Questions

1. Please provide information on the tribal dispute between the Konkamba and Nanumba including reference to incidents in 1994 and 2002.

RESPONSE

1. Please provide information on the tribal dispute between the Konkamba and Nanumba including reference to incidents in 1994 and 2002.

The 1994 and 2002 incidents are part of two different conflicts. The 1994 incident is part of an ongoing tribal dispute between the Konkamba and the Nanumba which has its roots in chieftaincy and land ownership. The 2002 incident is part of an ongoing internal chieftaincy dispute amongst the Dagbon. Therefore the information provided in response to this question has been organised into the following two sections:

- **Konkamba/Nanumba Conflict**;
- **Dagbon Chieftaincy Conflict**.

Konkamba/Nanumba Conflict

Chapter 9 of the book entitled *Reconciliation, Justice, and Coexistence: Theory & Practice* and published in 2000 provides background information on the conflict between the Nanumba and the Konkomba:

Traditionally, the social structure in the Northern Region has been divided into chiefly and acephalous societies. The former have organized themselves around hereditary chieftaincy structures that have a hierarchy from lower level chiefs to divisional chiefs, paramount chiefs, and even some that are superior to paramount chiefs who acts like kings. Four ethnic groups, Dagomba, Nanumba, Gonjas, and Mamprusis, organize themselves this way. The
acephalous groups, such as the Konkombs, Nawuris, Basares, and Nchumurus, are segmentary societies that have not had hierarchical structures such as chiefs and chieftaincies. To a very large extent they are migratory yam farmers who settle on a land and till it until it becomes less fertile, at which time they move on to other areas where the land has lain fallow for some time.

In most of the Northern Region, the traditional land tenure practice has not recognized individual ownership of land. Land ownership, to a very large extent, has been vested in paramount chiefs and is held in trust or on behalf of the ethnic groups to which the chief belongs. This, therefore, has restricted land ownership to chiefly groups. These groups argue that they were original settlers who allowed the acephalous groups migrating from other areas to settle on their land and farm there by permission. For this permission, the settlers pay tribute to the chiefs, although in many instances the tribute has become more and more symbolic.

The acephalous groups have resented the monopoly of land ownership in the hands of the chiefly peoples as well as the tribute that they are required to pay. Some of the acephalous people refer back to the sixteenth century to justify their claim that they were actually the indigenous people in the area and were invaded by the chiefly groups, who then took over the land and imposed their rule on them. The acephalous people insist on the creation of their own paramount chieftaincy that can hold land in trust for them.

Hidden under the issues of chieftaincy and title for land are deep resentments based on perceptions of economic and political inequalities, social and cultural prejudices, and competition for limited resources. Moreover, the era of multiparty politics in Ghana has made population a sensitive issue. The population of some of the acephalous people has been increasing rapidly, and this has meant more demand for representation in national and regional politics. This was threatening traditional authority in the area, which was based on ethnicity and control of land. To complicate issues further, religion also played a role in reinforcing the fault lines in the conflict. The leadership of the acephalous groups is predominately Christian, having close connections with Western churches and missionaries, while the chiefly groups are primarily Muslim (Assefa, Hizkias 2000, ‘Coexistence and Reconciliation in the Northern Region of Ghana’, Reconciliation, Justice, and Coexistence: Theory & Practice, Lexington Books, Maryland, pp.166-167, Brandeis University website http://www.brandeis.edu/ethics/pdfs/publications/assefa3.pdf – Accessed 23 March 2009 – Attachment 1).

A November 2004 paper for the Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity by Dzodzi Tsikata, Senior Research Fellow at the University of Ghana and Wayo Seini, Associate Professor of Agricultural Economics and head of the Economics Division at the University of Ghana provides background information on the conflict between the Nanumba and the Konkomba:

Most of the conflicts in Northern Ghana have been between ethnic groups that regard themselves as indigenous, and others that historically invaded and established the traditional kingdoms of the North. The aborigines of Northern Ghana, like those in other parts of modern-day Ghana, did not have centralised political systems. Lineage took the place of political allegiance with many lineages forming a clan. Lineage heads took all important decisions and resolved conflicts between people from different clans. A religious head called the Tindana had spiritual control over the land and people residing in his area. The aborigines found their area invaded around the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries, resulting in the establishment of the Manpurugu, Dagbon, Nanun and also the Gonja traditional kingdoms. The new comers usurped political power but were assimilated culturally. It is
important to note that the Konkombas are the largest of the “aboriginal” ethnic groups in Northern Ghana.

…The conflicts between the Konkombas and the traditional kingdoms of Northern Ghana have been described by Brukum (1995) as wars of emancipation, with one group determined to maintain the status quo and the other fighting to overthrow it. Realising the fertile nature of the lands in their host areas, some migrant Konkombas decided to settle as farmers and established permanent villages from Sambu near Yendi in the North, to Dambai in the Kete-Krachi district in the Volta Region. It was however in Nanun that trouble developed between them and their hosts. The main causes of Konkomba discontent were that they were compelled, like everyone else in the area, to put in some days free labour each year on the farms of Nanumba chiefs; that the chiefs also intermittently collected tribute in the form of foodstuff and livestock from their Konkomba tenants; and lastly, that it was compulsory to donate the hind leg of any big animal killed, whether wild or domesticated, to Nanum chiefs during funerals.

Perhaps the most problematic aspect of the settler/host relationship was the fact that the Konkombas were not allowed to settle disputes among themselves, including matrimonial and other interpersonal conflicts. The Konkomba Youth Association (KOYA) was revived in the early 1970s to address some of these problems. Its objectives included projecting Konkomba culture and abandoning obsolete customs. It was also decided that each Konkomba community in the host areas should select their leader to adjudicate petty problems among them. The implementation of the latter involved the Konkombas and their Nanumba hosts in a serious conflict in 1981, resulting in many fatalities.

…Konkomba actions in these conflicts arise from their desire for recognition and self-assertion. The Konkombas in the “diaspora” are many and scattered all over many areas in the savannah and transitional areas of Ghana. However, apart from Saboba, they do not have a large settlement anywhere else. The Konkombas in 1993 petitioned the National House of Chiefs to elevate the chief of Saboba to a paramountcy without passing it through the Ya Na, the overlord of Dagbon in which Saboba is situated. This created tension between the Dagombas and the Konkombas. When in 1994 fighting erupted between the Nanumbas and the Konkombas, the Dagombas were drawn into the fighting (Tsikata, Dzodzi & Seini, Wayo 2004, Identities, Inequalities and Conflicts in Ghana, Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, November, pp.29-31 http://www.crise.ox.ac.uk/pubs/workingpaper5.pdf – Accessed 23 March 2009 – Attachment 2).


