocutors on terrorist financing and has taken some steps to improve oversight of foreign charities that receive contributions from Qatari institutions and to work with the banking sector to identify suspicious transactions.

Qatar’s Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Law of 2010 requires Qatar’s Public Prosecutor to freeze the funds of terrorist organizations designated by the UN Security Council, and the government distributes lists of UN-designated terrorist entities and individuals to financial institutions. Qatar did not pass or implement any new legislation in 2013 although a law on charities oversight based on FATF standards was in development throughout the year, but remained in draft status as of December 31. Formally, Qatar’s Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs monitors and licenses nongovernmental charitable organizations and requires that Qatari organizations’ foreign partners submit to a vetting and licensing process before receiving Qatari funds. The Qatari government in the past has ordered Qatari institutions to cut ties with certain foreign charities over concerns about their activities.

Despite a strong legal framework, judicial enforcement and effective implementation of Qatar’s anti-money laundering/counterterrorist the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) law are lacking. Qatar’s lack of outreach and enforcement activities to ensure terrorist financing-related transactions are not occurring and the lack of referrals by the financial intelligence unit of cases are significant gaps.
The NATC is authorized to designate by resolution those who finance terrorism, terrorists, and terrorist organizations, independently of lists forwarded to the Government of Qatar by the UNSC 1267/1989 (al-Qa’ida) Sanctions Committee. No designations were made in 2013. Qatar does require financial institutions to file suspicious transactions reports. The Financial Intelligence Unit referred one suspicious transaction report case to the Public Prosecutor for investigation as of November 2013, with no judgment issued as of year’s end.


**Regional and International Cooperation:** Qatar participates in the UN, the Global Counterterrorism Forum, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the OIC, and the Arab League. Qatari military and security services participated in several bilateral and multilateral exercises aimed at responding to terrorist attacks. Qatar also supported and participated in GCC efforts this year to develop sanctions targeting Hizballah terrorist activities region-wide, although these efforts were not finalized as of December 31.

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**SAUDI ARABIA**

**Overview:** Although unsuccessful in conducting a terrorist attack in Saudi Arabia in 2013, al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), working primarily from Yemen, continued its efforts to inspire sympathizers to support, finance, or engage in conflicts outside of Saudi Arabia and encouraged individual acts of terrorism within the Kingdom. AQAP’s lack of success in Saudi Arabia can be attributed to the Saudi government’s continued domestic and bilateral efforts to build, augment, and refine its capacity to counter terrorism and violent extremist ideologies in the Kingdom, while increasing participation in international counterterrorism efforts. Saudi authorities continued public trials of individuals suspected of engaging in or supporting terrorism. The government pursued convictions of terrorism supporters, including prosecuting a religious cleric who issued fatwas (religious edicts) allowing suicide operations outside the Kingdom. Saudi Arabia continued to maintain a strong counterterrorism relationship with the United States and supported enhanced bilateral cooperation to ensure the safety of both U.S. and Saudi citizens within Saudi territories and abroad.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** In an effort to more clearly define terrorism, the Council of Ministers approved an updated draft of the Terrorism and Terrorist Financing Law in mid-December. Throughout 2013, Saudi Arabia continued its efforts to disrupt terrorist activities in the Kingdom by tracking, arresting, and prosecuting terrorist suspects. The Saudi General Investigations Directorate, also known as the Mabahith, is responsible for conducting counterterrorism investigations in the Kingdom and, upon its discretion, will cooperate with other elements of the Saudi government to further investigations into specific cases. Once the investigation is complete, the case is transferred to the Special Investigations and Public Prosecutions Office in the Saudi Ministry of Justice for the duration of the trial. In addition to continuing programs to improve physical border security through the employment of biometric systems, aerial reconnaissance, thermal imaging, and remote unattended sensors along the border region (primarily the border with Yemen), Saudi Arabia moved forward with its efforts to work with neighboring countries to build and maintain joint security programs and explore areas of mutual border security interest.
Neighborhood police units engaged and worked directly with community members in Saudi Arabia, encouraging citizens to provide tips and information about suspected terrorist activity. The government offered rewards for information on terrorists and Saudi security services made several announcements throughout the year pertaining to the arrest of AQAP militants and supporters.

The Saudi government continued its efforts to bring to trial groups and individuals suspected of terrorism. On September 25, Saudi courts convicted three Saudi nationals on charges related to coordinating the sending of youths to participate in violent extremism in conflict areas. Saudi prosecutors also convicted one of the three defendants of preparing to conduct a suicide operation. On October 1, the Specialized Criminal Court in Riyadh convicted 19 members of a group of 63 defendants on various terrorism charges. Additionally, the court found a cleric guilty of financing terrorism, issuing fatwas in support of terrorist suicide operations, and interfering in the affairs of foreign sovereign nations.

Saudi Arabia continued to cooperate with the United States to prevent acts of terrorism both through engagement in bilateral programs and through information exchange agreements with the United States.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Saudi Arabia is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force, a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. Saudi Arabia’s Financial Crimes Unit was accepted into the Egmont Group in 2009. The Saudi government affirmed its commitment to combating terrorist fundraising and sought to further establish itself as a regional leader in disrupting terrorist finance efforts. It provided training programs for bankers, prosecutors, judges, customs officers, and other officials from government departments and agencies in this area. The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency has standing requirements for all Saudi financial institutions to implement all the FATF recommendations regarding money laundering and terrorist finance. Notwithstanding Saudi Arabia’s increased control over the formal financial sector, bulk cash smuggling from individual donors and charities has reportedly been a major source of terrorist financing. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR)*, Volume 2, *Money Laundering and Financial Crimes*: [http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm](http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm).

**Regional and International Cooperation:** Saudi Arabia cooperated regionally and internationally on counterterrorism issues, including its participation as a founding member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF). In January, the Saudi government participated in a two-day workshop under the auspices of the GCTF Criminal Justice Sector and Rule of Law Working Group.

In February under the auspices of the UN Center for Counter-Terrorism (UNCCT), the Saudi government hosted an international terrorism conference with participants from 49 governments and representatives from international organizations and counterterrorism centers. On August 8, Saudi Arabia pledged US $100 million to UNCCT.

Saudi Arabia has been a member of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) since 2008. Saudi Arabia is also a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Saudi officials issued statements encouraging enhanced cooperation among GCC and Arab League states on counterterrorism issues, and the government hosted international counterterrorism conferences on subjects including, but not limited to, combating violent extremist ideology and counterterrorist financing.
Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism: As part of its strategy to counter violent extremism, the Saudi government focused on increasing public awareness campaigns and conducting outreach, counter-radicalization, and rehabilitation programs. Some of these efforts involved seminars that refuted violent Islamist extremist ideology. Public awareness campaigns were aimed at reinforcing the values of the Islamic faith and educating Saudi citizens about the dangers of violent extremism and terrorism. Methods used included advertisements and programs on television, in schools and mosques, and at sporting events. Additionally, in March, Saudi security officers participated in the GCTF Countering Violent Extremism Working Group on Community Engagement and Community-Oriented Policing, held in the United States.

The Ministry of Interior continued to operate its flagship deradicalization program (the Sakina Campaign for Dialogue), as well as its extensive prison rehabilitation program to reduce recidivism among former inmates. The Saudi government also continued its ongoing program to modernize the educational curriculum, including textbooks used in religious training. The Ministry of Islamic Affairs continued to re-educate imams, prohibiting them from incitement of violence, and continued to monitor mosques and religious education.

TUNISIA

Overview: Over the past year, the Tunisian government has increased its counterterrorism cooperation with the United States. The rise of violent extremist organizations in Tunisia since the January 2011 revolution – most notably Ansar al-Shari’a in Tunisia (AAS-T) – has posed serious security challenges to a post-revolutionary government previously inexperienced in counterterrorism operations. The assassination of two opposition politicians in February and July, as well as the attack on the U.S. Embassy and the American Community School in Tunis in September 2012, demonstrated the extent of the terrorist threat. The Tunisian government continued to face challenges that included the potential for terrorist attacks, the influx of arms and violent extremists from across the Algerian and Libyan borders, and the use of improvised explosive devices. The disproportionate numbers of Tunisians among those traveling to fight in Libya, Mali, and Syria – and the ensuing return of these fighters – is another cause for concern.

In response to these incidents, the government has taken increasingly bolder steps to counter terrorism and violent extremism in Tunisia. Following the revolution, Tunisia experienced the emergence of hard-line Salafists, who sought the reestablishment of an Islamist Caliphate, contended the Tunisian government was too accommodating to the West, despite the presence of the ruling Islamist party a-Nahda in the government, and rejected Western values. Salafists repeatedly disrupted social order in 2013. While the government initially vacillated in responding to excesses by Tunisia's Salafist movement, following the assassination of opposition figure Chokri Belaid in February, the government banned AAS-T’s annual conference in Kairouan. Following the July 25 assassination of a second opposition politician, Mohammed Brahmi, the government officially designated AAS-T a terrorist organization and intensified efforts to capture and arrest members of the group.

2013 Terrorist Incidents: There was a marked increase in the number of incidents fueled by violent extremism, which was in part a reaction to the government’s escalating campaign against terrorist groups. The list of incidents below highlights some of the most significant terrorist attacks that occurred during the year.

- On February 6, head of the leftist Popular Front coalition Chokri Belaid was assassinated in front of his home by unknown assailants. The killing prompted nationwide protests against the
government for failing to address security concerns that eventually resulted in the resignation of the Prime Minister and a cabinet reshuffle. The government has since blamed AAS-T violent extremists with reported connections to al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) for the killing.

- In defiance of the Ministry of Interior order banning its annual conference, members of AAS-T clashed with police in Kairouan on May 18 and in the Tunis suburb of Ettadhamen on May 19, resulting in the death of a protester. Several hundred AAS-T supporters, armed with rocks, knives, and Molotov cocktails, stormed a National Guard office and police station.
- On July 25, opposition member of the National Constituent Assembly Mohamed Brahmi was assassinated outside his home on Tunisia’s Republic Day. The Ministry of Interior announced the following day that the same individuals reportedly responsible for the murder of Chokri Belaid had also killed Brahmi.
- On October 17, two National Guard members were killed in clashes with an armed group in the town of Goubellat, when their vehicle reportedly came under fire. A third National Guard member was injured.
- On October 23, a total of six police officers were killed in clashes with militants near the central town of Sidi Bouzid. Two militants were also killed. The killings resulted in a two-day postponement of the National Dialogue aimed at negotiating a solution to the ongoing political impasse spurred by the July 25 killing of Mohamed Brahmi.
- On October 30, a man wearing explosives blew himself up outside a hotel in the resort town of Sousse after being chased by security, but killed no others. That same day, police prevented a suicide bombing in Monastir when they arrested a would-be bomber at the Tomb of Habib Bourguiba. Five other men were detained in Sousse. The government claimed the arrested men had ties to AAS-T and that both bombers were Tunisian. The Sousse bombing was the first attempted suicide attack in Tunisia since 2002 when 21 people were killed in a bombing at a synagogue on the island of Djerba.
- On November 30, the Ministry of Interior reported clashes in El Kef following the arrest of 10 alleged members of AAS-T. Some of the group’s supporters attempted to storm a police station while others tried to block roads by setting tires on fire.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** The 2003 counterterrorism law remains the primary piece of legislation for dealing with terrorism offenses, although lesser offenses can still be charged under the penal code. A new law, designed to address concerns raised by human rights groups, has been approved by the cabinet and was before the National Constituent Assembly at year’s end. On August 27, the Tunisian government designated AAS-T as a terrorist organization. The designation makes it a crime to be a member of the group or to offer it logistical or financial support and allows the government to freeze the group’s assets. AAS-T is the first group to be designated a terrorist organization in Tunisia since January 2011. The group has been implicated in attacks against Tunisian security forces, assassinations of Tunisian political figures (including Belaid and Brahmi), and an attempted bombing of a tourist hotel. AAS-T is ideologically aligned with AQ and has links to AQIM.

The Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense share responsibility for detecting, deterring, and preventing acts of terrorism in Tunisia. In particular, the Antiterrorism Brigade (BAT) – an elite unit under the Ministry of Interior’s National Police – is responsible for SWAT and tactical operations related to counterterrorism. The newly formed National Unit for the Investigation of Terrorist Crimes (UNECT) is a key partner to the BAT and takes the lead in investigating and liaising with the judicial system to encourage successful prosecutions. The military’s role in counterterrorism increased
substantially since the spring of 2013 when fighting around Mount Chaambi began and again in fall 2013 when the military reinforced its control of the southern third of the country.

Tunisian security services suffer from the legacy of the previous regime, which created a culture of red tape and a lack of communication and coordination between ministries. Security forces were also inexperienced in tackling terrorist threats and lacked appropriate equipment and training. In the past year, the government’s efforts have intensified, with successes including the seizure of weapons, arrests, and operations against armed groups throughout the country. At the tactical level, Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense forces reportedly work together, but communication and coordination between the military and law enforcement could be enhanced, especially with regard to strategic and operational planning.

Tunisia has an Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) and maintains fingerprint records for identification cards, criminal records, and latent prints. Tunisia currently has only one AFIS system and it is not known if the records can be shared with other government agencies via automated responses. Tunisia also maintains a DNA data base and has expressed an interest in becoming a Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) member. Tunisia does not currently share its biometric data with any counties.

Regional insecurity, particularly in Libya and in Mali, presents an additional challenge. Border security remained a priority in 2013 as Tunisian authorities sought to collaborate with their Libyan and Algerian counterparts in stemming the flow of weapons and insurgents across their common borders. Algeria and Tunisia signed an agreement in December 2012 to strengthen border security coordination, including the creation of joint patrols to combat terrorism, human trafficking, smuggling, and illegal migration. Efforts to root out militants in the Mount Chaambi region continued at year’s end. While the operation has achieved some success, it has been hampered by Tunisian security forces’ inexperience in this type of engagement.

The year has seen increased arrests and raids by security forces. The Government of Tunisia claimed to have arrested and detained hundreds of members of AAS-T, although successful prosecutions lagged behind. Significant law enforcement and proactive disruptions, arrests and prosecutions related to counterterrorism activities included:

- On February 20, the Tunisian National Guard seized a large weapons cache in the Ariana Governorate in northeastern Tunisia, including rocket propelled grenades and Kalashnikov assault rifles.
- On September 10, security forces arrested AAS-T military wing leader Mohamed Aouadi and Mohamed Khiari. Both were allegedly involved in the assassinations of opposition politicians Chokri Belaid and Mohamed Brahmi, according to a statement by the Ministry of Interior.
- On September 28, National Guard units conducted a raid in the town of Mornaguia in Tunisia’s interior region, seizing home-made bombs, explosives, and tasers. Security forces arrested two terrorists allegedly affiliated with AAS-T.
- On October 19, following the launch of an operation to apprehend terrorists who killed two National Guard officers and injured a third on October 17, security forces arrested AAS-T leaders Abdelouehed Alargoubi in Jendouba and Adel Hanachi in Beja. Eight other alleged members of the terrorist group were killed in military operations in response to the deaths of the National Guard officers.
• On November 30, the Ministry of the Interior announced special security forces had arrested 10 members of AAS-T in El Kef, in Tunisia’s northwest.

The Government of Tunisia arrested more than 120 individuals for their alleged involvement in the September 14, 2012 attacks on the U.S. Embassy and American Cooperative School of Tunis. Out of those arrested, many suspects were released or subjected to small fines. Several court cases related to the attacks were ongoing or on appeal at year’s end. In one instance, 20 suspects were issued two-year suspended sentences in May 2013, and those still in custody were released. The public prosecutor was appealing this case, which has been postponed several times.

Tunisia continued to participate in the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program. Tunisian Ministry of Interior professionals received ATA training in 2013 in the areas of crisis response and tactical and command training. Department of State International Narcotics and Law Enforcement programs supported leadership development, police reform, prison reform, hostage rescue, and crowd control management for the Justice and Interior ministries, and provided vehicles to enhance internal and border security. Leadership development included travel for Tunisian police and corrections professionals to the United States to meet U.S. law enforcement counterparts. In September, Tunisia and the United States signed an amendment to the 2012 letter of agreement to expand programming to reform and improve the capacity of the police and corrections officials. The Tunisian Armed Forces consider counterterrorism and border security their principal mission. The armed forces have successfully employed U.S.-funded patrol craft, equipment, and training in border security and counterterrorism operations. In 2013, the special operations Joint Combined Exchange Training program restarted.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Tunisia is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force, a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body. Since Tunisia has strict currency controls, it is likely that remittance systems such as hawala are operating. Trade-based money laundering is also a concern. Throughout the region, invoice manipulation and customs fraud were often involved in the process of hawala financial reconciliations. Tunisia’s financial intelligence unit, the Tunisian Financial Analysis Commission (CTAF), is headed by the governor of the Central Bank and includes representatives from a range of other agencies. The Tunisian penal code provides for the seizure of assets and property tied to narcotics trafficking and terrorist activities. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

Regional and International Cooperation: Tunisia participates in multinational efforts to counter terrorism, such as those at the UN, the Global Counterterrorism Forum, and the AU. Tunisia is an active member of the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, a U.S. multi-year regional program aimed at building the capacity of governments in the Maghreb and Sahel to confront the threats posed by violent extremists. Tunisian authorities intensified their coordination on border security with Libyan and Algerian counterparts over this past year. The Prime Ministers of Libya, Tunisia, and Algeria met January 12 in the southwest Libyan town of Ghadames to discuss border security and agreed to hold regular meetings on the topic. Algeria’s cooperation with Tunisia on counterterrorism is particularly robust: an agreement between the two countries established military-to-military communications and a coordination committee in order to improve information sharing related to counterterrorism activities. The (former) Tunisian Foreign Minister Othman Jarandi conducted a two-day visit to Algeria on August 6-7, following the killings of eight soldiers in an ambush on Mount Chaambi, to expand security cooperation and intelligence coordination.
**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** Tunisia is making concerted efforts to improve socioeconomic conditions in the country through economic development and education programs in order to counter radicalization and violence. It is working closely with USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) on several programs designed to counter violent extremism. The programs, which include awareness campaigns, youth centers, and educational activities, seek to engage youth who are at risk of being recruited by violent extremist organizations.

**UNITED ARAB EMIRATES**

**Overview:** The Government of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) continued to build its counterterrorism capacity and strengthened its international counterterrorism cooperation. Over the course of the year, the UAE government improved its border security measures and renewed its efforts to counter terrorist financing. The UAE and U.S. governments signed an agreement to establish a pre-clearance facility for travelers boarding direct flights to the United States at the Abu Dhabi International Airport. Prominent officials and religious leaders continued to publicly criticize violent extremist ideology.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** The UAE government continued to make use of Federal Law No. 1 of 2004 on combating terrorism offenses which outlined terrorism-related offenses and corresponding punishments. The State Security Directorate in Abu Dhabi and the Dubai State Security share principal responsibility for counterterrorism functions. Specialized law enforcement units exist that have advanced investigations, crisis response, and border security capacity. These specialized units are properly equipped and supported with relevant training.

The UAE participated in the Megaports and Container Security Initiatives (CSI). The CSI, which became operational at Port Rashid and Jebel Ali Port in the emirate of Dubai in 2005, co-locates two U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers with the Dubai Customs Intelligence Unit at Port Rashid. On average, CSI reviewed approximately 250 bills of lading each week, resulting in about 25 non-intrusive inspections per month of U.S.-bound containers. Examinations were conducted jointly with Dubai Customs officers, who shared information on transshipments from high risk areas, including those originating in Iran.

In 2012, the UAE initiated the use of retina scanning devices at international airport arrival terminals. The process for determining who is subjected to the scans was unclear.

In 2010, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) signed two Memoranda of Cooperation (MOCs) to support the respective training academies of the UAE Ministry of Interior’s (federal) Immigration Authority and the Abu Dhabi (emirate-level) Customs Authority (ADCA) and to enhance capacity building of its police and customs authorities. The aforementioned MOCs remain in effect.

A critical challenge to the effectiveness of the UAE’s law enforcement, border security, and judicial systems is the country’s shortage of human capacity. These sectors are generally reserved for Emirati citizens, who compose only 11 percent of the country’s total population, making it structurally difficult to develop the country’s human resources to counter the full range of terrorist activities. Despite this, the UAE government remained vigilant in its overall counterterrorism pursuits.
U.S. training initiatives included post-blast investigation and evidence response team training, which were designed to provide the UAE with the ability to develop instructors who would then train UAE police departments.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** The UAE is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force, a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body, and chairs the Task Force’s Training and Typologies Working Group. The UAE Central Bank’s (CBUAE) financial intelligence unit (FIU), the Anti-Money Laundering and Suspicious Cases Unit (AMLSCU), is a member of the Egmont Group. The UAE continued efforts to strengthen its institutional capabilities to combat terrorist financing, but challenges remained with its enforcement of local and international law. The UAE’s last mutual evaluation report, in 2008, included a recommendation to amend the federal anti-money laundering (AML) law and increase dedicated resources available to the AMLSCU. The amended law has been in draft since 2010 and was reportedly in the final stages of drafting at year’s end. The amended Law conforms to the FATF Recommendations according to the AMLSCU. This law had not been passed by the end of 2013.

The Central Bank conducted AML training both locally and regionally, and expanded its cooperation with foreign FIUs. Exploitation by illicit actors of money transmitters including licensed exchange houses, hawalas; and trading firms acting as money transmitters, remained significant concerns. With an expatriate population comprising around 90 percent of the country’s residents, a significant amount of money flows out of the country in remittances. Since formal financial services are limited in large parts of many guest workers’ home countries, hawaladars are prevalent in the UAE. There were some indications that trade-based money laundering occurs in the UAE, including through the use of commodities as a means of reconciling accounts in hawala transactions or through trading companies, and that such activity might support sanctions evasion networks and terrorist groups in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Somalia.

The CBUAE promulgated new regulations in 2013 that made hawala registration mandatory instead of voluntary. This represents a significant step towards improved oversight of informal value transfers systems although concerns remain about CBUAE’s capacity to supervise the vast number of hawalas in the country. The United States and the UAE continued to work together to strengthen efforts to counter terrorist finance, including: training on cross-border Bulk Cash Smuggling and money laundering, which remain of significant concern; collaborative engagement with the local financial communities; and other bilateral government cooperation.

In 2012, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Legal Attaché established a sub-office at the U.S. Consulate in Dubai to assist with Counterterrorist Financing matters and to provide a viable means to enhance cooperation between the FBI and UAE.

While it issued updated guidance in 2013 regarding the compliance obligations of UAE banks under UN-based sanctions programs, CBUAE does not routinely distribute UN lists of designated terrorists or terrorist entities to financial institutions. Terrorist organizations have used the UAE to send and receive financial support. Operational capability constraints and political considerations sometimes prevented the UAE government from immediately freezing and confiscating terrorist assets absent multilateral assistance. The UAE’s communication with the local financial community is largely driven by follow-up on suspicious transactions reports and close bilateral cooperation with partner governments.

Regional and International Cooperation: The UAE is a founding member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), and chaired the Working Group on Countering Violent Extremism with the UK. The International Center of Excellence for Countering Violent Extremism, known as Hedayah, was formally launched in Abu Dhabi on December 13-14, 2012, at the GCTF’s Third Coordinating Committee and Ministerial meetings. The UAE is Hedayah’s permanent host, and in November 2013, the UAE President Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed al Nahyan issued federal Law No. (7) of 2013 which officially established Hedayah.

The UAE government routinely invited participation from GCC countries at counterterrorism-related training sessions conducted by the FBI in the UAE.

Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism: To prevent violent extremist preaching in UAE mosques, the General Authority of Islamic Affairs and Endowments provided guidelines for all Friday sermons and monitored compliance. Abroad, the General Authority has trained cohorts of Afghan imams on preaching messages of non-violence and tolerance, a program they have conducted since 2010. During key periods of Muslim religious observance, especially the fasting month of Ramadan, the UAE government aired commercials on television warning its Muslim citizens and residents to refrain from donating money at mosques, as the funds could unknowingly go to support terrorist causes. The UAE worked to keep its education system free of violent extremist influences, and it emphasized social tolerance. Also, the UAE has a cybercrime law criminalizing the use of the internet by terrorist groups to “promote their ideologies and finance their activities." The UAE government repeatedly condemned terrorist acts in Libya, Syria, and elsewhere.

YEMEN

Overview: The Government of Yemen struggled to maintain momentum against a resilient al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in 2013, while facing multiple challenges from former regime elements, southern secessionists, Houthi rebels, and tribal adversaries. The military and security restructuring process, intended to unify the command structure of the armed forces, remained incomplete, with front-line units often poorly trained or poorly equipped to counter the threat posed by AQAP. The Yemeni military did not undertake major counterterrorism operations through most of 2013; instead, they primarily assumed a defensive posture, while relying on small-scale operations, including air strikes and raids, in response to AQAP attacks.

AQAP is exploiting delays in the military restructuring process – an element of Yemen’s ongoing political transition – by targeting military and security installations across several governorates and ambushing checkpoints, in addition to assassinating and kidnapping military, security, and intelligence officials. Additionally, AQAP retaliated against pro-government tribal militias known as Popular Committees for their role in driving out AQAP from the southern governorates in 2012. AQAP attacks have also increased in complexity and brazenness, as exemplified by the December 5 attack on a hospital located within the Ministry of Defense headquarters in Sanaa. In that attack, portions of which were caught on internal security cameras, AQAP operatives calmly murdered hospital staff, convalescing patients, and visiting family members.
Despite these challenges, the Government of Yemen under President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi remained a strong U.S. counterterrorism partner in 2013. As part of the political transition agreement, President Hadi convened a National Dialogue Conference (NDC) on March 18, 2013, bringing together political parties, activists, women, and youth to develop recommendations for Yemen’s future and lay the groundwork for a new constitution. President Hadi supported U.S. counterterrorism operations in Yemen and encouraged cooperation among the U.S. military and Yemen’s Special Operations Command and the Ministry of Interior’s Counterterrorism Unit. The U.S. military trained Yemeni counterterrorism units and advised efforts to restructure the Ministry of Defense. As part of these restructuring efforts, President Hadi dissolved the Republican Guard, effectively removing former president Saleh’s son as commander, and appointed Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar as senior advisor, removing him as head of the First Armored Division.

Yemeni government officials accused members of the southern movement (Hirak) of carrying out violent acts against the government. Senior military and security officials raised concern over Iranian assistance to Hirak, as well as over Iran’s role in supporting some armed Houthi groups in the north and fomenting sectarian and extremist violence.

**2013 Terrorist Incidents**: AQAP and AQAP-affiliated groups carried out hundreds of attacks throughout Yemen, including suicide bombings, car bombings, ambushes, kidnappings, and targeted assassinations by gunmen riding motorcycles. The following list is not exhaustive and details only a small fraction of the incidents recorded in 2013:

- On January 10, unknown gunmen ambushed and killed Sheikh Ali Abdullah Abdul Salam in Mahfid, in the Abyan Governorate. Sheikh Abdul Salam served as an intermediary between the Yemeni government and AQAP.
- On January 16, two unidentified gunmen riding motorcycles shot and killed the deputy security chief of the Dhamar Governorate, Brigadier General Abdullah al-Mushki, just south of Sanaa.
- On January 28, a suicide bomber affiliated with AQAP drove a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) into a checkpoint on the outskirts of Radaa, in the al-Bayda Governorate, killing 11 soldiers and wounding 17.
- On February 4, militants affiliated with the Yemen-based Ansar al-Sharia (designated as an alias for AQAP and separate from the Ansar al-Sharia groups in Benghazi, Darnah, and Tunisia), ambushed Yemeni troops in the Walad Rabi’a district of the al-Bayda Governorate, killing two soldiers and wounding three.
- On April 27, militants reportedly affiliated with AQAP attacked a checkpoint in Radaa, in the al-Bayda Governorate, killing five soldiers.
- On September 20, militants reportedly affiliated with AQAP detonated two car bombs at a military camp in al-Nashama, in the Shebwhah Governorate, killing 21 soldiers. In a separate but related incident, armed gunmen attacked the police headquarters in Mayfaa, killing eight police. The attackers reportedly kidnapped several soldiers during the attack and escaped using stolen vehicles.
- On September 30, AQAP militants overran the Second Military Regional Command (2MRC) headquarters in Mukalla, Hadramaut Governorate, killing 10 soldiers. A suicide bomber detonated a VBIED outside of the 2MRC building at the onset of the attack. Armed gunmen, disguised in military uniforms, exchanged fire with soldiers before storming the 2MRC headquarters and taking hostages.
- On October 11, a suicide bomber blew himself up in a market in Yafaa, in the Lahj Governorate, wounding seven people.
• On November 26, unidentified gunmen shot two Belarusians working as private contractors in Sanaa, killing one. In a separate incident, unidentified gunmen shot and killed Colonel Ahmed Ismail al-Jahdary, director of training at the police academy in Sanaa.

• On December 5, militants affiliated with AQAP initiated a complex attack on the Ministry of Defense headquarters in Sanaa. Suicide bombers detonated two VBIEDs: the first to gain entry into the complex, and the second in front of the hospital. Attackers wearing military uniforms then entered the hospital and gunned down medical staff, patients, and visitors indiscriminately. The Yemeni government reported 57 people killed and hundreds wounded. Qasim al-Raymi, an AQAP military commander, later apologized for the attack on the hospital in a December 21 video statement, due to public outrage.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: On September 17, the Yemeni parliament introduced a revision to the draft counterterrorism legislation that has been pending action since 2008. The revised law, if passed, would facilitate the detention of suspects and include mandatory sentencing for a number of terrorism-related crimes.

Although Yemeni courts tried dozens of suspected terrorists in 2013, many received light sentences due to the current legal framework for handling these cases. A number of government organizations were involved in countering acts of terrorism, including the National Security Bureau, the Political Security Organization, the Special Security Forces, and the Yemeni military.

Law enforcement units demonstrated limited capacity to detect, deter, or respond to terrorist incidents. There was sporadic interagency cooperation and coordination, and information-sharing was limited. The weakness of the judicial system with respect to terrorism-related crimes discouraged law enforcement officials.

Regarding border security, the security of Yemeni travel documents remained an acute vulnerability due to pervasive corruption. Yemen possessed biographic and biometric screening capabilities at 26 ports of entry (eight airports, six land border stations, and 12 seaports) through the adoption of the Terrorist Interdiction Program’s (TIP) Personal Identification Secure Comparison Evaluation System (PISCES). Yemen’s Immigration, Passport, and Nationality Administration has managed and operated PISCES since 2002.

Yemen continued to participate in the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program. In 2013, the ATA program had a broad number of strategic objectives, including protecting senior leaders from terrorist attacks, enhancing investigative capacity, strengthening border security capacity, and improving law enforcement officers’ leadership and management skills.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Yemen is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force, a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body, and enacted its first comprehensive anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) law in 2010. Since February 2010, Yemen has been publicly identified by the FATF as a jurisdiction with strategic AML/CFT deficiencies, and Yemen has committed to an action plan with the FATF to address these weaknesses. In October 2013, the FATF noted the country’s progress but urged the authorities to focus on adequately criminalizing money laundering and terrorist financing and establishing and implementing adequate procedures to identify and freeze terrorist assets.

In 2012 and 2013, the financial intelligence unit (FIU) participated in training to enhance its operational capacity. Yemen has a cross-border cash declaration or disclosure requirement for cash
amounts over US $15,000. The FIU and Tax Authority have increased coordination in reporting and investigating suspicious quantities of cash at ports of entry. There are approximately 530 registered money exchange businesses in Yemen. Money transfer businesses are required to register with the Central Bank of Yemen and can open offices at multiple locations. Yemen has a large underground economy. Yemeni legislation does not allow for the forfeiture of terrorist assets.


**Regional and International Cooperation:** Yemen continued to cooperate with and be advised by the Gulf Cooperation Council, the United States, and Jordan, with respect to its military restructuring plan. In April, Yemen also hosted the first Gulf of Aden Regional Counterterrorism Forum to coordinate counterterrorism capacity building with Djibouti and Somalia.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** President Hadi and other senior officials stressed the importance of countering terrorism by addressing the conditions that terrorists exploit. The Yemeni government expressed support for a rehabilitation and reintegration program for violent extremists, similar to the Mohammed bin Naif Center for Counseling and Care in Saudi Arabia. Yemeni officials explored the idea with the UN’s Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), which is leading a major international initiative in this area. In August 2013, UNICRI established a Steering Group that included the United States to assist the Yemeni government in establishing this type of program.

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**SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA**

South Asia remained a front line in the battle against terrorism. Although al-Qa’ida’s (AQ) core in Afghanistan and Pakistan has been seriously degraded, AQ’s global leadership continued to operate from its safe haven in the region and struggled to communicate effectively with affiliate groups outside of South Asia. AQ maintained ties with other terrorist organizations in the region, such as Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Haqqani Network (HQN). These alliances continued to provide the group with additional resources and capabilities. In 2013, terrorists in South Asia carried out operations in heavily populated areas and continued to target regional governmental representatives and U.S. persons. On numerous occasions, civilians throughout South Asia were wounded or killed in terrorist events.

Afghanistan, in particular, continued to experience aggressive and coordinated attacks by the Afghan Taliban, HQN, and other insurgent and terrorist groups. A number of these attacks were planned and launched from safe havens in Pakistan. Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) are now providing security across all of Afghanistan as the transition to full Afghan leadership on security continues in anticipation of the 2014 drawdown of U.S. and Coalition Forces (CF). The ANSF and CF, in partnership, took aggressive action against terrorist elements in Afghanistan, especially in Kabul, and many of the eastern and northern provinces.

Pakistan continued to experience significant terrorist violence, including sectarian attacks. The Pakistani military undertook operations against groups that conducted attacks within Pakistan such as TTP, but did not take action against other groups such as Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT), which continued to operate, train, rally, and fundraise in Pakistan during the past year. Afghan Taliban and HQN
leadership and facilitation networks continued to find safe haven in Pakistan, and Pakistani authorities did not take significant military or law enforcement action against these groups.

Levels of terrorist violence were similar to previous years. India remained severely affected by and vulnerable to terrorism, including from Pakistan-based groups and their affiliates as well as left-wing violent extremists. The Government of India, in response, continued to undertake efforts to coordinate its counterterrorism capabilities more effectively and expanded its cooperation and coordination with the international community and regional partners.

Bangladesh, an influential counterterrorism partner in the region, continued to make strides against international terrorism. The government’s ongoing counterterrorism efforts have made it more difficult for transnational terrorists to operate in or use Bangladeshi territory, and there were no major terrorist incidents in Bangladesh in 2013. The United States and Bangladesh signed a Counterterrorism Cooperation Initiative on October 22, 2013, to enhance bilateral cooperation.

The potential challenges to stability that could accompany the changes of the international force presence in Afghanistan in 2014 remained a significant concern for the Central Asian leaders. Additionally, terrorist groups with ties to Central Asia – notably the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the Islamic Jihad Union – continued to be an issue even as they operated outside of the Central Asian states. The effectiveness of some Central Asian countries’ efforts to reduce their vulnerability to perceived terrorist threats was difficult to discern in some cases, however, due to failure to distinguish clearly between terrorism and violent extremism on one hand and political opposition, or non-traditional religious practices, on the other.

AFGHANISTAN

Overview: Although responsibility for security in Afghanistan has transitioned from U.S. and international forces to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), the United States remains committed to continued political, diplomatic, and economic engagement in Afghanistan as a strategic partner. U.S. forces retain the capacity to conduct counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan, but increasingly these operations were being carried out in conjunction with Afghan units or solely by Afghan units. In 2013, the United States fully supported Afghan efforts to professionalize and modernize the security forces and will continue to train, advise, and assist the Afghan forces in these efforts. The Government of Afghanistan's response to the increase of insider attacks in 2012 led to new procedures to vet and train security force personnel, which likely contributed to a dramatic reduction in the number of insider attacks in 2013.

2013 Terrorist Incidents: In 2013, insurgents conducted a significant number of large vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attacks, targeting Coalition Forces (CF) bases, military convoys, and Afghan government buildings, mostly in southern and eastern Afghanistan, including Kabul. Insurgents across Afghanistan used a variety of tactics to target Afghan security personnel and CF in major cities and rural areas, seeking to expand their territorial influence and further disrupt civil governance. In major cities, attacks were often well-coordinated and complex, with the intention of garnering media attention; in rural areas, they targeted the ANSF. Insurgents carried out several targeted assassinations of provincial Afghan leaders. As in previous years, a greater number of attacks occurred during the summer months. Helmand, Kandahar, Ghazni, and Wardak represented the most dangerous provinces for Afghan security personnel and CF.

High-profile attacks included:
• On January 16, insurgents conducted a complex attack against the Afghan Intelligence Headquarters in Kabul city, killing 14 and wounding 32.
• On January 26, a suicide bomber killed 10 policemen and injured 19 other security personnel and civilians in the northeastern Afghan city of Kunduz. Among the victims were the city's counterterrorism and traffic police chiefs.
• On February 26, a group of 17 Afghan Local Police (ALP) recruits were shot to death after being drugged by Taliban infiltrators.
• On March 13, a suicide bomber detonated his vest at a sports event in Imam Sahib District, Kunduz Province which resulted in the death of the seven spectators, including the District Chief of Police, and the wounding of five other civilians.
• On April 3, a group of militants detonated a suicide VBIED outside a judicial building in Farah City, followed by an assault on the Farah Court Building by heavily-armed suicide bombers in an attempt to free accused Taliban fighters standing trial. The attack resulted in the deaths of 34 civilians, including 12 members of the security forces, along with nine insurgents. More than 100 others were injured.
• On April 6, a suicide bomber detonated a VBIED near FOB Smart in Zabul. The attack resulted in deaths of five Americans including three U.S. soldiers and a State Department diplomat. An additional 15 personnel were also injured.
• On May 16, a suicide VBIED targeted a NATO convoy on Route Crimson in Kabul city, killing six U.S. personnel.
• On May 24, a suicide attack on an International Organization for Migration (IOM) compound followed by a gun battle killed five and wounded 14, including IOM staff.
• On June 3, a suicide bomber targeting a joint U.S. and Afghan Local Police dismounted patrol in Samkani District, Paktia Province detonated his explosive-packed motorcycle killing two U.S. soldiers, an Afghan police officer, and 10 children from a nearby school. At least twenty others were injured by the blast.
• On June 11, two suicide bombers detonated VBIEDs in front of Afghanistan's Supreme Court building in a heavily fortified area of Kabul. The attack, which targeted buses with court employees, killed at least 17 people and left dozens more injured.
• On June 25, a group of eight Taliban fighters wearing American uniforms cleared two security check points to enter a heavily-restricted area in Kabul to assault the Presidential Palace and nearby U.S. Embassy facilities. Seven Embassy local guards were killed, as well as all eight Taliban fighters.
• On August 3, a suicide bomber detonated his vest outside the Indian Consulate in Jalalabad killing nine children studying in an adjacent mosque, and wounding an additional 23 persons in the area, including students. The three attackers involved were also killed.
• On August 30, a suicide attack at a mosque in Qarlugh Village in Kunduz resulted in the death of the District Governor, his body guard, and 10 civilians attending a memorial service. An additional 22 locals were wounded.
• On September 13, suicide bombers detonated a large VBIED at the entrance to the main gate of the U.S. Consulate in Herat. Shortly after, a second blast occurred when an explosives-laden van detonated. Additional suicide bombers then breached the outer perimeter and opened fire on security forces inside, but were killed in the ensuing gunfight. Eight U.S. Consulate Herat local national guards were killed in this attack.
• On October 18, insurgents conducted a suicide VBIED attack outside of Green Village in Kabul city. The attack killed two American citizens and wounded six.
• On November 16, a suicide bomber in a VBIED detonated his explosives-laden vehicle at a security checkpoint in the vicinity of the Afghan Loya Jirga (a traditional assembly of tribal elders and national and provincial leaders) site in Kabul. At least 10 people were killed and as many as 20 injured.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** The Afghan Attorney General's Office investigates and prosecutes violations of the laws on crimes against the internal and external security of the state (1976 and 1987), violations of the Law on Combat Against Terrorist Offences (2008), and the Law on Firearms, Ammunition and Explosives (2005), including laws that prohibit membership in terrorist or insurgent groups as well as laws that forbid violent acts committed against the state, hostage taking, murder, and the use of explosives against military forces and state infrastructure. The Antiterrorism Prosecution Department handled a total of 4005 cases in 2013 on both the primary and appellate levels.

The current Afghan Penal Code, enacted in 1976, has gaps, a lack of definitions, disproportionate mandatory fines and sentences, and strict minimum imprisonments that result in overcrowded prisons. The President of Afghanistan has issued a decree requiring the Ministry of Justice to reorganize and consolidate the penal code. That work has been undertaken by the Criminal Law Reform Working Group (CLRWG), chaired by the Minister of Justice, and staffed by various international and Afghan partners, including the United States. The CLRWG is actively discussing how the new penal code will address Sharia law, gender-related crimes, crimes involving children, and compliance with international obligations regarding human rights and other international treaties to which Afghanistan is a party.

Although the draft Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) was pending in Parliament at year's end, it is important to note that several provisions within the draft CPC continued to be problematic. In particular, the Ministry of Justice inserted new provisions restricting the testimony of family members against the accused.

The Law on the Structure and Jurisdiction of the Attorney General's Office was enacted in October 2013, and codified the structure and funding of the existing Antiterrorism Protection Directorate in the Attorney General's Office, permitting the investigation and prosecution of terrorist and national security cases using internationally accepted methods and evidentiary rules.

Under the current structure, the ANSF has demonstrated an adequate capacity to conduct counterterrorism operations, in part due to contributions from the international community and pressure from international partners. The Governments of Afghanistan and the United States investigated a variety of criminal acts, including kidnappings and conspiracy to commit terrorist acts. On several occasions, U.S. law enforcement bodies assisted the Ministry of Interior, the National Directorate of Security, and other Afghan authorities, which enabled them to take actions to disrupt and dismantle terrorist operations and prosecute terrorist suspects.

Afghanistan continued to process travelers on entry and departure at major points of entry with the Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES). With U.S. support, Afghan authorities continued to expand PISCES installations at additional locations. With assistance from United States Central Command, the Drug Enforcement Administration and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security mentor and support Afghan law enforcement bodies in interdicting illegal narcotics and arms; the proceeds from smuggling enterprises often support terrorist and insurgent groups. Afghanistan remained an important partner nation in the Department of State's Antiterrorism
Assistance (ATA) program, which continued to focus on building broader, self-sustaining Afghan security force capacity to protect national leadership, government facilities, and diplomatic facilities, and to improve Afghan security force agencies’ coordination and cooperation in response to terrorism-related crisis incidents. In addition to a suite of tactical response courses, the ATA program provided instructor development and mentorship to Afghan officers to build and institutionalize a sustained capacity in antiterrorism skills, so they could share lessons learned with law enforcement colleagues tasked with counterterrorism response.

In May, the U.S. Homeland Security Investigations Attaché to Embassy Kabul and the World Customs Organization (WCO) conducted a counter-improvised explosive device training seminar in support of its Global Shield program for Afghan law enforcement officers. The Global Shield course provided participants with a comprehensive understanding of risk assessment, targeting, identification of precursor chemicals, basic investigative techniques, and Afghan prosecution procedures. Throughout 2013, Homeland Security Investigations (HIS) training led to an increased number of seizures of illicit materials by Afghan counternarcotics and counterterrorism police forces.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Afghanistan is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. In June 2012, Afghanistan was publicly identified by FATF as a jurisdiction with strategic anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) deficiencies. The Central Bank of Afghanistan confirmed by letter the government’s high-level commitment to implement an action plan to address these deficiencies. In October 2013, the FATF noted key deficiencies that had not yet been addressed, including: adequately criminalizing money laundering and terrorist financing; establishing and implementing an adequate legal framework for identifying, tracing and freezing terrorist assets; implementing an adequate AML/CFT supervisory and oversight program for all financial sectors; establishing and implementing adequate procedures for the confiscation of assets related to money laundering; establishing a fully operational and effectively functioning financial intelligence unit; and establishing and implementing effective controls for cross-border cash transactions.

In addition to the problems FATF identified, the vast narcotics trafficking trade and bulk cash smuggling have been significant sources of revenue for terrorist groups. Foreign terrorist organizations were operating in Afghanistan and neighboring countries and both fundraised and sent funds from Afghanistan.

Terrorist finance investigations in Afghanistan have continued to be hampered by a weak or non-existent legal and regulatory regime, coupled with lack of capacity and political will.


**Regional and International Cooperation:** Afghanistan consistently emphasized the need to strengthen joint cooperation to fight terrorism and violent extremism in a variety of bilateral and multilateral fora. Notable among such meetings were the regular discussions of the U.S.-Afghanistan-Pakistan Core Group; the Istanbul Process; and meetings of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the UN Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia, the UN Office of Drugs and Crime, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and other bodies.
Afghanistan shares the lead on the Counterterrorism Confidence Building Measure (CBM) of the Istanbul Process, working closely with Turkey and the United Arab Emirates. In August 2013, the CBM Regional Technical Group met to discuss IED Precursors in Abu Dhabi and identified strategies to work together with Pakistan to help eliminate the shipment of precursors over the border into Afghanistan.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** Afghan government programs to counter violent extremism continued through increased engagement with religious communities. According to most estimates, over 90 percent of Afghan mosques and madrassas, operated independently of government oversight, with some promoting a violent extremist ideology. The Ministry of Hajj and Religious Affairs (MoHRA), as well as the Department of Islamic Education at the Ministry of Education, continued efforts to register more mosques and madrassas with limited success. The MoHRA also disseminated peaceful messages in its Friday sermons to both its affiliated mosques and some non-registered ones. The National Ulema Council, a quasi-governmental body of religious scholars established by President Karzai in 2002, became more vocal in condemning suicide attacks as un-Islamic.

The Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP) continued to reintegrate low- and mid-level insurgents back into their communities. The APRP is a National Priority Program of the Afghan government, is managed by the High Peace Council (HPC), and executed at the national level by the Joint Secretariat (JS). The HPC and JS work with the Provincial Peace committees and Provincial Joint Secretariat teams to effectively execute the program at the provincial level. By joining the program, the former fighter makes the commitment to renounce violence and sever all ties with the insurgency, and to abide by the Constitution of Afghanistan. This includes accepting the Government of Afghanistan's laws on women's rights. Since its inception, the APRP has successfully reintegrated over 7,400 former combatants across Afghanistan.

**BANGLADESH**

**Overview:** The Government of Bangladesh has demonstrated political will and firm commitment to combat domestic and transnational terrorist groups, and its counterterrorism efforts made it harder for transnational terrorists to operate or establish safe havens in Bangladesh. Bangladesh and the United States signed a Counterterrorism Cooperation Initiative to enhance counterterrorism cooperation as an important element of its bilateral partnership and engagement. In 2013, U.S. assistance supported programs for Bangladeshi civilian, law enforcement, and military counterparts to build their capacity to monitor, detect, and prevent terrorism.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Bangladesh’s criminal justice system was in the process of fully implementing the Antiterrorism Act of 2009. In 2013, Parliament passed into law extensive amendments to the ATA. The amendments, which were drafted with technical assistance from the Department of Justice and experts from the U.S. Department of Treasury, bring Bangladesh into greater compliance with international standards. Significant improvements have been made to the law, including more extensive criminalization of terrorist financing, prohibitions on supporting individuals (rather than simply organizations) who engage in terrorist activity, and an ability to promptly freeze funds and assets of those engaged in or supporting terrorism. Parliament also enacted the Children Act in 2013, which provides for capital punishment of those convicted of exploiting children to commit terrorist acts and provided for the appointment of a Children’s Affairs Officer in every police station.
In January, Bangladesh police arrested three suspected Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) terrorists. Bangladesh cooperated with the United States to further strengthen control of its borders and land, sea, and air ports of entry. Bangladesh continued to participate in the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program, and Bangladesh National Police (BNP) officers received training in crisis response, border security, and investigations. An ATA program team met with Bangladeshi law enforcement and U.S. embassy officials in September, and the outcomes of these meetings will contribute to the development of ATA program objectives to build Bangladeshi incident management and expand Bangladesh Border Guard’s (BBG) security capacity. In November, a senior level delegation representing a cross section of Bangladeshi security and public safety entities traveled to the U.S. to participate in a five-day crisis management seminar. The course included table top exercises designed to help participants effectively prepare for, manage, control, and support a coordinated response to a critical incident of national importance. Bangladesh also cooperated with the Department of Justice’s efforts to provide prosecutorial skills training to its assistant public prosecutors, encourage greater cooperation between police and prosecutors, and institute community policing in targeted areas of the country.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Bangladesh is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. The Bangladesh Bank (the central bank) and its financial intelligence unit/anti-money laundering section lead the government’s effort to comply with the international sanctions regime. Significant improvements to its Antiterrorism Act have allowed Bangladesh to start the path of successfully exiting the FATF International Cooperation Review Group process. The presence and large-scale use of informal value transfer systems such as hawalas and the hundi system of remittances provide channels for exploitation by terrorists. In the formal financial sector, law enforcement rarely uses its powers to freeze and confiscate assets. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR)*, Volume 2, *Money Laundering and Financial Crimes*: [http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm](http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm).

**Regional and International Cooperation:** Bangladesh is active in the full range of international fora. Bangladesh is party to various counterterrorism protocols under the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation and is bringing the country’s counterterrorism efforts in line with the four pillars of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. Bangladesh’s foreign and domestic policies are heavily influenced by the region’s major powers, particularly India. In past years, the India-Bangladesh relationship has provided openings for transnational threats, but the current government has demonstrated its interest in regional cooperation on counterterrorism. It has signed memoranda of understanding with a number of countries to share evidence regarding criminal investigations, including investigations related to financial crimes and terrorist financing.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** Bangladesh uses strategic communication to counter violent extremism, especially among youth. The Ministry of Education oversees madrassas and is developing a standard national curriculum that includes language, math, and science modules, as well as minimum standards of secular subjects to be taught in all primary schools, up to the eighth grade. The Ministry of Religious Affairs and the National Committee on Militancy Resistance and Prevention work with imams and religious scholars to build public awareness against terrorism. The Government of Bangladesh is also actively expanding economic opportunities for women as a stabilizing force against violent religious extremism.

