UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
U.S. Department of Justice
Antitrust Division
450 Fifth Street, N.W., Suite 4000
Washington, DC 20530,
STATE OF ARIZONA
Office of the Attorney General
1275 West Washington
Phoenix, AZ 85007,
STATE OF ARKANSAS
Office of the Attorney General
323 Center Street, Suite 200
Little Rock, AR 72201,
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
California Office of the Attorney General
300 So. Spring Street, Suite 1702
Los Angeles, CA 90013,
STATE OF FLORIDA
Office of the Attorney General
Antitrust Division
PL-01; The Capitol
Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050,
STATE OF ILLINOIS
Office of the Attorney General
100 West Randolph Street
Chicago, IL 60601,
STATE OF IOWA
Iowa Department of Justice
Hoover Office Building-Second Floor
1305 East Walnut Street
Des Moines, IA 50319,
STATE OF LOUISIANA
Public Protection Division
1885 North Third St.
Baton Rouge, LA 70802
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
Office of Attorney General Martha Coakley
One Ashburton Place
Boston, MA 02108,
STATE OF NEBRASKA
Nebraska Department of Justice
2115 State Capitol
Lincoln, NE 68509,
STATE OF NEVADA
Office of the Attorney General
Bureau of Consumer Protection
555 E. Washington Ave., Suite 3900
Las Vegas, NV 89101,
STATE OF OHIO
Office of Ohio Attorney General Richard Cordray
150 E. Gay St., 23rd Fl.
Columbus, OH 43215,
STATE OF OREGON
Oregon Department of Justice
1162 Court Street NE
Salem, OR 97301-4096,
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
Office of Attorney General
Antitrust Section
14th Floor Strawberry Square
Harrisburg, PA 17120,
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
Office of the Attorney General
150 South Main Street
Providence, RI 02903,
STATE OF TENNESSEE
Office of the Attorney General and Reporter
425 Fifth Avenue North
Nashville, TN 37243,
STATE OF TEXAS
Office of the Attorney General
300 W. 15th Street
Austin, TX 78701
and
STATE OF WISCONSIN
Wisconsin Department of Justice
17 West Main Street
Madison, WI 53707,
Plaintiffs,
v.
TICKETMASTER ENTERTAINMENT, INC.
8800 West Sunset Boulevard
West Hollywood, CA 90069,
and
LIVE NATION, INC.
9348 Civic Center Drive
Beverly Hills, CA 90210,
Defendants.
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Case: 1:10-cv-00139
Assigned To:
Collyer, Rosemary M.
Assign. Date: 1/25/2010
Description: Antitrust |
COMPLAINT
The United States of America, acting under the direction of the Attorney
General of the United States, and the States of Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Nebraska, Nevada, Ohio, Oregon,
Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, and Wisconsin, and the Commonwealths
of Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, acting under the direction of their
respective Attorneys General or other authorized officials ("Plaintiff
States") (collectively, "Plaintiffs"), bring this civil action pursuant
to the antitrust laws of the United States to enjoin the proposed merger
of Ticketmaster Entertainment, Inc. ("Ticketmaster") and Live Nation,
Inc. ("Live Nation") and to obtain such other equitable relief as the
Court deems appropriate. The United States and the Plaintiff States
allege as follows:
I. INTRODUCTION
1. This lawsuit challenges a proposed merger between Ticketmaster
and Live Nation. If not enjoined, the merger will eliminate competition
between the companies in the line of commerce of the provision of primary
ticketing services ("primary ticketing") to major concert venues in
the United States, in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as
amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18.
2. For over two decades, Ticketmaster has been the dominant primary
ticketing service provider in the United States to, among others, major
concert venues. Primary ticketing, the initial distribution of tickets,
has been highly profitable for Ticketmaster. Ticketmaster charges a
variety of service fees, which are added to the face value of the ticket.
Ticketmaster typically shares a percentage of the money from some of
these fees with venues. In 2008, Ticketmaster's share among major concert
venues exceeded eighty percent and its revenues from primary ticketing
were much greater than that of its nearest competitor. Ticketmaster's
contract renewal rate with venues typically exceeds eighty-five percent.