A February 2007 paper for the Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity by Julia Jönsson, doctoral research student at the University of Oxford provides the following information on the Pito War of 1981:
In 1981 the first large-scale inter-ethnic conflict in the Northern Region since the pre-colonial period broke out, also known as the Pito War. Young Konkomba intellectuals in Bimbilla had founded their own local office of KOYA [Konkomba Youth Association] in the late 1970s, which argued for emancipation, education and the abolition of ‘outdated’ customs that had previously led to intra-ethnic feuding, such as the infant betrothal of girls in exchange for the labour of their future husband on the parents’ farm. Subsequently, the Konkomba had stopped paying tribute and started adjudicating their disputes under their own headmen (or onikpel) and leader.

Since chieftaincy in the NR [Northern Region] has come to be intimately connected with the right to land, this was seen by Nanumba chiefs as an act of rebellion, denying them their status as landowners as well as an important source of income. The Nanumba lodged a complaint against ‘secret tribunals’ with the district administration and when nothing was done seized a Konkomba leader and temporarily expelled him (Skalník, 1986). The Konkomba maintained that they had a right as citizens to appoint leaders amongst themselves and that the Nanumba were unacquainted with their culture and hence ill-equipped to settle Konkomba civil cases in their traditional courts. KOYA also organised direct market access for Konkomba yams in Accra, terminating the lucrative role of Nanumba market-women in parts of Nanun.

Tensions had already developed over the refusal of the Nanumba paramount, the Bimbilla-Na, to appoint a Konkomba who had been nominated as chief in Kpasaland, formerly uninhabited Nanumba hunting grounds where some Konkomba had settled. This led to the Konkomba siding with the Atwode, another previously acephalous ethnic group whose recently created paramount chief was seeking to control Kpasaland. When the courts ruled in favour of Nanumba control in 1979 the Bimbilla-Na posted a number of new chiefs to the area, whom the Konkomba ignored.

The violence was finally sparked by a fight between a Nanumba man and a Konkomba man over a woman in a pito bar and spread from Bimbilla to Kpasaland where the Nanumba and Dagomba, who were also seen as ‘oppressors’, were even further outnumbered by the Konkomba than in the Nanumba traditional capital. By the time the state police arrived in Kpasaland several days later, the ethnic majority residents had all been killed or forced to flee. The attempts by the Nanumba to retake Kpasaland resulted in more casualties and the war was only ended through state intervention by Tamale police when Bimbilla itself was threatened. Estimates of the number that died in the conflict range from the low hundreds to 2,000 and thousands of people were made homeless and lost their cattle and material possessions.

The 1981 conflict left an enduring sense of humiliation amongst the Nanumba who had lost their paramount chief in the fighting, as well as control over several villages. There was no settlement and the commission set up to investigate the war headed by Justice Lamptey was suspended by the government take-over of Rawlings on 31 December 1981. Nanumba traditional leaders petitioned the government for removal of a long list of ‘disloyal’ Konkomba, but the Rawlings administration was content to enforce the stalemate (Jönsson, Julia 2007, The Overwhelming Minority: Traditional Leadership and Ethnic Conflict in Ghana’s Northern Region, Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity Working Paper No. 30, February, p.17 http://www.crise.ox.ac.uk/pubs/workingpaper30.pdf – Accessed 23 March 2009 – Attachment 4).

Chapter 9 of the book entitled Reconciliation, Justice, and Coexistence: Theory & Practice and published in 2000 provides the following information on the Guinea Fowl War of 1994 and the subsequent conflict in 1995:
The Northern Region, one of the six administrative regions of Ghana, covers almost a third of the country’s land area and is inhabited by eighteen ethnic groups. In February 1994, a quarrel which erupted in a small town between a man from the Konkomba ethnic group and another from the Nanumba group over the purchase of a guinea fowl, which eventually led to the killing of the Nanumba man. Almost immediately rumors began to fly that Konkombas had attacked Nanumbas. What had begun as a fight between two persons quickly engulfed two ethnic groups in armed conflict. Soon whole villages were aflame. Armed conflict had erupted in Northern Ghana four times since 1980, but this was to become the most devastating.

The conflict rapidly drew in other ethnic communities. The Dagombas and Gonjas, traditional allies of the Nanumbas, sided with them while the Basure, Nawuri, and Nchumuru joined in on the side of the Konkombas. By the time the war was over, according to some estimates close to ten thousand people were dead. Schools, clinics, and development projects estimated to be worth millions of dollars were destroyed. At least 423 villages were burnt or destroyed. Some towns were “ethnically cleansed.” The conflict left over 135,000 internally displaced people, out of an estimated population of close to 700,000 for the entire region.

Soon after the outbreak of the war in February 1994, the central government sent in the military to quell the conflict. Although the intervention was effective in stopping the fighting, in some instances the soldiers were drawn into the conflict and created more disaffection in certain areas.

Following the 1994 war, Konkombas who had to pass through Nanumba towns to go to hospitals, government offices, and other such public places were harassed, and a few were ambushed and killed by Nanumbas. This unleashed festering hostility and anger caused by the last war, and the Konkombas attacked, killing eighteen Nanumbas. The Nanumbas retaliated by attacking a Konkomba town, destroying it and killing its chief along with a number of Konkombas. The war immediately spread to a number of surrounding towns and villages. By the time the government military forces intervened and stopped it, about 150 people were killed, 14 villages were burnt, over 18,000 heads of cattle were looted, and about 21,000 people became displaced. Victims of the 1994 war who were just starting to rehabilitate themselves became victims again. Many say that they could have predicted the March 1995 war would break out, since the skirmishes between the Konkombas and Nanumbas had been increasing and tension was mounting. But the agencies responsible for looking into these matters allegedly did not heed the warnings of the impending crisis (Assefa, Hizkias 2000, ‘Coexistence and Reconciliation in the Northern Region of Ghana’, Reconciliation, Justice, and Coexistence: Theory & Practice, Lexington Books, Maryland, pp.165-167, Brandeis University website http://www.brandeis.edu/ethics/pdfs/publications/assefa3.pdf – Accessed 23 March 2009 – Attachment 1).

