OFFSHORE LOGISTICS, INC., PETITIONER V. BETH A. TALLENTIRE, ET AL. AIR LOGISTICS, A DIVISION OF OFFSHORE LOGISTICS, INC., PETITIONER V. CORINE ANN SOUDELIER TAYLOR No. 85-202 In the Supreme Court of the United States October Term, 1985 On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae supporting Petitioner TABLE OF CONTENTS Interest of the United States Statement Summary of the argument Argument: Plaintiffs may not supplement their remedies under the Death on the High Seas Act with remedies provided in state wrongful death statutes A. Federal maritime law generally provides the exclusive remedy for maritime wrongful death B. The Death on the High Seas Act does not authorize the application of state wrongful death statutes in addition to its comprehensive wrongful death remedy Conclusion QUESTION PRESENTED Whether plaintiffs may supplement remedies under the Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. 761 et seq., with those provided by state wrongful death statutes. INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES The United States operates thousands of ocean-going vessels and aircraft in the course of its extensive governmental and military activities. Generally speaking, the United States has waived its sovereign immunity from civilian suits arising within admiralty jurisdiction and is subject to wrongful death actions in much the same manner as private parties. See Suits in Admiralty Act Sections 1-12, 46 U.S.C. 741-752; Public Vessels Act Sections 1-9, 46 U.S.C. 781-789. The United States therefore has a strong interest in encouraging fair, uniform, and harmonious remedies for the redress of wrongful death on the high seas. Indeed, the Court requested the views of the United States in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970), a case raising similar issues concerning maritime wrongful death. See 396 U.S. 952 (1969). STATEMENT On August 6, 1980, a helicopter owned and operated by petitioner Offshore Logistics, Inc., a Louisiana corporation, crashed into the Gulf of Mexico, 30 miles from the coast of Louisiana, killing the passengers (Pet. App. 2a, 43a, 62a). The helicopter was in maritime service, transporting persons from an offshore drilling platform to Houma, Louisiana (see id. at 6a, 22a, 31a, 51a). The widows of two decendents, respondents Corrine Taylor and Beth Tallentire, brought separate wrongful death actions against petitioner raising claims under both the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA), 46 U.S.C. 761 et seq., and the Louisiana wrongful death statute, La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2315 (West Supp. 1985). Pet. App. 2a, 31a, 62a. Taylor, a Louisiana citizen, filed her action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, invoking the federal court's admiralty jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. 1333(1). Tarrentire, a Pennsylvania citizen, filed her action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana, invoking both admiralty jurisdiction (ibid.) and diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. 1332(a)(1). The suits were later consolidated in the Eastern District of Louisiana. See Pet. App. 6a n.6. Upon pretrial motion by petitioner, the district court ruled that the DOHSA provides the exclusive remedy for death on the high seas and therefore dismissed respondents' claims based upon the Louisiana wrongful death statute (Pet. App. 2a, 31a-32a, 51a-52a). Petitioner admitted liability and the trial was limited to the question of damages (ibid.). The district court awarded Tallentire $265,110 in lost support and various smaller amounts of pecuniary damages (id. at 48a-50a). The court made a similar, but unliquidated, pecuniary damages award to Taylor (id. at 68a-70a). Respondents then appealed the district court's dismissal of the state wrongful death claims, contending that they were entitled to non-pecuniary damages under the Louisiana wrongful death statute. /1/ They argued that Section 4 of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), 43 U.S.C. 1333, which adopts state laws to "(t)o the extent they are * * * not inconsistent with * * * other federal laws," incorporates state wrongful death statutes as part of the federal law for the continental shelf. They argued, in the alternative, that the state law applies of its own force and is not preempted by the DOHSA. The court of appeals reversed, with one judge specially concurring and another judge dissenting (Pet. App. 1a-30a). The court first concluded that the OCSLA did not adopt the Louisiana wrongful death statute as a remedy for death caused by a helicopter crash on the high seas (Pet. App. 6a-8a). The court then addressed "the far more difficult question of whether state wrongful death statutes are preempted by DOHSA" (id. at 8a). It turned to Section 7 of the DOHSA, which provides (46 U.S.C. 767): The provisions of any State statute giving or regulating rights of action or remedies for death shall not be affected by this chapter. Upon examining the legislative history of Section 7, the court of appeals concluded that the provision was intended to preserve state wrongful death actions on the high seas (Pet. App. 8a-13a). It rejected a series of contrary arguments pressed by petitioner and expressly declined to follow the Ninth Circuit's contrary decision in Nygaard v. Peter Pan Seafoods, Inc., 701 F.2d 77 (1983). See Pet. App. 14a-17a. It further held that Louisiana had legislative jurisdiction to extend its wrongful death statute to remedy deaths on the high seas and that Louisiana, in fact, intended that result (id. at 18a-24). /2/ The court of appeals expressed great dissatisfaction with its conclusion that state wrongful death statutes can be applied on the high seas (Pet. App. 17a-18a) but ultimately determined that "(o)ur desire for a uniform, consistent, scheme of maritime death remedies cannot justify a refusal to follow the legislative will" (id. at 28a). Judge Jolly filed a special concurrence observing that the court's result "may create a mess in more than a few cases" but was nonetheless compelled by Section 7 of the DOHSA (Pet. App. 28a-29a). Judge Garza dissented, concluding that Section 7 was intended to preserve state wrongful death actions only in territorial waters (Pet. App. 29a-30a). SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT The Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA) provides a comprehensive and exclusive remedy for wrongful death occurring on the high seas. Respondents are not entitled to supplement that federal remedy through invocation of state wrongful death statutes. Application of such statutes would be inconsistent with general principles of admiralty law, which emphasize uniform remedies for maritime injury, and with the language and legislative history of the DOHSA itself. Admiralty law provides a cohesive and independent system of national maritime principles that generally displaces state law. This Court has emphasized the importance of a uniform maritime law throughout the nation's history. The principle of federal uniformity has received specific recognition in disputes involving maritime personal injury. However, maritime wrongful death, until recently, raised peculiar problems because general maritime law did not recognize a remedy for wrongful death. To fill the void caused by the absence of an applicable federal statute, admiralty courts applied state law remedies. The decision in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970), ended this regime by recognizing a general maritime remedy for wrongful death. Thus, general maritime law no longer accommodates state wrongful death