Fees and Fee Waivers

Introduction

The Freedom of Information Act provides for the charging of fees "applicable to the processing of requests," and sets limitations and restrictions on the assessment of certain fees. A separate provision provides for the waiver or reduction of fees if the statutory fee waiver standard is satisfied. These provisions have remained largely unchanged since their passage as part of the 1986 FOIA amendments which established the majority of the present fee-related provisions.

The most recent fee-related amendments to the FOIA, enacted as part of the OPEN Government Act of 2007, addressed several FOIA provisions regarding fees. Section 3 of those amendments, Protection of Fee Status for News Media, discussed below, defines the requester subcategory "representative of the news media." Further,


3 Id. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iii).


5 Pub. L. No. 110-175, 121 Stat. 2524.

6 Id. § 3.
section 6 places restrictions on an agency's ability to collect certain fees if it fails to respond to a FOIA request within the statutory time frame, unless the exceptions to this provision are met.\(^7\) (For a further discussion of section 6 of the OPEN Government Act, see the section on Time Limits in the chapter on Procedural Requirements.)

**Fees**

Congress charged OMB with the responsibility of providing a "uniform schedule of fees" for agencies to follow when promulgating their FOIA fee regulations.\(^8\) OMB did so in its Uniform Freedom of Information Act Fee Schedule and Guidelines [hereinafter OMB Fee Guidelines] issued in March 1987.\(^9\) Under the FOIA, each agency is required to publish regulations "specifying the schedule of fees" applicable to processing requests and must conform its schedule to the guidelines promulgated by OMB.\(^10\)

The following discussion summarizes the FOIA's fee provisions.\(^11\) The OMB Fee Guidelines,\(^12\) which provide general principles for how agencies should set fee schedules and make fee determinations, and which include definitions of statutory fee terms, discuss these provisions in greater detail. Anyone with a FOIA fee (as opposed to fee waiver) question should consult these guidelines in conjunction with the FOIA statute and appropriate agency FOIA regulations for the records at issue. Agency personnel should attempt to resolve such fee questions by consulting first with their FOIA officers. Whenever fee questions cannot be resolved in that way, agency FOIA officers should direct their questions to OMB's Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Information Policy Branch, at smar@omb.eop.gov.

**Requester Categories**

The FOIA provides for three categories of requesters: 1) commercial use requesters; 2) educational institutions, noncommercial scientific institutions, and

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\(^7\) Id. § 6; see FOIA Post "OIP Guidance: New Limitations on Assessing Fees" (posted 11/18/08).


\(^12\) See 52 Fed. Reg. at 10,012.
representatives of the news media; and finally, 3) all requesters who do not fall within either of the preceding two categories.\textsuperscript{13}

The first such category, commercial-use requesters, is defined by the OMB Fee Guidelines as those who seek records for "a use or purpose that furthers the commercial, trade, or profit interests of the requester or the person on whose behalf the request is being made,"\textsuperscript{14} which can include furthering those interests through litigation.\textsuperscript{15} Designation of a requester as a "commercial-use requester," therefore, will turn on the use to which the requested information would be put, rather than on the identity of the requester.\textsuperscript{16} Agencies are encouraged to seek additional information or clarification from the requester when the intended use is not clear from the request itself.\textsuperscript{17}


\textsuperscript{14} Uniform Freedom of Information Act Fee Schedule and Guidelines [hereinafter OMB Fee Guidelines], 52 Fed. Reg. 10,012, 10,017-18 (Mar. 27, 1987); see also Research Air, Inc. v. Kempthorne, 589 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2008) (concluding that requester's intent to use records to oppose suspension of his pilot card was primarily in requester's commercial interest) (fee waiver context); Consumers' Checkbook v. HHS, 502 F. Supp. 2d 79, 89 (D.D.C. 2007) (suggesting that nonprofit's charging of fees to distribute some of its products was in commercial interest of plaintiff, but public interest in records sought outweighed that interest) (fee waiver context); VoteHemp, Inc. v. DEA, 237 F. Supp. 2d 55, 65 (D.D.C. 2002) (concluding that nonprofit organization, as advocate for free market in controlled substance, had commercial interest in requested records) (fee waiver context); Avondale Indus. v. NLRB, No. 96-1227, slip op. at 14 n.4 (E.D. La. Mar. 20, 1998) (embracing OMB's definition of "commercial use" and noting that case law is "sparse" as to what constitutes "commercial use"); cf. OSHA Data/CIH, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 220 F.3d 153, 160 (3d Cir. 2000) (observing that under 1986 FOIA amendments "commercial users shoulder more of the costs of FOIA requests").

\textsuperscript{15} See Rozet v. HUD, 59 F. Supp. 2d 55, 57 (D.D.C. 1999) (finding commercial interest where requester sought documents to defend his corporations in civil fraud action). But see McClellan Ecol. Seepage Situation v. Carlucci, 835 F.2d 1282, 1285 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding no commercial interest in records sought in furtherance of requesters' tort claim); Muffleto v. Sessions, 760 F. Supp. 268, 277-78 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding no commercial interest when records were sought to defend against state court action to recover debts).

\textsuperscript{16} See OMB Fee Guidelines, 52 Fed. Reg. at 10,013 (explaining that inclusion in commercial use category is not controlled by identity "but the use to which [requesters] will put the information obtained"); see also Rozet, 59 F. Supp. 2d at 57 (discounting plaintiff's assertion that information was not of commercial interest where timing and content of requests in connection with other non-FOIA litigation conclusively demonstrated otherwise); Comer v. IRS, No. 97-CV-76329, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16268, at *12 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 30, 1999) (reiterating that requester's motives in seeking records is relevant to "commercial user" determination); S.A. Ludsin & Co. v. SBA, No. 96 CV 5972, 1998 WL 355394, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 1998) (finding requester who sought documents to enhance prospect of securing government contract to be commercial requester); Avondale, No. 96-1227, slip op. at 14 (E.D. La. Mar. 20, 1998) (finding company's intent to use requested documents to contest union election results to be commercial use); cf. Hosp. & Physician Publ'g v. DOD, No. 98-
The second requester category consists of requesters who seek records for a noncommercial use and who qualify as one of three distinct subcategories of requesters: those who are affiliated with an educational institution, those who are part of a noncommercial scientific institution, and those who are representatives of the news media.\(^\text{18}\)

The OMB Fee Guidelines define "educational institution" to include various schools, as well as institutions of higher learning and vocational education.\(^\text{19}\) This definition is limited, however, by the requirement that the educational institution be one "which operates a program or programs of scholarly research."\(^\text{20}\) To qualify for inclusion in this fee subcategory, the Guidelines specify that the request must serve a scholarly research goal of the institution, not an individual goal.\(^\text{21}\) Thus, a student seeking inclusion in this subcategory, who "makes a request in furtherance of the completion of a course of instruction is carrying out an individual research goal," and would not qualify as an educational institution requester.\(^\text{22}\) By contrast, the Guidelines provide that a "request from a professor of geology at a State university" requesting records "related to soil erosion, written on letterhead of the Department of Geology" would qualify.\(^\text{23}\)


\(^{17}\) See OMB Fee Guidelines, 52 Fed. Reg. at 10,018 (specifying that where "use is not clear from the request . . . agencies should seek additional clarification before assigning the request to a specific category"); see also McClellan, 835 F.2d at 1287 ("Legislative history and agency regulations imply that an agency may seek additional information when establishing a requester's category for fee assessment."); cf. Long v. DOJ, 450 F. Supp. 2d 42, 85 (D.D.C. 2006) (finding moot requester's challenge to agency's authority to request certain information in order to make fee category determination where no fee ultimately was assessed).


\(^{19}\) See OMB Fee Guidelines, 52 Fed. Reg. at 10,018.

\(^{20}\) Id.; see Nat'l Sec. Archive v. DOD, 880 F.2d 1381, 1383-85 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (approving implementation of this standard in DOD regulation).

\(^{21}\) See OMB Fee Guidelines, 52 Fed. Reg. at 10,014 (distinguishing institutional from individual requests through use of examples).

\(^{22}\) Id. at 10,014.

\(^{23}\) Id.
The definition of a "noncommercial scientific institution" refers to a "noncommercial" institution that is "operated solely for the purpose of conducting scientific research the results of which are not intended to promote any particular product or industry."^{24}

As to the third type of requester in this category, "representative of the news media," as part of the OPEN Government Act of 2007,^{25} Congress borrowed from both the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit's opinion in National Security Archive v. DOD^{26} and the OMB Fee Guidelines^{27} to statutorily define a "representative of the news media." This subcategory includes "any person or entity that gathers information of potential interest to a segment of the public, uses its editorial skills to turn the raw materials into a distinct work, and distributes that work to an audience."^{28} Additionally, Congress incorporated into the statutory definition the OMB Fee Guidelines' definition of "news" as "information that is about current events or that would be of current interest to the public."^{29} The statutory definition also addresses the potential growth of alternative news media entities by providing a non-exclusive list of media entities.^{30} Finally, the statutory definition specifies that freelance journalists shall be considered representatives of the news media if they “can demonstrate a solid basis for expecting publication through [a news media] entity, whether or not the

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^{24} Id. at 10,018.


^{26} 880 F.2d 1381, 1387 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (defining "representative of the news media").

^{27} OMB Fee Guidelines, 52 Fed. Reg. at 10,018.

^{28} 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii); see Nat'l Sec. Archive v. DOD, 880 F.2d at 1387 (defining representative of the news media as "a person or entity that gathers information of potential interest to a segment of the public, uses its editorial skills to turn the raw materials into a distinct work, and distributes that work to an audience"); see also Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. DOD, (D.D.C. 2003) (explaining that fact that entity distributes its publication "via the Internet to subscribers' e-mail addresses does not change the [news media] analysis"); cf. Hall v. CIA, No. 04-00814, 2005 WL 850379, at *6 (D.D.C. Apr. 13, 2005) (finding organization's statement that "'news media is pled," without mentioning specific activities in which it is engaged, "misstates the burden that a party . . . must carry . . . [o]therwise, every conceivable FOIA requester could simply declare itself a 'representative of the news media' to circumvent fees").


^{30} 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii) ("[e]xamples of news-media entities are television or radio stations broadcasting to the public at large and publishers of periodicals (but only if such entities qualify as disseminators of 'news') who make their products available for purchase by or subscription by or free distribution to the general public").
Since the passage of the OPEN Government Act, there have been few cases addressing the "representative of the news media" category. Pre-dating the amendment to the statute, the term "representative of the news media," was the subject of a number of FOIA opinions, many of which held that the plaintiff before it was not such an entity, while others, including the D.C. Circuit in National Security Archive v. OMB Fee Guidelines, 52 Fed. Reg. at 10,019. The OMB Fee Guidelines provide that a request from a representative of the news media that supports a news-dissemination function "shall not be considered to be a request that is for a commercial use."

31 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii); see OMB Fee Guidelines, 52 Fed. Reg. at 10,018 (stating that for freelancers, publication contract with news organization would be "clearest" proof for inclusion in news media category but that agencies may consider "past publication record" in this regard); see also Brown v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 445 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1356-57 (M.D. Fla. 2006) (finding that plaintiff has not shown "that he is a freelance journalist with a 'solid basis for expecting publication'" (quoting agency regulation). But see Hosp. & Physician Pub'g, 1999 WL 33582100, at *3, *5 (ordering agency to apply news media status to plaintiff even though plaintiff had not gathered news in past but expressed intention to do so in future; noting that requester represented that information received "will eventually be disseminated to the news media," that it will "not receive any income from its news gathering activities," and that "any windfall to the commercial aspect of its business will be negligible").

32 OMB Fee Guidelines, 52 Fed. Reg. at 10,019.

33 See Serv. Women’s Action Network v. DOD, 888 F. Supp. 2d 282, 288 (D. Conn. 2012) (finding that because plaintiffs "have submitted an extensive list of past publications and adequately allege that they intend to publish" work regarding subject of requested records, plaintiffs are representatives of news media); ACLU of Wash. v. DOJ, No. C09-0642RSL, 2011 WL 887731, at *10 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 10, 2011) (quoting statutory definition and declaring that ACLU "qualifies as a representative of the news media" without further analysis).

34 See Brown, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 1356-57 (holding that plaintiff who provided no evidence of employment by news organization or evidence that he was "freelance" journalist as defined by agency's regulation, has "not demonstrated 'firm intention' of creating or publishing an editorialized work," and does not qualify as representative of news media), aff'd per curiam, 226 F. App'x 866 (11th Cir. 2007); Hall, 2005 WL 850379, at *6 (finding that plaintiff's endeavors, including "research contributions . . . email newsletters" . . . and a single magazine or newspaper article" were more akin to those of a middleman or information vendor; determining that second plaintiff offered only conclusory assertion that it was representative of news media and "mentioned no specific activities [that it] conducted"); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Rossotti, No. 01-1612, 2002 WL 535803, at *5 (D.D.C. Mar. 18, 2002) (finding persuasive prior district court decision on same issue, adopting "the reasoning and conclusions set forth" therein, and holding that plaintiff organization before it is not a representative of news media), rev'd on other grounds, 326 F.3d 1309 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. DOJ, 185 F. Supp. 2d 54, 59 (D.D.C. 2002) (concluding that plaintiff organization did not qualify for media status as it was not organized to broadcast or publish news and was "at best a type of middleman or vendor of information that
DOD, held that the plaintiff organizations did qualify for status as representatives of the news media.

representatives of the news media can utilize when appropriate’); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. DOJ, No. 00-0745, slip op. at 15 (D.D.C. Feb. 12, 2001) (finding that plaintiff organization is not "an entity that is organized and operated to publish or broadcast news," and stating that organization’s "vague intention" to use requested information is not specific enough "to establish the necessary firm intent to publish that is required [in order] to qualify as a representative of the news media’), partial summary judgment granted, slip op. at 22 (D.D.C. Apr. 20, 2001) (repeating that plaintiff’s "vague intentions" to use requested information are insufficient to establish media status); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. DOJ, 122 F. Supp. 2d 13, 21 (D.D.C. 2000) (same); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. DOJ, 122 F. Supp. 2d 5, 12 (D.D.C. 2000) (commenting that by its own admission requester is not an entity that is organized and operated to publish or broadcast news (quoting from definition found at 28 C.F.R. § 16.11(b)(6))); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. DOJ, No. 99-2315, 2000 WL 33724693, at *3-4 (D.D.C. Aug. 17, 2000) (stating that letting reporters view documents collected from government, faxing them to newspapers, and appearing on television or radio does not qualify requester for news media status; concluding that if requester’s "vague intentions" to publish future reports "satisfied FOIA's requirements, any entity could transform itself into a 'representative of the news media' by including a single strategic sentence in its request”); cf. Nat’l Sec. Archive, 880 F.3d at 1387 (noting that term "representative of the news media" excludes "private libr[aries]" or "private repositories" of government records or middlemen such as "information vendors [or] data brokers" who request records for use by others); Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 14 n.6 (stating that "not every organization with its own newsletter will necessarily qualify for news media status" and that, to qualify, newsletter "must disseminate actual 'news' to the public, rather than solely self-promoting articles about that organization”).

