1. Please provide a general overview of the current structure and activities of Hezbollah.

Hezbollah is a Shiite military, political and social organisation with strong links to Iran and Syria.\(^1\) Hezbollah and its allies currently hold the majority of seats in the Lebanese government.\(^2\) In 2009, Hezbollah formed part of a coalition led by former Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s March 14 Alliance.\(^3\) \(^4\) Hezbollah and its allies forced the collapse of the coalition in early 2011, over the cabinet’s refusal to oppose the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), established to investigate the assassination of Saad’s father and former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. At the time, the STL was expected to indict members of Hezbollah.\(^5\) Sealed indictments and arrest warrants were subsequently issued for the arrests of four Hezbollah members.\(^6\)

In January 2011, Najib Mikati was named as Lebanon’s new Prime Minister with the backing of Hezbollah.\(^7\) \(^8\) Saad Hariri refused to form a unity government with Mikati, announcing that he would join the political opposition to Hezbollah. \textit{The Wall Street Journal} argued that “Mr. Hariri’s move secures Hezbollah’s place as the dominant political force in the next Lebanese government”.\(^9\) In June 2011, Mikati announced a government dominated by members and allies of Hezbollah.\(^10\) \(^11\)

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\(^2\) „Lebanon opposition demands govt end support for Assad” 2011, \textit{Agence France Presse}, 3 November


http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8351651.stm – Accessed 30 November 2010


\(^8\) Shadid, A. 2011, „Next Premier of Lebanon Tries to Set His Own Course”, \textit{The New York Times}, 26 January.  


Despite the presence of Lebanese and United Nations security forces, Hezbollah retains significant military influence over various parts of the country, particularly southern Lebanon and the southern suburbs of Beirut.\(^1\)\(^2\)\(^3\) It remains unchallenged by any other sectarian militia force or the national Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF).\(^4\) In July 2011, *The New York Times* described Hezbollah as “the country’s pre-eminent political and military force [with] an armed militia more powerful than the Lebanese Army and a sprawling infrastructure that delivers welfare to its Shiite constituency, Lebanon’s largest community”.\(^5\) The US Department of State describes Hezbollah as “the most prominent and influential terrorist group in Lebanon”.\(^6\)

Nevertheless, the March 14 Alliance view militant Sunni groups, including Salafists in Tripoli, as a significant balance against Hezbollah’s influence. The current unrest in Syria may also provide Hezbollah’s opponents the opportunity to undermine Syria’s influence in Lebanon and, as such, weaken Hezbollah’s position.\(^7\) The Institute for War and Peace Reporting advised in September 2011 that a regime change in Syria would create difficulties for Hezbollah in Lebanon, most likely destabilising its position.\(^8\)

2. Please provide a general overview of the current structure and activities of Fatah al-Islam.

Fatah al-Islam (Victory of Islam – FAI) has been described as Lebanon’s “deadliest manifestation of Salafi jihadism”, with some suggestions that it is linked to al-Qaeda.\(^9\)\(^10\) The group was established in November 2006 as a splinter group of Fatah al-Intifada (Fatah Uprising), a Syrian-backed Palestinian group based in Lebanon. FAI seized control of the Palestinian Nahr al-Bared refugee camp in northern Lebanon, near Tripoli, where it battled Lebanese security forces between May and September 2007. The conflict resulted in the deaths of more than 160 Lebanese soldiers,\(^11\) and the effective destruction of FAI.\(^12\)\(^13\)\(^14\)

