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COMMENDATIONS

Assistant United States Attorney Melvin S. Kracov, District of New Jersey, has been commended by the Attorney General for his outstanding performance as the Attorney General's Advocacy Institute Director during his one year tenure in that post. In addition, Mr. Kracov was awarded the Assistant U.S. Attorney's Superior Performance Award.

Assistant United States Attorneys Terry Lehman and Robert Steinberg, Southern District of Ohio, have been commended by Judge Carl B. Rubin, Southern District of Ohio, for their successful prosecution of six defendants for the commission of ten bank robberies. The trial lasted three weeks, required one hundred witnesses, and one of the defendants was indicted for obstruction of justice arising out of his activities during the trial.

Special Assistant United States Attorney Ronald Jenkins, St. Louis Strike Force, has been commended by Harlan C. Phillips, Special Agent in Charge, St. Louis, Federal Bureau of Investigation for the successful prosecution of Richard Norman Schaffer and Richard Dean Trotter for extortionate credit transactions.

Special Assistant United States Attorney John R. Birkby, St. Louis Strike Force, has been commended by Clarence M. Kelley, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and by William D. Goldsberry, Regional Administrator, Chicago, Securities & Exchange Commission, for the conviction of Edward A. White and White Capital Corporation for conspiracy to commit stock fraud, bank fraud and perjury.

Attorneys William C. Hendricks, III, Edwin J. Tomko, Fraud Section, Criminal Division, and Assistant United States Attorney J. Daniel Ennis, Southern District of Florida, have been commended by Vincent K. Antle, Chief Assistant, Southern District of Florida, for the successful prosecution of Allen J. Lefferdink. Lefferdink was convicted of mail and wire fraud in setting up five mutual funds managed by a company solely controlled by the defendant. Proof at trial consisted of 1100 documents and 80 witnesses (45 of whom came from more than 9 countries).

Assistant United States Attorneys Thomas A. Daley and John Paul Garhart, Western District of Pennsylvania, have been commended by Benjamin J. Redmond, Regional Inspector, Philadelphia, Internal Revenue Service, for their successful prosecution of Jeffrey Peter Snyder for assaulting two IRS agents.

Assistant United States Attorney David M. Curry, Western District of Pennsylvania, has been commended by Anthony J. Carmona, Special Agent in Charge, Pittsburgh, United States Secret Service, for his expertise and professional handling of the prosecution of Thomas A. Colagrande, Jr., for forging and uttering 150 U.S. Savings Bonds.

POINTS TO REMEMBER

**FREEDOM OF INFORMATION/PRIVACY ACT\***

General departmental supervisory responsibility over these Acts has been transferred to the Office of Management and Finance, under the direction of that office's Executive Officer. (Formerly, this responsibility was with the Office of the Deputy Attorney General). That office, which is designated the Freedom of Information and Privacy Administration Unit (FOI and PA Unit), is responsible for receiving and routing to the appropriate office, board, division or bureau requests to the Department for access and/or correction of records subject to the Acts. In addition, the Unit is also responsible for monitoring compliance with the Acts, preparing reports required by the Acts and performing certain other administrative functions under the Acts.

Accordingly, the Executive Office wire of April 18, 1975, to All United States Attorneys is hereby superseded.

In the future, all requests for access or correction of records of the Department of Justice, which you receive should be forwarded to the FOI and PA Unit.

Upon receipt of such a request by your office, its receipt should be immediately acknowledged and the requester informed that his/her correspondence has been forwarded to the Freedom of Information and Privacy Act Unit. A copy of this acknowledgment and the original request letter should then be forwarded to the FOI and PA Unit, Room 1134, Main Justice Building. Upon receipt, the FOI and PA Unit will assign the request to the appropriate office and/or division of the Department for consideration.

The response period begins on the date that the request is received by the FOI and PA Unit. However, if the requested records are in your office (or have been produced by your office at some earlier date, and are stored in a Federal Records Center), they should be located immediately and preliminarily screened to determine the probable scope of the response. Immediate action will better enable requests to be answered in the short time given, and in those cases where our answers become the subject of litigation, allow us to readily demonstrate that we have acted with "due diligence" as required by the Act.

\*This topic will be covered in the U.S. Attorneys' Manual.  
(Executive Office)

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## TRAINING

This is a reminder that the Attorney General's Advocacy Institute has responsibility for conducting and authorizing training for all personnel in the U.S. Attorneys Offices. It has conducted numerous training programs for attorneys and non-attorney employees. In addition, there is available in the Attorney General's Advocacy Institute a lending library of continuing legal education, audio and video cassette tapes. However, since it is impossible for us to anticipate and plan instruction to meet the varied training requirements of the U.S. Attorney Offices, we have in the past, and will continue, to set aside a limited amount of funds to pay for both attorney and non-attorney training taken outside the Department of Justice by U.S. Attorneys Office personnel. This fund is available to pay for expenses for training conducted by both government and non-government agencies, and includes the cost of tuition, books, travel and per diem.

In the past, some U.S. Attorneys offices have freely utilized such non-Department of Justice training opportunities; others have not. By this notice it is hoped that all United States Attorneys Office personnel will be alerted to the existence of our training funds and be encouraged to request training, as appropriate.

Our action upon your training requests will be guided by budgetary constraints and factors such as:

- 1) Does the requested training appear to improve the efficiency of the requestor in some job-related skill?
- 2) Is the training requested the most geographically proximate to the requestor's office? (This will be considered where comparable training is offered in more than one location.)
- 3) Does the requested non-Department of Justice training substantially duplicate that which is offered already by the Department?
- 4) Does the benefit to be derived from this training justify its expense?

Anyone requesting such training must submit to the Attorney General's Advocacy Institute, through the U.S. Attorney concerned, the Optional Form-170 (10 part) as far in advance as is possible.

The Attorney General's Advocacy Institute will continue to advise U.S. Attorneys Offices concerning its own in-house training programs and will attempt to notify your offices concerning other training programs that come to our attention.

Please direct any questions you might have regarding these training matters to Doris F. Johnson, Staff Assistant, Attorney General's Advocacy Institute (FTS) 739-2837.

(Executive Office)

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#### CASSETTE TAPES LIBRARY

The Attorney General's Advocacy Institute is engaged in organizing a lending library of audio and video tapes for use by United States Attorney's Offices.

A number of Federal Rules of Evidence video tapes were sent out nearly a year ago by the AGAI for review in various United States Attorney's Offices. Many of these tapes have not been returned. The loss of these tapes could represent a loss of thousands of dollars to the AGAI.

It is absolutely imperative that these tapes be returned to the AGAI if that office is to make new and better tapes available to United States Attorneys' Offices.

Please search your offices for any cassette tapes which may have been mislaid or forgotten and send them to the Attorney General's Advocacy Institute.

(Executive Office)

CIVIL DIVISION  
Assistant Attorney General Rex E. Lee

Bradford School Bus Transit, Inc. v. Chicago Transit Authority  
(C.A. 7, No. 75-1958, decided July 7, 1976).  
DJ# 145-18-320.

Urban Mass Transportation Act.

Plaintiffs are private school bus operators who claim that the Chicago Transit Authority ("CTA") is violating the terms of its grant with the Urban Mass Transportation Authority ("UMTA") by engaging in school bus operations in competition with plaintiffs. The relief sought included an order enjoining UMTA from providing further funds to CTA under the terms of the grant contract. The court of appeals ruled that plaintiffs had standing to maintain the suit and that UMTA's actions were reviewable, but held that, under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, plaintiffs must exhaust subsequently established administrative remedies before presenting their complaint to the courts.

Attorneys: Samuel K. Skinner (U.S. Attorney,  
N.D. Ill.) FTS 353-5333; Fred  
Branding (Assistant U.S. Attorney,  
N.D. Ill.) FTS 353-5342.

Campbell and Pope v. Civil Service Commission (C.A. 10, No.  
75-1971, decided July 13, 1976). DJ# 145-156-86.

Freedom of Information Act.

In this case, after reviewing the main portion of a Civil Service Commission personnel management evaluation report, the plaintiffs also sought disclosure of appendices which specifically identified individuals who were thought to be either classified too high or promoted improperly. The Tenth Circuit held that under the balancing test of exemption 6 of the Freedom of Information Act the employees' interest in privacy outweighed any public interest in the disclosure of the materials. The court also held, with one judge dissenting, that an award of \$250 attorney's fees appeared arbitrarily low and ordered remand for consideration of a more just award.

Attorney: Thomas G. Wilson (Civil Division)  
FTS 739-3395

John P. Gallo, M.D. v. Mathews, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (C.A. 5, No. 75-1105, decided July 9, 1976).  
DJ# 137-18-254.

Administrative Procedure Act.

In this suit by a doctor to prevent HEW from recouping Medicare monies it had overpaid him, the district court enjoined the recoupment pending a court hearing. We appealed, arguing that the district court had no jurisdiction either under 28 U.S.C. 1331 or the Administrative Procedure Act. The court of appeals accepted our argument with respect to 28 U.S.C. 1331, but held that there was limited review under the APA, not extending to factual determinations by the Secretary. However, even the limited APA review was unavailable to the doctor here, because he had not availed himself of HEW's hearing procedures, and therefore there was no "final agency action" within the meaning of the APA.

Attorney: David M. Cohen (Civil Division)  
FTS 264-9233

Ira Gissen v. Arthur L. Tackman, et al. (C.A. 3, Nos. 75-1299, 75-1804 and 75-2214, decided July 2, 1976).  
DJ# 170-48-54.

Civil Rights Act.

Title VII.

In a per curiam decision, the Third Circuit, en banc, has ruled that a federal employee may not sue his superiors in their individual capacity for alleged employment discrimination, but is limited to the remedies against the federal government provided in Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16. The court based its decision on the intervening Supreme Court decision in Brown v. GSA, 44 U.S.L.W. 4704 (June 1, 1976).

Attorneys: Jonathan Goldstein (U.S. Attorney, N.J.) FTS 341-2289; Maryann T. Desmond (Assistant U.S. Attorney, N.J.) FTS 341-2289.

Violet Davis Grubbs v. Earl L. Butz (C.A.D.C., No. 73-1955, decided July 26, 1976). DJ# 170-16-70.

Title VII. Attorney Fees.

Plaintiff had previously won the right to a trial de novo on her Title VII complaint based upon the fact that the administrative proceeding was not completed within 180 days, 514 F.2d 1323, and the only question presented here was whether prior to a final judgment on the merits she was entitled to

attorneys' fees as a "prevailing party" under 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5 (k) and 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(d). The court of appeals rejected the claim to attorneys' fees as premature, holding that a "prevailing party" entitled to attorneys' fees within the meaning of Title VII is a plaintiff who ultimately proves discrimination; the plaintiff does not receive attorneys' fees for intermediate procedural victories.

Attorneys: Earl J. Silbert (U.S. Attorney, D.C.),  
FTS 426-7511; George Stohner (Assistant  
U.S. Attorney, D.C.) FTS 426-7153; Karen  
Ward (Assistant U.S. Attorney, D.C.)  
FTS 426-7121.

Public Citizens, Inc. v. Simon (C.A.D.C., No. 74-2025, decided  
June 25, 1976). DJ# 145-3-1247.

Standing.

The object of this taxpayers' suit was to compel the Secretary of the Treasury to recover the salaries paid to White House staff personnel who allegedly devoted their time to the 1972 Presidential election campaign rather than official business. Such payments were alleged to violate the Appropriations Clause of the Constitution and 31 U.S.C. 628. The court of appeals, one judge dissenting, ruled that plaintiffs' challenge is in essence to the conduct of the executive branch, and that the Appropriations Clause is "not a specific limitation on the congressional taxing and spending power" thus distinguishing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 82. Accordingly, the court of appeals affirmed the district court and dismissed for lack of standing.

Attorney: David Anderson (Civil Division)  
FTS 739-3311.

LAND AND NATURAL RESOURCES DIVISION  
Assistant Attorney General Peter R. Taft

Aeschliman, et al. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, et al. (C.A. D.C., Nos. 73-1776 and 73-1867, July 21, 1976). DJ 90-4-1-738.

National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.