35 880 F.2d at 1388.

36 See id. at 1387; see also Ctr. for Pub. Integrity v. HHS, No. 06-1818, 2007 WL 2248071, at *5 (D.D.C. Aug. 3, 2007) (finding that investigative reporting organization qualified as "representative of new media" under agency regulations and OMB Guidelines as it intended to use information sought as basis for articles and press releases, that its staff was comprised of investigative journalists, that information received would be posted in organization’s newsletter, and that it had demonstrated its past journalistic efforts that "had garnered various awards”); Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 241 F. Supp. 2d at 9 (concluding that publication activities of public interest research center -- which included both print and other media -- satisfied definition of "representative of the news media" under agency's FOIA regulation); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. DOJ, 133 F. Supp. 2d 52, 53-54 (D.D.C. 2000) (finding that requester qualified as representative of news media), appeal dismissed per curiam, No. 01-5019, 2001 WL 800022, at *1 (D.C. Cir. June 13, 2001) (ruling that "district court’s order holding that appellee is a representative of the news media for purposes of [the FOIA] is not final in the traditional sense and does not meet requirements of the collateral order doctrine" for purposes of appeal); Hosp. & Physician Publ’g, 1999 WL 33582100, at *4 (finding that requester qualified under test of National Security Archive as a "representative of the news media"); cf. Tax Analysts v. DOJ, 965 F.2d 1092, 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (noting that, in context of attorney fees, plaintiff "is certainly a news organization”); Nat’l Sec. Archive v. CIA, 564 F. Supp. 2d 29, 34-37 (D.D.C 2008) (finding plaintiff’s claim of
The D.C. Circuit also held in National Security Archive that merely making the information received available to the public (or others) was not sufficient to qualify a requester for placement in this fee category. Additionally, the same court noted that a request from a representative of the news media that does not support its news-dissemination function should not be accorded the favored fee treatment of this subcategory. The District Court for the District of Columbia has found that even a foreign news service may qualify as a representative of the news media under the FOIA.

The only other circuit courts to have had before them the question of whether a FOIA requester was properly categorized as a representative of the news media are the Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits. In the Seventh Circuit, the Court did not reach the issue because the appeal was resolved through settlement, letting stand the district court’s finding that the requester before it qualified for news media status. In contrast, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit concluded in a brief opinion, which affirmed the district court’s more extensive findings, that the requester before it was not a representative of the news media.

entitlement to news media status under Nat'l Sec. Archive v. DOD moot where agency informed court that all future noncommercial FOIA requests submitted by plaintiff would be accorded news media status), subsequent opinion granting plaintiff's motion for reconsideration, 584 F. Supp. 2d 144, 147 (D.D.C. 2008) (holding that despite agency's recent assurances to court, agency's continued placement of plaintiff into a category other than "news media" is in violation of D.C. Circuit law, and issuing order that agency "must treat [plaintiff] as a representative of the news media for all pending and future noncommercial FOIA requests").

37 See Nat'l Sec. Archive, 880 F.2d at 1386 (finding that "making information available to the public . . . [is] insufficient to establish an entitlement to preferred [fee] status"); see also Hall, 2005 WL 850379, at *6 (stating that plaintiff's endeavors "may establish" him as "vendor of information" but not as representative of news media).

38 See Nat'l Sec. Archive, 880 F.2d at 1387 (stating that "there is no reason to treat an entity with news media activities in its portfolio . . . as a 'representative of the news media' when it requests documents . . . in aid of its nonjournalistic activities").


41 Hosp. & Physician Publ’g, 1999 WL 33582100, at *3 (ordering defendant to apply news media status to plaintiff even though it had not gathered news in past, nor did so at time of litigation, but had expressed its intention to "begin gathering news for dissemination . . . to news media via free news releases").

42 Brown, 226 F. App’x at 868 (concluding that requester’s "status as the publisher of a website does not make him a representative of the news media").
The third and final category of requesters consists of all requesters who do not fall within either of the preceding two categories. 43

When any FOIA request is submitted by someone on behalf of another person -- for example, by an attorney on behalf of a client -- it is the underlying requester's identity and/or intended use that determines the requester category for fee purposes. 44 When such information is not readily apparent from the request itself, agencies "should seek additional clarification" from the requester before assigning a requester to a specific requester category. 45

An agency need not undertake a "fee category" analysis in any instance in which it has granted a full fee waiver. 46 Similarly, there is no need to determine a requester's fee category whenever the only assessable fee is a duplication fee, as that type of fee is properly chargeable to all three categories of requesters, 47 nor is an agency required to establish at an earlier date a requester's proper fee category with regard to any future FOIA requests that requester might make, 48 given that a requester's category can change over time. 49

43 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(ii)(III); see also Harrington v. DOJ, No. 06-0254, 2007 WL 625853, at *3 n.8 (D.D.C. Feb. 27, 2007) (explaining that because "[n]othing in the record suggests a commercial use or a non-commercial use by a scientific or educational institution" and given that plaintiff is not "a representative of the news media," plaintiff is properly classified into third category of requesters).

44 See OMB Fee Guidelines, 52 Fed. Reg. at 10,013-14, 10,017-18; see also Dale v. IRS, 238 F. Supp. 2d 99, 107 (D.D.C. 2002) ("A party's counsel is not the 'requester' for purposes of a fee waiver" request).

45 See OMB Fee Guidelines, 52 Fed. Reg. at 10,018.

46 See Carney v. DOJ, 19 F.3d 807, 814 n.3 (2d Cir. 1994) (doubting requester's status as "news media" but stating that there was no need to resolve issue given his entitlement to fee waiver); Duggan v. SEC, No. 06-10458, 2007 WL 2916544, at *9 (D. Mass. July 12, 2007) (magistrate's recommendation) (finding that given agency's decision to waive all fees, requester's fee category (and fee waiver) claims are moot), adopted, (D. Mass. July 27, 2008), aff'd on other grounds, 277 F. App'x 16 (1st Cir. May 15, 2008); Prison Legal News v. Lappin, 436 F. Supp. 2d 17, 27 (D.D.C. 2006) (finding "no need to analyze" entitlement to news media status where plaintiff was entitled to full fee waiver); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. DOT, No. 02-566, 2005 WL 1606915, at *5 n.2 (D.D.C. July 5, 2005) (same); Judicial Watch, 310 F. Supp. 2d 271, 293 n.3 (same); Long v. ATF, 964 F. Supp. 494, 498, 499 (D.D.C. 1997) (same); Project on Military Procurement v. Dep't of the Navy, 710 F. Supp 362, 368 (D.D.C. 1989) (same).


48 See, e.g., Long, 450 F. Supp. 2d at 85 (concluding that "any declaration" by the court of requester's fee status for future requests was not ripe, and that denial of "such a determination does not preclude a favorable outcome in the future, not least of all because
Types of Fees

The FOIA provides for three types of fees that may be assessed in response to FOIA requests: search, review, and duplication. The fees that may be charged to a particular requester are dependent upon the requester's fee category.

Requesters who fall within the first requester category, commercial use requesters, are assessed all three types of fees. Requesters falling within the second requester category, those determined to be educational or noncommercial scientific institutions, or representatives of the news media, are assessed only duplication fees. Requesters in the third category, those who do not fall within either the first or second requester category, are assessed both search fees and duplication fees. OMB recognized that costs would necessarily vary from agency to agency and directed that each agency promulgate regulations specifying the specific charges for search, review, and duplication fees.

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49 See Nat'l Sec. Archive, 880 F.2d at 1388 (stating that court's determination of requester's news media status is "not chiselled in granite"); Long, 450 F. Supp. 2d at 85 (indicating that "an entity's status can change"); Long, 964 F. Supp. at 498, 499 (rejecting plaintiff's request for declaratory judgment as to requester category when no fee was at issue, and finding that question was not ripe as to future requests).


54 OMB Fee Guidelines, 52 Fed. Reg. at 10,018 ("agencies should charge at the salary rate[s] [i.e. basic pay plus 16 percent] of the employee[s] making the search" or, "where a homogeneous class of personnel is used exclusively . . . agencies may establish an average rate for the range of grades typically involved").

55 Id. at 10,017-18 (in addition to collecting full "direct costs" (as defined by OMB) incurred by agency when reviewing responsive documents, if "a single class of reviewers is typically involved in the review process, agencies may establish a reasonable agency-wide average and charge accordingly").

56 Id. at 10,018 ("Agencies shall establish an average agency-wide, per-page charge for paper copy reproduction of documents.").
"Search" fees include all the time spent looking for responsive material, including if necessary page-by-page or line-by-line identification of material within documents.\(^{57}\) Additionally, agencies may charge for search time even if they fail to locate any records responsive to the request or even if the records located are subsequently determined to be exempt from disclosure.\(^{58}\) The OMB Guidelines direct that searches for responsive records should be done in the "most efficient and least expensive manner."\(^{59}\) The term "search" means locating records or information either "manually or by automated means"\(^{60}\) and requires agencies to expend "reasonable efforts" in electronic searches, if requested to do so by requesters willing to pay for that search activity.\(^{61}\)

The "review" costs which may be charged to commercial-use requesters consist of the "direct costs incurred during the initial examination of a document for the purposes of determining whether [it] must be disclosed [under the FOIA]."\(^{62}\) Review time thus

\(^{57}\) See OMB Fee Guidelines, 52 Fed. Reg. at 10,017.

\(^{58}\) See id. at 10,019; see also TPS, Inc. v. Dep't of the Air Force, No. C 01-4284, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10925, at *8-9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2003) ("[The fact that you did not receive any records from [the agency] . . . does not negate your responsibility to pay for programming services provided to you in good faith, at your request with your agreement to pay applicable fees."") (quoting with approval exhibit to defendant's declaration); Guzzino v. FBI, No. 95-1780, 1997 WL 22886, at *4 (D.D.C. Jan. 10, 1997) (upholding agency's assessment of search fees to conduct search for potentially responsive records within files of individuals "with names similar to" requester's when no files identifiable to requester were located), appeal dismissed for lack of prosecution, No. 97-5083 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 8, 1997); Linn v. DOJ, No. 92-1406, 1995 WL 417810, at *13 (D.D.C. June 6, 1995) (holding that there is no entitlement to refund of search fees when search unproductive).

\(^{59}\) OMB Fee Guidelines, 52 Fed. Reg. at 10,017.


\(^{61}\) Id. at § 552(a)(3)(C); see also FOIA Update, Vol. XVIII, No. 1, at 6 ("OIP Guidance: Amendment Implementation Questions") (analyzing 1996 FOIA amendment that requires agencies to "make reasonable efforts" to search for records electronically); cf. OMB Fee Guidelines, 52 Fed. Reg. at 10,018, 10,019 (providing that agencies should charge "the actual direct cost of providing [computer searches]," but that for certain requester categories, cost equivalent of two hours of manual search is provided without charge).

\(^{62}\) 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iv); see also Carney v. DOJ, 19 F.3d 807, 814 n.2 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting that fee for document review is properly chargeable to commercial requesters); Gavin v. SEC, No. 04-4522, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75227, at *17-18 (D. Minn. Oct. 13, 2006) (finding that agency's court-ordered initial review of documents was chargeable to commercial-use requester); OMB Fee Guidelines, 52 Fed. Reg. at 10,018 (clarifying that records "withheld under an exemption which is subsequently determined not to apply may be reviewed again to determine the applicability of other exemptions not previously considered" and, further, that "costs for such a subsequent review would be properly assessable").
includes processing the documents for disclosure, i.e., doing all that is necessary to prepare them for release, but it does not include time spent resolving general legal or policy issues regarding the applicability of particular exemptions or reviewing on appeal exemptions that already are applied. The OMB Fee Guidelines provide that records that have been withheld in full under an exemption that is later determined to no longer apply may be "reviewed again to determine the application of other exemptions not previously considered" and that review fees "for such a subsequent review would be properly assessable."

Under the FOIA, "duplication" charges represent the reasonable "direct costs" of making copies of documents. Copies can take various forms, including paper copies or machine-readable documentation. As further required by the FOIA, agencies must honor a requester's choice of form or format if the record is "readily reproducible" in that form or format with "reasonable efforts" by the agency.

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63 See OSHA Data/CIH, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 220 F.3d 153, 168 (3d Cir. 2000) (concluding that review fees include, in the context of commercial information submitted by outside entity, costs of conducting mandatory predisclosure notification under Exec. Order No. 12,600 and evaluation of companies' responses by agency for purpose of determining applicability of exemption to companies' submitted commercial information); Nelson v. U.S. Army, No. 10 C 1735, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17193, at *23 (N.D. IL Feb. 22, 2011) (noting that cost of submitter notice required under Exec. Order No. 12,600 is chargeable to commercial use requester).

64 See OMB Fee Guidelines, 52 Fed. Reg. at 10,017, 10,018.

65 Id. at 10,018. But see Hall & Associates v. EPA, 846 F. Supp. 2d 231, 240 (D.D.C. 2012) (concluding that when administrative appellate authority determined agency "improperly withheld documents in its first response" agency cannot "make its production of the originally improperly withheld documents contingent upon further payment from the requester under the theory that the work done in an effort to cure its initial inadequate response is still part of the 'initial review'"); AutoAlliance Int'l v. U.S. Customs Serv., No. 02-72369, slip op. at 7-8 (E.D. Mich. July 31, 2003) (finding that where agency did not review all responsive documents during initial review -- and charged no fee -- it effectively waived agency's ability to charge commercial requester review fees for agency's "thorough review" conducted at administrative appeal level inasmuch as statute limits such fees to "initial examination" only).