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\(^7\) „Syrian Unrest Raises Sectarian Tensions in Lebanon” 2011, Jamestown Foundation, UNHCR Refworld website, 4 August [http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4e3b95352.html](http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4e3b95352.html) – Accessed 20 October 2011
\(^8\) „Lebanon’s Take on Syria Conflict” 2011, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, UNHCR Refworld website, 28 September [http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4e85a9e2.html](http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4e85a9e2.html) – Accessed 20 October 2011
During the Nahr al-Bared clashes, FAI demonstrated a significant military capability likely to pose a security threat if permitted to expand.\textsuperscript{25} Time Magazine reported that 300 FAI militants were able to hold their own against over 11,000 Lebanese army troops for four months.\textsuperscript{26} However, the Lebanese army ultimately succeeded in eliminating FAI’s main body, dismantling the organisation’s infrastructure, and destroying most of its cells in northern Lebanon. Nevertheless, the bombing of two buses in Tripoli in 2008, and the attempted bomb attack on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in the south, indicated that not all of FAI’s cells had been eliminated.\textsuperscript{27}

Following the conflict at Nahr al-Bared, a weakened FAI moved into the Palestinian Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp,\textsuperscript{28,29} near Sidon in southern Lebanon.\textsuperscript{30} Ain al-Hilweh has been described as “an infamous haven for militants in southern Lebanon”.\textsuperscript{31} It is controlled by local Palestinian factions, rather than the Lebanese state.\textsuperscript{32} Lebanese security forces generally do not enter camps such as Ain al-Hilweh.\textsuperscript{33} FAI members reportedly live in the Hotein\textsuperscript{34} and Tawarek areas of the camp,\textsuperscript{35} and in the al-Tawari neighbourhood.\textsuperscript{36}


\textsuperscript{24}Abdel-Latif, O. 2008, \textit{Lebanon’s Sunni Islamists – A Growing Force}, Carnegie Middle East Center, Number 6, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January, pp.18-19


In August 2010, FAI leader Abdel-Rahman Awad was killed by the Lebanese Army in an ambush in the Bekaa Valley.\(^{37}\) \(^{38}\) Awad was reportedly “one of the most wanted men in Lebanon”. His death marked a major blow to FAI, which has come under increasing pressure from the Lebanese authorities since the 2007 clashes in Nahr al-Bared.\(^{39}\) Media reports suggest that Awad was succeeded by his assistant, Osama al-Shahabi.\(^{40}\) \(^{41}\) \(^{42}\)

Various sources indicate that while factions of FAI remain active, it is unclear to what extent the group has been able to rebuild its strength.\(^{43}\) \(^{44}\) *Al Shorfah* stated in September 2010 that the killing of Awad indicates that FAI “is now just a marginal organisation struggling to survive”. The same source noted that FAI “is believed to have only dozens of individuals active in certain Ain al-Hilweh neighbourhoods.”\(^{45}\) Palestinian forces operating in the camp are thought to be capable of keeping FAI contained. Mohammad Issa (also known as Al-Lino), head of the Palestinian Armed Struggle in Ain al-Hilweh, has claimed to have handed 32 FAI militants over to the Lebanese army since 2007. Simon Haddad, a professor at the American University of Beirut, stated in August 2010 that “the group is more or less done”.\(^{46}\)

Nevertheless, some sources have claimed that FAI has over 100 members in Ain al-Hilweh, following the recruitment of former members of FAI ally Jund al-Sham.\(^{47}\) \(^{48}\) A political source advised *NOW Lebanon* that FAI’s “numbers are still significant. In spite of the fact that they may be only armed with small arms and light weapons, they can still be a nuisance”.\(^{49}\) In March 2011, *NOW Lebanon* reported that five FAI members were injured in a gunfire exchange after hand grenades were detonated at FAI leader Osama al-Shahabi’s

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The confrontation reportedly occurred after FAI members attempted to sneak out of the Ain al-Hilweh camp to perform “acts of sabotage”.50

In August 2011, Mohammad Issa survived an assassination attempt in Ain al-Hilweh, allegedly carried out by members of FAI. The incident resulted in armed clashes between Palestinian group Fatah and FAI ally Jund al-Sham.51 52 The assassination attempt was reportedly linked to the attempted killing of Osama al-Shahabi in April 2011. According to Issa, “Fatah al-Islam and Jund al-Sham seem to be trying to fortify their presence inside the camp”.53 54

Furthermore, in October 2011 it was reported that ongoing investigations by Lebanese military intelligence, the United Nations, and foreign intelligence agencies into threats against the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) are focused on Sunni jihadist militants living in Ain al-Hilweh. According to The Daily Star, intelligence reports often name “Osama Shehabi” in relation to militants in Ain al-Hilweh.55

3. Please provide information on the beliefs, activities and reach of the al-Salafi group, purportedly based in Tripoli, Lebanon.

