Preface

This note provides country of origin information (COI) and policy guidance to Home Office decision makers on handling particular types of protection and human rights claims. This includes whether claims are likely to justify the granting of asylum, humanitarian protection or discretionary leave and whether – in the event of a claim being refused – it is likely to be certifiable as 'clearly unfounded' under s94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

Decision makers must consider claims on an individual basis, taking into account the case specific facts and all relevant evidence, including: the policy guidance contained with this note; the available COI; any applicable caselaw; and the Home Office casework guidance in relation to relevant policies.

Country information

COI in this note has been researched in accordance with principles set out in the Common EU [European Union] Guidelines for Processing Country of Origin Information (COI) and the European Asylum Support Office’s research guidelines, Country of Origin Information report methodology, namely taking into account its relevance, reliability, accuracy, objectivity, currency, transparency and traceability.

All information is carefully selected from generally reliable, publicly accessible sources or is information that can be made publicly available. Full publication details of supporting documentation are provided in footnotes. Multiple sourcing is normally used to ensure that the information is accurate, balanced and corroborated, and that a comprehensive and up-to-date picture at the time of publication is provided.

Information is compared and contrasted, whenever possible, to provide a range of views and opinions. The inclusion of a source is not an endorsement of it or any views expressed.

Feedback

Our goal is to continuously improve our material. Therefore, if you would like to comment on this note, please email the Country Policy and Information Team.

Independent Advisory Group on Country Information

The Independent Advisory Group on Country Information (IAGCI) was set up in March 2009 by the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration to make recommendations to him about the content of the Home Office’s COI material. The IAGCI welcomes feedback on the Home Office’s COI material. It is not the function of the IAGCI to endorse any Home Office material, procedures or policy. IAGCI may be contacted at:

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Information about the IAGCI’s work and a list of the COI documents which have been reviewed by the IAGCI can be found on the Independent Chief Inspector’s website at http://icinspectorgsi.gov.uk/country-information-reviews/
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1. **Introduction**

1.1 **Basis of claim**

1.1.1 That the general humanitarian situation in south and central Somalia is so severe as to make removal a breach of Articles 15(a) and 15(b) of European Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2014 (the Qualification Directive) / Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights; and/or

1.1.2 That the security situation presents a real risk to a civilian’s life or person such that removal would be in breach of Article 15(c) (serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence) of the Qualification Directive.

2. **Consideration of issues**

2.1 **Credibility**

2.1.1 For information on assessing credibility, see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

2.1.2 Decision makers must also check if there has been a previous application for a UK visa or another form of leave. Asylum applications matched to visas should be investigated prior to the asylum interview (see the Asylum Instruction on Visa Matches, Asylum Claims from UK Visa Applicants).

2.1.3 Decision makers should also consider the need to conduct language analysis testing (see the Asylum Instruction on Language Analysis).

2.2 **Exclusion**

2.2.1 All sides of the conflict including Al Shabaab, government security forces, and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) have been responsible for serious human rights abuses (see Pro-government forces).

2.2.2 If there are serious reasons for considering that the person has been involved with Al Shabaab or committed abuses with the government security forces or AMISOM, decision makers must consider whether any of the exclusion clauses is applicable.

2.2.3 If the person is excluded from the Refugee convention, they will also be excluded from a grant of humanitarian protection.

2.2.4 For further guidance on the exclusion clauses and restricted leave, see the instructions on Exclusion under Articles 1F and 33(2) of the Refugee Convention, Humanitarian Protection and Restricted Leave.
2.3 Assessment of risk

2.3.1 At present it is only possible to remove nationals of Somalia to Mogadishu or, in some cases, to Puntland or Somaliland for those formerly resident and having clan connections in those areas. Therefore, unless the person can be removed to Somaliland or Puntland, the first consideration is whether the person would be at risk on return to Mogadishu. If so, decision makers must whether they can reasonably be expected to relocate to another area in Somalia. That will, in part, depend on whether the person can get to that area safely and, if so, the general security and humanitarian situation there.

a. Refugee convention

2.3.2 A state of civil instability and/or where law and order has broken down does not of itself give rise to a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason. However, decision makers must first consider if the person faces persecution or serious harm for a Refugee Convention reason.

2.3.3 Where the person qualifies under the Refugee Convention, decision makers do not need to go on to make an assessment of the need for protection firstly under Articles 15(a) and 15(b) of the Qualification Directive/Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), and if that is unsuccessful, under Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive.

2.3.4 It is only if the person does not qualify under the Refugee Convention that decision makers need to make an assessment of the need for protection firstly under Articles 15(a) and 15(b) of the Qualification Directive/Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and, if that is unsuccessful, under Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive.

2.3.5 In general, return to an area under the control of Al Shabaab is not feasible for a person who has had no history of living under Al Shabaab in that area and is in general unlikely to be a reasonable proposition for someone who has had such a history (AMM and others, para 603).

2.3.6 Such persons may be at real risk of persecution by Al Shabaab because of actual or imputed religious or political opinion, and therefore a potential refugee convention defined reason (for information on Al Shabaab’s areas of control and persons targeted by the group, see the country policy and information note on Somalia (South and Central): Fear of Al Shabaab).

b. Humanitarian situation: Mogadishu

2.3.7 The European Court of Human Rights, in the case of K.A.B. v. Sweden - 886/11 - Chamber Judgment [2013] ECHR 814 (05 September 2013), having considered the case on 2 July 2013, found that there is no general Article 3 risk in Mogadishu.

2.3.8 In the country guidance case of MOJ & Ors (Return to Mogadishu) Somalia CG [2014] UKUT 00442 (IAC), heard 10, 11, 12, 13, 25 February and 9 September 2014, the Upper Tribunal held that a person returning to Mogadishu after a period of absence will look to his nuclear family, if he has one living in the city, for assistance in re-establishing himself and securing a livelihood. Although a returnee may also seek assistance from his clan members who are not close relatives, such help is only likely to be
forthcoming for majority clan members, as minority clans may have little to offer (para 407(f)).

2.3.9 The Tribunal also held that the significance of clan membership in Mogadishu has changed. Clans now provide, potentially, social support mechanisms and assist with access to livelihoods, performing less of a protection function than previously. There are no clan militias in Mogadishu, no clan violence, and no clan based discriminatory treatment, even for minority clan members (para 407(g)). (See also the country policy and information note on Somalia (South and Central): majority clans and minority groups).

2.3.10 The humanitarian situation in Mogadishu has continued to improve since KAB and MOJ were heard in 2013 and 2014 respectively (see Pro-government forces, Security situation, Humanitarian situation and return of diaspora to Somalia).

2.3.11 If it is accepted that a person facing a return to Mogadishu after a period of absence has no nuclear family or close relatives in the city to assist him in re-establishing himself on return, there will need to be a careful assessment of all of the circumstances.

2.3.12 The UT in MOJ and Others stated that these considerations will include, but are not limited to:

- circumstances in Mogadishu before departure
- length of absence from Mogadishu
- family or clan associations to call upon in Mogadishu
- access to financial resources
- prospects of securing a livelihood, whether that be employment or self employment
- availability of remittances from abroad
- means of support during the time spent in the United Kingdom
- why his ability to fund the journey to the West no longer enables an appellant to secure financial support on return (para 407(h))

‘Put another way, it will be for the person facing return to explain why he would not be able to access the economic opportunities that have been produced by the economic boom, especially as there is evidence to the effect that returnees are taking jobs at the expense of those who have never been away’ (para 407(h)).

‘It will, therefore, only be those with no clan or family support who will also not be in receipt of remittances from abroad and who have no real prospect of securing access to a livelihood on return who will face the prospect of living in circumstances falling below that which is acceptable in humanitarian protection terms’ (para 408).

2.3.13 For guidance on Articles 2 and 3 ECHR / Articles 15(a) and (b) of the QD, see the Asylum Instruction on Humanitarian Protection.
c. Humanitarian situation: Outside Mogadishu

2.3.14 The country guidance case of AMM and others (conflict; humanitarian crisis; returnees; FGM) Somalia CG [2011] UKUT 445 (IAC) (28 November 2011), heard 13 to 21 June and 15 July 2011, found that there is no generalised risk of Article 3 / Articles 15(a) and (b) of the QD harm as a result of armed conflict in south and central Somalia outside of Mogadishu (paragraph 597).

2.3.15 Since AMM was promulgated, the security situation has generally improved across the country and there continues to be no generalised risk as a result of the conflict (see Security situation, Humanitarian situation, and the country policy and information note on Somalia (South and Central): Fear of Al Shabaab).

2.3.16 An ongoing drought, resulting in disease and famine, has caused displacement of people from the north part of south and central Somalia to Mogadishu and the south west. Aid agencies are working to help alleviate the situation and recent rains have resulted in a dramatic drop in displacements with others returning home. Conditions in drought-affected areas (in the north of the country with nearby Puntland and Somaliland being the worst affected) are severe and may reach the Article 3 ECHR / Article 15(a) and (b) QD threshold in some areas where there is no access to humanitarian assistance (see humanitarian situation).

2.3.17 Family and/or clan connections will have an important part to play when assessing whether return to an area of south and central Somalia (outside Mogadishu) not under the control of Al Shabaab would breach Article 3 / Articles 15(a) and (b) of the QD on account of the humanitarian conditions.