68 See OMB Fee Guidelines, 52 Fed. Reg. at 10,017.

For paper copies, the OMB Fee Guidelines specifically require that agencies establish an "average agency-wide, per-page charge for paper copy reproduction." For non-paper copies, such as disks or other electronic media, the Guidelines provide that agencies should charge the actual costs of production of that medium. For any of these forms of duplication, agencies should consult with their technical support staff for assistance in determining their actual costs associated with producing the copies in the various media sought.

In addition to charging the costs provided by agency implementing regulations for searching, reviewing, and duplicating records, the OMB Fee Guidelines authorize the recovery of the full costs of providing all categories of requesters with "special services" that are not required by the FOIA, such as when an agency agrees to certify records as true copies or mails records by express mail.

The OMB Guidelines provide that agencies may use contractor services, as long as an agency does not relinquish responsibilities it alone must perform, such as making fee waiver determinations. With regard to any contractor services that agencies may employ, the OMB Fee Guidelines require that agencies ensure that the cost to the requester "is no greater than it would be if the agency itself had performed the task."

**Fee Restrictions**

The FOIA includes restrictions both on the assessment of certain fees and on the authority of agencies to ask for an advance payment of a fee. No FOIA fee may be

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70 See OMB Fee Guidelines, 52 Fed. Reg. at 10,017, 10,018 (detailing elements included in direct costs of duplication).

71 See id. at 10,018; FOIA Update, Vol. XI, No. 3, at 4 & n.25 ("Department of Justice Report on 'Electronic Record' FOIA Issues, Part II").

72 See OMB Fee Guidelines at 10,017-18 (advising agencies to "charge the actual cost, including computer operator time, of production of [a computer] tape or printout").

73 Id. at 10,018; see, e.g., DOJ Fee Regulations, 28 C.F.R. § 16.11(f); cf. OMB Fee Guidelines, 52 Fed Reg. at 10,016 (specifying that charges for ordinary packaging and mailing are to be borne by government).

74 See OMB Fee Guidelines, 52 Fed. Reg. at 10,018 ("Agencies are encouraged to contract with private sector services to locate, reproduce and disseminate records in response to FOIA requests when that is the most efficient and least costly method.").

75 Id.

charged by an agency if the government’s cost of collecting and processing the fee is likely to equal or exceed the amount of the fee itself.\textsuperscript{78} In addition, except with respect to commercial-use requesters, agencies must provide the first one hundred pages of duplication, as well as the first two hours of search time, without cost to the requester.\textsuperscript{79} These two provisions work together so that, except with respect to commercial-use requesters, agencies should not begin to assess fees until after they provide this amount of free search and duplication; the assessable fee for any requester then must be greater than the agency’s cost to collect and process the fee in order for it actually to be charged.\textsuperscript{80}

Agencies also may not require a requester to make an advance payment, i.e., payment before work is begun or continued on a request, unless the agency first estimates that the assessable fee is likely to exceed $250, or unless the requester has previously failed to pay a properly assessed fee in a timely manner (i.e., within thirty days of the billing date).\textsuperscript{81} Estimated fees, though, are not intended to be used to discourage requesters from exercising their access rights under the FOIA.\textsuperscript{82}

\textsuperscript{77} See id.

\textsuperscript{78} See id. \textsuperscript{\textcopyright} § 552(a)(4)(A)(iv)(I); see also Uniform Freedom of Information Act Fee Schedule and Guidelines [hereinafter OMB Fee Guidelines], 52 Fed. Reg. 10,012, 10,018 (Mar. 27, 1987).

\textsuperscript{79} See 5 U.S.C. \textsuperscript{\textcopyright} § 552(a)(4)(A)(iv)(II); OMB Fee Guidelines, 52 Fed. Reg. at 10,018-19; see also Carlson v. USPS, No. 02-05471, 2005 WL 756573, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2005) (upholding requester's statutory entitlement to two hours of search time and 100 pages of duplication without cost regardless of whether remainder of responsive records were to be processed); cf. Skinner v. DOJ, 744 F. Supp. 2d 185, 196-97 (D.D.C. 2010) (concluding that requester's lack of response to agency's fee estimate does not preclude release of 100 pages free of charge to requester); Trupei v. DEA, No. 04-1481, 2005 WL 3276290, at *3 (D.D.C. Sept. 27, 2005) (upholding agency's refusal to expend additional search time without payment of fees where statutory allowance of two hours was already exceeded); Hicks v. Hardy, No. 04-0769, slip. op. at 2 (D.D.C. Sept. 25, 2005) (observing that agency had apprised requester that "100-page limit on free releases" was reached and that commitment was needed to pay for remaining responsive records), renewed motion for summary judgment granted to agency, No. 04-0769, 2006 WL 949918 (D.D.C. Apr. 12, 2006).

\textsuperscript{80} See 5 U.S.C. \textsuperscript{\textcopyright} § 552(a)(4)(A)(iv)(I); OMB Fee Guidelines, 52 Fed. Reg. at 10,018; see, e.g., DOJ Fee Regulations, 28 C.F.R. \textsuperscript{\textcopyright} § 16.11(d)(4) (2012) (establishing fee threshold below which no fee will be charged).

The statutory restriction generally prohibiting a demand for advance payments does not prevent agencies from requiring payment before actually releasing records which have been processed. When an agency reasonably believes that a requester or

2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120826, at *14-15 (D. Conn. Nov 16, 2010) (same); Saldana v. BOP, 715 F. Supp. 2d 10, 21 (D.D.C. 2010) (noting that pursuant to agency’s regulations, until requester has paid full amount in arrears, agency may stop processing pending request and may require advance payment for other requests); Jordan v. DOJ, No. 07-cv-02303, 2009 WL 2913223, at *17 (D. Colo. Sept. 8, 2009) (observing that agency “is entitled to collect advance fees when anticipated reproduction costs exceed $250”); Antonelli v. ATF, 555 F. Supp. 2d 16, 23 (D.D.C. 2008) (stating that “under DOJ regulations, plaintiff’s failure to pay fees to which he had agreed ‘within 30 days of the [billing] date’ provided an adequate basis for defendant to require” advance payment); Brunsilius v. DOE, 514 F. Supp. 2d 30, 34-36 (D.D.C. 2007) (citing agency’s regulation allowing collection of fees before processing when they exceed $250 and concluding "request is not considered received until the payment is in the agency’s possession”); Emory v. HUD, No. 05-00671, 2007 WL 641406, at *4 (D. Haw. Feb. 23, 2007) (same); Pietrangelo v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, No. 2:04-CV-44, slip op. at 14 (D. Vt. Mar. 7, 2005) ("Fees may be estimated by the agency and demanded in advance if the fee will exceed $250."); Jeanes v. DOJ, 357 F. Supp. 2d 119, 123 (D.D.C. 2004) (citing agency’s regulation requiring advance fee payment noting that "the request shall not be considered received and further work will not be done on it until required payment is received”) (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 16.11(i)(4)); TPS, Inc. v. Dep’t of the Air Force, No. C 01-4284, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10925, at *8-9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2003) (upholding agency’s refusal to process further requests until all outstanding FOIA debts were paid), appeal dismissed voluntarily, No. 03-15950 (9th Cir. May 24, 2007); Rothman v. Daschle, No. 96-5898, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13009, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 20, 1997) (upholding agency’s request for advance payment when fees exceeded $250); Mason v. Bell, No. 78-719-A, slip op. at 1 (E.D. Va. May 16, 1979) (finding dismissal of FOIA case proper when plaintiffs failed to pay fees to other federal agencies for prior requests). But cf. Ruotolo v. DOJ, 53 F.3d 4, 9-10 (2d Cir. 1995) (suggesting that agency should have processed request up to amount offered by requesters rather than state that estimated cost "would greatly exceed" $250 without providing an amount to be paid or offering assistance in reformulating request).


group of requesters is attempting to divide a request into a series of requests for the purpose of avoiding the assessment of fees, the agency may aggregate those requests and charge accordingly. The OMB Fee Guidelines should be consulted for additional guidance on aggregating requests.

The FOIA also provides that FOIA fees are superseded by "fees chargeable under a statute specifically providing for setting the level of fees for particular types of records." Thus, when documents responsive to a FOIA request are maintained for distribution by an agency according to a statutorily based fee schedule, requesters should obtain the documents from that source and pay the applicable fees in accordance with the fee schedule of that other statute. This may at times result in the assessment

84 See OMB Fee Guidelines, 52 Fed. Reg. at 10,019; see also Smith v. BOP, 517 F. Supp. 2d 451, 453-54 (D.D.C. 2007) (finding it reasonable to "aggregate plaintiff's separate requests . . . submitted over the course of three weeks" for similar documents); Atkin v. EEOC, No. 91-2508, slip op. at 20-21 (D.N.J. Dec. 4, 1992) (finding agency's decision to aggregate requests proper; reasonable for agency to believe that thirteen requests relating to same subject matter submitted within three-month period were made by requester to evade payment of fees), appeal dismissed for failure to timely prosecute sub nom. Atkin v. Kemp, No. 93-5548 (3d Cir. Dec. 6, 1993).


86 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(vi); see OMB Fee Guidelines, 52 Fed. Reg. at 10,017-18; see also Oglesby v. U.S. Dep't of the Army, 79 F.3d 1172, 1177-78 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (stating that NARA's enabling statute, 44 U.S.C. § 2116 (2006), qualifies "as the genre of fee-setting provision" that supersedes FOIA's fee provisions); cf. Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 432 F.3d 945, 947-48 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding FOIA's superseding fee provision to be "ambiguous," relying instead on OMB's Guidelines that discuss that provision, and determining that FOIA's reference to "a statute specifically providing for setting the level of fees" means "any statute that specifically requires a government agency . . . to set the level of fees" and not one that simply allows it to do so (quoting OMB Fee Guidelines) (emphasis added)).

87 See OMB Fee Guidelines, 52 Fed. Reg. at 10,012-13, 10,017-18 (implementing 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(vi), and advising agencies to "inform requesters of the steps necessary to obtain records from those sources"); id. at 10,017 (contemplating "statutory-based fee
of fees that are higher than those that would otherwise be chargeable under the FOIA, but it ensures that such fees are properly borne by the requester and not by the general public.

The superseding of FOIA fees by the fee provisions of another statute raises a related question as to whether an agency with a statutorily based fee schedule for particular types of records is subject to the FOIA's fee waiver provision in those instances where it applies an alternate fee schedule. Although this question has been raised, it has not yet been explicitly decided by an appellate court.

The FOIA requires that requesters follow the agency's published rules for making FOIA requests, including those pertaining to the payment of authorized fees.

88 See, e.g., Wade v. Dep't of Commerce, No. 96-0717, slip op. at 5-6 (D.D.C. Mar. 26, 1998) (approving assessment of $1300 fee pursuant to National Technical Information Service's superseding fee statute and noting cost of $210 if processed under FOIA).

89 See OMB Fee Guidelines, 52 Fed. Reg. at 10,017.

90 See Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr., 432 F.3d at 946, 948 (recognizing FOIA's superseding fee provision as "exception to the fee waiver provision of FOIA," but stating that statute in question did not qualify as a superseding fee statute).

91 Compare Oglesby, 79 F.3d at 1178 (refusing to rule on plaintiff's argument that a superseding fee statute does not exempt agency from making FOIA fee waiver determination, because plaintiff failed to raise argument in timely manner), and Oglesby v. U.S. Dep't of the Army, 920 F.2d 57, 70 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (declining to reach fee waiver issue because plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies), with Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr., 432 F.3d at 946, 948 (recognizing FOIA's superseding fee provision as "exception to the fee waiver provision of the FOIA"), and St. Hilaire v. DOJ, No. 91-0078, slip op. at 4-5 (D.D.C. Sept. 10, 1991) (avoiding fee waiver issue because requested records were made publicly available), summary judgment granted to agency, (D.D.C. Mar. 18, 1992), aff'd per curiam, No. 92-5153 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 28, 1994).

Requesters have been found not to have exhausted their administrative remedies when they fail to satisfy the FOIA's fee requirements,93 such as failing to file an administrative appeal of an adverse fee determination94 or failing to agree to pay estimated fees.95

See, e.g., Trenerry v. IRS, No. 95-5150, 1996 WL 88459, at *2 (10th Cir. Mar. 1, 1996) (explaining that exhaustion includes payment of FOIA fees); Stuler v. IRS, No. 10-1342, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66942, at *8 (W.D. Pa. June 23, 2011) (declaring that requester has not exhausted administrative remedies when requester "declines to provide a firm agreement to pay for, or request a waiver of, fees and costs" and "the process is properly suspended pending compliance"); Island Film, S.A. v. Dep't of Treasury, 768 F. Supp. 2d 286, 288 (D.D.C. 2011) (holding that "[b]ecause [requester] has not paid, committed to paying or sought a waiver of . . . fees, [requester] has not exhausted its administrative remedies"); Godaire v. Napolitano, No. 3:10cv01266, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122237, at *14-15 (D. Conn. Nov. 17, 2010) (observing no exhaustion where plaintiff failed to specify a maximum fee and had not submitted a fee waiver request); Hines v. U.S., 736 F. Supp. 2d 51, 54 (D.D.C. 2010) (dismissing requester's complaint due to failure to exhaust administrative remedies by not paying assessed fee, not seeking fee waiver, nor filing administrative appeal); McLaughlin v. DOJ, No. 07-2347, 2009 WL 428925, at *3 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2009) (finding no exhaustion where plaintiff admitted to nonpayment of fees); Skrzypek v. Dep't of Treasury, 550 F. Supp. 2d 71, 73-74 (D.D.C. 2008) (concluding that plaintiff had not exhausted administrative remedies when he admitted to not having paid assessed fees); Antonelli, 555 F. Supp. 2d at 23 (stating "payment or waiver of assessed fees or an administrative appeal from the denial of a fee waiver request is a prerequisite to filing a FOIA lawsuit"); Smith, 517 F. Supp. 2d at 455 (finding that because requester's fee waiver was properly denied, exhaustion by paying fees required prior to seeking judicial review of agency action); Bansal v. DEA, No. 06-3946, 2007 WL 551515, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2007) (stating "[p]laintiff has failed to exhaust administrative remedies because he has not paid the required fees"); Dinsio, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 311 (determining that plaintiff was barred from seeking judicial review due to failure to agree to pay fees). But cf. Wall v. EOUSA, No. 3:09-cv-344, 2010 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 120826 (D. Conn. Nov. 16, 2010) (determining that plaintiff's initial request for waiver of fees made to appellate authority satisfied requirement to exhaust).

See, e.g., Oglesby, 920 F.2d at 66 & n.11, 71 ("Exhaustion does not occur until the required fees are paid or an appeal is taken from the refusal to waive fees."); Smith, 517 F. Supp. 2d at 454 (dismissing plaintiff's aggregation claim "because plaintiff did not exhaust this claim at the administrative level" by appealing agency's determination); Gonzalez v. ATF, No. 04-2201, 2005 WL 3201009, at *6 (D.D.C. Nov. 9, 2005) (finding that requester's inaction -- i.e., that he never paid assessed fee nor appealed agency's refusal of fee waiver denial -- precludes judicial review of request); Sliney, 2005 WL 3273567, at *4 (reiterating that where plaintiff neither agreed to pay processing fee nor appealed agency's refusal of his "installment' plan offer, administrative exhaustion had not occurred); Antonelli v. ATF, No. 04-1108, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17089, at *28 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 2005) (finding requester's unsuccessful administrative appeal challenging amount of fee to be insufficient to satisfy exhaustion requirement); Tinsley v. Comm'r, No. 3:96-1769-P, 1998 WL 59481, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 1998) (finding that because plaintiff failed to appeal fee waiver denial,
Courts, however, have not required exhaustion where an agency has failed in some way to fully comply with its own regulations or the FOIA statute. A requester's obligation to comply with the agency's fee requirements does not cease after litigation has been initiated under the FOIA. (For a further discussion of the exhaustion requirement, exhaustion was not achieved). But cf. Payne v. Minihan, No. 97-0266, slip op. at 34 n.17 (D.N.M. Apr. 30, 1998) (holding plaintiff was not required to exhaust by appealing fee waiver denial when requester's right to sue already was perfected on different issue), summary judgment granted, (D.N.M. Oct. 27, 1999), aff'd, 232 F.3d 902 (10th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision).

95 See Monaghan v. DOJ, No. 2:09-CV-2199, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28981, at *5 (D. Nev. Mar. 16, 2011) (holding that "failure to pay the required fees results in a failure to exhaust . . . administrative remedies); King v. DOJ, 772 F. Supp. 2d 14, 18 (D.D.C. 2010) (emphasizing that plaintiff who did not pay fees associated with search and processing of responsive records had not exhausted administrative remedies);Cnty. of Santa Cruz v. Ctr. for Medicare and Medicaid Advocacy, No. C-07-2889, 2009 WL 816633, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2009) (finding that requester who "failed to pay the full amount of search fees assessed" by agency had not exhausted administrative remedies); Banks v. DOJ, 605 F. Supp. 2d 131, 139 (D.D.C. 2009) (finding that plaintiff had not exhausted administrative remedies "because he failed to pay duplication fees"); Research Air, Inc. v. Kempthorne, 589 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10 & n.6 (D.D.C. 2008) (concluding that because requester did not commit to pay assessed fee, "agency properly refused to process his FOIA requests"); Brunslius v. MUT, 514 F. Supp. 2d at 34 (citing agency regulation allowing agency to treat request as not received once fees are determined or estimated to exceed $25 until requester agrees to pay fees); Dale v. IRS, 238 F. Supp. 2d 99, 107 (D.D.C. 2002) (dismissing case because plaintiff failed to make "firm commitment" to pay fees); cf. Kemmerly v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, No. 06-2386, 2006 WL 2990122, at *1 (E.D. La. Oct. 17, 2006) (finding requester's agreement to pay "reasonable fees" to be insufficient under FOIA and agency's implementing regulation); Hall v. CIA, No. 04-0814, 2005 WL 850379, at *5 n.9 (D.D.C. Apr. 13, 2005) (noting that although plaintiff characterized agency's six-figure fee estimate as "ludicrous," he sought neither accounting nor relief from estimated fees from court). But see Hinojosa v. Dep't of Treasury, No. 06-0215, 2006 WL 2927095, at *4-5 (D.D.C. Oct. 11, 2006) (finding that requesters' commitment to pay up to $50 per request "appears to satisfy" requirement of "firm promise" to pay).

96 See, e.g., Hall & Associates v. EPA, 846 F. Supp. 2d 231, 240 (D.D.C. 2012) (finding that because agency failed to comply with own regulations that require informing requester of adverse determination concerning assessment of fees, agency's argument that requester had failed to exhaust administrative remedies was "baseless"); Bansal v. MUT, 2007 WL 551515, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2007) (refusing to grant agency's motion for summary judgment for failure to pay fees as agency had not shown it had complied with its regulation requiring notification when fees are estimated to exceed $25); Sliney v. MUT, 2005 WL 839540, at *4 (characterizing agency's contention that requester failed to exhaust by paying fees as "disingenuous" where agency failed to notify requester of fee at administrative level as required by agency fee regulation).

97 See Pollack v. DOJ, 49 F.3d 115, 119-20 (4th Cir. 1995) (providing that commencement of FOIA action does not relieve requester of obligation to pay for documents); Chaplin v.
including exhaustion of "fee" issues, see Litigation Considerations, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, below.)

Further, the FOIA contains no provision for reimbursement of fees if the requester is dissatisfied with the agency's response, nor does it provide for penalties to be assessed against an agency or its administrators for delays in refunding a requester's overpayment. In addition, absent specific statutory authority allowing an agency (or a

Stewart, 796 F. Supp. 2d 209, 211 (D.D.C. 2011) (same); Scaff-Martinez v. DEA, 770 F. Supp. 2d 17, 23 (D.D.C. 2011) ((same, citing Trueblood v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, 943 F. Supp. 64, 68 (D.D.C. 1996))); King, 772 F. Supp. 2d at 18 (same, citing Pollack, 49 F.3d at 120); Harrington, 2007 WL 625853, at *2 (same); Kemmerly, 2006 WL 2990122, at *2 (emphasizing that whether request for payment is made by agency pre- or post-litigation, "the plaintiff has an obligation to pay") (quoting Trueblood v. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, 943 F. Supp. 64, 68 (D.D.C. 1996))); Gavin v. SEC, No. 04-4522, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75227, at *16 (D. Minn. Oct. 13, 2006) (stating that FOIA fees may be assessed post-litigation); Hicks, 2006 WL 949918, at *2 (same); Pietrangelo, No. 2:04-CV-44, slip op. at 13 (D. Vt. Mar. 7, 2005) (explaining that constructive exhaustion based on agency's failure to respond "did not relieve [requester] of his statutory obligation to pay any and all fees" (quoting Pollack, 49 F.3d at 119)); Jeanes, 357 F. Supp. 2d at 123 (observing that although plaintiff did not receive notice of fees until after litigation ensued, obligation to pay fees remained); Maydak v. DOJ, 254 F. Supp. 2d 23, 50 (D.D.C. 2003) (noting that plaintiff is still obligated to pay fees or seek waiver even if agency's fee assessment is made after plaintiff files suit); Goulding v. IRS, No. 97 C 5628, 1998 WL 325202, at *9 (N.D. Ill. June 8, 1998) (finding plaintiff's constructive exhaustion did not relieve his obligation to pay authorized fees), summary judgment granted, No. 97 C 5628 (N.D. Ill. July 30, 1998) (restating that plaintiff's failure to comply with fee requirements is fatal to claim against government); Trueblood v. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, 943 F. Supp. 64, 68 (D.D.C. 1996) (stating even if request for payment not made until after litigation commences, that fact does not relieve requester of obligation to pay reasonably assessed fees); cf. Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Dep't of Educ., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2003) (disallowing assessment of fees after litigation ensued where agency failed to inform requester that fees were in excess of amount to which it agreed, failed to give notice that fees would exceed $250 as required by regulation, and failed to address request for fee waiver); Judicial Watch of Fla., Inc. v. DOJ, No. 01-0212, slip op. at 3 (D.D.C. Oct. 19, 2001) (finding that plaintiff, through its actions, including its ambiguous response to court's order to notify agency of its intent with regard to payment of fees, "constructively abandoned its FOIA request").

See Stabasefski v. U.S., 919 F. Supp. 1570, 1573 (stating that the FOIA does not provide for reimbursement of fees when agency redacts portions of records that are released).

See Johnson v. EOUA, No. 98-0729, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6095, at *8 (D.D.C. May 2, 2000) (observing that despite delay in refunding overpayment, FOIA does not provide for award of damages to requester, nor does delay rise to level of constitutional violation by agency or its employees), aff'd, 310 F.3d 771 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
subdivision of it) to do so, all fees collected in the course of providing FOIA services are to be deposited into the Treasury of the United States.

The appropriate standard of judicial review for fee issues has yet to be clearly established in the decisions that have considered this issue. The majority of courts that have reviewed fee issues under the FOIA have applied a single review standard (i.e., de novo review) to both fee and fee waiver matters, and they have done so with little or no discussion. As for the scope of the review, courts have limited their review to the


101 See OMB Fee Guidelines, 52 Fed. Reg. at 10,012, 10,017 (directing that funds collected for providing FOIA services must be deposited into general revenues of United States and not into agency accounts).

102 Compare Hall, 2005 WL 850379, at *6 n.10 (acknowledging that there is "some dispute" as to review standard for fee limitation based on news media status (citing Judicial Watch, 122 F. Supp. 2d 5, 11-12 (applying arbitrary and capricious standard), and Judicial Watch, Inc. v. DOJ, 133 F. Supp. 2d 52, 53 (D.D.C. 2000) (applying de novo standard)), Crain v. Customs, No. 02-0341, slip op. at 5 & n.5 (D.D.C. Mar. 25, 2003) (stating that there is uncertainty within D.C. Circuit as to standard of review regarding fee category status), Judicial Watch, Inc. v. DOJ, 185 F. Supp. 2d 54, 59 (D.D.C. 2002) (conceding that there is "some disagreement as to the correct standard" for review of agency's denial of media status), and Rozet v. HUD, 59 F. Supp. 2d 55, 56 (D.D.C. 1999) (emphasizing that although denials of fee waiver requests are reviewed de novo, "the appropriate standard of review for an agency determination of fee status under FOIA . . has not been decided in this Circuit"), with Brown v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 445 F. Supp. 2d 1347, 1356 (M.D. Fla. 2006) (acknowledging some disagreement as to appropriate standard of review for media category but applying de novo standard "because review under the de novo standard or under some more deferential standard leads to the same conclusion" in instant case), Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. DOD, 241 F. Supp. 2d 5, 9 (D.D.C. 2003) (concluding that "[t]he statutory language, judicial authority, and [FOIA Reform Act’s] legislative history . . . support the view that determinations regarding preferred fee status are reviewed de novo" while acknowledging that at least one recent court has applied "arbitrary and capricious" standard), and Hosp. & Physician Publ’g v. DOD, No. 98-CV-4117, 1999 WL 33582100, at *2 (S.D. Ill. June 22, 1999) (stating in single sentence that court review of fee category is de novo, yet citing to statutory provision for de novo review of fee waivers).

103 See, e.g., Judicial Watch, No. 00-0745, slip op. at 14-15 (D.D.C. Feb. 12, 2001) (applying de novo standard to both fee category and fee waiver issues); Judicial Watch, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 53 (rejecting government’s argument that arbitrary and capricious standard applied to matter of fee category; undertaking de novo review on both fee and fee waiver issues); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. DOJ, No. 99-2315, 2000 WL 33724693, at *3-4 (D.D.C. Aug. 17, 2000) (applying de novo standard to fee category and fee waiver issues); cf. Hosp. & Physician Publ’g, 1999 WL 33582100, at *2 (using de novo standard for media issue, without discussion).
administrative record before the agency at the time of its decision.\footnote{See Stewart v. Dep't. of the Interior, 554 F.3d 1236, 1243 (10th Cir. 2009) (declining, as did district court, to rely on affidavit submitted by agency because it "was not contained in the administrative record"); Ctr. for Pub. Integrity v. HHS, No. 06-1818, 2007 WL 2248071, at *5 & n.3 (D.D.C. Aug. 3, 2007) (limiting administrative record to website pages actually viewed by agency instead of incorporating requester's entire website as suggested by plaintiff); Crain, No. 02-0341, slip op. at 7 (D.D.C. Mar. 25, 2003) (stating that "this Court's review of fee categorization is limited to the record that was before the agency at the time it made its decision"); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. DOJ, 122 F. Supp. 2d 5, 12 (D.D.C. 2000) (stating that scope of court's review is limited to administrative record).}

The extent of judicial deference given to agency fee regulations that are based upon the OMB Fee Guidelines still remains unclear.\footnote{Compare Media Access Project v. FCC, 883 F.2d 1063, 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (stating that agency's interpretation of its own fee regulations "must be given at least some deference"), and Pietrangelo v. U.S. Dep't of the Army, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46495, at *16 (same) (quoting Media Access Project, 883 F.2d at 1071), with Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Rossotti, 326 F.3d 1309, 1313 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (emphasizing that court owes "no particular deference to the [agency's] interpretation of FOIA") (fee waiver case), Physicians Comm. for Responsible Med. v. HHS, 480 F. Supp. 2d 119, 122 n.3 (D.D.C. 2007) (noting that while no deference was owed agency's interpretation of FOIA, court would apply agency's regulation because it was not in controversy and plaintiff had relied upon it in its request) (fee waiver context), and Inst. for Wildlife Prot. v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 290 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1230 (D. Or. 2003) (stating that court owes no particular deference to agency's interpretation of FOIA (citing Judicial Watch, 326 F.3d at 1313)).}


\footnote{\textit{Id.}}

\footnote{\textit{See 5 U.S.C. § 552(e)(6).}}

\footnote{See \textit{FOIA Update, Vol. VIII, No. 1}, at 3-10 ("New Fee Waiver Policy Guidance").}

\section*{Fee Waivers}

The fee waiver standard of the Freedom of Information Act\footnote{5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iii) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).} provides that fees should be waived or reduced "if disclosure of the information is in the public interest because it is likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities of the government and is not primarily in the commercial interest of the requester."\footnote{\textit{Id.}} To implement this standard, the Department of Justice issued fee waiver policy guidance\footnote{\textit{See 5 U.S.C. § 552(e)(6).}} advising agencies of six analytical factors to be considered in applying this statutory fee waiver standard.\footnote{\textit{See FOIA Update, Vol. VIII, No. 1}, at 3-10 ("New Fee Waiver Policy Guidance").} These factors have been referenced and applied by
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,\(^\text{110}\) as well as the Courts of Appeals for the Ninth\(^\text{111}\) and Tenth Circuits.\(^\text{112}\)

The statutory fee waiver standard contains two basic requirements: the public interest requirement (consisting of fee waiver factors one through four); and the requirement that the requester's commercial interest in the disclosure, if any, must be less than the public interest in disclosure (consisting of fee waiver factors five and six).\(^\text{113}\)

Both of these statutory requirements must be satisfied\(^\text{114}\) before properly assessable fees

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\(^{110}\) See Judicial Watch, Inc. v. DOJ, 365 F.3d 1108, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (stating that "[f]or a request to be in the 'public interest,' four criteria must be satisfied," citing agency's multi-factor fee waiver regulation); cf. Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Rossotti, 326 F.3d 1309, 1313-15 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (applying agency's multi-factor public interest test but noting that no particular deference is owed to agency's interpretation of FOIA) (citation omitted).

