Exemption 2

Exemption 2 of the Freedom of Information Act exempts from mandatory disclosure records that are "related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency."¹ The courts have interpreted Exemption 2 to encompass two different categories of information:

(a) internal matters of a relatively trivial nature -- often referred to as "low 2" information; and

(b) more substantial internal matters, the disclosure of which would risk circumvention of a legal requirement -- often referred to as "high 2" information.²

When applying Exemption 2, it is important to first note that the President and the Attorney General have issued memoranda to all agencies emphasizing that the FOIA reflects a "profound national commitment to ensuring an open Government" and directing agencies to "adopt a presumption in favor of disclosure."³ (For a discussion of these memoranda, see Procedural Requirements, President Obama's FOIA Memorandum & Attorney General Holder's FOIA Guidelines, above.) A comprehensive examination of both the "low 2" and "high 2" aspects of Exemption 2 is set forth below.

Initial Considerations

Exemption 2's protection of two distinct categories of information can be traced back


to the legislative history of the FOIA’s enactment. For more than fifteen years after the passage of the Act, much confusion existed concerning the intended coverage of Exemption 2 due to the differing approaches taken in the Senate and House Reports when the FOIA was enacted and the fact that these differences were not reconciled in a joint statement or report by both Houses of Congress. The Senate Report stated:

Exemption No. 2 relates only to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency. Examples of these may be rules as to personnel's use of parking facilities or regulation of lunch hours, statements of policy as to sick leave, and the like.4

The House Report provided a more expansive interpretation of Exemption 2's coverage, stating that it was intended to include:

[op]erating rules, guidelines, and manuals of procedure for Government investigators or examiners . . . but [that] this exemption would not cover all "matters of internal management" such as employee relations and working conditions and routine administrative procedures which are withheld under the present law.5

The Supreme Court was confronted with this conflict in Department of the Air Force v. Rose.6 In that case, the Supreme Court construed Exemption 2, in line with the Senate's view, as protecting what is now known as "low 2" information, i.e., internal agency matters so routine or trivial that they could not be "subject to . . . a genuine and significant public interest."7 The Court declared that Exemption 2 was intended to relieve agencies of the burden of assembling and providing access to any "matter in which the public could not reasonably be expected to have an interest."8 At the same time, the Court left the door open for the future application of "high 2," in line with the House's view.9

The Supreme Court's ruling in Rose helped to define the contours of Exemption 2, but it did not dispel all the confusion about Exemption 2's scope. Early judicial opinions subsequent to this ruling, particularly in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia

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5 H. Rep. No. 89-1497, at 10 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2418, 2427; see also id. at 5 (explaining that "premature disclosure of agency plans that are undergoing development . . . , particularly plans relating to expenditures, could have adverse effects upon both public and private interest[s].").


7 Id. at 369-370.

8 Id.

9 Id. at 369 (suggesting that approach taken in House Report could permit an agency to withhold matters of some public interest "where disclosure may risk circumvention of agency regulation.").
Circuit, demonstrated judicial ambivalence about whether Exemption 2 covered only personnel-related records or included more general internal agency practices. Additionally, these early cases did not entertain the possible existence of a "high 2" aspect of Exemption 2.

As is discussed in greater detail below, the D.C. Circuit eventually determined in Crooker v. ATF that Exemption 2 was intended to cover "high 2" records, whether or not such records were personnel-related. Subsequently, in Founding Church of Scientology v. Smith, the court buttressed Crooker's holdings, conclusively establishing that Exemption 2 was not limited to agency personnel records. Further, the court articulated the following approach for protecting records under either "low 2" or "high 2":

First, the material withheld should fall within the terms of the statutory language as a personnel rule or internal practice of the agency. Then, if the material relates to trivial administrative matters of no genuine public interest, exemption would be automatic under the statute. If withholding frustrates legitimate public interest, however, the material should be released unless the government can show that disclosure would risk circumvention of lawful agency regulation.

In this decision, the D.C. Circuit thus clarified that Exemption 2 allows the withholding of a great variety of internal rules, procedures, and guidelines, and not just those related to "personnel."

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10 Compare Allen v. CIA, 636 F.2d 1287, 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding that exemption covers "nothing more than trivial administrative personnel rules"), and Jordan v. DOJ, 591 F.2d 753, 764 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (en banc) (ruling that exemption covers "trivia" pertaining only to "internal personnel matters"), with Lesar v. DOJ, 636 F.2d 472, 485 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (withholding non-personnel related records (informant codes) because exemption covers routine matters of merely internal interest), and Cox v. DOJ, 601 F.2d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (withholding non-personnel related law enforcement manuals as "routine matters of merely internal interest"). See generally DeLorme Publ'g Co. v. NOAA, 917 F. Supp. 867, 875-76 & n.10 (D. Me. 1996) (describing debate among various circuit courts on meaning of Exemption 2's language), appeal dismissed per stipulation, No. 96-1601 (1st Cir. July 8, 1996).

11 670 F.2d 1051, 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (en banc) (rejecting Jordan's rationale that Exemption 2 was limited to personnel records of little interest to general public, and endorsing protection for sensitive law enforcement manuals (citing Jordan, 591 F.2d at 763)).

12 721 F.2d 828, 830 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (rejecting Allen and Jordan to extent that they limited Exemption 2 to personnel records (citing Crooker, 670 F.2d at 1073)).

13 Id. at 830-31 n.4 (citations omitted); see also Morley v. CIA, 508 F.3d 1108, 1124-25 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (noting that records can be withheld under Exemption 2 if they "fall within the terms of the statutory language" and their release "risk[s] circumvention of agency regulation" or they pertain to "trivial administrative matters of no genuine public interest" (quoting Schwaner v. Dep't of the Air Force, 898 F.2d 793, 794 (D.C. Cir. 1990))).

14 Founding Church, 721 F.2d at 830 & n.2; see also, e.g., Bangoura v. U.S. Dep't of the Army, (continued...)
Some differences among the courts of appeals for circuits other than the D.C. Circuit remain, however, with respect to the degree to which Exemption 2 information must be personnel-related as a threshold matter. Two 1997 appellate decisions from the Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, which are discussed in detail below, utilize a more narrow approach to the concept of "personnel-relatedness."15

"Low 2": Trivial Matters

Exemption 2 of the FOIA permits the withholding of internal matters that are of a relatively trivial nature.16 As its legislative and judicial history make clear, in this "low 2" aspect Exemption 2 is the only exemption in the FOIA having a conceptual underpinning totally unrelated to any harm caused by disclosure per se.17 Rather, this aspect of the exemption is based upon the rationale that the very task of processing and releasing some requested records would place an administrative burden on the agency that would not be justified by any genuine public benefit.18

14(...continued)
607 F. Supp. 2d 134, 144 (D.D.C. 2009) ("'personnel rules and practices' has been interpreted to include not only 'minor employment matters' but also 'other rules and practices governing agency personnel'" (quoting Kurdyukov v. U.S. Coast Guard, 578 F. Supp. 2d 114, 124 (D.D.C. 2008))); Concepcion v. FBI, 606 F. Supp. 2d 14, 30 (D.D.C. 2009) (same) (quoting Crooker, 670 F.2d at 1056) (appeal pending); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. DOT, No. 02-566, 2005 WL 1606915, at *9 (D.D.C. July 7, 2005) (stating that "Exemption 2 is not limited to internal personnel rules and practices; rather, it is construed more generally to encompass documents that are used for predominantly internal purposes"); FOIA Update, Vol. V, No. 1, at 10 ("FOIA Counselor: The Unique Protection of Exemption 2") (advising that Founding Church "expressly" held that Allen "personnel" restriction no longer applies).

15 Maricopa Audubon Soc'y v. U.S. Forest Serv., 108 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 1997); Audubon Soc'y v. U.S. Forest Serv., 104 F.3d 1201 (10th Cir. 1997).


17 See Rose, 425 U.S. at 369-70; see also, e.g., Edmonds v. FBI, 272 F. Supp. 2d 35, 51 (D.D.C. 2003) (observing that showings of "foreseeable adverse consequence[s]" not necessary to withhold information that is trivial and of no public interest).

18 See, e.g., Dirksen v. HHS, 803 F.2d 1456, 1460 (9th Cir. 1986) (observing that "the thrust of Exemption 2 [i.e., 'low 2'] is . . . to relieve agencies of the burden of disclosing information in which the public does not have a legitimate interest"); Martin v. Lauer, 686 F.2d 24, 34 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Exemption 2 "serves to relieve the agency from the administrative burden of processing FOIA requests when internal matters are not likely to be the subject of public interest."); Carbe v. ATF, No. 03-1658, 2004 WL 2051359, at *6 (D.D.C. Aug. 12, 2004) ("'Low 2' information refers to internal procedures and practices of an agency where disclosure would constitute an administrative burden unjustified by any genuine and significant public benefit."); see also FOIA Update, Vol. V, No. 1, at 10-11 ("FOIA Counselor: The Unique Protection of Exemption 2").
Accordingly, as a matter of longstanding practice, agencies have recognized that disclosing "low 2" information -- which by its very nature is nothing more than "trivial" -- is in many instances less burdensome than invoking the exemption to withhold it.19

For information in a requested record to be properly withheld under "low 2," it must meet two criteria: First, the information must be "predominantly internal," and second, the information must be of a trivial nature and not of any "genuine public interest."20 Thus, "low 2" shares in common with "high 2" the requirement that the information withheld be "predominantly internal."21 However, for "low 2" in particular, some courts have also focused on the literal language of the exemption to determine whether the information at issue sheds light on agency "rules and practices."22

Applying this principle to federal personnel lists, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that a list of the names and duty addresses of military personnel stationed at Bolling Air Force Base did not meet the threshold requirement of being "related solely to the internal rules and practices of an agency."23 The court held that, for "low 2"

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19 See Fonda v. CIA, 434 F. Supp. 498, 503 (D.D.C. 1977) (finding that where administrative burden is minimal and it would be easier to release information at issue, policy underlying Exemption 2 does not permit withholding); see also FOIA Update, Vol. V, No. 1, at 11 ("FOIA Counselor: The Unique Protection of Exemption 2") (advising agencies to invoke "low 2" aspect of Exemption 2 only where doing so truly avoids burden).

20 See Schiller v. NLRB, 964 F.2d 1205, 1207 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ("Predominantly internal documents that deal with trivial administrative matters fall under the 'low 2' exemption.").


22 Schwaner v. Dep't of the Air Force, 898 F.2d 793, 795 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (noting that courts may be more willing to "sanction a weak relation to 'rules and practices'" for weightier government interests); see also Abraham & Rose, P.L.C. v. United States, 138 F.3d 1075, 1081, 1083 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that records pertaining to agency practice of collecting and compiling information was not sufficiently related to personnel rule or practice to qualify for Exemption 2, while acknowledging that where significant interest in non-disclosure of sensitive information exists, courts are more willing to "sanction a weak relation to 'rules and practices'" (quoting Schwaner, 898 F.2d at 795)); Long, 450 F. Supp. 2d at 58 n.19 (clarifying that records pertaining to "sensitive agency practices" may only be withheld if "predominantly internal," but noting that Schwaner may support weakened relationship to agency "rules and practices" for weighty government interests).

