WEEK OF JULY 30 - AUGUST 3

1.  Hall v. CIA, No. 04-814, 2012 WL 3143839 (D.D.C. Aug. 3, 2012) (Lamberth, J.)

Re:  Request for various records pertaining to POW/MIAs from the Vietnam War era

Holding:  Granting, in part, CIA's renewed motion for summary judgment on the basis that its searches for certain responsive records were adequate, that certain withholdings under Exemptions 1, 3, 5 and 6 were proper, and that it released all reasonably segregable material; ordering CIA to conduct searches for other records; concluding that CIA must take affirmative steps with respect to certain referred records; ordering release of certain information withheld under Exemption 6; determining DOD must further justify certain Exemption 3 withholdings; and denying plaintiffs' requests for discovery and for in camera review

• Adequacy of search:  The court grants in part and denies in part the CIA's motion for summary judgment as to the adequacy of its search for responsive records.  Unreasonably burdensome:  Regarding plaintiffs' request for documents concerning alleged Vietnam War POW/MIAs, the court rejects the CIA's argument that a search simply using the 1,711 names proffered by plaintiffs without additional identifying information would be "an 'unreasonable burden.'"  In searching its Automatic Declassification and Release Environment system, the agency "is not asked to determine the responsiveness of [the document by] name alone [rather] if the record is regarding an individual as a POW or MIA, it is responsive."  Moreover, although the CIA claims that "it may be impossible to determine [responsiveness] for some documents," the court finds that defendant "offers no estimates of the percentage of documents for which responsiveness would be 'impossible.'"  As to its search of archived records, the court concludes that the CIA "fails to provide . . . an estimate of how many man-hours are necessary to fulfill the search."

As to the agency's search for POW/MIAs in Laos, the court determines that the CIA's statement that "the offices that were searched 'were the only offices within the [Director of CIA] likely to contain [responsive] information'" "meets the test."  Further, the court finds that defendant's search with respect to this portion of plaintiffs' request was adequate "[b]ecause the CIA submitted declarations explaining in reasonable detail the scope and method of the agency's search, and explained in adequate detail that all systems likely to contain responsive records were searched."  However, with respect to another item of plaintiffs' request, the court denies defendants' motion for summary judgment finding that "only searching the databases 'most likely' to contain responsive documents does not satisfy FOIA, as it may preclude record systems that are less likely than others to contain responsive documents, yet may still likely contain them."

The court determines that the CIA's search for records regarding plaintiffs' previous FOIA requests to the agency was adequate, noting that "[t]he Agency searched for the documents using [plaintiff's] name and case number, searched all systems likely to contain responsive records, named the supervisor of the search, and provided the Court with an explanation as to why other systems would only contain duplicate responsive records."  With regard to plaintiffs' claim that the agency should have used additional search terms which appeared in some of the released records, the court holds that "[w]ith 'several thousand pages of records' released by the CIA, a showing that each newly suggested term existed in a single document is not enough to find the CIA's search inadequate without further explanation as to why these terms in particular would uncover responsive documents that the previous search did not."  However, the court finds that "[w]here specific records, photographs, or attachments are referenced in CIA documents, it is no longer 'mere speculation' that the files exist," and holds that the agency "cannot demonstrate beyond material doubt that its search was 'reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents' until those missing responsive documents are searched for."  Conversely, the court finds that the agency is not required to search for records that plaintiffs speculate should have been created, concluding "[t]here is no indication that any of these records were actually created, only that there may have been an intention at one point to create documents."

• Procedural/referral & coordination:  The court holds that the CIA satisfied its burden with respect to referred records where the agencies receiving the referrals have sent final responses to plaintiffs as to their determinations regarding those documents.  However, with regard to referrals to "unnamed agencies" [sent prior to OIP's guidance directing agencies not to make referrals when the receiving agency cannot be named] for which plaintiffs have not received any information, the court finds that "the failure to produce the documents amounts to an improper withholding" by the CIA.  The court observes that "[i]t has been over 10 months since the CIA sent the referral letter, and the CIA has offered no evidence that it has followed up with the 'unnamed agencies' in regard to the referral documents."  Accordingly, the court concludes "[b]ecause the CIA is responsible [for those records] . . . the CIA must take immediate affirmative steps to be sure that each referral is being processed, which it shall describe in its supplemental filing."  Additionally, the court concludes that the CIA "fulfilled its burden as to the coordination" of certain documents where it processed the responsive records and provided "supporting declarations from the coordinating agencies."  