\(^{111}\) See Friends of the Coast Fork v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 110 F.3d 53, 55 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that agency had "promulgated a multi-factor balancing test to assist it in evaluating the statutory standard"); McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Carlucci, 835 F.2d 1282, 1285-86 (9th Cir. 1987) (identifying four public interest factors regarding fee waiver considerations articulated in Department of Defense FOIA regulations).

\(^{112}\) See Stewart v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, 554 F.3d 1236, 1242 (10th Cir. 2009) (stating that agency "established several [fee waiver] criteria that must be met . . . to obtain a fee waiver").


\(^{114}\) See, e.g., Reynolds v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 391 F. App'x 45, 46 (2d Cir. Aug. 26, 2010) (declaring that "requester bears the burden of establishing" that he satisfies two-prong test); Perkins, 754 F. Supp. 2d, at 5 (noting that requester "retains the burden of satisfying both prongs" of the statutory standard); Ctr. for Medicare Advocacy, Inc. v. HHS, 577 F. Supp. 2d 221, 239 (D.D.C. 2008) (noting that "[c]ourts employ a two part test to determine whether the requester has satisfied [its] burden"); In Def. of Animals v. NIH, 543 F. Supp. 2d 83, 97 (D.D.C. 2008) (noting that "requester bears the initial burden" of meeting two-prong statutory test); S.A. Ludsin & Co. v. SBA, No. 96 Civ. 2146, 1997 U.S.
are waived or reduced, with the requester bearing the burden of showing the statutory standard is met.\textsuperscript{115} Courts have held that requests for a waiver or reduction of fees must be considered on a case-by-case basis\textsuperscript{116} inasmuch as the information sought varies from request to request.\textsuperscript{117} Further, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has held that requesters should address both of the statutory requirements in sufficient detail for the agency to make an informed decision as to whether it can appropriately waive or reduce the fees in question.\textsuperscript{118} If a requester is represented by an attorney, the

\textsuperscript{115} See, e.g., Monaghan v. FBI, 506 F. App’x 596, 597 (9th Cir. Jan 28, 2013) (acknowledging that "burden is on the requester to satisfy FOIA’s statutory requirements and the Department of Justice’s regulatory requirements"); Friends of the Coast Fork, 110 F.3d at 55 (reiterating that "requesters bear the initial burden of satisfying the statutory and regulatory standards for a fee waiver") (citing McClellan, 835 F.2d at 1284-85}); Wall v. EOUSA, No. 3:09-cv-344, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120826, at *16 (D. Conn. Nov 16, 2010) (stating that "burden is on the requester to establish that a fee waiver is warranted"); Clemente v. FBI, 741 F. Supp. 2d 64, 75 (D.D.C. 2010) (noting that "before the agency and before a reviewing court, the FOIA requester bears the burden of demonstrating” statutory standard is satisfied); Saldana v. BOP, 715 F. Supp. 2d 10, 20 (D.D.C. 2010) (articulating that "requester bears the burden of demonstrating that he and his request qualify" for waiver of fees); Coven, 2009 WL 3174423, at *12 (acknowledging that requester "bear[s] the initial burden of satisfying the statutory and regulatory standards for a fee waiver") (quoting Friends of the Coast Fork, 110 F.3d, at 55); Brown, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 1354 (stating that requester "bears the burden of providing information that supports his fee waiver request with the initial FOIA request"); McQueen v. United States, 264 F. Supp. 2d 502, 524 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (same), aff’d per curiam in pertinent part, 100 F. App’x 964 (5th Cir. 2004); Citizens Progressive Alliance v. U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 241 F. Supp. 2d 1342, 1366 (D.N.M. 2002) (same); Anderson v. DEA, No. 93-253, slip op. at 4 (W.D. Pa. May 11, 1995) (magistrate’s recommendation) (stating that burden is on requester to establish fee waiver standard met), adopted, (W.D. Pa. June 21, 1995).


\textsuperscript{117} See, e.g., Judicial Watch, Inc. v. DOJ, No. 99-2315, 2000 WL 33724693, at *5 (D.D.C. Aug. 17, 2000) ("Under the FOIA, the analysis focuses on the subject and impact of the particular disclosure, not the record of the requesting party.").

\textsuperscript{118} See, e.g., Judicial Watch, 326 F.3d at 1312 (reiterating that requests for fee waivers "must be made with reasonable specificity . . . and based on more than conclusory allegations") (quotation marks and internal citations omitted); McClellan, 835 F.2d at 1285 (stating that
fee waiver showing must be made as to the requester, and not the requester's counsel.\textsuperscript{119} To the extent that an agency in its fee waiver analysis does not consider a factor or factors addressed by the requester in its request, courts generally have construed that factor as not at issue and thus conceded.\textsuperscript{120}

When a requester fails to provide sufficient information for the agency to make a fee waiver decision, the agency may defer consideration of the fee waiver request in order to ask the requester for necessary supplemental or clarifying information.\textsuperscript{121} As

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\item conclussory statements will not support fee waiver request); Saldana, 715 F. Supp. 2d at 21 (holding that conclussory statements regarding public interest do not satisfy the statutory requirements); In Def. of Animals, 543 F. Supp. 2d at 109 (observing that fee waiver requests must be reasonably specific and not based on conclusory allegations); Jarvik v. CIA, 495 F. Supp. 2d 67, 73 (D.D.C. 2007) (stating that requester "must pinpoint the type of government activity he is investigating"); Prison Legal News v. Lappin, 436 F. Supp. 2d 17, 26 (D.D.C. 2006) (finding that requester had provided reasonable specificity as to how records about events within agency's facilities would benefit public); McQueen, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 525 (emphasizing that "[c]onclusory statements on their face are insufficient" to prove entitlement to fee waiver).
\end{itemize}


\textsuperscript{120} See, e.g., Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 593 F. Supp. 2d 261, 269-270 (D.D.C. 2009) (noting that by not addressing plaintiff's assertion that its requests "were not primarily for its commercial interest," defendant conceded point); Physicians Comm. for Responsible Med. v. HHS, 480 F. Supp. 2d 119, 122 (D.D.C. 2007) (deciding that because agency did not raise any argument with regard to "commercial interest prong," plaintiff's commercial interest is not at issue).

\textsuperscript{121} See, e.g., McClellan, 835 F.2d at 1287 (noting that "[t]he fee waiver statute nowhere suggests that an agency may not ask for more information if the requester fails to provide enough"); finding twenty-three questions posed by agency not burdensome); Citizens, 241 F. Supp. 2d at 1366 (recognizing that agency "is entitled to ask for more information with regards to a fee waiver request, where the information provided is not sufficient"); see also FOIA Update, Vol. VIII, No. 1, at 8 & n.5 ("New Fee Waiver Policy Guidance") ("Where not readily apparent to an agency, requesters should be asked to describe specifically their qualifications, the nature of their research, the purposes for which they intend to use the requested information, and their intended means of dissemination to the public"); cf. OMB Fee Guidelines, 52 Fed. Reg. at 10,018 (specifying same in context of fee issue). But see Judicial Watch, 326 F.3d at 1315 (concluding that initial request demonstrated with reasonable specificity requester's eligibility for fee waiver, thus rejecting propriety of agency's request for additional information).
amended by the OPEN Government Act of 2007, the FOIA expressly provides that an agency may request additional information from the requester "if necessary to clarify with the requester issues regarding fee assessment." (For a discussion of when it is appropriate to make such an inquiry, see Procedural Requirements, Time Limits, above.)

As an additional threshold matter, agencies analyzing fee waiver requests are not strictly bound by previous administrative decisions.

In order to determine whether the first fee waiver requirement has been met -- i.e., that disclosure of the requested information is in the public interest because it is likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of government operations or activities -- agencies should consider the following four factors, collectively referred to as the "public interest requirement," in sequence:


124 See, e.g., Judicial Watch, Inc., 2000 WL 33724693, at *5 (noting that requester's "past record in uncovering information [through use of FOIA] is simply irrelevant"); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. DOJ, No. 97-2089, slip op. at 14 (D.D.C. July 14, 1998) (finding, in case at hand, that it was "wholly irrelevant" that requester received fee waivers in other cases); Dollinger v. USPS, No. 95-CV-6174T, slip op. at 7-8 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 1995) (concluding that agency is not bound by previous decision on fee waiver for similar request from same requester); cf. Judicial Watch, Inc. v. GSA, No. 98-2223, slip op. at 14 (D.D.C. Sept. 25, 2000) (reiterating that although prior judicial recognition of requester's "ability to disseminate FOIA-disclosed information is not binding," agency should consider requester's "track record" and reputation for disseminating information).

125 See, e.g., Judicial Watch, 326 F.3d at 1312 (stating that case turns on whether public interest requirement is met, and noting that agency's implementing regulation included "non-exclusive list of factors the agency 'shall consider'" (quoting agency's regulation)); S.A. Ludsin & Co. v. SBA, No. 97-7884, 1998 WL 642416, at *1 (2d Cir. Mar. 26, 1998) (reiterating that first requirement not met when requester "merely paraphrased" fee waiver provision); Oglesby v. U.S. Dep't of the Army, 920 F.2d 57, 66 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (conclusory statements insufficient to make public interest showing); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. OMB, 546 F. Supp. 2d 722, 727 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (finding request was in "the public interest" and thus qualified for fee waiver where requester established why records were sought, what it intended to do with them, to whom it would give records, and "the [subject matter] expertise of [its] membership"); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. DOJ, 122 F. Supp. 2d 5, 9 (D.D.C. 2000) (finding that nonprofit group's "general description of [its] organizational mission" failed to identify public interest to be served by release of specific information requested); Sloman, 832 F. Supp. at 68 (finding that public interest requirement is not met merely by quoting statutory standard).

126 See Judicial Watch, Inc., 365 F.3d at 1126 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (invoking agency's four-factor fee waiver test, and stating that "[the] four criteria must be satisfied" in order "for a request to be in the 'public interest'"); Judicial Watch, 326 F.3d at 1312 (applying agency's four-
First, the subject matter of the requested records, in the context of the request, must specifically concern identifiable "operations or activities of the government." 127 Although in most cases records possessed by a federal agency will meet this threshold, the records must be sought for their informative value with respect to specifically identified government operations or activities. 128 However, when a federal agency has

factor analysis of fee waivers, but referring to factors as "non-exclusive list"); Monroe-Bev v. FBI, No. 11-1915, 2011 WL 4017729, at *3 (D.D.C. Sept 13, 2012) (reiterating that all four factors must be satisfied for request to be in public interest); Perkins, 754 F. Supp. 2d, at 5 (listing the four factors to be considered under public interest prong); Coven, 2009 WL 3174423, at *13 (adhering to the four-factor test of public interest prong); Clemente, 741 F. Supp. 2d, at 75 (noting the four factors of public interest prong); In Def. of Animals, 543 F. Supp. 2d at 108-09 (applying agency's four-factor public interest test set forth in its regulations); Physicians Comm. for Responsible Med., 480 F. Supp. 2d at 122 (acknowledging defendant's use of four-part regulatory test to determine furtherance of public interest); Inst. for Wildlife Prot., 290 F. Supp. 2d at 1229 (recognizing that "agency is to consider [four fee waiver] factors in sequence").

127 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iii); see Brown v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 226 F. App'x 866, 869 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding that requester failed to adequately explain how requested records were "related to the activities and operations" of agency); Oglesby v. DOJ, No. 02-0603, slip op. at 4 (D.D.C. Sept. 3, 2002) (finding that requester's statement that records pertaining to him would show "which [of his] activities were of interest to the Government and what actions it took with respect to them" was conclusory and did not identify "the link between identifiable government operations and the information requested"); FOIA Update, Vol. VIII, No. 1, at 6 ("New Fee Waiver Policy Guidance").

