Country Information and Guidance

Pakistan: Fear of the Taliban and other militant groups
Preface

This document provides guidance to Home Office decision makers on handling claims made by nationals/residents of Pakistan as well as country of origin information (COI) about Pakistan. This includes whether claims are likely to justify the granting of asylum, humanitarian protection or discretionary leave and whether - in the event of a claim being refused - it is likely to be certifiable as 'clearly unfounded' under s94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

Decision makers must consider claims on an individual basis, taking into account the case specific facts and all relevant evidence, including: the guidance contained with this document; the available COI; any applicable caselaw; and the Home Office casework guidance in relation to relevant policies.

Within this instruction, links to specific guidance are those on the Home Office’s internal system. Public versions of these documents are available at https://www.gov.uk/immigration-operational-guidance/asylum-policy.

Country Information

The COI within this document has been compiled from a wide range of external information sources (usually) published in English. Consideration has been given to the relevance, reliability, accuracy, objectivity, currency, transparency and traceability of the information and wherever possible attempts have been made to corroborate the information used across independent sources, to ensure accuracy. All sources cited have been referenced in footnotes. It has been researched and presented with reference to the Common EU [European Union] Guidelines for Processing Country of Origin Information (COI), dated April 2008, and the European Asylum Support Office’s research guidelines, Country ofOrigin Information report methodology, dated July 2012.

Feedback

Our goal is to continuously improve the guidance and information we provide. Therefore, if you would like to comment on this document, please email: CPI@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk.

Independent Advisory Group on Country Information

The Independent Advisory Group on Country Information (IAGCI) was set up in March 2009 by the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration to make recommendations to him about the content of the Home Office’s COI material. The IAGCI welcomes feedback on the Home Office’s COI material. Information about the IAGCI’s work and a list of the COI documents which have been reviewed by the IAGCI can be found on the Independent Chief Inspector’s website at http://icinspector.independent.gov.uk/country-information-reviews/

It is not the function of the IAGCI to endorse any Home Office material, procedures or policy.

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### Context

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- **KU (Pakistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] EWCA Civ 107** (17 January 2012)
1. Guidance

Updated 8 May 2014

1.1. Basis of claim

1.1.1 Fear of the Taliban and other militant groups in Pakistan.

1.2. Specific issues

- Is the person at real risk from the Taliban, or other militant groups, in Pakistan?
- Is there effective protection?
- Is the person able to internally relocate within Pakistan to escape that risk?

1.3. Consideration of issues:

Is the person at real risk from the Taliban (or other militant groups) in Pakistan?

1.3.1 Simply living in an area occupied, either wholly or partly, by the Pakistani Taliban or other militant groups does not give rise to a protection need. In general the risks from the Pakistani Taliban or other militant groups will depend on the particular profile of the person, the nature of the threat and how far it would extend.

1.3.2 Primary targets include political and/or tribal leaders, security forces and minority religious groups. However, ordinary Pakistanis, including students and those perceived to be opposing the Taliban and other militant groups or not following sharia law, have also been subjected to violence by these groups. The risk will be highest in areas where those armed anti-government groups are operating or have control. Those main areas are:

- Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (formerly known as North West Frontier Province),
- the semi-autonomous Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) that have a strong Taliban presence; and
- Baluchistan, where separatists are seeking greater political autonomy and control over local mineral resources.

The Pakistani Taliban and other militant groups do however have reach outside of those areas.

1.3.3 Where decision makers conclude that the person is at real risk of the Pakistani Taliban or other militant groups then they need to identify the reason, but in general it is likely to be for reasons of (imputed) political opinion.
Is there effective protection?

1.3.4 The reported case of AW (26 January 2011) found that there is ‘systemic sufficiency of state protection’ in Pakistan. Decision makers must, however, assess whether effective protection is available in relation to the particular circumstances and profile of the person. Any past persecution and past lack of effective protection may indicate that effective protection would not be available in the future.

1.3.5 Decision makers must take particular account of past persecution (if any) and consider whether there are good reasons that such persecution (and past lack of sufficient protection) is likely to be repeated.

Is the person able to internally relocate within Pakistan to escape that risk?