**INDIA**
Overview: According to the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), approximately 400 people were killed as a result of terrorist attacks in India in 2013. This figure is somewhat higher than in 2012, demonstrating that India remains subject to violent terrorist attacks and continued to be one of the most persistently targeted countries by transnational and domestic terrorist groups. Included in the total number of fatalities were approximately 200 deaths ascribed to the Communist Party of India (Maoist) or Maoist/Naxalite violence, which the Indian government considers its most serious internal security threat. To date, these groups have not specifically targeted U.S. or other international interests.

In 2013, Indian sources continued to attribute violence and deaths in Jammu and Kashmir to transnational terrorist groups that India alleges are backed by Pakistan. Continued allegations of violations of the Line of Control between India and Pakistan (the border along Jammu and Kashmir), Pakistan’s failure to bring the perpetrators of the 2008 Mumbai attacks to justice, and activities of Pakistan-based terrorist groups remained serious concerns for the Indian government.

The United States and India maintained counterterrorism capacity building efforts and cooperation. In May 2013, the Second U.S.-India Homeland Security Dialogue took place in Washington, DC, and Indian and U.S. leaders reaffirmed their commitment to, and the importance of, bilateral counterterrorism cooperation. In December, India hosted the U.S.-India Homeland Security Dialogue Police Chiefs Conference, a landmark event that brought together U.S. and Indian law enforcement officials to share best practices and lessons learned in detecting, preventing, and responding to threats facing large cities, including terrorist threats. Indian officials participated in courses provided through the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program and through other regional capacity building programs. In addition, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, through the Embassy’s Office of the Legal Attaché, conducted exchanges with Indian law enforcement personnel.

2013 Terrorist Incidents: Significant terrorist incidents included the following:

- On February 21, terrorists exploded two bombs in Dilsukhnagar, a crowded shopping area within Hyderabad. The bombs exploded within 330 feet of each other, killing 17 and injuring at least 119. Authorities determined that the Indian Mujahideen (IM) carried out the attack.
- On April 17, a motorcycle bomb was detonated in front of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) headquarters in the Malleswaram district of Bangalore, injuring 18 people. Following the blast, authorities arrested 15 suspects with alleged links to the al-Ummah terrorist organization.
- On May 25, Naxalite insurgents belonging to the Communist Party of India (Maoist) attacked a convoy of Indian National Congress party leaders in the Darbha Valley in the Sukma district of Chhattisgarh, India. The attack killed 27, including former state minister Mahendra Karma as well as India’s former Minister of External Affairs Vidya Charan Shukla.
- On July 7, a series of 10 bombs exploded in and around the Mahabodhi Temple complex, a UNESCO World Heritage Site in Bodh Gaya. Five people, including two Buddhist monks, were injured by the blasts. Bomb-disposal squads defused three other devices at a number of locations in Gaya. Authorities determined that IM was responsible for the bombings.
- On September 26, Pakistan-based terrorists entered Jammu and Kashmir and attacked a police station in Hiranagar, killing five; and an Indian army camp in Samba, killing 10, including an army officer. The attacks took place just ahead of a planned meeting between Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in New York.
On October 27, IM operatives detonated a series of bombs at a political rally for the BJP, and its prime ministerial candidate, Narendra Modi, in Patna, Bihar. The attacks killed at least six and injured 85.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: India passed no new counterterrorism laws in 2013. The country continued to apply previously-enacted measures, including the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (1967), the SAARC Convention on Suppression of Terrorism Act (1993), and various state-level laws.

Following the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks, India enhanced efforts to counter terrorism through agencies including the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), the National Security Guard (NSG), and the National Investigation Agency (NIA). India’s efforts to counter terrorism are seriously hampered by impediments to coordination and information sharing between agencies. In addition, law enforcement organizations display a limited command and control capacity. India has launched initiatives to address some of these challenges, including through a Multi-Agency Centre for enhancing intelligence gathering and sharing. It also plans to implement the National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID), a system for linking databases in different government departments and ministries for use by intelligence agencies. The Indian government had proposed to create a National Counterterrorism Centre, but state-level officials have opposed this initiative and it has not been implemented.

On December 16, the U.S. Transportation Security Administration and the Indian Bureau of Civil Aviation Security signed a Sensitive Security Information-sharing agreement to enhance cooperation on aviation security, increase collaboration on security-related technologies, increase reciprocal visits for airport security assessments, and facilitate the exchange of ideas and best practices for security at airport points of entry. Indian airport officials already utilize biographical databases for counterterrorism screening. In an effort to boost its border security, India continued to build fences along its borders with Pakistan and Bangladesh, although rural areas remained susceptible to illegal border crossings. India’s maritime boundaries, as well as its border with Nepal, remained extremely porous.

India continued to participate in the Department of State’s ATA program, and received training and equipment designed to build Indian police counterterrorism capacity. ATA training focused on issues related to securing infrastructure, conducting investigations, and responding to critical incidents.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: India is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and two FATF-style regional bodies, the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing and the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering. India’s financial intelligence unit is also a member of the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units. India has criminalized terrorist financing in accordance with international standards. Indian officials monitor and regulate money transfers, require the collection of data for wire transfers, oblige non-profit organizations to file suspicious transaction reports, and regulate and monitor these entities to prevent misuse and terrorist financing. However, the government does not have procedures in place for freezing and confiscating terrorist assets without delay and does not routinely distribute UN lists of designated entities to financial institutions.

In November 2012, the Government of India passed amendments to the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA) that aligned the law to international standards.
The degree of training and expertise in financial investigations involving transnational crime or terrorist-affiliated groups varies widely among the federal, state, and local levels and depends on the particular jurisdiction’s financial resources and perceived necessities. U.S. investigators have had limited success in coordinating the seizure of illicit proceeds with their Indian government counterparts. While intelligence and investigative information supplied by U.S. law enforcement authorities have led to numerous money seizures, a lack of follow-through on investigational leads has prevented a more comprehensive offensive against violators and related groups.

The Indian government is taking steps to increase financial inclusion through “small [banking] accounts,” and issuing a biometric-enabled universal identification number. International experts have urged India to further the development and expansion of alternative money transfer services in the financial sector, including mobile banking, domestic funds transfer, and foreign remittances in order to allow broader financial inclusion of legitimate individuals and entities and reduce overall AML/CFT vulnerabilities. India’s reporting structure only protects principal officers/compliance officers of institutions who file suspicious activity reports in good faith. The lack of protection for staff or employees of these institutions who report may limit the number of reports received.


Regional and International Cooperation: India is a founding member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) and participated in GCTF and UN forums on counterterrorism.

The 2013 arrests of high-profile terrorists Abdul Karim Tunda and Yasin Bhatkal cast a spotlight on India’s counterterrorism cooperation with neighbors, in this case, Nepal. India sought greater cooperation with Nepal in managing the two countries’ shared border, and it appeared that Nepal was taking steps to achieve this.

During 2013, the Indian and Bangladeshi governments continued their cooperation under their bilateral Coordinated Border Management Plan to control illegal cross-border activities and announced the strengthening of bilateral cooperation in the field of security and border management through additional cooperation agreements.

Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism: India’s counter-radicalization and violent extremism efforts are mostly directed by state and local authorities. While there is no comprehensive national policy for countering radicalization or violent extremism, the government has implemented some initiatives to counter violent extremism, such as offering quality and modern education in madrassas. In addition, the government has programs to rehabilitate and integrate various groups, mostly insurgents, back into the mainstream of society, such as the “Scheme for Surrender cum-Rehabilitation of militants in North East.” While not a CVE program per se, it is directed at disaffected members of Indian society who support separatist and at times violent movements. Indian government officials have raised concerns about how social media and the internet can be used to stir communal unrest and radicalization.

KAZAKHSTAN

Overview: The Government of Kazakhstan passed new counterterrorism legislation and continued to develop its national program for countering terrorism and what it refers to as “religious extremism,”
with efforts to establish new interagency counterterrorism bodies at the national, regional, and local levels. The national program outlines the responsibilities of each government agency and ministry to prevent and/or respond to acts of terrorism, with a strong focus on social and educational programs that are intended to form a zero-tolerance approach for citizens, especially youth, against the influence of terrorist or “extremist” ideas. Broad, vague definitions of terrorism and so-called “religious extremism” sometimes led to the arrest and prosecution of individuals and religious groups that are peaceful.

The Government of Kazakhstan has expressed an interest in increasing counterterrorism cooperation with the United States, particularly in the areas of information sharing and law enforcement cooperation, and in the development of Kazakhstani capability to conduct special counterterrorism operations.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Kazakhstani legislation criminalizes terrorist acts and extremist “propaganda.” Broad, vague definitions of terrorism and religious extremism sometimes lead to the arrest and prosecution of individuals and groups that are engaged in apparently peaceful activities. New legislation adds the forfeiture of property to the potential sentences for all terrorism-related crimes.

In January, President Nursultan Nazarbayev approved changes and amendments to Kazakhstan’s existing counterterrorism legislation that provided new definitions for several legal terms relating to terrorism and violent extremism, assigned counterterrorism roles and responsibilities to 26 government agencies, and created a framework for the government’s national counterterrorism program, including the establishment of national, regional, and local counterterrorism centers. The government’s ambitious new counterterrorism plan envisions extensive interagency cooperation and coordination, but cooperation, coordination, and information-sharing are limited in practice and certain government agencies dominate counterterrorism operations. There are four special counterterrorism detachments under the Ministry of Internal Affairs and one under the National Security Committee. The new state program for law enforcement development provides for the creation of new counterterrorist detachments and enhanced training for such units.

Details of the implementation of the national counterterrorism program are being defined primarily through specific bylaws, executive orders, and government decrees. For example, the government issued decrees identifying facilities vulnerable to terrorist threats, a public outreach system that includes codes corresponding to current threat levels, and procedures for compensating victims of terrorist acts. Nevertheless, a lack of capacity and the government’s general lack of respect for human rights constrained more effective Kazakhstani government counterterrorism efforts in 2013.

Law enforcement units demonstrated the capacity to detect, deter, and respond to terrorist plots; law enforcement officials made numerous arrests of people believed to be terrorists or violent extremists, but also of peaceful religious figures. Kazakhstan continued to participate in the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance program and received training in incident response.

Kazakhstan’s security forces, including military and law enforcement, are undergoing a process of professionalization and reform with the goal of more effectively discharging their duties. To date, however, security forces have a poor record of accountability and respect for human rights. Parliamentarians criticized law enforcement bodies for the tendency to “eliminate” or kill members of suspected terrorist groups rather than capture them for questioning, but there is a lack of transparency about the specific circumstances of counterterrorism operations. We refer you to the State
Kazakhstani officials announced the arrest and prosecution of numerous individuals and groups on charges of terrorism or extremism. Trials of small groups of alleged extremists have become frequent throughout Kazakhstan. Sentences typically range from five to 15 years in prison. One group was accused of planning to attack senior host government officials and bomb several landmark sites in the capital.

As a testament to Kazakhstan’s growing cooperation with the United States, the Prosecutor General of Kazakhstan traveled to Washington in December 2013 and met with heads of federal law enforcement agencies. In a meeting with the FBI Director, the two parties discussed bilateral judicial cooperation in countering terrorism.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Kazakhstan belongs to the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and the Finance of Terrorism (EAG), a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body. The Financial Monitoring Committee under the Ministry of Finance recorded 360 cases of terrorist financing in 2013. The latest EAG evaluation, done in 2011, found Kazakhstan non-compliant in reporting suspicious transactions. There is no requirement for non-profit organizations to file suspicious transaction reports. A further evaluation was scheduled, but was postponed by Kazakhstan in order to properly prepare for the evaluation. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR)*, Volume 2, *Money Laundering and Financial Crimes*: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

**Regional and International Cooperation:** The Kazakhstani Prosecutor General’s Office cooperated with the OSCE on countering violent extremism and terrorism through joint workshops.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** The government’s counterterrorism efforts focused heavily on the prevention of radicalization, with particular efforts to educate youth and provide positive alternatives through social programs and economic opportunities, but the results of these nascent programs are unclear. Kazakhstan’s legislation on religious beliefs and practices is unnecessarily restrictive, and might engender violent resistance from peaceful religious groups that experience government repression. We refer you to the Department of State’s *Annual Report to Congress on International Religious Freedom* (http://www.state.gov/j/drl/irf/rpt/index.htm) for further information.

Kazakhstan’s recent strategy in countering radicalization and religious extremism focuses on preventive messaging to vulnerable groups, primarily young people and prison inmates. State-sponsored NGOs and local officials offer lectures to students in secondary schools, vocational schools, and universities. The lectures focused on religious groups the government considers to be “destructive,” which include peaceful “non-traditional” religious groups. The program aims to make young people “immune” to religious extremism and includes government publications on “proper” religious values.

Media have aired interviews with former terrorists who publicly state that they regret their deeds, including an interview with young men who said they illegally crossed the Turkish-Syrian border to fight alongside Syrian insurgents because of the influence of “internet propaganda.” One of
Kazakhstan’s national news agencies aired a segment that showed the men repenting of their actions and appealing to Kazakhstani Muslims not to follow in their footsteps.

KYRGYZSTAN

Overview: In 2013, there were no reported terrorist attacks in Kyrgyzstan. However, Kyrgyzstani security forces arrested several individuals suspected of affiliation with terrorist organizations and terrorist activities abroad. Security forces became more aware of increased recruitment of citizens for terrorist acts in Syria. On December 26, the Government of Kyrgyzstan arrested one fighter who reportedly returned from Syria.

The Government of Kyrgyzstan is committed to preventing terrorist attacks and reaches out to international organizations and foreign governments that can provide training and technical assistance. The country remains vulnerable, however, especially in the south where conflicts on the border with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and lack of central government control of the mountainous border are an issue. The Government of Kyrgyzstan is also concerned about the potential for an influx of terrorist elements into its territory following the withdrawal of ISAF troops from Afghanistan in 2014.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: In 2013, the State Committee for National Security (GKNB) remained the main government organization tasked with countering terrorism. It arrested several individuals based on their alleged connections to terrorist organizations, including those linked to Hizb-ut-Tahrir, which the Kyrgyzstani government designated as a terrorist organization in 2003. Embassy officials report positive cooperation with Kyrgyzstan’s main counterterrorism bodies – the GKNB and the MOI.

In November 2013, the Kyrgyzstani Parliament approved a law aimed at improving interagency cooperation and regulations in the field of counterterrorism. The law addressed the integration of international agreements and improvements in streamlining regulations for counterterrorism activities. The new legislation also reduced the number of people required in order for a mass gathering to receive additional security and protection from terrorist attacks. This will allow more events to qualify for an increased police presence.

Although the GKNB’s antiterrorism unit has demonstrated the capacity to quickly react to bomb scares or other potential terrorist threats, it has limited capacity to act to counter the threat in practice. It lacks both specialized training and equipment.

There remains strong political will and desire for increased capacity building and acquisition of equipment and all law enforcement entities demonstrated a desire for cooperation with international organizations. Kyrgyzstani police officers continued to participate in the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program, and received training focused on enhancing law enforcement capacity to secure Kyrgyzstan’s airports and conduct terrorism-related investigations. The ATA program continued to focus on strengthening police capacity to secure the country’s borders.

The border guards and customs service also cooperated closely with Embassy Bishkek’s Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) office. EXBS is funding construction of additional border towers and providing renovations and enhancements to existing border towers along the southern borders of Kyrgyzstan with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The OSCE, through its Community Security Initiative (CSI) continued to support an embedded police advisor with law enforcement agencies in each region of Kyrgyzstan, which began following ethnic clashes between
ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in 2010 in the southern regions of Osh and Jalalabad. Along with community policing, the advisors train local law enforcement officials on how to identify potential terrorist attacks.

The Government of Kyrgyzstan does not maintain a terrorist screening watch list. It also does not have biographic or biometric screening capabilities at ports of entry. Although internal information sharing within the host government increased in 2013, it still needs improvement. Information sharing with other countries happened rarely and usually only by request in the context of a human trafficking or other organized crime investigation. The Government of Kyrgyzstan does not collect advance passenger name records on commercial flights.

In August, the GKNB arrested two citizens of Kyrgyzstan and a citizen of Kazakhstan who were suspected members of a terrorist cell in southern Kyrgyzstan. According to GKNB, the suspects intended to execute a series of attacks in Kyrgyzstan on behalf of foreign sponsors. The suspects purchased weapons, explosive materials, and communication equipment. In September, GKNB Special Forces facilitated the repatriation of two Kyrgyzstani recruits from Syria, working in collaboration with relatives of the recruits. It is not clear how many Kyrgyzstani nationals remain in Syria. On December 26, an alleged fighter who returned from Syria was arrested in Batken province under suspicion of attempting to recruit local Kyrgyzstani citizens for membership into an unnamed terrorist group.

Deterrents to more effective host government law enforcement measures against terrorism include interagency rivalries, a lack of coordination between the GKNB and the MOI, and budgetary constraints. Inefficient Soviet-era bureaucratic structures, low salaries, and frequent personnel turnover hampered law enforcement efforts. Kyrgyzstani counterterrorist units remained largely untested in real-life situations.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Kyrgyzstan belongs to the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and the Finance of Terrorism (EAG), a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. In October 2011, Kyrgyzstan made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and EAG to address its strategic anti-money laundering/counterterrorist finance (AML/CFT) deficiencies. Since then, Kyrgyzstan has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime. However, the FATF called for the country to address its remaining deficiencies: the criminalization of money laundering in accordance with international standards; improving the framework for freezing terrorist assets; and improving the AML/CFT supervisory program. In 2012, the Government of Kyrgyzstan established a Commission on Combating the Financing of Terrorism but it was largely inactive in 2013. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: [http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm](http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm).

**Regional and International Cooperation:** In 2013, Kyrgyzstan participated in counterterrorism activities organized by the OSCE, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Antiterrorism Center, and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). The U.S. military conducted eight counterterrorism training events with the GKNB, the Interior Ministry, the Defense Ministry, and the Border Service. These events were designed to teach units to perform typical military tasks while respecting human rights and the safety of noncombatants.

MALDIVES
Overview: Maldives, an archipelago consisting of nearly 1,200 coral islands grouped into 26 atolls, is strategically located close to international sea lanes bisecting the Indian Ocean. Since 2010, concerns about the activities of a small number of local violent extremists involved with transnational terrorist groups have been mounting. There has been particular concern that young Maldivians, including those within the penal system, may be at risk of becoming radicalized and joining violent Islamist extremist groups. Links have been made between Maldivians and violent extremists throughout the world.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: In 2013, the Maldivian government arrested several people possibly associated with violent extremism. However, since existing laws and law enforcement processes severely limit the ability of law enforcement agencies to prosecute such cases, the number of convictions was limited.

Maldives continued to participate in the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program. ATA training focused on building capacity in counterterrorism leadership and management, critical target protection, and crisis management. ATA training included courses in securing maritime and other vital infrastructure from terrorism-related threats. The State Department also provided training to more than 100 Maldivian immigration officers in fraudulent travel document recognition.

Maldives has few laws that effectively control the movement of people and money in and out of the country. Due to its sprawling island geography and insufficient technological capabilities, the Maldivian Coast Guard currently cannot effectively patrol Maldivian waters. In August, the Maldivian government worked with the United States to upgrade its border security with installation of the PISCES system (Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System) at Maldives’ main international airport and at Malé Seaport.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Maldives is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body. Maldivian authorities believe that funds are currently being raised in Maldives to support terrorism abroad; however, there is no reliable information regarding the amounts involved. While no official studies yet have been conducted, the Maldivian Central Bank believes that criminal proceeds mainly come from domestic sources, as a large percentage of Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs) are related to Maldivians. The Maldives Monetary Authority reports that hawala systems (informal money transfer networks) are being used to transfer funds between the islands, although the extent to which these systems are used to launder money is still unclear.

The Maldivian government monitors banks, the insurance sector, money remittance institutions and finance companies, and requires the collection of data for wire transfers. Financial institutions other than banks and intermediaries in the securities sector, however, are not subject to current anti-money laundering/countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) obligations. Insurance companies and intermediaries, finance companies, money remittance service providers, foreign exchange businesses, and credit card companies therefore operate outside the AML/CFT framework. Maldives does not currently require non-profit organizations to file suspicious transaction reports, nor does it regulate or monitor those organizations to prevent misuse and terrorist financing.

The Maldivian government implements UNSCRs 1267 (1999) and follow-on resolutions and 1373 (2001), and monitors and regulates alternative remittance services, despite the fact that they lie outside the AML/CFT framework. The Maldivian government did not report any efforts to seize terrorist assets in 2013.
According to the Maldivian government, capacity building of relevant supervisory and regulatory authorities (such as the Maldives Monetary Authority and the Capital Market Development Authority), as well as law enforcement authorities (the Anti-Corruption Commission, Department of Immigration and Emigration, Maldives Customs Service, and Maldives Police Service), and the judiciary is needed in order to properly counter money laundering and terrorist financing. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

Regional and International Cooperation: The Maldivian government cooperated closely with Indian security forces, who offered regular support in the form of assets and training to Maldivian security forces. The Maldivian government also cooperated closely with the Sri Lankan government.

Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism: The Maldivian government continued to recognize that counter-radicalization efforts form a critical component to long-term success against violent extremism and pursued initiatives in this area. In 2013, the Ministry of Islamic Affairs conducted more than a dozen seminars and workshops on preventing violent extremism for religious leaders, educators, and local government officials.

NEPAL

Overview: Nepal experienced no significant acts of international terrorism in 2013, although its open border with India and weak controls at Kathmandu’s Tribhuvan International Airport raised concerns that international terrorist groups could use Nepal as a transit point.

2013 Terrorist Incidents: On March 13, a group of attackers ambushed a motorcade including Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (UCPN(M)) Chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal (aka “Prachanda”) en route to a campaign event in Kanchanpur. Media reported that a landmine exploded near the lead car, but nobody was injured. In the run-up to the November 19 Constituent Assembly Elections, one individual was killed and several injured in sporadic violence. During this period, police and army bomb squads discovered what appeared to be more than 100 improvised explosive devices (IEDs), of which about one-third were in the Kathmandu Valley. While the vast majority of IED scares were hoaxes, at least five actual IEDs exploded. There were no fatalities from any of these relatively unsophisticated IEDs, although on election day, a young child was seriously injured when he handled an IED that he believed was a toy. Also on election day, an IED injured three individuals when it exploded near a polling station in Kathmandu. In addition, there were at least six petrol-bomb attacks on long-distance buses and vans. A bus driver was killed in one of the attacks, and several individuals were injured.

The police arrested more than 200 individuals for involvement in the attacks, including dozens of members of the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) – a splinter party that broke from the UCPN(M) in June 2012 and opposed the elections. CPN-M leaders denied responsibility for the attacks, although CPN-M Chairman Mohan Baidya acknowledged at a December press conference that some party members, frustrated that demands to call off the elections were ignored, may have been involved in the petrol-bomb attacks.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Nepali law criminalizes activities related to terrorism, including the financing of terrorism. While Nepal has specialized units to respond to terrorist incidents, law enforcement units lack the capacity to effectively detect, deter, and identify
terrorist suspects. An open border with India and relatively weak airport security hamper efforts to implement effective counterterrorism policing.

Nepali police officers continued to participate in the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program. In 2013, the ATA program funded six training courses to improve counterterrorism capabilities within Nepali law enforcement agencies. ATA training focused on building Nepali law enforcement capacity to secure the country’s borders from terrorist transit and preventing terrorists from establishing safe havens within Nepal. Additionally, the U.S. Department of Justice International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) began training the Nepal Police in Polygraph Examination to improve criminal investigations, including investigations of potential terrorist activities. The United States also sponsored four joint training exercises with the Nepal Army to develop its counter-terrorism force, the Mahabir Rangers.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Nepal belongs to the Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering, a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. In June, President Yadav signed an additional ordinance to satisfy FATF requirements for criminalizing terrorist finance. The President also approved amendments to the Money-Laundering Prevention Act (MLPA) that give the government broad powers to confiscate assets of terrorist organizations and financiers. In September, Nepal froze the assets of 224 entities and 64 individuals with suspected connections to al-Qa’ida.

In October, the FATF noted that Nepal had largely addressed its action plan and is planning on conducting an onsite review to ensure that the process of implementing the required reforms and actions is underway, including addressing deficiencies previously identified by the FATF.

Nepali law allows the government to freeze and confiscate terrorist assets; however, coordination among different institutions remained slow. The Nepali authorities were in the process of installing computer systems to trace suspected terrorist assets and freeze them.

The Nepal Rastra Bank (the Central Bank of Nepal, NRB), licenses and monitors business services that receive remittances. Transactions by unauthorized banks and financial institutions to transfer or receive money (such as *hundi* and *hawala*) are considered criminal money laundering offenses, but it is difficult for the Nepali government to investigate these informal money transfer systems.

Only banks can legally transfer money out of Nepal. Money transfer services in Nepal may receive inbound remittances, but funds must be distributed to recipients through banks, which are required to collect data on the originator.

The NRB’s Financial Information Unit (FIU) directives do not cover non-profit organizations, unless there is specific information that they are involved in money laundering and terrorist financing.


**PAKISTAN**

**Overview:** In 2013, Pakistan continued to confront terrorist groups, including al-Qa’ida (AQ), Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Punjabi Taliban, and Lashkar I Jhangvi (LJ), all of whom mounted attacks against police, military and security forces, or engaged in sectarian violence and criminal
activities against all sectors of society. Pakistan did not confront Lashkare-Tayyiba, however, who continued to operate, rally, and fundraise in Pakistan with its front organizations. In 2013, terrorists used remote-controlled improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in bicycles, motorcycles, parked cars, rickshaws, donkey carts, and alongside roads, used vehicle-borne IEDs, suicide bombers (including females), targeted assassinations, rocket-propelled grenades, and other armed combat tactics in attacks on mosques, churches, markets, journalists, aid workers, government institutions and officials. AQ and HQN continued to plot against U.S. interests in the region, including U.S. diplomatic facilities. TTP posed a threat to both U.S. and Pakistani interests, and carried out numerous attacks against Pakistani armed forces, Pakistani civilians, and government institutions.

The May 2013 national elections brought in new civilian leadership, which was reviewing a new counterterrorism strategy at year’s end. In the pre-election period, some terrorist groups forged alliances with certain political parties, including religiously-based political parties. Some violent extremists conducted election-related terrorist attacks against political parties, candidates, and government officials. Pakistan’s government has pursued negotiations with TTP while also targeting the group militarily. Pakistan continued to support the Afghan peace process.

Karachi continued to suffer from political and ethnic violence inflicted by different groups, including militant organizations, fundamentalist religious groups, and the militant wings of political parties. Some militant groups worked to assert control over political parties and criminal gangs operating in the city and surrounding areas of southern Sindh. The security situation in Karachi was a priority concern for Pakistan’s president, prime minister, parliament, Supreme Court, and the military and law enforcement agencies.

2013 Terrorist Incidents: During 2013, terrorist groups targeted the Pakistani government and military, engaged in sectarian violence, and perpetrated attacks against civilians. Terrorists organized armed assaults on police stations, judicial centers, border check posts, military convoys, and polio vaccination teams. Terrorists plotted against and attacked judges, prosecutors, police officers, defense lawyers, anti-TTP peace committee members, intelligence officers, and elected officials. In the months leading up to the May national elections, terrorists attacked and killed political party workers and candidates, bombed political rallies, and, after the elections, killed newly elected and appointed officials. Terrorists mounted an armed attack on a Pakistan military and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) office in Sukkur, and days later stormed a major prison, releasing several dozen imprisoned high-profile terrorists.

In separate incidents, terrorists assassinated a high-ranking Army general in the tribal areas, the Karachi Chief of Police, and the president’s chief of security. Terrorists targeted Shia and other religious minorities in all areas of Pakistan, especially in Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), and Balochistan. Terrorists killed an international team of mountain climbers, including one U.S. citizen, on Pakistan’s famed Nanga Parbat Mountain.

As of mid-December, over 1,025 civilians and more than 475 security forces personnel had been killed in terrorist-related incidents in Pakistan during the year. The presence of AQ, TTP, and other militant groups continues to pose a threat to U.S. citizens throughout Pakistan. The TTP claimed responsibility for the majority of the frequent attacks that targeted civilians and security personnel. Terrorist incidents occurred in every province. Representative incidents include:

- On January 10, a string of bombings in Quetta killed over 105 people and injured an estimated 169 more. In one attack, there were two explosions 10 minutes apart, with most fatalities
occurring when police and media responded to the first bombing. The banned Sunni group, LJ, claimed responsibility for the twin attack, which took place in a predominantly Shia neighborhood. On the same day, a bomb exploded under a military vehicle at a busy market area, killing 12 and injuring 47 people. A Baloch nationalist group claimed responsibility.

- On June 15, 25 people died in a sectarian-related coordinated attack on a women’s college in Quetta along with the medical complex where victims were subsequently taken for treatment. The attack was notable for its use of a female suicide bomber, the first such occurrence in Balochistan. Later the same day, terrorists attacked and torched the historical landmark Ziarat residence 75 miles east of Quetta.
- On June 23, terrorists wearing paramilitary uniforms attacked a mountaineering base camp on Nanga Parbat in Gilgit-Baltistan and killed 10 foreign climbers, including one U.S. citizen. Three security officials sent to investigate the murders were also killed by terrorists.
- On July 10, a terrorist suicide bomber attacked the convoy of the chief of the presidential security detail in Karachi, killing the chief of security for President Zardari and two others.
- On July 24, suicide bombers and armed militants attacked the regional office of the ISI in a high security zone in Sukkur. Three ISI officials, and 10 Sindh police and Rangers personnel were killed, and 50 other people were injured during the ensuing battle.
- On July 29, terrorists stormed the Central Prison at Dera Ismail Khan in KP, forcing the release of imprisoned high-value terrorists. Twenty-four people died during the attack.
- On September 22, two suicide bombers attacked an historic Christian church in Peshawar; 119 persons were killed with over 145 others injured. The bombers detonated their vests at the end of a church service.
- On September 29, 42 people were killed and over 100 injured after a car bomb blast in the crowded Kissa Khawani Bazaar in Peshawar.
- On October 16, the newly appointed Khyber Pakhtunkhwa law minister and 10 others died after a suicide attacker exploded a bomb at the minister’s residence in Dera Ismail Khan.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Pakistan enacted additional amendments to the Antiterrorism Act of 1997, and promulgated several new laws to empower the national government to address terrorism with enhanced law enforcement and prosecutorial powers. Pakistan’s government is in the process of implementing four significant laws passed in 2013: the National Counterterrorism Authority Act, the Fair Trial Act, amendments to the Antiterrorism Act of 1997, and the Protection of Pakistan Ordinance of 2013 (PPO). The Pakistan government continued to make use of the reinforced counterterrorism legislation; however, the judiciary moved slowly in processing terrorism and other criminal cases in general.

Pakistan took steps in 2013 to address challenges in interagency cooperation and coordination. In 2013, Pakistan engaged in structural reforms on counterterrorism, designed to centralize coordination and information sharing. The National Counterterrorism Authority (NACTA) was empowered by new legislation in April, but was not fully activated in 2013. NACTA is envisioned as facilitating increased coordination and collection of counterterrorism intelligence among security agencies and provincial police, and providing a vehicle for national policy and strategy formulation for all aspects of counterterrorism. The Intelligence Bureau (IB) has nationwide jurisdiction as a civilian agency, and is fully empowered under the PPO to coordinate with provincial and territorial counterterrorism units.

Intimidation by terrorists against witnesses, police, victims, prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges contribute both to the slow progress of cases in Antiterrorism Courts and a high acquittal rate. Prosecutors often lacked resources needed to conduct successfully prosecutions in the trial phase.
Jurisdictional divisions among and between military and civilian security agencies continued to hamper effective investigation and prosecution of terrorism cases. Pakistan promulgated new legislation in 2013 that supports the investigation and prosecution of terrorism offenses. The new enhanced tools provided by the Fair Trial Act of 2012 and the NACTA law are in the process of being implemented by the government. These laws are designed to provide the necessary legal tools to detect, disrupt, and dismantle terrorist activities and organizations to intelligence agencies, law enforcement agencies, and prosecutors. The PPO augments the Antiterrorism Act of 1997 (as amended) and creates a federally-empowered infrastructure with special federal courts, prosecutors, police stations, and investigation teams for the enforcement of 20 specially delineated categories of offenses. Pakistan’s 2013 amendments to the Antiterrorism Act of 1997 increase protections for witnesses, victims, and judges in terrorism cases, provide for admissibility of electronic evidence in court, and set guidelines for detention and judicial review.

Pakistan is implementing biometric collection in national databases and screening at border land crossings with the International Border Management Security (IBMS) system. The National Automated Database Registration Authority (NADRA) maintains a national biometric database of citizens, residents, and diaspora Pakistanis, which is continually subject to upgrades. The Federal Board of Revenue (FBR), Pakistan’s customs and tax authority, continues to maintain currency detection units in Pakistan’s 12 international airports to counter bulk cash smuggling. The FBR has improved information sharing protocols on arrests and seizures.

The Antiterrorism Courts in Pakistan have limited procedures for the admission of foreign evidence. Pakistan’s prosecution of seven suspects accused in the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack is ongoing, with witnesses recording statements before the court. A Pakistani judicial commission made a second visit to India to obtain evidence and cross-examine four witnesses involved in India’s prosecution of Ajmal Kasab; however, it is unknown what impact India’s execution of Kasab in 2012 might have on the prosecution’s ability to introduce Kasab’s confession in the trial.

Pakistani military forces conducted significant counterterrorism operations in the tribal areas, and civilian and other forces conducted operations in Sindh, Balochistan, KP, and Punjab. Some AQ-affiliated terrorist groups were disrupted in Punjab, and some TTP leaders were killed during security operations. Security forces intercepted large stockpiles of weapons and explosives and discovered bomb-making facilities and sophisticated telecommunication networks. Pakistan continued to arrest terrorists and initiate prosecutions throughout 2013.

Cooperation with Pakistan’s security establishment on information sharing and law enforcement continued. Law enforcement cooperation continues with respect to terrorist attacks and plots against the embassy and personnel in Islamabad and the U.S. Consulates General and personnel in Lahore, Karachi, and Peshawar. Pakistani security services continued to actively investigate individuals and organizations behind the threats to the U.S. Consulate in Lahore and have partnered with the United States for information exchange and enhanced security cooperation.

Pakistan continued to participate in the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program. ATA training and equipment focused on building capacity to respond to critical terrorism-related incidents – including explosives-related incidents – and to conduct counterterrorism investigations. The ATA program was able to successfully deliver crisis response training in the latter part of 2013. Overall, however, delays in issuance of Pakistani visas to ATA trainers significantly impeded program implementation.
Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Pakistan is an active participant in the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. In February 2012, FATF identified Pakistan on its public statement because Pakistan failed to address strategic deficiencies in anti-money laundering and counterterrorist finance (AML/CFT). In October, the FATF noted Pakistan’s substantial steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime, including by issuing a Statutory Regulatory Order that addresses the definition of terrorism and an Antiterrorism Amendment Ordinance to establish procedures for the identification and freezing of terrorist assets. While FATF praised the content of the Antiterrorism Amendment Ordinance, it encouraged Pakistan to take the necessary steps for swift ratification of the ordinance by its legislature.

UN-designated terrorist organizations in Pakistan continue to avoid sanctions by reconstituting themselves under different names, often with little effort to hide their connections to previously banned groups. Although Pakistan added some named groups to its proscribed organizations list, there was still concern about the weak implementation of UNSCRs 1267 (1999) and 1988 (2011) and their follow-on resolutions. While Pakistan has taken steps over the past year to implement UNSCR 1267, it still falls short of FATF’s international standards regarding the identification and freezing of terrorist assets under UNSCR 1373 (2001). The government has the ability to freeze assets but cannot confiscate assets unless an individual or entity is convicted of a crime. Pakistan issued a UNSC Enforcement Order of 2012 setting out a range of sanctions for non-compliance in the implementation of UNSCR 1267 but has not yet applied this authority. The FATF has recommended that Pakistan increase the administrative monetary penalty available or legislate for additional criminal sanctions to meet the international standards.

Lack of capacity, resource constraints, and effective CFT training for all participants in the criminal justice system are deterrents to an effective government response. Further, delays or denials of visas for U.S. law enforcement and judicial officials seeking to engage in AML/CFT capacity building have furthered hampered efforts in this area. Terrorist groups such as the Haqqani Network continued to raise funds in Pakistan.


Regional and International Cooperation: Pakistan actively participated in counterterrorism efforts in both regional and international venues. Pakistan is an active member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) and attended GCTF meetings and supported GCTF initiatives. Pakistan is a partner in the UK’s Counterterrorism Prosecution Reform Initiative (CaPRI), and provincial governments contributed to rule of law programs in Malakand and Punjab. Pakistan participated in South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) meetings on counterterrorism; is a member of Interpol and the Organization of Islamic States (OIC); and participated in multilateral groups where counterterrorism cooperation is discussed, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) (as an observer) and the D-8, a group of developing nations with large Muslim populations. Pakistan participated in UN Security Council meetings on sanctions and counterterrorism, and co-hosted a UN Counter-Terrorism Committee’s Executive Directorate regional workshop for South Asian judges, prosecutors and investigators in Islamabad.

Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the United States held high-level meetings on regional security, including efforts to combat violent extremism in the border region and to promote an Afghan reconciliation.
process. Pakistan also participated in bilateral meetings with a number of other nations on security cooperation and counterterrorism, including Turkey and the People’s Republic of China.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** In 2013, Pakistan’s NACTA started consultations with Malaysia, Turkey, and Indonesia on strategies for countering violent extremism. Integration of militants into society after peace agreements remained a major priority for the government. Pakistan’s military worked with civil society to operate the Sabaoon Rehabilitation Center, a de-radicalization program for youth in a military camp in Mingora, Swat. Militancy-exposed youth are rehabilitated through a combination of education and counseling. Sabaoon centers claim success in reintegrating militant youth into society, and there are now nine such centers operating in KP and FATA.

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**SRI LANKA**

**Overview:** The Sri Lankan government defeated the terrorist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in 2009. Concerns remain that widely reported allegations of atrocities and violations of international law committed by both the government and the LTTE during the civil war have not been addressed. Partly as a result, counterterrorism cooperation and training with the United States was limited in 2013. No arrests related to terrorism were made, but the Government of Sri Lanka remained concerned that the LTTE’s international network of financial support was still functioning. The Sri Lankan government continued to maintain a strong military presence in post-conflict areas and continued to voice concern about the possible re-emergence of pro-LTTE sympathizers. Sri Lankan police did not participate in the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program in 2013.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Counterterrorism legislation in Sri Lanka has historically focused on eliminating the LTTE. In 2013, the Government of Sri Lanka continued to implement the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), enacted in 1982 as a wartime measure, which gives security forces sweeping powers to search, arrest, and detain individuals. The government sometimes used the PTA to stifle dissent among political opponents or others critical of the government.

Although U.S. antiterrorism assistance to Sri Lanka has generally been limited, in 2013 the Sri Lankan government was a proactive partner with the U.S. Departments of State, Homeland Security, Defense, and Energy on securing its maritime border. The U.S. Coast Guard, under the Department of State’s Export Control and Related Border Security program, continued to train Sri Lankan Coast Guard and Navy personnel on border and export control matters, and the government of Sri Lanka continued to cooperate with U.S. Customs and Border Protection through the Container Security Initiative.

Border security remained a significant issue for the Sri Lankan Government in 2013. In 2013, the U.S. State Department trained 25 Sri Lankan immigration officials on fraudulent document recognition, while the International Organization for Migration (IOM) trained 40 immigration officers in techniques to improve border surveillance and combat human trafficking. IOM also continued to work with the Australian government to provide specialized training to Sri Lankan immigration personnel on profiling, identification of violators, and arrests and prosecutions, among other border control-related training.

Beginning in late 2012, the Sri Lankan government began partnering with the Canadian Counterterrorism Program on two border security related projects: the Interpol Database system, used
to store and share profiling information in real time, and the Lost and Stolen Passport program, which addresses the large-scale border control issues the Sri Lankan government faces.

Also in 2013, the Sri Lankan government collaborated with the EU Immigration Department on the Advanced Passenger Information system, which transmits passenger information to Government of Sri Lanka immigration officials upon arrival. Collaboration with the Australian government has resulted in the development of a passport fingerprinting program scheduled to go online in 2014. The data generated from these collection systems will be significant assets to the Sri Lankan government in its efforts to control and combat illegal migration; however, the issue of maritime border security is one that needs additional action and must be considered within a regional context.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Sri Lanka belongs to the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and the Finance of Terrorism (EAG), a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. In June, the FATF welcomed Sri Lanka’s progress in improving its anti-money laundering/counterterrorist finance (AML/CFT) regime and removed the country from FATF’s monitoring process. Sri Lanka was, however, encouraged to continue the implementation of its procedures to identify and freeze terrorist assets.

While neither an important regional financial center nor a preferred center for money laundering, several factors make the country vulnerable to money laundering and terrorist finance. These include a lack of transparent tender mechanisms in government projects, past experience with terrorism, tax evasion, and a large informal economy. Legal remittance flows through the formal banking system have increased sharply in recent years. Remittances originate primarily from Sri Lanka’s substantial overseas workforce.

Before its defeat in 2009, the LTTE had used a number of non-profit organizations for fundraising purposes. Sri Lanka continued its efforts to search for other financial links to the LTTE, even many years after the war ended. There were criticisms that this search for terrorists was extended well beyond its utility and expanded to target legitimate political opponents of the government. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR)*, Volume 2, *Money Laundering and Financial Crimes*: [http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm](http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm).

**Regional and International Cooperation:** In November, the Sri Lankan government held the Galle Dialogue, which featured multilateral discussion by international security force representatives on issues of regional security in South Asia. Issues covered during the conference included maritime terrorism and the trafficking of narcotics, weapons, and people.

**TAJIKISTAN**

**Overview:** In 2013, Tajikistan continued to address weaknesses in its counterterrorism strategy and demonstrated its ability to conduct counterterrorism operations. Tajikistan’s counterterrorism policies were focused on marginalizing violent Islamist extremist groups in Tajikistani society. In 2013, Tajikistan conducted various meetings with its fellow Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) member countries to enhance cooperation in the sphere of counterterrorism and border security. Tajikistan sought to increase military and law enforcement capacity to conduct tactical operations through bilateral and multilateral assistance programs, including with the United States.
Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The Tajikistani government prosecuted terrorists under the Law on Combating Terrorism, the Law on Anti-Money Laundering, the Law on Currency Regulation, the Law on Notary, and the Criminal Code of the Republic of Tajikistan. Resource constraints, corruption, lack of training for effective law enforcement and border security officials, and general capacity issues continued to plague the Tajikistani government’s ability to interdict possible terrorists.

Throughout 2013, Tajikistan was an active participant in the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program, and other U.S.-sponsored counterterrorism training programs. ATA focused on delivering training and equipment to build Tajikistani capacity to secure the country’s borders. ATA assistance also included instructor development courses to improve the abilities of Tajikistani officers to share lessons from ATA training with their colleagues.

Tajikistan continued to make progress in improving border security with bilateral and multilateral assistance, although effectively policing the Tajikistani/Afghan border was a difficult task requiring more resources and capabilities than were available to the Tajikistani government. In 2013, the Tajikistani government established an interagency Secretariat, which met regularly throughout the year to coordinate implementation of Tajikistan’s 2010 National Border Management Strategy. The International Organization for Migration and the OSCE worked to improve travel document security. The OSCE also provided funding to link Tajikistan’s existing passport data scanners at airports and land ports of entry to the Interpol database. The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, the Border Management Program in Central Asia, and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime worked to improve border infrastructure, promote inter-agency cooperation, provide direct training, and expand training capacity in Tajikistan.

Corruption in the judicial system and misuse of counterterrorism statutes to suppress legitimate political opposition hampered the effectiveness of the government’s counterterrorism efforts.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Tajikistan is a member of the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (EAG), a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. In June 2011, Tajikistan made a high-level political commitment to work with the FATF and EAG to address its strategic AML/CFT deficiencies. In October, the FAFT noted that Tajikistan has taken steps towards improving its AML/CFT regime but called on the country to address its remaining deficiencies: ensuring adequate procedures for freezing terrorist assets; implementing adequate procedures for the confiscation of funds related to the full range of money laundering predicate offences; and addressing the remaining issues relating to customer due diligence measures. The EAG has provided Tajikistan with assistance to improve its legislative and regulatory frameworks and operational capabilities.

In 2013, Tajikistan amended portions of its legislation pertaining to money laundering and financial crimes, bringing its laws closer to compliance with international recommendations.

Outstanding deficiencies in the financial crime enforcement and regulatory sector included: lack of adequate record keeping; the lack of an effective financial intelligence unit; and poor coordination, staffing, and training among Tajikistani agencies that deal with money laundering, which impeded the Tajikistani government’s ability to conduct effective investigations. Endemic corruption also hampered reforms in this area.
Tajikistan successfully prosecuted terrorists under the Law on Combating Terrorism in 2013. Three suspects faced anti-money laundering (AML) charges, and 28 faced charges related to countering the financing of terrorism (CFT), resulting in two AML- and 13 CFT-related convictions. In total, Tajikistan sentenced 45 members of prohibited organizations, 15 on finance-related charges. The Tajikistani government confiscated property in one AML and five CFT-related cases.


**Regional and International Cooperation:** Tajikistan is an active member of the OSCE, where it focuses on border security issues, and is also a member of the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization and the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (CSO). The United States, Russia, Japan, and the EU provided funding for border security programs in Tajikistan. In June 2013, Tajikistan participated in regional counterterrorism exercises with SCO partner nations.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** Stemming violent extremism and radicalization in Tajikistan is a top priority for the Tajikistani government. Many of the government's measures, however, had a negative impact on religious freedoms, including prohibiting children under 18 from attending mosque or other public religious services and banning women from worshiping in mosques. We refer you to the Department of State’s Annual Report to Congress on International Religious Freedom (http://www.state.gov/j/drl/irf/rpt/index.htm) for further information.

**TURKMENISTAN**

**Overview:** The Government of Turkmenistan continued its efforts to improve the capacity of law enforcement agencies to combat terrorism, ensure border security, and detect terrorist financing. The Government of Turkmenistan has been reluctant to work with the State Department, however, participating in only two out of five Antiterrorism Assistance courses offered in the past three years. Counterterrorism cooperation continued to focus on building the trust and relationships necessary for future effective, widespread training and capacity building. Broad, vague definitions of terrorism and so-called “religious extremism” are sometimes used by the government to target internal dissent.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** The country’s legal system as it pertains to counterterrorism centers on the 2003 counterterrorism law that defines which crimes are considered terrorist in nature. This law is supplemented by articles 271-273 of the criminal code, which pertain to terrorist acts and terrorist financing and are used to prosecute terrorism-related offenses.

The Ministries of National Security, Internal Affairs, Defense, and State Border Service perform counterterrorism functions and share information through an interagency commission. The country’s law enforcement capacity needs improvement, as law enforcement units have a poor record of accountability and respect for human rights. Prosecutors, however, do play a significant role in the investigation phase of a case, and specialized law enforcement units exist to conduct investigations. These units possess specialized equipment but usually only use the equipment for official ceremonies and demonstrations as opposed to daily operations. Turkmenistan also participated in U.S. and international-sponsored training programs, including a UN Office on Drugs and Crime program on international counterterrorism instruments and a U.S. training program on combating transnational threats. Turkmenistan remained a partner nation for the Department of State’s Antiterrorism...
Assistance (ATA) program, and the ATA program provided a successful crisis management seminar for law enforcement leaders in 2013.

The State Border Service (SBS) continued to operate frontier garrisons on its borders with Iran and Afghanistan and managed eight radiation portal monitors along its borders, which were donated by the Department of Energy through its Second Line of Defense program. The State Migration Service maintains a terrorist screening watch-list and possesses biometric screening capabilities at ports of entry.

Turkmenistan’s political will to counter terrorism and ensure border security is evident in the government’s continued emphasis on maintaining stability above all other concerns. On border security, the Government of Turkmenistan has increased its cooperation with the United States via participation in the Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) Program, and for the first time, participated in programs pertaining to legal/regulatory reform and the creation of a strategic trade control regime to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Petty corruption, however, sometimes hampered effective law enforcement. For example, in October, President Berdimuhamedov dismissed the Chairman of the State Border Service (SBS), who was imprisoned shortly thereafter on bribery charges. Additionally, international cooperation with the government is often hampered by a bureaucracy that operates according to an opaque set of rules and that frequently deems public information “state secrets.”

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Turkmenistan is a member of the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (EAG), a FATF-style regional body. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

**Regional and International Cooperation:** Turkmenistan government officials participated in OSCE-sponsored trainings on border security, countering the financing of terrorism, and protecting human rights while combating terrorism.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** Turkmenistan’s law enforcement and security agencies exercise stringent control over the population. The Turkmen government reportedly views conservative Islam with suspicion. Since the country’s independence, mosques and Muslim clergy have been state-sponsored and financed. This level of government surveillance suggests that any violent extremist groups existing in Turkmenistan would be small, underground, and disparate. However, the severe curtailment of basic freedoms, growing economic inequality, an ideological void among young people, and the perception of corruption could cause people to be attracted to violent extremist ideologies. We refer you to the Department of State’s Annual Report to Congress on International Religious Freedom (http://www.state.gov/j/drl/irf/rpt/index.htm) for further information.

**UZBEKISTAN**

**Overview:** As with other Central Asian governments in 2013, the Government of Uzbekistan remained concerned about the possibility of a growing terrorism threat connected to changes in the number of international forces in Afghanistan past 2014, and it continued to seek to reduce its vulnerability to this perceived threat. A central concern is the possibility that terrorist groups that have
previously operated in Uzbekistan, notably the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), could return from Afghanistan and pose a greater threat. While Uzbekistan’s government remains confident that it can control its border with Afghanistan, it is less sure about its neighbors’ ability to do so and is particularly concerned with infiltration of extremists through Uzbekistan’s long, rugged border with Tajikistan.

The Government of Uzbekistan restricts information on internal matters, making it difficult to analyze both the extent of the terrorist threat and the effectiveness of Uzbekistani law enforcement’s efforts to combat it. Additionally, resource constraints, corruption and lack of modern law enforcement training continue to hamper the government’s ability to respond to terrorist attacks. Furthermore, Uzbekistan’s counterterrorism effectiveness is undermined by its lack of respect for fundamental human rights, ineffective and overly bureaucratic institutions, and slow progress in establishing the rule of law. These factors increase the country’s vulnerability to the appeal of violent extremism.