A paper for the Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity dated February 2007 by Julia Jönsson, doctoral research student at the University of Oxford provides the following information on the Guinea Fowl War of 1994:

In 1994 the Northern Region was engulfed in an inter-ethnic war of a size not previously witnessed in independent Ghana. As the Nanumba, Dagomba and Gonja fought the Konkomba, 441 villages were destroyed and in excess of 178,000 people displaced (Inter-NGO Consortium, mimeo). At least 2,000 people lost their lives (NPI/Inter-NGO Consortium, mimeo), a particularly high death toll in a region with a population of only just over 1.8 million (Government of Ghana, 2002). As mentioned earlier, the question of paramountcy was a major factor precipitating the escalation of tensions leading up to the conflict.
In June 1993, KOYA presented a petition directly to the president of the National House of Chiefs requesting the elevation of the Chief of Saboba to the status of paramount chief, thus circumventing the Ya-Na, through whom the request should have been made according to the 1992 Constitution. Furthermore, the petition asserted that the Konkomba had inhabited the entire Oti basin from the 17th century, a claim that would negate their status as immigrants in Nanun and Gonja Districts. While the Konkomba were not looking to establish land ownership outside of Dagbon they wanted to be accepted as the equals of the majority groups, with the right to farm without paying tribute and to settle their own disputes.

The Ya-Na demanded that the petition be reformulated in a more respectful tone and resubmitted to him, but when this was done his reply in a letter to the NHC [National House of Chiefs] was an unambiguous refusal, claiming that the Konkomba were immigrants from Togo. The Ya-Na later clarified his position, stating that the Konkomba had originally been driven out by the Dagomba cavalry, but had then ‘trickled back’. After the petition and its refusal, tensions were running high, and on October 31, 1993, the Ghanaian Chronicle published rumours warning of an imminent bloodbath. In Bimbilla the police station was broken into in November 1993 and guns seized, some of which had been confiscated from the Nanumba by the police during the 1981 conflict. Weapons appear to have been stockpiled by all sides.

The ‘Guinea Fowl War’ got its popular name from the incident that finally sparked the violence, an argument between a Konkomba and a Nanumba man over the sale of a black guinea fowl at Nakpayili market near Bimbilla on 31 January 1994. The quarrel quickly degenerated into ethnic abuse, threats of oncoming war, and violence in which the Konkomba man severed a finger. The following day the son of the Konkomba man injured in the fight sought out the Nanumba man on his farm and shot him, after which large-scale Konkomba-Nanumba fighting broke out in Nanun, and quickly spread to Dagomba and Gonja-controlled areas.

Two days after the start of the war, the Konkomba minority in Tamale, numbering about 5,000 people at the time, were attacked by youths from the majority ethnic groups and forced to flee. The fighting centred around the Oti river region, mainly outside the district capitals that were protected by the army. Almost all Dagomba, Nanumba, and Gonja settlements along the Bimbilla-Yendi road were burnt and February-March saw intense fighting in seven districts.

Road blocks were also erected along the Tamale–Buipe road in the West Gonja District. While it is believed that a significant number of the Konkomba victims were killed at these road blocks (Bogner, 2000), West Gonja District was not among the seven districts included in the state of emergency declared by the government on February 10. All Konkomba villages in West Gonja were destroyed and the survivors have never returned, the paramount chief of the Gonja both at the time and at present having made it clear that they are not welcome. The current Yagbonwura was formerly the Gonja divisional chief of Kpandai at Kpembe, from where he was forced away by the Nawuri and the Konkomba in 1992; he personally lost 16 close relatives in that and the following 1994 war.

In June 1994 a government commission pressured the parties into signing a peace treaty. The state of emergency was lifted in August, but despite this renewed but localised fighting took place in March and April 1995 in Bimbilla in Nanumba district and the area around Kpatinga in Gushiegu-Karaga District, which was burnt by the Konkomba. The government responded with retaliatory attacks on the Konkomba villages seen as responsible (Bogner, 2000), which in combination with the peace negotiation efforts by civil society organisations finally halted the violence. The post-colonial ethnic dichotomies of the NR had become violently explosive and defusing them would prove a very complex task (Jönsson, Julia 2007, *The Overwhelming Minority: Traditional Leadership and Ethnic Conflict in Ghana’s Northern Region*, Centre
The Minorities at Risk Project provides the following time-line of the 1994/1995 conflict:

**Feb 2, 1994**  
Fighting in the north near the border with Togo broke out between Konkomba and Dagomba ethnic groups. The incident began with a dispute over prices in a market, but quickly accelerated to large-scale violence. The two groups have been at loggerheads for many years because the Konkomba, who are not Ghanaian natives, are denied chieftainship and land. Only 4 of 15 ethnic groups in the region have land ownership.

**Feb 10, 1994**  
The government issued a state of emergency in the northern region (the districts of Yendi, Nanumba, Gushihegu/Karaga, Saboba/Chereponi, East Gonjo, Zabzugu/Tatale and the town of Tamale). About 6000 Konkomba fled to Togo as a result. The government also closed four of its border posts to prevent the conflict from spreading.

**Mar 1994**  
The government fired on a crowd in Tamale killing 11 and wounding 18. Security forces fired on mainly Dagomba after they had attacked a group of rival Konkomba. It is difficult for the government to reach Konkomba fighters since they operate in small packets under bush cover. Members of the Dagomba, Gonjas and Namubas (allies) turned in their arms in compliance with a government order to all warring factions. The seven districts affected by the fighting are the breadbasket of the region and food prices have increased since the fighting broke out in February.

**Mar 4, 1994**  
A grenade exploded in Accra in a Konkomba market injuring three. It is thought to be a spillover from the violence in the north between the Konkomba and Dagomba.

**Apr 1994**  
An 11 member government delegation held separate talks with leaders of the warring factions in Accra. Both sides agreed to end the conflict and denounce violence as a means of ending their conflict. The three-month old conflict left over 1000 (one report suggested 6000) people dead and 150,000 displaced.

**Jun 9, 1994**  
A peace pact was signed among all warring factions in the north. Two main groups of disputants were involved in the fighting (Konkomba vs. Dagomba, Nanumba and Gonja) as were several smaller groups (Nawuri, Nchumri, Basari). No incidents were reported in the past several weeks, though the region remained tense.

**Jul 8, 1994**  
Parliament agreed to extend the state of emergency imposed on the 7 northern districts for a further month.

**Oct 1994**  
Police seized arms bound for the north. The Tamale region is tense and the peace agreement signed in April was regarded as a dead letter. Dagomba communities, backed by the Nanumbas and Gonjas, again began buying arms. Many Konkomba have been keeping out of sight following a series of lynchings.

**Mar 1995**  
Renewed ethnic fighting in the north left at least 110 dead and 35 wounded. The Konkombas were largely blamed as instigators of the latest violence. The
government had the situation under control by the end of the month. In Nanumba District, five arrests were made in connection to the violence. A total of 25 have been arrested since September 1994 in connection to the violence. Latest casualty figures put the number of dead at 2000 since February 1994, and 400 villages and farms have been burnt to the ground.