2.3.18 Decision makers must make a careful assessment of all of the circumstances and have regard to the person’s ability to cater for their most basic needs, their vulnerability to ill-treatment and the prospect of their situation improving within a reasonable time-frame. In general those with no close family connections to provide support, or if those connections are in an area which the person could not safely reach, there is a likelihood that the person would have to have recourse to an internally displaced person (IDP) camp. Where it is reasonably likely that the person would find himself or herself in an IDP camp, there is a real risk that they would be exposed to treatment in breach of Article 3 / Articles 15(a) and (b) of the QD on account of the humanitarian conditions.

2.3.19 For guidance on consideration of Article 3 ECHR / Articles 15(a) and (b) of the QD, see Asylum Instruction on Humanitarian Protection.

d. Security situation: Mogadishu

2.3.20 Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive applies only to civilians, who must be genuine non-combatants and not those who are party to the conflict. This could include former combatants who have genuinely and permanently renounced armed activity.

2.3.21 In the country guidance case of MOJ & Ors (Return to Mogadishu) Somalia CG [2014] UKUT 00442 (IAC), the Tribunal held that “Generally, a person who is “an ordinary civilian” (i.e. not associated with the security forces; any aspect of government or official administration or any NGO or international
organisation) on returning to Mogadishu after a period of absence will face no real risk of persecution or risk of harm such as to require protection under Article 3 of the ECHR or Article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive’ (para 407(a)) and that ‘there has been significant and durable change in the security situation in Mogadishu following Al-Shabaab’s withdrawal from the city in August 2011 and there is no real prospect of a re-established presence within the city’ (para 407(b)).

2.3.22 Al Shabaab continues to mount attacks in Mogadishu and some sources state that after an initial decline in the number of incidents in 2014/15 numbers have started to increase again. However sources also indicate that Al Shabaab regard only certain people as ‘legitimate targets’ and most civilians are not seen as such. Al Shabaab’s increased ability to carry out more complex and targeted attacks than in previous years has further reduced the risk to ordinary civilians who, as such, are generally not at risk of serious harm (see country policy and information note on Somalia (South and Central): Fear of Al Shabaab).

2.3.23 The general security situation across the country, including in Mogadishu, while continuing to be volatile, has improved since 2014, allowing some refugees and diaspora to gradually return to Mogadishu (see Security situation and the country policy and information note on Somalia (South and Central): Fear of Al Shabaab).

2.3.24 Therefore, there is no reason to depart from MOJ & Ors. It is unlikely that, in general, a person would be at risk of harm that would breach Article 15(c).

2.3.25 Even where there is no general Article 15(c) risk, decision makers must consider whether there are particular factors relevant to the person’s individual circumstances which might nevertheless place them at risk.

2.3.26 For guidance on Article 15(c), including consideration of enhanced risk factors, see the Asylum Instruction on Humanitarian Protection.

e. Security situation: Outside Mogadishu

2.3.27 AMM and others also found that fighting in southern and central Somalia outside of Mogadishu was both sporadic and localised, and was not such as to place every person in that part of the country at real risk of harm that breaches Article 15(c) (paragraph 597).

2.3.28 Most urban areas are now held by the Somali authorities with assistance from AMISOM. Al Shabaab is unable to hold areas if AMISOM decides to seize and maintain control of them, but if lack of resources should force AMISOM to withdraw, Al Shabaab will, in most cases, immediately seize the vacated areas and take retribution against the local population. Al Shabaab has limited resources and sources consider it unlikely that it would be able to take major cities such as Mogadishu, Kismayo, Baidoa and Belet Weyne (see the country policy and information note on Somalia (South and Central): Fear of Al Shabaab).

2.3.29 Al Shabaab controls most rural areas in south and central Somalia and although it is not militarily present everywhere, it “rules” these areas through fear and intimidation (see the country policy and information note on Somalia (South and Central): Fear of Al Shabaab).
2.3.30 Al Shabaab continues with its asymmetric warfare outside of Mogadishu, but this tends to be in the form of targeted attacks against government security forces and AMISOM, particularly along supply routes, and generally civilians will not be directly affected (see Al Shabaab attacks).

2.3.31 Clan violence continues to occur but this is usually in the form of localised disputes leading to targeted assassinations (see Security situation).

2.3.32 The security situation has in general improved since AMM and others was promulgated in 2011 (see Security situation, maps and information resources and country policy and information note on Somalia (South and Central): Fear of Al Shabaab).

2.3.33 Therefore the evidence does not support a departure from existing country guidance caselaw.

2.3.34 Although there is no general Article 15(c) risk in southern and central Somalia outside Mogadishu, decision makers must consider whether there are particular factors relevant to the person’s individual circumstances which might nevertheless place them at risk. However it is unlikely that, in general, most people would be at risk of harm that would breach Article 15(c).

2.3.35 For guidance on Article 15(c), including consideration of enhanced risk factors, see the Asylum Instruction on Humanitarian Protection.

2.4 Internal relocation

2.4.1 Decision makers must give careful consideration to the relevance and reasonableness of internal relocation on a case-by-case basis taking full account of the individual circumstances of the particular person, referring to the country information (see Security situation, maps and information resources, freedom of movement and the country policy and information note on Somalia (South and Central): Fear of Al Shabaab).

2.4.2 The Upper Tribunal in MOJ and Others held that ‘… the evidence indicates clearly that it is not simply those who originate from Mogadishu that may now generally return to live in the city without being subjected to an Article 15(c) risk or facing a real risk of destitution. On the other hand, relocation in Mogadishu for a person of a minority clan with no former links to the city, no access to funds and no other form of clan, family or social support is unlikely to be realistic as, in the absence of means to establish a home and some form of ongoing financial support, there will be a real risk of having no alternative but to live in makeshift accommodation within an IDP camp where there is a real possibility of having to live in conditions that will fall below acceptable humanitarian standards’ (paras 424 and 425).

2.4.3 If a person cannot remain in Mogadishu, decision makers must establish whether that person could reasonably return elsewhere in Somalia.

2.4.4 In AMM and others, the Upper Tribunal held that internal relocation to an area controlled by Al Shabaab is not feasible for a person who has had no history of living under Al Shabaab in that area and is in general unlikely to be a reasonable proposition for someone who has had such a history (paras
598-601) (see also security situation, freedom of movement and the country policy and information note on Somalia (South and Central): Fear of Al Shabaab).

2.4.5 For areas of south and central Somalia which are not under the control of Al Shabaab, in AMM and others the Upper Tribunal held that internal relocation is in general unlikely to be an option, if the place of proposed relocation is stricken by famine or near famine. In addition, family and/or clan connections may have an important part to play in determining the reasonableness of a proposed place of relocation. Travel by land across southern and central Somalia to a home area or proposed place of relocation may well, in general, pose real risks of serious harm, not only from Al Shabaab checkpoints but also as a result of the present famine conditions. Women travelling without male friends or relatives are in general likely to face a real risk of sexual violence (paras 603-605) (see also Freedom of movement and the country policy and information note on Somalia: Women Fearing Gender-based Violence).

2.4.6 For further guidance on internal relocation and the factors to be considered, see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

2.5 Certification

2.5.1 Where a claim is refused on the basis that the person is “an ordinary civilian” (i.e. not associated with the security forces; any aspect of government or official administration or any NGO or international organisation) returning to Mogadishu after a period of absence and fears the general security and/or humanitarian situation, it is likely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

2.5.2 For further guidance on certification, see Certification of Protection and Human Rights claims under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (clearly unfounded claims).
3. **Policy summary**

3.1.1 Ordinary civilians returning to Mogadishu after a period of absence, including those from other parts of Somalia who had not previously lived there, depending on their circumstances, will in general face no real risk of persecution or risk of harm such as to require protection under Articles 2 and 3 of the ECHR / Articles 15(a) and (b) of the Qualification Directive (QD).

3.1.2 Persons who originate from Mogadishu, as well as those from other parts of Somalia who had not previously lived there, depending on their circumstances, may now generally return to live in the city without being subjected to an Article 15(c) risk.

3.1.3 The situation might be otherwise for a person returning to Mogadishu belonging to a minority group, who has no clan or family support, will not be in receipt of remittances from abroad and who has no real prospect of securing access to a livelihood in Mogadishu. Such people would be at real risk of having no alternative but to live in makeshift accommodation within an IDP camp where there is a real possibility of having to live in conditions that will fall below acceptable humanitarian standards and could amount to serious harm.

3.1.4 In areas of south and central Somalia outside of Mogadishu the general conditions do not present a general risk of a breach of Articles 2 or 3 ECHR / Articles 15(a) and (b) QD although conditions in drought-affected areas are severe and may reach the Article 3 / Articles 15(a) and (b) threshold in some areas where there is no access to humanitarian assistance.

3.1.5 Indiscriminate violence in south and central Somalia is not such that removal would be a breach of Article 15(c) QD. Particular factors relevant to the person’s individual circumstances might, nevertheless, place them at risk.

3.1.6 Although some areas of the country are facing famine, this is not country wide and internal relocation would be a reasonable option, although each case must be considered on its individual circumstances.

3.1.7 If a person is not able to remain in Mogadishu, relocation to another part of south and central Somalia which is not controlled by Al Shabaab may be reasonable in some cases where the person has family and / or clan connections. Relocation to an area controlled by Al Shabaab will not generally be reasonable. Women travelling without male friends or relatives are in general likely to face a real risk of serious harm.