2013 Terrorist Incidents: On October 26, independent, Prague-based press outlet Ozodlik reported that 25 year-old Doniyor Oripov detonated an improvised explosive device in a restroom of a restaurant in Samarkand, killing himself and wounding his 18 year-old brother Damir Oripov. Uzbekistani authorities did not release any information on the incident.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The Government of Uzbekistan investigates and prosecutes terrorist-related acts under its Law on Combating Terrorism, passed in 2000 and revised in 2004. The Law on Combating Terrorism identifies the National Security Service (NSS), the Ministry of Interior, the State Border Guards Committee (operating within the NSS command structure), the State Customs Committee, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry on Emergency Situations as the government entities responsible for countering and responding to terrorism. The NSS is the lead counterterrorist law enforcement agency, with primary responsibility for the coordination and supervision of the interagency efforts.

Law enforcement in Uzbekistan continued to arrest, prosecute, and convict an unknown number of people under charges of extremism in 2013. External security threats and “religious extremism” provide the primary justifications for Uzbekistan’s restrictive border control and often indiscriminate police actions. Moreover, the security sector in Uzbekistan, led by the NSS, prioritized the narrow goal of securing the regime against internal dissent and utilized broad enforcement methods to maintain internal security. As a result, its policy is to brand any Islamic groups that it broadly determines to deviate from the state-sponsored version of Islam as “extremist” and to criminalize membership in such groups. Law enforcement frequently uses the terms “terrorism” or “extremism” interchangeably and views alleged ties to what the government considers extremist organizations as grounds to arrest, prosecute, and convict people. It is possible that the Uzbekistani security forces have neutralized legitimate threats in course of conducting indiscriminate and broadly targeted anti-extremist or politically motivated operations; however, a lack of reliable information makes it difficult to differentiate between legitimate counterterrorist law enforcement actions and politically motivated arrests aimed at individuals on the basis of their religion or opponents of the government.

Below are known examples from 2013 in which law enforcement arrested and prosecuted suspects under charges of alleged extremism or terrorism. As with many cases like this, it is difficult to determine if the arrests and convictions were truly terrorist- or violent extremist-related or simply used to suppress expressions of political or religious beliefs.
• A court sentenced to five to 12 years in prison 11 adherents of the banned Jihadisti (Jihodchilar) group from Namangan Region for attempting to overthrow the constitutional order and “inciting interethnic and interreligious hatred.”
• Authorities jailed nine individuals for membership in the banned Tabligh Jammat group, as well as for teaching religion to others without proper education.
• A court sentenced eight individuals from eight to 18 years in prison for alleged membership in a “Wahhabi” group and for possessing banned religious literature.
• Authorities brought charges against Novosti Uzbekistana newspaper for “consciously promoting terrorism” and banned its publication. The charges related to a picture that the newspaper published in its October 10 edition. The file photograph, taken from the internet for an article about the Andijon local government, reportedly showed armed individuals during the 2005 Andijon events.
• A court sentenced 26-year-old Murodali Isroilov to seven years in prison for conspiring while in Russia to create a clandestine extremist organization within Uzbekistan to build an Islamic state and implement “Wahhabi” doctrine.
• An international NGO and family members reported that Kazakhstan extradited to Uzbekistan 38-year-old Khayrullo Tursunov. Kashkadaryo Region Criminal Court sentenced Tursunov to 16 years in prison on June 6 on “religious extremism” charges.
• In July 2013, Amnesty International released a report focusing on the practice of forcible extraditions in Central Asia, highlighting numerous cases where Uzbekistani citizens were extradited from other Commonwealth of Independent States member states, often forcibly and without due process of law, to face charges of “religious extremism” in Uzbekistan.

As part of an end-of-year amnesty of prisoners announced by the Senate in December in honor of the 21st anniversary of the adoption of the Constitution, the Uzbekistani government included a group of prisoners identified as “individuals who were convicted for the first time of participation in banned organizations and the commission of crimes against peace and security or against public security and who have firmly stood on the path to recovery.” However, the decree also included stipulations that prisoners convicted of “participating in banned organizations and those convicted of participating in crimes against the public order,” terms used in the past for prisoners convicted of extremism, would be excluded from those being released.

The Government of Uzbekistan continued issuing biometric passports to citizens for travel outside of Uzbekistan. The biometric data includes a digital photo, fingerprints, and biographical data.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Uzbekistan belongs to the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (EAG), a FATF-style regional body. In 2013, Uzbekistan’s Cabinet of Ministers designated the Department on Fighting Tax, Currency Crimes and Legalization of Criminal Income under Prosecutor-General's Office as the body responsible for implementation of EAG agreements.

Legally, money laundering needs to be linked to a predicate offense. As such, investigators and the judicial system do not often pursue money laundering charges. Investigators have three months to finalize investigations. With the intense pressure to solve cases, this three month time frame does not leave much time to understand the complexities and/or to learn of the players involved in the money laundering.

**Regional and International Cooperation:** Although the Government of Uzbekistan prefers bilateral engagement in its security-related cooperation, it is currently a member of several regional organizations that address terrorism, including the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), with the Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure of the SCO (RATS) headquartered in Tashkent. Tashkent hosted the 2013 annual meeting of SCO heads of government. The Uzbekistani government also continued to work with several multilateral organizations such as the OSCE, the EU, and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime on general security issues, including border control.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** Official government media continued to produce documentaries, news articles, and full-length books about the dangers of joining violent Islamist extremist and terrorist organizations. The message is generally targeted to the 15-40 year old, male demographic, which the government considers the most susceptible to recruitment to violent extremist groups, although some media has focused on keeping women from falling into the traps of violent extremists. In February and July, state TV aired programs warning parents of the danger of sending their children to hujras, traditional religious schools outlawed in the country, and declaring that the roots of religious extremism, dogmatism, and terrorism lay in private religious classes. However, some NGOs continued to suggest that greater freedom to circulate mainstream, non-extremist Islamic and other religious materials could be more effective in countering extremism than the current policy of maintaining a government monopoly over religious publications. We refer you to the Department of State’s Annual Report to Congress on International Religious Freedom (http://www.state.gov/j/drl/irf/rpt/index.htm) for further information.

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**WESTERN HEMISPHERE**

In 2013, governments in Latin America made modest improvements to their counterterrorism capabilities and their border security. Corruption, weak government institutions, insufficient interagency cooperation, weak or non-existent legislation, and a lack of resources remained the primary causes for the lack of significant progress in some of the countries. Transnational criminal organizations continued to pose a more significant threat to the region than transnational terrorism, and most countries made efforts to investigate possible connections with terrorist organizations.

Iran’s influence in the Western Hemisphere remained a concern. However, due to strong sanctions imposed on the country by both the United States and the EU, Iran has been unable to expand its economic and political ties in Latin America.

The United States continued to work with partner nations to build capacity to detect and address any potential terrorist threat.

There were no known operational cells of either al-Qa’ida or Hizballah in the hemisphere, although ideological sympathizers in South America and the Caribbean continued to provide financial and ideological support to those and other terrorist groups in the Middle East and South Asia. The Tri-Border area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay continued to be an important regional nexus of arms, narcotics, and human trafficking; counterfeiting; pirated goods; and money laundering – all potential funding sources for terrorist organizations.
Despite the peace negotiations throughout the year, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia committed the majority of terrorist attacks in the Western Hemisphere in 2013.

**ARGENTINA**

**Overview:** Argentina maintained substantial capabilities for confronting terrorism at the federal level, but continued to face challenges in policing its remote northern and northeastern borders – including the Tri-Border Area, where Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay meet – against transnational crimes such as illicit drug and human trafficking, contraband smuggling, and illicit trade-based money laundering. Limited U.S. law enforcement and security cooperation with Argentina focused on information sharing.

**2013 Terrorist Incidents:** On September 19, a small improvised explosive device detonated in front of the headquarters of the Mutual Help Association of the Argentine National Gendarmerie, lightly wounding two gendarmes. Several groups inconclusively claimed responsibility.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Argentina’s Antiterrorism Law of 2007, modified in 2011, serves as a supplement to the criminal code for the prosecution of terrorism cases. Multiple security agencies maintained specialized law enforcement units that have substantial capabilities to respond to terrorist incidents. The Argentine government enacted a program to strengthen coordination between federal and provincial security institutions in August. By the end of 2013, 15 of 23 provinces signed on to the initiative.

The Government of Argentina continued to implement an identification security system (similar to the Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) that uses a fingerprint database created via a national identity card implemented in 2009. This AFIS-type system was deployed at all Argentine international airports, along with a program that requires taking photos and fingerprints of all travelers upon arrival and departure. The Ministry of Interior continued to issue e-passports that include a new passport book numbering system that facilitates the reporting of lost and stolen passports to Interpol.

The Argentine government took steps that it maintained would help determine culpability for the July 18, 1994 terrorist bombing of the Argentine-Jewish Mutual Association (AMIA) community center in Buenos Aires that killed 85 and injured more than 150 people. The foreign ministers of Argentina and Iran met three times in 2013 for dialogues designed to clarify Iran’s alleged role in the bombing, for which several former Iranian cabinet-level officials have outstanding Interpol Red Notices. President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner pressed the Iranian government at the September UN General Assembly to be forthcoming in implementing a “truth commission,” agreed by the two governments in January. Fernandez also requested that the United States raise the AMIA bombing in its own negotiations with Iran. The Argentine-Jewish community and other opinion leaders publicly opposed the Argentina-Iran dialogue, and criticized the government for failing to share information about the talks.

In July, an Argentine court denied the extradition to Peru of Peruvian national Rolando Echarri Pareja, a member of the Movement for Amnesty and Fundamental Rights – an organization with links to the Shining Path. Echarri was detained by Argentine security forces in December 2012.
On December 16, the Argentine Federal Police arrested alleged Shining Path member Oswaldo Ceferino Quispe Caso, who is the subject of an Interpol Red Notice, seeking his arrest for the murder of multiple police officers in Peru.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Argentina is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering in South America (GAFISUD), a FATF-style regional body. Argentina has been on FATF’s “grey list” since 2011; however, in October 2013, FATF noted that Argentina had taken steps towards improving its anti-money laundering/counterterrorism terrorist finance (AML/CFT) regime. The 2011 revision of the Antiterrorism Law broadened the definition of terrorism and increased monetary fines and prison sentences for crimes linked to terrorist financing. It closed several loopholes in previous legislation, empowered the Argentine Financial Intelligence Unit (UIF) to freeze assets, and criminalized the financing of terrorist organizations, individuals, and acts. At year’s end, this law had been applied almost exclusively to human rights cases dating back to Argentina’s military dictatorship more than 30 years ago. However, in 2013, the UIF administratively froze funds of an individual who was already being prosecuted when they were notified of his association with an international terrorist organization.

While exchange houses are licensed by the Central Bank and subject to some AML/CFT requirements, Argentina has an extensive network of informal exchange houses and individuals that operate outside of government supervision.

For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes*:


**Regional and International Cooperation:** Argentina participated in the OAS Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE), and the Southern Common Market Special Forum on Terrorism. Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay coordinated law enforcement efforts in the Tri-Border Area via their Trilateral Tri-Border Area Command.

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**BRAZIL**

**Overview:** The Brazilian government continued to support counterterrorism activities, including investigating potential terrorist financing, document forgery networks, and other illicit activity. Operationally, Brazilian security forces worked with U.S. officials to pursue investigative leads provided by U.S. and other intelligence services, law enforcement, and financial agencies regarding terrorist suspects. Brazil has a sophisticated and competent financial intelligence unit, the Council for Financial Activities Control.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Brazil has four pieces of terrorism legislation pending in Congress: one would deny visas to persons and/or expel foreigners convicted or accused of a terrorist act in another country (introduced in 2011); another defines terrorism in the Brazilian Constitution (introduced in 2013); a third updates the Brazilian penal code to include sentencing guidelines for terrorism crimes (introduced in 2012); and the fourth defines specific crimes, including terrorism, during and preceding the World Cup (introduced in 2011).

Brazil’s law enforcement capacity, as it pertains to proactive detection, deterrence, and prevention of terrorism within its borders, appears adequate but is limited as law enforcement priorities are almost singularly focused on counternarcotic activities. Interagency cooperation and coordination need
improvement, particularly regarding information sharing. While problems exist at the State level between enforcement agencies and their investigative counterparts, these are much more pronounced between Federal and State level law enforcement agencies. Coordination between civilian security and law enforcement agencies and the Brazilian military is hindered by inter-service rivalries.

Brazil has three law enforcement agencies with counterterrorism responsibilities, ranging from the investigation of terrorism to interdiction and response. They are the Brazilian Federal Police (DPF), through its Antiterrorism Division (DAT) and Tactical Operations Command (COT); the state-level Military Police Departments, through their respective Police Special Operations Battalions (BOPE); and the state-level Civil Police Departments through their respective Divisions of Special Operations (DOE).

All three of Brazil’s law enforcement agencies with counterterrorism responsibilities have benefitted from U.S. capacity building training. The U.S. Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance program delivered courses to security and law enforcement personnel covering topics such as tactical command, vital infrastructure security, crisis incident management, digital network security, and bus and rail security – all with the goal of enhancing investigative capabilities, building border security capabilities, and supporting the Government of Brazil’s efforts to prevent terrorist attacks at the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics. Training courses had the added benefit of bringing together disparate agencies, which enhanced the Brazilian interagency communication effort. Likewise, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation offered courses to the aforementioned units ranging from interview and interrogation techniques, terrorist financing and money laundering investigations, and Hostage Rescue Team tactical subject matter expert exchanges.

Brazilian authorities continued to work with other concerned nations – particularly the United States – in combating document fraud. Since 2009, multiple regional and international joint operations successfully disrupted a number of document vendors and facilitators, as well as related human-trafficking networks. Since 2008, DHS Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) have trained Brazilian airline employees on identifying fraudulent documents.

The U.S.-Brazil Container Security Initiative (CSI) in Santos, which began in 2005, continued to operate throughout 2013. The CSI promotes secure containerized cargo – shipped to the United States – by co-locating DHS CBP personnel overseas to work with a foreign customs administration, specifically to target, detect, and inspect high risk cargo and containers that are potentially associated with terrorism while facilitating the movement of legitimate trade. Brazil continued to reach out to CBP International Affairs and Office of Field Operations to learn best practices and conduct joint workshops to bolster supply chain security and port security.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Brazil is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering in South America (GAFISUD), a FATF-style regional body (FSRB). Brazil gives FATF recommendations high priority and has created a working group chaired by the Ministry of Justice to incorporate these recommendations into legislation and regulation. Brazil seeks to play an active leadership role in its FSRB and has offered technical assistance to Argentina to implement FATF recommendations. Brazil updated its money laundering legislation in 2012, establishing stricter penalties but it did not criminalize terrorist financing as a stand-alone criminal offense. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, *Money Laundering and Financial Crimes*: [http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcpt/index.htm](http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcpt/index.htm).
Regional and International Cooperation: The Brazilian government continued to invest in border and law enforcement infrastructure and has undertaken initiatives to control the flow of goods—legal and illegal—through the Tri-Border Area of Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay. Brazil’s intelligence and law enforcement forces also work with their regional and international partners. Brazil participates in regional counterterrorism fora, including: the OAS and its Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE), the Union of South American Nations, and Mercosur’s working group on terrorism and sub-working group on financial issues – the latter of which discusses terrorist financing and money laundering among the Mercosur countries.

CANADA

Overview: Canada played a vital role in international efforts to detect, disrupt, prevent, and punish acts of terrorism in 2013. Canada and the United States maintained a close, cooperative counterterrorism partnership, working together on key bilateral homeland security programs such as the Beyond the Border Action Plan and the Cross Border Crime Forum. Canada made major contributions to the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) and the Global Initiative to Counter Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), while Canadian diplomacy supported global efforts to prevent radicalization, counter violent extremism, and promote the rule of law overseas. Canadian law enforcement made some significant terrorism-related arrests in 2013, including disrupting a nascent conspiracy to derail a passenger train traveling between Toronto and New York City.

2013 Terrorist Incidents: There were no terrorist incidents in Canada in 2013. However, in January, two Canadian citizens who participated in the seizure of the In Amenas gas plant in Algeria, Xristos Katsioubas and Ali Medlej were killed in the attack.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Canada’s legal framework includes significant penalties for committing terrorist acts, conspiring to commit terrorist acts, financing terrorism, and traveling abroad to engage in terrorism. The Canadian government passed two counterterrorism-related bills in 2013, and introduced one more that failed to pass the House of Commons and terminated in September at the end of the first session of Parliament.

In April, Bill S-7, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code, the Canada Evidence Act, and the Security of Information Act, known as the Combating Terrorism Act received Royal Assent (the final legislative stage), and entered into force on July 15. The law restored clauses of the Antiterrorism Act of 2001 that had lapsed in 2007 under automatic sunset provisions. The law compels testimony at investigative hearings and permits preventive arrest and imposition of recognizance with conditions (preemptive bail conditions) on individuals to disrupt terrorist activity prior to the commission of a terrorist offense. New provisions include the offense of leaving or attempting to leave Canada for the purpose of engaging in terrorist activity or participating in terrorist training. It also increases penalties for individuals who knowingly harbor or conceal persons who have committed terrorist offenses.

In June, Bill S-9, an Act to Amend the Criminal Code, known as the Nuclear Terrorism Act received Royal Assent, and it entered into force on November 1. The law amended the legal definition of “terrorist activity” to include four new criminal offenses relating to the possession, use, transfer, export, import, alteration, and disposal of nuclear material or a radioactive device with the intent to cause death, serious bodily harm, or substantial damage to property or the environment; committing acts against a nuclear facility; committing an indictable offense for the purpose of obtaining nuclear or radioactive material or to obtain access to a nuclear facility; or threatening to commit any of these

Canadian law enforcement units have effectively demonstrated their capacity to detect, deter, and respond to terrorist incidents. Canadian law enforcement and homeland security entities readily share terrorism-related information with the United States and other investigative counterparts, and have clearly demarcated counterterrorism missions and effective working relationships with elements of the Canadian Forces that also have counterterrorism roles. Prosecutors work in close cooperation with specialized law enforcement units, all of which demonstrate its adherence to strict standards of accountability and scrupulous respect for human rights.

Canada has an extensive border security network, and makes excellent use of travel document security technology, terrorist-screening watch lists, biographic and biometric screening capabilities at ports of entry, and information sharing with other countries. Canada and the United States enjoy extensive border security collaboration under the auspices of the Beyond the Border Action Plan, the Cross Border Crime Forum, and other ongoing law enforcement exchanges.

Notable terrorism-related arrests in 2013 included:

- On April 22, police charged Chiheb Esseghaier – a Tunisian national – and Raed Jaser – a Palestinian national – with conspiring to derail a VIA Rail passenger train between Toronto and New York City. Neither of the suspects is a Canadian citizen. At year’s end, both men remained in custody and no trial date had been set. In a coordinated arrest, authorities in New York City arrested a third individual, Ahmed Abassi, whom they alleged radicalized Esseghaier and fraudulently applied for a visa to remain in the United States to commit acts of terrorism and develop a network of terrorist recruiters.

- In June, the Canadian Minister of Justice ordered the surrender of Iraqi-born Canadian citizen Sayfildin (Sayf) Tahir Sharif (also known as Faruq Khalil Muhammad ‘Isa) to the United States to face charges of conspiracy to murder Americans abroad, aiding and abetting the murder of U.S. nationals abroad, and provision of material support to terrorist conduct. Sharif filed for judicial review of the Minister’s decision and also appealed the 2012 judicial ruling by an Alberta court that found sufficient evidence existed to justify extradition. The hearing date on both of these matters was set for May 1, 2014. On October 29, 2013, by Diplomatic Note, the U.S. provided assurances that the death penalty would not be sought or imposed should Sharif be convicted. Sharif remained in custody at year’s end.

- On July 1, police charged Canadian citizens John Stewart Nuttall and Amanda Marie Korody of Vancouver with plotting to explode pressure-cooker devices among crowds on the grounds of the British Columbia Legislature. Police alleged that the pair were self-radicalized and inspired by al-Qaeda (AQ) ideology on the internet, but acted independently with no support from outside the country. In August, authorities transferred Nuttall to a forensic mental health facility. No trial date had been set by year’s end.

- In October, the Canadian Supreme Court heard an appeal of the constitutionality of an immigration security certificate against Ottawa resident Mohamed Harkat, which the Federal Court had upheld in 2010 on the basis that Harkat constituted a threat to national security. Authorities alleged that Harkat was an AQ sleeper agent. Separately, in June the Federal Court relaxed some restrictions on Harkat’s supervision in the community, including removal of his GPS tracking bracelet, and permitted him to travel domestically and have access to a mobile
telephone and computer. The court ruled that Harkat had complied with previous conditions and that the danger he posed to the community had lessened with the passage of time.

- In October, a Federal Court judge upheld the reasonableness of an immigration security certificate against Mohamed Zeki Mahjoub. The judge found credible evidence that Mahjoub was a member of two Egyptian terrorist groups: al-Jihad and Vanguards of Conquest. In January 2013, the Federal Court had relaxed conditions against Mahjoub on the basis that he had complied with restrictions and that the danger he posed to public security had lessened with time.
- As of December 2013, Misbahuddin Ahmed, Khurram Sher and Hiva Alizadeh continued to await trial as a result of their August 2010 arrest and charges related to an alleged conspiracy to bomb targets in Ottawa and participate in and facilitate terrorist activity. Authorities released Misbahuddin Ahmed and Khurram Sher on bail in 2011, while Hiva Alizadeh remained in custody.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Canada is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the Egmont Group, the Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, and is a supporting nation of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force. Canada is also an observer in the Council of Europe’s Select Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financial Action Task Force of South America against Money Laundering. Canada has a rigorous detection and monitoring process in place to identify money laundering and terrorist financing activities. The Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada is Canada’s financial intelligence unit and is responsible for detecting, preventing, and deterring money laundering and financing of terrorist activities. From April 1, 2012, to March 31, 2013, FINTRAC made 157 terrorist finance and security threat-related reports to law enforcement and national security partners, up from 116 the prior year. Canada has criminalized terrorist financing in accordance with international standards; freezes and confiscates terrorist assets without delay; monitors and regulates money/value transfer and other remittance services; requires collection of data for wire transfers; obligates non-profits to file suspicious transaction reports and monitors them to prevent misuse/terrorist financing; and routinely distributes UN lists of designated terrorists and terrorist organizations to financial institutions. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

Regional and International Cooperation: Canada prioritizes collaboration with international partners to counter terrorism and international crime, and regularly seeks opportunities to lead. Canada is a founding member of the GCTF and co-chairs the GCTF Sahel Working Group with Algeria. Canada was also active in fora dealing with counterterrorism, including the OSCE, UN, G-8, OAS, APEC, ASEAN, and the ASEAN Regional Forum, Commonwealth, International Civil Aviation Organization, and the International Maritime Organization. Canada makes major contributions to the GCTF and the GICNT, while Canadian diplomacy supports global efforts to prevent radicalization, counter violent extremism, and promote the rule of law overseas.

Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Development maintains a Counterterrorism Capacity Building Program, and provides training, funding, equipment, and technical and legal assistance to states to enable them to prevent and respond to a broad spectrum of terrorist activity. Examples of Canadian counterterrorism assistance include: border security; transportation security; legislative, regulatory and legal policy development; human rights training; law enforcement, security, military and intelligence training; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons and
explosives terrorism prevention; mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery; detecting and preventing terrorism financing; cyber security; and protection of critical infrastructure.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** The Royal Canadian Mounted Police’s National Security Community Outreach program promotes interaction and relationship-building with at-risk communities. The Department of Public Safety’s Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security fosters dialogue on national security issues between the government and community leaders, including diaspora groups. Both of these initiatives are part of Canada’s aforementioned Counterterrorism Strategy, which seeks specifically to reduce the risk of individuals succumbing to violent extremism and radicalization. The government continued to work with NGO partners and concerned communities to deter violent extremism through preventative programming and community outreach.

**COLOMBIA**

**Overview:** In 2013, even with an increase of attacks on infrastructure, Colombia experienced a year of overall decreased terrorist activity, thanks in part to significant successes in its military campaign against Colombia’s largest terrorist organization, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Although the government and the FARC reached tentative, partial agreements on land reform and political participation, no bilateral peace agreement was concluded.

The number of members of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs), including the FARC, the National Liberation Army (ELN), and several minor guerrilla groups killed in combat in 2013 went down by 23 percent, from 439 in 2012 to 340 in 2013. Similarly, the number of members of FTOs and guerrilla organizations captured decreased by 17 percent, from 3,151 in 2012 to 2,611 in 2013. At the same time, the total number of insurgents who demobilized in the same period rose by 18 percent from 1,140 in 2012 to 1,350 in 2013. The FARC concluded the year by declaring a 30-day unilateral ceasefire starting on December 15, while President Santos stated the government would continue its military pressure against insurgents. The ELN also expressed a desire to find a “political exit.” Although formal peace negotiations with the government have not started, the ELN released two high-profile victims of kidnapping and named a five-person negotiating team.

**2013 Terrorist Incidents:** As in 2012, the FARC focused on low-cost, high-impact asymmetric attacks. The most common forms of terrorist activity were the launching of mortars at police stations or the military, explosive devices placed near roads or paths, sniper attacks, roadblocks, and ambushes. Terrorist attacks on infrastructure – particularly on oil pipelines and equipment – primarily by the FARC and the ELN, increased by 46 percent in 2013 compared to 2012. Security forces and government buildings were the most common targets, although civilian casualties occurred throughout the year. Attacks were most common along the Venezuelan border in the departments of Arauca, Norte de Santander, and La Guajira, in the southwestern departments of Nariño and Cauca, and in the northwestern department of Antioquia.

In 2013, Colombian government statistics showed a seven percent decrease in attacks from 2012, with 830 terrorist incidents around the country compared to 894 attacks in the previous year. Among the terrorist attacks recorded in 2013, several were notable for their severity or significant press coverage:

- On May 10, Colombian police identified and neutralized a vehicle bomb that the FARC placed in a parking lot in Bogota. The vehicle contained 1.5 kilos of pentolite, enough to kill civilians in the immediate area, and was adjacent to a building that housed district attorneys.
On June 20, FARC rebels kidnapped American citizen Kevin Scott Sutay when he entered FARC-influenced territory. On October 27, the FARC released Sutay after Colombian government, U.S., and other international pressure and Red Cross mediation.

In October, repeated FARC attacks on energy infrastructure left the municipality of Tumaco in the Department of Nariño without water for almost a week and without power for more than three weeks. Similar attacks in Buenaventura in the Department of Valle del Cauca in November left approximately 400,000 residents without electricity.

In October and November, the FARC carried out repeated attacks on the Cerrejón coal mine in the Department of La Guajira, which represents 40 percent of Colombia’s coal exports. The FARC derailed coal trains on October 13 and 21, and killed one soldier and wounded two others that were guarding the mine on November 13.

On December 7, the FARC attacked a police station in the town of Inza in the Department of Cauca, killing five soldiers, one policeman, and three civilians, and wounding more than 40 people.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** The legal regime governing the investigation and prosecution of terrorism cases in Colombia is governed by Section 906 of Colombia’s Criminal Code, which phased in an accusatory system for the country’s criminal justice system. The goal of Section 906 is to develop an evidence-based system of justice where cases are tried before a judge based on testimonial, physical, or documentary evidence with a “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard of proof.

The Prosecutor General’s Office has a specialized Counterterrorism Unit with prosecutors assigned at the national level in Bogota, and in regions of conflict throughout the country. The unit has developed a great deal of expertise in investigating and prosecuting acts of terrorism and insurgency with the Prosecutor General’s own Technical Criminal Investigative Body (CTI), Colombia’s National Police (CNP), and the country’s military forces. Most cases are prosecuted under traditional legal statutes that are used for narcotics trafficking and organized crime, such as conspiracy and illegal possession of firearms for exclusive use of the armed forces. There are some specialized statutes that the Counterterrorism Unit uses, such as “rebellion” under Section 467 of Colombia’s Criminal Code. Colombia’s rebellion statute criminalizes “those who, through armed conflict, seek to overthrow the Constitutionally-enacted government of Colombia.”

On October 23, Colombia’s Constitutional Court struck down a constitutional amendment intended to provide greater legal protection to members of security forces and expand the jurisdiction of military courts over crimes allegedly committed by members of the security forces. President Santos later publicly announced his intention to resubmit the bill to Congress in 2014, arguing such an amendment would encourage the military to be more effective in the fight against terrorism.

Colombian law enforcement units have demonstrated their capacity to detect, deter, and respond to terrorist incidents. However, there is room for improvement in interagency cooperation and sharing of terrorism-related information. Prosecutors are consulted at early stages of investigations and work, in coordination with counterparts in other components of law enforcement. The CNP has specialized counterterrorism units in the Intelligence, Anti-Kidnapping, and Judicial Police Directorates, all with advanced investigation techniques and crisis response capabilities. However, there is no single agency that has jurisdiction over terrorism-related investigations and post-incident response. Law enforcement units display clear and effective command and control within each organization. These specialized law enforcement units are properly equipped and supported with relevant training. Counterterrorism
missions are demarcated to a limited extent between law enforcement and military units. Colombia’s contemporary military and law enforcement units have an improved record of accountability and respect for human rights. In April, the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights formally removed Colombia from its list of human rights abusers in the region.

Colombian authorities created several military task forces to enhance coordination in combating terrorism. The CNP created fusion centers to ensure all operational missions coordinate intelligence, investigations, and operations under the command of regional police commanders. Additionally, the Police Intelligence Directorate inaugurated a 24-hour-a-day Citizen Security Center tasked with detecting, deterring, and responding to terrorist attacks, among other crimes.

Colombian border security remained an area of vulnerability. Law enforcement officers faced the challenge of working in areas with porous borders and difficult topography plagued by the presence of illegal armed groups and illicit drug cultivation. The CNP lacked the manpower to enforce uniform policies for vehicle or passenger inspection at land border crossings. Biometric and biographic screening was conducted only at international airports.

Improved relations with neighboring Ecuador and Venezuela have led to some increased cooperation from those countries on law enforcement issues. Colombia also continued cooperation and information sharing with the Panamanian National Border Service. The CNP does not currently utilize advance passenger name records, but is in the process of designing and procuring a system that will allow it to do so.

Colombian authorities killed or arrested several important FARC members in 2013. An investigation revealed that the FARC, ELN, and the criminal gang “Urabeños” were working together in the department of Antioquia. In November, Colombian authorities cited new evidence recovered from seized FARC computers indicating the FARC paid a criminal organization US$500,000 to carry out the May 2012 assassination attempt against former Interior Minister Fernando Londoño. On December 15, a CTI-CNP operation killed FARC member Diego Fernando Tabares, the alleged planner of the Londoño assassination attempt and a separate future plot to assassinate former President Alvaro Uribe and current Prosecutor General Eduardo Montealegre. Colombian authorities also had improved results hindering the operations of terrorist support networks.

While kidnappings as a whole have declined in recent years, they continued to pose a real threat, especially in rural and insurgent-influenced portions of Colombia. In 2013, Colombia saw a 79 percent reduction in kidnappings from the same period in 2004. Organized extortion networks inhibit economic growth and subvert the rule of law where they are active, and the alleged failure of victims to accede to extortion demands is regularly cited as the cause for terrorist attacks. The CNP Anti-Kidnapping and Anti-Extortion Directorate (DIASE, also referred to as GAULA) has an international kidnapping unit to address any kidnappings involving foreign nationals.

Law enforcement cooperation between Colombia and the United States remained excellent. Evidence sharing and joint law enforcement operations occurred in a fluid and efficient manner, with information gathered in Colombia contributing to hundreds of prosecutions of U.S.-based criminals and organizations. The Prosecutor General’s Counterterrorism Unit reported no investigations and prosecutions of acts of terrorism against U.S. citizens during the year.

Colombia continued to participate in the U.S. Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program. ATA provided instruction and resources as part of a five-year plan to assist Colombia in
building advanced, self-sustaining border security capabilities, to investigate terrorists and terrorist incidents, and to protect critical infrastructure. Colombia continued to establish itself as a regional provider of counterterrorism training, particularly with regard to anti-kidnapping and protection of national leadership training.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Colombia is a member of the Financial Action Task Force of South America against Money Laundering (GAFISUD), a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body. Colombia stands out as a regional leader in the fight against terrorist financing, and has become a key part of a regional financial intelligence unit initiative aimed at strengthening information-sharing among Latin American countries.

Asset forfeiture cases developed by the Prosecutor General Office’s Counterterrorism Unit were referred to the Prosecutor General Office’s National Money Laundering and Asset Forfeiture Unit. The Unit’s prosecutors were generally very experienced. Given the volume of case referrals from virtually all units in the Prosecutor General’s Office, however, asset forfeiture prosecutors often found themselves overwhelmed.

The Prosecutor General’s Office used the same legal asset forfeiture tools for seizing assets in all criminal cases, including organized crime, drug trafficking, and terrorism. On December 12, the Colombian Congress approved and sent to President Santos for his signature, a more stringent asset forfeiture law that established a technical legal regime to streamline the manner in which the Prosecutor General’s Office processes such cases. The Prosecutor General’s Office also initiated a process of restructuring that includes the creation of more specialized police units with expertise in asset forfeiture and organized crime, especially financial crime.


**Regional and International Cooperation:** Colombia is actively involved in the UN, the OAS and its Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE), the Pacific Alliance, the Union of South American Nations, and is a founding member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum. The Colombian government frequently integrates the recommendations of the UN and OAS into its security and human rights decisions. The CNP operates an Interpol office of approximately 70 analysts, agents, and support staff. Colombia also led the creation of the American Police Community (Ameripol), with CNP Director General Rodolfo Palomino Lopez serving as Ameripol’s president in 2013. Colombia also helped found the Latin American and Caribbean Community of Police Intelligence in 2005, whose Technical Secretariat is based in Bogota.

Colombia is becoming a key leader in providing security training and assistance to other countries in the region. From January through October, Colombia conducted security training for 7,627 non-Colombian individuals – including 3,818 individuals from Central America and the Caribbean – in counter-narcotics, citizen security, crime prevention and monitoring, and military and police capacity building. The CNP and military continued to operate schools that train security personnel from around the region. Colombia provided judicial training to regional judges and prosecutors in handling drug trafficking and terrorism cases, basic and advanced helicopter training to pilots from countries throughout Latin America, and maintained its elite *Lancer* and *Jungla* special forces courses open to students from other countries. Colombia hopes to deepen its international security cooperation.
by becoming a non-member partner nation of NATO. The government signed an information sharing agreement with NATO on June 25 and introduced it to Congress for approval on September 11.

**Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism:** Colombia employed a robust and modern multi-agency approach to countering radicalization and violent extremism, with a focus on encouraging individual members and entire units of the FARC and ELN to demobilize and reintegrate into society. In 2013, a total of 1,350 FARC and ELN members and other dissidents had demobilized, an increase of 18 percent over 2012. The demobilization and reintegration programs provide medical care, psychological counseling, education benefits, and job placement assistance for former members of the FARC and ELN. In order to receive benefits, demobilized members of the paramilitary, FARC, and ELN must check in monthly. Recidivism rates were estimated at between 10 and 20 percent by the Colombian Agency for Reintegration.

The Colombian armed forces and police employed a number of fixed and mobile radio transmitters to broadcast strategic messaging to potential deserters. Such messaging was also seen in print, television, and alternative media. The Colombian military and police employed the same media to counter FARC recruitment efforts. Additionally, the Ministry of Defense organized highly publicized festivals and social events with celebrity participation to discourage the recruitment of vulnerable youth.

**MEXICO**

**Overview:** The Mexican government remained vigilant against domestic and international terrorist threats in 2013. There are no known international terrorist organizations operating in Mexico, and there is no evidence that any terrorist group has targeted U.S. citizens in Mexican territory. The Government of Mexico continued to strengthen law enforcement institutions and to disrupt and dismantle the transnational criminal organizations responsible for much of the violence in Mexico.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Mexico’s Congress passed a political reform in 2013 that, among other goals, aims to create a more independent federal investigative and prosecutorial body by increasing the autonomy of the Office of the Attorney General (PGR) from the President. The legislation seeks to amend Mexico’s Constitution and would require the approval of a simple majority of Mexican states to be implemented.

There are weaknesses in Mexico’s capacity to proactively investigate and detect terrorism-related activities. Specialized units exist within the PGR that focus on organized crime and money laundering, but Mexican authorities could improve cooperation with other government entities, such as the Mexican Finance Secretariat’s Financial Intelligence Unit (UIF).

CBP has mechanisms in place, in Mexico City, to verify and validate travel documents at the request of the Mexican government. Mexico is expanding its capacity to collect and store biometric information. On December 18, 2013, Mexican Immigration (INM) launched the Trusted Traveler Program (“Viajero Confiable,” its Global Entry Program equivalent). This program will enable Mexico to develop a list of trusted travelers, allowing them to focus more on the passengers about which they know the least. CBP assisted Mexico with the vetting of “Viajero Confiable” members, and Mexico assisted the United States on the vetting of Mexican citizens who applied for Global Entry. Mexico’s capacity to collect and share passenger name record (PNR) information is expanding. Mexican Customs has asked for CBP assistance with U.S. airline carriers to ensure compliance with SAT PNR requirements.
The U.S. Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and the Government of Mexico continue to strengthen passenger information sharing. In support of U.S. efforts to identify and interdict illegitimate travel and travelers, the U.S. government provided training to local, state, and federal officials, as well as to bank investigators, on how to detect fraudulent U.S. and Mexican identity and travel documents.

Mexico participated in the U.S. Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program. The goals of the ATA program in Mexico are to build border security capabilities; to prevent terrorists or terrorist organizations from operating and establishing safe havens, whether physical or virtual; and to build critical infrastructure protection capabilities. The ATA partnership with the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement continues to coordinate protection of national leadership training and cyber infrastructure security training.

On May 30, 2013, Manssor Arbabsiar was sentenced in a federal court in New York City to 25 years in prison after pleading guilty for his role in a plot by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to the United States. The Government of Mexico assisted the United States in its investigation of Arbabsiar, which led to his arrest in September 2011.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Mexico is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an observer of the Council of Europe Committee of Experts on the Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Measures and the Financing of Terrorism (Moneyval), and a non-observer special status member of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force. In 2013, the Financial Intelligence Unit of the National Banking Commission (UIF/CNBV) was working to finalize a law that would allow Mexico to freeze, without delay, funds directly or indirectly tied to terrorist financing. In October 2012, Mexico’s President signed long-awaited anti-money laundering legislation into law; as a result, the Federal Law for the Prevention and Identification of Operations with Illicit Resources, which went into effect on July 17, 2013, targets “vulnerable” transactions or activities that could be exploited for money laundering and terrorist financing. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes*: [http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm](http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm).

**Regional and International Cooperation:** Mexico continued to work with the OAS Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE) to implement a joint counterterrorism work plan, which includes nonproliferation and weapons of mass destruction interdiction. OAS/CICTE collaborated closely with the Export Control and Related Border Security Program on this initiative, and in 2013, the Committee funded multiple CICTE workshops in Mexico City focused on building awareness and best practices. In May, Mexico hosted the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism plenary in Mexico City.

**PANAMA**

**Overview:** The most direct terrorist threats to Panama were incursions by small units of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) 57th Front, which traversed remote areas of the Darien Region to smuggle drugs and people from Colombia. The Panamanian National Border Service (SENAFRONT) undertook several operations against the FARC in 2013, degrading the FARC’s capabilities in Panama to the point where they could not maintain a permanent presence. Panama has continued close cooperation with its neighbors, particularly Colombia, to secure its
Additionally, the Panama Canal Authority’s vigilance, along with international support, contributed to the security of the Panama Canal.

The potential for illicit transit and transshipment of strategically controlled, sanctioned, and dual-use goods and technologies through the Panama Canal and its Free Trade Zones (FTZ) is a vulnerability for Panama.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** In 2013, Panama passed a law that modified the language contained in the Penal Code regarding terrorism-related crimes. The law adds new provisions to the Criminal Code related to common aggravating circumstances and the crime of terrorism, establishing a penalty of six months to a year without prejudicing the right to claim compensation for damages sustained.

The seizure of the North Korean-flagged vessel Chong Chon Gang, which was carrying illicit arms, demonstrated the threat of armaments smuggling through Panama. Panama has yet to adopt comprehensive strategic trade management legislation but is working on a draft Executive Decree that would publish a National Control List for Panama. Efforts on the decree are being led by the Coordination Council Against International Terrorism, a body created by Executive Decree 448 of December 28, 2011, to review compliance with international terrorism conventions, strategize the implementation of UNSC Resolutions on terrorism, compile information about public institution measures against terrorism, report on actions taken, and recommend new measures. The draft decree was under review at the end of 2013.

Securing borders as well as air and seaports have been priorities of counterterrorism efforts in Panama. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has linked the Panamanian Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) at Tocumen International Airport to CBP data systems in the United States. Both CBP and the Export and Border Security Program (EXBS) have worked with the Government of Panama on risk analysis models that can be used to segment high risk travelers and cargo. Mobile security teams supporting the Tocumen Airport continued to identify and intercept fugitives, persons associated with organized crime and terrorists networks, as well as interdict narcotics and currency being smuggled through Panama.

The Government of Panama continued its efforts to enforce its sovereignty in the Darien through more aggressive patrolling by security forces. Panama has eliminated the permanent presence of the FARC in Panamanian towns along the border. However, incursions and the use of territory by the FARC and drug gangs to transport narcotics and people continued to pose a threat to residents there.

In February, a SENAFRON officer was injured in a clash with FARC elements. SENAFRON operations against FARC elements intensified in late 2013. In early November, SENAFRON captured a FARC member after a firefight near Bagre, Darien. Clashes also occurred near Mogue, Darien, resulting in the capture of one guerrilla fighter and some supplies. In December, SENAFRON Director Abrego reported at least 15 clashes occurred from October to December between SENAFRON and armed groups – including the FARC and others – escorting drugs into Panama from Colombia. The clashes resulted in two deaths, five injuries, and 20 FARC members captured.

Panama has several cooperative programs with the United States, detailed below, to address terrorism threats in and from Panama:
• The United States and Panama continued to plan for responding to incidents that could potentially shut down transit through the Panama Canal. In August, Panama hosted the annual PANAMAX ALPHA exercise, a multi-national security training exercise that focuses on canal security. The exercise included a U.S. component – Task Force Eagle – that supported Panama’s Public Forces (PPF) on exercise scenarios.

• The U.S. Southern Command sponsored training and provided equipment to PPF in 2013. Funding – as well as the donation of boats, communications equipment, and training – increased Panama’s capacity to protect its borders from FARC incursion by supporting the completion of a strategically-located pier for the PPF near the Panamanian-Colombian border on the Pacific Coast.

• Panama's Darien region is a significant pathway for human smuggling with potential counterterrorism implications; approximately 3,000 migrants were stopped by SENAFRONT in 2013. While approximately 64 percent are Cubans, the Panamanian National Border Service reports a consistent flow of African, Middle Eastern, and South Asian smuggled aliens (30 percent of the total number), including from countries that have active terrorist networks operating within them. Some of this smuggling is being facilitated by FARC elements operating on both sides of the border. Representatives of DHS and the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation worked with Panamanian authorities to identify smuggled aliens with potential terrorism ties.


Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Panama is a member of the Financial Action Task Force of South America (GAFISUD), a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body. Panama’s financial intelligence unit, Unidad de Análisis Financiero (UAF), is responsible for analyzing suspicious financial transactions but the unit lacks resources and political independence. The legal and regulatory frameworks that address anti-money laundering also address counterterrorist financing in Panama. In August, Panama enacted legislation to immobilize bearer shares, but the law does not go into full effect until 2018. Until then, the continued existence of bearer share corporations remains a prime vulnerability of the regulatory framework.

Uneven enforcement of existing anti-money laundering and terrorist finance controls coupled with the weak judicial system remained a problem. Moreover, the Colon Free Zone, the second largest free zone in the world, continued to be vulnerable to exploitation for illicit financial activities – due primarily to weak customs, trade, and financial transactions oversight. The IMF conducted a detailed assessment in October 2012 on anti-money laundering and countering terrorist financing in Panama. The final report was not released by year’s end.

The United States and Panama signed an agreement in October to utilize US $36 million of seized assets to fight money laundering and related crimes, which would include terrorist finance. Projects for these funds were being determined by mutual agreement.

Regional and International Cooperation: Panama participates in UN and regional security initiatives, such as the OAS Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE). Panama has a well-established border commission with Colombia and continued to cooperate on training with partners in the region. Several Panamanian officers have attended training in Colombia on security tactics and equipment maintenance, and the Colombian Army and National Police have provided additional operational training in Panama facilitated through the U.S.-Colombia High-Level Strategic Security Dialogue. In addition, Panama hosted personnel from Nicaragua and Costa Rica at its training facilities.

The Colombia-Panama Binational Commission met in April. Panama and Colombia senior security officials met in June and September to discuss border security issues. In addition, the two countries took steps to strengthen border security by agreeing to establish a joint base in Panama near their border. This permanently manned base will improve security in the Darien by hindering the entrance of FARC from Colombia. Security forces from Panama and Colombia will be able to exchange information quickly and conduct operations on each side of the border against the FARC and other groups.

Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism: While internal capacity is limited, Panama continued to develop and refine its civil affairs and information operations capacity as part of its overall strategy to counter FARC influence in the Darien. Working with NGO partners and the Government of Panama, the United States supported four youth centers in the Darien to provide more options for young people to constructively use their free time and energy.

PARAGUAY

Overview: The Government of Paraguay continued to pursue individuals under counterterrorism laws created in 2010 and 2011. In August, President Horacio Cartes successfully lobbied the Paraguayan Congress to modify the National Defense Law and broaden the Executive’s authority to deploy the Paraguayan military domestically to combat internal threats. Paraguay faced challenges of ineffective immigration, customs, and law enforcement controls along its porous borders, particularly the Tri-Border Area with Argentina and Brazil.

2013 Terrorist Incidents: Since 2008, persons claiming to be part of the Paraguayan People’s Army (EPP) – an internal guerrilla movement – have been active in the northern Departments of Concepcion and San Pedro. The group has been involved in violence designed to intimidate the population and government. The true size of the group has been difficult to establish, but the Government of Paraguay believes it to be a small, decentralized group of 20-100 members. Assumed EPP activity intensified in 2013, with multiple attacks occurring on isolated police and army posts, on ranchers and on peasants accused of collaborating with security services.

The EPP is widely suspected to be responsible for the following incidents in 2013:

- On February 19, a human rights activist was killed by alleged members of the EPP.
- On April 18, a civilian truck driver was killed by alleged members of the EPP.
- On April 21, one policeman was killed and three were injured by a roadside bomb allegedly planted by the EPP in Concepcion during national elections.
- On May 31, alleged members of the EPP killed a rancher in Tacuati.
• On August 17, five security guards at the same ranch in Tacuati were executed by alleged members of the EPP who then used homemade bombs and firearms to attack reinforcements sent to the scene.
• On October 1, a policeman was killed and six injured in a shootout in Tacuati when alleged EPP members ambushed a convoy with the Minister of the Interior.
• On October 23, the chief of police in Horqueta was killed and three others were injured in a shootout with alleged EPP members.
• On December 8, a military official was killed and another wounded in a shootout with alleged EPP members in Horqueta, Concepcion.


On August 22, the Paraguayan Senate approved a law to give the President power to use the armed forces to confront “internal or external aggression that threatens the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Paraguay.” While this authority does not require prior congressional approval, the President must notify Congress within 48 hours of deployment. Since the passage of the law, military forces have been deployed in the San Pedro, Concepcion, and Amambay departments with limited success.

The government made upgrades to Paraguay’s principal international airport, the Silvio Pettirossi Airport in Asuncion, to improve perimeter security and immigration controls. Few steps were taken to address security issues at land border crossings, however, particularly with respect to the large and generally unprotected borders with Argentina and Brazil. The minimal police and military presence along these borders allowed for a largely unregulated flow of people, contraband, and money.

The Government of Paraguay continued to cooperate with the United States on counterterrorism matters, and the U.S. Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance program contributed to building Paraguay’s counterterrorism law enforcement capacity through training that included: the Police Leader’s Role in Combatting Terrorism, Fraudulent Document Recognition, Investigating Terrorist Incidents, Interviewing Terrorist Suspects, and Cellular Telephone Forensics. Paraguay’s efforts to provide more effective law enforcement and border security were hampered by pervasive corruption within security, border control, and judicial institutions.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Paraguay is a member of the Financial Action Task Force of South America against Money Laundering (GAFISUD), a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body. Paraguay maintains counterterrorist financing legislation, although there were no terrorist financing convictions in 2013. Significant quantities of money are laundered through businesses or moved in cash. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

Regional and International Cooperation: Paraguay collaborated with Brazil and Argentina in border protection initiatives, regional exchanges, and discussions on counterterrorism and law enforcement projects. In March, Paraguayan officials attended the 13th Regular Session of the OAS’s Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE).
Overview: The Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso or SL) remained a significant threat to Peru’s internal security, although its numbers have shrunk considerably from its peak in the early 1990s when it numbered between 7,500 and 10,000 combatants in its ranks. By the end of 2013, the SL consisted of a single active faction with an estimated 300 to 500 fighters. Its area of activity and influence was largely confined to the special military emergency zone known as the Apurimac, Ene, and Mantaro River Valley (VRAEM), a remote and rugged region slightly larger than Switzerland that accounts for over half of the cocaine produced in Peru. The SL sustained itself through its involvement in drug production, narcotics trafficking, and extortion of “revolutionary taxes” from others involved in the drug trade. It continued to use Maoist philosophy to justify its illegal activities. The SL faction that previously operated in the Upper Huallaga Valley (UHV) collapsed following the capture of its leader, Florindo Flores Hala, better known as Comrade Artemio, in February 2012. Artemio was the sole remaining member of the SL’s historic Central Committee from the 1980s and 1990s that had not already been convicted or killed.

On August 10, an operation conducted by a joint military-police task force in the VRAEM resulted in the deaths of two of the SL’s top leaders, Alejandro Borda Casafranca (also known as Comrade Alipio) and Martin Quispe Palomino (also known as Comrade Gabriel). Alipio was the SL’s number two overall leader and widely recognized as its most capable and dangerous field commander. Gabriel occupied a spot on SL’s Central Committee and was the brother of the faction’s supreme leader, Victor Quispe Palomino (also known as Comrade Jose).

The demise of Alipio and Gabriel was the biggest blow sustained by the SL since the capture of SL’s then-national leader, Comrade Feliciano, in 1999. The organization remains dangerous, however, and could reunite as it has done in the past after sustaining hard blows.

