Government's Amended Proposed Findings of Fact

240. Occidental Chemical (United States to Europe) — Stolt introduced evidence only that a low-level Odfjell employee who was never linked to the conspiracy suggested that Odfjell seek an invitation to quote for a post-March 2002 contract. (DX-4063, at 92619-20; Nystad, 6/11/07 p. 230 line 3 to p. 231 line 23). There is no evidence that Odfjell even quoted for this contract.

241. Foskor (South Africa to India) — Foskor business in the South Africa to India trade lane was not allocated to Stolt. (See GX-42; see also Vogth-Eriksen, 6/4/07 p. 31 lines 11-21).

242. Maroc Phosphore — Maroc Phosphore was allocated to both Odfjell and Stolt (see GX-41, at 5818, GX-42, at 76824) and there is no evidence that Odfjell sought to take any of the business allocated to Stolt, or that Stolt dropped its price in response to any competition from Odfjell. (See Vogth-Eriksen, 6/4/07 p. 32 lines 8-18).

243. Sasol (transatlantic) — As set forth above, Odfjell bid in accordance with the status quo agreement by submitting a bid not designed to win when submitting no bid would have raised suspicions of collusion.

244. Equatorial (Malaysia/Indonesia/Singapore to Africa and Brazil) — As set forth above, both Jansen and Wingfield complained to Nilsen about Equatorial after March 2002. Stolt's contract with Equatorial required rate renegotiation based on the general level of pricing to all companies in the market. Because Odfjell's agent in South Africa was quoting low rates in the market generally, Equatorial demanded that Stolt lower its rates. (Jansen, 6/13/07 p.125 line 24 to p. 129 line 4; see DX-2918, at 252633 - "MFN [most favored nation] Clause"). Thus, this did not reflect an attempt by Odfjell to take a Stolt allocated customer.

245. SK Corp. (Far East to U.S. Gulf) — As set forth above, Odfjell's quote to SK was rigged.

246. Stolt witnesses admitted that, even prior to Marach 2002, Odfjell and Jo Tankers occasionally cheated on the conspiratorial agreement. (E.g., Long, 6/5/07 p. 91 line 8 to p. 92 line 13 (Atlantic Ocean Service, including South America); Vogth-Eriksen, 6/4/07 p. 34 line 13 to p. 35 line 8; p. 36 lines 8-12 (Indian Ocean Service)).

247. As noted above, O'Brien's June 18, 2002 constructive termination suit against Stolt and Cooperman did not allege any antitrust violation. (See GX-10A). However, on November 1, 2002, O'Brien filed an amended complaint, in which he publicly alleged, for the first time, that Stolt and Cooperman had been involved in criminal violations of U.S. antitrust laws. (See GX-10B).

248. Shortly thereafter, Stolt learned that one of its customers had been approached by a class action attorney, who solicited the customer to join an antitrust action against Stolt, and showed the customer portions of Wingfield's business journal detailing illegal contacts with competitors. (Nannes, GX-5 p. 112 line 8 to p. 113 line 1).

249. On approximately November 21, 2002, Stolt was contacted by the Wall Street Journal concerning an article it was preparing about O'Brien's allegations of Stolt's criminal conduct. These allegations also began appearing on the message board for SNSA's publicly-traded stock. (See GX-86). At the same time, Stolt's outside antitrust counsel, Gary Sesser, arranged a meeting with John Nannes, an experienced antitrust counsel and former Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division for November 22, 2002. (Nannes, GX-5 p. 107 lines 13-22).

250. On November 22, 2002, Nannes met with Cooperman, Sesser and Alan Winsor, Stolt's general counsel. (Nannes, GX-5 p. 124 lines 13-20). This was the same day the Wall Street Journal published its article about O'Brien's lawsuit. (See GX-14).

251. In the almost day-long meeting, Cooperman never admitted any specific knowledge of or role in criminal antitrust violations. Instead, Cooperman spent a large part of the meeting talking about the parcel tanker industry, explaining that the industry was an oligopoly, explaining that customers rarely changed shipping companies for many legitimate reasons, and enumerating various legitimate reasons for competitor contacts in the parcel tanker industry. (Nannes, GX-5 p. 109 line 9 to p. 112 line 7).

252. During this meeting, they also discussed that day's Wall Street Journal article. (Nannes, GX-6 p. 103 lines 10-16). Cooperman also provided Nannes with a "chronology of events" that occurred after O'Brien found a copy of the Jansen Memo. Cooperman then described a February 2002 memorandum O'Brien wrote to Cooperman. Cooperman said that O'Brien raised "some antitrust concerns" and, as a result of their discussions, the company instituted a number of steps to strengthen its antitrust program. Cooperman told Nannes that, despite the company's efforts, O'Brien was dissatisfied with the company's response and resigned. (Nannes, GX-5 p. 113 lines 3-18).

253. Cooperman's failure to disclose his participation in and knowledge of Stolt's illegal conduct, coupled with his misleading description of competition in the industry, prevented Nannes from understanding the criminal nature of the Jansen Memo. (GX-5, at 163 lines 14-17). Nannes testified that it was not until he later obtained the customer allocation lists, that he believed Stolt had been engaged in a criminal conspiracy. (GX-5, at 156 line 12 to p. 157 line 1).

254. While it appeared to Nannes that Cooperman and Winsor were knowledgeable about the Division's Conditional Leniency Program, he nonetheless reviewed its requirements with them. (Nannes, GX-5 p. 131 lines 3-18). Thereafter, Cooperman directed Nannes to contact the Division and discuss a potential application by Stolt for conditional leniency. (Nannes, GX-5 p. 131 lines 19-23).

255. On November 22, 2002, after the Wall Street Journal published an article reporting about O'Brien's amended complaint, Fisher wrote to the CEO of SNSA, Niels G. Stolt-Nielsen, complaining that Cooperman had not been honest in his August presentation to the board. (GX-77, at 1640-44). Cooperman drafted Niels G. Stolt-Nielsen's response in which Cooperman falsely claimed he had not misled the Board. (See GX-77, at 1638-39). Niels G. Stolt-Nielsen sent the response Cooperman drafted to Fisher. (See GX-78)

256. On November 25, 2002, three days after Nannes first contacted the Division, Cooperman wrote to the SNSA Board of Directors concerning the matter. (GX-16). Cooperman stated "[a]bout ten days ago information came to my attention for the first time regarding possible antitrust violations by SNTG during 2000 and 2001." (GX-16, at 445522). Cooperman further advised the Board that an independent investigation was to be conducted to determine if the "allegations of collusion with competitors" were correct. (GX-16, at 445523).

257. These statements by Cooperman to SNSA's Board of Directors were false and misleading because Cooperman not only knew of but initiated Stolt's illegal allocation conspiracy in 1998.

258. Dissatisfied with Stolt's handling of the investigation of its illegal conduct, Fisher resigned in December 2002. (Fisher, 6/11/07 p. 40 line 18 to p. 41 line 24; GX-82).

259. When Jansen was first interviewed, on February 5, 2003, pursuant to his cooperation/non-prosecution agreement (DX-6), he told the Government that Stolt ended its participation in the conspiracy when Stolt implemented its revised antitrust policy in March 2002. At the time he made that statement, Jansen was accompanied by Stolt counsel, John Nannes. (Jansen, 6/13/07 p. 136 line 8 to p. 137 line 16; p. 147 lines 14-16).

260. Thereafter, Jansen told Wingfield that he had lied to the Government about the true duration of the conspiracy and Jansen created a document to determine whether he could justify the lies he told the Government. (Jansen, 6/13/07 p. 145 line 12 to p. 146 line 5; p. 256 line 3 to p. 257 line 25; see DX-4009).

261. When Jansen learned that the Government questioned the truth of his interview statements, he retained individual counsel and recanted his lies. Jansen testified before the grand jury that his initial interview statement was false (see Jansen, 6/13/07 p. 141 lines 12-16), and that he and Wingfield had continued to participate in the conspiracy after March 2002. (Jansen, 6/13/07 p. 144 lines 13-24). Jansen repeated his testimony at this hearing. (See Jansen, 6/13/07 p. 102 line 20 to p. 103 line 8; p. 212 lines 13-16).

262. Defendants have offered no plausible reason why Jansen would falsely implicate himself in criminal conduct more extensive than that which he actually committed. In fact, Jansen had direct knowledge of the continuation of the conspiracy:

1. Following the March 2002 NPRA meeting, Wingfield told Jansen he had told Odfjell that Stolt's revised antitrust policy did not mean that Stolt was going to go to war with Odfjell. Jansen understood Wingfield's statement as an instruction not to compete for Odfjell's customers. (Jansen, 6/13/07 p. 211 lines 17-23; p. 110 lines 17-25).
2. Thereafter, Wingfield never told Jansen, who was the business manager for Stolt's Pacific Ocean Service, that he should compete for Odfjell customers. (See Jansen, 6/13/07 p. 105 line 13 to p. 106 line 5; p. 110 lines 13-24).
3. Jansen continued to have conspiratorial phone discussions about customers with Odfjell, although he could only specifically recall Equatorial. (Jansen, 6/13/07 p. 250 line 19 - p. 252 line 20; p. 216 lines 6-13).
4. Wingfield told Jansen of discussions that he had with Nilsen concerning Equatorial (Jansen, 6/13/07 p. 250 line 19 - p. 252 line 20).
5. At the June London meeting, Jansen heard Wingfield tell Odfjell about the problems O'Brien had created at Stolt and say that future conspiratorial contacts would be with Wingfield or Jansen, if Wingfield was not available. (Jansen, 6/13/07 p. 114 line 23 to p. 115 line 16).
6. In October 2002, Jansen received a call from Nilsen complaining about Stolt's Sasol bid and then transferred the call to Wingfield. (Jansen, 6/13/07 p. 134 line 2 to p. 135 line 12).
7. Later that day, Wingfield told Jansen that he had spoken to Nilsen who complained that a bid by Stolt would be a "deal breaker." Jansen understood that the "deal" Nilsen complained Stolt was breaking was the "status quo agreement" between Stolt and Odfjell. (See Jansen, 6/13/07 p. 120 line 13 to p. 121 line 7).
8. One week later at the October Heathrow meeting, Wingfield stood by while Jansen complained to Odfjell about Equatorial and Nilsen agreed to look into it. (Jansen, 6/13/07 p. 125 line 25 to p. 127 line 3).

263. Jansen's inability to recall more specifically his own conspiratorial conduct does not undermine his testimony that the conspiracy continued until November. Although Stolt relieved Jansen of all work duties in August 2003, it continued to pay him his full salary at least through the date of his hearing testimony, almost four years later. Between August 2003 and June 2007, Stolt paid Jansen almost $1 million dollars. Jansen admitted that he expected to remain on Stolt's payroll, despite providing no services, until he is eligible for retirement. (See Jansen, 6/13/07 p. 141 line 12 to page 143 line 3). Stolt's past and expected future payments to Jansen provided Jansen with an incentive to testify favorably for Stolt despite his cooperation agreement with the Government.

264. Jansen's failure to recall specific matters on direct examination and his willingness to readily agree when questioned by Stolt counsel appear to reflect such bias. During his direct testimony for the Government, Jansen repeatedly did not recall certain matters until confronted by the Government with his prior grand jury testimony. (E.g., Jansen, 6/13/07 p. 114 line 3 to p. 115 line 7. In contrast, Jansen had no failure of memory when responding to questions posed by Stolt counsel, simply responding "yes" to more than 200 questions. (Jansen, 6/13/07 passim).

268. Nystad's and Sjaastad's testimony that Wingfield told them at the March 2002 NPRA meeting that Stolt would continue to participate in the allocation agreement is credible. It is consistent with and corroborated by one another's testimony (compare Nystad, 6/11/07 p. 112 line 16 to p. 113 line 5; p. 116 line 15 to p. 122 line 7 with Sjaastad, 6/20/07 p. 96 line 12 to p. 101 line 16), and with testimony of other Odfjell witnesses. (Compare Nystad, 6/11/07 p. 121 line 22 to p. 122 line 7 with Nilsen, 6/15/07 p. 122 line 17 to p. 123 line 15; compare Sjaastad, 6/20/07 p. 96 line 12 to p. 101 line 16 with Knutsen, 6/13/07 p. 17 line 10 to p. 18 line 9).