Apr 1995

The government began proving funds for the rehabilitation of displaced persons from the ethnic conflict. An estimated 200,000 have been displaced. Most health, education and water facilities were destroyed in the wake of the conflict and most personnel fled the area. Outbreaks of cerebro-spinal meningitis, polio, diptheria, measles, tetnus and whooping cough were reported. Agriculture in the area is nowhere near its pre-conflict levels (Minorities at Risk Project 2007, *Chronology for Mossi-Dagomba in Ghana*, 10 January [http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/chronology.asp?groupId=45203 – Accessed 23 March 2009 – Attachment 5).

For more information on the 1994 conflict please see the following news articles:
- Davies, Desmond 1994, ‘Fatal Miscalculation’, 28 February-6 March – Attachment 7;

The US Department of State reports that by “the end of 1995, while the underlying reasons for this ethnic problem remained unresolved, an uneasy calm appeared to prevail among the rival ethnic groups. Ethnic tension and violence in the northern region diminished further during 1996, and with the dispatch of army troops to the area, Konkomba farmers were again able to travel to regional markets to sell their produce” (US Department of State 1997, *Ghana – Profile of Asylum Claims & Country Conditions*, July, Political Asylum Research and Documentation Service website, Paragraph 16 [http://pards.org/pacc/Ghana(July1997)ProfileofAsylumClaimsandCountryConditionsPARD SReport-SpecificSourceandReliabilityAssessment.doc – Accessed 23 March 2009 – Attachment 11)).

Chapter 9 of the book entitled *Reconciliation, Justice, and Coexistence: Theory & Practice* and published in 2000 documents the peace-building process in northern Ghana which took place between November 1994 and December 1996. In April 1994 the Permanent Peace Negotiation Team (PPNT), a high-level government commission was appointed to mediate peace in northern Ghana. The author of Chapter 9, Assefa notes that the “mediation effort did not make much progress, because the chiefly groups insisted on an acknowledgement of responsibility and apology from the acephalous groups before negotiations could begun, which the latter were unwilling to do.” In June 1994, “a cease-fire agreement was signed under the auspices of the PPNT...unfortunately another armed confronttion was in the making.” Several developmental NGOs operating in the area were concerned that much of the infrastructure they had built was destroyed and that they could not continue their work because of the conflict. As a result “they formed a consortium to develop collaborative responses to the problems they were facing.” Assefa, who at that time was the Director of the Nairobi Peace Initiative, was approached by the consortium to assist with the process.
Chapter 9 documents the peace process which culminated in the Kumasi Accord on Peace and Reconciliation Between Ethnic Groups in the Northern Region of Ghana. The Accord was signed by all parties to the conflict on 30 March 1996 and “became the official peace agreement, ending the hostilities between the warring ethnic groups and proposing new ways of governing their relationships with one another” (Assefa, Hizkias 2000, ‘Coexistence and Reconciliation in the Northern Region of Ghana’, Reconciliation, Justice, and Coexistence: Theory & Practice, Lexington Books, Maryland, Brandeis University website http://www.brandeis.edu/ethics/pdfs/publications/assefa3.pdf – Accessed 23 March 2009 – Attachment 1).

According to a report dated 1 October 2002 by the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, since 1994/1995 “the conflict has simmered down and no deaths resulting from the conflicts have been reported.” A press release of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination dated 18 March 2003 reports that the Ghanaian Government delegation said although there had been no violent incidents between the Konkomba and Nanumba, “matters had not been completely resolved.” The delegation said that “there were ongoing processes such as using the regional and district security councils to resolve the differences permanently with a view to finding a lasting solution to the crisis, which had its roots in chieftaincy and land disputes” (UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 2002, Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 9 of the Convention – Seventeenth periodic reports of States parties due in 200 – Addendum Ghana, 1 October, CERD/C/431/Add.3, Paragraph 98 – Attachment 12; and United Nations 2003, ‘Press Release – Committee on Elimination of Racial Discrimination Adopts Remaining Conclusions on Reports of Tunisia – Concludes Consideration of Reports of Ghana – 62nd session’, 18 March – Attachment 13).

An article dated 29 December 2006 in Modern Ghana News reports that Mustapha Ali Idris, Northern Regional Minister “has cautioned Nanumbas and Kokombas in the Nanumba North and Nanumba South district against any intent to disturb the peace.” He warned that the “security agencies will not hesitate to deal with trouble makers.” The article continues:

Alhaji Idris said this at a joint meeting of the security committees of the two districts at Bimbilla on Wednesday.

The meeting was held in the wake of a rumour of imminent attacks on each other by elements of the two ethnic groups.

Alhaji Idris who attended the meeting with the full complement of the members of the Regional Security Committee (REGSEC), said their mission was not to find out who was wrong or right but to advise both parties to let it remain a rumour and not reality because the security agencies would not sit by and allow any group to take the law into their own hands.

‘Let nobody take the REGSEC for granted and foment trouble,’ he warned.

…Alhaji Idris commended the security personnel in the two districts for their tireless efforts in ensuring that peace prevails in the area.

He urged them to remain vigilant and give nothing to chance and assured them that the REGSEC will make all resources needed available to them to operate effectively.
The District Chief Executive for Nanumba North, Salifu Sa-eed, said that the security personnel in the district have intensified patrol in the communities and are carrying out investigations into the attack rumours.

The Nanumba South District Chief Executive, Thomas Donkor Ogajah, said the district security committee has sensitized the chiefs, community opinion leaders and religious leaders on the need to maintain the peace.


An article dated 15 January 2007 by Ghana News Agency (GNA) reports that Salifu Saeed, District Chief Executive (DCE) “appealed to Nanumbas and Konkombas to desist from acts that would jeopardize the prevailing peace in” Nanumba North and Nanumba South:

The DCE said the Nunumba North and Nanumba South District Assemblies were making preparations to organize a forum for the two ethnic groups to address their concerns to promote peaceful co-existence.

A GNA investigation into the recent insecurity situation in the District revealed that the first issue was the alleged poor trade relation between the farmers of Chamba, a Konkomba dominated community and the Nanumbas.

The farmers from Chamba allege that their trading partners had nicknamed their market “Jara-daa” literally meaning “Fools market” in the Nanumba language implying that Konkomba farmers sold their produce to Nanumbas at prices determined by the buyers, who also arbitrarily measure the commodities.

In a reaction, the Konkomba farmers at Chamba decided to measure their produce themselves instead of the buyers, which did not go down well with some of the Nanumba buyers who decided to boycott trading with the Konkomba farmers.

Traders from Nanumba were alleged to have prevented other traders outside the District from trading with the farmers at Chamba and the surrounding communities.

The investigation revealed that at a meeting at Chamba, the issue of measurement was discussed and it was agreed that the Konkomba farmers should measure their produce while prices were to be determined by the forces of supply and demand.