statutes. The DOHSA, like the general maritime law, provides a federal remedy for wrongful death that displaces otherwise applicable state law remedies. Although Section 7 of the DOHSA does provide, rather ambiguously, that "provisions of any State statute giving * * * remedies for death shall not be affected by this chapter" (46 U.S.C. 767), a careful review of the pertinent legislative history reveals that Section 7 was not meant to authorize the application of state wrongful death statutes in tandem with the DOHSA's comprehensive wrongful death remedy. Section 7 of the DOHSA was intended to prevent inadvertent displacement of state law remedies that might be available in circumstances other than those covered by the DOHSA. Additionally, like the "savings to suitors" clause of the Judiciary Act of 1789 (ch. 20, Section 9, 1 Stat. 77), Section 7 was intended to preserve state law only insofar as the application of the law was consistent with principles of maritime uniformity. Congress did not expect Section 7 to preserve application of wrongful death statutes on the high seas. To the contrary, Congress was aware that contemporaneous precedent of this Court would preclude that result. Since the DOHSA's passage, it has been generally understood that the Act creates an exclusive remedy for death on the high seas. If the DOHSA remedy were to be supplemented with remedies available under state wrongful death statutes, it would seriously undermine fundamental and settled principles of maritime uniformity and would create substantial anomalies. There is no reason to introduce needless confusion and discordance into a sound and workable federal remedy for death on the high seas. ARGUMENT PLAINTIFFS MAY NOT SUPPLEMENT THEIR REMEDIES UNDER THE DEATH ON THE HIGH SEAS ACT WITH REMEDIES PROVIDED IN STATE WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTES Justice Cardozo once observed that "(d)eath is a composer of strife by the general law of the sea as it was for many years by the common law of the land." Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, Inc., 287 U.S. 367, 371 (1932). Congressional action, coupled with this Court's recent decisions, has largely eliminated the confusion surrounding the maritime response to wrongful death. As this case demonstrates, however, occasional uncertainty, largely of historical origin, continues to attend application of federal wrongful death remedies, including those provided by the Death on the High Seas Act (DOSHA), 46 U.S.C. 761 et seq. The question in this case is whether the DOHSA wrongful death remedy may be supplemented through application of state statutes addressing wrongful death. In the view of the United States, respondents are not entitled to enlarge the DOHSA remedy through the invocation of a state statute that provides a different measure of damages. That result would be inconsistent with the general framework of admiralty law, which emphasizes uniform remedies for maritime injury, and with the language and legislative history of the DOHSA itself. A. Federal Maritime Law Generally Provides the Exclusive Remedy for Maritime Wrongful Death 1. Article III of the Constitution provides that the federal judicial power shall extend to "all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." U.S. Const. Art. III, Section 2. The Admiralty Clause reflects core principles of traditional federalism, authorizing the exercise of federal judicial power over matters of innately national concern. /3/ It not only empowers Congress to confer admiralty jurisdiction on the lower federal courts; it also "empower(s) the federal courts * * * to draw on the substantive law 'inherent in the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction' * * * and to continue the development of this law within constitutional limits." Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 360-361 (1959) (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 55 (1932)). Furthermore, "(i)t empower(s) Congress to revise and supplement the maritime law within the limits of the Constitution." Romero, 358 U.S. at 361. As this Court expressly recognized in The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558 (1874), the Admiralty Clause embraces a fundamental concern for uniformity in maritime law. Id. at 574-575. The Court acknowledged that the precise scope of admiralty jurisdiction must be left to judicial development (id. at 574-576), but nevertheless stated (id. at 575): One thing, however, is unquestionable; the Constitution must have referred to a system of law coextensive with, and operating uniformly in, the whole country. It certainly could not have been the intention to place the rules and limits of maritime law under the disposal and regulation of the several States, as that would have defeated the uniformity and consistency at which the Constitution aimed on all subjects of a commercial character affecting the intercourse of the States with each other or with foreign states. This view is consistent with that of the Constitution's framers. /4/ Of course, state law is not irrelevant to maritime matters. "The State and Federal Governments jointly exert regulatory powers today as they have played joint roles in the development of maritime law throughout our history." Romero, 358 U.S. at 374. See, e.g., Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). Moreover, since enactment of the Judiciary Act of 1789 (ch. 20, Section 9, 1 Stat. 77), Congress has consistently recognized that federal courts adjudicate admiralty claims while "saving to suitors all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled." 28 U.S.C. 1333(1). Nevertheless, "state law must yield to the needs of a uniform federal maritime law when this Court finds inroads on a harmonious system." Romero, 358 U.S. at 373. /5/ Admiralty indisputably reaches suits alleging tortious personal injury at sea. /6/ A maritime tort is "a type of action which the Constitution has placed under national power to control in 'its substantive as well as its procedural features * * *.'" Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409 (1953) (quoting Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 386 (1924)). Thus, the resolution of these suits is guided by the foregoing principles of federal supremacy. Federal maritime law -- rather than state law -- determines the measure of liability even when the tort occurs in state territorial waters or the plaintiff invokes state court or diversity jurisdiction. See, e.g., Kermarec v. Campagne Generale Transatlantic, 358 U.S. 625, 628 (1959); Pope & Talbot, 346 U.S. at 409. /7/ Indeed, early in the twentieth century, this Court reiterated benchmark principles of federal maritime supremacy in personal injury cases. In 1917, the Court determined that a longshoreman, injured while unloading a docked ship, was engaged in maritime activity and must invoke federal maritime remedies rather than resorting to state worker's compensation laws. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917). Citing The Lottawanna, the Court explained that the Constitution's grant of admiralty jurisdiction circumscribed the states' power to enact legislation modifying maritime rights. Id. at 216. It specifically stated (ibid.): And plainly, we think, no such legislation is valid if it contravenes the essential purpose expressed by an act of Congress or works material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law or interferes with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its international and interstate relations. This limitation, at the least, is essential to the effective operation of the fundamental purposes for which such law was incorporated into our national laws by the Constitution itself. The Court concluded that federal maritime law could not tolerate the application of various state worker's compensation statutes to longshoremen in ports across the country, reasoning that the variations in applicable remedies would result in the "destruction of the very uniformity in respect to maritime matters which the Constitution was designed to establish." Id. at 217. /8/ The Court reached a similar conclusion the following year in Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918). It rejected an injured seaman's argument that he was entitled to a state common law remedy of full indemnification rather than the traditional maritime remedy of maintenance and cure, stating (id. at 382): Under the doctrine approved in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, no State has power to abolish the well recognized maritime rule concerning measure of recovery and substitute thereof the full indemnity rule of the common law. 2. As these cases indicate, the principle of uniformity is deeply engrained in federal admiralty law. Admiralty law generally provides an exclusive remedy for maritime injury and supplants otherwise applicable state law. Although history temporarily muddled the question, it is now clear that the principle has equal application in the case of maritime wrongful death actions. In 1970, this Court expressly recognized a federal remedy under general maritime law for death caused by violation of maritime duties. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970). This decision, overruling The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886), ended a striking anomaly in federal maritime law -- admiralty reliance on state law to provide a remedy for certain instances of maritime wrongful death. 398 U.S. at 395-397. /9/ The Moragne remedy, compelled by principles of uniformity in maritime law, brought consistency to an area previously dominated by "substantial debate and uncertainty." Id. at 378. It seems clear that the Moragne remedy displaces the previously applicable state wrongful death statutes. As Moragne recognized, the Harrisburg's denial of a federal remedy for maritime wrongful death created a void in admiralty law. 398 U.S. at 393. In the absence of a federal remedy, lower courts "accommodated the humane policies of "state wrongful death statutes by allowing recovery whenever an applicable state statute favored such recovery." Ibid. /10/ In 1907, this Court seemingly approved the application of a state wrongful death statute -- at least "where Congress has remained silent" -- in a damages action between two citizens of that state involved in an accident upon the high seas. The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398, 404 (1907). /11/ That decision, apparently of little practical consequence in cases involving death on the high seas, /12/ no doubt encouraged continued application of state wrongful death statutes on state territorial waters. See Patton-Tully Transp. Co. v. Turner, 269 F. 334, 341 (6th Cir. 1920). In 1920, Congress addressed admiralty's inadequate response to maritime death by enacting the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 688, governing the death of seamen, and the DOHSA, governing death on the high seas. At the time of passage, these Acts were largely viewed as supplanting otherwise applicable state law. /13/ The federal courts continued to grapple, however, with that portion of The Harrisburg's legacy that was undisturbed by Congress -- the absence of a federal maritime remedy for wrongful death occurring on the territorial waters. This Court determined that: where death upon such waters results from a maritime tort committed on navigable waters within a State whose statutes give a right of action on account of death by wrongful act, the admiralty courts will entertain a libel in personam for the damages sustained by those to whom such right is given. The subject is maritime and local in character and the specified modification of or supplement to the rule applied in admiralty courts, when following the common law, will not work material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law, nor interfere with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its international and interstate relations. Western Fuels Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233, 242 (1921) (citing Jensen, supra). In the next 50 years, the Court rendered a series of maritime decisions attempting to apply state wrongful death statutes that it ultimately found impossible to reconcile. /14/ Eventually, in 1970, the Court concluded that the remaining battlements of The Harrisburg were indefensible, stating: We do not regard The Harrisburg as a closely arguable proposition -- it rested on a most dubious foundation when announced, has become an increasingly unjustifiable anomaly as the law over the years has left it behind, and * * * has produced litigation spawning confusion * * *. To supplant the present disarray in this area with a rule both simpler and more just will further, not impede, efficiency in adjudication. Moragne, 398 U.S. at 404-405. The Court therefore overruled The Harrisburg and held that "an action does lie under general maritime law for death caused by violation of maritime duties." Id. at 409. The Court had no occasion in Moragne to discuss whether the newly recognized federal remedy displaced an otherwise applicable state wrongful death statute. /15/ However, it seems clear that it must. Judicial creation of federal maritime remedies, like the creation of federal common law remedies, is premised on the existence of federal interests that preclude resort to state law. See Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641-642 (1981); cf. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 313 & n.7. 1981. The Moragne decision was necessary to protect the overriding federal interest in a uniform maritime remedy for wrongful death. The Court intended to "give effect to the constitutionally based principle that federal admiralty law should be 'a system of law coextensive with, and operating uniformly in, the whole country.'" 398 U.S. at 402 (quoting The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 575). /16/ The creation of a concurrent federal remedy, standing alongside state remedial schemes, could not "supplant the present disarray" (398 U.S. at 405); it would simply add to the "torrent of difficult litigation" (id. at 408) that resulted from The Harrisburg. Indeed, if the federal maritime remedy for wrongful death had been recognized in the nineteenth century, there is no doubt that it would have been treated as an exclusive remedy under the principles that guided Chelentis, Jensen, and The Lottawanna. State statutes were applied only because wrongful death was "untouched" by general maritime law. Garcia, 257 U.S. at 240. Thus, we believe that the Moragne wrongful death remedy, like the Jones Act remedy, displaces otherwise applicable state law. This result, recognized in two principal maritime circuits, /17/ fully comports with the principles of uniformity that generally control maritime personal injury law. B. The Death on the High Seas Act Does Not Authorize the Application of State Wrongful Death Statutes in Addition to Its Comprehensive Wrongful Death Remedy 1. As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, admiralty application of state wrongful death statutes is an historical anomaly; it was inconsistent with general maritime principles and, under Moragne, should have little future importance. Against that background, the question presented by