• Exemption 1:  With regard to classified records that are "more than 25 years old," the court concludes that the CIA properly invoked Exemption 1 to protect that information.  With respect to plaintiffs' argument that the documents lack the proper classification markings, the court finds that the CIA provided an adequate explanation; namely, that "the documents in their redacted form are not classified – therefore the markings required by § 1.6(a) [of Executive Order 13526] 'are inapplicable to the documents released to Plaintiffs.'"  The court also rejects plaintiffs' challenge to the adequacy of the agency's declarant, finding that the declarant "meets the test for the level of personal knowledge necessary for a FOIA declaration" where his statements were made based on personal knowledge and the information made available to him in his official capacity.  As to plaintiffs' assertion that the agency's national security concerns are "speculative," the court finds that the CIA's declaration "contains the necessary level of specificity required in exemption 1 claims, as specific documents are referenced, and the reasons for information withholding cited."  Lastly, although the court notes that "records over 25 years old that have permanent historical value are automatically unclassified," the court finds that this requirement does not apply to the instant information which was withheld pursuant to § 3.4(b)(1) of the Executive Order because it "would expose sources and reveal intelligence methods." 

• Exemption 3:  The court rejects plaintiffs' challenges to the CIA's Exemption 3 withholdings.  With respect to plaintiffs' claim that the CIA Act of 1949, 50 U.S.C. § 403(g) "'doesn't apply to 'deceased [CIA] officers and employees and those who have been publicly identified as such,'" the court finds that "deceased former employees still fall within the plain language of 403(g) as having been 'employed' by the CIA." 

The court also dismisses plaintiffs' argument that, for referred records, "the Department of Defense inappropriately invoked exemption 3 in relation to 10 U.S.C. § 150b, because the statute is 'clearly discretionary' and therefore not an exemption 3 statute."  Rather, the court determines that the statute qualifies as an Exemption 3 withholding statute "because it '(B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld.'"  Moreover, the court finds that redactions of "'names of individuals assigned to routinely deployable units'" under 10 U.S.C. § 150b were proper "because the withheld material falls within the statute."  However, the court denies summary judgment for "redaction of names withheld under 50 U.S.C. § 435."  The court notes that "[t]he statute requires the primary next of kin to give written consent to the release of information concerning [those individuals] treatment, location, or condition" and finds that there is no indication here that DOD consulted its primary next of kin list to determine whether such consent was given. 

• Exemption 5 (deliberative process & attorney-client privileges): The court concludes that the CIA has now supported its withholdings under the deliberative process privilege.  For one, the court grants summary judgment to CIA with regard to two documents withheld under the deliberative process privilege for which plaintiffs did not respond to CIA's legal arguments or dispute its factual assertions.  With regard to "emails, memoranda, and handwritten notes by Agency officers regarding the calculation of fee estimates for processing" one of plaintiffs' FOIA requests, the court find that "[b]ecause the CIA has adequately explained . . . that the redacted information was 'pre-decisional,' that the information concerned recommendations and opinions on legal and policy matters and that the recommendations were never adopted," summary judgment is appropriate.  The court also determines that CIA properly justified its assertion of the deliberative process privilege for a document over thirty years old where the agency adequately demonstrated to the court that "the withheld information concerns deliberations, and not the results of deliberations, as the documents show no evidence that the policy recommendations were ever adopted."  Additionally, the court grants summary judgment to the CIA regarding its attorney-client privilege withholdings where plaintiffs' failed to contest the CIA's legal arguments or factual assertions.

• Exemption 6:  The court holds that CIA properly withheld information revealing "date of birth, place of birth, social security number, blood type, place of residence, names of family members, or religious affiliation" of CIA employees, concluding that privacy interest in this identifying information is "high" and the public interest is "low."  However, with regard to the names of CIA employees not protected by Exemption 3, the court concludes that "the CIA has not overcome the heavy 'presumption in favor of disclosure' found in exemption 6 in regard to the names themselves."  The court finds that "[t]hough the CIA is correct that the superfluous information such as blood type has a very low public interest, the names of these individuals themselves appear to be the subject of substantial public interest."   Moreover, the court notes that "there is an especially low level of privacy interest in the case of deceased individuals" and finds that the CIA has failed to address that issue.  As such, the court grants summary judgment to plaintiffs with respect to the names.