The joint operation that claimed the lives of Alipio and Gabriel was conducted in accordance with a new Peruvian government strategy that emphasizes intelligence and unity of command in combatting the SL. The successful operation also demonstrated the increasing ability of security forces to plan and execute complex missions and the willingness of military and police forces to work together. The government’s new strategy, announced by President Humala in July, also stresses gaining control of territory in the VRAEM at the lowest cost in human lives. Three soldiers were killed in the VRAEM in 2013, a significant reduction from the 19 members of the security forces who lost their lives in armed confrontations with the SL in 2012.

There was some evidence to suggest declining popular support for the SL among the general population in the VRAEM. For example, the SL appeared to have made a crucial error on July 23 when one of its units, led by Alipio, set fire to heavy construction machinery being used to pave a highway linking the VRAEM with the city of Ayacucho. This was a project long sought by the local population as a means of improving their lives and reducing their isolation. The US$5 million in equipment losses sustained by the company building the highway caused it to pull out of the project, which cost many local employees their jobs and possibly created a one-year delay in connecting local farmers to markets for their products. Thousands of residents in the VRAEM subsequently participated in a government-organized “Peace March” on August 18 in Pichari, the region’s unofficial capital.

The Movement for Amnesty and Fundamental Rights, a Shining Path political front organization founded in 2009, actively sought to increase its influence, particularly on university campuses and in
undeveloped areas where the state had a minimal presence. The organization made a particular effort to attract support among agricultural workers and to penetrate teachers unions and university faculties. It also played an active role provoking opposition to development projects.

**2013 Terrorist Incidents:** According to the Government of Peru, the SL carried out 49 terrorist acts, a noticeable decline from the 87 reported acts it committed in 2012. The SL has not conducted any major operations against Peruvian security forces since Alipio and Gabriel were killed in August, except for repeated sniper fire at military outposts in the central VRAEM, particularly Union Mantaro. In addition to the July 23 incident mentioned above, notable SL action included:

- In March, the SL destroyed four cellular phone towers in the VRAEM. These actions likely reflected SL’s desire to cut communication services in the special emergency zone that could be used by security forces to pinpoint the location of their rebel columns.
- On April 5, SL snipers fired on an Army counterterrorism base in the district of Echarate in the Department of Cusco, killed one soldier and wounded another.
- On June 5, a column of 23 armed SL fighters took over a worksite of Consorcio Vila Quinua in Ayacucho’s Huanta province, seizing communication equipment, food, and medicine.
- On November 26, SL snipers killed a soldier at the Union Mantaro counterterrorism base in Junin’s Satipo province in the VRAEM.

**Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security:** Peru has passed a variety of laws specifically designed to counter terrorism during the past three decades. In 2013, Peru passed two related laws (Law 29988 and Law 30076) which banned the hiring and/or rehiring within Peru’s educational system of anyone convicted on terrorism charges. Congress also passed Law 30077, the Law against Organized Crime, which expanded the government’s authority to conduct electronic eavesdropping against suspected terrorists. In January, Congress passed Law 29979, which established criteria to compensate victims of terrorism.

Peru has steadily improved its ability to detect, deter, and respond to terrorist incidents in the 21 years since police captured the SL’s founder and chief ideologue, Abimael Guzman. Improved cooperation and information-sharing between specialized police and military counterterrorism units played a major role in the takedown of Alipio and Gabriel in August.

President Humala continued reauthorizing 60-day states of emergency in the VRAEM and the UHV emergency zones, giving the armed forces and police additional authority to maintain public order.

Immigration authorities collected no biometrics information from visitors. Citizens of neighboring countries were allowed to travel to Peru by land using only national identification cards. There was no visa requirement for citizens from Mexico and most countries in Western, Central, and Eastern Europe. Peruvian immigration used a database called “Movimiento Migratorio” at seven points of entry to track entries and exits of travelers, but the database was limited to Interpol and a local database that tracks outstanding warrants. Peruvian immigration did not have access to passenger name recognition data or a terrorist watch list.

Apart from the August 10 security force operation that resulted in the deaths of Alipio and Gabriel, the most significant law enforcement actions against the Shining Path this year included:
In April, counterterrorism police disbanded a financial ring suspected of laundering more than US $150 million for SL.

On June 7, Comrade Artemio, the long-time leader of the SL faction in the UHV, was given a life sentence for the crimes of aggravated terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and money laundering.

On July 14, former Congresswoman Nancy Obregon was arrested and charged with terrorism. Obregon was detained with more than 20 other people, including two of her siblings, for alleged ties to the Shining Path and international drug rings. She is awaiting trial on charges of having planned cocaine shipments from the Huallaga Valley to Bolivia.

On December 9, a joint military-police task force captured Alexander Fabian Huaman, alias “Hector,” the last of Comrade Artemio’s lieutenants still at large. Hector was charged with trying to reconstitute the SL in the UHV following Artemio’s capture in February 2012.

SL founder and leader Abimael Guzman and key accomplices remained in prison serving life sentences stemming from crimes committed in the 1980s and 1990s.

Political will to counter terrorism in Peru exists at all levels. Cooperation between specialized police and military counterterrorism units has improved, as evidenced by the operation that killed SL leaders Alipio and Gabriel. Relations between the military and the Peruvian National Police in general, however, were characterized by competition and mistrust. Interagency cooperation between senior-level policy planners and operators on the ground also remained a problem, as did the high rate of turnover among senior security leaders.

The government also continued to be hampered by resource constraints, corruption, and a lack of training. New recruits to the security forces were often sent to emergency zones with inadequate training, and were poorly equipped to fight battles in a dense jungle environment. Corruption was endemic within both the judiciary and security forces, although President Humala has declared eliminating corruption a pillar of his administration. Existing laws are adequate, but there was a lack of full and timely implementation.

Peru continued to participate in the U.S. Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program. ATA delivered courses designed to manage critical incidents, increase awareness among law enforcement leadership of the potential threat from terrorism, and prevent terrorist misuse of the internet and digital media.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Peru is a member of the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering in South America (GAFISUD), a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body. In 2013, the Government of Peru made significant strides in the implementation of the National Plan to Combat Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing.

In 2013, the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) received new powers to freeze bank accounts in cases suspected of links with terrorist financing within 24 hours of a judge’s request without the prerequisite of a criminal case being filed. This is an important advancement, especially with respect to enforcing UNSCR sanctions. The FIU has requested a complementary bill to provide more legal clarity in the implementation of this new power. The Executive announced that a bill had been submitted to Congress.

Additionally, in August, a new implementing regulation was passed that allows the Peruvian Customs and Tax Authority (SUNAT) to seize cash holdings above US $30,000 from individuals crossing the
border. SUNAT is required to immediately inform the FIU of any seizure, and the owners of the seized currency have 72 hours to submit evidence to the FIU that the cash is of licit origin. Additionally, the FIU can now initiate investigations on suspicious electronic transactions over US $10,000.


Countering Radicalization to Violence and Violent Extremism: The Government of Peru has publicly noted the importance of heavily investing in the VRAEM as a means of breaking the symbiotic relationship that has existed for years between the VRAEM’s residents and SL. In 2013, the Government of Peru more than doubled the civilian budget for social and economic development. The increased funds are being used to pave roads, provide basic health and education services, and establish a greater state presence.

The official position of the National Penitentiary Institute is that prison is meant to rehabilitate and reintegrate prisoners, especially terrorists. A psychological evaluation is required of incarcerated terrorists before parole can be granted. Many observers have expressed concern that the program is ineffective and that many convicted terrorists are not rehabilitated, but instead choose to rejoin SL upon release.

VENEZUELA

Overview: In May, for the eighth consecutive year, the U.S. Department of State determined, pursuant to section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act, that Venezuela was not cooperating fully with U.S. counterterrorism efforts. The Venezuelan government took no action against senior Venezuelan government officials who have been designated as Foreign Narcotics Kingpins by the U.S. Department of the Treasury for directly supporting the narcotics and arms trafficking activities of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). However, Venezuelan and Colombian officials held high-level talks on border and security issues.

Venezuela maintained the economic, financial, and diplomatic cooperation with Iran that the late President Hugo Chavez established during his presidency. President Nicolas Maduro publicly stated his intention to strengthen ties with Iran. The two countries have agreements in various sectors, including housing construction, agriculture, car assembly, and shipping.


There were credible reports that Venezuela maintained a permissive environment that allowed for support of activities that benefited known terrorist groups. Individuals linked to FARC and National Liberation Army (ELN) members were present in Venezuela, as well as Hizballah supporters or sympathizers.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Venezuelan criminal code and additional Venezuelan laws explicitly criminalize terrorism and dictate procedures for prosecuting individuals
engaged in terrorist activity. Venezuelan military and civilian agencies perform counterterrorism functions. Within the Venezuelan armed forces, the Command Actions Group of the National Guard has primary counterterrorism duty. The Venezuelan intelligence service (SEBIN) and the Division of Counterterrorism Investigations in the Bureau of Scientific, Penal, and Criminal Investigative Corps within the Ministry of Interior, Justice, and Peace have primary civilian counterterrorism responsibilities. The degree of interagency cooperation and information sharing among agencies is unknown due to a lack of government transparency.

Border security at ports of entry is vulnerable and susceptible to corruption. The Venezuelan government did not perform biographic and biometric screening at ports of entry or exit. There was no automated system to collect advance passenger name records on commercial flights or to cross check flight manifests with passenger disembarkation data.

Venezuelan officials arrested Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) member Asier Guridi Zaloña (aka “Gari”) on September 20 after Spain requested his extradition, but released him in December. Also in December, the National Guard reportedly detained FARC commander Reinel Guzman (aka “Rafael Gutierrez”) in the state of Apue near the Venezuela-Colombia border.

**Countering the Financing of Terrorism:** Venezuela is a member of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), a Financial Action Task Force-style regional body (FATF); the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission Anti-Money Laundering Group; and the Egmont Group. Venezuela made progress in implementing its 2010 FATF action plan. The CFATF reported in February that Venezuela had criminalized terrorist financing and established a regime for freezing terrorist assets without delay. For further information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the 2014 *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes*: [http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm](http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm).

**Regional and International Cooperation:** Venezuela participated as an official observer in ongoing peace negotiations between the Colombian government and the FARC. In August, Venezuela and Colombia announced that the two countries would increase bilateral cooperation to reduce smuggling of illegal goods, narcotics trafficking, and the activity of illegally armed groups. In September and October, the Venezuelan and Colombian defense ministers met to coordinate joint efforts to fight illegally armed groups along the Venezuela-Colombia border.
Chapter 3
State Sponsors of Terrorism

To designate a country as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, the Secretary of State must determine that the government of such country has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism. Once a country is designated, it remains a State Sponsor of Terrorism until the designation is rescinded in accordance with statutory criteria. A wide range of sanctions are imposed as a result of a State Sponsor of Terrorism designation, including:

- A ban on arms-related exports and sales;
- Controls over exports of dual-use items, requiring 30-day Congressional notification for goods or services that could significantly enhance the terrorist-list country’s military capability or ability to support terrorism;
- Prohibitions on economic assistance; and
- Imposition of miscellaneous financial and other restrictions.

This report provides a snapshot of events during 2013 relevant to countries designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism; it does not constitute a new announcement regarding such designations. More information on State Sponsor of Terrorism designations may be found online at http://www.state.gov/j/ct/c14151.htm.

**CUBA**

Cuba was designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism in 1982.

Cuba has long provided safe haven to members of Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Reports continued to indicate that Cuba’s ties to ETA have become more distant, and that about eight of the two dozen ETA members in Cuba were relocated with the cooperation of the Spanish government. Throughout 2013, the Government of Cuba supported and hosted negotiations between the FARC and the Government of Colombia aimed at brokering a peace agreement between the two. The Government of Cuba has facilitated the travel of FARC representatives to Cuba to participate in these negotiations, in coordination with representatives of the Governments of Colombia, Venezuela, and Norway, as well as the Red Cross.

There was no indication that the Cuban government provided weapons or paramilitary training to terrorist groups.

The Cuban government continued to harbor fugitives wanted in the United States. The Cuban government also provided support such as housing, food ration books, and medical care for these individuals.

**IRAN**

Designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism in 1984, Iran continued its terrorist-related activity, including support for Palestinian terrorist groups in Gaza, and for Hizballah. It has also increased its presence in Africa and attempted to smuggle arms to Houthi separatists in Yemen and Shia oppositionists in Bahrain. Iran used the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF)
and its regional proxy groups to implement foreign policy goals, provide cover for intelligence operations, and create instability in the Middle East. The IRGC-QF is the regime’s primary mechanism for cultivating and supporting terrorists abroad.

Iran views Syria as a crucial causeway in its weapons supply route to Hizballah, its primary beneficiary. In 2013, Iran continued to provide arms, financing, training, and the facilitation of Iraqi Shia fighters to the Asad regime’s brutal crackdown, a crackdown that has resulted in the death of more than 100,000 civilians in Syria. Iran has publicly admitted sending members of the IRGC to Syria in an advisory role. There are reports indicating some of these troops are IRGC-QF members and that they have taken part in direct combat operations. In February, senior IRGC-QF commander Brigadier General Hassan Shateri was killed in or near Zabadani, Syria. This was the first publicly announced death of a senior Iranian military official in Syria. In November, IRGC-QF commander Mohammad Jamalizadeh Paghaleh was also killed in Aleppo, Syria. Subsequent Iranian media reports stated that Paghaleh was volunteering in Syria to defend the Sayyida Zainab mosque, which is located in Damascus. The location of Paghaleh’s death, over 200 miles away from the mosque he was reported to be protecting, demonstrated Iran’s intent to mask the operations of IRGC-QF forces in Syria.

Iran has historically provided weapons, training, and funding to Hamas and other Palestinian terrorist groups, including the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), although Hamas’s ties to Tehran have been strained due to the Syrian civil war. Since the end of the 2006 Israeli-Hizballah conflict, Iran has also assisted in rearming Hizballah, in direct violation of UNSCR 1701. Iran has provided hundreds of millions of dollars in support of Hizballah in Lebanon and has trained thousands of its fighters at camps in Iran. These trained fighters often use these skills in support of the Asad regime in Syria.

Despite its pledge to support Iraq’s stabilization, Iran trained, funded, and provided guidance to Iraqi Shia militant groups. The IRGC-QF, in concert with Hizballah, provided training outside of Iraq as well as advisors inside Iraq for Shia militants in the construction and use of sophisticated improvised explosive device technology and other advanced weaponry. Similar to Hizballah fighters, many of these trained Shia militants then use these skills to fight for the Asad regime in Syria, often at the behest of Iran.

On January 23, 2013, Yemeni authorities seized an Iranian dhow, the Jihan, off the coast of Yemen. The dhow was carrying sophisticated Chinese antiaircraft missiles, C-4 explosives, rocket-propelled grenades, and a number of other weapons and explosives. The shipment of lethal aid was likely headed to Houthi separatists in Northern Yemen. Iran actively supports members of the Houthi movement, including activities intended to build military capabilities, which could pose a greater threat to security and stability in Yemen and the surrounding region.

On December 29, 2013, the Bahraini Coast Guard interdicted a speedboat filled with weapons and explosives that was likely bound for Shia oppositionists in Bahrain, specifically the 14 February Youth Coalition (14 FYC). Bahraini authorities accused the IRGC-QF of providing opposition militants with...
explosives training in order to carry out attacks in Bahrain. The interdiction led to the discovery of two weapons and explosives cache sites in Bahrain, the dismantling of a car bomb, and the arrest of 15 Bahraini nationals.

Iran remained unwilling to bring to justice senior al-Qa’ida (AQ) members it continued to detain, and refused to publicly identify those senior members in its custody. Iran allowed AQ facilitators Muhsin al-Fadhli and Adel Radi Saqr al-Wahabi al-Harbi to operate a core facilitation pipeline through Iran, enabling AQ to move funds and fighters to South Asia and also to Syria. Al-Fadhli is a veteran AQ operative who has been active for years. Al-Fadhli began working with the Iran-based AQ facilitation network in 2009 and was later arrested by Iranian authorities. He was released in 2011 and assumed leadership of the Iran-based AQ facilitation network.

Iran remains a state of proliferation concern. Despite multiple UNSCRs requiring Iran to suspend its sensitive nuclear proliferation activities, Iran continued to violate its international obligations regarding its nuclear program. For further information, see the Report to Congress on Iran-related Multilateral Sanctions Regime Efforts (November 2013), and the Report on the Status of Bilateral and Multilateral Efforts Aimed at Curtailing the Pursuit of Iran of Nuclear Weapons Technology (September 2012).

SUDAN

Sudan was designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism in 1993. In 2013, the Government of Sudan remained a generally cooperative counterterrorism partner and continued to take action to address threats to U.S. interests and personnel in Sudan.

Elements of al-Qa’ida (AQ)-inspired terrorist groups remained in Sudan. The Government of Sudan has taken steps to limit the activities of these elements, and has worked to disrupt foreign fighters’ use of Sudan as a logistics base and transit point for terrorists going to Mali, Syria, and Afghanistan. However, groups continued to operate in Sudan in 2013 and there continued to be reports of Sudanese nationals participating in terrorist organizations. For example, regional media outlets alleged one Sudanese national was part of an al-Shabaab terrorist cell that attacked the Westgate Mall in Nairobi in September. There was also evidence that Sudanese violent extremists participated in terrorist activities in Somalia and Mali.

In 2013, Sudan continued to allow members of Hamas to travel, fundraise, and live in Sudan.

The UN and NGOs reported in 2013 that the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) is likely operating in the disputed Kafia Kingi area, claimed by Sudan and South Sudan, in close proximity to Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). At year’s end, the United States continued to engage the Government of Sudan, the AU, and the UN to evaluate these reports.

The kidnapping of foreigners for ransom in Darfur continued, although no U.S. citizens were kidnapped in 2013. These kidnappings have hindered humanitarian operations in Darfur. Abductees have been released unharmed amid rumors of ransoms having been paid.

In 2013, the United States continued to pursue justice for the January 1, 2008 killing of two U.S. Embassy employees. At the end of the year, the Sudanese Supreme Court was deliberating on an appeal filed by defense attorneys of the three remaining men convicted of the two murders, requesting that their death sentences be commuted. In February 2013, one of five men convicted of aiding the 2010 escape attempt by the four convicted killers received a presidential commutation of his remaining
sentence. Government of Sudan authorities explained his release was part of a broad administrative parole affecting 200 other prisoners who had served some portion of their sentences with good behavior. U.S. officials protested the commutation and urged the Government of Sudan authorities to imprison the convicted accomplice for the full 12 years of his sentence.

In 2013, the U.S. Department of State designated three of the individuals who participated in the January 1, 2008 killings – Abdelbasit Alhaj Alhasan Haj Hamad, Mohamed Makawi Ibrahim Mohamed, and Abd Al-Ra’Uuf Abu Zaid Mohamed Hamza – as Specially Designated Global Terrorists under Executive Order 13224.

In 2013, Sudanese authorities continued to prosecute 25 individuals detained during a raid in December 2012 on what the Government of Sudan described as a terrorist training camp operating in Dinder National Park. The so-called “Dinder cell” as of December was still awaiting trial on charges of terrorism and murder stemming from the deaths of several police involved in the December 2012 raid. At least one fringe party, Just Peace Forum, has called upon President Bashir to pardon members of the “Dinder Cell,” but the court cases were still ongoing at the end of the year. One trial judge from the country’s terrorism court remanded several cases back to the attorney general for additional interrogations.

The Government of Sudan has made some progress in opposing terrorist financing, although members of Hamas are permitted to conduct fundraising in Sudan. The Central Bank of Sudan and its financial intelligence unit circulate to financial institutions a list of individuals and entities that have been included on the consolidated list of the UNSC 1267/1989 (al-Qa’ida) Sanctions Committee, as well as the U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations and E.O. lists. The financing of terrorism per UNSCR 1373 (2001) was criminalized in Sudan pursuant to Sudan’s Money Laundering Act of 2003.

Sudan is generally responsive to international community concerns about counterterrorism efforts. Sudan’s vast, mostly unmonitored borders with Libya, Chad, the Central African Republic, South Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea hampered counterterrorism efforts. Nonetheless, in recent years Sudan has forged increasingly stronger relations with its neighbors. For example, in December 2013, Government of Sudan law enforcement authorities hosted a regional workshop on counterterrorism initiatives under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development’s program for security sector reform.

**SYRIA**

Designated in 1979 as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, the Asad regime continued its political support to a variety of terrorist groups affecting the stability of the region and beyond, even amid significant internal unrest. The regime continued to provide political and weapons support to Hizballah and continued to allow Iran to rearm the terrorist organization. The Asad regime’s relationship with Hizballah and Iran continued to grow stronger in 2013 as the conflict in Syria continued. President Bashar al-Asad remained a staunch defender of Iran's policies, while Iran has exhibited equally energetic support for Syrian regime efforts to defeat the Syrian opposition. Statements supporting terrorist groups, particularly Hizballah, were often in Syrian government speeches and press statements.

The Syrian government had an important role in the growth of terrorist networks in Syria through the permissive attitude the Asad regime took towards al-Qa’ida’s foreign fighter facilitation efforts during the Iraq conflict. Syrian government awareness and encouragement for many years of violent
extremists’ transit through Syria to enter Iraq, for the purpose of fighting Coalition Troops, is well documented. Syria was a key hub for foreign fighters en route to Iraq. Those very networks were the seedbed for the violent extremist elements that terrorized the Syrian population in 2013.

As part of a broader strategy during the year, the regime has attempted to portray Syria itself as a victim of terrorism, characterizing all of its armed opponents as “terrorists.”

Asad’s government has continued to generate significant concern regarding the role it plays in terrorist financing. Industry experts reported that 60 percent of all business transactions were conducted in cash and that nearly 80 percent of all Syrians did not use formal banking services. Despite Syrian legislation that required money changers to be licensed by the end of 2007, many continued to operate illegally in Syria's vast black market, estimated to be as large as Syria's formal economy. Regional hawala networks remained intertwined with smuggling and trade-based money laundering, and were facilitated by notoriously corrupt customs and immigration officials. This raised significant concerns that some members of the Syrian government and the business elite were complicit in terrorist finance schemes conducted through these institutions.

In 2013, the United States continued to closely monitor Syria’s proliferation-sensitive materials and facilities, including Syria’s significant stockpile of chemical weapons, which the United States assesses remains under the Asad regime’s control. Despite the progress made through the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapon’s Executive Council and UNSC Resolution 2118 (2013) to dismantle and destroy Syria’s chemical weapons program, there continues to be significant concern, given ongoing instability in Syria, that these materials could find their way to terrorist organizations. The United States is coordinating closely with a number of like-minded nations and partners to prevent Syria’s stockpiles of chemical and advanced conventional weapons from falling into the hands of violent extremists.
Chapter 4

The Global Challenge of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear (CBRN) Terrorism

Nonproliferation efforts have been a top U.S. national security priority for decades. The past decade has seen a growing recognition that our strategic counterterrorism posture is strengthened by counter and nonproliferation programs that aim to reduce the amount of chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) material produced and stored by states; restrict the diversion of materials and expertise for illicit use; and prevent the trafficking of CBRN weapons and related material. Yet CBRN materials and expertise remain a significant terrorist threat as demonstrated by terrorists’ stated intent to acquire and use these materials; the nature of injury and damage these weapons can inflict; the ease with which information on these topics now flows; and the dual-use nature of many relevant technologies and material. While efforts to secure CBRN material across the globe have been largely successful, the illicit trafficking of these materials persists, including instances involving highly enriched uranium in 2010 and 2011. These examples suggest that caches of dangerous material may exist on the black market and that we must complement our efforts to consolidate CBRN materials and secure facilities with broader efforts to detect, investigate, and secure those materials that have fallen outside of regulatory control. We must remain vigilant to prevent terrorist groups from obtaining the means and methods to develop and deploy CBRN weapons.

A number of international partnerships have either the explicit or the implicit purpose of countering the CBRN threat from terrorists and other non-state actors. Organizations and initiatives concerned with chemical and biological weapons use international conventions and regulations to reduce stockpiles of material, regulate the acquisition of dual-use technology, and to regulate trade of specific goods. International nuclear and radiological initiatives and programs focus on promoting peaceful uses of nuclear material and energy, safeguarding materials and expertise against diversion, and countering the smuggling of radioactive and nuclear material. The United States routinely provides technical and financial assistance and training to ensure that partner nations have the ability to adequately protect and secure CBRN-applicable expertise, technologies, and material. U.S. participation within, and contribution to these groups, is vital to ensure our continued safety from the CBRN threat.

The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI): Launched in 2003, the PSI has increased international capability to address the challenges associated with stopping the trafficking of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their related components, and their means of delivery. The PSI remains an important tool in the global effort to combat CBRN material transfers to both state and non-state actors of proliferation concern. As of December 31, 2013, 102 states have endorsed the PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles, by which states commit to take specific actions to support efforts to halt the trafficking of WMD and related materials.

The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT): The GICNT, which is co-chaired by the United States and Russia, is an international partnership of 85 nations and four official observers dedicated to strengthening individual and collective capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to a nuclear terrorist event. Partners engage in multilateral activities and exercises designed to share best practices and lessons learned on a wide range of nuclear security and terrorism issues. To date, partners have conducted over 60 multilateral activities and eight senior-level plenary meetings in support of these nuclear security goals. In 2013, there were eight multilateral activities to promote the
sharing of best practices on the topics of nuclear forensics, nuclear detection, and emergency preparedness and response.

**Nuclear Trafficking Response Group (NTRG):** The NTRG is an interagency group focused on coordinating the U.S. government response to incidents of illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials overseas, including radiation alarms. The NTRG works with foreign governments to secure smuggled nuclear material, prosecute those involved, and develop information on smuggling-related threats including potential links between smugglers and terrorists. The U.S. Department of State chairs the NTRG, which includes representatives from the U.S. government’s nonproliferation, law enforcement, and intelligence communities.

**Preventing Nuclear Smuggling Program (PNSP):** Continuing seizures of nuclear and radioactive material suggest these dangerous materials remain in illegal circulation. Securing these materials before they reach the hands of terrorists or other malicious actors is critical to U.S. national security, and that of U.S. allies. Using PNSP funds, the U.S. Department of State utilizes outreach and programmatic capabilities to partner with key governments to broadly enhance capabilities to prevent, detect, and respond effectively to nuclear smuggling attempts. PNSP funds enable the U.S. Department of State to develop joint action plans with partner governments to specify priority steps to be taken to improve counter-nuclear smuggling capabilities. As a result, the U.S. Department of State has developed donor partnerships to assist with joint action plan implementations, resulting in foreign contributions of more than US $72 million to anti-nuclear smuggling projects. To date, 15 countries have developed joint action plans and the U.S Department of State has programmatically engaged 12 countries using PNSP-funded projects to enhance nuclear smuggling response procedures, improve nuclear forensics capabilities, and enable the successful prosecution of smugglers. The U.S. Department of State also uses PNSP funds to lead a U.S. effort to develop specialized counter-nuclear smuggling capabilities for foreign partners that integrate law enforcement, intelligence, and technical reach-back capabilities. All PNSP-funded efforts advance the objectives in the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit Work Plan and the 2010 and 2012 Nuclear Security Summit Communiqués.

**Export Control and Related Border Security Program (EXBS):** Through the EXBS Program, the U.S. Department of State leads the interagency effort to strengthen export control systems to improve national capabilities to detect, deter, interdict, investigate, and prosecute illicit transfers of WMD, WMD-related items, and advanced conventional arms in over 60 countries. EXBS delivered over 200 information sharing and training activities in 2013, promoting the adoption, implementation, and enforcement of comprehensive strategic trade controls. These activities improve the capability of partner states to prevent transfers of dual-use items to end-users for purposes of proliferation or terrorism. EXBS is also actively involved in efforts to combat WMD smuggling through enhanced border security and has provided equipment and training to develop the ability to detect, deter, and interdict illicit smuggling of radioactive and nuclear materials, WMD components, and other weapons-related items at ports of entry and across borders.

In 2013, the EXBS program oversaw over 200 bilateral and regional training activities involving 77 countries, and delivered detection and identification equipment to bolster border security in over 25 countries. EXBS works in harmony with and complements the DHS Container Security Initiative, the U.S. Department of Energy International Nonproliferation Export Control Program, the Second Line of Defense Program, the Megaports Initiative, and other international donor assistance programs. EXBS programs fulfill important U.S. and international commitments, including under UNSC Resolution 1540 (2004), the National Security Strategy, and adherence to the guidelines of multilateral export control regimes.
Second Line of Defense (SLD): Under its SLD Program, the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration cooperates with partner countries to provide radiation detection systems and associated training to enhance their capabilities to deter, detect, and interdict illicit trafficking of special nuclear and radiological materials across international borders. The SLD Program provides mobile radiological detection equipment to selected countries for use at land borders and internal checkpoints and includes two components: the Core Program and the Megaports Initiative. The Core Program began with work in Russia and has since expanded to include states in the Caucasus, Eastern Europe, and other key regions, providing equipment for land border crossings, feeder seaports, and international airports.

Global Threat Reduction (GTR): GTR programs work to prevent terrorists from acquiring CBRN expertise, materials, and technology across the globe. By engaging scientists, technicians, and engineers with CBRN expertise, GTR seeks to prevent terrorist access to knowledge, materials, and technologies that could be used in a CBRN attack against the U.S. homeland. In 2013, GTR was actively engaged in countries and regions at high risk of proliferation and terrorism. GTR programs have expanded to meet emerging CBRN proliferation threats worldwide and focus on promoting biological, chemical, and nuclear security in those countries where there is a high risk of CBRN proliferation.

Biological Weapons Convention Inter-Sessional Work Program (BWC): The December 2011 BWC Review Conference adopted a program of work aimed at strengthening international capacities to prevent, detect, and respond to the proliferation or use of biological weapons, whether by state or non-state actors. In 2013, the United States continued efforts in this forum to: acquire better information about BWC parties’ implementing measures, and enhance such measures; promote sustainable, effective approaches to laboratory biosecurity; raise international awareness of the need for appropriate, balanced oversight of dual-use life science research with significant potential for harm; and identify and address impediments to international coordination and response in the event of a bioterrorism attack or a significant disease outbreak of unknown origin.
Chapter 5
Terrorist Safe Havens (Update to 2012 Report)

Terrorist safe havens described in this report include ungoverned, under-governed, or ill-governed physical areas where terrorists are able to organize, plan, raise funds, communicate, recruit, train, transit, and operate in relative security because of inadequate governance capacity, political will, or both.

As defined by section 2656f(d) of Title 22 of the U.S. Code, the term “terrorist sanctuary” or “sanctuary” excludes the territory of a country the government of which is subject to a determination under section 2405(j)(1)(A) of the Appendix to Title 50; section 2371(a) of Title 22; or section 2780(d) of Title 22—the state sponsors of terrorism. Accordingly, information regarding Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria can be found in Chapter 3, State Sponsors of Terrorism.

TERRORIST SAFE HAVENS

AFRICA

Somalia. In 2013, large areas of territory throughout Somalia provided safe haven for terrorists. Following significant military offensives in 2012 that pushed al-Shabaab out of most urban areas of southern and central Somalia, al-Shabaab still maintained freedom of movement and some control in some rural areas, as well as a destabilizing presence in some urban areas. In each of these areas, al-Shabaab could organize, plan, raise funds, communicate, recruit, train, and operate in relative security due to inadequate security, justice, and governance capacity. The absence of anti-money laundering and counterterrorist finance laws, regulatory bodies, and counterterrorism law enforcement resulted principally from a lack of capacity, rather than a lack of political will.

In 2013, the city of Barawe served as al-Shabaab’s primary urban safe haven. Al-Shabaab also maintained a presence in the Golis Mountains of Puntland and in some of Puntland’s larger urban areas. Al-Shabaab continued to operate largely uncontested large sections of rural areas in the middle and lower Jubba regions, the Lower Shabelle region, and the Gedo, Bay, and Bakol regions. Additionally, Somalia’s long unguarded coastline, porous borders, and proximity to the Arabian Peninsula allowed foreign fighters and al-Shabaab members to transit throughout the region. Areas under al-Shabaab control provided a permissive environment for al-Shabaab operatives and affiliated foreign fighters to conduct training and terrorist planning. However, foreign fighters maintained limited freedom within al-Shabaab due to internal strife within the group. The capability of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) to prevent and preempt al-Shabaab terrorist attacks remained limited in 2013, although the FGS was committed to countering terrorism and collaborating with international partners, including the United States. As 2013 came to a close, AMISOM was preparing for another offensive against al-Shabaab in conjunction with Somali National Army troops following the UN Security Council’s authorization of 4,000-plus additional troops for AMISOM.

According to independent sources and NGOs engaged in demining activities on the ground, there was little cause for concern for the presence of weapons of mass destruction in Somalia.

The Trans-Sahara. The primary terrorist threat in the Trans-Sahara region in 2013 was posed by al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and associated splinter groups, such as the al-Mulathamun...
Battalion (AMB) and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO). Although its leadership remained primarily based in northeastern Algeria, AQIM factions also operated in northern Mali and the neighboring region. In 2013, these violent extremist groups used footholds in northern Mali to conduct operations, although safe haven areas in northern Mali were significantly diminished by the French and African intervention in 2013.

**Mali.** Although the Government of Mali lacks the capacity to control much of its vast, sparsely populated northern region, international and Malian forces were able to erode terrorist safe haven in the region in 2013. French Serval and UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) operations enabled Mali to redeploy government administrators and security forces to urban population centers in the northern regions through the end of 2013. These operations reduced the ability of AQIM and other terrorist groups such as Ansar al-Dine and MUJAO to organize, plan, raise funds, communicate, recruit, train, and operate in the northern region.

The new Malian government demonstrated its political will to deny safe haven to terrorists by supporting and collaborating with international efforts to stabilize northern Mali. The Malian government also demonstrated its political will to increase governance capacity in the North by holding a National Decentralization Conference in October 2013. During the conference, the Government of Mali identified measures to reinforce decentralized authority over northern Mali and to increase the capacity of local authority to govern over the vast territories. The government decided at the conference to create new administrative regions with the intention to increase the presence of the state in the northern region.

Despite having made some progress in disrupting terrorist safe havens in northern Mali, challenges remain, including dealing with long-existing, unregulated smuggling activities integral to the local economy. Controlling long and porous international borders also remains a challenge for the Malian government. The tacit engagement of local populations in illicit commercial activities and licit smuggling in northern Mali provides implicit support to criminal enterprises which undermines efforts to destabilize terrorist networks. Some segments of local populations have been willing to tolerate and enable AQIM's presence to avoid conflict and for financial gain, rather than ideological affinity.

In September 2013, the foreign assistance restriction to the Government of Mali was lifted. The State Department plans to reengage with the Government of Mali to strengthen biological security and reduce the risk of biological weapons acquisition by terrorists.

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**SOUTHEAST ASIA**

**The Sulu/Sulawesi Seas Littoral.** The numerous islands in the Sulawesi Sea and the Sulu Archipelago make it a difficult region for authorities to monitor. The range of licit and illicit activities that occur there – including worker migration, tourism, and trade – pose additional challenges to identifying and countering the terrorist threat. Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines have improved efforts to control their shared maritime boundaries, including through the U.S.-funded Coast Watch South radar network, which is intended to enhance domain awareness in the waters south and southwest of Mindanao. Nevertheless, the expanse remained difficult to control. Surveillance improved but remained partial at best, and traditional smuggling and piracy groups have provided an effective cover for terrorist activities, including the movement of personnel, equipment, and funds. The United States has sponsored the Trilateral Interagency Maritime Law Enforcement Working Group since 2008, which has resulted in better coordination among Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines on issues of interdiction and maritime security.
Southeast Asia is vulnerable to exploitation by illicit traffickers and proliferators given the high volume of global trade that ships through the region as well as the existence of smuggling and proliferation networks. Weak strategic trade controls, legal and regulatory frameworks, inadequate maritime law enforcement and security capabilities, as well as emerging and re-emerging infectious disease and burgeoning bioscience capacity, make Southeast Asia an area of concern for weapons of mass destruction proliferation.

**The Southern Philippines.** The geographical composition of the Philippines, spread out over 7,107 islands, made it difficult for the central government to maintain a presence in all areas. Counterterrorism operations over the past 12 years, however, have been successful at isolating the location and constraining the activities of transnational terrorists. U.S.-Philippines counterterrorism cooperation remained strong. Abu Sayyaf Group members, numbering a few hundred, were known to be present in remote areas in Mindanao, especially on the islands of Basilan and Sulu. JI members, of whom there are only a small number remaining, are in a few isolated pockets of Mindanao. Peace agreements between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) are suspected to have limited safe haven areas within MILF territories. Continued pressure from Philippine security forces made it difficult for terrorists to organize, plan, raise funds, communicate, recruit, train, and operate.

**THE MIDDLE EAST**

**Iraq.** In the vast desert areas of western Iraq, especially in Anbar and Ninewa Provinces, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) established semi-permanent encampments. These areas reportedly included camps, training centers, command headquarters, and stocks of weapons. ISIL fighters allegedly controlled villages, oases, grazing areas, and valleys in these areas and were able to move with little impediment across international borders in the area.

Also, the lack of sustained coordination between the Government of Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional government security forces in the Disputed Internal Boundaries areas made it easier for insurgents and terrorists to operate or move through these areas unchecked.

The Government of Iraq lacked the capabilities to fully deny safe havens to terrorists, but not the will to do so. Iraqi Security Forces have conducted air and ground operations to destroy encampments but faced well-trained and heavily equipped ISIL fighters. The scale of the terrorist presence in Iraq is compounded by the cross-border flow of weapons and personnel between Iraq and Syria. The United States has encouraged the Government of Iraq to seek broader cross-border counterterrorism cooperation with like-minded neighboring countries.

During the first half of 2013, Iraq, Turkey, and the United States continued a trilateral security dialogue as part of ongoing efforts to combat the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the region. As part of peace process negotiations between the Government of Turkey and jailed PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, hundreds of PKK fighters left Turkey and entered the Iraqi Kurdistan Region in northern Iraq starting in May.

Overall, the central government made progress in preventing the proliferation and trafficking of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) both within and across its borders, including arresting four individuals who were allegedly planning to synthesize small quantities of the nerve agent sarin in June, and particularly as it relates to reducing proliferation risks arising from the commercial chemical
sector. The Act of the Iraqi National Monitoring Authority on WMD Non-Proliferation No. 48 of 2012 (INMA Act), enacted in February 2012, created the Iraqi National Monitoring Authority (INMA) as an independent federal government entity to oversee Iraq’s nonproliferation activities and tasks it with, among other responsibilities, establishing mechanisms for licensing trade in dual-use goods. The law specifically requires the INMA to set up procedures for controlling the import, export, transit, and transshipment of dual-use equipment and materials that are listed by international nonproliferation treaties and regimes. Iraq participated in various border security trainings and discussions.

**Lebanon.** The Lebanese government does not exercise complete control over all regions in the country or its borders with Syria and Israel. Hizballah militias controlled access to parts of the country, limiting access by Lebanon’s security services, including the police and army, which allowed terrorists to operate in these areas with relative impunity. Palestinian refugee camps were also used as safe havens by Palestinian and other armed groups and were used to house weapons and shelter wanted criminals.

The Lebanese security services conducted frequent operations to capture terrorists. They did not target or arrest Hizballah members.

The primary concern regarding weapons of mass destruction is that Lebanon’s porous borders will make the country vulnerable for use as a transit and transshipment hub for proliferation-sensitive transfers. The conflict in Syria increases the risk of illicit transfers of items of proliferation concern across the Lebanese border. On border security, the United States conducted numerous trainings with and donated equipment to Lebanese Customs to enhance its capabilities to detect illicit cross-border trade in strategic goods and other contraband. Hizballah’s continued ability to receive sophisticated munitions via Iran and Syria requires aggressive regular monitoring.

**Libya.** With a weak government possessing very few tools to exert control throughout its territory, Libya has become a terrorist safe haven and its transit routes are used by various terrorist groups, notably in the southwest and northeast. The General National Congress has tried to tackle the lawlessness of the southern region by temporarily closing – at least officially – the country’s southern border, and declaring large swaths of area (west from Ghadames, Ghat, Ubari, Sebha, Murzuq, and across a 620 miles off-road east to Kufra) as closed military zones to be administered under emergency law. In reality, however, Libya’s weak and under-resourced institutions have had little influence in that region, and have failed to implement this vague decree, as is evident from frequent ethnic clashes in the area. Instead, tribes and militias continue to control the area, and traders, smugglers, and terrorists continue to utilize ancient trade routes across these borders. All of Libya’s borders are porous and vulnerable to this activity, and the United States is working closely with the EU Border Assistance Mission to help the government mitigate these threats.

The Libyan government recognizes the gravity of the threats emanating from its borders, and is willing to work with the international community to overcome its inability to tackle these problems itself. In 2013, the United States signed an agreement with the Libyan government to cooperate on destroying Libya’s stockpile of legacy chemical weapons in accordance with its obligations as an Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) member state. Libya successfully completed operations for the disposal of its remaining mustard gas filled in artillery projectile and aerial bombs in January 2014. Libya also previously completed the disposal of its remaining bulk mustard in 2013. There also have been reports of thousands of barrels of yellowcake uranium, a foundational material for nuclear enrichment, precariously secured in a former military facility near Sebha in Libya’s south. Although representing limited risk of trafficking due to the bulk and weight of the storage containers,
Libya agreed to host an assessment team of inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency to survey the stockpile in early 2014.

**Yemen.** The Government of Yemen, under President Abdo Rabbo Mansour Hadi, remained a strong partner of the United States on counterterrorism issues. Military campaigns against AQAP strongholds in the southern governorates in 2012, along with tribal resistance in the form of pro-government Popular Committees, eliminated much of the territory considered a “safe haven” for AQAP terrorists. In 2013, however, Yemeni security forces have been losing the ground gained in 2012. The impunity with which AQAP conducted ambush-style attacks and assassinations, particularly in the Abyan, Shebwa, and Hadramawt Governorates, suggests that AQAP has been successful in expanding its theatre of operations.

Yemen’s instability makes the country vulnerable for use as a transit point for weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-related materials. In the past year the United States resumed training focusing on the development of strategic trade controls and continued to conduct border security training for Yemeni Customs and other enforcement agencies. Yemen has identified an inter-ministry group to work on nonproliferation-related issues.

The United States continued to build Yemeni government capacity to secure potentially dangerous biological and chemical materials and infrastructure housed at Yemeni facilities, while also productively engaging Yemeni scientists and engineers that have WMD or WMD-applicable expertise.

**SOUTH ASIA**

**Afghanistan.** Several terrorist networks active in Afghanistan, such as al-Qa’ida (AQ), the Haqqani Network, and others, operate largely out of Pakistan. AQ has some freedom of movement in Kunar and Nuristan provinces largely due to a lack of Afghan National Security Forces’ capacity to control certain border territories in north and east Afghanistan. During 2013, the Afghan government continued to counter the Afghan Taliban and Taliban-affiliated insurgent networks with AQ connections. The increased capability of the Afghan Local Police units helped to secure some rural areas that had previously lacked a Government of Afghanistan presence.

The potential for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) trafficking and proliferation was a concern in Afghanistan because of its porous borders and the presence of terrorist groups. The U.S. government worked with the Government of Afghanistan to implement comprehensive strategic trade controls. The U.S. Border Management Task Force also worked closely with Afghan officials to prevent the proliferation of and trafficking of WMD in and through Afghanistan. The Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) contributed to strengthening Afghanistan’s enforcement capacity through participation in a regional cross-border training program, and training through the Department of Homeland Security’s Customs and Border Protection agency.

The United States continued to assist the Afghan government to build capacity needed to secure potentially dangerous biological materials and infrastructure housed at Afghan facilities, promote surveillance capabilities to detect and identify possibly catastrophic biological events, and productively engage Afghan scientists and engineers that have WMD or WMD-applicable expertise.

**Pakistan.** Portions of Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, and Balochistan province remained a safe haven for terrorist groups seeking to conduct domestic, regional, and global attacks. Al-Qa’ida, the Haqqani Network, Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan,
Lashkar i Jhangvi, Lashkar e-Tayyiba, and other terrorist groups, as well as the Afghan Taliban, took advantage of this safe haven to plan operations in Pakistan and throughout the region. Though they did act against TTP, Pakistani authorities did not take significant military or law enforcement action against other groups operating from Pakistan-based safe havens, such as HQN and the Afghan Taliban.

The potential for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) trafficking, proliferation, and terrorism remained a concern in Pakistan. Pakistan is a constructive and active participant in the Nuclear Security Summit process and has worked to strengthen its strategic trade controls. A number of State Department programs are being implemented to mitigate the risk of WMD, such as the Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) Program, which enabled Pakistani officials to gain expertise in properly classifying items of proliferation concern and export licensing best practices.

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Colombia. Colombia’s borders with Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Panama, and Brazil include rough terrain and dense forest cover, which coupled with low population densities and historically weak government presence, have often allowed for potential safe havens for insurgent and terrorist groups, particularly the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN). Colombia continued its efforts to combat terrorism within its borders, targeting both the FARC and ELN. Additionally, even as the Government of Colombia engaged with the FARC in peace talks throughout the year, President Santos maintained pressure by continuing operational exercises to combat the FARC’s ability to conduct terrorist attacks. Nevertheless, illegal armed groups, primarily known as “Bandas Criminales,” use the porous borders, remote mountain areas, and jungles to maneuver, train, cultivate and transport narcotics, operate illegal mines, “tax” the local populace, and engage in other illegal activities. Colombia continued cooperation and information sharing with the Panamanian National Border Service, establishing a joint base of operation and strengthening control of their shared border in the Darien region. Improved relations with neighboring Ecuador and Venezuela have led to some increased cooperation from those countries on law enforcement issues. Stronger government actions in Brazil and Peru and continued cooperation with the Government of Colombia have also addressed potential safe haven areas along their shared borders.

Venezuela. There were credible reports that Venezuela maintained an environment that allowed for fundraising activities that benefited known terrorist groups. Individuals linked to Hizballah as well as FARC and ELN members were present in Venezuela.

COUNTERING TERRORISM ON THE ECONOMIC FRONT

In 2013, the Department of State designated four new Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO), listed 18 organizations and individuals as Specially Designated Global Terrorists under Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, and revoked the designations of one organization and four individuals. The Department of the Treasury also designated organizations and individuals under E.O. 13224. For a full list of all USG designations, see the Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control website at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/SDN-List/Pages/default.aspx.

FTO/EO 13224 group designations:
• On March 21, the Department of State designated Ansar al-Dine (AAD) under E.O. 13224 and as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on March 22. (See Chapter 6, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, for further information on AAD.)
• On May 28, the Department of State revoked the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group’s (GICM) designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.

• On November 13, the Department of State designated Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis-Sudan (Ansaru) under E.O. 13224 and as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on November 14. (See Chapter 6, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, for further information on Ansaru.)

• On November 13, the Department of State designated Boko Haram (BH) under E.O. 13224 and as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on November 14. (See Chapter 6, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, for further information on BH.)

• On December 18, the Department of State designated the al-Mulathamun Battalion under E.O. 13224 and as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on December 19. (See Chapter 6, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, for further information on AMB.)

E.O. 13224 designations:
• On January 8, the Department of State designated Abdelbasit Alhaj Alhassan Haj Hamad and Mohamed Makawi Ibrahim Mohamed, who participated in an armed attack in Khartoum, Sudan in 2008 that resulted in the deaths of a U.S. diplomat serving with USAID, John Michael Granville, and a Sudanese USAID employee, Adbelrahman Abbas Rahama. On July 3, the Department of State also designated a third individual involved in the 2008 attack, Abd Al-Ra’Ouf Abu Zaid Mohamed Hamza.

• On January 24, the Department of State designated Ahmed Abdullah Saleh al-Khazmari al-Zahran, who travelled to Afghanistan and Pakistan from Saudi Arabia to join al-Qa’ida (AQ) prior to 2007 and is closely connected to many senior AQ leaders.

• On February 26, the Department of State designated the Commander Nazir Group (CNG) and its sub-commander Malang Wazir. Since 2006, CNG has run training camps, dispatched suicide bombers, provided safe haven for al-Qa’ida fighters, and conducted attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan against military and civilian targets. Acting as a sub-commander for CNG, Malang has overseen training camps and has been known to send fighters to Afghanistan to support the Taliban.

• On February 26, the Department of State designated Iyad ag Ghali, the leader of Ansar al-Dine (AAD). Ghali received backing from al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb in AAD’s fight against Malian and French forces. Ghali has been involved with rebel forces in Mali since the 1990s.

• On May 16, the Department of State designated Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, the leader of al-Nusrah Front, a Syria-based organization allied with al-Qa’ida. Under al-Jawlani’s leadership, al-Nusrah Front has carried out multiple suicide attacks throughout Syria, many of which have killed innocent Syrian civilians.

• On June 27, the Department of State delisted the deceased Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) member, Eric Breininger. He was originally listed for his commitment to violence against U.S. interests, specifically in Germany, and his association with IJU terrorist training camps.

• Also on June 27, the Department of State delisted the deceased AQAP operative Nayif Bin-Muhammad al-Qahtani, who was originally designated for his involvement in the planning and execution of terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

• On July 24, the Department of State designated Bulut Yayla, a trained operative of the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C), a Marxist terrorist organization that used a suicide bomber to attack U.S. Embassy Ankara on February 1, 2013.

• On August 6, the Department of State designated Bahawal Khan, who was appointed leader of the Commander Nazir Group after Maulvi Nazir’s death in January 2013. Khan previously served as a sub-commander for the group and has fought with the Taliban since the late 1990s.
On August 21, the Department of State designated Mohamed Lahbous, a member of the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, who has participated in a number of attacks, including the October 2011 abduction of three aid workers from a refugee camp in western Algeria, and a June 2012 attack in Ouargla, Algeria, which killed one and injured three.

On September 26, the Department of State delisted the deceased Fahd al-Quso, a member of AQAP who was wanted for his participation in the 2000 bombing of the USS Cole.

Also on September 26, the Department of State delisted Badruddin Haqqani, who was deceased and had been one of the Haqqani Network's most senior leaders.

On October 7, the Department of State designated Muhammad Jamal and the Muhammad Jamal Network (MJN). In the 1980s Muhammad Jamal trained in Afghanistan with al-Qa’ida. Upon his return to Egypt, he became a top military commander and head of the operational wing of Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Jamal formed MJN after his release from Egyptian prison in 2011, and established several terrorist training camps in Egypt and Libya.

