IRAQ

JOINT REPORT OF THE DANISH IMMIGRATION SERVICE / UK BORDER AGENCY FACT FINDING MISSION TO EBIL AND DAIUK, KURDISTAN REGION OF IRAQ (KRI), CONDUCTED 11 TO 22 NOVEMBER 2011

UPDATE (2) ON ENTRY PROCEDURES AT KURDISTAN REGIONAL GOVERNMENT CHECKPOINTS (KRG); RESIDENCE PROCEDURES IN KURDISTAN REGION OF IRAQ (KRI) AND ARRIVAL PROCEDURES AT EBIL AND SULEIMANIYAH AIRPORTS (FOR IRAQIS TRAVELLING FROM NON-KRI AREAS OF IRAQ)

March 2012
Overview of Danish fact finding reports published in 2011 and 2012

Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh and Thailand, Report from Danish Immigration Service’s Fact finding mission to Bangladesh and Thailand, 4 to 17 February 2011
2011: 1

Update on Entry Procedures at Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Checkpoints and Residence in Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), Report from Danish Immigration Service’s fact-finding mission to Erbil, Suleimaniyah and Dohuk, KRI, 7 to 24 March 2011
2011: 2

Iranian Kurdish Refugees in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), Report from Danish Immigration Service’s fact-finding mission to Erbil, Suleimaniyah and Dohuk, KRI, 7 to 24 March 2011
2011: 3

Joint Report of the Danish Immigration Service/UK Border Agency Fact Finding Mission to Erbil and Dahuk, Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), conducted 11 to 22 November 2011
2012: 1
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Introduction

BACKGROUND TO THE MISSION AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The fact finding mission was conducted jointly by the UK Border Agency (UKBA), Country of Origin Information Service and the Danish Immigration Service (DIS), Documentation and Research Division.

Funding for the mission was provided by the European Country of Origin Sponsorship Project (ECS) with the intention to undertake an evaluation on behalf of the ECS of the 2010 EU common guidelines on (Joint) Fact Finding Missions: a practical tool to assist member states in organizing (joint) Fact Finding Missions (EU Guidelines). However neither the ECS nor any other EU member states, except the UK and Denmark, were involved in the undertaking of this fact finding mission or production of this report. An evaluation report will be provided to the ECS by the UK and Denmark in early 2012.

The UK-Danish delegation comprised of Jens Weise Olesen, Chief Advisor, DIS and Stewart Wheatley, Senior Country Researcher, UKBA. Jens Weise Olesen was the appointed Head of Delegation.

The delegation would like to thank the British Consulate, Erbil, for providing logistical support and assistance to the mission. Special thanks also to the ECS Secretariat for coordinating and arranging funding for the mission.

PURPOSE OF THE MISSION

The purpose of the mission was to gather Country of Origin Information (COI) on matters related to freedom of movement for Iraqis travelling between southern and central Iraq (S/C Iraq), the ‘disputed areas’¹ and the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). Specifically the mission sought to examine entry procedures at Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) external checkpoints and at airports in the KRI (for Iraqis travelling from non-KRI areas of Iraq). Additionally the mission sought to gather COI on residence procedures in KRI and documentation issues related to internal movement.

The Terms of Reference for the mission can be found at Annex B.

This report should be considered together with the DIS’ previous FFM reports on this subject, namely Entry Procedures and Residence in Kurdistan Reion of Iraq (KRI) for Iraqi nationals, Report from Danish Immigration Service’s fact finding mission to Erbil, Sulemaniyah, Dahuk, KRI and Amman, Jordan, 6 – 20 January and 25 to 15 March 2010, published April 2010, and Update of Entry Procedures at Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Checkpoints and Residence in Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), Report from the Danish Immigration Service’s fact-finding mission to Erbil, Suleimaniyah and Dohuk, KRI, 7-24 March 2011, published June 2011.

METHODOLOGY

The mission took place between 11 and 22 November and comprised a series of interviews with interlocutors in Erbil and Dahuk, KRI, against the Terms of Reference. Additionally the mission

¹ “The disputed areas are parts of the Iraqi governorates bordering KRI. These areas comprise parts of Tameem (Kirkuk, Hawiga), Ninewa (Mosul), Salah Al-Din and Diyala (Khanaqin, Ba’qubah) governorates” (DIS, Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) for Iraqi nationals, Report from Danish Immigration Service’s fact finding mission to Erbil, Sulemaniyah, Dahuk, KRI and Amman, Jordan, 6 – 20 January and 25 to 15 March 2010, published April 2010, p.3, footnote 2).
involved a visit by the delegation to two of the KRG external checkpoints near Erbil. The delegation was based in Erbil throughout the mission. The delegation consulted non-governmental organisations, international non-governmental organisations, international organisations and government officials. A full list of interlocutors interviewed is at Annex A.

The list of interlocutors interviewed was identified by the delegation based on the expertise, remit and role of each interlocutor relevant to the Terms of Reference of the mission. The delegation in particular relied on contacts established by the DIS’ Documentation and Research Division which had previously undertaken similar missions in 2010 and 2011 (for further details see Purpose of the mission). The delegation considers that to the best of its knowledge, the list of interlocutors consulted represent the main sources relevant to the Terms of Reference of this mission. However as with any fact finding mission factors, including time constraints and availability of sources, means that the list of interlocutors consulted should not be considered exhaustive.

All interlocutors who were interviewed were informed that the delegation’s fact finding report would be a public document. Interview notes (including notes of the delegation’s own observations where applicable) were approved with interlocutors before publication, as is standard practice of the UKBA and the DIS and as recognised in the EU Guidelines. Three of the interlocutors asked to be referred to anonymously.

The delegation had planned to interview representatives of UNHCR Erbil. However, UNHCR Erbil officers declined to be interviewed unless they were able to have sight of the final report of the mission, including contributions from other interlocutors, before its publication, in addition to approving the notes of their own interview. The delegation did not agree to this exceptional request, giving reference to paragraph 5.3.3 (Methodology) of the EU Guidelines which states that: “If the Principle of Approved Notes has been applied … it is not advisable to let interviewees review the [FFM] report.”

Written contributions were later provided by UNHCR London in December 2011, although these included very limited relevant material to the specific Terms of Reference of the mission and deferred any findings on protection issues, to the Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Iraqi Asylum-Seekers, published in April 2009. For further details refer to the section UNHCR and Protection and Assistance Centre (PAC) surveys 2010/2011. See also: Annex D – Written contributions provided by UNHCR London, December 2011.

The fact finding mission report contains no policy or analysis, and consists, unless otherwise indicated via a footnote, of the approved interview notes. Where it has been necessary to explain or clarify a point made by an interlocutor, supplementary explanations have been provided in square brackets […]. Additionally, there are hyperlinks to other sections in the report where there is related information. These links have been added to assist the reader and are in italics.

This report is available on the DIS’s website www.newtodenmark.dk (refer to publications) and UKBA’s website http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rdscountry_reports.html. Any comments regarding this report are very welcome and should be submitted to UKBA and/or the DIS at the address/email addresses on the front page of this report.

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2 Observations made by the delegation were included in interview notes from the visit to the KRG external checkpoints in Erbil (interview with Major Sharhang Tawfiq Kareem et al.) and interview notes from the visit to the Ministry of Interior, Citizenship police (interview with Brigadier General Abdulrahman Ismael Aziz).

In undertaking this fact finding mission, the delegation made reference to the 2010 EU common guidelines on (Joint) Fact Finding Missions: a practical tool to assist member states in organizing (joint) Fact Finding Missions.
Findings of the fact finding mission (FFM)

1. Number and profile of Iraqis entering Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) from South and Central (S/C) Iraq and the ‘disputed areas’

Overview

1.01 PAO [Public Aid Organisation, the UNHCR Protection Assistance Centre partner in Erbil] reported that persons continued to enter the KRI. Iraqi nationals entered KRI for various reasons, i.e. tourism, work and residency, as well as those who had been internally displaced by violence. Additionally there were non-Iraqi persons entering KRI, such as refugees, asylum seekers and economic migrants, for example from Thailand.

1.02 According to the Director of an international NGO in Erbil, all Iraqis irrespective of ethnic origin or religious orientation are free to enter KRI through the KRG external checkpoints by presenting their Iraqi Civil ID Card. [The same source added] ... there were thousands of persons of Arab origin living in KRI, many living with their families, whilst others had come to KRI for work, including individuals.

1.03 Harikar NGO [the UNHCR Protection Assistance Centre partner in Dahuk] explained that during the Eid Adha celebrations more than 100,000 Iraqis come to KRI for holiday and the vast majority of these apply for a Tourism Card when entering KRI. Approximately 90% of all Iraqi tourists coming to KRI during Eid Adha are Arabs, of either Sunni or Shia origin.

See also: Issuance of entry passes and Annex E – Sample of Entry Passes

1.04 When asked about the typical profile of Iraqis entering KRI, the Director of an international NGO in Erbil explained that the majority of Iraqis come to KRI for business, work and tourism, especially during the hot summer months when Iraqis come to KRI due to its cooler climate. The number of so-called tourists coming to KRI during this period was high. There are also a large number of highly qualified professionals from S/C Iraq in KRI, who had come to KRI for work, many of these already had some kind of link to the area (such as business or family), thus found it comparatively easy to settle in KRI.

1.05 [During a visit by the delegation to the Mosul-Erbil checkpoint] Major Sharhang Tawfiq Kareem [who had overall operational responsibility for the checkpoint] explained that persons came to KRI for various reasons, including to visit family, tourism, for business purposes and to come to KRI to travel to countries outside Iraq, because of the international airports in Erbil and Sulaimaniyah. There were approximately 67,000 persons who crossed through the Mosul-Erbil checkpoint each month. During certain periods of time many people from S/C Iraq and the disputed areas come to KRI for tourism, especially during summer time, when it is cooler in KRI than in S/C Iraq. Major Sharhang Tawfiq Kareem added that visitors would also come to KRI during Islamic festivals.

1.06 [During the same visit] the delegation met with an officer who was responsible for issuing entry cards, i.e. Work Card; Tourism Card and Information Card/Residency Card for those seeking to reside in KRI. According to the officer, on average at least 1,000 persons would pass through the Mosul-Erbil checkpoint per day. However the number of persons entering through the checkpoint could vary greatly, depending on the time of the year. For example during the recent Eid festivities around 16,000 persons had crossed
through the Mosul-Erbil checkpoint in just one week and in 2010 the officer recalled that in one day over 10,000 persons had entered.

1.07 [Whilst during a visit by the delegation to the Kirkuk-Erbil checkpoint] According to 2nd Lt Wishyar Ahmad Jameel between 3,000 and 4,000 people passed through the checkpoint each day, although the officer went on to explain that this figure would depend on the day and season, for example the holiday season would see more persons seeking to enter KRI. The Kirkuk checkpoint was strategically significant because it was the entry checkpoint used by persons coming from Baghdad.

See also – Update on entry procedures at the KRG external checkpoints and specifically Visit to the checkpoints by the delegation

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) moving to KRI

1.08 [Shokr Yaseen Yaseen, Director of Bureau, Bureau of Migration & Displacement (BMD), Ministry of Interior, Erbil explained] at present approximately 40,000 IDP families from S/C Iraq and the disputed areas reside in all three governorates of KRI, i.e. Erbil, Suleimaniyah and Dohuk governorates.

See also: Annex H – Statistics on number of IDPs registered by the BMD

1.09 Shokhr Yaseen Yaseen explained that the economic impact from the influx of IDPs to KRI had been significant and the price of land, houses and other property have increased enormously in KRI. This development indicates that many IDPs are wealthy and have chosen to move to invest their capital in KRI where security is good and economic growth is high, rather than remaining in S/C Iraq and the disputed areas which is much more unpredictable.

1.10 Shokhr Yaseen Yaseen explained that the IDPs who make investments in KRI can be classified into three categories: wealthy business-people; well educated people including professionals and former politicians from Baghdad buying property in KRI [...] Other IDPs comprise middle class people, skilled workers and labourers looking for unskilled jobs in KRI. In addition there are large numbers of IDPs from religious minority communities in S/C Iraq and the disputed areas. These are mostly Christians and Saebaens who were displaced following sectarian violence.

1.11 Muhammed Saleem Mizuree [Head of Private Bureau of General Security (Asayish)] stated persons displaced by violence, i.e. IDPs, continued to enter KRI, and reported for example that recently there had been 80 persons from central Iraq and Mosul who had come to KRI for protection.

1.12 [International Organisation of Migration] IOM Erbil noted that one of the main difficulties facing IDPs in KRG was increasing prices in rental accommodation, with prices in Erbil for example increasing some 200 to 300 percent between 2006 and today. According to IOM Erbil, an average rental property in the city cost around $1000USD per month. IOM Erbil observed that one of the causes of this rise in accommodation prices was the influx of people entering KRG from the rest of Iraq. Other reasons are the economic development in KRG.

1.13 According to the IOM publication entitled Review of Displacement and Return in Iraq, February 2011, there were 6,736 IDP families assessed by IOM in Erbil; 5,332 families in
Suleimaniyah and 5,508 IDP families assessed in Dahuk\(^4\). IOM Erbil additionally provided the delegation in an email sent on 12 January 2012 with data on the profile of IDPs in the three KRI governorates indicating place of origin and ethnicity. According to these undated figures, within Erbil governorate 29.47 per cent of the IDP population were of Arab ethnicity, 44.42 per cent Kurdish and 18.10 per cent Chaldean; in Suleimaniyah 70.80 per cent were of Arab ethnicity and 27.93 per cent Kurdish; whilst in Dahuk only 3.90 per cent were Arab, 48.67 per cent Kurdish, 29.19 per cent Chaldean and 14.51 per cent Assyrian. The data provided by IOM Erbil on the governorate of origin of IDPs in the three KRI governorates reported that within Erbil, 48.74 per cent of IDPs originated from Baghdad and 45.83 per cent from Ninewa; in Suleimaniyah 41.49 per cent were from Baghdad, whilst 47.58 per cent came from Diyala, whilst in Dahuk, 46.82 per cent originated from Baghdad and 52.23 per cent from Ninewa.\(^5\)

See also: Annex I – Data on ethnicity and place of origin of IDPs in KRI registered with IOM Erbil

Registration and monitoring of IDPs in KRI

1.14 Regarding registration of IDPs in KRI, Shokhr Yaseen Yaseen stated that previously the Government of Iraq GoI laid down instructions to register IDPs in Iraq including KRI, however the GoI had since suspended the registration of any new IDPs. Shokhr Yaseen Yaseen explained that this significantly restricted the ability of the BMD to provide any meaningful assistance to IDPs, although there were some emergency cases, such as Christian IDPs forced to flee violence in S/C Iraq and the disputed areas, who were still provided assistance by the BMD in KRI.

1.15 When asked what the current number of IDPs registered with the BMD was in KRI, Shokhr Yaseen Yaseen stated that the number of IDPs who are registered in KRI is about 40,000 families after [i.e. since] 2008.

1.16 When asked what date the GoI decided to suspend registration of IDPs and whether the BMD continued to register IDPs, Shokhr Yaseen Yaseen stated that the GoI suspended registration of IDPs on 15/6/2010 and after this date the BMD stopped the registration of IDPs except those Christians who came to KRI after the incident of Sayda Najat Church [31 October 2010].

1.17 IOM Erbil reported that they had no role in registering IDPs formally with the Ministry of Displacement and Migration MoDM or BMD. According to IOM Erbil MoDM is [were] trying to close the IDP file.

1.18 IOM Erbil explained that in order to develop programmes and services to support internally displaced persons (IDPs) in KRG [i.e. KRI], IOM Erbil used 55 monitoring field teams to collect data from local IDP communities. IOM Erbil clarified that monitoring field teams would recognise IDPs irrespective of whether they had formally registered as an ‘IDP’ with the Ministry of Displacement and Migration (MoDM) or Bureau of Migration and Displacement (BMD) in KRG [i.e KRI]. This approach, to recognise all internally displaced persons in Iraq was a central component to the work of IOM and allowed them to effectively support such communities and understand their needs.


\(^5\) Statistical data provided to the delegation by email from IOM Erbil on 12 January 2012.
1.19 According to IOM Erbil, IDPs are identified by their field monitoring teams through local community links, such as the local Mukhtar, who had been displaced and when; where they were residing in KRG [i.e. KRI] and what support they required. IOM Erbil also clarified that the assessment is carried out by field monitors in different areas of displacement. IOM Erbil considered these monitoring arrangements to be accurate in allowing their organisation to understand the profile and changing needs of internally displaced persons entering KRG.

1.20 When asked how Harikar NGO monitors the situation of IDPs in KRI, Harikar NGO explained that as a Protection and Assistance Centre for UNHCR, it has two mobile teams each of which undertake four field visits per month. Through this monitoring Harikar NGO is continuously being updated on any problems that IDPs may be facing.

1.21 PAO [...] clarified that their organisation had daily contact with the Bureau of Migration & Displacement (BMD) in Erbil, which is part of the Ministry of Interior and hold responsibility for dealing with IDPs, Returnees and practically with Refugees and Asylum seekers in KRI.

Difficulties in supporting IDP communities in KRI

1.22 When asked what the current number of IDPs registered with the BMD was in KRI, Shokhr Yaseen Yaseen stated that the number of IDPs who are registered in KRI is about 40,000 families after [i.e. since] 2008. According to the IOM publication, *Review of Displacement and Return in Iraq*, February 2011, there were 6,736 IDP families assessed by IOM in Erbil; 5,332 families in Suleimaniyah and 5,508 IDP families assessed in Dahuk, giving a total figure of 17,576 IDP families assessed by IOM for the three KRI governorates.

1.23 IOM Erbil explained that the IDP community in KRG [i.e. KRI] was very different, compared for example to those countries who have IDP populations living in large displacement camps and in very poor humanitarian conditions. In contrast in KRG [i.e. KRI], IDPs were predominantly middle class, reasonably well educated and with some financial savings to fall back on. Consequently one of the main issues for the majority of IDPs in KRG [i.e. KRI] was to provide accommodation and income generation that met the expectations of IDPs. In many respects this made the demands of the IDP community in KRG [i.e. KRI] more complex and challenging, because it was difficult to identify and develop sustainable programmes, particularly given the financial limitations IOM Erbil were operating under. One consequence of this was that the IDP population in KRG [i.e. KRI] would also seek support or assistance through other channels, such as family or business contacts. This was particularly an issue for the Christian community displaced to KRG [i.e. KRI], who would instead often seek to leave Iraq and travel to Europe or the US for resettlement.