3. Live Nation is the country's largest concert promoter. It also
controls over seventy-five concert venues in the United States, including
many major amphitheaters. Live Nation had been Ticketmaster's largest
primary ticketing client for a number of years. In 2007, however, Live
Nation announced that it would not renew its contract with Ticketmaster.
Instead, Live Nation would become Ticketmaster's direct competitor in
primary ticketing when its Ticketmaster contract expired on December
31, 2008. After spending nearly two years evaluating, licensing, and
developing a ticketing platform, in late December 2008, Live Nation
launched its ticketing service for its own venues and potential third-party
major concert venue clients.
4. Live Nation presented a new and different source of competition
in primary ticketing. As a concert promoter, Live Nation could offer
venues access to concert tours as an inducement to use Live Nation's
ticketing service. Ticketmaster had no concert promotion business. In
contrast, as both a venue owner and a concert promoter, Live Nation
had economic incentives to reduce service fees on tickets in order to
fill more seats and earn the associated ancillary revenue from doing
so.
5. Entrants face substantial hurdles in the form of Ticketmaster's
economies of scale, long-term contracts, and brand recognition as well
as the technological hurdles necessary to compete in primary ticketing.
Live Nation had overcome many of these by virtue of its position in
promotion and venue operation and the two years it had devoted to building
a ticketing platform.
6. On February 10, 2009, Ticketmaster and Live Nation announced their
plans to merge. The merger would eliminate head-to-head competition
between Ticketmaster and Live Nation in the provision of primary ticketing
services. Unless remedied, the merger between Ticketmaster and Live
Nation would substantially lessen competition for the provision of primary
ticketing services in the United States in violation of Section 7 of
the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18.
7. Thus, the United States and the Plaintiff States ask this Court
to enjoin this proposed merger.
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
8. The United States brings this action under Section 15 of the Clayton
Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 25, to prevent and restrain Ticketmaster
and Live Nation from violating Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 18.
9. The Plaintiff States, by and through their respective Attorneys
General and other authorized officials, bring this action under Section
16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26, to prevent and restrain
Ticketmaster and Live Nation from violating Section 7 of the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18. The Plaintiff States bring this action in
their sovereign capacities and as parens patriae on behalf
of the citizens, general welfare, and economy of each of their states.
10. Ticketmaster and Live Nation provide and sell primary ticketing
services to major concert venues in the flow of interstate commerce.
Ticketmaster's and Live Nation's activities in providing and selling
primary ticketing services to major concert venues substantially affect
interstate commerce as well as commerce in each of the Plaintiff States.
This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this action and these
defendants pursuant to Section 15 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 25, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337(a), and 1345.
11. Venue is proper in this District under Section 12 of the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 22, and 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(1), (c). Defendants
Ticketmaster and Live Nation transact business and are found within
this District.
III. PARTIES AND THE PROPOSED MERGER
12. Ticketmaster is a Delaware corporation headquartered in West Hollywood,
California. It is the largest provider of primary ticketing to major
concert venues and others in the United States and the world. In 2008,
Ticketmaster sold more than 141 million tickets valued at over $8.9
billion on behalf of more than 10,000 clients worldwide and earned approximately
$1.4 billion in gross revenues. Ticketmaster also owns a majority interest
in Front Line Management Group, Inc., the largest artist management
group in the country.
13. Live Nation is a Delaware corporation headquartered in Beverly
Hills, California. It is the world's largest promoter of live concerts,
with 2008 worldwide gross revenues of over $4 billion. Live Nation's
North American Music business principally involves the promotion of
live music events at Live Nation owned and/or operated venues and in
rented third-party venues primarily in the United States and Canada.
Live Nation also owns or operates over seventy-five live entertainment
venues of various sizes in the United States. This includes eleven House
of Blues ("HOB") venues around the country.
14. On February 10, 2009, Live Nation and Ticketmaster entered into
a definitive merger agreement providing for an all-stock "merger of
equals" transaction with a combined estimated enterprise value of $2.5
billion.