Salafism is a puritanical movement which seeks to model itself on early Islamic history and purge Islam of “fallacious innovations”. Salafi groups sometimes pursue this goal through missionary and educational work, whilst others choose violent means. Distinguishing features of Salafis include their rejection of a national identity, identifying instead with the global Muslim community; and intolerance of unorthodox Muslims. In Lebanon, many Salafi preachers have studied in Saudi Arabia, where the fundamentalist Wahhabi sect is dominant. Funding from Saudi donors reportedly allowed a Salafi community to establish itself in Tripoli and surrounds in the 1990s.56

No information was located on a group by the name of al-Salafi; however, there are a number of reports on the activities of the Salafist movement, and various Salafist groups in Tripoli. The closest reference to al-Salafi is the Salafist movement al-Haraka al-Salafiyya which, according to the Carnegie Middle East Center, incorporates approximately “fifty organizations operating as charitable associations and religious schools, mainly concentrated

50 „Fatah al-Islam members injured in Ain al-Hilweh” 2011, NOW Lebanon, 31 March
51 Zaatari, M. 2011, „Ain al-Hilweh refugees reeling after latest clashes”, The Daily Star (Lebanon), 8 August
52 „Mastermind behind al-Lino’s Assassination SucceedsAwad as Fatah al-Islam Leader” 2011, Naharnet, 9 August
53 Alami, M. 2011, „New round of unrest in Ain al-Hilweh”, NOW Lebanon, 10 August
54 „Fatah al-Islam is trying to regroup in Ain al-Hilweh, Fatah military chief warns” 2011, NOW Lebanon, 2 April
55 Blanford, N. 2011, „UNIFIL on edge over bomb warnings’, The Daily Star (Lebanon), 29 October
56 „Islamist Groups in Lebanon” 2007, Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol.11, No.4, December
in the north but having branches in Beirut and Sidon”. Northern Salafist leader Dai al-Islam al-Shahhal describes the movement as “the true face of Islam”.  

In August 2011, the Jamestown Foundation described Tripoli as “ground zero for Lebanon’s radical Salafist movement, a trend that has gained a following among the city’s Sunnis”. Salafi militants are reportedly associated with Fatah al-Islam (FAI) and Jund al-Sham in Tripoli, and have been linked to terrorist attacks, bank robberies, and the 2007 clash with Lebanese security forces in the Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp. The influence of Salafists in Tripoli has reportedly increased in recent years.

Salafist groups are generally hostile towards Hezbollah, due to the perception that the group’s political and military strength is aimed at undermining Sunnis. Many armed Salafists declared jihad on Hezbollah following its takeover of West Beirut and Mount Lebanon in May 2008. Salafists have been associated with former Prime Minister Saad Hariri’s Future Movement and the March 14 Alliance opposed to Hezbollah, which held power until January 2011. In January 2008, it was reported that “most Salafist movements in Tripoli have regular contacts with the police, military or intelligence, and are being supplied with weapons”.

However, the International Crisis Group (ICG) reported in 2010 that the conflict at Nahr al-Bared has since held Salafist jihadists in check. The events led to an increase in state surveillance and repression, and emphasised the heavy cost of future confrontations with the Lebanese security forces. The clashes at Nahr al-Bared also “deprived jihadists of an ideal sanctuary [and] hampered their access to other Palestinian camps insofar as the conflict marked the end of the era of camp inviolability”. Since 2007, Salafist jihadists have reportedly “been unable to establish a significant, sustained presence”. Militant activity has promoted a strong response from the authorities, and jihadists have suffered in combat with security forces. According to the ICG, “[t]hough ingredients for a more widespread jihadist movement remain present, and risks ought not to be dismissed, the development of more organised movements does not appear likely in the foreseeable future”.

