


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ANDRÉ BIROTTE JR.  
United States Attorney  
SANDRA R. BROWN  
Assistant United States Attorney  
Chief, Tax Division  
DARWIN THOMAS (SBN 80745)  
Assistant United States Attorney  
Federal Building, Room 7211  
300 North Los Angeles Street  
Los Angeles, California 90012  
Tel: (213) 894-2740; Fax: (213) 894-0115  
Email: darwin.thomas@usdoj.gov  
BRIAN H. CORCORAN (DC Bar No. 456976)  
Trial Attorney, Tax Division  
U.S. Department of Justice  
Post Office Box 7238  
Washington, D.C. 20044  
Tel: (202) 353-7421; Fax (202) 514-6770  
Email: Brian.H.Corcoran@usdoj.gov  
Attorneys for the United States of America



UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA  
WESTERN DIVISION

(Type)

United States of America,  
Plaintiff,  
vs.  
Kenneth Elliott, d/b/a KAE Insurance  
Services, Inc., Vista Barranca, Inc.,  
and KAE Consulting; Sea Nine  
Associates, Inc., and Ramesh Sarva,  
Defendants.

Case No. SACV13-1582JLS

COMPLAINT FOR PERMANENT  
INJUNCTION AND OTHER  
RELIEF

1 The United States of America, for its complaint against Defendants Kenneth  
2 Elliott d/b/a KAE Insurance Services, Inc., Vista Barranca, Inc., and KAE  
3 Consulting, and Sea Nine Associates, Inc., and Ramesh Sarva, seeking a  
4 permanent injunction pursuant to 26 U.S.C. ("I.R.C.") §§ 7402 and 7408 to  
5 prohibit them from further promoting a fraudulent tax scheme (more completely  
6 described herein), states as follows:

7  
8 **NATURE OF ACTION**

9 1. Defendants organize, operate, and/or promote a scheme in which they  
10 sell to customers owning small, often closely-held companies participation in  
11 Voluntary Employee Beneficiary Association ("VEBA") plans. The Defendants  
12 claim that customers can, through the contributions their businesses make to  
13 VEBA plans administered or operated by the Defendants, fund for their employees  
14 (and more often than not themselves) a valuable insurance-oriented welfare benefit  
15 while claiming all of the VEBA contributions as a federal income tax deduction.  
16 At the same time, those plan contributions are intended to provide participating  
17 customers with a valuable deferred compensation-like benefit that allows them to  
18 recoup the full value of their initial contributions. In fact, this scheme – through  
19 which the Defendants' customers enjoy a substantial tax deduction for their plan  
20 contributions, while also permitting them to retain the full value of the  
21 contributions later - violates the Internal Revenue Code and applicable Treasury  
22 regulations, and the Defendants' promotion of it constitutes enjoined penalty  
23 conduct.

24 2. Defendant Kenneth Elliott ("Elliott"), personally and through both his  
25 employment with co-defendant Sea Nine Associates, Inc. ("Sea Nine"), a number  
26 of related entities he controls (KAE Insurance Services, Inc. ("KAE"), Vista

1 Barranca, Inc., and KAE Consulting), and a network of affiliated third parties (e.g.  
2 independent certified public accountants (“CPA”) and financial planners) informs  
3 potential participating companies that participating in a VEBA plan provides them  
4 with a lucrative and tax-advantaged method to accrue wealth.

5 3. Defendant Ramesh Sarva (“Sarva”) is a CPA who has been steering  
6 his customers toward VEBA plans for over 20 years – and in particular, toward Sea  
7 Nine-administered VEBA plans. He promotes the plans’ false benefits while also  
8 rebroadcasting the false statements that Elliott and Sea Nine make about the plans  
9 they operate and administer. Sarva has persuaded more than 30 taxpayers to  
10 participate in a Sea Nine plan, enriching himself (as well as Elliott and Sea Nine)  
11 in the process.

12 4. As a result of the Defendants’ promotion, companies from across the  
13 nation have contributed millions in dollars to a variety of VEBA plans, and paid  
14 the Defendants substantial sums to manage these plans. VEBA plan participating  
15 companies also deduct millions of dollars in contributions to the plans.

16 5. More than a decade ago, however, the IRS ruled that employee  
17 welfare benefit plans like the VEBAs the Defendants promote and operate do not  
18 comply with federal tax law, and such determinations have been repeatedly upheld  
19 by federal courts. Yet the Defendants have continued to falsely claim that the  
20 VEBA plans in fact comply with the tax laws, and manage and promote them to  
21 this day despite their documented knowledge of the illegality of the plans. The  
22 result is significant amounts of lost tax revenue to the Treasury based on  
23 erroneously claimed tax deductions.

24 6. Accordingly, the United States brings this complaint pursuant to  
25 I.R.C. §§ 7402 and 7408 to enjoin the Defendants from promoting participation in  
26 VEBA plans, managing the plans, and/or assisting persons in participating in them,

1 thereby enabling their customers to falsely claim tax deductions to which they are  
2 not entitled.

### 4 JURISDICTION AND VENUE

5 7. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1340 and 1345, and  
6 I.R.C. §§ 7402(a).

7 8. This action for injunctive relief is brought at the request of the Chief  
8 Counsel of the Internal Revenue Service, a delegate of the Secretary of the  
9 Treasury, and commenced at the direction of a delegate of the Attorney General of  
10 the United States, pursuant to I.R.C. §§ 7402 and 7408.

11 9. Venue is proper in this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because a  
12 substantial part of the events giving rise to this suit took place in this district. The  
13 Court has personal jurisdiction over all named defendants, including those not  
14 domiciled in this jurisdiction, because the claims asserted against them arise out of  
15 events that took place in this district, and because it was foreseeable they would be  
16 sued in this district.

### 18 THE PARTIES

19 10. Defendant Elliott is a resident of Rancho Santa Margarita, California.  
20 Besides his employment with Sea Nine, Elliott conducts business relevant to the  
21 claims in this lawsuit through a variety of entities that he set up for administrative  
22 purposes (*e.g.* to enable him to separate income streams he derives for the different  
23 kinds of work and services he generally provides through Sea Nine).

24 11. Defendant Sea Nine is a Nevada corporation founded by Stephen  
25 Ross. After Ross's death in 2000, ownership and formal control of Sea Nine passed  
26 to his widow, Sylvia Ross Calhoun. Elliott (via a management contract between  
27

1 Sea Nine and one of his personal business entities) operates and manages Sea Nine  
2 as a business concern as if he were its chief executive officer, even though he does  
3 not possess a formal title at the company.

4 12. KAE is the business name Elliott utilizes for performance of any  
5 licensed insurance agent-related work he performs for Sea Nine.

6 13. Vista Barranca is a business entity Elliott created for the purpose of  
7 employing and paying him for the work he performs for Sea Nine. At the end of  
8 each year, Sea Nine issues a Form 1099 to Vista Barranca for whatever income  
9 Elliott has drawn from his work for Sea Nine.

10 14. KAE Consulting is the business name Elliott utilizes when he  
11 performs certain fee-for-service consulting work for Sea Nine or independently.

12 15. Defendant Sarva is a CPA and resident of Little Neck, New York. He  
13 does business as "Ramesh Sarva, CPA, PC" and has offices in New York and  
14 Tennessee. He also does business as "Soft Tech Source," which is a division of his  
15 CPA practice.