IV. BACKGROUND
A. The Live Music Entertainment Industry
15. The components of the live music entertainment industry pertinent
to this case are:
[D]
16. An artist manager serves as the "CEO" of a performer's business
activities, advising in some or all phases of the performer's professional
life (tours, appearances, recording deals, movies, advertising, etc.).
Managers often are compensated based on a share of the performer's revenues
or profits.
17. The artist manager often hires booking agents to assist in arranging
a concert event or tour. The manager or booking agent contracts with
promoters, such as Live Nation. Under such contracts, the promoter typically
receives the proceeds from gross ticket receipts and then pays the performer,
venue, and other expenses associated with the event. For example, the
promoter generally contracts with the venue (or uses its own venues),
arranges for local production services, and advertises and markets the
concert. The promoter bears the downside risk of an event if tickets
sell poorly and reaps the upside benefit if tickets sell well.
18. Venue operators provide the facilities where the events will be
held and often many of the associated services, such as concessions,
parking, and security. Venues traditionally receive a fixed fee for
hosting an event as well as proceeds from concessions, parking, and
a share of merchandise sales (which may be controlled by the performer
or promoter).
19. Ticketing companies such as Ticketmaster arrange with venues --
and at times promoters -- to provide primary ticketing services. They
are responsible for distributing primary ticket inventory through channels
such as the Internet, call centers, and retail outlets and for enabling
the venue to sell tickets at its box office. The ticketing company provides
the technology infrastructure for distribution. Primary ticketing firms
also may provide technology and hardware that allow venues to manage
fan entry at the event, including everything from handheld scanners
that ushers use to check fans' tickets to the bar codes on the tickets
themselves. In some cases, primary ticketing services are provided by
the venue itself.
20. The overall price a consumer pays for a ticket generally includes
the face value of the ticket and a variety of service fees above the
face value of the ticket. Such fees are most often charged by the provider
of primary ticketing services. Venues generally receive a split of the
money from ticket service fees. Often described as "convenience," "processing,"
and "delivery" fees, these service fees can constitute a substantial
portion of the overall cost of the ticket to the consumer.
B. Ticketmaster Dominates Primary Ticketing
21. Ticketmaster has dominated primary ticketing, including primary
ticketing for major concert venues, for over two decades. It derives
substantial revenues from ticketing for venues that host major concerts.
Other companies seek to compete against Ticketmaster for primary ticketing
to major concert venues, but none has been particularly successful.
In fact, no other competitor (other than Live Nation) has more than
a four percent share, while in 2008 Ticketmaster's share exceeded eighty
percent among major concert venues. Plaintiffs have focused on the top
500 revenue generating venues in the United States as reported by Pollstar
(referred to in this Complaint as "major concert venues"). Pollstar
is a widely used third-party service that collects information on ticket
sales. The pie chart below shows primary ticketers' shares of major
concert venues, based on seating capacity:
Pre-Live Nation Entry
Share of Venue Capacity
[D]
22. High shares are not the only indicators of Ticketmaster's dominance.
Ticketmaster's revenues are much greater than those of the next several
largest primary ticketing service competitors (other than Live Nation).
Moreover, while other primary ticketing competitors do compete against
Ticketmaster for primary ticketing rights at venues, Ticketmaster has
had very high renewal rates.
23. Ticketmaster's costs for distributing a ticket have been decreasing
as consumers increasingly purchase tickets through the Internet. The
cost-per-ticket to Ticketmaster for tickets sold through its website
is significantly lower than the cost-per-ticket to Ticketmaster for
tickets sold over the telephone or at a retail outlet. However, ticketing
fees retained by Ticketmaster have not fallen as its distribution costs
have declined.
C. Live Nation Decides to Enter Primary Ticketing
24. Prior to entering into primary ticketing, Live Nation had been
using Ticketmaster as its primary ticketing provider for its venues
and was Ticketmaster's largest customer. In late 2006, Live Nation concluded
that it was unlikely to renew the Ticketmaster contract. Live Nation
began considering other options for its primary ticketing needs, including
operating its own primary ticketing business to ticket its own venues
and to expand the service to third-party venues.
25. On Dec. 20, 2007, Live Nation announced an agreement with CTS
Eventim ("CTS"), the leading German primary ticketing provider. Under
the agreement, Live Nation would use CTS technology to provide primary
ticketing services to Live Nation's venues as well as third-party venues
in the United States.