1.3.6 A person who has a localised threat on the basis that they are perceived to be collaborating with the Pakistani authorities, or to be acting against the Taliban or other militant groups, may be able to relocate to an area where that localised threat does not exist.

1.3.7 Decision makers must refer to the more general guidance on ‘Internal Relocation’ and make a case-specific assessment of the particular profile of the person, the nature of the threat and how far it would extend and whether it would be unduly harsh to expect them to relocate.

Policy summary

While simply living in an area occupied by the Pakistani Taliban or other militant groups does not give rise to a protection need, a person may face a real risk of mistreatment/persecution/harm on the basis of their individual circumstances. This will depend on the particular profile of the person, the nature of the threat and how far it would extend.

Risks might be heightened for political and/or tribal leaders, members of the security forces, or religious minorities, but ordinary Pakistanis, including students and those perceived to be opposing the Taliban have also been targeted. The risk will be highest in areas where those armed anti-government groups are operating or have control.

For a person who can demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution because of their imputed political opinion and who is unable to acquire a sufficiency of protection or relocate internally, a grant of asylum will be appropriate.
Where a claim falls to be refused, it is unlikely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
2. Information

2.1. Overview

2.1.1 Pakistan confronted a number of security challenges in the face of continuing sectarian violence and terrorism. Since 2007, terrorism has risen in Pakistan, as militant groups targeted political leaders, the security forces, tribal leaders, minority religious groups, and schools. Suicide bombings have become common place across the country. In its Pakistan Security Report 2013, the Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) recorded 1,717 terrorist attacks in 2013.

2.1.2 The South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) recorded a total of 5,379 fatalities in 2013, over 3,000 of whom were civilians, resulting from acts of terrorism. A total of 5,665 deaths from militant, sectarian and politically motivated violence in 2013 were recorded by the Center for Research and Security Studies (CRSS). The PIPS recorded fewer fatalities, stating 2,451 lives were lost in 2013 from terrorist attacks.

2.1.3 The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) stated in its Armed Conflict Database, January to July 2013, that:

‘Military operations by the Pakistani army and clashes with militant groups, militant-planted bombs/IEDs [improvised explosive device] and mortar attacks, as well as suicide bombings, caused most fatalities in FATA [Federally Administered Tribal Areas]. US drone attacks in tribal areas continued to target suspected militants, but in some instances also caused civilian casualties. In the most devastating attack so far in 2013, over 60 people, the majority of whom were Shia civilians, were killed and at least 200 others were injured by two huge car bomb explosions at a congested market in Parachinar, Kurram Agency. At least 1,276 people were killed as a result of violence in FATA. The figure shows an increase of over 23% in the number of fatalities compared to the figures from the same period last year [2012].’

2.1.4 The CRSS gave security updates in its Pakistan Conflict Tracker Report, updated on a monthly basis, as well as providing a Timeline of Violent Incidents, obtained from media reports, from March 2012 to November 2013.

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7 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) Armeed Conflict Database (subscription only) https://acd.iiss.org/, Pakistan (KPK and Northwest), Military and Security, January to July 2013, date accessed 14 February 2014
2.1.5 Attacks by the Pakistani Taliban and other militants against police and security forces in some parts of Pakistan; a lack of resources limited the governments’ ability to implement effective control and enforce the law. This was principally so in the FATA and in rural areas of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan.  

See Pakistan: Country Information and Guidance: Actors of protection and Internal relocation

2.2. Non state armed groups

2.2.1 Terrorist groups in Pakistan fall into five main categories:

- Sectarian: Religiously motivated groups such as the Sunni Sipah-e-Sahaba and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and the Shia Tehrik-e-Jafria that are engaged in violence within Pakistan;
- Anti-Indian: Groups focused on the Kashmir dispute that operate with the alleged support of the Pakistani military and the intelligence agency Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Muhammad, and Harakat ul-Mujahadeen;
- Afghan Taliban: The original Taliban movement and especially its Kandahari leadership centred around Mullah Mohammad Omar, believed to be based in Quetta;
- Al-Qaeda and its affiliates: The global jihadist organization founded by Osama bin Laden and led by Ayman al-Zawahiri;
- The Pakistani Taliban: A coalition of extremist groups in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), led by Mullah Fazlullah.