As a result some Nanumbas at Bimbilla decided that the Konkombas should now pay for the land they are farming on, which the Konkombas opposed saying it was not practiced in the Northern Region and could threaten peaceful co-existence among the different ethnic communities (‘Social Association Forum 2 Bimbilla’ 2007, Ghana News Agency, 15 January, Ghanaweb News Website http://ghana.wordpress.com/2007/01/15/provide-bimbilla-security-personnel-with-logistics-ghanat_govt_ured/ – Accessed 23 March 2009 – Attachment 15).

An article dated 26 February 2008 by the Ghana News Agency reports that the Nanumba North District Security Committee (DISEC) “has averted a possible clash between Konkombas and Nanumbas over a protracted land dispute.” The article continues:
The long-standing feud between the two ethnic groups over the custodian of Nakpaa, a farming town in the Nanumba North District, was renewed last Tuesday when a group of Konkomba’s were reported to be planning an attack on some Nanumba’s in the area.

However, the DISEC [Nanumba North District Security Committee] intervened swiftly to arrest the four persons who were mentioned in connection with the planned attack. They have since been released to assist in investigations. Their names were not disclosed.

At the moment, the DISEC is holding a series of reconciliatory talks between the leadership of the two groups, which the District Chief Executive for the area, Mr. Salifu Seidu, described as fruitful. He added that the situation in the town was also calm (‘Nanumba South District Security Averts Clash’ 2008, Ghana News Agency, 26 February, northernghana.com website http://www.northernghana.com/news/i/?n=416 – Accessed 23 March 2009 – Attachment 16).

An article dated 13 August 2008 in Accra Mail reports that the Land Developmental Force of Ghana “has appealed to the government to see and discuss land issues in the country as a national developmental issue.” Madam Cecilia Acheampong, Communications Director of the group said “there has been several seemingly intractable land related conflicts dotted throughout the country and mentioned…Nanumba-Konkomba as some of the areas affected by land related conflicts” (Kissiedu, Ernest 2008, ‘Ghana: Take Land Issues Seriously – Gov’t Urged’, Accra Mail, 13 August, allAfrica.com website https://allafrica.com/ – Accessed 23 March 2009 – Attachment 17).

**Dagbon Chieftaincy Conflict**

A paper presented by Dr Isaac Olawal Albert at the 15th Annual Africa/Diaspora Conference in April 2006 provides the following summary of the Dagbon Chieftaincy dispute:

It started in the pre-colonial period in Ghana’s history but became a major crisis in the post-colonial period. The Dagomba people of the Dagbon kingdom are the single largest ethnic group in Northern Ghana. The capital city of the kingdom is Yendi, where the Ya-Na who is the traditional head of the people resides. The main issue in the Dagbon crisis, which started in the pre-colonial period in the history of Ghana, is the rotation of chieftaincy power between two rival sections of the Dagbon royal family. The rivalry between the two ruling houses [“Gates”] started in the nineteenth century following the death of Ya-Na Yakubu. He was succeeded by his son Abdullahi and then another son, Andani. Trouble started in 1899 when Andani died. The problem had to do with whether Andani should be succeeded by his own son or the son of his brother, Abudulahi.


A November 2004 paper for the Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity by Tsikata and Seini provides extensive information on the Dagbon chieftaincy dispute. Please see Section 5.2 (pp.32-37) of the report which is included as Attachment 2 for details:
The Dagbon chieftaincy dispute is a good example of the passions that chieftaincy issues can inflame in Ghana, and of the extent to which these matters have become politicised. In the Dagbon case, a traditional matter has become the main subject of local politics as well as an issue of national politics.

…The Dagbamba are strongly attached to the institution of chieftaincy, which partly accounts for the intensity with which conflicts over chieftaincy are carried out. Conflicts tend to revolve around questions of succession, since the rules for succession tend to be rather flexible and allow for a number of candidates. Part of the current dispute (known variously as the Dagbon conflict or the Yendi chieftaincy affairs) hinges on whether or not it is a rule of tradition that succession to the throne should alternate between two rival sections of the royal family. These two sections originated in the late nineteenth century, following the death of Ya Na Yakubu who was succeeded first by his son Abudulai and then by another son Andani (Tsikata, Dzodzi & Seini, Wayo 2004, Identities, Inequalities and Conflicts in Ghana, Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, November, pp.33 http://www.crise.ox.ac.uk/pubs/workingpaper5.pdf – Accessed 23 March 2009 – Attachment 2).


Dr Isaac Olawal Albert reports that the “latest in the violent encounters between the Andani and Abudu ruling houses in Dagbon” occurred in Yendi from 25-27 March 2002 and resulted in the death of the Ya-Na Yakuba Andani II and thirty other people. The Ghanaian Government declared a state of emergency in the Dagbon area which helped to restore peace:

The Abudu Gate most likely saw the victory of NPP [New Patriotic Party] in the 2000 elections as an opportunity to boost its political image and re-awaken the chieftaincy dispute that was in abeyance.

…One of the steps taken by the Abudos was to start contesting the powers of the seating Ya-Na to unilaterally control certain festivals and ceremonies, most especially the traditional Bugum and the Eid-ul-Adha, in the kingdom. The celebration of the two festivals in 2002 created a lot of problems. The Eid-ul-Adha was the first to be celebrated. It was celebrated on two separate days. Bolin Lana and his supporters took the first turn. The Andanis followed the next day. The latter however rejected the formal security cover and protocol offered by the police for the ceremony in protest against similar privileges granted the Bolin Lana the previous day. The Ya-Na saw the separate celebrations and the officialdom that characterised the previous day’s event as an open affront to the office of the Ya-Na.

The events surrounding the Eid-ul-Adha escalated the conflict between the ruling houses. As the community prepared for the Bugum festival in March 2002, the two sides piled up arms and ammunition, trained their warriors, and mobilised as much support as they could. In response to the available security reports, the government had to put off the festival and impose a dusk to dawn curfew on Yendi from March 20 -26, 2002. This further heightened tension. The Abudos were happy that they had scuttled the efforts to celebrate the festival; the Andanis on the other hand were unhappy that their powers had once again been successfully
eroded. Troubles started in the evening of March 24, 2002 when the Regional Minister, Prince Imoru Andani [a member of the Andani family and who was hitherto absent from his region when the curfew was imposed] came back to reverse the order [p. 67]. As the Andanis rejoiced, they were attacked by Abudu youths. The battle was gradually taken to the Gbewaa palace and in the process Ya-Na Yakubu Andani II was killed and his head severed from his body and taken away by his assailants (Albert, Dr Isaac Olawale 2006, ‘From “Owo Crisis” to “Dagbon Dispute”: Lessons in the Politicization of Chieftaincy Disputes In Modern Nigeria and Ghana’, Presented at the 15th Annual Africa/Diaspora Conference, 28 April, Sacramento State University, pp.10-11 http://www.csus.edu/org/capcr/documents/archives/2006/ConferenceProceedings/Owo_Dagbon%20.pdf – Accessed 24 April 2009 – Attachment 18).