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4. Background


4.1.2 For more maps giving updated information on incidents and displacements see: [http://reliefweb.int/country/som/thumb#content_top](http://reliefweb.int/country/som/thumb#content_top) 3 and [http://www.ecoi.net/somalia/maps](http://www.ecoi.net/somalia/maps) 4

4.1.3 A BBC Map 5, updated November 2016, showed the areas of influence and control by various groups in Somalia:

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3 Reliefweb, Somalia, [http://reliefweb.int/country/som/thumb#content_top](http://reliefweb.int/country/som/thumb#content_top) Accessed 24 July 2017
4 Ecoi.net, Somalia: Maps. [http://www.ecoi.net/somalia/maps](http://www.ecoi.net/somalia/maps)
5. **Pro-government forces**

5.1 Government and international sponsors

5.1.1 At the international London Somalia Conference held in May 2017 a ‘New Partnership for Somalia for Peace, Stability and Security’ was agreed. A paper from the conference, ‘A Framework for Mutual Accountability and Accelerated Progress’, gave details of the security measures the Somali Government and international community committed to work to together to achieve:

‘1. Political agreement between the FGS [Federal Government of Somalia] and the FMS [Federal Member States] on a national security architecture defining the sizes, distributions and compositions of regional and federal forces and providing clarity on command and control and resourcing responsibilities.

‘2. Recognising the interdependence of security, politics and development, a Security Pact between Somalia and the international community setting out a shared vision for a comprehensive approach to security, with clear milestones including for security sector reform and implementation of the national security architecture, and the establishment of civilian oversight of all security sector institutions.

‘3. A conditions-based transition of security responsibilities from AMISOM to Somali-led security institutions and forces that are affordable, accountable, acceptable and able and that are managed in line with broader systems for public financial management, oversight and accountability.

‘4. Increased coordination and effectiveness of military and non-military interventions, including on countering violent extremism and early recovery and extension of state authority, resulting in increased success in defeating terrorist and insurgent groups, particularly Al Shabaab.

‘5. Establishment of coordination mechanisms for better coordinated, more transparent and predictable international support to federal and regional components of the national security architecture accelerating security sector reform.6

5.1.2 For information on protection offered by the security services see the [country policy and information on Fear of Al Shabaab in South and Central Somalia](#).

5.2 State armed groups (army and police)

5.2.1 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment for Somalia last updated 7 December 2016 looked at the armed forces:

‘Until recently, the army was not a traditional army per se, but a collection of forces loyal to the individual clan and warlord leaders participating in the

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Accessed 22 May 2017
Transitional Federal Government (TFG). However, since the end of the official tenure of the TFG and the inauguration of the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), the Somali National Army (SNA) is has become increasingly being accepted as the sole legitimate force fighting on behalf of the Mogadishu government, albeit with localised help from allied militias.

‘Despite training efforts from regional and Western partners, discipline is generally low and membership fluid. The FGS has not provided a clear outline of the composition and strength of the SNA, including allied militia, according to the UNMG [UN Major Groups] report, which says the SNA leadership has sought to inflate the number of serving troops in order to secure greater funding for salaries and rations.

‘The Somali armed forces are the poorest in the region in terms of training and equipment. They are currently in no position to secure all of Somalia from the Shabab militants, let alone defend the borders of the country.

‘The SNA continues to rely on forces deployed with the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), numbering approximately 21,500 (after a UN resolution in November 2013 raised the troop ceiling to approximately 23,000). (…) As military advances continue, the SNA and AMISOM forces are stretched thin, with their bases increasingly vulnerable to attacks, as it could be seen with the recent attacks on the bases in El Adde and Janale.’

‘While Somalia’s navy and air force are all but non-existent, the army has benefited from foreign training and is now actively engaged alongside AMISOM in operations to find and eliminate pockets of insurgent resistance.’

5.2.2 Jane’s assessed Somalia’s military capabilities:

‘However, professionalism and morale concerns remain, due in part to concerns over adequate infrastructure and funding. In September 2011, AMISOM took up the responsibility of monitoring the payment of salaries to the SNA, therefore increasing the number of soldiers receiving their salary on time. This has had a positive impact on overall morale. However… the armed forces did complain of delayed salaries. The issue of soldiers defecting or setting up illegal checkpoints because they had not been paid in months resurfaced in October 2015. Moreover, the outgoing head of the EU training mission, EUTM-Somalia, said in March 2015 that without basic housing and equipment for Somalia’s soldiers, it would fail to achieve its long-term objectives.’

5.2.3 The US State Department Country Report on Human Rights, covering 2016, and published 3 March 2017 (USSD 2016 report) noted:

‘The provisional federal constitution states that the armed forces are responsible for assuring the country’s sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity and that the national federal and state police are

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Subscription source. Accessed: 22 May 2017
8 Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, ‘Somalia: Armed Forces’, updated 7 December 2016,
Subscription source. Accessed: 22 May 2017
responsible for protecting lives, property, peace, and security. Police were
generally ineffective and lacked sufficient equipment and training. In
Mogadishu, for example, police lacked sufficient vehicles to transfer
prisoners from cells to courts or to medical facilities. There were reports of
police engaging in corrupt practices.

‘AMISOM and the SNA worked to maintain order in areas of the southern
and central regions. The FGS regularly relied on NISA forces to perform
police work, often calling on them to arrest and detain civilians without
warrants. Some towns and rural areas in the southern and central regions
remained under the control of al-Shabaab and affiliated militias. The Ministry
of Defense is responsible for controlling the armed forces. Police forces fall
under a mix of local and regional administrations and the government. The
national police force remained under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of
Internal Security, while regional authorities maintained police forces under
their areas’ interior or security ministries.

‘Civilian authorities did not maintain effective control of security forces.
Security forces abused civilians and often failed to prevent or respond to
societal violence. Although authorities sometimes used military courts to try
individuals believed to be responsible for abuse, they generally did not
investigate abuse by police, army, or militia members; a culture of impunity
was widespread. For example, on August 1, in Mogadishu an SNA soldier
reportedly killed a bus driver during an extortion attempt. The soldier was not
arrested.

‘The Ministry of Defense’s control over the army remained tenuous but
improved somewhat with the support of international partners. At year’s end
the army consisted of between 11,000 and 14,000 soldiers, according to
estimates by international organizations. The bulk of forces were located in
Middle Shabelle and Lower Shabelle regions, as well as in the ISWA and
IJA. The Ministry of Defense exerted some control over forces in the greater
Mogadishu area, extending as far south as Lower Shabelle Region, west to
Baidoa, Bay Region, and north to Jowhar, Middle Shabelle Region. Army
forces and progovernment militia sometimes operated alongside AMISOM in
areas where AMISOM was deployed.

‘The federal police force maintained its presence in all 17 districts of the
capital. AMISOM-formed police units complemented local and FGS policing
efforts in Mogadishu. These police officers provided mentoring and advisory
support on basic police duties, respect for human rights, crime prevention
strategies, community policing, and search procedures. More than 300
AMISOM police officers worked alongside the formed units to provide
training to national police.’

5.2.4 In his January 2017 report on Somalia, the Secretary-General considered
the rule of law and security institutions:

‘Delays in regular salary payments to Somali security personnel remain a
key concern and a major incentive for personnel to desert or, worse, defect.

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Salary arrears are currently estimated at between 6 and 13 months for soldiers and 15 months for police officers. Donor-funded stipends, however, are paid regularly to the national army, the federal police and 1,000 regional police officers in Baidoa and Kismaayo...

‘UNSOM and UNDP continued to support the implementation of the new federated policing model that was endorsed by the National Leadership Forum in June. While there is strong commitment on the part of the existing and emerging federal member states to developing a decentralized policing model, the momentum that existed at the federal level stalled during the second half of 2016. International advocacy and support will be provided to the incoming Federal Government to promote the implementation of the model and to reinvigorate commitment.

‘The Interim Jubba Administration is authorizing explosive ordnance disposal capacity training for selected members of its police service, with assistance from the Mine Action Service and UNSOM. The initiative supports the comprehensive approach to security, in line with the new policing model. A total of $2 million was received from Germany for a non-lethal support package for the Somali police. An amount of $1 million has been assigned to the technical committees for the implementation of the new policing model in each state. The remaining $1 million will be used to build a police training facility in Kismaayo; the land has been secured and it is expected that construction will begin early in 2017.’

5.2.5 The Security Pact mentioned above, adopted by the Federal Republic of Somalia and 42 International partners on 11 May 2017, gave details of Somalia’s political agreement on security reached on 16 April 2017:

‘These recommendations take into account and build on the existing National Security Policy and the New Policing Model.

‘The Somali National Army will consist of:
1. Somali Ground Forces
2. Somali Air Force
3. Somali Maritime Forces/Navy

‘Key Tasks/Responsibilities:
- Safeguarding National Unity/Sovereignty of the country
- Safeguarding and defending the borders of the country
- Defending against external threats and any internal threats that endanger the stability of the country

‘Figures/Numbers of the SNA and Police Force
Recognizing the challenges of Somali budget and revenue generation, we recommend that:

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1. The Somali National Army (SNA) shall number at least 18,000, excluding the Special Forces (Danab), Air force and Navy. This work shall be completed within six (6) months, starting from 1 June 2017.

2. The training of these forces shall take place within Somalia, with a unified Somali doctrine, in order to revive national training institutions, which shall be reequipped and resupplied.

3. The SNA shall fall under the Ministry of Defence, and the Minister for Defence shall prepare and assign budgetary allocations in consultation with the Minister for Finance.

4. The Somali police force shall number 32,000, divided into Federal Police and State Police as per the New Policing Model. This expanded figure shall include the Coastguard, as well as Darwish. This task shall be completed within six (6) months, starting from 1 June 2017.