The Pakistani Taliban

2.2.2 In December 2007, about 13 different militant groups joined together under the umbrella of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), also known as the Pakistani Taliban. The group is predominantly Pashtun and represents membership from all seven agencies of the Federally Administered Tribal Area’s (FATA). The TTP has declared jihad against the Pakistani state, seeks to control territory, enforces sharia law, and fights NATO forces in Afghanistan. Its current leader is Mullah Fazlullah. There are no reliable estimates on the size of the Pakistani Taliban.

2.2.3 In its Issues Paper 'The Pakistani Taliban', dated January 2013, the Australian Government Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) reported, amongst other things, on the TTP’s organisation, its areas of influence, aims and connections.

2.2.4 Peace talks between the Pakistani government and the Taliban began on 6 February 2014. However, negotiations collapsed after Taliban insurgents admitted executing 23
soldiers, who had been held in captivity since 2010 in Mohmand agency, in revenge for military operations in the tribal areas. Following this, an air offensive against the Taliban in North Waziristan, by Pakistan’s armed forces, reportedly killed 120 militants and resulted in the displacement of thousands of people. Air raids were suspended on 2 March 2014 after the TTP announced a ceasefire. A statement by the Interior Ministry added that it would “reserve the right to respond to violent attacks”, although hopes of further peace talks resumed. Some analysts stated that the Pakistani Taliban was not a unified organisation and some factions were believed to be against any peace talks.

2.2.5 On 15 June 2014, the Pakistan armed forces began a major air offensive on suspected militant hideouts in North Warziristan in response to an attack on Karachi airport the previous week, which killed 38 people. The airstrikes were said to have killed 360 militants, and was followed by a ground offensive on 30 June 2014. Critical Threats, a project of the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (AEI), provided almost daily updates, dated from June 2009 to present, of the security situation in Pakistan, in its Pakistan Security Brief. The fighting has forced tens of thousands of civilians to flee the area.

See Internally displaced persons

2.2.6 The Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) indicated that ‘Around 1300 militants and members of radical organisations were arrested in 2012, including around 850 with suspected links to the Taliban. Despite this relatively high number of arrests, successful prosecutions of those responsible for politically-motivated or sectarian attacks are rare, usually because of a lack of evidence or poor investigative methods.’

See Pakistan: Country Information and Guidance: Actors of protection and Internal relocation

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22 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Fresh fighting in Pakistan's North Waziristan displaces more than 75,000, 3 July 2014, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/53b509754.html, date accessed 16 July 2014
2.3. Sectarian violence

2.3.1 Since 2010 there has been a sharp rise in sectarian violence, mostly concentrated in Quetta, Kurram, parts of Karachi and Gilgit Baltistan. The SATP recorded 525 deaths and 914 injuries resulting from 128 incidents of sectarian violence in 2013. The PIPS reported 208 sectarian-related incidents in 2013, which included sectarian clashes, militant attacks and targeted assassinations of people from all sects, causing 658 deaths and 1,195 injuries. The majority of attacks were against the Shia community.

2.3.2 Anti-Shia and militant groups pose the greatest threat to Shias in Pakistan, including the banned Sunni Deobandi terrorist group, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan – SSP (now know as Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamat – ASWJ), and the TTP. The LeJ and SSP come under the banner of the ‘Punjabi Taliban’ network; the LeJ is a breakaway faction of the SSP. The group aims to rid Pakistan of ‘non-believers’, including Shias, Christians, Hindus and Jews.

See Pakistan: Country Information and Guidance Religious freedom

2.3.3 The LeJ claimed responsibility for attacks in Balochistan’s capital, Quetta, that killed at least 200 Shias, mostly from the Hazara community, in January and February 2013. The website Hazara.net, a non-profit site focused on the human rights of Hazaras and the promotion of Hazara culture, provided news and reports on human rights issues concerning members of the Hazara community.

2.3.4 Other militant groups operating in Balochistan include the Baloch Liberation Front (BLF), the Baloch Republican Army (BRA), the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), the Baloch United Liberation Front (BULF) and the Lashkar-e-Balochistan. As part of their campaign,
Baloch militant groups regularly target Government security forces and Punjabi settlers in Balochistan.  