These cases involve consolidated petitions to review orders by NRC's predecessor (the Atomic Energy Commission) granting construction permits for two pressurized water nuclear reactors in Midland, Michigan. The court reversed and remanded, holding (1) that the agency had erroneously rejected energy conservation alternatives to the reactors on the basis of the "threshold test," (2) the report of the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards should be returned to that Committee for clarification of certain ambiguities, and (3) NRC should reconsider waste disposal and other unaddressed fuel cycle issues and restrike the cost-benefit analysis as required by NRDC v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (C.A. D.C. 1972).

Attorney: James L. Kelley (NRC), (202) 492-7194.

Krueger v. Morton (C.A. D.C. No. 75-1456, July 22, 1976). DJ 90-1-18-1084.

National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.

The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal on summary judgment of a complaint by an applicant for a coal prospecting permit against the Secretary of the Interior. Rejecting the Government's arguments that the applicant lacked standing to challenge the Secretary's decision to temporarily suspend issuance of coal prospecting permits, and that the Secretary's action was judicially unreviewable because it was "committed to agency discretion by law," the court sustained the validity of the suspension order (made pending issuance of new regulations governing coal mining on federal lands) on which the Secretary had decided not to file an environmental impact statement under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.

Attorney: John J. Zimmerman (Land and Natural Resources Division), FTS 739-4519.

Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (C.A. D.C. Nos. 74-1385 and 74-1586, July 21, 1976).  
DJ 90-1-4-896; 90-1-4-456.

National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.

These two cases, both relating to the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Reactor, concern the degree that the NRC must give consideration to the problem of disposal of radioactive wastes, in deciding to license nuclear reactors. The first case concerned NEPA consideration of the issue for a specific reactor, and the second case concerned rulemaking which would have set specific numerical values to factor into required cost-benefit analyses to account for the storage of the waste, but no more. The court found that the issue should have been considered fully in the impact statement and remanded the NRC's order granting a full-term license in the first case. In the second case, the court held that, while no specific procedures are required for informal rulemaking, the record must be fully developed, which was not the case here where NRC brushed aside the apparently reasonable objections of the petitioners. The case was remanded to create a full record. Judge Tamm, concurring, would only have required a fuller explanation by the Agency.

Attorney: James A. Glasgow (NRC) (202) 492-7375.

Sierra Club, et al. v. EPA (C.A. D.C., No. 74-2063, et al.,  
August 2, 1976). D.J. 90-5-2-3-632.

Clean Air Act.

The court reaffirmed the decision in Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus and held that the regulations promulgated by EPA to prevent the significant deterioration of air quality were rational and in accordance with law. Judge Wilkey concurred in the result only. The court upheld the regulations after consideration of 12 different issues raised by environmental, industry, and state petitioners. Among the issues decided in EPA's favor were whether the Clean Air Act authorized promulgation of the regulations; whether the regulations were valid because only two of the six primary air pollutants were considered; whether EPA complied with the Clean Air Act in the procedures used to promulgate the regulations; and whether the regulations were constitutional. The only issue left undecided by the court was whether, by providing for reclassification of federal and Indian lands independent of state action, the

regulations abrogated authority granted to the states by the Clean Air Act. The court determined that that issue was not ripe for review.

Attorneys: Richard J. Denney (EPA), 202-755-0763;  
Erica L. Dolgin, FTS 739-2792 and  
Earl Salo, FTS 739-5267 (Land and Natural  
Resources Division).

Louisiana Environmental Society, Inc., et al. v. William T.  
Coleman, Jr., Secretary, Department of Transportation  
and Department of Highways, State of Louisiana  
(C.A. 5, No. 76-1686, July 19, 1976). D.J. 90-1-4-  
392.

Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act  
and Highway Act of 1966.

The Fifth Circuit ruled that the EIS concerning the I-220 by-pass highway around Shreveport, Louisiana, satisfied the National Environmental Protection Agency. However, it directed issuance of a temporary injunction because it rejected the Secretary of Transportation's Section 4(f) determination in that it did not adequately evaluate whether the harm to a lake and recreational area, to be bridged by the highway, could be mitigated by the selection of a different route. The Secretary's finding, that alternatives which would not affect the Lake at all were imprudent, was upheld. The case was remanded for a determination of exactly when final design approval occurred, upon which turns whether an additional design hearing is required.

Attorney: Larry G. Gutteridge, FTS 739-2740  
(Land and Natural Resources Division).