5. The Coastguard will be built and strengthened at the federal level, and the coastguard police at the FMS-level. Their roles and responsibilities will be established later. This task shall be completed within six (6) months, starting from 1 June 2017.

'Distribution and Composition

6. The existing SNA sectors shall be redrawn to align with FMS boundaries to reflect the political developments in the country/federal system. This task shall be completed within three (3) months, starting from 1 June 2017.

7. The SNA forces, numbering at least 18,000, shall be distributed across existing SNA sectors (12th, 21st, 43rd, 49th, 48th, 54th, 26th and 60th). The subsequent distribution of the SNA forces (numbering at least 18,000) across the FMS boundary-aligned sectors, shall be determined based on military and geographic need. SNA and FMS leadership will participate in any necessary redistribution of forces. This task shall be completed within six (6) months, starting from 1 June 2017.

8. 500 Danab Special Forces shall be established in each SNA sector, with input from the FMS, reporting to the Danab Brigade HQ in Baledogle. This task shall be completed within six (6) months, starting from 1 June 2017.

9. The distribution of the 32,000 police, between Federal and State-level, and the question of how many of these should be Darwish, is yet to be determined. But it is agreed that there should be a fair and equitable distribution, based on needs.

10. The Darwish elements of the State-Level Police shall be a reserve force that can be activated as deemed necessary. They shall work with the SNA forces in times of national crisis.

11. The existing regional forces will therefore become part of SNA or be part of State Police. This task shall be completed within three (3) months, starting from 1 June 2017.

12. Those armed personnel who do not meet the requirements for inclusion in any security forces will require comprehensive demobilization and reintegration programmes. Given Somalia’s limited resources and the need to reduce security forces substantially, a DDR and rehabilitation programme
will be instrumental to mitigate the risk of extremist groups recruiting former security forces personnel. This task shall be completed within twelve (12) months, starting from 1 June 2017.

‘13. The National Integration Commission shall be a crucial component for ensuring the realization of Somali national security forces, which represent each FMS and the whole country. This task shall be completed within thirty (30) days, starting from 1 June 2017.’

5.2.6 For more details on the armed services and police see the country policy and information note on Somalia: Fear of Al Shabaab.

5.3 African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

5.3.1 UN Security Resolution 2297 (2016), adopted by the Security Council at its 7731st meeting, on 7 July 2016, gave full details of AMISOM’s current mandate. This resolution authorises the Member States of the African Union [AU] to maintain the deployment of AMISOM up to a maximum level of 22,126 uniformed personnel until 31 May 2017. The Security Council followed this with resolution 2358 of 14 June 2017, which extends the remit to 31 May 2018.

5.3.2 Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment for Somalia, posted 6 April 2016, stated:

‘AMISOM's anti-Al-Shabaab offensive made territorial gains, but is unlikely to completely eradicate the group from southern Somalia, where it has gained recruits from Kenya

‘The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) officially has over 22,000 troops from Kenya, Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti, Sierra Leone and Ethiopia. Ethiopia joined the unified AMISOM command in January 2014, having previously deployed its forces inside Somalia independently of the multinational regional force. With Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda as the largest troop contributors, the force is now likely to serve as a vehicle for Somalia's neighbours to push their own visions for the country's development, particularly the federalisation process. This is likely to be most apparent in the border regions of Jubaland and the South West Administration, where Kenya and Ethiopia respectively, have used their military presence to influence which political leaders control the states.’

5.3.3 The military component of AMISOM is deployed in six sectors covering south and central Somalia:

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12 UN Security Resolution 2297 (2016)
13 UN Security Council, Resolution 2358, 14 June 2017
- Ugandan troops are deployed in Sector 1, which comprises the regions of Banadir, and Lower Shabelle.
- Kenyan forces are responsible for Sector 2 comprising Lower and Middle Jubba.
- Sector 3 comprising Bay and Bakool as well as Gedo (Sub Sector 3) comes under Ethiopian command.
- Djiboutian forces are in charge of Sector 4 which covers Hiiraan and Galgaduud
- Burundian forces are in charge of Sector 5 which covers the Middle Shabelle region.\(^{15}\)

5.3.4 African Business Magazine, in an article published on 20 April 2017, looked at the October 2016 withdrawal of Ethiopian troops and the implications for AMISOM:

‘The withdrawn Ethiopian soldiers were part of an additional Ethiopian force of around 4,000 that operated outside, but in tandem with, AMISOM, providing crucial assistance. “Ethiopian troops know the land, they’re used to the temperatures, they are the only ones who have fought both guerrilla and conventional warfare,” says an Ethiopian Horn of Africa political analyst in Addis Ababa…

‘Meanwhile, another increasing problem for AMISOM, says the foreign politico, is that due to its dependence on the United Nations it is increasingly hamstrung by UN peacekeeping processes when it needs be operating as a war fighting force. For there has been little to resemble peacekeeping during AMISOM’s deployment. Precise figures of AMISOM fatalities are unknown due to contributing countries not releasing numbers, but estimates range as high as 2,000.

‘Ethiopia’s troops are the only ones that are mobile and taking the fight to al-Shabaab, while the rest of AMISOM stay in Mogadishu or a few major bases,” says the Ethiopian analyst.’\(^{16}\)

5.3.5 Police contributing countries are: Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Uganda\(^{17}\).

5.3.6 A letter dated 7 October 2016 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009), with a mandate extended in 2016 to 15 December 2017, concerning Somalia and Eritrea, addressed to the President of the Security Council, [UN Security Council October 2016 update] stated, with reference to AMISOM’s effectiveness in Somalia:


Moreover, the attack [by Al Shabaab on 15 January 2016, killing 150 Kenyan soldiers] highlighted the lack of coordination between countries contributing troops to AMISOM and the fractured nature of the AMISOM command and control mechanism... The lack of effective intelligence gathering and the absence of engagement with local communities on the part of AMISOM both contributed to the effectiveness of the attack.  

5.3.7 However, in his January 2017 report, the UN Secretary-General stated, 'The work of AMISOM continues to be a vital enabler of progress in peacebuilding and state-building. The sacrifices that AMISOM troops are making are not in vain. They go far in contributing to lasting peace and stability in Somalia and the Horn of Africa.'  

5.3.8 The International Crisis Group, in an April 2017 commentary called 'Somalia: Transforming Hope into Stability' considered the impact of the possible withdrawal of AMISOM. 'After AMISOM played a key role in pushing Al-Shabaab’s conventional forces from most urban centres, most troop contributing countries (TCCs) are seeking to depart; at a March [2017] meeting in Nairobi, the TCCs began crafting a plan for the mission’s drawdown. AMISOM Commander General Soubagleh now says the withdrawal could start as early as 2018. But to make this possible, the FGS and federal states will need to improve governance dramatically and end local conflicts in liberated areas.'

5.4 Alleged human rights abuses by government/AMISOM forces

5.4.1 The Human Rights Watch, World Report 2017, published 12 January 2017 covering events in 2016, looked at alleged abuses carried out by AMISOM and other foreign forces not under the command of AMISOM:

'Reports persist of indiscriminate killings of civilians by AMISOM and other foreign forces, including during operations against Al-Shabab and airstrikes.

'On July 17, Ethiopian forces indiscriminately killed 14 civilians during an operation against Al-Shabab in Somalia’s Bay region. So far, despite public commitments from AMISOM’s leadership, and an AMISOM board of inquiry, the findings have not been made public and survivors and the community have not received any compensation.

'Airstrikes by Kenya in the Gede region following the January 15 attack on its base in El Adde resulted in significant civilian deaths, displacement, and

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destruction of livestock and civilian property. The UN raised concerns of use of cluster munition by Kenya in the Gedo region, which Kenya denied.

‘The UN Security Council repeatedly called on troop-contributing countries to share information with AMISOM’s Civilian Casualty Tracking Analysis Research Cell, but this has not regularly occurred in practice.’

5.4.2 In his January 2017 report, the Secretary-General in Somalia noted:

‘Security operations generated 242 civilian casualties, of which 55 deaths and 120 injuries were attributed to the Somali security forces and 37 deaths and 12 injuries to AMISOM. UNSOM continued to engage with AMISOM on reported allegations of violations of human rights and humanitarian law, including the incident of 17 July [2016] that left 14 civilians dead and 3 others injured in Wardinle, near Baidoa, which was attributed to AMISOM (Ethiopian) troops. AMISOM is finalizing its investigation.’

5.4.3 The Danish Immigration Service’s fact finding report on the ‘Security Situation, al-Shabaab Presence and Target Groups’ (DIS 2017 report), published 8 March 2017 but based on interviews in Nairobi, Kenya, 3 to 10 December 2016, detailed human rights abuses conducted by the security services. The report is composite of several sources and details of those quoted are contained within the report:

‘According to a number of sources, human rights violations are not exclusively related to al-Shabaab. A UN source mentioned that e.g. extrajudicial killings and forced displacement are also taking place in government controlled areas. The same UN source added that family members of al-Shabaab fighters are perceived to pose a threat and therefore consequently forced to leave government controlled areas. As an example, the source mentioned that a mother to an al-Shabaab fighter was executed in the summer of 2015 allegedly for this reason only. The source mentioned five other episodes regarding sanctions against al-Shabaab family members by the government/AMISOM, and underlined that these examples should not be considered exhaustive.’

5.4.4 For statistical data of incidents involving AMISOM and government forces see Security situation – Overview.

5.5 United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS)

5.5.1 The UNSOS website defined its mandate:


‘United Nations Security Council Resolution 2245 decides that UNSOS will be responsible for support to AMISOM, UNSOM, the Somali National Army (SNA) and the Somali Police Force (SPF) on joint operations with AMISOM.’

5.5.2 A news article of 2 May 2016 on Gov.UK explained that UK troops were supporting the UN mission in Somalia:

‘Following a recce to assess options, this is the first UK team to travel to Somalia as part of United Nations (UN) support for the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) that is working to build stability in the country and tackle the threat posed by extremist group Al-Shabaab.

‘UK military personnel, drawn from Force Troop Command, 1 Div and Field Army training will provide medical, logistical and engineering support as part of a wider UK commitment. Following the arrival of these initial troops, up to 70 UK personnel will deploy to Somalia this year.’

5.6 UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

5.6.1 In his January 2017 report, the Secretary-General in Somalia noted:

‘The Mine Action Service continued to provide technical support and training in improvised explosive device detection and destruction as part of its efforts to enhance AMISOM operational mobility. Through a United Nations/AMISOM working group on improvised explosive devices, which was established in September, a “defeat-the-device” training plan was launched under the guidance of the Service. It comprises mitigation measures, specifically awareness, increased search capacity, technical operational equipment, threat/route assessments and proactive analysis.

‘The combined efforts of the training partners, through the AMISOM force headquarters, resulted in AMISOM finding an increased number of improvised explosive devices before they could detonate, as manifested by the Ugandan military locating and disposing of 16 devices on sector 1 main supply routes in October.

‘Efforts are under way to enhance security on the main supply routes in order to encourage trade and the movement of people, facilitate humanitarian access and ultimately contribute to the expansion of governance and state authority in areas liberated by AMISOM. Discussions with UNSOS led to AMISOM committing itself to incrementally providing force protection for road convoys, thereby drastically reducing the current overreliance on airlifts for logistical support.’

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6. **Al Shabaab and other groups**

6.1 **Al Shabaab**

6.1.1 Ambassador Matthew Rycroft, UK Permanent Representative to the United Nations, on Somalia, stated in a speech on 13 April 2017 that ‘Al Shabaab remains a vicious threat to security in Somalia, and indeed to the region.’27 The BBC described Al Shabaab as having emerged of the radical youth wing of Somalia's now-defunct Union of Islamic Courts, which controlled Mogadishu in 2006, before being forced out by Ethiopian forces. There are numerous reports of foreign jihadists going to Somalia to help Al-Shabaab, from neighbouring countries, as well as the US and Europe. It is banned as a terrorist group by both the US and the UK and is believed to have between 7,000 and 9,000 fighters. 28

6.1.2 For more detail about of Al Shabaab, including its formation, aims, current operation, areas of influence, tactics and targets, see the Country Policy and Information and Note on Somalia: Fear of Al Shabaab.

6.2 **Other non-state armed groups**

6.2.1 The European Asylum Support Office, Country of Origin Information Report. Somalia Security Situation, February 2016 (page 22) reported on the existence of small armed groups affiliated to Al-Shabaab who are based in the north east of the country and Ahlu Sunna wal Jamaa which is a pro-government militia that has significantly contributed to the relative security in the areas under its control.29

7. **Security situation**

7.1 **General overview**

7.1.1 For more detail see the Country Policy and Information and Note on Somalia: Fear of Al Shabaab.

7.1.2 The USSD 2016 report summarised the security situation for the twelve months of 2016, ‘Conflict during the year involving the government, militias, AMISOM, and al-Shabaab resulted in death, injury, and displacement of civilians. Clan-based political violence involved revenge killings and attacks on civilian settlements. Clashes between clan-based forces and with al-

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Shabaab in the Galmudug, Lower Shabelle, and Hiiraan Regions, also resulted in deaths.  

7.1.3 The United States Institute of Peace’s fact sheet of 30 January 2017, noted:

‘After decades of civil war and the collapse of the central government in 1991, Somalis and international supporters have made progress in re-establishing state structures, such as a provisional 2012 constitution and the country’s first elections for a government since 1969. The African Union and the United Nations, with U.S. assistance, support the Federal Government of Somalia in restoring institutions. Still, continued attacks by the al-Shabab extremist group, plus corruption and regional and clan disputes, have complicated the government’s efforts to hold popular elections and establish stable governance...Of an estimated 10 million Somalis, more than 2 million are displaced and 5 million need humanitarian assistance, according to U.N. agencies.’  

7.1.4 In his January 2017 report, the Secretary-General noted that when the Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security visited Somalia in October 2016 he noted ‘some improvement in the general security situation since his previous visit, in August 2014.’  

7.1.5 In his subsequent May 2017 report, covering the first four months of the year, the Secretary-General stated:

‘The number of human rights violations decreased during the reporting period: 646 civilian casualties were reported, including 287 deaths and 359 injuries. Overall, security forces were responsible for 150 civilian casualties, of which 54 deaths and 35 injuries were attributed to Somali security forces, while 20 deaths and 41 injuries were attributed to AMISOM.

‘Civilian casualties attributed to Al-Shabaab or unidentified persons totalled 134 deaths and 200 injuries, a 46.5 per cent increase from the previous reporting period [1 September – 31 December 2016]. Al-Shabaab abducted 36 persons, 15 of whom were later released.’  

7.1.6 The FCO report, Somalia – Human Rights Priority Country, status report: July to December 2016, updated 8 February 2017, noted:

‘There were frequent reports of civilian casualties attributable to all sides in the ongoing conflict and more localised conflicts between clan militias. Al Shabaab attacks, including assassinations, increased during this period. August saw a further Al Shabaab beach attack in Mogadishu that killed 9 civilians …and a truck bomb killed 22 civilians close to the presidential

palace. In December, Al Shabaab attacked the National Theatre. A total of 45 significant attacks took place in 2016. Fighting broke out between militias in Galkayo in October and caused a large number of civilian deaths and casualties. The media regularly reported on extra judicial killings by all parties. 34

7.1.7 The DIS 2017 report considered the security situation and found that:

‘Several sources agreed that AMISOM/SNA has some degree of military control of most urban centres, and al-Shabaab is in control of, or at least has influence over, most rural areas in S/C [south and central] Somalia and has a hidden presence in most urban centres. Two sources mentioned that due to al-Shabaab’s military gains during the second half of 2016, AMISOM had restructured its presence by abandoning smaller bases in order to consolidate at larger bases. When assessing the resilience and capacity of SNA, four sources agreed that at the moment it is unrealistic for SNA to take over from AMISOM.

‘It is difficult to make a clear demarcation of what areas are under the control of what group, and there exists grey areas of mixed or unknown control. A UN source added that it does not make much sense to talk about AMISOM/SNA being in “effective control” of a given city. The control situation is more nuanced and according to a Somalia Country Director of a humanitarian agency, al-Shabaab can infiltrate and move around in cities at night, which during the day are controlled by AMISOM/SNA. It was explained that S/C Somalia has been a highly insecure context for many years. The current security situation is characterised by armed conflict between AMISOM/SNA and allied forces, and al-Shabaab. This includes airstrikes in rural areas targeting al-Shabaab, but also causing displacement; and a considerable number of terror attacks in urban areas with AMISOM/SNA presence. In general, four sources highlighted that the security situation and conflicts of S/C Somalia should not be simplified to a black and white conflict between AMISOM/SNA and al-Shabaab as the situation and the role of the various actors are more complex and ambiguous. The security situation is also affected by flood, drought, land disputes, and clan violence, all of which cause displacement. Two sources mentioned that there are currently 1.1 million IDP’s throughout Somalia. According to a Somalia Country Director of a humanitarian agency, the security situation has seen little change the last three years and mentioned that it seems as if all actors are comfortable with status quo. A Western source assessed that, as of December 2016, the security situation is significantly better compared to five years ago when al-Shabaab was dislodged from Mogadishu but that the picture over the last 12 month is more blurred. In relation to this, a UN source found that the security situation has not improved compared to 2015 and deemed that in certain areas the situation has worsened.’ 35


7.1.8 The following map, compiled by the Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation (ACCORD) on 22 June 2017, contains information on conflict-related incidents according to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) at the University of Sussex (covering January to April 2017)\(^\text{36}\).

7.2 Situation in Mogadishu

7.2.1 Landinfo, in a query response of 27 February 2017, ‘Somalia: Violence, fatalities, perpetrators and victims in Mogadishu’, looked at who is behind the violence in Mogadishu. Landinfo prepared the following material from raw


data provided by ACLED’s [Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project] dataset Version 7 (1997-2016) (ACLED 2107):

‘Recorded violent incidents and recorded fatalities [in Mogadishu for 2016]’37

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perpetrators</th>
<th>Recorded incidents</th>
<th>Recorded fatalities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Shabaab</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government forces</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clan militia</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>510</strong></td>
<td><strong>681</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perpetrators</th>
<th>Registered attacks against civilians</th>
<th>Registered killed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Shabaab</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government forces</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>204</strong></td>
<td><strong>256</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.2.2 The table above shows that about 40% of all the recorded incidents in Mogadishu in 2016 were against civilians.

‘Civilians are also victims of firefights between military actors or in other attacks against military targets. It is unclear how many civilians were among the 425 who according to ACLED were killed in connection with attacks against military targets, but they probably form a minority. Here the civilians are not directly targeted, but become victims as a result of chance by being “in the wrong place at the wrong time”.