1.24 IOM clarified that whenever they were unable to provide services directly to an IDP, they would refer a person to specialist organisations who may be able to assist them (referral system).

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6 A Mukhtar is a neighbourhood representative who is responsible for keeping records of the residents in his local district(s). DIS, *Update of Entry Procedures at Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Checkpoints and Residence in Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI),* Report from the Danish Immigration Service’s fact-finding mission to Erbil, Suleimaniyah and Dohuk, KRI, 7-24 March 2011, published June 2011, p. 31, footnote 24.

1.25 Shokhr Yaseen Yaseen [Director of Bureau, Bureau of Migration & Displacement (BMD), Ministry of Interior, Erbil] explained that the BMD in Erbil cooperates with the GoI, Ministry of Migration & Displacement in Baghdad regarding IDPs in KRI. [...] KRG has on several occasions requested the GoI provide economic assistance in order to support the needs of the IDP population in KRI. However, the GoI has not transferred adequate funds to KRG despite the readiness of the BMD to assist IDPs. Although the GoI, Ministry of Displacement & Migration has opened an office in Erbil, the budget for this office is not financed by GoI. KRG covers all administrative costs. Initially there was some level of cooperation between KRG and GoI regarding assistance to IDPs. This is no longer so, and the GoI does not provide any economic support for IDPs in KRI.

1.26 Shokhr Yaseen Yaseen stated that his main concern was that the GoI does not take on its responsibilities regarding the IDPs, and emphasized that the GoI is not always ready to cooperate and address the needs of the IDPs in KRI. KRG has signed an official memorandum of understanding with GoI to share the burden and responsibility for IDPs in KRI, but this agreement does not function satisfactorily in practice. All KRG institutions take on their responsibilities but these institutions are not being supported by the GoI. The majority of IDPs seeking assistance from BMD in Erbil are being supported by KRG and not by the GoI.  

See also: Occurrence of arbitrary practices at the KRG external checkpoints, including risk of arrest and denial of entry, Differential treatment for persons internally displaced by violence (i.e. IDPs) and Update on security procedures to reside in KRI, Differential treatment for persons internally displaced by violence (i.e. IDPs)

8 The delegation were informed by the BMD by email on 9 January 2012: “Additionally, BMD has just been signed an MoU between Ministry [sic] of Migration and displacement of GoI and BMD in 4/1/2012 and we are certain that this strengthens the position of the GoI and KRG to better assist the displaced people in the country and we hope this MoU will form a good base for future cooperation between us and solve all the problems.”
2. UPDATE ON SECURITY PROCEDURES AT THE KRG EXTERNAL CHECKPOINTS

The following section should be considered together with information under the sections entitled Variations in security procedures at the KRG external checkpoints and Occurrence of arbitrary practices at the KRG external checkpoints, including risk of arrest and denial of entry

Effectiveness of security procedures

2.01 Muhammed Saleem Mizuree, Head of Private Bureau of General Security (Asayish), explained that although KRI was part of Iraq, it differed from the rest of the country because it was able to maintain effective levels of security. This was due to the entry procedures in KRI which were necessary to protect KRI from terrorist attack.

2.02 An international organization (A) explained that no major security incidents had occurred in KRI since 2007. This was partly due to the security precautions at the KRG external checkpoints which bordered the disputed areas and S/C Iraq. The international organization (A) however explained that terrorist insurgents continued to represent a risk to the security of KRI. For example in November 2010 a major incident was averted when Asayish at the Kirkuk-Erbil checkpoint stopped a vehicle carrying explosives.

2.03 PAO [Public Aid Organisation, the UNHCR Protection Assistance Centre partner in Erbil] reported that between April and July 2011 there had been a series of attempts made by terrorist groups to enter KRI and that in one notable incident, six cars were found by security staff, i.e. Asayish at the checkpoint with explosives. In this regard PAO stated that security measures adopted by the Asayish at the KRG checkpoints were effective in protecting the people of KRI.

Security procedures

2.04 Muhammed Saleem Mizuree [Head of Private Bureau of General Security (Asayish)] explained that it was important the KRG authorities knew who was entering KRI and therefore the Asayish had good levels of cooperation with Iraqi intelligence, sharing details of persons who they were required to arrest and stop. In addition the Asayish maintained their own classified information on terrorist groups, such as Ansar-e-Islam or Al Qaeda in Iraq. Muhammed Saleem Mizuree explained there were two [security] lists in operation, the ‘black list’, which included persons who had an arrest warrant outstanding for their detention and a second list, i.e. the ‘stop list’.

2.05 Muhammed Saleem Mizuree stated that the entry procedures at the KRG external checkpoints would take around 10 or 20 minutes in total and that these were relatively straightforward as the control system was computerised.

2.06 An international organization (B) informed the delegation that no major changes in entry policies and procedures at KRG checkpoint has occurred since the Danish Immigration Service last consulted the organization in March 2011.9

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9 For further information see the DIS’ report entitled, Update of Entry Procedures at Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Checkpoints and Residence in Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), Report from the Danish Immigration Service’s fact-finding mission to Erbil, Suleimaniyah and Dohuk, KRI, 7-24 March 2011, published June 2011.
2.07 [During a visit by the delegation to the Mosul-Erbil checkpoint] Major Sharhang Tawfiq Kareem [who had overall operational responsibility for the checkpoint] stated that around five or six persons were arrested per month at the Mosul-Erbil checkpoint, whilst across all the KRG external checkpoints, in all three governorates, around 30 persons per month were arrested. [...] Major Sharhang Tawfiq Kareem explained that if a positive match with someone on the ‘black list’ was confirmed and verified, the person would be immediately arrested. However if there was only a suspicion that someone may be involved in criminal or terrorist activities they would only be denied entry. When asked under what circumstances someone would be denied entry, Major Sharhang Tawfiq Kareem explained that there was a list of persons deemed suspicious by the authorities, this was known as the ‘stop list’. Major Sharhang Tawfiq Kareem went onto explain that his officers had no authority to deny entry arbitrarily and only obeyed and applied regulations.

2.08 During the tour of the registration centre [at the Kirkuk-Erbil checkpoint] the delegation were also introduced to 2nd Lt Muhammad Taha Ibrahim who allowed the delegation to observe how his staff would check persons against the ‘black list’ and ‘stop list’. The delegation observed that this screening process involved individuals queuing up to be checked by a security officer in one of the booths in the registration centre. In order to obtain clearance, a person would provide their identification documents, e.g.: Civil ID Card, to the security officer and the officer would then search that person’s name against a computer database, which included all names on the ‘stop list’ and ‘black list’. According to 2nd Lt Muhammad Taha Ibrahim there were around 2,000 names on the ‘black list’, whilst the ‘stop list’ had fewer names recorded, although the precise number were not stated. The database also included known aliases and civil identification numbers. In the eventuality someone’s name matched to a person on the security database, the case would be passed to the Officer in Charge and the Officer in Charge would check the person’s details against a hardcopy file which included further details about the case flagged up on the computer database.

See also: *Visit to the checkpoints by the delegation and Occurrence of arbitrary practices at the KRG external checkpoints, including risk of arrest and denial of entry*

*For further background on the ‘black list’ and ‘stop list’, refer to the subsections below. For further information on how these security procedures are applied in KRI also see: Arrival procedures at airports in KRI and The new Information Card issued under Law 95/1978 – issuance procedures in KRI*

The ‘black list’

2.09 General Kaiwan [General Manager, Kurdistan Checkpoints, Kurdistan Regional Security Protection Agency, Security General Directorate, KRG Ministry of Interior, Erbil] explained that at each of the KRG external checkpoints, there were information units who dealt with all terrorist related issues. This unit maintained a list of persons wanted by KRG or GoI authorities. This list was known as the ‘black list’ and if a person seeking to enter through a checkpoint was identified as on this ‘black list’, they would be arrested immediately. The names on the ‘black list’ were compiled from information received from courts, criminal police, federal police or Interpol, based for example on fax reports, emails or court letters received. General Kaiwan clarified that only persons who had committed a
serious criminal offence would be added to the ‘black list’. The ‘black list’ comprised persons who were drug smugglers, traffickers, terrorists and other significant criminals.\(^{10}\)

### The ‘stop list’

2.10 General Kaiwan reported that there existed a ‘stop-trip warrant’ to prevent persons travelling from Iraq to another country, but where an arrest warrant had not yet been issued by a court, i.e. when there was no court order outstanding for arrest. The ‘stop list’ comprised all persons with an outstanding ‘stop trip warrant’. General Kaiwan clarified such persons would be stopped from entering KRI, but they would not be arrested as long as there was no arrest warrant outstanding as well. Persons on the ‘stop list’ already in KRI would not be arrested, but would be stopped from leaving KRI at KRG external checkpoints, border posts and at airports.

2.11 General Kaiwan reported that a ‘stop trip warrant’ was issued by a court, but was not an arrest warrant/court order, hence no arrest takes place. This was used to deny international travel and travel between KRI and the rest of Iraq. However General Kaiwan clarified that a ‘stop-trip warrant’ related only to civil cases and not terrorist cases. In the case of suspected terrorist involvement, persons on the ‘stop list’ would be arrested immediately. This would take place on authorisation of a judge by telephone, who would issue an arrest warrant/court order. General Kaiwan added terrorists already known to the authorities who were on the ‘black list’ would of course also be arrested immediately.

2.12 [According to Muhammed Saleem Mizuree p]ersons on this ‘stop list’ would not have an outstanding arrest warrant issued against them, but be persons under suspicion, for example persons who had been arrested by the US or other foreign forces, or persons with a dubious political background. Persons on the ‘stop list’ would be stopped from entering KRI, but would not be arrested, as the KRG authorities had no legal right to do this. Muhammed Saleem Mizuree explained these procedures existed purely for security reasons.

2.13 Brig. General Serbest Sedeek [Head of Airport Security, Erbil International Airport] made it clear that a person on the ‘stop list’ is free to travel throughout KRI but he or she cannot travel between KRI and the rest of Iraq or leave the country and travel abroad. Brig. General Serbest Sedeek added that the ‘stop list’ was also distributed to border enforcement and KRG checkpoints and therefore used by officers checking persons entering KRI from S/C Iraq and the disputed areas.

2.14 Brig. General Serbest Sedeek explained that only persons who are subject to a stop warrant, issued by a court are included on the ‘stop list’. The ‘stop list’ is computerized and continuously being updated. It was added that whenever a court withdrew a stop warrant on a particular person, he or she would be removed from the list.

2.15 According to Brig. General Serbest Sedeek, approximately five to ten persons are added to the ‘stop list’ each month, but on some months there could be no persons added. The inclusion or removal of persons to the ‘stop list’ was entirely dependent on the courts.

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\(^{10}\) For further information on the ‘black list’ refer to the DIS’ earlier reports entitled, *Entry Procedures and Residence in Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) for Iraqi nationals, Report from Danish Immigration Service’s fact finding mission to Erbil, Sulemaniyah, Dahuk, KRI and Amman, Jordan, 6 – 20 January and 25 to 15 March 2010*, published April 2010 and *Update of Entry Procedures at Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Checkpoints and Residence in Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), Report from the Danish Immigration Service’s fact-finding mission to Erbil, Suleimaniyah and Dohuk, KRI, 7-24 March 2011*, published June 2011.
The 'stop list' procedures are standardized in Erbil and Suleimaniyah airports. It is all one system and it is based on the law and legal procedures.

Documentation required at external KRG checkpoints

2.16 According to Muhammed Saleem Mizuree at KRG external checkpoints, documents would be required to prove the identity of a person, this could include their Civil ID Card; Nationality Card; passport or, if they worked for a government department, their departmental ID card. [However ...] Muhammed Saleem Mizuree [further explained that] a person would not necessarily be denied entry into KRI because he or she lacked some identification documents, as the system is computerised. Muhammed Saleem Mizuree went on to explain that a person already on their database system would be logged with their photo and name recorded onto the system. Consequently such a person could even enter KRI with only a driving licence or a similar document which proved the individual's identity and Iraqi citizenship.

2.17 Brigadier General Abdulrahman Ismael Aziz [Erbil (Governorate) Civil Information Card General Director, Ministry of Interior, Citizenship Police ...] stated that at the KRG checkpoints, a Nationality Card; Civil ID Card or passport could [...] be used as a form of identification to pass through the checkpoint. It was added that the procedure for entry at the KRG checkpoints was the same irrespective of the documentation they used at the KRG checkpoint, i.e. whether the person presented a Civil ID Card; Information Card issued under Law 95/1978 or any other documentation.

2.18 PAO [...] noted that persons seeking to enter the KRI would be questioned and asked to provide their identification, usually a Civil ID Card or Nationality Card [...].

2.19 When asked if documentation other than a Civil ID Card would be required at KRG checkpoints in order for persons to enter, the Director of an international NGO in Erbil stated individuals from S/C Iraq and the disputed areas only need to present their Civil ID Card. [...]The Director added that persons not in possession of a Civil ID Card or any other personal documents, such as a driving licence or passport would not be allowed entry into KRI same as happened in any other state in the world.

2.20 An international organization (A) stated that the only document required at KRG checkpoints in order for Iraqi citizens to enter KRI is a Civil ID Card and the requirement to fill in a form. This form is an entry pass.

2.21 Harikar NGO [the UNHCR Protection Assistance Centre partner in Dahuk] explained that the only documentation needed at a KRG checkpoint in order to enter KRI is a Civil ID Card.

See also: Issuance of entry passes and Differential treatment for persons of certain ethnic/religious groups, including persons from the disputed areas

Use of fake documents and risk of arrest

2.22 [During a visit by the delegation to the Mosul-Erbil checkpoint] Major Sharhag Tawfiq Kareem [who had overall operational responsibility for the checkpoint] explained persons seeking to enter KRI with a fake document were committing a criminal offense and that prostitution and trafficking had led to an increase in fake identity documents being circulated in Iraq, especially Civil ID Cards. However Major Sharhag Tawfiq Kareem
clarified that in practice there were a lot of fake documents used by persons trying to enter KRI and therefore providing a person could still be positively identified by staff at the entry checkpoint, they would be permitted entry and not arrested. It was only if there was a suspicion someone represented a terrorist risk they would be arrested with regard to the letter from court.

2.23 An officer the delegation met with at the Erbil-Mosul checkpoint explained that fraudulent identity documents were commonly used at the checkpoint and that fake documents could be obtained. However the officer clarified that a person would only be arrested if it was considered there was a genuine criminal case worthy of prosecution, such as related trafficking, terrorism or drug related offences.

2.24 When asked why different entry procedures may exist for Arab persons seeking to passing [sic] through the checkpoints, General Kaiwan explained that in central Iraq where many Iraqi Arabs were coming, their identification cards, such as Iraqi Nationality Cards and Civil ID Cards were frequently considered to be fraudulent. The circulation of fake documents was a real problem across Iraq and it was for this reason that the Asayish at the KRG external checkpoints needed to obtain further information through questioning. General Kaiwan clarified that the Asayish at the checkpoints would not arrest an Iraqi seeking to enter KRI, just because they were attempting to use a fake document. Neither would they automatically deny entry to those with a fake document. However it was important that persons with possibly fraudulent documents were questioned appropriately about their identity and intentions, so that accurate information was available to Asayish concerning who was entering the region. It was for this reason the information checks and procedures related to the issuance of the entry cards were so important.

2.25 General Kaiwan added that some persons of Arab origin used fraudulent Civil ID Cards in human trafficking cases, for example for the purposes of prostitution. If someone was in possession of a fake Civil ID Card and/or thought to be a victim of trafficking, the KRG authorities would assist such a person.

2.26 When asked what would happen to persons presenting fake identity documents at the checkpoints, an international organization (B) emphasized that being in possession of false documents was a criminal offence and such persons would be detained. The international organization (B) disagreed with the statement that the KRG authorities would assist a person using fake identity documents to re-obtain their correct identification. According to the international organization (B), there were many reasons why some persons do not have their original documents and are in possession of fake documents: conflict had caused many people to flee their homes without being in possession of their personal documents; some had lost personal documents under the Baath regime or had had them stolen. The international organization (B) was unaware if there were any procedures in Iraq for the re-issuance of lost documents to Iraqi citizens.

2.27 Many Iraqis claimed to have lost their personal documents in 2006/07 and the total number of citizens without documents was considered to be quite high. The international organization (B) added that some had lost these documents when they were pushed out of their homes by one of the conflicting parties in Iraq, whereas others had had their documents taken by sectarian groups in order to push them out of their traditional home area.
See also: Risk of arrest due to mistaken identity at checkpoints in KRI; Differential treatment for persons of certain ethnic/religious groups, including persons from the disputed areas and Use of Documentation in KRI

Issuance of entry passes

2.28 General Kaiwan [General Manager, Kurdistan Checkpoints, Kurdistan Regional Security Protection Agency, Security General Directorate, KRG Ministry of Interior, Erbil] explained after a person had finished providing information about their identity to Asayish at the KRG external checkpoint, they would then undergo a second procedure at the checkpoint to apply for the appropriate entry card. There existed three entry cards, a Tourism Card; a Work Card and an Information Card/Residency Card for those seeking to reside in KRI. Once the relevant card had been issued, the person would then be free to travel throughout KRI, including travel between the three KRI governorates, without being required to show any further form of documentation. General Kaiwan stated that this procedure made it easy for anyone to move freely within KRI.

2.29 Muhammed Saleem Mizuree [Head of Private Bureau of General Security (Asayish)] clarified that there were three entry cards issued at the KRG external checkpoints, namely the Tourism Card; Work Card and Information Card/Residency Card for those seeking to reside in KRI.

2.30 [During a visit by the delegation to the Mosul-Erbil checkpoint] Major Sharhang Tawfiq Kareem [who had overall operational responsibility for the checkpoint] explained that three cards were issued at the [documentation and registration] centre, a Tourism Card; a Work Card valid for 10 days and an Information Card/Residency Card, for those seeking to reside in KRI. Major Sharhang Tawfiq Kareem added that the latter card was valid for up to one year, once the individual had registered with the local Asayish office where they were residing. [...] Major Sharhang Tawfiq Kareem explained that persons with a Work Card would be required to return to the checkpoint to have the Work Card reissued for another 10 day period. When asked what would happen if a person did not have an address or know anyone in KRI, Major Sharhang Tawfiq Kareem explained that such a person would still be allowed to enter and the majority of those coming into KRI were migrant workers in search of employment with no reference in KRI.