D. Live Nation Was a Competitive Threat to Ticketmaster
26. As a promoter, Live Nation's relationships with many third-party
venues gave it the ability to offer third-party venues access to content.
Live Nation believed that its prominence in promotions would give it
immediate credibility in primary ticketing.
27. Live Nation was in a position to challenge Ticketmaster's dominance
in primary ticketing due to its control of venues. Live Nation selects
the primary ticketing provider for over seventy-five live entertainment
venues in the United States and had been Ticketmaster's largest customer.
28. Live Nation also expected to compete on price with Ticketmaster.
According to Live Nation, its concert promotion business operated on
small margins, while Ticketmaster's margins from ticketing were substantially
higher. Thus, entry into primary ticketing created an opportunity for
Live Nation to increase its overall profit margin and disrupt Ticketmaster's
business model by lowering service fees.
E. Live Nation Enters Primary
Ticketing
29. Live Nation's strategy was to launch Live Nation ticketing for
its own venues in 2008, and then in late 2009 and early 2010 seek to
compete for third-party ticketing contracts.
30. Even before launching its ticketing platform, however, Live Nation
began competing with Ticketmaster to win primary ticketing contracts
for third-party venues. In September 2008, Live Nation signed a multi-year
ticketing agreement with SMG, the world's largest venue management company,
whereby it would have certain rights to ticket SMG-managed venues as
each venue's Ticketmaster contract ended.
31. Using its promotion business as a stepping stone, Live Nation
also began competing with Ticketmaster for the primary ticketing contracts
for other venues. This was met with some early successes. For example,
in October 2008, Live Nation won the ticketing contract at the Roseland
Ballroom in New York City.
32. Live Nation began selling tickets for its own and third-party
venues on December 22, 2008. Almost overnight, Live Nation became the
second-largest provider of primary ticketing in the United States.
33. On February 10, 2009, Live Nation and Ticketmaster entered into
a definitive merger agreement.
34. Live Nation has sold millions of tickets using the CTS system.
The pie chart below shows primary ticketers' shares of major concert
venues, based on seating capacity, following Live Nation's entry into
primary ticketing.
Post-Live Nation Entry
Share of Venue Capacity
[D]
V. RELEVANT MARKET
35. Primary ticketing services are sold pursuant to terms individually
negotiated with customers. The customers most directly and adversely
affected by the merger are major concert venues, which generate substantial
income from live music events. Major concert venues that generate substantial
income from live music events can be readily identified, and market
power can be selectively exercised against them, because there is no
reasonable substitute service to which the customers could turn. Nor
can these customers engage in arbitrage. The provision of primary ticketing
services to major concert venues is a relevant price discrimination
market and "line of commerce" within the meaning of Section 7 of the
Clayton Act. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Horizontal Merger Guidelines
§ 1.12 (1997).
36. The United States is the relevant geographic scope of the market.
Major concert venues purchasing primary ticketing services are located
throughout the United States.
VI. ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS
37. A combination of Ticketmaster and Live Nation would lead to a
high share among providers of primary ticketing for major concert venues.
The set of customers most likely to be affected by the merger of Ticketmaster
and Live Nation are major concert venues. Ticketmaster has the vast
share of this primary ticketing business. As described in the pie chart
in ¶ 21, before Live Nation entered primary ticketing, Ticketmaster
had an eighty-two percent share. The next largest share was Tickets.com
at less than four percent. As depicted in the pie chart in ¶ 34,
with Live Nation ticketing its own venues and some third-party venues,
Ticketmaster's share in this same group is reduced to sixty-six percent
and Live Nation becomes the second largest ticketer with a sixteen percent
share more than four times larger than Tickets.com.
38. The market for primary ticketing for major concert venues is highly
concentrated. The proposed merger will further increase the degree of
concentration to levels raising serious antitrust concerns as described
in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines issued by the Department
of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. Id. § 1.51.
39. Using a measure of market concentration called the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index ("HHI"), defined and explained in Appendix A, the post-acquisition
HHIs increase by over 2,190 points, resulting in a post-acquisition
HHI of over 6,900.