On December 18, 2013, the Department of State designated Usamah Amin al-Shihabi, a Lebanon-based associate of Fatah al-Islam and head of Syria-based al-Nusrah Front’s Palestinian wing in Lebanon.

MULTILATERAL EFFORTS TO COUNTER TERRORISM

In 2013, the United States continued to work with key partners and allies to strengthen our diplomatic engagement through multilateral organizations. By deepening and broadening the international multilateral counterterrorism framework, we are drawing on the resources and strengthening the activities of multilateral institutions at the international, regional, and sub-regional levels to counter the threat of violent extremists and build the capacities of countries around the world.

The Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF). The GCTF aims to strengthen the international architecture for addressing 21st century terrorism and promotes a strategic, long-term approach to dealing with the threat. Since its launch in September 2011, the GCTF has mobilized over US $230 million to strengthen counterterrorism-related rule of law institutions, in particular, for countries transitioning away from emergency law.

Other accomplishments since the launch include the adoption of six sets of good practices that are intended to both provide practical guidance for countries as they seek to enhance their counterterrorism capacity and bring greater strategic coherence to global counterterrorism capacity building efforts:

- The Rabat Memorandum on Good Practices for Effective Counterterrorism Practice in the Criminal Justice Sector;
- The Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders;
- The Algiers Memorandum on Good Practices for Preventing and Denying the Benefits of Kidnapping for Ransom by Terrorists;
- The Madrid Memorandum on Good Practices for Assistance to Victims of Terrorism Immediately after the Attack and in Criminal Proceedings;
- The Ankara Memorandum on Good Practices for a Multi-Sectoral Approach to Countering Violent Extremism; and
- Good Practices on Community Engagement and Community-Oriented Policing as Tools to Counter Violent Extremism.
In addition, the GCTF has set in motion the development of two independent international training centers that will provide platforms for delivering sustainable training in the Forum’s two areas of strategic priority: countering violent extremism (CVE) and strengthening rule of law institutions. Hedayah, the first international center of excellence on CVE, officially opened in Abu Dhabi in December 2012. The International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law, to be based initially in Malta, is slated to begin operations in 2014.

In September 2013, Secretary Kerry announced that a core group of government and non-governmental partners from different regions will establish the first-ever public-private global fund to support local grass-roots efforts to counter violent extremism. The Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF) will be the first global effort to leverage greater public and private-sector support for community-based projects aimed at addressing local drivers of radicalization by focusing on education, vocational training, civic engagement, and women’s advocacy. GCTF member Switzerland will host the GCERF in Geneva when it opens in the second half of 2014.

The UN is a close partner of and participant in the GCTF and its activities. The GCTF serves as a mechanism for furthering the implementation of the universally-agreed UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and, more broadly, to complement and reinforce existing multilateral counterterrorism efforts, starting with those of the UN. The GCTF also partners with a wide range of regional multilateral organizations, including the Council of Europe, the OSCE, the AU, and the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development.

The United Nations (UN). Sustained and strategic engagement at the UN on counterterrorism issues is a priority for the United States. The United States engaged with a wide range of UN actors on counterterrorism, providing almost US $7 million since 2011. These included:

- **The Counter-Terrorism Committee Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED).** The United States supported CTED efforts to facilitate training and other technical assistance to UN member states on a range of issues addressed in the UN Strategy. These include: counterterrorism financing, securing borders, and investigating, prosecuting, and adjudicating terrorism cases within a rule of law framework.

- **The Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF).** The United States was among the group of member states that financed a major CTITF initiative to raise awareness of the UN Strategy in different regions, including West Africa and South Asia. The United States also provided funding to support a range of CTITF activities including: its partnership with the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization to support conflict prevention and promote peace and education in Nigeria, which is part of the Integrated Assistance for Countering Terrorism initiative; training and capacity building of law enforcement officials on human rights, the rule of law and the prevention of terrorism; targeted financial measures to counter terrorism; and public relations and media awareness training for victims of terrorism to provide counter-narratives to messages inciting violent extremism more effectively.

- **The UNSC 1267/1989 Committee.** The United States worked closely with the UN 1267/1989 (al-Qa’ida) Sanction Committee and its Monitoring Team by proposing listings and delistings, providing amendments, engaging the Committee’s Ombudsperson in delistings, and providing input to the Committee to enhance its procedures and implementation of sanctions measures. The United States also assisted the Monitoring Team with information for its research and reports. The 1267/1989 Committee added eight new individuals and two new entities to its
Sanctions List in 2013. The Committee also worked to ensure the integrity of the list by endeavoring to remove those individuals and entities that no longer meet the criteria for listing. To date, 180 individuals and entities – 55 through the Ombudsperson, 21 through the Focal Point mechanism, and 104 through Committee reviews – have been delisted and additional information on remaining listings has been provided to assist in the operational implementation of the sanctions.

- **The UN Office on Drugs and Crime’s Terrorism Prevention Branch (UNODC/TPB).** The Terrorism Prevention Branch (TPB), in conjunction with the UNODC’s Global Program against Money Laundering, continued to provide assistance to countries in its efforts to ratify and implement the universal legal instruments against terrorism. In 2013, the United States supported a range of TPB programs aimed at strengthening the capacity of criminal justice officials to prevent and respond to terrorism within a rule of law framework, including in Morocco, Tunisia, Yemen, Libya; in the countries of the Sahel; and South and Southeast Asia.

- **The UN Inter-Regional Crime Research Institute (UNICRI).** The United States has provided financial support to a UNICRI-led global awareness-raising and capacity building campaign related to the implementation of the Global Counterterrorism Forum’s (GCTF) Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for the Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders (Rome Memorandum).

- **The UNSC 1540 Committee.** UNSCR 1977, adopted in 2011, extended the mandate of the 1540 Committee for 10 years, reaffirming UNSCR 1540’s attention to the nonproliferation of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. The resolution also encouraged member states to prepare national implementation plans and urged the Committee to strengthen its role in facilitating technical assistance for implementing UNSCR 1540. The 1540 Committee’s program of work focuses on five main areas: monitoring and national implementation; assistance; cooperation with international organizations, including the UNSC committees established pursuant to UNSCRs 1267 and 1373; transparency and media outreach; and administration and resources.

- **The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).** ICAO’s Universal Security Audit Program (USAP) continued to contribute directly to U.S. homeland security by ensuring that each of ICAO’s 191 member states undergo regular security audits and comply with uniform aviation security standards. USAP conducted assistance missions to help states correct security problems revealed by surveys and audits. ICAO, in partnership with the UN’s Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED), has assisted member states in the implementation of UNSCRs on counterterrorism, including border control. The two entities have conducted assessment visits and organized workshops focused on countering terrorism and the use of fraudulent travel documents, and promoting good practices on border control and aviation security. Together with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, ICAO and CTED have encouraged member states to ratify and implement international counterterrorism treaties.

- **The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).** The IAEA continued to implement its Nuclear Security Plan (2010-2013) for countering the threat of terrorism involving nuclear and other radioactive material. The United States was actively involved in IAEA efforts to enhance security for vulnerable nuclear and other radioactive materials and associated facilities, and to reduce the risk that such materials could be used by terrorists.
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and FATF-Style Regional Bodies (FSRBs). The United States supported FATF plenary activities on policy issues, negotiating, and revising the assessment criteria for mutual evaluations under the new standards; and participated in the working groups on implementation and on strengthening the FATF network through the FATF-style regional bodies (FSRBs). The United States continued to stress the importance of targeted sanctions and Special Recommendation III, a provision to freeze and confiscate assets. Further work by the United States revised the FATF-FSRB relationship, looking at guidance on and vulnerabilities of new payment methods; outreach to the private sector; maintaining emphasis on non-financial businesses and professions; and engagement with the Contact Group on the Central African Action Group Against Money Laundering.

African Union (AU). The United States supported the efforts of the AU to bolster the counterterrorism capacity of its members to implement the UN Strategy, particularly via the AU’s efforts to implement GCTF framework documents. For example, the United States provided assistance for AU-led workshops on implementing the GCTF’s Madrid Plan of Action on Victims of Terrorism and the Algiers Memorandum on Good Practices for Preventing and Denying the Benefits of Kidnapping for Ransom to Terrorists. The United States also supported a joint effort between the AU’s African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism and CTED to strengthen border-related counterterrorism capacities in the Sahel and the Maghreb through training on the use of international databases and enhanced cooperation, coordination, and information exchanges.

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The OSCE consolidated its counterterrorism mandate and focused efforts on promoting a rule of law-based counterterrorism approach. U.S.-funded border security training in Central Asia, particularly through the OSCE’s Border Management Staff College in Dushanbe, also contributed to the capabilities of border and customs officials to counter threats. Through the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department and its Action against Terrorism Unit, the United States continued to support initiatives aimed at critical energy infrastructure protection, travel document security, cyber-security, nonproliferation, and promoting the role that women play in countering violent extremism, particularly in Central Asia and South Eastern Europe. In 2013, the OSCE released the Good Practices Guide on Non-Nuclear Critical Energy Infrastructure Protection (NNCEIP) from Terrorist Attacks Focusing on Threats Emanating from Cyberspace, which focuses on raising awareness of the significance of protecting critical energy infrastructure and the extent to which it is threatened by cyber-related terrorist attacks. The Guide will help share established good practices for improving critical energy infrastructure cybersecurity for governments and industry.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO leads ISAF stability operations in Afghanistan. ISAF conducted operations to degrade the capability and will of the insurgency, support the growth in capacity and capability of Afghanistan’s National Security Forces, and facilitate improvements in governance and socio-economic development to provide a secure environment for stability. NATO’s Policy Guidelines on Counterterrorism focus on NATO’s current capabilities and discusses how NATO will consolidate its counterterrorism efforts in three main areas: awareness, capabilities, and engagement. The Policy Guidelines on Counterterrorism called for the development of an implementation action plan, which is intended to identify initiatives to enhance the prevention of, and resilience to, acts of terrorism with a focus on improved threat awareness, adequate capabilities, and enhanced engagement with partner countries and other international actors in countering terrorism. NATO also focused on the protection of critical infrastructure, including energy infrastructure, as well
as harbor security and route clearance. Many of these challenges are being addressed by NATO’s Emerging Security Challenges Division.

- **NATO-Russia Council (NRC).** Founded in 2002, the NRC provides a framework for security cooperation to address shared challenges, including NATO-Russia counterterrorism cooperation. Through the NRC’s Science for Peace and Security Committee, NATO Allies and Russia are working on the STANDEX (“Stand-off Detection of Explosive Devices”) project, which is designed to detect and counter a terrorist threat to mass transit and other public spaces.

**European Union (EU).** The EU’s work with the United States covers a range of counterterrorism issues, including efforts to curb terrorist financing, to strengthen cooperation on countering violent extremism, and to build counterterrorism capacity in third countries. Much of this work is completed through U.S.-EU dialogues, including the U.S.-EU Consultation on Terrorism and the U.S.-EU Political Dialogue on Counterterrorist Financing.

**Group of Eight (G-8).** Within the context of the G-8 Roma-Lyon Group (RLG) meetings on Counterterrorism and Countercrime, the United States participated actively during the UK’s 2013 G-8 Presidency by leading initiatives aimed at strengthening implementation of the UN al-Qa’ida Sanctions Regime; countering the use of chemical precursors to make improvised explosive devices; and coordinating counterterrorism efforts in North and West Africa. The United States also supported a UK-sponsored project to assist multinational companies with protective security and crisis planning in response to the terrorist attacks in In Amenas, Algeria. The RLG met twice in 2013 and advanced projects through its expert groups on counterterrorism, transportation security, high tech crime, migration, criminal legal affairs, and law enforcement.

**Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).** The United States joined in counterterrorism activities of the 27-member ARF, including the annual meeting on counterterrorism and transnational crime (CTTC) and supported capacity building through ARF institutions. The United States supported efforts in ARF to address cyber security issues, including confidence-building measures in cyberspace and promoted efforts that respect human rights such as freedom of expression and open access. The United States encouraged information sharing and supported the CTTC work plan, which focuses on illicit drugs; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear terrorism; cyber-security; and counter-radicalization through a series of biological preparedness workshops, the sponsorship of a regional transnational crime information sharing center, and a workshop on migration.

**Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).** In 2013, APEC continued to implement its comprehensive Consolidated Counter-Terrorism and Secure Trade Strategy, adopted in 2011, which endorsed the principles of security, efficiency, and resilience; and advocated for risk-based approaches to security challenges across its four cross-cutting areas of supply chains, travel, finance, and infrastructure. The United States co-sponsored a policy dialogue on Secure Infrastructure in the Asia-Pacific Region, which highlighted how APEC economies face varied challenges to building secure, efficient, and resilient infrastructure for regional commerce and transportation and also demonstrated the importance of identifying gaps, sharing best practices, and developing a regional approach to critical infrastructure protection and resilience. The United States also sponsored APEC capacity building workshops on canine screening in aviation security and low cost/ no cost checkpoint optimization, which helped further implement the APEC Counter-Terrorism and Secure Trade Strategy.
Organization of American States Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (OAS/CICTE). In 2013, the CICTE Secretariat conducted 113 activities, training courses, and technical assistance missions that benefited more than 4,181 participants in five thematic areas: border control; critical infrastructure protection; counterterrorism legislative assistance and terrorist financing; strengthening strategies on emerging terrorist threats (crisis management); and international cooperation and partnerships. The United States is a major contributor to CICTE’s training programs and has provided funding and expert trainers for capacity building programs focused on maritime security, aviation security, travel document security and fraud prevention, cybersecurity, counterterrorism legislation, and efforts to counter terrorist financing.

INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND PROTOCOLS

A matrix of the ratification status of 16 of the international conventions and protocols related to terrorism can be found here: https://www.unodc.org/tldb/universal_instruments_NEW.html

LONG-TERM PROGRAMS AND INITIATIVES DESIGNED TO COUNTER TERRORIST SAFE HAVENS

COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM (CVE). CVE is part of a strategic approach to counterterrorism (CT) that aims to deny terrorist groups new recruits. In 2009, the State Department created a CVE team in the Counterterrorism Bureau, to lead our efforts in this critical area. In our CVE programming and activities, we are seeking to (1) build resilience among communities most at risk of recruitment and radicalization to violence; (2) counter terrorist narratives and messaging; and (3) build the capacity of partner nations and civil society to counter violent extremism.

To be effective, CVE must work on multiple levels. First, our efforts must be well targeted. As such, we identify both key nodes and locales where radicalization is taking place, and focus our programming and activities in these areas. Second, our efforts must be tailored to take the local context into account. The drivers of recruitment and radicalization to violence are varied, often localized, and specific to each region, and our programming choices are developed in response to these factors.

Therefore, State’s CT Bureau emphasizes supporting local CVE efforts and building local CVE capacity. Given the growing international focus on CVE, we have also been able to develop a broader range of international partners to work within our efforts, including other governments, multilateral organizations, and non-governmental actors. Through these broad-based partnerships, we have been able to develop good practices, leverage others’ resources, and multiply its impact.

The President and the Secretary of State established the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications (CSCC) in 2011 to lead an interagency effort to coordinate, orient, and inform government-wide foreign communications activities targeted against terrorism and violent extremism, particularly al-Qa’ida (AQ), its affiliates, and adherents. CSCC, based at the Department of State, collaborates with U.S. embassies and consulates, interagency partners, and outside experts to counter terrorist narratives and misinformation, and directly supports U.S. government communicators at our U.S. embassies overseas. CSCC’s programs draw on a full range of intelligence information and analysis for context and feedback. CSCC counters terrorist propaganda in the social media environment on a daily basis, contesting space where AQ and its supporters formerly had free reign. CSCC communications have provoked defensive responses from violent extremists on many of the
most popular extremist websites and forums as well as on social media. In 2013, CSCC produced over 10,000 postings and 138 videos. CSCC also engages in a variety of projects directly supporting U.S. government communicators working with overseas audiences, as well as amplifying credible CVE voices and supporting local initiatives, in critical parts of the Middle East and Africa, such as Yemen, Syria, Somalia, and Mali.

While public diplomacy and development projects can have a positive impact on the CVE environment, our CVE programs and activities are far more narrowly tailored and targeted. In fact, CVE programming more closely resembles programs for curtailing recruitment into militias or gangs. It requires knowledge of where youth are most susceptible to radicalization to violence and why that is so. We ensure that our areas of focus align with the areas of greatest risk by working with foreign partners and other U.S. government agencies, such as USAID and DoD, to identify hotspots of radicalization and to design programming. Key areas of programming include:

- **Community Engagement and Community-Oriented Policing.** The Department of State has implemented projects that link marginalized groups in a community, such as at-risk youth or women, with responsible influencers and leaders in their communities to build their resilience to violent extremism or improve their capacity to counter it. These activities include: providing skills training to youth, their families, and their communities; leadership development; and promoting problem solving and conflict resolution skills. Projects also include those to mentor and train law enforcement personnel in community engagement, facilitation and conflict mitigation; and communication techniques. Through increased cooperation between community leaders, law enforcement, and local government; community-oriented policing builds community resilience to violent extremism by addressing factors of community instability, disenfranchisement, and marginalization.

- **CVE Advocacy: Women and Victims/Survivors.** Women can act as gatekeepers to their communities, and can thus provide a first line of defense against recruitment and radicalization to violence in their families and communities. In regions such as East Africa and West Africa, women are trained to recognize signs of radicalization, deploy prevention techniques, and become personally responsible for the local promotion of security and for radicalization prevention. In partnership with local women’s networks, the Department of State supports training for women civil society leaders and works with law enforcement personnel to devise CVE-prevention strategies and pilot activities.

  By sharing their stories, victims of terrorism offer a resonant counternarrative that highlights the destruction and devastation of terrorist attacks. Workshops train victims to interact with conventional and social media, create public relations campaigns that amplify their messages, and seek out platforms that help them disseminate their message most broadly to at-risk audiences.

- **Media and CVE Messaging.** The Department of State supports media projects that include radio shows that reach millions of listeners who are facing a looming violent extremist threat. Pivotal in West Africa, these projects include weekly radio dramas that are produced locally and are designed to tackle CVE subjects by empowering locally-credible voices who reject violent extremism. They include call-in shows that engage youth; women; traditional, religious, and political leaders; representatives from educational institutions; and government officials in thematic discussions about CVE, peace, and stability.
The Department of State supports efforts to conduct outreach, engagement, and training tours among diaspora communities who may be targeted for recruitment or susceptible to radicalization to violence in certain regions. Efforts involve screening documentaries highlighting the tragedy and devastation wrought by the recruitment of youth to terrorism and holding community roundtables to raise awareness and discuss ways to prevent recruitment and radicalization to violence. These projects are especially effective in engaging Somali diaspora communities.

- **Prisoner Rehabilitation/Prison Disengagement.** The Department of State has worked to identify and address key nodes of potential radicalization to violence, an example of which is prisons. Improperly managed, a prison can serve as both a safe haven for violent extremism and an incubator for new recruits. Recognizing that many such inmates will eventually be released back into society, the Department of State is working – directly and through partner organizations – to strengthen the capabilities of key countries to rehabilitate and reintegrate such offenders. Such partners include the UN’s Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute and the International Center for Counterterrorism, a Dutch NGO; who are leading a major international initiative on prison rehabilitation and disengagement. They have been using the Global Counterterrorism Forum’s Rome Memorandum – a series of good practices in this area – to shape their efforts. More than 40 countries, multilateral organizations, and leading independent experts have participated in this stage of the initiative, which provided policymakers, practitioners, and experts a chance to compare notes and develop good practices in this critically important area.

A number of multilateral bodies remain key partners for the Department of State in its CVE efforts. Through these partnerships, we are able to shape the international CVE agenda, leverage others’ resources and expertise, and build broader support for our CVE priorities.

- **Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) CVE Working Group.** The GCTF provides a platform for counterterrorism policymakers and experts to identify urgent needs, devise solutions, and mobilize resources for addressing key counterterrorism challenges. GCTF’s CVE Working Group, one of five expert-driven groups, focuses on the following areas: (a) using institutions to counter violent extremism; (b) measuring the impact of CVE programs; and (c) countering the violent extremist narrative.

- **Hedayah, the International CVE Center of Excellence:** With support from GCTF members and international partners, the United Arab Emirates launched the first international CVE Center of Excellence, Hedayah, in December 2012. Hedayah’s mandate covers CVE research, dialogue, and training. The Department of State supports Hedayah with funding to develop pilot training courses for governmental and non-governmental CVE practitioners in the areas of community-oriented policing, education, youth development, and media. More information on the GCTF and Hedayah can be found at: [http://www.thegctf.org/](http://www.thegctf.org/).

- **Global CVE Fund:** In September 2013, Secretary Kerry announced the launch of the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF), the first ever public-private global effort to support local grassroots CVE projects. GCERF will leverage public and private sector support for community-based projects aimed at addressing local drivers of radicalization by focusing on education, vocational training, civic engagement, and women’s advocacy. GCTF member Switzerland will host the GCERF in Geneva when it opens in the second half of 2014.
USAID APPROACH TO CVE. USAID’s approaches to CVE run parallel to and are undertaken in coordination with the CVE efforts of the Department of State. Unlike traditional development programs, USAID CVE programs address narrow populations – targeting young men in particular – that generally are not reached by other efforts. Programming objectives aim to strengthen specific resiliencies that are critical to addressing the socioeconomic, political, and cultural drivers of violent extremism. In partnership with host countries, each activity is tailored to meet the specific threat levels, political environments, and material needs of each country. Activities include:

- **Empowering Youth** through: vocational and entrepreneurial skills training, civic education, capacity building for youth associations, and leadership training to increase participation in local decision-making by young men and women. In East Africa, for example, programming aims to promote a positive sense of identity for vulnerable youth through youth association activity, community participation, and vocational training.

- **Increasing Moderate Voices** through: integrated radio, social media, and civic education activities, enhanced quality and credible information, and positive dialogue. In the Sahel, for example, USAID is providing technical and financial support for local radio stations and their production of moderate community-based content. Religious leaders are being engaged with training and dialogue to promote moderate messaging, conflict prevention and resolution, and constructive community initiatives.

- **Increasing Civil Society Capacity** through: formal and informal training, strengthened advocacy skills, citizen-led accountability initiatives and issue-based campaigns integrated with radio and social media and enhanced through civil society coalitions and networks. For example, USAID is providing capacity building grants to civil society organizations (CSOs) in the Sahel for rehabilitation projects and community initiatives.

- **Strengthening Local Government** through: organized and enhanced community entities and CSO capacity, greater citizen participation, and training in public administration, transparency, advocacy, and government outreach. For example, in the Sahel, USAID is supporting the establishment of local community advisory councils composed of women, youth, religious, and other representatives to ensure local governance and activities are more responsive to community needs.

CAPACITY BUILDING PROGRAMS. As the terrorist threat has evolved and grown more geographically diverse in recent years, it has become clear that our success depends in large part on the effectiveness and ability of our partners. To succeed over the long term, we must increase the number of countries capable of and willing to take on this challenge. We have had important successes in Indonesia and Colombia, but we must intensify efforts to improve our partners' law enforcement and border security capabilities to tackle these threats. Our counterterrorism capacity building programs – Antiterrorism Assistance Program, Counterterrorist Finance, Counterterrorism Engagement, the Terrorist Interdiction Program/Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System, and transnational activities under the Regional Strategic Initiatives – are all critically important and work on a daily basis to build capacity and improve political will. For further information on these programs, we refer you to the Annual Report on Assistance Related to International Terrorism, Fiscal Year 2013: http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/rpt/221544.htm.

REGIONAL STRATEGIC INITIATIVE. Terrorist groups often take advantage of porous borders and ungoverned areas between countries. The U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Counterterrorism created the Regional Strategic Initiative (RSI) to encourage Ambassadors and their Country Teams to develop regional approaches to counterterrorism. RSI operates in key terrorist theaters of operation to
assess the threat, pool resources, and devise collaborative strategies, action plans, and policy recommendations. In 2013, RSI groups were in place for Central Asia, East Africa, Eastern Mediterranean, Iraq and its Neighbors, South Asia, Southeast Asia, the Trans-Sahara (the Maghreb and the Sahel), and the Western Hemisphere.

One example of an RSI program approved and funded in 2013 is the Explosive Incident Countermeasures (EIC) course for Bulgaria, which yielded almost immediate results when a week after the course ended, the Ministry of Interior officers that participated in the course successfully responded to two bomb threats, one of which was at the U.S. Embassy in Sofia.

RSI is continuing to fund Resident Legal Advisors in Malaysia, Mauritania, Niger, and Turkey. RSI also funds a number of regional workshops focusing on border security and larger counterterrorism issues. Two ongoing series include Eastern Mediterranean Working Groups on border security and the Gulf of Aden Regional Forum. These forums provide a venue for participants to discuss current counterterrorism issues, as well as joint efforts to counter them.

**SUPPORT TO PAKISTAN**

The United States continues to build a long-term partnership with Pakistan, as we believe that a stable, secure, prosperous, and democratic Pakistan is in the long-term U.S. national security interest. To support this partnership, the United States has allocated civilian and security assistance totaling more than US $8.5 billion since 2009. U.S. security assistance to Pakistan is designed to build Pakistan’s counterterrorism and counterinsurgency capacity. In addition, since 2002, the Department of Defense has reimbursed over US $11 billion in Coalition Support Funds for Pakistani expenditures in support of Operation Enduring Freedom.

Since the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act (EPPA) was enacted in October 2009, and with funding made available in annual appropriations legislation, the United States has disbursed over US $4.1 billion in civilian assistance to Pakistan, including over US $1 billion for humanitarian assistance following floods and conflict. We continue to focus on five sectors determined in consultation with the Pakistani government in 2011: energy, stabilization, education, health, and economic growth, including agriculture. Emphasis on improving democracy, governance, and gender equity are integrated into programming across the five sectors.

Since the passage of this major authorization and annual appropriations legislation, U.S. assistance has added over 1,000 megawatts to Pakistan’s electricity grid and helped Pakistan take steps to reform the troubled sector; funded the refurbishment or construction of 560 miles of roads, enabling trade, security, and mobility; trained over 5,100 police and 1,000 prosecutors across Pakistan; provided scholarships to approximately 10,000 Pakistanis to attend Pakistani universities; and supplied better access to comprehensive family planning services to over 20,000 women.
Energy: Chronic energy shortages severely limit Pakistan’s economic development. As such, energy is our top assistance priority, supporting the goal of job creation, security, and political stability in Pakistan. We continued to fund infrastructure rehabilitation projects and provided technical assistance to Pakistani energy institutions, including distribution companies, to increase power generation and improve performance.

Economic Growth: Through a range of programs and public-private partnerships in agriculture and other sectors of Pakistan’s economy, U.S. assistance helped Pakistan create jobs and foster economic growth. In 2013, the United States also made awards for the Pakistan Private Investment Initiative (PPII), a public-private program in which U.S. capital, matched equally by private sector funding, was committed as equity to small- and medium-sized Pakistani enterprises to provide much needed liquidity.

Stabilization: The United States supported Pakistan’s efforts to ensure its territory is inhospitable to violent extremists by strengthening governance and civilian law enforcement capacity and promoting socio-economic development, particularly in border areas with Afghanistan and other targeted locations vulnerable to violent extremism. Our efforts included road construction, small community-based grants, police and governance training, and providing equipment to civilian law enforcement.

Education: Pakistan’s ability to educate its youth is critical to its economic growth and future trajectory. U.S. education programs focused on increasing the number of students who enroll in and complete courses in primary, secondary, and tertiary educational institutions; and improving the quality of that education to prepare Pakistani students for the workforce. We are also committed to building bridges between Pakistani and American students and professionals through exchange programs.

Health: The provision of basic health services in Pakistan is inadequate for much of the population, particularly for rural populations. U.S. health programs supported the Government of Pakistan’s efforts to deliver healthcare, particularly in the areas of maternal and child health and family planning. U.S. assistance was also used to assist Government of Pakistan initiatives to construct health clinics and hospitals and fund the acquisition of medical materials, including contraception.

Humanitarian Assistance: In 2010 and 2011, the United States was the largest bilateral donor of assistance in response to severe flooding. In 2011, the U.S. funded emergency assistance and provided

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>($ in thousands)</th>
<th>FY 2012</th>
<th>FY 2013</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1,737,941</td>
<td>1,076,498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Support Fund</td>
<td>904,697</td>
<td>723,329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Military Financing</td>
<td>295,408</td>
<td>280,172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Health and Child Survival - USAID</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Military Education and Training</td>
<td>4,868</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement</td>
<td>34,000</td>
<td>57,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs</td>
<td>5,900</td>
<td>10,597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund</td>
<td>425,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food for Peace</td>
<td>68,068</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
US $190 million for direct assistance to more than one million families affected by the 2010 floods. Since October 2009, over US $1 billion of emergency humanitarian assistance has been provided to Pakistan in response to floods and conflict, above and beyond bilateral assistance.

**International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement:** During 2013, Pakistan took important steps to counter violent extremists operating in the border region with Afghanistan. These steps included intensifying support to civilian law enforcement and border security agencies. The United States directly supported Pakistan’s efforts to build the capacity of its civilian law enforcement and border security agencies by providing training, equipment, infrastructure, and aviation assistance. U.S. assistance built law enforcement capacity to hold areas cleared by Pakistan’s military, protect local populations from militant attacks, and maintain law and order. Collectively, these efforts enhanced the counterinsurgency, law enforcement, and counternarcotics capacities of Pakistan’s civilian law enforcement and border security agencies. Improved security will, in turn, facilitate economic development, which is necessary for long-term Pakistani stability and progress.

**Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR):** The United States provided assistance to strengthen Pakistan’s export control system to prevent transfer of weapons of mass destruction and related technology. NADR/Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) funds were used for nonproliferation export control training addressing legal/regulatory reform, export licensing systems, customs enforcement, general inspection, weapons of mass destruction detection training for border control personnel, and procuring specialized radiation/chemical detection equipment. The United States also provided targeted assistance to build Pakistani law enforcement capacity to detect, deter, and respond to terrorist threats. Specifically, the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program provided training and equipment to Pakistani law enforcement to build its capacity to tactically respond to terrorism-related incidents and more effectively conduct terrorism-related investigations, including through improved police-prosecutorial cooperation. The State Department provided ATA assistance with the goal of institutionalizing such assistance within Pakistan’s law enforcement training structure. NADR/Global Threat Reduction Programs (GTR) provided assistance to Pakistan to prevent terrorist access to biological expertise, materials, and technology. GTR engaged scientists to reduce bio-security threats against the United States by supporting pathogen security, safe and secure laboratory conduct, and disease detection and control.

**Foreign Military Financing (FMF):** FMF promotes the development of Pakistan's long-term counterinsurgency (COIN) and counterterrorism capabilities to enable security and stability throughout the country, particularly in the conflict-affected areas on the western borders with Afghanistan and to improve Pakistan's ability to lead and/or participate in maritime security operations that support counterterrorism aims. During FY 2013, we coordinated with Pakistan to refine our plan for current and future FMF to more narrowly focus on seven core capabilities that support their COIN/counterterrorism aims, and that are in our own national interest. These are: precision strike; battlefield air mobility/combat search and rescue; battlefield communications; night vision; survivability; countering improvised explosive devices; border control; and maritime security/counternarcotics. To support this, in 2013 the United States obligated nearly US $600 million in new FY 2012 and FY 2013 FMF, and realigned unused prior-year funding to be targeted on the development of these capabilities.

**International Military Education and Training (IMET):** Pakistan’s IMET program supported professional military education for Pakistan’s military leaders, emphasizing respect for the rule of law, human rights, and democratic values, including civilian control of the military. IMET also supported
effective management of Pakistan’s defense establishment through training in logistics, defense acquisition, and resource management. In accordance with the Kerry-Lugar-Berman legislation, a significant portion of this funding supports training related to counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in Pakistan. To build capacity and cooperation between our security forces, Pakistan receives the largest amount of IMET of any of our global partners, at nearly US $5 million annually.

**Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF):** PCCF builds the capability of Pakistan’s Army, Air Force, and Frontier Corps to clear and hold terrain in contested areas throughout Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) by providing targeted equipment and training for COIN/counterterrorism operations. In FY 2013, we provided US $425 million in FY 2012 PCCF funding for execution. FY 2012 is the final fiscal year that funding was requested for this program. During FY 2013, the United States provided Pakistan with significant assistance to help Pakistan pursue its COIN/counterterrorism operations, including bunker defeat munitions; secure radios; two King Air intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft; and night vision devices.

**Measures to ensure that assistance has the greatest long-term positive impact on the welfare of the Pakistani people and their ability to counter terrorism:** Roughly half of U.S. civilian assistance is implemented via Pakistani partners, including the Government of Pakistan and private sector actors, when practicable. This is done to strengthen local capacity and increase sustainability, providing the greatest possible long-term impact of U.S. assistance. Increasingly, the Administration is also implementing public-private partnerships to engage the private sector as a long-term partner in Pakistan’s development.

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**COUNTERTERRORISM COORDINATION WITH SAUDI ARABIA**

The United States and Saudi Arabia have a strong bilateral relationship. Multiple high-level visits in 2013 deepened this relationship at the personal and institutional level and enabled senior officials from both countries the chance to discuss means of improving coordination. In 2013, high-level visits from Secretary of State John Kerry, CIA Director John O. Brennan, FBI Director James B. Comey, and Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, among others, reaffirmed the importance of bilateral counterterrorism cooperation between the United States and Saudi Arabia.

During 2013, the Government of Saudi Arabia, working in coordination with the United States, continued to build and augment its capacity to counter terrorism and violent extremist ideologies. Saudi Arabia continued to maintain a robust counterterrorism relationship with the United States and supported enhanced bilateral cooperation to ensure the safety of U.S. and Saudi citizens in both countries. Saudi Arabia’s continued domestic and international efforts to refine its counterterrorism capacity hampered al-Qa’ida in the Arabia Peninsula’s ability to carry out a terrorist attack inside the Kingdom, despite efforts by the terrorist organization to inspire sympathizers to support, finance, or engage in terrorist activities.

Like other countries in the region, Saudi Arabia sought to find meaningful economic and civic opportunities for its people. Over 65 percent of the Saudi populace are younger than 25 years old. The King has clearly enunciated an economic development agenda, and Saudi Arabia made progress in addressing economic sources of social discontent, such as housing scarcity and the need to create jobs for millions of Saudis. Despite this, many sources of economic discontent remain.
The King Abdulaziz Center for National Dialogue continued to promote tolerance and respect for diversity through its dialogue and awareness-raising programs. The Ministry of Islamic Affairs continued to reeducate imams, prohibiting them from inciting violence, and continued to monitor mosques and religious education. Numerous religious figures not directly associated with the establishment, however, continued to promote violence and intolerance.

The United States continued to support Saudi Arabia in reforms it is undertaking by facilitating Saudi nationals studying in the United States and promoting other educational exchanges; encouraging increased bilateral trade and investment, urging Saudi Arabia to take actions necessary to attract job-creating partnerships with U.S. companies; and targeting programming in such areas as judicial reform and women’s entrepreneurship. The Ministry of Interior (MOI) continued to operate its flagship de-radicalization program, as well as its extensive prison rehabilitation program to reduce recidivism among former inmates.

Throughout the year, Saudi security professionals regularly participated in joint programs around the world, including in the United States and Europe. In January 2013, Saudi officials participated in a two-day workshop aimed at ensuring an effective criminal justice system – based on the rule of law – that not only responds to terrorist attacks but also has the ability to prevent them from occurring. In February 2013, the government hosted an international terrorism conference with participants from 49 governments and representatives from international organizations and counterterrorism centers, under the auspices of the UN Centre for Counter-Terrorism (UNCCT). On August 8, 2013, Saudi Arabia pledged US $100 million to the UNCCT.

U.S.-Saudi collaboration was not confined to bilateral issues. With political upheaval across the region throughout the year, we consulted closely with the Saudi government on regional stability, including in Yemen, Syria, and Egypt. Working both bilaterally and multilaterally through the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Arab League, the Saudi government provided leadership in promoting peaceful transitions. As part of its strategy to support these transitions and promote stability throughout the region, the Saudi government significantly increased the scope of its economic and development assistance.

BROADCASTING BOARD OF GOVERNORS INITIATIVES:
OUTREACH TO FOREIGN MUSLIM AUDIENCES

This section is provided by the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG)

Four of the five broadcast entities under the supervision of the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) provided programming for Muslim audiences overseas in 2013: the Voice of America (VOA), the Middle East Broadcasting Networks (Alhurra TV, Radio Sawa, and Afia Darfur), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), and Radio Free Asia.

- Eighteen of RFE/RL’s broadcast languages – almost two-thirds of the total – were directed to regions with majority-Muslim populations, including Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Bosnia, Kosovo, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Additional broadcasting regions in the Russian Federation included the majority Muslim populations of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and the North Caucasus.
• VOA has been particularly successful in reaching non-Arabic-speaking Muslim audiences, with strong performances in Nigeria, Indonesia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Tanzania, among other places.
• The Middle East Broadcasting Networks (MBN) broadcast throughout the region to a Muslim population estimated at 315 million.
• VOA and RFE/RL provided news and information to Afghanistan and the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region in Dari and Pashto. Together, RFE/RL and VOA reached nearly 75 percent of Afghan adults each week.
• Radio Free Asia broadcast to the more than 16 million mainly ethnic Uighur Muslims in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region of northwestern China and Central Eurasia.

The BBG used the latest communications technologies to avoid jamming of its signals and to reach audiences through digital and other communications tools, such as webchats and blogs.

THE MIDDLE EAST

Arabic. Middle East Broadcasting Networks (MBN) has five bureaus/production centers in the region, in addition to its main studios in Virginia, and a network of regional correspondents. MBN broadcasts throughout the region to a Muslim population estimated at 315 million. This represents 92 percent of the region’s population and 20 percent of the world’s Muslim population. MBN takes a diverse approach to reaching the largest potential audience, using three platforms: television (Alhurra TV), radio (Radio Sawa), and digital (Alhurra.com and RadioSawa.com). The networks provide a unique, local perspective of breaking news, current events, and topics that are not readily found in domestic media, such as freedom of speech, religion, and the role of women in society and politics. Alhurra also produces short segments encouraging freedom of the press, freedom of expression, and non-violence.

MBN has focused on reaching out to the younger generation living in the Middle East. Alhurra launched a second season of the critically-acclaimed series Rayheen ala Fain? (Where are We Going?) The Alhurra series follows six young Egyptian adults from different political and socioeconomic backgrounds as they take on challenges such as education, sexual harassment, employment, and the rights of women. MBN’s dedicated channel to Iraq (Alhurra-Iraq) launched Youth Talk in 2013, a weekly program that highlights talented young people talking about their achievements and aspirations, as well as the challenges they face in Iraqi society. Its Facebook page encourages young Iraqis to exchange ideas and views on political, scientific, cultural, social, and technical issues.

MBN digital outreach focuses its efforts on original reporting and interactive posts on Facebook, as well as integration within television and radio broadcasts. Alhurra’s primetime newscasts and many of its current affairs programs incorporate social media into their daily and weekly programs. Each day a question is posted on Facebook and then viewers’ responses are used within the newscasts and shows. More and more of MBN’s audience are using mobile platforms and the Alhurra application to get the latest news and information.

The audience has reacted positively to MBN digital platforms. In 2013, Alhurra’s Facebook page went from less than a million “likes” to more than three million, while Radio Sawa’s Facebook page has nearly three million “likes.”
Radio Sawa’s network of stations, broadcasting 24/7, is designed to reach the Arabic-speaking population under the age of 35. It broadcasts 325 newscasts per week about the Middle East, the United States, and the world.

Radio Sawa broadcasts on FM in Morocco, Jordan, the West Bank and Gaza, Kuwait, Bahrain, Libya, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Iraq, Lebanon, and Djibouti. Radio Sawa also broadcasts on medium wave to Egypt, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan; and was available on the Arabsat, Nilesat, and Eutelsat satellite systems in 2013.

**Iraq.** Every week, 67 percent of Iraqi adults – some 12.4 million people – listened to or watched one of the four BBG broadcasters serving the country: Alhurra TV, Radio Sawa, RFE/RL’s Radio Free Iraq, and VOA Kurdish. Alhurra and Radio Sawa continued to be very successful given their localized dedicated streams to Iraqi news and information. The television network reached 30 percent of the Iraqi population weekly and Radio Sawa remained one of the top radio stations among adults. Radio Free Iraq, with 16 percent weekly reach on radio and internet, was among the top five radio stations for news. VOA Kurdish reached 7.1 percent of Kurdish-speaking Iraqis weekly.

**Kurdish.** VOA’s Kurdish Service is the only international news organization broadcasting to Iraq’s Kurds in their main dialects, Sorani and Kurmanji. Although the primary target audience was initially the Iraqi Kurd population, the Service has expanded its coverage to reach Kurds in Turkey, Syria, and Iran. The Service broadcasts three hours of radio programming seven days a week via short wave and FM transmitters in the cities of Sulaimania, Kirkuk, Mosul, Erbil, and Baghdad. The Kurdish Service has enhanced its concentration on both Sorani and Kurmanji websites. The Kurdish Service website visits from the Kurdi (Kurmanji) website increased from 52,560 in 2012, to 82,700 in 2013, due to postings on YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter. VOA Kurdish also expanded its audience by introducing one of its daily radio shows via satellite TV, and incorporated Skype technology into its broadcasts.

**Persian.** VOA Persian provided relevant global and regional news as it relates to Iran, and crucial information about U.S. policy toward Iran and the region. VOA Persian delivered original television programming six hours per day. In addition, VOA and Radio Farda each produced one hour of Radio-on-TV (ROT), starting with VOA Persian’s ROT Tamasha and followed by Radio Farda’s ROT “Sobhane Ba Khabar.”

VOA Persian did exceedingly well in bringing worldwide coverage on timely issues to the people of Iran. For example, it attracted a wide television and online audience during its coverage of the Iranian elections. VOA Persian delivered substantive coverage ahead of, during, and in the aftermath of the June 14 election of Iranian President Hassan Rohani. On November 24, VOA Persian was on the ground in Geneva, providing in depth coverage of the interim agreement signed between Iran and the P5+1 countries.

RFE/RL’s Radio Farda broadcast newscasts at the top of each hour, followed by reports, features, interviews, and regular segments on youth, women, culture, economics, and politics.

- Radio Farda’s coverage of the November Geneva negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program was carried by state media and cited widely inside the country.
- Radio Farda is a leading news destination for Iranian audiences during national events. During the 2013 presidential elections, citizens defied the censors and sent hundreds of tips and comments to Radio Farda by SMS, email, and telephone. Such direct communications have
Radio Farda’s comprehensive human rights monitoring is unique inside Iran. It is listened to by prison inmates who rely on it as the sole source of accurate reporting on their cases.

Recent distinguished Radio Farda programs included: “The Sixth Hour,” a live, current events call-in show; the award-winning investigative report, “Solitary Confinement,” about life in the isolation cells of Iran’s notorious prisons; "Victims of 88,” a groundbreaking report on the deaths and disappearances of activists associated with the 2009 protests; “Visit,” a multi-segment radio documentary profiling Iran's prisoners of conscience,” and Radio Farda’s daily coverage of music and musicians banned in Iran.

Radio Farda’s online community expanded rapidly. Its main Facebook page added new fans at a rate of 3,000 per day for an overall Radio Farda fan base of approximately one million at the end of 2013. A Facebook link to its live audio stream was "recommended" by users over 3,600,000 times.

Radio Farda’s circumvention strategies to fight internet blockage by the Iranian regime was proving successful. From December 2012 to November 2013, Farda’s website logged 154 million page views.

SOUTH ASIA

Afghanistan. Research shows that RFE/RL’s Radio Free Afghanistan is among the most popular and trusted media in Afghanistan, as a result of its dual-language programming, moderate tone, and focus on local concerns such as corruption, narcotics trafficking, kidnapping, and human rights. Call-in shows and roundtables are central to Radio Free Afghanistan programming. Through its unique program “In Search of Loved Ones,” the Service helps reunite families who have lost relatives to violence and war.

Every day the Service receives between 500 to 600 voicemails and messages from citizen journalists, which are verified by and integrated into the news product. Nearly 300,000 Afghans receive news four times a day from Radio Free Afghanistan on their mobile phones and send citizen journalism reports to the station via a subscription-based SMS news service RFE/RL launched in 2010 in partnership with local mobile phone service provider Etisalat Afghanistan.

VOA’s Afghanistan Service provided radio and television programming to Afghan audiences, with a weekly reach of 35.6 percent (12.9 percent via TV and 28.1 percent via radio). VOA’s daily newscast, TV Ashna, broadcast nine hours daily to Afghanistan (four hours of Dari and four hours of Pashto for radio, and one half-hour each of Dari and Pashto on TV). Ashna has become especially popular in urban centers. The Service’s TV program “Karwan,” which looks at current issues through the prism of youth, boasts a loyal following among young viewers. Special programming and segments covered Eid, Ramadan, and the Haj, with correspondent reports on prayers in mosques in both Afghanistan and Washington. In addition to news of Afghanistan, Ashna provided the full range of news and views from the United States.

Urdu. VOA’s Urdu Service reached all of Pakistan, including the Afghanistan/Pakistan border region, as well as neighboring nations and the diaspora. The service has a seven percent audience share (TV, radio, and the internet) in Pakistan, with its six TV products, 12 hours of daily radio broadcasts to the region, and a full-fledged news website. Its website is considered a leading source of news in Urdu in the region as well as the diaspora, and it has recorded an overall 88 percent increase in the last year.
Urdu also produces separate programming for its growing base of FM affiliates. “Kahani Pakistani” presents a peek into America, culture, music, politics, food, and the Pakistani-American community. Another popular weekly show, “Zindagi 360” is aimed at the region’s youth and is one of the top rated shows in its time slot. “Café DC” is an English-language weekly program that discusses and analyzes U.S. policies in the region and around the world. It airs weekly on a state-operated TV channel, the PTV World. The program features interviews and discussions with U.S. and Pakistani lawmakers, policy makers, prominent analysts, and scholars. Urdu offers a quick daily news update, the “VOA NewsMinute,” to three different leading TV channels in Pakistan. Urdu also produces two weekly web-based current affairs and news TV shows, “Access Point” (English), and “Independence Ave” (Urdu). Urdu’s Washington bureau program has been successful with local Pakistani TV channels and radio stations. During the U.S. and Pakistan elections, Urdu offered exclusive footage and news reports from Washington to several channels in Pakistan. Urdu provided over five hours of coverage to over 10 media outlets in Pakistan when Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif visited the United States. Urdu also has a strong and interactive presence on social media.

The Pakistan/Afghanistan Border Region. Radiois considered a market leader in Pakistan's most volatile border regions near Afghanistan for its accuracy, timely news, and interactive programming. VOA Deewa provides a unique narrative on terrorism, U.S.-South Asia relations, and regional politics to over 40 million Pashtuns in the target region. The rival media outlets include Pakistan's state and private television stations, the Taliban-run Mullah radio, and Jihadi media. VOA Deewa’s daily interactive shows engage top regional experts, Pakistani thinkers, democratic leaders, minority leaders, human rights leaders, and women’s activists. VOA Deewa’s flagship daily show for women, "Bibi Shereen" (Sweet Woman) is engaging a huge number of Pashtun college-age women and household women sharing their life stories on the radio when families sit for breakfast in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The daily one-hour simulcast show (Radio on TV) gives a glimpse of the studio in Washington with more video stories from Washington and Pakistan since its launch in 2012. VOA Deewa listeners say the TV show has added life to their evenings. A network of 27 stringers in an extremely hostile media environment provides balanced reporting on tribal regions, national politics, human rights, violent extremism, women, economy, society, and internally displaced people living in camps.

With its extensive network of local reporters, RFE/RL’s Radio Mashal (Torch) provides local and international news and in-depth political reporting that offers an alternative to violent extremist propaganda prevalent in the tribal areas, especially among the region’s majority youth population. It broadcasts several programs that are unique in the region, dedicated to youth, women’s issues, human rights, and health care. In April 2013, Radio Mashal hosted the first ever political debates between Pakistani parliament candidates from the 12 districts in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. The Service emphasizes interaction with its audience through regular call-in shows and voice mail.

Bangladesh. The VOA Bangla service reported extensively on the war crime trial and execution of Jamaat e Islami leader Qader Molla, with roundtable discussions, call-in shows reflecting listeners’ views, and panels. The Service reported on activities of the new youth movement that is demanding justice for war criminals and a corruption-free society, and ran interviews with the movement’s leaders. U.S. and Bangladeshi experts, analysts, and members of human rights groups regularly appeared on Bangla radio, TV, and web reports, including extensive programming in preparation for general elections. VOA Bangla also successfully launched the USAID-funded, VOA-USAID weekly Health Reporting program on DESH TV in Dhaka/Radio Today.
Kazakhstan. RFE/RL’s Kazakh Service content was delivered via its internet website, mobile site, and social media platforms. The web strategy attracted a younger audience to this bilingual (Kazakh and Russian) site, providing opportunities for interactivity and exploring new genres such as video reporting. The Service has broken several major stories in 2013. Following the October discovery on YouTube of an al-Qa’ida propaganda video purporting to show dozens of Kazakh nationals taking part in "jihad" in Syria, the Service searched for and identified 10 adults and three children from the video, speaking with their relatives and reporting their stories for RFE/RL.

Kyrgyzstan. RFE/RL’s Kyrgyz Service was the leading source of independent news and information for elites and ordinary citizens alike. The Service’s two TV shows were broadcast during prime time hours on national TV with a combined weekly reach of 25 percent of the population. In September, the Service investigated an effort by the Tablighi Jamaat movement to recruit young Kyrgyz by offering them a free Islamic education in Bangladesh, while in June, it posted a widely cited exclusive investigative report on nepotism and cronyism under the administration of former President Bakiev.

Tajikistan. According to a local research center, 60 percent of the news in local media is sourced to RFE/RL’s Tajik Service, which serves as the country's primary source of news and information. The Association of Internet Providers in Tajikistan ranked Radio Ozodi among the five most-read websites in Tajikistan in 2013, while the Civil Initiative and Internet Policy Organization, an NGO, also ranked ozodi.org among the country’s top five websites.

Uzbekistan. RFE/RL’s Uzbek Service provides vital news coverage of issues neglected by domestic media such as human trafficking and the problems faced by female labor migrants.