2.31 PAO [Public Aid Organisation, the UNHCR Protection Assistance Centre partner in Erbil] outlined the entry procedures at the KRG external checkpoints and noted that persons seeking to enter the KRI would be questioned and asked to provide their identification, usually a Civil ID Card or Nationality Card, after which they would obtain one of three cards for entry – a Tourism Card, valid for 1 day or up to 1 month and which was renewable; a Work Card valid for 10 – 15 days which was also renewable; or an Information Card/Residency Card for those seeking to reside in KRI. PAO did not know how long this card, issued at the checkpoint, would be valid for.

2.32 [Harikar NGO, the UNHCR Protection Assistance Centre partner in Dahuk, explained] in order to enter Dohuk Governorate an individual will only have to deposit his or her Civil ID Card at the checkpoint in exchange for an entry pass, i.e. an Information Card/Residency Card for those seeking to reside in KRI, Work or Tourism Card.

See also: Update on security procedures to reside in KRI and Visit to the checkpoints by the delegation and Annex E – Sample of Entry Passes
Visit to the checkpoints by the FFM delegation

Mosul – Erbil checkpoint

2.33 The delegation visited the Mosul-Erbil checkpoint, a KRG external checkpoint, at approximately 1400hrs on a Saturday. The checkpoint comprised of several designated lanes for vehicles to enter and pass through the checkpoint facility – the arrangements resembled a road toll-system commonly seen in Europe. There were approximately 40 to 60 vehicles at the entry checkpoint when the delegation visited. The delegation were informed by Major Sharhang Tawfiq Kareem, who had overall operational responsibility for the checkpoint, that this was a relatively quiet time of day and that before 1200hrs it was much busier. This was because there was a curfew in operation in Mosul, which meant traffic volume from Mosul to KRG would be reduced later in the day.

2.34 Each lane open for transit was manned by officers who were checking passenger entry cards/documentation and conducting searches of vehicles. One of the lanes was designated for persons who had travelled on foot and an officer was similarly present to check documents and personal belongings. Lorries were required to use a separate road which passed behind the main checkpoint facility, where according to Major Sharhang Tawfiq Kareem, additional security checks were carried out on the vehicle.

2.35 Major Sharhang Tawfiq Kareem explained to the delegation that CCTV cameras had recently been installed at the checkpoint by a Dutch company (Netherlander) to improve security monitoring arrangements.

2.36 The delegation was informed by Major Sharhang Tawfiq Kareem that the persons crossing the entry checkpoint on foot were workers who had been issued with a Work Card for 10 days and were coming from S/C Iraq and the disputed areas. These persons commonly came to KRG region for work purposes as they represented a source of labour.

2.37 The delegation then visited the documentation and registration centre, where entry cards were issued. This centre was next to the checkpoint structure. [...] The delegation had a tour of the documentation and registration centre, where persons came to apply for an entry card. Following a physical security search of all persons entering the centre, the delegation observed that inside was a compound comprising a series of booths where different aspects of the security/registration process took place. At each booth persons queued up before eventually queuing to be issued with an entry card. Major Sharhang Tawfiq Kareem explained that the registration process involved checking each person’s name; identity documents; place of residence; purpose of visit; duration and intended visit address. Checks would also be undertaken to verify whether a person was listed on the ‘black list’ or ‘stop list’. Major Sharhang Tawfiq Kareem added that each month five to six persons would be identified and arrested who were on the ‘black list’.

2.38 1st Lt Hamza Nimat Nasir, who was the Officer in Charge of the Mosul-Erbil checkpoint during the delegation's visit, explained that there were around 50 employees working at the Mosul-Erbil checkpoint, all of which were Asayish.

Kirkuk-Erbil checkpoint
2.39 The delegation visited the Kirkuk-Erbil checkpoint and met with 2nd Lt Wishyar Ahmad Jameel who was the Officer in Charge of the Kirkuk-Erbil checkpoint on the day of the visit. The delegation observed that the physical layout of the Kirkuk-Erbil checkpoint and registration centre was very similar to what they had witnessed at the Mosul-Erbil checkpoint with the exception that the registration centre was a little further away from the checkpoint facility (around 400 or 500 metres before the checkpoint).

2.40 2nd Lt Wishyar Ahmad Jameel explained that the Kirkuk-Erbil checkpoint was also commonly known as the ‘Erbil checkpoint’. According to 2nd Lt Wishyar Ahmad Jameel between 3,000 and 4,000 people passed through the checkpoint each day, although the officer went on to explain that this figure would depend on the day and season, for example the holiday season would see more persons seeking to enter KRI. The Kirkuk checkpoint was strategically significant because it was the entry checkpoint used by persons coming from Baghdad.

2.41 2nd Lt Wishyar Ahmad Jameel explained that there was a total of around 130 staff working at the Kirkuk-Erbil checkpoint, all of which were Asayish, although staffing was split into two work shifts.

2.42 2nd Lt Muhammad Taha Ibrahim explained that the Kirkuk-Erbil checkpoint was manned by staff 24 hours a day, but the registration centre was only open until around 2300hrs, however sometimes the centre could be open until 0100hrs or 0200hrs if there were still persons requiring an entry card.
3. VARIATIONS IN SECURITY PROCEDURES AT THE KRG EXTERNAL CHECKPOINTS

The following section should be considered together with information under the sections entitled Update on entry procedures at the KRG external checkpoints and Occurrence of arbitrary practices at the KRG external checkpoints, including risk of arrest and denial of entry

3.01 Muhammed Saleem Mizuree [Head of Private Bureau of General Security (Asayish)] explained [...] that all security procedures adopted in KRG were applied only for security purposes and it was for this reason that the security situation in KRI remained stable, relative to the rest of the country. [...] Muhammed Saleem Mizuree finally stated that no foreigner or member of the coalition forces have ever been killed or injured in KRI, and added that the concept of racism/racial discrimination did not exist in KRI.

3.02 General Kaiwan [General Manager, Kurdistan Checkpoints, Kurdistan Regional Security Protection Agency, Security General Directorate, KRG Ministry of Interior, Erbil] reiterated that these [entry] procedures existed due to the security precautions because there was a lack of technology, for example use of biometric data systems, which necessitated the need for Asayish to question those seeking to enter KRI. General Kaiwan added that it was the responsibility of the KRG authorities to question all individuals entering KRI in order to know who they were.

3.03 [During a visit by the delegation to the Mosul-Erbil checkpoint] Major Sharhang Tawfiq Kareem [who had overall operational responsibility for the checkpoint] stated the procedures at the checkpoint were only necessary for security purposes because of the terrorist threat posed by groups operating in S/C Iraq and the disputed areas, which was very close to KRI. For example Mosul, which had seen a lot of violence, was geographically relatively close to Erbil.

3.04 Muhammed Saleem Mizuree commented that the security procedures applied at the checkpoints varied only in response to the security risk present in Iraq and KRG at the time, and that the situation was reviewed at monthly security briefings. When there was a high terrorist threat, measures would be adopted to strengthen entry checks. When asked how many people passed through KRG external checkpoints on average, Muhammed Saleem Mizuree stated he did not have the exact figures available, but observed that at the Kirkuk-Erbil and Mosul-Erbil checkpoints for example, there could be between 100,000 and 130,000 persons passing through these two checkpoints each month. However this could increase during Islamic festivals to approximately 67,000 persons over a three day period or alternatively be limited to 10,000 persons over a similar period, if there was a heightened security risk.

3.05 The Director of an international NGO in Erbil explained that whenever there are specific security concerns and/or threats of terrorist attacks the security and entry procedures will be adapted to the situation. Such procedures only related to security concerns and not to any other factor and these procedures are normal even in Europe.

3.06 When asked if there would be variations in applied entry procedures at KRG checkpoints, an international organization (A) stated that such variations are only related to security concerns and precautions and nothing else.
3.07 [According to Harikar NGO all entry procedures are only related to security considerations and nothing else. [...] Harikar NGO emphasized that its cooperation with the Asayish is good and that the Asayish comply with the law, including the procedures applied at KRG checkpoints. Harikar NGO has not noticed any irregularities or arbitrary practices at the checkpoints.

**Update on the reference requirement**

3.08 Muhammed Saleem Mizuree clarified that the policy requiring a person to provide a reference at the KRG external checkpoint, i.e. before entry, existed when the security situation was more precarious, but was abandoned around two or three years ago. However Muhammed Saleem Mizuree added there may still be some instances in which a person was asked by Asayish at the checkpoint to make a telephone call to somebody they knew, to verify their identity.

3.09 [During a tour of the Mosul-Erbil checkpoint] Major Sharhang Tawfiq Kareem [who had overall operational responsibility for the checkpoint] explained that there was no longer a requirement for a reference to be present at the KRG external checkpoint and this procedure was abolished around four years ago.

3.10 [According to the Director of an international NGO in Erbil ...] the overall entry procedures at KRG checkpoints have been made easier during the last year or so and there is no need for a reference to be present at KRG checkpoints. The Director emphasized that persons of Arab origin do not need a reference to be present at the checkpoint. [The same source added ...] entry procedures and policies at KRG checkpoints are only related to security concerns. And these procedure are followed everywhere in Iraq and even in neighbour and Europe countries.

3.11 The Director of an international NGO in Erbil explained that the former requirement that a reference should be present at the KRG checkpoint in order for a person to enter KRI has been abolished.

3.12 Harikar NGO stated that there is no requirement for a reference to be present at a KRG checkpoint in order for an Iraqi from outside KRI to enter.

See also: *Occurrence of arbitrary practices at the KRG external checkpoints, including risk of arrest and denial of entry; Issuance of entry passes* and *Annex E – Sample of Entry Passes*

**Regional variations (between the three Governorates)**

3.13 General Kaiwan reported that there were no variations in procedures at the checkpoints between the three KRG governorates and the practices applied at each were the same in all three governorates. However General Kaiwan clarified that he had only operational responsibility for the checkpoints and security in Erbil and Dahuk governorates, together with security checkpoints around Mosul and in the disputed areas. In Suleimaniyah governorate the local Asayish had responsibility for the entry checkpoints in that governorate. When asked why this was the case, General Kaiwan explained it referred to the organisational structure which existed between the KDP [Kurdistan Democratic Party] and PUK [Patriot Union of Kurdistan] parties. It was for this reason that each entry card was designated with either a ‘H’, ‘S’ or ‘D’ letter to identify the governorate where the card was issued – ‘H’ for HAWLER i.e. Erbil; ‘D’ for Dohuk and ‘S’ for Suleimaniyah.
However General Kaiwan reiterated that the same procedures operated throughout the three governorates and that he had in fact personally designed the three information cards himself, which were applied throughout KRI. General Kaiwan also confirmed that he maintained full cooperation with the authorities i.e. the Governor and Mayor of Suleimanyiah, through meetings to ensure there were no variations in procedure or security related weaknesses. General Kaiwan emphasized that it was only the administrative matters that were different, not entry procedures and security related issues.

3.14 [During a visit by the delegation to the Mosul-Erbil checkpoint] Major Sharhang Tawfiq Kareem [who had overall operational responsibility for the checkpoint] clarified that the procedures adopted at the Mosul-Erbil checkpoint were the same as procedures applied at other KRG external checkpoints, including those in Suleimaniyah and Dahuk governorates. Major Sharhang Tawfiq Kareem explained that persons at the checkpoint with a valid entry card would pass through the checkpoint procedures without any delays.

3.15 [Whilst during a tour of the Kirkuk-Erbil checkpoint] 2nd Lt Wishyar Ahmad Jameel explained that the same entry procedures applied at the Kirkuk-Erbil checkpoint as occurred at all other KRG external checkpoints, there was only one regulation which was followed throughout KRI.

3.16 The Director of an international NGO in Erbil stated that there is a uniform entry procedure at all external KRG checkpoints across all three KRI governorates.

3.17 [International organization (A) ...] clarified that the same [entry] procedures were applied in the three KRG governorates.
4. Occurrence of arbitrary practices at the KRG external checkpoints, including risk of arrest and denial of entry

The following section should be considered together with information under the sections entitled Update on entry procedures at the KRG external checkpoints and Variations in security procedures at the KRG external checkpoints

4.01 Muhammed Saleem Mizuree [Head of Private Bureau of General Security (Asayish)] explained that individuals not from KRI may be asked by the Asayish at the checkpoint to telephone an acquaintance in KRI, to verify their identity. When asked if an individual, not from KRI, and who knew no one in KRI would be able to pass through the KRG external checkpoint, Muhammed Saleem Mizuree explained that this would depend on the individual and the circumstances of the case, but in some instances such a person would be viewed with suspicion. Muhammed Saleem Mizuree confirmed however such cases were very rare. Less than 30 persons per month across all the KRG external checkpoints, in all three governorates, may be denied entry purely on the grounds that they were considered suspicious for some reason, this included persons who had given inconsistent information when questioned. Muhammed Saleem Mizuree clarified this figure of ‘less than 30 cases per month’, did not include persons denied entry because they did not have appropriate documentation, and only related to those who were denied entry because they were deemed suspicious for some reason.

4.02 However Muhammed Saleem Mizuree added that if a person was denied entry due to some misunderstanding or even because a wrong decision may have been made initially by the Asayish, such a person could freely return to the checkpoint at a later date to seek entry. In cases where a mistake had been made by the Asayish, they would also receive an apology. Muhammed Saleem Mizuree emphasized that a person can only be arrested when there is a warrant, i.e. a court order to arrest.

4.03 Harikar NGO [the UNHCR Protection Assistance Centre partner in Dahuk] emphasized that its cooperation with the Asayish is good and that the Asayish comply with the law, including the procedures applied at KRG checkpoints. Harikar NGO has not noticed any irregularities or arbitrary practices at the checkpoints.

4.04 Regarding allegations that arbitrary practices or policies may occur at KRG checkpoints, an international organization (A) reported that in practice this would be unlikely, because there are always at least two Asayish officers and a number of lower ranking personnel at each KRG checkpoint, therefore if arbitrary and/or discriminatory practices did occur, this would be reported and action taken against those responsible. The international organization (A) stated that it had never heard of arbitrary or discriminatory practices occurring. The organization emphasized that security concerns are of such high importance to KRG, that arbitrary procedures and practices would never be accepted. Security precautions would not depend on the mood of officers and personnel at the checkpoints.

4.05 [However...] PAO [Public Aid Organisation, the UNHCR Protection Assistance Centre partner in Erbil] was of the opinion that the authorities often used the security situation and terrorist threat to interrogate or question persons seeking to enter KRI and that there was an ulterior motive behind such questioning. When asked to explain what the real motive for such questioning may be, PAO explained that for example there remained constant political pressures with regard to the labour market in KRI and that although on the one hand persons seeking to enter KRI for employment purposes provided a
relatively cheap source of labour and so this was encouraged by some, competing against this there were other interests in KRI, including the media and opposition political parties, who were against the influx of workers from the GoI who were taking jobs from residents of KRI. This situation therefore created competing tensions and which PAO considered could lead to inconsistent or arbitrary practices at the KRG checkpoints. PAO Erbil considered such practices represented a violation of the Iraqi Constitution which respects freedom of movement.

4.06 When asked whether arbitrary practices occur at KRG checkpoints, the Director of an international NGO in Erbil stated that one cannot exclude that occasionally cases may occur where an policeman at a checkpoint may [be] overly suspicious of an individual. However, officers at the checkpoints could not routinely reject individuals from entering KRG. [sic] as there was a chain of command and it was only the commanding officer in charge of the checkpoint who could make such a decision.

4.07 [During a visit to the Mosul-Erbil checkpoint by the delegation] 1st Lt Hamza Nimat Nasir explained that the procedures applied at the checkpoint meant no one could be denied entry without the case being reported to him first, as he was the Officer in Charge of the checkpoint. 1st Lt Hamza Nimat Nasir confirmed that a decision to deny entry would be made by him and in line with procedures. It was clarified that this meant only persons on the 'black list' or 'stop list' who had been referred by a Court Letter, would be denied entry.

4.08 Regarding assertions that there are persons who are not on the ‘black list’ who risk being denied entry at a KRG checkpoint, an international organization (A) explained that their organization is in daily contact with all KRG checkpoints yet had never heard of any persons being denied entry arbitrarily, for example because the officer/personnel at the checkpoint might be in a bad mood.

4.09 Harikar NGO had no reports of IDPs or any other Iraqi citizen who was not on the ‘black list’, being denied entry into KRI at a checkpoint. However, the representative of Harikar NGO mentioned an incident where a friend from Mosul was denied entry to KRI as they did not have their Civil ID Card with them. The representative found it hard to understand why his friend would approach a KRG checkpoint without any identity documents.

4.10 When asked if persons had been rejected from entering KRI at the external KRG checkpoints. The international organization (B) explained that they did not conduct visits to the checkpoints, so it was difficult to comment. However the international organization (B) stated there was evidence that persons not from KRI, who had been detained, had been asked to leave KRI if they were suspected of having links with terrorist groups. Additionally persons without proper identification had also been asked to leave KRI. The international organization (B) added that in some cases, where persons had been detained, individuals decided to leave on their own merits, because they feared remaining in KRI.

4.11 The international organization (B) explained that young persons of Arab origin are most vulnerable to discrimination and arbitrary arrest at KRG checkpoints. However, the international organization (B) found it difficult to give exact figures of the number of young persons of Arab origin who have been detained without lawful reason, at KRG checkpoints, but estimated that the figure could be between 35 and 40 persons at a given time. The international organization (B) explained that most of those detained either had names identical to names on the ‘black list’. Others had no personal identity.
documentation, while some had no reference or they originated from Baghdad or the disputed areas. The international organization (B) added that these factors related mainly to cases in Dohuk and Erbil Governorates, whilst in Suleimaniyah Governorate, most cases of arbitrary detention at the checkpoint occurred because the individual originated from the disputed areas.

4.12 The international organization (B) stated that suspicion was the main motivation for the arrest of persons at the KRG checkpoints, even if someone had genuine identification documents and was not on the ‘black list’. Young persons who were with their families would not face any real risk of arrest, but if there was a group of young individuals together for example, they may be considered suspicious. Behaviour at the checkpoint was also considered a factor which could lead to an individual being detained.