16  
17 **BACKGROUND ON WELFARE BENEFIT PLANS**

18 16. As described in more detail below, the Defendants typically market  
19 participation in the VEBA plans that Sea Nine operates to high net worth  
20 customers who operate small or closely-held businesses, such as medical practices.  
21 They inform such customers that participation in a Sea Nine-administered VEBA  
22 plan allows the customers to lawfully avoid paying taxes on the funds contributed  
23 to the plans - because such contributions constitute tax-deductible payments to a  
24 "welfare benefit plan" that purportedly complies with the Internal Revenue Code.

25 17. A welfare benefit plan provides certain benefits - such as medical or  
26 death benefits - to a company's employees or its other designated beneficiaries,

1 like the company's principals. Where such a plan provides benefits for only one  
2 company's employees, it is sometimes referred to as a "single employer plan" or  
3 "Section 419(e) Plan." By contrast, if ten or more employers participate in the  
4 plan, and other conditions are met, the plan is commonly called a "10 or more  
5 employer plan," "multiple employer plan" or "Section 419A(f)(6) plan." The  
6 Defendants purport to operate lawful and compliant Section 419A(f)(6) plans.

7 18. Welfare benefit plans under Section 419 have common characteristics.  
8 To finance the employee benefits that such a plan is supposed to make available,  
9 the plan creates a single joint trust or other fund to which an employer (or, in the  
10 case of a 419A(f)(6) plan, all participating company/employers) makes  
11 contributions. In turn, the trust uses those contributions to purchase insurance  
12 contracts and other assets which provide welfare benefits (mainly life insurance  
13 protection) to certain of the company's employees. A trustee (often a bank or other  
14 financial institution) typically takes formal ownership of the insurance policies  
15 purchased by the plan and helps operate the VEBA plan.

16 19. A company could opt simply to finance the purchase of individual  
17 insurance policies for those employees to whom it wished to provide such a  
18 benefit. However, in such cases the premium paid for the individual insurance  
19 policies would generally be included as part of the employee's gross income. (*See*  
20 *Treasury Reg. §1.61-2(d)(2)(ii)(A)*).

21 20. By contrast, under appropriate circumstances, contributions to a  
22 legally compliant welfare benefit plan that are used to purchase life insurance for a  
23 company's eligible employees are deductible in the year they are paid without the  
24 entirety of the premiums for such policies being counted as part of the employee's  
25 income. This makes a welfare benefit plan attractive – because of the benefit it  
26 provides to employees as well as its tax advantages. Federal tax law, however,

1 strictly limits the deductibility of contributions to welfare benefit plans in a number  
2 of ways in order to limit the abuse of such plans (which in the past have been used  
3 as tax shelters).

4 21. First, a company generally cannot deduct its contribution to a welfare  
5 benefit plan if the payment does not constitute an “ordinary and necessary”  
6 business expense within the meaning of I.R.C. § 162. For example, a corporation  
7 may not claim a deduction for a purported plan contribution that is actually used to  
8 distribute corporate earnings (a dividend) to the company’s shareholders rather  
9 than to purchase a health or insurance benefit.

10 22. Second, a company cannot deduct a contribution to a welfare benefit  
11 plan in the year made if the benefits provided constitute deferred compensation as  
12 defined by I.R.C. § 404. *See* I.R.C. § 419(e)(2). Contributions to a deferred  
13 compensation plan are deductible only in the future year in which the recipient  
14 employee includes the compensation in his or her gross income. I.R.C. § 404(a)(5).

15 23. In addition, even if a particular contribution to a purported welfare  
16 benefit plan passes these two tests, a company still generally may not deduct the  
17 full amount of its contribution unless the requirements of I.R.C. §§ 419 and 419A  
18 are also met.

19 24. To prevent taxpayers from using welfare benefit plans to obtain  
20 improperly inflated tax deductions, Congress has limited a company’s deductible  
21 contributions to the fund’s “Qualified Cost” for the taxable year (less the fund’s  
22 after-tax income). *See* I.R.C. § 419(c). A fund’s Qualified Cost is the sum of (1)  
23 the “Qualified Direct Cost” for the taxable year, and (2) any addition to a  
24 “Qualified Asset Account” for the taxable year (subject to certain limitations). *Id.*  
25 The Qualified Direct Cost excludes – and therefore an employer may not deduct –

1 contributions paid for premiums on life insurance policies that have cash value. *See*  
2 *Rev. Rul. 2007-65.*

3 25. This “Qualified Cost” deduction limit does not, however, apply to  
4 contributions made to a legitimate “10 or more employer plan” (also known as a  
5 “multiple employer plan”) under I.R.C. § 419A(f)(6). In a legitimate “10 or more  
6 employer plan,” generally a group of smaller employers pool together to provide  
7 benefits for their employees – making the relationship between each participant  
8 and the plan like that of an insurer and insured. The tax code excludes  
9 contributions to a qualified “10 or more employer plan” from the Qualified Cost  
10 limits of Section 419 – and thus permits such contributions to be deducted - since it  
11 presumes that an employer would not rationally pay more for the welfare benefits  
12 they are purchasing than the benefits’ actual cost. Excess contributions paid to a  
13 plan fund that complies with Section 419A(f)(6) are available to pay the benefits of  
14 the employees of all other participating employers, and thus are generally not  
15 recoupable at a later date by the employers making the excess contributions.  
16 However, a plan in which all, or nearly all, employers are making excess  
17 contributions may (often through clever bookkeeping) operate in a manner such  
18 that all excess contributions are in fact recoupable to the employers making the  
19 excess contributions.

20 26. Thus, to ward against the possibility of participating companies  
21 abusing welfare benefit plans through the Section 419A(f)(6) exception in order to  
22 obtain both large tax deductions and the preservation of the value of their excess  
23 contributions, Section 419A(f)(6) narrowly defines “10 or more employer plan” as  
24 existing only where (a) there is a single plan, (b) more than one company  
25 contributes, (c) to which no company regularly makes more than 10% of the total  
26 contributions to the plan, and (d) there are no experience-rating arrangements with

1 respect to individual employers. *See* I.R.C. § 419A(f)(6); Treas. Reg. §  
2 1.419A(f)(6)-1(a)(1).

3 27. Applicable Treasury regulations describe an “experience-rating  
4 arrangement” to be when a particular plan participant’s costs for being in the plan  
5 vary from those of other participants - whether because the participant’s past  
6 contributions are applied to reduce his specific later contributions, or because the  
7 generation of a policy’s cash value over time reduces the need for future payments  
8 (in effect, excessive earlier premium payments result in the policy being fully  
9 funded at a later date). (*See* Treas. Reg. § 1.419A(f)(6)-1(b)(1)).

10 28. Purported Section 419A(f)(6) welfare benefit plans have been vehicles  
11 for rampant tax abuse. In one common tax avoidance scheme, employers pay  
12 excessive contributions to Section 419A(f)(6) welfare benefit funds that obtain  
13 cash value insurance policies or otherwise set funds aside for a particular company  
14 owners’ future benefit. In doing so, the companies are not really providing a  
15 welfare benefit for their employees, but are instead either distributing excess  
16 corporate profits to employees or providing deferred compensation to their owners  
17 and, in the process, avoiding current federal taxes. *See, e.g., Neonatology Assoc.,*  
18 *P.A. v. Comm’r*, 299 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2002); *V.R. De Angelis v. Comm’r*, T.C.  
19 Memo. 2007-360, *aff’d* 574 F.3d 789 (2d Cir. 2009); IRS Notice 95-34; IRS Notice  
20 2007-83; IRS Notice 2007-84.