‘The table [above] shows that nearly 2/3 of the recorded attacks against civilians were committed by unknown perpetrators. The recorded events mainly appear as assassinations in the form of drive-by shootings, throwing of hand grenades and bombs attached under the victim’s car. The attacks mainly targeted business people, clan leaders and civil servants. Because the perpetrators of these events are unknown, the motives also remain unclear. According to source G (meeting in Mogadishu, January 2016) violence against individual civilians is often financially motivated or a consequence of personal disputes.’38

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7.3 Al Shabaab attacks

7.3.1 In his January 2017 report, the Secretary-General in Somalia detailed security developments in the period 1 September to 31 December 2016:

‘In Mogadishu, Al-Shabaab stepped up the use of car bombings with the intention of perpetuating a sense of insecurity among the public during the electoral period. On 18 September, a suicide bomber drove his vehicle into a Somali forces convoy, killing a senior commander and seven soldiers. On 1 October, an explosive-laden vehicle detonated outside a restaurant, killing 4 people and injuring 10 others. On 5 November, a suicide bomber drove into a Somali and AMISOM convoy, killing four troops and injuring nine others. On 11 December, a minivan exploded at the port of Mogadishu, killing more than 35 people. Two suicide bombers failed to hit their targets on 10 and 15 December, but their vehicles exploded, killing a National Intelligence and Security Agency officer and injuring 12 other people. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for a mortar attack that caused minor damage to the United Nations common compound on 29 September. Suspected Al-Shabaab operatives gunned down six clan elders and two electoral delegates on 20 October, 2, 6, 9 and 29 November and 11 and 28 December.

In central and southern Somalia, Al-Shabaab continued to engage in guerrilla warfare and occasionally deployed fighters to carry out complex attacks. On 16 September, some 150 fighters raided a Somali army base in Ceel Waaq, Gedo region, killing eight soldiers. On 18 October, more than 100 Al-Shabaab fighters attacked multiple government locations in Afgooye, Shabelle Hoose region, killing 14 people, including two senior military officials and the Director General of the Ministry of Finance of the Interim South-West Administration. On 25 October, an explosives-laden truck targeted Djiboutian positions in Beledweyne, Hiraan region, leaving four people dead and eight injured.

‘Al-Shabaab made some territorial gains following the withdrawal of Ethiopian and Somali forces from Muqakoori, Ceel Cali and Halgen, Hiraan region, on 15 September and 11 and 23 October. The group also regained control of Tayeeglow, Bakool region, following the withdrawal on 26 October of Ethiopian and Somali troops. Somali forces sought to recover the town on 15 November, but did not succeed. In Bay region, Somali forces twice lost Goof Guduud Shabelow to Al-Shabaab, on 1 and 23 November, but regained control of the town with the support of AMISOM on 7 December.’

7.3.2 In his subsequent May 2017 report, the Secretary-General detailed the security incidents, in most part assigned to Al Shabaab, during the first four months of 2017:

[Mogadishu]

‘In Mogadishu, Al-Shabaab failed to disrupt the electoral process, despite conducting two attacks there in January. On 2 January, two explosive-laden vehicles detonated near the Mogadishu International Airport, killing 16

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people and injuring 23. On 25 January, four assailants launched a complex attack on the Daya Hotel, resulting in 38 fatalities and more than 50 injured.

‘No security incidents were reported during the presidential election on 8 February, but terrorist activities resumed the following week. On 16 February, four mortar rounds landed near Villa Somalia at the time of the presidential handover ceremony. On 19 February, a car bomb in a market area killed at least 34 people and injured 50. On 22 February, three mortar rounds impacted the same area, injuring four civilians. Al-Shabaab senior leaders have expressed hostility towards the new President and vowed to continue waging war on the Federal Government. On 13 March, two explosive-laden vehicles detonated near the former Jazeera Training Centre and in front of the Wehliye Hotel, killing 18 people and injuring others. Another car bombing at a checkpoint near the National Theatre on 21 March resulted in over 10 fatalities and more injured. In both cases, Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility. On 16 April, a United Nations convoy on its way to a settlement of internally displaced persons in the outskirts of Mogadishu was nearly hit by a roadside bomb. A rear escort vehicle was slightly damaged and two Somali escort guards suffered minor injuries. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the bomb, stating that the United Nations was the intended target.

[South and central Somalia]

‘Al-Shabaab guerrilla warfare continued in rural areas of central and southern Somalia. Attacks on Somali and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces were reported regularly along logistics routes. The most serious incident was a complex attack on 27 January on a Kenyan military base near Kulbiyow, Lower Juba region. More than 30 Kenyan troops were reported killed, although the exact figure remains unknown.’

7.3.3 On 15 June 2017 the BBC reported that ‘A combined suicide bomb and gun attack at two restaurants in Somalia's capital, Mogadishu, has killed at least 20 people...Militants from the al-Shabab group held hostages during a shoot-out with police...All five attackers are said to have been killed.’


‘Since September 2016, the primary locations for violent activity involving al-Shabaab have been in the population centres of Mogadishu as well as areas in the immediate south-west along the southern tail of the Shebelle River. Over the past several months, these two areas alone account for over 40 percent of all violent al-Shabaab activity in the region... Prominent and deadly tactics of the sect’s violence in this area have come in the way of large IEDs or explosive-laden vehicles placed in crowded open air-markets, markets, or military checkpoints. Often, these tactics have been used


in coordination with other methods, such as organized raids following the initial explosion… Generally, these attacks tend to have a specific and strategic human target, which could include senior military officers or politicians, which was the case in at Wehliye. In more remote areas, al-Shabaab tends to target AMISOM supply convoys and armed patrols with buried IEDs and other mines. In similar tactic to urban settings, the attackers may lay in wait for the initial blast, and then engage their target in the ensuing confusion. This strategy of attack is often used in the Lower Shabelle, along the Marka – Afgoye – Mogadishu corridor.’42

7.3.5 The DIS 2017 report stated:

‘During the second half of 2016 Ethiopian bilateral troops (ENDF) withdrew from the following locations: Tayeeglow, Garas Weyne, Rab Duuure, and Buur Dhuxunle (Bakool); Ceel Cali, Halgan, and Moqokori (Hiraan); and Galcad and Bulbud (Galgaduud). In all cases, al-Shabaab has immediately moved in and taken control. According to a UN source, civilians in these areas have reportedly been subjected to retribution attacks, including torture, forced recruitment, and killings. A Somali NGO concurred that the retaliation has been against persons accused of collaborating with the Ethiopian troops. The pattern of retaliation is not restricted to these cases of ENDF withdrawals. An independent organisation and a Somali NGO explained that it also applies whenever AMISOM/SNA withdraws and whenever AMISOM/SNA/ENDF takes over an area from al-Shabaab. The attitude of the government and the human rights abuses committed by AMISOM/SNA e.g. when clearing an area is explained as a key factor in understanding the level of popular support for al-Shabaab.’ 43

7.3.6 For full details of Al Shabaab, including its formation, aims, current operation, areas of influence, tactics and targets see the Country Information and Policy Note on Somalia: Fear of Al Shabaab.

7.4 Clan violence

7.4.1 The DIS 2017 report stated:

‘The security situation is dynamic and displacement and casualties in S/C Somalia do not necessarily relate to al-Shabaab. Businessmen with their own militias and other clan militias are also involved in the assassinations and many of these are erroneously ascribed to al-Shabaab and al-Shabaab may claim responsibility for attacks it has not been involved in. Clan violence due to e.g. disputes over land, blood revenge or political control is widespread. Intra and inter-clan armed clashes continue with limited success of reconciliation efforts.

'According to a Somalia Country Director of a humanitarian agency, clan violence is regarded as a higher risk for civilians than violence carried out by al-Shabaab. The same source highlighted that Somalia, in general, is an extremely violent society, and that the population is used to resort to violence as a response to disputes within both the private and public sphere. Disputes easily escalate into violence, and it is not unusual that business agreements or recruitment of employees escalate into violence and/or death threats. This high level of social violence affects the civilian population throughout S/C Somalia, where social violence has worsened due to the lack of rule of law. According to an anonymous source, the security situation is particularly dire for single women without a clan network and women who are internally displaced. The existence of a clan network can offer an individual including a single woman, a level of protection. However, the same source found that due to both the current security and humanitarian situation it is becoming more difficult for the clans to protect their members.'

7.4.2 Amnesty International, in their ‘2016/17 International Report – Somalia’, noted, ‘Clan and government-aligned militias continued to carry out extrajudicial killings, extortion, arbitrary arrests and rape. On 7 August [2016], a clan militia in Qansax Dheere district in Bay region fired mortar shells at civilians, killing three. In August, several civilians were killed during clan clashes in Bay region.’

7.4.3 The UN Security Council October 2016 update noted:

‘The clan-based composition of most SNA units continues to compromise their impartiality, especially in districts with complex inter-communal relations. In its final report for 2015…, the Monitoring Group documented opportunistic alliances made by particular units with regional clan militias and/or Al-Shabaab during periods of conflict. During the current mandate, the Group has received multiple reports, from the Lower Shabelle, Hir and Mudug regions, of similar incidents in which elements of SNA have perpetuated rather than prevented local conflicts.’

7.4.4 The USSD report for 2016 noted, ‘Clan-based political violence involved revenge killings and attacks on civilian settlements. Clashes between clan-based forces and with al-Shabaab in the Galmudug, Lower Shabelle, and Hiiraan Regions, also resulted in deaths.’