4.13 The international organization (B) stated that they did not conduct visits to the KRG checkpoints and that information on how entry procedures are applied at these checkpoints and reports of violations, were based on interviews with detainees who were arrested at a KRG checkpoint.

See also: Use of fake documents and risk of arrest and Risk of arrest due to mistaken identity at checkpoints in KRI

Lack of written procedures

4.14 General Kaiwan [General Manager, Kurdistan Checkpoints, Kurdistan Regional Security Protection Agency, Security General Directorate, KRG Ministry of Interior, Erbil] explained that there was a consistent and uniform system throughout KRI for Iraqis to enter into KRI at the KRG external checkpoint. [...] General Kaiwan stressed the point that all these procedures related entirely to security precautions and the need to maintain an effective deterrent against the threat posed by terrorism to the KRI.

4.15 Muhammed Saleem Mizuree [Head of Private Bureau of General Security (Asayish)] repeated that all security procedures adopted in KRG were applied only for security purposes and it was for this reason that the security situation in KRI remained stable, relative to the rest of the country.

4.16 The international organization (B) stated that there are people from S/C Iraq and the disputed areas who are unaware of their rights in KRI, and it was emphasized that there is a need for a formalized entry and residence procedure in order for all Iraqis to know their rights and the relevant procedures. The international organization (B) explained that the procedures applied in practice were arbitrary, ad-hoc and often given only verbally. Consequently someone who had links with the authorities would be able to stay in KRI, but others without such links would be treated differently. According to the international organization (B) without formalised procedures, decision making was reliant only on the opinions of officers at the checkpoint.

4.17 However, the international organization (B) stated that KRG has no interest in a formalized entry procedure at its checkpoints. When asked why this would be the case, the international organization (B) explained that there are politically motivated considerations with regard to GoI and the question of federalism in Iraq. This issue is legally tricky.
4.18 PAO reported that there were no written procedures regarding entry procedures applied by Asayish. This meant the process was arbitrary and could depend on the mood of the officer conducting the checks.

Avenues of complaint / training of security personnel at the checkpoints

4.19 Muhammed Saleem Mizuree explained that if someone wished to lodge a complaint against the Asayish they would need to do this at the Ministry of Interior in Baghdad.

4.20 Commenting on the security personnel that manned the KRG external checkpoints in KRI, PAO stated that such persons were still not that well trained and there were very limited avenues for Iraqi citizens to seek redress, if they had been treated unfairly in some way. For example PAO explained that even if one were to file a complaint against the security personnel, nothing would happen and in any case often persons would be afraid of criticising the Asayish. PAO explained that the Asayish were one of the most powerful government institutions within KRG, therefore pursuing such a course of action would not be logical. PAO also reported that the Asayish were linked closely with the main political parties in KRI which held power.

4.21 PAO further remarked that there existed ethnic discrimination at a limited level and individual practices at the entry checkpoints but it’s not a systematic matter, and PAO is aware that the KRI is trying their best uproot this case, through replacing the security staff whenever find that they are doing such practices[.]

4.22 When asked whether arbitrary practices occur at KRG checkpoints, the Director of an international NGO in Erbil stated that one cannot exclude that occasionally cases may occur where an policeman at a checkpoint may overly suspicious of an individual. However, officers at the checkpoints could not routinely reject individuals from entering KRG. [sic] as there was a chain of command and it was only the commanding officer in charge of the checkpoint who could make such a decision. […] The Director stated that whenever an officer at a checkpoint breached regulations, he risked disciplinary action being taken against him. The Director added however that those normal policemen [at] the checkpoints were relatively uneducated and their training fairly limited, therefore there may be isolated cases of arbitrary practices being applied, however such cases would be very few.

4.23 [During a visit to the Mosul-Erbil checkpoint by the delegation] 1st Lt Hamza Nimat Nasir explained that the procedures applied at the checkpoint meant no one could be denied entry without the case being reported to him first, as he was the Officer in Charge of the checkpoint. 1st Lt Hamza Nimat Nasir confirmed that a decision to deny entry would be made by him and in line with procedures. It was clarified that this meant only persons on the 'black list' or 'stop list' who had been referred by a Court Letter, would be denied entry.

See also: Risk of arrest due to mistaken identity at checkpoints in KRI and Differential treatment for persons of certain ethnic/religious groups, including persons from the disputed areas

Risk of arrest due to mistaken identity at checkpoints in KRI

4.24 Muhammed Saleem Mizuree reported that one of the difficulties facing Asayish at the KRG external checkpoints was that persons of Arab origin would frequently have very
similar or identical names, and that for example there could be many persons with the same name as someone listed on the ‘black list’. It was for this reason that rigorous procedures existed at the KRG external checkpoints to determine a person’s identity.

4.25 During the tour of the registration centre [at the Kirkuk-Erbil checkpoint] the delegation were also introduced to 2nd Lt Muhammad Taha Ibrahim who allowed the delegation to observe how his staff would check persons against the ‘black list’ and ‘stop list’. The delegation observed that this screening process involved individuals queuing up to be checked by a security officer in one of the booths in the registration centre. In order to obtain clearance, a person would provide their identification documents, e.g.: Civil ID Card, to the security officer and the officer would then search that person’s name against a computer database, which included all names on the ‘stop list’ and ‘black list’. According to 2nd Lt Muhammad Taha Ibrahim there were around 2,000 names on the ‘black list’, whilst the ‘stop list’ had fewer names recorded, although the precise number were not stated. The database also included known aliases and civil identification numbers. In the eventuality someone’s name matched to a person on the security database, the case would be passed to the Officer in Charge and the Officer in Charge would check the person’s details against a hardcopy file which included further details about the case flagged up on the computer database.

4.26 According to 2nd Lt Muhammad Taha Ibrahim it was quite a common occurrence for persons being screened to have a positive name match with those listed on the security database. This was particularly common for Arab persons who would frequently have very similar names to one another. The officer who was conducting the screening process explained to the delegation that only a few hours ago a person being screened had received a positive match, but on checking the file details, it was found the individual was not the actual person listed on the database, so the individual was released and free to go. However the same officer also stated that about four days ago they had arrested a very high profile Al Qaeda operative through this security screening process, after a positive identification had been made.

4.27 Regarding arbitrary procedures at KRG external checkpoints, an international organisation (B) stated that it was not uncommon for individuals to be victims of mistaken identity when approaching KRG checkpoints. Persons with Arab names can easily be wrongly identified as many Arab names are very similar, consequently there were cases where an individual with the same name as someone on the black list, would be detained for further questioning. The international organisation (B) explained that questioning and comparison of photos normally would solve the mistake, and it would be appropriate in cases where the individual lacked proper personal identification, for the authorities to detain such a person for 24 to 48 hours, while investigations over a person’s identity were being undertaken. However, the international organization (B) stated that there are also examples of persons being held for up to nine months. It was added that such incidents are especially notorious at the Erbil prison. According to an international organization (B) those persons not from KRG were most vulnerable because often they could not speak Kurdish and were out of touch from family or friends.

4.28 An international organization (B) explained that persons completely unknown to the staff at KRG checkpoints may face more difficulties and scrutiny at the checkpoint than persons who are known to the staff.

4.29 An international organization (B) stated that there are persons held in detention facilities or Erbil prison on suspicion of affiliation with insurgent or terrorist groups, because they
cannot be properly identified by the authorities. Such individuals may not be able to contact their families or a lawyer unless the international organization (B) visits them in the prison to assist them. Since 2009 there have been a total of 50 cases. As of today between 35 and 40 such cases are pending. In some cases the international organization (B) has contacted the Ministry of Interior in KRG in order to have detained persons released from prison – in one such case the detainee was released after four days in detention. The international organization (B) emphasized that those families who were poorly educated, may not know their rights and consequently find it very difficult to take any action when a family member has been illegally detained, whereas more educated families, with good connections in society, find it much easier to defend their rights. [...] The international organization (B) stated that beatings of detainees are common during the initial stages of the detention process, i.e. during the interrogations and investigations.

4.30 An international organization (B) concluded that one cannot say there are any real avenues to seek redress in such cases, as detainees have no access to contact their families, a lawyer or file a complaint. The only assistance detainees can hope for is when some international agency visits the detention facility or the prison. Some international organizations have free access to the detention facilities and the prison in Erbil.

4.31 Harikar NGO explained that they had never heard of any IDP having problems at the KRG checkpoints and no IDP has ever contacted Harikar NGO in order to be assisted at the checkpoints. Harikar NGO had no knowledge of IDPs being detained because they were a victim of mistaken identity at the KRG checkpoints, because they had the same name as someone wanted by the authorities, i.e. someone on the 'Black List'. However Harikar NGO added that Arab names were very similar to one another.

See also: Use of fake documents and risk of arrest and Differential treatment for persons of certain ethnic/religious groups, including persons from the disputed areas

Differential treatment for persons of certain ethnic/religious groups, including persons from the disputed areas

4.32 General Kaiwan [General Manager, Kurdistan Checkpoints, Kurdistan Regional Security Protection Agency, Security General Directorate, KRG Ministry of Interior, Erbil] explained that there was a consistent and uniform system throughout KRI for Iraqis to enter into KRI at the KRG external checkpoint. This system applied to all Iraqi nationals and did not discriminate against any persons, including persons from non-Kurdish ethnic groups. However General Kawian went on to state entry procedures for Arabs and Kurds may differ, in light of the changing security situation and the need to protect KRI from the terrorist threat which has existed in Iraq since 2004. However General Kawan also clarified that the KRI authorities always maintained a respect for Arab persons from Iraq, who were seeking to enter KRI.

4.33 When asked how procedures may differ for Arab persons seeking to enter KRI at KRG external checkpoints, General Kaiwan clarified that the use of fraudulent identification documents, especially Nationality Cards and Civil ID Cards in S/C Iraq and the disputed areas was a particular problem. This meant the KRG security forces, i.e. the Asayish at the checkpoints, were required to question Iraqis from outside KRI who were seeking to enter KRI. This was conducted to better understand their reasons for travelling and also obtain further information about the person, such as where they were from, who they
knew in KRI, where they intended to stay and how long they intended to reside in KRI, so as to understand they did not pose a security risk. General Kaiwan added that some persons of Arab origin used fraudulent Civil ID Cards in human trafficking cases, for example for the purposes of prostitution. If someone was in possession of a fake Civil ID Card and/or thought to be a victim of trafficking, the KRG authorities would assist such a person. [...] General Kaiwan stressed the point that all these [entry] procedures related entirely to security precautions and the need to maintain an effective deterrent against the threat posed by terrorism to the KRI.

4.34 When asked how persons without genuine identity documents would be treated by the KRG authorities when seeking to enter KRI. An international organization (B) explained that a Kurd without personal ID documents may be treated more sympathetically and be permitted entry because they would normally know someone in KRI who could identify him or her or they would have a known family/clan name which was recognised. With regard to Christians, the entry arrangements were significantly easier and such persons may even be able to enter KRI without providing any documentation at all. This was because Christians were not considered a terrorist threat to the region – the KRG authorities were very lenient towards Christians. However, the international organization (B) concluded that a person of Arab origin without genuine documents to identify themselves would not be permitted entry.

4.35 The international organization (B) added that a significant percentage of people in the Asayish detention facility in Erbil, detained for suspected terrorist activities, were young Arabs under 30 years of age, although it was also common to find Arab individuals under 50 years of age on similar charges. The international organization (B) explained this was not surprising when one looked at recent terrorist attacks, which were mainly committed by young Arab males. According to the international organization (B) Arab women would also be scrutinised at the entry checkpoint, but less so than men.

See also: Use of fake documents and risk of arrest and Risk of arrest due to mistaken identity at checkpoints in KRI

4.36 According to Major Sharhang Tawfiq Kareem [who had overall operational responsibility for the Mosul-Erbil checkpoint] the procedures applied at the entry checkpoints did not discriminate against any ethnic group and Arabs, Turkmen and Yezidis would be treated no different from Kurds seeking to enter KRI. [...] Major Sharhang Tawfiq Kareem completely rejected the statement from UNHCR that Arabs, Turkmen and Kurds from the disputed areas would face difficulties/rejection at KRG checkpoints\(^\text{11}\). Major Sharhang Tawfiq Kareem explained that most of the new houses being bought in KRI were being purchased by Arabs and not Kurds and stated for example that Arab persons from Mosul were moving to KRI not just temporarily for work, but also to live. Major Sharhang Tawfiq Kareem also added that the vast majority of Iraqis passing through the KRG checkpoints are actually Arabs. [...] According to Major Sharhang Tawfiq Kareem the only reason a person from S/C Iraq and the disputed areas would be denied entry was because they posed a terrorist threat. Such a person would already be listed on one of two lists, the

\(^{11}\) The DIS’ report entitled, Update of Entry Procedures at Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Checkpoints and Residence in Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), Report from the Danish Immigration Service’s fact-finding mission to Erbil, Suleimaniyah and Dohuk, KRI, 7-24 March 2011, published June 2011, reported that “UNHCR Stockholm has stated in three notes from January-February 2011 that, ‘Arabs, Turkmen and Kurds from the disputed areas […] will most likely face difficulties/rejection at the checkpoint’” For further details on the notes provided by UNHCR Stockholm see footnote 20 of this report.
‘black list’, which would result in their immediate arrest and the ‘stop list’, where such persons would only be turned away and denied entry.

4.37 [Whilst during a tour of the Kirkuk-Erbil checkpoint] 2nd Lt Wishyar Ahmad Jameel stated there were no discriminatory practices applied at the checkpoint against person of non-Kurdish ethnicity and denial of entry would only occur due to identified security risks and in line with policy. 2nd Lt Wishyar Ahmad Jameel denied the statement from UNHCR that Arabs, Turkmen, and Kurds from the disputed areas will face difficulties/rejection at KRG external checkpoints. 12

4.38 According to PAO [Public Aid Organisation, the UNHCR Protection Assistance Centre partner in Erbil], persons from the disputed areas who were of Turkmen or Arab ethnicity would be questioned for a long time at the KRG external checkpoints, before they would be allowed to enter, and this is because the disputed areas are more suspicious of terrorism. [...] PAO added that there was a specific area at the checkpoint to facilitate questioning and the recording of documentation for those persons seeking to enter.

4.39 PAO further remarked that there existed ethnic discrimination at a limited [level] and individual practices at the entry checkpoints but it’s not a systematic matter, and PAO is aware that the KRI is trying their best uproot this case, through replacing the security staff whenever find that they are doing such practices[.] PAO gave the example that Yazidi Kurds would experience no difficulties and be allowed to enter and reside in KRI, but that Arabs or Turkmen would experience greater difficulties to pass through the KRG checkpoint. PAO gave the example that some managers of companies in KRI, who were known to PAO, had experienced difficulties when attempting to bring skilled labourers into KRI from GoI. Such persons would be required to bring all Iraqi documentation, such as Civil ID Card; Nationality Card and PDS Card, and yet would still routinely undergo thorough questioning at the KRG checkpoints. PAO Erbil clarified that this information was not from the UNHCR commissioned survey, but based on personal knowledge from one of PAO’s staff members.

4.40 When asked if IOM Erbil had ever heard that Arabs, Turkmen and Kurds from the disputed areas will most likely face difficulties/rejection at the KRG checkpoints, IOM Erbil stated that it had never heard of such discriminatory policies being applied at the KRG checkpoints. 13

4.41 According to the Director of an international NGO in Erbil, all Iraqis irrespective of ethnic origin or religious orientation are free to enter KRI through the KRG external checkpoints by presenting their Iraqi Civil ID Card. The Director added that Iraqi Turkmen, Christians and Faili Kurds normally enter through these checkpoints without any difficulties. [...] On the other hand Iraqis of Arab origin would normally be required to undergo greater scrutiny, requested to present their Civil ID Card at the checkpoint and explain the nature and intention of their visit to KRI. However, this procedure was unproblematic and did not require that a reference should be present at the checkpoint. According to the Director of an international NGO in Erbil all persons would be required to routinely show their Civil ID Card at the entry checkpoint and persons of Arab origin faced no problems in staying in the KRI. However the same source clarified that persons of Arab origin would normally have their Civil ID Card photocopied as an extra security precaution. [...] The Director emphasized that persons of Arab origin do not need a reference to be present at the checkpoint.

12 See footnote 11.
13 See footnote 11.
4.42 [According to the Director of an international NGO in Erbil ...] one could not claim that ethnic or religious discrimination took place at KRG checkpoints and added that entry procedures are only set up according to security considerations. People coming from areas of Iraq where conflict and insurgent/terrorist activities are more frequent could be asked questions regarding the reason for their entry, but this did not amount to discrimination and was only implemented due to real security concerns.

4.43 When informed that some interlocutors consulted by the DIS [Danish Immigration Service] during its previous fact finding mission to KRI in early 2011 had stated that Turkmen, Arabs and Kurds from the disputed areas are most likely to face difficulties/rejection at KRG checkpoints, Harikar NGO was astonished, and stated that there is no discrimination at the KRG checkpoints – if one were to go down to the market in Dahuk for example, you would find many Arab persons living and working. Harikar NGO explained that its surveys in 2010/2011 provided no evidence to indicate discrimination based on religious orientation or ethnic affiliation occurred at the KRG checkpoints. Arabs, including Sunni Arabs are not being discriminated against at KRG checkpoints. [...] Harikar NGO explained that only persons on the ‘Black List’ or persons under suspicion of being affiliated with insurgents/terrorists would face difficulties and /or arrest when approaching a KRG checkpoint.

4.44 [On the subject of entry procedures at KRG external checkpoints ...] PAO Erbil clarified that the situation for Christians entering through GoI/KRG checkpoints was one of ‘positive discrimination’ and that such groups experienced no difficulties, neither in entrance nor in obtaining Information Card which is an ID issued for all IDPs, even if they don’t have sponsor which is one of the requirements of obtaining this ID, the Ainkawa [a district within Erbil] Churches are taking the responsibility and became their sponsors.[...]

**Differential treatment for IDPs**

The following section should be considered together with information under the section entitled **Registration and monitoring of IDP communities in KRI** and specifically information under **Difficulties in supporting IDPs in KRI**

4.45 The DIS’ report *Update of Entry Procedures at Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Checkpoints and Residence in Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), Report from the Danish Immigration Service’s fact-finding mission to Erbil, Suleimaniyah and Dohuk, KRI, 7-24 March 2011*, published June 2011, explained that all three of UNHCR’s Protection Assistance Centre (PAC) partners in KRI, namely PAO in Erbil, Harikar in Dahuk and CDO Suliemaniyah had undertaken in 2010 and 2011 surveys on behalf of UNHCR to document the experiences of IDPs at the KRG external checkpoints.\(^14\)

4.46 Public Aid Organization (PAO) reported that in March 2011 they conducted a second survey of IDPs concerning their experiences at the KRG external checkpoints, with an earlier survey conducted in November/December 2010.

