

# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the  
Northern District of California

## In the Matter of the Search of

(Briefly describe the property to be searched  
or identify the person by name and address)

2401 44th Ave., Unit #6, San Francisco, California, and  
2015 white Audi sedan with vehicle identification number  
(VIN) WUAC6AFRXFA901213

Case No.

**3 16 7 0699**

**LB**

**MAG**

## APPLICATION FOR A SEARCH WARRANT

I, a federal law enforcement officer or an attorney for the government, request a search warrant and state under penalty of perjury that I have reason to believe that on the following person or property (identify the person or describe the property to be searched and give its location):

See Attachment A

located in the Northern District of California, there is now concealed (identify the person or describe the property to be seized):

See Attachment B

The basis for the search under Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(c) is (check one or more):

- ☒ evidence of a crime;
- ☒ contraband, fruits of crime, or other items illegally possessed;
- ☒ property designed for use, intended for use, or used in committing a crime;
- ☒ a person to be arrested or a person who is unlawfully restrained.

The search is related to a violation of:

Code Section	Offense Description
21 U.S.C. 841, 846	Conspiracy, distribution, and manufacture of controlled substances
21 U.S.C. 843(b)	Use of a communication facility in furtherance of drug trafficking
18 U.S.C. 1956(h)	Money laundering conspiracy


The application is based on these facts:  
See attached affidavit in support of search warrant

- ☒ Continued on the attached sheet.
- ☐ Delayed notice of \_\_\_\_\_ days (give exact ending date if more than 30 days: \_\_\_\_\_) is requested under 18 U.S.C. § 3103a, the basis of which is set forth on the attached sheet.

Approved as to form:



AUSA Rita Lin



Applicant's signature


Austin Curnow, DEA Special Agent

Printed name and title

Sworn to before me and signed in my presence.

Date: Jun 7, 2016

City and state: San Francisco, California



Judge's signature

Hon. Laurel Beeler, U.S. Magistrate Judge

Printed name and title

1                                   **AFFIDAVIT OF DEA SPECIAL AGENT AUSTIN CURNOW**

2 I, Special Agent Austin Curnow, being first duly sworn, hereby depose and state as follows:

3 **I. INTRODUCTION**

4           1.       I make this affidavit in support of an application for a criminal complaint charging the  
5 following persons (collectively, the "Target Subjects") with violations of the Controlled Substances Act:

- 6                   a.       Kia ZOLFAGHARI;  
7                   b.       King Edward HARRIS II; and  
8                   c.       Candelaria Dagandan VAZQUEZ;

9 and in support of an application for a warrant to search the following locations, described more  
10 particularly in Attachment A, for the items specified in Attachment B:

- 11                   a.       **Target Premises:** 2401 44<sup>th</sup> Ave., Unit #6, San Francisco, California; and  
12                   b.       **Target Vehicle:** 2015 white Audi sedan, with paper dealer plates, and vehicle  
13                               identification number (VIN) WUAC6AFRXFA901213;

14 and any computers, cell phones, or other digital media devices found therein or on the Target Subjects at  
15 the time of their arrest, and to seize certain items that are fruits, evidence, and instrumentalities of  
16 violations of Title 21, United States Code, sections 841 (possession with intent to distribute and  
17 distribution of controlled substances), 846 (conspiracy to manufacture, distribute, and possess with  
18 intent to distribute controlled substances), 843(b) (illegal use of a communications facility), and Title 18,  
19 United States Code, section 1956(h) (conspiracy to launder money).<sup>1</sup> This search shall include all rooms  
20 and garages or storage spaces, attached or unattached, that are associated with the **Target Locations**,  
21 and any containers, locked or unlocked, located within or attached to the **Target Locations**.

22           2.       The statements contained in this affidavit are based on my own investigation, my training  
23 and experience as a law enforcement agent, information provided to me by or through other law  
24 enforcement agents, investigators and individuals with knowledge of this matter, and through my review  
25 of documents related to this investigation. This affidavit summarizes such information in order to show  
26

27 \_\_\_\_\_  
28 <sup>1</sup> Although the affidavit states probable cause to believe that certain of the defendants have  
violated money laundering statutes, and therefore, the search warrants seek evidence related to those  
crimes, the government is not yet seeking charges for those crimes, though it may in the future.

1 that there is probable cause to believe that the items listed in Attachment B are believed to be in the  
2 locations described in Attachment A. This affidavit does not purport to set forth all of the evidence  
3 gathered to date in this investigation. Based upon the information below, it is my opinion that there is  
4 probable cause to believe that the fruits, evidence, and instrumentalities of violations of 21 U.S.C.  
5 §§ 841, 843(b) and 846, and 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) are likely to be found in the **Target Locations**.

## 6 **II. AGENT BACKGROUND**

7 3. I am a Special Agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and have been  
8 since September of 2012. As such, I am an investigative or law enforcement officer of the United States  
9 empowered by law to conduct criminal investigations within the meaning of 21 U.S.C. § 878(a); that is,  
10 an officer who is empowered by law to conduct investigations, make arrests, and seize property for  
11 violations of Titles 18 and 21 of the United States Code.

12 4. As part of my training to become an agent, I have received 17 weeks of specialized  
13 training at the DEA Academy in Quantico, Virginia. This training included several hundred hours of  
14 comprehensive, formalized instruction regarding numerous subjects, including, but not limited to: basic  
15 narcotics investigations, drug identification, familiarization with United States narcotic laws, financial  
16 investigations and money laundering, identification and seizure of drug-related assets, undercover  
17 operations, and electronic and physical surveillance procedures. Prior to joining the DEA, I was  
18 employed by Naval Special Warfare Group in Coronado, California, and enlisted in the US Navy as a  
19 combat trauma medic from 1999 to 2004.

20 5. While with DEA, I have participated in over 25 separate investigations of drug trafficking  
21 organizations. I have conducted or helped conduct physical and electronic surveillance, including using  
22 electronic physical location data, of drug trafficking suspects on more than 80 occasions. I have  
23 participated in the execution of no fewer than 25 federal and state search warrants relating to drug  
24 trafficking investigations. On numerous occasions, I have debriefed defendants, informants, and  
25 witnesses who had personal knowledge regarding drug trafficking organizations. As a result of my  
26 participation in these and other activities, I am familiar with the use of physical surveillance, toll  
27 records, undercover agents, confidential informants, cooperating witnesses, search warrants, grand jury  
28 subpoenas, financial and other business records, witness interviews, trash covers, pole cameras, GPS

1 tracking devices, and mail covers to conduct investigations into drug trafficking organizations.

2         6. Through my work and training to become a DEA agent, I am also familiar with the  
3 manner in which narcotics traffickers use telephones, cellular telephone technology, pagers, coded  
4 communications or slang-filled telephone conversations, false or fictitious identities, and other means to  
5 facilitate their illegal activities and thwart law enforcement investigations. Based upon my training and  
6 experience, I know that it is common practice for narcotics traffickers to use pagers, telephones, and/or  
7 cellular telephones in order to communicate with their customers, suppliers, couriers, and other co-  
8 conspirators in order to insulate themselves from detection by law enforcement. Moreover, it is  
9 common for them to initiate such service under the name of an associate or fictitious name.

10 Furthermore, it is common for narcotic traffickers to utilize false or incomplete address(es) while filling  
11 out subscriber information related to their cellular phone(s) in an effort to secret their illegal activities.

12         7. As a DEA agent, I have also monitored and conducted surveillance, as well as  
13 participated in an investigation involving the direct interception of communications. I have attended  
14 training classes specializing in conducting electronic surveillance. I have had the opportunity to monitor,  
15 listen to, review transcripts or line sheets or monitor's logs prepared by linguists and/or otherwise  
16 discussed with linguists the content of intercepted conversations, the majority of which were in the  
17 Spanish language and involved the trafficking of heroin and methamphetamine by Mexican Drug  
18 Trafficking Organizations ("DTOs"), which often employ coded communications to thwart law  
19 enforcement.

20         8. By virtue of my training and experience, and through my conversations with other agents  
21 and law enforcement officers that conduct drug investigations, I have become familiar with the methods  
22 used by drug traffickers to import, transport, safeguard, and distribute drugs, and the methods used by  
23 drug traffickers to collect, transport, safeguard, remit, and/or launder drug proceeds.

24         9. I have personally participated in the investigation discussed in this Affidavit. I am  
25 familiar with the facts and circumstances of the investigation through my personal participation in it  
26 based on several investigative techniques, including discussions with agents of the DEA and with other  
27 law enforcement agencies, discussions with witnesses involved in the investigation, and review of  
28 records and reports relating to the investigation. Unless otherwise noted, wherever in this affidavit I

1 assert that a statement was made, the information was provided by another DEA agent, law enforcement  
2 officer, or witness who may have had either direct or hearsay knowledge of that statement and to whom  
3 I or others have spoken, or whose reports I have read and reviewed. Such statements are among many  
4 statements made by others and are stated in substance and in part unless otherwise indicated.  
5 Throughout this Affidavit, all sentences that begin with the words "I believe" are based upon such  
6 information as well as my training and experience.