A 2011 article in the Middle East Quarterly similarly described Tripoli’s Salafist movement as “hopelessly fragmented [and] primarily non-combative”, and stated that its more militant groups, such as FAI, have “long been defeated and pacified”. The article explains that despite being devout and conservative, the Salafist movement in Tripoli “is very much a cathartic reaction to the city’s prolonged political marginalization and economic deprivation…The city may be a bastion of the Salafi movement, but its roots are essentially non-belligerent”. Six moderate Salafi movements in Tripoli reportedly disapproved of FAI’s militancy that

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58 “Syrian Unrest Raises Sectarian Tensions in Lebanon” 2011, Jamestown Foundation, UNHCR Refworld website, 4 August  
60 Alami, M. 2008, „Radical Islam Comes to Town”, IPS News, 14 July  
62 Alami, M. 2008, „Radical Islam Comes to Town”, IPS News, 14 July  
63 International Crisis Group 2010, Lebanon’s Politics: The Sunni Community and Hariri’s Future Current, Middle East Report N°96, 26 May, p.29
culminated in the clashes at Nahr al-Bared in 2007, calling for an end to the fighting and the eviction of radicals from the camp. 

Nevertheless, according to The World Almanac of Islamism, Salafi jihadist group Isbat al-Ansar (Band of Partisans) continues to operate within Ain al-Hilweh Palestinian refugee camp near Sidon in southern Lebanon. The group reportedly has between 100 and 300 fighters. In June 1999, Isbat al-Ansar was responsible for the assassination of “three Lebanese judges and the chief prosecutor for southern Lebanon at the Justice Palace in Sidon in an act of revenge for the execution of three of their colleagues”. The group is also committed to the jihad against US troops in Iraq. Salafist militant group and FAI ally Junad al-Sham also operates out of Ain al-Hilweh.

4. Is there any information to indicate whether taxi drivers or persons in other like occupations have been targeted for harm in Lebanon, particularly on suspicion of being informants?

No information was located to suggest that taxi drivers are targeted for harm in Lebanon. Taxis are a common mode of transport. In a country of 4 million people, there are 33,500 registered taxis; unregistered taxis are estimated to total twice that figure.

No information was located to indicate that taxi drivers, or others in similar occupations, are suspected of being informants for armed militia groups. Nevertheless, the US Department of State noted a number of incidents in 2007 where security forces arrested, detained, tortured and interrogated people on suspicion of supplying weapons to, or having information about, Fatah al-Islam.

Additionally, The New York Times reports that the Lebanese authorities have arrested and charged individuals accused of spying for Israel. Hezbollah has also “discovered and captured spying suspects before handing them to the authorities in Lebanon”. In 2009, Hezbollah captured a businessman in Nabatiye who had allegedly “sold dozens of cars to Hezbollah officials with tracking and listening devices inside them, on behalf of Israeli intelligence”. The man was handed over to the Lebanese authorities, who charged him with collaborating with Israel.

5. Please provide information as to whether “rogue government officials” are influenced by armed militia in Lebanon.

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64 Khashan, H. 2011, ‘Lebanon’s Islamist Stronghold’, Middle East Quarterly, Spring, pp.85-90

65 ‘Lebanon’ 2011, The World Almanac of Islamism, American Foreign Policy Council, 18 July, pp.5-7


70 US Department of State 2011, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2010 – Lebanon, 8 April, Sections 1c, 2d

The US Department of State reported in April 2011 that government corruption is a serious problem in Lebanon. Criminal penalties for official corruption are rarely enforced. Government officials and agencies, including the police force, are subject to laws against bribery and extortion; however, the effectiveness of such laws is limited by a lack of enforcement. According to Freedom House, “[p]olitical and bureaucratic corruption is widespread...and anticorruption laws are loosely enforced. Lebanon was ranked 127 out of 178 countries surveyed in Transparency International’s 2010 Corruption Perceptions Index”.