40. The merger of Ticketmaster and Live Nation would eliminate Live
Nation's competitive presence in the market for the provision of primary
ticketing services for major concert venues, resulting in less aggressive
competition, less pressure on the fees earned by Ticketmaster, and less
innovation for venues and fans than would exist absent the merger. The
proposed merger came at a time when Live Nation was just starting to
make a competitive impact. Live Nation's ability to begin to attract
third-party venues and stated intentions to compete on price likely
would have resulted in increasingly competitive pricing and better services
to major concert venues and consumers in the future. The proposed merger
is likely to lessen competition for primary ticketing services for major
concert venues.
41. The proposed merger will also reduce the merged firm's incentive
to innovate and improve their respective primary ticketing services.
Ticketing innovations are less likely to occur in a post-merger world
in which Ticketmaster's dominance will continue and Live Nation's ticketing
service has been shuttered. Notably, the benefits of quality enhancements
and product variety that flow from experimentation would be far less
likely to take place.
VII. ABSENCE OF COUNTERVAILING FACTORS
42. Supply responses from competitors or potential competitors will
not prevent likely anticompetitive effects of the proposed merger. The
merged firm would possess significant advantages that any new or existing
competitor would have to overcome to successfully compete with the merged
firm.
43. Ticketmaster has historically possessed competitive advantages.
As a result, small ticketing firms have been limited in their ability
to compete. With the merger, additional entry barriers are emerging.
The merged firm's promotion and artist management businesses provide
an additional challenge that small ticketing companies will now have
to overcome. The ability to use its content as an inducement was the
point that Live Nation touted as the basis on which Live Nation could
challenge Ticketmaster in ticketing.
44. No existing ticketing company or likely entrant possesses the
combination of attributes to prevent the selective exercise of market
power over the major concert venues by the merged firm. New entry into
the provision and sale of primary ticketing services is costly and time-consuming.
Major concert venues require primary ticketing services to be provided
in the United States by service personnel located in the United States.
It would take a new entrant a substantial investment of money and over
two years to develop the combination of comparable characteristics necessary
to compete with the merged firm in primary ticketing. New entry is not
likely to occur in a timely or sufficient basis to prevent the anticompetitive
effects that would otherwise result from the merger of Ticketmaster
and Live Nation.
VIII. VIOLATION ALLEGED
(Violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act)
45. The United States and the Plaintiff States incorporate the allegations
of paragraphs 1 through 44 above.
46. The proposed merger of Ticketmaster and Live Nation would likely
substantially lessen competition in interstate trade and commerce in
violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act in the provision and sale
of primary ticketing services for major concert venues. 15 U.S.C. §
18.
47. The proposed merger threatens to reduce competition in a number
of ways, including, among others:
- eliminating the head-to-head competition between the merging parties;
- reducing the incentives of the merging parties to innovate and
improve their primary ticketing services, including the loss of the
increased opportunity for innovation from a firm engaged in experimentation
in primary ticketing;
- impairing the ability of venue customers to benefit from competition
between these firms, including competition based on price, terms,
quality, service, and innovation; and
- impairing the ability of consumers to benefit from competition
between these firms, including competition based on price, terms,
quality, service, and innovation.
48. The proposed merger of Ticketmaster and Live Nation likely will
have the following effects:
- actual and potential competition between Ticketmaster and Live
Nation in the provision and sale of primary ticketing services for
major concert venues will be eliminated; and
- competition generally in the market for primary ticketing for major
concert venues would be substantially lessened.
REQUESTED RELIEF
49. The United States and the Plaintiff States request that:
- the proposed merger of Ticketmaster and Live Nation be adjudged
to violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18;
- Ticketmaster and Live Nation be enjoined from carrying out the
proposed merger or carrying out any other agreement, understanding,
or plan by which Ticketmaster and Live Nation would acquire, be acquired
by, or merge with each other;
- the United States and Plaintiff States be awarded their costs
of this action;
- the Plaintiff States be awarded their reasonable attorneys'
fees; and
- the United States and Plaintiff States receive such other and
further relief as the case requires and the Court deems just and proper.
Dated: January 25, 2010
|
FOR PLAINTIFF UNITED STATES:
_______________/s/________________
CHRISTINE A. VARNEY (DC 411654)
Assistant Attorney General
_______________/s/________________
WILLIAM F. CAVANAUGH, JR.
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
_______________/s/________________
J. ROBERT KRAMER II
Director of Operations
_______________/s/________________
JOHN R. READ (DC 419373)
Chief
DAVID C. KULLY (DC 448763)
Assistant Chief
|
_______________/s/________________
AARON D. HOAG
Attorney
U.S. Department of Justice
Antitrust Division
450 Fifth Street, N.W., Suite 4000
Washington, D.C. 20530
Telephone: (202) 514-5038
Fax: (202) 514-7308
Email: aaron.hoag@usdoj.gov
ANN MARIE BLAYLOCK (DC 967825)
PAM COLE
ANDREW J. EWALT (DC 493433)
TIMOTHY T. FINLEY (DC 471841)
KERRIE J. FREEBORN (DC 503143)
ETHAN C. GLASS
CHRISTOPHER HARDEE (DC 458168)
WILLIAM H. JONES II
JACKLIN CHOU LEM
CREIGHTON J. MACY
MARY BETH MCGEE (DC 358694)
LISA SCANLON
CLAUDE F. SCOTT, JR. (DC 414906)
JOHN M. SNYDER (DC 456921)
LAUREN SUN (DC 991508)
JENNIFER A. WAMSLEY (DC 486540)
WEEUN WANG
CHRISTINA M. WHEELER
Attorneys for the United States
|
FOR PLAINTIFF STATE OF ARIZONA
TERRY GODDARD
Attorney General
State of Arizona
_______________/s/________________
NANCY M. BONNELL
AZ Bar # 016382
Antitrust Unit Chief
Consumer Protection & Advocacy Section
1275 West Washington
Phoenix, AZ 85007
Tel: (602) 542-7728
Fax: (602) 542-9088
Email: Nancy.Bonnell@azag.gov
FOR PLAINTIFF STATE OF ARIZONA
TERRY GODDARD
Attorney General
State of Arizona
_______________/s/________________
NANCY M. BONNELL
AZ Bar # 016382
Antitrust Unit Chief
Consumer Protection & Advocacy Section
1275 West Washington
Phoenix, AZ 85007
Tel: (602) 542-7728
Fax: (602) 542-9088
Email: Nancy.Bonnell@azag.gov
FOR PLAINTIFF STATE OF ARKANSAS
DUSTIN McDANIEL
Attorney General
State of Arkansas
_______________/s/________________
David A. Curran
Arkansas Bar No. 2003031
Assistant Attorney General
323 Center St., Suite 200
Little Rock, AR 72201
Tel: (501) 682-3561
Fax: (501) 682-8118
Email: david.curran@arkansasag.gov
FOR PLAINTIFF STATE OF CALIFORNIA
EDMUND G. BROWN JR., Attorney General
of the State of California
KATHLEEN FOOTE,
Sr. Assistant Attorney General
_______________/s/________________
PAULA LAUREN GIBSON, State Bar No. 100780
Deputy Attorney General
California Office of the Attorney General
300 So. Spring Street, Suite 1702
Los Angeles, CA 90013
Tel: (213) 897-0014
Fax: (213) 897-2801
Email: Paula.Gibson@doj.ca.gov
FOR PLAINTIFF STATE OF FLORIDA
BILL McCOLLUM
Attorney General
State of Florida
_______________/s/________________
PATRICIA A. CONNERS
Associate Deputy Attorney General
LIZABETH A. BRADY
Chief, Multistate Antitrust Enforcement
LISA ANN MCGLYNN
Assistant Attorney General
ANTITRUST DIVISION
PL-01; The Capitol
Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050
Tel: (850) 414-3300
Fax: (850) 488-9134
Email: Lisa.McGlynn@myfloridalegal.com
FOR PLAINTIFF STATE OF ILLINOIS
LISA MADIGAN, Attorney General
_______________/s/________________
By: Robert W. Pratt
Chief, Antitrust Bureau
Office of the Attorney General
State of Illinois
100 West Randolph Street
Chicago, Illinois 60601
Tel: (312) 814-3722
Fax: (312) 814-4209
Email: RPratt@atg.state.il.us
FOR PLAINTIFF STATE OF IOWA
Thomas J. Miller
Attorney General of Iowa
_______________/s/________________
Layne M. Lindebak
Assistant Attorney General
Special Litigation Division
Iowa Department of Justice
Hoover Office Building-Second Floor
1305 East Walnut Street
Des Moines, Iowa 50319
Tel: (515) 281-7054
Fax: (515) 281-4902
Email: Layne.Lindebak@iowa.gov
FOR PLAINTIFF STATE OF LOUISIANA
JAMES D. "BUDDY" CALDWELL
Attorney General
State of Louisiana
_______________/s/________________
STACIE L. DEBLIEUX
LA Bar #92142
Assistant Attorney General
Public Protection Division
1885 North Third St.
Baton Roughe, LA 70802
Tel: (225) 326-6400
Fax: (225) 326-6499
Email: deblieuxs@ag.state.la.us
FOR PLAINTIFF COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
MARTHA COAKLEY
ATTORNEY GENERAL
By: _______________/s/________________
William T. Matlack, BBO #552109
Chief, Antitrust Division
Matthew M. Lyons, BBO #657685
Assistant Attorneys General
Office of Attorney General Martha Coakley
One Ashburton Place
Boston, MA 02108
Tel: (617) 727-2200
Fax: (617) 727-5765
Email: William.Matlack@state.ma.us
Email: Matthew.Lyons@state.ma.us
FOR PLAINTIFF STATE OF NEBRASKA
JON BRUNING
Attorney General
State of Nebraska
_______________/s/________________
Leslie Campbell-Levy
Assistant Attorney General
Chief, Consumer Protection & Antitrust
Nebraska Department of Justice
2115 State Capitol
Lincoln, NE 68509
Tel: (402) 471-2811
Fax: (402) 471-2957
Email: leslie.levy@nebraska.gov
FOR PLAINTIFF STATE OF NEVADA
CATHERINE CORTEZ MASTO
Attorney General
ERIC WITKOSKI
Consumer Advocate and Chief Deputy Attorney
General
_______________/s/________________
By: BRIAN ARMSTRONG
Senior Deputy Attorney General
State of Nevada, Office of the Attorney
General
Bureau of Consumer Protection
555 E. Washington Ave., Suite 3900
Las Vegas, Nevada 89101
Tel: (702) 486-3420
Fax: (702) 486-3283
Email: BArmstrong@ag.nv.gov
FOR PLAINTIFF STATE OF OHIO
RICHARD CORDRAY
ATTORNEY GENERAL
_______________/s/________________
Jennifer L. Pratt
Chief, Antitrust Department
Patrick E. O'Shaughnessy (D.C. Bar # 494394)
Senior Assistant Attorney General
150 E. Gay St., 23rd Floor
Columbus, OH 43215
Tel: (614) 466-4328
Fax: (614) 995-0266
Email: jennifer.pratt@ohioattorneygeneral.gov
patrick.o'shaughnessy@ohioattorneygeneral.gov
FOR PLAINTIFF STATE OF OREGON
JOHN R. KROGER
Attorney General of Oregon
_______________/s/________________
By: Caren Rovics
Senior Assistant Attorney General
Financial Fraud/Consumer Protection Section
Civil Enforcement Division
1162 Court Street NE
Salem, OR 97301-4096
Tel: (503) 934-4400
Fax: (503) 378-5017
Email: caren.rovics@doj.state.or.us
FOR PLAINTIFF COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
TOM CORBETT
Attorney General
By:_______________/s/________________
James A. Donahue, III
Chief Deputy Attorney General
PA Bar No. 42624
Jennifer A. Thomson
PA Bar No. 89360
Norman W. Marden
PA Bar No. 203423
Joseph S. Betsko
PA Bar No. 82620
Deputy Attorneys General
Office of Attorney General
Antitrust Section
14th Floor Strawberry Square
Harrisburg, PA 17120
Tel: (717) 787-4530
Fax: (717) 705-7110
E-mail: jdonahue@attorneygeneral.gov
E-mail: jthomson@attorneygeneral.gov
E-mail: nmarden@attorneygeneral.gov
E-mail: jbetsko@attorneygeneral.gov
FOR PLAINTIFF STATE OF RHODE ISLAND
_______________/s/________________
PATRICK C. LYNCH
Attorney General
State of Rhode Island
150 South Main Street
Providence, Rhode Island 02903
Tel: (401) 274-4400 ext. 2401
Fax: (401) 222-2295
Email: emurray@riag.ri.gov
FOR PLAINTIFF STATE OF TENNESSEE
_______________/s/________________
Robert E. Cooper, Jr.
Attorney General and Reporter
Victor J. Domen, Jr.
Senior Counsel
State of Tennessee
425 Fifth Avenue North
Nashville, TN 37243
Tel: (615) 532-5732
Fax: (615) 532-2910
Email: Vic.Domen@ag.tn.gov
FOR PLAINTIFF STATE OF TEXAS
GREG ABBOTT
Attorney General of Texas
C. ANDREW WEBER
First Assistant Attorney General
DAVID S. MORALES
Deputy Attorney General for Civil Litigation
JOHN T. PRUD'HOMME
Assistant Attorney General
Acting Chief, Antitrust Division
_______________/s/________________
David M. Ashton
Assistant Attorney General
State Bar No. 24031828
Office of the Attorney General
300 W. 15th Street
Austin, Texas 78701
Tel: (512) 936-1781
Fax: (512) 320-0975
Email: david.ashton@oag.state.tx.us
FOR PLAINTIFF STATE OF WISCONSIN
J.B. VAN HOLLEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STATE OF WISCONSIN
By:_______________/s/________________
GWENDOLYN J. COOLEY
WI Bar #1053856
17 West Main Street
Madison, WI 53703
Telephone: (608) 261-5810
Fax: (608) 267-2778
Email: cooleygj@doj.state.wi.us
Appendix A
DEFINITION OF HHI
The term "HHI" means the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index,
a commonly accepted measure of market concentration. The HHI is calculated
by squaring the market share of each firm competing in the market and
then summing the resulting numbers. For example, for a market consisting
of four firms with shares of 30, 30, 20, and 20 percent, the HHI is
2,600 (302 + 302 + 202 + 202
= 2,600). The HHI takes into account the relative size and distribution
of the firms in a market. It approaches zero when a market is occupied
by a large number of firms of relatively equal size and reaches its
maximum of 10,000 when a market is controlled by a single firm. The
HHI increases both as the number of firms in the market decreases and
as the disparity in size between those firms increases.
Markets in which the HHI is between 1000 and 1800 are considered to
be moderately concentrated, and markets in which the HHI is in excess
of 1800 points are considered to be highly concentrated. Transactions
that increase the HHI by more than 100 points in highly concentrated
markets presumptively raise significant antitrust concerns under the
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission 1992 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Aaron Hoag, hereby certify that on January 25, 2010, I caused a
copy of the Complaint and attached Exhibits to be served on defendants
Ticketmaster Entertainment, Inc., and Live Nation, Inc., by mailing
the documents via email to the duly authorized legal representatives
of the defendants, as follows:
FOR TICKETMASTER ENTERTAINMENT, INC.
M. Sean Royall, Esq.
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP
1050 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036
Tel: (202) 955-8546
Fax: (202) 467-0539
Email: SRoyall@gibsondunn.com
FOR LIVE NATION, INC.
Michael Egge, Esq.
Latham & Watkins LLP
555 Eleventh Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20004
Tel: (202) 637-2200
Fax: (202) 637-2201
Email: michael.egge@LW.com
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_______________/s/________________
Aaron D. Hoag, Esq.
Attorney
U.S. Department of Justice
Antitrust Division
450 Fifth Street, N.W., Suite 4000
Washington, D.C. 20530
Telephone: (202) 514-5038
Fax: (202) 514-7308
Email: aaron.hoag@usdoj.gov |
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