### 7 **III. RELEVANT STATUTES**

8 10. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) makes it unlawful for a person to knowingly or intentionally  
9 manufacture, distribute, dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense,  
10 controlled substances, including fentanyl, a Schedule II controlled substance.

11 11. 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) makes it unlawful to use a communications facility, including a  
12 cellular telephone, to facilitate a violation of Title 21.

13 12. 21 U.S.C. § 846 makes it unlawful for a person to attempt or conspire to manufacture,  
14 distribute, or possess with intent to distribute controlled substances.

15 13. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) makes it unlawful to conspire to launder the proceeds of certain  
16 unlawful activities, including drug trafficking.

17 14. 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) subjects property to seizure and forfeiture that constitutes, or is  
18 derived from, any proceeds a person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of a violation of 21  
19 U.S.C. § 841, 843, or 846, or other violations within that subchapter, and any property used, or intended  
20 to be used, in any manner or part, to commit or to facilitate the commission of such violations.

### 21 **IV. PROBABLE CAUSE**

#### 22 **A. Overview**

23 15. This case arises out of a joint investigation by the Drug Enforcement Administration  
24 (DEA), Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) who are  
25 investigating the drug trafficking and money laundering activities of the Kia ZOLFAGHARI Drug  
26 Trafficking Organization (DTO). As further detailed below, I believe that that the ZOLFAGHARI DTO  
27 is involved in manufacturing fentanyl-laced counterfeit prescription pills in the **Target Premises** and  
28 then distributing said pills to customers throughout the United States.

1 16. Fentanyl, a Schedule II controlled substance, is a highly potent opiate that can be diluted  
2 with cutting agents to create counterfeit pills that attempt to mimic the effects of oxycodone, and can  
3 typically be obtained at a lower cost than genuine oxycodone. However, small variations in the amount  
4 or quality of fentanyl used can have significant effects on the potency of the counterfeit pills, raising the  
5 danger of overdoses.

6 17. As detailed below, beginning in November 2015, a DEA Confidential Source<sup>2</sup> (CS) has  
7 negotiated, as directed by the DEA, a sample acquisition and six controlled purchases for suspected  
8 fentanyl pills. Those controlled purchases were negotiated between the CS and HARRIS, a Los  
9 Angeles-based narcotics broker, in a series of recorded phone calls and text messages. Through analysis  
10 of phone records, a federal wiretap on two of ZOLFAGHARI's cell phones (hereinafter, Target  
11 Telephones 1 and 2, respectively), trash searches, mail covers, vehicle and phone trackers, pole-camera  
12 observation, search warrants, and physical surveillance, agents have developed evidence that  
13 ZOLFAGHARI was the supplier of the pills purchased by the CS via HARRIS and that ZOLFAGHARI  
14 appears to be manufacturing those pills in his apartment, which is the **Target Premises**. Agents have  
15 also developed evidence that ZOLFAGHARI's significant other, VAZQUEZ, who lives in **Target**  
16 **Premises** with ZOLFAGHARI, assists ZOLFAGHARI by purchasing mailing and packaging materials,  
17 delivering packages, and laundering drug proceeds.

18 **B. Initial Sample of Pills and First Four Controlled Purchases**

19 18. The CS began by obtaining a sample of pills from HARRIS. On November 14, 2015, the  
20 CS called HARRIS regarding what type of pills the CS would be purchasing from HARRIS's supplier.  
21 HARRIS responded, "They the M-30's", "they are the white ones". HARRIS also said, "And he does it  
22 on the internet. He doesn't really deal with it the way you and me do it right now. Like the mother  
23 f\*\*kers he deal with, they have pharmacies and stuff and they only call him for the white ones." The CS  
24

25 <sup>2</sup> The CS has worked intermittently with DEA since 2005. The CS has a criminal history dating  
26 back to 1989 and has previously been arrested and convicted for controlled substance violations,  
27 robbery, vehicle theft, and false impersonation. The CS has not been arrested since 2003 and has  
28 provided information which has been independently corroborated when possible. The CS has assisted  
DEA with numerous investigations which have led to the arrest of multiple defendants in both state and  
federal court and the seizure of kilogram quantities of cocaine as well as smaller amounts of heroin and  
methamphetamine. The CS has not provided information which has been deemed false or misleading.  
Currently, the CS is working for monetary compensation.

1 acknowledged. The two then discussed meeting in Las Vegas, Nevada, so HARRIS could provide the  
2 CS with a "sample" of the pills they were discussing. Based on my training and experience, and my  
3 consultation with other agents, I believe that "M-30s" and "white ones" are code words used to describe  
4 white 30 milligram oxycodone pills.

5 19. On November 20, 2015, the CS and HARRIS traveled to Las Vegas, Nevada for the pre-  
6 arranged meeting. The CS met with HARRIS, who provided the CS with two small, circular white pills  
7 with the markings "ETH" and "446". The CS later provided the pills to agents of the DEA. Analysis by  
8 the DEA Western Regional Laboratory indicated the pills contained fentanyl.

9 20. The CS then conducted a series of four more controlled purchases, each of which was  
10 negotiated with HARRIS. In each instance, the CS was instructed to make payment to a Bank of  
11 America account controlled by VAZQUEZ. Bank records show that VAZQUEZ is the sole signatory on  
12 that account, with her address listed as the **Target Premises**. The pills were then sent to a post office  
13 box whose address the CS provided to HARRIS. In each instance, the pills were small white pills  
14 marked "ETH" and "446", and were delivered in layers of envelopes (such as a priority mail envelope,  
15 bubble wrap envelope, and a standard mail envelope) with multiple hermetically sealed pouches, each  
16 containing a colorfully tape-wrapped clear Ziploc bag with pills inside. In each instance, the return  
17 address was listed in the name of a fictitious business, with a corresponding QR code (which is similar  
18 to a bar code). The controlled purchases are detailed in the below chart:

Date	Quantity	Substance
12/10/15	100 pills	DEA's Western Regional Laboratory found a representative sample, 25 of 100 pills, to contain Fentanyl.
2/17/16	250 pills	Suspected Fentanyl (laboratory test pending)
2/25/16	250 pills	Suspected Fentanyl (laboratory test pending)
4/12/16	420 pills	Suspected Fentanyl (presumptive field test for fentanyl, laboratory test pending)

21. In each of those instances, HARRIS stated that the pills would be sent by his supplier.

1 On numerous occasions during the negotiation of the controlled purchases, when the CS asked for  
2 details about payment or timing of the deliveries, telephone toll records showed that HARRIS contacted  
3 ZOLFAGHARI.

4 22. For example, on December 5, 2015, the CS received a text message from HARRIS,  
5 which said, "He said he calling me tonight". Analysis of HARRIS' telephone toll records showed that  
6 after sending the CS the above text message, HARRIS received a 45 second call from ZOLFAGHARI  
7 using Target Telephone 1. Approximately 15 minutes later, HARRIS called ZOLFAGHARI on Target  
8 Telephone 2 and had a 149 second conversation. HARRIS' next phone call was with the CS. During that  
9 conversation, HARRIS told the CS, "He said that sound like a bet, that he can press 100 out fast as f\*ck.  
10 The only problem is that he asked if you could send the bread MoneyGram, I don't know if you do that."  
11 The CS voiced his/her preference for transferring the money from bank account to bank account.  
12 HARRIS agreed and said, "Let me call him, I'll call you right back. I'll call him right now and get you  
13 on here three-way, just answer the call". Analysis of HARRIS' telephone toll records show that  
14 approximately nine seconds after speaking with the CS, HARRIS called Target Telephone 2 and had a  
15 119 second conversation with ZOLFAGHARI. During that call, the CS received an incoming call from  
16 HARRIS; however, the CS's phone experienced a malfunction, preventing the parties from having a  
17 three-way call. Moments later, the CS received a call from HARRIS who said that he had just spoken  
18 with "him" and that HARRIS tried to call the CS when "he" (the supplier) was on the other phone line.  
19 HARRIS went on to say that his supplier said he doesn't have a bank account to "throw" the money into  
20 unless the CS had a PayPal account. The CS insisted on using a bank transfer method and HARRIS  
21 agreed to pass his supplier's information to the CS. Analysis of HARRIS's toll records show he called  
22 ZOLFAGHARI on Target Telephone 1 and had a 21 minute conversation.