21 29. Significantly, the *Neonatology* case involved the participants in a Sea  
22 Nine-sponsored and promoted VEBA plan – thus evidencing the Defendants’  
23 persistent promotion of the tax scheme at issue in this case despite knowledge of  
24 its potential illegality for over 10 years.

25 30. Since 1995, the IRS has warned taxpayers and their representatives  
26 that many arrangements claiming to provide substantial tax deductions through  
27

1 contributions to purported multiple employer welfare benefit plans are, in fact,  
2 abusive transactions that violate I.R.C. §§ 419 and 419A. *See* Notice 95-34. These  
3 transactions require large employer contributions relative to the cost of the term  
4 insurance that would be required to provide the death benefits under the  
5 arrangement, often maintain separate accounting of assets of the employers within  
6 the plan, and may insulate an individual employer from the experiences of the  
7 plan's other participating employers.

8 31. The IRS has designated such transactions, and those substantially  
9 similar, as "listed transactions." *See* IRS Notice 2000-15. A listed transaction is a  
10 transaction that is the same as or substantially similar to one of the types of  
11 transactions that the IRS has determined to be a tax avoidance transaction, and  
12 must therefore be reported by participants to the IRS in accordance with specified  
13 regulations. *See* I.R.C. § 6111(a) and (b); Treas. Reg. § 301.6111-3.

14 32. Further, since at least 2007, the IRS has warned taxpayers and their  
15 representatives that certain purported "single employer plans" involving cash value  
16 life insurance policies are properly deemed "listed transactions" because of their  
17 abusive characteristics. *See* IRS Notice 2007-83; Notice 2007-84; *see also* Rev.  
18 Rul. 2007-65. In these transactions, employers take large deductions for  
19 contributions to purported welfare benefit plans and the plans accumulate value for  
20 the benefit of select owners either inside the life insurance policies or through  
21 agreements outside of the policies.

## 22 **DEFENDANTS' VEBA PLAN SCHEME**

### 23 *Overview*

24 33. Since 2001, Elliott has organized, promoted, and (through Sea Nine  
25 and the various other business entities he uses) administered a number of VEBA  
26

1 plans that falsely purport to meet the definition of a “10 or more employer plan”  
2 under I.R.C. § 419A(f)(6), thereby permitting a participating company to fully  
3 deduct its contributions. Elliott was instrumental in creation of the present iteration  
4 of Sea Nine’s VEBA plan, and the ultimate resource for questions about its  
5 operation by participating companies (although such companies were usually first  
6 solicited to participate in the VEBA plans by third party insurance brokers or  
7 CPAs, some of whom consistently identified customers for Elliott).

8 34. Sea Nine typically tries to group facially-similar entities into the same  
9 plans, giving them names reflective of their participants’ respective businesses.

10 35. In the mid-1990s, Elliott began working for Stephen Ross at Sea Nine,  
11 where he learned about the VEBA plans. After Ross’s death Elliott continued to  
12 operate Sea Nine’s business and to market and manage the VEBA plans it  
13 promotes. Through his administration of the VEBA plans, Elliott receives a share  
14 of the total commission paid from the sale of the underlying life insurance policy.

15 36. A typical Sea Nine-originated VEBA plan has several common  
16 components. First, there is a “master plan” document that establishes the  
17 responsibilities of the parties to the plan. The participant’s company adopts the  
18 master plan through an adoption agreement. Sea Nine created the first version of  
19 such a master plan in 1985 when Sea Nine’s former principal, Stephen Ross, was  
20 still alive. There is a separate master plan document for each VEBA plan Sea Nine  
21 administers, with VEBAs distinguished typically by the nature of the businesses  
22 that participate in them. Nevertheless, the master plans used by Sea Nine and  
23 Elliott for each VEBA they administered have historically been largely identical.

24 37. The master plans for each Sea Nine VEBA specify their elements and  
25 provisions, such as the nature and circumstances in which contributions are made  
26 to it, the eligibility requirements for participation or beneficiaries, the nature of the

1 benefit provided by the plan and the establishment of the Master Committee tasked  
2 with choosing the proper insurance policy to purchase. The plans specify that the  
3 participating company will make contributions to the plan sufficient to provide the  
4 intended insurance benefits to eligible employees. The plans also specified the  
5 conditions under which participating companies may terminate participation,  
6 providing the policies' beneficiaries the opportunity to take personal ownership of  
7 the life insurance policy.

8 38. Next, a participating company enters into an "adoption agreement"  
9 with Sea Nine. Through such an agreement, the participating taxpayer adopts the  
10 Master Plan, specifies the initial amount of contributions paid into the plan, and  
11 specifies the benefits to be provided by the plan. The adoption agreement also  
12 specifies the eligibility requirements for that participating company's employees to  
13 be covered by the plan, and establishes and appoints irrevocably the members of  
14 the Master Committee.

15 39. The Trustee appointed under the plan document is technically  
16 responsible for protecting and preserving the assets of the plan like an independent  
17 fiduciary. In fact, under the terms of the plan document the Trustee acts only at the  
18 direction of the Master Committee. The Master Committee ultimately determines  
19 the kind of insurance policies to be purchased with the contribution, the insurance  
20 company from which they will be purchased, and is responsible for all other issues  
21 concerning the payment of benefits under the plan.

22 40. Participating companies in a Sea Nine VEBA plan typically contribute  
23 a set amount per year as set forth in the adoption agreement until the date by which  
24 the policies are mostly funded (usually for five years). Although the annual  
25 contribution amount can vary, it is typically in increments of \$250,000.

1           41. Participating companies are told that they can legally reduce their  
2 federal income taxes by deducting the amount of their VEBA plan contributions on  
3 their companies' tax returns. Those contributions, however, invariably exceeded  
4 the actual cost of the primary "welfare benefit" claimed to be the aim of the VEBA  
5 plans – the death benefit derived from a life insurance policy – for a given year.  
6 The excess sums were in fact used to fund cash value whole life policies that plan  
7 participant beneficiaries (typically including, since most participating companies  
8 were small businesses, the company's principal or founder) could later purchase  
9 and then use as a source of tax-free income – either to borrow against or cash out  
10 entirely. Doing so merely reduced the value of the death benefit to be paid  
11 (assuming loans on the policy were not repaid).

12           42. The price of purchasing a whole life policy that has this sort of cash  
13 value is usually substantially higher than if the plan merely purchased term life  
14 insurance (which would only provide a death benefit without any cash value). For  
15 example, one participant, Dr. Sydney Smith, joined a Sea Nine VEBA plan  
16 through his Hawaii-based medical practice. Dr. Smith's company contributed more  
17 than \$300,000 to the Sea Nine VEBA plan between January 1, 2004 and December  
18 31, 2006, even though he was the only beneficiary. The cost of term insurance for  
19 this same period for Dr. Smith would have been approximately \$7,410.<sup>1</sup>

20           43. The higher premiums for whole life policies purchased through the  
21 Sea Nine VEBA plans serve a dual purpose. The larger the contribution, the larger  
22 the tax deduction a participating employer could claim (and because most VEBA  
23 participating companies were owned by a single individual, such as a doctor or

---

24 <sup>1</sup> Dr. Smith was covered by a \$1.9 Million policy during this period. He was 42 years old at the  
25 time the policy was issued. IRS Table 2001 was used to determine that the applicable annual  
26 cost for term insurance based on Dr. Smith's age is \$1.20 per thousand dollars of insurance. The  
27 total cost for all three year is calculated as follows: \$1,900 X \$1.2 X 3 Yrs = \$7,410.