- The Service is at the forefront of the digital media revolution in Uzbekistan, integrating citizen journalism and social media as standard elements of its programming. In November, the Service's website generated a record 9.7 million page views.
- Working with Swedish journalists, the Service carried out in-depth investigations in 2013 into deaths of children and students during the controversial cotton harvest and corruption allegations involving members of President Islam Karimov's family.
- Ongoing publicity and reports by the Service have led to the release of more than half a dozen human rights activists and journalists who were detained as political prisoners.

VOA Uzbek’s weekly 30-minute TV program and daily 30-minute radio broadcast featured interviews with U.S. and international sources on topics including religious extremism, terrorism, and U.S.-Uzbekistan and U.S.-Central Asian relations. VOA Uzbek regularly covers the Fergana valley. The service is distributing original stories to mobile phone subscribers. Reports were also accessible on Twitter, YouTube, and Facebook; and Russia based MoiMir, BKontakte, and Yandeks. VOA Uzbek has FM radio affiliates in Northern Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan, and a TV affiliate in Southern Kyrgyzstan.

Turkmenistan. RFE/RL’s Turkmen Service is not allowed to have a bureau or accredited journalists within the country, but it still provides a vital, unmatched service to its audience. It is the only international media company providing regular multi-media reporting from inside the country, with original video reporting and photojournalism. Over the past year, visits to the Service’s webpage increased five-fold. The Service's coverage of homelessness, housing conditions, and travel restrictions on Turkmen citizens has prompted government action to improve facilities and social
services, while its reporting on human rights cases has helped bring about the release of activists and journalists from prison.

EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC

China. VOA Chinese included daily Mandarin and Cantonese broadcasts via satellite television, radio, internet, social media, and mobile channels to penetrate PRC government jamming and censorship. These broadcasts delivered news about the world and the United States, including religious and legal issues affecting China’s estimated 22 million Muslims. Radio Free Asia’s Uighur language service broadcast two hours daily, seven days a week, and was the only international radio service providing impartial news and information in the Uighur language to the potential audience of more than 16 million Uighur Muslims in northwestern China and Central Eurasia. Consistent with RFA’s mandate, the Uighur service acted as a substitute for indigenous media reporting on local events in the region. Its programs included breaking news, analysis, interviews, commentary, a weekly news review, and feature stories.

Indonesia. VOA’s 2013 weekly audience in Indonesia is more than 21 million people. VOA Indonesian TV news products were regularly seen on eight of Indonesia’s 11 national stations, in addition to more than 30 local and regional stations. The Service produced a weekly TV segment on Islam in the United States for ANTV’s Wisata Hati, a popular early morning Muslim-oriented program. During the month of Ramadan, VOA produced a special TV series on Islam in the United States, carried by several national stations. The Service produced more than eight hours daily of original radio programming for a network of more than 300 affiliate FM stations. Radio programming included five-minute Headline News reports aired 32 times a day, seven days a week. The Service’s Facebook page surpassed 1.3 million fans by the end of 2013.

Thailand. VOA broadcasts news throughout Thailand with a weekly audience of 5.5 percent in the cities of Bangkok, Chiang Mai, and Udon Thani. While Thailand is largely Buddhist, VOA served southern Thailand’s Muslim population through a national TV affiliate and eight radio affiliates in the south.

EUROPE AND EURASIA

The Russian Federation. VOA’s Russian Service regularly addresses terrorism-related issues in the United States and other key areas. Russian Service reporters covered various aspects of the April 2013 Boston Marathon bombing and took part in live interactive broadcasts with Russian media affiliates and partners to provide audiences the latest information and the U.S. perspective. VOA Russian journalist Fatima Tlisova provided in-depth coverage of many topics relating to the bombing including an insider’s view of the Tsarnaev family, the elder brother’s ties to an underground terrorist group in Russia, and the first detailed account of his trip to Dagestan. U.S. media quoted some of these reports in its coverage. The Service also posted exclusive reports from the mosque in Cambridge attended by the Tsarnaev brothers, interviews with Chechens in Boston who knew them well, and interviews via Skype with their mother and aunt.

VOA Russian covered Syria, and produced a series focusing on violent extremist groups from the former Soviet Union fighting in Syria. A special section on its website dedicated to the coverage of developments in the North Caucasus region, “Caucasus Today,” was regularly updated with multimedia reports about terrorist activities in the Russian Federation.
RFE/RL’s Russian Service, the leading international broadcaster in Russia and a leading locally-based alternative to state-controlled media, provided accurate, independent, and wide-ranging news and analysis of a wide range of issues affecting its Russian audience, including the rising levels of violence and ethnic/religious tensions targeted at economic migrants from Muslim-majority regions once part of the Soviet Union, and the threat and reality of Islamic terrorism, such as the October and December bombings in Volgograd.

**Tatarstan/Bashkortostan.** The Tatar and Bashkir communities are the two largest Muslim communities in Russia. RFE/RL’s Tatar/Bashkir Service was the only major international media producing content in the Tatar and Bashkir languages and provided listeners with objective news and analysis on issues such as Russia’s policy toward ethnic and religious minorities, centralization, corruption, the role of Islam in predominantly Muslim regions, and gender issues. The Service’s webpage, the most technologically advanced, state-of-the-art web source in Tatar, continued to be a virtual meeting place for people to discuss these and other issues.

**North Caucasus.** Broadcasting in the Avar, Chechen, and Circassian Languages, RFE/RL’s North Caucasus Service reported the news in a region where media freedom and journalists remained under severe threat. Following the April 2013 Boston Marathon bombing, the Service was the first media to interview the mother, father, and uncle of the Tsarnaev brothers. The Service was also the only Chechen media outlet to provide in-depth coverage of human rights abuses by the police and security forces.

**Turkey.** VOA’s Turkish Service has concentrated much of its TV and web coverage on the rising political tensions in Turkey and the war in Syria, including the impact of the flow of Syrian refugees to Turkey. The Turkish Service updated its website with top news seven days a week with original reporting, exclusive interviews, and stringer reports from Turkey and the EU. The Service offered English teaching programs, blogs, online surveys, video and audio clips, and the ability for users to post comments. It was also accessible by web-enhanced mobile phones and similar devices and content was distributed on YouTube, Twitter, and Facebook.

**The Balkans.** VOA’s Balkans services explored the life of Muslims in the United States, multi-ethnic and religious tolerance in the Balkans, and the global threat of terrorism, including manifestations of that threat in the Balkans. More than 4.7 million adults watched or listened weekly to VOA programs in Albania, Kosovo, Bosnia, Serbia, and Macedonia.

- VOA Bosnian followed up on the latest news regarding Mevlid Jasarevic, whose sentence for the 2011 terrorist attack on the U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo was reduced to 15 years during a retrial in a Bosnian Appeals Court. The Service also consulted senior religious leaders and presented commentary and analysis from U.S. terrorism experts.
- VOA Albanian reported on the risks that radical Islam poses for Kosovo. In an exclusive interview in July 2013, which was widely rebroadcast and quoted by media outlets in Kosovo and Albania, the head of the Kosovo Islamic Community, Naim Ternava denounced religious extremism as having nothing to do with Islam.

RFE/RL’s Balkan Service is the only inclusive source of news in a region where genuine media freedom remains elusive and many outlets reflect ethnic divisions. RFE/RL reporters in Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia and Bosnia collaborated on a report in June that showed how the conflict...
in Syria had sparked efforts by some organizations to recruit Muslims from the Balkans to join the Syrian rebels.

**Azerbaijan.** VOA Azerbaijani daily TV and web programming focused on the country’s political dynamics as the authorities increased pressure on political activists and civil society groups. With its enhanced multimedia coverage of the 2013 presidential election, protest rallies, and the trials of opposition leaders and youth activists, VOA Azerbaijani tripled its number of page views. The U.S. State Department’s reaction to the presidential elections, disseminated via the VOA website, garnered 2,500 Facebook recommends, highlighting the Service’s strong presence in online social networks. VOA Azerbaijani has more than doubled the number of its Twitter followers. VOA Azerbaijani’s biweekly web forums, livestreams from Azerbaijan-related events in Washington, DC, and Skype interviews, have helped improve the interactive quality of the content. VOA Azerbaijani commenced cooperation with RFE/RL’s Azerbaijani Service by broadcasting a weekly Showbiz program on the latter’s Hot Bird satellite channel. VOA Azerbaijani regularly programmed reports and interviews targeting the large Azeri population in northern Iran, with an emphasis on the Azeri minority’s demands for cultural rights, the issue of human rights in Iran, and the regime’s attempts to suppress dissent and the rights of Iran’s minorities.

When it was banned from FM airwaves, RFE/RL’s Azerbaijani Service lost more than half of its reach in Baku. It has since turned to the internet and to satellite television to reconnect with listeners. The Service’s “Korrupsiometr” web portal features the latest laws and regulations, along with Azerbaijani lawyers responding to audience questions, and serves as a forum for people impacted by corruption. Investigative reports on Azeri ministers’ family businesses and offshore account holders linked to President Ilham Aliyev’s family were widely cited by major international media.

**AFRICA**

**Nigeria.** VOA’s Hausa Service has provided extensive coverage, through interactive call-in shows and web and mobile postings, of Boko Haram’s terrorist activities in Northern Nigeria. The Service also provided coverage of Nigeria’s military Special Task Forces in its operations aimed at routing Boko Haram in Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, and Kano States. VOA itself was threatened by Boko Haram as a result of its coverage.

**Somalia.** VOA’s Somali Service continued to produce a weekly Islamic affairs program that regularly discussed political, economic, and social changes in Muslim majority countries. The issues covered in 2013 included the defeat and retreat of al-Shabaab from major cities and its attempt for revival, a Town Hall Meeting on child soldiers in Mogadishu where the Prime Minster was the keynote speaker, and human trafficking. Several international media outlets used the news referring to VOA as the major source.

**Swahili.** VOA’s Swahili Service broadcast to large Muslim populations in Tanzania and Kenya, and to Muslim communities in Uganda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

**French to Africa.** VOA’s French to Africa Service provided extensive coverage of the conflict in Mali and its effect on the sub-region. In 2013 in Mali, VOA launched a daily news and information show in Bambara, the most widely spoken local language, as well as a weekly newscast in Songhai, the most prevalent language in the north of the country. The French to Africa Service also reaches Muslims through the French language “Sahel Plus,” a program with some news but mostly features about the issues that link the Sahel region, such as food insecurity, drought, and political instability.

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Sahel Plus airs for 25 minutes five days a week. Additionally, the weekly program Dialogue des Religion organizes discussions with Muslim scholars and experts on aspects of Islam.

**ENGLISH**

**English to Africa.** The Service provides ongoing coverage on radio and TV of terrorism-related developments. Overseas, VOA’s coverage is primarily focused on the Nigerian terrorist group Boko Haram and the Somali terrorist group al-Shabaab. Notable interviews included one in September 2013 with Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan, who called for international cooperation in countering and defeating terrorism, which followed the Westgate mall attack in Nairobi by members of al-Shabaab. In another interview, Jonathan’s Special Advisor Rueben Abati said the U.S. designation of Boko Haram as a Foreign Terrorist Organization strengthened U.S.-Nigeria counterterrorism cooperation. The service regularly aired reports from VOA’S correspondents at the State Department and the UN, plus reports from stringers on the ground in Mali, Somalia, Kenya, Nigeria, and other locations in Africa.

**VOANews.com.** VOA’s English-language website consistently reported on the impact of terrorism throughout the world as well as efforts to curb the growth of terrorist organizations. For example, in the aftermath of the Kenya mall shootings, the site featured VOA’s exclusive reporting from Minnesota, where our journalists talked with the local Somali community about al-Shabaab’s efforts to recruit young people from the United States. Following the Boston Marathon bombing, VOANews.com was also the first to report Fatima Tlisova’s exclusive report about the former Chechen rebel fighter living in the United States who met several times with Boston bombing suspect Tamerlan Tsarnaev prior to the attack.

**Radio.** VOA’s English radio programs, including “Encounter” and “Press Conference USA,” regularly featured interviews with U.S. and international experts on U.S. counterterrorism efforts. In 2013, besides U.S. government officials, guests included: Ali Soufan, CEO of The Soufan Group and author; Matthew Levitt about the worldwide threat from Hizballah; and Karima Benoune, an Algerian scholar on her book “Your Fatwa Does not Apply Here,” recounting little-known efforts by ordinary Muslims who are countering violent extremism in the name of their faith around the world. Encounter programs also focused on the global terrorism alert in August, which prompted Washington to close 28 diplomatic posts across the Middle East and Africa.
Chapter 6
Foreign Terrorist Organizations

Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) are designated by the Secretary of State in accordance with section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). FTO designations play a critical role in the fight against terrorism and are an effective means of curtailing support for terrorist activities.

In 2013, the following FTOs were designated by the Department of State: Ansar al-Dine on March 22, Boko Haram and Jama'atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis-Sudan on November 14, and Al-Mulathamun Battalion on December 19. Also in 2013, the Department of State revoked the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group’s designation as an FTO on May 28.

Legal Criteria for Designation under Section 219 of the INA as amended:

1. It must be a foreign organization.
2. The organization must engage in terrorist activity, as defined in section 212(a)(3)(B) of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)), or terrorism, as defined in section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2)), or retain the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism.
3. The organization’s terrorist activity or terrorism must threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national security (national defense, foreign relations, or the economic interests) of the United States.

U.S. Government Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations

Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB)
Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (AAMB)
Ansar al-Dine (AAD)
Ansar al-Islam (AAI)
Army of Islam (AOI)
Asbat al-Ansar (AAA)
Aum Shinrikyo (AUM)
Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)
Boko Haram (BH)
Communist Party of Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA)
Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)
Gama’a al-Islamiyya (IG)
Hamas
Haqqani Network (HQN)
Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HUJI)
Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B)
Harakat ul-Mujahideen (HUM)
Hizballah
Indian Mujahedeen (IM)
Islamic Jihad Union (IJU)
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis-Sudan (Ansaru)
Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM)
Jemaah Ansharut Tawhid (JAT)
Jemaah Islamiya (JI)
Jundallah
Kahane Chai
Kata’ib Hizballah (KH)
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)
Lashkar e-Tayyiba
Lashkar i Jhangvi (LJ)
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)
Al-Mulathamun Battalion (AMB)
National Liberation Army (ELN)
Palestine Islamic Jihad – Shaqaqi Faction (PIJ)
Palestine Liberation Front – Abu Abbas Faction (PLF)
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC)
Al-Qa’ida (AQ)
Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
Al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI)
Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
Real IRA (RIRA)
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17N)
Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C)
Revolutionary Struggle (RS)
Al-Shabaab (AS)
Shining Path (SL)
Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP)
United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)

**ABDALLAH AZZAM BRIGADES**

**aka** Abdullah Azzam Brigades; Ziyad al-Jarrah Battalions of the Abdallah Azzam Brigades; Yusuf al-’Uayyri Battalions of the Abdallah Azzam Brigades

**Description:** The Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB) was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on May 30, 2012. AAB formally announced its establishment in a July 2009 video statement claiming responsibility for a February 2009 rocket attack against Israel. The group is divided into two branches: the Arabian Peninsula-based Yusuf al-’Uayyri Battalions of the Abdullah Azzam Brigades, named after the now-deceased founder of al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula; and the Lebanon-based Ziyad al-Jarrah Battalions of the Abdallah Azzam Brigades, named after Ziad al Jarrah, a Lebanese citizen who was one of the masterminds of the September 11 attacks on the United States.
Activities: AAB has relied primarily on rocket attacks against Israeli civilians, and is responsible for numerous rocket attacks fired into Israeli territory from Lebanon. These attacks have targeted population centers in Israel, including Nahariya and Ashkelon. In addition to rocket attacks, AAB carried out a July 2010 suicide bombing attack against the Japanese-owned oil tanker M/V M. Star in the Strait of Hormuz. According to a statement released online, AAB claimed that the attack was carried out by its Arabian Peninsula Branch.

AAB has increased its operational pace since the onset of the Syrian insurgency, claiming responsibility for a rocket attack launched from Lebanon into northern Israel in August 2013. In November 2013, AAB claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing outside the Iranian Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, which killed 23 people and wounded over 140, and warned that the group would carry out more attacks unless Hizballah stops sending fighters to support Syrian government forces.

Strength: Unknown

Location/Area of Operation: AAB is based in both Lebanon and the Arabian Peninsula.

Funding and External Aid: Unknown

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**ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION**

aka ANO; Arab Revolutionary Brigades; Arab Revolutionary Council; Black September; Fatah Revolutionary Council; Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Muslims

Description: Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on October 8, 1997, the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) was founded by Sabri al-Banna (aka Abu Nidal) after splitting from the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1974. In August 2002, Abu Nidal died in Baghdad. Leadership of the organization after Nadal’s death remains unclear. ANO advocates the elimination of Israel and has sought to derail diplomatic efforts in support of the Middle East peace process.

Activities: The ANO has carried out terrorist attacks in 20 countries, killing or injuring almost 900 persons. It has not staged a major attack against Western targets since the late 1980s and was expelled from its safe haven in Libya in 1999. Major attacks included those on the Rome and Vienna airports in 1985, the 1986 Neve Shalom Synagogue in Istanbul, the hijacking of Pan Am Flight 73 in Karachi in 1986, and the City of Poros day-excursion ship attack in Greece in 1988. The ANO was suspected of assassinating PLO Deputy Chief Abu Iyad and PLO Security Chief Abu Hul in Tunis in 1991, and a senior Jordanian diplomat in Beirut in 1994. In 2008, a Jordanian official reported the apprehension of an ANO member who planned to carry out attacks in Jordan. There were no known ANO attacks in 2013.

Strength: Unknown

Location/Area of Operation: ANO associates are presumed present in Lebanon.

Funding and External Aid: The ANO’s current access to resources is unclear, but it is likely that the decline in support previously provided by Libya, Syria, and Iran has had a severe impact on its capabilities.
ABU SAYYAF GROUP

aka al Harakat al Islamiyya (the Islamic Movement)

Description: The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on October 8, 1997. ASG is the most violent of the terrorist groups operating in the Philippines and claims to promote an independent Islamic state in western Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. The group split from the much larger Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the early 1990s under the leadership of Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani, who was killed in a clash with Philippine police in December 1998.

Activities: The ASG engages in kidnappings for ransom, bombings, beheadings, assassinations, and extortion. In April 2000, an ASG faction kidnapped 21 people, including 10 Western tourists, from a resort in Malaysia. In May 2001, the ASG kidnapped three U.S. citizens and 17 Philippine nationals from a tourist resort in Palawan, Philippines. Several of the hostages, including U.S. citizen Guillermo Sobero, were murdered. A Philippine military hostage rescue operation in June 2002 freed U.S. hostage Gracia Burnham, but her husband, U.S. national Martin Burnham, and Deborah Yap of the Philippines were killed. Philippine and U.S. authorities blamed the ASG for a bombing near a Philippine military base in Zamboanga in October 2002 that killed a U.S. serviceman. In one of the most destructive acts of maritime violence, the ASG bombed SuperFerry 14 in Manila Bay in February 2004, killing at least 116 people.

In 2013, ASG remained active, particularly with kidnappings for ransom, the use of improvised explosive device (IED) attacks, and armed attacks on civilian and police personnel. In May, ASG militants were involved in a gun battle near Patikul, Sulu, which killed seven Philippine Marines and injured nine. In June, ASG kidnapped two sisters filming a documentary in Sulu, and they were still being held at year’s end. Two Philippine soldiers were injured in August when a convoy was hit by an IED planted by ASG in Sulu. In November, gunmen linked to ASG attacked a resort on Pom Pom Island, Malaysia, killing a tourist from Taiwan and taking his wife hostage; she was released one month later.

Philippine police conducted a number of raids and arrests of ASG members in 2013. At least eight members of ASG were killed during a firefight with government soldiers after they raided an ASG camp in Basilan in April. In August, one Philippine soldier was killed and two others wounded in a raid against an estimated 70 ASG members in Basilan; seven ASG members were killed and explosive components and rockets were found.

Strength: ASG is estimated to have 400 members.

Location/Area of Operation: The ASG operates primarily in the Philippine provinces of the Sulu Archipelago, namely Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi; and on the Zamboanga Peninsula. The group also operates in Malaysia.

Funding and External Aid: The ASG is funded through kidnapping for ransom operations and extortion, and may also receive funding from external sources such as remittances from overseas Philippine workers and Middle East-based violent extremists. In the past, the ASG has also received assistance from regional terrorist groups such as Jemaah Islamiya, whose operatives provided training to ASG members and helped facilitate several ASG terrorist attacks.
**AL-AQSA MARTYRS BRIGADE**

aka al-Aqsa Martyrs Battalion

**Description:** Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on March 27, 2002, the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (AAMB) is composed of an unknown number of small cells of Fatah-affiliated activists that emerged at the outset of the al-Aqsa Intifada, in September 2000. AAMB’s goal is to drive the Israeli military and West Bank settlers from the West Bank in order to establish a Palestinian state loyal to the Fatah.

**Activities:** AAMB employed primarily small-arms attacks against Israeli military personnel and settlers as the intifada spread in 2000, but by 2002 turned increasingly to attacks against Israeli civilians bombing inside Israel. In January 2002, the group claimed responsibility for the first female suicide bombing inside Israel. In 2010, AAMB launched numerous rocket attacks on communities in Israel, including the city of Sderot and areas of the Negev desert. Again in December 2011, AAMB launched rockets aimed at communities in the Negev. The attack caused no injuries or damage. In November 2012, two men recruited by AAMB were arrested in connection with stabbing a student in the Israeli city of Beersheba. Also in November 2012, AAMB claimed that they had fired more than 500 rockets and missiles into Israel during Operation Pillar of Defense, the week-long Israeli Defense Force operation in Gaza. In February 2013, AAMB claimed responsibility for a rocket attack in southern Israel, which landed outside of the city of Ashkelon.

**Strength:** A few hundred members

**Location/Area of Operation:** Most of AAMB’s operational activity is in Gaza but the group also planned and conducted attacks inside Israel and the West Bank. The group also has members in Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon.

**Funding and External Aid:** Iran has exploited AAMB’s lack of resources and formal leadership by providing funds and guidance, mostly through Hizballah facilitators.

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**ANSAR AL-DINE**

Aka Ansar Dine; Ansar al-Din; Ancar Dine; Ansar ul-Din; Ansar Eddine; Defenders of the Faith

**Description:** Ansar al-Dine (AAD) was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on March 22, 2013. Operating in Mali, AAD was created in late 2011 after AAD’s leader, Iyad ag Ghali, failed in an attempt to take over another secular Tuareg organization. Following the March 2012 coup that toppled the Malian government, AAD was among the organizations to take over northern Mali, destroy UNESCO World Heritage sites, and enforce a severe interpretation of Sharia law upon the civilian population living in the areas it controlled.

Beginning in January 2013, French and allied African forces conducted operations in northern Mali to counter AAD and other violent extremist groups, eventually forcing AAD out of the population centers it had seized. AAD’s leader Iyad ag Ghali, however, remained free and by the end of 2013, some AAD fighters reportedly remained active in northern Mali.
Activities: AAD has received backing from al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in its fight against The Government of Mali – most notably in the capture of the Malian towns of Agulhok, Tessalit, Kidal, Gao, and Timbuktu – between January and April 2012. In March 2012, Tuareg rebels, reportedly including AAD, executed 82 Malian soldiers and kidnapped 30 others in an attack against the town of Agulhok. Before the French intervention in January 2013, Malian citizens in towns under AAD’s control who did not comply with AAD’s laws, reportedly faced harassment, torture, or execution.

AAD was severely weakened by the French intervention in Mali, but continued to participate in and support attacks in Mali, reportedly including bringing arms and fighters into Kidal in September 2013, in advance of an AQIM-led attack that killed at least two civilians.

Strength: AAD has fractured and its members have been largely scattered by the French intervention in Mali. The group’s membership numbers were unknown at the end of 2013.

Location/Area of Operation: Northern Mali, Southwestern Libya

Funding and External Aid: AAD cooperates closely with and has received support from AQIM since its inception, and some factions of AAD are believed to maintain close ties to the group.

ANSAR AL-ISLAM

aka Ansar al-Sunna; Ansar al-Sunna Army; Devotees of Islam; Followers of Islam in Kurdistan; Helpers of Islam; Jaish Ansar al-Sunna; Jund al-Islam; Kurdish Taliban; Kurdistan Supporters of Islam; Partisans of Islam; Soldiers of God; Soldiers of Islam; Supporters of Islam in Kurdistan

Description: Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on March 22, 2004, Ansar al-Islam’s (AI’s) goals include expelling western interests from Iraq and establishing an independent Iraqi state based on its interpretation of Sharia law. AI was established in 2001 in Iraqi Kurdistan with the merger of two Kurdish violent extremist factions that traced their roots to the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan. On May 4, 2010, Abu Abdullah al-Shafi’i, AI’s leader, was captured by U.S. forces in Baghdad and remains in prison. On December 15, 2011 AI announced a new leader, Abu Hashim Muhammad bin Abdul Rahman al Ibrahim.

Mullah Krekar (aka Najmuddin Faraj Ahmad), an Iraqi citizen and the founder of AI continued to reside in Norway on a long-term residence permit. In March 2012, a trial court in Norway convicted Krekar of issuing threats and inciting terrorism, and sentenced him to six years in prison. Krekar appealed, and in December 2012, an appeals court affirmed his convictions for issuing threats and intimidating witnesses, but reversed his conviction for "inciting terrorism." The appeals court reduced his sentence to two years and 10 months in prison.

Activities: AI has conducted attacks against a wide range of targets including Iraqi government and security forces, and U.S. and Coalition Forces. AI has conducted numerous kidnappings, executions, and assassinations of Iraqi citizens and politicians. The group has either claimed responsibility or is believed to be responsible for attacks in 2011 that killed 24 and wounded 147. During August and September 2013, AI claimed attacks against Iraqi Army security forces, as well as an attack against an individual associated with the Iraqi government.
Strength: Although precise numbers are unknown, AI is considered one of the largest Sunni terrorist groups in Iraq.

Location/Area of Operation: Primarily northern Iraq, but also maintains a presence in western and central Iraq.

Funding and External Aid: AI receives assistance from a loose network of associates in Europe and the Middle East.

**ARMY OF ISLAM**

aka Jaysh al-Islam; Jaish al-Islam

Description: Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on May 19, 2011, the Army of Islam (AOI) is a Gaza-based terrorist organization founded in late 2005 responsible for numerous terrorist acts against the Governments of Israel and Egypt, as well as American, British, and New Zealander citizens. Led by Mumtaz Dughmush, AOI primarily operates in Gaza. It subscribes to a violent extremist Salafist ideology together with the traditional model of armed Palestinian resistance. AOI has previously worked with Hamas and is attempting to develop closer al-Qa’ida contacts.

Activities: AOI’s terrorist acts include a number of rocket attacks on Israel, the 2006 kidnapping of two journalists in Gaza (an American and a New Zealander), and the 2007 kidnapping of a British citizen in Gaza. AOI is also responsible for early 2009 attacks on Egyptian civilians in Cairo and Heliopolis, Egypt, and allegedly planned the January 1, 2011 Alexandria attack on a Coptic Christian church that killed 25 and wounded 100. On July 28, 2012, AOI released a statement that one of its members, Nidal al ‘Ashi, was killed fighting in Syria and in November 2012 announced that they had carried out rocket attacks on Israel in a joint operation with the Mujahideen Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem. In August 2013, an Israeli official reported that AOI leader Dughmush was running training camps in Gaza.

Strength: Membership is estimated in the low hundreds.

Location/Area of Operation: Gaza, with attacks in Egypt and Israel.

Funding and External Aid: AOI receives the bulk of its funding from a variety of criminal activities in Gaza.

**ASBAT AL-ANSAR**

aka Asbat al-Ansar; Band of Helpers; Band of Partisans; League of Partisans; League of the Followers; God’s Partisans; Gathering of Supporters; Partisan’s League; AAA; Esbat al-Ansar; Isbat al-Ansar; Osbat al-Ansar; Usbat al-Ansar; Usbat ul-Ansar

Description: Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on March 27, 2002, Asbat al-Ansar is a Lebanon-based violent Sunni extremist group composed primarily of Palestinians with links to al-Qa’ida (AQ) and other Sunni violent extremist groups. Some of the group’s stated goals include thwarting perceived anti-Islamic and pro-Western influences in the country, although the group remains largely confined to Lebanon’s refugee camps.

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Activities: Asbat al-Ansar first emerged in the early 1990s. In the mid-1990s, the group assassinated Lebanese religious leaders and bombed nightclubs, theaters, and liquor stores. The group has also plotted against foreign diplomatic targets. In October 2004, Mahir al-Sa’di, a member of Asbat al-Ansar, was sentenced in absentia to life imprisonment for his 2000 plot to assassinate then-U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon David Satterfield. Asbat al-Ansar has no formal ties to the AQ network, but the group shares AQ’s ideology and has publicly proclaimed its support for al-Qa’ida in Iraq. Members of the group have traveled to Iraq between 2005 and 2011 to fight Coalition Forces. Asbat al-Ansar has been reluctant to involve itself in operations in Lebanon due in part to concerns over losing its safe haven in the Ain al-Hilwah refugee camp. AAA did not stage any known attacks in 2013.

Strength: The group has fewer than 2,000 members.

Location/Area of Operation: The group’s primary base of operations is the Ain al-Hilwah Palestinian refugee camp near Sidon in southern Lebanon.

Funding and External Aid: It is likely that the group receives money through international Sunni extremist networks.

AUM SHINRIKYO

aka A.I.C. Comprehensive Research Institute; A.I.C. Sogo Kenkyusho; Aleph; Aum Supreme Truth

Description: Aum Shinrikyo (AUM) was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on October 8, 1997. Jailed leader Shoko Asahara established AUM in 1987, and the organization received legal status in Japan as a religious entity in 1989. The Japanese government revoked its recognition of AUM as a religious organization following AUM’s deadly 1995 sarin gas attack in Tokyo. Despite claims of renunciation of violence and Asahara’s teachings, members of the group continue to adhere to the violent and apocalyptic teachings of its founder.

Activities: In March 1995, AUM members simultaneously released the chemical nerve agent sarin on several Tokyo subway trains, killing 13 people and causing up to 6,000 to seek medical treatment. Subsequent investigations by the Japanese government revealed the group was responsible for other mysterious chemical incidents in Japan in 1994, including a sarin gas attack on a residential neighborhood in Matsumoto that killed seven and injured approximately 500. Japanese police arrested Asahara in May 1995; in February 2004, authorities sentenced him to death for his role in the 1995 attacks, but authorities have not yet carried out the sentence. In 2010 and 2011, several death sentences for other AUM senior members were finalized or affirmed by Japanese courts. In 2012, the final three AUM fugitives were arrested after 17 years on the run.

Since 1997, the group has split into two factions, both of which have recruited new members, engaged in commercial enterprises, and acquired property. In July 2000, Russian authorities arrested a group of Russian AUM followers who had planned to detonate bombs in Japan as part of an operation to free Asahara from jail and smuggle him to Russia. In August 2012, a Japan Airlines flight to the United States was turned back after receiving a bomb threat demanding the release of Asahara.
Although AUM has not conducted a terrorist attack since 1995, concerns remain regarding its continued adherence to the violent teachings of Asahara.

**Strength:** As of November 2013, AUM membership in Japan was approximately 1,650 with another 160 in Russia. AUM continues to maintain at least 32 facilities in 15 prefectures in Japan and continues to possess several facilities in Russia. (At the time of the Tokyo subway attack in 1995, the group claimed to have as many as 40,000 members worldwide, including 9,000 in Japan and 30,000 members in Russia.)

**Location/Area of Operation:** AUM’s principal membership is located in Japan; a residual branch of about 160 followers live in Russia.

**Funding and External Aid:** Funding primarily comes from member contributions and group-run businesses.

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**BASQUE FATHERLAND AND LIBERTY**

aka ETA; Askatasuna; Batasuna; Ekin; Euskal Herritarrok; Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna; Herri Batasuna; Jarrai-Haika-Segi; K.A.S.; XAKI

**Description:** Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on October 8, 1997, Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) was founded in 1959 with the aim of establishing an independent homeland based on Marxist principles encompassing the Spanish Basque provinces of Vizcaya, Guipuzcoa, and Alava; the autonomous region of Navarra; and the southwestern French territories of Labourd, Basse-Navarre, and Soule. ETA is listed as a terrorist organization by Spain and the EU. In 2002, the Spanish Parliament banned the political party Batasuna, ETA’s political wing, charging its members with providing material support to the terrorist group. The European Court of Human Rights in June 2009 upheld the ban on Batasuna. In September 2008, Spanish courts also banned two other Basque independence parties with reported links to Batasuna. In 2010, when Batasuna continued to try to participate in regional politics, splits between parts of ETA became publicly apparent.

**Activities:** ETA primarily has conducted bombings and assassinations. Targets typically have included Spanish government officials, businessmen, politicians, judicial figures, and security and military forces; but the group has also targeted journalists and tourist areas. The group is responsible for killing 829 civilians and members of the armed forces and police, and injuring thousands since it formally began a campaign of violence in 1968.

ETA has committed numerous attacks in the last four decades. Some of the group’s high profile attacks include the February 2005 ETA car bombing in Madrid that wounded more than 20 people at a convention center where Spanish King Juan Carlos and then Mexican President Vicente Fox were scheduled to appear. In December 2006, ETA exploded a massive car bomb that destroyed much of the covered parking garage at Madrid’s Barajas International Airport. ETA marked its fiftieth anniversary in 2009 with a series of high profile and deadly bombings, including the July attack on a Civil Guard Barracks that injured more than 60 people, including children.

In October 2011, the militarily weakened and politically isolated ETA announced a “definitive cessation” of armed activity. Given that the group has made and broken several past ceasefires,
Madrid rejected this announcement and demanded that ETA disarm and disband. The group has yet to disband formally or give up its weapons arsenal since this latest cessation of armed activity.

Nearly 500 ETA members have been arrested since 2007, including 12 arrests in 2013. In France on January 11, two ETA members were arrested. In Spain, regional Basque Country police arrested six members of ETA’s youth branch on April 18 and the Spanish Civil Guard arrested two ETA members on June 11. With the support of Venezuelan and French security forces, an ETA member was apprehended on September 20 in Venezuela, and Belgian police arrested another ETA member on October 8.

**Strength:** Estimates put ETA membership of those who have not been captured by authorities at fewer than 100. Spanish and French prisons together hold approximately 750 ETA members.

**Location/Area of Operation:** ETA operates primarily in the Basque autonomous regions of northern Spain and southwestern France, but has attacked Spanish and French interests elsewhere. The group also maintains a low profile presence in Cuba and Venezuela.

**Funding and External Aid:** ETA is probably experiencing financial shortages given that the group announced publicly in September 2011 that it had ceased collecting “revolutionary taxes” from Basque businesses. This extortion program was a major source of ETA’s income.

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**BOKO HARAM**

aka Nigerian Taliban; Jama’atu Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda’Awati Wal Jihad; Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad; People Committed to the Prophet’s Teachings for Propagation and Jihad; Sunni Group for Preaching and Jihad

**Description:** Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on November 14, 2013, and led by Abubakar Shekau, Boko Haram (BH) is a Nigeria-based group responsible for numerous attacks in northern and northeastern Nigeria that have killed thousands of people since its emergence in 2009. The group espouses a violent Sunni extremist ideology and at times has received assistance, including funds and training, from al Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

**Activities:** Among its major attacks, BH was responsible for the August 26, 2011 bomb attack on the UN building in Abuja that killed at least 21 people and wounded dozens more. The group is also responsible for the January 2012 attacks in Kano, Nigeria, in which a wave of bomb attacks in the city killed more than 180 people in a single day.

BH maintained a high operational tempo in 2013, claiming or being accused of a number of significant attacks in northeast Nigeria, including March 14 and 22 attacks on prisons in Gwoza and Adamawa that freed approximately 270 BH members or associates; a September attack on a school in Mamudo, Yobe state, that killed 65 students; and a December 2 attack on a Nigerian military airbase in Maiduguri that killed at least 20 Nigerian military personnel and destroyed military equipment, including two helicopters. Among its most lethal attacks, Boko Haram was responsible for indiscriminate attacks in Benisheikh, Nigeria, in September that killed more than 160 civilians, many of them innocent women and children, in a single day.
Boko Haram has also increasingly crossed Nigerian borders to evade pressure and conduct operations. In February 2013, Boko Haram was responsible for kidnapping seven French tourists in the Far North of Cameroon. In November 2013, Boko Haram members kidnapped a French priest in Cameroon. In December 2013, Boko Haram gunmen reportedly attacked civilians in several areas of northern Cameroon. Security forces from Chad and Niger also reportedly partook in skirmishes against suspected Boko Haram members along Nigeria’s borders. In 2013, the group also kidnapped eight French citizens in northern Cameroon and obtained ransom payments for their release.

**Strength:** Membership estimates range from the hundreds to a few thousand.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Northern Nigeria, northern Cameroon, and Lake Chad Basin.

**Funding and External Aid:** BH receives the bulk of its funding from bank robberies and related criminal activities, including extortion and kidnapping for ransoms. The group has also received funding from AQIM.

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**COMMUNIST PARTY OF PHILIPPINES/NEW PEOPLE’S ARMY**

aka CPP/NPA; Communist Party of the Philippines; the CPP; New People’s Army; the NPA

**Description:** The Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army (CPP/NPA) was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on August 9, 2002. The military wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), the New People’s Army (NPA), is a Maoist group formed in March 1969 with the aim of overthrowing the government through protracted guerrilla warfare. Jose Maria Sison, the Chairman of the CPP’s Central Committee and the NPA’s founder, reportedly directs CPP and NPA activity from the Netherlands, where he lives in self-imposed exile. Luis Jalandoni, a fellow Central Committee member and director of the CPP’s overt political wing, the National Democratic Front (NDF), also lives in the Netherlands and has become a Dutch citizen. Although primarily a rural-based guerrilla group, the NPA had an active urban infrastructure to support its terrorist activities and, at times, used city-based assassination squads.

**Activities:** The CPP/NPA primarily targeted Philippine security forces, government officials, local infrastructure, and businesses that refused to pay extortion, or “revolutionary taxes.” The CPP/NPA charged politicians running for office in CPP/NPA-influenced areas for “campaign permits.” In addition to its focus on Philippine governmental targets, the CPP/NPA has a history of attacking U.S. interests in the Philippines. In 1987, the CPP/NPA conducted direct actions against U.S. personnel and facilities, killing three American soldiers in four separate attacks in Angeles City. In 1989, the CPP/NPA issued a press statement claiming responsibility for the ambush and murder of Colonel James Nicholas Rowe, chief of the Ground Forces Division of the Joint U.S.-Military Advisory Group.

For many years, the CPP/NPA carried out killings, raids, acts of extortion, and other forms of violence. Throughout the past few years, the CPP/NPA’s attacks and kidnappings have continued unabated. In May 2013, the Armed Forces of the Philippines reported that from 2011 through the first quarter of 2013, 383 people, including 158 civilians, were killed in encounters between the CPP/NPA and government forces, and related atrocities. Some of those attacks include detonating a landmine improvised explosive device in Illuro Sur, Philippines that killed five and injured two police officers in 2011; and clashes between the CPP/NPA and the Philippine government that caused the displacement of approximately 700 individuals from their homes in 2012. In August 2013, elements of the CPP/NPA
detonated a landmine targeting a group of volunteers on their way back to their village, killing one civilian and wounding another.

**Strength:** The Philippine government estimates there are 4,000 CPP/NPA members. In a statement shortly after observing its 45th anniversary in late December 2013, the CPP/NPA said it planned to increase its number of guerrilla fronts and fighters, as well as undertake more frequent tactical offensives and seize more weapons.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Rural Luzon, Visayas, and parts of northern and eastern Mindanao. There are also cells in Manila and other metropolitan centers.

**Funding and External Aid:** The CPP/NPA raises funds through extortion.

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**CONTINUITY IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY**

aka Continuity Army Council; Continuity IRA; Republican Sinn Fein

**Description:** Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on July 13, 2004, the Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA) is a terrorist splinter group formed in 1994 as the clandestine armed wing of Republican Sinn Fein; it split from Sinn Fein in 1986. “Continuity” refers to the group’s belief that it is carrying on the original Irish Republican Army’s (IRA) goal of forcing the British out of Northern Ireland. CIRA cooperates with the larger Real IRA (RIRA).

In 2012, CIRA released a statement claiming it had new leadership, after previous leadership was ousted over allegations that it was acting to the detriment of the organization.

**Activities:** CIRA has been active in Belfast and the border areas of Northern Ireland, where it has carried out bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, hijackings, extortion, and robberies. On occasion, it provided advance warning to police of its attacks. Targets have included the British military, Northern Ireland security forces, and Loyalist paramilitary groups. CIRA did not join the Provisional IRA in the September 2005 decommissioning and remained capable of effective, if sporadic, terrorist attacks. On April 21, 2011, authorities defused an explosive device planted by CIRA near a statue of the Duke of Wellington in Trim, Meath, Ireland.

In December 2012, a plot by CIRA to murder an Irish national serving in the British army was foiled by Irish police. In January 2013, the group claimed responsibility for firing shots at police officers in Drumbeg, Craigavon County, Northern Ireland.

**Strength:** Membership is small, with possibly fewer than 50. Police counterterrorism operations have reduced the group’s strength.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.

**Funding and External Aid:** CIRA supported its activities through criminal activities, including smuggling.

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**GAMA’A AL-ISLAMIYYA**

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**Gama’a al-Islamiyya (IG)** was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on October 8, 1997. Once Egypt’s largest militant group, IG was formed in the 1970s. In 2011, it formed the Construction and Development political party that competed in the 2011 parliamentary elections, winning 13 seats. Egypt-based members of IG released from prison prior to the 2011 revolution have renounced terrorism, although some members located overseas have worked with or joined al-Qa’ida (AQ). Hundreds of members, who may not have renounced violence, were released from prison in 2011. The external wing, composed of mainly exiled members in several countries, maintained that its primary goal was to replace the Egyptian government with an Islamic state. IG’s “spiritual” leader, the “blind Sheikh,” Omar Abd al-Rahman, is serving a life sentence in a U.S. prison for his involvement in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Supporters of Abd al-Rahman have called for reprisal attacks in the event of his death in prison.

**Activities:** In the 1990s, IG conducted armed attacks against Egyptian security, other government officials, and Coptic Christians. IG claimed responsibility for the June 1995 assassination attempt on Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The group also launched attacks on tourists in Egypt, most notably the 1997 Luxor attack. In 1999, part of the group publicly renounced violence. IG has not committed a known terrorist attack in recent years.

**Strength:** At its peak, IG likely commanded several thousand core members and a similar number of supporters. Security crackdowns following the 1997 attack in Luxor and the 1999 ceasefire, along with post-September 11 security measures and defections to AQ, have probably resulted in a substantial decrease in what is left of an organized group.

**Location/Area of Operation:** The IG maintained a presence in Afghanistan, Yemen, Iran, the UK, Germany, and France.

**Funding and External Aid:** Unknown

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**Hamas**

aka the Islamic Resistance Movement; Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya; Izz al-Din al Qassam Battalions; Izz al-Din al Qassam Brigades; Izz al-Din al Qassam Forces; Students of Ayyash; Student of the Engineer; Yahya Ayyash Units; Izz al-Din al-Qassim Brigades; Izz al-Din al-Qassim Forces; Izz al-Din al-Qassim Battalions

**Description:** Hamas was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on October 8, 1997. Hamas possesses military and political wings, and came into being in late 1987 at the onset of the first Palestinian uprising, or Intifada, as an outgrowth of the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. The armed element, called the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, has conducted anti-Israeli attacks, including suicide bombings against civilian targets inside Israel. Hamas also manages a broad, mostly Gaza-based network of “Dawa” or ministry activities that include charities, schools, clinics, youth camps, fundraising, and political activities. After winning Palestinian Legislative Council elections in January 2006, Hamas gained control of significant Palestinian Authority (PA) ministries in Gaza, including the Ministry of Interior. In 2007, Hamas cadres took control of Gaza in a violent confrontation with Fatah, forcing Fatah forces to leave Gaza or go underground. Hamas retains control of Gaza. A Shura Council based in Damascus, Syria, set overall policy for many years, but the group
abandoned its Damascus base in late 2011 following a disagreement with the Syrian government over its use of violence against protestors.

Activities: Prior to 2005, Hamas conducted numerous anti-Israeli attacks, including suicide bombings, rocket launches, improvised explosive device (IED) attacks, and shootings. Hamas has not directly targeted U.S. interests, although US citizens have died and been injured in the group’s attacks against Israeli targets. The group curtailed terrorist attacks in February 2005 after agreeing to a temporary period of calm brokered by the PA, and ceased most violence after winning control of the PA legislature and cabinet in January 2006. In June 2007, after Hamas took control of Gaza from the PA and Fatah, the Gaza borders were closed and Hamas increased its use of tunnels to smuggle weapons into Gaza, using the Sinai and maritime routes. Hamas has since dedicated the majority of its activity in Gaza to solidifying its control, hardening its defenses, building its weapons caches, tightening security, and conducting limited operations against Israeli military forces.

Hamas fought a 23-day war with Israel from late December 2008 to January 2009. From November 14-21, 2012, Hamas fought another war with Israel during which it claims to have launched more than 1,400 rockets into Israel. Prior to the confrontation, approximately 750 rockets had been fired into Israel from Hamas-governed Gaza, including one that killed three civilians in Kiryat Malachi. Despite the Egypt-mediated ceasefire between Israel and Hamas in 2012, operatives from Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad coordinated and carried out a November bus bombing in Tel Aviv that wounded 29 people. In 2013, the Government of Israel continued to hold Hamas, as the dominant organization in effective control, responsible for the attacks emanating from Gaza; and Israeli officials point to these attacks as additional proof that Hamas has not abandoned terrorism.

Strength: Several thousand Gaza-based operatives with varying degrees of skills are in its armed wing, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, along with its reported 9,000-person Hamas-led paramilitary group known as the “Executive Force.”

Location/Area of Operation: Since 2007, Hamas has controlled Gaza and also has a presence in the West Bank. The group retains a cadre of leaders and facilitators that conduct political, fundraising, and arms-smuggling activities throughout the region. Hamas also has a presence in the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, probably with the goal of eclipsing Fatah’s long-time dominance of the camps.

Funding and External Aid: Historically, Hamas has received funding, weapons, and training from Iran, but the relationship suffered after Hamas refused to follow Iran’s lead in supporting Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The group also raises funds in the Gulf countries and receives donations from Palestinian expatriates around the world through its charities, such as the umbrella fundraising organization, the Union of Good. However, recent efforts by the Egyptian military to destroy tunnels connecting Gaza with the Sinai have severely limited Hamas’s access to weapons, smuggled goods, and construction materials.

HAQQANI NETWORK

aka HQN

Description: Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on September 19, 2012, the Haqqani Network (HQN) was formed in the late 1970s, around the time of the Soviet Union’s invasion of
Afghanistan. Jalaluddin Haqqani, HQN’s founder, established a relationship with Usama bin Laden in the mid-1980s, and joined the Taliban in 1995. After the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001, Jalaluddin retreated to Pakistan where, under the leadership of Jalaluddin’s son, Sirajuddin Haqqani, the group began participating in the insurgency and became known as the Haqqani Network.

**Activities:** HQN has planned and carried out a number of significant kidnappings and attacks against U.S. and Coalition Forces in Afghanistan, as well as Afghan government and civilian targets. HQN’s most notorious attacks in recent years include an attack on the Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul in June 2011, which killed 11 civilians and two Afghan policemen; a September 2011 truck bombing in Wardak Province, Afghanistan, which wounded 77 U.S. soldiers; a 19-hour attack on the U.S. Embassy and ISAF headquarters in Kabul in September 2011, which killed 16 Afghans, including at least six children; a June 2012 suicide bomb attack against Forward Operating Base Salerno, which killed two U.S. soldiers and wounded more than 100; and a 12-hour siege of the Spozhmai Hotel in Kabul in June 2012, which resulted in the death of at least 18 Afghans, including 14 civilians. HQN has also been involved in holding U.S. Army Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl, who was kidnapped in 2009 and remained in captivity throughout 2013.

HQN’s attacks continued in 2013. In January, HQN was blamed for a suicide attack against the Traffic Police Headquarters in Kabul, which killed at least three Afghan police officers. In September, captured members confessed that HQN was behind the killing of an Indian writer in Paktika province. In addition to these attacks, multiple HQN plots, many planned against locations in Kabul, were disrupted by the Afghan police before they could be carried out.

Despite HQN’s violent attacks, the group suffered numerous setbacks in 2013 with the death of multiple senior leaders, including financier Nasiruddin Haqqani, and commanders Sangeen Zadran and Ahmed Jan.

**Strength:** HQN is believed to have several hundred core members, but it is estimated that the organization is also able to draw upon a pool of upwards of 10,000 fighters with varying degrees of affiliation. HQN cooperates closely with the larger Afghan Taliban and also draws strength through cooperation with other terrorist organizations operating in Afghanistan, including al-Qa’ida, Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Lashkar I Jhangvi, and Jaish-e Mohammad.

**Location/Area of Operation:** HQN is active along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and across much of southeastern Afghanistan, particularly in Loya Paktia. The group’s leadership maintains a power base in Miram Shah, North Waziristan, Pakistan.

**Funding and External Aid:** In addition to the support it receives through its connections to other terrorist organizations, HQN receives much of its funds from donors in Pakistan and the Gulf, as well as through criminal activities such as kidnapping, extortion, smuggling, and other licit and illicit business ventures.

**HARAKAT-UL JIHAD ISLAMI**

**Description:** Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on August 6, 2010, Harakat-ul Jihad Islami (HUJI) was founded in 1980 in Afghanistan to fight against the Soviet Union. Following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, the organization re-focused its efforts on India. HUJI seeks the annexation of Indian-administered Kashmir and expulsion of Coalition Forces from Afghanistan. It also has supplied fighters for the Taliban in Afghanistan. In addition, some factions of HUJI espouse a more global agenda and conduct attacks in Pakistan. HUJI is mostly composed of Pakistani militants and veterans of the Soviet-Afghan war. HUJI has experienced a number of internal splits and a portion of the group has aligned with al-Qa’ida (AQ) in recent years, including training its members in AQ training camps. Mohammad Ilyas Kashmiri, one of HUJI’s top leaders who also served as an AQ military commander and strategist, died on June 3, 2011.

**Activities:** HUJI has been involved in a number of terrorist attacks in recent years. On March 2, 2006, a HUJI leader was behind the suicide bombing of the U.S. Consulate in Karachi, Pakistan, which killed four people, including U.S. diplomat David Foy, and injured 48 others. HUJI was also responsible for terrorist attacks in India including the May 2007 Hyderabad mosque attack, which killed 16 and injured 40; and the March 2007 Varanasi attack, which killed 25 and injured 100. HUJI claimed responsibility for the September 7, 2011 bombing of the New Delhi High Court, which left at least 11 dead and an estimated 76 wounded. HUJI sent an email to the press stating that the bomb was intended to force India to repeal a death sentence of a HUJI member. While HUJI continued its recruitment efforts in 2012, several members of the organization were arrested by authorities. HUJI committed no known attacks in 2013.

**Strength:** HUJI has an estimated strength of several hundred members.

**Location/Area of Operation:** HUJI’s area of operation extends throughout South Asia, with its terrorist operations focused primarily in India and Afghanistan. Some factions of HUJI conduct attacks within Pakistan.

**Funding and External Aid:** Unknown

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**HARAKAT UL-JIHAD-I-ISLAMI/BANGLADESH**


**Description:** Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on March 5, 2008, Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B) was formed in April 1992 by a group of former Bangladeshi Afghan veterans to establish Islamic rule in Bangladesh. In October 2005, Bangladeshi authorities banned the group. HUJI-B has connections to Pakistani terrorist groups such as Lashkar e-Tayyiba, which advocate similar objectives. The leaders of HUJI-B signed the February 1998 fatwa sponsored by Usama bin Laden that declared American civilians legitimate targets.

**Activities:** In December 2008, three HUJI-B members were convicted for the May 2004 grenade attack that wounded the British High Commissioner in Sylhet, Bangladesh. In 2011, Bangladeshi authorities formally charged multiple suspects, including HUJI-B leader Mufti Abdul Hannan, with the killing of former Finance Minister Shah AMS Kibria of Awami League in a grenade attack on January 27, 2005. HUJI-B committed no known attacks in 2013. However, in March 2013, police in Dhaka
arrested a group of militants which included some HUIJ-B members. The group was preparing attacks on public gatherings and prominent individuals; and bombs, bomb-making material, and counterfeit currency were found when the arrest took place.

**Strength:** HUJI-B leaders claim that up to 400 of its members are Afghan war veterans, but its total membership is unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** The group operates primarily in Bangladesh and India. HUJI-B trains and has a network of madrassas in Bangladesh.

**Funding and External Aid:** HUJI-B funding comes from a variety of sources. Several international Muslim NGOs may have funneled money to HUJI-B and other Bangladeshi terrorist groups.

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**HARAKAT UL-MUJAHIDEEN**

aka HUM; Harakat ul-Ansar; HUA; Jamiat ul-Ansar; JUA; al-Faran; al-Hadid; al-Hadith; Harakat ul-Mujahidin

**Description:** Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on October 8, 1997, Harakat ul-Mujahideen (HUM) seeks the annexation of Indian Kashmir and the expulsion of Coalition Forces in Afghanistan. Reportedly under pressure from the Government of Pakistan, HUM’s long-time leader Fazlur Rehman Khalil stepped down and was replaced by Dr. Badr Munir as the head of HUM in January 2005. HUM operated terrorist training camps in eastern Afghanistan until Coalition air strikes destroyed them in 2001. Khalil was detained by Pakistani authorities in mid-2004 and subsequently released in December of the same year. In 2003, HUM began using the name Jamiat ul-Ansar (JUA). Pakistan banned JUA in November 2003.

**Activities:** HUM has conducted a number of operations against Indian troops and civilian targets in Kashmir. It is linked to the Kashmiri terrorist group al-Faran, which kidnapped five Western tourists in Kashmir in July 1995; the five reportedly were killed later that year. HUM was responsible for the hijacking of an Indian airliner in December 1999 that resulted in the release of Masood Azhar, an important leader in the former Harakat ul-Ansar, who was imprisoned by India in 1994 and then founded Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) after his release. Another former member of Harakat ul-Ansar, Ahmed Omar Sheik, was also released by India as a result of the hijackings and was later convicted of the abduction and murder in 2002 of U.S. journalist Daniel Pearl.

HUM targets Indian security and civilian targets in Kashmir. In 2005, such attacks resulted in the deaths of 15 people. In November 2007, two Indian soldiers were killed in Kashmir while engaged in a firefight with a group of HUM militants. Indian police and army forces have engaged with HUM militants in the Kashmir region, killing a number of the organization’s leadership in April, October, and December 2008. In February 2009, Lalchand Kishen Advani, leader of the Indian opposition Bharatiya Janata Party, received a death threat that was attributed to HUM. In December 2012, Pakistani police disrupted militants associated with HUM and Lashkar i Jhangvi who were planning an attack on a congregation hall in Karachi, Pakistan. HUM conducted no known terrorist attacks in 2013; however, in February, three British nationals, two of whom reportedly trained with HUM in Pakistan in 2009, were convicted in London on terrorism charges for plotting to carry out terrorist attacks in the UK.
Strength: HUM has several hundred armed supporters located in Pakistan-administered Kashmir; Indian-administered Kashmir and Doda regions; and in the Kashmir valley. Supporters are mostly Pakistanis and Kashmiris, but also include Afghans and Arab veterans of the Soviet-Afghan war. After 2000, a significant portion of HUM’s membership defected to JEM.

Location/Area of Operation: Operating from Muzaffarabad in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, as well as several cities in Pakistan, HUM conducts terrorist operations primarily in Kashmir and Afghanistan. HUM trains its militants in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Funding and External Aid: HUM collects donations from wealthy and grassroots donors in Pakistan. HUM’s financial collection methods include soliciting donations in magazine advertisements and pamphlets.

HIZBALLAH

aka the Party of God; Islamic Jihad; Islamic Jihad Organization; Revolutionary Justice Organization; Organization of the Oppressed on Earth; Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine; Organization of Right Against Wrong; Ansar Allah; Followers of the Prophet Muhammed

Description: Hizballah was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on October 8, 1997. Formed in 1982 following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the Lebanon-based radical Shia group takes its ideological inspiration from the Iranian revolution and the teachings of the late Ayatollah Khomeini. The group generally follows the religious guidance of the Iranian Supreme Leader, which was Ali Khamenei in 2013. Hizballah is closely allied with Iran and the two often work together on shared initiatives, although Hizballah also acts independently. Hizballah shares a close relationship with Syria, and like Iran, the group is providing assistance – including fighters – to Syrian regime forces in the Syrian conflict.

Hizballah has strong influence in Lebanon, especially with the Shia community. Hizballah plays an active role in Lebanese politics, and the group holds 12 seats in the 128-member Lebanese Parliament and two seats in the 24-member Council of Ministers. Hizballah’s political strength grew in the wake of the 2006 war with Israel and the group’s 2008 takeover of West Beirut, although its reputation and popularity have been significantly undermined by the group’s active support for the Asad regime.

Hizballah provides support to several Palestinian terrorist organizations, as well as a number of local Christian and Muslim militias in Lebanon. Besides overt political support, support includes the covert provision of weapons, explosives, training, funding, and guidance.

Activities: Hizballah’s terrorist attacks have included the suicide truck bombings of the U.S. Embassy and U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983; the U.S. Embassy annex in Beirut in 1984; and the 1985 hijacking of TWA flight 847, during which a U.S. Navy diver was murdered. Elements of the group were responsible for the kidnapping, detention, and murder of Americans and other Westerners in Lebanon in the 1980s. Hizballah was implicated, along with Iran, in the 1992 attacks on the Israeli Embassy in Argentina and on the 1994 bombing of the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association in Buenos Aires. In 2000, Hizballah operatives captured three Israeli soldiers in the Shebaa Farms area and, separately, kidnapped an Israeli non-combatant in Dubai. Although the non-combatant survived, on November 1, 2001, Israeli Army Rabbi Israel Weiss pronounced the soldiers dead. The surviving non-
combatant and the bodies of the Israeli soldiers were returned to Israel in a prisoner exchange with Hizballah in 2004.

Two attacks against UN Interim Force in Lebanon peacekeepers— an attack in late July 2011 that wounded six French citizens and a second attack days later that injured three other French soldiers— were believed to have been carried out by Hizballah. Also in 2011, four Hizballah members were indicted by the U.N.-based Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), an international tribunal investigating the 2005 assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. The four Hizballah members indicted in 2011 by the STL were Mustafa Badreddine, Salim Ayyash, Assad Sabra, and Hassan Anise. A fifth Hizballah member, Hassan Habib Merhi, was indicted in October 2013.

In 2012, Hizballah stepped up the pace of its terrorist plotting, and was implicated in several terrorist plots around the world. In January 2012, Thai police detained a Hizballah operative on immigration charges as he was attempting to depart Thailand from Suvarnabhumi International Airport. He led police to nearly 10,000 pounds of urea-based fertilizer and 10 gallons of liquid ammonium nitrate in a commercial building about 20 miles south of Bangkok. It was unclear if the materials were intended to be used to carry out terrorist attacks in Thailand—possibly against Israeli tourists— or if they were to be transported to another country. The Hizballah operative was convicted of possessing bomb-making materials by a Thai court in September 2013. He was sentenced to two years and eight months in prison.

In Cyprus, a suspected Hizballah operative was detained by the Cypriot authorities on July 7, 2012 for allegedly helping plan an attack against Israeli tourists in Cyprus. The trial began in September 2012, and on March 21, 2013, a Cyprus court found a Hizballah operative guilty of charges stemming from his surveillance activities of Israeli tourist targets.

In July 2012, a terrorist attack was carried out on a passenger bus carrying 42 Israeli tourists at the Sarafovo Airport near the Bulgarian city of Burgas. The explosion killed five Israelis and one Bulgarian, and injured 32. On February 5, 2013, Bulgarian Deputy Prime Minister Tsvertan Tsvetanov publicly linked two operatives in the Burgas bombing to Hizballah, and in July 2013, the Bulgarian government identified the operatives as Hassan al-Hajj Hassan, a dual Canadian-Lebanese citizen; and Meliad Farah, a dual Australian-Lebanese citizen. In August 2013, Hizballah claimed responsibility for an attack on the Lebanese-Israeli border that wounded four members of an Israeli military convoy.

In May 2013, Hizballah publicly admitted to playing a significant role in the ongoing conflict in Syria, rallying to support Syrian President Bashar al-Asad. During a battle which took place in May and June of 2013 in the Syrian border town of al-Qusayr, Hizballah claimed to have lost over 100 fighters.

**Strength:** Tens of thousands of supporters and members worldwide.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Hizballah is based in the southern suburbs of Beirut, the Bekaa Valley, and southern Lebanon. However, as evidenced by Hizballah’s activities during the course of 2012 and 2013, the group is capable of operating around the globe. As of December 2013, some Hizballah members were stationed on the outskirts of Aleppo, Syria, as well as the Qalamoun mountains northwest of Damascus.

**Funding and External Aid:** Iran continues to provide Hizballah with training, weapons, and explosives, as well as political, diplomatic, monetary, and organizational aid; Syria has furnished training, weapons, diplomatic, and political support. Hizballah also receives funding from private
donations and profits from legal and illegal businesses. Hizballah receives financial support from Lebanese Shia communities in Europe, Africa, South America, North America, and Asia. As illustrated by the Lebanese-Canadian bank case, Hizballah supporters are often engaged in a range of criminal activities that benefit the group financially. These have included smuggling contraband goods, passport falsification, trafficking in narcotics, money laundering, and credit card, immigration, and bank fraud.

**INDIAN MUJAHEDEEN**

*aka* Indian Mujahidin; Islamic Security Force-Indian Mujahideen (ISF-IM)

**Description:** The Indian Mujahedeen (IM) was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on September 19, 2011. An India-based terrorist group with significant links to Pakistan-based terrorist organizations, IM has been responsible for dozens of bomb attacks throughout India since 2005, and has caused the deaths of hundreds of civilians. IM maintains ties to other U.S.-designated terrorist entities including Pakistan-based Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LeT), Jaish-e-Mohammed, and Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami. IM’s stated goal is to carry out terrorist actions against Indians for their oppression of Muslims.

**Activities:** IM’s primary method of attack is multiple coordinated bombings in crowded areas against economic and civilian targets to maximize terror and casualties. In 2008, an IM attack in Delhi killed 30 people; that same year, IM was responsible for 16 synchronized bomb blasts in crowded urban centers, and an attack at a local hospital in Ahmedabad that killed 38 and injured more than 100. IM also played a facilitative role in the 2008 Mumbai attack carried out by LeT that killed approximately 170 people, including six Americans. In 2010, IM carried out the bombing of a popular German bakery in Pune, India, frequented by tourists, killing 17 and injuring over 60.

In 2013, IM conducted multiple bombings, killing dozens of innocent civilians and injuring hundreds more. In February, IM exploded two bombs in a crowded shopping area within Hyderabad, killing 17 and injuring at least 119. In July, IM was responsible for 10 bombs which exploded in and around the Mahabodhi Temple complex – a UNESCO World Heritage Site in Bodh Gaya – injuring five people. In October, IM operatives detonated a series of bombs at a political rally attended by Prime Ministerial candidate Narendra Modi in Patna, Bihar, killing at least six and injuring 85. On August 28, IM co-founder Yasin Bhatkal was arrested near the India-Nepalborder. Bhatkal was charged in the 2010 attack on a restaurant in Pune that killed 17 people.

**Strength:** Estimated to have several hundred supporters and members.

**Location/Area of Operation:** India

**Funding and External Aid:** Suspected to obtain funding and support from other terrorist organizations, such as LeT and al-Qa’ida, and from sources in Pakistan and the Middle East.

**ISLAMIC JIHAD UNION**

*aka* Islamic Jihad Group; Islomiy Jihad Ittihodi; al-Djihad al-Islami; Dzhamaat Modzhakhedov; Islamic Jihad Group of Uzbekistan; Jamiat al-Jihad al-Islami; Jamiyat; The Jamaat Mojahedin; The Kazakh Jama’at; The Libyan Society
Description: Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on June 17, 2005, the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) is a Sunni violent extremist organization that splintered from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in the early 2000s and is currently based in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Najmiddin Jalolov founded the organization as the Islamic Jihad Group (IJG) in March 2002, but the group was renamed IJU in May 2005. Although IJU remains committed to overthrowing the Government of Uzbekistan, it also has a global agenda, seen in its attacks on Coalition Forces in Afghanistan.

Activities: The IJU primarily operates against ISAF and American Forces in Afghanistan and continues to pose a threat to Central Asia. The group claimed responsibility for attacks in March and April 2004 in Uzbekistan, targeting police at several roadway checkpoints and at a popular bazaar, killing approximately 47 people, including 33 IJU members, some of whom were suicide bombers. In July 2004, the group carried out near-simultaneous suicide bombings of the Uzbek Prosecutor General’s office and the U.S. and Israeli Embassies in Tashkent. In September 2007, German authorities disrupted an IJU plot to attack U.S. military bases and personnel by detaining and prosecuting three IJU operatives, including two German citizens. Foreign fighters from Germany, Turkey, and elsewhere in Europe continued to travel to the Afghan-Pakistan border area to join the IJU to fight against U.S. and Coalition Forces.

In 2013, IJU released two videos showing an IJU attack against an American military base in Paktia province, Afghanistan, and an attack showing an IJU sniper shooting an Afghan soldier at a base in Paktika, Afghanistan. In August, the Kyrgyzstan State Committee of National Security announced that three IJU members were arrested for traveling from Syria to carry out attacks in Osh and the capital Bishkek in the run up to Independence Day and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit in Bishkek.

Strength: 100-200 members

Location/Area of Operation: Based in Pakistan and active in Afghanistan, IJU members are also scattered throughout Central Asia and Europe.

Funding and External Aid: Unknown

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ISLAMIC MOVEMENT OF UZBEKISTAN

aka IMU

Description: Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on September 25, 2000, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan’s (IMU) goal is to overthrow the Uzbek government and establish an Islamic state. For most of the past decade, however, the group recruited members from other Central Asian states and Europe and has focused on fighting in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The IMU has a relationship with al-Qa’ida, the Taliban, and Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan. In April 2012, IMU leader Abu Usman Adil died and Usman Ghazi was named the group’s new leader. IMU’s leadership cadre remains based in Pakistan's Taliban-controlled North Waziristan and operates primarily along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border and in northern Afghanistan. Top IMU leaders have integrated themselves into the Taliban's shadow government in Afghanistan’s northern provinces. Operating in cooperation with each other, the Taliban and IMU have expanded their presence throughout northern
Afghanistan, and have established training camps in the region. Group members may have also traveled to Syria to fight with violent extremist oppositionist groups.

**Activities:** Since the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom, the IMU has been predominantly focused on attacks against U.S. and Coalition Forces in Afghanistan. In late 2009, NATO forces reported an increase in IMU-affiliated foreign fighters in Afghanistan. In 2010, IMU claimed credit for the September 19 ambush that killed 25 Tajik troops in Tajikistan. On October 15, 2011, IMU claimed responsibility for a suicide assault on a U.S.-led Provincial Reconstruction Team base in the Afghan province of Panjshir that killed two Afghan civilians and wounded two security guards. In 2013, IMU remained active and carried out numerous attacks including a May joint attack with the Taliban in which six militants wearing Afghan National Police uniforms armed with suicide vests and weapons stormed the provincial governor compound in Bazarak, Afghanistan, killing one policeman and wounding four; a May suicide attack in Quetta, Pakistan that targeted the chief of police, killing eight and wounding 100 more; and an October suicide attack near Bagram Air Base that targeted a US military convoy.

**Strength:** 200-300 members

**Location/Area of Operation:** IMU militants are located in South Asia, Central Asia, and Iran.

**Funding and External Aid:** The IMU receives support from a large Uzbek diaspora, terrorist organizations, and donors from Europe, Central and South Asia, and the Middle East.

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**JAMA’ATU ANSARUL MUSLIMINA FI BILADIS-SUDAN (ANSARU)**

aka Ansar; Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan; Vanguards for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa; JAMBS; Jama’atu Ansaril Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan

**Description:** Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on November 14, 2013, Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina fi Biladis-Sudan (Ansaru) publicly splintered from Boko Haram in January 2012. Ansaru’s leadership structure remains unclear; however, it is known that Khalid al-Barnawi holds one of the top leadership positions within the organization. Since its inception, Ansaru has targeted western and international civilians and Nigerian government and security officials and is responsible for the deaths of countless civilians and Nigerian security personnel. Ansaru’s stated goals are to defend Muslims throughout all of Africa by fighting against the Nigerian government and international interests, but to avoid killing innocent Muslim civilians. While Ansaru claims to identify with Boko Haram’s objectives and struggle, it has criticized the group for killing fellow Muslims.

**Activities:** In November 2012, Ansaru raided a police station in Abuja, killing Nigerian police officers and freeing detained terrorists from prison. In January 2013, Ansaru attacked a convoy of Nigerian peacekeepers on their way to Mali. Ansaru has also engaged in multiple kidnapping attacks targeting civilians. In late 2012, Ansaru kidnapped a French engineer and claimed the action was justified due to French involvement in Mali. Similarly in early 2013, Ansaru kidnapped and subsequently executed seven international construction workers.

**Strength:** Total membership is unknown. Given its narrower scope of operations, it is estimated that Ansaru’s membership is much smaller than that of Boko Haram’s.


**Location/Area of Operation:** Ansaru’s operations take place in northern Nigeria.

**Funding and External Aid:** Ansaru maintained a working relationship with Boko Haram. The group has some connections with other regional terrorist organizations, such as al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb.

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**JAISH-E-MOHAMMED**

aka the Army of Mohammed; Mohammed’s Army; Tehrik ul-Furqan; Khuddam-ul-Islam; Khudamul Islam; Kuddam e Islami; Jaish-i-Mohammed

**Description:** Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on December 26, 2001, Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) is based in Pakistan. JEM was founded in early 2000 by Masood Azhar, a former senior leader of Harakat ul-Ansar, upon his release from prison in India in exchange for 155 hijacked Indian Airlines hostages. The group’s aim is to annex Indian-administered Kashmir to Pakistan and expel Coalition Forces from Afghanistan, and it has openly declared war against the United States. Pakistan outlawed JEM in 2002. By 2003, JEM had splintered into Khuddam-ul-Islam (KUI), headed by Azhar; and Jamaat ul-Furqan (JUF), led by Abdul Jabbar who was released from Pakistani custody in August 2004. Pakistan banned KUI and JUF in November 2003.

**Activities:** JEM continued to operate openly in parts of Pakistan despite the 2002 ban on its activities. Since Masood Azhar’s 1999 release from Indian custody, JEM has conducted many fatal terrorist attacks in the region. JEM claimed responsibility for several suicide car bombings in Indian-administered Kashmir, including an October 2001 suicide attack on the Jammu and Kashmir legislative assembly building in Srinagar that killed more than 30 people. The Indian government has publicly implicated JEM, along with Lashkar e-Tayyiba, for the December 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament that killed nine and injured 18. In 2002, Pakistani authorities arrested and convicted a JEM member for the abduction and murder of U.S. journalist Daniel Pearl. Pakistani authorities reportedly suspect that JEM members may have been involved in the 2002 anti-Christian attacks in Islamabad, Murree, and Taxila that killed two Americans. In December 2003, Pakistan implicated JEM members in the two assassination attempts against President Musharraf. In 2006, JEM claimed responsibility for a number of attacks, including the killing of several Indian police officials in the Indian-administered Kashmir capital of Srinagar. In December 2013, JEM threatened to kill Indian politician Narendra Modi if he were elected Prime Minister.

**Strength:** JEM has at least several hundred armed supporters – including a large cadre of former Harakat ul-Mujahideen members – located in Pakistan, the Indian-administered Kashmir and Doda regions, and the Kashmir Valley.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Kashmir in India; Afghanistan; and Pakistan, particularly southern Punjab.

**Funding and External Aid:** To avoid asset seizures by the Pakistani government, since 2007 JEM has withdrawn funds from bank accounts and invested in legal businesses, such as commodity trading, real estate, and the production of consumer goods. JEM also collects funds through donation requests in magazines and pamphlets, sometimes using charitable causes to solicit donations.
**JEMAAMH ANSHORUT TAUHID**

*aka* JAT; Jemmah Ansharut Tauhid; Jem’mah Ansharut Tauhid; Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid; Jama’ah Ansharut Tauhid; Laskar 99

**Description:** The Department of State designated Indonesia-based group Jemah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT) as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on March 13, 2012. Formed in 2008, JAT seeks to establish an Islamic caliphate in Indonesia, and has carried out numerous attacks on Indonesian government personnel, police, military, and civilians. In 2011, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, the founder and leader of JAT, was convicted and sentenced to 15 years in prison for his role in organizing a militant training camp in Aceh. Ba’asyir is also the co-founder and former leader of Jemaah Islamiya (JI). JAT maintains close ties to JI and other indigenous terrorist groups in Southeast Asia.

**Activities:** JAT has conducted multiple attacks targeting civilians and Indonesian officials, resulting in the deaths of several Indonesian police. JAT has robbed banks and carried out other illicit activities to fund the purchase of assault weapons, ammunition, explosives, and bomb-making materials. In October 2012, two policemen investigating an alleged terrorist camp linked to JAT were tortured and found dead in Poso, and authorities implicated JAT in the killings. In December 2012, four police officers were killed and two wounded in an attack by suspected local JAT members in Central Sulawesi after a group of 10 to 15 gunmen ambushed a police patrol in the area. In 2013, JAT and its members remained active. In January, Indonesian authorities conducted two raids that killed five JAT members who had fled Poso after they had killed several policemen. Police found a pipe bomb and other bomb-making materials at the JAT camp.

**Strength:** JAT is estimated to have several thousand supporters and members.

**Location/Area of Operation:** JAT is based in Indonesia with suspected elements in Malaysia and the Philippines.

**Funding and External Aid:** JAT raises funds through membership donations, as well as bank robberies, cyber hacking, and other illicit activities; and legitimate business activities such as operating bookstores and other shops.

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**JEMAAMH ISLIAMIYA**

*aka* Jemaa Islamiyah; Jema’a Islamiyyah; Jemaa Islamiyya; Jema’ah Islamiyyah; Jemaa Islamiyyah; Jema’a Islamiyyah; Jemaa Islamiyyah; Jemaah Islamiyah; Jemaah Islamiyah; Jema’ah Islamiyah; Jemaah Islamiyyah; Jema’a Islamiyyah; JI

**Description:** Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on October 23, 2002, Jemaah Islamiya (JI) is a Southeast Asia-based terrorist group co-founded by Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and Abdullah Sungkar that seeks the establishment of an Islamic caliphate spanning Indonesia, Malaysia, southern Thailand, Singapore, Brunei, and the southern Philippines. More than 400 JI operatives have been captured since 2002, including operations chief and al-Qa’ida associate Hambali. In 2006, several members connected to JI’s 2005 suicide attack in Bali were arrested; in 2007, Muhammad Naim (a.k.a. Zarkashih) and JI military commander Abu Dujana were arrested; and in 2008, two senior JI operatives were arrested in Malaysia and a JI-linked cell was broken up in Sumatra. In September 2009, JI-splinter group leader Noordin Mohammad Top was killed in a police raid. Progress against JI
continued in February 2010, when Indonesian National Police discovered and disbanded a violent extremist training base in Aceh in which members of JI and other Indonesian violent extremist groups participated. The police raid resulted in the capture of more than 60 militants, including some JI operatives, and led authorities to former JI leader Dulmatin, one of the planners of the 2002 Bali bombing. In March 2010, Dulmatin was killed outside of Jakarta. In June 2010, wanted JI commander Abdullah Sunata was captured while planning to bomb the Danish Embassy in Jakarta. In January 2011, JI member Umar Patek was captured in Abbottabad, Pakistan, and put on trial in Indonesia, where he was convicted and sentenced to 20 years in prison in June 2012 for his role in the Bali bombing.

**Activities:** In December 2001, Singaporean authorities uncovered a JI plot to attack U.S., Israeli, British, and Australian diplomatic facilities in Singapore. Other significant JI attacks include the 2002 Bali bombings, which killed more than 200, including seven U.S. citizens; the August 2003 bombing of the J. W. Marriott Hotel in Jakarta; the September 2004 bombing outside the Australian Embassy in Jakarta; and the October 2005 suicide bombing in Bali, which killed 26, including the three suicide bombers.

On July 17, 2009, a JI faction led by Top conducted the group’s most recent high-profile attacks, when two suicide bombers detonated explosive devices at the J.W. Marriott and Ritz-Carlton hotels in Jakarta that killed seven and injuring more than 50, including seven Americans. The Philippine military announced it had killed two JI members in separate incidents in the south of the country in late 2012, including one of the group’s senior-most representatives to the Philippines.

In August 2013, the Philippine military announced that it had foiled an Abu Sayyaf Group and JI plan to carry out bombings in parts of Mindanao after it carried out a six-hour military offensive on a unit that was in charge of making improvised explosive devices. In October, Masyhadi Mas Selamat, son of JI leader Mas Selamat Kastari, was arrested in Indonesia for his involvement in JI, and was deported to Singapore later that month.

**Strength:** Estimates of total JI members vary from 500 to several thousand.

**Location/Area of Operation:** JI is based in Indonesia and is believed to have elements in Malaysia and the Philippines.

**Funding and External Aid:** Investigations have indicated that JI is fully capable of its own fundraising through membership donations and criminal and business activities. It has received financial, ideological, and logistical support from Middle Eastern contacts and NGOs.

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**JUNDALLAH**

aka People’s Resistance Movement of Iran (PMRI); Jonbesh-i Moqavemat-i-Mardom-i Iran; Popular Resistance Movement of Iran; Soldiers of God; Fedayeen-e-Islam; Former Jundallah of Iran; Jundullah; Jondullah; Jundollah; Jondollah; Jondallah; Army of God (God’s Army); Baloch Peoples Resistance Movement (BPRM)

**Description:** Jundallah was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on November 4, 2010. Since its inception in 2003, Jundallah, which operates primarily in the province of Sistan va Balochistan of Iran, has engaged in numerous attacks, killing and maiming scores of Iranian civilians.
and government officials. Jundallah’s stated goals are to secure recognition of Balochi cultural, economic, and political rights from the Government of Iran, and to spread awareness of the plight of the Baloch situation through violent and nonviolent means.

Activities: In March 2006, Jundallah attacked a motorcade in eastern Iran, which included the deputy head of the Iranian Red Crescent Security Department, who was then taken hostage. The Governor of Zahedan, his deputy, and five other officials were wounded; seven others were kidnapped; and more than 20 were killed in the attack. An October 2009 suicide bomb attack in a marketplace in the city of Pishin in the Sistan va Balochistan province, which killed more than 40 people, was reportedly the deadliest terrorist attack in Iran since the 1980s. In a statement on its website, Jundallah claimed responsibility for the December 15, 2010 suicide bomb attack inside the Iman Hussein Mosque in Chabahar, which killed an estimated 35 to 40 civilians and wounded 60 to 100. In July 2010, Jundallah attacked the Grand Mosque in Zahedan, killing approximately 30 and injuring an estimated 300. In 2013, attacks continued in the Sistan va Balochistan province; however, it is unclear if Jundallah was involved in these attacks.

Strength: Reports of Jundallah membership vary from 500 to 2,000.

Location/Area of Operation: Throughout Sistan va Balochistan province in southeastern Iran and the greater Balochistan area of Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Funding and External Aid: Unknown

KAHANE CHAI

aka American Friends of the United Yeshiva; American Friends of Yeshivat Rav Meir; Committee for the Safety of the Roads; Dikuy Bogdim; DOV; Forefront of the Idea; Friends of the Jewish Idea Yeshiva; Jewish Legion; Judea Police; Judean Congress; Kach; Kahane; Kahane Lives; Kahane Tzadak; Kahane.org; Kahanetzadak.com; Kfar Tapuah Fund; Koach; Meir’s Youth; New Kach Movement; Newkach.org; No’ar Meir; Repression of Traitors; State of Judea; Sword of David; The Committee Against Racism and Discrimination (CARD); The Hatikva Jewish Identity Center; The International Kahane Movement; The Jewish Idea Yeshiva; The Judean Legion; The Judean Voice; The Qomemiyut Movement; The Rabbi Meir David Kahane Memorial Fund; The Voice of Judea; The Way of the Torah; The Yeshiva of the Jewish Idea; Yeshivat Harav Meir

Description: Kach – the precursor to Kahane Chai – was founded by radical Israeli-American Rabbi Meir Kahane, with the goal of restoring Greater Israel, which is generally used to refer to Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza. Its offshoot, Kahane Chai (translation: “Kahane Lives”), was founded by Meir Kahane’s son Binyamin, following his father’s 1990 assassination in the United States. Both organizations were designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations on October 8, 1997. The group has attempted to gain seats in the Israeli Knesset over the past several decades but won only one seat in 1984.

Activities: Kahane Chai has harassed and threatened Arabs, Palestinians, and Israeli government officials, and has vowed revenge for the death of Binyamin Kahane and his wife. The group is suspected of involvement in a number of low-level attacks since the start of the First Palestinian Intifada in 2000. Since 2003, Kahane Chai activists have physically intimidated Israeli and Palestinian government officials who favored the dismantlement of Israeli settlements. Although they have not
explicitly claimed responsibility for a series of mosque burnings in the West Bank, individuals affiliated with Kahane Chai are widely suspected of being the perpetrators. There were no known Kahane Chai attacks during 2013.

**Strength:** Kahane Chai’s core membership is believed to be fewer than 100. The group’s membership and support networks are overwhelmingly composed of Israeli citizens that live mostly in West Bank settlements.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Israel and West Bank settlements, particularly Qiryat Arba in Hebron.

**Funding and External Aid:** Receives support from sympathizers in the United States and Europe.

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**KATA’IB HIZBALLAH**

*aka* Hizballah Brigades; Hizballah Brigades in Iraq; Hizballah Brigades-Iraq; Kata’ib Hezbollah; Khata’ib Hezbollah; Khata’ib Hizballah; Khattab Hezbollah; Hizballah Brigades-Iraq of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq; Islamic Resistance in Iraq; Kata’ib Hizballah Fi al-Iraq; Katibat Abu Fathel al-A’abas; Katibat Zayd Ebin Ali; Katibut Karbalah

**Description:** Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on July 2, 2009, Kata’ib Hizballah (KH) was formed in 2006 and is a radical Shia Islamist group with an anti-Western outlook and violent extremist ideology that has conducted attacks against Iraqi, U.S., and Coalition targets in Iraq. KH has threatened the lives of Iraqi politicians and civilians that support the legitimate political process in Iraq. The group is notable for its extensive use of media operations and propaganda by filming and releasing videos of attacks. KH has ideological ties to Lebanese Hizballah and receives support from that group and its sponsor, Iran.

**Activities:** KH has been responsible for numerous terrorist attacks since 2007, including improvised explosive device bombings, rocket propelled grenade attacks, and sniper operations. In 2007, KH gained notoriety with attacks on U.S. and Coalition Forces in Iraq. KH was particularly active in the summer of 2008, recording and distributing video footage of its attacks. In June 2011, five U.S. soldiers were killed in a rocket attack in Baghdad when KH assailants fired between three and five rockets at U.S. military base Camp Victory. The group remained active in 2013, participating in fighting in Syria, but has not conducted an attack on U.S. interests since July 2011.

**Strength:** Membership is estimated at 400 individuals.

**Location/Area of Operation:** KH’s operations are predominately Iraq-based. In 2011, KH conducted the majority of its operations in Baghdad but was active in other areas of Iraq, including Kurdish areas such as Mosul. In 2012 and 2013, KH militants were reportedly fighting in Syria.

**Funding and External Aid:** KH is almost entirely dependent on support from Iran and Lebanese Hizballah.

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**KURDISTAN WORKERS’ PARTY**
Description: Founded by Abdullah Ocalan in 1978 as a Marxist-Leninist separatist organization, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on October 8, 1997. The group, composed primarily of Turkish Kurds, launched a campaign of violence in 1984. The PKK’s original goal was to establish an independent Kurdish state in southeastern Turkey, but in recent years it has spoken more often about autonomy within a Turkish state that guarantees Kurdish cultural and linguistic rights.

Activities: In the early 1990s, the PKK moved beyond rural-based insurgent activities to include urban terrorism. Anatolia was the scene of significant violence; some estimates placed casualties at least 40,000 persons. Following his capture in 1999, Ocalan announced a “peace initiative,” ordering members to refrain from violence and requesting dialogue with Ankara on Kurdish issues. Ocalan’s death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment; he remains the symbolic leader of the group. The group foreswore violence until June 2004, when the group’s hard-line militant wing took control and renounced the self-imposed ceasefire of the previous five years. Striking over the border from bases within Iraq, the PKK has engaged in terrorist attacks in eastern and western Turkey. In 2009 the Turkish government and the PKK resumed peace negotiations, but talks broke down after a PKK-initiated attack in July 2011 that left 13 Turkish soldiers dead. Violence in 2011 and 2012 marked another deadly time period in the almost 30 year conflict, with multiple car bombings in 2012 that resulted in the death of at least 10 people. Primary targets included Turkish government security forces, local Turkish officials, and villagers who oppose the organization in Turkey.

Widely publicized peace talks between Ocalan and the Turkish government to resolve the conflict began at the end of 2012. Peace talks continued in 2013, with Ocalan calling for a ceasefire in the spring. Violent acts persisted, with PKK terrorists kidnapping and eventually releasing four Turkish soldiers in December, but at the end of the year the ceasefire remained in place.

Strength: Approximately 4,000 to 5,000 members; 3,000 to 3,500 are located in northern Iraq.

Location/Area of Operation: The PKK operates primarily in Turkey, Iraq, and Europe.

Funding and External Aid: The PKK receives financial support from the large Kurdish diaspora in Europe and from criminal activity.

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**LASHKAR E-TAYYIBA**

aka al Mansooreen; Al Mansoorian; Army of the Pure; Army of the Pure and Righteous; Army of the Righteous; Lashkar e-Toiba; Lashkar-i-Taiba; Paasban-e-Ahle-Hadis; Paasban-e-Kashmir; Paasban-i-Ahle-Hadith; Pasban-e-Ahle-Hadith; Pasban-e-Kashmir; Jamaat-ud-Dawa; JUD; Jama’at al-Dawa; Jamaat ud-Daawa; Jamaat ul-Dawah; Jamaat-ul-Dawa; Jama’at-i-Dawat; Jamaat-ud-Dawa; Jama’at-ud-Da’awah; Jama’at-ud-Da’awa; Jamaati-ud-Dawa; Idara Khidmat-e-Khalq; Falah-i-Insaniat Foundation; FiF; Falah-e-Insaniat Foundation; Falah-e-Insaniyat; Falah-i-Insaniyat; Falah Insania; Welfare of Humanity; Humanitarian Welfare Foundation; Human Welfare Foundation
Designation: Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) on December 26, 2001, Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LeT) is one of the largest and most proficient of the traditionally anti-India-focused terrorist groups. It has the ability to severely disrupt already delicate regional relations. LeT formed in the late 1980s as the terrorist wing of the Islamist extremist organization, Markaz ud Dawa ul-Irshad, a Pakistan-based Islamic fundamentalist mission organization and charity originally founded to oppose the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. Led by Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, LeT is not connected to any political party. Shortly after LeT was designated as an FTO, Saeed changed its name to Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JUD) and began humanitarian projects to circumvent restrictions. LeT disseminates its message through JUD’s media outlets. Elements of LeT and Jaish-e-Muhammad (JEM) combined with other groups to mount such attacks as “The Save Kashmir Movement.” The Pakistani government banned LeT in January 2002, and JUD in 2008, following the 2008 Mumbai attack. LeT and Saeed continue to spread terrorist ideology, as well as virulent hate speech condemning the United States, India, Israel, and other perceived enemies.

Activities: LeT has conducted a number of operations against Indian troops and civilian targets in Jammu and Kashmir since 1993; several high profile attacks inside India; and operations against Coalition Forces in Afghanistan. The group uses assault rifles, machine guns, mortars, explosives, and rocket-propelled grenades.

Indian governmental officials hold LeT responsible for the November 2008 attacks in Mumbai against luxury hotels, a Jewish center, a train station, and a popular café that killed approximately 170 people – including six American citizens – and injured more than 300. India has charged 38 people in the case; most are at large and thought to be in Pakistan.

In March 2010, Pakistani-American businessman David Headley pled guilty in a U.S. court to charges related to his role in the November 2008 LeT attacks in Mumbai, as well as to charges related to a separate plot to bomb the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten. In May 2011, Headley was a witness in the trial of Tahawwur Rana, who was charged with providing material support to LeT. Rana was convicted for providing material support to LeT in June 2011, and was sentenced to 14 years in prison in January 2013.

In June 2012, Indian authorities arrested LeT member Sayeed Zabiuddin Ansari, alias Abu Jindal, one of the instigators of the November 2008 Mumbai attack.

LeT continued carrying out attacks in 2013. LeT is alleged to have been responsible for a March attack on Indian paramilitary forces in the Indian-controlled Kashmir city of Srinagar, which killed five people and wounded 10 others.

Strength: The size of LeT is unknown, but it has several thousand members in Pakistan-administered Kashmir and Pakistani Punjab; Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab Provinces in Pakistan; and in the southern Jammu, Kashmir, and Doda regions.

Location/Area of Operation: LeT has global connections and a strong operational network throughout South Asia. LeT maintains a number of facilities, including training camps, schools, and medical clinics in Pakistan.

Funding and External Aid: LeT collects donations in Pakistan and the Gulf as well as from other donors in the Middle East and Europe, particularly the UK. LeT front organizations continued to openly fundraise in Pakistan and solicit donations in the Pakistani press during 2013.
**LASHKAR I JHANGVI**

**aka** Army of Jhangvi; Lashkar e Jhangvi; Lashkar-i-Jhangvi

**Description:** Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on January 30, 2003, Lashkar I Jhangvi (LJ) is the terrorist offshoot of the Sunni Deobandi sectarian group Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan. LJ focuses primarily on anti-Shia attacks and other attacks in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and was banned by the Government of Pakistan in August 2001 as part of an effort to rein in sectarian violence. Many of its members then sought refuge in Afghanistan with the Taliban, with whom they had existing ties. After the collapse of the Taliban as the ruling government in Afghanistan, LJ members became active in aiding other terrorists, providing safe houses, false identities, and protection in Pakistani cities, including Karachi, Peshawar, and Rawalpindi. LJ works closely with Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan.

**Activities:** LJ specializes in armed attacks and bombings and has admitted responsibility for numerous killings of Shia religious and community leaders in Pakistan. In January 1999, the group attempted to assassinate Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his brother Shahbaz Sharif, Chief Minister of Punjab Province. Media reports linked LJ to attacks on Christian targets in Pakistan, including a March 2002 grenade assault on the Protestant International Church in Islamabad that killed two U.S. citizens.

LJ attacks in 2012, ranging from suicide bombings to targeted shootings of ethnic Hazaras, killed hundreds of people.

In 2013, LJ continued targeting individuals and groups of different ethnic or religious backgrounds. A January dual bombing in Quetta, Pakistan targeted a crowded billiards hall, leaving upwards of 80 Pakistanis dead and over 100 wounded. In February, LJ claimed responsibility for a deadly bombing in a crowded Quetta market that killed at least 84 people and wounded around 200 more. In June, LJ conducted a complex attack in which they detonated a bomb targeting a bus carrying female university students. After the students were brought to a local hospital for treatment, LJ stormed the hospital with small arms and grenades. The attacks resulted in the deaths of at least 20 Pakistani civilians.

**Strength:** Assessed in the low hundreds.

**Location/Area of Operation:** LJ is active primarily in Pakistan’s Punjab province, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Karachi, and Baluchistan.

**Funding and External Aid:** Funding comes from wealthy donors in Pakistan, as well as the Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia. The group engages in criminal activity to fund its activities, including extortion and protection money.

**LIBERATION TIGERS OF TAMIL EELAM**

**aka** Ellalan Force; Tamil Tigers

**Description:** Founded in 1976 and designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on October 8, 1997, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) became a powerful Tamil secessionist group in Sri Lanka. Despite its military defeat at the hands of the Sri Lankan government in 2009, the LTTE’s...
international network of sympathizers and financial support persists.

**Activities:** Although the LTTE has been largely inactive since its military defeat in Sri Lanka in 2009, in the past the LTTE was responsible for an integrated battlefield insurgent strategy that targeted key installations and senior Sri Lankan political and military leaders. It conducted a sustained campaign targeting rival Tamil groups, and assassinated Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India in 1991 and President Ranasinghe Premadasa of Sri Lanka in 1993. Although most notorious for its cadre of suicide bombers, the Black Tigers, LTT also had an amphibious force, the Sea Tigers, and a nascent air wing, the Air Tigers. Fighting between the LTTE and the Sri Lanka government escalated in 2006 and continued through 2008.

In early 2009, Sri Lankan forces recaptured the LTTE’s key strongholds, including their capital of Kilinochchi. In May 2009, government forces defeated the last LTTE fighting forces, killed LTTE leader Prabhakaran and other members of the LTTE leadership and military command, and declared military victory over LTTE. There have been no known attacks in Sri Lanka that could verifiably be attributed to the LTTE since the end of the war, but LTTE’s financial network of support continued to operate throughout 2013.

**Strength:** Exact strength is unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Sri Lanka and India

**Funding and External Aid:** The LTTE uses its international contacts and the large Tamil diaspora in North America, Europe, and Asia to procure weapons, communications, funding, and other needed supplies. The group employed charities as fronts to collect and divert funds for their activities.

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**LIBYAN ISLAMIC FIGHTING GROUP**

aka LIFG

**Description:** The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on December 17, 2004. In the early 1990s, LIFG emerged from the group of Libyans who had fought Soviet forces in Afghanistan and pledged to overthrow Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi. In the following years, some members maintained an anti-Qadhafi focus and targeted Libyan government interests. Others, such as Abu al-Faraj al-Libi, who was arrested in Pakistan in 2005, aligned with Usama bin Laden and are believed to be part of the al-Qa’ida (AQ) leadership structure. On November 3, 2007, AQ leader Ayman al-Zawahiri announced a formal merger between AQ and LIFG. However, on July 3, 2009, LIFG members in the UK released a statement formally disavowing any association with AQ. In September 2009, six imprisoned LIFG members in Libya issued a 417 page document that renounced violence. More than 100 LIFG members pledged to adhere to this revised doctrine and have been pardoned and released from prison in Libya since September 2009.

**Activities:** LIFG has been largely inactive operationally in Libya since the late 1990s when members fled predominately to Europe and the Middle East because of tightened Libyan security measures. In early 2011, in the wake of the Libyan revolution and the fall of Qadhafi, LIFG members returned to Libya and some created the Movement for Change (LIMC), and became one of many rebel groups united under the umbrella of the opposition leadership known as the Transitional National Council. Former LIFG and LIMC leader Abdel Hakim Bil-Hajj was appointed the Libyan Transitional
Council’s Tripoli military commander during the Libyan uprisings, and has denied any link between his group and AQ. There were no known terrorist attacks carried out by LIFG in 2013.

**Strength:** Unknown

**Location/Area of Operation:** Since the late 1990s, many members have fled to southwest Asia, and European countries, particularly the UK.

**Funding and External Aid:** Unknown

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**AL-MULATHAMUN BATTALION**

aka al-Mulathamun Brigade; al-Muwaqqi’un bil-Dima; Those Signed in Blood Battalion; Signatories in Blood; Those who Sign in Blood; Witnesses in Blood; Signed-in-Blood Battalion; Masked Men Brigade; Khaled Abu al-Abbas Brigade; al-Mulathamun Masked Ones Brigade; al-Murabitoun; The Sentinels

**Description:** The al-Mulathamun Battalion (AMB) was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on December 19, 2013. Originally part of al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), AMB became a separate organization in late 2012 after its leader, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, split from AQIM. In Belmokhtar’s first public statement after the split, he threatened to fight against Western interests and announced the creation of the sub-battalion, “Those Who Sign in Blood.” In August 2013, AMB and the Mali-based Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) announced that the two organizations would merge under the name “al-Murabitoun.”

**Activities:** AMB’s Those Who Sign in Blood sub-battalion claimed responsibility for the January 2013 attack against the Tiguentourine gas facility near In Amenas, in southeastern Algeria. Over 800 people were taken hostage during the four-day siege, resulting in the death of 39 civilians, including three U.S. citizens. Seven other Americans escaped the attack.

Before their merger, in May 2013, AMB cooperated with MUJAO in twin suicide bombings in northern Niger on a Nigerien military base in Agadez and a French uranium mine in Arlit. The coordinated attacks killed at least 20 people, including all of the attackers; 12 additional suspects were arrested after the attack.

Throughout the year, AMB members have also been involved in clashes with French forces stationed in northern Mali.

**Strength:** Membership levels of AMB are unknown; however, the newly formed al-Murabitoun terrorist group constitutes the greatest near-term threat to U.S. and international interests in the Sahel, because of its publicly stated intent to attack Westerners and proven ability to organize complex attacks.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Algeria, southwestern Libya, Mali, and Niger

**Funding and External Aid:** In addition to the support it may receive through its connections to other terrorist organizations in the region, AMB is likely funded through kidnapping ransoms and other criminal activities.
NATIONAL LIBERATION ARMY

aka ELN; Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional

Description: The National Liberation Army (ELN) was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on October 8, 1997. The ELN is a Colombian Marxist-Leninist group formed in 1964. It is primarily rural-based, although it also has several urban units. The ELN remains focused on attacking economic infrastructure, in particular oil and gas pipelines and electricity pylons, and extorting foreign and local companies.

Activities: The ELN engages in kidnappings, hijackings, bombings, drug trafficking, and extortion activities. The group also uses intimidation of judges, prosecutors, and witnesses; and has been involved in the murders of teachers and trade unionists. Historically, the ELN has been one of the most prolific users of anti-personnel mines in Colombia. In recent years, including 2013, the ELN launched joint attacks with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Colombia’s largest terrorist organization.

During 2013, the ELN increased its attacks on infrastructure, particularly on oil pipelines and equipment. In January, the ELN abducted a Canadian executive and five geologists employed at a Canadian gold mining company in a gold-rich region of northern Colombia. The ELN released the geologists a month later. The Canadian executive was not released until August, after seven months of captivity. In May, the ELN killed 10 Colombian army soldiers in Cucuta. In October, the ELN took responsibility for over 50 attacks against petroleum operational and security forces in Arauca, in eastern Colombia. The ELN spokesperson issued a press release threatening more attacks unless the Colombian government met the ELN’s list of conditions. The group also increased its use of small arms fire against the U.S.-supported Colombian police aerial eradication aircraft, in an effort to undermine the program’s ability to eradicate illicit coca cultivation used to finance the ELN and FARC.

Strength: Approximately 2,000 armed combatants and an unknown number of active supporters.

Location/Area of Operation: Mostly in the rural and mountainous areas of northern, northeastern, and southwestern Colombia, as well as the border regions with Venezuela.

Funding and External Aid: The ELN draws its funding from the illicit narcotics trade and from extortion of oil and gas companies. Additional funds are derived from kidnapping ransoms. There is no known external aid.

PALESTINE ISLAMIC JIHAD - SHAQAQI FACTION

aka PIJ; Palestine Islamic Jihad; PIJ-Shaqaqi Faction; PIJ-Shallah Faction; Islamic Jihad of Palestine; Islamic Jihad in Palestine; Abu Ghunaym Squad of the Hizballah Bayt al-Maqdis; Al-Quds Squads; Al-Quds Brigades; Saraya al-Quds; Al-Awdah Brigades

Description: Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on October 8, 1997. Formed by militant Palestinians in Gaza during the 1970s, PIJ is committed to both...
the destruction of Israel through attacks against Israeli military and civilian targets and the creation of an Islamic state in all of historic Palestine, including present day Israel.

Activities: PIJ terrorists have conducted numerous attacks, including large-scale suicide bombings against Israeli civilian and military targets. PIJ continued to plan and direct attacks against Israelis both inside Israel and in the West Bank and Gaza. Although U.S. citizens have died in PIJ attacks, the group has not directly targeted U.S. interests. PIJ attacks between 2008 and 2011 were primarily rocket attacks aimed at southern Israeli cities, and have also included attacking Israeli targets with explosive devices. The group is thought to be behind a large number of the record-setting 2,300 plus rockets launched from Gaza towards Israel in 2012. Additionally, in November 2012, PIJ operatives, working with Hamas, detonated a bomb on a bus in Tel Aviv, leaving 29 civilians wounded. In December 2013, four PIJ operatives were arrested by Israeli authorities for their role in a bus bombing near Tel Aviv, which was discovered in time for passengers to escape injury.