the instant case is whether the DOHSA has nevertheless preserved this historical curio as an operative principle in the case of death on the high seas. This question, at least insofar as it involves an issue of statutory construction, should be answered through examination of the language and legislative history of Section 7 of the DOHSA in light of general principles of admiralty law. A close examination of Section 7 reveals that it was not meant to preserve application of state wrongful death statutes on the high seas. Section 7 provides in relevant part (46 U.S.C. 767): The provisions of any State statute giving or regulating rights of action or remedies for death shall not be affected by this chapter. It employs rather unusual phraseology, professing noninterference with the "provisions" of state laws. Interpreted according to its plain terms, Section 7 appears simply to state the unremarkable position that the DOHSA shall not alter the general content of state wrongful death statutes. It does not expressly address the maritime application of state statutes, and it certainly does not express an unambiguous intent to preserve the pre-DOHSA practice of invoking those statutes in admiralty. As the court of appeals acknowledged, "there has been considerable uncertainty over the effect of this seemingly simple provision" (Pet. App. 8a). Thus, the court correctly turned for guidance to the DOHSA's legislative history. The DOHSA, prompted by the Titanic tragedy and other sea disasters, responded to the absence of effective remedies for maritime wrongful death. /18/ The House and Senate reports indicate that the DOHSA was the final product of a number of attempts to replace divergent and ineffective state remedies with uniform federal legislation. H.R. Rep. 674, 66th Cong., 2d Sess. (1920); S. Rep. 216, 66 Cong., 1st Sess. (1919). /19/ Section 7 of the DOHSA bill, as originally proposed in the 66th Congress, preserved state wrongful death actions only in territorial waters, providing (59 Cong. Rec. 4482 (1920) (emphasis added)): (T)he provisions of any State statute giving or regulating rights of action or remedies for death shall not be affected by this act as to causes of action accruing within the territorial limits of any state * * *. However, Section 7 was amended on the House floor, following a rather confused colloquy, to eliminate the italicized passage. See 59 Cong. Rec. 4482-4487 (1920). That colloquy "does not reveal the utmost precision in thought." The Tungus, 358 U.S. at 608 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The colloquy initially centered on the scope and necessity of Section 7. Rep. Volstead, the floor manager of the bill, joined by Reps. Igoe and Montague, defended Section 7 in the face of charges that it was superfluous. They maintained that the DOHSA provided an exclusive federal remedy for death on the high seas, while Section 7 preserved the application of state law in territorial waters. 59 Cong. Rec. 4482-4484 (1920). /20/ Rep. Moore suggested that it was unclear whether the bill created an exclusive federal remedy (id. at 4483). However, Rep. Montague replied that general admiralty principles would assure that the federal remedy was exclusive (ibid.). /21/ Rep. Volstead agreed (ibid.). Rep. Sanders expressed continued concern that Section 7 might create "concurrent jurisdiction" (id. at 4484). At this juncture, Rep. Mann suggested an amendment deleting the portion of Section 7 italicized above (ibid.). He explained the amendment as follows (id. at 4484): Now, I do not know whether I am right or wrong about it, because I have not examined the report on this bill carefully as reported this time. * * *. I was under the impression that this bill was not intended to take away any jurisdiction which can now be exercised by any State court. * * *. If the amendment which I have suggested should be agreed to, the bill would not interfere in any way with rights now granted by any State statute, whether the cause of action accrued within the territorial limits of a State or not. In other words, if a man had cause of action and could get service, he could sue in a State court and not be required to bring suit in the Federal court. Rep. Igoe objected to the amendment, noting that it could defeat the goal of uniformity (ibid.). However, Rep. Mann stated that if the bill "was intended for the purpose of taking away jurisdiction now conferred by state statutes, it ought to be very critically examined" (ibid.). /22/ Rep. Volstead, joined by Rep. Goodykoontz, also objected to the amendment, but maintained that the bill would provide an exclusive remedy for death on the high seas, even if the Mann amendment were adopted. /23/ A vote was finally taken and the amendment was defeated 12-10 (id. at 4486). Rep. Mann called for a quorum and another vote was taken without further debate. The amendment passed 201-75 (ibid.). The Senate later concurred in the amendment without discussion (id. at 4674). 2. Since the passage of the DOHSA, courts and commentators have generally assumed that the Act displaced application of state wrongful death statutes on the high seas, attaching little significance to the Mann amendment. /24/ This longstanding consensus is entitled to great respect. Admittedly, it cannot wholly resolve the question. If statutes have meaning, then changes in proposed statutory language cannot be casually dismissed as meaningless. Like the court of appeals, we are unwilling to assume that the Mann amendment is null verbiage. But we cannot agree with the court below that the ambiguous statutory language and the confused floor colloquy demonstrate a congressional intent to thwart the DOHSA's central goal of creating an exclusive federal remedy for death on the high seas. That result would also be plainly at odds with established principles of maritime uniformity. The "evaluation of congressional action * * * must take into account its contemporary legal context." Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 379 (1982) (quoting Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 698-699 (1979)). Fidelity to congressional intent can be achieved only if the Mann amendment is "(r)ead in light of the state of maritime law in 1920." Moragne, 398 U.S. at 397. At that time, it was widely understood that state wrongful death statutes generally did not provide a remedy for death on the high seas. Indeed, the motivating factor prompting passage of the DOHSA was the absence of an effective remedy. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. 