1 entrepreneur, the benefit of the deduction flowed directly to that individual). In  
2 addition, large contributions were beneficial to participating companies because  
3 the contributions were used to pay premiums that mostly flowed through into the  
4 accumulating cash value of the life insurance that the VEBA bought to benefit the  
5 company's employees (including the company principal).

6 44. Thus, the core purpose and effect of the participation in a Sea Nine  
7 VEBA plan is to provide participants with a mechanism to accumulate wealth for  
8 their personal benefit, unlawfully protecting that income from federal taxation by  
9 treating it as a welfare benefit when it was that in name only. Sea Nine VEBA  
10 participating employers were able to deduct the entirety of their substantial  
11 contributions – and then realize the complete benefit of those contributions later,  
12 when they left the VEBA. Even though the Defendants purport that their VEBA  
13 plans conform to the Tax Code, in substance they do not at all – a fact of which the  
14 Defendants are well aware.

15 *Marketing of the VEBA plans*

16 45. As noted, Elliott and Sea Nine promote the VEBA plans mostly to  
17 high-income professionals across the country who own small, closely-held  
18 companies. They do so through a variety of insurance brokers, CPAs, and  
19 independent financial advisors. Although the principals of participating companies  
20 did not always speak directly to Elliott in the course of adopting a plan and making  
21 contributions to it, Elliott provided all the information about the VEBA plans and  
22 their functioning to the individuals initially responsible for marketing the VEBA  
23 plans to potential customers. Elliott was always involved in operating the VEBA  
24 plans and always the ultimate expert on how they worked.

25 46. Defendant Sarva has for many years been particularly avid and  
26 successful in promoting participation in Sea Nine VEBA plans to taxpayers. Sarva

1 encouraged small business owners with high net worth (often doctors with small  
2 but lucrative medical practices) to consider VEBA plans. Sarva's familiarity with  
3 Sea Nine VEBA plans extended back to when Stephen Ross was alive. After Mr.  
4 Ross' death, Sarva dealt with Elliott on matters pertaining to the functioning of the  
5 plans. Sarva continues to this day to refer customers to Sea Nine plans where he  
6 deems it appropriate.

7 47. Sarva has successfully marketed at least 33 separate VEBAs plans to a  
8 variety of small business owners. All of these participants have been or are  
9 currently being audited by the IRS. 13 of these participant audits have been  
10 completed and have resulted in total tax adjustments of \$3,500,519. The remaining  
11 20 audits are still in progress, but at present the IRS expects that these pending  
12 audits will result in additional total tax adjustments of \$5,385,414.

13 *Examples of VEBA plans marketed by Defendants*

14 48. In the past 10 years, Elliott and Sea Nine have (directly or through  
15 intermediaries like Sarva) successfully promoted VEBA plans to a large number of  
16 taxpayers. In the process, however, they have frequently been confronted with the  
17 fact that their conduct is illegal and that they make false statements about the tax  
18 benefits of their VEBA plans. They have learned of the illegality of their acts both  
19 from the examination by the IRS of their customers' tax returns, and also when  
20 those same customers (alarmed to learn that they owe substantial unpaid taxes after  
21 relying on the Defendants' representations) have sued the Defendants themselves.  
22 But nothing has stopped the Defendants from continuing to promote the VEBA  
23 plans or to falsely claim that they comply with federal law.

24 J & M Associates

25 49. J & M Associates ("J & M") is a subchapter S corporation located in  
26 Mobile, Alabama that provided contract labor for marinas and shipyards in the

1 Gulf Coast and San Diego, California regions. Its two principal shareholders were  
2 brothers John and Mike Wilks.

3 50. J & M was interested in a financially prudent benefit plan that would  
4 have tax advantages. It specifically learned of the Sea Nine VEBA plans in 2004  
5 through a financial consultant – who in turn had a personal connection with  
6 another financial advisor who repeatedly promoted VEBA plans.

7 51. Through such intermediaries, J & M learned that Sea Nine  
8 administered a welfare benefit plan that had room for a new participating employer  
9 if J & M acted quickly. In particular, Elliott (directly or through the individuals  
10 promoting Sea Nine's VEBA plan directly) told J & M that the Sea Nine VEBA  
11 plan had been approved by the IRS. To establish this assertion, Elliott frequently  
12 showed potential customers like J & M copies of old letters from the IRS  
13 acknowledging that the Sea Nine VEBAs were proper tax-exempt entities under  
14 I.R.C. § 501(c)(9) – *not* that they complied with § 419A(f)(6). Indeed, the letters  
15 Elliott provided to potential customers and which he claimed showed the IRS's  
16 approval predated the 2004 changes to the relevant Treasury regulations.

17 52. J & M consequently agreed to enter into the Sea Nine VEBA plan in  
18 the spring of 2004. The terms of the plan obligated the Wilkses to contribute one  
19 million dollars annually for five years toward the purchase of cash value whole life  
20 insurance policies that the plan's Trustee would control. Elliott (directly or through  
21 the individuals who first contacted J & M) informed the Wilkses that after the five-  
22 year funding period, they could terminate the plan and directly obtain ownership of  
23 the policies they had been funding, allowing them after an additional period of  
24 time to make annual tax free withdrawals on the policies as a retirement benefit.  
25 He also (directly or indirectly) informed the Wilkses that they could easily  
26 terminate the plan even earlier in case of hardship (*e.g.*, if it became difficult for

1 them to make the required yearly contributions), permitting them to withdraw  
2 entirely from the plan but still realize the benefits for those portions of the policies  
3 that had been paid for.

4 53. In order to clear up questions they had about the overall legality of the  
5 Sea Nine VEBA plan, the Wilkses obtained a legal opinion from attorney  
6 Frederick Romero "as to the legal viability of deductions claimed for contributions  
7 made for the initial 2004 plan year as well as substantial authority concerning the  
8 implementation of the program including consideration of the final regulations  
9 issued by the Internal Revenue Service relative to the 'ten or more' employer  
10 programs." On August 12, 2004, Romero provided an opinion that the IRS would  
11 "more likely than not" lose on the issues of 1) whether the VEBA program is one  
12 described under IRS 501(c)(9) and 419A(f)(6), and 2) whether J & M was entitled  
13 to a current deduction for the entire contribution into the VEBA program. Elliott  
14 and Sea Nine referred Romero to the Wilkses; Sea Nine had maintained a long  
15 standing relationship with Romero dating back to the time when Ross was alive.  
16 Romero had previously written several favorable legal opinions with regard to the  
17 VEBAs.

18 54. In 2005, after Hurricane Katrina devastated the Gulf Coast, J & M's  
19 business was severely impacted, making it impossible for it to make the second  
20 million dollar contribution due for its participation in the VEBA plan. The Wilkses  
21 subsequently requested (in keeping with the manner in which they had been told  
22 the plan was to be operated) that their participation be restructured to reduce their  
23 yearly payment because of their financial hardship. J & M received reassurances  
24 from Elliott and his representatives that all of their understandings were correct,  
25 and were able to make a lesser contribution of \$250,000.

1           55. In 2006, however, J & M subsequently received a contradictory  
2 message: because they were not making the proper level of contributions to their  
3 VEBA plan, the cash value of their total contribution was dwindling rapidly and  
4 would soon have no value at all (because the plan was using the cash value of the  
5 policies to make up the balance of unpaid contributions). One of the individuals  
6 responsible for directly marketing the Sea Nine VEBA plan to J & M even  
7 admitted this was the case.