7.4.5 The International Crisis Group reported in May 2017 that:

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‘Al-Shabaab is not the only non-state armed actor whose actions have a direct impact on the humanitarian crisis. Parts of the country remain trapped in unresolved interclan conflicts. These tensions are typically exacerbated in times of drought when massive numbers of people and livestock move across traditional clan “boundaries” in search of water and pasture. Pre-existing clan disputes tend to resurface, sometimes resulting in sporadic, low-level clashes among clan militias. This is particularly true in Sool and Sanaag regions (northern Somalia) as well as Hiiraan, Galgadud, Mudug Lower and Middle Shabelle in south-central Somalia. A series of clashes in the contested town of Galkacyo in north-central Somalia in the last two years triggered a massive displacement, with estimates ranging between 75,000 and 100,000, and a humanitarian crisis.\(^{48}\)

7.4.6 In his May 2017 report, the UN Secretary-General noted, ‘On 11 January [2017], six people died and eight were injured in clashes between clan militias in Abudwak.' \(^{49}\)

8. **Humanitarian situation**

8.1 **Overview**

8.1.1 In his January 2017 report, the Secretary-General in Somalia detailed the humanitarian situation in the period 1 September to 31 December 2016:

‘The humanitarian situation deteriorated during the reporting period and is set to worsen as drought conditions extend beyond Puntland and “Somaliland” to areas in the south, such as Gedo and Juba Hoose. A continued lack of social safety nets and basic services increases the country’s vulnerability and the potential for a broader crisis. The situation is expected to worsen because the current deyr rainy season has not yielded the expected level of rainfall.

‘The assessments carried out by the Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit of the post-gu rain were delivered in September and showed that two worrying thresholds had been surpassed. There are now 5 million Somalis facing acute food shortages, of whom more than 1.1 million are in emergency and crisis situations. The nutrition situation has also deteriorated, with more than 320,000 acutely malnourished children in need of urgent nutrition support, including more than 50,000 who are severely malnourished.

‘The growing humanitarian needs come as resources are dwindling. The perception that Somalia is on the rise, coupled with competition from other global crises, has led to diminished humanitarian funding. As at early December, the Humanitarian Response Plan for 2016, launched in January, was funded at just in excess of 47 per cent, or $414 million of the $885

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million required. Owing to the limited resources, livelihood and resilience programmes had to be deprioritized in favour of life-saving programmes.\(^{50}\)

8.1.2 The UN Secretary-General in his May 2017 report covering the first four months of the year stated:

‘The humanitarian situation deteriorated at an alarming pace and the risk of famine continues in 2017. On 28 February, the President of the Federal Republic convened a high-level round table on drought response and declared a national disaster, urging international and national stakeholders to redouble efforts to avert a catastrophe. The communique issued at the end of the meeting announced the adoption of a policy of zero tolerance for any diversion of humanitarian assistance and included a pledge to take firm action against anyone engaging in such corrupt practices. It also highlighted the vital role of the private sector in supporting the delivery of humanitarian supplies.

‘…Prices of staple food surged in January, and declining livestock prices and increasing cereal prices have sharply depleted terms of trade for pastoralists, according to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations.’\(^{51}\)

8.2 Drought

8.2.1 The House of Commons Briefing Paper 7298 – Somalia: February 2017 update, published 16 February 2017, noted:

‘Perhaps the most urgent challenge facing the new president is the severe drought that is affecting Somalia. In January 2017 the UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia said that five million Somalis – about half the population – do not have enough to eat. In February, the UK Government’s Envoy for the Horn of Africa, Sir Nicholas Kay, said that hundreds of thousands of Somalis could die in the next few months unless there is action to address the threat of famine. However, the crisis has not yet officially been declared a famine.’\(^{52}\)

8.2.2 The FCO report, Somalia – Human Rights Priority Country, status report: July to December 2016, updated 8 February 2017 noted:

‘Somalia faces an increasingly severe humanitarian crisis, exacerbated by ongoing drought. Puntland and Somaliland remain the most severely affected. 5 million people are now in need of assistance, over one million of whom are Internally Displaced Persons (IDP). Approximately one million people in Somalia face a humanitarian and emergency crisis and almost four million people face food security stress…DFID’s multiyear (2013-2017)


Humanitarian and Resilience programme has increased from £169m to £179m in response to the drought and refugee returns from Kenya. An additional £10m was made available in December for drought response in 2017.  

8.2.3 The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs [UNOCHA] 2017 ‘Humanitarian Needs Overview, Somalia’, published October 2016, stated:

‘Drought, caused by failure of successive rains, remains the most significant climatic driver of the humanitarian crisis in Somalia…The majority of Somalis in rural areas depend on subsistence farming and pastoralism for their livelihoods, with men and women making significant contributions to the household economy and food production. Given the dependency of rural livelihoods on the seasonal calendar, the impact of up to four seasons of failed rains, with a fifth, the 2016 Deyr rains in jeopardy, in some areas has been so severe that recovery for many requires more than one beneficial rainy season to recover.’

8.2.4 The UNOCHA ‘Somalia: Drought Response - Situation Report No. 8’ (as of 16 May 2017) included the following bullet points:

- ‘The humanitarian situation continues to deteriorate and the estimated number of people in need of humanitarian assistance has now increased to 6.7 million people — more than half the population of the country, according to the latest projections by the FAO-managed Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit.

- ‘Some 683,000 people have been displaced due to drought in Somalia since November 2016.

- ‘Drought has caused the largest outbreak of cholera Somalia has seen in the last five years with over 38,000 cases and 683 deaths so far in 2017, according to WHO. Nearly 7,694 suspected cases of measles have been reported in 2017.

- ‘The Gu rainfall started two weeks later than normal and has been below average in all areas, except in the northeast where rainfall totals have been near average.

- ‘The revised Humanitarian Response Plan was launched on 10 May. The revised HRP is seeking US$1.5 billion to reach 5.5 million people with life-saving assistance in 2017.

- ‘The London Somalia Conference held on 11 May has called for strong partnerships and additional funding for further scale-up of the humanitarian response in Somalia.’

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8.2.5 The UN Secretary-General, who visited the area on 7 March 2017, noted in his May 2017 report:

‘On 18 February, the humanitarian country team issued an operational plan for prevention of famine, requesting $825 million to reach 5.5 million people from January to June 2017. Donors have moved quickly to contribute $580 million to scale up humanitarian action.

‘Following lessons learned from the 2011 drought, robust risk management capacity has been put in place to minimize diversion of humanitarian aid. An increased use of cash assistance (constituting around 50 per cent of assistance in major aid sectors), which draws on the strong private sector role, contributes to stabilizing markets and has improved the ability to scale up assistance and reach beneficiaries in remote areas. Access issues, including roadblocks and administrative impediments, are more systematically mapped and addressed through engagement with federal and local authorities, as well as traditional leaders.’

8.2.6 UNHCR Somalia in its PRMN (Protection and Return Monitoring Network) drought displacements figures to 31 May 2017 noted a ‘dramatic drop’ in new displacements which ‘may indicate an improvement in the humanitarian situation in areas of origin as a result of widespread rains during the second half of May.’

8.3 Internally displaced persons (IDPs)

8.3.1 The UNHCR, in a press briefing of 12 May 2017, stated:

‘More than two million Somalis are currently displaced by conflict - now lasting for more than two decades. Some 1.5 million people are internally displaced in Somalia and nearly 900,000 are refugees in the region…

‘The ongoing drought also increases risk of famine-induced displacement in the region. Since November 2016, more than 683,000 people in Somalia have been internally displaced by drought, including more than 377,000 displaced during the first quarter of 2017. Over 126,000 of those are in the capital Mogadishu, and some 136,000 to Baidoa in the country’s southwest Bay region…

‘In addition to conflict and famine-induced internal displacement, some refugees are returning to Somalia - mainly from Kenya (60,800) since December 2013 and Yemen (30,600) since March 2015.’
8.3.2 The International Displacement Monitoring Centre, in its ‘Grid 2017 Spotlight Somalia: Returning “home” from Dadaab camp’, stated that the ‘UNHCR considers much (if not all) of the displacement in Somalia to be the same people being displaced repeatedly and, as a result, did not update its stock figure during 2016. Indeed, despite the number of new displacements and cross-border returns, UNHCR reported the exact same number of IDPs (1,106,751) in January, February, March, April, May, June, July and December 2016.’\(^{59}\)

8.3.3 The Rift Valley Institute 2017 report, ‘Land Matters in Mogadishu: Settlement, ownership and displacement in a contested city’, argued:

‘While it is important to maintain the category of IDP within Mogadishu—to inform understanding of associated needs and to shape the implementation of aid and protection programmes—the assumption that all urban IDPs will eventually leave Mogadishu when stability is restored is misleading and misinforms policy development. The fluidity of categories, and the desire of many to remain where they now reside, was acknowledged as far back as 2007, but this long-standing reality is not reflected in the recent government’s policy or rhetoric, which is still centred on return.’\(^{60}\)

8.4 Evictions in Mogadishu

8.4.1 The USSD report for 2016 stated:

‘Government and regional authorities provided negligible protection and assistance to IDPs and sometimes actively participated in their displacement. Private persons with claims to land and government authorities, for example, regularly pursued the forceful eviction of IDPs in Mogadishu. Some IDPs and humanitarian agencies criticized local authorities for tacitly endorsing the forceful relocation of IDPs to insecure areas in Mogadishu. Somali authorities did not prevent the forced displacement of persons from shelters to camps on the outskirts of the city.