674, supra; S. Rep. 216, supra. In debating a previous DOHSA bill, Rep. Mann himself had stated that the states could not provide a remedy for death on the high seas. /25/ Thus, it simply runs counter to general understanding to surmise that the Mann amendment was intended to accomplish that result. Rep. Mann proposed his impromptu amendment in the course of a debate over the existence of "concurrent jurisdiction." See 59 Cong. Rec. 4484 (1920). He apparently was motivated by the concern that the DOHSA bill, as originally proposed, might inadvertently displace state court power to provide relief in situations not contemplated by the bill's sponsors. /26/ In particular, Rep. Mann apparently was concerned that the bill would displace state remedies for wrongful death arising on inland waterways at distances greater than "a marine league from the shore of any State." See S. 2085, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. Section 1 (1919) (reprinted in 59 Cong. Rec. 4482 (1920). During an earlier portion of the colloquy, he expressed specific concern that "if a man is injured on the high seas within a State" he should be entitled to maintain a suit in that state's courts. Id. at 4483 (emphasis added). /27/ Thus, his amendment apparently was intended merely to protect state court jurisdiction from unforseen inroads by unnecessarily restrictive language in Section 7. Under these circumstances, it appears that Rep. Mann viewed his amendment as having an effect similar to that of the general "savings clause" that has long been a fixture of admiralty jurisdiction, "saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled." 28 U.S.C. 1333(1). The amendment simply ensured that state law would remain applicable in situations where the DOHSA would not provide a remedy and to the extent that contemporary principles of maritime uniformity permitted. /28/ That interpretation is consistent with the remarks of Reps. Volstead, Montague, Igoe, and Goodykoontz, suggesting that the DOHSA would displace state wrongful death statutes on the high seas regardless of the Mann amendment -- a prediction that Rep. Mann made no attempt to dispute. /29/ At all events, even if Rep. Mann, in his own mind, did not intend that the DOHSA would provide an exclusive remedy for death on the high seas, it seems certain that Congress contemplated that result. "It is always appropriate to assume that our elected representatives, like other citizens, know the law." Cannon, 441 U.S. at 696-697. It was well established during this era that "in amending and revising the maritime law, the Congress necessarily acts within a sphere restricted by the concept of the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." Detroit Trust Co. v. The Thomas Barlum, 293 U.S. 21, 44 (1934). As Reps. Volstead, Montague, Igoe, and Goodykoontz plainly realized and explained, this Court's contemporaneous interpretation of the Admiralty Clause left no doubt that the DOHSA would displace state wrongful death statutes, regardless of the Mann amendment. /30/ In light of this "contemporary legal context," Congress could not reasonably have concluded that the Mann amendment would detract from the DOHSA's exclusivity on the high seas. As noted above, a different conclusion would thwart both the expectations of Congress and the obvious purpose of the statute. See Clark v. Uebersee Finanz-Korp, 332 U.S. 480, 489 (1947) (statutes should not be construed "to impute to Congress a purpose to paralyze with one hand what it sought to promote with the other"). /31/ 3. In our view, the Mann Amendment cannot reasonably be read to permit general application of state wrongful death statutes on the high seas. Admittedly, the language and legislative history of the amendment exhibit some ambiguity. However, one matter is clear -- application of state wrongful death statutes on the high seas would depart from accepted principles of maritime uniformity and would create serious anomalies in admiralty law. As previously discussed, principles of maritime uniformity require an exclusive federal remedy for maritime wrongful death in Jones Act cases (see, e.g., Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 154-155 (1964)), and in Moragne cases (see, e.g., Nelson v. United States, 639 F.2d 469, 473 (9th Cir. 1980)). There is no reason to depart from those principles in DOHSA cases. The DOHSA, like the Jones Act, is a federal statute "of general application intended to bring about the uniformity in the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction required by the Constitution, and necessarily supersedes the application of the death statutes of the several States." Lindgren, 281 U.S. at 44. As in Moragne, the application of state law would lead to "tensions and discrepancies * * * result(ing) from the necessity to accommodate state remedial statutes to exclusively maritime substantive concepts." 398. U.S. at 401. The application of state law would run counter to the general understanding that the DOHSA provides a "national rule" for death on the high seas. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 624 n.18 (1978). This Court has observed that "Congress did not limit DOHSA beneficiaries to recovery of their pecuniary losses in order to encourage the creation of non-pecuniary supplements." Mobil, 436 U.S. at 625. That observation holds true whether the supplement is founded on federal or state law. Indeed, it would seem particularly anomalous to supplement a federal maritime remedy with general state law remedies of non-maritime origin. Furthermore, it is difficult to justify why state wrongful death actions, foreclosed by Moragne in the case of death within a state's territorial waters, should be maintainable if death occurs beyond the state's territorial jurisdiction. If law operated under the principles that guide archeology, there might be some practical reason to preserve high seas application of state wrongful death actions as an historical artifact of the pre-Moragne era. However, this Court has observed that "the same respect for the rule of law that requires us to seek consistency over time also requires us, if with somewhat more caution and deliberation, to seek consistency in the interpretation of an area of law at any given time." Arkansas Electric Cooperative Corp. v. Arkansas Public Service Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375, 391 (1983). The Court's obligations in this regard are particularly pronounced in the field of admiralty, where "this Court has fashioned a large part of the existing rules" (Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 314 (1955). The application of state wrongful death statutes on the high seas has its roots in The Harrisburg, which was overruled in Moragne, and in The Hamilton, which was subject to criticism from its inception. Since the passage of the DOHSA, the justification for high seas application of state wrongful death statues has completely dissipated. The obvious conclusion -- supported by the clear weight of authority -- is that the DOHSA provides the exclusive remedy for death on the high seas. /32/ In sum, the court of appeals, in a well-intentioned search for meaning, simply read too much into Rep. Mann's amendment. The DOHSA can, in fact, be reconciled with the imperative need "for a uniform, consistent, scheme of maritime death remedies" (Pet. App. 28a). The court of appeals' decision, on the other hand, "defies reason, runs contrary to principles of the general precedent in the field, and creates all sorts of internal inconsistencies in the prosecution of cases dealing with death in the high seas" (id. at 28a-29a) (Jolly, J., concurring). There is no need to preserve that result. CONCLUSION The judgment of the court of appeals should be reversed. Respectfully submitted. CHARLES FRIED Solicitor General RICHARD K. WILLARD Assistant Attorney General KENNETH S. GELLER Deputy Solicitor General ROBERT L. WILLMORE Deputy Assistant Attorney General JEFFREY P. MINEAR Assistant to the Solicitor General THOMAS L. JONES Attorney DECEMBER 1985 /1/ The DOHSA limits recovery to "fair and just compensation for * * * pecuniary loss" (46 U.S.C. 762) while the Louisiana wrongful death statute permits recovery for both pecuniary and nonpecuniary damages, "includ(ing) loss of consortium, service, and society" (La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2315(B) (West Supp. 1985)). /2/ The court of appeals added that a federal district court could apply the state wrongful death statute to diverse parties directly, as an exercise of diversity jurisdiction (Pet. App. 24a); it concluded that the district court, sitting in admiralty, could apply the state statute to non-diverse parties through its pendent jurisdiction over state law claims (ibid.; see id. at 6a n.6). /3/ Alexander Hamilton wrote (rather intemperately): The most bigoted idolizers of state authority have not thus far shown a disposition to deny the national judiciary the cognizances of maritime causes. These so generally depend on the law of nations, and so commonly affect the rights of foreigners, that they fall within the considerations which are relative to the public peace. The Federalist, No. 80, at 497-498 (Lodge ed. 1908), quoted in Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 361 n.8 (1959). /4/ For example, James Madison stated at the Virginia Convention: There are strong reasons why there should be a Supreme Court to decide (certain) disputes. If, in any case, uniformity be necessary, it must be in the exposition of treaties. The establishment of one revisionary superintending power can alone secure such uniformity. The same principles hold with respect to cases affecting ambassadors and foreign ministers. To the same principles may also be referred their cognizance in admiralty and maritime cases. As our intercourse with foreign nations will be affected by decisions of this kind, they ought to be uniform. This can be done only be giving the judiciary exclusive jurisdiction. 3 J. Elliot, The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 532 (1836). Similarly, Governor Randolph stated: Cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction cannot, with propriety, be vested in particular state courts. As our national tranquility and reputation, and intercourse with foreign nations, may be affected by admiralty decisions; as they ought therefore, to be uniform; and as there can be no uniformity if there be thirteen distinct, independent jurisdictions, -- this jurisdiction ought to be in the federal judiciary. Id. at 571 (emphasis in original). See note 3, supra. /5/ See, e.g., Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731 (1961) (holding that a maritime contract is not subject to a state statute of frauds); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409 (1954) (holding that a state direct action statute may not be applied against a maritime insurer); Union Fish Co. v. Erickson, 248 U.S. 308 (1919) (holding that a maritime contract is not subject to a state statute of frauds); The Roanoke, 189 U.S. 185 (1903) (holding that a state may not create a maritime lien against an out-of-state ship for costs incurred in repair). /6/ This Court stated in The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20, 36 (1865): Every species of tort, however occurring, and whether on board a vessel or not, if upon the high seas or navigable waters, is of admiralty cognizance. See also, e.g., Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 672 (1982); Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202, 206 (1971); Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52, 60 (1914). The crucial factor in determining admiralty jurisdiction traditionally has been the location of the tort. As early as 1815, Circuit Justice Story concluded that "the jurisdiction of the admiralty depends * * * as to torts, upon locality, i.e., whether done upon the high sea, or ports within the ebb and flow of the tide, or not." De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418, 440 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 3,776). /7/ See also, e.g., Messel v. Foundation Co., 274 U.S. 427, 434 (1927) (requiring application of federal maritime law in a personal injury action brought in state court); Robins Dry Dock v. Dahl, 266 U.S. 449, 457 (1925) (same); Carlisle Packing Co. v. Sandanger, 259 U.S. 255, 259 (1922) (same); Workman v. City of New York, 179 U.S. 552, 557-558 (1900) (refusing to recognize a state law claim of municipal immunity in a negligence action brought in admiralty court). /8/ The Court thus established the "Jensen line," prohibiting the extension of state worker's compensation statutes to longshoremen injured seaward of the water's edge. See Director, OWCP v. Perini North River Associates, 459 U.S. 297, 306 & n.14 (1983). Congress later attempted to override the result in Jensen by specifically authorizing the application of state worker's compensation statutes to maritime injuries. See Act of Oct. 6, 1917, ch. 97, 40 Stat. 395 et seq. This Court invalidated that attempt as an unconstitutional delegation of federal maritime power, holding that Congress could not authorize the states to prescribe rules governing maritime injuries that "would inevitably destroy the harmony and uniformity which the Constitution not only contemplated but actually established." Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 164 (1920). The Court later recognized a "maritime but local" exception to Jensen, applicable in cases where the "the application of local law (would not) materially affect" the uniformity of maritime law. Grant Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rhode, 257 U.S. 469, 477 (1922). That same year, Congress again attempted to authorize application of state worker's compensation laws to maritime accidents, this time excepting ship masters and crew from the state laws. Act of June 10, 1922, ch. 216, 42 Stat. 634 et seq. The Court again invalidated the legislation as an unconstitutional delegation of federal maritime power. Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 227-228 (1924). The Court noted that Congress had made "no attempt to prescribe general rules"; instead, it authorized "any State to alter the maritime law and thereby introduce conflicting requirements." Id. at 228. Congress, in response, ultimately passed the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act (see 33 U.S.C. 901 et seq.) which prescribes federal standards for compensation to injured longshoremen and related maritime employees. See generally Perini, 459 U.S. at 306-324. /9/ The Harrisburg held that general maritime law, like the common law, provided a remedy for tortious injury but did not provide a remedy for wrongful death. 119 U.S. at 213. It instructed that admiralty courts must instead look to "a statute giving the right." Ibid. /10/ These cases seemingly relied on the notion that state legislation should be applied, in the face of congressional silence, because the vessel was a part of the "territory" of the state, International Navigation Co. v. Lindstrom, 123 F. 475, 476 (2d Cir. 1903), or because the vessel was in territorial waters at the time of the accident, City of Norwalk, 55 F. 98, 105, 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1893). /11/ The Court did not discuss The Harrisburg. Instead, it reasoned that, absent constitutional limitations, a state could provide a remedy for death "outside the territory of the State * * * but within no other territorial jurisdiction" in a dispute involving solely its own citizens. 207 U.S. at 403. It stated that "where Congress has remained silent" a state is free to enact appropriate legislation (id. at 404) and that "the admiralty would not disregard, but would respect" the resulting rights (id. at 405). The Court gave short shrift to uniformity concerns, simply stating that its result would not "produce() any lamentable lack of uniformity." Id. at 406. See also La Bourgogne, 210 U.S. 95 (1908). /12/ The Court noted in Moragne that "(t)he general understanding was that the statutes of the coastal states, which provided remedies for deaths in territorial waters, did not apply beyond state boundaries." 