23 23. I believe the above conversation describes methods of drug trafficking used by HARRIS  
24 and ZOLFAGHARI. I believe in the CS's initial conversation with HARRIS, HARRIS said his supplier  
25 agreed to the purchase and could quickly manufacture 100 pills ("he could press 100 out fast as f\*ck").  
26 HARRIS then indicated ZOLFAGHARI requested payment for the pills be made via MoneyGram, a  
27 money remitter service. I believe that after the CS expressed his/her preference for paying through a  
28 banking institution, HARRIS said he would call the CS right back so that the CS, HARRIS, and



1 ZOLFAGHARI could speak together on a three-way call. When the three-way did not occur, I believe  
2 HARRIS indicated ZOLFAGHARI didn't have a bank account and preferred payment through PayPal.

3 **C. Fifth Controlled Purchase of 500 Pills on May 18, 2016, Over Federal Wiretap**

4 24. On May 13, 2016, the Honorable Richard Seeborg, United States District Judge, Northern  
5 District of California, granted court authorization for the interception of wire and electronic  
6 communications on 510-283-3833 ("Target Telephone 1") and 415-340-9107 ("Target Telephone 2").  
7 Evidence indicates that ZOLFAGHARI is the user of both phones. Target Telephone 1 is registered in  
8 ZOLFAGHARI's name with the address of the **Target Premises**, where agents have observed him and  
9 where trash searches contain indicia in his name. ZOLFAGHARI also gave that telephone number as  
10 his number during a traffic stop on May 3, 2016. Voice identification has confirmed that  
11 ZOLFAGHARI is also the user of Target Telephone 2, which GPS location data has shown to be located  
12 in the same vicinity as Target Telephone 1, commonly at ZOLFAGHARI's address at the **Target**  
13 **Premises**.

14 25. Agents arranged for a fifth controlled purchase to occur during the federal wiretap. As  
15 detailed below, ZOLFAGHARI was captured on the wiretap discussing the supplying of pills, and then  
16 seen both by physical surveillance and on pole-camera footage handing over the envelope of pills to  
17 HARRIS, who then met and provided the pills to the CS.

18 26. Prior to the period of interception, on April 28, 2016, the CS received a call from  
19 HARRIS. During their conversation, the CS conveyed to HARRIS that the CS wished to purchase 500  
20 counterfeit oxycodone pills. HARRIS acknowledged and said he'll call his "guy". Analysis of HARRIS'  
21 toll records showed he made an immediate call to ZOLFAGHARI on Target Telephone 2. At  
22 approximately 8:28 p.m., HARRIS sent a text message to the CS saying, "He said cool". The CS then  
23 sent HARRIS a text saying, "I don't care who he sends I can't do the waiting game with that kind of  
24 money". HARRIS responded, "He already getting them ready tonight he said. So they'll be out  
25 whenever you shoot the bread. I jus can't make that trip for 500 bro. I would need 1200 min". The CS  
26 said, "I'll take care of you if you can make it happen the same day with the paper".

27 27. On May 16, 2016, the CS called HARRIS and discussed details about their arranged drug  
28 buy. HARRIS indicated that he will be renting a vehicle and driving to the San Francisco Bay Area late

1 that night so that he can meet with the CS the next morning. The CS acknowledged.

2 28. On May 17, 2106, the next morning, the CS received a call from HARRIS. HARRIS told  
3 the CS that the source of supply does not have the 500 pills prepared yet because the CS had not made  
4 an advanced payment (via the VAZQUEZ bank account). The CS asked HARRIS to inquire if the  
5 supplier could prepare the pills today and conduct the purchase later in the day. HARRIS said that he  
6 will call his supplier immediately.

7 29. Moments later, agents monitoring Target Telephone 2 intercepted a call from HARRIS.  
8 During the intercepted conversation, HARRIS asked ZOLFAGHARI if the pills could be prepared that  
9 day. ZOLFAGHARI negated and said, "Nah. They would've been ready if he made the payment  
10 already. I would've had it ready for him. Since you told me at the end of last month, I had it, he never  
11 sent the payment so I sold it. And then you said the 9<sup>th</sup>, I had it, never received the payment so I sold it,  
12 and then you said a week later, I had it and then I just got home right now. I have to redo". HARRIS  
13 asked, "You can knock 500 out like that though?", ZOLFAGHARI responded, "Yeah, I sold 550 today,  
14 yesterday, last night, just now." HARRIS acknowledged and said he'll call the CS.

15 30. Seconds later, the CS received a call from HARRIS who explained to the CS that the  
16 entire payment for the 500 pills (\$6,000) needed to be made to the supplier (ZOLFAGHARI) before he  
17 would prepare the pills and that if the CS deposited the money that day, the pills will be available the  
18 next day (May 18<sup>th</sup>). The CS acknowledged.

19 31. At 9:29 a.m., the CS received a call from HARRIS asking when the CS would make the  
20 payment. The CS said after he/she gets out of bed and takes a shower. Approximately two minutes after  
21 their conversation, agents monitoring Target Telephone 2 intercepted a call from HARRIS who notified  
22 ZOLFAGHARI that after the CS gets up and takes a shower, the CS is "walking it in" to the bank to  
23 deposit and that the money will be in the account by 11:00 a.m. HARRIS said the CS is putting "6 in  
24 there", which based on previous pricing conversations, is \$6,000.00. ZOLFAGHARI acknowledged and  
25 asked HARRIS "so its good for 5?" and HARRIS confirmed. I believe "5" is code for 500 pills, the  
26 agreed upon amount that the CS will be paying \$6,000.00 to for.

27 32. At approximately 11:20 a.m., the CS deposited \$6,000.00 into the Bank of America  
28 savings account for Candelaria VAZQUEZ. Minutes after the deposit, the CS called HARRIS and

1 notified him that deposit had been completed.

2        33.     On May 18, 2016, at approximately 4:16 a.m., agents monitoring Target Telephone 1  
3 intercepted text messages HARRIS sent ZOLFAGHARI. The messages said, "Omw" (shorthand for 'on  
4 my way') and "I'm omw but have a new phone. Need your addy again". Approximately 45 minutes  
5 later, ZOLFAGHARI responded, "2401 44<sup>th</sup> Ave. San Francisco" (*i.e.*, the **Target Premises**). At  
6 approximately 10:30 a.m., agents intercepted a call with HARRIS. HARRIS notified ZOLFAGHARI  
7 that he is ten minutes out. ZOLFAGHARI told HARRIS to call ZOLFAGHARI when he arrived.

8        34.     At approximately 10:40 a.m., agents observed a gold-colored Toyota sedan arrive and  
9 park in front of 2401 44<sup>th</sup> Avenue. The vehicle was occupied by two adult males who exited the vehicle  
10 after parking. One male was positively identified as King Edward HARRIS II, based on his California  
11 Driver's License photograph, and the identity of the other man remained unknown. The unknown man  
12 returned to the driver-side of the Camry and HARRIS remained outside. While standing outside of the  
13 car, HARRIS placed a call to Target Telephone 1 and told ZOLFAGHARI, "I'm downstairs," and  
14 ZOLFAHGARI responded, "I'll be down in a minute". At approximately 10:48 a.m., agents observed a  
15 man exit the front entrance of 2401 44<sup>th</sup> Avenue with a black beanie cap, sunglasses, and a black hooded  
16 sweatshirt carrying a tan envelope. The man was positively identified as Kia ZOLFAGHARI based on  
17 his California Driver's License photograph. In addition to physical surveillance, agents also trained a  
18 covert pole-camera on the two men while their transaction took place, recording all actions in the  
19 process. ZOLFAGHARI and HARRIS met, at which time agents observed ZOLFAGHARI hand  
20 HARRIS the tan envelope. HARRIS placed the envelope inside his car then engaged ZOLFAGHARI in  
21 conversation for several minutes. At approximately 11:04 a.m., the parties separated. ZOLFAGHARI  
22 returned through the entrance to 2401 44<sup>th</sup> Avenue and HARRIS departed in the gold Toyota sedan with  
23 his unidentified friend.

24        35.     HARRIS then drove to a predetermined meeting location provided by the CS. In the  
25 parking lot, HARRIS met the CS inside the CS's vehicle. Onboard video from inside the CS's vehicle  
26 showed HARRIS pull a tan envelope from his waistband and provide it to the CS. They engaged in  
27 conversation for several minutes before HARRIS departed the vehicle, entered his Toyota sedan and  
28 departed the area.

1           36.     Later, upon inspection of the envelope contents, agents found approximately 500  
2 counterfeit pills with markings virtually identical to those in the four previous pill deliveries. Agents  
3 also found that the packaging materials used to contain the counterfeit pills matched items seized in the  
4 four previous pill deliveries. I believe the near identical packaging materials, coupled with the virtually  
5 exact method in which the pills were packed (multiple layers of specific materials) demonstrate that  
6 ZOLFAGHARI has been the supplier of fentanyl pills in each of the four other controlled buys the CS  
7 has made with HARRIS. Agents later transferred the envelope and its contents (packaging materials and  
8 pills) to the DEA Western Regional Lab for analysis and safekeeping.