4.47 [The delegation were informed that] the two surveys conducted by PAO through the PAC Project, comprised responses from 86 heads of household surveyed in November and December 2010 and a further 19 heads of household surveyed in March 2011. The

\(^{14}\) DIS’ report *Update of Entry Procedures at Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Checkpoints and Residence in Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), Report from the Danish Immigration Service’s fact-finding mission to Erbil, Suleimaniyah and Dohuk, KRI, 7-24 March 2011*, published June 2011, p.11.
respondents were all IDPs of Arab, Christian or Kurdish origin and were all identified by PAO. [...]\[15\]

4.48 PAO, reported that the main findings of their survey concluded that the situation was unchanged from when the Danish Immigration Service visited in March 2011\[16\], although PAO Erbil clarified that the situation for Christians entering through GoI/KRG checkpoints was one of ‘positive discrimination’ and that such groups experienced no difficulties, neither in entrance nor in obtaining Information Card which is an ID issued for all IDPs, even if they don’t have sponsor which is one of the requirements of obtaining this ID, the Ainkawa Churches are taking the responsibility and became their sponsors[.]

4.49 [The delegation were informed by] Harikar NGO […] that during its two surveys undertaken in 2010/2011 in which IDPs were asked if they faced difficulties, i.e. harassment or discrimination at the KRG checkpoints, no IDP had claimed this to be the case neither for themselves nor for other IDPs known to them. [...] On the basis of its surveys, Harikar NGO denied that there are arbitrary practices or discriminatory procedures applied at the KRG checkpoints\[17\].

4.50 According to Harikar NGO, in one incident in 2010 in Dohuk an individual was initially rejected entry at a KRG checkpoint, but this problem was soon solved by Harikar NGO and the individual permitted entry. It was added that the Harikar NGO had never heard of any individual/IDP being denied entry. On the other hand Harikar NGO stated that one cannot exclude that this has occurred as it would be difficult to get information on such incidents. When asked if IDPs interviewed during the UNHCR/PAC survey in 2010/2011 would have reported to Harikar NGO about rejected relatives, friends and/or other IDPs, Harikar NGO stated that most likely they would have.

4.51 Regarding possible arbitrary practices and discrimination at KRG checkpoints, Harikar NGO stated that no IDP being interview by Harikar NGO has reported any kind of arbitrary procedures or discrimination at checkpoints. [...] Harikar NGO explained that they had never heard of any IDP having problems at the KRG checkpoints and no IDP has ever contacted Harikar NGO in order to be assisted at the checkpoints. Harikar NGO had no knowledge of IDPs being detained because they were a victim of mistaken identity at the KRG checkpoints, because they had the same name as someone wanted by the authorities, i.e. someone on the ‘Black List’. However Harikar NGO added that Arab names were very similar to one another.

See also: Risk of arrest due to mistaken identity at checkpoints in KRI

4.52 IOM Erbil explained that they were unable to provide any specific comments with regard to entry procedures at the checkpoints or security restrictions in KRG, although observed that their own office had excellent relations with the BMD [Bureau of Migration and

\[15\] NB: The DIS’ earlier report, Update of Entry Procedures at Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Checkpoints and Residence in Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), Report from the Danish Immigration Service’s fact-finding mission to Erbil, Suleimaniyah and Dohuk, KRI, 7-24 March 2011, published June 2011 refers to the two surveys conducted by PAO in March 2011 and November/December 2010. For further details see p.11 of the report.

\[16\] Ibid.

\[17\] The DIS’ earlier report, Update of Entry Procedures at Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Checkpoints and Residence in Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), Report from the Danish Immigration Service’s fact-finding mission to Erbil, Suleimaniyah and Dohuk, KRI, 7-24 March 2011, published June 2011, explained that Harikar NGO had undertaken two IDP surveys in Dahuk governorate. The first took place in mid December 2010 and the second in mid March 2011, p. 11. For further details refer to this report.
Displacement]. When asked if IDPs registered with IOM had highlighted entry procedures or freedom of movement in KRG as particularly problematic to them during needs assessment work conducted by IOM’s field monitors, IOM Erbil explained that there were reports of some difficulties encountered by IDPs in 2008 and 2009, but this was no longer an issue being reported to them. In general the Asayish are acting professionally and IOM Erbil had no records of the Asayish being discriminatory against certain ethnic or religious groups or individuals. IOM had not heard of any human rights violations against IDPs committed by the authorities.

UNHCR and the Protection and Assistance Centre (PAC) surveys 2010/2011

4.53 The UK Border Agency informed UNHCR about their intention to conduct a joint UK-Danish fact finding mission to KRI on the subject of entry procedures at a meeting in Brussels on 21 October 2011. The delegation subsequently contacted the UNCHR Baghdad office on 25 October and again on 28 October and was put in touch with the UNCHR Erbil office on 28 October 2011. The delegation provided advance sight of the Terms of Reference (ToR) for the mission on 10 November 2011 and in a covering email to UNCHR Erbil explained: “We are looking forward to meeting with you when we come out to KRG for our FFM and would very much welcome an opportunity for us to discuss our ToR (attached) as we consider UNCHR a key interlocutor for our mission. We will be in KRG between 11 and 25th November.” However, UNCHR Erbil officers declined to be interviewed unless they were able to have sight of the final report of the mission, including contributions from other interlocutors, before its publication, in addition to approving the notes of their own interview. The delegation did not agree to this exceptional request, giving reference to paragraph 5.3.3 (Methodology) of the EU Guidelines which states that: “If the Principle of Approved Notes has been applied … it is not advisable to let interviewees review the [FFM] report.” Instead it was suggested UNCHR Erbil may consider providing written contributions against the ToR. However, no such written contributions were provided to the delegation, although the Erbil office did consult with the legal department in UNCHR HQ and advised that a contribution would be provided to the delegation based on reports from the Erbil office which had been ‘reviewed’ and ‘cleared’ by HQ.

4.54 On 20 December 2011, the delegation received an email from UNHCR London which stated, “As you may be aware, UNHCR standard operating procedures require that queries originating from a country where UNCHR has an office, as in this case the UK, should be directed to the local office rather than to UNCHR offices abroad.” The written response entitled, Observations on Iraq for the UKBA FFM, dated December 2011, stated: “The information complements the information already provide[d] in UNCHR’s Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing International Protection Needs of Iraqi Asylum-Seekers in April 2009.” The response went onto clarify: “Nothing in the information below should be understood to limit in any way eligibility for protection as set out in the Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Iraqi Asylum-Seekers mentioned above” which was published in April 2009.

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18 COI Service/UNHCR Erbil email correspondence dated 10 November 2011
19 The delegation met with UNCHR Erbil in Erbil on 21 November 2011, however UNCHR Erbil were unwilling to be interviewed for the purposes of the fact finding mission for the reasons outlined above.
21 Email from UNCHR Erbil dated 12 December 2011
22 Email from UNCHR London dated 20 December 2011
23 UNHCR London, Observations on Iraq for the UKBA FFM, dated December 2011
24 Ibid.
provided by UNHCR London is included in Annex D.

4.55 [UNHCR’s Protection Assistance Centre (PAC) partner in Dahuk] Harikar NGO explained that the results of the [UNHCR sponsored] survey on entry procedures [and the experiences of IDPs] undertaken in late 2010 and early 2011 by UNHCR and its three PAC partners in Erbil, Suleimaniyah and Dohuk Governorates have not been made public, but were shared between all the PAC partners. When asked why this was the case Harikar NGO recommended the delegation to consult UNHCR on the issue.

4.56 [UNHCR’s PAC partner in Erbil] Public Aid Organization (PAO) reported that in March 2011 they conducted a second [UNHCR sponsored] survey of IDPs concerning their experiences at the KRG external checkpoints, with an earlier survey conducted in November/December 2010. These two surveys were for use only by UNHCR and its three NGO partners that are running Protection Assistance Centers (PACs) and the survey[s] were not for public disclosure. However UNHCR had compiled a report on this issue, which included findings from the survey data of PAO and the other UNHCR NGO partners, namely Harikar NGO in Dahuk and the Civil Development Organisation (CDO) in Suleimaniyah. Additionally this report included contributions from other departments within the UN and UN security departments. PAO were unable to share with the delegation any documentary material from their surveys.

4.57 The written contribution provided by UNHCR London, dated December 2011, provided no reference to these PAC surveys nor any reference to findings based on the survey results.26

**Monitoring of checkpoints by international and domestic non-governmental organisations**

4.58 General Kaiwan [General Manager, Kurdistan Checkpoints, Kurdistan Regional Security Protection Agency, Security General Directorate, KRG Ministry of Interior, Erbil ...] stated that he had not been consulted or visited by UNHCR with regard to any concerns they may have related to procedures at KRG external checkpoints. Although General Kaiwan explained that he was unable to confirm or deny if UNHCR staff had visited such checkpoints, but added that he was not aware they had carried out any such visits. General Kaiwan went on to explain that his office dealt with other UN agencies, but only to assist them with logistical matters, such as providing authorisation for their security vehicles to pass through the checkpoints.

4.59 [During a visit by the delegation to the Mosul-Erbil checkpoint] Major Sharhang Tawfiq Kareem [who had overall operational responsibility for the checkpoint] stated that neither UNHCR nor PAO Erbil had to his knowledge visited the Mosul-Erbil checkpoint or raised any matters concerning entry arrangements with him or his staff. Major Sharhang Tawfiq Kareem explained that he would welcome an opportunity to cooperate with such organisations and assist with any enquiries they may have concerning entry procedures.

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4.60 2nd Lt Muhammad Taha Ibrahim confirmed that no one from UNHCR or PAO Erbil had to his knowledge visited the Kirkuk-Erbil checkpoint or raised any matters concerning entry arrangements with him or his colleagues. 2nd Lt Muhammad Taha Ibrahim rejected claims that the procedures applied at the Kirkuk-Erbil checkpoint were discriminatory against Arabs, Turkmen or Kurds from the disputed areas.

4.61 Major Sharhang Tawfiq Kareem strongly criticised those groups or persons who had made unfounded allegations regarding the procedures applied at KRG external checkpoints. In his opinion such allegation served only to give the people of Kurdistan a ‘bad name’ and to encourage Iraqis to leave the country in order to pursue asylum claims in Europe. It was for these reasons that Major Sharhang Tawfiq Kareem had explained to the delegation that they were free to access any part of the checkpoint facilities during their visit and to interview any person/individual that the delegation wished. Major Sharhang Tawfiq Kareem also remarked that it was important that those who criticised the entry procedures as arbitrary or discriminatory should provide clear verifiable evidence and visit the checkpoints themselves to see how the procedures were applied in practice. In this regard Major Sharhang Tawfiq Kareem hoped that in the future, the KRG authorities could work together with such organisations to allay any concerns they may have.

4.62 When asked if persons had been rejected from entering KRI at the external KRG checkpoints. The international organization (B) explained that they did not conduct visits to the checkpoints, so it was difficult to comment. [The same source explained ...] that they did not conduct visits to the KRG checkpoints and that information on how entry procedures are applied at these checkpoints and reports of violations, were based on interviews with detainees who were arrested at a KRG checkpoint.

See also: Use of fake documents and risk of arrest and Risk of arrest due to mistaken identity at checkpoints in KRI

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5. **Arrival Procedures at Airports in KRI**

5.01 Brig. General Serbest Sedeek [Head of Airport Security, Erbil International Airport] explained that Iraqi citizens arriving in Erbil International Airport and Suleimaniyah Airport on domestic flights, for example from Baghdad, only needed to present their Civil ID Card or Nationality Card upon arrival. According to Brig. General Serbest Sedeek, most of the security related procedures for flights from Baghdad take place prior to departure because of the security situation. There are therefore only limited security controls for arriving passengers on domestic flights to Erbil and Suleimaniyah airports. Brig. General Serbest Sedeek explained that there are many reasons why Iraqi security precautions are on a high alert and added there were several agencies operating in S/C Iraq and the disputed areas, including the police, intelligence services, Prime Minister’s security services and customs.

5.02 Brig. General Serbest Sedeek stated that for domestic flights arriving in Erbil or Suleimaniyah, all Iraqi citizens will have their photo taken and a photocopy of their identity document will also be taken. The identity document used could be either a Civil ID Card or Nationality Card. No arrival stamp is needed. These procedures took place in full cooperation with the relevant authorities in Baghdad.

5.03 When asked if the airport authorities would have a so-called ‘black list’, Brig. General Serbest Sedeek explained that the airport authorities in Erbil and Suleimaniyah airports only have what was referred to as a ‘stop list’. The ‘stop list’ is not the same as the ‘black list’; the latter is only for the Asayish at KRG Checkpoints. The ‘stop list’ comprises persons who are under suspicion of criminal activities, such as fraud, money laundering, terrorism or robbery. Persons on the ‘stop list’ would have a stop warrant issued against them by a court, giving the airport authorities legal authority to stop a person from travelling. Brig. General Serbest Sedeek clarified that persons on the ‘stop list’ would not be arrested unless there was additionally an outstanding arrest warrant which had been issued by the court. Brig. General Serbest Sedeek emphasised that persons on the ‘stop list’ cannot be arrested until a court has issued an arrest warrant.

*See also: [Update on entry procedures at the KRG external checkpoints](#)*

5.04 Brig. General Serbest Sedeek stated that the entry cards, i.e. Tourism Card, Work Card and Information Card/Residency Card for those seeking to reside in KRI, are not issued at the airports only by the Asayish at the KRG external checkpoints.

5.05 Regarding entry procedures for passengers on domestic flights arriving at Erbil and Suleimaniyah airports, an international organization (A) confirmed the information given to the delegation by the head of Airport Security, Brig. General Serbest Sedeek to be correct.27

5.06 [...]he Director of an international NGO in Erbil explained that Iraqi passengers from all of Iraq, including Baghdad can enter KRI without any difficulty. The security checks will take place at departure and not upon arrival in KRI airports. Entry is very easy and the

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27 The delegation explained during the interview with international organisation (A), information provided by Brig. General Serbest Sedeek about entry procedures at airports in KRI for Iraqi nationals travelling from within Iraq (as outlined in paragraphs 3.01 to 3.04). Additionally the delegation forwarded draft notes of the interview with Brig. General Serbest Sedeek to international organisation (A) to verify the accuracy of this information.
Director has never noted any kind of discriminatory procedures or behaviour at airports in KRI. The same procedure applies to all Iraqis at all airports in KRI.

Risk of arrest due to mistaken identity at airports in KRI

5.07 When asked if the international organization (B) had any reports/cases of Iraqi citizens being detained following arrival at Erbil or Suleimaniyah airports, on account suspicion of affiliation with a terrorist group due to mistaken identity/use of fake documents. The international organization (B) explained that they had no such cases. The international organization (B) clarified that they had only received cases of Iraqi citizens being held at the KRG external checkpoints and not at the airport. The organization was however aware of foreign nationals being held in KRG prisons for mistaken identity from the airport, some of whom had spent eight months in detention.

See also: Use of fake documents and risk of arrest and Risk of arrest due to mistaken identity at checkpoints in KRI
6. INTERNAL KRG CHECKPOINTS

Security measures applied at internal checkpoints

6.01 On the subject of internal checkpoints and freedom of movement within KRI, PAO [Public Aid Organisation, the UNHCR Protection Assistance Centre partner in Erbil] reported that on most occasions persons would not be asked anything by the security personnel or even stopped at the checkpoints, however on occasions individuals would be required to provide identification and questioned about their activities. PAO felt this process was also arbitrary and could easily change from one day to the next. However, PAO emphasized that there was freedom of movement for anyone in KRI.

6.02 An international organization (A) explained that internal checkpoints in KRI do not apply any particular security measures or procedures. However, if there is specific intelligence about a threat, for example information about a particular vehicle that should be stopped, the checkpoints would be alerted. According to the source every checkpoint would have a list of persons wanted by the authorities, and if there was intelligence someone was in a specific area, the officers would conduct more stringent checks of vehicles and persons. Foreigners or persons from other areas of Iraq did not undergo any special procedures at these checkpoints and would be treated no differently from residents of KRI.

6.03 An international organization (A) stated that from time to time, mobile checkpoints will be set up in KRI. These so-called 'emergency checkpoints' are established whenever there is a security situation requiring additional checkpoints.

6.04 Regarding internal checkpoints in KRI and mobile internal checkpoints, the Director of an international NGO in Erbil explained that mobile checkpoints did occur and were set up by Asayish whenever there are specific security concerns in a certain area. At the ordinary internal checkpoints, there was no particular security procedures and normally the officers at these checkpoints would not ask individuals to present any documentation when passing these checkpoints. However, if Asayish had for example details of a specific vehicle that should be stopped, officers at the internal checkpoints would be notified. Equally persons who may be considered conspicuous by checkpoint officers, for example strangers not from the area, may have to identify themselves by providing their Civil ID Card or other forms of identification documents. There are no variations in procedures between persons originating in KRI and persons originating in S/C Iraq and the disputed areas.

6.05 Harikar NGO [the UNHCR Protection Assistance Centre partner in Dahuk] stated that internal checkpoints in KRI were in place only for security reasons.

Location of internal checkpoints

6.06 The international organization (A) explained that there are Peshmerga outposts along the road between Erbil and Mosul. These outposts are located every 1,000 metres, after one has exited through the last major KRG checkpoint towards Mosul, where entry checks would be undertaken for individuals coming into Erbil (i.e. the Mosul Checkpoint). A similar security precaution applied on the road between Erbil and Kirkuk.

6.07 According to an international organization (A), the internal checkpoints between the city of Erbil and the city of Suleimaniyah will soon be removed. Only the checkpoint at the...
Kirkuk entry of Suleimaniyah will remain. The checkpoints between Erbil and Dohuk will remain as usual, as the road between the two cities pass through the disputed area.
7. **FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT WITHIN KRI FOR NON-IRAQI CITIZENS INCLUDING REFUGEES IN KRI**

7.01 Shokhr Yaseen Yaseen [Director of Bureau, Bureau of Migration & Displacement (BMD), Ministry of Interior, Erbil] explained that all non-Iraqi citizens, including refugees, in KRI are free to travel throughout KRI. There are no limits in the freedom of movement of non-Iraqi citizens in KRI.

7.02 General Kaiwan [Asayish security, responsible for KRG external checkpoints] stated that there was absolute freedom of movement within KRI for foreigners and refugees residing in KRI. Refugees holding a Residency Card and/or a UNHCR Registration Card were free to travel throughout KRI. There were no limitations and there were no special procedures for foreigners and refugees at KRG internal checkpoints.

7.03 Concerning freedom of movement in KRI for persons of non Iraqi origin, i.e. non Iraqi citizens, the Director of an international NGO in Erbil explained that foreigners including refugees with a UNHCR identity card or a residency card have the right to travel freely throughout KRI. There are no particular procedures at internal checkpoints for such persons. Any person with a legal stay in KRI is free to travel in all three KRI governorates.

7.04 PAO [Public Aid Organisation, the UNHCR Protection Assistance Centre partner in Erbil] reported that in the case of non-Iraqi persons in KRI, providing such persons had a Residency Card or/and UNHCR Refugee Card, as there are people who are not registered with UNHCR, they would not experience any restrictions in their freedom of movement in KRI, providing their card was still valid and in-date. Iranian refugees in KRI with Residency Cards or UNHCR Refugee Cards would be permitted to move freely throughout KRI.

7.05 [The international organization (B) observed that they had no reports on limitations of freedom of movement for foreigners residing in KRI, including refugees registered with UNHCR.]

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8. UPDATE ON SECURITY PROCEDURES TO RESIDE IN KRI

Registration with the Asayish and the application procedures for an Information Card

8.01 During a visit by the delegation to the Mosul-Erbil checkpoint, Major Sharhang Tawfiq Kareem [who had overall operational responsibility for the checkpoint] explained after an individual had entered KRI, they were required to report to the neighbourhood Asayish office, to register their presence in the area. Major Sharhang Tawfiq Kareem clarified that a person seeking to stay in KRI would subsequently be required to apply for a pink Information Card at the neighbourhood Asayish, which would allow them to remain in KRI for as long as they wished.

8.02 Brigadier General Abdulrahman Ismael Aziz [Erbil (Governorate) Civil Information Card General Director, Ministry of Interior, Citizenship Police ... explained] that for example if a person came to KRI from another part of the country and took up residence in a hotel, that person could remain only until their entry pass, i.e. Tourism Card, Work Card or Information Card/Residency Card for those seeking to reside in KRI had expired. Such persons would then be required to leave or regularise their stay with the Asayish in accordance with recognised regulations.

8.03 Muhammed Saleem Mizuree [Head of Private Bureau of General Security (Asayish)] stated Iraqi nationals from outside KRI seeking to stay in KRI, would be required to go the local Asayish office in the neighbourhood they were living, to apply for an Information Card. To do this a person would fill out a form, giving relevant information about their background and their intentions whilst in KRI. This information would then be compared against information they provided at the KRG external checkpoint when the person first entered KRI, i.e. when they obtained their entry card. In addition a person would also be required to provide a letter from the local Mukhtar in their neighbourhood, to confirm their place of residence in KRI. The Asayish would then issue an Information Card.

8.04 Muhammed Saleem Mizuree stated that the Information Card/Residency Card for those seeking to reside in KRI issued at the KRG external checkpoints should not be mistaken for the pink Information Card issued by the local Asayish office, for those wishing to extend their stay in KRI. The pink Information Card was issued only once to each person in KRI. There was no need to have this card renewed as it was valid for an unlimited time, as long as the individual remained residing in KRI. This procedure applied to all Iraqis residing in KRI, regardless of ethnicity and was a procedure which existed to record where each person in KRI was living. When a person therefore moved house in KRI he or she would be required to report to the local Asayish office, so this information could be updated on their records accordingly. Muhammed Saleem Mizuree added that this Information Card could also be used to travel freely throughout KRI’s three governorates. If a person who had been issued with an Information Card was to leave KRI permanently and intended to move, either to another country or another part of Iraq outside KRI, they would be required to inform their local Asayish office and hand in their Information Card.

8.05 When asked if a person could reside in KRI without obtaining an Information Card from the Asayish, Muhammed Saleem Mizuree explained that this may have been possible four or five years ago, however now the processes had been strengthened and unified to ensure greater consistency in regulations and so this would not be possible. Muhammed
Saleem Mizuree clarified these procedures had been in place for the last three years and confirmed that it would not be possible for ordinary Iraqis to reside in KRI without an Information Card, although this could occur in special cases, such as for VIPs from Baghdad. However for ordinary Iraqis, the Asayish would be made aware of a person residing in KRI who did not have an Information Card. This would be done for example through the local Mukhtar who would be informed by local residents in the community about suspicious or unknown persons in the area.

8.06 The international organization (B) stated that any person having entered KRI and wishing to stay for an extended period of time will have to report to the nearest Asayish office within 24 to 48 hours, together with his or her reference in person, in order to have an Information Card issued.

8.07 [The international organization (B) continued p]ersons who have a short term permit to stay in KRI, i.e. Tourism Card, will not need a reference at the Asayish office. Anyone who stays for less than a month in KRI will only have to report to the nearest Asayish office and provide an address for where they were residing in KRI. Those who wish to reside in KRI for more than one month however, must report to the nearest Asayish office and provide a reference. If a person comes with one month permission and overstays, he could be asked to leave and be blacklisted.

8.08 [According to Harikar NGO, the UNHCR Protection Assistance Centre partner in Dahuk t]hose Iraqis who wish to stay for a longer period of time or permanently in KRI will have to approach the local Asayish which will issue an Information Card. [...] Harikar NGO explained that in order for a person to reside in Dohuk Governorate and thus have an Information Card issued, one would have to present to the Asayish a letter from his or her neighbourhood Mukhtar, a Civil ID Card and a reference. When asked how long this Information Card was valid for, Harikar NGO stated that the validity of this card was unlimited and valid for as long as the person sought to reside in KRI.

8.09 PAO [Public Aid Organisation, the UNHCR Protection Assistance Centre partner in Erbil] stated that the application process for the Information Card issued by the local Asayish was the same as had been reported to the Danish Immigration Service previously and there was no change in the procedures.28

See also: Issuance of entry passes and Annex F – Sample of Information Card issued by Asayish

Update on the reference requirement

8.10 According to Muhammed Saleem Mizuree [Head of Private Bureau of General Security (Asayish)], whether a reference was required when applying for an Information Card from the neighbourhood Asayish would depend on the individual concerned. For example professionals, such as doctors, government officials or business persons would not be required to provide a reference. However in some cases it may be required, for example

where a person was completely unknown to anyone in KRI. When asked how frequently a person applying for an Information Card would be asked to provide a reference, Muhammed Saleem Mizuree explained that this may occur in only two or three cases per month.

8.11 Harikar NGO [...] added that they thought a reference was still required for residency (i.e. when applying for an Information Card).

8.12 PAO stated that the application process for the Information Card issued by the local Asayish was the same as had been reported to the Danish Immigration Service previously and there was no change in the procedures.\(^{29}\)

8.13 The international organization (B) stated that any person having entered KRI and wishing to stay for an extended period of time will have to report to the nearest Asayish office within 24 to 48 hours, together with his or her reference in person, in order to have an Information Card issued.

8.14 [The international organization (B) also stated] persons who have a short term permit to stay in KRI, i.e. Tourism Card, will not need a reference at the Asayish office. Anyone who stays for less than a month in KRI will only have to report to the nearest Asayish office and provide an address for where they were residing in KRI. Those who wish to reside in KRI for more than one month however, must report to the nearest Asayish office and provide a reference. If a person comes with one month permission and overstays, he could be asked to leave and be blacklisted.

See also: Issuance of entry passes

Rejection of persons applying for an Information Card, occurrence of arbitrary practices and risk of deportation

8.15 Muhammed Saleem Mizuree [Head of Private Bureau of General Security (Asayish)] confirmed he was not aware of any cases in which an Iraqi from S/C Iraq or the disputed areas had been deported from KRI however he clarified that there were some occasions when a person’s application for an Information Card would be rejected. Muhammed Saleem Mizuree stated such occurrences were increasingly rare and would only occur when a person was considered a security risk. Muhammed Saleem Mizuree explained that before an Information Card was issued, additional checks would be carried out with the Ministry of Interior in Baghdad and terrorist Information Support Units in KRG and if someone was considered a security risk, their application would be rejected. Similarly if someone had overstayed on a Tourist Card their application may be rejected, although this would depend on the specific circumstances of each case.

8.16 Muhammed Saleem Mizuree explained the KRG authorities had issued a huge number of pink Information Cards in KRI and that this card was important because it demonstrated a

person had officially recorded their presence and place of residency with the KRG. This was also important for a person to access local services, such as registering their children at a local school.

8.17 When asked if Harikar NGO had any records of persons being deported for not having been issued an Information Card, Harikar NGO stated that it had no records of this being the case. It was emphasized that it is not a complicated procedure to apply for and to get an Information Card. It was reiterated that all entry and residency procedures are only related to security issues.

8.18 The Director of an international NGO in Erbil had not heard about any cases in which persons had been deported or rejected from KRI and returned to S/C Iraq or the disputed area because they were not permitted to stay by the Asayish.

Differential treatment for IDPs

The following section should be considered together with information under the section entitled Registration and monitoring of IDP communities in KRI and specifically information under Difficulties in supporting IDPs in KRI

8.19 Muhammed Saleem Mizuree [Head of Private Bureau of General Security (Asayish)] explained persons displaced by violence coming to KRI from the rest of Iraq would be required to apply for an Information Card at their neighbourhood Asayish in the same way as any other person applying for this card and there existed no special procedure to assist them. Muhammed Saleem Mizuree however went on to clarify that for Christians there existed special procedures, which meant such persons were not obliged to apply for an Information Card at the Asayish. Muhammed Saleem Mizuree explained this was because the Christians community was at particular risk from terrorist groups in S/C Iraq and the disputed areas and the terrorist threat posed from Christians was considered to be non-existent.

8.20 When asked if Harikar NGO [the UNHCR Protection Assistance Centre partner in Dahuk] was aware of any cases where persons could not obtain an Information Card, Harkar NGO explained that the 2010/2011 UNHCR/PAC survey showed that this did not occur and none of the interviewees had heard of anyone being denied an Information Card.

8.21 With regard to IDPs, PAO [Public Aid Organisation, the UNHCR Protection Assistance Centre partner in Erbil] were of the opinion that only families would be likely to successfully obtain an Information Card from the Asayish. According to PAO Erbil individuals who were internally displaced were therefore at risk of deportation from KRI by the authorities. However PAO clarified that they had no specific information on persons having been deported from KRI and that no such cases had been reported to their organisation. When asked if PAO were aware of any cases in which individuals had been rejected for an Information Card, PAO went onto give the example of an individual who in 2009 moved from Baghdad to Jordan due to the security situation and who subsequently moved to Erbil where he tried to register with the Asayish for an Information Card. However according to PAO, the individual was turned down and decided to leave KRI after three days. When asked why this individual had been rejected for an Information Card, PAO explained that it was for no particular reason, other than that the authorities would be suspicious of such a person.30

30 PAO stated in 2010 to the DIS that the person in question was an “Arab man, who was originally from Baghdad, had lived in Jordan for the past 16 years prior to entering KRI” (DIS, Entry Procedures and Residence in Kurdistan
8.22 PAO also reported that Arab individuals who were internally displaced by violence, i.e. IDPs, would face similar difficulties when attempting to obtain an Information Card from the Asayish to remain in KRI. It was for this reason that such persons would apply only for a Tourism Card at the KRG checkpoint as this was an easier way to gain entry to KRI and which subsequently could be renewed.

See also: Issuance of entry passes

9. **ENTRY PROCEDURES AND RESIDENCE FOR STATELESS FASTLY-KURDS**

9.01 Shokhr Yaseen Yaseen [Director of Bureau, Bureau of Migration & Displacement (BMD), Ministry of Interior, Erbil] had no information regarding stateless Faily Kurds in KRI. The Faily Kurds were originally Iraqi citizens, but during the war with Iran in the 1980s Saddam Hussein withdrew the Iraqi citizenship of 666 Faily Kurds and they were made stateless. According to Shokhr Yaseen Yaseen there are no stateless Faily Kurds residing in KRI. On the contrary, there are many Iraqi Faily Kurds in KRI and there is a Faily Kurdish Cultural Centre in Erbil. In any case Shokhr Yaseen Yaseen clarified that matters related to citizenship, were handled by the GoI Ministry of Interior in Baghdad.

9.02 When asked if there would be specific entry and residence procedures for stateless Faily Kurds wishing to enter and reside in KRI, Shokhr Yaseen Yaseen suggested that the Asayish should be consulted on these issues. Shokhr Yaseen Yaseen reiterated that he had never heard of any stateless Faily Kurds residing in KRI, and added that the historical ties between the Kurdish people mean there is a common respect for each other.

9.03 General Kaiwan [General Manager, Kurdistan Checkpoints, Kurdistan Regional Security Protection Agency, Security General Directorate, KRG Ministry of Interior, Erbil] explained that in the case of Faily Kurds, such persons did not have any difficulties travelling throughout KRI, providing they had registered with the authorities in Baghdad to obtain their Civil ID Card. General Kaiwan added that it was only the GoI that can grant stateless persons citizenship in Iraq.

9.04 Regarding stateless Faily Kurds, Brig. General Serbest Sedeek [Head of Airport Security, Erbil International Airport] stated that he had never heard of issues related to these persons. He added that KRG authorities do not deal with nationality issues. KRG is part of Iraq and such issues are the responsibility of GoI in Baghdad.

9.05 On the subject of stateless Faily Kurds, PAO [Public Aid Organisation, the UNHCR Protection Assistance Centre partner in Erbil] considered that such persons would face difficulties trying to enter KRI at KRG checkpoints, although the PAO did not have any experience dealing with such cases. The PAO reported that there was a network of NGOs representing the interests of Faily Kurds operating across Iraq and that the NGO Kurdish-Faily Association operated in Erbil.

9.06 Regarding stateless Faily Kurds, the international organization (B) stated that the agency had undertaken interviews in Suleimaniyah with two stateless Faily Kurds in 2010 who were in prison and unable to get identity documents. Such cases were difficult to resolve because matters related to citizenship needed to be referred through Baghdad and the GoI. They were originally from southern Iraq. The international organization (B) had no information on problems related to entry procedures and residence in KRI for stateless Faily Kurds.

9.07 Concerning entry procedures and residence in KRI for stateless Faily Kurds in Iraq, Harikar NGO [the UNHCR Protection Assistance Centre partner in Dahuk] stated that it had never heard of Faily Kurds residing in Dohuk Governorate. Harikar NGO had no reports or information on issues or incidents related to stateless Faily Kurds.

*See also: Use of documentation in KRI*
10. **USE OF DOCUMENTATION IN KRI**

The following discrete section provides information on matters related to documentation and transfer of personal documents in KRI. For additional information on documentation required in relation to entry and residence procedures and the impact of lack of documentation, refer to the relevant sections outlined in the Contents.

**Lack of documentation**

10.01 According to the international organization (B), there were many reasons why some persons do not have their original documents and are in possession of fake documents: conflict had caused many people to flee their homes without being in possession of their personal documents; some had lost personal documents under the Baath regime or had had them stolen. The international organization (B) was unaware if there were any procedures in Iraq for the re-issuance of lost documents to Iraqi citizens.

10.02 Many Iraqis claimed to have lost their personal documents in 2006/07 and the total number of citizens without documents was considered to be quite high. The international organization (B) added that some had lost these documents when they were pushed out of their homes by one of the conflicting parties in Iraq, whereas others had had their documents taken by sectarian groups in order to push them out of their traditional home area.

10.03 [A]ccording to PAO [Public Aid Organisation, the UNHCR Protection Assistance Centre partner in Erbil], the issue of lack of documentation among IDPs was not a common occurrence now, compared to previous years, where persons fled violence immediately, and often without their documents. Today IDPs in KRI usually had their personal documentation.

10.04 Harikar NGO [the UNHCR Protection Assistance Centre partner in Dahuk] added that most IDPs were in possession of their personal documents, therefore this was less of an issue now.

**Transfer of personal documents and assistance available in KRI for persons IDPs**

10.05 Regarding transfer of personal documents in Iraq, the international organization (B) stated that under normal circumstances one has to go back to one’s place of origin in order to have such documents transferred, for instance to KRI or to have lost documents reissued. When asked if the BMD would be of any assistance to IDPs and other Iraqis in need of transferring his or her personal documents to KRI, the international organization (B) stated that the BMD is not known to be very active in assisting people in need of personal documents. This assistance is not very well organized by BMD. The international organization (B) concluded that it all boils down to weak state institutions and unresolved political issues between KRG and GoI.

10.06 When asked if the BMD provided any legal support to IDPs who have lost identity documents, such as their Civil ID Card, Shokhr Yaseen Yaseen [Director of Bureau, Bureau of Migration & Displacement (BMD), Ministry of Interior, Erbil] clarified that the BMD only provide official and logistic support to IDPs not legal support.
10.07 PAO explained their organisation would provide support to IDPs who needed to re-obtain missing documentation and PAO would deal with around three to five cases like this per month. PAO also clarified that often this role would involve facilitating discussions with the Asayish in cases where persons had experienced difficulties regularising their entry/stay in KRI. However according to PAO, the issue of lack of documentation among IDPs was not a common occurrence now, compared to previous years, where persons fled violence immediately, and often without their documents. Today IDPs in KRI usually had their personal documentation. PAO also reported that due to the relative stabilisation in the security situation across Iraq, persons were more confident to return back to their place of origin for a short period of time to acquire documentation or would even pay for persons, such as taxi drivers, to return on their behalf and through a Power of Attorney, obtain documentation for them. PAO reported that in the majority of cases, IDPs would not be at risk of harm if they returned to their place of origin temporarily. It was only if such persons sought to return home permanently and reacquire lost property would they come to be at risk in the majority of cases. PAO reiterated that property rights and ownership was one of the most complex and challenging issues IDPs in Iraq.