MacGaffey reports that in March 2002 the Ya Na was killed in Yendi along with at least 30 other people. MacGaffey notes that these killings “were the latest development in a dynastic rivalry between the Andani and Abudu branches of the royal family that had been carried on throughout the twentieth century.” MacGaffey continues:

The Ya Na sponsors the great festivals in Dagbon, which are governed by the Muslim calendar although some of them are much older than the introduction of Islam in the eighteenth century. In February 2002, the Bolin Lana apparently aroused the Ya Na’s indignation by holding his own celebration of the festival of Eid al-Adha, and still more by reputedly appointing chiefs.

A month later a similar dispute erupted over the Bugum or Fire Festival, a time of sacrifice to gods and ancestors...

…As sporadic violence continued in Yendi, the government imposed a curfew, and then lifted it. It became a matter of dispute which officials were responsible for this and other errors; also, what parts were played by the Ya Na and the Bolin Lana. On the third day of the unrest, 27 March 2002, the Gbewaa Palace was burned down together with 36 other houses, and 30 people were killed, including the Ya Na, whose body was dismembered and burned. Parts of his body were carried around town amid jubilation. The events aroused violent anger in Dagbon, giving way later to intense anxiety: ‘We do not know what is happening, we do not know what is going on; our fathers never knew such a thing, and our grandfathers had no knowledge of it.’ A killing in the course of a fight was understandable, but the treatment of the Ya Na’s body was an unprecedented barbarity. It is likely that the dismemberment was a deliberate effort to disqualify the late king as a future royal ancestor, whose body should be complete; the killing was a religious as well as a political act (MacGaffey, Wyatt 2006, ‘Death of a king, death of a kingdom? Social pluralism and succession to high office in Dagbon, northern Ghana’, Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 44, Issue 1, March, pp.86-87 – Attachment 19).

Dr Isaac Olawale Albert reports that on 25 April 2002, Ghanaian President John Agyekum Kufour “constituted a Commission of Inquiry headed by Justice I.N.K. Wuaku, a retired Justice of the Supreme Court to investigate the conflict.” On 29 May 2002 the Commission started its work and on 6 November 2002 submitted its report to the President:

The report of the commission showed that the 2002 incident was a cumulative effect of the poor management of past phases of the Dagbon dispute. Though the problem had been there for a long time, the commission traced the origin of the 2002 phase of the problem to the non-observance of the funeral of the late Abdulai IV in 1974 as demanded by traditions. His son, Mahammadu Abdulai, who was considered by the Abudu gate to be their Bolinla Na [regent] was also denied the opportunity to become the king by the Andani family [Republic of Ghana 2002:64]. This created a deep gulf between the two families and paved way for the insistence
of the “Bolin Lana” that the customary cycle of his father’s burial should be completed. The problem here however is that the funerals “can only be properly performed at the Gbewaa Palace, which would entail temporary vacation of the Gbewaa premises for the purpose. Ya-Na Yakubu Andani II, however, would not entertain that. Any opportunity given to his ‘rival’ to occupy the palace for the funeral, may be abused to usurp the throne, according to the Andani’s” [ibid.:64]. The beheading of Ya-Na Yakubu Andani II in 2002 was therefore aimed at making him taste the same bitter pill he had forced down the throats of his rivals.

The other major cause of the escalation of the Dagbon dispute, according to the report, was the intrusion of national politics into the chieftaincy dispute. The Dagbon region is one of the most populated parts of Ghana. The people of the region have strong allegiance to their traditional political authority. This makes the position of the Ya-Na of great interest to politicians who wish to win votes or have the support of the king for their programmes. Every political leader in Ghana thus tries to ensure that only a friend of the regime occupies the Ya-Na seat. The Abudu royal gate is believed to have been historically sympathetic to the Busia/Danquah political tradition in Ghana which produced the present regime of New Patriotic Party [NPP] in Ghana. The Andani Gate, is on the other hand, pro-NDC [National Democratic Congress]. The victory of NPP in the 2000 elections was thus a victory for the Abudu family and a cause for worry for the Andani family, whose political party [NDC] lost in the election. The latter feared that the NPP government would use state powers to encourage the Bolin Lana to set up a parallel authority in Dagbon to challenge the supremacy of the Ya-Na. The ease with which the request of the Bolin Lana for police protection was granted by the local police-military authorities reinforced the suspicion of the Andanis that the escalating conflict has a political undertone [p 65]. This eroded the confidence of the Andanis in the government of the day and its agents and further helped to fuel the crisis (Albert, Dr Isaac Olawale 2006, ‘From “Owo Crisis” to “Dagbon Dispute”: Lessons in the Politicization of Chieftaincy Disputes In Modern Nigeria and Ghana’, Presented at the 15th Annual Africa/Diaspora Conference, 28 April, Sacramento State University, pp.9-10 http://www.csus.edu/org/capcr/documents/archives/2006/ConferenceProceedings/Owo_Dagbon%20.pdf – Accessed 24 April 2009 – Attachment 18).

The US Department of State provides the following information on the investigation which followed the events of March 2002:

Extensive police investigations, an independent Commission of Inquiry, and traditional and international fact-finding teams all were working toward establishing responsibility for the deaths and resolution of the underlying conflict. In August the Commission finished public hearings, and in November it submitted its report to the executive branch. The Commission’s report recommended the prosecution of several dozen individuals involved in the violence, including the Northern Regional Minister. The report exonerated two other senior government officials who resigned as a result of the violence. The Commission also recommended the official reprimand of military officers in command over the area where the fighting took place. In December the Government responded by accepting most of the Commission recommendations; however, the Government declined to prosecute the Northern Regional Minister (US Department of State 2003, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2002 – Ghana, 31 March, Section 5 ‘National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities’ – Attachment 20).

The US Department of State reports that in July 2003 “two men indicted for conspiracy to commit the Ya-Na’s murder were acquitted due to lack of evidence. Several others have been implicated in the crime, but no other arrests were made by year’s end.” By the end of 2003, the Ghanaian Government “had lifted the curfew in four out of six districts subject to the state of emergency. For most of the year, the curfew remained from midnight to 4 a.m.” On 18 August 2004, the Ghanaian Government “lifted a state of emergency in Yendi…which began in 2002 following intra-tribal violence.” The US Department of State also reports that by the


An article dated 13 April 2006 in BBC News reports that “after four years of uncertainty” Ya Na Yakubu Andani II was buried:

The Ya-Na’s burial follows a long and bloody dispute between two rival clans over who should become regent, resolved only by means of a compromise deal that offered some benefit to both the Andani and the Abudu clan.

Until this issue had been resolved, the slain ruler could not be laid to rest.

In terms of the deal, his first son, Kankupya Na Abdullai Andani, a 40-year-old primary school teacher, is now to be named regent.

…As soon as the regent takes office, he will run the affairs of the Dagomba Kingdom along with a council of six elders: three each from the Andani and Abudu clans or “gates” in an interim mandate.

Together, they will determine who becomes the next Ya-Na. Although succession rotates between the two gates, a bi-factional “road map” reached with mediators makes either gate eligible because Yakubu Andani didn’t die a natural death.

Having a shot at providing a successor satisfies both sides. In addition, the burial and naming of a regent satisfies the Andanis.

The Abudus also take home a sweetener. Ya-Na Yakubu’s predecessor, Mahamadu, who was an Abudu, and who was removed in the mid-70s from “the skin” – the symbol of authority on

The US Department of State reports that in May 2006 the Ghanaian President and Vice-President “visited Yendi for the first time in four years to encourage the peace process.” The US Department of State also reports that in August 2006 “security forces resisted an attempt by youths from the Abudu “gate” (line of succession) to forcefully enter the Ya Na’s former palace, resulting in the deaths of a number of youth. The government announced that three deaths resulted, but credible local sources reported more” (US Department of State 2007, *Country Reports on Huamn Rights Practices 2006 – Ghana*, 6 March, Section 5 ‘National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities’ – Attachment 27).

The Committee of Eminent Kings met with representatives of the two families on 16 and 17 November 2007 to agree on a final peace agreement on the Dagbon Chieftaincy dispute. The final peace agreement was signed on 18 November 2007. Relevant extracts follow, for more information on the components of the final peace agreement please see Attachment 28:

Funeral of Naa Mahamadu Abdulai. …We therefore conclude that the funeral should take place at the old Gbewaa Palace under certain conditions specified in this agreement.

…Under the “Roadmap” both parties accepted that there can not be duality of authority in Dagbon, and that since Naa Yakubu died in office, his regent should take precedence over the regent of Naa Mahamadu Abdulai. In this connection, the Kampakuya-Na shall remain Regent of the Kingdom until a new Ya Naa is enskinned. The Bolin-Lana as Regent of Naa Mahamadu Abdulai shall enter the old Gbewaa Palace as regent of his father and not as regent of Dagbon. His stay at the old palace shall commence on 22 December 2007 and terminate on 17 January 2008. …During this period he shall perform all ceremonies necessary for the funeral of his father ONLY.

…The funeral of Na Yakubu Andani II shall be performed from 6 February to 5 March 2008.

… The processes for the enskinment of a new Ya Naa shall commence on 10 March and be concluded by 30 April 2008.

…The Government has assured the Eminent Kings that it shall provide the necessary security for the implementation of this final peace agreement. More specifically the government further undertakes to ensure full protection for the Kampakuya Naa during the funeral of Naa Mahamadu Abdulai, and further that the Bolin-Lana and the Abdulai family shall enjoy full protection during the funeral of Naa Mahamadu Abdulai in particular, the security agencies shall introduce security measures including the temporary physical demarcation of the old and new palaces to ensure that ceremonies being performed within any of the palaces take place unhindered. Upon the conclusion of the funeral of Naa Mahamadu Abdulai, the physical separation shall be removed. Both parties acknowledge that there is only one palace in Yendi compound of the old and new palaces and that both palaces shall be at the disposal of the Kampakuya Naa immediately after the performance of the funeral of Ya Naa Mahamadu Abdulai and the departure of the Abdulai family from the old palace (‘Peace Agreement For Abudud and Andani’ 2007, Ghana HomePage, 29 November [http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=135060](http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=135060) – Accessed 24 March 2009 – Attachment 24).

An article dated 11 December 2007 in *The Daily Graphic* reports that “the Regent of Dagbon, Kampakuyu Naa Yakuba Abdulai, is questioning the authenticity” of a document entitled
“Final Peace Agreement” and said to have been issued by the Eminent Chiefs while “the Abudu gate is quoting it to support its stand of performing the funeral in Gbewaa Palace” (‘Andanis, Abudus disagree over ‘final peace agreement’” 2007, Daily Graphic, 11 December, Modern Ghana website http://www.modernghana.com/newsp/149656/1/pageNum1/andanis-abudus-disagree-over-final-peace-agreement.html – Accessed 24 March 2009 – Attachment 28).

An article dated 14 February 2008 in The Chronicle reports that Alhaji Mustapha Ali Idris, Northern Regional Minister “has vehemently condemned the few stubborn natives of Dagbon, who are hiding behind the Dagbon Chieftaincy crisis, to cause serious and unnecessary apprehensions in the area, through alarming text messages.” Ali Idris also “denied the assertion that government was preparing to violently evict the Dagbon Regent from the palace with troops.” The article continues:

The alarming text messages, which were made available to the press, read: “SECURITY ALERT – We have received credible information that the government of Ghana through the Northern Regional Minister and the Asantehene has deployed troops from the Sunyani Barracks to besiege the Gbewa Palace to forcibly evict the Regent from the Palace in order to make way for the Abudos to perform the funeral of the Late Mahamadu Abdulai. However, we the Andanis are foreseeing a bloodbath in Dagbon and thus asking all non native residents in Dagbon to immediately evacuate within 72 hours for their safety.”

The content of the message directly suggests that there were secret preparations, and stockpiling of arms and other dangerous weapons, by the two Dagbon royal families – Andanis and the Abudus – to revisit the protracted chieftaincy crisis (Gyebi, Edmond 2008, ‘Ghana: Gov’t Has Not Sent Troops to Gbewaa Palace’, The Chronicle, 14 February, allAfrica.com website http://allafrica.com/ – Accessed 24 March 2009 – Attachment 29).

An article dated 20 February 2008 by the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation reports that “Ali-Idris is appealing to all in the region to remain calm and gave the assurance that the government is doing all in its power to track down those who will want to reverse the clock of progress and development in the region” (‘Abudu and Andani factions asked to exercise restraint’ 2008, Ghana Broadcasting Corporation, 20 February http://gbcghana.com/news/18545detail.html – Accessed 24 March 2009 – Attachment 30).

The Daily Graphic reports that supporters of the Andani and Abudu factions clashed at the Manhiya Palace in Kumasi on 19 April 2008 when the Committee of Eminent Chiefs met with leaders of the two gates:

It took the police about 15 minutes to quell the disturbances, which saw the supporters, who had massed up at the precincts of the palace, fight with stones and other missiles.

Some vehicles were damaged, as they were hit by stones or ran into each other while the occupants were fleeing the scene of the incident.

One person was arrested, but according to the Commander of the Zongo District Police, Assistant Superintendent of Police (ASP) Gabriel Magamsi, he was released on bail to prevent the escalation of the disturbances.

The committee of eminent chiefs had met on the first of a three-day deliberation on the late Ya Na Mahamadu Abdulai’s funeral, which has been planned to take place at the Gbewaa Palace (Boadu, Kwame Asare 2008, ‘Andani, Abudu Factions Clash’, Daily Graphic, 21
An article dated 26 April 2008 reports that since March 2002 “the area has seen no real peace.” The article continues:

Though violence has by and large been contained, it is an uneasy calm prevailing there. The government has put in resources, in terms of cash, materiel and security personnel to keep the peace there while looking for a lasting solution to the succession problems of the area.

It is a complex and complicated undertaking made even more daunting by a people who do not seem to have the word compromise in their lexicon of negotiations!

6 years after the death of the Ya Na, suspicion, mistrust and no small amount of bigotry, continue to dog the peace process and so not much has been achieved even with the involvement of three eminent chiefs invited by the government to use traditional conflict resolution methods to find a way out (‘Ghana: Dagbon, 6 Years After’ 2008, Accra Mail, 26 April, allAfrica.com website https://allafrica.com/ – Accessed 24 March 2009 – Attachment 32).

Joy FM reports that the Committee of Eminent Chiefs was scheduled to meet with representatives of the Abudu and Andani family in Kumasi on 25 May 2008. The article notes that “[d]eliberations of the committee have led to a considerable ease of tensions between the two sides, however, the burial and subsequent funeral arrangements of the late Ya Na Abdulai Mohammed remain a sore point between the two sides” (Yeboah, Isaac 2008, ‘Abudus, Andanis meet eminent chiefs Sunday’, Joy FM, 21 May, Modern Ghana website http://www.modernghana.com/newsp/166488/1/pageNum1/abudus-andanis-meet-eminent-chiefs-sunday.html – Accessed 24 March 2008 – Attachment 33). The Ghanaian Times reports that the Committee of Eminent Chiefs has adjourned the meeting for two weeks:

The committee further asked the Abudus to prepare and submit the programme for the funeral which will last between 10 and 14 days for onward submission to the security agencies who will monitor activities during the funeral.

The main contention at the sitting of the committee since 2003 had been the venue for the funeral of Naa Mahamadu Abdulai.

The Abudus insist that since the former Ya-Na was buried in the royal mausoleum in the Gbewaa Palace, the funeral must be held there.

But the Andanis claimed that Naa Abdulai was allowed to be buried in the royal cemetery by the late Ya-Na Yakubu Andani in a spirit of reconciliation but his funeral could not be held at the Gbewaa Palace.

An article dated 15 September 2008 in Public Agenda reports that Naangi-Lana Ziblim Abukari, Prince of Gushegu and brother of the Regent of Tamale was murdered recently in Gushegu. The Regent of Dagbon Kampakuya-Naa Abdulai Yakubu Andani “stated that he was not in doubt that the architects of the murder of the King of Dagbon, Ya-Na Andani Yakkuba II are the same wicked minds behind the death of Naangi-Lana Ziblim Abukair.” The article continues:

He [Regent of Dagbon] called on the police to do any thing possible to apprehend the culprits of these heinous crimes in order to end the culture of impunity and restore law and order in Dagbon.

Meanwhile, the Regent of Tamale, Alhaji Naa Abdulai Ziblim has warned the security agencies that the Andani Royal Family has had enough and will not back and watch others take undue advantage of them. The regent who spoke to the media following the murder of another member of the Andani gate said it is clear there is a political agenda against his family.

He stated that his brother was not a politician but was chased and shot several times and beheaded by the said wicked elements in Gushegu (Zakaria-Tamale, Mahama 2008, ‘Ghana: Regent Urges Gov’t to End Culture of Impunity in Dagbon’, Public Agenda, 15 September, allAfrica.com website https://allafrica.com/ – Accessed 24 March 2009 – Attachment 34).

An article dated 5 February 2009 on Citi 97.3fm reports that conflict resolution expert Emmanuel Bombande said that the “burial of Ya Na Yakubu Andani II has so far been the only element of the road map successfully implemented” (‘Dagbon crises could have been resolved in 2007—Bombande’ 2009, Citi 97.3fm, 5 February http://www.citifmonline.com/2009/02/05/dagbon-crises-could-have-been-resolved-in-2007%E2%80%94bombande/ – Accessed 24 March 2009 – Attachment 35).

An article dated 27 February 2009 in The Daily Graphic reports that the Abudu family “said it was happy to hear the President indicate during the State of the Nation Address his intention to investigate” the Dagbon crisis which resulted in the death of Ya Na Yakubu Andani:

This was contained in a statement signed by the Secretary to the family, Mr Alhassan Iddrisu, to congratulate the President, Professor J.E.A. Mills, on his ascension to the highest office of the nation.

It said, “We of the Abudu side were immensely pleased by that promise. We believe that any genuine and dispassionate investigation of this unfortunate event based on the actual facts surrounding the event will expose the actual enemies of Dagbon and absolve innocent and respectable persons who had hitherto been smeared with unjustified accusations regarding the Yendi unfortunate event.”

The statement continued that it was the belief of the family that the absence of the real picture of events leading to the clash between the two royal families which resulted in the unfortunate deaths was attributable to apparent insolubility of the Dagbon crisis (‘Abudos welcome President Mills’ promise to probe the Dagbon crisis’ 2009, Daily Graphic, 27 February, Modern Ghana website http://www.modernghana.com/news/204163/1/abudos-welcome-president-mills-promise-to-probe-da.html – Accessed 24 March 2009 – Attachment 36).

An article dated 25 March 2009 in Gye Nyame Concord reports that “as the deadline for submission of all illegal arms and ammunitions in Dagbon elapsed last week without a single
weapon being retrieved, intelligence gathered by the Gye Nyame Concord suggests that some members of the various ethnic and political groupings in Dagbon may be planning to use this week’s 7th year anniversary of the gruesome murder of Ya-Na Yakubu Andani II to unleash violence in the community.” The article continues:

Usually reliable sources in Dagbon say some indigenes plan to mark the day in grand style by taking advantage of any security lapse to attack opponents and score what they perceive to be factional and political victory.

…Information gathered by this paper suggests that some members of one of the factions in the conflict have already drawn a list of about 50 potential targets in the event of unrest.

…There are suggestions that some residents have hatched a plan to use street processions on the principal streets of Dagbon as an opportunity to attack any of the potential targets seen on the road that day.

…Dagbon has been a source of concern to security personnel following the hording of large caches of arms smuggled into the community.


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List of Attachments