9           **D.     Sixth Controlled Buy of 500 Pills on June 2, 2016, Over the Federal Wiretap**

10          37.     In the days leading up to June 2, 2016, the CS was in close communication with HARRIS  
11 regarding another drug deal. During that time, agents arranged for a sixth controlled purchase to occur  
12 during the federal wiretap. As detailed below and a repeat from the previous controlled buy,  
13 ZOLFAGHARI was captured on the wiretap discussing the supplying of pills to HARRIS, and then seen  
14 both by physical surveillance and on live-feed pole-camera footage exchanging an unknown object to  
15 HARRIS at the trunk of HARRIS' vehicle, who then met and provided the pills to the CS.

16          38.     On May 27, 2016, at approximately 4:19 p.m., the CS spoke with HARRIS. During their  
17 conversation, the two discussed which day of the week to conduct their transaction. Ultimately the two  
18 settled on Thursday, June 2, 2016. Also, the CS said he/she would send HARRIS \$500.00 through  
19 MoneyGram so HARRIS could pay for a rental car to drive to San Francisco and meet the CS.

20          39.     At approximately 4:58 p.m., that same day, agents intercepted a call between  
21 ZOLFAGHARI and HARRIS. During their conversation, HARRIS said that "he" (the CS) wants to do  
22 the deal on Thursday (June 2). ZOLFAGHARI acknowledged and said he'll "definitely have them ready  
23 by then", that he'll "have them ready by Tuesday at the earliest". HARRIS acknowledged.

24          40.     On June 1, 2016, the CS deposited \$6,000.00 into the VAZQUEZ Bank of America  
25 savings account. Following the deposit, the CS alerted HARRIS to the deposit. At approximately  
26 2:37 p.m. the same day, HARRIS sent a text message to ZOLFAGHARI using Target Telephone 2,  
27 saying, "He say it's there". ZOLFAGHARI responded by saying, "Got it, had orders for 800 yesterday  
28 so I gotta get back to work right now".

1           41.     On June 2, 2016, while monitoring Target Telephone 2, agents intercepted a text message  
2 from HARRIS which said, "On my way. I'll be there around 10". ZOLFAGHARI responded, "Ok just  
3 finished and got it ready for you".

4           42.     At approximately 10:13 a.m., agents observed a gold colored sedan arrive and park in  
5 front of 2401 44<sup>th</sup> Avenue (ZOLFAGHARI's residence. At that exact time, HARRIS called Target  
6 Telephone 2 and told ZOLFAGHARI that he (HARRIS) was outside. ZOLFAGHARI acknowledged.  
7 Minutes later, agents observed a man, identified as King HARRIS based on his California Driver's  
8 License photograph, exit the vehicle and stand near the front entrance of 2401 44<sup>th</sup> Avenue. Moments  
9 later, agents observed ZOLFAGHARI walk out the front entrance and meet with HARRIS near  
10 HARRIS' vehicle. ZOLFAGHARI was wearing a dark beanie cap, sunglasses and a satchel bag. As the  
11 two men walked toward the back of the vehicle, agents observed HARRIS open the trunk, and then  
12 ZOLFAGHARI appeared to retrieve an item from his satchel and hand it to HARRIS. The two men  
13 engaged in conversation for approximately 10 more minutes before ZOLFAGHARI returned to his  
14 residence and HARRIS got into his vehicle and departed.

15           43.     Agents followed HARRIS to a predetermined meeting location where the CS was parked.  
16 Agents observed HARRIS walk to and enter the CS's vehicle. Onboard video captured HARRIS  
17 meeting with the CS. During their meet, HARRIS provided the CS with a tan bubble envelope, nearly  
18 identical to the same package HARRIS provided the CS during the last controlled buy that had  
19 contained approximately 500 pills of suspected fentanyl. The CS and HARRIS met for approximately 30  
20 minutes and discussed various music topics as well as details about a future deal involving the purchase  
21 of 1,000 pills. HARRIS said he'll find out if it's possible then get back to the CS. Following their  
22 meeting, HARRIS walked away out of sight.

23           44.     Agents met with the CS shortly thereafter and acquired the tan envelope provided by  
24 HARRIS. Agents later dissected the envelope and its contents. In the process, agents found packaging  
25 material consistent with materials used in previous controlled buys. Additionally, agents found  
26 approximately 500 small, circular white pills in clear Ziploc bags. Each pill was labeled with "ETH" and  
27 "446," which is exactly how every other pill seized in the subject investigation has been labeled. I  
28 believe that ZOLFAGHARI provided the tan envelope to HARRIS in a covert manner when the two

1 were near the trunk of HARRIS's vehicle. I further believe that ZOLFAGHARI has been the supplier  
2 for every controlled purchase of pills in this investigation.

3 **E. Trash Search Confirming that the Target Premises Is Being Used to Manufacture**  
4 **and Distribute the Fentanyl-Laced Pills**

5 45. On May 2, 2016, DEA agents conducted a trash search of the garbage bags from the  
6 apartment complex of 2401 44<sup>th</sup> Ave., San Francisco, CA 94116. Upon inspecting the bags, agents  
7 determined two garbage bags came from **Target Premises** at 2401 44th Avenue, Unit #6, San  
8 Francisco, CA 94116. The determination was based on the fact that agents found at least one piece of  
9 indicia in each bag which listed "Kia Zolfaghari, 2401 44th Avenue, Unit #6, San Francisco, CA". Also  
10 found in the bags were numerous pairs of latex gloves, some of which had a white powdery residue  
11 clinging to the glove material. Additionally, agents found several forms of packaging materials that  
12 matched the packaging material used to contain fentanyl-laced pills obtained through multiple previous  
13 controlled purchases with the CS. Specifically, agents pulled from the trash adhesive tape with a defined  
14 color pattern which matches the colorful adhesive tape used to package illicit pills previously seized by  
15 agents. Other items found in the garbage bags are listed below:

- 16 a. Walgreens receipts showing the purchase of bulk quantities of priority mail  
17 envelopes, bubble mail envelopes, nitrile exam gloves, and other such items.
- 18 b. Western Union receipts with Candelaria VAZQUEZ's name on them.
- 19 c. MoneyGram receipts with Candelaria VAZQUEZ's name on them.
- 20 d. Mail Center receipts for multiple parcels paid in cash.
- 21 e. Multiple Walgreens receipts for purchases of Visa Gift Cards in \$200  
22 increments.
- 23 f. A hand-written list including "small bubble mailers", "buy stamps", "mail boxes  
24 to Florida".
- 25 g. A small clear Ziploc bag, the exact size and type used to contain pills in previous  
26 CS pill buys.
- 27 h. A Priority Express mail bubble envelope with a label showing, "Kia Zolfaghari,  
28 2401 44th Avenue, Unit 6, San Francisco, CA".
- i. Numerous (30+) pink and yellow torn post-it notes with full names and  
quantities hand-written on them in the format "[first name] [last name] X [number]".

1 46. I believe the materials obtained through the trash search show a clear connection between  
2 the materials used to package quantities of pills seized by agents and ZOLFAGHARI and VAZQUEZ.  
3 Analysis of the materials show that ZOLFAGHAI and VAZQUEZ purchase bulk quantities of mailing  
4 materials, utilize MoneyGram and Western Union to send and receive money, use exam gloves to  
5 handle their pill making materials, keep track of their customer orders by writing them down on post-it  
6 notes, then discard evidence of the above in the trash. I further believe that the post-it notes list Fentanyl  
7 Pill customers who may be placing orders via the internet or other non-traditional communication  
8 methods.

9  
10 **F. Mailing of Pills by ZOLFAGHARI and VAZQUEZ and Further Trash Search of the Target Premises**

11 47. On May 23, 2016, at approximately 4:30 a.m., DEA agents established surveillance in the  
12 area of the Westlake Shopping Center in Daly City, CA, in anticipation of ZOLFAGHARI's travels.  
13 During this time, other agents were monitoring live-feed pole camera footage which overlooked the  
14 garage door and front entrance to ZOLFAGHARI's building at 2401 44<sup>th</sup> Avenue, San Francisco, CA.  
15 Agents were also monitoring the court-authorized GPS location data associated with a tracking device  
16 placed on the **Target Vehicle**, a white Audi.

17 48. At approximately 5:06 a.m., the pole camera showed the garage door to 2401 44<sup>th</sup>  
18 Avenue open and the **Target Vehicle** depart then travel southbound on 44<sup>th</sup> Avenue. Moments later,  
19 agents began following the vehicle and during that time noticed the vehicle was occupied by two  
20 adults. Agents followed the vehicle to Southgate Avenue and observed the vehicle make a U-turn in  
21 front of a United States Post Office located at 199 Southgate Avenue, Daly City, CA. Agents then  
22 observed the **Target Vehicle** stop in the middle of the road and the passenger door open. A female  
23 identified as VAZQUEZ exited the passenger side carrying multiple envelopes. Agents watched  
24 VAZQUEZ walk to two blue street-side collection boxes in front of the post office, then moments later  
25 walk back to the **Target Vehicle** empty-handed. VAZQUEZ returned to the passenger seat and the  
26 **Target Vehicle** departed. During this time, the agents monitoring tracking information observed the  
27 **Target Vehicle** drive directly back to 2401 44<sup>th</sup> Avenue, San Francisco, CA. The pole camera footage  
28 also showed the **Target Vehicle** enter the garage and park. The garage door closed immediately after.