10.08 Harikar NGO explained as part of its role, it assists people to have their PDS [Public Distribution System] Cards and other personal documents transferred to KRI and reissued. Harikar NGO has a specific Legal Assistance Programme in order to assist with these transfers, and Harikar NGO added that it has a well functioning cooperation with the Asayish in order to facilitate the transfer of documents. Harikar NGO stated that transfer of PDS Cards and other personal documents takes place according to the law.

10.09 Concerning transfer of personal documents, Harikar NGO explained that it is a problem when a person – for security reasons – is unable to return to his or her place of origin in order to have personal documents transferred to KRI. However, Harikar NGO stated that there are Legal Assistance Centre’s similar to the one run by Harikar NGO in all Iraqi governorates. All these centres including Harikar’s are funded by UNHCR, and all centres can share information with one another. These centres are called PAC (Protection and Assistance Centre). Harikar NGO assists with cases involving transfer/reissuance of personal documents two to three times per month. It was added that Harikar NGO cooperates with the BMD as well as with the Asayish in KRI in order to have documents transferred. However Harikar NGO added that most IDPs were in possession of their personal documents, therefore this was less of an issue now.

10.10 Regarding transfer of personal documents from S/C Iraq and the disputed areas, Harikar NGO stated that transfer of PDS Cards is a complex matter. Transfer of PDS Cards is easy for Christians irrespective of their place of origin in Iraq. On the other hand Kurds from the disputed areas will find it very difficult to transfer their PDS Cards. This was related to political factors regarding the future of the disputed areas and whether they would become part of KRI. Harikar NGO was unsure however whether PDS Cards would be used for voter registration in the future. Arabs from S/C Iraq or the disputed areas will need a security clearance from the Asayish in order to have their PDS Cards transferred. This procedure is lengthy and it can take up to two months.

10.11 According to Shokhr Yaseen Yaseen the transfer of PDS Cards is a sensitive issue in Iraq, both politically and economically. Transfer of PDS Cards alters the demographic make-up of governorates and provinces, as the PDS Card functions as a registration card at elections.
10.12 IOM clarified that whenever they were unable to provide services directly to an IDP, they would refer a person to specialist organisations who may be able to assist them (referral system).

See also: Registration and monitoring of IDP communities in KRI and specifically information under Difficulties in supporting IDPs in KRI and Use of fake documents and risk of arrest

The new Information Card issued under Law 95/1978

Background and purpose of the card

10.13 Brigadier General Abdulrahman Ismael Aziz, Erbil Civil Information Card General Director, Ministry of Interior, Citizenship Police stated that the new Information Card had been issued in KRI since 4 December 2010. The initiative was introduced to issue a new Information Card to all Iraqi nationals residing in KRI and was legislated under Law 95 of 1978 relating to the Organization of Places of Domicile and Residence inside Iraq. [...] Brigadier General Abdulrahman Ismael Aziz explained that the Information Card issued under Law 95/1978 was administered by the Ministry of Interior, General Directorate for Nationality in Baghdad. The aim of this process was to provide a reliable registration of residency of all Iraqis. Brigadier General Abdulrahman Ismael Aziz clarified that only one card was issued to the head of each family, therefore individuals would also still require their Civil ID Card.

10.14 Brigadier General Abdulrahman Ismael Aziz explained that the Information Card issued under Law 95/1978 was different to the Information Card issued by the Asayish in KRG and that if a person was seeking to move to KRI from S/C Iraq or the disputed areas, they would still be required to register with the Asayish to inform them of their presence in the area and apply for an Information Card.

10.15 PAO [Public Aid Organisation, the UNHCR PAC partner in Erbil] clarified that a new Information Card, issued under Law 95/1978, was also being issued in KRI for residents. This process began in January 2011. The new Information Card issued under Law 95/1978 was issued by the KRG Main Police Station in each quarter and not by the Asayish offices.

10.16 PAO explained that the intention of the new card was to improve or simplify the documentation procedures in Iraq, so persons did not need to carry the wide range of documentation commonly used in Iraq, such as Civil ID Card; Nationality Card; PDS Card or the letter from the neighbourhood Mukhtar, used to verify a person’s place of residence. The Information Card issued under Law 95/1978 was to improve access to day to day services and could be used as identification, when for example conducting banking transactions. However PAO clarified that this card did not replace or make all these other documents obsolete, and that for example, to access food rations one would still need to have a valid PDS Card.

10.17 Harikar NGO [the UNHCR Protection Assistance Centre partner in Dahuk] stated that this card does not replace other ID cards. When asked why the new Information Card was needed, Harikar NGO explained the card was introduced to provide a reliable record on where persons were residing across Iraq and was necessary to access services provided by government departments.
10.18 The international organization (B) explained that the issuance of the new Information Card, issued under Law 95/1978, makes life easier for Iraqis as they only have to be in possession of this card whenever approaching the authorities, instead of needing their Civil ID Card; PDS Card and Nationality Card. However the international organization (B) clarified that the new card did not make any real difference to entry procedures at the KRG checkpoints.

10.19 Brigadier General Abdulrahman Ismael Aziz reiterated that the Information Card issued under Law 95/1978 applied to all Iraqi citizens, in all 18 Governorates of Iraq and was laid down by the GoI. These procedures did not relate to security procedures in KRI and regulations regarding registration with the Asayish. Brigadier General Abdulrahman Ismael Aziz went onto explain that for example if a person came to KRI from another part of the country and took up residence in a hotel, that person could remain only until their entry pass, i.e. Tourism Card, Work Card or Information Card/Residency Card for those seeking to reside in KRI had expired. Such persons would then be required to leave or regularise their stay with the Asayish in accordance with recognised regulations.

10.20 Muhammed Saleem Mizuree [Head of Private Bureau of General Security (Asayish)] explained that a new Information Card, issued under law 95/1978 was currently being issued in KRI. This card was administered through the GoI in Baghdad and issued to all Iraqi citizens. Muhammed Saleem Mizuree explained that when this project was fully implemented in KRI and all citizens in KRI had this new information card, the Asayish would link in with this police information card system.

See also: Update on entry procedures at the KRG external checkpoints; Registration with the Asayish and application procedures for an Information Card and Annex G – Sample of Information Card issued under Law 95/1978

Using the card as identification for internal travel in KRI

10.21 Brigadier General Abdulrahman Ismael Aziz explained that the Information Card issued under Law 95/1978 could be used as identification to pass through the KRG checkpoints and enter KRI. [...] Brigadier General Abdulrahman Ismael Aziz added that the new Information Card issued under Law 95/1978 did not replace the Civil ID Card.

10.22 Brigadier General Abdulrahman Ismael Aziz stated that any Iraqi in possession of the new Information Card issued under Law 95/1978 is free to travel throughout Iraq and KRI without having to present any other documentation at any checkpoint.

10.23 PAO reported that the Information Card issued under Law 95/1978, together with a car/vehicle registration, could be used to travel freely throughout all of Iraq including KRI and between KRI and S/C Iraq and the disputed areas and added that this card was respected as a legitimate form of identification by the GoI and KRG authorities. [...] However a] staff member of PAO also added that they did not personally have confidence in this new identification, so would always carry another form of identification such as their Civil ID Card. When asked why this was the case, the staff member of PAO did not give any specific reason, but felt the new Information Card issued under Law 95/1978 had only recently been brought into circulation in KRI and so it was prudent to have other more commonly used identification as well, in case a security officer at a checkpoint did not know about the new card.

Issuance procedures in KRI
10.24 Brigadier General Abdulrahman Ismael Aziz observed that to apply for an Information Card issued under Law 95/1978, the head of the family must provide a range of documentation including all Civil ID Cards for each member of the family; Nationality Cards for the head of each family; PDS Cards; a letter from the local Mukhtar to confirm a person’s place of residence; four passport photographs and fingerprint. The head of the family would then be required to attend one of the 12 Information Card offices in Erbil city or one of 56 offices in Erbil Governorate. The length of time it took to be issued with a card varied between offices, due to population density, but this procedure could take between one or three weeks. Alternatively a person could visit the Residency Police registration office in Erbil, to have their application processed in around one hour.

10.25 Brigadier General Abdulrahman Ismael Aziz explained that in the case of those who were disabled/handicapped or too ill to visit a police station/registration centre to apply for an Information Card issued under Law 95/1978, police officers would visit the individual’s place of residence in order to complete the application and take their fingerprints.

10.26 When asked if some persons were unable to apply for an Information Card issued under Law 95/1978, Brigadier General Abdulrahman Ismael Aziz explained that providing they were able to provide the required documentation and had a permanent residency address in Iraq, they would not be denied a card. However persons without a permanent address, or family address, could not apply for such a card. Additionally, persons in prison or those who were mentally ill were also denied the right to apply for this Information Card.

10.27 [Following the interview with Brigadier General Abdulrahman Ismael Aziz, Erbil Civil Information Card General Director, Ministry of Interior, Citizenship Police, the delegation was given a tour of the registration centre where persons could come to apply in person for the Information Card issued under Law 95/1978. The registration centre comprised a series of male and female manned booths where applicants would queue and provide documentation and registration details. According to Brigadier General Abdulrahman Ismael Aziz, the first booth required persons to be screened against persons wanted under the ‘stop list’ and ‘black list’. After this security check had been completed the applicant would then complete the rest of the registration process. Once an application had been completed by the registration clerks in the booths, the file was then passed to an authorising officer, who would sign off the application and the file would be transferred to the local office where the applicant resided. This office would then arrange for the Information Card issued under Law 95/1978 to be issued to the head of family.

10.28 The delegation subsequently visited the offices of the Residency Police and met with staff involved in the administration of the Information Cards issued under Law 95/1978.

See also: *The ‘black list’* and *The ‘stop list’*

10.29 Brigadier General Abdulrahman Ismael Aziz, Erbil Civil Information Card General Director, Ministry of Interior, Residency Police stated that currently these new Information Cards issued under Law 95/1978 were issued in the form of a paper card, with each card given a unique serial number. However Brigadier General Abdulrahman Ismael Aziz explained that he was currently engaged in negotiations with Baghdad to switch an electronic card which would be able to store information/data on the card itself. This system was however currently not in place. The current paper system was therefore considered an interim measure, although Brigadier General Abdulrahman Ismael Aziz
explained that personal data relating to each paper card was already being input onto a computer database system by the Residency Police.

10.30 Brigadier General Abdulrahman Ismael Aziz stated that the application procedures were the same in Dahuk and Suliemanyiah governorates, as well as through the rest of Iraq.

10.31 PAO also clarified that the new Information Card issued under Law 95/1978 was for residents of KRI only and that for other persons only temporarily residing in KRI, for example IDPs, they would not apply for this new Information Card in KRI. PAO explained that the Information Card issued by the Asayish office and used to register those residing temporarily in KRI was still in operation and that this card would still be issued to temporary residents, such as IDPs in KRI.

See also: Update on entry procedures at the KRG external checkpoints and Registration with the Asayish and application procedures for an Information Card

Circulation in KRI

10.32 According to Brigadier General Abdulrahman Ismael Aziz around a quarter of the population of Erbil Governorate currently had the Information Card issued under Law 95/1978. Altogether approximately 400,000 Information Cards issued under Law 95/1978 had been issued in KRI. The aim was that each family in Iraq would have a new Information Card. All Iraqis had the right to be issued with a new Information Card.

10.33 Brigadier General Abdulrahman Ismael Aziz explained that he expected that 90 per cent of the population in KRI to be issued with this new card in the next two years and now is about 43% completed. Currently there were 270 members of staff employed by the Erbil Residency Police, however according to Brigadier General Abdulrahman Ismael Aziz there was a need for further resources and investment in research and development.

10.34 [...] PAO Erbil explained this card began being issued to residents in KRI in January 2011, however not everyone currently had this card. Residents of KRI had up until the end of the year to obtain this new Information Card, which was issued by the General Directorate of Civil Status in KRI. [...]PAO stated that so far only around a quarter of the population in KRI had this card.

10.35 Regarding the new Information Card issued under Law 95/1978, Harikar NGO explained that many people in Dahuk were applying for this card. [...] Harikar NGO added that this new card was currently being issued to all families across KRI.
Annex A

LIST OF SOURCES INTERVIEWED BY THE DELEGATION

An international organization (A)

An international organization (B)

Brig. General Serbest Sedeek, Head of Airport Security, Erbil International Airport

Brigadier General Abdulrahman Ismael Aziz, Erbil (Governorate) Civil Information Card General Director, Ministry of Interior, Citizenship Police

Colonel Muhammed Saleem Mizuree, Head of Private Bureau of General Security (Asayish)

Director of an international NGO in Erbil

General Kaiwan Tawfeq, General Manager, Kurdistan Checkpoints, Kurdistan Regional Security Protection Agency, Security General Directorate, KRG Ministry of Interior, Erbil

Harikar NGO, Protection and Assistance Centre, Dohuk, http://www.harikar.org/

IOM Erbil, Regional Hub – Northern Iraq, http://www.iomiraq.net/aboutIOM.html


Shokr Yaseen Yaseen, Director of Bureau, Bureau of Migration & Displacement (BMD), Ministry of Interior, Erbil

List of sources the delegation interviewed during visits to the KRG external checkpoints in Erbil

Major Sharhang Tawfiq Kareem, Mosul-Erbil checkpoint

1st Lt Hamza Nimat Nasir, Officer in Charge of the Mosul-Erbil checkpoint during the delegation’s visit

2nd Lt Wishyar Ahmad Jameel Officer in Charge of the Kirkuk-Erbil checkpoint during the delegation’s visit

2nd Lt Muhammad Taha Ibrahim, Kirkuk-Erbil checkpoint

An officer at the Mosul-Erbil checkpoint
Annex B

TERM OF REFERENCE

Untitled document

1. Profile of Iraqis entering KRI from S/C Iraq, incl. disputed areas, and available statistical data

2. Entry procedures at KRG external checkpoints and airports
   2.1 Occurrence of arbitrary practices
   2.2 Regional variations (between the three Governorates)
   2.3 Variations in applied security procedures
   2.4 Documentation required at external checkpoints
   2.5 Entry procedures at Erbil and Suleimaniyah airports (for Iraqis travelling from within Iraq)
   2.6 Reports of denial of entry
   2.7 Entry procedures and residence for stateless Fayli-Kurds

3. Internal KRG checkpoints/freedom of movement within KRI
   3.1 Location and function of internal checkpoints (incl. mobile checkpoints)
   3.2 Security measures applied at internal checkpoints
   3.3 Documentation required at internal checkpoints
   3.4 Variations in procedures between persons originating in KRI and persons originating in S/C Iraq and disputed areas
   3.5 Freedom of movement for non-Iraqi citizens, including refugees in KRI

4. Application for Information Cards and risk of deportation from KRI
   4.1 Documentation required to apply for Information Cards
   4.2 Renewal of Information Cards
   4.3 Risk of deportation of persons who’s application/renewal of Information Card is rejected
   4.4 Occurrence of arbitrary practices

5. Use of documentation in KRI
   5.1 Transfer of personal documents from GoI to KRG
   5.2 Impact of lack of documentation
   5.3 Assistance available to support transfer of documentation
Glossary of Abbreviations and Acronyms

- BMD – Bureau of Migration & Displacement
- CCTV – Closed Circuit Television
- CDO – Civil Development Organisation
- COI – Country of Origin Information
- DIS – Danish Immigration Service
- EU – European Union
- ECS – European Country of Origin Sponsorship Programme
- GoI – Government of Iraq
- ID – Identification
- IDP – Internally Displaced Person
- IFA – Internal Flight Alternative
- IOM – International Organization for Migration
- KDP – Kurdistan Democratic Party
- KR – Kurdistan Region (i.e. KRI)
- KRG – Kurdistan Regional Government
- KRI – Kurdistan Region of Iraq
- MoDM – Ministry of Displacement and Migration
- NGO – Non-Governmental Organization
- PAC – Protection and Assistance Centre
- PAO – Public Aid Organisation
- PDS – Public Distribution System
- PUK – Patriotic Union of Kurdistan party
- S/C Iraq – south/central Iraq
- UK – United Kingdom
- UKBA – UK Border Agency
- UN – United Nations
- UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
- UNHCR Stockholm – UNHCR Regional Office for the Baltic and Nordic Countries, Stockholm
- US – United States
Annex D

WRITTEN CONTRIBUTION PROVIDED BY UNHCR LONDON, DECEMBER 2011

The delegation received the following written response from UNCHR London, dated December 2011. In considering this written contribution, it should be highlighted that paragraph 5.1.4 of the 2010 EU common guidelines on (Joint) Fact Finding Missions: a practical tool to assist member states in organizing (joint) Fact Finding Missions, on the subject of COI with analysis and policy observes:

“COI, with analysis and policy would be considered the least transparent and most susceptible to bias. This type of [fact finding] report is not recommended for reasons of objectivity, impartiality and Independence of the COI Unit. There should always be a clear distinction between COI and policy.”

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31 The 2010 EU common guidelines on (Joint) Fact Finding Missions: a practical tool to assist member states in organizing (joint) Fact Finding Missions was produced by a working group comprised of representatives from COI units working for the immigration authorities in Belgium, Norway, Austria, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The reference group for the project was comprised of representatives from Denmark (chair), UNHCR, ACCORD, the European Commission, Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland and Switzerland.

32 The 2010 EU common guidelines on (Joint) Fact Finding Missions: a practical tool to assist member states in organizing (joint) Fact Finding Missions, pp.33.
Observations on Iraq for the UKBA FFM

The below information is provided, further to request from UKBA in relation to situation in Iraq.

The information complements the information already provide in UNHCR’s Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Iraqi Asylum-Seekers in April 2009.\(^1\) The validity of these Guidelines was confirmed by the Note on the Continued Applicability of the April 2009 UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Iraqi Asylum-Seekers issued on 28 July 2010.\(^2\) The issuance of revised guidance, which will supersede the above guidance and may contain further detail or updates of the information and positions contained in this document, is pending further developments in Iraq.

The information relates specifically to re-admission to Iraq and availability of protection in parts of Iraq. Nothing in the below should be understood to limit in any way eligibility for protection as set out in the Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Iraqi Asylum-Seekers mentioned above.

1. Re-admission to Iraq

1.1. Admission of Foreigners to Iraq

Pursuant to Article 3 of the Foreigners Residency Law No. 118 of 1978, foreigners cannot enter or exit Iraqi territory without a valid passport or travel document from an authorized source, including an ICRC Travel Document. Entry must be based on a valid visa and be through an official border entry/exit point. All foreigners must complete and sign an entry form at the border.