128 See, e.g., Monroe-Bev, 2012 WL 4017729, at *4 (holding that agency regulation requires direct and clear connection to activities and operations of federal government); Wall, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120826, at *17-18 (finding plaintiff's "conclusory, and not entirely comprehensible, allegations of government corruption" insufficient to meet statutory standard); Saldana, 715 F. Supp. 2d at 21 (noting that "conclusory statement [of public interest] do not entitle plaintiff to a fee waiver"); Brown, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 1358-59 (finding that the allegations made in lawsuits brought against agency did not concern operations or activities of agency); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Reno, No. 00-0723, 2001 WL 1902811, at *10 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 2001) (upholding agency's assessment of fees, reasoning that while agency's response to citizen letters regarding Cuban emigre Elian Gonzales would likely contribute to understanding of agency actions, incoming citizen letters to agency on that topic do not), summary judgment granted on other grounds, (D.D.C. Sept. 25, 2001); S.A. Ludsin, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8617, at *14 (holding that disclosure of appraisals of government property do not "in any readily apparent way" contribute to public's understanding of operations or activities of government); Atkin v. EEOC, No. 91-2508, slip op. at 27-28 (D.N.J. Dec. 4, 1992) (finding requested list of agency attorneys and their bar affiliations "clearly does not concern identifiable government activities or operations"), appeal dismissed for failure to timely prosecute sub nom. Atkin v. Kemp, No. 93-5548 (3d Cir. 1993); Nance v. USPS, No. 91-1183, 1992 WL 23655, at *2 (D.D.C. Jan. 24, 1992) (reiterating that disclosure of illegally cashed money orders will not contribute significantly to public understanding of operations of government.
in some manner used records that came into its possession that ordinarily would not in
and of themselves be reflective of the operations of the government, some courts have
found them to concern the operations or activities of the government.129

Second, in order for the disclosure to be "likely to contribute" to an
understanding of specific government operations or activities, disclosure of the
requested information must be meaningfully informative in relation to the subject
matter of the request.130 Requests for information that is already in the public domain,

129 See Forest Guardians v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 416 F.3d 1173, 1178 (10th Cir. 2005)
(finding that lienholder agreements that derived from private transactions have connection
to activities of government where government maintains copies of those records and notifies
submitters of agency actions that "might affect" their value); Schoenman v. FBI, 604 F.
Supp. 2d 174, 192 (D.D.C. 2009) (finding that records that originated outside government
are not "categorically ineligible" for fee waiver when they are "targeted and collected" by
agency); Ctr. for Medicare Advocacy, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 240-41 (finding that although
certain documents sought were "submitted by private parties seeking to do business with
the federal government" they "were reviewed by the agency" as part of its considerations
and thus concern activities of government); Inst. for Wildlife Prot., 290 F. Supp. 2d at 1231
(ordering fee waiver where requested documents consisted of petitions submitted to agency
by outside parties seeking to list particular species as endangered and where requester
"theorized" that such petitions were "likely to contain marginal notes" by agency employees
whose "opinions are often ignored or overturned" by agency personnel of higher authority).

130 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(4)(A)(iii); see Monaghan, 506 F. App'x at 598 (finding requester did
not demonstrate "how documents that address 'broad public skepticism' and 'public doubts'
regarding" the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 "are 'meaningfully informative' on
governmental operations or activities"); Carney v. DOJ, 19 F.3d 807, 814 (2d Cir. 1994)
(stating that it is relevant to consider subject matter of fee waiver request); Larson, 843 F.2d
at 148; (noting that character of information is proper factor to consider); Perkins, 754 F.
Supp. 2d at 6 (noting that where stated goal of FOIA request is to evaluate racial disparities
among federal employees, but requested records do not reveal this information release
cannot contribute to public understanding); Wall, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120826, at *18
(determining plaintiff failed to demonstrate how request for records concerning himself
would be informative regarding his unsubstantiated allegations of government corruption);
Clemente, 741 F. Supp. 2d at 76 (stating that records revealing "extent to which the FBI
countenances the criminal behavior" of high profile informant would "likely improve
the public's understanding of the FBI's activities); Manley v. Dep't of the Navy, No. 1:07-cv-721,
regulation requiring "assessment of the 'the substantive content of the record . . . to
determine whether disclosure is meaningful'"); Klein v. Toupin, No. 05-647, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 32478, at *11-12 (D.D.C. May 24, 2006) (reiterating that conclusory and unsupported
assertions of misconduct are not "meaningfully informative" of government operations);
speculation" plaintiff's allegations that agency had "ulterior motive" when it published
interpretive rule, thus concluding that plaintiff "failed to establish that the disclosure it
seeks has informative value"); AFGE v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 632 F. Supp. 1272, 1278
(D.D.C. 1986) (finding union's allegations of malfeasance to be too ephemeral to warrant
waiver of search fees without further evidence that informative material will be found), aff'd
either in a duplicative or a substantially identical form, or responsive files that consist largely of routine administrative information in comparison with a limited amount of substantive information, may not warrant a full fee waiver because the disclosure would not be likely to contribute to an understanding of government operations or activities when nothing new or substantive about the agency's activities would be added to the public's understanding.\textsuperscript{131} There is no clear consensus among the courts as to what is considered information in the public domain for purposes of a fee waiver determination.\textsuperscript{132}

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{131} See Monaghan, 506 F. App'x at 598 (affirming district court's dismissal of requester's challenge to fee waiver denial and observing that requester did not challenge that "portions of the responsive documents have previously been released to the public" and finding that their "prior availability makes them unlikely to contribute to public understanding"); Judicial Watch, Inc., 365 F.3d at 1127 (upholding denial of "blanket fee waiver," emphasizing that plaintiff failed to counter government's representations that requested information "was already in the public domain"); Sierra Club Legal Def. Fund, No. 93-35383, slip op. at 4 (9th Cir. Aug. 29, 1994) (determining that plaintiff failed to explain "how its work would add anything to public understanding" where requested material already widely disseminated and publicized); Carney, 19 F.3d at 815 (observing that where records "are readily available from other sources . . . further disclosure by the agency will not significantly contribute to the public's understanding"); McClellan, 835 F.2d at 1286 (recognizing new information has more potential to contribute to public understanding); Coven, 2009 WL 3174423, at *13 (agreeing with agency's fee waiver denial and puzzling over how request for job vacancy data already provided by agency on own website could contribute to public understanding); Bansal v. DEA, No. 06-3946, 2007 WL 551515, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2007) (observing that allegations that records sought "are proof of corrupt government practices" to support fee waiver were raised during requester's criminal prosecution and thus are "already on the public record"); Brown, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 1359-60 (applying agency regulation that specified that "disclosure of information that already is in the public domain," such as that found "in open records and available to the public in court documents "would not be likely to contribute" to public understanding); Sloman, 832 F. Supp. at 68 (stating that public's understanding would not be enhanced to significant extent where material was previously released to other writers and "more important[ly]" was available in agency's public reading room "where the public has access and has used the information extensively").

\end{footnotesize}
Third, the disclosure must contribute to "public understanding" as opposed to the individual understanding of the requester or a narrow segment of interested persons. A few courts have found prisoners to be the "public" within the meaning of the FOIA. Only one case has directly addressed the issue of whether the "public"

4326448, at *4 (recognizing that "extent to which the information already exists in the public domain is relevant in assessing [factor two]," but finding that defendant had failed to substantiate that requested information in this instance was publicly available). Compare Judicial Watch, 2001 WL 1902811, at *10 (sustaining agency's assessment of fees for duplication of court documents, press clippings, and citizen letters where material was "easily accessible and available to everyone else for a fee") (quoting Durham v. DOJ, 829 F. Supp. 428, 434-35 (D.D.C. 1993)), and Durham, 829 F. Supp. at 434-35 (denying fee waiver for 2340 pages of public court records), appeal dismissed for failure to timely file, No. 93-5354 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 29, 1994), with Friends of the Coast Fork, 110 F.3d at 55 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that availability in agency's public reading room alone does not justify denial of fee waiver), Carney, 19 F.3d at 815 (finding that mere fact records released to others does not mean same information is readily available to public), and In Def. of Animals, 543 F. Supp. 2d at 111 (commenting that courts "have been reluctant to treat information that is technically available, through a reading room or upon a FOIA request, as part of the public domain").


134 See Forest Guardians, 416 F.3d at 1179 (emphasizing that "FOIA fee waivers are limited to disclosures that enlighten more than just the individual requester"); Carney, 19 F.3d at 814 (observing that relevant inquiry is "whether the requester will disseminate the disclosed records to a reasonably broad audience of persons interested in the subject"); Cmty. Legal Servs., Inc. v. HUD, 405 F. Supp. 2d 553, 557 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (acknowledging that while requester's limited dissemination methods are unlikely to reach general audience "there is a segment of the public interested in [requester's] work"); Citizens, 241 F. Supp. 2d at 1367 (holding that requester's intent to release information obtained "to the media is not sufficient to demonstrate that disclosure would contribute significantly to public understanding"); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. DOJ, 185 F. Supp. 2d 54, 62 (D.D.C. 2002) (stating that requester must show that disclosure will contribute to understanding of "reasonably broad audience of persons"); Fazzini v. DOJ, No. 90-C-3303, 1991 WL 74649, at *5 (N.D. Ill. May 2, 1991) (finding that requester cannot establish public benefit merely by alleging he has "corresponded" with members of media and intends to share requested information with them), summary affirmance granted, No. 91-2219 (7th Cir. July 26, 1991).

135 See FedCURE, 602 F. Supp. 2d at 202-03 (rejecting agency's "small audience" argument, finding that plaintiff's dissemination to "federal inmates, their families and others," constitutes "sufficiently broad audience" interested in subject); Ortloff v. DOJ, No. 98-2819, slip op. at 21 (D.D.C. Mar. 22, 2002) (stressing that to qualify for fee waiver, requester's ability to disseminate information "to the general public, or even to a limited segment of the public such as prisoners" must be demonstrated); Linn v. DOJ, No. 92-1406, 1995 WL 631847, at *14 (D.D.C. Aug. 22, 1995) (rejecting agency's position that dissemination to
encompasses only the population of the United States. In that case the court held that disclosure to a foreign news syndicate that published only in Canada satisfied the requirement that it contribute to "public understanding."

Courts have held that because the proper focus must be on the benefit to be derived by the public, any personal benefit to be derived by the requester, or the requester’s particular financial situation, are not considerations entitling him or her to a fee waiver. Indeed, it is well settled that indigence alone, without a showing of a public benefit, is insufficient to warrant a fee waiver.

prison population is not to public at large; statute makes no distinction between incarcerated and nonincarcerated public).


137 Id. at 892-93; cf. Edmonds Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 460 F. Supp. 2d 63, 74 n.7 (D.D.C. 2006) (refraining from addressing agency's claim that meaning of "public" for fee waiver purposes "does not include members of the international community" given that there were sufficient number of U.S.-based organizations involved in supporting request before agency).

138 See, e.g., Carney, 19 F.3d at 816 (finding fee waiver inappropriate for portion of responsive records that concerned processing of plaintiff's own FOIA requests); McClain v. DOJ, 13 F.3d 220, 220-21 (7th Cir. 1993) (stating that fee waiver not merited when requester sought to serve private interest rather than "public understanding of operations or activities of the government"); Ferrigno v. DHS, No. 09 civ. 5878, 2011 WL 1345168, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2011) (holding that private benefit outweighed public interest where "request for . . . emails seems to be . . . an attempt to continue [an] investigation and settle old scores"); Banks v. DOJ, 605 F. Supp. 2d 131, 139 (D.D.C. 2009) (finding that individual's "attack on a criminal conviction is a private interest"); Cotton v. Stine, No. 6:07-98, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93149, at *1-2 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 14, 2008) (finding no indication of public benefit where prisoner sought fee waiver for papers lost during his transfer to another facility); Bansal, 2007 WL 551515, at *5 (observing that records needed to perfect appeal of requester's criminal conviction "primarily serves his own interests"); Klein, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32478, at *12 (finding that plaintiff presented no evidence to show how records related to his suspension from practice before agency "would benefit anyone other than himself"); McQueen, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 525 (acknowledging that although plaintiff asserted more than one basis in support of fee waiver, his "primary purposes" served private interests and disqualified him on that basis alone); Mells v. IRS, No. 99-2030, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24275, at *10 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 2002) (noting that requester's reasons for fee waiver were "overwhelmingly personal in nature" where he claimed that disclosure "would yield exculpatory evidence pertaining to his criminal conviction"). But see Johnson v. DOJ, No. 89-2842, slip op. at 3 (D.D.C. May 2, 1990) (stressing that death-row prisoner seeking previously unreleased and possibly exculpatory information was entitled to partial fee waiver on rationale that potential "miscarriage of justice . . . is a matter of great public interest"), summary judgment granted, 758 F. Supp. 2, 5 (D.D.C. 1991) (holding that, ultimately, FBI not required to review records or forego FOIA exemption for possibly exculpatory information); see also Pederson v. RTC, 847 F. Supp. 851, 856 (D. Colo. 1994) (concluding that requester's personal interest in disclosure of requested information did not
Additionally, agencies should evaluate the identity and qualifications of the requester -- e.g., his or her expertise in the subject area of the request and ability and intention to disseminate the information to the public -- in order to determine whether the public would benefit from disclosure to that requester. Specialized knowledge undercut fee waiver request when requester established existence of concurrent public interest).

139 See, e.g., Reynolds, 391 F. App’x at 46 (upholding district court’s denial of fee waiver request, noting that requester “argued only that he should be granted the waiver because he could not afford the fees”); Brunsilius v. DOE, No. 07-5362, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 15314, at *2 (D.C. Cir. July 16, 2008) (per curiam) (emphasizing that “[a]ppellant’s indigence and his private litigation interest are not valid bases for waiving fees under FOIA”); Ely v. USPS, 753 F.2d 163, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“Congress rejected a fee waiver provision for indigents.”); Cotton, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93149, at *1-2 (reiterating that Congress has “rejected a fee waiver provision for indigents” and that fee waiver denials for records on self ”will be upheld despite requester's indigence”); Bansal, 2007 WL 551515, at *6 (finding "no special provision in statute for "reduced fees based on indigence or incarcerated status"); Rodriguez-Estrada v. United States, No. 92-2360, slip op. at 2 (D.D.C. Apr. 16, 1993) (explaining no entitlement to fee waiver on basis of in forma pauperis status under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (2000)); see also S. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1200, at 8 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6285, 6287 (proposed fee waiver provision for indigents eliminated; “such matters are properly the subject for individual agency determination in regulations”); cf. Banks, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 137 (distinguishing between in forma pauperis status for civil filings and obligation to pay fees for FOIA requests); Emory v. HUD, No. 05-00671, 2007 WL 641406, at *4 (D. Haw. Feb. 23, 2007) (stating that order granting in forma pauperis status is not waiver of FOIA fee requirement in agency regulation).