1           49.     Agents remained at the post office within eyesight of the blue street-side USPS collection  
2 boxes, and at approximately 6:40 a.m., made contact with a USPS employee who agreed to provide  
3 agents access to the mail contained in the collection boxes. In the intervening time, agents did not see  
4 anyone else put any mail into those boxes. Agents immediately noticed six priority mail envelopes  
5 sitting near the top of one USPS mail tub in one of the collection boxes, each of which listed the same  
6 return address. Agents took the mail envelopes and observed the addressees for each. Based on  
7 previous searches of ZOLFAGHARI's trash in which post-it notes were recovered containing what  
8 appeared to be customer order slips, agents determined that several of the Priority Mail envelopes found  
9 in the blue USPS collection box appeared to be addressed to repeat customers because the same names  
10 were on those envelopes as on the post-its in ZOLFAGHARI's trash. At that time, agents seized three  
11 out of the six envelopes and retained custody until reaching the DEA San Francisco Division Office.

12           50.     At approximately 8:25 a.m. that same morning, agents conducted another trash search of  
13 the garbage bags from the apartment complex of 2401 44<sup>th</sup> Ave., San Francisco, CA 94116. Upon  
14 inspection, agents determined two bags belonged to ZOLFAGHARI and VAZQUEZ based on indicia  
15 found in each bag. In addition to indicia, agents found numerous pairs of purple nitrile exam gloves,  
16 packaging materials, and various receipts. Lastly, agents found approximately 20 post-it notes with  
17 hand-written names and quantities. Specifically, agents found post-it notes with the same names as  
18 those listed as addressees on the envelopes seized from the blue USPS collection box.

19           51.     I believe the aforementioned post-it notes are customer order slips which also indicated  
20 the number of pills to be sent. I also believe the exam gloves found in the trash are used by  
21 ZOLFAGHARI and/or VAZQUEZ when manufacturing their illicit pills. I further believe the names  
22 listed on the seized mail envelopes corresponding to post-it notes found in the trash show a clear process  
23 which ZOLFAGHARI and VAZQUEZ follow to distribute their drugs to customers.

24           52.     On May 25, 2016, agents conducted a controlled delivery of one of the packages taken  
25 from the blue USPS collection mailbox, which was addressed to an individual in Charlotte, North  
26 Carolina (the "Customer").<sup>3</sup> After being read his *Miranda* rights, the Customer said he has ordered the  
27

28           <sup>3</sup> The Customer's name is not included in this affidavit, as he has not been charged at this time.



1 pills from a vendor on the DarkNet. The Darknet is where websites operate in the Internet's unindexed  
2 portions, beyond what can found with commercial search engines. These sites facilitate anonymous  
3 value exchange and global traffic of illicit goods and services from sellers operating there. Digital  
4 currencies, such as bitcoin, facilitate illicit transactions and laundering of criminal proceeds through  
5 pseudo anonymous fund movement. The Customer said he paid for the Oxycodone using bitcoin. The  
6 Customer further stated that he had bought the same Oxycodone pills from the same DarkNet vendor on  
7 approximately 20 occasions since 2015. The Customer opened the parcel in the presence of DEA agents  
8 and said each time he ordered the pills they were all packaged, marked, and labeled in a similar fashion.  
9 The seized parcel and associated wrapping and packaging material were all similar to other parcels  
10 seized throughout this investigation.

11 53. On May 26, 2016, agents obtained a search warrant authorized by the Honorable  
12 Elizabeth D. Laporte to search another of the packages taken from the blue USPS collection mailbox,  
13 which was addressed to what appears to be a fictitious name in Edmonds, Washington. It should be  
14 noted that the name on the package matched a name on a post-it note previously seized during  
15 ZOLFAGHARI's trash search. On May 31, 2016, agents opened the package and discovered multiple  
16 layers of packaging materials nearly identical to those previously seized during controlled purchases.  
17 Inside, agents uncovered a small clear Ziploc bag containing approximately 31 small circular white pills,  
18 each labeled with "ETH" and "446", the exact same markings as every other pill seized in the subject  
19 investigation.

20 54. Agents also anticipate attempting a controlled delivery of the third parcel taken from the  
21 blue USPS collection mailbox, which may be completed near the time or shortly before the submission  
22 of this affidavit.

23 **G. VAZQUEZ's Role in the Conspiracy**

24 55. As detailed above, agents witnessed VAZQUEZ placing packages that contained pills  
25 into a U.S. Mail collection box for delivery shortly after 5:00 a.m. on May 23, 2016. VAZQUEZ also  
26 purchases mailing and packaging supplies for the pills. Along with nitrile exam gloves and packaging  
27 materials, agents also seized Walgreens receipts which listed cash purchases for bulk-quantity postal  
28 materials, pre-paid gift cards, and mailing stamps. Agents have reviewed closed circuit surveillance

1 footage from inside of Walgreens during several purchases associated with the recovered receipts.  
2 During each event, agents observed VAZQUEZ approach the cashier with postal items and/or pre-paid  
3 gift cards then pay in cash. On multiple occasions, VAZQUEZ purchased several hundred dollar pre-  
4 paid gift cards while paying in cash. I believe the aforementioned surveillance footage shows  
5 VAZQUEZ purchasing the packaging materials used by ZOLFAGHARI to bundle and distribute his  
6 counterfeit prescription pills. Additionally, I believe VAZQUEZ purchases high-dollar gift cards for her  
7 and ZOLFAGHARI's use to try and avoid banking institutions or otherwise traceable financial  
8 instruments.

9 56. VAZQUEZ's only known bank account was used to receive drug proceeds from the  
10 controlled purchases. As noted above, via HARRIS, ZOLFAGHARI directed the CS to send the  
11 payments to VAZQUEZ's account, and stated that she would check to see if the payment arrived.  
12 VAZQUEZ is listed as the sole signatory on that account in the bank's records.

13 57. According to records from California's Employment Development Department,  
14 VAZQUEZ did not have any reported employment in 2014 or 2015. Nonetheless, VAZQUEZ's bank  
15 records from December 2014 to April 2015 (5 months) show VAZQUEZ received 33 wire transfers  
16 totaling \$26,871 from various remitting services. In addition, between April 2015 and October 2015 (5  
17 months), when VAZQUEZ sent approximately 40 wire transfers totaling \$10,250. The transfers were  
18 sent to various states including Oregon, Florida, California, Missouri, New York, Minnesota, and  
19 Virginia and were received by eight different people. Bank account analysis has also shown that  
20 VAZQUEZ has purchased a large cashier's check, which she used to purchase expensive jewelry.

21 58. The evidence indicates that, while she was mailing packages, purchasing materials for  
22 mailing and packaging pills, and sending those wire transfers, VAZQUEZ was well aware that the  
23 purpose of those activities was to support ZOLFAGHARI's narcotics business. As reflected in the  
24 address she has listed on her bank account, and surveillance showing her leaving the residence,  
25 VAZQUEZ lives in the same apartment with ZOLFAGHARI (the **Target Premises**) where he appears  
26 to be manufacturing pills on a pill press. HARRIS has told the CS in recorded calls that his supplier  
27 manufactures the pills himself. In one call, on April 4, 2016, the CS asked why it's taking so long for  
28 the supplier to send the pills out. HARRIS responded, "Have you ever made them mother f\*ckers?"

1 Have you ever made them sh\*ts by hand? Do you know how tiresome and time consuming it is? You're  
2 not going to sit up there and grind them mother f\*ckers out, dry them out, make sure they all look good  
3 and then go put them all together, send them out to people then start over again once you get home.  
4 Don't nobody do that. He does." Moreover, ZOLFAGHARI appears to be carrying out those activities  
5 in the apartment. Based on GPS location data and physical surveillance between February 2016 and  
6 April 2016, during which time several controlled purchases were made, ZOLFAGHARI rarely left his  
7 apartment, except for brief forays in the 2:00 a.m. to 5:00 a.m. time frames. The results of the trash  
8 searches described above further confirm that ZOLFAGHARI appears to be manufacturing the pills in  
9 the apartment he shares with VAZQUEZ, based on the discovery of numerous pairs of latex gloves with  
10 white powdery residue.

11 59. The apartment that VAZQUEZ shares with ZOLFAGHARI is a 1,110 square-foot two-  
12 bedroom apartment with a den, according to the building floor plans. VAZQUEZ posted photographs of  
13 every room in that apartment except the den on her Facebook page, raising the implication that she knew  
14 photographs of that room would provide incriminating evidence and avoided posting such photographs  
15 to prevent detection by law enforcement. Specifically, VAZQUEZ maintains a Facebook page under the  
16 name "Candy Zolfaghari Hernando". Agents have identified the user as VAZQUEZ based on  
17 photographs found on her Facebook page compared to her California Driver's License photograph.  
18 Additionally, agents searched Facebook using only VAZQUEZ's known phone number (415) 320-9871,  
19 which is the phone number listed on VAZQUEZ's bank account, into which the drug money for each of  
20 the six controlled purchases was deposited. The search resulted in a single associated profile for Candy  
21 Zolfaghari Hernando.<sup>4</sup> In addition to the phone number associated with VAZQUEZ's Facebook  
22 account, agents have inspected numerous photographs and found several of them to include VAZQUEZ  
23 and ZOLFAGHARI together. On that Facebook profile page, VAZQUEZ has posted photographs of  
24 every room in her and ZOLFAGHARI's residence except the den area. Agents came to this  
25 determination based on the comparison of the photographs with floor plans for the residence.

#### 26 H. Additional Facts Regarding the Target Locations

27 <sup>4</sup> Facebook has developed an internal application for use on cellular devices named Facebook  
28 Messenger. Users must associate a phone number with Facebook Messenger. In this instance the only  
Facebook profile associated with (415) 320-9871, is that of Candy Zolfaghari Hernando.

1           60. I believe that VAZQUEZ and ZOLFAGHARI reside at **Target Premises**, as evidenced  
2 by the trash searches and surveillance detailed above, including during the fifth controlled purchase in  
3 which ZOLFAGHARI came downstairs to hand the envelope of pills to HARRIS.

4           61. Pursuant to a court-authorized warrant, agents have monitored the physical location data  
5 for ZOLFAGHARI's cell phones (Target Telephones 1 and 2) and they were consistently located at or in  
6 the vicinity of the **Target Premises** throughout the day and night. For example, from May 16 to June 2,  
7 2016, both phones were co-located at the **Target Premises** for near 24-hour periods with accuracy radii  
8 from 1 meter to 294 meters.

9           62. As detailed above, agents have observed the **Target Vehicle** driving to the post office to  
10 deliver packages, which were later found to contain pills, and saw VAZQUEZ come out of the car to  
11 deliver those packages to the collection box.

12           63. Moreover, ZOLFAGHARI has identified both the **Target Vehicle** and **Target Premises**  
13 as his. On May 3, 2016, at approximately 3:55 a.m., San Francisco Police Department ("SFPD")  
14 detectives observed VAZQUEZ and ZOLFAGHARI as they were driving the **Target Vehicle** from the  
15 **Target Premises**. The **Target Vehicle** drove approximately 3-4 blocks before a marked SFPD police  
16 car pulled the **Target Vehicle** over for having paper plates and no registration. During the stop, the  
17 SFPD Officers spoke with the driver and passenger of the **Target Vehicle**. The driver self-identified  
18 himself as Kia ZOLFAGHARI by using his California Driver's License. The passenger identified  
19 herself as Candelaria VAZQUEZ by her California Driver's license. The officers determined that the  
20 **Target Vehicle** was registered to Franklyn McKesson at 9810 Reseda Blvd #314, Northridge, CA. As  
21 such, the Officers issued ZOLFAGHARI a "fix-it ticket" to get the vehicle properly registered or the  
22 next traffic stop will result in a citation. On the fix-it ticket, ZOLFAGHARI provided the **Target**  
23 **Premises** as his address and Target Telephone 1 as his contact phone number. During the stop,  
24 ZOLFAGHARI explained to the Officer that he has had the vehicle for over a year and has not gotten  
25 around to registering the vehicle

26           64. The garage at the **Target Premises** is located on the west side of 44<sup>th</sup> Avenue and has a  
27 single remote controlled door. ZOLFAGHARI parks the **Target Vehicle** just inside the garage in an  
28 assigned location. The garage has several storage areas of which are not marked or differentiated. Also,

1 other natural voids in the garage exist which, based on my training and experience, have been shown to  
2 be used by drug traffickers to hide important elements associated with their drug trafficking operations.  
3 Agents have observed VAZQUEZ and ZOLFAGHARI both access the garage multiple times and have  
4 apparent access to such spaces.

5 65. No known storage space has been discovered in the complex by agents; however, based  
6 on my experiences in executing search warrants on apartment complexes, it is common for 6-unit  
7 condominium buildings to have a separate storage area specifically designated for tenants to use as  
8 additional storage. This additional storage is commonly used by drug traffickers to store drugs, drug  
9 making materials, or bulk drug proceeds and believe that such stored materials are safe from search and  
10 seizure since the storage area is not directly attached to the residence.

## 11 **V. ANTICIPATED ITEMS TO BE FOUND AT THE TARGET LOCATIONS**

### 12 **A. General Knowledge Regarding Drug Trafficking**

13 66. Based on my training, experience, and participation in this and other narcotics trafficking  
14 investigations and upon my consultation with other experienced law enforcement officers, I know the  
15 following information regarding individuals, involved in drug trafficking:

16 a. These persons often maintain documents pertaining to the possession,  
17 manufacture, importation, exportation, and/or distribution of controlled substances and illegal proceeds,  
18 including invoices, shipping labels, tracking numbers, boxes, and envelopes at their residences, stash  
19 houses, and/or in their vehicles where they are available for reference and concealed from law  
20 enforcement;

21 b. Drug traffickers commonly store drugs and drug paraphernalia, including  
22 packaging materials, cutting agents, and manufacturing tools in their residences, stash houses, and/or  
23 vehicles in order to have ready access to the drugs and/or paraphernalia in order to conduct their drug  
24 trafficking business or to use those drugs personally;

25 c. Drug traffickers attempt to mask the distinct odors of particular drugs through the  
26 use of heat sealing and/or canning devices and/or aromatic substances such as laundry soap, dryer  
27 sheets, air fresheners, or axle grease. Also, drug traffickers will utilize a layering system which includes  
28 the use of several packaging layers to decrease the scent;

1           d.       Fentanyl pill traffickers often dilute, or "cut," drugs in order to maximize the  
2 volume of drugs they have to sell, and thus their profits. Illicit pill manufacturers commonly use  
3 fentanyl as a replacement for Oxycodone which mimics the effects but a much low price to the  
4 manufacturer. Pill traffickers use various other substances to dilute drugs, including mannitol, mannite,  
5 lactose, Vitamin B12, and MSM. Illicit pill traffickers use equipment, such as manual and automated  
6 pill-press machines, scales, sifters, hammers, grinders, razor blades, glass panes, mirrors and kilo or  
7 pound presses as part of the dilution or "cutting" process. Once the drug has been "cut," drug traffickers  
8 usually will repackage it, often in smaller quantities, using masking agents, tape, heat sealers and heat  
9 sealed bags, ziplocs bags, hermetically sealed pouches, and/or other containers for redistribution. It is  
10 common for illicit pill traffickers to maintain such equipment and supplies in their residences, stash  
11 houses;

12           e.       Drug traffickers keep books, receipts, notes, ledgers and other forms of records  
13 specifically relating to their drug distribution activities. Because drug traffickers often "front" drugs to  
14 their customers – that is, sell the drugs on credit – or receive drugs from their suppliers on credit, such  
15 documentation is necessary to keep track of the amounts paid and owed with respect to their customers  
16 and suppliers. These ledgers are more commonly known as "pay/owe sheets" and may be as simple as  
17 notations on miscellaneous pieces of paper or may be recorded more formally in notebooks or even  
18 computer spreadsheets, and are frequently encoded in order to protect those involved. Drug traffickers  
19 often keep such records on their person or in their residences, stash houses, and/or vehicles;

20           f.       Drug traffickers commonly keep large sums of currency, financial instruments,  
21 precious metals, jewelry, gift cards, and other items of value which represent either the proceeds from  
22 drug sales or are intended for the purchase of controlled substances. When drug traffickers amass such  
23 wealth, they often attempt to legitimize that wealth or otherwise conceal it and its origin from discovery  
24 by law enforcement. To accomplish this, drug traffickers often use different techniques, including the  
25 use of digital currency, foreign and domestic banks and their attendant services, including savings and  
26 checking accounts, securities, cashier's checks, money drafts and letters of credit to exchange drug  
27 proceeds into money that appears to come from a legitimate source. Drug traffickers also purchase real  
28 estate or vehicles, and establish shell corporations and business fronts that they use to launder drug

1 proceeds. Drug traffickers often utilize fictitious or "straw-holder" owners to conceal the true  
2 ownership, vehicles, or other valuable items purchased with the proceeds of illicit drug sales. In  
3 addition, drug traffickers often use wire transfers, cashier's checks, and money orders to pay for drugs or  
4 other costs relating to their distribution business. Drug traffickers often keep these items of value, and  
5 records relating to them, on their person or in their residences, stash houses, and/or vehicles where they  
6 are concealed from law enforcement and readily available.

7           g. Drug traffickers go to great lengths to hide and secure the drugs, drug proceeds,  
8 other items of value and records relating to their drug business. This is to safeguard those items against  
9 robbery and keep them from law enforcement. These secure locations typically include safes, vaults, or  
10 other locked containers, as well as specially constructed concealed compartments such as those often  
11 found in vehicles used specifically to facilitate drug trafficking. Other methods of concealment include  
12 the burial of such items underground, the use of locked vehicles, trailers, out buildings, sheds, and/or  
13 exterior closets, the use of natural spaces within walls, furniture, vehicles, and other areas, and the use of  
14 sealed cans and canning machines;

15           h. Drug traffickers often use the United States Postal Service or commercial express  
16 mail delivery companies, such as FedEx or UPS, to ship drugs and money to various points within the  
17 United States. They do so, at least in part, due to the convenience of the service and the availability of  
18 related internet and phone tracking services, speed of delivery, and to reduce their risk of arrest during  
19 the transportation of drugs from one place to another. They often use hand-written airbills, drop the  
20 packages near closing time, pay for such services in cash and utilize false or nominee names, addresses,  
21 and/or telephone numbers when using such services in order to further insulate themselves from  
22 detection by law enforcement. Drug traffickers frequently maintain records relating to their use of these  
23 services, such as receipts, copies of airbills, empty and/or previously used boxes, packing tape, packing  
24 popcorn/filler and other packaging materials, and package tracking records printed from the internet, at  
25 their residences, stash houses, and/or in their vehicles where they are available for reference.

26           i. Drug trafficking is a business that involves numerous co-conspirators, from  
27 lower-level dealers to higher-level suppliers, as well as associates to process, package and deliver the  
28 drugs and persons to launder the drug proceeds. These persons frequently maintain listings of names,

1 aliases, telephone numbers, pager numbers, facsimile numbers, physical addresses, and email addresses,  
2 sometimes encoded and sometimes not encoded, for the purpose of contacting their suppliers, customers,  
3 transporters, and others involved in their illicit drug distribution activities. These records are typically  
4 maintained on their person or in their residences, stash houses, and/or vehicles, so they are readily  
5 available in order to efficiently conduct their drug trafficking business. Moreover, such records are  
6 often stored electronically within the memory of telephones, computers, and/or personal digital  
7 assistants such as iPhone and Blackberry devices;

8 j. Drug traffickers often use cellular telephones, satellite telephones, pagers and text  
9 messaging devices, voicemail or answering machine systems, telephone calling cards, computers, email,  
10 and/or personal digital assistants such as iPhone and Blackberry devices in order to communicate with  
11 their suppliers, customers, transporters, and others involved in their illicit drug distribution activities.  
12 Drug traffickers often keep these items on their person or in their residences, stash houses, businesses,  
13 and/or vehicles where they are readily available;

14 k. Drug traffickers often travel by car, bus, train, or airplane, both domestically and  
15 to and/or within foreign countries, in connection with their illegal activities in order to meet with co-  
16 conspirators, conduct drug transactions, or to transport drugs or drug proceeds. Documents relating to  
17 such travel, such as calendars, travel itineraries, maps, airline ticket and baggage stubs, frequent use club  
18 membership information and records associated with airlines, rental car companies, and/or hotels,  
19 airline, hotel and rental car receipts, credit card bills and receipts, photographs, videos, passports, and  
20 visas, are often maintained by drug traffickers in their residences, stash houses, and/or vehicles where  
21 they are readily available for use or reference;

22 l. Drug traffickers frequently possess firearms, ammunition, silencers, explosives,  
23 incendiary devices, and other dangerous weapons to protect their profits, supply of drugs, and persons  
24 from others who might attempt to forcibly take such items and/or harm them during transactions. Such  
25 weapons, which are often stolen or otherwise possessed illegally, are typically maintained on their  
26 person or in their residences, stash houses, and/or vehicles where they are concealed from law  
27 enforcement and readily available;

28 m. Drug traffickers often utilize two way radios, police scanners, video surveillance



1 systems, and other counter surveillance equipment to prevent detection by law enforcement, and that  
2 such items are typically maintained at their residences, stash houses, and/or in their vehicles.

3 n. Drug traffickers frequently take, or cause to be taken, photographs and/or videos  
4 of themselves, their criminal associates, their real and personal property, their weapons, and their drugs,  
5 and that such items are often stored on their person, in their residences, and/or vehicles;

6 o. During the course of a search it is not uncommon to find items of personal  
7 property that tend to identify the person(s) in residence occupancy, control, or ownership of the place  
8 being searched vehicle, such as cancelled mail, deeds, leases, titles, registration information, rental  
9 agreements, photographs, videos, diaries, utility and telephone bills, tax documentation, travel  
10 documents, statements, passports, driver's licenses and/or identification cards, immigration  
11 documentation, birth certificates, and keys.

12 **B. Information Regarding Seizure Of Computers And Related Storage Materials**

13 67. Based on my own training and experience and conversations with other agents, I know  
14 that drug traffickers often store information regarding their illicit activities on computers and related  
15 electronic storage devices. Agents have obtained a photograph from VAZQUEZ's Facebook page  
16 showing ZOLFAGHARI holding an Apple Ipad and a laptop computer. In this case, as detailed above,  
17 one of ZOLFAGHARI's customers stated that he purchased pills from ZOLFAGHARI via an online site  
18 on the DarkNet. Moreover, as noted above, HARRIS has stated to the CS that ZOLFAGHARI sells pills  
19 on the "internet." Accordingly, permission is sought herein to seize and search computers and related  
20 devices, consistent with the scope of the requested search.

21 68. The information stored in an electronic format may be found not only on the hard disk  
22 drive of a computer, but on other computer hardware, peripherals, and storage media. In order to  
23 conduct a thorough search of computers, agents are often required to seize most or all of the computer  
24 hardware to be searched later by a qualified expert in a laboratory or other controlled environment. This  
25 is true for the following reasons:

- 26 a. *Volume of Evidence:* Computers and storage devices (like hard disks, diskettes, tapes,  
27 CD-ROMs, DVDs, and zip drives) can store the equivalent of thousands of pages of  
28 information. Also, when the user wants to conceal criminal evidence, he or she may

1 store it in many places, in random order, and with deceptive file names. This requires  
2 searching authorities to examine all the stored data to determine whether it is included  
3 in the warrant. This sorting process can take several weeks to conduct, and it would  
4 be impractical to attempt this kind of data search on site.

- 5 b. *Technical Requirements*: Searching computer systems is a highly technical process  
6 that requires specific expertise and specialized equipment. There are so many types  
7 of computer hardware and software in use today that it is impossible to bring to the  
8 search site all of the necessary technical manuals and specialized equipment needed  
9 to conduct a thorough search. In addition, it may be necessary to consult with  
10 personnel who have specific expertise in the type of computer, software application,  
11 or operating system that is being searched.
- 12 c. *Files May Be Hidden, Erased, Compressed, Password Protected, or Encrypted*: The  
13 data search procedures used to recover electronically stored evidence are designed to  
14 protect the integrity of the evidence and to recover hidden, erased, compressed,  
15 password protected, or encrypted files. Without knowing the password for encrypted  
16 files, it may be impossible to view the information in those files. This is especially  
17 true with certain encryption algorithms and/or programs, such as Elgamal, Diffie-  
18 Hellman, DSA, and Triple-DES. Even less secure encryption programs may require  
19 considerable time or outside agency assistance to decrypt the files absent a password.
- 20 d. *Danger of Destruction of Evidence*: Computer evidence is extremely vulnerable to  
21 inadvertent or intentional modification or destruction, both from external sources and  
22 destructive codes embedded in the system such as a "booby trap." In order to  
23 maintain the integrity of the original evidence, a qualified expert may need to conduct  
24 a forensic examination of the storage media in a controlled environment, such as a  
25 law enforcement laboratory, where specific procedures and specialized software  
26 designed to protect the integrity of the original media will be used.

27 69. In order to retrieve electronically stored evidence from a computer, agents may be  
28 required to seize most or all of a computer system's equipment, including hardware, peripherals,

1 software, documentation, security devices, and passwords. This is true because certain operating  
2 systems and hardware can be configured to operate only with a precise set of hardware, software, and  
3 peripherals. Peripheral devices that allow users to enter or retrieve data from the storage devices may  
4 vary in their compatibility with other hardware and software.

5 70. The Computer Forensic Agent may have to install software used by the suspect on a  
6 government computer in order to retrieve the information the suspect may have stored using that  
7 software. The Computer Forensic Agent may also need to refer to hardware and software  
8 documentation maintained by the suspect to complete his/her analysis in a timely manner. The suspect's  
9 computer documentation may also contain hand-written notes specific to the seized computer system.  
10 Physical keys, encryption devices, and similar items may be necessary to gain access to computer  
11 equipment. Passwords, pass-phrases, password files, and similar decryption codes may be required to  
12 access specific information stored on the seized computer system.

13 71. Due to the facts outlined above, it is requested that agents serving this search warrant be  
14 authorized to employ the procedure described in Attachment C, which is the standard computer search  
15 protocol for the Northern District of California, upon the execution of this search warrant.

16 **C. Potentially Hazardous Materials**

17 72. As detailed above, ZOLFAGHARI and VAZQUEZ appear to have facilities in the  
18 **Target Premises** for the manufacturing of fentanyl-laced pills. Based on my training and experience  
19 and consultation with a DEA Clandestine Laboratory Site Safety Officer, I know that the handling of  
20 clandestine laboratory chemicals without proper supervision and facilities has caused in the past  
21 explosions, fires, cross contamination to neighboring structures, and other events that have resulted in  
22 injuries and health problems.

23 73. Because of these facts and because the DEA San Francisco Division Office has no  
24 adequate safe storage facilities, your affiant requests authorization by supplemental order to dispose of  
25 any fentanyl manufacturing or conversion equipment and chemicals in event of their discovery and if  
26 such equipment and chemicals cannot be safely stored. Such an order will require that (1) photographs  
27 will be taken of the chemicals and their containers, and their containers and/or labels will be maintained  
28 as evidence if those containers and/or labels pose no hazard; but (2) if in the DEA agents' opinion,

1 sampling of these chemicals poses a significant risk to the assembled officers and agents, then the  
2 chemicals will be destroyed but only after photographs have been taken and every effort made to  
3 maintain their original containers.

4 **VI. CONCLUSION**

5 74. Based on the foregoing, it is my opinion that there is probable cause to believe that the  
6 Target Subjects have violated Title 21, United States Code, sections 841, 843(b) and 846 and Title 18,  
7 United States Code, section 1956(h), and that the **Target Locations** will contain evidence, fruits, and  
8 instrumentalities of these violations, and that the Target Subjects may be found there. Therefore, I  
9 request that the Court issue complaints against the Target Subjects and a warrant authorizing agents to  
10 search the **Target Locations**.

11 75. Since this investigation is continuing, disclosure of the complaint, the search and seizure  
12 warrants, this affidavit, and/or this application and the attachments thereto will jeopardize the progress  
13 of the investigation and potentially endanger the agents and confidential sources working on the  
14 investigation. It may also cause the Target Subjects to flee and/or destroy evidence of their crimes.  
15 Accordingly, I request that the Court seal the application, this affidavit, the complaints, the warrants and  
16 the supporting papers, except that the Clerk of the Court be directed to provide copies of these  
17 documents to the United States Attorney's Office and/or the Drug Enforcement Administration for use  
18 in connection with this case.

19  
20 I declare under penalty of perjury that the above is true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

21  
22 Dated: June 7, 2016

  
DEA Special Agent Austin Curnow

23  
24 Subscribed and sworn to before me this \_\_\_\_ day of June, 2016 in San Francisco, California.

25  
26   
27 HON. LAUREL BEELER  
United States Magistrate Judge

## Attachment A

### LOCATIONS TO BE SEARCHED

#### Target Premises

Is located at 2401 44<sup>th</sup> Avenue, Unit #6, San Francisco, California. The three-level building is positioned on the southeast corner of 44<sup>th</sup> Avenue and Taravel Street. The only entrance and garage door is located on 44<sup>th</sup> Avenue. A street-level, remote accessed parking garage is located on the southeast corner of the building. The building has a main entrance also located on 44<sup>th</sup> Avenue. Unit #6 is positioned on the third level and on the northwest corner of the building. The unit has two entrance and exit doors and has window which overlook Taraval Street. The unit is 1,110 square-feet with one bedroom, two bathrooms, a kitchen and den. Affixed to the wall to the left of the main entrance door is a gold-plated number "6".

The search of the Target Premises shall include the following vehicles:

- (a) Any and all vehicles located in the garage or driveway associated with the **Target Premises**, and
- (b) Any and all vehicles located in the immediate vicinity of the **Target Premises** that are under the custody or control of the **Target Subjects**, as evidenced by keys or documents found in the **Target Premises** or on the persons of **Target Subjects**.

This search shall also include all rooms and garages or storage spaces, attached or unattached, that are associated with the premises, including but not limited to the designated remote accessed parking area for ZOLFAGHARI's Audi located in the southeast corner of the building on the street level, any containers, locked or unlocked, located within or attached to the premises; and any computers, cell phones, or other digital media devices found in the Target Premises or on the person of the **Target Subjects** at the time of their arrest. The **Target Subjects** are Kia ZOLFAGHARI; King Edward HARRIS II, a.k.a. "KING"; and Candelaria Dagandan VAZQUEZ.

In addition, agents are authorized to search the **Target Vehicle**, even if not located at or near the **Target Premises**. The **Target Vehicle** is described as a white 2015 Audi sedan, with paper dealer plates and Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) WUAC6AFRXFA901213, registered to Franklyn N. MCKESSON at 9810 Reseda Boulevard, Apt. 314, Northridge, California 91324.



## **ATTACHMENT B**

### **Description of Items to be Searched for and Seized**

- a. Documents pertaining to the possession, manufacture, importation, exportation, and/or distribution of controlled substances and illegal proceeds, including invoices, shipping labels, tracking numbers, boxes, and envelopes;
- b. Drugs and drug paraphernalia, including packaging materials, cutting agents, and manufacturing tools;
- c. Heat sealing and/or canning devices and/or aromatic substances such as laundry soap, dryer sheets, air fresheners, or axle grease;
- d. Diluents and other agents used to dilute, or "cut," drugs in order to increase the drugs' volume or weight, including mannitol, mannite, lactose, Vitamin B12, and MSM. Also, equipment used in the packaging and distribution of drugs such as manual and automated pill-press machines, scales, sifters, hammers, grinders, razor blades, glass panes, mirrors and kilo or pound presses, masking agents, tape, heat sealers and heat sealed bags, ziplocs bags, hermetically sealed pouches, and/or other containers;
- e. Books, receipts, notes, ledgers and other forms of records – whether in paper, electronic or other format – relating to drug distribution activities, including "pay/owe sheets";
- f. Cash, financial instruments, gift cards, precious metals, jewelry, and other items of value which represent either the proceeds from drug sales or signal unexplained wealth, as well as evidence of the use of digital currency, banks and financial institutions, including evidence of savings and checking accounts, securities, cashier's checks, wire transfers, money orders, money drafts and letters of credit. Also, evidence of ownership of real estate, vehicles and businesses.
- g. Evidence of the use of the United States Postal Service or commercial express mail delivery companies, such as FedEx or UPS, to ship drugs and money to various points within the United States, such as airbills, empty and/or previously used boxes, packing tape,

packing popcorn/filler and other packaging materials, and package tracking records printed from the internet;

h. Lists of names, aliases, telephone numbers, pager numbers, facsimile numbers, physical addresses, and email addresses, sometimes encoded and sometimes not encoded, whether stored electronically (e.g., within the memory of telephones, computers, and/or personal digital assistants such as iPhone and Blackberry devices or on paper (such in notebooks, address books, pads or other materials);

i. Cellular telephones, satellite telephones, pagers and text messaging devices, voicemail or answering machine systems, telephone calling cards, computers, email, and/or personal digital assistants such as iPhone and Blackberry devices, as well as any records or documents that appear to contain access codes for any electronic devices;

j. Documents relating to travel by air, bus, car, rental car or other means, such as calendars, travel itineraries, maps, airline ticket and baggage stubs, frequent use club membership information and records associated with airlines, rental car companies, and/or hotels, airline, hotel and rental car receipts, credit card bills and receipts, photographs, videos, passports, and visas;

l. Firearms, ammunition, silencers, explosives, incendiary devices, and other dangerous weapons;

m. Two way radios, police scanners, video surveillance systems, and other counter surveillance equipment to prevent detection by law enforcement;

n. Photographs and/or videos of persons, real and personal property, weapons, drugs and other items related to drug trafficking or the proceeds of drug trafficking;

o. Items of personal property that tend to identify the person(s) in residence occupancy, control, or ownership of the place being searched vehicle, such as cancelled mail, deeds, leases, titles, registration information, rental agreements, photographs, videos, diaries, utility and telephone bills, tax documentation, travel documents, statements, passports, driver's licenses and/or identification cards, immigration documentation, birth certificates, and keys;



p. Keys belonging to and/or evidence of the existence and usage of any lockers, safe deposit boxes, storage facility, vehicle or other property.

The terms "records," "documents," and "materials" include all of the items described above in whatever form and by whatever means they may have been created and/or stored. This includes any photographic, mechanical, electrical, electronic, and/or magnetic forms. It also includes items in the form of computer hardware, software, documentation, passwords, and/or data security devices, as more fully described below