|
|
|
All-units Discounts in Retail Contracts
and Janusz A. Ordover August 2002 Abstract All-units discounts in retail contracts refer to discounts that lower a retailer's wholesale price on every unit purchased when the retailer's purchases equal or exceed some quantity threshhold. These discounts pose a challenge to economic theory because, like linear pricing, the average price paid by the retailer is (almost) everywhere the same as its marginal price (the price of obtaining one more unit) but, unlike linear pricing, purchases at higher quantities may be cheaper than purchases at lower quantities. Since it is difficult to understand why a manufacturer would ever charge less for a larger order if its intentions were benign, antitrust authorities have argued that all-units discounts must be exclusionary. However, in this paper, we show that all-units discounts may profitably arise absent any exclusionary motive--in a bilateral-monopoly setting. All-units discounts can solve the problem of double marginalization when demand is known, and they can profitably induce second-degree price discrimination when retailers have private information about demand. Compared to linear pricing, all-units discounts lead to lower consumer prices and are welfare improving. Compared to two-part tariffs, all-units discounts may lead to higher or lower prices depending on demand parameters. Key Words: Vertical control, double marginalization, price discrimination
I Introduction The use of all-units discounts in intermediate-goods markets is common. Coca-Cola and Irish Sugar use them in their contracts with retailers. British Airways uses them in their contracts with travel agents, and Michelin uses them in their contracts with tire dealers. An all-units discount refers to a discount that lowers a retailer's wholesale price on every unit purchased when the retailer's purchases equal or exceed some quantity threshhold or target. The discount is usually specified in terms of some percentage off list price, and is sometimes also referred to as a 'target rebate,' because when the target is reached, the retailer receives a rebate on all units previously purchased. All-units discounts have the property that the average price paid by a retailer is almost everywhere the same as its marginal price (the price of obtaining one more unit). Since linear pricing also has this property, one might think that the economic effects of all-units discounts and linear pricing would be similar.1 But therein lies a puzzle: if the effects of all-units discounts are similar to those of linear pricing, where the retailer pays a constant per-unit wholesale price, why would we ever observe all-units discounts in practice? Since all-units discounts are in general more costly to administer (because the manufacturer must keep track of the retailer's purchases), we should not expect to observe them when linear pricing is optimal. And when linear pricing is not optimal, e.g., when it leads to double markups, it is not obvious why a manufacturer would ever offer a quantity-discount scheme that applies to all units when it can solve the problem of double marginalization with discounts that apply only to incremental units, or, equivalently, with a two-part tariff?2 Despite their prevalence, all-units discounts have for the most part been ignored in the economics and business literatures. And when they are mentioned in these literatures, it is often simply asserted that their purpose is to induce the buyer to purchase a larger quantity, or (even worse) that their use is irrational.3 On the other hand, antitrust authorities tend to look upon all-units discounts as exclusionary.4 They focus on the fact that, with all-units discounts, purchases at higher quantities may be cheaper than purchases at lower quantities, and conclude from this that the manufacturer's intent is to harm its rivals by offering discounts that would be unprofitable for them to match when spread over smaller volumes. In other words, all-units discounts are viewed by the antitrust authorities with suspicion because they provide a strong incentive for a retailer to promote the sale of products on which it is eligible to earn a rebate at the expense of other products, particularly when it is close to the level of sales required to reach the rebate target. The problem with this reasoning is that it might be used to condemn (unjustifiably in our view) as exclusionary almost any type of pricing scheme in which a manufacturer offers a quantity-based discount, because it might be argued that these schemes also induce a retailer to promote the sale of some products at the expense of other products in order to qualify for the manufacturer's best discounts. Yet antitrust authorities do not typically view other quantity-discount schemes (e.g., two-part tariffs and incremental-units discounts) with the same degree of suspicion. This raises several questions. Is the bias against all-units discounts justified? Do they unambiguously lead to lower social welfare relative to other quantity discount schemes? And, given that there is a bias against all-units discounts, why would a manufacturer ever risk prosecution by offering them? We are the first to model the use of all-units discounts in retail contracts. In this paper we are interested in whether all-units discounts might arise for non-exclusionary reasons, and we ask how their profitability and social-welfare properties compare to other types of quantity-discounts. To rule out exclusion as a possible motive, we restrict attention to a setting in which an upstream monopolist or manufacturer sells its output to a downstream monopolist or retailer (exclusion is implicitly ruled out in a bilateral-monopoly setting because neither firm has a horizontal rival). We consider cases in which demand is known at the time of contracting, and cases in which it is not. In the former case, we compare the performance of all-units discounts against a benchmark of two-part tariffs, which are known to be optimal in simple bilateral-monopoly settings. In the latter case, we compare the performance of menus of all-units discounts and menus of two-part tariffs. We establish three main results. First, we show that all-units discounts, like two-part tariffs, can solve the problem of double marginalization when consumers' demand is deterministic and known at the time of contracting by both parties. Instead of selling its product to the retailer at marginal cost plus a fixed fee, which is one way of solving the problem, the manufacturer can offer the retailer an all-units discount contract and eliminate double markups by choosing the target quantity to induce the joint-profit maximizing retail price and the percentage discount off list price to divide the surplus. All-units discount contracts in this case are welfare improving compared to linear pricing schedules, benefiting firms with higher profits and consumers with lower prices. Second, we show that when the retailer has private information about consumers' demand, the manufacturer will prefer to offer the retailer a menu of all-units discounts rather than a menu of two-part tariffs. That is, when the retailer has private information about consumers' demand, the manufacturer earns higher profit under the profit-maximizing menu of all-units discount contracts than under the profit-maximizing menu of two-part tariff contracts. All-units discounts in this case are more efficient than two-part tariffs at inducing the retailer to reveal the state of demand (they are a better screening device) and hence lead to greater surplus extraction for the manufacturer. Third, we show that when the retailer has private information, the profit-maximizing menu of all-units discounts may result in higher or lower prices for consumers than the profit-maximizing menu of two-part tariffs. Whether it is higher or lower depends on the shape of consumer demand. For example, if demand is linear, and the demand curves in the different states of nature have a common vertical intercept, or are vertical translations of each other (i.e., parallel shifts), then all-units discounts lead to lower consumer prices and are welfare improving. On the other hand, if demand is linear, and the demand curves in the different states of nature have a common horizontal intercept, then all-units discounts lead to higher consumer prices and are welfare worsening. In summary, our results imply that all-units discounts need not be irrational, as some have asserted, nor are they necessarily used for exclusionary purposes (if at all), as antitrust authorities have asserted. We find that all-units discounts may profitably arise in retail contracts even in the absence of an exclusionary motive. The discounts can be viewed as a means of vertical control when consumers' demand is deterministic and known by both parties at the time of contracting,5 and as a screening device to induce the retailer to reveal the state of demand and extract surplus when the retailer has private information.6 Consumer welfare can be higher or lower as a result. The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we introduce the model, discuss the problem of double marginalization, and present our first main result. In Section 3, we extend the model to allow for demand uncertainty and present our second main result. Our third main result and illustrative examples are presented in Section 4. We offer concluding remarks in Section 5. II The case of demand certainty We begin with the case of bilateral monopoly and demand certainty. There is a single upstream firm which
produces a good at constant marginal cost c. The upstream firm sells the good to a single downstream firm
which then resells the good to final consumers. We will refer to the upstream firm as the "manufacturer" and
the downstream firm as the "retailer." For simplicity, we assume the retailer incurs no costs of distribution,
and hence, the only cost the retailer bears is the amount it pays to the manufacturer for the good. Let Given our assumptions, the manufacturer's profit can be expressed as The case of bilateral monopoly with demand certainty is the simplest setting in which to examine the
issue of vertical control. The vertical-control literature asks: what kinds of contracts will induce the retailer
to choose the same quantity that an integrated firm would choose.8 Comparing
To see that the manufacturer cannot do any better than this, let w be the wholesale price and F the fixed
fee. Let
such that
where the inequality in (2) ensures that the retailer earns non-negative profit. Since the maximand is
increasing in F, the manufacturer will choose the fixed fee to satisfy the constraint with equality. Substituting
this into the maximand and solving yields w = c and In the case in Figure 1, and in the case of
where Since the retailer would never purchase q less than The contracts in Figures 1 and 2 share the property that the retailer's average per-unit price is greater
than its marginal price. This allows the manufacturer to extract surplus from the retailer without distorting
its incentives at the margin. In Figure 1, the manufacturer achieves this separation of average and marginal
price by specifying two parameters, a fixed fee and a constant wholesale price. In Figure 2, the manufacturer
offers an initially high wholesale price and then discounts the wholesale price on the retailer's incremental
purchases beyond the quantity In contrast, contracts that offer linear pricing do not allow the retailer's average per-unit price to differ
from its marginal price. This is problematic because it leads to the well-known problem of double
marginalization when the manufacturer makes the offer (see Spengler, 1950). In order to extract surplus, the
manufacturer must charge Contracts that offer all-units discounts would also seem to be problematic because they too equate the retailer's average per-unit price and its marginal price. These contracts have the form
where Unlike linear pricing, this contract involves setting three parameters: the wholesale price w, which is
valid over the range Contracts with all-units discounts have raised antitrust concerns that they may be exclusionary ![]() when used by dominant firms because the downward discontinuity in the total outlay schedule (at The antitrust concerns are all the more striking in this instance because, until now, no efficiency rationale has been offered to explain the use of all-units discounts. In contrast, contracts with two-part tariffs, and incremental-units discounts, which may also give rise to similar concerns, have efficiency rationales and thus tend to be treated far more leniently. In our bilateral monopoly setting, where exclusionary motives are absent, we have seen that these latter types of contracts can solve the double-marginalization problem, raising firm profits and lowering prices for consumers. We now show that contracts with all-units discounts can also solve the double-marginalization
problem. To begin, consider the set of contracts that offer an initial wholesale price of
With these contracts, the retailer would never purchase less than Proposition 1 Contracts with all-units discounts can solve the problem, of double marginalization. Proposition 1 implies that the integrated outcome can be achieved even if the retailer's average per-unit price is the same as its marginal price. This feature of the contract makes all-units discounts appear more similar to linear pricing, which cannot induce the integrated outcome, than other quantity discount schemes, which distinguish between inframarginal and marginal payments. The contracts in (5) induce the integrated outcome because the quantity threshhold III The case of uncertain demand The analysis thus far has assumed that consumer demand is known by both firms at the time of contracting. In this section, we extend the model to allow for demand uncertainty. This is an important case to consider for at least two reasons. First, in practice, consumer demand often varies depending on the state of nature, and thus it is realistic to assume that demand may sometimes be unpredictable. For example, sales of ice-cream and cold drinks will be higher when the weather is warm, and lower when the weather is cold, but apriori neither a manufacturer nor its retailers may know at the time of contracting which state will occur. Second, the model as yet does not have predictive power to explain why one contract form may be chosen over another, whereas the extended model with demand uncertainty does. As we shall see, the equivalence among two-part tariffs, incremental-units discounts, and all-units discounts no longer holds in this latter case.
We assume, for simplicity, that consumer demand can take one of two forms. It may be high
or low depending on the state of nature. The low-demand state of nature occurs with probability
Let
The first assumption in (6) implies that the retailer's revenue in each state is concave (this ensures that firm i's marginal revenue is downward sloping). The second assumption in (6) implies that the retailer's marginal revenue in the high-demand state is always greater than its marginal revenue in the low-demand state (this property is sometimes referred to as the single-crossing condition). The timing of the game is as follows. In the first stage, the manufacturer specifies the terms at which it
will sell its good to the retailer. It does so without knowing whether consumer demand will be high or low.
In the second stage, the uncertainty is resolved and the retailer realizes the nature of the demand it faces. The
retailer then chooses whether to purchase and how much to purchase from the manufacturer, and pays the
manufacturer according to the terms of its contract. The retailer resells this quantity to final consumers,
earning revenue We assume the manufacturer cannot contract on the state of nature (if it could, we are back to the model in the previous section), and so cannot prevent a retailer facing one demand state from pretending that another demand state has occurred. Thus, the manufacturer must choose its contract in stage one to induce the retailer to reveal the true state of demand in stage two.12 This situation has been studied in the literature on self-selection and price discrimination (in our model, the manufacturer offers a menu of options to the retailer and prices the menu so as to induce the retailer to reveal the state of demand by the option it selects).13 Conventional wisdom is that (1) the retailer will earn zero surplus in the low-demand state and positive surplus in the high-demand state; and (2) the manufacturer will distort downward the quantity chosen by a low-demand retailer, but not the quantity chosen by a high-demand retailer.14 We will show these results using the manufacturer's profit-maximizing menu of two-part tariffs, or, equivalently, incremental-units discount, as a benchmark. We will then compare consumer prices and social welfare under this benchmark with those of the manufacturer's optimal menu of all-units discounts. Menu of two-part tariffs, incremental-units discount Suppose the manufacturer offers a menu of two-part tariffs
subject to the low-demand retailer choosing a positive quantity under
and the high-demand retailer choosing to purchase under
Our assumptions on the revenue functions, and the fact that the maximand in (7) is increasing in Substituting the fixed fees that satisfy (8) and (9) with equality into the maximand, and assuming the
new maximand is concave in
We see from the expression in (10) that the manufacturer should charge Let ![]() Figure 6 depicts the total outlay of the retailer for any quantity it might purchase under the
manufacturer's profit-maximizing menu of two-part tariffs. The two-part tariff meant for the low-demand
retailer is given by the upward-sloping line beginning at
line beginning at Since the retailer will only choose points from along the lower envelope of the menu of two-part tariffs, as depicted in Figure 6 (the cost-minimizing outlay), the manufacturer could instead have induced the same profit-maximizing outcome with a single contract that traces out this curve:
With this contract, the retailer faces a per-unit price of All-units discounts We now show that there exists a contract with all-units discounts that induces the retailer to choose the
same quantities as in Figure 6, but yields strictly higher profit than Proposition 2 When the retailer has private information about demand, the manufacturer can earn higher profit with a menu of all-units discounts than with a menu of two-part tariffs. Proof: Let
or, equivalently, the contract that corresponds to the cost-minimizing outlay given this menu:
Figure 7 depicts the retailer's total cost for any quantity it might purchase under To expedite the proof, it is useful to begin with a couple of observations. First, we note that, when faced
with contract These observations imply that the retailer will choose These observations also imply that the retailer will choose ![]() where the first inequality follows because Since the manufacturer earns ![]() Comparing The manufacturer can extract a higher profit with an all-units discount contract because such contracts
are more efficient at inducing the retailer to reveal the state of demand. Put simply, the flexibility afforded
by the discontinuous outlay schedule makes it possible for the manufacturer to
charge higher prices for all quantities greater than IV Profit-maximizing quantities with all-units discounts Menus of two-part tariffs are viewed more favorably in antitrust law than menus of all-units discounts because the former are thought to have efficiency justifications while the latter are thought only to be exclusionary. Yet, as we showed in section II, all-units discounts can solve the double-marginalization problem, and as we showed in section III, all-units discount contracts may even be the preferred choice of the manufacturer relative to other types of quantity-discount contracts in certain settings, e.g., in a bilateral-monopoly setting when the retailer has private information about consumers' demand. Moreover, all-units discounts need not lower welfare in these settings. In our example in Figure 7, the all-units discount contract hurts the retailer (relative to the two-part tariff contract in Figure 6) but does not hurt consumers, since the quantity sold by the retailer in each state is unchanged. This implies that, in our example, there is no effect on social welfare. In this section, we extend the analysis to consider the welfare effects of the manufacturer's profit-maximizing all-units discount contract. Our main result is that that the direction of change is ambiguous. Depending on the functional form of demand, it is possible for consumers to be better or worse off with all-units discounts than with two-part tariffs or incremental-units discounts. Let ![]() Let
subject to the low-demand retailer choosing a positive quantity under
and the high-demand retailer choosing to purchase under
The solution to the manufacturer's problem is not as straightforward here as it is in the case of two-part tariffs because, with all-units discounts, there are no fixed fees to equate the two sides of (16) and (17), and hence seemingly no way to extract the maximum possible surplus from the retailer in each demand state. Nevertheless, as we now show, even without fixed fees, it is possible for the manufacturer to choose the terms of its contracts to satisfy (16) and (17) with equality. Lemma 1 Let ![]() Proof: See the appendix. We can understand Lemma 1 as follows. The manufacturer can induce a retailer in the low-demand state
to purchase zero or at least The following lemma shows that the manufacturer must choose its contract terms in this way. Lemma 2 Let Proof: See the appendix. Lemma 2 implies that at the optimum the manufacturer must choose its contract terms to induce the
retailer to purchase at the quantity threshhold that corresponds to each demand state. Since we know that
for any
such that
It follows that the profit-maximizing Proposition 3 Let Proof: See the appendix. Proposition 3 establishes that a retailer in the high-demand state will choose the integrated quantity, which is the same quantity that a high-demand retailer would choose under the manufacturer's profit-maximizing menu of two-part tariffs. Thus, the welfare comparison between the profit-maximizing menu of two-part tariffs and the profit-maximizing menu of all-units discounts will depend solely on the relation between the quantities purchased by the low-demand retailer in the two cases. From the manufacturer's problem in (18)--(19), we see that, in the case of the profit-maximizing menu of all-units discounts, the manufacturer will want to distort downward the quantity purchased by a retailer in the low-demand state. There are two subcases to consider. Proposition 4 Let
and if
Proof: See the appendix. Proposition 4 characterizes the manufacturer's choice of The welfare effects of all-units discounts To determine whether welfare is higher with all-units discounts or with two-part tariffs, we compare the
low-demand retailer's quantity choice as characterized in Proposition 4 with its quantity choice under the
profit-maximizing menu of two-part tariffs, Subcase 1: If we evaluate the left-hand sides of (20) and (11) at
then the left-hand side of (20) can be written as
It follows that if Subcase 2: If we evaluate the left-hand sides of (21) and (11) at ![]() then the left-hand side of (21) can be written as
It follows that if Linear Demands With linear demands, the left-hand sides of (20) and (21) are decreasing in q, implying that the signs of (23) and (24) suffice to determine whether the low-demand retailer's quantity choice under the profit-maximizing menu of all-units discounts is greater than, less than, or equal to the low-demand retailer's quantity choice under the profit-maximizing menu of two-part tariffs. Since the high-demand retailer's quantity choice is the same for both, we have the following proposition. Proposition 5 Suppose consumer demands are linear and
Otherwise, if
Proof: With linear demands, (25) follows by substituting As we now show, consumer welfare can be higher, the same, or lower with all-units discounts depending
on the functional form of demand. This can be most easily seen when consumers' demand in the high and
low demand states are sufficiently close that Example in which welfare is higher with all-units discounts Suppose the inverse demands are given by
lower and social welfare is higher with all-units discounts than with two-part tariffs. As we show in the
appendix, a similar conclusion also holds when (25) applies, i.e., when This case might arise, for example, if the differences in the high and low-demand states correspond to differences in the population size of a market with no change in the elasticity of demand. For example, suppose the manufacturer sells a product in a locale that depends on tourism, which in turn depends on the weather (tourism is higher when the weather is good and lower when the weather is bad). Then one can think of the high-demand state as corresponding to an increase in the population size of a market relative to the low-demand state with no change in the underlying distribution of consumer preferences. At the choke price, the quantity demanded in either state is zero, but for any price with positive demand, the high-demand quantity is a multiple of the low-demand quantity reflecting its larger population size. It is plausible that at the time of contracting, the manufacturer may not know whether the weather will be good or bad, and so it must offer a menu of options to the retailer to induce self-selection. Our findings imply that antitrust authorities would be wrong to forbid all-units discounts in this case because, in addition to the manufacturer's profit being higher with all-units discounts, consumer surplus and social welfare will also be higher. Example in which welfare is the same or higher with all-units discounts Suppose the inverse demands are given by This case might arise, for example, if both the market size and consumers' willingness-to-pay are affected by the state of nature. For example, with cold drinks and ice cream, consumers may be willing to consume more and pay a higher price when the weather is warm than when it is cold. Our findings imply that antitrust authorities would be wrong to forbid all-units discounts in this case because then consumer surplus and social welfare would either be unaffected or would decrease. Example in which welfare is lower with all-units discounts Suppose the inverse demands are given by This case might arise, for example, if the differences in the high and low-demand states correspond to differences in consumers' incomes. For example, suppose the manufacturer sells a product for which demand depends primarily on consumers' discretionary income. In good times, consumers will have more to spend, while in recessionary times, consumers will have less to spend. Thus, when the product's price is zero, demand is the same in the two states of nature, but as the product's price increases, demand is everywhere higher in the state of the world where consumers in aggregate have higher incomes. In this case, it is plausible that at the time of contracting, the manu- ![]() facturer may not know which state of the world will occur. Our findings imply that, in this instance, all-units discounts will lead to lower consumer surplus and social welfare relative to two-part tariffs. Thus, with these three examples, we have shown that social welfare can be higher, the same, or lower with all-units discounts compared to a benchmark of two-part tariffs. If demand is linear, and the demand curves in the different states of nature have a common vertical intercept, or are vertical translations of each other (i.e. parallel shifts), then we have shown that all-units discounts lead to the same or lower consumer prices and are welfare improving. In contrast, if demand is linear, and the demand curves in the different states of nature have a common horizontal intercept, then we have shown that all-units discounts lead to higher consumer prices and decrease welfare. V Conclusion A discussion of the competitive effects of all-units discounts has until now been left to policymakers and legal scholars, who invariably conclude that the discounts are exclusionary. On the one hand, it is not surprising that all-units discounts are viewed with suspicion because it seems odd that a manufacturer would ever want to charge less for a larger order if its intention is benign. On the other hand, policymakers and legal scholars have overlooked plausible efficiency rationales. In this paper, we have offered an efficiency rationale for the use of all-units discounts in retail contracts. In particular, we showed in a bilateral monopoly setting that all-units discounts can arise in the absence of any exclusionary motive. We compared and contrasted all-units discounts to other quantity-discount schemes, such as two-part tariffs and incremental-units discounts, and showed that, when demand is deterministic, all-units discounts are equally adept at solving the double marginalization problem that arises with linear pricing when retailers have market power. And, when retailers have private information about demand, we showed that all-units discounts can yield strictly higher profit for the manufacturer (lower profit for the retailer) than the profit-maximizing menu of two-part tariffs or incremental-units discount. Compared to linear pricing, all-units discounts are welfare improving. Compared to a benchmark of two-part tariffs, there exist environments in which all-units discounts can lead to higher or lower consumer prices in equilibrium. Our results suggest that it might be possible to determine when all-units discounts are likely to be welfare improving and when not. In the context of our bilateral monopoly setting, we find that with linear demands the former case is more likely when the uncertainty about demand is over population size (tourism), or when one demand state is a vertical translation of another, while the latter case is more likely when the uncertainty applies to aggregate consumers' incomes. These results suggest that a more cautious approach should be taken in antitrust enforcement against all-units discounts. The bias that currently exists against all-units discounts appears to be unjustified. In the absence of traditional percursors of potential market foreclosure, such as the manufacturer engaging in predatory pricing by pricing all-units below marginal cost (Marx and Shaffer, 1998), or large fixed costs that give rise to significant economies of scale (Rasmusen et. al. 1991; and Segal and Whinston, 2000), or the existence of long-term contracts that explicitly specify exclusive dealing (Aghion and Bolton, 1987) or otherwise condition quantity sold on the retailer's purchases of competitors' products, we suggest that these discounts can be welfare improving in a wide variety of circumstances. As a solution to the double marginalization problem they unambiguously lead to lower prices and higher welfare. As a means of inducing second-degree price discrimination, they may lead to higher or lower prices than other quantity-discount schemes.
Appendix To prove Lemma 1, we must show that (16) and (17) are satisfied with equality at To show the
manufacturer has a profitable deviation, consider an alternative menu of contracts
With these contracts, there is no change in the manufacturer's profit in the low-demand state and the
constraint in (16) is satisfied (the option meant for the low-demand retailer is unchanged). To see that the
constraint in (17) is satisfied, note that because Now suppose To show the manufacturer has a profitable deviation, consider an alternative menu of contracts
With these contracts, there is no change in the manufacturer's profit in the high-demand state and the
constraint in (17) is satisfied (the menu meant for the high-demand retailer is unchanged, and it is now more
costly to mimic the low-demand retailer). To see that the constraint in (16) is satisfied, note that because the
retailer can always choose We know from Lemma 1 that (16) must be satisfied with equality at To finish the proof, it remains only to establish that To narrow the possibilities, suppose To prove Proposition 3, we must show that
Suppose
To show the manufacturer has a profitable deviation, consider an alternative menu of contracts
With these contracts, there is no change in the manufacturer's profit in the low-demand state and the constraint in (16) is satisfied (the option meant for the low-demand retailer is unchanged). Also, because To prove Proposition 4, we begin by considering the high-demand retailer's quantity choice if it were to
purchase under the contract meant for the low-demand retailer. Since
Differentiating (A.6) with respect to
Differentiating (A.7) with respect to Example in which welfare is higher with all-units discounts Suppose the inverse demands are given by ![]() In the case of all-units discounts, we will have different solutions for the two subcases that may arise.
If ![]() In this subcase, the high-demand retailer's quantity choice is the same in both cases (as expected), while the
low-demand retailer's quantity choice is higher if and only if If ![]() Comparing Example in which welfare is the same or higher with all-units discounts Suppose the inverse demands are given by ![]() In the case of all-units discounts, we will have different solutions for the two subcases that may arise.
If ![]() In this subcase, the high-demand retailer's quantity choice is the same in both cases (as expected), whole the low-demand retailer's quantity choice is higher if and only if If ![]() We see that Example in which welfare is lower with all-units discounts Suppose the inverse demands are given by ![]() In the case of all-units discounts, we will have different solutions for the two subcases that may arise.
If ![]() In this subcase, the high-demand retailer's quantity choice is the same in both cases (as expected), while the low-demand retailer's quantity choice is higher if and only if ![]() If this condition holds, then welfare is lower with lower with all-units discounts. If ![]() Comparing
REFERENCES Aghion, P. and P. Bolton (1987), "Contracts as a Barrier to Entry," American Economic Review, 77: 388-401. Goldman, M., H. Leland, and D. Sibley (1984), "Optimal Nonuniform Pricing," Review of Economic Studies, 51: 305-320. Katz, M. (1989), "Vertical Contractual Relations," in Handbook of Industrial Organization, R. Schmalensee and R. Willig, eds., Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Elsevier Science Publishers. Marx, L. and G. Shaffer (1998), "Predatory Accomodation: Below-Cost Pricing Without Exclusion in Intermediate Goods Markets," Rand Journal of Economics, 30: 22-43. Maskin, E. and J. Riley (1984), "Monopoly with Incomplete Information," Rand Journal of Economics, 15: 171-196. Mathewson, G.F. and R. Winter (1984), "An Economic Theory of Vertical Restraints," Rand Journal of Economics, 15: 27-38. Moorthy, K.S. (1987), Managing Channel Profits: Comment, Marketing Science, 6: 375-379. Nahmias, S. (2001), Production and Operations Analysis, 4th ed., New York, NY: McGraw Hill. O'Brien, D.P. and G. Shaffer (1992), "Vertical Control with Bilateral Contracts," Rand Journal of Economics, 23: 299-308. Ordover, J. and J. Panzar (1982), "On the Nonlinear Pricing of Inputs," International Economic Review, 23: 659-675. Perry, M.K. and R. Porter (1990), "Can Resale Price Maintenance and Franchise Fees Correct Sub-Optimal Levels of Retail Service," International Journal of Industrial Organization, 8: 115-141. Rasmusen, E., Ramseyer, J., and J. Wiley (1991), "Naked Exclusion," American Economic Review, 81: 1137-1145. Reiffen, D. (1999), "On the Equivalence of Resale Price Maintenance and Quantity Restrictions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, 17: 277-288. Roberts, K. (1979), "Welfare Considerations of Nonlinear Pricing," Economic Journal, 89: 66-83. Salant, S. (1989), "When is Inducing Self Selection Suboptimal for a Monopolist," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104: 391-398. Segal, I. and M. Whinston (2000), "Naked Exclusion: Comment," American Economic Review, 90: 296-311. Spence, A.M. (1977), "Nonlinear Prices and Welfare," Journal of Public Economics, 8: 1-18. Spence, A.M. (1980), "Multiproduct Quantity Dependent Prices and Profitability Constraints," Review of Economic Studies, 47: 821-841. Spengler, J. (1950), "Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy," Journal of Political Economy, 58: 347-352. Tirole, J. (1988), The Theory of Industrial Organization, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Tom, W., Balto, D., and N. Averitt (2000), "Anticompetitive Aspects of Market-Share Discounts and Other Incentives to Exclusive Dealing," Antitrust Law Journal, 67: 615-639. Warren-Boulton, R. (1974), "Vertical Control with Variable Proportions," Journal of Political Economy, 82: 783-802. Willig, R. (1978), "Pareto-Superior Nonlinear Outlay Schedules," Bell Journal of Economics, 9: 56-69. Winter, R. (1993), "Vertical Control and Price Versus Non-Price Competition," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108: 61-76.
FOOTNOTES * Addresses: Sreya Kolay, Department of Economics, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627; Greg Shaffer, Simon School of Business, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627; and Janusz A. Ordover, Department of Economics, New York University, New York, NY 10003. E-mail: srya@troi.cc.rochester.edu; shaffer@simon.rochester.edu; and janusz.ordover@nyu.edu. Corresponding author: Greg Shaffer, voice: 585-275-4497; fax: 585-273-1140. 1 With linear pricing, the retailer's average per-unit price is independent of the amount purchased. In other words, a retailer pays the same constant per-unit price (and no fixed fee) regardless of how much it purchases. 2 The problem of double marginalization was first pointed out by Spengler (1950). The use of two-part tariffs as a solution has been noted by Moorthy (1987), Tirole (1988; 174-176), Katz (1989; 664-665) and many others. 3 Nahmias (2001; 216) states "The all-units schedule appears irrational in some respects. Why would .... actually charge less for a larger order? One reason would be to provide an incentive for the purchaser to buy more." 4 See Dekeyser, "Pricing and Discounts/Rebates in Dominant Companies-The Commission's View," DG Competition, European Commission, Brussels, at 3. See also the article by Tom, Balto, and Averitt (2000). 5 Seminal articles on vertical control include Warren-Boulton (1974) and Matliewson and Winter (1984). 6 The problem we consider is formally equivalent to implementing second-degree price discrimination among retailers with different demands. In the context of our model, the manufacturer offers a menu of options to the retailer and prices the menu so as to induce the retailer to reveal the state of demand by the option it selects. 7 We follow the tradition of the vertical-restraints literature and say that an integrated firm is one that controls all the pricing and quantity decisions made by the vertical structure. See Tirole (1988; 170). 8 Mathewson and Winter (1984) use the terminology of instruments and targets. One can think of the manufacturer's decision variables as instruments, and the retailer's decision variables as targets. "The control problem consists in knowing how to use the instruments to reach, or come close to, the desired values of the targets--that is, the values that maximize the vertical structure's aggregate (vertically integrated) profit (Tirole, 1988: 173)." For specific applications, see Perry and Porter (1990), O'Brien and Shaffer (1992), Winter (1993), and Reiffen (1999). 9 After substitution, the manufacturer's problem is to choose w to solve 10 The European Commission has brought several cases against upstream firms for, among other things, offering all-units discounts in their contracts. To our knowledge, the U.S. antitrust agencies have not explicitly condemned contracts with all-units discounts, although their concerns are similar (see Tom, Balto, and Averitt, 2000). 11 A similar idea motivates the use of maximum resale price maintenance (a vertical restraint in which a resale price-ceiling is imposed on the retailer) as a solution to the problem of double marginalization. 12 In what follows, we assume that the manufacturer wants to serve both retailer types. That is, we assume that selling to the high-demand retailer only is less profitable than selling to both types. See Salant (1989) for a characterization of the necessary and sufficient conditions for discrimination to be optimal for the two-type case. 13 See, for example, Willig (1978), Spence (1977, 1980), Roberts (1979), Goldman, Leland, and Sibley (1984), Maskin and Riley (1984), and the excellent survey on second-degree price discrimination in Tirole (1988), pp. 142-158. 14 This result depends on the assumption that the retailer's demand in the high-demand state is independent of its demand in the low-demand state. Ordover and Panzar (1982) show that if the demands across states of nature, or among different types of consumers, are interrelated, then a distortion may arise even in the high-demand state. 15 Two constraints are suppressed: a high-demand retailer must purchase a positive quantity, and a low-demand
retailer must purchase under 16 To see this, note that the high-demand retailer's profit is 17 To see this, note that for all units between 18 We suppress the other constraints. As in section III, the high-demand retailer's participation is assured given (16),
and the constraint that the low-demand retailer purchase under 19 For example, the manufacturer can choose 20 Note that | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||