‘From January to August [2016], authorities forcibly evicted approximately 91,000 persons, mostly IDPs; more than 78,000 were relocated to the south central part of the country, primarily Mogadishu. Insecure land tenure and limited land title verification contributed to the scale of forced evictions.’\(^{61}\)

8.4.2 A Human Rights Watch report, ‘In Crisis-Stricken Somalia, No Safe Haven’, published 18 April 2017, looked at the eviction of people from IDP camps on public land in Mogadishu, ‘Since November 2016, over 60,000 people have been forcibly evicted…Many of those evicted have been forced to move to

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more dangerous places on the outskirts of Mogadishu, where shelter is scarce and access to aid is even more limited.\textsuperscript{62}

8.4.3 The Rift Valley Institute 2017 report, ‘Land Matters in Mogadishu: Settlement, ownership and displacement in a contested city’, stated:

‘Access to land and security of land tenure are important determinants of vulnerability experienced by IDPs and the urban poor in Mogadishu. Those settled on government or private land have little or no security of tenure as property is reclaimed, and very little access to land within the city. Without a clear and comprehensive approach to the issue of IDPs and the urban poor, Mogadishu’s densely populated IDP camps will morph into vast urban slums, creating a permanent under-class of city residents living in squalid conditions, and, some argue, an on-going security threat.’\textsuperscript{63}

9. Freedom of movement

9.1 General

9.1.1 The USSD 2016 report noted: ‘Checkpoints operated by government forces, allied groups, armed militias, clan factions, and al-Shabaab inhibited movement and exposed citizens to looting, extortion, harassment, and violence. Roadblocks manned by armed actors and attacks on humanitarian personnel severely restricted movement and the delivery of aid in southern and central sectors of the country.’\textsuperscript{64}

9.1.2 The Logistics Cluster in its Somalia - Access Constraints Map\textsuperscript{65}, as of 7 April 2017, showed the road system and gave details of accessibility.

9.1.3 The International Crisis Group reported in May 2017 that:

‘Al-Shabaab maintains an active military presence in much of the south’s drought-stricken countryside, and its violence and other destabilising activities constitute the greatest impediment to the delivery of relief to drought victims. The group routinely launches deadly assaults on troops of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), Somalia Federal Government (SFG) and federal member states; runs ‘security checkpoints’ on major routes; and uses a variety of coercive tactics to prevent people from leaving and block access to aid agencies.’\textsuperscript{66}

9.1.4 For detailed information on freedom of movement see the country policy and information note on Somalia: Fear of Al Shabaab.


\textsuperscript{63}Rift Valley Institute (RVI), Land Matters in Mogadishu: Settlement, ownership and displacement in a contested city (page 75), 2017, http://riftvalley.net/publication/land-matters-mogadishu#.WT6TzPn5w1k Accessed 12 June 2017


9.2 Return of refugees

9.2.1 Kenya announced in May 2016 that it would close Dadaab camp, home to more than 300,000 Somalis. The UNHCR’s report, ‘Voluntary Repatriation of Somali Refugees From Kenya: Operations Strategy 2015-2019’ considered the situation:

‘At the height of the humanitarian crisis in 2011, the number of Somali refugees in Kenya was 519,411. This figure is now 420,711 – a decrease of 98,700 – indicating that a significant number may have spontaneously returned to Somalia. In this regard, tracking of refugee assistance trends by UNHCR and WFP Kenya during 2014 revealed that 50,000 Somali refugees were reported as being absent at the end of the year. UNHCR Kenya considers that a significant majority of these people may have spontaneously returned to Somalia, although this could not be verified fully by UNHCR and partners in Somalia.

‘Recently, UNHCR Dadaab has noted increasing numbers of refugees making inquiries about return to Somalia. Since November 2013, Return Help-Desks in Dadaab refugee camps recorded more than 10,000 refugees who made return-related inquiries. By August 2015, 4,912 had expressed the intention to return to Somalia and may confirm their intention at any time. Given that all the returnees under the pilot arrived at their final destination in safety and dignity, and very few are reported to have entered a situation of internal displacement, it is envisaged that the number of people deciding to return to Somalia will steadily increase.’

9.2.2 The UK Government, in a news article of 22 September 2016 published on the government website, stated:

‘The UK has announced that it will provide an additional £20 million (approx Ksh 2.7b) to accelerate the voluntary return of refugees to Somalia from Kenya. This new support will help ensure that refugees who want to return home have the support and livelihoods in place to ensure their safe, long-term resettlement in Somalia. Of the £20 million, £4million (approx Ksh 529m) will be spent in Kenya to identify and register Somali refugees who want to return, and provide safe routes of transport from Kenya. The remainder of the funds will go into providing shelter, hygiene kits and the essentials for people to return and resume a normal life in Somalia.

‘The UK is already working with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to support voluntary returns and has helped over 12,000 people return to Somalia in 2016, giving people the choice about where they build their livelihoods.’

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9.2.3 A UN News Centre’s press release of 22 December 2016 reported:

‘The United Nations Peacebuilding Fund is set to allocate $3 million on a pilot project that will provide peacebuilding and professional skills to Somali refugees volunteering to return from Kenya to Somalia…

‘UN Peacebuilding notes that the project is unique as it reaches across borders and targets the same population, first in asylum in Dadaab, Kenya, and then upon return to Baidoa, Somalia. It builds on an agreement between the governments of Kenya and Somalia and Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on the voluntary repatriation of Somali refugees living in Dadaab.

‘UNHCR in Kenya, as well as UNHCR, the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the Food and Agriculture Organizations (FAO), the World Food Programme (WFP), the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the International Labour Organization (ILO) in Somalia will receive the funding. ‘The Peacebuilding Fund is currently also sponsoring other projects in Somalia, aimed at strengthening the national authority in areas liberated from rebel control.

‘The initiative is designed to promote coexistence and peaceful resolution of conflict in Somalia, in addition to supporting the Government’s priorities for stabilization and peace dividends, including investment in jobs. The Fund also aims to continue launching similar initiatives on return and reintegration of refugees.’

9.3 Return of diaspora to Somalia

9.3.1 A policy brief by the Heritage Institute for Policy Studies, ‘Diaspora Return to Somalia, Perceptions and Implications’, published June 2014, concluded, ‘Unless widespread conflict re-emerges in Somalia, the diaspora will continue to return to their country of origin. Indeed, with sustained peace throughout the country the rate of return would be expected to increase.’

9.3.2 A 2015 paper by the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) looked at the return of the diaspora to Somalia. The paper was prefaced with a brief summary overview:

- ‘Diaspora return for business is appreciated in Somalia, but constitutes a small portion of returns
- Those who return voluntarily from Norway and the USA, return with citizenship and resources, including education
- Many diaspora Somalis lead transnational lives compatible with business – with families working and living in multiple countries

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Some diaspora business brings new services and products to Somalia – including taxis, dry cleaners, gyms and law firms

Support for diaspora businesses with investment funds is important; building on collaborations between local and diaspora entrepreneurs.\(^\text{72}\)

9.3.3 Al Arabiya reported on 3 January 2016 about new housing developments in Mogadishu:

‘Somalia’s elegant colonial villas were left in ruins by two decades of street fighting among warlords, and the seaside capital Mogadishu was dubbed the most dangerous city in the world.

‘But now new housing estates are being built amid an economic boom as diaspora Somalis return and newly wealthy businessmen capitalize on the relative peace in the city.

‘Some seven kilometers (four miles) outside Mogadishu in a formerly largely rural area, new homes are springing up, with almost 50 houses now ready on an estate, builders say…

‘Those returning to Somalia - including investors wanting to start new business in their homeland - say the Daru Salaam estate offers them a more secure place to live.

‘I came back to this city to buy a new home in Daru Salaam neighborhood… the houses are well built,” said Abdiqadar Jimale Roble, 34, who grew up in Sweden from the age of 12 […]

‘I have been out of Somalia for long time but I came back because everybody needs his country -and the country is making much progress,” Roble added.

‘I had to take part in that progress, and everybody should have a house in his country.’\(^\text{73}\)

9.3.4 An article of 10 January 2017 by Andrew Harding and published by Hurst noted that ‘The Somali diaspora is starting to return to help rebuild Mogadishu after years of violence in and around the capital.’ He spoke to a women’s rights activist who originally left Somalia with her family in 1992, but had now returned:

‘Ilham explained how she and other educated members of the diaspora were determined to come back to Mogadishu “with a different mindset.” They had grown up in stable western democracies, able to appreciate the value of institutions, and were anxious now to prove that politics in Somalia could be done differently, free of corruption and clan divisions…“If you can help a nation to stand on its feet, why not?”


‘…she’s got a new job as a political advisor at the United Nations office beside the airport, and she’s thinking of bringing her family from London to nearby Nairobi, Kenya. “It’s not safe enough to move them back here yet. But maybe next year.”’

10. Maps and information resources

10.1.1 The following sources contain current and regularly updated maps and resources on the conflict and humanitarian situation:

- For the UN Security Council’s regular reports on developments in Somalia including maps and other information regarding territorial control within Somalia, see: http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/somalia/

- **UN Map of Somalia December 2011**

- The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) also provides regular updates on the situation on the ground including maps showing territorial control, see: http://amisom-au.org/

- UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)’s Reliefweb, Somalia country page contains regularly updated maps and resources on the humanitarian and security situation in Somalia


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Version control and contacts

Contacts

If you have any questions about this note and your line manager, senior caseworker or technical specialist cannot help you, or you think that this note has factual errors then email the Country Policy and Information Team.

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Clearance

Below is information on when this note was cleared:

- version 3.0
- valid from 26 July 2017

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Updated country information and minor revisions to policy guidance section.

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