23 Schwaner, 898 F.2d at 794; see also Maydak v. DOJ, 362 F. Supp. 2d 316, 323 (D.D.C. 2005) (holding Exemption 2 inapplicable to list of names and titles of prison staff; applying reasoning similar to that of Schwaner court), reconsideration denied, 579 F. Supp. 2d 105 (D.D.C. 2008). But see The News-Press v. DHS, No. 05-CV-102, 2005 WL 2921952, at *10-11 (continued...
purposes, if the information in question is not itself actually a "rule or practice," then it must "shed significant light" on a "rule or practice" in order to qualify.\textsuperscript{24} In doing so, the court acknowledged that it 'often applied the 'predominant internality' test without emphasizing the words 'rules and practices' ... [b]ut in such cases the requested information was typically a rule or practice in the most literal sense.'\textsuperscript{25}

Most courts have not focused specifically on the issue of relatedness to agency rules or practices, but instead have focused solely on the meaning of the phrase "predominantly internal," which courts regularly interpret as follows:

Information is 'predominantly internal' if it does not 'purport to regulate activities among members of the public or set standards to be followed by agency personnel in deciding whether to proceed against or take action affecting members of the public.'\textsuperscript{26}

(The "predominant internality" requirement for "high 2" records is discussed in greater detail below under Exemption 2, "High 2": Risk of Circumvention.)

Over time, courts have continued to include a wide variety of trivial administrative

\textsuperscript{23}(...continued)

(M.D. Fla. Nov. 4, 2005) (finding that names and signatures of low-level FEMA employees were properly redacted from disaster-assistance documents, falling "well within ["low 2' aspect of] Exemption 2"), rev’d on other grounds, 489 F.3d 1173 (11th Cir. 2007).

\textsuperscript{24} Schwaner, 898 F.2d at 797; see also, e.g., Abraham & Rose, 138 F.3d at 1081, 1083 (ruling that "information [contained in an IRS electronic database] ... is not sufficiently related to a personnel rule or practice to satisfy ... [t]he] Exemption 2 analysis," but can be protected under Exemptions 6 and 7(C)); Audubon Soc’y v. U.S. Forest Serv., 104 F.3d 1201, 1204 (10th Cir. 1997) (concluding that maps of habitats of owls deemed "threatened" under Endangered Species Act are not sufficiently related to internal personnel rules and practices); Bangoura v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 607 F. Supp. 2d 134, 145 (D.D.C. 2009) (finding "predominantly internal" the "special agent sequence numbers" used to identify agents, in part because withheld records need only be "related to" agency rules and practices (quoting Kurdyukov v. U.S. Coast Guard, 578 F. Supp. 2d 114, 124 (D.D.C. 2008))); Concepcion v. FBI, 606 F. Supp. 2d 14, 31 (D.D.C. 2009) (observing that information need not constitute "rules and practices" under Exemption 2 if it relates to such rules and practices (quoting Schwaner, 898 F.2d at 795)) (appeal pending); Singh v. FBI, 574 F. Supp. 2d 32, 43 (D.D.C. 2008) (same). But see Hale v. DOJ, 973 F.2d 894, 902 (10th Cir. 1992) (ruling, in post-Schwaner decision, that "personnel directories containing the names and [office] addresses of [most] FBI employees" are properly withheld as "trivial matters of no genuine public interest"), cert. granted, vacated & remanded on other grounds, 509 U.S. 918 (1993).

\textsuperscript{25} Schwaner, 898 F.2d at 795.

\textsuperscript{26} Edmonds, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 50 (quoting Cox v. DOJ, 601 F.2d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 1979)); see also, e.g., Bangoura, 607 F. Supp. 2d at 145 (determining that special agent identification numbers do not constitute "secret law" ... or [an] 'attempt to modify or regulate public behavior" (quoting Crooker v. ATF, 670 F.2d 1051, 1073-75 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (en banc))).
information within the "low 2" aspect of Exemption 2's coverage. This includes file or tracking numbers, document routing information, internal telephone and fax numbers, routine


personnel instructions, \textsuperscript{30} other similar administrative codes and markings, \textsuperscript{31} routine internal computer codes and data, \textsuperscript{32} and a variety of other types of purely internal administrative

\textsuperscript{30} Hale, 973 F.2d at 902 (checklist form used to assist FBI special agents in consensual monitoring); Schiller, 964 F.2d at 1208 (internal time deadlines and procedures, recordkeeping directions, instructions on contacting agency officials for assistance, and guidelines on agency decisionmaking); Peter S. Herrick's Customs & Int'l Trade Newsletter v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., No. 04-00377, 2006 WL 1826185, at *4 (D.D.C. June 30, 2006) (permitting withholding of twelve categories of "quintessentially internal" information, including file management procedures, paperwork completion instructions, and basic computer instructions), summary affirmance granted on other grounds, No. 06-5427 (D.C. Cir. May 24, 2007); DiPietro v. EOUSA, 368 F. Supp. 2d 80, 82 (D.D.C. 2005) (holding that agency properly withheld "an internal checklist of clerical actions, code numbers on a form for attorney time devoted to a task, a record of transmittals and receipts of records, a form used for inputting attorney work product data into a computer system, and identification and file numbers"); Amro v. U.S. Customs Serv., 128 F. Supp. 2d 776, 783 (E.D. Pa. 2001) ("record keeping directions, instructions on contacting agency officials for assistance, and guidelines on agency-decision making" (quoting agency's filing)).

\textsuperscript{31} See, e.g., Hale, 973 F.2d at 902 (administrative markings and notations on documents); Bangoura, 607 F. Supp. 2d at 145-46 (military special agent identification numbers); Concepcion, 606 F. Supp. 2d at 31-32 ("administrative markings relating to internal agency file control systems" and FBI source symbol numbers/informant numbers); Durrani, 2009 WL 755219, at *9 (internal codes from reports of investigation); Singh, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 44 (ICE case identification numbers, source symbol numbers, "case program codes," and other administrative codes); Gavin v. SEC, No. 04-4522, 2007 WL 2454156, at *6 (D. Minn. Aug. 23, 2007) (case names/numbers, dates investigations were opened/closed, checklists, classification codes, and staff names and telephone numbers); Baez v. FBI, 443 F. Supp. 2d 717, 727 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (administrative markings from account statement); Maydak, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 324 ("accounting numbers from purchase orders . . . because such information, similar to code numbers, is used for internal purposes and has no significant public interest"); Hamilton v. Weise, No. 95-1161, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18900, at *17 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 1, 1997) (Customs Service codes concerning individual pilot). But see Gerstein v. DOJ, No. C-03-4893, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41276, at *36-38 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2005) (ordering disclosure of page numbers on records pertaining to delayed-notice searches, given that "the public has an interest in learning about the aggregate length of notification delays" and "the redacted page numbers prevent [the requester] from linking documents together in a meaningful way"); Manna v. DOJ, 832 F. Supp. 866, 880 (D.N.J. 1993) (finding that "DEA failed to describe or explain what these 'internal markings' are . . . [and if they] relate to internal rules or practice and whether these markings constitute trivial administrative matters of no public interest").

records. 33

The second part of the "low 2" formulation is whether there is a genuine and significant public interest in disclosure of the records requested. 34 As the Supreme Court observed, the purpose of "low 2" is to "relieve agencies of the burden of assembling and maintaining for public inspection matter in which the public could not reasonably be expected to have an interest." As the D.C. Circuit found in Founding Church of Scientology v. Smith, "a reasonably low threshold is maintained for determining when withheld administrative material relates to significant public interests." 36 When there is such an interest -- for example, with the Air Force Academy honor code proceedings that were at issue in Department of the Air Force v. Rose -- the information has been found not to be covered by the "low 2" aspect of Exemption 2. 37

32 (...continued)


34 Rose, 425 U.S. at 369.

35 Id. at 369-70; see also Dirksen, 803 F.2d at 1460 (noting that "low 2's" purpose is to relieve agency burden of releasing information in which public has no "legitimate interest").


37 Rose, 425 U.S. at 367-70; see also, e.g., Tax Analysts v. DOJ, 845 F.2d 1060, 1064 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (finding Exemption 2 inapplicable due to "public's obvious interest" in agency copies of court opinions), aff'd on other grounds, 492 U.S. 136 (1989); Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d 1136, 1140-43 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (refusing to allow agency to withhold evaluations of effectiveness of implementation of agency's policies due to legitimate public interest in them); Keeper of the Mountains Found. v. DOJ, 514 F. Supp. 2d 837, 848-50 (S.D. W. Va. 2007) (rejecting agency's argument that withheld information was trivial because document constituted substantive (continued...)
On the other hand, courts have allowed the withholding of records pursuant to the "low 2" aspect of Exemption 2 in the absence of any "legitimate public interest" in the information. 38

37 (...continued)
evidence of agency’s role in assisting Senator’s research into environmentalists' hypothesized role in breach of New Orleans levees during Hurricane Katrina); Gerstein, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41276, at *36-38 (ordering disclosure of page numbers on records concerning delayed-notice searches, because public has interest in such searches and "the redacted page numbers prevent [the requester] from linking documents together in a meaningful way"); Carlson v. USPS, No. C-02-05471, 2005 WL 756573, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2005) (rejecting agency's application of "low 2" to records pertaining to mailbox locations, in part because agency had released records in response to prior similar requests and in part because of media coverage praising requester's efforts to obtain requested information), appeal dismissed voluntarily, No. 05-16039 (9th Cir. Sept. 16, 2005); Church of Scientology v. IRS, 816 F. Supp. 1138, 1149 (W.D. Tex. 1993) (stating that "public is entitled to know how IRS is allocating" taxpayers' money as it pertains to IRS advance of travel funds to its employees), appeal dismissed per stipulation, No. 93-8431 (5th Cir. Oct. 21, 1993); Globe Newspaper Co. v. FBI, No. 91-13257, 1992 WL 396327, at *2-3 (D. Mass. Dec. 29, 1992) (finding that agency improperly invoked "low 2" for amount paid to FBI informant involved in "ongoing criminal activities"); News Group Boston, Inc. v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 799 F. Supp. 1264, 1266-68 (D. Mass. 1992) (concluding that agency must disclose disciplinary actions taken against Amtrak employees due to legitimate public interest in such documents), appeal dismissed, No. 92-2250 (1st Cir. Dec. 4, 1992); North v. Walsh, No. 87-2700, slip op. at 3 (D.D.C. June 25, 1991) (finding "low 2" inapplicable to travel vouchers of senior officials of Office of Independent Counsel); FBI Agents Ass’n, 3 Gov’t Disclosure Serv. ¶ 83,057, at 83,566-67 (concluding that standards of conduct, grievance procedures, and EEO procedures for FBI employees were improperly withheld under "low 2" because such records are of "public concern and interest"); Ferris v. IRS, 2 Gov’t Disclosure Serv. (P-H) ¶ 82,084, at 82,363 (D.D.C. Dec. 23, 1981) (holding that agency improperly withheld SES performance objectives given that such matters "are of legitimate interest to the public").

38 See Hale, 973 F.2d at 902 (finding no public interest in administrative markings and notations, personnel directories containing names and addresses of FBI employees, room and telephone numbers, employee identification numbers, consensual monitoring checklist form, and rap sheet-dissemination page); Asian Law Caucus, 2008 WL 5047839, at *5 (finding no legitimate public interest in name of obsolete database); Middleton, 2006 WL 2666300, at *6 (concluding that "it is apparent" that "the redacted ID numbers [do not] constitute a matter of genuine public interest"); Gavin, 2005 WL 2739293, at *5 (finding that opening and closing reports of investigation were properly withheld because there is "no public interest" in them); Morales Cozier, No. 99-0312, slip op. at 13 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 25, 2000) (ruling that "facsimile numbers of FBI employees . . . constitute trivial matter that could not reasonably be expected to be of interest to the public"); Germosen, 1999 WL 1021559, at *12 (finding no legitimate public interest in source symbol numbers and agent identification numbers, as well as in computer access codes, telephone and fax numbers, and numbers used to denote different categories of counterfeit currency); Voinche v. FBI, 46 F. Supp. 2d 26, 30 (D.D.C. 1999) (applying Exemption 2 to telephone number of FBI's Public Corruption Unit as "trivial administrative matter of no genuine public interest"); News Group Boston, 799 F. Supp. at 1268 (holding that there is no public interest in payroll and job title codes); Buffalo Evening News, Inc. v. U.S. Border Patrol, 791 F. Supp. 386, 390-93 (W.D.N.Y. 1992) (declaring that there is no (continued...).
An illustration of how this "public interest" delineation has been drawn can be found in a decision in which large portions of a FOIA training manual used by the SEC were ruled properly withholdable as trivial and of no public interest, while another portion, because of a discerned "public interest" in it, was not.

In some cases courts have conflated the "low 2" and "high 2" aspects of the exemption or have not specified which aspect of the Exemption was being applied. Courts have also reached differing conclusions as to whether agencies are required to specify that the "low 2" or "high 2" aspect of Exemption 2 is being invoked to protect records. (See also the further discussion of this point under Litigation Considerations, Vaughn Index, below.)

(...continued)

public interest in "soundex" encoding of alien's family name, in whether or not alien is listed in Border Patrol Lookout Book, in codes used to identify deportability, in narratives explaining circumstances of apprehension, or in internal routing information).

Am. Lawyer Media, Inc. v. SEC, No. 01-1967, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16940, at *8 (D.D.C. Sept. 6, 2002) ("This information is the paradigmatic 'trivial administrative matter [that] is of no genuine public interest.'").

Id. at *16 (finding that certain definitions "contain[ing] general legal instruction to SEC staff on how to analyze FOIA requests . . . must be disclosed").

See, e.g., Concepcion, 606 F. Supp. 2d at 31-32 (allowing the withholding of internal telephone numbers pursuant to "low 2," both because of lack of genuine public interest in such records and because employees could be subject to disruptive, harassing telephone calls); Bullock v. FBI, 577 F. Supp. 2d 75, 81 (D.D.C. 2008) (withholding information without specifying whether "low 2" or "high 2" was applicable); Lipsey v. DOJ, No. 06-423, 2007 WL 842956, at *3 (D.D.C. Mar. 19, 2007) (same); Baez, 443 F. Supp. 2d at 727 (holding that agency properly withheld "allegedly sensitive" administrative markings, because they "could not be of any interest to the public"); Neuhausser v. DOJ, No. 6: 03-531, 2006 WL 1581010, at *10 (E.D. Ky. June 6, 2006) (discussing agency's "high 2" argument, but permitting redactions under "low 2" approach); Maydak v. DOJ, 254 F. Supp. 2d 23, 36 (D.D.C. 2003) (protecting BOP's internal codes for electronic systems because inmates "could access information regarding other inmates," and reiterating that courts have "consistently found no significant public interest in the disclosure of identifying codes"); Voinche, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 30 (concluding that "disclosure of [a telephone extension] could result in the circumvention of FBI law enforcement procedures and there is no significant public interest in [its] disclosure").

Compare Robinson v. Attorney General of U.S., 534 F. Supp. 2d 72, 80 (D.D.C. 2008) (finding that agency's declaration was inadequate because it failed to specify whether "high 2" or "low 2" was basis for withholding), appeal dismissed voluntarily, No. 08-5048 (D.C. Cir. June 23, 2008), with Moayedi, 510 F. Supp. 2d at 84 (finding that agency need not designate withholdings as "high 2" or "low 2" in its Vaughn index (citing NYC Apparel FZE v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., 484 F. Supp. 2d 77, 92 n.21 (D.D.C. 2007))), and Changzhou, 2005 WL 913268, at *3 ("[T]he Court is unaware of any authority requiring the government to designate[] whether a withholding falls within a 'low' or 'high' category.").
"High 2": Risk of Circumvention

The second category of information covered by Exemption 2 -- internal matters of a far more substantial nature the disclosure of which would risk the circumvention of a statute or agency regulation -- was not initially considered to be within the scope of Exemption 2's coverage. In Department of the Air Force v. Rose, the Supreme Court specifically left open the question of whether such records fall within Exemption 2's coverage.

This question was resolved by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit when it addressed the issue in Crooker v. ATF, a case involving a law enforcement agents' training manual. The Crooker decision stands at the head of a long line of cases interpreting Exemption 2 to encompass protection for sensitive internal agency information where disclosure would significantly risk circumvention of the law.

In Crooker, the D.C. Circuit fashioned a two-part test for determining which sensitive materials are exempt from mandatory disclosure under the "high 2" aspect of Exemption 2. This test requires both:

(1) that a requested document be "predominantly internal," and

(2) that disclosure of which would risk circumvention of the law.

See, e.g., Massey v. FBI, 3 F.3d 620, 622 (2d Cir. 1993) (finding that disclosure of informant symbol numbers and source-identifying information "could do substantial damage to the FBI's law enforcement activities"); Schiller v. NLRB, 964 F.2d 1205, 1207-08 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (protecting records pertaining to agency's litigation strategy because disclosure "would render those documents operationally useless" (quoting NTEU v. U.S. Customs Serv., 802 F.2d 525, 530-31 (D.C. Cir. 1986))); Dirksen v. HHS, 803 F.2d 1456, 1458-59 (9th Cir. 1986) (affirming nondisclosure of claims-processing guidelines that could be used by healthcare providers to avoid audits); Hardy v. ATF, 631 F.2d 653, 657 (9th Cir. 1980) (holding that "law enforcement materials, disclosure of which may risk circumvention of agency regulation, are exempt from disclosure" under Exemption 2); Kurdyukov v. U.S. Coast Guard, 578 F. Supp. 2d 114, 125-26 (D.D.C. 2008) (withholding sensitive documents pertaining to drug interdiction efforts because release of such records could lead to circumvention of law enforcement efforts), reconsideration denied, No. 07-1131 (D.D.C. Nov. 26, 2008), appeal dismissed, No. 08-5460, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 5600 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 17, 2009); Moayed v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., 510 F. Supp. 2d 73, 82 (D.D.C. 2007) (recognizing applicability of "high 2" to "more substantial internal matters" where disclosure would significantly risk circumvention of the law).

Crooker, 670 F.2d at 1074 (adopting requirement that records be "predominantly internal" to qualify for "high 2" protection as proposed by Judge Leventhal in concurrence in Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d 1136, 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1975)); see also Judicial Watch, Inc. v. DOT, No. 02-566, 2005 WL 1606915, at *9 (D.D.C. July 7, 2005) ("Exemption 2 is not limited to internal personnel rules and practices; rather, it is construed more generally to encompass documents that are (continued...)
"High 2": Risk of Circumvention

(2) that its disclosure "significantly risks circumvention of agency regulations or statutes."48

Historically, beginning with Crooker, courts typically found that any asserted public interest in disclosure is legally irrelevant under this "anti-circumvention" aspect of Exemption 2.49 Rather, the concern under "high 2" is that a FOIA disclosure should not "benefit those attempting to violate the law and avoid detection."50 Notably, despite Crooker and its progeny, recent cases have given inconsistent treatment to the question of the relevance of public interest under "high 2."51

47(...continued)

used for predominantly internal purposes.

48 Crooker, 670 F.2d at 1073-74; see also Peter S. Herrick's Customs & Int'l Trade Newsletter v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., No. 04-00377, 2006 WL 1826185, at *5 (D.D.C. June 30, 2006) (rejecting plaintiff's argument that agency must show that circumvention "be almost certain," finding that instead "the test is satisfied so long as the information could assist individuals seeking to avoid or hinder lawful agency regulation"), summary affirmance granted on other grounds, No. 06-5427 (D.C. Cir. May 24, 2007); Dorsett v. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, 307 F. Supp. 2d 28, 36-37 (D.D.C. 2004) (upholding applicability of "high 2" protection for Secret Service "internal protective investigative information," and reiterating that "Congress evidenced a secondary purpose when it enacted FOIA of preserving the effective operation of governmental agencies") (quoting Crooker, 670 F.2d at 1074)).

49 See, e.g., Crooker, 670 F.2d at 1074 ("It is not up to this court to balance the public interest in disclosure against any reason for avoiding disclosure."); Gordon v. FBI, 388 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1036 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (finding irrelevant substantial public interest in records pertaining to aviation "watch lists," because "disclosing the information would assist terrorists in circumventing the purpose of the watch lists"); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 337 F. Supp. 2d 146, 165 (D.D.C. 2004) ("In light of Exemption 2's anti-circumvention purpose, public interest in the disclosure is legally irrelevant."); Inst. for Policy Studies v. Dep't of the Air Force, 676 F. Supp. 3, 5 (D.D.C. 1987) (assuming "significant public interest," but nevertheless holding that classification procedures were properly withheld because of risk of circumvention in identifying vulnerabilities). But cf. Kaganove v. EPA, 856 F.2d 884, 889 (7th Cir. 1988) (suggesting that document might not meet Crooker test if its purpose were not "legitimate").

50 Crooker, 670 F.2d at 1054 (quoting agency declaration).

51 Compare Moayedi, 510 F. Supp. 2d at 85 (finding public interest in disclosure to be "legally irrelevant" under "high 2" (citing Judicial Watch, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d at 165)), and Peay v. DOJ, No. 04-1859, 2007 WL 788871, at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 14, 2007) (unpublished disposition) (noting that Congress did not authorize weighing of public interest against reasons for withholding under Exemption 2 (quoting Crooker, 670 F.2d at 1074)), amended on other grounds (D.D.C. Mar. 27, 2007), with Duncan v. DEA, No. 06-1032, 2007 WL 1576316, at *5 (D.D.C. May 30, 2007) (finding "there is not a sufficient public interest to override the agency's appropriate interest . . . ." in withholding G-DEP codes, NADDIS numbers, and other internal information for which release would risk legal circumvention), and Lipsey v. DOJ, No. (continued...)
To meet the first part of the "high 2" Crooker standard, agencies must demonstrate that the information withheld is "predominantly internal." As noted by the D.C. Circuit, "judicial willingness to sanction a weak relation to 'rules and practices' may be greatest when the asserted government interest is relatively weighty."