• Segregability:  "Because the CIA has adequately demonstrated with reasonable specificity that no withheld documents contain reasonably segregable factual information, both in the records released before the [court's earlier] Order and after, the Court holds that the CIA has met its segregability requirements under FOIA." 

• Discovery:  The court denies plaintiffs' request for discovery, concluding that there is no evidence of bad faith on the part of the CIA.  Although plaintiffs argue that "'the CIA's bad faith is manifest by its abuse of the FOIA's fee waiver provisions,'" the court finds that "[e]stimating the search fees – especially of such a broad search as that of the plaintiffs – is no doubt a difficult proposition, and a recalculation of those fees does not show that the previous estimate was intentionally inaccurate."  Additionally, the court finds that discovery is premature to probe defendant's search for missing documents where a new search will be conducted.

• In camera review:  The court declines to conduct an in camera review absent any evidence of agency bad faith.  As to plaintiffs' arguments regarding two instances of inadequate segregability on the part of the CIA, the court determines that "[w]hen thousands upon thousands of pages of records are involved, it is inevitable that some unnecessary redactions will be made" and given that they are "minor" and there is no evidence of bad faith, in camera review is not necessary.

2. Houghton v. U.S. Dep't of State, No. 11-869, 2012 WL 3132702 (D.D.C. Aug. 2, 2012) (Jackson, J.)

Re:  Request for records from the State Department's Cultural Property Advisory Committee (CPAC) referencing plaintiff and/or a certain committee member; at issue is defendant's search for records related to a particular email account

Holding:  Granting the portion of the State Department's motion for summary judgment as it relates to the adequacy of its search

• Adequacy of search:  The court concludes that the State Department's search for responsive records was adequate where it now clarified that a certain CPAC member did not possess an agency email account and that any of her emails "'would have been captured in the earlier searches'" for responsive records.  The court finds that this explanation "negates any 'substantial doubt' about the adequacy of the search that might have been raised by plaintiff's argument that State failed to address why it did not search emails sent or received by [the committee member]." 

3. Black v. DHS, No. 10-2040, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107910 (D. Nev. Aug. 2, 2012) (Mahan, J.)

Re:  Requests for a report of investigation and related records that ICE and the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) prepared in response to plaintiff's complaint accusing his supervisors at the Federal Air Marshal Services of misconduct

Holding:  Denying plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that he did not properly authenticate the evidence underlying his motion; and denying defendant's motion for summary judgment where it failed to adequately support its claims of exemption

• Exemption 7/threshold:  The court holds that ICE has not provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the OPR records at issue satisfy the law enforcement threshold of Exemption 7.  The court finds that "[t]he declaration does not discuss:  (1) the underlying OPR investigation to show that the investigation was conducted pursuant to OPR's law enforcement duties, or (2) how ICE determined that the underlying investigation was for law enforcement purposes."  Accordingly, the court determines that it "is left with no basis upon which to find that the OPR investigation was conducted pursuant to OPR's law enforcement duties rather than ORP's duties to investigate allegations of misconduct which 'would jeopardize or undermine the agency's ability to perform its mission.'" 
  
• Exemption 6:  The court denies without prejudice ICE's motion for summary judgment to the extent that it relies on Exemption 6 as a basis for withholding certain third party information contained in the responsive records.  The court finds that although the privacy interests at issue are "'substantial'" the public interest in documents regarding the "allegations of official misconduct and retaliatory actions by three supervisory managers in the Federal Air Marshal Service" "is strong."  Accordingly, the court determines that, here, defendant "has not demonstrated that disclosure of these documents 'would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.'"

4. Milton v. DOJ, No. 08-242, 2012 WL 3105984 (D.D.C. July 31, 2012) (Roberts, J.)

Re:  Requests for recordings of telephone conversations that plaintiff made from prison to third parties

Holding:  Denying plaintiff's motion for reconsideration brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e)

• Litigation considerations/motion for reconsideration:  The court denies plaintiff's motion for reconsideration brought under Rule 59(e), finding that he "cites no intervening change in controlling law, provides no new evidence, and demonstrates no clear error in the February 8th opinion's treatment of Yeager [v. DEA,]"a case that he raised in connection with an earlier briefing.  The court notes that its earlier "opinion concluded that the decision did not support [plaintiff's] argument that an agency has a duty to install new technology to facilitate disclosure under FOIA, for example by installing technology to facilitate segregation of the nonexempt portions of the [prison telephone conversations that he seeks]."   Moreover, the court finds that "to the extent that [plaintiff] suggests that the agency acted in bad faith in selecting a technology system for recording inmates' telephone calls, the February 8th opinion expressly concluded that [he] provided no evidence of bad faith to refute the agency's assertion that it lacked the technological capacity to segregate the requested material, . . . and [plaintiff's] motion for reconsideration provides no such evidence either."

5.  Soghoian v. DOJ, No. 11-1080, 2012 WL 3090309 (D.D.C. July 31, 2012) (Jackson, J.)

Re:  Request for records concerning certain federal law enforcement electronic surveillance practices; at issue are defendants' withholdings pursuant to Exemptions 5 and 7(E), and the adequacy of their searches for responsive records

Holding:  Granting defendants' motion for summary judgment on the basis that they properly withheld certain information pursuant to Exemptions 5 and 7(E), released all reasonably segregable non-exempt information, and plaintiff conceded the adequacy of DOJ's search

• Adequacy of search:  "In light of the representations in DOJ's declarations as well as the fact that plaintiff was properly notified [of his obligation to contradict any assertions contained in defendant's motion] but did not challenge the adequacy of the search, the Court is satisfied that DOJ has established that it conducted an adequate search for responsive documents." 

• Exemption 5 (attorney work-product privilege):  The court holds that defendants properly asserted the attorney work-product privilege to protect various records including "internal presentations and discussions among DOJ attorneys that analyze the legal precedents and statutes applicable to the various methods of obtaining evidence from cell phones themselves and from phone carriers."  As to plaintiff's contention that DOJ has not pointed to "the specific litigation for which the withheld documents were prepared," the court notes that "the D.C. Circuit has not construed the privilege so narrowly as to protect only work product related to specific cases currently in litigation."  The court determines that the application of the attorney work-product privilege is appropriate because "[h]ere, the legal strategies and issues addressed in the withheld documents are protected because they relate to foreseeable litigation arising out of the government's criminal investigations."  Moreover, the court finds that "[t]he availability of the privilege is even clearer where the documents relate to specific litigation," noting that two documents "are properly excluded under the work product doctrine because they include the attorney's mental impressions of sealed cases."  Segregability:  The court further finds, due to the nature of the records as protected work product, it "does not need to consider whether . . . [they] are properly severable."  

• Exemption 5 (deliberative process privilege):  The court holds that defendants properly invoked the deliberative process privilege to withhold draft material related to a policy manual, draft language on guidance for obtaining search warrants, and draft material giving guidance regarding obtaining location information from phone carriers.  For one, the court finds that these documents are "pre-decisional because they were drafts that had not yet been adopted as agency policy at the time they were written."  Further, the court concludes that records are deliberative because "they were 'part of the agency give-and-take of the deliberative process by which the decision itself is made.'"  Segregability: The court notes that "plaintiff's assertion that DOJ has withheld purely factual information does not compel the release of all 'purely factual' information within the document."  Based on its in camera review, the court "is satisfied that . . . disclosure [of the records] would improperly expose the decisionmaking process and that there are no segregable portions of the documents." 

• Exemption 7(E):  Based on its in camera review, the court concludes that DOJ's Criminal Division properly asserted Exemption 7(E) to withhold "legal and investigative techniques that should be considered by investigators and Assistant United States Attorneys in conducting their criminal investigations."  With respect to these documents, the court finds that "[k]nowing what information is collected, how it is collected, and more importantly, when it is not collected, is information that law enforcement might reasonably expect to lead would-be offenders to evade detection."  Additionally, the court determines that Criminal Division and EOUSA properly withheld records containing advice and guidance in connection with particular investigations.  The court finds that "[i]t is reasonable to conclude that where law enforcement seeks advice on electronic surveillance techniques, '[d]isclosure of even general guidance might reveal investigative techniques and considerations that could assist criminals in developing their own techniques for evading detection.'"

6.  Jean-Pierre v. BOP, No. 12-78, 2012 WL 3065377 (D.D.C. July 30, 2012) (Huvelle, J.)

Re:  Request posing various questions

Holding:  Granting BOP's motion to dismiss on grounds that plaintiff failed to state a claim where he did not comply with agency regulations, submit a reasonably described request, and failed to exhaust his administrative remedies

• Proper party defendant:  The court holds that BOP is a proper party defendant that may be sued in its own name.  "Although a small number of decisions hold that only the DOJ, and not its subcomponents, may be sued under FOIA," the court finds that "the weight of authority is that subcomponents of federal executive departments may, at least in some cases, be properly named as FOIA defendants."

• Procedural/compliance with agency regulations:  Noting that "[e]ven small failures to comply with FOIA regulations can mean the attempted request is improper," the court concludes that plaintiff's failure to comply with DOJ's and BOP's regulations at 28 C.F.R. §§ 16.41(d) and 513.61(c) concerning first parties and inmates, respectively, means that "he never properly initiated a FOIA request and his FOIA complaint is subject to dismissal." 

• Procedural/reasonably described request:  The court determines that "plaintiff's pure requests for information do not constitute [requests for] 'records' under FOIA."  With respect to one question posed by plaintiff, the court finds that "because it seeks a rationale or explanation [for a prison transfer], [it] is not within FOIA's scope."  As to two other questions, the court determines that "although they request more objective pieces of information – 'who gave the order' to transfer plaintiff, and 'on what day' did prison officials call a particular federal agent to come see him – are also not cognizable under FOIA, because they ask questions calling for specific pieces of information rather than records." 

• Exhaustion of administrative remedies:  In addition to other grounds for dismissal, the court finds that plaintiff's complaint must also be dismissed for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies where "[h]e neither appealed the BOP's December 15 determination that his request was not cognizable under the FOIA, nor resubmitted his request, although he was advised multiple times of his right to appeal an adverse decision and provided information about how to do so."  Moreover, the court rejects plaintiff's argument that "administrative remedies were 'unavailable' because he had already made an appeal to the 'highest FOIA division.'"  Rather, the court finds that plaintiff's first administrative appeal was premature and notes that he was advised of "his right to appeal once an adverse determination had actually been made."    

7.  Judicial Watch, Inc. v. DHS, No. 11-606, 2012 WL 3065390 (D.D.C. July 30, 2012) (Kessler, J.)

Re:  Request for records related to certain types of deportation proceedings; at issue is DHS's withholdings in twenty documents under deliberative process privilege and its segregation of non-exempt material

Holding:  Granting DHS's motion for summary judgment on the basis that its withholdings pursuant to the deliberative process privilege were proper, and that it released all reasonably segregable material

• Exemption 5 (deliberative process privilege):  The court concludes that DHS properly withheld certain material pursuant to the deliberative process privilege where its submissions "specifically explain the reasons that [the twenty] document[s] at issue [are] predecisional and deliberative and why disclosure would harm the decision-making process."  Moreover, the court notes that "[t]he two Vaughn Indices explain with reasonable detail the agency decision or policy to which the documents contributed and the reason the documents are properly considered deliberative."  The court notes that "[g]iven the presumption of good faith to be accorded to these submissions, nothing more is required of DHS."  The court rejects plaintiff's contention that six of the records "concern[ing] public relations" should be disclosed.  To the contrary, the court finds that "[e]ven if the documents are created after the underlying policy they discuss is finalized, 'these documents are generated as part of a continuous process of agency decision making, viz., how to respond to on-going inquiries."  Additionally, the court determines that "the fear of public scrutiny may affect an agency's consideration of whether to provide a statement to a television news program just as it may affect consideration of the underlying substantive policy."  The court concludes that these records "are predecisional to the agency's determination of how to present its policy in the press." With respect to plaintiff's argument that two other documents "'appear to be merely lists of questions or primarily factual material,'" the court finds that plaintiff "simply ignores applicable case law in this District that draft questions prepared for a presentation are protected by the deliberative process privilege."  Moreover, the court determines that plaintiff "is wrong when it states that the records 'appear to be . . . primarily factual material'" because "[t]he Vaughn Index clearly states that one record contains draft questions for use in a presentation and the other contains draft language and edits for a memorandum."

• Segregability:  The court holds that DHS released all reasonably segregable information where its declarations "indicate that all withheld documents were reviewed line-by-line to identify reasonably segregable material" and its "Vaughn Indices demonstrate DHS and ICE's efforts to separate the segregable information identified in each withheld or redacted record."  The court concludes that these submissions "'are sufficient to fulfill the agency's obligation to show with 'reasonable specificity' why a document cannot be further segregated.'"