Strength: PIJ has fewer than 1,000 members.

Location/Area of Operation: Primarily Gaza with minimal operational presence in the West Bank and Israel. The group’s senior leadership resides in Syria. Other leadership elements reside in Lebanon and official representatives are scattered throughout the Middle East.

Funding and External Aid: Receives financial assistance and training primarily from Iran.

PALESTINE LIBERATION FRONT - ABU ABBAS FACTION

aka PLF; PLF-Abu Abbas; Palestine Liberation Front

Description: The Palestinian Liberation Front – Abu Abbas Faction (PLF) was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on October 8, 1997. In the late 1970s, the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) splintered from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), and then later split into pro-Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), pro-Syrian, and pro-Libyan factions. The pro-PLO faction was led by Muhammad Zaydan (a.k.a. Abu Abbas) and was based in Baghdad prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Activities: Abbas’s group was responsible for the 1985 attack on the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro and the murder of U.S. citizen Leon Klinghoffer. The PLF was suspected of supporting terrorism against Israel by other Palestinian groups into the 1990s. In April 2004, Abu Abbas died of natural causes while in U.S. custody in Iraq. The PLF took part in the 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections but did not win a seat. In 2008, as part of a prisoner exchange between Israel and Hizballah, Samir Kantar, a PLF member – and purportedly the longest serving Arab prisoner in Israeli custody – was released from an Israeli prison.

After approximately 16 years without claiming responsibility for an attack, the PLF claimed responsibility for two attacks against Israeli targets on March 14, 2008. One attack was against an Israeli military bus in Huwarah, Israel, and the other involved a PLF brigade firing at an Israeli settler south of the Hebron Mountain, seriously wounding him. On March 28, 2008, shortly after the attacks, a PLF Central Committee member reaffirmed PLF’s commitment to using “all possible means to restore” its previous glory and to adhering to its role in the Palestinian “struggle” and “resistance,” through its military. There were no known PLF attacks in 2013.
Strength: Estimates have placed membership between 50 and 500.

Location/Area of Operation: PLF leadership and membership are based in Lebanon and the West Bank and Gaza.

Funding and External Aid: Unknown

POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE

aka PFLP; Halhul Gang; Halhul Squad; Palestinian Popular Resistance Forces; PPRF; Red Eagle Gang; Red Eagle Group; Red Eagles; Martyr Abu-Ali Mustafa Battalion

Description: Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on October 8, 1997, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a Marxist-Leninist group founded by George Habash, broke away from the Arab Nationalist Movement in 1967. The group earned a reputation for large-scale international attacks in the 1960s and 1970s, including airline hijackings that killed at least 20 U.S. citizens. A leading faction within the PLO, the PFLP has long accepted the concept of a two-state solution but has opposed specific provisions of various peace initiatives.

Activities: The PFLP stepped up its operational activity during the Second Intifada. This was highlighted by at least two suicide bombings since 2003, multiple joint operations with other Palestinian terrorist groups, and the assassination of Israeli Tourism Minister Rehavam Ze’evi in 2001, to avenge Israel’s killing of the PFLP Secretary General earlier that year. In 2008 and 2009, the PFLP was involved in several rocket attacks launched primarily from Gaza against Israel, and claimed responsibility for numerous attacks on Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) in Gaza, including a December 2009 ambush of Israeli soldiers in central Gaza. The PLFP claimed responsibility for numerous mortar and rocket attacks fired from Gaza into Israel in 2010, as well as an attack on a group of Israeli citizens. In October 2011, the PFLP claimed responsibility for a rocket attack that killed one civilian in Ashqelon.

In August 2012, the Israeli Shin Bet security agency arrested a cell of PFLP militants on suspicion of engaging in terrorist activities. The group of militants, three of whom were previously imprisoned, was accused of plotting to carry out shooting attacks on IDF checkpoints in the West Bank, and planning to kidnap an Israeli IDF soldier. In December 2012, Israeli authorities arrested 10 more members of the PFLP and charged them with attempted kidnapping. The suspects were allegedly planning to kidnap an Israeli soldier to use as leverage in a prisoner swap for PFLP head Ahmad Sadaat, who is incarcerated by the Israelis for his role in a number of terrorist attacks.

There were no known PFLP attacks in 2013, although a spokesman for the Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades, the armed wing of the PFLP, commented that the group received training in Damascus from Hezbollah.

Strength: Unknown

Location/Area of Operation: Syria, Lebanon, Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza.

Funding and External Aid: Leadership received safe haven in Syria.
aka PFLP-GC

Description: The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on October 8, 1997. The PFLP-GC split from the PFLP in 1968, claiming it wanted to focus more on resistance and less on politics. Originally, the group was violently opposed to the Arafat-led Palestinian Liberation Organization. Ahmad Jibril, a former captain in the Syrian Army, has led the PFLP-GC since its founding. The PFLP-GC is closely tied to both Syria and Iran.

Activities: The PFLP-GC carried out dozens of attacks in Europe and the Middle East during the 1970s and 1980s. The organization was known for cross-border terrorist attacks into Israel using unusual means, such as hot-air balloons and motorized hang gliders. The group’s primary recent focus was supporting Hizballah’s attacks against Israel, training members of other Palestinian terrorist groups, and smuggling weapons. The PFLP-GC maintained an armed presence in several Palestinian refugee camps and at its own military bases in Lebanon and along the Lebanon-Syria border. In recent years, the PFLP-GC was implicated by Lebanese security officials in several rocket attacks against Israel. In May 2008, the PFLP-GC claimed responsibility for a rocket attack on a shopping center in Ashqelon that wounded at least 10 people. In 2009, the group was responsible for wounding two civilians in an armed attack in Nahariyya, Northern District, Israel. In 2011, the PFLP-GC targeted Israeli communities in a March 20 rocket attack by its Jihad Jibril Brigades in the city of Eshkolot, Southern District, Israel. The attack caused no injuries or damage.

In November 2012, PFLP-GC claimed responsibility for a bus bombing in Tel Aviv that injured 29 people, although four Palestine Islamic Jihad and Hamas operatives were later arrested for being behind the attack. In 2013, the PFLP-GC issued statements in support of the Syrian government, Hizballah, and Iran. The group was accused of participating, along with Syrian regime forces, in a battle at the al-Yarmouk refugee camp in July, using a rocket to target and kill civilians in the camp.

Strength: Several hundred.

Location/Area of Operation: Political leadership is headquartered in Damascus, with bases in southern Lebanon and a presence in the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon and Syria. The group also maintains a small presence in Gaza.

Funding and External Aid: Received safe haven and logistical and military support from Syria and financial support from Iran.

AL-QA’IDA

aka al-Qa’eda; Qa’idat al-Jihad (The Base for Jihad); formerly Qa’idat Ansar Allah (The Base of the Supporters of God); the Islamic Army; Islamic Salvation Foundation; The Base; The Group for the Preservation of the Holy Sites; The Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Places; the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders; the Usama Bin Laden Network; the Usama Bin Laden Organization; al-Jihad; the Jihad Group; Egyptian al-Jihad; Egyptian Islamic Jihad; New Jihad
Description: Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on October 8, 1999, al-Qa’ida (AQ) was established by Usama bin Laden in 1988. The group helped finance, recruit, transport, and train Sunni Islamist extremists for the Afghan resistance. AQ’s strategic objectives are to remove Western influence and presence from the Muslim world, topple “apostate” governments of Muslim countries, and establish a pan-Islamic caliphate governed by its own interpretation of Sharia law that ultimately would be at the center of a new international order. These goals remain essentially unchanged since the group’s 1996 public declaration of war against the United States. AQ leaders issued a statement in February 1998 under the banner of “The World Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and Crusaders,” saying it was the duty of all Muslims to kill U.S. citizens, civilian and military, and their allies everywhere. AQ merged with al-Jihad (Egyptian Islamic Jihad) in June 2001. Many AQ leaders have been killed in recent years, including bin Laden and then second-in-command Atiyah Abd al-Rahman, in May and August 2011, respectively. Al-Rahman’s replacement, Abu Yahya al-Libi, was killed in June 2012. Leader Ayman al-Zawahiri remains at-large.

Activities: AQ and its supporters conducted three bombings that targeted U.S. troops in Aden in December 1992, and claim to have shot down U.S. helicopters and killed U.S. servicemen in Somalia in 1993. AQ also carried out the August 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, killing up to 300 individuals and injuring more than 5,000. In October 2000, AQ conducted a suicide attack on the USS Cole in the port of Aden, Yemen, with an explosive-laden boat, killing 17 U.S. Navy sailors and injuring 39.

On September 11, 2001, 19 AQ members hijacked and crashed four U.S. commercial jets – two into the World Trade Center in New York City, one into the Pentagon near Washington, DC, and the last into a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania – leaving over 3,000 individuals dead or missing.

In November 2002, AQ carried out a suicide bombing of a hotel in Mombasa, Kenya that killed 15. In 2003 and 2004, Saudi-based AQ operatives and associated violent extremists launched more than a dozen attacks, killing at least 90 people, including 14 Americans in Saudi Arabia. Al-Zawahiri claimed responsibility on behalf of AQ for the July 7, 2005 attacks against the London public transportation system. AQ likely played a role in the unsuccessful 2006 plot to destroy several commercial aircraft flying from the UK to the United States using liquid explosives. AQ claimed responsibility for a 2008 suicide car bomb attack on the Danish embassy in Pakistan that killed six, as retaliation for a Danish newspaper re-publishing cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad and for Denmark’s involvement in Afghanistan.

In January 2009, Bryant Neal Vinas – a U.S. citizen who traveled to Pakistan and allegedly trained in explosives at AQ camps, was captured in Pakistan, extradited to the United States, and charged with providing material support to a terrorist organization and conspiracy to commit murder. Vinas later admitted his role in helping AQ plan an attack against the Long Island Rail Road in New York and confessed to having fired missiles at a U.S. base in Afghanistan. In September 2009, Najibullah Zazi, an Afghan immigrant and U.S. lawful permanent resident, was charged with conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction, to commit murder in a foreign country, and with providing material support to a terrorist organization as part of an AQ plot to attack the New York subway system. Zazi later admitted to contacts with AQ senior leadership, suggesting they had knowledge of his plans. In February 2010, Zazi pled guilty to charges in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York.
In a December 2011 video, AQ leader al-Zawahiri claimed AQ was behind the August kidnapping of American aid worker Warren Weinstein in Pakistan. Weinstein remained in AQ custody throughout 2013.

Strength: In South Asia, AQ’s core has been seriously degraded. The death or arrest of dozens of mid- and senior-level AQ operatives – including bin Laden in May 2011 – have disrupted communication, financial, facilitation nodes, and a number of terrorist plots. However, AQ serves as a focal point of “inspiration” for a worldwide network of affiliated groups – al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI), al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), al-Shabaab – and other violent Sunni Islamist extremist groups, including the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Islamic Jihad Union, Lashkar i Jhangvi, Harakat ul-Mujahadin, and Jemaah Islamiya. Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan and the Haqqani Network also have ties to AQ. Additionally, supporters and associates worldwide who are “inspired” by the group’s ideology may be operating without direction from AQ central leadership, and it is impossible to estimate their numbers.

Location/Area of Operation: AQ was based in Afghanistan until Coalition Forces removed the Afghan Taliban from power in late 2001. Since then, the group’s core leadership is believed to reside largely in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas. AQ affiliates – AQI, AQAP, AQIM, and al-Shabaab – operate in Iraq and Syria, Yemen, the Trans-Sahara, and Somalia, respectively.

Funding and External Aid: AQ primarily depends on donations from like-minded supporters, as well as from individuals who believe that their money is supporting a humanitarian cause. Some funds are diverted from Islamic charitable organizations.

AL-QA’IDA IN THE ARABIAN PENINSULA

aka al-Qa’ida in the South Arabian Peninsula; al-Qa’ida in Yemen; al-Qa’ida of Jihad Organization in the Arabian Peninsula; al-Qa’ida Organization in the Arabian Peninsula; Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Jazirat al-Arab; AQAP; AQY; Ansar al-Shari’a

Description: Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) on January 19, 2010. In January 2009, the leader of al-Qa’ida in Yemen (AQY), Nasir al-Wahishi, publicly announced that Yemeni and Saudi al-Qa’ida (AQ) operatives were working together under the banner of AQAP. This announcement signaled the rebirth of an AQ franchise that previously carried out attacks in Saudi Arabia. AQAP’s self-stated goals include establishing a caliphate in the Arabian Peninsula and the wider Middle East, as well as implementing Sharia law. On September 30, 2011, AQAP cleric and head of external operations Anwar al-Aulaqi, as well as Samir Khan, the publisher of AQAP’s online magazine, Inspire, were killed in Yemen.

Activities: AQAP has claimed responsibility for numerous terrorist acts against both internal and foreign targets since its inception in January 2009, including: a March 2009 suicide bombing against South Korean tourists in Yemen, the August 2009 attempt to assassinate Saudi Prince Muhammad bin Nayif, and the December 25, 2009 attempted attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253 from Amsterdam to Detroit, Michigan. AQAP was responsible for two unsuccessful attempted attacks against British targets during 2010. Also in October 2010, AQAP claimed responsibility for a foiled plot to send explosive-laden packages to the United States via cargo plane. The parcels were intercepted in the UK and in the United Arab Emirates. AQAP attacks in 2012 targeted the Yemeni military, including a February 2012 suicide car bombing that killed 26 Yemeni soldiers in Hadramawt Governorate.
The FTO designation for AQAP was amended on October 4, 2012, to include the alias Ansar al-Shari’a (AAS). AAS represents a rebranding effort designed to attract potential followers in areas under AQAP’s control. AQAP, operating under the alias AAS, carried out a May 2012 suicide bombing in Sanaa that killed 96 people. AQAP/AAS claimed responsibility for the attack, which targeted Yemeni soldiers rehearsing for a parade to celebrate Yemen’s National Day, and said the bombing was intended to target Yemeni military officials. Also in May 2012, press reported that AQAP allegedly plotted to detonate a bomb aboard a U.S.-bound airliner using an improvised explosive device. Although there was no imminent threat to U.S. jetliners, the device, which was acquired from another government, was similar to devices that AQAP had previously used in attempted terrorist attacks.

In 2013, AQAP continued targeting the Yemeni military. In September, AQAP carried out a coordinated attack on two military targets in southern Yemen that killed at least 21 Yemeni soldiers. Also in December, AQAP attacked the Yemeni Defense Ministry headquarters compound in Sanaa, Yemen. A suicide bomber driving a car full of explosives blew open an entrance into the compound before other operatives gunned down civilians, including doctors and nurses, in a hospital inside, killing 52 people.

**Strength:** AQAP is estimated to have approximately one thousand members.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Yemen

**Funding and External Aid:** AQAP’s funding primarily comes from robberies and kidnap for ransom operations, and to a lesser degree from donations from like-minded supporters.

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**AL-QA’IDA IN IRAQ**

aka al-Qa’ida Group of Jihad in Iraq; al-Qa’ida Group of Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers; al-Qa’ida in Mesopotamia; al-Qa’ida in the Land of the Two Rivers; al-Qa’ida of Jihad in Iraq; al-Qa’ida of Jihad Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers; al-Qa’ida of the Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers; al-Tawhid; Jam’at al-Tawhid Wa’al-Jihad; Tanzeem Qa’idat al Jihad/Bilad al Raafidaini; Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn; The Monotheism and Jihad Group; The Organization Base of Jihad/Country of the Two Rivers; The Organization Base of Jihad/Mesopotamia; The Organization of al-Jihad’s Base in Iraq; The Organization of al-Jihad’s Base in the Land of the Two Rivers; The Organization of al-Jihad’s Base of Operations in Iraq; The Organization of al-Jihad’s Base of Operations in the Land of the Two Rivers; The Organization of Jihad’s Base in the Country of the Two Rivers; al-Zarqawi Network; Islamic State of Iraq; al-Nusrah Front; Jabhat al-Nusra; Jabhet al-Nusrah; The Victory Front; al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant

**Description:** Al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on December 17, 2004. In the 1990s, Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian-born militant, organized a terrorist group called al-Tawhid wal-Jihad to oppose the presence of U.S. and Western military forces in the Islamic world and the West’s support for and the existence of Israel. In late 2004, he joined al-Qa’ida (AQ) and pledged allegiance to Usama bin Laden. After this, al-Tawhid wal-Jihad became known as AQI. Zarqawi traveled to Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom and led his group against U.S. and Coalition Forces until his death in June 2006. In October 2006, AQI publicly re-named itself the Islamic State of Iraq, although within the past year the group adopted the moniker “Islamic State of
Iraq and the Levant” as it expanded its operations to include the Syrian conflict. Since 2012, AQI has been led by Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim Ali al-Badri, aka Abu Du’a, who was designated by the Department of State under Executive Order 13224 on October 4, 2013.

**Activities:** Since its founding, AQI has conducted high profile attacks, including improvised explosive device (IED) attacks against U.S. military personnel and Iraqi infrastructure; videotaped beheadings of Americans Nicholas Berg (May 11, 2004), Jack Armstrong (September 22, 2004), and Jack Hensley (September 21, 2004); suicide bomber attacks against both military and civilian targets; and rocket attacks. AQI perpetrates the majority of suicide and mass casualty bombings in Iraq using foreign and Iraqi operatives.

AQI was active in Iraq in 2012 and 2013. In 2012, AQI was behind an attack in March on Shia pilgrims in the city of Karbala; the torching of cars near a police headquarters in Kirkuk; the targeting of security forces and government officials in Baghdad; a series of attacks in July that killed 325 people; and attacks in November that killed at least 166 Iraqi civilians, police, and soldiers.

AQI was responsible for the majority of the over 7,000 Iraqi civilians killed in 2013 – the highest number since 2008. In April 2013, AQI’s leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared the group was operating in Syria and changed its public name to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). In 2013, ISIL was heavily involved in the fighting in Syria, including against other militant opposition groups, and participated in a number of kidnapping incidents against civilians and reporters. For example, in September ISIL abducted Spanish journalist and photographer, and in December, ISIL reportedly kidnapped at least 120 Kurdish civilians in Aleppo province. According to a December 2013 UN report, ISIL is also running secret prisons in northern Syria, where civilians are tortured and killed for challenging ISIL’s rule.

In April 2013, AQI’s leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi declared the group was operating in Syria and changed its public name to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. AQI was responsible for the simultaneous attacks in July on prisons at al-Taji and Abu Ghraib that killed approximately 29 and freed hundreds of prisoners; a wave of bombings in Baghdad in August that killed approximately 52; and the September bombing of the Kurdistan Democratic Party’s Directorate of Security headquarters in Irbil that killed six. On October 6, in Nineveh Province, two Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs) were detonated in the al-Aiyathiya neighborhood. The first VBIED was detonated near an elementary school and the second one targeted an Iraqi Police checkpoint. The attacks killed up to 13 school children and one Iraqi police officer. Another 140 were wounded, mostly students from the school. On October 17, near the end of the Eid al-Adha holiday, a suicide bomber detonated a VBIED in a Shabak minority neighborhood in eastern Mosul, killing 15, including seven children, and wounding more than 50 others. On December 23, five people were killed in a suicide bombing after armed AQI militants stormed a television complex in the city of Tikrit. The violence unfolded when a car bomb exploded outside Salah ad Din TV and the local offices of al-Iraqiya State TV. Militants then stormed the offices of Salah ad Din TV and a suicide bomber killed the chief news editor, a copy editor, a producer, a presenter, and the archives manager. Five other employees were wounded.

**Strength:** In Iraq, membership is estimated between 1,000 and 2,000, making it the largest Sunni violent extremist group in Iraq. Membership in Syria is unknown, although it is likely that the group’s members make up a significant portion of the estimated 26,000 violent extremist fighters in Syria.
Location/Area of Operation: AQI’s operations are predominately Iraq- and Syria-based, but it has perpetrated attacks in Jordan. In Syria, al-Nusra Front has claimed attacks in several major city centers. AQI maintains a logistical network throughout the Middle East, North Africa, Iran, South Asia, and Europe.

Funding and External Aid: AQI receives most of its funding from a variety of businesses and criminal activities within Iraq and Syria.

AL-QA’IDA IN THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB

aka AQIM; Group for Call and Combat; GSPC; Le Groupe Salafiste Pour la Predication et le Combat; Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat

Description: The Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on March 27, 2002. After the GSPC officially joined with al-Qa’ida (AQ) in September 2006 and became known as al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Department of State amended the GSPC designation on February 20, 2008, to reflect the change. AQIM remains largely a regionally-focused terrorist group. It has adopted a more anti-Western rhetoric and ideology and has aspirations of overthrowing “apostate” African regimes and creating an Islamic Caliphate. Abdelmalek Droukdel, aka Abu Mus’ab Abd al-Wadoud, is the group’s leader.

Activities: After 2007, when AQIM bombed the UN headquarters building and an Algerian government building in Algiers killing 60 people, AQIM’s northern leadership was largely contained to the mountainous region of northeastern Algeria, and the group’s southern battalions focused mostly on its kidnapping for ransom efforts. In 2011 and 2012, however, AQIM took advantage of the deteriorating security situation across Tunisia, Libya, and Mali, to plan and conduct expanded operations. In 2011, AQIM claimed responsibility for multiple suicide bomb attacks against Algerian military and police targets, which killed at least 20 people and wounded almost 50 others. In 2012, militants with ties to AQIM were involved in the September 11 attack on U.S. facilities in Benghazi that killed J. Christopher Stevens, the U.S. Ambassador to Libya, and three staff members.

In 2013, AQIM attacked regional security forces, local government targets, and westerners in the Sahel. A September suicide bombing, targeting a Malian military camp in Timbuktu, detonated two vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices that killed two Malian civilians and injured six Malian soldiers.

In addition to conducting attacks, AQIM also continues to conduct kidnap for ransom operations. The targets are usually Western citizens from governments or third parties that have established a pattern of making concessions in the form of ransom payments for the release of individuals in custody. In November, AQIM claimed responsibility for the kidnapping and killing of two French journalists in Kidal, Mali.

Strength: AQIM has under a thousand fighters operating in Algeria with a smaller number in the Sahel. Since the French intervention in northern Mali, AQIM’s safe haven in northern Mali is less tenable for the organization and elements have moved to southwestern Libya. AQIM is attempting to reorganize in the wake of setbacks inflicted upon them by the combined French and African forces.
Location/Area of Operation: Northeastern Algeria (including but not limited to the Kabylie region), southwestern Libya, northern Mali, and Niger.

Funding and External Aid: AQIM members engage in kidnapping for ransom and criminal activities to finance their operations. AQIM supporters abroad – many residing in Western Europe – may also provide limited financial and logistical support.

REAL IRA

aka RIRA; Real Irish Republican Army; 32 County Sovereignty Committee; 32 County Sovereignty Movement; Irish Republican Prisoners Welfare Association; Real Oglaigh Na hEireann

Description: Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on May 16, 2001, the Real IRA (RIRA) was formed in 1997 as the clandestine armed wing of the 32 County Sovereignty Movement, a “political pressure group” dedicated to removing British forces from Northern Ireland and unifying Ireland. The RIRA has historically sought to disrupt the Northern Ireland peace process and did not participate in the September 2005 weapons decommissioning. In September 1997, the 32 County Sovereignty Movement opposed Sinn Fein’s adoption of the Mitchell principles of democracy and non-violence. Despite internal rifts and calls by some jailed members, including the group’s founder Michael “Mickey” McKevitt, for a ceasefire and disbandment, the RIRA has pledged additional violence and continued to conduct attacks.

Activities: Many RIRA members are former Provisional Irish Republican Army members who left the organization after that group renewed its ceasefire in 1997. These members brought a wealth of experience in terrorist tactics and bomb making to the RIRA. Targets have included civilians (most notoriously in the Omagh bombing in August 1998), British security forces, and police in Northern Ireland. The Independent Monitoring Commission, which was established to oversee the peace process, assessed that RIRA members were likely responsible for the majority of the shootings and assaults that occurred in Northern Ireland.

The group remained active in 2013. In February, two alleged RIRA members were arrested by Irish police while attempting to carry out the assassination of a local drug dealer. Police searched the van they were traveling in and found two loaded handguns and facemasks.

Strength: According to the Irish government, the RIRA has approximately 100 active members. The organization may receive limited support from IRA hardliners and Republican sympathizers who are dissatisfied with the IRA’s continuing ceasefire and with Sinn Fein’s involvement in the peace process.

Location/Area of Operation: Northern Ireland, Great Britain, and the Republic of Ireland.

Funding and External Aid: The RIRA is suspected of receiving funds from sympathizers in the United States and of attempting to buy weapons from U.S. gun dealers. The RIRA was also reported to have purchased sophisticated weapons from the Balkans and to have occasionally collaborated with the Continuity Irish Republican Army.

REVOLUTIONARY ARMED FORCES OF COLOMBIA

aka FARC; Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia
**Description:** Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on October 8, 1997, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) is Latin America’s oldest, largest, most violent, and best-equipped terrorist organization. The FARC began in the early 1960s as an outgrowth of the Liberal Party-based peasant self-defense leagues, but took on Marxist ideology. Today, it only nominally fights in support of Marxist goals, and is heavily involved in illicit narcotics production and trafficking. The FARC has been responsible for large numbers of kidnappings for ransom in Colombia, and in past years has allegedly held as many as 700 hostages. The FARC’s capacity has been degraded by a continuing Colombian military offensive targeting key FARC units and leaders that has, by most estimates, halved the FARC’s numbers – estimated at approximately 8,000 in 2013 – and succeeded in capturing or killing a number of FARC senior and mid-level commanders. The FARC and the Colombian government began peace talks in 2012, but fighting continued throughout 2013.

**Activities:** The FARC has carried out bombings, murders, mortar attacks, sniper attacks, kidnapping, extortion, and hijacking, as well as guerrilla and conventional military acts against Colombian political, military, civilian, and economic targets. The FARC has used landmines extensively. The FARC has well-documented ties to the full range of narcotics trafficking activities, including extortion, cultivation, and distribution.

Over the years, the FARC has perpetrated a large number of high profile terrorist acts, including the 1999 murder of three U.S. missionaries working in Colombia, and multiple kidnappings and assassinations of Colombian government officials and civilians. In July 2008, the Colombian military made a dramatic rescue of 15 high-value FARC hostages including U.S. Department of Defense contractors Marc Gonsalves, Keith Stansell, and Thomas Howe, who were held in captivity for more than five years, along with former Colombian presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt.

In 2013, the FARC focused on low-cost, high-impact asymmetric attacks, such as launching mortars at security forces, the use of explosive devices placed near roads, sniper attacks, roadblocks, and ambushes. In May, Colombian police neutralized a vehicle containing explosives parked by the FARC in Bogotá adjacent to a building which housed district attorneys. In June, the FARC kidnapped an American citizen in a rural area, releasing him in October. In July, the FARC killed 15 soldiers who were guarding an oil pipeline in Arauca. In October, repeated FARC attacks on energy infrastructure left the municipality of Tumaco, in Nariño, without water for almost a week and without power for more than three weeks. In October and November, the FARC repeatedly attacked the Cerrojon coal mine in La Guajira, which produces 40 percent of Colombia’s coal exports, killing one soldier and wounding two others. In December, the FARC attacked a police station in the town of Inza in the department of Cuaca, killing six members of the security forces, three civilians, and wounding more than 40 people. The group also increased its use of small arms fire against the U.S.-supported Colombian police aerial eradication aircraft in an effort to undermine the program’s ability to eradicated illicit coca cultivation used to finance the ELN and FARC.

**Strength:** Approximately 8,000 to 9,000 members, with several thousand additional supporters.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Primarily in Colombia. Activities including extortion, kidnapping, weapons sourcing, and logistical planning, took place in neighboring countries.

**Funding and External Aid:** The FARC often use Colombia’s border areas with Venezuela, Panama, and Ecuador for incursions into Colombia; and used Venezuelan and Ecuadorian territory for safe haven.
REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION 17 NOVEMBER

aka Epanastatiki Organosi 17 Noemvri; 17 November

Description: Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on October 8, 1997, the Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17N) is a radical leftist group established in 1975. Named for the student uprising in Greece in November 1973 that protested the ruling military junta, 17N is opposed to the Greek government, the United States, Turkey, and NATO. It seeks the end of the U.S. military presence in Greece, the removal of Turkish military forces from Cyprus, and the severing of Greece’s ties to NATO and the EU.

Activities: Initial attacks consisted of assassinations of senior U.S. officials and Greek public figures. Between 1975 and 1991, four American citizens were killed by 17N. The group began using bombings in the 1980s. 17N’s most recent attack was a bombing attempt in June 2002 at the port of Piraeus in Athens. After the attempted attack, Greek authorities arrested 19 17N members. The convictions of 13 of these members have been upheld by Greek courts. There were no known 17N attacks in 2013.

Strength: Unknown

Location/Area of Operation: Athens, Greece

Funding and External Aid: Unknown

REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE’S LIBERATION PARTY/FRONT(DHKP/C)

aka DHKP/C; Dev Sol; Dev Sol Armed Revolutionary Units; Dev Sol Silahlı Devrimci Birlikleri; Dev Sol SDB; Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi; Devrimci Sol; Revolutionary Left

Description: Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on October 8, 1997, the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C) was originally formed in 1978 as Devrimci Sol, or Dev Sol, a splinter faction of Dev Genc (Revolutionary Youth). It was renamed in 1994 after factional infighting. “Party” refers to the group’s political activities, while “Front” is a reference to the group’s militant operations. The group advocates a Marxist-Leninist ideology and opposes the United States, NATO, and Turkish establishments. Its goals are the establishment of a socialist state and the abolition of harsh high-security Turkish prisons.

Activities: Since the late 1980s, the group has primarily targeted current and retired Turkish security and military officials, although it has conducted attacks against foreign interests, including U.S. military and diplomatic personnel and facilities, since 1990. The DHKP/C assassinated two U.S. military contractors and wounded a U.S. Air Force officer in the 1990s, and bombed more than 20 U.S. and NATO military, diplomatic, commercial, and cultural facilities. DHKP/C added suicide bombings to its repertoire in 2001, with attacks against Turkish police in January and September that year. Since the end of 2001, DHKP/C has typically used improvised explosive devices against official Turkish targets and U.S. targets of opportunity.
Operations and arrests against the group have weakened its capabilities, although attacks continued. In late June 2004, the group was suspected of a bus bombing at Istanbul University, which killed four civilians and wounded 21. In July 2005, in Ankara, police intercepted and killed a DHKP/C suicide bomber who attempted to attack the Ministry of Justice. In June 2006, the group killed a police officer in Istanbul; four members of the group were arrested the next month for the attack.

The DHKP/C was dealt a major ideological blow when Dursun Karatas, leader of the group, died in August 2008. After the loss of their leader, the DHKP/C reorganized in 2009 and was reportedly competing with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party for influence in both Turkey and with the Turkish diaspora in Europe.

The group was responsible for a number of high profile attacks in 2012; including a suicide bombing of a police station in Istanbul. This tactic continued in 2013 when, on February 1, a DHKP/C operative exploded a suicide vest inside the employee entrance to the U.S. Embassy in Ankara. Besides himself, the explosion killed a Turkish guard and seriously wounded a visiting Turkish journalist. On March 19, using grenades and rocket launchers, three members of the group attacked the Ministry of Justice and the Ankara headquarters of the Turkish Justice and Development political party. The DHKP/C also claimed a similar attack on September 20, when two members of the DHKP/C fired rockets at the Turkish National Police (TNP) headquarters and a police guesthouse. One operative was arrested and the other killed after the attack. No other Turkish casualties were reported in either attack.

**Strength:** Probably several dozen members inside Turkey, with a support network throughout Europe.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Turkey, primarily in Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, and Adana. Many members live and plan operations in European countries.

**Funding and External Aid:** The DHKP/C finances its activities chiefly through donations and extortion, and raises funds primarily in Europe.

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**REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE**

**aka RS; Epanastatikos Aghonas; EA**

**Description:** Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on May 18, 2009, Revolutionary Struggle (RS) is a radical leftist group with Marxist ideology that has conducted attacks against both Greek and U.S. targets in Greece. RS emerged in 2003 following the arrests of members of the Greek leftist groups 17 November and Revolutionary People’s Struggle.

**Activities:** RS first gained notoriety when it claimed responsibility for the September 5, 2003 bombings at the Athens Courthouse during the trials of 17 November members. From 2004 to 2006, RS claimed responsibility for a number of improvised explosive device (IED) attacks, including a March 2004 attack outside of a Citibank office in Athens. RS claimed responsibility for the January 12, 2007 rocket propelled grenade (RPG) attack on the U.S. Embassy in Athens, which resulted in damage to the building. In 2009, RS increased the number and sophistication of its attacks on police, financial institutions, and other targets. RS successfully bombed a Citibank branch in Athens in March 2009, but failed in its vehicle-borne IED attack in February 2009 against the Citibank headquarters.
building in Athens. In September 2009, RS claimed responsibility for a car bomb attack on the Athens Stock Exchange, which caused widespread damage and injured a passerby.

In 2010, the Greek government made significant strides in curtailing RS’s terrorist activities. On April 10, Greek police arrested six suspected RS members, including purported leadership figure Nikos Maziotis. In addition to the arrests, the Greek raid resulted in the seizure of a RPG launcher, possibly the one used against the U.S. Embassy in Athens in the 2007 attack. On April 3, 2013, five members of RS were convicted by an Athens appeals court, three of them receiving maximum prison sentences. Nikos Maziotis and one other accused RS conspirator were convicted in absentia. Both remained at-large after disappearing in July 2012, after they were released following 18 months pre-trial confinement. Greek police alleged that Matziotis was involved in an armed robbery of a bank in Methana, Greece, after his fingerprint was found at the crime scene.

**Strength:** Unknown

**Location/Area of Operation:** Athens, Greece

**Funding and External Aid:** Unknown

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**AL-SHABAAB**

*a*ka* The Harakat Shabaab al-Mujahidin; al-Shabab; Shabaab; the Youth; Mujahidin al-Shabaab Movement; Mujahideen Youth Movement; Mujahidin Youth Movement

**Description:** Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on March 18, 2008, al-Shabaab was the militant wing of the former Somali Islamic Courts Council that took over parts of southern Somalia in the second half of 2006. Since the end of 2006, al-Shabaab and associated militias have undertaken a violent insurgency using guerrilla warfare and terrorist tactics against the series of transitional Somali governments. In 2013, the group continued to fight to discredit and destabilize the Federal Government of Somalia.

In February 2012, al-Qa’ida (AQ) announced that al-Shabaab leader Ahmed Abdi aw-Mohamed had pledged obedience to Ayman al-Zawahiri and AQ. Al-Shabaab also has ties to al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

In some camps, AQ-affiliated foreign fighters often led the training and indoctrination of the al-Shabaab recruits, while rank and file militia fighters from multiple clan and sub-clan factions that are aligned with al-Shabaab are predominantly interested in indigenous issues. The group’s foreign fighters were generally intent on conducting attacks outside Somalia, but since 2011 have seen their operational capacity reduced due to the military efforts of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Somali forces against al-Shabaab; and clashes, some violent, within the group. Although al-Shabaab’s capability to wage conventional attacks was greatly diminished in 2012 with the loss of key territory – including the port city of Kismayo – the organization was able to maintain its hold on large sections of rural areas in south-central Somalia in 2013, and conduct new asymmetric attacks, including several large-scale attacks in Mogadishu.

**Activities:** Al-Shabaab has used intimidation and violence to exploit divisions in Somalia and undermine the Federal Government of Somalia, forcibly recruit new fighters, and kill activists working
to bring about peace through political dialogue and reconciliation. The group has claimed responsibility for several high profile bombings and shootings throughout Somalia targeting AMISOM troops and Somali officials. It has been responsible for the assassination of numerous civil society figures, government officials, and journalists. Al-Shabaab fighters and those who have also claimed allegiance to the group have conducted violent attacks and have assassinated international aid workers and members of NGOs.

In its first attack outside of Somalia, al-Shabaab was responsible for the July 11, 2010 suicide bombings in Kampala, Uganda during the World Cup, which killed nearly 76 people, including one American citizen. In 2013, al-Shabaab again expanded its activities outside of Somalia and staged a significant attack in September against the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya. The siege resulted in the death of at least 65 civilians – including foreign nationals from 13 countries outside of Kenya – six soldiers and police officers, and hundreds of injured. Throughout the year, al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for at least three additional attacks in Kenya that killed a total of 10 people.

Al-Shabaab’s attacks within Somalia continued apace in 2013, and resulted in the deaths of hundreds of civilians. Among al-Shabaab’s most notable 2013 attacks in Somalia was a suicide attack in April against Mogadishu’s Supreme Court complex, followed by a secondary attack on first responders, which killed approximately 30 people; a June attack against the UN Common Compound in Mogadishu, which killed 22 people, including three international staff; a July attack against the Turkish Embassy Housing complex in Mogadishu; a September attack in Kismayo targeting the convoy of Interim Juba Administration President Ahmed Madobe, which resulted in the death of at least 10 civilians; and a November attack on a police station in Beledweyne, which killed 21 Somali police and one Djiboutian AMISOM soldier.

There were frequent reports of al-Shabaab carrying out amputation of limbs for minor thievery offenses, stoning for suspected adultery, killing converts to religions other than Islam, and forced conscription of child soldiers. Al-Shabaab leaders frequently ordered beheaded corpses to be left in streets as a lesson to local communities. Al-Shabaab forces also reportedly engaged in widespread rape and violence against women.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Al-Shabaab lost full control of significant areas of territory in 2011 and 2012. In September 2012, al-Shabaab lost control of Kismayo, a vital port it used to obtain supplies and funding through taxes. Despite these losses, in 2013 al-Shabaab continued to control large sections of rural areas in the middle and lower Juba regions, as well as Bay, Shabelle, and Bakol regions, and augmented its presence in northern Somalia along the Golis Mountains and within Puntland’s larger urban areas.

**Strength:** Al-Shabaab is estimated to have several thousand members, including a small cadre of foreign fighters, a force that is augmented by allied clan militias in some areas.

**Funding and External Aid:** In 2012, al-Shabaab saw its income diminish due to the loss of the strategic port cities of Kismayo and Merka; furthermore, it lost a general ability to freely levy taxes in certain urban areas in southern and central Somalia. Al-Shabaab continued to have sufficient financing available in 2013, however, including funds from illegal charcoal production and exports from smaller ports along the coast, including Baraaawe; taxation of local populations and areas under al-Shabaab control; and foreign donations.
Because al-Shabaab is a multi-clan entity, it reportedly receives donations from individuals in the Somali diaspora; however, the donations are not always intended to support terrorism, but also to support family members.

**SHINING PATH**

aka SL; Sendero Luminoso; Ejercito Guerrillero Popular (People’s Guerrilla Army); EGP; Ejercito Popular de Liberacion (People’s Liberation Army); EPL; Partido Comunista del Peru (Communist Party of Peru); PCP; Partido Comunista del Peru en el Sendero Luminoso de Jose Carlos Mariategui (Communist Party of Peru on the Shining Path of Jose Carlos Mariategui); Socorro Popular del Peru (People’s Aid of Peru); SPP

**Description:** The Shining Path (SL) was designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on October 8, 1997. Former university professor Abimael Guzman formed SL in Peru in the late 1960s, and his teachings created the foundation of SL’s militant Maoist doctrine. SL’s stated goal is to destroy existing Peruvian institutions and replace them with a communist peasant revolutionary regime. It also opposes any influence by foreign governments. In the 1980s, SL was one of the most ruthless terrorist groups in the Western Hemisphere. The Peruvian government made dramatic gains against SL during the 1990s, capturing Guzman in 1992, and killing a large number of militants. The SL faction that previously operated in the Upper Huallaga Valley (UHV) collapsed following the capture of its leader, Florindo Flores Hala, better known as Comrade Artemio, in February 2012. Separately, the much larger and stronger rival SL faction in the Apurimac, Ene, and Montaro River Valley (VRAEM) expanded in 2012; but on August 10, 2013, an operation conducted by a joint military-police task force in the VRAEM resulted in the deaths of two of the SL’s top leaders, Alejandro Borda Casafranca (also known as Comrade Alipio) and Martin Quispe Palomino (also known as Comrade Jose). Alipio was the SL’s number two overall leader and widely recognized as its most capable and dangerous field commander. Gabriel occupied a spot on SL’s Central Committee and was the brother of the faction’s supreme leader, Victor Quispe Palomino (also known as Comrade Jose).

The demise of Alipio and Gabriel was the biggest blow sustained by the SL since the capture of SL’s then-national leader, Comrade Feliciano, in 1999.

**Activities:** SL carried out nearly 50 terrorist acts in 2013, a noticeable decline from the 87 acts it committed in 2012. In March, SL rebels allegedly destroyed three telephone towers in the province of Tayacaja, Huancavelica. The following month, SL blew up a fourth tower in an isolated coca-growing region in southeastern Peru. In April, a Peruvian soldier was killed and another injured when SL rebels ambushed their military post in the VRAEM. In November, SL snipers killed a soldier at the Union Mantaro counterterrorism base in Junin’s Satipo province in the VRAEM. In July, SL members torched 20 vehicles belonging to a construction company that had refused to pay protection money, destroying over US $5 million in equipment.

**Strength:** The VRAEM faction is believed to have between 300 and 500 members.

**Location/Area of Operation:** Peru, with most activity in rural areas, specifically the Huallaga Valley and the Apurimac, Ene, and Montaro River Valley of central Peru.

**Funding and External Aid:** SL is primarily funded by the illicit narcotics trade.
Description: Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on September 1, 2010, Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is a Pakistan-based terrorist organization formed in 2007 in opposition to Pakistani military efforts in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Previously disparate militant tribes agreed to cooperate and eventually coalesced into TTP under the leadership of now deceased leader Baitullah Mehsud. TTP was led by Hakimullah Mehsud from August 2009 until his death in November 2013. Following Hakimullah Mehsud’s death, TTP has been led by Mullah Fazlullah, formerly the leader of TTP’s chapter in the Swat area of Pakistan.

TTP’s goals include waging a terrorist campaign against the Pakistani military and state, as well as against NATO forces in Afghanistan, and overthrowing the Government of Pakistan. TTP uses the tribal belt along the Afghan-Pakistani border to train and deploy its operatives, and the group has ties to al-Qa’ida (AQ). TTP draws ideological guidance from AQ, while AQ relies on TTP for safe haven in the Pashtun areas along the Afghan-Pakistani border. This arrangement gives TTP access to both AQ’s global terrorist network and the operational experience of its members.

Activities: TTP has carried out and claimed responsibility for numerous terrorist acts against Pakistani and U.S. interests, including a December 2009 suicide attack on a U.S. military base in Khowst, Afghanistan, which killed seven U.S. citizens; and an April 2010 suicide bombing against the U.S. Consulate in Peshawar, Pakistan, which killed six Pakistani citizens. TTP is suspected of involvement in the 2007 assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. TTP directed and facilitated the failed attempt by Faisal Shahzad to detonate an explosive device in New York City’s Times Square on May 1, 2010.

Throughout 2011 and 2012, TTP carried out attacks against the Government of Pakistan and civilian targets, as well as against U.S. targets in Pakistan. Attacks in 2011 targeted civilians, Pakistani government and military targets, and an American consulate convoy in a series of suicide bombings and attacks that killed nearly 90 people. In 2012, TTP killed over 12 people in a March attack against a mosque; 24 in a suicide bombing against a police checkpoint in May; five soldiers in an August attack against a Pakistani Air Force base; and 22 Shia Muslims after stopping their busses in August.

TTP continued targeting both civilian and government targets in 2013. In May, two TTP bombings targeted political parties in Karachi, Pakistan, killing three and wounding 34 others in the run-up to elections. Also in May, TTP claimed responsibility for a bombing that killed 11 members of a newly-created elite police force and wounded 20 others outside Quetta, Pakistan. In September, a TTP suicide bomber struck outside a church in Peshawar, Pakistan, killing 81 and wounding approximately 140. In October, a Pakistani government minister and nine other civilians were killed when a suicide bomber, believed to be a member of a local branch of the TTP in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province, struck outside the official’s home during the Eid al-Adha holiday. In November, twin bomb attacks targeting a Shia neighborhood of Karachi, Pakistan killed six people and wounded 35 others.

Strength: Several thousand.

Location/Area of Operation: Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Pakistan
**Funding and External Aid:** TTP is believed to raise most of its funds through kidnapping ransoms and operations that target Afghanistan-bound military transport trucks for robbery. Such operations allow TTP to steal military equipment, which it sells in Afghan and Pakistani markets.

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**UNITED SELF-DEFENSE FORCES OF COLOMBIA**

*aka* AUC; Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia

**Description:** Designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization on September 10, 2001, the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) – commonly referred to as the paramilitaries – was formed in April 1997. AUC was designed to serve as an umbrella group for loosely affiliated, illegal paramilitary groups retaliating against leftist guerrillas. As the Colombian government increasingly confronted terrorist organizations, including the AUC, the group’s activities decreased. In the years after the AUC declared a ceasefire in December 2002, the AUC’s centralized military structure was dismantled and all of the top paramilitary chiefs have since stepped down.

**Activities:** The AUC carried out political killings and kidnappings of human rights workers, journalists, teachers, and trade unionists, among others. The AUC did not carry out any terrorist attacks in 2013. It has been demobilized for seven years.

**Strength:** Unknown

**Location/Area of Operation:** None

**Funding and External Aid:** None
Chapter 7
Legislative Requirements and Key Terms

Country Reports on Terrorism 2013 is submitted in compliance with Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f (the “Act”), which requires the Department of State to provide Congress a full and complete annual report on terrorism for those countries and groups meeting the criteria of the Act. Statutory excerpts relating to the terms used in this report and a discussion of the interpretation and application of those terms in this report are included below.

Excerpts and Summary of Key Statutory Terms:

Section 2656f(a) of Title 22 of the United States Code states as follows:
(a) … The Secretary of State shall transmit to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, by April 30 of each year, a full and complete report providing-

(1) (A) detailed assessments with respect to each foreign country-

(i) in which acts of international terrorism occurred which were, in the opinion of the Secretary, of major significance;

(ii) about which the Congress was notified during the preceding five years pursuant to Section 2405(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979; and

(iii) which the Secretary determines should be the subject of such report; and

(B) detailed assessments with respect to each foreign country whose territory is being used as a sanctuary for terrorist organizations;

(2) all relevant information about the activities during the preceding year of any terrorist group, and any umbrella group under which such terrorist group falls, known to be responsible for the kidnapping or death of an American citizen during the preceding five years, any terrorist group known to have obtained or developed, or to have attempted to obtain or develop, weapons of mass destruction, any terrorist group known to be financed by countries about which Congress was notified during the preceding year pursuant to section 2405(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, any group designated by the Secretary as a foreign terrorist organization under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189), and any other known international terrorist group which the Secretary determines should be the subject of such report;

(3) with respect to each foreign country from which the United States Government has sought cooperation during the previous five years in the investigation or prosecution of an act of international terrorism against United States citizens or interests, information on-

(A) the extent to which the government of the foreign country is cooperating with the United States Government in apprehending, convicting, and punishing the individual or individuals responsible for the act; and
(B) the extent to which the government of the foreign country is cooperating in preventing further acts of terrorism against United States citizens in the foreign country; and

(4) with respect to each foreign country from which the United States Government has sought cooperation during the previous five years in the prevention of an act of international terrorism against such citizens or interests, the information described in paragraph (3)(B).

Section 2656f(d) of Title 22 of the United States Code defines certain key terms used in Section 2656f(a) as follows:

(1) the term “international terrorism” means terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country;

(2) the term “terrorism” means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents; and

(3) the term “terrorist group” means any group practicing, or which has significant subgroups which practice, international terrorism.

Interpretation and Application of Key Terms. For purposes of this report, the terms “international terrorism,” “terrorism,” and “terrorist group” have the definitions assigned to them in 22 USC 2656f(d) (see above). The term “non-combatant,” which is referred to but not defined in 22 USC 2656f(d)(2), is interpreted to mean, in addition to civilians, military personnel (whether or not armed or on duty) who are not deployed in a war zone or a war-like setting.

It should be noted that 22 USC 2656f(d) is one of many U.S. statutes and international legal instruments that concern terrorism and acts of violence, many of which use definitions for terrorism and related terms that are different from those used in this report. The interpretation and application of defined and related terms concerning terrorism in this report is therefore specific to the statutory and other requirements of the report, and is not intended to express the views of the U.S. government on how these terms should be interpreted or applied for any other purpose. Accordingly, there is not necessarily any correlation between the interpretation of terms such as “non-combatant” for purposes of this report and the meanings ascribed to similar terms pursuant to the law of war (which encapsulates the obligations of states and individuals with respect to their activities in situations of armed conflict).

Statistical Information. Pursuant to 22 USC § 2656f(b), this report should contain “to the extent practicable, complete statistical information on the number of individuals, including United States citizens and dual nationals, killed, injured, or kidnapped by each terrorist group during the preceding calendar year.” This is satisfied through the inclusion of a statistical annex to the report that sets out statistical information provided by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), a Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Center of Excellence, based at the University of Maryland. The statistical annex includes a discussion of the methodology employed by START in compiling the relevant data. This report does not contain statistical information specifically concerning combatants. The focus of the terrorism report, as is clear from the definition of terrorism, is on violence against noncombatant targets. Further, it would not be practicable to provide such statistics, as the government does not maintain - and would have great difficulty maintaining - statistics that distinguish between incidents against combatants by terrorist groups and by others, including insurgents, in Iraq and Afghanistan.
**Contextual Reporting.** Adverse mention in this report of individual members of any political, social, ethnic, religious, or national population is not meant to imply that all members of that population are terrorists. Indeed, terrorists rarely represent anything other than a tiny fraction of such larger populations. It is terrorist groups--and their actions--that are the focus of this report.

Furthermore, terrorist acts are part of a larger phenomenon of violence inspired by a cause, and at times the line between the two can become difficult to draw. This report includes some discretionary information in an effort to relate terrorist events to the larger context in which they occur, and to give a feel for the conflicts that spawn violence.

Thus, this report will discuss terrorist acts as well as other violent incidents that are not necessarily “international terrorism” and therefore are not subject to the statutory reporting requirement.