140 Compare Monaghan, 506 F. App’x at 598 (holding that publication on "sub blog . . . not easily accessible through a general searches conducted on common search engines" does not demonstrate ability to effectively disseminate information); Brunsilius, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 15314, at *2 (finding no entitlement to fee waiver where plaintiff failed to "demonstrate his ability to disseminate . . . to the general public"), Brown, 226 F. App’x at 868-69 (determining that requester’s stated purpose of his website, its traffic, and attention it has received "do not establish that he . . . disseminates news to the public at large"), McClain, 13 F.3d at 221 (stating that fee waiver must be assessed in light of identity and objectives of requester), Larson, 843 F.2d at 1483 & n.5 (holding that inability to disseminate information alone is sufficient basis for denying fee waiver request; requester cannot rely on tenuous link to newspaper to establish dissemination where administrative record "failed to identify the newspaper company to which he intended to release the requested information, his purpose for seeking the requested material, or his . . . contacts with any major newspaper companies"), Ferrigno, 2011 WL 1345168, at *6 (finding that requester "has not even argued that he has an intention of disseminating the [requested] emails to the public, much less demonstrated his ability to do so"), Perkins, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 8 (concluding that lack of "professional or personal contacts" at newspaper and no "history of publishing in it" does not "lend credence to [requester's] statement of intention"), Hall v. CIA, No. 04-0814, 2005 WL 850379, at *7 (D.D.C. Apr. 13, 2005) (viewing requester’s statement that he "makes pertinent information available to newspapers and magazines" . . . [as] exactly the kind of vague statement that will preclude a
may be required to extract, synthesize, and effectively convey the information to the public, and courts have taken that into account in making fee waiver determinations.\textsuperscript{141}
Although courts have found that representatives of the news media, as defined by the FOIA,\(^\text{142}\) are not "automatically" entitled to a fee waiver\(^\text{143}\) they are generally able to meet this aspect of the statutory requirement by showing their ability to disseminate information.\(^\text{144}\) (For a further discussion of news media requesters as defined by the OPEN Government Act, see Fee and Fee Waivers, Fees, Requester Categories, above.) Additionally in this regard, while nonprofit organizations and public interest groups often are capable of disseminating information, they do not automatically qualify for fee waivers; rather courts likewise have held that they must, like any requester, meet the statutory requirements to qualify for a waiver of fees.\(^\text{145}\)


143 See McClain, 13 F.3d at 221 (dictum) (concluding that status as newspaper or nonprofit institution does not lead to automatic waiver of fee); Hall, 2005 WL 850379, at *7 n.13 (noting that qualification as news media entity "would not automatically" entitle requester to public interest fee waiver).


145 See Forest Guardians, 416 F.3d at 1178 (reiterating that public interest groups "must still satisfy the statutory standard to obtain a fee waiver"); Sierra Club Legal Def. Fund, No. 93-35383, slip op. at 4 (9th Cir. Aug. 29, 1994) (explaining that status as public interest law firm does not entitle requester to fee waiver); McClain, 13 F.3d at 221 (stating that status as newspaper or nonprofit institution does not lead to "automatic" waiver of fee); McClellan, 835 F.2d at 1284 (stating that legislative history makes plain that "public interest" groups must satisfy statutory test); Friends of Oceano Dunes, 2011 WL 6748575, at *2 (reiterating that non-profit status is not automatic entitlement to fee waiver); VoteHemp, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 59 (explaining that nonprofit status "does not relieve [the requester] of its obligation to satisfy the statutory requirements for a fee waiver"); Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, No. 95-017-BU,
Some courts have found that requesters who make no showing of how the information would be disseminated, other than through passively making it available to anyone who might seek access to it, do not meet the burden of demonstrating with particularity that the information will be communicated to the public.\textsuperscript{146}

Fourth, the disclosure must contribute "significantly" to public understanding of government operations or activities.\textsuperscript{147} To warrant a waiver or reduction of fees, the public's understanding of the subject matter in question, as compared to the level of public understanding existing prior to the disclosure, must be likely to be enhanced by

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\textsuperscript{146} See, e.g., Van Fripp v. Parks, No. 97-0159, slip op. at 12 (D.D.C. Mar. 16, 2000) (emphasizing that placement in library amounts to, "at best, a passive method of distribution" that does not establish entitlement to fee waiver); Klamath Water Users Protective Ass'n, No. 96-3077, slip op. at 47 (D. Or. June 19, 1997) (finding placement in library insufficient in itself to establish entitlement to fee waiver); see also FOIA Update, \textit{Vol. VIII, No. 1}, at 8 ("New Fee Waiver Policy Guidance") (advising agencies that such requests should be analyzed to identify particular person or persons who actually will use requested information in scholarly or other analytic work and then disseminate it to general public).

\textsuperscript{147} See \textit{5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iii)}; see also Stewart, 554 F.3d at 1244 (denying fee waiver where plaintiffs failed to demonstrate how search for documents not yet known to exist would "reveal additional or different information" than that already provided, stating that court could not determine "how such information would 'contribute significantly to public understanding'"); Brown, 226 F. App'x at 869 (finding that requester failed to explain how disclosure would be "likely to contribute significantly to public understanding"); Venkataram v. OIP, No. 09-6520, 2011 WL 4120438, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 18, 2012) (finding disclosure of records regarding co-conspirator "would benefit plaintiff and not contribute significantly to public understanding"); Perkins, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 8 (explaining that where requester has failed to establish contribution to understanding of government operations under factor two, he cannot therefore "establish that disclosure will significantly increase such understanding" under factor four); Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 581 F. Supp. 2d 491, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (stating that public's understanding of agency's decision-making "will be significantly enhanced by learning about the nature and scope of [agency] communications with commercial interests"; no allegation of agency impropriety by requester necessary); Bansal, 2007 WL 551515, at *5 (noting that records needed to perfect appeal of requester's criminal conviction insufficient basis on which to conclude that disclosure would contribute significantly to public understanding of government operations); FOIA Update, \textit{Vol. VIII, No. 1}, at 8 ("New Fee Waiver Policy Guidance"); cf. Cmty. Legal Servs., 405 F. Supp. 2d at 558-59 (while observing that neither statute nor agency's regulation provided guidance on "what constitutes a 'significant' contribution," other courts have considered "current availability" and "newness of information sought" under this factor)
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the disclosure to a significant extent.\textsuperscript{148} Such a determination must be an objective one; agencies are not permitted to make separate value judgments as to whether any information that would in fact contribute significantly to public understanding of government operations or activities is "important" enough to be made public.\textsuperscript{149}

Once an agency determines that the "public interest" requirement for a fee waiver has been met -- through its consideration of fee waiver factors one through four -- the statutory standard's second requirement calls for the agency to determine whether

\textsuperscript{148} See Sierra Club Legal Def. Fund, No. 93-35383, slip op. at 4 (9th Cir. Aug. 29, 1994) (concluding that requester failed to explain how disclosure to it "would add anything to 'public understanding' in light of vast amount of material already disseminated and publicized"); Carney, 19 F.3d at 815 (observing that when requested records are readily available from other sources, further disclosure will not significantly contribute to public understanding); Coven, 2009 WL 3174423, at *14 (recognizing that given availability of job vacancy information on agency's own website, release of job vacancy records to plaintiff will not significantly contribute to public understanding); FedCURE, 602 F. Supp. 2d at 205 (explaining that any dissemination of "highly technical" information where none is currently available, will significantly enhance public's understanding of it); McDade v. EOUSA, No. 03-1946, slip op. at 9 (D.D.C. Sept. 29, 2004) (paraphrasing with approval agency's regulation that provides that "public's understanding of the subject after disclosure must be enhanced significantly when compared to level of public understanding prior to disclosure"), summary affirmance granted to agency, No. 04-5378, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 15259, at *1 (D.C. Cir. July 25, 2005); W. Watersheds, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 1039 n.2 (finding that significance factor was met where requester's statements that information sought either was not readily available or had never been provided to public were not contradicted in administrative record by agency); Judicial Watch, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 62 (finding that plaintiff failed to describe with specificity how disclosure of "these particular documents will 'enhance' public understanding 'to a significant extent'"); FOIA Update, Vol. VIII, No. 1, at 8 ("New Fee Waiver Policy Guidance"); cf. Forest Guardians, 416 F.3d at 1181-82 (acknowledging that significance of contribution to be made by "release of the records" at issue "is concededly a close question," and finding that requester "should get the benefit of the doubt" and therefore is entitled to fee waiver); Cmty. Legal Servs., 405 F. Supp. 2d at 559 (finding that extent to which requested information already is available, its newness, and whether request is pretext for discovery all were proper considerations in applying "significance factor" where agency's regulation did not address statutory provision); Pederson, 847 F. Supp. at 855 (finding that despite requesters' failure to specifically assert such significance, widespread media attention referenced in appeal letter sufficient to demonstrate information's significant contribution to public understanding).

\textsuperscript{149} See FOIA Update, Vol. VIII, No. 1, at 8 ("New Fee Waiver Policy Guidance"); see also 132 Cong. Rec. S14,298 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1986) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (emphasizing that agencies should administer fee waiver provision in "an objective manner and should not rely on their own, subjective view as to the value of the information"); cf. Cmty. Legal Servs., 405 F. Supp. 2d at 560 (finding that agency's inference that requester's use of "information in advising clients suggests a litigious motive" was speculative given that requester's services include counseling as well as litigation and there was no evidence of any pending lawsuits against agency).
"disclosure of the information ... is not primarily in the commercial interest of the requester." In order to decide whether this requirement has been satisfied, agencies should consider the final two fee waiver factors -- factors five and six -- in sequence:

To apply the fifth factor an agency must next determine as a threshold matter whether the request involves any "commercial interest of the requester" which would be furthered by the disclosure. A commercial interest is one that furthers a commercial, trade, or profit interest as those terms are commonly understood. Information sought in furtherance of a tort claim for compensation or retribution for the requester is not considered to involve a "commercial interest." Furthermore, not only profit-making corporations but also individuals or other organizations may have a commercial interest to be furthered by disclosure, depending upon the circumstances involved, in particular "the use to which [the requester] will put the information obtained." Agencies may properly consider the requester's identity and the circumstances surrounding the


\[151\] Id.; see FOIA Update, Vol. VIII, No. 1, at 9 ("New Fee Waiver Policy Guidance") (discussing analysis that is required to determine whether requester has commercial interest); see also VoteHemp, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 64 (citing to agency's regulation and noting that "agencies are instructed to consider 'the existence and magnitude' of a commercial interest").

\[152\] See OMB Fee Guidelines, 52 Fed. Reg. at 10,017-18 (defining "commercial interest"); cf. Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., 588 F.2d 863, 870 (2d Cir. 1978) (defining term "commercial" in Exemption 4 as meaning anything "pertaining or relating to or dealing with commerce").

\[153\] See McClellan, 835 F.2d at 1285; Martinez v. SSA, No. 07-cv-01156, 2008 WL 486027, at *4 (D. Colo. Feb. 18, 2008) (restating that "claims for damages do not constitute commercial interest ... when grounded in tort"); cf. Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. DOJ, 73 F.3d 93, 98 (6th Cir. 1996) (stating, in context of attorney fees, that "'news interests should not be considered commercial interests'" when examining commercial benefit to requester (quoting Fenster v. Brown, 617 F.2d 740, 742 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1979))).

\[154\] OMB Fee Guidelines, 52 Fed. Reg. at 10,013; see FOIA Update, Vol. VIII, No. 1, at 9-10 ("New Fee Waiver Policy Guidance"); see also Kemmerly v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, No. 07-9794, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75622, at *13 (E.D. La. July 26, 2010) (acknowledging plaintiff was correct when he "recognized that he would be ineligible for a fee waiver" because requested data would be used for commercial purpose); Research Air, Inc. v. Kempthorne, 589 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2, 10 (D.D.C. 2008) (finding that records pertaining to aircraft incident involving requester, who was president and sole owner of corporate plaintiff, would benefit his commercial interests); VoteHemp, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 65 (concluding that nonprofit organization, as advocate for free market in controlled substance, had commercial interest in requested records); cf. Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC, 830 F.2d 278, 281 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (recognizing that entity's "non-profit status is not determinative" of commercial status) (Exemption 4 case).
request and draw reasonable inferences regarding the existence of a commercial interest.\footnote{155}

When a commercial interest is found to exist and that interest would be furthered by the requested disclosure, an agency must assess the magnitude of such interest in order subsequently to compare it to the "public interest" in disclosure.\footnote{156} In assessing the magnitude of the commercial interest, the agency should reasonably consider the extent to which the FOIA disclosure will serve the requester's identified commercial interest.\footnote{157}

Lastly the agency must balance the requester's commercial interest against the identified public interest in disclosure and determine which interest is "primary."\footnote{158} A fee waiver or reduction must be granted when the public interest in disclosure is greater in magnitude than the requester's commercial interest.\footnote{159}

\footnote{155} See \textit{FOIA Update, Vol. VIII, No. 1}, at 9 ("New Fee Waiver Policy Guidance"); see also \textit{Martinez}, 2008 WL 486027, at *3-4 (analyzing class action representatives' commercial interest in records regarding amount paid by federal government to state government as reimbursement to class members, to include legal fees awarded to members, and concluding that it did not constitute "an interest in commerce, trade or profit"); \textit{VoteHemp}, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 65 (reiterating defendants' argument that plaintiff's website had "direct links to the websites of companies that sell hemp products" and solicit donations to "the 'industry's legal effort,'" and concluding that "plaintiff has a commercial interest in the information it is seeking"); cf. \textit{Tax Analysts v. DOJ}, 965 F.2d 1092, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (clarifying that in context of attorney fees, status of requester as news organization does not "render[] irrelevant the news organization's other interests in the information").

\footnote{156} See \textit{FOIA Update, Vol. VIII, No. 1}, at 9 ("New Fee Waiver Policy Guidance").

\footnote{157} See id.; see also \textit{VoteHemp}, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 65 ("A review of plaintiff's website pages demonstrates that indeed it has a commercial interest in the information it is seeking to obtain.").

\footnote{158} See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iii) (providing that disclosure cannot be "primarily in the commercial interest of the requester"); see \textit{Research Air, Inc.}, 589 F. Supp. 2d at 3, 10 (finding that requester's use of documents to challenge suspension of pilot's card was "primarily to benefit [requester's] commercial interests"); \textit{VoteHemp}, 237 F. Supp. 2d at 65-66 (noting that agency "should consider the 'primary interest in disclosure,'" and concluding that while "'[t]he private, commercial benefit to [requester] is clear[, t]he public benefit, however, is not'" (quoting \textit{S.A. Ludsin & Co. v. SBA}, No. 96-2146, 1997 WL 337469, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. June 19, 1997))); \textit{FOIA Update, Vol. VIII, No. 1}, at 9 ("New Fee Waiver Policy Guidance").