8           56. J & M's Form 1120S corporate tax return was audited by the IRS for  
9 the 2004 and 2005 tax years. As a result of the audits, the IRS determined that the  
10 VEBA plan promoted by Sea Nine and in which J & M had participated did not  
11 qualify for the deduction limit exceptions set forth in § 419A(f)(6), and therefore  
12 the Wilkses' personal income taxes would be adjusted by nearly \$1.3 million for  
13 the two tax years – causing them to jointly owe over \$460,000 in unpaid taxes. The  
14 IRS also issued penalties against J & M for failure to report their participation in  
15 the VEBA plan as a listed transaction.

16           57. J & M subsequently brought a lawsuit in federal court against the  
17 individuals who directly marketed Sea Nine's VEBA and AIG (issuer of the  
18 insurance policies that were purchased for it through the VEBA plan). Elliott was  
19 deposed in the case but not named as a party. J & M obtained a favorable  
20 settlement after the Court ruled, on summary judgment, that questions of fact  
21 existed as to whether the defendants had properly disclosed to J & M all the facts  
22 of which they were aware as to the legal validity of the Sea Nine VEBA plan.

23           Drs. Singer and Smith

24           58. Drs. Daniel Singer and Sydney Smith are Hawaii-based orthopedic  
25 surgeons who learned of Elliott's Sea Nine VEBA plans through a financial  
26

1 planner in Honolulu. That individual in turn relied on Elliott as his source for  
2 information about the VEBA plans and how they functioned.

3 59. Although Elliott did not directly initiate contact with Drs. Singer and  
4 Smith, he participated in explaining the VEBA plans to them and the purported tax  
5 benefits, and personally prepared materials sent to them while they weighed  
6 whether to participate. The two doctors decided to participate in a Sea Nine VEBA  
7 plan after hearing (from Elliott and his representatives or interested third parties)  
8 the same kinds of representations that convinced other owners to do so, *e.g.* that  
9 contributions were tax-deductible; that they could pre-fund the insurance through  
10 such contributions; that they could buy out the insurance while its cash value  
11 remained low; and that the resulting whole life policy would have high value later  
12 against which they could borrow or otherwise obtain tax free income.

13 60. Elliott thus packaged the materials necessary for Drs. Singer and  
14 Smith to become VEBA plan participating employers. Ultimately, however, the  
15 IRS learned of their participation in the VEBA plans and disallowed their  
16 contributions after audit. As a result, Dr. Singer had in excess of \$500,000 in  
17 additional tax liabilities, while Dr. Smith owed approximately \$209,000.

18 61. Drs. Singer and Smith also filed suit in Circuit Court for the State of  
19 Hawaii against (among others) Elliott, Sea Nine, AIG, and the financial planner  
20 who had first steered them toward the Sea Nine plan. The complaint alleged  
21 against Elliott and the other defendants claims of fraud, intentional  
22 misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, civil conspiracy, negligent failure  
23 to disclose, and violation of Hawaii's consumer protection statute. The lawsuit  
24 settled in 2012.



1 valuable incentive to join LSL without also having to directly pay him more in  
2 compensation.

3 68. In the course of adopting the Sea Nine VEBA plan, LSL's principals  
4 learned (from the individuals promoting the plan – who in turn relied directly on  
5 Elliott to answer any questions about the Sea Nine plans) that the plan had been  
6 previously approved by the IRS, as well as that contributions were tax-deductible.  
7 Lawley was the sole LSL employee or member designated as a beneficiary of the  
8 VEBA plan.

9 69. The IRS subsequently audited LSL and disallowed the tax deductions  
10 it had taken for its contributions to the Sea Nine VEBA plan, resulting in LSL  
11 owing additional taxes of \$143,550.

12 70. Omer Katzir was another Sea Nine/Elliott customer who ultimately  
13 paid a high price for participating in the VEBA plan they promoted. Katzir owns  
14 "Katzir's Floor & Home Design," a Southern California company specializing in  
15 hardwood floor design and installation. Katzir wished to invest extra money he was  
16 earning, and through his CPA was introduced to a California financial planner,  
17 who informed him about the Sea Nine VEBA plans and their tax benefits.

18 71. Katzir had reservations about participating in the plan, deeming it "too  
19 good to be true," and therefore he resisted joining for six months. However, after  
20 several meetings (some of which Elliott himself participated in) he decided to  
21 participate in a Sea Nine VEBA plan (specifically, the "Southern California Retail  
22 Merchant's League" plan) and began making contributions in 2004 to fund the  
23 purchase of an \$8 million life insurance policy. The sole beneficiaries of the  
24 insurance to be purchased through the plan were Katzir and his wife.

25 72. In the course of Katzir's evaluating whether to participate in the Sea  
26 Nine VEBA plans, Elliott informed Katzir both that his contributions were fully

1 tax-deductible and that he could borrow against the cash value of the policy at age  
2 64. Elliott and the third parties working with him, in response to Katzir's questions  
3 about the legal validity of the plan showed Katzir irrelevant IRS "approvals"  
4 predating the relevant regulations but which, they told him, established the IRS's  
5 approval of the plans.

6 73. As with other Sea Nine plan participating companies, however, the  
7 IRS audited Katzir's company and disallowed his contributions, resulting in Katzir  
8 owing an additional \$1,284,270 in taxes.

9 *Defendants' Knowledge of the Illegality of the VEBA Plans*

10 74. For over 10 years, the Defendants have been on notice that statements  
11 they were making about the tax effects or benefits of participation in a VEBA plan,  
12 and the legality of the Sea Nine plans themselves, were false. Yet the Defendants  
13 persist to this day in promoting as well as operating and/or administering such  
14 plans.

15 75. In July 2003, the U.S. Treasury Department issued final regulations  
16 applicable to programs that purport to be "multiple employer plans" under I.R.C. §  
17 419A(f)(6). *See* Treas. Reg. § 1.419A(f)(6)-1.

18 76. As of that date, Elliott had been running Sea Nine for almost two  
19 years since the death of Stephen Ross. Sea Nine was also still using the same plan  
20 documents it had employed for its VEBA plans since 1985. Those documents were  
21 thus unquestionably not drafted in light of the new regulations, and contained  
22 provisions that would likely not satisfy those regulations.

23 77. In particular, those versions of Sea Nine's VEBA plans allowed  
24 participants to distribute the value of the assets contributed to the plan back to  
25 themselves in accordance with a defined formula – in effect, to recover some value  
26 of their contribution in excess of the basic death benefit provided by the insurance

1 policy that the plan contributions were funding. This is very much the kind of  
2 “experience-rating arrangement” that the revised regulations prohibited. (See  
3 Treas. Reg. 1.419A(f)(6)-1(b)).

4 78. Similarly, Elliott has stated that the various VEBA plans Sea Nine  
5 administers contain sufficient funds within them to avoid the need for individual  
6 participants to adjust their contributions later. These excess sums are the result of  
7 differences between the amounts contributed by plan participants and the costs of  
8 the insurance policies purchased by the VEBA plans. But the 1.419A(f)(6)  
9 regulations define an “experience-rating arrangement” to include situations arising  
10 in a welfare benefit plan where the *cost of coverage* is, or can be expected to be,  
11 based on the employer’s *benefit experience* or *overall experience* as those terms  
12 are defined in the regulations. (Trea. Reg. § 1.419A(f)(6)-1(d)). Thus, each Sea  
13 Nine plan maintains an experience-rating arrangement because the cost of  
14 coverage for any employer is based on that employer’s insurance funding from a  
15 prior year (i.e., his or her overall “experience” with the plan).

16 79. In addition, the 2003 version of the Sea Nine plan documents  
17 encouraged participants to obtain the financial benefit of terminating participation  
18 in the plan after making only five years of contributions – shortly before the policy  
19 to be purchased began realizing its springing cash value. To do so would violate  
20 the 2003 revisions to the regulations relating to Section 419A(f)(6), because  
21 participants would be paying a variable amount for their policies not common to all  
22 plan participants, while also obtaining a benefit in excess of the cost of the basis  
23 death benefit (which, as noted above, could be obtained for far less had the plan  
24 participants simply purchased term life insurance for their beneficiaries instead of  
25 whole life policies with cash value).





1           87. In addition, Elliott has admitted (in sworn testimony in the lawsuit  
2 brought by Drs. Singer and Smith) that VEBA plan participants not only were  
3 never told about the need to change the plans' terms after adoption of the new  
4 Treasury regulations in 2003, but also that they were never asked to sign any new  
5 plan documents.

6           88. The Sea Nine VEBA plan documents have not been substantively  
7 altered despite Elliott's knowledge of the changes to the law in 2003. Although  
8 Elliott purports to have prepared a revised plan document in 2009, it has not yet  
9 replaced older versions currently in use by the various Sea Nine VEBAs in  
10 existence.

11           89. Substantively, the 2009 version of the Sea Nine plan differs facially  
12 from prior versions in that (1) certain plan provisions, such as the provisions  
13 relating to voluntary terminations, that would cause the plan to fail to satisfy the  
14 requirements of the 1.419A(f)(6) regulations on form alone have been removed;  
15 (2) other plan provisions, such as the fixed benefits provision which uses language  
16 straight out of the 1.419A(f)(6) regulations, were added (apparently to give the  
17 plan the appearance that it satisfies the requirements of the 1.419A(f)(6)  
18 regulations); and (3) the plan adopted a "Rating Group" structure in the most  
19 general sense (*i.e.*, "the group of Participants with the same rating factors as  
20 defined in the Regulations and described in the Adoption Agreement").

21           90. Such changes, however – even if adopted by all existing Sea Nine  
22 VEBA plans – are insufficient to satisfy Section 419A and its applicable  
23 regulations. In particular, the 2009 revised plan document still exhibits experience  
24 rating because it appears to continue to allow participants to make contributions in  
25 excess of their actual cost for insurance, with the notion that such contributions can  
26 later be "trued up" through an "ultimate ratings group."

1           91. Sarva also knows or has reason to know that the Sea Nine VEBA  
2 plans he urges his customers to adopt are not compliant with the tax laws. As an  
3 accountant, Sarva is professionally obligated to keep abreast of developments in  
4 the law relevant to the services and investments he advises his customers to  
5 participate in. Yet Sarva has repeatedly provided his customers with evidence of  
6 IRS “approvals” of the Sea Nine plan that facially say nothing about whether its  
7 plan complies with Section 419A(f)(6). He also was in possession of the legal  
8 opinions that Elliott and Sea Nine obtained around the time the VEBA regulations  
9 were revised that noted that the existing plan documents did not comply with the  
10 law, and yet he repeatedly promoted Sea Nine plans to his customers as legally  
11 valid. Indeed, Sarva has informed customers as well as the IRS that for a long time  
12 after 2004, Sea Nine’s VEBA plan remained unchanged – thus underscoring his  
13 knowledge of the fact that it was not compliant with the Tax Code.

14           *Defendants’ False Statements Promoting the VEBA Plans*

15           92. Elliott has made or furnished, or caused other persons to make or  
16 furnish, many false and/or fraudulent statements with respect to the tax benefits of  
17 participation in the VEBA plans and their legality. He has done so both directly, to  
18 potential plan participants or their representatives, as well as indirectly, through the  
19 individuals who market Sea Nine VEBA plans to others and who rely on his  
20 expertise and information in explaining the operations of the plans to interested  
21 taxpayers.

22           93. Thus, Elliott has repeatedly but falsely informed participants that the  
23 entirety of their contributions were tax deductible in the year made, despite the fact  
24 that their plan contributions greatly exceeded their deductible “qualified cost”  
25 under Section 419(c), because they exceeded the actual premium amount for the  
26 insurance purchased by the plan for its beneficiaries.

1 94. He has also repeatedly but falsely informed participants that the plans  
2 to which the contributions were made qualified as I.R.C. § 419A(f)(6) “10 or more  
3 employer plans,” (meaning the plans did not show experience rating and therefore  
4 were not subject to the deduction exceptions).

5 95. Elliott has also falsely informed participants that plan contributions  
6 help create a “tax free income stream” later in the lives of plan beneficiaries. This  
7 would be accomplished by funding the plan for five years and then terminating it,  
8 allowing the plan participant to buy the almost fully-funded whole life insurance  
9 policy provided under the VEBA plan at the lower amount of its cash surrender  
10 value, rather than at its fair market value. A few years later, however, the springing  
11 value of the policy would mean the participant-Owner could now realize the  
12 policy’s cash value in the form of loans or distributions taken against the policy’s  
13 death benefit.

14 96. In making such representations, Elliott did not inform participants that  
15 the only benefit properly provided by a VEBA plan is the death benefit, aware that  
16 plan participants expected more than just the protections provided by term life  
17 insurance.

18 97. Elliott also made numerous false statements about the Sea Nine  
19 VEBA plans’ compliance with applicable provisions of the Internal Revenue Code  
20 or Treasury regulations. Thus, he (a) falsely indicated that existing plans had been  
21 properly revised or amended in light of the 2003 regulations pertaining to Section  
22 419A(f)(6), (b) falsely represented to certain participant/Owners that the plans had  
23 been approved by the IRS based on prior IRS determinations having nothing to do  
24 with Section 419A(f)(6), and (c) falsely claimed that the VEBA plans were not  
25 listed transactions.



1 or Drs. Smith and Singer. In 36 of the 41 audits, the IRS determined that the  
2 taxpayer was liable for additional taxes, because the plan participants had some or  
3 all of their plan contributions disallowed for not being in compliance with Section  
4 419A(f)(6). The total amount of tax deficiencies assessed in the audits of these 41  
5 Sea Nine/Elliott taxpayer customers for 108 separate tax years is \$13,874,555.  
6 There are at least 89 other pending audits involving 21 additional Elliott VEBA  
7 Plan participants, so the total figure may become higher.

8 102. If all companies participating in an illegal Sea Nine VEBA that the  
9 IRS is presently aware of were similarly liable for additional taxes, the total  
10 amount lost by the Treasury to date from improperly-claimed contributions  
11 deducted on participant tax returns could exceed \$70 million dollars.

12 103. As of August 23, 2013, the IRS has closed audits of 12 Sea Nine  
13 VEBA plan-participating taxpayers who were referred to Sea Nine by Sarva. For  
14 those taxpayers alone, the IRS assessed a total of \$4,852,106 in additional taxes, or  
15 an average additional tax of \$404,342 per audit. Because Sarva has acknowledged  
16 directing at least 40 of his customers to Sea Nine, the total amount of harm to the  
17 Treasury he has caused through promotion of improper VEBA plans is likely  
18 almost four times higher.

19 104. If Defendants are not enjoined, the United States will suffer  
20 irreparable harm from the underpayment of tax liability and the exhaustion of  
21 resources to enforce the internal revenue laws, and the substantial losses caused by  
22 Defendants' actions will continue to increase.

23 105. The Internal Revenue Service is harmed because it must dedicate  
24 scarce resources to detecting and examining inaccurate returns filed by  
25 participants, and to attempting to assess and collect unpaid taxes.

1 106. Companies participating in Sea Nine VEBA plans are also harmed  
2 because they are liable for any unpaid tax, plus interest and penalties resulting  
3 from their disallowed plan contribution deductions. Such entities and their  
4 principals may detrimentally rely on the false representations Elliott and Sarva  
5 make about the tax benefits to be derived from participation.

6  
7 **Count I - Injunction under I.R.C. § 7408**

8 107. The United States incorporates by reference the allegations in  
9 Paragraphs 1 through 106.

10 108. Section 7408 authorizes a district court to enjoin any person from  
11 further engaging in conduct subject to penalty under either I.R.C. § 6700 or §  
12 6701, if injunctive relief is appropriate to prevent recurrence of that conduct.

13 109. Section 6700 provides that a penalty will be imposed against any  
14 person who organizes or assists in the organization of a partnership or other  
15 investment plan or arrangement, or participates in the sale of an interest in an entity  
16 or plan, and (a) knowingly makes, or causes to be made, a false or fraudulent  
17 statement as to the allowability of a deduction or credit, the excludability of any  
18 income, the securing of another tax benefit, because of an interest held in the entity  
19 or because of his participation in the plan, or (b) makes a gross valuation  
20 overstatement as to any material matter.

21 110. Section 6701 imposes a penalty on any person who aids or assists in,  
22 procures, or advises with respect to the preparation or presentation of a federal tax  
23 return, refund claim, or other document, knowing or having a reason to believe that  
24 it will be used in connection with any material matter arising under the internal  
25 revenue laws, and knowing that if so used it would result in an understatement of  
26 another person's tax liability.

1 111. The Sea Nine VEBA plans that Defendants promote, administer,  
2 and/or operate are “plans or arrangements” within the meaning of I.R.C. § 6700.

3 112. Elliott and Sea Nine have been intimately involved in the organization  
4 and operation of the Sea Nine VEBA plans for 15 years. They have overseen the  
5 plans’ evolution and are aware of both the manner in which the plans operate as  
6 well as the legal guidelines governing their operation.

7 113. Defendants have also directly and indirectly promoted the VEBA plan  
8 scheme to prospective participants. Sarva for his part has been marketing Sea  
9 Nine’s VEBA plans to customers across the United States for nearly 30 years –  
10 even before Elliott became involved – and continues to do so to this day.

11 114. In connection with the organization and/or sale of participation in the  
12 VEBA plan scheme, Defendants have made or furnished, or caused others to make  
13 or furnish, material and false and/or fraudulent statements with respect to the Sea  
14 Nine VEBA plans’ purported tax benefits.

15 115. Defendants knew or had reason to know that their statements were  
16 false and/or fraudulent.

17 116. By promoting participation in the VEBA plans and/or administering  
18 such plans, the Defendants have also aided and abetted their customers’  
19 preparation of income tax returns in which the customers claim large deductions  
20 reflecting the entirety of their contributions to the plans based on the belief that the  
21 plans comply with I.R.C. § 419A(f)(6). All of the Defendants are fully aware that  
22 their customers will claim such deductions, as a principal and widely-promoted  
23 feature of participating in a VEBA plan is the deductibility of the contributions.

24 117. In fact, however, Sea Nine VEBA plan participants consistently  
25 understate their true tax liability because the plans are not compliant with the  
26 Internal Revenue Code.





**RELIEF SOUGHT**

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff United States of America respectfully prays the following:

A. That this Court find that Defendants Kenneth Elliott (d/b/a KAE Insurance Services, Inc., Vista Barranca, Inc., and KAE Consulting), Sea Nine Associates, Inc., and Ramesh Sarva have engaged in conduct subject to penalty under I.R.C. § 6700 and that injunctive relief under I.R.C. § 7408 is appropriate to prevent recurrence of that conduct;

B. That this Court find that Defendants Kenneth Elliott (d/b/a KAE Insurance Services, Inc., Vista Barranca, Inc., and KAE Consulting), Sea Nine Associates, Inc., and Ramesh Sarva have engaged in conduct subject to penalty under I.R.C. §§ 6700 and 6701 and that injunctive relief under I.R.C. § 7408 is appropriate to prevent recurrence of that conduct;

C. That this Court find that Defendants Kenneth Elliott (d/b/a KAE Insurance Services, Inc., Vista Barranca, Inc., and KAE Consulting), Sea Nine Associates, Inc., and Ramesh Sarva have engaged in conduct interfering with the administration and enforcement of the internal revenue laws and that injunctive relief is appropriate to prevent recurrence of that conduct under I.R.C. § 7402(a);

D. That this Court, pursuant to I.R.C. §§ 7402 and 7408, enter a permanent injunction prohibiting Defendants Kenneth Elliott (d/b/a KAE Insurance Services, Inc., Vista Barranca, Inc., and KAE Consulting), Sea Nine Associates, Inc., and Ramesh Sarva, and any other person in active concert or participation with them, from directly or indirectly:

i. Promoting, administering, managing, or selling any version of the Sea Nine VEBA plan described in this complaint;



1 E. That this Court, pursuant to I.R.C. §§ 7402 and 7408, enter a  
2 permanent injunction prohibiting Defendants Kenneth Elliott (d/b/a KAE  
3 Insurance Services, Inc., Vista Barranca, Inc., and KAE Consulting), Sea Nine  
4 Associates, Inc., and Ramesh Sarva, and any other person in active concert or  
5 participation with them, from directly or indirectly:

- 6 i. Acting as trustee, representative, salesman, manager, or  
7 administrator for, or otherwise organizing, administering, or  
8 implementing any version of the Sea Nine VEBA plan  
9 described in this complaint;
- 10 ii. Acting as trustee or administrator for, or otherwise organizing,  
11 administering, or implementing any plan or arrangement that is  
12 similar to the Sea Nine VEBA plan, including any plan or  
13 arrangement that claims to be a welfare benefit plan or to allow  
14 an employer to make deductible contributions to a welfare  
15 benefit fund under I.R.C. § 419 and/or I.R.C. § 419A;
- 16 iii. Organizing, administering, or implementing any plan or  
17 arrangement that advises or assists others in violating or  
18 attempting to violate the internal revenue laws or unlawfully  
19 evading the assessment or collection of one's federal tax  
20 liabilities;
- 21 iv. Selling or organizing, or causing the sale or organization of,  
22 any type of corporation, trust, limited liability company,  
23 arrangement of business entities, or plan which he knows or  
24 has reason to know is designed to or will be used to facilitate  
25 non-compliance with the federal tax laws; and  
26

1 v. Engaging in any other conduct that substantially interferes with  
2 the administration or enforcement of the internal revenue laws.

3 F. That the Court, pursuant to I.R.C. § 7402, order Defendants Kenneth  
4 Elliott (d/b/a KAE Insurance Services, Inc., Vista Barranca, Inc., and KAE  
5 Consulting), Sea Nine Associates, Inc., and Ramesh Sarva to produce to counsel  
6 for the United States within 30 days of entry of judgment in this case a list  
7 identifying (by name, address, e-mail address, phone number, and Social Security  
8 or other tax identification number) all of the companies and Owners of such  
9 companies who have participated in any Sea Nine VEBA plan promoted, operated,  
10 or organized by any of the Defendants in the past 13 years;

11 G. That the Court, pursuant to I.R.C. § 7402, order Defendants Kenneth  
12 Elliott (d/b/a KAE Insurance Services, Inc., Vista Barranca, Inc., and KAE  
13 Consulting), Sea Nine Associates, Inc., and Ramesh Sarva, at their own expense, to  
14 send by mail to each individual identified in Paragraph F above a copy of the  
15 permanent injunction and a copy the Court's findings in support of the permanent  
16 injunction;

17 H. That the Court, pursuant to I.R.C. § 7402, order Defendants Kenneth  
18 Elliott (d/b/a KAE Insurance Services, Inc., Vista Barranca, Inc., and KAE  
19 Consulting), Sea Nine Associates, Inc., and Ramesh Sarva each to file with the  
20 Court, within 45 days of the date on which the permanent injunction is entered, a  
21 certification signed under penalty of perjury that he or she has complied with  
22 paragraphs E and F above;

23 I. That the Court allow the United States full post-judgment discovery to  
24 monitor compliance with the injunction;

1 J. That the Court retain jurisdiction over this action for the purpose of  
2 implementing and enforcing the final judgment and any additional orders  
3 necessary and appropriate to the public interest;

4 K. That Defendants Kenneth Elliott (d/b/a KAE Insurance Services, Inc.,  
5 Vista Barranca, Inc., and KAE Consulting), and Sea Nine Associates, Inc., and  
6 Ramesh Sarva shall not make any statements, written or verbal, or cause or  
7 encourage others to make any statements, written or verbal, that misrepresent any  
8 of the terms of this injunction; and

9 L. That the Court grant the United States such other and further relief as  
10 the Court deems appropriate.

11 October 8, 2013

12  
13 Respectfully submitted,

14 ANDRÉ BIROTTE, JR.  
15 United States Attorney  
16 SANDRA R. BROWN  
17 Assistant United States Attorney  
18 Chief, Tax Division

19  
20 /s/  
21 DARWIN THOMAS (SBN 80745)  
22 Assistant United States Attorney

23 BRIAN H. CORCORAN  
24 DC Bar, No. 456976  
25 Trial Attorney, Tax Division  
26 U.S. Department of Justice

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

NOTICE OF ASSIGNMENT TO UNITED STATES JUDGES

This case has been assigned to District Judge Josephine L. Staton and the assigned Magistrate Judge is Jean P. Rosenbluth.

The case number on all documents filed with the Court should read as follows:

8:13CV1582 JLS JPRx

Pursuant to General Order 05-07 of the United States District Court for the Central District of California, the Magistrate Judge has been designated to hear discovery related motions.

All discovery related motions should be noticed on the calendar of the Magistrate Judge.

Clerk, U. S. District Court

October 9, 2013

Date

By J.Prado

Deputy Clerk

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NOTICE TO COUNSEL

*A copy of this notice must be served with the summons and complaint on all defendants (if a removal action is filed, a copy of this notice must be served on all plaintiffs).*

**Subsequent documents must be filed at the following location:**

Western Division  
312 N. Spring Street, G-8  
Los Angeles, CA 90012

Southern Division  
411 West Fourth St., Ste 1053  
Santa Ana, CA 92701

Eastern Division  
3470 Twelfth Street, Room 134  
Riverside, CA 92501

**Failure to file at the proper location will result in your documents being returned to you.**

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ANDRÉ BIROTTE JR.  
United States Attorney  
SANDRA R. BROWN  
Assistant United States Attorney  
Chief, Tax Division  
DARWIN THOMAS (SBN 80745)  
Assistant United States Attorney  
Federal Building, Room 7211  
300 North Los Angeles Street  
Los Angeles, California 90012  
Tel: (213) 894-2740; Fax: (213) 894-0115  
Email: darwin.thomas@usdoj.gov  
BRIAN H. CORCORAN (DC Bar No. 456976)  
Trial Attorney, Tax Division  
U.S. Department of Justice  
Post Office Box 7238  
Washington, D.C. 20044  
Tel: (202) 353-7421; Fax (202) 514-6770  
Email: Brian.H.Corcoran@usdoj.gov  
Attorneys for the United States of America

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA  
WESTERN DIVISION

United States of America,  
Plaintiff,  
vs.

Kenneth Elliott, d/b/a KAE Insurance  
Services, Inc., Vista Barranca, Inc.,  
and KAE Consulting; Sea Nine  
Associates, Inc., and Ramesh Sarva,  
Defendants.

-Case No. \_\_\_\_\_

**COMPLAINT FOR PERMANENT  
INJUNCTION AND OTHER  
RELIEF**



AFTER COMPLETING THE FRONT SIDE OF FORM CV-71, COMPLETE THE INFORMATION REQUESTED BELOW.

VIII(b). RELATED CASES: Have any cases been previously filed that are related to the present case?  No  Yes

If yes, list case number(s): SA CV 08-00619 - AHS

Civil cases are deemed related if a previously filed case and the present case:

- (Check all boxes that apply)  A. Arise from the same or closely related transactions, happenings, or events; or  
 B. Call for determination of the same or substantially related or similar questions of law and fact; or  
 C. For other reasons would entail substantial duplication of labor if heard by different judges; or  
 D. Involve the same patent, trademark or copyright, and one of the factors identified above in a, b or c also is present.

IX. VENUE: List the California County, or State if other than California, in which EACH named plaintiff resides (Use an additional sheet if necessary)  
 Check here if the U.S. government, its agencies or employees is a named plaintiff.

Los Angeles County

List the California County, or State if other than California, in which EACH named defendant resides. (Use an additional sheet if necessary).

Check here if the U.S. government, its agencies or employees is a named defendant.

Orange County; New York State

List the California County, or State if other than California, in which EACH claim arose. (Use an additional sheet if necessary)

Note: In land condemnation cases, use the location of the tract of land involved.

Orange County

X. SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY (OR PRO PER):

*Damon Thomas*

Date Oct. 9, 2013

Notice to Counsel/Parties: The CV-71 (JS-44) Civil Cover Sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required pursuant to Local Rule 3-1 is not filed but is used by the Clerk of the Court for the purpose of statistics, venue and initiating the civil docket sheet. (For more detailed instructions, see separate instructions sheet.)

Key to Statistical codes relating to Social Security Cases:

Nature of Suit Code	Abbreviation	Substantive Statement of Cause of Action
861	HIA	All claims for health insurance benefits (Medicare) under Title 18, Part A, of the Social Security Act, as amended. Also, include claims by hospitals, skilled nursing facilities, etc., for certification as providers of services under the program. (42 U.S.C. 1935FF(b))
862	BL	All claims for "Black Lung" benefits under Title 4, Part B, of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969. (30 U.S.C. 923)
863	DIWC	All claims filed by insured workers for disability insurance benefits under Title 2 of the Social Security Act, as amended; plus all claims filed for child's insurance benefits based on disability. (42 U.S.C. 405(g))
863	DIWW	All claims filed for widows or widowers insurance benefits based on disability under Title 2 of the Social Security Act, as amended. (42 U.S.C. 405(g))
864	SSID	All claims for supplemental security income payments based upon disability filed under Title 16 of the Social Security Act, as amended.
865	RSI	All claims for retirement (old age) and survivors benefits under Title 2 of the Social Security Act, as amended. (42 U.S.C. (g))