

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

Southern District of New York

18 MAG 7833

United States of America

v.

Haji Abdul Satar Abdul Manaf, a/k/a "Haji Abdul Sattar Barakzai,"

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)  
)  
)  
)

Case No. 18 Mag.

Defendant

ARREST WARRANT

To: Any authorized law enforcement officer

YOU ARE COMMANDED to arrest and bring before a United States magistrate judge without unnecessary delay (name of person to be arrested) Haji Abdul Satar Abdul Manaf, a/k/a "Haji Abdul Sattar Barakzai," who is accused of an offense or violation based on the following document filed with the court:

- Indictment, Superseding Indictment, Information, Superseding Information, Complaint, Probation Violation Petition, Supervised Release Violation Petition, Violation Notice, Order of the Court

This offense is briefly described as follows:

Attempted narcotics importation in violation of: Title 21, United States Code, Sections 963 and 959(d); Title 18, United States Code, Section 3238. Narco-terrorism and attempted narco-terrorism, in violation of: Title 21, United States Code, Sections 960a, 959(d), Title 18, United States Code, Section 3238 and 2.

Date: 09/13/2018

Kevin Nathaniel Fox Issuing officer's signature

City and state: New York, New York

U.S.M.J. KEVIN NATHANIEL FOX Printed name and title

Return

This warrant was received on (date) , and the person was arrested on (date) at (city and state)

Date:

Arresting officer's signature

Printed name and title

18 MAG 7833

APPROVED:

*Rebekah Donaleski*

REBEKAH DONALESKI  
Assistant United States Attorney

BEFORE: THE HONORABLE KEVIN NATHANIEL FOX  
United States Magistrate Judge  
Southern District of New York

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	:	<u>SEALED COMPLAINT</u>
	:	
- v. -	:	
	:	Violations of
HAJI ABDUL SATAR ABDUL MANAF,	:	21 U.S.C. §§ 960a, 963
a/k/a "Haji Abdul Sattar	:	& 959; 18 U.S.C. §§
Barakzai,"	:	3238 & 2.
	:	
Defendant.	:	
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SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK, ss.:

PAUL T. LARSEN, being duly sworn, deposes and says that he is a Special Agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA"), and charges as follows:

COUNT ONE  
(Attempted Narcotics Importation)

1. From at least in or about January 2018, up to and including in or about September 2018, in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, and in an offense begun and committed out of the jurisdiction of any particular state or district, HAJI ABDUL SATAR ABDUL MANAF, a/k/a "Haji Abdul Sattar Barakzai," the defendant, who is expected to be first brought to and arrested in the Southern District of New York, intentionally and knowingly attempted to distribute a controlled substance, intending, knowing, and having reasonable cause to believe that such substance would be unlawfully imported into the United States and into waters within a distance of 12 miles of the coast of the United States, from a place outside thereof, in violation of Sections 959(a) and 963 of Title 21, United States Code.

2. The controlled substance involved in the offense was one kilogram and more of mixtures and substances containing a

detectable amount of heroin, in violation of Sections 812, 960(a)(3), and 960(b)(1)(A) of Title 21, United States Code.

(Title 21, United States Code, Sections 963 and 959(d); Title 18, United States Code, Section 3238.)

**COUNT TWO**  
**(Narco-Terrorism - Taliban)**

3. From at least in or about January 2018, up to and including in or about September 2018, in Afghanistan and elsewhere, and in an offense begun and committed outside the jurisdiction of any particular state or district of the United States, HAJI ABDUL SATAR ABDUL MANAF, a/k/a "Haji Abdul Sattar Barakzai," the defendant, who is expected to be first brought to and arrested in the Southern District of New York, knowingly and intentionally did engage in conduct that would be punishable under Section 841(a) of Title 21, United States Code, if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States, to wit, the manufacture, distribution, and possession with intent to manufacture and distribute, of one kilogram and more of mixtures and substances containing a detectable amount of heroin, knowing and intending to provide, directly and indirectly, something of pecuniary value to a person and organization that has engaged and engages in terrorism and terrorist activity, to wit, the Taliban and its members, operatives, and associates, having knowledge that said persons and organizations have engaged in and engage in terrorism and terrorist activity, which activity violates the criminal laws of the United States, occurs in and affects foreign commerce, and causes and is designed to cause death and serious bodily injury to nationals of the United States while the nationals are outside of the United States.

(Title 21, United States Code, Sections 960a(a), (b)(1), (b)(2); (b)(3), (b)(5), and 959(d), and Title 18, United States Code, Sections 3238 and 2.)

**COUNT THREE**  
**(Attempted Narco-Terrorism - Haqqani Network)**

4. From at least in or about January 2018, up to and including in or about September 2018, in Afghanistan and elsewhere, and in an offense begun and committed outside the jurisdiction of any particular state or district of the United States, HAJI ABDUL SATAR ABDUL MANAF, a/k/a "Haji Abdul Sattar Barakzai," the defendant, who is expected to be first brought to

and arrested in the Southern District of New York, knowingly and intentionally did and did attempt to engage in conduct that would be punishable under Section 841(a) of Title 21, United States Code, if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States, to wit, the manufacture, distribution, and possession with intent to manufacture and distribute, of one kilogram and more of mixtures and substances containing a detectable amount of heroin, knowing and intending to provide, directly and indirectly, something of pecuniary value to a person and organization that has engaged and engages in terrorism and terrorist activity, to wit, the Haqqani Network (which has been designated by the United States Secretary of State as a foreign terrorist organization pursuant to Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act and remains so designated) and its members, operatives, and associates, having knowledge that said persons and organizations have engaged in and engage in terrorism and terrorist activity, which activity violates the criminal laws of the United States, occurs in and affects foreign commerce, and causes and is designed to cause death and serious bodily injury to nationals of the United States while the nationals are outside of the United States.

(Title 21, United States Code, Sections 960a(a), (b)(1), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(5), and 959(d), and Title 18, United States Code, Sections 3238 and 2.)

The bases for my knowledge and the foregoing charges are as follows:

5. I have been a DEA Special Agent since 1999. I am currently assigned to the DEA Special Operations Division's Bilateral Investigations Unit, which focuses on international criminal activities. During my time as a DEA Special Agent, I have become familiar with some of the ways in which narcotics traffickers operate, and have participated in numerous investigations involving international drug trafficking. I have been personally involved in the investigation of this matter. This affidavit is based on my communications with other law enforcement officers and other individuals, and on my review of various reports and records. Because this affidavit is being submitted for the limited purpose of establishing probable cause for the offenses cited above, it does not include all of the facts that I have learned during the course of the investigation. Where the contents of communications with others and statements by others are reported herein, they are reported in substance and in part, except where otherwise indicated.

## Overview

6. As set forth in greater detail below, since at least in or about January 2018, HAJI ABDUL SATAR ABDUL MANAF, a/k/a "Haji Abdul Sattar Barakzai," the defendant, an Afghanistan-based drug trafficker, has (1) attempted to import large quantities of heroin into the United States, (2) used the proceeds of heroin trafficking to benefit the Taliban, and (3) attempted to provide financial support — and, in particular, drug proceeds — to the Haqqani Network. Specifically, MANAF has participated in in-person meetings and recorded telephone calls, and has exchanged electronic communications with individuals whom MANAF understood to be affiliated with an international drug trafficking organization.<sup>1</sup> During those meetings, MANAF has helped arrange to import heroin into the United States with the assistance of — and recognizing that some of the proceeds of that narcotics trafficking would go to — the Taliban. Four of these individuals were, in fact, DEA confidential sources. Another of these individuals was, in fact, an undercover DEA agent (the "UC"). MANAF has also helped transfer what he had been advised were drug proceeds from Australia to Afghanistan, with the understanding that that money would be given to the Haqqani Network.

7. In or around January 2018, at the DEA's direction, a confidential source ("CS-1")<sup>2</sup> spoke with HAJI ABDUL SATAR ABDUL MANAF, a/k/a "Haji Abdul Sattar Barakzai," the defendant, by telephone. During the course of that conversation, CS-1 and MANAF discussed executing a large-scale heroin deal with the UC. See infra ¶ 16.

8. Beginning in approximately February 2018, HAJI ABDUL SATAR ABDUL MANAF, a/k/a "Haji Abdul Sattar Barakzai," the

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<sup>1</sup> All communications referenced in this Complaint were conducted principally in Pashto, which I do not speak. All quotations and summaries in this Complaint drawn from meetings and telephone calls are based on my review of audio recordings and/or preliminary draft transcripts, summaries, and translations, and are subject to revision upon the completion of finalized transcripts and translations.

<sup>2</sup> CS-1 has been a paid confidential source with the DEA since 2014. Information provided by CS-1 has been deemed reliable and has sometimes been corroborated by independent evidence.

defendant, communicated with the UC by telephone. See infra ¶ 17. For purposes of this investigation, the UC posed as a large-scale narcotics trafficker based in the United States. During the calls and messages, which were recorded (calls) or saved (messages), MANAF and the UC discussed, among other things, arranging for MANAF to provide the UC with large quantities of heroin for shipment to the United States, as well as providing money to the Haqqani Network and the Taliban for their assistance and protection in MANAF's and the UC's respective drug trafficking businesses.

9. Beginning in or around June 2018, HAJI ABDUL SATAR ABDUL MANAF, a/k/a "Haji Abdul Sattar Barakzai," the defendant, discussed with the UC how MANAF had enlisted the Taliban in the drug trafficking business MANAF intended to conduct with the UC. MANAF told the UC that he had paid the Taliban to register a specific stamp for use only in MANAF's heroin production with the UC, and provided a photograph of that stamp to the UC. See infra ¶¶ 19-20. Moreover, MANAF described how he would pay the Taliban to transport the heroin for MANAF and the UC within Afghanistan, and promised that the heroin would be safe because the Taliban transporters would be armed.

10. In or around June 2018, HAJI ABDUL SATAR ABDUL MANAF, a/k/a "Haji Abdul Sattar Barakzai," the defendant, agreed to facilitate the transfer of approximately AU\$50,000 (i.e., Australian dollars) to the Haqqani Network for the UC. See infra ¶ 18. The UC told MANAF that the UC wished to pay the Haqqani Network in exchange for allowing the UC to transport heroin through their territory, and allowing heroin to be stored within their territory. MANAF agreed to transfer AU\$50,000 from Australia to Afghanistan, and provide the money to the UC's associates, who would in turn give the money to the Haqqani Network.

11. In or around August 2018, HAJI ABDUL SATAR ABDUL MANAF, a/k/a "Haji Abdul Sattar Barakzai," the defendant, agreed to provide a sample shipment of approximately ten kilograms of heroin (the "Ten Kilo Shipment") to the UC in Afghanistan, for the UC to transport for sale in New York. See infra ¶ 20. MANAF and the UC agreed that, following the successful importation of the Ten Kilo Shipment into the United States, the UC would purchase larger, multi-hundred kilogram quantities of heroin from MANAF for importation to and distribution within the United States.

12. In or about August 2018, HAJI ABDUL SATAR ABDUL MANAF, a/k/a "Haji Abdul Sattar Barakzai," the defendant, communicated by telephone with the UC to arrange for the pickup of the Ten Kilo Shipment in Afghanistan. See *infra* ¶ 20. On or about August 5, 2018, CS-1 picked up the Ten Kilo Shipment in Afghanistan, and delivered the Ten Kilo Shipment to a confidential source ("CS-2")<sup>3</sup>. On or about August 6, 2018, CS-2 delivered the Ten Kilo Shipment to DEA agents in Kabul, Afghanistan.

13. In or around August 2018, HAJI ABDUL SATAR ABDUL MANAF, a/k/a "Haji Abdul Sattar Barakzai," the defendant, facilitated the transfer of approximately AU\$50,000 from Australia to Afghanistan. The UC had told MANAF that the AU\$50,000 represented the UC's narcotics proceeds, which the UC intended to pay to the Haqqani Network. See *infra* ¶ 21. On or about August 12, 2018, MANAF provided the money in its U.S.-dollar equivalent, through an intermediary, to CS-2 in Afghanistan. MANAF understood that CS-2 would provide the money to the Haqqani Network.