Hezbollah and its allies currently dominate the Lebanese government, following the formation of a new cabinet in June 2011. The appointment of Hezbollah cabinet members may increase the group’s influence over government officials. According to Stratfor, Hezbollah already had “substantial influence over the Lebanese Armed Forces”, particularly units in the south, prior to the establishment of the current cabinet. Stratfor noted in August 2010 that “Hezbollah has significant influence over and an established presence in the already weak and fractured Lebanese army. The organization makes it a point to discharge a portion of its recruits after they serve two years in the military wing and then enlists them in the Lebanese army. This allows Hezbollah to both control the composition of the army’s ranking officers and influence specific operations”.

Limited information was located on the influence of Salafist militia groups over “rogue government officials”; however, it was reported in 2010 that Fatah al-Islam (FAI) members may on occasion encounter a more liberal attitude from Lebanese security personnel. According to Middle East Online, FAI inmates at Roumieh prison are treated more leniently, including being given their own water pump which they use to sell water to other inmates, being allowed more relaxed visiting hours, and being permitted visits from religious figures believed to be smuggling in phones and electronic equipment. The claims are corroborated by a journalist, who visited the prison herself, in an article published on the International Media Support website in February 2010.

Furthermore, there have been political allegations within Lebanon that FAI had previously been backed by the Lebanese authorities under former Prime Minister Saad Hariri, as part of an effort to support Lebanese Sunnis and counterweight the power of Hezbollah. The Internal Security Forces (ISF) has been accused of being a Sunni militia itself.

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72 US Department of State 2011, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2010 – Lebanon, 8 April, Sections 1d, 4
77 Alami, M. 2010, „Criminality rife in Lebanon’s Roumieh Prison“, Middle East Online, 2 April http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=38218 – Accessed 10 June 2010
78 Rida, F. 2010, „The Danish connection to Fatah al Islam: Part 1“, International Media Support website, 15 February http://www.i-m-s.dk/?q=article/fatima-part-1 – Accessed 10 June 2010
6. Please provide information on whether militia groups are “more powerful and armed” than Lebanese security forces, and on the ability for Lebanese authorities to provide protection from harm by militia groups.

Security forces in Lebanon include the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), which controls borders, and the Internal Security Forces (ISF), which “enforces laws, conduct searches and arrests, and refers cases to the judiciary”. In addition, the state security apparatus reports on groups deemed to be a threat to national security.  

According to the US Department of State, the Lebanese government has failed to make significant progress towards disbanding and disarming armed militia groups. Militia forces operating in Palestinian refugee camps are not under the direction of government officials. Such camps largely function as self-governed entities, maintaining their own security outside of government control.

Nevertheless, the US Department of State also reports that Lebanese authorities carried out some significant law enforcement actions against militia groups in 2010, including the arrests of Fatah al-Islam (FAI) members.

Hezbollah

Since June 2011, Hezbollah and its allies have held the majority of seats in the Lebanese government. The New York Times reported in July 2011 that Hezbollah “has transformed itself from a shadowy militant group…to the country’s pre-eminent political and military force”. It currently “has an armed militia more powerful than the Lebanese Army and a sprawling infrastructure that delivers welfare to its Shiite constituency, Lebanon’s largest community”. According to the Center for Strategic & International Studies, Hezbollah remains unchallenged by any other sectarian militia force or the LAF.

Stratfor reported in August 2010 that Hezbollah “has substantial influence over the Lebanese Armed Forces”. Hezbollah’s powerful military influence extends to various parts of Lebanon, particularly the southern suburbs of Beirut. The US Department of State reports that in 2010, Lebanese security forces were unable to enforce the law in Hezbollah-controlled areas of Beirut. According to a 2008 Ya Libnan article, “Hezbollah’s disregard for the state...
authority is indicative of its disregard of the state as a whole...[T]he state sadly seems to have accepted that Hezbollah will operate on its own terms”.

**Salafists, including Fatah al-Islam**

FAI is primarily based in the Palestinian Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp, which “is under the control of local Palestinian factions rather than the Lebanese state”. According to *BBC News*, “Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon are often a haven for armed groups. Lebanese security forces do not enter the camps, only guarding their perimeters”. However, political factions inside the camp have argued that FAI members “can be kept in check by the coalition of Palestinian forces”. *Al Shorfah* reported in September 2010 that the Lebanese army and Palestinian organisations had “succeeded in cutting off any real connection between Fatah al-Islam and the population outside the Ain al-Hilweh camp”.

The International Crisis Group (ICG) reported in 2010 that the conflict at Nahr al-Bared has since held Salafist jihadists, such as FAI, in check. The events led to an increase in state surveillance and repression. Since 2007, Salafist jihadists have reportedly “been unable to establish a significant, sustained presence”. Militant activity has promoted a strong response from the authorities, and jihadists have suffered in combat with security forces. Furthermore, the powerful presence of Hezbollah in southern Lebanon has “effectively curbed the jihadists’ progress” in the region.

The Lebanese authorities have reportedly carried out some significant law enforcement actions against FAI in recent years. In August 2011, two members of FAI were indicted by a military judge for possession of arms. The men were referred to a military court for trial over “a 2009 incident in which rockets were fired into Israel from Lebanon”.

In 2010, actions taken by the authorities against FAI included:

- The arrests of four members of Fatah al-Islam (FAI) by the LAF Intelligence Bureau in January on charges of plotting the escape from Roumiyeh prison of FAI associates; a total of 14 FAI members were indicted.
- The arrest of a suspected FAI member in Beirut in January, on accusation of plotting terrorist operations;

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91 Zaatari, M. 2011, „Ain al-Hilweh refugees reeling after latest clashes”, *The Daily Star (Lebanon)*, 8 August


• The arrest of another suspected FAI member in January, on accusation of providing weapons and funding to fighters in Nahr al-Bared in 2007;¹⁰⁰

• The March arrest in Zahrai of a Palestinian accused of working with a terrorist unit operating with FAI;¹⁰¹

• The sentencing by a military court in May of 31 alleged FAI members to prison terms of up to 15 years for terrorism;¹⁰² and

• The sentencing of 54 individuals associated with al-Qaeda and FAI by a military court in November, to terms ranging from 18 months’ hard labour to life imprisonment.¹⁰³

Additionally, the killing of FAI leader Abdel-Rahman Awad by the Lebanese Army in August 2010 delivered a significant blow to the group. Al Shorfah reported that Awad’s death indicated that FAI “is now just a marginal organisation struggling to survive”.¹⁰⁴

Furthermore, in July 2009, the authorities arrested 10 suspected FAI members on accusation of plotting attacks against the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).¹⁰⁵ In the same month, 12 FAI members were reportedly sentenced to life in prison for terrorism after being found guilty of several criminal acts.¹⁰⁶ In October 2009, the Lebanese authorities arrested 21 suspected members of FAI in October 2009 for bombings in Tripoli in August and September that killed 25 people.¹⁰⁷

The Lebanese authorities have also had some success in locating and prosecuting FAI members suspected of involvement in the Nahr el-Bared conflict in 2007.¹⁰⁸ However, FAI’s continued presence in Lebanon, and the apparent failure of the 11,000-strong Lebanese security forces to crush a small group of 300 militants in a period of four months,¹⁰⁹ reflects a weakness in the state’s ability to effectively eliminate armed militia groups.¹¹⁰ An October
2009 NOW Lebanon article called the success of the Lebanese army at Nahr al-Bared in 2007 “a rare victory”.\textsuperscript{111}

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