There are a number of provisions penalising persons for illegal entry and exit into Iraq. Article 24(1) of the Foreigners Residency Law stipulates that persons found to be in breach of Article 3 are to receive a prison sentence of either life imprisonment (20 years) or for a term of 5 to 10 years in addition to the confiscation of the property in their possession. Article 24(5) further provides for the expulsion or deportation of persons

\(^1\) Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/49f569cf2.html

\(^2\) Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texs/vtx/refworld?doctid=4c4fed282
convicted of illegal entry or exit. Article 10(1A) of the Passports Law No. 32 of 1999 provides that persons who exit or try to exit, or enter or try to enter Iraq without a valid passport or travel document will be sentenced to 5 to 15 years imprisonment and confiscation of their movable and immovable properties. Article 10 (1C) of the same law states that persons who exit or try to exit, enter or try to enter Iraq through unofficial border points and/or points where there is no document checking, will be sentenced to temporary imprisonment and confiscation of their movable and immovable properties. On an ad hoc basis, some cases may receive a waiver from the Government, and are therefore not referred to Court in connection with illegal entry/exit offences.

1.2. Re-admission to Iraq of Refugees and Asylum-seekers (previously recognised or registered in Iraq)
Refugees and asylum-seekers, of any nationality or ethnicity, who were previously recognized or registered in Iraq will not be re-admitted to Iraq solely on the basis of possession of a refugee or asylum-seeker certificate issued by UNHCR Iraq. Refugees and registered asylum-seekers who are returned or return voluntarily to Iraq are considered to be foreigners seeking admission to Iraq, and as such, they must comply with the documentary and other entry requirements set out in the Foreigners Residency Law cited above. They are similarly subject to the penalties for violation of the entry requirements as stipulated in the Foreigners Residency Law and the Passports Law.

The Ministry of Interior has however continued to respect refugee status determination decisions made by the Iraqi authorities prior to March 2003. As such, if an individual was registered with the former regime as a refugee prior to March 2003, they may be permitted to re-enter the country if they can provide their refugee identity card, or at least a copy thereof. For persons wishing to return to the KR, they must be able to prove links with family members residing in the KR in addition to the documentary requirements mentioned above. These criteria may apply to persons formerly residing in Al Tash camp, as well as Palestinians and Syrians registered as refugees by the Iraqi Government prior to March 2003, and who still possess a copy of their refugee card. However, even if all of the conditions above are met, the person wishing to return to the KR is likely to be detained at the entry point until a full investigation is completed by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to confirm the person’s identity and previous residence in the KR.

If the refugee or asylum seeker was not from the above-mentioned groups or previously registered by the former regime as a refugee, but was previously residing in the KR and held a valid residence permit, which they can provide to the authorities upon their re-entry, either in the original or copy form, then they may be re-admitted to the KR as long as they hold a valid passport and can secure an Iraqi sponsor from the KR. Again, such individuals are likely to be held in detention at the entry point (airport or road check point) until the KRG is able to confirm their relationship with their sponsor and their security check is complete.

In situations where the individual does not possess the necessary documentation upon arrival, such as a valid entry visa, they may be returned to the sending country on the
flight they arrived on. For those who are found to have entered illegally or with forged documents, or for whom the security check and family links cannot be verified, the individual will be accused of illegal entry into Iraq in accordance with the *Foreigners Residency Law*. After completion of the prison sentence, the individual will be referred to the Deportation Department/Residency Affairs Directorate for deportation in accordance with Article 298 of the *Iraqi Penal Law*. In general, deportation is to the country of origin, but if it is not possible to expel or deport the individual to their country of origin due to concerns about the protection situation in that country, they will be deported to a country of their choice (if they do not require a visa or can obtain a visa) or to a country where they do not require a visa for entry.

1.3. Additional Penal Provisions Which May Apply to Refugees and Asylum-seekers (previously recognised or registered in Iraq) Seeking Re-admittance to Iraq

In order for any refugees or asylum-seekers previously recognised or registered in Iraq to be able to re-enter Iraq, in addition to fulfilling the documentary and other requirements listed above, they must have obtained the approval of the Minister of the Interior prior to their exit by providing the reason for their exit from Iraq and the length of their absence from Iraq. Articles 17 and 18 of the *Political Refugee Law* penalise all refugees exiting Iraq illegally and without prior consent of the Minister of Interior. Article 17 specifies that refugees may only leave Iraq with the consent of the Minister of Interior, whereas Article 18 provides that where a refugee exits without the consent of the Minister, all of the refugee’s movable and immovable property shall be confiscated by the authorities, on the basis of a decision of the Minister of Interior, ratified by the President.

Some refugees claim they are Iraqis when they seek asylum outside of Iraq or use forged Iraqi documents when leaving Iraq or claiming asylum abroad. This is considered a crime under Articles 292 and 298 of the *Iraqi Penal Law*. Upon return to Iraq, if the Iraqi authorities discover that they had obtained and/or used forged Iraqi documents, they may be subject to trial and sentenced to imprisonment for a maximum of 15 years imprisonment under Article 298. Under Article 292, persons found guilty of creating forged official Iraqi documents may also be subject to a period of imprisonment between 3 months and 5 years and a fine of IQD 300.

As a result of the above considerations, UNHCR considers that readmission of refugees to Iraq must be verified in advance in order to determine whether the individual(s) meet Iraqi entry requirements, including documentary, security and family link or sponsorship criteria. UNHCR further notes that where readmission is possible under the national legal framework, individuals may nevertheless be subject to prolonged detention upon arrival and/or serious penalties in cases where illegal exit from Iraq and/or the use of forged documents may be an issue.

UNHCR notes that both criteria in Article 26 (a) and (b) APD are subject to the proviso that the designated first country of asylum will re-admit the applicant. This is an important safeguard which ensures that the application of the first country of asylum concept will not result in refugees who are denied admission by the designated first
country of asylum and subsequently shuttled from one country to another. If admission to the designated first country of asylum cannot be assured, then the application should be substantively examined by the Member State where the application has been made. As such, the application of the first country of asylum concept without ensuring that the individual would be re-admitted to Iraq would constitute a violation of Article 26 APD.

2. The Availability of Protection in Iraq

2.1. Legal Framework for the Protection of Refugees and Asylum-Seekers, Including Protection from Refoulement

While Iraq has long been host to refugees, including Palestinian, Turkish, Iranian and Syrian refugee populations, the Government of Iraq is not a signatory to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol. The protection of refugees is governed by the Political Refugee Law No. 51 of 1971, which stipulates that refugee status falls under the responsibility of the Permanent Committee of the Ministry of Interior. Article 1(3) of the Political Refugee Law defines a refugee as ‘[e]very person who seeks asylum in Iraq for political or military reasons’. In general, the Government of Iraq respects the principle of non-refoulement, although access to border areas and detention facilities remain challenging.

A new refugee law has been drafted, but has not yet been adopted by the Iraq Parliament. Moreover, as noted above, UNHCR conducts refugee status determination in Iraq under its mandate as the Government of Iraq has not yet developed a system for the determination of refugee status.

Iraq’s Constitution, adopted in 2005, incorporates specific guarantees for the rights of minorities, and enshrines the principle of equality before the law. However, refugees with special needs, particularly the elderly, persons with disabilities, LGBTI persons, women, youth and other groups face many protection challenges similar to those faced by other population groups amongst the host population.\(^\text{4}\)

2.2. The Security Situation in Iraq and whether Refugees Face a Risk of Serious Harm or Risk to their Life

Refugees in Iraq face the same difficulties as the host community in relation to their personal security, including continued heightened levels and intensity of violence and the gaps in the application of the rule of law or, for persons with certain profiles, the continued fear of targeted attacks. While the overall security situation in Iraq has improved since the 2006-2008 period, the situation remains very volatile, amongst other, in Baghdad as well as in Nineva and Kirkuk, the disputed internal boundary region. During 2010 the number of security incidents recorded in the capital, as well as country-wide, was higher than 2009. Throughout 2010 and 2011, serious security incidents

\(^3\) UNHCR, Improving Asylum Procedures, supra Footnote 12, p. 281.

\(^4\) Please see UNHCR’s Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Iraqi Asylum-Seekers cited in Footnotes 9 and 10 above for more information about the availability of state protection for certain groups at risk.
continued to be reported, including Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), Vehicle Borne Explosive Devices (VBIEDs), roadside bombs and an increasing number of targeted attacks. Whilst increasingly security incidents are targeted at security personnel and political figures, the highest numbers of deaths and injuries are amongst bystanders, including family members of persons targeted, who are caught up in the violence. Many attacks seem to stem from a sectarian motivation, but a significant number throughout 2010 also appeared to be random, aimed at creating terror amongst the population, and destabilizing the fragile situation in the country. The State will remain unable to protect the general population, including refugees, from the impact of such violence.

The security situation in the northern Kurdish Regional Government Area is relatively stable in comparison with the rest of Iraq. Unless the KRG has specific reasons to believe that an individual is a threat to the security and/or stability of the region and/or has engaged in terrorist, political, or criminal activities, the KRG generally respects the rights of Kurdish refugees from Iran, Turkey and Syria. This is primarily due to the shared ethnicity, language and political affiliation of the refugees and the majority of the population.

Some reports appear to suggest that Iranian Kurd refugees or Iraqis of Kurdish ethnicity may face greater risk if returned to areas outside the KR. This is primarily due to ongoing sectarian and ethnic violence. It is also important to note the dangers, threats and risks that will be faced by persons from religious minorities, including the Chaldeans, Assyrians and other Christians, and the Yazidi.

2.3. Access to Sufficient Means of Subsistence to Maintain an Adequate Standard of Living for Refugees

The protection environment remains challenging in the KR with refugees facing the same difficulties as Iraqis in terms of security, poor infrastructure and unemployment; however these challenges are exacerbated for refugees and asylum-seekers as they have limited access to employment and other services, and do not usually have a support network.

Pursuant to the Political Refugee Act, recognised refugees are granted employment rights largely equal to those of Iraqi citizens. One important distinction in respect of employment rights is that asylum-seekers and refugees are unable to become Government employees, which requires possession of an Iraqi ID card. However, despite having permission to work, refugees are negatively affected by the prevailing economic situation. With unemployment levels high across the country in general, refugees often face additional challenges to find work, which may be due to hostility and discrimination. Consequently, many are obliged to accept low skilled and poorly paid jobs. Women are particularly vulnerable to exploitation.

Access to basic needs and essential services for refugees in Iraq is frequently inadequate as is the case for the host community. Refugees are not included in any of the Government’s Social welfare programs, but may benefit from UNHCR programmes. Access to adequate shelter is a concern for refugee populations living in urban and rural areas across the country. Given the lack of regular income, refugees have difficulty
meeting living expenses in housing that is often overcrowded and in poor condition. Furthermore, refugees are not entitled to register movable and immovable property and the Iraqi Government currently does not provide them with any kind of travel document, further restricting their mobility. In fact, refugees and asylum-seekers are not allowed to travel or choose their place of residence freely amongst the different Governorates.

Refugees and asylum-seekers generally have free access to all levels of education on par with the Iraqi population and receive UNHCR support according to the needs of the group. Urban refugee children are provided with access to education in Iraqi schools while refugee children residing in camps such as Kawa and Makhmour are provided with education through projects supported by UNHCR focusing primarily on primary education. Overcrowded schools and language barriers limit full access to education for refugee children.

The influx of refugees and IDPs from the Central Governorates to the KR in light of its relative stability has placed severe strain on the region’s resources. The influx of IDPs and refugees has had a significant impact on the host communities, and has resulted in increased housing and rental prices, thereby placing additional pressure on already strained public services and adding to concerns about security and demographic shifts. There is often little or no work available and there is resentment against refugees working in jobs when a significant proportion of the local population is unable to find employment.

UNHCR
December 2011
Annex E

SAMPLE ENTRY PASSES (TOURISM CARD; WORK CARD AND INFORMATION CARD/RESIDENCY CARD FOR THOSE SEEKING TO RESIDE IN KRI)\(^\text{33}\)

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33 Provided to the delegation by General Kaiwan Tawfeq, General Manager, Kurdistan Checkpoints, Kurdistan Regional Security Protection Agency, Security General Directorate, KRG Ministry of Interior.
SIDE A

WORK AUTHORIZATION CARD

SID B

WORK AUTHORIZATION CARD

Checkpoint Authority In Chief
Full Name:
Rank:
Date:

(THUMBS) Finger Print of the Referenced People
Finger print Area
NO LONGER IS IN USE
Annex F

SAMPLE OF INFORMATION CARD ISSUED BY THE ASAYISH

Kurdistan Regional Government Information Card

Ref No: Date

Full Name:
Surname:
POD & DOB:
Previous (OLD) Address:
Current (NEW) Address:
Form No:

34 Provided to the delegation by General Kaiwan Tawfeq, General Manager, Kurdistan Checkpoints, Kurdistan Regional Security Protection Agency, Security General Directorate, KRG Ministry of Interior.
Sample of Information Card Issued under Law 95/1978

35 Provided to the delegation by Brigadier General Abdulrahman Ismael Aziz, Erbil (Governorate) Civil Information Card General Director, Ministry of Interior, Citizenship Police.
Annex H

Statistics on the number of IDPs registered by the Bureau of Migration and Displacement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Total number</th>
<th>Kirkuk governorate</th>
<th>Sulaymaniyah governorate</th>
<th>Soran governorate</th>
<th>Dahuk governorate</th>
<th>Erbil governorate</th>
<th>Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Displaced families</td>
<td>39262</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8874</td>
<td>252</td>
<td>20606</td>
<td>9530</td>
<td>Displaced families</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Displaced individuals</td>
<td>177705</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>36474</td>
<td>1134</td>
<td>92727</td>
<td>47370</td>
<td>Displaced individuals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With respect

[Signature]

2011.11.13

[Stamp]

Office for Planning and Statistics

Bureau of Migration & Displacement

Ministry of Interior

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36 Provided to the delegation by Shokr Yaseen Yaseen, Director of Bureau, Bureau of Migration & Displacement (BMD), Ministry of Interior, Erbil. Translation provided by DIS.
Annex I

DATA ON ETHNICITY AND PLACE OF ORIGIN OF IDPs IN KRI REGISTERED WITH IOM ERBIL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Arab</th>
<th>Armenian</th>
<th>Assyrian</th>
<th>Chaldean</th>
<th>Kurd</th>
<th>No Answer</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Turkmen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dahuk</td>
<td>3.90%</td>
<td>2.61%</td>
<td>14.51%</td>
<td>29.19%</td>
<td>48.67%</td>
<td>0.35%</td>
<td>0.07%</td>
<td>0.67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Erbil</td>
<td>29.47%</td>
<td>1.01%</td>
<td>5.48%</td>
<td>18.10%</td>
<td>44.42%</td>
<td>0.05%</td>
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<th>Erbil</th>
<th>Sulaymaniyah</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>45.83%</td>
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<td>Sulaymaniyah</td>
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<td>Tameem</td>
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Statistical data provided to the delegation by email from IOM Erbil on 12 January 2012.
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<tr>
<th>Governorate</th>
<th>Anbar</th>
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<th>Basrah</th>
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<th>Erbil</th>
<th>Muthanna</th>
<th>Nineveh</th>
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<td>0.22%</td>
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<td>1.87%</td>
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<td>22.35%</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
<td>4.19%</td>
<td>6.43%</td>
<td>0.53%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Chaldean</td>
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<td>10.33%</td>
<td>0.15%</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
<td>6.43%</td>
<td>38.18%</td>
<td>0.16%</td>
<td>0.13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Kurd</td>
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<td>0.24%</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
<td>0.02%</td>
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<td>0.13%</td>
<td>0.16%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.05%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.04%</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Erbil       | Arab  | 0.09%   | 23.25% | 0.06%  | 0.01% | 1.04%   | 0.01%   | 0.01%      | 0.01%  |
|             | Armenian | 0.03%   | 0.77%  | 0.01%  | 0.01% | 0.36%   | 0.36%   | 0.01%      | 0.01%  |
|             | Assyrian | 4.07%   | 12.69% | 0.01%  | 0.01% | 0.02%   | 0.02%   | 0.43%      | 0.03%  |
|             | Chaldean | 7.44%   | 7.44%  | 0.01%  | 0.01% | 0.02%   | 0.02%   | 0.04%      | 0.03%  |
|             | Kurd   | 0.06%   | 0.06%  | 0.01%  | 0.01% | 0.16%   | 0.16%   | 0.06%      | 0.06%  |
|             | No Answer | 0.03%   | 0.03%  | 0.01%  | 0.01% | 0.16%   | 0.16%   | 0.31%      | 0.31%  |
|             | Other  | 0.15%   | 0.15%  | 0.02%  | 0.02% | 1.07%   | 1.07%   | 0.06%      | 0.06%  |
|             | Turkmen | 0.06%   | 0.06%  | 0.02%  | 0.02% | 0.02%   | 0.02%   | 0.04%      | 0.04%  |

| Sulaymaniyah | Arab  | 1.18%   | 1.62%  | 0.02%  | 0.02% | 0.02%   | 0.02%   | 0.02%      | 0.02%  |
|              | Armenian | 0.36%   | 0.04%  | 0.04%  | 0.04% | 0.04%   | 0.04%   | 0.04%      | 0.04%  |
|              | Assyrian | 0.08%   | 0.08%  | 0.08%  | 0.08% | 0.08%   | 0.08%   | 0.08%      | 0.08%  |
|              | Chaldean | 0.02%   | 0.02%  | 0.02%  | 0.02% | 0.02%   | 0.02%   | 0.02%      | 0.02%  |
|              | Kurd   | 0.88%   | 0.88%  | 0.88%  | 0.88% | 0.88%   | 0.88%   | 0.88%      | 0.88%  |
|              | No Answer | 0.04%   | 0.04%  | 0.04%  | 0.04% | 0.04%   | 0.04%   | 0.04%      | 0.04%  |
|              | Other  | 0.06%   | 0.06%  | 0.06%  | 0.06% | 0.06%   | 0.06%   | 0.06%      | 0.06%  |
|              | Turkmen | 0.04%   | 0.04%  | 0.04%  | 0.04% | 0.04%   | 0.04%   | 0.04%      | 0.04%  |
Annex J

MAP OF KRG EXTERNAL CHECKPOINTS

38 Provided to the delegation by international organization (A)