#### Background on the Taliban

14. Based on my participation in this investigation, training, experience, and review of publicly available materials, I understand the following:

a. The Taliban is a terrorist organization based in Afghanistan. The Taliban has engaged in a public insurgency campaign to regain control of Afghanistan since losing power in 2001, as a result of the U.S. and NATO-led invasion of Afghanistan, which is also known as Operation Enduring Freedom - Afghanistan. As part of this campaign, the Taliban has conducted numerous suicide bombings, targeted killings, assassinations, and hostage takings against the Afghan government, U.S. military forces, and American civilians.

b. The Taliban often publicly accepts responsibility for these attacks through public statements issued to the media or posted online. The Taliban has claimed responsibility for the following acts of terror, among others:

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<sup>3</sup> CS-2 has been a paid confidential source with the DEA since 2018. Information provided by CS-2 has been deemed reliable and has sometimes been corroborated by independent evidence.

- In October 2012, in Helmand Province, the Taliban killed six police officers in an "insider" attack, carried out by Taliban members posing as members of the Afghan police. In claiming responsibility for the attack, a Taliban spokesman stated that the Taliban carried out the attack using a "mujahid who had infiltrated and penetrated the police ranks."
- In June 2013, the Taliban launched a rocket attack against coalition forces at Bagram Air Base, outside of Kabul. The attack killed four American soldiers.
- In May 2015, a Taliban suicide bomber detonated a car bomb near the airport in Kabul, hitting a vehicle used by European Union police advisory officials. Three people were killed, including one British security contractor.
- In May 2015, a Taliban gunman opened fire at a guesthouse in an upscale area of central Kabul frequented by foreigners. The assault lasted five hours and killed 14 people, including an American. In claiming responsibility for the attack, a Taliban spokesman stated, "[t]he occupying forces should realize that they are not safe from our attacks under any cover or in any location."
- In August 2018, a Taliban suicide bomber detonated a bomb outside a U.S. air base in Parwan Province, Afghanistan, killing three NATO soldiers and wounding one American soldier.

#### Background on the Haqqani Network

15. Based on my participation in this investigation, training, experience, conversations with other law enforcement agents and conversations with CS-1, CS-3, and CS-4, and review of publicly available materials, I understand the following:

a. - On September 7, 2012, the U.S. Secretary of State designated the Haqqani Network as a Foreign Terrorist Organization under Section 219 of the INA.

b. The Haqqani Network, which is sometimes referred to as the "Network" or the "Miram Shah Taliban," is a terrorist organization based in southeastern Afghanistan that is aligned with the Taliban. The leadership of the Haqqani Network is

based primarily in Miram Shah, an area in Waziristan in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas near southeastern Afghanistan and a neighboring country.

c. Since 2001, the Haqqani Network has sought to drive the U.S.-led coalition forces out of Afghanistan, in order to re-establish Taliban rule. As part of this campaign, the Haqqani Network has conducted numerous suicide bombings, targeted killings, assassinations, and high-profile hostage takings against the Afghan government, U.S. military forces, and American civilians. In furtherance of this campaign, the Haqqani Network has claimed responsibility for the following acts of terror, among others:

- In March 2008, the Haqqani Network launched a suicide bombing in Khost Province, which killed two members of the International Security Assistance Force ("ISAF"), the NATO security mission in Afghanistan.
- In November 2008, members of the Taliban kidnapped an American journalist, and transferred him to the custody of the Haqqani Network, who held him in captivity until June 2009.
- In September 2011, the Haqqani Network launched a military assault on the U.S. Embassy and ISAF headquarters in Kabul, Afghanistan, resulting in the deaths of at least sixteen Afghan citizens.

### The Investigation

#### **January 2018: Manaf Communicates with CS-1 Concerning a Heroin Transaction**

16. Based on my participation in this investigation, conversations with other law enforcement officers involved in this investigation and my review of DEA reports, I have learned, among other things, the following:

a. In or about January 2018, at the DEA's direction, CS-1 spoke with HAJI ABDUL SATAR ABDUL MANAF, a/k/a "Haji Abdul Sattar Barakzai," the defendant, by telephone.<sup>4</sup> During that

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<sup>4</sup> CS-1 has known HAJI ABDUL SATAR ABDUL MANAF, a/k/a "Haji Abdul Sattar Barakzai," the defendant, in a social capacity for

telephone call, which was not recorded, CS-1 told MANAF, in sum and substance, that CS-1 worked with a U.S.-based drug trafficker who wanted to purchase heroin from MANAF for importation into the United States. At MANAF's request, CS-1 provided the UC's contact information to MANAF.

**February-June 2018: The Defendant Communicates with the UC  
Concerning a Heroin Transaction**

17. Based on my participation in this investigation, conversations with other law enforcement officers involved in this investigation and my review of DEA reports, I have learned, among other things, the following:

a. On or about February 12, 2018, the UC spoke with HAJI ABDUL SATAR ABDUL MANAF, a/k/a "Haji Abdul Sattar Barakzai," the defendant, by telephone. During that conversation, which was recorded, the following was discussed, in substance and in part:

i. MANAF told the UC that CS-1 had provided the UC's telephone number to MANAF. MANAF introduced himself as "Haji Sattar."

ii. MANAF told the UC that MANAF had "no way to that side," which the UC understood to mean the ability to transport heroin directly to the United States. However, MANAF told the UC that he could "give" in Kabul, which the UC understood to mean that MANAF could deliver heroin in Kabul. The UC told MANAF that the UC would "take care of the transportation," that is, a transportation method to the United States. MANAF told the UC that he was currently on "the blacklist of America."<sup>5</sup> MANAF suggested that he and the UC meet in person, and told the UC that the UC would "know" MANAF when they meet in person, because MANAF used to own a well-known

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several years.

<sup>5</sup> On June 29, 2012, HAJI ABDUL SATAR ABDUL MANAF, a/k/a "Haji Abdul Sattar Barakzai," the defendant, was sanctioned by the United States Treasury Department pursuant to the United States' terrorism sanctions authority, Executive Order No. 13224, for storing or moving money for the Taliban through his money-remitting service (or "serafi"), the Haji Khairullah Haji Sattar Money Exchange.

"sarafi," or money-remitting service, in Afghanistan, the "Khairulla and Sattar" sarafi. See supra n.5.

b. On or about March 10, 2018, the UC spoke with MANAF by telephone. During that conversation, which was recorded, the following was discussed, in substance and in part:

i. MANAF told the UC that he could "prepare five of them," which the UC understood to mean five kilograms of heroin, for the UC as a sample, and deliver them to CS-1 in Kabul. MANAF told the UC that if the UC could deliver "all the way to America[]," MANAF could deliver in Kabul.

ii. The UC told MANAF that "[o]nce the five pieces arrive here, and when I sit with friends and find that they are happy, we will make a big plan for several hundreds. If possible, we will speak in person, so we can set everything up." MANAF replied, "Indeed, indeed."

c. On or about July 29, 2018, MANAF sent the UC the below-photograph of himself via a secure messaging application ("Application-1").



d. Between on or about June 11, 2018, and June 13, 2018, MANAF spoke with CS-1 by telephone on several occasions. During the course of those telephone calls, which were not recorded, MANAF told CS-1, in sum and substance, that he needed approximately \$25,000 to \$30,000 to complete an unspecified deal. CS-1 suggested, in sum and substance, that MANAF ask to

borrow the money from the UC, since they would be business partners.<sup>6</sup>

e. On or about June 13, 2018, the UC spoke with MANAF by telephone. During that conversation, which was recorded, the following was discussed, in substance and in part:

i. The UC asked MANAF "how much should I deliver to the person in Australia for you" (an apparent reference to MANAF's earlier conversation with CS-1, see supra ¶ 17(d)), and MANAF replied that he needed "30,000." The UC told MANAF that the UC had money available in Australia, and offered to give the money to a particular individual in Australia, "Mosa," whom MANAF identified to the UC as MANAF's associate. MANAF told the UC "I will tell him [Mosa] to get in touch with you." The UC asked MANAF to "transfer the money to me in America after your work is over," to which MANAF replied: "it is not a problem. For me, wherever you want, wherever, except [a particular Middle Eastern country]."

ii. The UC told MANAF that "I am in New York," and that "I have partners here in America. I also have partners in Australia" and that "all of them want items. Once we get the business going, I will keep you busy." MANAF replied, "Yes. Keep me busy."

iii. The UC told MANAF that "[a]fter the Eid you and I will set up a deal," to which MANAF replied "The deal[,] those things of mine are ready. Whenever you want. They are ready. Ok." MANAF then explained that he has "done business," which the UC understood to mean drug trafficking, in, among other places, Tanzania and Oman, and that MANAF "has worked a lot."

f. On or about June 14, 2018, MANAF sent the UC several messages via Application-1, which included the contact

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<sup>6</sup> On or about June 11, 2018, MANAF met with CS-1 in Afghanistan. During the course of that meeting, CS-1 took a video of MANAF while MANAF was speaking (which video did not include the portions of the conversation described above). The UC reviewed the video and confirmed that the voice in the video sounded like the individual with whom the UC had spoken by phone (that is, MANAF), and that the individual depicted in the video appeared to be the individual in the photograph that MANAF sent the UC of himself, see supra ¶ 17(c).

information for MANAF's associate in Australia, "Mosa," who would receive the \$30,000.

g. Also on or about June 14, 2018, an undercover Australian law enforcement agent, posing as the UC's associate, dropped off the money, which equaled approximately AU\$30,000, in Melbourne, Australia, to a man using the telephone number MANAF had provided to the UC, supra ¶ 17(f).

**June 2018: The Defendant Discusses His Heroin Trafficking and is Advised that the UC Uses the Haqqani Network to Traffic Heroin**

18. Based on my participation in this investigation, conversations with other law enforcement officers involved in this investigation and my review of DEA reports, I have learned, among other things, the following:

a. On or about June 20, 2018, the UC spoke with HAJI ABDUL SATAR ABDUL MANAF, a/k/a "Haji Abdul Sattar Barakzai," the defendant, by telephone. During that conversation, which was recorded, the following was discussed, in substance and in part:

i. MANAF explained that over the last "six and a half months," he had "delivered a lot of rice there," to Iran, and that he had lost "150,000 dollars, let alone the fact that I didn't make any profit at all," particularly because "[a]lmost 80 pieces were also caught in Iran." Based on his prior interactions with MANAF, and his training and experience, the UC understood "rice" to have been a code word for heroin. See, e.g., infra ¶ 18(a)(iv).

ii. MANAF also reported that he sent "crystal from Pakistan to Tanzania" in the amount of "560 of them." Based on my conversations with the UC, I understand that "crystal" is a word commonly used in Afghanistan to refer to heroin. MANAF explained that he had lost approximately \$1.8 million, because his business partner died. MANAF told the UC that he had discovered a smuggling route and sent the 560 kilograms in multiple loads, but that one load consisting of "200" kilograms was "caught" because someone "snitched."

iii. MANAF told the UC that MANAF and the UC needed to establish a business relationship soon. MANAF told the UC, "if there is anyone who wants to do business, I can do it here. I don't want to brag about it. I have connection in this business. I also have experience." The UC understood

"business" to mean the drug trafficking business. MANAF continued, "[t]here is no profit in other businesses right now."

iv. The UC told MANAF that the UC had "partners here in America; I also have partners in Australia." The UC explained that "[i]n America one crystal is, the market price is 70,000 to 75,000 dollars per piece," to which MANAF responded, "Ok. It is very good." The UC also told MANAF "in Australia, there are friends who obtain in wholesale for 90,000 to 100,000 per piece." The UC intended "one crystal" to refer to one kilogram of heroin (which would be consistent with the fact that both CS-1 and the UC had previously discussed heroin trafficking with MANAF, see, e.g., supra ¶¶ 16, 17). MANAF replied, "I am in a position to do from one up to 500," and that the UC should "[j]ust tell me, send this amount to this place." MANAF told the UC that he could deliver it anywhere in Afghanistan, or send it via "launch," which the UC understood to refer to maritime shipping, to Tanzania. MANAF instructed the UC "[f]rom this point onward, whatever you want to do, say the name 'rice,' and we will know it." I understand based on conversations with the UC that "rice" is a code word for heroin.

v. MANAF again told the UC that he was on the "blacklist," and explained that the "Treasury of America" placed him on the "blacklist" because of his money-changing business, "Haji Khairullah and Abdul Sattar." See supra ¶ 17(a)(ii) & n.5. MANAF told the UC that the Americans claimed that MANAF was "help[ing] the Taliban." MANAF told the UC: "I was a money-changer, what difference does it make to me? In whose forehead is it written that one is a Taliban[?]" MANAF told the UC that this issue had "caused me a loss of 20 million dollars."

vi. The UC told MANAF that the UC had "some money in Australia and would like to send it to New York." The UC explained to MANAF that the UC had shipped "500 crystals," or kilograms of heroin, see supra ¶ 18(a)(ii), "to Australia" and that the UC wanted to "deliver its money to New York." MANAF told the UC "it [was] not a problem," and that MANAF could "transfer your money to New York within one hour."

vii. The UC asked MANAF if he could assist the UC by moving money from Australia to Afghanistan. The UC explained that the UC did a "deal," that is, a heroin transaction, and that members of the "network" from the "east side" helped the UC "deliver them out from their areas toward Pakistan until they reached the harbor." The UC then asked MANAF, "I have some

friends who are in the network, do you know what I am saying?" to which MANAF replied "Yes, yes." Based on the UC's familiarity with drug trafficking in and around Afghanistan, as well as his interactions with MANAF and other Afghanistan-based drug traffickers, the UC believed that MANAF understood his reference to the "network" from the "east" to mean the Haqqani Network, which operates in eastern Afghanistan, see supra ¶ 15, and that MANAF understood his reference to "deliver them out from their areas" to refer to the transportation of heroin through Haqqani Network-controlled areas. The UC continued, "I also would like to send them some money because Ramadan just passed, and I want to offer them some Zakat, too." MANAF replied: "No problem. I can do it whenever and any time that you ask me." Based on my training and experience, conversations with the UC, and review of publicly available documents, I understand that Ramadan is an Islamic religious holiday that consists of a month of fasting and increased prayer, in which Muslims are encouraged to give "zakat," or charitable donations, to the poor. Based on my conversations with the UC and other law enforcement agents who are familiar with drug trafficking in and around Afghanistan, I understand that narcotics traffickers in and around Afghanistan typically give "zakat," consisting of drug trafficking proceeds, to the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and similar organizations that control territory in Afghanistan during the month of Ramadan. Thus, the UC believed that MANAF understood that his reference to sending "zakat" or "money" to the "network" in the "east" meant sending money and donations to the Haqqani Network.

b. On or about July 4, 2018, MANAF sent the UC a photograph of MANAF's passport via Application-1. The passport bore the name "Haji Abdul Satar Abdul Manaf," and the man depicted in the passport photograph appeared to be the same person who appeared in the photograph MANAF previously sent the UC of himself, supra ¶ 17(c).

c. On or about July 11, 2018, the UC spoke with MANAF by telephone. During that conversation, which was recorded, MANAF told the UC that MANAF had approximately "1,800 of them," which the UC understood to mean 1,800 kilograms of heroin, in Mozambique, and that if the UC wanted to purchase "five to ten of them," and the UC was satisfied with the quality, they could execute a "larger deal." MANAF offered the heroin to the UC for "\$10,000" per kilogram. The UC told MANAF that the UC would speak with his customers.

**July 2018: The Defendant Reports Paying the Taliban to Transport Heroin**

19. Based on my participation in this investigation, conversations with other law enforcement officers involved in this investigation, my review of DEA reports, and my review of foreign law enforcement reports, I have learned, among other things, the following:

a. On or about July 22, 2018, the UC spoke with HAJI ABDUL SATAR ABDUL MANAF, a/k/a "Haji Abdul Sattar Barakzai," the defendant, by telephone. During that conversation, which was recorded, the following was discussed, in substance and in part:

i. MANAF told the UC that MANAF was "traveling to take care of the work," which the UC understood to be a reference to traveling to supervise the production of the heroin sample that MANAF had agreed to sell to the UC for importation into the U.S.

ii. The UC asked MANAF to let the UC know when MANAF arrived in Kandahar Province, Afghanistan, because the UC would send two of the UC's drug "transporters" — i.e., CS-3 and CS-4 — to meet with MANAF.<sup>7</sup>

b. On or about July 24, 2018, the UC spoke with MANAF by telephone. During that conversation, which was recorded, the following was discussed, in substance and in part:

i. MANAF reported that he had met with "the bearded people, the Mullahs." Based on my conversation with the UC, I understand the "bearded people, the Mullahs," to be a reference to the Taliban leadership.<sup>8</sup> MANAF told the UC that MANAF had met with "their elders," which the UC understood to be a reference to the Taliban leadership.

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<sup>7</sup> CS-3 and CS-4 have been paid confidential sources for the DEA since 2010 and 2014, respectively. Information provided by CS-3 and CS-4 has been deemed reliable and has sometimes been corroborated by independent evidence.

<sup>8</sup> Based on my conversations with the UC and other law enforcement agents who have worked in and around Afghanistan, I understand the term "mullah" to be commonly used in Afghanistan to refer to Taliban leadership.

ii. MANAF told the UC that MANAF could load "stuff," meaning heroin, on commercial airplanes. The UC asked MANAF "how many" MANAF was sending the UC as a "sample." MANAF told the UC he would send "as many as" the UC needed, and the UC responded that "four or five would be good."

c. On or about July 26, 2018, the UC spoke with MANAF by telephone. During that conversation, which was recorded, the following was discussed, in substance and in part:

i. MANAF told the UC that he had used certain chemicals to enhance the potency of the product because it was "go[ing] abroad" (an apparent reference to MANAF's prior discussions with the UC about the heroin being sold to the UC's customers in the U.S., see supra ¶ 18(a)(vi)). Specifically, MANAF told the UC that he ensured that the color "will become white" and that the product would be a "good color" and give a "good buzz."

ii. MANAF confirmed that the UC would pay \$1,800 per kilogram for the sample. MANAF explained that he would purchase 200 of the "beest," which would "be turned into around 100 to 150 items," and store it for the future. Based on my conversations with the UC and other law enforcement officers who have worked in Afghanistan, I understand "beest" to be a word commonly used in Afghanistan to refer to morphine, which is a heroin precursor, and "items" to refer to kilograms of heroin.

iii. MANAF explained that it would cost approximately 10,000 to 20,000 Pakistani rupees ("Rs") per kilogram, to transport the heroin sample from Helmand Province, where it was being prepared, to Kabul. MANAF told the UC that "toward Kabul, they are delivered on asphalted ways and this is why the people are scared a little bit." MANAF explained that they "are delivered [to Baram Chah] on dirt ways." Specifically, MANAF said that "[t]he Taliban charge [Rs] 5,000 per kilogram and deliver them there," to Baram Chah, an area on the southern border of Afghanistan in Helmand Province, "with [their] guarantee."

iv. The UC asked MANAF, "[t]he Taliban won't give trouble on the way to [Baram Chah], will they?" MANAF responded: "No. The Taliban carry them, they charge [a] fare . . . the Taliban load them up in the vehicles and charge [Rs] 5,000 per piece. [Rs] 5,000 is nothing. They charge per kilogram and deliver them." MANAF explained that the Taliban "submit them in [Baram Chah]. They deliver them while armed."

v. MANAF told the UC that he had a contact who was a translator at the "Bagram" Air Base — the U.S. Air Base in Bagram, Afghanistan — and suggested that MANAF and the UC utilize that contact to ship small amounts, such as "five or ten," through Bagram Air Base.

vi. The UC told MANAF that the UC's previous loads were transported through eastern Afghanistan through the "Miram Shah" area, and that the "long-bearded people" charged the UC "a lot of money."<sup>9</sup> The UC asked MANAF, "you know whom I am talking about?" MANAF replied: "Yes, I know." Based on my conversations with the UC, I understand the "long-bearded people" to be a reference to the Haqqani Network, which operates in eastern Afghanistan, and whose leadership is based in the Miram Shah area, see supra ¶ 15.

vii. The UC told MANAF that "the friends who will come to you," a reference to the UC's prior conversation with MANAF about CS-3 and CS-4 visiting MANAF, supra ¶ 19(a)(ii), "used to take items and sometimes they would get stuck on the way probably because the situation was bad or something else in Miram Shah." The UC continued that the "good thing was that these people" — a reference to the "long-bearded people, supra ¶ 19(c)(vi) — "would give them space and stuff so that the friends could keep the items for one or two weeks so that they could avoid problems. This is the reason I said, in the past we delivered items from their ways, but we haven't sent them their money, alms or anything like that, and this is the reason." (As discussed above, see supra ¶ 18(a)(vii), the UC had previously advised MANAF of his intent to provide charitable contributions

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<sup>9</sup> Based on my training and experience and conversations with the UC and other law enforcement agents, I understand that the Haqqani Network is based in and around southeastern Afghanistan, and that their leadership is based in the Miram Shah area of Waziristan, in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Afghanistan and a neighboring country. See supra ¶ 15. I also understand that the term "Miram Shah Taliban" is commonly used in Afghanistan to refer to the Haqqani Network. See supra ¶ 15(b). Finally, I understand that the area of eastern Afghanistan in which the Haqqani Network operates is largely controlled by the Taliban and/or the Haqqani Network, and that it is an area in which regular armed conflict (between the Taliban and/or the Haqqani Network and U.S. and coalition forces) occurs.

to the Haqqani Network.) Based on my conversations with the UC, I understand "give them space" to "keep the items for one or two weeks" to be a reference to storing heroin to "avoid problems" during transportation. The UC concluded, "I said that when these people come to you," a reference to CS-3 and CS-4, "I will send them their money," a reference to the Haqqani Network. MANAF replied, "it was not a problem, Haji. Look. You and we have [a] place in Miram Shah, in Peshawar, and everywhere else. We have people, ok?"

viii. MANAF told the UC that "[t]hey are not going to charge us money even if it is going to be 1,000's of kilograms. They will keep them for us for free." MANAF continued, "They won't charge you and me money. I have done a lot of things for them." Based on his prior interactions with MANAF, supra ¶ 19(c)(iv), the UC understood "they" to be a reference to the Taliban, and "keep them for us for free," to be a reference to the Taliban allowing MANAF to store heroin for free (which MANAF told the UC in response to, and in contrast to, the UC's report of paying the Haqqani Network to store the UC's heroin, supra ¶ 19(c)(vii)).

ix. MANAF explained that he had created a "stamp" for the UC, under the name "Helmand 1." Based on my training and experience, and my conversations with the UC and other law enforcement officers, I understand that heroin traffickers in Afghanistan typically stamp each kilogram of heroin with a unique stamp to identify the heroin's provenance. MANAF told the UC that he had directed his brother to "make it official by the Taliban there. It will take some money. Nobody else in Afghanistan can make these stamps." The UC asked, "[d]oes the stamp need to be made official through the Taliban?" MANAF replied "Yes. If this succeeds and someone else makes it, you can ask for the money for the loss. You can get a hold of the person. Nobody else can. The government doesn't have anything to do with this business."<sup>10</sup> MANAF told the UC that it

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<sup>10</sup> Based on my conversations with the UC and other law enforcement agents, and my review of publicly available documents, I understand that the Taliban exercises substantial control over large portions of Helmand Province. I also understand, based on my conversations with the UC and other law enforcement agents who have worked in Afghanistan and become familiar with some of the means and methods of narcotics traffickers in Afghanistan, that approval from the Taliban is necessary in order to conduct heroin transactions in certain

would cost Rs "10,000 to 20,000" to register the stamp with the Taliban.

x. MANAF explained that the Taliban charged a "commission rate" per "kilogram" of "chainak," "beest," or "these types," that was produced. Based on my conversations with the UC, I understand that "chainak" and "beest" are words commonly used in Afghanistan to refer to opium and morphine, respectively, and that the UC understood "these types" to refer to heroin.

xi. MANAF told the UC that the Taliban "don't charge much. To them it is a lot of money." MANAF explained that in "Helmand" the "people there have nothing to do . . . there is no work to do there in Musa Qala and places. The Taliban have all my lands. There is no government present there." See supra ¶ 19 n. 10.

xii. On or about July 30, 2018, CS-3 and CS-4 met with MANAF at MANAF's home in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The UC had previously told MANAF, in sum and substance, that CS-3 and CS-4 were the UC's associates, who had helped move a large load of heroin through Afghanistan with the help of the Haqqani Network, supra ¶ 19 (c) (vii), and that the UC needed to send money to the Haqqani Network in order to pay them for their assistance moving that load of heroin. During that meeting, which was not recorded, MANAF sent the UC a photograph of CS-3 and CS-4 via Application-1.

#### **August 2018: The Defendant Sells Heroin for Importation into the United States**

20. Based on my participation in this investigation, conversations with other law enforcement officers involved in this investigation, my review of DEA reports, and my review of foreign law enforcement reports, I have learned, among other things, the following:

a. On or about August 2, 2018, the UC spoke with HAJI ABDUL SATAR ABDUL MANAF, a/k/a "Haji Abdul Sattar Barakzai," the defendant, by telephone. During that


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parts of Afghanistan, including in Helmand Province.

conversation, which was recorded, the following was discussed, in substance and in part:

i. MANAF reported that CS-1 had visited MANAF, and encouraged MANAF to call the UC and "do a deal" with him. MANAF said he had told CS-1 that he would first send "10 pieces" — i.e., the Ten Kilo Shipment — and if the price was "good," MANAF and the UC would do a deal again.

b. On or about August 2, 2018, MANAF sent the UC the below photograph via Application-1 of the Helmand 1 stamp, see supra ¶ 19(c)(ix).



c. On or about August 3, 2018, the UC spoke with MANAF by telephone. During that conversation, which was recorded, the following was discussed, in substance and in part:

i. MANAF reported that he "bought opium and made beest out of them. Again, after making the beest, I made these things, ok?" MANAF told the UC that the "10 pieces" would be available soon, but that the production of the Ten Kilo Sample had been delayed because "there have been a lot of bombardments there," on the "factories," and the resultant "chaos" was the reason "it got a little bit late," an apparent reference to the delayed production of the Ten Kilo Sample.

ii. MANAF explained, in sum and substance, that he preferred to purchase his own opium and produce morphine and heroin himself, so that he could "reliably" ensure its quality. MANAF told the UC that future, larger loads would be delivered via "launch," or maritime shipment, through Baram Chah. MANAF


explained, "I have set up the factory and stuff" in "Musa Qala," an area in Helmand Province.

iii. MANAF told the UC that the Taliban would transport the items for the UC and MANAF for future transactions, and that they would charge Rs 5,000 to transport the heroin from Helmand Province to Baram Chah. Based on my conversations with the UC, I understand MANAF to have been quoting the Taliban's transportation price per kilogram of heroin.

iv. The UC confirmed that once the "ten pieces arrive," the "next offer will be for 400 to 500 pieces." MANAF replied, "It is not a problem . . . I have access everywhere, ok? This is our homeland, ok? We have no problem there, not even [Baram Chah]. We don't have any problem in Helmand either."

v. MANAF told the UC "I will register" the "Helmand 1" stamp with the "Taliban."

d. On or about August 5, 2018, MANAF sent the UC the below photographs of the Ten Kilo Shipment via Application-1, see supra ¶ 20(c).



Forwarded



Forwarded



Forwarded

5 AUGUST 2018



e. On or about August 5, 2018, the UC spoke with MANAF by telephone. During that conversation, which was recorded, the following was discussed, in substance and in part:

i. The UC confirmed that the UC had received the photographs that MANAF had sent, see supra ¶ 20(d). MANAF told the UC that the products were "white as milk."

ii. MANAF told the UC that the administrator to the "Taliban" "Governor of Helmand" Province called MANAF and told MANAF to send him (the administrator to the Taliban Governor) Rs 150,000. MANAF reported that he told the administrator to "register" MANAF's "stamp," and that he had sent Rs 150,000 to the Taliban Governor.

iii. MANAF explained that MANAF "always" pays the Taliban, and that the Taliban is "very good for our and your business." MANAF told the UC that "[i]f there are 2,000 pieces, they will observe, they will patrol, and nobody will be able to touch them." Based on the UC's prior interactions with MANAF, the UC understood "2,000 pieces" to be a reference to 2,000 kilograms of heroin, and "them" to refer to the Taliban.

iv. MANAF also confirmed that the Ten Kilo Shipment would be ready soon. The UC told MANAF that CS-1 would receive the Ten Kilo Shipment and transport it to CS-2. MANAF told the UC that "our business will not be delayed," and in the future, "if we are to use the river way, the Taliban will deliver them. We can give [Rs] 5,000 to 6,000 per pieces and they will deliver them all the[] way to [Baram Chah]. In [Baram Chah] I will deliver them to [another location] using the police, the governmental vehicles."