See Pakistan: Country Information and Guidance : Internal relocation

2.4. Politically motivated violence

2.4.1 Politically motivated violence is most prevalent in Karachi between members of the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), the Awami National Party (ANP), the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), and Sindhi nationalist parties. The TTP has also claimed responsibility for attacks against MQM and ANP supporters.

2.4.2 In 2013, Karachi witnessed nearly 3,000 killings in political and sectarian violence and targeted killings, a 20 per cent increase compared to 2012. The Daily Times recorded that ‘As many as 139 workers of MQM, 37 of ANP, 26 of PPP, 17 of Sunni Tehreek, five of MQM-Haqani, six workers of Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz and one of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf were killed.’

2.4.3 A report published by the US Institute of Peace in February 2014, stated:

‘The political turf battles in Karachi have resulted in target killings, kidnappings for ransom, and extortions; they are exacerbated further by a large presence of underworld gangs, some of which are allegedly supported by political parties, and those operating as independent criminals. Kidnappings and killings are so common that people are afraid to leave their homes and send their children to schools. Afghan and Pakistani Taliban groups are also consolidating in Karachi, engaging in criminal activity, recruiting and fundraising, and, in the case of the TTP, organizing attacks on security personnel and political or sectarian rivals.’

See Pakistan: Country Information and Guidance : Internal relocation

Internally displaced persons (IDPs)

2.4.4 By the end of July 2013, over one million internally displaced individuals (170,000 families) were estimated to be affected by the ongoing security operations in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). Three camps for IDPs, accommodated more than 80,000 individuals in 2013. Most displaced

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persons lived in rented accommodation, or with relatives. Security operations and intertribal and sectarian violence hindered access to people in need of assistance in north-west Pakistan, Balochistan, Karachi and parts of inner Sindh and southern Punjab. The Pakistan government estimated that 470,000 people were internally displaced owing to the recent offensive in North Waziristan. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs provided a map, as of 12 July 2014, showing the number of individuals and families affected by internal displacement in North Waziristan.

See The Pakistani Taliban (para 2.2.5)

See Pakistan: Country Information and Guidance: Actors of protection and Internal relocation

42 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Fresh fighting in Pakistan's North Waziristan displaces more than 75,000, 3 July 2014, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/53b509754.html, date accessed 16 July 2014
Annex A: Map of Pakistan

2.4.5 Map of Pakistan, dated 2010, extracted from the University of Texas at Austin, Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection. 44

Annex B: Militant groups

In its Issues Paper ‘Pakistan Militant Groups’, dated January 2013, the Australian Government Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) provided background information on some of Pakistan’s main militant groups, as well as the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani Network based in Pakistan.45

The South Asia Terrorism Portal provided a list of Terrorist and Extremist Groups of Pakistan. 46

The Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) listed sectarian and militant groups in Pakistan, in its report Evolution of Militant Groups in Pakistan, dated April to June 2011. 47

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Annex C: Caselaw


The Upper Tribunal of the Immigration and Asylum Chamber found that:

1. At paragraph 55 of Auld LJ’s summary in Bagdanavicius [2005] EWCA Civ.1605 it is made clear that the test set out in Horvath [2001] 1 AC 489 was intended to deal with the ability of a state to afford protection to the generality of its citizens.

2. Notwithstanding systemic sufficiency of state protection, a claimant may still have a well founded fear of persecution if authorities know or ought to know of circumstances particular to his/her case giving rise to the fear, but are unlikely to provide the additional protection the particular circumstances reasonably require (per Auld LJ at paragraph 55(vi)).

3. In considering whether an appellant’s particular circumstances give rise to a need for additional protection, particular account must be taken of past persecution (if any) so as to ensure the question posed is whether there are good reasons to consider that such persecution (and past lack of sufficient protection) will not be repeated.

KU (Pakistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] EWCA Civ 107 (17 January 2012)

In this determination the Court of Appeal concluded that it would be difficult for the appellant to maintain a very low profile in the part of Pakistan where there were not high densities of migrants from the FATA, and that he might be an object of official suspicion in such areas which might in turn bring him to the attention of the Taliban network, and alternatively that if he did relocate in an area where there were others from South Waziristan, then it was even more likely that sooner or later he would be identified as someone who was wanted by the Taliban.