269. Nystad's and Sjaastad's testimony that Wingfield told them at the March 2002 NPRA meeting that Stolt would continue participating in the allocation agreement is consistent with and corroborated by:

1. Wingfield's testimony that he told Sjaastad and Nystad that just because Stolt had issued a revised antitrust policy "that didn't necessarily mean we were going to contact all of their customers" and his admission on cross-examination that "it stood to reason that if it worked one way, it was going to work the other way" and that Stolt expected Odfjell would not go after Stolt's customers. (Wingfield, 6/6/07 p. 33 lines 7-19). Even Wingfield's characterization of what he said to Odfjell reflects an assurance that Stolt and Odfjell would not compete for their already allocated customers.
2. Jansen's testimony regarding Wingfield's report to him after that meeting during which Wingfield said he had told Odfjell that Stolt's revised antitrust policy did not mean that Stolt was going to go to war with Odfjell. Jansen understood Wingfield's statement as an instruction not to compete for Odfjell's customers. (Jansen, 6/13/07 p. 110 lines 13-25).
3. Jansen's testimony that the conspiracy continued and that Wingfield never told Jansen that he should compete for Odfjell customers. (Jansen, 6/13/07 p. 102 line 20 to p. 103 line 8; p. 105 line 13 to p. 106 line 5; see p. 110 lines 13-24).
4. Finlay's testimony concerning Wingfield's NPRA meeting with Jo Tankers. (Finlay, 6/14/07 p. 80 line 21 to p. 85 line 4). There is no evidence that Nystad or Sjaastad communicated with Finlay concerning Wingfield's meetings with them at the NPRA meeting.
5. the testimony of Nilsen and Haugsdal concerning what Wingfield told them at the June 2002 London meeting. (Compare Nystad, 6/11/07 p. 112 line 16 to p. 113 line 5; p. 116 line 15 to p. 121 line 20 with Haugsdal, 6/12/07 p. 88 line 21 to p. 91 line 14).
6. their own testimony on cross-examination. (Compare Nystad, 6/11/07 p. 112 line 16 to p. 113 line 5; p. 116 line 13 to p. 122 line 7 with Nystad, p. 175 line 24 to p. 179 line 2; compare Sjaastad, 6/20/07 p. 96 line 12 to p. 101 line 25 with Sjaastad, 6/20/07 p. 111 line 11 to p. 113 line 2; p. 115 line 23 to p. 116 line 11).

270. Haugsdal's and Nilsen's testimony that Wingfield told them at the June 2002 London meeting that the agreement was continuing (Haugsdal, 6/12/07 p. 89 line 12 to p. 91 line 14; Nilsen, 6/5/07 p. 125 lines 2-19) is credible. It is corroborated by Jansen's testimony that Wingfield told Odfjell that, despite the problems O'Brien had created at Stolt, future conspiratorial contacts would be with Wingfield or Jansen. (Jansen, 6/13/07 p. 114 line 23 to p. 115 line 16).

271. Haugsdal's and Nilsen's testimony that Stolt allowed Odfjell to win the October 2002 Sasol bid by providing Odfjell with Stolt's final bid numbers (Haugsdal, 6/12/07 p.97 line 10 to p. 102 line 2; Nilsen, 6/15/07 p. 143 line 19 to p. 148 line 17) is credible. It is consistent with and corroborated by the testimony of several other witnesses and by documentary evidence, including:

1. the testimony of Stolt employee Humphreys that Odfjell had told him that Nilsen had called concerning the Sasol bid on the day bids were due (see FOF 147);
2. the testimony of Humphreys that he had told Cooperman about Wingfield's call with Nilsen and then observed Cooperman meeting with Wingfield behind closed doors (see FOF 148);
3. the testimony of Humphreys that shortly after Cooperman met with Wingfield, Humphreys observed Wingfield talking with Nilsen again concerning Sasol rates (see FOF 152, 153):
4. the testimony of Nils Vogth-Eriksen that Odfjell's Knut Holsen had called him in October 2002 asking to speak with Humphreys concerning the Sasol bid (see FOF 136);
5. Wingfield's own admission that he had numerous conversations with Odfjell concerning the Sasol bid on October 11, 2002 (see FOF 139-143);
6. Wingfield's own admission on cross-examination that Odfjell believed a competitive bid by Stolt on the Sasol contract in October 2002 was a breach of the agreement and Wingfield's statement to Jansen that Odfjell would consider it a "deal breaker" if Stolt won the Sasol contract (see FOF 141, 142);
7. Wingfield's October 1, 2002 e-mail to Niels G. Stolt-Nielsen in which he falsely characterized the Sasol contract as "regional" (GX-72; see FOF 134, 135);
8. Sasol's report to Stolt that Stolt's prices "were similar or 'just slightly higher'" than Odfjell's. (GX-204, Humphreys, 6/4/07 p. 137 line 23 to p. 138 line 11); and
9. one week after the Sasol bid, Wingfield and Jansen met with Nilsen and Haugsdal at Heathrow Airport.

272. Nilsen and Haugsdal testified that at the October 18, 2002 Heathrow meeting, Nilsen had complained about Stolt's activities in early 2002 in the Gulf of Mexico regarding two customers, Dow Mexico and GE, and that Wingfield had agreed to look into the complaints, and that Wingfield did so following the meeting. (Nilsen, 6/15/07 p. 153 line 7 to p. 155 line 4; Haugsdal, 6/12/07 p. 102 line 3 to p. 104 line 10; p. 111 line 1 to p. 112 line 14). Their testimony is credible. It is corroborated by both Odfjell and Stolt contemporaneous documents and the testimony of Stolt employee Long. GX-53 is an internal Odfjell e-mail dated October 15, 2002, just prior to the London meeting, that describes Odfjell's complaint. GX-54 is an internal Stolt e-mail chain dated November 1, 2002, i.e., shortly after the October meeting, in which Long forwarded to Jansen an explanation from Knut Staubo regarding Stolt's competition for the Dow Mexico and GE contracts. Long testified that Jansen had asked him to provide this information. (Long, 6/5/07 p. 97 line 10 to p. 98 line 18; see FOF 168). Jansen was present with Wingfield at the October 2002 Heathrow meeting when Nilsen raised his complaint, but had no responsibilities for the route covered by those contracts. Jansen could not explain why Staubo and Long provided him the information just two weeks after the October 2002 meeting. (Jansen, 6/13/07 p. 129 line 15 to p. 133 line 24; see GX-54).

273. The Odfjell witnesses' testimony that the conspiratorial agreement between Stolt and Odfjell continued and that Odfjell continued to abide by the agreement after March 2002 is credible. It is corroborated by:

1. the testimony of Stolt employee Jansen that the conspiracy continued (Jansen, 6/13/07 p. 117 line 13 to p. 121 line 7; p. 133 line 25 to p. 134 line 25);
2. the testimony of Stolt employee Humphreys that he heard Wingfield discussing Sasol bid figures in October 2002, as well as by Humphreys' other testimony concerning the events surrounding the Sasol contract and the calls by Odfjell to Stolt (see FOF 147-153);
3. Wingfield's own admission on cross-examination that Odfjell believed a competitive bid by Stolt on the Sasol contract in October 2002 was a breach of the agreement and Wingfield's statement to Jansen that Odfjell would consider it a "deal breaker" if Stolt won the Sasol contract (see FOF 141, 142);
4. contemporaneous internal Odfjell e-mails concerning Odfjell's decisions not to compete for Stolt customers (GX-83, GX-84; GX-85);
5. the testimony of Stolt witnesses that Odfjell continued to call Stolt after March 2002 concerning the agreement (E.g., Vogth-Eriksen, 6/4/07 p. 14 line 23 to p. 15 line 22); and
6. the November 1, 2002 internal Stolt e-mail from Long to Jansen concerning the contracts about which Odfjell had complained at the October Heathrow meeting (GX-54; see FOF 168).

274. During the investigation, several Odfjell witnesses signed declarations in lieu of testifying before the grand jury. The Odfjell witnesses did not personally draft the declarations they signed. (E.g., Nystad, 6/12/07 p. 59 line 25 to p. 61 line 21; Nilsen, 6/19/07 p. 162 lines 5-25). In some instances, there are differences between the signed declarations and initial drafts that had been prepared by the Government. There is no evidence that any witness saw the draft prepared by the Government, and there is no evidence as to who made changes between any Government draft and any final declaration. It is possible that changes were made by Odfjell counsel before Odfjell witnesses reviewed any draft. Because there is no evidence that Odfjell witnesses made or were aware of any specific change from the original Government version to the signed declaration, no significance should be given to such changes.

275. To the extent the Odfjell witness declarations did not include references to all of the matters to which the witnesses testified, such omissions will not be given significant weight. The declarations were prepared initially by the Government who determined what to include in them. The witnesses were asked to review the declarations only for accuracy. The very brief declarations obviously did not contain all information they knew concerning the conspiratorial activities of Stolt and Odfjell. Furthermore, any differences between the versions of the declarations are insignificant. For example, Haugsdal and Nilsen were questioned by defense counsel about why "understanding" replaced "status quo" in their declarations. (Haugsdal, 6/12/07 p. 197 lines 4-19, Nilsen, 6/19/07 p. 84 lines 8-20). Such a difference is insignificant; "status quo" was the phrase used at Stolt, not Odfjell, to refer to the agreement. (See, e.g., Humphreys, 6/4/07 p. 144 lines 17-21; Jansen, 6/13/07 p. 90 lines 9-13).

276. To the extent the testimony of the Odfjell witnesses may differ from Government notes of their interviews, such difference will not be given significant weight because:

1. the Government's notes were not transcriptions of the witnesses' interviews; rather, they reflect attorneys' selected mental impressions;
2. Odfjell witnesses never saw or reviewed attorney notes of their interviews and never confirmed their accuracy or completeness. (See, e.g., Haugsdal, 6/12/07 p. 260 lines 6-15; Knutsen, 6/13/02 p. 74 lines 14 to p. 76 line 16; p. 78 lines 7-14); and
3. the Odfjell witnesses' testimony was not inconsistent with the Government's notes of their interviews. For example:
   1. Stolt attacked Nystad's credibility because he testified that he called Nilsen the day after he met with Wingfield at the NPRA meeting in March 2002, despite Government interview notes reflecting that he called Nilsen the same day or possibly after Easter. (See Stolt FOF 626). The precise date when Nystad called Nilsen to report what Wingfield told them is not significant. Nystad's hearing testimony that he called Nilsen is consistent with what is reflected in Government interview notes, i.e., that he called Nilsen soon after meeting with Wingfield.
   2. Stolt insinuates that Edvardsdal's story changed because his testimony was that the spot market had fallen to $35, rather than to the 40's as suggested by the Government interview notes. (See Stolt Finding of Fact 702). Whether the spot market had fallen to $35 or to the $40's is not significant. The importance of Edvardsdal's testimony is that by June 2002, the spot market was dramatically lower than Stolt's contract rate with SK, which was in the $60's. (See DX-2722, at 143282, where YM Park of SK demanded a discount from Stolt because "COA rate[] is around $60/[ton] when the current market rates is in 40's. [I]t means that there is around $20/[ton] difference").

277. Defendants' failure to cite any material inconsistencies between the testimony of the Odfjell witnesses and the Government's notes of their interviews demonstrates that the description of the conspiracy by these witnesses always has been consistent.

278. The testimony of Odfjell witnesses is credible despite any claims by Stolt that their testimony is inconsistent with information submitted to the Korean Fair Trade Commission ("KFTC"). Most importantly, there is no reference in any of the KFTC documents (DX-508; DX-524; DX-526; DX-4095) to Wingfield, or any Stolt employee, having told Odfjell that the agreement was over or that the communication between the companies should stop. In fact, quite the contrary is true. (See DX-508, at (regarding the NPRA meeting: "Wingfield never mentioned that the communication with the companies should stop"; see also, Nystad, 6/12/07 p. 34 line 21 to p. 35 line 11)).

279. To the extent Odfjell witnesses' testimony differs from information contained in DX-4095 or DX-508, documents submitted to the KFTC by Odfjell counsel, such differences will not be given significant weight because:

1. they are not statements of the witnesses but were prepared by Odfjell's counsel (see DX-4095, at 2 (referencing submission by the Yulchon Law Offices Woo Yun Kang Jeong & Han of Seuol Korea); DX-508 (containing no statements of any particular witness)); and
2. the witnesses had never read or reviewed the documents for accuracy before they were submitted to the KFTC, and, in fact, had never seen the documents prior to being shown them on cross-examination. (Haugsdal, 6/12/07 p. 175 line 18 to p. 176 line 5; p. 177 line 5 to p. 178 line 23; Nystad, 6/11/07 p. 195 lines 11-17; p. 198 lines 9-13; p. 201 lines 2-7).

280. Erik Nilsen's hearing testimony is credible despite any claims by Stolt that it is inconsistent with a summary of his oral testimony in the KFTC proceedings (DX-524). However, any claimed difference has no bearing on Nilsen's credibility. For example, Nilsen's statement to the KFTC that the 2002 meetings were "minor" as compared with the earlier meetings is not inconsistent with his hearing testimony. Unlike 1998 and 2001, customer lists were not negotiated and exchanged in 2002. Moreover, the summary was prepared in connection with an investigation of whether Korean antitrust laws had been violated and did not address issues relevant to U.S. antitrust law. Thus, facts that are critical at this hearing may not have been relevant to the proceedings in Korea.

281. Edvardsdal's testimony is credible. Stolt wrongly claims that Edvardsdal's testimony about SK is inconsistent with his declaration submitted to the Korean authorities (DX-526). (See Stolt FOF 703 and 704). First, Edvardsdal testified that his declaration did not refer to collusion on the June 2002 SK Corporation bid because he was not asked about it for his Korean declaration. (Edvardsdal, 6/15/07 p. 37 lines 19-20). As U.S. and Korean antitrust laws differ, facts that are critical in this hearing may not have been relevant in the Korean proceedings. Moreover, Edvardsal's testimony at this hearing that Nilsen obtained bid numbers from Wingfield is consistent with his KFTC statement that the numbers came from someone at Stolt since Wingfield was a Stolt employee.

290. Van Westenbrugge's testimony that there was no quid quo pro that Jo Tankers would refrain from bidding on SK in exchange for Stolt not bidding competitively for the Shell-Pecten contract is an attempt to minimize his own criminal conduct and is not credible. It is inconsistent with:

1. his admission that the SK business would have fit in with Jo Tankers' business plans (van Westenbrugge, 6/14/07 p. 198, line 20 to p. 199, line 8), and his testimony that he told Wingfield that Jo Tankers had submitted a price indication to SK in mid-2002 (van Westenbrugge, 6/14/07 p. 199, line 9 to 200, line 1);
2. Finlay's testimony that Jo Tankers had been very interested in winning the SK business until van Westenbrugge directed Jo Tankers not to bid (Finlay, 6/14/07 p. 97, line 23 to p. 98, line 24);
3. two internal Jo Tankers' e-mails (GX-62 (expressing interest in the SK business); GX-63 (noting van Westenbrugge's direction not to offer for the SK business)); and
4. his testimony after he learned that Wingfield had deceived him about Stolt being invited to bid by Shell-Pecten, that he felt Wingfield had taken him "for a ride" (van Westenbrugge, 6/14/07 p. 227 line 23 to p. 228 line 3; p. 233 lines 8-18), admitting, in essence, that Wingfield had duped him into not bidding for SK in return for Stolt not competing for Shell-Pecten.

291. That the Government linked the Shell-Pecten and SK Corp. contracts is reasonable because (a) Finlay testified van Westenbrugge told him of the quid pro quo arrangement (Finlay, 6/14/07 p. 99 line 23 to p. 100 line 6); and (b) on May 26, 2004, van Westenbrugge voluntarily signed a sworn declaration admitting they were linked in light of the above evidence demonstrating the link between Shell-Pecten and SK.

292. Van Westenbrugge testified that when Wingfield told him at the March 2002 NPRA meeting about Stolt's problem with O'Brien, and said that future communications regarding "severe matters" would have to be limited to Wingfield and van Westenbrugge, he understood that Wingfield was referring to limiting future legitimate discussions regarding the co-service agreement between Jo Tankers and Stolt. (van Westenbrugge, 6/14/07 p. 183 line 7 to p. 184 line 11). His testimony that "severe matters" meant legitimate discussions is not credible because it is inconsistent with:

1. his admission at this hearing that he said in the Celanese private antitrust litigation that he and Wingfield "had set up a platform to do things, to discuss things which were not allowed according to the antitrust handbook." (van Westenbrugge, 6/14/07 p. 230 line 18 to p. 232 line 13) (emphasis added); and
2. with his hearing testimony that he had conspiratorial discussions with Wingfield after the NPRA to rig the Shell-Pecten bid (van Westenbrugge, 6/14/07 p. 187 line 14 to p. 196 line 23); and
3. evidence that co-service communications between Jo Tankers and Stolt continued to take place after the NPRA just as they had previously. (See Finlay, 6/14/07 p. 85 lines 5-15; Cleary, 6/1/07 p. 119 line 19 to 120 line 5).

293. Van Westenbrugge testified on cross-examination that when he learned, shortly after joining Jo Tankers in January 2001, that Jo Tankers and its competitors had an understanding not to go after each other's base contracts, he believed that understanding was not the result of an illegal agreement but was an independent decision by Jo Tankers not to compete for its competitors' contracts. (van Westenbrugge, 6/14/07 p. 211 line 9 to 212 line 1). This testimony was an attempt to minimize his own criminal culpability and shows his bias in favor of the defendants. It is inconsistent with van Westenbrugge's willingness to submit voluntarily to U.S. jurisdiction, and, in fact, he pleaded guilty to the Information in United States v. van Westenbrugge (GX-19B) charging him with joining the conspiracy in January 2001.

294. There is no evidence to support van Westenbrugge's testimony that Finlay would falsely incriminate Van Westenbrugge to protect himself. (See van Westenbrugge, 6/14/07 p. 223 line 15 to 224 line 5). To the contrary, Finlay's testimony corroborates van Westenbrugge's testimony that he rigged the Shell-Pecten and SK contracts with Wingfield, and Finlay provided no other testimony that incriminated van Westenbrugge in other bid-rigging incidents.

295. Van Westenbrugge's claim that he knowingly signed a false declaration as a matter of personal convenience (van Westenbrugge, 6/14/07 p. 203 line 10 to 205 line 3) shows his bias against the Government in this matter.

296. Van Westenbrugge's testimony that he did not tell Finlay about the conversation he had with Wingfield after Finlay left the table (van Westenbrugge, 6/14/07 p. 210 lines 10-13) is not credible. If Wingfield had told van Westenbrugge that the allocation agreement was over, van Westenbrugge would have had to inform Finlay because Finlay participated in the agreement on Jo Tanker's behalf.

297. Stolt employee William Humphreys' testimony that Wingfield discussed Sasol freight rates with Nilsen on the day final quotes were due is credible because: (a) as a Stolt employee, he has no motive to fabricate a story that would be adverse to his employer's interest and (b) his demeanor evidenced his sincerity when he testified about how upset he was to observe Wingfield discussing bid numbers with Nilsen "at the eleventh hour, 59^th minute" of the Sasol bid day after having just reported Wingfield's prior conversation with Nilsen to Cooperman. (Humphreys, 6/4/07 p. 96 lines 2-5; p. 136 lines 13; p. 92 lines 11-20).

299. During his testimony on cross-examination, Wingfield claimed he was unable to recall important matters that conflict with his claim that Stolt withdrew from the conspiracy at the March 2002 NPRA meetings. That is implausible, particularly in light of his professed ability to recall minor details, which if true, would support his claim. For example:

1. Wingfield provided conflicting testimony about his discussion with Cooperman concerning the Jansen Memo after O'Brien discovered the Memo in early 2002. Ultimately, after objections from defense counsel, Wingfield claimed not to recall anything that was said during his meeting with Cooperman, despite the great concern O'Brien's report caused at Stolt. (See Wingfield, 6/6/07 p. 18 line 8 to p. 23 line 13).
2. Wingfield claimed not to recall whether he had told Nannes that he had told Jo Tankers and Odfjell at their March 2002 NPRA meetings that the allocation agreement was over (Wingfield, 6/6/07 p. 88 lines 12-17), despite the fact that his November 25, 2002 business journal entry proves he knew the importance of the NPRA meetings. (See GX-26C.5789.A-5790.A).
3. Wingfield claimed not to recall whether, during Nannes' internal investigation, he had provided Nannes with any of the inculpatory information about which he testified regarding his post-March 2002 conversations with Odfjell and Jo Tankers in 2002. (See Wingfield, 6/6/07 p. 95 lines 1-4).
4. Wingfield claimed not to recall whether Nannes had ever asked him to explain his October 2002 journal entry about Sasol which says "EN - Not Accepting!! backbone of [Odfjell] trade told [Nilsen] won't discuss" (Wingfield, 6/6/07 p. 93 lines 16-19; GX-26B.5746-47), even though Nannes brought that journal entry to the Government's attention as proof that the Government's concern that Stolt had not ended its collusive activity was unfounded. (Nannes, GX-6 p. 76 line 22 to p. 78 line 3).
5. Wingfield claimed not to recall the connection between the two parts of his November 25, 2002 journal entry: (i) "first found out - ended promptly" and (ii) "[g]ave AT policy to competitors/partners" (GX-26C.5789.A-5790.A), but he admitted the notation was a record of his discussion with Cooperman about the Corporate Leniency Program requirement of prompt and effective action to terminate upon discovery. (Wingfield, 6/6/07 p. 83 line 16 to p. 86 line 10). The obvious meaning — that in November 2002, Stolt recognized it had discovered its illegal activity prior to the NPRA meetings and would claim it complied with its obligation to terminate by providing its antitrust policy to its competitors following the March 2002 NPRA meetings — conflicts with Stolt's current position that it did not discover its illegal conduct until the end of 2002.

300. Wingfield's claimed inability to recall important matters is in stark contrast to his recollection of minor details that support his defense. For example:

1. Wingfield recalled the names of specific airlines he claimed Sjaastad had mentioned during their March 2002 NPRA meeting while discussing antitrust issues in the airline industry. (Wingfield, 6/5/07 p. 145 lines 19-22).
2. To bolster his testimony that he did not provide Stolt's final Sasol prices to Odfjell, Wingfield claimed on cross-examination, five years later, to recall that he never opened the attachment to an e-mail in which Humphreys had sent Wingfield Stolt's proposal. (Wingfield, 6/6/07 p. 59 line 21 to p. 60 line 1).

301. Wingfield often changed his testimony on cross-examination. For example:

1. Wingfield initially testified that when he discussed the Jansen Memo with Cooperman, Cooperman appeared to understand that its use of the word "coop" referred to the illegal agreement between Stolt and Odfjell (Wingfield, 6/6/07 p. 23 lines 14-21), but Wingfield then retreated from his testimony and said he did not know what Cooperman understood. (Wingfield, 6/6/07 p. 23 line 22 to p. 24 line 1).
2. Wingfield initially admitted that Humphreys told him about having reported the fact that Wingfield had spoken to Nilsen concerning Sasol the morning the bids were submitted (Wingfield, 6/6/07 p. 60 lines 11-24), but later denied knowing that Humphreys had told Cooperman about it. (Wingfield, 6/6/07 p. 60 line 25 to p. 61 line 17).

302. Wingfield's testimony that he told Odfjell and Jo Tankers at the March 2002 NPRA meetings that their illegal agreement was over is not credible. If he said the agreement was over:

1. Why did he ask Finlay and Cleary to leave the table? (Wingfield, 6/5/07 p. 151 lines 12-24). If Wingfield planned to tell Jo Tankers that the conspiracy was over, Finlay would have to be told as well since Finlay had been a key conspirator for Jo Tankers. Moreover, his claim that he feared Finlay would tell the "3,000 individuals that were attending the NPRA" that the agreement was over (Wingfield, 6/5/07 p. 151 lines 12-24) is absurd. The conspiracy in which Wingfield and Finlay had been participating was a secret agreement to cheat their customers, and the idea that Finlay would publicly announce that they would no longer cheat their customers is patently incredible. More likely, Wingfield did not want Stolt employee Cleary to learn that the conspiracy would continue despite Stolt's revised antitrust policy.
2. Why did he continue to have customer allocation lists readily accessible in his desk drawer? (See Wingfield, 6/6/07 p. 87 line 15 to p. 88 line 1).
3. Why would he plan to signal Odfjell that Stolt's bid to Sasol was for "regional business," i.e., that Stolt's bid was not a violation of the status quo agreement? (See GX-72; cf. Wingfield, 6/6/07 p. 55 line 24 to p. 56 line 16).
4. Why would Odfjell have believed, as Wingfield admitted, that a competitive bid by Stolt on Sasol would be a breach of their conspiratorial agreement? (See Wingfield, 6/6/07 p. 64 lines 5-14).
5. Why would Wingfield admittedly stand by and do nothing when Jansen complained to Nilsen about Stolt's allocated customer Equatorial and Nilsen agreed to look into it at the October Heathrow meeting? (Wingfield, 6/6/07 p. 69 lines 13-19). If it were a "throwaway comment" as Wingfield now claims, five years later, he wouldn't remember it. (See Wingfield, 6/6/07 p. 69 lines 13-19).

303. Wingfield's testimony that the reason he and Jansen met with Nilsen and Haugsdal at Heathrow Airport in October 2002 was to discuss complaints by Dow about Odfjell's handling of sublets on the BAJ trade lane is not credible. (See Wingfield, 6/5/07 p. 176 line 24 to p. 177 line 15). It is inconsistent with the testimony of Cleary — the Stolt executive responsible for and most knowledgeable about the matters Wingfield claims were discussed — that he was never told about the meeting, either before or after it occurred. (Cleary, 6/1/07 p. 97 line 23 to p. 98 line 9). Moreover, there is no documentary evidence of what occurred at the meeting to corroborate Wingfield's explanation.

304. In October 2002, Wingfield made a false exculpatory entry in his business journal regarding a telephone discussion he had that day with Nilsen concerning the Sasol contract, falsely stating: "Told him won't discuss." Wingfield admitted on cross-examination that he had several discussions with Nilsen concerning Sasol and that he never told Nilsen he would not discuss the matter. (Compare GX-26B.5746-47 with Wingfield, 6/6/07 p. 93 lines 11-15; Wingfield, 6/6/07 p. 91 line 18 to p. 93 line 15). Wingfield's false exculpatory entry shows he knew what he was doing was illegal.

305. On or about November 1, 2002, Wingfield made a false exculpatory entry in his business journal regarding a telephone discussion he had with van Westenbrugge concerning the Shell-Pecten contract, falsely noting "BAC," i.e., Brian Cleary, the Stolt business director responsible for Shell-Pecten (GX-26B.5768), to create the false impression that he obtained the pricing information from Cleary rather than van Westenbrugge. Cleary testified that he did not recall giving this information to Wingfield (Cleary, 6/1/07 p. 104 lines 14-16), nor was it likely he would have done so since Stolt was not asked to bid on the contract. (See Cleary, 6/1/07 p. 86 line 24 to p. 87 line 1; p. 99 line 25 to p. 100 line 3).

306. Wingfield's testimony that he did not learn that O'Brien had found the Jansen Memo until March 11, 2002 (Wingfield, 6/6/07 p. 9 line 23 to p. 11 line 3), is not credible. Since Wingfield admitted he was "well aware" of Stolt's revised antitrust policy by this time, he must have been aware of the O'Brien problem that prompted the revised policy. (See Wingfield, 6/5/07 p. 110 line 23 to p. 111 line 4).

310. Stolt introduced testimony that its lower-level employees did not engage in conspiratorial communications after Stolt introduced its revised antitrust policy in March 2002, but their testimony was misleading. Only on cross-examination did they acknowledge that they did not end their illegal communications with Odfjell and Jo Tankers due to the revised antitrust policy, but, in fact, had ended their illegal communications with Odfjell and Jo Tankers much earlier in 2001 when Wingfield directed that he and Jansen would be responsible for conspiratorial communications going forward. (See, e.g., Long, 6/5/07 p. 92 lines 14 to p. 95 line 24; Fleming, 6/5/07 p. 10 line 11 to p. 12 line 14).

311. Confrey's testimony on direct examination that it was "impossible" that Stolt could have continued to conspire without his knowledge is not credible because:

1. It was based solely on the fact that he sat on the trading floor with lower-level employees whose conversations he could overhear and he did not hear communications with competitors. (Confrey, 6/1/07 p. 227 line 20 to p. 228 line 25). In fact, the lower-level employees whose conversations he could overhear had ended their conspiratorial communications in 2001, well before even Stolt claims it withdrew from the conspiracy. (See, e.g., Long, 6/5/07 p. 92 lines 14 to p. 95 line 24; Fleming, 6/5/07 p. 10 line 11 to p. 12 line 14).
2. Confrey could not and did not know whether Wingfield spoke to or met with coconspirators because, as he admitted on cross-examination, he could not overhear Wingfield's telephone conversations since Wingfield had a private office (see Confrey, 6/1/07 p. 235 line 17 to p. 236 line 3), nor was he even aware that Wingfield met with Odfjell in 2002. (Confrey, 6/1/07 p. 234 line 2 to p. 235 line 6).

312. Harrison's testimony that he did not know of any collusion post-March 2002 is irrelevant because he acknowledged that Stolt had colluded for years without him knowing about it. (Harrison, 6/1/07 p. 10 line 20 to p. 11 line 2). Stolt introduced Harrison's testimony that he, not Wingfield, set Stolt's final SK prices in November 2002 to prove that Wingfield did not rig the bid. However, Harrison's set Stolt's SK prices in 2001 and yet did not know that Odfjell and Stolt had rigged the 2001 SK contract. (Harrison, 6/1/07 p. 7 lines 4-20; p. 10 lines 3-7; see Edvardsdal, 6/15/07 p. 17 line 10 to p. 18 line 11).

314. Stolt provided the testimony of an economic expert, Barry Harris, that Stolt's revised antitrust policy was likely to be effective in preventing collusion because "people who would be talking with competitors" (i.e., Wingfield and Jansen) had "severed their relationship within Stolt from the people who actually bid on contracts" such as Sasol and SK. (Harris, 6/20/07 p. 24 lines 13-21). Harris' assumption conflicts with testimony of Stolt employees and Stolt documents that Wingfield and Jansen were, at minimum, kept informed of pricing on those contracts. For example,

1. Humphreys reported to and kept Wingfield informed regarding Stolt's bids for the Sasol contract (Humphreys, 6/4/07 p. 78 lines 16-19; p. 131 lines 2-14), Humphreys informed Wingfield of the freight rates Stolt intended to and did bid for the Sasol contract both orally and by copying him on Stolt's bids to Sasol (Humphreys, 6/4/07 p. 106 line 21 to p. 107 line 2; p. 176 lines 8-13), and Humphreys and Wingfield discussed whether or not to reduce the rates to Sasol on October 11, 2002 and Wingfield agreed that Stolt should not do so. (Humphreys, 6/4/07 p. 108 lines 16-21, p. 131 lines 2-6; see also Wingfield, 6/6/07 p. 59, lines 13-18).
2. Wingfield and Jansen were "very much involved" in the 2002 SK negotiations, (Harrison, 5/31/07 p. 237 line 4-11), their subordinates Harrison and Gibney kept them generally informed of the negotiations, (Wingfield; 6/6/07 p. 71 lines 13-21), and, in fact, Jansen was directly involved in the determination of Stolt's rates. (Harrison, 5/31/07 p. 238 lines 5-8).
3. Numerous internal Stolt e-mails show that Wingfield was in contact with his subordinates regarding bidding and pricing. (See, e.g., GX-59; GX-65; DX-1912; DX-1617; DX-2722).
4. There is no evidence in the record and it is absurd to think that Wingfield, as Managing Director of Tanker Trading, would not be able to obtain whatever pricing or other competitive information he wanted from his subordinates. Even Jansen, who had no supervisory authority over Long, obtained information concerning the Dow and GE contracts from Long shortly after Nilsen complained about these contracts at the October Heathrow meeting. (Nilsen, 6/15/07 p. 154 line 1 to p. 155 line 4; Long, 6/5/07 p. 97 line 20 to p. 98 line 18; Jansen, 6/13/07 p. 131 line 23 to p. 132 line 10; GX-54). Moreover, Long provided the information to Jansen without question, even though it involved contracts outside of Jansen's trade area and Long knew Jansen was one of Stolt's two principal conspirators with Odfjell. (Jansen, 6/13/07 p. 131 lines 13-18, p. 132 line 2 to p. 133 line 2; Long, 6/5/07 p. 93 lines 11-16).

315. Likewise, Harris' testimony concerning whether the Sasol bid appeared to be rigged from an economic perspective is irrelevant because he relied on inaccurate hearsay, as explained in Findings of Fact 158-159).

316. Since 1993, the Antitrust Division has publicized its Corporate Leniency Policy in many ways, including making speeches to bar associations, business groups and criminal enforcement groups, issuing policy statements, and publishing information on the Division's website. (Griffin, GX-5 p. 189 lines 17-22).

317. Because the Antitrust Division believes it is important for the antitrust bar and the business community to understand the provisions of its Corporate Leniency Policy, it has issued public statements as to how the Policy is applied. (Griffin, GX-5 p. 193 lines 1-19).

318. The Corporate Leniency Policy established a Program under which the Government will grant leniency, i.e., agree not to charge criminally, to companies that report their illegal antitrust activity to the Government and otherwise meet all of the Policy's stated conditions. (Corporate Leniency Policy, GX-3, Preamble).

319. Only one company can qualify for leniency per conspiracy. (GX-3, at 1-2).

320. In 1998, the Antitrust Division prepared and published a model conditional leniency letter agreement (the "Model Agreement"). The Model Agreement and subsequent modifications to its terms and conditions have been published by the Antitrust Division and are publicly available. (Griffin, GX-5 p. 196 lines 6-21).

321. The Model Agreement sets forth the conditions for obtaining leniency; a company that applies for leniency represents therein that it has satisfied those express conditions. These representations are subject to verification before leniency is granted. (GX-4, Attachment).

322. Among the conditions a company must meet to qualify for the Corporate Leniency Program is that "[t]he corporation, upon its discovery of the illegal activity being reported, took prompt and effective action to terminate its part in the activity." (GX-3, at 1-3 ¶ A.2, ¶ B.3). It is the Division's position that, as a matter of good public policy, it is not appropriate to provide leniency to a company that continued to engage in illegal conduct after discovering it. In addition, a company's failure to terminate its illegal conduct may diminish the credibility and value of evidence it may later provide in connection with the investigation and prosecution of other cartel members. (Griffin, GX-5 p. 191 lines 5-24).

323. The term "discovery" is not defined in the Model Agreement. The Division clarified the meaning of the term "discovery" in a 1998 Policy Statement, The Corporate Leniency Policy: Answers to Recurring Questions (the "1998 Policy Statement"). (GX-4). This Policy Statement provides "[g]enerally, the Division will consider the corporation to have discovered the illegal activity at the earliest date on which either the board of directors or counsel for the corporation (either inside or outside) were first informed of the conduct at issue." (emphasis added). Thus, the fact that top executives, individual members of the board of directors, or owners participated in the conspiracy will not necessarily bar the corporation from eligibility for amnesty. (GX-4, at 3 ¶ IIA(2)).

324. Because the Antitrust Division cannot know with certainty the date of discovery at the time an agreement is signed, the Model Agreement does not specify the date of discovery, and therefore, it does not specify the date on which the obligation to take prompt and effective action to terminate its part in the anticompetitive activity arises. The obligation to take action to terminate the illegal conduct is triggered by the act of discovery, whenever the date discovery occurred. (Griffin, GX-5 p. 209 lines 2-22).

325. The phrase "prompt and effective action to terminate" is not defined in the Model Agreement. The Division's 1998 Policy Statement provides express guidance to leniency applicants on the meaning of their obligation to take "prompt and effective action to terminate their illegal activity upon discovery." Specifically, a leniency applicant must "refrain[] from further participation [in the conspiracy] unless continued participation is with Division approval." (GX-4, at 3 ¶ IIA(1)).

326. The 1998 Policy Statement further provides that "[t]ermination does not require announcement of withdrawal in the illegal activity to other participants in the activity (although that would constitute one means of termination). Termination can also be effectuated by reporting the illegal activity to the Division and refraining from further participation unless continued participation is with Division approval." (GX-4, at 3 ¶ IIA(1)).

327. "Prompt and effective action" should be construed to have its reasonable meaning, i.e., action that does not lead to actual termination of a company's anticompetitive activity within a reasonable period of time after discovery is not prompt and effective.

328. Because conditional leniency agreements often are entered into at the early stage of an investigation, the Antitrust Division has little information concerning the crime being reported and typically no way to verify a company's representations. For this reason, the Model Agreement is expressly conditioned on the Government's verification of the representations. (Griffin, GX-5 p. 192 lines 8-25).

329. Also among the conditions a company must meet is the condition that it provide full, continuing and complete cooperation to the Antitrust Division in connection with the activity being reported. (GX-3, at 3 ¶ B.4).

330. Once a corporation qualifies for leniency under Part B of the Leniency Program, its directors, officers and employees who come forward with the corporation will be considered for immunity from criminal prosecution on the same basis as if they had approached the Division individually. (See GX-3 ¶ C; GX-1 ¶¶ 3-4) (The Division agreed conditionally to accept Stolt into Part B of the Corporate Leniency Program.)

332. On November 22, 2002, John M. Nannes first contacted the Division on behalf of Stolt, but did not identify Stolt as his client. Nannes, an experienced attorney who had worked previously for the Antitrust Division, had held the positions within the Division of Acting Assistant Attorney General and Deputy Assistant Attorney General in 1998 through 2001. (Nannes, GX-5 p. 103 line 1 to p. 106 line 16). Nannes was familiar with the Corporate Leniency Program and the Antitrust Division's policy statements concerning the Program. (Nannes, GX-5 p. 105 lines 22-25; p. 176 line 17 to p. 177 line 3; see Nannes, GX-5 p. 114 line 19 to p. 115 line 8).