UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	:	Mag. No. 26-9042
	:	
v.	:	Hon. Cari Fais
	:	
ROBERT M. MCCLOUGHY	:	**CRIMINAL COMPLAINT**

I, Special Agent James Otten, being duly sworn, state the following is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief:

SEE ATTACHMENT A

I further state that I am a Special Agent with the United States Attorney's Office for the District of New Jersey, and that this complaint is based on the following facts:

SEE ATTACHMENT B

Continued on the attached page and made a part hereof:

/s/ James Otten, Special Agent
James Otten, Special Agent
United States Attorney's Office for the
District of New Jersey

Special Agent James Otten attested to this Complaint by telephone pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 4.1(b)(2)(A), on this 29th day of April, 2026.

/s/ Hon. Cari Fais
Hon. Cari Fais
United States Magistrate Judge

ATTACHMENT A

Count One
(Wire Fraud)

From in or around 2017 through in or around May 2025, in Bergen County, in the District of New Jersey, and elsewhere, the defendant,

ROBERT M. MCCLOUGHY,

knowingly and intentionally devised and intended to devise a scheme and artifice to defraud and to obtain money and property by means of materially false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises, and, for the purpose of executing and attempting to execute such scheme and artifice to defraud, did knowingly transmit and cause to be transmitted by means of wire communications in interstate and foreign commerce, certain writings, signs, signals, pictures, and sounds, to wit, a $59,324.76 wire transfer sent on or about December 9, 2024.

In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1343 and Section 2.

Count Two and Three
(Money Laundering)

On or about January 3, 2024 and December 9, 2024, in Bergen County, in the District of New Jersey, and elsewhere, the defendant,

ROBERT M. MCCLOUGHY,

did knowingly engage, and attempt to engage, in the following monetary transactions by, through, or to a financial institution, affecting interstate and foreign commerce, in criminally derived property of a value greater than $10,000, such property having been derived from a specified unlawful activity.

Count	Approximate Date	Transaction	Approximate Amount
2	January 3, 2024	Payment McCloughy account x9126 to Sportsbook-1	$21,200.00
3	December 9, 2024	Transfer from McCloughy account x9704 to Sportsbook-2	$15,201.34

In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1957(a) and Section 2.

ATTACHMENT B

I, James Otten, am a Special Agent with the United States Attorney's Office for the District of New Jersey. I am fully familiar with the facts set forth herein based on my own investigation, my conversations with other law enforcement officers, and my review of reports, documents, and other items of evidence. Because this Complaint is being submitted for a limited purpose, I have not set forth each and every fact that I know concerning this investigation. Where statements of others are related herein, they are related in substance and part. Where I assert that an event took place on a particular date, I am asserting that it took place on or about the date alleged.

Background

1. At all times relevant to this Complaint, Defendant Robert M. McCloughy, a/k/a "Bob" ("McCloughy") resided in New Jersey.

2. McCloughy has an accounting background and was previously employed as a Revenue Agent with the Internal Revenue Service.

3. In or around 2009, McCloughy was hired by a New Jersey-based company (together with its affiliates, "Company-1") engaged in the fuel business.

4. During McCloughy's time at Company-1, he served interchangeably as its Chief Financial Officer ("CFO") and Controller.

5. During the investigation, law enforcement obtained evidence from numerous different sources, including bank and financial transaction records for Company-1 and McCloughy, Company-1 communications and payroll records, gambling transaction records from McCloughy, outside payroll records, and witness statements.

The Misappropriation Scheme

6. As Company-1's CFO and Controller, McCloughy managed the finances of Company-1 and had access to its books, records, and bank accounts.

7. Based on records obtained from Company-1, during his employment at Company-1, McCloughy was compensated in the normal course, including through authorized regular pay, holiday pay, sick pay, vacation pay, and bonus pay. McCloughy's total compensation averaged more than approximately $180,000 per year from in or around 2017 through in or around 2024. This compensation was made to McCloughy through Company-1's payroll provider (the "Payroll Company").

8. From at least as early as in or around March 2017 through in or around March 2025, McCloughy misappropriated at least approximately $12 million from

Company-1, separate and apart from what he was paid in the normal course. He did so through at least two methods: (1) causing the Payroll Company to pay him unauthorized "expense" reimbursements; and (2) causing unauthorized transfers to be made from Company-1's bank accounts to his personal bank accounts.

9. For the first method, McCloughy would direct the Payroll Company to pay him for fake "expense" reimbursements, which would be funded by Company-1.[1] These were not legitimate expense reimbursements, and McCloughy neither obtained authorization for these payments nor disclosed them to Company-1's owner or other executives. To conceal the unauthorized payments to himself, McCloughy would falsify the purpose of certain of the expenditures in Company-1's books and records.[2]

10. For example, from on or about January 3, 2024 through on or about January 30, 2024, McCloughy directed the Payroll Company to make more than approximately $589,000 of false and unauthorized expense reimbursements to himself. Then, over the next approximately six months, McCloughy made false entries in Company-1's books and records to mask the false and unauthorized expense reimbursements he had received, including indicating in the books and records that Company-1 had more than $540,000 in fictious training expenses.

11. For the second method, McCloughy would make direct transfers from Company-1's bank accounts to his own personal bank accounts. These transfers were not part of McCloughy's approved compensation, and McCloughy neither obtained authorization for these payments nor disclosed them to Company-1's owner or other executives. To conceal the unauthorized payments to himself, McCloughy would falsify the purpose of certain of the expenditures in Company-1's books and records.

12. For example, on or about December 9, 2024, McCloughy directed an unauthorized wire transfer[3] of approximately $59,324.76 from Company-1's account to his own. Specifically, bank records showed that "Bob McCloughy" initiated the wire and directed it to be sent from Company-1's account x0377 to his personal checking account x9704. To mask the unauthorized transfer, McCloughy falsely recorded the payment (along with another unauthorized transfer) in Company-1's books and records as "Prepaid Insurance."

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[1] For the Payroll Company transactions described herein, law enforcement reviewed records showing that McCloughy conducted the relevant transactions.

[2] For the books and records entries and changes described herein, law enforcement reviewed audit trails from Company-1's internal accounting system, which showed that McCloughy's username took the relevant actions.

[3] This wire was processed by the Fedwire Funds Service and involved electronic communications between Federal Reserve Bank facilities in New Jersey and Texas.

McCloughy's Misuse of the Misappropriated Funds

13. After embezzling money from Company-1, McCloughy misused the proceeds for a variety of personal expenses.

14. Based on a review of bank and gambling company records, McCloughy routinely used misappropriated funds for personal expenditures, including for gambling. For example:

a. On or about January 3, 2024, McCloughy misappropriated approximately $67,935.83 by making unauthorized payments from Company-1 to his personal savings account x4529. The same day, McCloughy withdrew approximately $67,000—which withdrawal could not have been made without the unauthorized payments McCloughy had obtained from Company-1—through an online transfer to McCloughy's personal checking account x9126. Again on the same day, McCloughy spent more than approximately $52,000—which expenditures could not have been made without the unauthorized payments McCloughy had obtained from Company-1—at on online sportsbook and casino ("Sportsbook-1"). One of those transactions was a payment to Sportsbook-1 for $21,200.

b. On or about December 9, 2024, McCloughy received the above-referenced unauthorized transfer of approximately $59,324.76 from Company-1 to personal bank account x9704. That same day, McCloughy withdrew more than approximately $100,000 for payments to multiple sportsbooks and casinos, as well as to make transfers to his own accounts elsewhere, which transactions could not have been made without the unauthorized payments McCloughy had obtained from Company-1. One of those transactions was a transfer for approximately $15,201.34 to a sportsbook and casino ("Sportsbook-2").

McCloughy's Destruction of Evidence

15. On or about March 28, 2025, Financial Institution-1—which held Company-1's primary bank accounts—restricted McCloughy's access to Company-1's accounts. After McCloughy's account access had been cut off and his scheme had been discovered, McCloughy began destroying evidence.

16. For example, based on a review of surveillance video obtained from Company-1, at or around 10:55 a.m., on or about March 30, 2025, a Sunday, McCloughy drove his SUV to Company-1's headquarters in New Jersey, where he maintained an office, as can be seen in the surveillance footage screenshot below.

17. At or about 10:56 to 11:02 a.m., McCloughy left his office with handfuls of documents and entered a room where, among other things, a shredder was located, as seen in the surveillance footage screenshots below.[4] Shortly thereafter, he left that room to obtain a trash bag from another room, returned to the room where the shredder was located, and then left with a full trash bag.

[4] The timestamp for one internal camera was slow by approximately one hour.


03-30-2025 Sun 09:58:12
Camera 07


03-30-2025 Sun 09:59:48
Camera 07


03-30-2025 Sun 10:02:31
Camera 07

18. McCloughy left Company-1's headquarters at approximately 12:13 p.m. with multiple full bags, as can be seen in the screenshot below: