1					
1 2 3	Presented to the Court by the foreman of the Grand Jury in open Court, in the presence of the Grand Jury and FILED in the U.S. DISTRICT COURT at Seattle, Washington.				
	Janvary 25,1 20 23				
4	Ravi Subrammian, Clerk				
5	By Deputy				
6	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE				
7	WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA				
8					
9	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	NO.C R23 - 5034 RTB			
10	Plaintiff,				
11		INDICTMENT			
12	V.				
13	FATIU ISMAILA LAWAL and				
14	SAKIRU OLANREWAJU AMBALI,				
15	Defendants.				
16					
17	The Grand Jury charges that:				
18	<u>COUNT 1</u>				
19	(Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud)				
20	A. Overview				
21	1. These charges involve the participation of FATIU ISMAILA LAWAL and				
22					
23	Grand Jury, in a conspiracy to use stolen identities of American workers and taxpayers to				
24	fraudulently obtain United States government funds, including COVID-19 pandemic				
25	unemployment benefits, pandemic assistance for small businesses, and federal tax				
26	refunds. In connection with the conspiracy, LAWAL, AMBALI, and their co-				
27					
<i>~</i> /					

Indictment - 1 United States v. Lawal et al. USAO No. 2022R00205 conspirators possessed and used the stolen personal identifying information of over
 14,700 American workers and taxpayers.

3 2. Specifically, LAWAL and AMBALI, both Nigerian nationals and Canadian residents, and their co-conspirators used these stolen identities to submit over 1,700 4 claims for COVID-19 pandemic-related unemployment benefits to over 25 state 5 workforce agencies and over 2,300 fraudulent tax returns to the Internal Revenue Service. 6 LAWAL, AMBALI, and their co-conspirators also used stolen personal identifying 7 information of Americans to seek pandemic assistance from the United States Small 8 Business Administration. In so doing, LAWAL and AMBALI, together and with their 9 co-conspirators, caused, and attempted to cause, state and federal agencies to pay out 10 approximately \$25 million in American government funds. They successfully obtained 11 over \$2.4 million, primarily from COVID-19 pandemic unemployment benefits. This 12 included approximately \$253,000 paid by the Washington Employment Security 13 Department. 14

15 **B.** Rel

Relevant Programs

16 3. CARES Act and COVID-19 Unemployment Benefits. On March 27, 17 2020, the United States enacted into law the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic 18 Security (CARES) Act. The CARES Act authorized approximately \$2 trillion in aid to 19 American workers, families, and businesses to mitigate the economic consequences of 20the COVID-19 pandemic. The CARES Act funded and authorized each state to 21 administer new unemployment benefits. These benefits included: (1) Federal Pandemic 22 Unemployment Compensation, which provided a benefit of \$600 per week per 23 unemployed worker in addition to existing benefits; (2) Pandemic Unemployment 24 Assistance, which extended benefits to self-employed persons, independent contractors, 25 and others; and (3) Pandemic Emergency Unemployment Assistance, which extended 26 benefits for an additional 13 weeks after regular unemployment benefits were exhausted.

Indictment - 2 *United States v. Lawal et al.* USAO No. 2022R00205

27

4. CARES Act unemployment benefits were funded by the United States
 government through the Department of Labor and administered at the state level by state
 agencies known as state workforce agencies (SWAs). The Washington Employment
 Security Department (ESD) is the SWA for the State of Washington.

CARES Act unemployment benefits were authorized, transferred, disbursed 5. 5 and paid in connection with a nationwide emergency declared by Presidential 6 Proclamation 9994 (effective as of March 1, 2020) and a Presidential declaration of a 7 major disaster for the State of Washington concerning the COVID-19 pandemic that was 8 issued on March 22, 2020. On August 8, 2020, to further assist American workers 9 suffering from the economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, the President 10 authorized the Federal Emergency Management Agency to expend up to \$44 billion from 11 disaster relief funds for the Lost Wage Assistance Program (LWAP) to provide an 12 additional \$300 per week to workers who were unemployed because of COVID-19. 13

SWAs allow applicants to apply online for state-administered
 unemployment benefits. For example, in Washington, applicants can apply online for
 ESD-administered benefits by visiting ESD's Unemployment Tax and Benefit (UTAB)
 system via an online portal called eServices. To access eServices, the applicant must first
 set up an account with the state's SecureAccess Washington (SAW) web-based identity
 validation system.

7. COVID-19 Economic Injury Disaster Loans. The CARES Act also
 authorized the United States Small Business Administration (SBA) to provide assistance
 through the Economic Injury Disaster Loan (EIDL) program. The EIDL program
 provides low-interest financing to small businesses and non-profit organizations in
 regions affected by declared disasters. EIDL funds can be used for payroll expenses, sick
 leave, production costs, and business obligations, such as debts, rent, and mortgage

Indictment - 3 United States v. Lawal et al. USAO No. 2022R00205

26

27

payments. The CARES Act authorized eligible small businesses experiencing substantial
 financial disruption due to the COVID-19 pandemic to receive EIDLs of up to \$2 million.

8. A qualifying business applying for an EIDL must submit an application to
the SBA and provide information about its operations, such as the number of employees,
gross revenues for the 12-month period preceding the disaster, and cost of goods sold in
the 12-month period preceding the disaster. The applicant must also certify that all of the
information in the application is true and correct to the best of the applicant's knowledge.
SBA directly disburses funds issued under an EIDL to an account identified by the
applicant.

9. Tax Refunds. The Internal Revenue Service is an agency of the United 10 States Department of Treasury and is responsible for administrating the tax laws of the 11 United States. An individual who is a citizen or resident of the United States and earned 12 income during a calendar year in excess of a threshold amount is obligated to file an 13 individual tax return with the IRS for that calendar year. If the taxpayer paid more in 14 15 taxes (for example through employer withholdings or quarterly payments) than was due for a given year, the taxpayer may request that a refund be paid by electronic wire 16 transfer to a bank account designated by the taxpayer. The IRS relies in part on the 17 taxpayer's tax return to determine whether a refund is due. 18

19

27

С.

Use of Interstate Wires.

10. The processes for applying for and receiving the government payments
discussed above involve the use of interstate wire transmissions. For example,
applications for ESD-administered unemployment benefits involve at least the following
three types of interstate or foreign wire transmissions: when the SAW system sends an
activation email to an email server outside the State of Washington, when a user accesses
UTAB on eServices from outside the State of Washington, and when ESD initiates a
benefit payment.

Indictment - 4 *United States v. Lawal et al.* USAO No. 2022R00205

Case 3:23-cr-05034-RJB Document 1 Filed 01/25/23 Page 5 of 15

SAW. The SAW website is hosted at the State Data Center in Olympia,
 Washington. To establish a SAW account, an applicant must provide the SAW system
 with an email address. The SAW system then sends an activation link to the designated
 email account by wire transmission originating in Olympia, Washington. The user must
 click on the link to activate his or her SAW account. When the user uses an email server
 outside the State of Washington, the SAW system uses an interstate wire each time it
 sends an activation email.

12. eServices. After activating the SAW account, the user may use the SAW 8 account to access ESD's UTAB application system through eServices. The eServices 9 website is also hosted at the State Data Center in Olympia, Washington. To file a claim 10 through eServices, the applicant enters his or her personal identifying information (PII), 11 to include name, date of birth, and Social Security number. When the applicant accesses 12 or submits the application through eServices from outside the State of Washington, his or 13 her electronic device sends an interstate wire transmission terminating at the State Data 14 Center in Olympia, Washington. 15

16 13. *Payment.* In UTAB, the applicant may designate a bank or financial
account to receive the unemployment benefits, and ESD pays these benefits via wire
(ACH) transfer. When ESD disburses unemployment benefits, ESD sends an interstate
wire communication from Olympia, Washington, to a KeyBank processing center,
directing KeyBank to make the benefit payment. KeyBank does not have any processing
centers within Washington State. Therefore, every ESD benefits payment results in an
interstate wire communication that originates in Washington and travels to another state.

23 D. The Conspiracy

14. Beginning at a time unknown but no later than on or about February 2,
25 2018, and continuing through at least on or about November 11, 2022, at Olympia, in
26 Thurston County, within the Western District of Washington, and elsewhere, FATIU

Indictment - 5 *United States v. Lawal et al.* USAO No. 2022R00205

27

ISMAILA LAWAL and SAKIRU OLANREWAJU AMBALI, together with others 1 2 known and unknown to the Grand Jury, did conspire, confederate and agree, together and with each other, to commit the offense of wire fraud in violation of Title 18, United 3 States Code, Section 1343. That is, FATIU ISMAILA LAWAL and SAKIRU 4 OLANREWAJU AMBALI, together with others known and unknown, with intent to 5 defraud, agreed to knowingly devise a scheme and artifice to defraud, and to obtain 6 money and property, by means of materially false and fraudulent pretenses, 7 representations, and promises. To execute and attempt to execute the scheme and artifice 8 to defraud, FATIU ISMAILA LAWAL and SAKIRU OLANREWAJU AMBALI, 9 together with others known and unknown, knowingly transmitted, and caused to be 10transmitted by wire communication in interstate and foreign commerce, writings, signs, 11 signals, pictures and sounds. 12

The object of the conspiracy was to use stolen identities of American 13 15. workers, residents, and taxpayers to fraudulently obtain United States government funds, 14 including COVID-19 pandemic unemployment benefits, pandemic assistance for small 15 16 businesses, and tax refunds.

16. 17 The wire fraud that was the object of this conspiracy occurred in relation to, and involved, benefit payments authorized, transmitted, transferred, disbursed, and paid 18 in connection with the presidentially-declared major disaster and emergency described in 19 Paragraph 5 of this Indictment. 20

E. 21

22

27

Manner and Means

The following conduct was part of the conspiracy:

17. 23 Use of Stolen Personal Identifying Information. LAWAL, AMBALI, and their co-conspirators unlawfully obtained, possessed, and shared with one another the 24 names, dates of birth, Social Security numbers, and other PII of American workers and 25 26 taxpayers, including residents of the State of Washington.

Indictment - 6 United States v. Lawal et al. USAO No. 2022R00205

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY 700 STEWART STREET **SUITE 5220** SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98101 (206) 553-7970

1 18. LAWAL, AMBALI, and their co-conspirators used Telegram and other encrypted messaging services to instruct one another how to obtain and use stolen PII to 2 fraudulently obtain United States government funds. Telegram is an encrypted, cloud-3 based, centralized instant messaging system that is accessible from electronic devices 4 such as smartphones, tablets, and computers. Telegram uses a "distributed infrastructure" 5 to deliberately evade disclosure of data to third parties, including governments. Its 6 features include a channel function that allows an administrator to post to a public or 7 private feed that broadcasts to an unlimited number of subscribers. 8

9 19. LAWAL, AMBALI, and their co-conspirators used at least one Telegram
10 channel that instructed its subscribers how to: purchase stolen PII from the channel
11 administrator or use tools that scrape the internet for PII; submit fraudulent
12 unemployment benefit claims to various SWAs across the nation, including ESD; and
13 mask IP addresses to evade detection. The channel also provided tutorials on how to use
14 stolen PII to defraud other COVID-19 benefit programs such as the SBA's EIDL
15 program and the Treasury's Emergency Rental Assistance Program.

16 20. Use of Deceptive Email Accounts. LAWAL, AMBALI, and their co17 conspirators created and maintained over a dozen email accounts for the purpose of
18 participating in fraudulent transactions while obscuring their identities. LAWAL,
19 AMBALI, and their co-conspirators primarily used accounts administered by Google
20 LLC, with domain names ending in gmail.com and googlemail.com, and email addresses
21 linked to private domains administered by Namecheap, a domain name registrar and web
22 hosting company.

23 21. LAWAL, AMBALI, and their co-conspirators, using foreign and interstate
24 wire transmissions, accessed ESD's SAW portal and eServices, as well as similar portals
25 of SWAs for at least 25 other states, including New York, Maryland, Michigan, Nevada,
26 and California. Each time LAWAL, AMBALI, or a co-conspirator accessed the

Indictment - 7 United States v. Lawal et al. USAO No. 2022R00205

27

Washington SAW portal and eServices, he or she caused wire transmissions terminating
 and originating at the State Data Center in Olympia, Washington.

22. To establish SAW accounts, LAWAL, AMBALI, and their co-conspirators
provided email addresses to ESD to receive activation emails. Each time LAWAL,
AMBALI, or a co-conspirator input an email address into the SAW system, an activation
email was sent to the email account. Each of these emails was sent via an interstate wire
transmission originating from the State Data Center in Olympia, Washington and passing
through either a Google or Namecheap data center outside the State of Washington.

23. To prevent ESD and other SWAs from recognizing that the same email
account or user was filing file multiple claims, LAWAL, AMBALI, and their coconspirators used hundreds of variants of each email address.

12 24. For the Google accounts, LAWAL, AMBALI, and their co-conspirators placed periods at different locations within the email address for each claim. For 13 example, LAWAL, AMBALI, and their co-conspirators opened SAW accounts and 14 15 submitted claims using the variants "G.AM.E.W.O.R.K393@GMAIL.COM." "G.A.M.EWO.RK393@GMAIL.COM," and "G.AMEWORK3.93@GMAIL.COM." In 16 routing emails to a gmail.com or googlemail.com account, Google disregards periods 17 within the email address (e.g., "john.doe@gmail.com" is routed to the same account as 18 "johndoe@gmail.com"). As a result, Google delivered all of these emails (and any 19 similar "dot variants" of the same address) to the gamework393@gmail.com account. 20

21 25. By using these email address variants, LAWAL, AMBALI, and their co22 conspirators were able to file hundreds of claims using the same email account, without
23 ESD and other SWAs detecting that they were doing so. LAWAL, AMBALI, and their
24 co-conspirators used the following 13 Google accounts, and others, and their dot variants,
25 to file over 900 COVID-19 pandemic unemployment benefits:

26 gamework393@gmail.com, bankupdates2014@gmail.com, js755642@gmail.com,

Indictment - 8 *United States v. Lawal et al.* USAO No. 2022R00205

27

1 vac22334@gmail.com, onlinefacebookprogs2016@gmail.com,

2 seritdavis@googlemail.com, js8979767@gmail.com, tailorjames23@gmail.com,
3 nwork654@gmail.com, billyjeanolowo@gmail.com, harveynaomi0@gmail.com,
4 kimphillips059@gmail.com, and nationarmstrong@gmail.com.

5 26. Beginning in approximately December 2020, LAWAL became the registered owner of at least four internet domain names used to fraudulently obtain 6 7 American government funds. LAWAL, AMBALI, and their co-conspirators created a single email mailbox for each domain through a private email service provided by 8 Namecheap, which also hosted each domain. The private email service has features that 9 allow users to funnel an unlimited number of email addresses associated with a registered 10 domain to a single inbox for that domain. For example, k(a) sensormargin.com, 11 h@sensormargin.com, and r@sensormargin.com were among the hundreds of 12 sensormargin.com emails LAWAL, AMBALI, and their co-conspirators used to file 13 COVID-19 unemployment claims with SWAs across the nation. But because LAWAL 14 created a single mailbox for the domain sensormargin.com, all of the emails associated 15 with the domain were delivered to a single inbox. 16

17 27. Using these private email service features, LAWAL, AMBALI, and their
18 co-conspirators used approximately 800 different email addresses associated with one of
19 four domain names—sensormargin.com, minderpower.com, redfoxdna.com, or
20 unitedgsat.com—to submit fraudulent claims to SWAs. Each email address appeared
21 unique to the SWA but was ultimately routed to the single inbox for each domain.

28. **Other Fraudulent Submissions.** LAWAL, AMBALI, and their coconspirators, used stolen personal identifying information of American residents and some of the same email accounts and domains described in Paragraphs 24-27, and others to seek EIDL proceeds and other assistance from SBA that were intended to assist small businesses suffering during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Indictment - 9 *United States v. Lawal et al.* USAO No. 2022R00205

22

23

24

25

26

27

Case 3:23-cr-05034-RJB Document 1 Filed 01/25/23 Page 10 of 15

29. Between on or about February 2, 2018, and November 11, 2022, LAWAL, 1 AMBALI, and their co-conspirators, using some of the same and additional email 2 accounts and domain names described in Paragraphs 24-27, used the stolen identities of 3 American taxpayers to electronically file over 2,300 fraudulent tax returns without the 4 taxpayers' knowledge. The fraudulent tax returns falsely claimed tax refunds and 5 requested that those refunds be deposited to accounts under the control of the defendants 6 or their co-conspirators. In total, LAWAL, AMBALI, and their co-conspirators sought 7 over \$7.1 million in tax refunds and obtained approximately \$30,000. 8

30. 9 **Dissipation of Proceeds.** When completing the applications for pandemic unemployment benefits, LAWAL, AMBALI, and their co-conspirators directed some of 10the benefits be paid to online payment accounts, including accounts administered by 11 MovoCash, Inc. LAWAL, AMBALI, and their co-conspirators also directed fraudulent 12 benefits to be loaded onto debit cards issued by banks and mailed to addresses in the 13 United States or deposited into bank accounts controlled by persons known as "money 14 mules," who withdrew and transferred the funds according to instructions given by 15 LAWAL, AMBALI, and their co-conspirators. 16

31. LAWAL, AMBALI, and their co-conspirators also used stolen identities to 17 open bank accounts specifically for the purpose of receiving fraudulent COVID-19 18 19 benefits. For example, LAWAL, AMBALI, and their conspirators directed benefits from at least 10 claims submitted to Washington and other SWAs to a common bank account. 20These 10 claims used dot variant email addresses of four different Google accounts. The 21 22 bank account was opened online on or about March 31, 2020, using the stolen identity of F.B, and received deposits exclusively from Washington and New York SWAs that were 23 withdrawn through ATMs and postal money orders, before the bank closed the account 24 on or about June 11, 2020, due to suspicious activities. 25

26

27

All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1349.

Indictment - 10 United States v. Lawal et al. USAO No. 2022R00205

COUNTS 2-11

(Wire Fraud)

32. The Grand Jury incorporates by reference Paragraphs 1-31 of this Indictment as if fully set forth herein.

33. Beginning at a time unknown, but no later than on or about February 2, 2018, and continuing through at least on or about November 11, 2022, at Olympia, in Thurston County, within the Western District of Washington, and elsewhere, FATIU ISMAILA LAWAL, SAKIRU OLANREWAJU AMBALI, and others known and unknown, with intent to defraud, knowingly devised a scheme and artifice to defraud, and to obtain money and property, by means of materially false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises, as further described below.

34. The essence of the scheme and artifice to defraud was to use stolen identities of American workers and taxpayers to fraudulently obtain United States government funds, including COVID-19 pandemic unemployment benefits from state workforce agencies, assistance for small businesses from the United States Small Business Administration, and tax refunds from the United States Department of Treasury. The scheme and artifice to defraud occurred in relation to, and involved, benefit payments authorized, transmitted, transferred, disbursed, and paid in connection with a presidentially-declared major disaster and emergency.

35. On or about the dates set forth below, for the purpose of executing and attempting to execute this scheme and artifice to defraud, FATIU ISMAILA LAWAL, SAKIRU OLANREWAJU AMBALI, and others known and unknown to the Grand Jury, aiding and abetting each other, did knowingly transmit and cause to be transmitted, by wire communication in interstate and foreign commerce, writings, signs, signals, pictures and sounds, each transmission of which constitutes a separate count of this Indictment. Each of the following offenses was committed in furtherance of, and was a foreseeable part of, the conspiracy charged in Count 1 of this Indictment.

Indictment - 11 United States v. Lawal et al. USAO No. 2022R00205

1	Count	Approximate Date	Applicant Initials	Wire Transmission
2 3 4	2	May 2, 2020	R.R.	SecureAccess Washington account activation email from State Data Center in Olympia, Washington to vac.2.2334@gmail.com via a Google server outside of Washington
5 6 7 8	3	May 7, 2020	C.A.	Wire from outside Washington to State Data Center in Olympia, Washington to submit an application via eServices for ESD benefits using the email address g.a.mewor.k.3.9.3@gmail.com
9 10 11	4	May 8, 2020	S.C.	SecureAccess Washington account activation email from the State Data Center in Olympia, Washington to v.a.c.2.23.34@gmail.com via a Google server outside of Washington
12 13 14	5	May 8, 2020	R.L.	Wire from outside Washington to State Data Center in Olympia, Washington to submit an application via eServices for ESD benefits using the email address o.nl.i.nef.a.c.e.bookprogs2016@gmail.com
15 16	6	May 12, 2020	B.E.	Wire from Washington to another state to initiate ACH transfer of approximately \$8,530 in ESD benefits
17 18 19	7	May 13, 2020	B.E.	Wire from Washington to another state to initiate ACH transfer of approximately \$1,390 in ESD benefits
20 21	8	May 13, 2020	T.G.	Wire from Washington to another state to initiate ACH transfer of approximately \$1,580 in ESD benefits
22 23 24 25	9	May 14, 2020	P.S.	Wire from outside Washington to State Data Center in Olympia, Washington to submit an application via eServices for ESD benefits using the email address o.nlinef.aceb.ookprogs2016@gmail.com

,

Indictment - 12 United States v. Lawal et al. USAO No. 2022R00205

26

27

1 2 3 4	10	May 17, 2020	L.S	Wire from outside Washington to State Data Center in Olympia, Washington to submit an application via eServices for ESD benefits using the email address o.n.l.i.ne.face.b.ookprogs2016@gmail.com	
5 6 7	11	August 6, 2021	D.B.	Wire from outside Washington to State Data Center in Olympia, Washington to submit an application via eServices for ESD benefits using the email address berry9360@minderpower.com	
8	All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 1343 and 2.				
9	<u>COUNTS 12-17</u>				
10 11	(Aggravated Identity Theft)				
11	36. The Grand Jury incorporates by reference Paragraphs 1-35 of this				
12	Indictment as if fully set forth herein.				
13	37. On or about the dates set forth below, at Olympia, in Thurston County,				
	within the Western District of Washington, and elsewhere, FATIU ISMAILA LAWAL				
15	and SAKIRU OLANREWAJU AMBALI, knowingly transferred, possessed, and used,				
16	without lawful authority, means of identification of other persons, and did aid and abet				
17	the same, in that FATIU ISMAILA LAWAL and SAKIRU OLANREWAJU AMBALI				
18	submitted claims to the Washington Employment Security Department using the names,				
19	dates of birth, and Social Security numbers, of the persons with the initials listed below,				
20	during and in relation to felonies listed in Title 18, United States Code, Section 1028A(c),				
 to wit, conspiracy to commit wire fraud in violation of Title 18, United States C Section 1349, and wire fraud in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 				d in violation of Title 18, United States Code,	
				on of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1343.	
	Each of the following offenses was committed in furtherance of, and was a foreseeal				
	24 part of, the conspiracy charged in Count 1 of this Indictment.				
25 //					
26	//				
27	Indictmen	t - 13		UNITED STATES ATTORNEY	

Indictment - 13 *United States v. Lawal et al.* USAO No. 2022R00205

Case 3:23-cr-05034-RJB Document 1 Filed 01/25/23 Page 14 of 15

Count	Date	Initials of Victim
12	May 6, 2020	D.H.
13	May 9, 2020	J.C.
14	May 10, 2020	S.S.
15	May 11, 2020	M.H.
16	May 11, 2020	T.G.
17	May 17, 2020	J.S.

All in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1028A(a)(1) and 2.

FORFEITURE ALLEGATION

The allegations contained in Counts 1–11 of this Indictment are hereby realleged and incorporated by reference for the purpose of alleging forfeiture. Upon conviction of any of the offenses alleged in Counts 1–11 of this Indictment, defendants FATIU ISMAILA LAWAL and SAKIRU OLANREWAJU AMBALI, shall forfeit to the United States, pursuant to Title 18, United States Code, Section 981(a)(1)(C), by way of Title 28, United States Code, Section 2461(c), any property that constitutes or is traceable to proceeds of the offense. This property includes, but is not limited to, a sum of money reflecting the proceeds the defendant obtained from the offense.

Substitute Assets. If any of the property described above, as a result of any act or omission of the defendant:

- a. cannot be located upon the exercise of due diligence;
- b. has been transferred or sold to, or deposited with, a third party;
- c. has been placed beyond the jurisdiction of the court;
- d. has been substantially diminished in value; or,
- e. has been commingled with other property which cannot be divided without difficulty,

it is the intent of the United States to seek the forfeiture of any other property of the

Indictment - 14 United States v. Lawal et al. USAO No. 2022R00205

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

defendants, up to the value of the above-described forfeitable property, pursuant to Title 1 21, United States Code, Section 853(p). 2 A TRUE BILL: 3 DATED: 2023 4 5 [Signature of Foreperson redacted pursuant to the policy of the Judicial Conference of 6 the United States] 7 FOREPERSON 8 9 NICHOLAS W. BROWN 10United States Attorney 11 12 13 ANDREW C. FRIEDMAN Assistant United States Attorney 14 15 16 Assistant United States Attorney 17 18 19 SETH WILKINSON Assistant United States Attorney 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 Indictment - 15

United States v. Lawal et al. USAO No. 2022R00205