\footnote{159} See \textit{Consumers' Checkbook}, 502 F. Supp. 2d at 89 (finding that while requester charges fees, this "does not outweigh the advancement of the public interest here," taking into consideration that requester "does not accept any advertising," its nonprofit status, its full funding through sales of certain of its products, and through consumer donations); \textit{FOIA Update, Vol. VIII, No. 1}, at 9 ("New Fee Waiver Policy Guidance") (noting that determining whether requester's identified commercial interest is primary "requires the balancing of the
Agencies may generally presume that when a news media requester has satisfied the "public interest" standard, that will be the primary interest served.160

When agencies analyze fee waiver requests by considering these six factors, courts have found that they have carried out their statutory obligation to determine whether a waiver is in the public interest.161 Additionally, when only some of the requested records satisfy the statutory test, waiver has been upheld for just those records,162 but some courts have found that a full waiver is appropriate.163

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160 See FOIA Update, Vol. VIII, No. 1, at 10 ("New Fee Waiver Policy Guidance"); see also Nat’l Sec. Archive, 880 F.2d at 1388 (requests from news media entities, in furtherance of their newsgathering function, are not for "commercial use"); cf. Tax Analysts, 965 F.2d at 1096 ("That the entity 'was not motivated simply by altruistic instincts' obviously does not mean that [it] is not a news organization . . . . If newspapers and television news shows had to show the absence of commercial interests before they could win attorney's fees in FOIA cases, very few, if any, would ever prevail." (internal citation omitted)).

161 See, e.g., Smith v. BOP, 517 F. Supp. 2d 451, 454-55 (D.D.C. 2007) (holding that agency correctly decided requester failed to satisfy factors found in agency regulation when requester did not specify public interest involved, identify government activity relevant to request, explain how disclosure would contribute to public understanding of it, or state his intent and ability to disseminate requested information); see also FOIA Update, Vol. VIII, No. 1, at 10 ("New Fee Waiver Policy Guidance"); cf. Friends of the Coast Fork, 110 F.3d at 55 (emphasizing that where agency’s regulations provide for multifactor test, it is inappropriate to rely on single factor); Or. Natural Desert Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 24 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1095 (D. Or. 1998) (finding that fee waiver denial must fail when agency did not fully follow its multifactor regulation).

162 See Samuel Gruber Educ. Project v. DOJ, 24 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1998) (upholding, in case involving in excess of 80,000 pages of responsive records, seventy-percent fee waiver granted by agency); cf. Campbell, 164 F.3d at 35-37 (finding, where agency awarded partial fee waiver, that it had not carried its burden in denying waiver for public domain, repetitious, and administrative information in files, remanding for agency to "recalculate its fee waiver ratio" but specifically "declin[ing] to hold" that FBI cannot charge any copying fee").

163 See Schoenman, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 191 (D.D.C. 2009) (finding that "the presence of administrative material within files that also contain substantive documents does not justify charging fees for . . . the non-substantive clutter") (quoting Campbell, 164 F.3d at 36)); Schrecker, 970 F. Supp. at 50-51 (granting full fee waiver where agency provided no "strong evidence" that portion of requested information already was in public domain).
The statutory standard speaks to whether "disclosure" of the requested information is in the public interest. The question of whether an agency should be required to establish the precise contours of its anticipated withholdings at the fee waiver determination stage was raised during the late 1980s in Project on Military Procurement v. Department of the Navy. There the district court suggested that an agency submit an index pursuant to the requirements of Vaughn v. Rosen to defend the denial of a fee waiver based on anticipated application of FOIA exemptions.

Since Project on Military Procurement, several district court opinions have concluded that fee waiver requests should not take into consideration the fact that records may ultimately be found to be exempt from disclosure. Additionally, the


166 484 F.2d 820, 826-28 (D.C. Cir. 1973).

167 See 710 F. Supp. at 367 n.11 (noting that government "may be correct" that fee waiver determination depends in part on applicability of FOIA exemptions to responsive records, and stating that it "suggested that defendant [either] submit a Vaughn Index or . . . produce the documents it seeks to withhold for in camera inspection" so that court could "determine both the nondisclosure and fee waiver issues").

168 See Carney, 19 F.3d at 815 (finding that agency's denial of fee waiver was not proper when made simply on basis that requested records "may [be] exempt from disclosure . . . [because a] fee waiver request should be evaluated based on the face of the request and the reasons given by the requester" (citing Project on Military Procurement, 710 F. Supp. at 367)); Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. DOJ, 602 F. Supp. 2d 121, 125 (D.D.C. 2009) ("Fee-waiver requests are [not] evaluated . . . on the possibility of eventual exemption from disclosure.") (citations omitted); Ctr. for Medicare Advocacy, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 241 (fee waiver decision should not be based on "possibility that the records may ultimately be determined to be exempt from disclosure" (quoting Judicial Watch, Inc. v. DOT, No. 02-566, 2005 WL 1606915, at *4 (D.D.C. July 5, 2005)) (remaining citations and quotations omitted); Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 546 F. Supp. 2d at 729 (rejecting agency's rationale for fee waiver denial based on its argument that "its unique role as a deliberative agency that advises the President about proposed regulations makes this the rare case" when responsive documents were "patently exempt" from disclosure); S. Utah, 402 F. Supp. 2d at 90 (deciding that agency cannot base fee waiver decision on anticipated redactions to responsive records); Judicial Watch, 2005 WL 1606915, at *4 (stating that fee waiver decision should not be made on basis of agency's "determination that most of the information was exempt from disclosure"); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. DOE, 310 F. Supp. 2d 271, 295 (D.D.C. 2004) (same); Wilson v. CIA, No. 89-3356, slip op. at 3-4 (D.D.C. Mar. 25, 1991) (stating that agency may not deny fee waiver request based upon "likelihood" that information will be withheld); cf. Schoenman, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 190-91 (finding that agency improperly concluded that "certain records are not qualified for a fee waiver because they contain exempt material," rejecting defendants' distinction between asserted exemptions for records already processed as in instant case and "anticipated" exemptions, stating that "this distinction is not one that courts have necessarily relied on").
majority of these opinions specify that a fee waiver request should be evaluated "on the face of the request." 169

The FOIA does not explicitly reference any time period within which an agency must resolve a fee waiver issue, 170 although agencies are required to include in their Annual FOIA Reports each year the number of fee waiver requests that were granted and denied and the average and median number of days for adjudicating fee waiver determinations. 171 The statutory twenty-working day time period to respond to a request has been applied to resolution of fee waiver (and fee) issues by several courts, including the D.C. Circuit.172

The FOIA also does not explicitly provide for administrative appeals of denials of requests for fee waivers. Nevertheless, many agencies, either by regulation or by practice, have considered appeals of such actions.173 The Courts of Appeals for the D.C.

169 See, e.g., Carney, 19 F.3d at 815 (finding that "fee waiver request should be evaluated based on the face of the request and the reasons given by the requester" (citing Project on Military Procurement, 710 F. Supp. at 367)); Coven, 2009 WL 3174423, at *12 (same); Schoenman, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 190 (asserting that request "should be evaluated based on the face of the request and the reasons given by [requester] in support of the waiver") (quoting Judicial Watch, 2005 WL 1606915, at *5); Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash., 602 F. Supp. 2d at 125 (emphasizing that "[f]ee-waiver requests are evaluated based on the face of the request") (citations omitted); Ctr. for Medicare Advocacy, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 241 (same) (quoting Judicial Watch, 2005 WL 1606915, at *4)); Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 546 F. Supp. 2d at 730 (finding that fee waiver ")should be evaluated based on the face of the request and the reasons given by the requester" (quoting Carney, 19 F.3d at 815)).


172 See Judicial Watch, 326 F.3d at 1311 ("A requester is considered to have constructively exhausted administrative remedies and may seek judicial review immediately if . . . the agency fails to answer the [fee waiver] request within twenty days.") (citations omitted); Lawyers Comm. for Civil Rights v. U.S. Dep't of Treasury, No. C 07-2590, 2009 WL 2905963, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2009) (holding that agency "was required to act upon LCCR's fee waiver request within [twenty] days"); Judicial Watch, 310 F. Supp. 2d at 293 (commenting that where agency fails to respond to fee waiver request within twenty working days, requester has constructively exhausted administrative remedies and may seek judicial review); Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Dep't of Educ., 292 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2003) (stating that "if the agency fails to respond to a waiver request within [twenty] days, the requester is deemed to have constructively exhausted" administrative remedies).

173 See, e.g., DOJ FOIA Regulations, 28 C.F.R. § 16.6(c) (including in its listing of adverse determinations "a denial of a request for a fee waiver"); Dept of State FOIA Regulations, 22 C.F.R. § 171.51 (2012) (appeals of denials of fee waivers and reductions); DOT FOIA
and Fifth Circuits have held that exhaustion of administrative remedies in connection with fee waiver claims includes filing an administrative appeal.\textsuperscript{174} (For a discussion of constructive exhaustion of administrative remedies, see Litigation Considerations, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, below.)

As part of the Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986,\textsuperscript{175} a specific judicial review provision for fee waivers was added to the FOIA,\textsuperscript{176} which provides for the review of agency fee waiver denials according to a de novo standard, yet explicitly provides that the scope of judicial review remains limited to the administrative record established before the agency.\textsuperscript{177} Thus, courts have not permitted either party to supplement the

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\textsuperscript{174} See Pruitt v. EOUSA, No. 01-5453, 2002 WL 1364365, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 19, 2002) (reiterating that judicial review is not appropriate until requester either appeals fee waiver denial or pays assessed fee); Voinche v. U.S. Dep't of the Air Force, 983 F.2d 667, 669 (5th Cir. 1993) (emphasizing that requester seeking fee waiver under FOIA must exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial review); Oglesby, 920 F.2d at 66 & n.11, 71 ("Exhaustion does not occur until . . . fees are paid or an appeal is taken from the refusal to waive fees."); Judicial Watch v. DOJ, No. 99-1883, slip op. at 10-12 (D.D.C. Sept. 11, 2003) (concluding that although plaintiff "may have" exhausted its administrative remedies as to other issues, it had failed to administratively exhaust as to agency's denial of fee waiver, so its claims related to fee waiver were not properly before court; see also AFGE, 907 F.2d 203, 209 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (declining consideration of fee waiver request when not pursued during agency administrative proceeding); In Def. of Animals, 543 F. Supp. 2d at 97 (noting that nonpayment of fees did not preclude judicial review where plaintiff had timely appealed its fee waiver denial).

\textsuperscript{175} Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207.


\textsuperscript{177} See id.; see also Reynolds, 391 F. App'x at 46 (reiterating that standard of review is de novo and is limited to the administrative record); Stewart, 554 F.3d at 1241 (same); Judicial Watch, 326 F.3d at 1311 (same); Carney, 19 F.3d at 814 (same); Friends of Oceano Dunes, 2011 WL 6748575, at *1 (same); Bensman v. Nat'l Park Serv., 806 F. Supp. 2d 31, 37 (D.D.C. 2011) (same); Perkins, 754 F. Supp. 2d at 5 (same); Wall, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120826, at *7 (same); Clemente, 741 F. Supp. 2d at 75 (same); Monaghan, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60310, at *3 (same); Saldana, 715 F. Supp. 2d at 20 (same); Coven, 2009 WL 3174423, at *12 (same); Schoenman, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 188 (same); Manley, 2008 WL 4326448, at *2 (same); Brown, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 1353 (same); Cmty. Legal Servs., 405 F. Supp. 2d at 555 (same); W. Watersheds, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 1039 (same); Inst. for Wildlife Prot., 290 F. Supp. 2d at 1228 (same); McQueen, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 424 (same); cf. Physicians Comm. for Responsible Med., 480 F. Supp. 2d at 121 n.2 (dismissing separate challenge to fee waiver denial brought under APA's arbitrary and capricious standard, emphasizing that FOIA provides adequate remedy); Eagle, 2003 WL 21402534, at *2, *4 (stating that Court reviews fee waiver decisions de novo; acknowledging that agency ordinarily is not permitted "to rely on justifications for its decision that were not articulated during the administrative decision-making process").
record or offer new argument or rationale for seeking a fee waiver or for denying such a request.\textsuperscript{178}

\textsuperscript{178} See, e.g., Reynolds, 391 F. App’x at 46 (upholding district court’s refusal to consider requester’s "academic status or interest in publishing a scholarly article" because neither was made known to agency during administrative proceedings); Friends of the Coast Fork, 110 F.3d at 55 (reiterating that agency’s letter "must be reasonably calculated to put the requester on notice" as to reasons for fee waiver denial); Larson, 843 F.2d at 1483 (information not part of administrative record may not be considered by district court when reviewing agency fee waiver denial); Bensman, 806 F. Supp. 2d at 43 (D.D.C. 2011) (declaring that court "may not entertain litigation positions newly adopted by Defendant after Plaintiff filed suit"); Monaghan, 2010 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 60310, at *3 (denying plaintiff’s motion to supplement record with "materials that were not submitted with the Plaintiff’s FOIA request or request for a fee waiver"); Coven, 2009 WL 3174423, at *13 (emphasizing that plaintiff cannot augment claims at district court level with arguments not articulated at administrative stage); Manley, 2008 WL 4326448, at *3 (concluding that when agency administratively determined that plaintiff’s request met factor one, it could not raise "post hoc rationalization . . . to deny plaintiff’s request on this first factor" during litigation); Physicians Comm. for Responsible Med., 480 F. Supp. 2d at 121 n.1 (disallowing plaintiff’s submission of affidavit that was not part of administrative record); Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash., 481 F. Supp. 2d at 107 n.1 (refusing to take into account material submitted by both parties that were not before agency when administrative appeal considered); Brown, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 1354 (observing that "administrative record should consist of those documents which [agency] used to determine whether Plaintiff’s fees should be waived"); Pub. Citizen, 292 F. Supp. 2d at 5 (criticizing agency for its failure to adjudicate fee waiver by emphasizing that "this Court has no record upon which to evaluate plaintiff’s claims that it is entitled to a waiver"); see also Ctr. for Pub. Integrity v. HHS, No. 06-1818, 2007 WL 2248071, at *5 (D.D.C. Aug. 3, 2007) (noting that "mere inclusion" of web address in request insufficient to include all information on website as part of administrative record) (requester category context); FOIA Update, Vol. VIII, No. 1, at 10 ("New Fee Waiver Policy Guidance"); FOIA Update, Vol. VI, No. 1, at 6 ("OIP Guidance: FOIA Counselor) (answering question of whether agency can supplement its rationale for denying fee waiver after requester files suit).