The D.C. Circuit established specific guidance on what constitutes an "internal" document in Cox v. DOJ, where it protected information that:

- does not purport to regulate activities among members of the public . . . [and]
- does [not] set standards to be followed by agency personnel in deciding whether to proceed against or to take action affecting members of the public.

Differently stated, the unreleased information is not "secret law," the primary target of [the FOIA's] broad disclosure provisions.

As the District Court for the District of Columbia explained, because all internal rules and practices of an agency affect the public to some extent, "material is considered predominantly internal where it 'was designed to establish rules and practices for agency

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51(...continued)

06-423, 2007 WL 842956, at *3 (D.D.C. Mar. 19, 2007) (finding public interest insufficient to overcome agency's interest in maintaining secrecy of records under Exemption 2), and L.A. Times Commc'ns, LLC v. Dept of the Army, 442 F. Supp. 2d 880, 902 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (concluding that public interest in disclosure of names of private security contractors outweighed by need to protect life and safety of such contractors (allowing withholding pursuant to Exemptions "high 2" and 7(F))).

52 See, e.g., Kaganove, 856 F.2d at 889 (finding that agency, like any employer, "reasonably would expect" applicant rating plan to be internal); NTEU v. U.S. Customs Serv., 802 F.2d 525, 531 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding that "appointments of individual members of the lower federal bureaucracy is primarily a question of 'internal' significance for the agencies involved"); Judicial Watch, Inc., 2005 WL 1606915, at *11 (rejecting agency's application of Exemption 2 to letter from private company to FAA official, because agency did not explain how letter was "predominantly internal"); Inst. for Policy Studies, 676 F. Supp. at 5 ("[I]t is difficult to conceive of a document that is more 'predominantly internal' than a guide by which agency personnel classify documents."); Shanmugadhasan v. DOJ, No. 84-0079, slip op. at 31-34 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 1986) (finding that DEA periodical distributed to more than 1700 state, federal, and foreign agencies was "predominantly internal," by reasoning that it did not "modify or regulate public behavior" and that DEA took "stringent steps" to ensure that it was distributed only to law enforcement agencies).


54 Cox v. DOJ, 601 F.2d 1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam); see also Herrick's Newsletter, 2006 WL 1826185, at *5 (withholding information and finding that it did not constitute "secret law" because records did not "attempt to modify or regulate public behavior -- only to regulate it for illegal activity") (quoting Wiesenfelder v. Riley, 959 F. Supp. 532, 535 (D.D.C. 1997))); cf. Gordon, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 1036-37 (requiring disclosure of "the legal basis for detaining someone whose name appears on a watch list").
personnel and where it does not constitute "secret law" of the agency. In Cox, the D.C. Circuit held that the requested documents did not constitute "secret law" because "no members of the public are likely to behave or to think differently owing to a revelation about [the contents of the records at issue]." In some circumstances, even widely disseminated law enforcement documents have been held to be sufficiently internal for purposes of Exemption 2 protection.

Courts have treated a wide variety of information pertaining to law enforcement activities as "predominantly internal," including:

1. general guidelines for conducting investigations;

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56 Cox, 601 F.2d at 5; see also Moayedi, 510 F. Supp. 2d at 84 (finding to be "predominantly internal" law enforcement documents regarding observations of members of public at airports because there was "no attempt to modify or regulate public behavior [,] only to observe it for illegal activity" (quoting Crooker, 670 F.2d at 1075)).

57 See, e.g., Milner v. U.S. Dept of the Navy, No. 06-1301, 2007 WL 3228049, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 30, 2007) (supporting as "predominantly internal" sensitive records used by Navy to design and construct ammunition and explosives storage facilities even though such records were made available to local municipalities) (appeal pending); L.A. Times, 442 F. Supp. 2d at 901 (rejecting plaintiff's arguments that withheld information could not be "predominantly internal" because it had been "widely disseminated"; finding instead that distribution to private contractors "does not negate th[e] fact" that withheld information was "compiled for predominantly internal purposes," in part because of access restrictions placed on private contractors); Shanmugadhassan, No. 84-0079, slip. op. at 31-34 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 1986) (protecting sensitive portions of DEA periodical disseminated to 1700 state, federal, and foreign law enforcement agencies because this dissemination was necessary for maximum law enforcement effectiveness and access by general public was prohibited) (citing Asian Law Caucus v. DHS, No. 08-00842, 2008 WL 5047839, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2008) (withholding, under Exemption "high 2" and/or 7(E), procedures for coordination with other law enforcement agencies). But cf. Sussman v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 494 F.3d 1106, 1112-13 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (reversing lower court's determination that information pertaining to "inter-agency communications" is "predominantly internal" because agency provided "no evidence" to counter plaintiff's assertions to the contrary); El Badrawi v. DHS, 583 F. Supp. 2d 285, 316-17 (D. Conn. 2008) (finding that agency failed to provide evidence that records regarding collaboration with other law enforcement agencies is "predominantly internal" (citing Sussman, 494 F.3d at 1112-13)).

(2) guidelines for conducting post-investigation litigation;\(^{59}\)

(3) guidelines for identifying law violators;\(^{60}\)

(4) a study of agency practices and problems pertaining to undercover agents;\(^{61}\)

\(^{58}\)(...continued)


\(^{59}\) See, e.g., Schiller, 964 F.2d at 1207-08 (upholding district court’s finding that litigation strategy pertaining to Equal Access to Justice Act passes Exemption 2’s "threshold test" of being "predominantly internal"); rejecting requester’s contention that it does not simply because it "involves [agency’s] relations with outsiders"); see also Shumaker, Loop & Kendrick, L.P. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, No. 97-7139, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23993, at *10-15 (N.D. Ohio May 27, 1997) (relying on Schiller to determine that agency settlement guidelines are similar to exempt litigation strategies, and implicitly finding that they are "predominantly internal"). But see Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 107 F. Supp. 2d 912, 920 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (rejecting agencies’ invocation of Exemption 2 for individual malpractice case settlement amounts, treating them as not covered by "internal personnel rules and practices" threshold and, therefore, as "presum[ptively] . . . subject to disclosure" absent applicability of any other exemption).

\(^{60}\) See, e.g., Dirksen, 803 F.2d at 1458-59 (affirming nondisclosure of claims-processing guidelines that could be used by health care providers to avoid audits); Moayedi, 510 F. Supp. 2d at 84 (finding that instructions to agency personnel regarding observations of potentially illegal activity by members of public are "predominantly internal"); Schwarz v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 131 F. Supp. 2d 142, 150 (D.D.C. 2000) ("personal characteristics used by the Secret Service in evaluating the dangerousness of a subject" found "clearly exempt from disclosure" under both Exemptions 2 and 7(E)), summary affirmance granted, No. 00-5453, 2001 WL 674636 (D.C. Cir. May 10, 2001); Voinche v. FBI, 940 F. Supp. 323, 328-29 (D.D.C. 1996) (protecting as "internal" manual describing techniques used by professional gamblers to evade prosecution); Church of Scientology Int’l v. IRS, 845 F. Supp. 714, 723 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (protecting "information about internal law enforcement techniques, practices, and procedures used by IRS to coordinate flow of information regarding Scientology"); Buffalo Evening News, Inc. v. U.S. Border Patrol, 791 F. Supp. 386, 393 (W.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding methods of apprehension and statement of ultimate disposition of case to be internal); Windels, Marx, Davies & Ives v. Dept of Commerce, 576 F. Supp. 405, 409-10 (D.D.C. 1983) (protecting computer program under Exemptions 2 and 7(E) because it merely instructs computer how to detect possible law violations, rather than modifying or regulating public behavior).

\(^{61}\) See Cox v. FBI, No. 83-3552, slip op. at 1 (D.D.C. May 31, 1984) (holding that report concerning undercover agents "is exclusively an internal FBI document which does not affect the public and contains no ‘secret law’"); appeal dismissed, No. 84-5364 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 28, (continued...)}
(5) information related to prison security,\(^{62}\) and

(6) vulnerability assessments.\(^{63}\)

Courts have sometimes protected procedures for an agency's cooperation with other agencies,\(^{64}\) but have also denied protection when the agency failed to make a sufficient showing that the information at issue was "predominantly internal."\(^{65}\)

\(^{61}\)(...continued)

1985).


\(^{63}\) See \textit{Schreibman v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce}, 785 F. Supp. 164, 166 (D.D.C. 1991) (protecting vulnerability assessment of agency's computer security plan); see also \textit{Dorsett}, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 36-37 (concluding that Secret Service document used to "analyze and profile factual information concerning individuals" who may constitute threat to Secret Service protectees met "predominantly internal" standard); \textit{Schwarz}, 131 F. Supp. 2d at 150 (finding "the threat potential to individuals protected by the Secret Service" to be exempt from disclosure under both Exemptions 2 and 7(E)); \textit{Voinche}, 940 F. Supp. at 328-29 (protecting as "predominantly internal" information relating to security of Supreme Court building and Supreme Court Justices); \textit{FOIA Update}, Vol. X, No. 3, at 3-4 ("OIP Guidance: Protecting Vulnerability Assessments Through Application of Exemption Two").

\(^{64}\) See \textit{Asian Law Caucus}, 2008 WL 5047839, at *5 (finding "predominantly internal" the guidelines for determining when Customs and Border Patrol officials should contact other law enforcement agencies to request assistance or cooperation); \textit{cf. Durrani v. DOJ}, No. 08-0609, 2009 WL 755219, at *9 (D.D.C. Mar. 24, 2009) (withholding "information relating to the coordination of investigative efforts with other law enforcement agencies," implicitly finding such documents to be "predominantly internal").

\(^{65}\) See \textit{Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. OMB}, No. 08-5004, 2009 WL 1709216, at *4-7 (D.C. Cir. June 19, 2009) (reversing district court and holding that OMB documents containing "guidance to OMB officials regarding other agencies' ability to bypass presidential review of those agencies' budgetary and/or legislative recommendations" are not related predominantly to OMB's internal practices); \textit{Sussman}, 494 F.3d at 1112-13 (finding that agency failed to meet burden of proof that information pertaining to communications between agencies is "predominantly internal"); \textit{Allard K. Lowenstein Int'l Human Rights Project v. DHS}, 603 F. Supp. 2d 354, 363, 365 (D. Conn. 2009) (ordering release of names of other agencies participating in law enforcement operation and description of task delegation between agencies, because agency failed to demonstrate that such records are "predominantly internal" or that they would risk circumvention of law if released) (appeal pending); \textit{El Badrawi}, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 316-17 (continued...)
In the non-law enforcement context in particular, courts have denied Exemption 2's protections when they do not find a sufficient showing of "predominant internality." In two decisions narrowly construing Exemption 2, the Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and Tenth Circuits declined to protect maps showing nest site locations of two different species of birds because the documents lacked sufficient "predominant internality" under Exemption 2. Declaring that the statutory phrase "internal personnel" modified both "rules" and "practices" of an agency, the Tenth Circuit did not accept arguments from the Forest Service that the maps related to agency practices in that they helped Forest Service personnel perform their management duties. Declining to consider the potential harm from disclosure of such maps, the Tenth Circuit declared that it would "stretch[] the language of the exemption too far to conclude that owl maps 'relate' to personnel practices of the Forest Service." In reaching this

65 (...continued)

(finding that agency failed to provide evidence that records regarding collaboration with other law enforcement agencies is "predominantly internal" (citing Sussman, 494 F.3d at 1112-13)).

66 See In Def. of Animals v. NIH, 543 F. Supp. 2d 70, 80-81 (D.D.C. 2008) (rejecting agency's contention that information about building used to house chimpanzees was "predominantly internal" due to agency's failure to provide evidence to support its contention), remanded on other grounds, No. 08-5186 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 4, 2009); Tidewater Contractors, Inc. v. USDA, No. 95-541, 1995 WL 604112, at *3-4 (D. Or. Oct. 4, 1995) (determining that daily diary used to verify contract compliance was not withholdable because it did not contain internal instructions to government officials), appeal dismissed voluntarily, No. 95-36238 (9th Cir. Mar. 5, 1996); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. GSA, No. 89-0746, 1992 WL 71394, at *5 (D.D.C. Mar. 25, 1992) (finding records relating to procurement of telecommunication services by federal government to lack internality, because of project's "massive" scale and significance); Don Ray Drive-A-Way Co. of Cal. v. Skinner, 785 F. Supp. 198, 200 (D.D.C. 1992) (finding technique used by DOT to determine motor carrier safety ratings not "predominantly internal" because technique was used to ascertain "whether and to what extent certain violations will have any legal effect or carry any legal penalty").


68 Audubon Soc'y, 104 F.3d at 1204; see also Living Rivers, Inc. v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 272 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1317-18 (D. Utah 2003) (finding that "inundation maps" for Hoover Dam do not meet test used by Tenth Circuit requiring relation to "personnel practices").

69 Audubon Soc'y, 104 F.3d at 1204; see also Thompson v. DOJ, No. 96-1118, slip op. at 30 (D. Kan. July 15, 1998) (following Audubon Society to deny protection for file numbers found not to qualify under strict application of "personnel practices" requirement).
decision,\textsuperscript{70} the Tenth Circuit relied on the D.C. Circuit case of Jordan v. DOJ,\textsuperscript{71} even though the D.C. Circuit, sitting en banc, had explicitly repudiated the rationale of Jordan in this respect.\textsuperscript{72}

Agreeing in a related case that such wildlife maps may not be protected despite the potential risk of harm from their disclosure, the Ninth Circuit declared that the maps bore "no meaningful relationship to the 'internal personnel rules and practices' of the Forest Service."\textsuperscript{73} The court also stressed that the maps "do[] not tell the Forest Service how to catch lawbreakers [or] tell lawbreakers how to avoid the Forest Service's enforcement efforts," and it thereby specifically distinguished its previous Exemption 2 decisions involving law enforcement records.\textsuperscript{74} Therefore, the Ninth Circuit's decision has left room for "high 2" protection of sensitive information holding law enforcement significance.\textsuperscript{75}

Once the "internality" of the information involved is established, courts readily move to the second "high 2" requirement and focus on what constitutes circumvention of legal requirements. The "high 2" aspect of Exemption 2 is not limited to criminal matters, but is also commonly used for civil enforcement and other regulatory matters that are not law enforcement or national security activities in the traditional sense.\textsuperscript{76}

\textsuperscript{70} Audubon Soc'y, 104 F.3d at 1204.

\textsuperscript{71} 591 F.2d 753, 764 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (en banc).

\textsuperscript{72} Crooker, 670 F.2d at 1075 (repudiating "the rationale of Jordan because it does not appear to comport with the full congressional intent underlying FOIA").

\textsuperscript{73} Maricopa, 108 F.3d at 1086.

\textsuperscript{74} Id. at 1087 (distinguishing Hardy, 631 F.2d at 656-57, and Dirksen, 803 F.2d at 1458-59).

\textsuperscript{75} Maricopa, 108 F.3d at 1087 (emphasizing that nest-site information "does not constitute 'law enforcement material' entitled to protection under Exemption 2"); see also, e.g., Lahr v. NTSB, 453 F. Supp. 2d at 1153, 1171 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (reiterating Ninth Circuit's distinction between "law enforcement materials" and "administrative materials" in applying "high 2") (appeal pending); L.A. Times, 442 F. Supp. 2d at 901 (citing Hardy and Dirksen in finding that Army reconstruction efforts in Iraq had law enforcement purpose); Gordon, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 1035-36 (relying on Hardy in holding that FBI aviation "watch list" records were properly withheld under "high 2"); Coastal Delivery Corp. v. U.S. Customs Serv., 272 F. Supp. 2d at 958, 965 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (recognizing protective room left by Ninth Circuit -- in that its Hardy rule remains "still in force today" -- and agency's consequently qualifying law enforcement purpose for container-inspection data at Los Angeles/Long Beach seaport), reconsideration denied, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 966-68 (C.D. Cal. 2003), appeal dismissed voluntarily, No. 03-55833 (9th Cir. Aug. 26, 2003); cf. Milner, 2007 WL 3228049, at *6-7 (noting that Ninth Circuit cases do not limit application of "high 2" to law enforcement records).

\textsuperscript{76} See, e.g., Schiller, 964 F.2d at 1208 ("[W]e have not limited the 'high 2' exemption to situations where penal or enforcement statutes could be circumvented."); Dirksen, 803 F.2d at 1459 (finding guidelines for processing Medicare claims properly withheld when disclosure could allow applicants to alter claims to fit them into certain categories, thereby diminishing utility of such guidelines); Concepcion v. FBI, 606 F. Supp. 2d at 14, 31 (D.D.C. 2009) (observing (continued...)}
point, the NTEU sought documents known as "crediting plans," records used to evaluate the credentials of federal job applicants; the Customs Service successfully argued that disclosure of the plans would make it difficult to evaluate the applicants because they could easily exaggerate or even fabricate their qualifications, such falsifications would go undetected because the government lacked the resources necessary to verify each application, and unscrupulous future applicants could thereby gain an unfair competitive advantage.\(^{77}\) The D.C. Circuit approved the withholding of such criteria under a refined application of Crooker and held that the potential for circumvention of the selection program, as well as the general statutory and regulatory mandates to enforce applicable civil service laws, was sufficient to bring the information at issue within the protection of Exemption 2.\(^{78}\) The agency demonstrated "circumvention" by showing that disclosure would either render the documents obsolete for their intended purpose, make the plan's criteria "operationally useless" or compromise the utility of the selection program.\(^{79}\)

This approach was expressly followed by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Kaganove to withhold from an unsuccessful job applicant the agency's merit promotion rating plan because disclosure of the plan "would frustrate the document's objective [and]...continued

\(^{76}\) (...continued)
that "high 2" is not limited to "penal or enforcement statutes" (quoting Schiller, 964 F.2d at 1208) (appeal pending); L.A. Times, 442 F. Supp. 2d at 901 (relying on Dirksen and Hardy in finding that law enforcement purpose of Army Corps of Engineers' Reconstruction Operations Center in Iraq was "to synthesize battlefield intelligence and make it available to military and [private security contractor] personnel in order to protect the lives of those individuals"); Wiesenfelder, 959 F. Supp. at 539 (finding trigger figures, error rate tolerances, and amounts of potential fines properly withheld because release would "substantially undermine" agency's regulatory efforts); cf. Jefferson v. DOJ, 284 F.3d 172, 178 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (reiterating that Exemption 7 "covers investigatory files related to enforcement of all kinds of laws,' including those involving 'adjudicative proceedings'" (quoting Rural Hous. Alliance v. USDA, 498 F.2d 73, 81 n.46 (D.C. Cir. 1974))); Gordon, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 1036 ("Exemption 7(E) is not limited to documents created in connection with a criminal investigation.").

\(^{77}\) NTEU, 802 F.2d at 528-29; see also Kelly v. FAA, No. 07-00634, 2008 WL 958037, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2008) (magistrate's recommendation) (endorsing withholding of "grading sheet" used to apply criteria for ranking Designated Pilot Examiner position applicants because applicants could embellish certain criteria to circumvent hiring process), adopted, 2008 WL 4379199 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2008).

\(^{78}\) NTEU, 802 F.2d at 529-31.

\(^{79}\) Id. at 530-31 ("Where disclosure of a particular [record] would render [it] operationally useless, the Crooker analysis is satisfied whether or not the agency identifies a specific statute or regulation threatened by disclosure."); Edmonds v. FBI, 272 F. Supp. 2d 35, 51 (D.D.C. 2003) (secure fax numbers found to be properly withheld because "this equipment would be worthless to the FBI in supporting its investigations" if fax numbers were to be released).
render it ineffectual" for the very reasons noted in the NTEU case.80

With regard to the effect of the passage of time on an agency's assertion of Exemption 2, courts have found that some documents remain sensitive even after long periods of time,81 while other documents lose their sensitivity over time.82 On a final preliminary note, the risk of circumvention of a legal requirement has been found to apply to records directed at the conduct of federal agency employees.83

There are a number of different categories of information for which the risk of circumvention is readily apparent. For instance, records that reveal the nature and extent of a particular investigation have been repeatedly held protectible to prevent circumvention of the law under "high 2."84 One common form of such information is sensitive administrative

80 Kaganove, 856 F.2d at 889; see also Wiesenfelder, 959 F. Supp. at 537-38 (withholding trigger figures, error rates, and potential fines that provide "internal guidance to staff about how, when, and why they should concentrate their regulatory oversight" because disclosure would allow regulated institutions to impermissibly "engage in a cost/benefit analysis in order to choose their level of compliance" and thereby undermine agency's regulatory efforts); Samble v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, No. 92-225, slip op. at 12 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 22, 1994) (protecting criteria used to evaluate job applicants (citing Kaganove, 856 F.2d at 889)).

81 See Buckner v. IRS, 25 F. Supp. 2d 893, 899 (N.D. Ind. 1998) ("Because DIF scores are investigative techniques . . . still used by the IRS in evaluating tax returns . . . the age of the scores is of no consequence" in determining their releasability.) (Exemption 7(E)); Willis v. FBI, No. 96-1455, slip op. at 7 (D.D.C. Aug. 6, 1997) (magistrate's recommendation) (finding that DEA numbers -- G-DEP, NADDIS, and informant identifier codes -- are protectible even after case is long closed), adopted, (D.D.C. Feb. 14, 1998), remanded on other grounds, 194 F.3d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision).

82 See Homick v. DOJ, No. 98-00557, slip op. at 14-15 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2004) (taking age of records into account in ordering disclosure of law enforcement techniques because agency failed to show that particular polygraph techniques and undercover vehicle were still in use after approximately twenty years), appeal dismissed voluntarily, No. 04-17568 (9th Cir. July 5, 2005).

83 See, e.g., Sinsheimer, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 56 (approving withholding of "agency procedures for the conduct of sexual harassment investigations" because they could allow subjects of such investigations (i.e., employees) to "potentially foil investigative tactics" (quoting agency declaration)). But cf. Massachusetts v. HHS, 727 F. Supp. 35, 42 (D. Mass. 1989) ("The Act simply cannot be interpreted in such a way as to presumptively brand a sovereign state as likely to circumvent federal law. The second prong of Exemption 2 does not apply when it is [the state] itself that seeks the information.").

84 See, e.g., Concepcion, 606 F. Supp. 2d at 32-33 (agreeing with EOUSA's withholding of "investigative forms" providing step-by-step plan for government's investigation of drug conspiracy because release would allow members of "future drug conspiracies to tailor their behavior and avoid apprehension" (quoting agency declaration)); Durrani, 2009 WL 755219, at *9 (withholding investigative procedures and records pertaining to inter- and intra-agency (continued...)}
codes and file numbers that contain information about law enforcement activities.85

Similarly, courts have upheld nondisclosure of any information that might permit

84(...continued)

law enforcement cooperation, because release of such information could reveal scope of investigations and "allow[] individuals intent on violating the law the ability to alter their behavior . . . [and] circumvent[] the law"); Fischer v. DOJ, 596 F. Supp. 2d 34, 45-46 (D.D.C. 2009) (noting that release of source symbol numbers could reveal "strength, breadth, and scope" of FBI's informant program (quoting agency declaration)); Callaway v. U.S. Dept of the Treasury, No. 04-1506, slip op. at 16 (D.D.C. Aug. 31, 2007) (unpublished disposition) (endorsing withholding of internal TECS database codes showing "type, size, scope and location" of investigation due to risk of interference with ongoing investigations) (appeal pending); Williams v. DOJ, No. 02-2452, slip op. at 6 (D.D.C. Feb. 4, 2004) (protecting FBI confidential source numbers because disclosure could reveal "the identity, scope, and location of FBI source coverage within a particular area"); reconsideration denied (D.D.C. Mar. 10, 2004), aff'd per curiam, 171 F. App'x 857 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Barkett v. DOJ, No. 86-2029, 1989 WL 930993, at *1 (D.D.C. July 18, 1989) ("The non-disclosure of information which reveals the nature and extent of a particular criminal investigation has been upheld under this exemption.").

unauthorized access to agency computer or communications systems.\textsuperscript{86} In a particular case illustrating this point, an agency's computer security plan was protected to prevent unauthorized access to information which could result in "alteration, loss, damage or destruction of data contained in the computer system."\textsuperscript{87}

Release of various other categories of information have been found likely to result in harmful circumvention of the law. Protection has been afforded to:

(1) information that would reveal the identities of informants or would otherwise

\textsuperscript{86} See, e.g., Sussman, 494 F.3d at 1112 (affirming withholding of "certain internet addresses" that lower court had found would give location of files on computer network and thereby lead to circumvention of agency's law enforcement mission); Lewis-Bey, 595 F. Supp. 2d at 131 (protecting law enforcement and administrative codes where release could "allow an individual 'knowledgeable in computer mainframes and systems to try to circumvent the database and interfere with enforcement proceedings"); Asian Law Caucus, 2008 WL 5047839, at *4 (withholding names of databases and other information that could lead to improper accessing of Customs and Border Patrol databases); Singh v. FBI, 574 F. Supp. 2d 32, 44-45 (D.D.C. 2008) (protecting ICE "distribution and apprehension codes" whose disclosure would facilitate improper access to ICE computer systems); James v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., 549 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8-9 (D.D.C. 2008) (protecting computer codes to prevent access to sensitive Customs records); Boyd v. ATF, 496 F. Supp. 2d 167, 171 (D.D.C. 2007) (finding that disclosure of TECS database screenshots containing database codes could provide "computer-literate" persons with sufficient information to circumvent TECS system); Knight v. NASA, No. 2:04-cv-2054, 2006 WL 3780901, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2006) (observing that "high 2" protects "information facilitating a computer hacker's access to vulnerable agency databases, like file pathnames, keystroke instructions, directory address and other internal information," and approving agency's withholding of information that would reveal server's "directory structure"); Poulsen v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., No. 06-1743, 2006 WL 2788239, at *6-9 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2006) (holding that agency properly withheld certain specific technical details of repairing computer network, such as "identifying codes for machines and workstations," "names or other specific identifying information for databases or the patch installed," and "work tickets" generated in response to employees' requests for assistance); Masters v. ATF, No. 04-2274, slip op. at 8-9 (D.D.C. Sept. 25, 2006) (protecting computer data that would indicate to a hacker "the terminal from which a query was made and the route by which the record was retrieved"); Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. DHS, 384 F. Supp. 2d 100, 109 (D.D.C. 2005) (protecting "information that would allow access to an otherwise secure database"); Judicial Watch, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d at 166 (protecting file numbers and administrative markings because release could render computer system "vulnerable to hacking," and also protecting information pertaining to internal DOD communication method); Linn, 1995 WL 417810, at *18-19, *21-22, *24-25 (protecting "access codes and routing symbols" withheld by Marshals Service because disclosure "could allow unauthorized access to and compromise of data in law enforcement communications systems," but refusing to protect similar information withheld by INTERPOL and Customs Service because asserted risks of compromised integrity of agencies' recordkeeping system were found to be "plainly insufficient").

\textsuperscript{87} Schreibman, 785 F. Supp. at 166; see also FOIA Update, Vol. X, No. 3, at 3-4 ("OIP Guidance: Protecting Vulnerability Assessments Through Application of Exemption Two").
interfere with law enforcement activities of informants;\textsuperscript{88}

(2) information that would jeopardize undercover agents or operations;\textsuperscript{89}

(3) funding for law enforcement activities, including funding for informants,\textsuperscript{90}

\textsuperscript{88} See, e.g., Davin v. DOJ, 60 F.3d 1043, 1065 (3d Cir. 1995) (upholding protection for informant codes); Jones v. FBI, 41 F.3d 238, 244-45 (6th Cir. 1994) (same); Massey, 3 F.3d at 622 (finding that disclosure of informant symbol numbers and source-identifying information "could do substantial damage to the FBI's law enforcement activities"); Lesar v. DOJ, 636 F.2d 472, 485 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (finding that "informant codes plainly fall within the ambit of Exemption 2"); Amuso v. DOJ, 600 F. Supp. 2d 78, 91-92 (D.D.C. 2009) (withholding FBI confidential source file numbers and source symbol numbers because release of this information could "indicate both the scope and location of FBI informant coverage within a particular geographic area" and could tend to identify particular sources (quoting agency declaration)); Willis v. DOJ, 581 F. Supp. 2d 57, 74 (D.D.C. 2008) (concluding that release of source symbol number could lead to informant's identification or could indicate "scope and location of FBI informant coverage within a particular geographic area"); Mack v. Dep't of the Navy, 259 F. Supp. 2d 99, 107 n.3 (D.D.C. 2003) (finding cooperating witness identification numbers to be "strictly internal and . . . sensitive because they conceal the identity of informants who were promised confidentiality in exchange for their cooperation"); Coleman v. FBI, 13 F. Supp. 2d 75, 79 (D.D.C. 1998) (finding that disclosure of file numbers "could potentially reveal a sequence of information including the dates, times, and identities of . . . informant transactions thereby exposing the depth of FBI's informant coverage").

\textsuperscript{89} See Amuso, 600 F. Supp. 2d at 100-101 (protecting logistics of undercover FBI operations because disclosure would allow wrongdoers to "predict how the FBI will conduct similar operations in the future," thereby allowing wrongdoers to circumvent such future operations (quoting agency declaration)); Keys v. DHS, 510 F. Supp. 2d 121, 127-28 (D.D.C. 2007) (allowing withholding of Secret Service special agent ID numbers whose disclosure would allow identification or impersonation of agent), remanded on other grounds, No. 07-5364 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 28, 2008); Russell v. FBI, No. 03-0611, 2004 WL 5574164, at *4 (D.D.C. Jan. 9, 2004) (holding that release of "funds used for undercover operations . . . 'would impede the effectiveness of the FBI's internal law enforcement procedures'" (quoting agency declaration)), summary affirmance granted sub nom. Russell v. DOJ, No. 04-5036, 2004 WL 1701044 (D.C. Cir. July 29, 2004); Barkett, 1989 WL 930993, at *1 (finding that disclosure of "sensitive, detailed codes of current [DEA] activities could place the lives of undercover DEA agents in extreme peril"). But see Homick, No. 98-00557, slip op. at 15 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2004) (ordering disclosure of twenty-two-year-old records concerning undercover vehicle because FBI failed to show that same type of vehicle was still being used).

\textsuperscript{90} See Amuso, 600 F. Supp. 2d at 100-101 (protecting amounts of money used for undercover evidence purchases because such information could be used to exhaust FBI's funding for undercover activities or otherwise gain insight into FBI's conduct of undercover operations); Peay, 2007 WL 788871, at *2 (protecting FBI funding for law enforcement activities because law violator could attempt to exhaust FBI's funding for such activities); Pettier v. FBI, No. 02-4328, slip op. at 16-17 (D. Minn. Oct. 24, 2006) (magistrate's recommendation) (withholding dollar amount of funds paid to FBI informant), adopted, (D. Minn. Feb. 9, 2007), aff'd, 563 F.3d (continued...)
(4) guidelines and techniques for identifying law-violators;\(^91\)

(5) internal agency security techniques;\(^92\)

(6) law enforcement training procedures;\(^93\)

\(^90\)(...continued)


\(^91\) See Asian Law Caucus, 2008 WL 5047839, at *4 (holding that the non-public details regarding watchlists are withholdable investigative techniques because release of such details could facilitate wrongful access to watchlist databases or otherwise circumvent law enforcement efforts); Miller, 562 F. Supp. 2d at 124 (withholding form used by FBI to develop criminal psychological profiles because release could allow subjects of such profiles to circumvent their purpose); Ebersole v. United States, No. 06-2219, 2007 WL 2908725, at *4-5 (D. Md. Sept. 24, 2007) (unpublished disposition) (withholding explosive sniffing dog training materials because disclosure would allow criminals to reduce effectiveness of this training technique), appeal dismissed, No. 07-2200 (4th Cir. Apr. 22, 2008); cf. Lowenstein, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 367 (withholding techniques for generating investigative leads).

\(^92\) See, e.g., Cox, 601 F.2d at 4-5 (upholding nondisclosure of weapon, handcuff, and transportation security procedures); James Madison Project v. CIA, 605 F. Supp. 2d 99, 111-12 (D.D.C. 2009) (withholding internal CIA security procedures relating to foreign nationals as well as employee security clearance procedures, because effectiveness of such procedures would be reduced if they were released, allowing foreign intelligence services and others to circumvent such procedures); Jimenez v. FBI, 938 F. Supp. 21, 27 (D.D.C. 1996) (approving nondisclosure of criteria for classification of prison gang member); Hall v. DOJ, No. 87-0474, 1989 WL 24542, at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 8, 1989) (magistrate's recommendation) (reasoning that disclosure of teletype routing symbols, access codes, and data entry codes maintained by Marshals Service "could facilitate unauthorized access to information in law enforcement communications systems, and [thereby] jeopardize [prisoners' security]"), adopted, (D.D.C. July 31, 1989); Miller, 1989 WL 10598, at *1 (disclosure of sections of BOP Custodial Manual that describe procedures for security of prison control centers would "necessarily facilitate efforts by inmates to frustrate [BOP's] security precautions"). But see Linn v. DOJ, No. 92-1406, 1995 WL 631847, at *4-5 (D.D.C. Aug. 22, 1995) (rejecting as "conclusory" BOP's argument that release of case summary and internal memoranda would cause harm to safety of prisoners).

\(^93\) See, e.g., Crooker, 670 F.2d at 1072-73 (holding that ATF agent training manual would risk circumvention of law if released to public); James Madison Project, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 111-12 (upholding withholding of CIA training procedures, because disclosure of such procedures could reduce their efficacy and render them vulnerable to circumvention); Ebersole, 2007 WL (continued...)
(7) agency audit guidelines;\(^94\)

(8) agency testing or employee rating materials;\(^95\)

(9) codes that would identify intelligence targets;\(^96\)

(10) agency credit card numbers;\(^97\)

\(^93\)(...continued)

2908725, at *4-5 (withholding explosive sniffing dog training materials because disclosure would allow circumvention of explosives detection techniques).

\(^94\) See, e.g., Dirksen, 803 F.2d at 1458-59 (upholding protection of internal audit guidelines to prevent risk of circumvention of agency Medicare reimbursement regulations); Judicial Watch, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d at 166 (holding that agency properly withheld "guidelines for internal audits of Commerce expenses and travel vouchers"); Wiesenfelder, 959 F. Supp. at 539 (protecting benchmarks signifying when enforcement action taken, errors identifying agency's tolerance for mistakes, and dollar amounts of potential fines); Archer v. HHS, 710 F. Supp. 909, 911-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (ordering Medicare reimbursement-review criteria disclosed, but protecting specific number that triggers audit); Windels, 576 F. Supp. at 412-13 (withholding computer program containing anti-dumping detection criteria). But see Don Ray Drive-A-Way, 785 F. Supp. at 200 (ordering disclosure based upon finding that knowledge of agency's regulatory priorities would allow regulated carriers to concentrate efforts on correcting most serious safety breaches).

\(^95\) See Kaganove, 856 F.2d at 890 (holding that disclosure of applicant rating plan would render it ineffectual and allow future applicants to "embellish" job qualifications); NTEU, 802 F.2d at 528-29 (determining that disclosure of hiring plan would give unfair advantage to some future applicants); Kelly, 2008 WL 958037, at *2 (protecting "grading sheet" used to apply criteria for ranking Designated Pilot Examiner position applicants because applicants could embellish certain criteria to circumvent hiring process); Samble, No. 92-225, slip op. at 12-13 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 22, 1994) (finding that release of evaluative criteria would compromise validity of rating process). But cf. Commodity News Serv. v. Farm Credit Admin., No. 88-3146, 1989 WL 910244, at *4-5 (D.D.C. July 31, 1989) (holding that steps to be taken in selecting receiver for liquidation of failed federal land bank, including sources agency might contact when investigating candidates, were not protectible under "high 2" because agency did not demonstrate how disclosure would allow any applicant to "gain an unfair advantage in the . . . process").


\(^97\) See Judicial Watch, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d at 166 (approving redaction of "government (continued...)
(11) agency telephone and fax numbers;98

(12) an agency’s manual used to determine whether agency information is sufficiently sensitive to warrant classification and/or withholding from public;99

(13) information concerning border security;100

97(...continued)


98 See, e.g., United Latina En Accion v. DHS, 253 F.R.D. 44, 55 (D. Conn. 2008) (withholding cell phone numbers of ICE law enforcement agents); Antonelli v. BOP, 569 F. Supp. 2d 61, 65 (D.D.C. 2008) (allowing withholding of ICE employee telephone numbers because harassing telephone calls would inhibit ICE's ability to carry out responsibilities); Truesdale v. DOJ, No. 03-1332, 2005 WL 3294004, at *5 (D.D.C. Dec. 5, 2005) (protecting FBI Special Agents' telephone and fax numbers, because disclosure "would disrupt official business and could subject the FBI's employees to harassing telephone calls"), reconsideration denied (D.D.C. Feb. 17, 2006); Queen v. Gonzales, No. 96-1387, 2005 WL 3204160, at *4 (D.D.C. Nov. 15, 2005) (finding that internal fax numbers of FBI Special Agents and support personnel involved in plaintiff's narcotics investigation were properly withheld), appeal dismissed, No. 06-5018 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 6, 2006); Pinnavaia v. FBI, No. 03-112, slip op. at 8 (D.D.C. Feb. 25, 2004) (holding that FBI Special Agents' beeper numbers and cell phone numbers were properly withheld, because their "disclosure . . . would disrupt official business" and "would serve no public benefit"); Edmonds, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 51 (concluding that FBI properly withheld secure fax numbers, because "this equipment would be worthless to the FBI in supporting its investigations" if fax numbers were released).

99 See James Madison Project v. CIA, No. 07-1382, 2009 WL 780228, at *9 (D.D.C. Mar. 26, 2009) (endorsing withholding of manual used by CIA's Publications Review Board to review sensitivity of proposed nonofficial publications by current and former CIA employees, because individual seeking to publish sensitive and/or classified material could circumvent review process if details of such review process were publicized); Inst. for Policy Studies, 676 F. Supp. at 5 (upholding use of Exemption 2 to protect Air Force security classification guide from which "a reader can gauge which components [of a classified emergency communication system] are the most sensitive and consequently the most important").

100 See Kurdyukov, 578 F. Supp. 2d at 125-26 (withholding records pertaining to drug seizures at sea because records could show time-of-year and geographic concentrations of drug interdiction efforts, facilitating circumvention of such efforts); Moayedi, 510 F. Supp. 2d at 84-85 (finding that agency properly withheld records pertaining to detention and interrogation of airport travelers, as well as records pertaining to observation of public behavior for illegal activity, because disclosure would allow individuals to circumvent agency's law enforcement mission); Herrick's Newsletter, 2006 WL 1826185, at *5 (approving withholding of portions of manual pertaining to seized property, in part because they could (continued...)
(14) information concerning military "rules of engagement";¹⁰¹
(15) details of laboratory testing procedures;¹⁰²
(16) law enforcement team and operation names;¹⁰³
(17) guidelines for protecting government officials;¹⁰⁴ and
(18) rankings of the effectiveness of, or priority accorded to, certain types of law enforcement techniques or investigations.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁰(...continued)

assist those wanting to smuggle contraband into country); Coastal Delivery Corp., 272 F. Supp. 2d at 965 (recognizing Exemption 2 protection for number of inspections performed on shipping containers at particular port by Customs Service, based on law enforcement purpose).


¹⁰² See VoteHemp, Inc. v. DEA, 567 F. Supp. 2d 1, 18 (D.D.C. 2004) (concluding that DEA properly withheld "internal procedures for certifying a future [laboratory] testing procedure," because disclosure "could significantly risk future circumvention of federal drug control regulations" (quoting agency declaration)).


¹⁰⁴ See Judicial Watch, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d at 166 (finding that "guidelines for protecting the Secretary of Commerce on trade missions" were properly withheld, as disclosure "would compromise the Secretary's safety, making the Secretary subject to unlawful attacks"); Voinche, 940 F. Supp. at 329, 331 (approving nondisclosure of information relating to security of Supreme Court building and Justices).

¹⁰⁵ See Lowenstein, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 365 (protecting priority rankings of types of investigations and criteria used by agency to prioritize such investigations); Kishore v. DOJ, (continued...)
Even within sensitive law enforcement contexts, however, courts have rejected justifications for withholding when they fail to sufficiently articulate, with adequate evidentiary support, the potential harm from disclosure.\(^{106}\)

Under some circumstances, Exemption 2 may be applied to prevent potential

\(^{106}\)(...continued)


\(^{106}\) See, e.g., Lowenstein, 603 F. Supp. 2d at 363-65 (rejecting withholding of records pertaining to cooperation with other law enforcement agencies, past law enforcement initiatives, and discussion of news media coverage of law enforcement operation, where release of such records would not allow circumvention of the law); El Badrawi, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 312 (finding that agency failed to justify "high 2" withholdings by offering "conclusory assertions, restatements of statutory language and case law, and boilerplate warnings about 'jeopardizing' databases and 'revealing law enforcement procedures'"); Hidalgo, 541 F. Supp. 2d at 253-54 (ordering disclosure of dollar amounts paid to drug informant because FBI failed to demonstrate how such information could be used by drug traffickers to circumvent future investigations); Shearson v. DHS, No. 06-1478, 2007 WL 764026, at *5, *7 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 7, 2007) (finding inadequate agency's rationale for withholding certain documents pursuant to "high 2," which consisted solely of general recitation of applicable law), reconsideration granted on other grounds, 2008 WL 928487 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 4, 2008); Gerstein v. DOJ, No. C-03-04893, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41276, at *39-43 & n.16 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2005) (ordering disclosure of compilation detailing each United States Attorney's Office's use of certain delayed-notice warrants, because technique "is a matter of common knowledge" and disclosure would not "facilitate criminal activity"); Larson v. Dept of State, No. 02-1937, 2005 WL 3276303, at *14 (D.D.C. Aug. 10, 2005) (rejecting as "conclusory" agency's argument that release of documents concerning congressman's discussions with foreign officials "would reveal certain internal rules and practices" of agency; conjecturing that such an approach "would sweep into Exemption 2 nearly every record" maintained by agency), aff'd on other grounds, No. 06-5112, 2009 WL 1258276 (D.C. Cir. May 8, 2009); Carlson v. USPS, No. C-02-05471, 2005 WL 756573, at *6-7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2005) (rejecting agency's use of "high 2" to protect records pertaining to mailbox locations, because "plaintiff debunks defendant's efforts to show that releasing the information could be used to facilitate lawlessness" and because some of the agency's arguments were found to be "far-fetched," "speculative[,] and unsupported by evidence in the record"), appeal dismissed voluntarily, No. 05-16039 (9th Cir. Sept. 16, 2005); Maydak v. DOJ, 362 F. Supp. 2d 316, 322 (D.D.C. 2005) (finding raw data from psychological test of prisoner not protectible under Exemptions 2 or 7(P) because agency's reasoning was "too speculative and not based upon competent evidence"), reconsideration denied, 579 F. Supp. 2d 105 (D.D.C. 2008); Homick, No. 98-00557, slip op. at 14-15 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2004) (ordering disclosure of information related to a twenty-year-old polygraph test because "the FBI has provided no statement that the type of machine, test, and number of charts used twenty years ago are the same or similar to those utilized today," and for similar reasons also ordering disclosure of information in twenty-two-year-old records related to an undercover vehicle). But see Bullock v. FBI, 577 F. Supp. 2d 75, 81 (D.D.C. 2008) (upholding protection of information regarding law enforcement operations despite agency's "somewhat vague" articulation of harm because "courts have generally protected such information under similar circumstances" (citing Anderson v. DOJ, 518 F. Supp. 2d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2007))).
circumvention through a "mosaic" approach -- information which would not by itself reveal sensitive law enforcement information can nonetheless be protected to prevent damage that could be caused by the assembly of different pieces of similar information by a requester.107 This circumstance first arose in the Exemption 2 context in a case involving a request for "Discriminant Function Scores" used by the IRS to select tax returns for examination.108 Although the IRS conceded that release of any one individual’s tax score would not disclose how returns are selected for audit, it took the position that the routine release of such scores would enable the sophisticated requester to discern, in the aggregate, its audit criteria, thus facilitating circumvention of the tax laws; the court accepted this rationale as an appropriate basis for affording protection under Exemption 2.109 In one relatively recent application of the "mosaic" approach, a court upheld protection for the number of containers inspected by

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107 See, e.g., James Madison Project, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 111-12 (agreeing that disclosure of seemingly harmless CIA security procedures and employee training materials "could risk circumvention of federal statutes or regulations if foreign intelligence services employed the 'mosaic' approach" (citing defendant’s filing)); Fischer, 596 F. Supp. 2d at 46 (agreeing with agency that repeated disclosure of source symbol number in various documents could facilitate identification of informant (citing agency declaration)); Milner, 2007 WL 3228049, at *7 (noting that "mosaic" approach sometimes used by courts to prevent release of information not intrinsically harmful, which could be combined with similar information to cause Exemption 2 harms); L.A. Times, 442 F. Supp. 2d at 898-99, 902 (using "mosaic" analysis in context of Exemptions 2 and 7(F) to find names of private security contractors protectible, because insurgents could use names in conjunction with other data "to organize attacks on vulnerable" companies and "to disrupt U.S. reconstruction efforts"); Brunetti v. FBI, 357 F. Supp. 2d 97, 104 (D.D.C. 2004) (reasoning that FBI source symbol numbers and informant file numbers were properly withheld because "it would be possible . . . to discern patterns of information associated with particular sources," thereby allowing "[a]n individual with knowledge of the people and facts [to] be able to deduce the identities of these sources"); Dorsett, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 36 (concluding that certain Secret Service information, disclosure of which in isolation would be "relatively harmless," could "in the aggregate" benefit those attempting to violate law); Jan-Xin Zang v. FBI, 756 F. Supp. 705, 712 (W.D.N.Y. 1991) (ruling that source symbol and administrative identifiers were properly withheld on basis that "accumulation of information" known to be from same source could lead to detection); Inst. for Policy Studies, 676 F. Supp. at 5 (reasoning that classification guidelines could reveal which parts of sensitive communications system are most sensitive, which would enable foreign intelligence services to gather related unclassified records and seek out system’s vulnerabilities).


Customs officials at a port of entry in Los Angeles. The court based its reasoning on the fact that, given publicly known information about the total number of incoming containers, smugglers could use such information combined with similar information pertaining to other ports of entry to target ports that inspect the smallest percentage of containers. In another recent "mosaic" case, the court found the agency's argument "unconvincing" that confirming the existence of heightened background investigations for selected White House visitors could be used to "piece together" the reasons why the Secret Service chose to conduct such investigations for particular visitors.

Lastly, there is a great deal of overlap between the coverage of "high 2" and Exemption 7(E). Numerous cases have protected information from disclosure under both Exemption 2 and Exemption 7(E).

Homeland Security-Related Information

Courts have protected different types of information related to homeland security under "high 2." Protection has been afforded to:


111 Id.


113 See, e.g., Kaganove, 856 F.2d at 888-89 (recognizing congruence between protection of information under Exemptions 2 and 7(E) based on "risk [of] circumvention of the law"); Coastal Delivery Corp., 272 F. Supp. 2d at 965 (observing that same reasons apply under both Exemptions 2 and 7(E) to protect from disclosure "information [that] has a law enforcement purpose . . . [where disclosure] would risk circumvention of agency regulations as well as the law").

114 See, e.g., PHE, 983 F.2d at 251 (relying on both Exemptions 2 and 7(E) because release of "who would be interviewed, what could be asked, and what records or other documents would be reviewed" in FBI investigatory guidelines would risk circumvention of law); El Badrawi v. DHS, 596 F. Supp. 2d 389, 396 (D. Conn. 2009) (endorsing FBI's refusal to confirm or deny existence of plaintiff's name in Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File database, pursuant to Exemptions 2 and 7(E)), amended on other grounds, No. 07-372 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2009); Asian Law Caucus, 2008 WL 5047839, at *4-5 (protecting non-public details of travel watchlists, Customs interrogation techniques, and other Customs procedures on basis of Exemptions 2 and 7(E)); Schwarz, 131 F. Supp. 2d at 150 (finding Secret Service code names and White House gate numbers "clearly exempt from disclosure" under both Exemptions 2 and 7(E)); Peralta v. U.S. Attorney's Office, 69 F. Supp. 2d 21, 32, 35 (D.D.C. 1999) (applying both Exemptions 2 and 7(E) to radio channels used by FBI during physical surveillance); Voinche, 940 F. Supp. at 329, 331 (approving nondisclosure of information relating to security of Supreme Court building and Justices on basis of both Exemptions 2 and 7(E)).
(1) cargo container-inspection data from a particular seaport;\(^\text{115}\)

(2) records pertaining to aviation and other "watch lists";\(^\text{116}\)

(3) assessment of detainee's "law enforcement value and threat level";\(^\text{117}\)

(4) storage locations of explosives-detection equipment used in aviation security;\(^\text{118}\)

(5) interrogation techniques used to question detainees or travelers at ports of entry;\(^\text{119}\)

(6) names of private security contractors in a war zone;\(^\text{120}\)

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\(^{115}\) See Coastal Delivery Corp. v. U.S. Customs Serv., 272 F. Supp. 2d 958, 964-65 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (recognizing Exemption 2 protection for number of inspections performed on shipping containers at particular port by Customs Service, because disclosure of such information would allow smugglers to target ports with lower rates of inspection), reconsideration denied, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 966-68 (C.D. Cal. 2003), appeal dismissed voluntarily, No. 03-55833 (9th Cir. Aug. 26, 2003).

\(^{116}\) See Asian Law Caucus v. DHS, No. 08-00842, 2008 WL 5047839, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2008) (protecting non-public details regarding watchlists used by Customs and Border Patrol agents to screen travelers at ports of entry); Gordon v. FBI, 388 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1035-36 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (protecting details of FBI's aviation "watch list" program, including records detailing "selection criteria" for lists, describing handling and dissemination of lists, and providing guidance on "perceived problems in security measures").


\(^{118}\) See Judicial Watch, Inc. v. DOT, No. 02-566, 2005 WL 1606915, at *9 (D.D.C. July 7, 2005) (agreeing with agency that "release of this information would enable an individual or group to cause harm to the explosive detection systems prior to their installation").

\(^{119}\) See Asian Law Caucus, 2008 WL 5047839, at *5 (withholding subject matter topics used by Customs and Border Patrol agents to question individuals attempting to enter United States); Azmy, 562 F. Supp. 2d at 601 (protecting detainee interrogation techniques as disclosure would allow subjects of terrorism-related investigations "to anticipate and counter [such] techniques"); Moayedi v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., 510 F. Supp. 2d 73, 84-85 (D.D.C. 2007) (finding that disclosure of detention and interrogation techniques would benefit those attempting to violate law or avoid detection).

\(^{120}\) See L.A. Times Commc'ns, LLC v. Dep't of the Army, 442 F. Supp. 2d 880, 900, 902 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (approving agency's withholding of contractor company names in Iraq under Exemptions 2 and 7(F) because insurgents could target more vulnerable contractors, thereby (continued...)}
205 Homeland Security-Related Information

(7) records pertaining to the security of national borders;  

(8) blueprints of facilities housing sensitive projects or critical infrastructure;  

(9) military "rules of engagement."  

(See also the discussions of related exemptions under Exemption 7, Exemption 7(E), and Exemption 7(F), below.) However, in several contrary decisions, courts have rejected agencies' "high 2" defenses pertaining to homeland security-related information where the agencies did not sufficiently articulate the potential harm from disclosure.  

(continued)

120 (...continued)

121 See Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. DHS, No. 04-1625, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94615, at *16-19 (D.D.C. Dec. 22, 2006) (magistrate's recommendation) (approving agency's withholding of "current and proposed operational practices" that "concern procedures for the detection . . . of illegal border crossing activities" (quoting agency declaration)), adopted, (D.D.C. Jan. 23, 2007); Peter S. Herrick's Customs & Int'l Trade Newsletter v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., No. 04-00377, 2006 WL 1826185, at *5 (D.D.C. June 30, 2006) (acknowledging that withheld portions of property-seizure law enforcement manual are "intertwined with overarching concerns of national security" because "individuals seeking to evade capture by customs officials, to smuggle illegal contraband into the country, [or] to reclaim or otherwise obtain seized contraband . . . would be privy to the most effective ways in which to do so" if manual were disclosed), summary affirmance granted on other grounds, No. 06-5427 (D.C. Cir. May 24, 2007).


124 See El Badrawi v. DHS, 583 F. Supp. 2d 285, 316-17 (D. Conn. 2008) (finding that the agencies' "conclusory," "boilerplate" assertions were insufficiently detailed to support certain "high 2" withholdings pertaining to foreign national's alleged placement on FBI terrorist watchlist and subsequent visa revocation and expulsion from United States); Hiken, 521 F. Supp. 2d at 1060 (finding that agency improperly invoked "high 2" for names assigned to certain military routes and units because agency failed to show how such publicly available information could lead to legal circumvention); Poulsen v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot., No. 06-1743, 2006 WL 2788239, at *6-9 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2006) (holding that agency improperly withheld certain general information about computer network "crash," but also holding that it properly withheld specific technical information about repairing network); Carlson v. USPS, No. C-02-05471, 2005 WL 756573, at *6-7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2005) (concluding that disclosure of data pertaining to mailbox locations would not risk use of postal system to distribute (continued...)
biological or chemical agents because agency failed to demonstrate that such data actually could be used to determine mail collection routes); see also Gordon, 388 F. Supp. 2d at 1036-37 (requiring disclosure of “the legal basis for detaining someone whose name appears on a watch list”).

\(^{124}\) (...continued)