398 U.S. at 393 n.10. It suggested that "probably because most state death statutes were not meant to have application to the high seas, (The Hamilton) did little to fill the vacuum." Ibid. It appears equally true, however, that the courts observed The Hamilton's implication that states may not apply their wrongful death statues in cases involving parties from other states or nations. See The Sagamore, 247 F. 743 (1st Cir. 1917) (refusing to apply a Massachusetts wrongful death statute in a collision between Massachusetts and British vessels); The Middlesex, 253 F. 142 (D. Mass. 1916) (refusing to apply a Massachusetts statute in a collision between vessels of different states). Notably, The Hamilton was sharply criticized from its inception. See Whitlock, A New Development in the Application of Extra-Territorial Law to Extra-Territorial Marine Torts, 22 Harv. L. Rev. 403, 414-416 (1908). Both recent and Jensen era commentators have suggested that The Hamilton's reasoning was repudiated by Jensen. See Currie, Federalism and the Admiralty: "The Devil's Own Mess," 1960 Sup. Ct. Rev. 158, 204; R. Hughes, Handbook of Admiralty Law 233 (2d ed. 1920). /13/ Following the Jones Act's passage, this Court held that the statues "is one of general application intended to bring about the uniformity in the exercise of admiralty jurisdiction required by the Constitution, and necessarily supersedes the application of the death statutes of the several states." Lindgren v. United States, 281 U.S. 38, 44 (1930). Accord Northern Coal Co. v. Strand, 278 U.S. 142, 147 (1928); Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 392 (1924). The instant case presents the first opportunity for this Court to rule on the DOHSA's effect on state law. However, the leading commentators of the 1920's agreed that the DOHSA displaced application of state wrongful death statutes on the high seas. See 1 E. Benedict, The American Admiralty 208-209 (5th ed. 1925) ("Congress in 1920 enacted a statute governing (wrongful death) on the high seas but leaving the statutes of the several States in effect within their respective territorial waters"); id. at 211; Magruder and Grout, Wrongful Death Within the Admiralty Jurisdiction, 35 Yale L. J. 395, 416 (1926) (the DOHSA "superseded the state death acts so far as they had been theretofore applied to wrongful deaths on the high seas."). /14/ See, e.g., Goett v. Union Carbide Co., 361 U.S. 340 (1960); Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314 (1960); The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959); Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383 (1941). /15/ The Moragne decedent had died in Florida territorial waters. Upon certification from the court of appeals, the Florida Supreme Court determined that the Florida wrongful death statute did not apply to maritime wrongful death. Moragne, 398 U.S. at 377. /16/ The Court specifically stated (398 U.S. at 401): Our recognition of a right to recover for wrongful death under general maritime law will assure uniform vindication of federal policies, removing the tensions and discrepancies that have resulted from the necessity to accommodate state remedial statutes to exclusively maritime substantive concepts. It further noted that "(f)ederal law, rather than state, is the more appropriate source of a remedy for violation of the federally imposed duties of maritime law." Id. at 401 n.15. /17/ See Nelson v. United States, 639 F.2d 469, 473 (9th Cir. 1980); In re S/S Helena, 529 F.2d 744, 753 (5th Cir. 1976). /18/ The events leading to passage of the DOHSA are documented in various law reviews. See, e.g., Hughes, Death Actions in Admiralty, 31 Yale L.J. 115 (1921); Whitlock, supra, 22 Harv. L. Rev. 403. Mr. Hughes, a noted scholar of admiralty and author of a leading admiralty treatise, was a principal draftsman of the DOHSA. See 31 Yale L.J. at 116. Mr. Whitlock provided input to the formulation of the DOHSA on behalf of the American Bar Association. See H.R. Rep. 674, 66th Cong., 2d Sess. (1920). See also Magruder and Grout, Wrongful Death Within the Admiralty Jurisdiction, 35 Yale L.J. 395 (1926). /19/ The reports, supporting passage of S. 2085, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. (1919), reprint correspondence from the Maritime Association, the American Bar Association, and Judge Putnam of New York urging passage of previous DOHSA bills. The reports are virtually identical to those prepared for S. 4288, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1916). See H.R. Rep. 1419, 64th Cong., 2d Sess. (1917); S. Rep. 741, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1916). The correspondence specifically discusses the deficiencies in The Harrisburg, The Hamilton, and state legislation. The letters from the Maritime Association and the American Bar Association discuss S. 4288, a bill similar to S. 2085. Compare 54 Cong. Rec. 3641 (1917) (reprinting S. 4288), with 59 Cong. Rec. 4482 (1920) (reprinting S. 2085). The letter from Judge Putnam, however, is apparently directed to a previous bill, H.R. 6143, 63d Cong., 1st Sess. (1913), which differed markedly from S. 2085. See 51 Cong. Rec. 1928 (1914) (reprinting H.R. 6143). /20/ Their statements were directed to comments from Reps. Sanders, Connally, and Cullen, who suggested that since the Act, by definition, would apply only to deaths on the high seas, the provisions of Section 7 were unnecessary (59 Cong. Rec. 4482-4484 (1920)) and to comments from Rep. Moore, who suggested that Section 7 preserved the application of state law on the high seas (id. at 4482, apparently referring to The Hamilton). Rep. Volstead stated that "my understanding is that the object of the act is to make a uniform rule for everything outside of the 3-mile limit." Ibid. Rep. Montague added that Section 7 simply reflected "abundant caution, to calm the minds of those who think that rights within the territorial waters will be usurped by the national law." Id. at 4483. Rep. Igoe suggested that Section 7 would preserve a state remedy under The Hamilton, but only in territorial waters. Ibid. /21/ He stated (59 Cong. Rec. 4483 (1920)): (I)t has been held over and over again by our courts that when the Congress legislates in pursuance of constitutional authority such a law is exclusive * * *. It is exclusive in virtue of its superior jurisdiction; therefore, I submit, it is needless to amend this bill now and raise the chance of its defeat by adding a mere adjective when by the very force of the Constitution and the law in pursuance thereof it is inherently and necessarily exclusive. /22/ Rep. Mann added: "(I)f we are told that where (the) right of action now exists under State statutes that suit can be brought in state courts (and) we propose to take away that right, I do not see how we are progressing" (59 Cong. Rec. 4484 (1920)). He further stated that, under his amendment, "the act will not take away any jurisdiction conferred now by the states" (id. at 4485). /23/ Rep. Volstead stated (59 Cong. Rec. 4485 (1920)): The view taken by the parties who drew this bill is that it is exclusive, because as the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Montague) pointed out, the power to pass laws on this subject is conferred on Congress in the Constitution and whenever Congress acts I have no doubt it excludes the power on the part of the State to pass laws on the same subjects. Similarly, Rep. Goodykoontz stated (id. at 4486): If the amendment prevails, my judgment is that the State courts and their decisions will be superseded by the exclusive power and authority of the admiralty courts and such result will be in harmony with the decisions of the Supreme Court in interpreting the commerce clause of the Constitution. /24/ They have generally concluded that the amendment worked no change in the meaning of Section 7 because "approval of the amendment represented no more than the acceptance of what appeared to be an innocuous change in language to facilitate the immediate passage of the legislation." Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, 121 F. Supp. 85, 90 (N.D. Cal. 1954). That court added that "it appears to have been the unanimous view of both the cases and the commentators that the Act supersedes the state wrongful death statutes as to actions for death occurring on the high seas. An ambiguous and ill-considered amendment to the bill, which became the Act, is not sufficient justification for reaching a contrary conclusion at this late date." 121 F. Supp. at 91. /25/ See 51 Cong. Rec. 1928 (1914) ("the gentleman knows that the same reason affecting the admiralty courts' jurisdiction of accidents on the high seas, where no states have jurisdiction, would not apply to one of the Great Lakes where all of the bed of the lake is within some State") (emphasis added); ibid. ("If an accident occurs on the high seas, you can not bring a suit anywhere else than in the admiralty court; but if an accident occurs on the Great Lakes, where anybody is liable, you can bring suit in the State in which the lake lies"). /26/ Rep. Mann's focus was plainly on preserving state court jurisdiction rather than preserving admiralty application of state wrongful death statutes. See, e.g., 59 Cong. Rec. 4484 (1920) ("I was under the impression that the bill was not intended to take away any jurisdiction which can now be exercised by any State court."); ibid. ("In other words, if a man had cause of action and could get service, he could sue in state court and would not be required to bring suit in the Federal court."). /27/ Rep. Mann's reference to the "high seas within a State" is not internally inconsistent. This Court had interpreted the term "high seas," as used in a criminal statute, to include "navigable water other than a river, which is of an extent beyond the measurement of one's unaided vision, and is open and unconfined, and not under the exclusive control of any one nation or people." United States v. Rodgers, 150 U.S. 249, 259 (1893). Thus, the Great Lakes are "high seas." Ibid. Of course the Great Lakes and the Canal Zone were specifically excluded from coverage under the DOHSA bill. See S. 2085, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. Section 1 (1919) (reprinted in 59 Cong. Rec. 4482 (1920)). Rep. Mann noted, however, that "the same situation might arise in other states." 59 Cong. Rec. 4483. /28/ Indeed, Robert Hughes, a principal draftsman of the DOHSA, suggested this interpretation of Section 7 shortly after its passage. See Hughes, Death Actions in Admiralty, 31 Yale L.J. 115, 123-124 (1921). He noted that Section 7 "is a mere savings clause, and does not give the (state) statutes any effect that they did not have regardless of it." Ibid. /29/ Rep. Igoe stated to Rep. Mann: "If we pass a law for admiralty jurisdiction in the United States, it is exclusive in certain cases." 59 Cong. Rec. 4484. Rep. Mann replied: "If it is exclusive, then it does not affect this." Ibid. Later, Rep. Dewalt inquired of Rep. Mann if it was "the intent of the legislators to give exclusive jurisdiction to the admiralty courts of the United States in regard to accidents on the high seas?" Ibid. Rep. Mann replied: "I would not undertake to say. That is my recollection of it. Still, that may be the intent of the men who drew the bill." Ibid. Rep. Mann's equivocations are, of course, ambiguous. Their ambiguity, in turn, indicates that he did not intend to foreclose the possibility that the DOHSA, as ultimately applied, would provide an exclusive remedy for death on the high seas. See note 25, supra (quoting Rep. Mann's statements in a previous Congress that federal remedies alone could apply on the high seas). /30/ See notes 21, 23 & 29, supra. Indeed, this Court had recently proclaimed its unequivocal support for the principle of maritime uniformity, stating that the Admiralty Clause required displacement of state legislation that "contraven(ed)" federal maritime legislation or "work(ed) material prejudice" to general maritime law. Jensen, 244 U.S. at 216; see Chelentis, 247 U.S. at 372. Thus, the congressmen could confidently predict that the Court would treat the DOHSA as displacing state law, notwithstanding Rep. Mann's savings clause. Indeed, their prescience was confirmed -- two months after the DOHSA's passage -- in Knickerbocker, where the Court ruled that Congress could not preserve state worker's compensation statutes through the use of a "savings clause." 253 U.S. at 158-161. See note 8, supra. It was further confirmed by the Court's later determination that the DOHSA's sister statute, the Jones Act, displaced state law. Lindgren, 281 U.S. at 44. See note 13, supra. And it was echoed by contemporary commentators, who agreed that the creation of a federal maritime death remedy displaced state law. See ibid. Although Rep. Volstead did not solidly grasp that federal maritime law might be applied in state courts, see Moragne, 398 U.S. at 400 n.14, he was correct in concluding that, under this Court's prevailing precedents, the DOHSA remedy would displace state wrongful death remedies. /31/ By the same token, it seems clear that even if Congress intended that Section 7 of the DOHSA would permit application of state wrongful death statutes on the high seas, the operation of those statutes could not exceed the scope contemplated in 1920. As previously noted (see note 12, supra), The Hamilton imposed a number of major constraints on the high seas application of state wrongful death statutes. The state remedy was available only in the instance of a dispute wholly between intrastate parties, and only if the state intended its statute to have effect on the high seas. Additionally, it was quesionable whether The Hamilton survived the Jensen era cases (see note 12, supra). Moreover, given Rep. Mann's insistence that he was preserving the power of state courts to apply state remedies (see notes 22, 26, supra), it appears that this theory of Section 7 would permit pursuit of the state remedy solely in state courts and solely as a local alternative of the DOHSA remedy. Thus, if the Mann amendment preserved a state statutory remedy, it certainly was a strange and anomalous remedy of extremely circumscribed application. For example, in the present case, respondent Tarrentire could not invoke the state law remedy because her citizenship is diverse from that of petitioner. Although respondent Taylor perhaps could have originally invoked this theoretical state law remedy, she now would be precluded by her decision to pursue a DOHSA remedy in federal court, rather than the state alternative in the local forum. /32/ See, e.g., Nygaard v. Peter Pan Seafoods, Inc., 701 F.2d 77, 80 (9th Cir. 1983); Barbe v. Drummond, 507 F.2d 794, 801 n.10 (1st Cir. 1974); Dugas v. National Aircraft Corp., 438 F.2d 1386, 1388 (3d Cir. 1971); See also, e.g., 1 Benedict on Admiralty 7-52 (7th rev. ed. 1985) ("The need for uniformity requires that the Death on the High Seas Act supersede state wrongful death statutes.")' Day, Maritime Wrongful Death and Survival Recovery: The Need for Legislative Reform, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 648, 651 (1964) (accord). Indeed, the issue appears to have been largely uncontroverted -- at least in the appellate courts -- since the DOHSA's passage. It would be most remarkable that, if Section 7 preserved state law remedies on the high seas, the contention could have escaped appellate recognition until now. See United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 819 (1982).