8.  Pub. Emp's for Envtl. Resp. v. Off. of Sci. & Tech. Pol'y, No. 11-1518, 2012 WL 3126778 (D.D.C. July 30, 2012) (Leon, J.)

Re:  Request for records concerning certain communications relating to the cultivation of genetically-modified crops on national wildlife refuges, and certain records related to an inter-agency working group on agricultural biotechnology

Holding:  Granting defendant's motion for summary judgment on the basis that its withholdings under Exemptions 4 and 5 were appropriate, and that it released all reasonably segregable material

• Adequacy of Vaughn Index:  The court holds that, contrary to plaintiff's arguments, defendant's Vaughn Index is adequate where it "provided thorough information [for each withheld document], including details about each document's sender, recipients, date and time, and subject."  Additionally, the court finds that "OSTP has also specifically described how that information is exempted from FOIA, and provided the relevant FOIA exemption for each piece of withheld information."  

• Exemption 4:  The court concludes that OSTP properly invoked Exemption 4 to protect information provided to the agency inadvertently by a third-party trade association.  First, the court finds that "this information is commercial for purpose of Exemption 4" because "[t]here is no doubt that both [the trade association] and its members have a commercial interest in [the association's] advocacy strategy, which is at the core of [its] competitive value to itself and its members."  Second, the court determines that "OSTP also meets its obligation to show that this information was confidential."  Because the information was submitted inadvertently, the court observes that "OSTP must show only that the information 'is of a kind that would customarily not be released to the public' to sufficiently prove confidentiality," which it has demonstrated.  The court further notes that "the standard for assessing confidentiality is 'how the particular party customarily treats the information' and not how plaintiff or other parties might view the information."  Here, the court find that the submitter's "representation that the information concerns a 'recommendation for [the submitter's] internal strategy' is sufficient to conclude that the information is confidential." 

• Exemption 5:  The court holds that OSTP properly asserted the deliberative process privilege to protect "'draft interagency comments, opinions and impressions of Executive Branch officials on draft documents, perceived priorities and issues for discussion, proposed policies and processes for consideration, and tentative concerns.'"  The court finds that OSTP's declaration made it clear that "all of this information is predecisional because it was either 'provided to [Agricultural Biotech] Working Group[, an interagency group which is convened by OSTP,] for their consideration and input on the approach it proposed' or was 'subject to further editing . . . [and] in draft form, or describe[d] tentative comments on draft submissions.'"  Although plaintiff argues that OSTP has failed to identify the "specific decisions to which the withheld materials are related," the court finds that "the absence of such specific information is not fatal to OSTP's privilege claims, especially given the Working Group's advisory nature and the likelihood that it would deliberate and examine many proposals without arriving at specific decisions for each proposal."  As to plaintiff's assertion that "a particular document's name could not be deliberative," the court determines that "[t]he agency's Vaughn index explains that these agenda topics actually identify proposals and processes" that are considered by the Working Group.  The court concludes that "such information is properly considered deliberative because it would reveal the specifics of how the Working Group makes decisions on a particular issue."  With respect to plaintiff's challenge to "the Working Group's ability to employ the deliberative process privilege at all" in light of the fact that it lacks authority over federal agencies, the court finds that "non-decision-makers can take part in the decision making process either by providing recommendations or by debating at a lower level about what course of action to recommend."  As such, the court concludes that "[t]here is no doubt that in the Working Group's coordinating role 'to share information related to the science, technology, and regulation of agricultural biotechnologies with staff of relevant Federal agencies,' . . . it may certainly participate in the deliberative process."  Lastly, the court finds that OSTP has shown that disclosure of the information "could 'have a chilling effect on future interagency discussions over important and sensitive science and technology policy issues.'" 

• Segregability:  The court finds that "contrary to [plaintiff's] contentions, it is evident that OSTP released all reasonably segregable non-exempt material" where its declaration "adequately states, 'OSTP conducted a careful, line-by-line review of each document withheld in full and in part to determine that there was no reasonably segregable factual or non-deliberative information responsive to plaintiff's request'" and its "Vaughn Index describes in detail all of the redacted portions of the documents."