f. On or about August 5, 2018, the Ten Kilo Shipment was delivered to CS-1 in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. CS-1 transported the Ten Kilo Shipment to Wardak Province, which borders Kabul Province. On or about August 6, 2018, in Wardak Province, CS-1 provided the Ten Kilo Shipment to CS-2. CS-2 then transported the Ten Kilo Shipment into Kabul, and provided the Ten Kilo Shipment to DEA agents in Kabul, Afghanistan. The Ten Kilo Shipment, pictured below, field-tested positive for the presence of heroin. The total weight of the Ten Kilo Shipment was approximately ten kilograms. The Ten Kilo Shipment bore the "Helmand 1" stamp, see supra ¶¶ 19(c)(ix), 20(b).



g. On or about August 7, 2018, the UC spoke with MANAF by telephone. During that conversation, which was recorded, the following was discussed, in substance and in part:

i. The UC confirmed receipt of the Ten Kilo Shipment in Kabul. The UC agreed to provide payment for the Ten Kilo Shipment to MANAF's associate in Australia.

ii. The UC told MANAF, in sum and substance, that it would take approximately one month for the Ten Kilo Shipment to arrive in New York. At that time, the UC would be ready for a future, larger deal. MANAF told the UC that he would invest his own "capital" as well, and agreed to become business partners with the UC.

iii. MANAF asked the UC about the money the UC had previously asked MANAF to transfer from Australia to Afghanistan, see supra ¶ 18(a). The UC explained that the UC had previously sent "200 pieces" out of a "500 piece" deal to Australia. The UC told MANAF: "the Miram Shah Taliban really helped me a lot on the way. I feel like I owe them money. I also need to help them. I have 50,000 dollars." Based on my conversations with the UC, I understand Miram Shah Taliban to be a reference to the Haqqani Network. See supra ¶ 15(b). MANAF replied, "it is not a problem," and told the UC "if you want it in New York, if you want it in Kabul or anywhere else, it is not a problem." The UC explained that once the money arrived in Kabul, the UC would direct his associates to pick up the money.

**August 2018: The Defendant Facilitates the Transfer of Purported Narcotics Proceeds to Purported Haqqani Network Representatives**

21. Based on my participation in this investigation, conversations with other law enforcement officers involved in this investigation, my review of DEA reports, and my review of foreign law enforcement reports, I have learned, among other things, the following:

a. On or about August 8, 2018, the UC spoke with HAJI ABDUL SATAR ABDUL MANAF, a/k/a "Haji Abdul Sattar Barakzai," the defendant, by telephone. During that conversation, which was recorded, the following was discussed, in substance and in part:

i. MANAF asked if the UC had spoken with the UC's customers about the stuff in Mozambique, see supra ¶ 18(c), to which the UC replied that the UC needed more time.

ii. The UC told MANAF that the UC would pay MANAF "18,000 dollars from Australia to be the money for the ten pieces," to which MANAF replied, "ok."

iii. The UC confirmed that MANAF would transfer AU\$50,000 from Australia to Afghanistan for the UC. The UC told MANAF that the money was going to the "the Taliban of Miram Shah," to which MANAF replied, "Not a problem." MANAF asked the UC, "[t]he Miram Shah folks have made this much effort? Isn't 50,000 dollars a lot of money that you are giving them? I make agree for [Rs] 100,000 here. [Rs] 150,000 that you are sending them is a lot of money." The UC told MANAF, "this is because I owe them some money from the past." MANAF replied, "Ok. If that is the case, then it is ok." The UC continued, "Ramadan also passed, and I didn't send them anything. This will be a help for them." See supra ¶ 18(a)(vii). MANAF replied, "Ok, ok."

b. On or about August 9, 2018, the UC spoke with MANAF by telephone. During that conversation, which was recorded, the following was discussed, in substance and in part:

i. MANAF provided contact information for two of his associates in Melbourne, Australia, to whom the UC's associate could drop off the money, see supra ¶ 21(a)(iii).

c. On August 10, 2018, an undercover Australian law enforcement agent, posing as the UC's associate, dropped off the money, totaling AU\$50,000, in Melbourne, to a man MANAF had previously identified as his associate.

d. On or about August 10, 2018, the UC spoke with MANAF by telephone. During that conversation, which was recorded, the following was discussed, in substance and in part:

i. The UC confirmed that the UC's associate had dropped off the money to MANAF's associate in Melbourne. The UC provided the name of his associate — that is, CS-2 — who would pick up the money in Kabul. MANAF confirmed that the money would be ready for pickup within several days.

e. On or about August 12, 2018, the UC spoke with MANAF by telephone. During that conversation, which was recorded, the following was discussed, in substance and in part:

i. MANAF told the UC that MANAF had spoken with CS-2, and that the money would be ready for pickup.

f. On or about August 12, 2018, CS-2 picked up the U.S. dollar equivalent of AU\$50,000, or approximately \$34,000, from a serafi MANAF had identified to CS-2 in Kabul, Afghanistan.

g. On August 13, 2018, an undercover Australian law enforcement agent, posing as the UC's associate, dropped off the money, which equaled AU\$25,000, in Melbourne, Australia, to a man MANAF had previously identified as his associate.

h. On or about August 13, 2018, the UC spoke with MANAF by telephone. During that conversation, which was recorded, the following was discussed, in substance and in part:

i. The UC confirmed that CS-2 picked up the money that MANAF had transferred to Kabul. MANAF told the UC that he had been in contact with CS-2 until CS-2 had picked up the money.

ii. MANAF confirmed that he had received the money the UC had provided to MANAF's associate in Australia, which represented payment for the Ten Kilo Shipment, see supra ¶ 20(g). The UC told MANAF that the next transaction would be up to 500, meaning 500 kilograms, to which MANAF replied, "hopefully it will be 1,000."

WHEREFORE, your deponent respectfully requests that a warrant be issued for the arrest of HAJI ABDUL SATAR ABDUL MANAF, a/k/a "Haji Abdul Sattar Barakzai," the defendant, and that he be arrested and imprisoned, or bailed, as the case may be.



PAUL T. LARSEN  
Special Agent  
Drug Enforcement Administration

Sworn to before me this  
6th day of September, 2018

KAF  
U.S.M.S.  
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THE HONORABLE KEVIN NATHANIEL FOX  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE  
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK