U.S. Department
of Justice
BIA Precedent Chart AI-CA
AIRLINE FINES
Matter of Varig Brazilian Airlines Flight No. 830, 21 I&N Dec. 744 (BIA 1997)
(1) The reasonable diligence standard of section 273(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1323(c) (Supp. III 1991), is applied both to the determination of whether the passenger was an alien and to the adequacy of the carrier’s examination of the passenger’s documents.
(2) In a determination of reasonable diligence under section 273(c) of the Act, the carrier must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that it has established, and its staff has complied with, procedures to ensure that all of its passengers’ travel documents have been inspected prior to boarding so that only those with valid passports and visas are permitted to board.
(3) Where a document is altered, counterfeit, or expired, or where a passenger is an imposter, to the extent that a reasonable person should be able to identify the deficiency, a carrier is required to refuse boarding as a matter of reasonable diligence.
(4) In denying reconsideration, the Board of Immigration Appeals reaffirms its decision that, in fine proceedings, the reasonable diligence standard is applied both to the determination of whether a passenger is an alien and to the adequacy of the carrier’s examination of the passenger’s documents.
Matter of Air India Flight No. 101, 21 I&N Dec. 890 (BIA 1997)
A decision of the Immigration and Naturalization Service regarding the imposition of a fine that does not state the specific reasons for the determination fails to meet the requirements of 8 C.F.R. § 103.3(a)(1) (1996) and is inadequate for purposes of appellate review.
Matter of Air India Airlines Flight No. AI 101, 22 I&N Dec. 681 (BIA 1999)
A carrier is subject to fine under section 273(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §1323(a) (Supp. V 1993), for bringing an alien passenger without proper documents to the United States even though the alien passenger is a lawful permanent resident who was subsequently granted a waiver under 8 C.F.R. § 211.1(b)(3) (1994).
Matter of United Airlines Flight UA802, 22 I&N Dec. 777 (BIA 1999)
A carrier is subject to fine under section 273(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1994), when an alien passenger it has transported to the United States is paroled into the country but is not granted a waiver of documents under 8 C.F.R. § 212.1(g) (1995).
Matter of Finnair Flight AY103, 23 I&N Dec. 140 (BIA 2001)
A carrier is subject to a fine under section 273(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1994), for bringing an alien passenger to the United States without a valid nonimmigrant visa even though the passenger was subsequently granted a waiver of the nonimmigrant documentary requirements pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 212.1(g) (1997).
Matter of Northwest Airlines Flight NW 1821, 23 I&N Dec. 38 (BIA 2001)
A carrier is subject to fine under section 231(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1221(b) (Supp. IV 1998), when it fails to file a properly completed Form I-94T (Arrival-Departure Record (Transit Without Visa)) for an alien who is a transit without visa passenger not departing directly on the same flight.
AMERICAN BAPTIST CHURCHES (ABC) SETTLEMENT
Matter of Morales, 21 I&N Dec. 130 (BIA 1995, 1996)
(1) Where an alien in exclusion or deportation proceedings requests administrative closure pursuant to the settlement agreement set forth in American Baptist Churches et al. v. Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 797 (N.D.Cal.1991) ("ABC agreement"), the function of the Executive Office for Immigration Review ("EOIR") is restricted to the inquiries required under paragraph 19 of the agreement, i.e., (1) whether an alien is a class member, (2) whether he has been convicted of an aggravated felony, and (3) whether he poses one of the three safety concerns enumerated in paragraph 17.
(2) If a class member requesting administrative closure under the ABC agreement has not been convicted of an aggravated felony and does not fall within one of the three listed categories of public safety concerns under paragraph 17 of the agreement, EOIR must administratively close the matter to afford the alien the opportunity to pursue his rights in a special proceeding before the Immigration and Naturalization Service.
(3) If the applicant is subsequently found ineligible for the benefits of the ABC agreement in the nonadversarial proceeding before the asylum officer, or if he is denied asylum after a full de novo hearing, the Service may reinstitute exclusion or deportation proceedings by filing a motion with the Immigration Judge to recalendar the case, and such motion need only show, through evidence of an asylum officer's decision in the matter, that the class member's rights under paragraph 2 of the agreement have been exercised.
(4) Neither the Board of Immigration Appeals nor the Immigration Judges will review the Service's eligibility determinations under paragraph 2 of the ABC agreement.
Matter of Gutierrez, 21 I&N Dec. 479 (BIA 1996)
(1) Administrative closure of a case is used to temporarily remove the case from an Immigration Judge's calendar or from the Board of Immigration Appeal's docket. A case may not be administratively closed if opposed by either of the parties. Administrative closing of a case does not result in a final order. It is merely an administrative convenience which allows the removal of cases from the calendar in appropriate situations.
(2) The settlement agreement under American Baptist Churches v. Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796 (N.D.Cal.1991) ("ABC"), specifically states that nothing in the agreement shall limit the right of a class member to pursue other legal rights to which he or she might be entitled under the Immigration and Nationality Act. This language is mandatory and does not indicate that such action by an alien would be curtailed by the administrative closing of each class member's case or postponed until the eventual final resolution of each class member's remedies under the settlement agreement itself.
(3) An ABC alien's right to apply for relief from deportation is not prohibited due to the administrative closure of his or her case. Such an alien, therefore, may file a motion to reopen with the administrative body which administratively closed his or her case in order to pursue issues or relief from deportation which were not raised in the administratively closed proceedings. Such motion must comply with all applicable regulations in order for the alien's case to be reopened.
(4) An alien who has had his or her case reopened and who receives an adverse decision from an Immigration Judge in the reopened proceedings must file an appeal of that new decision, in accordance with applicable regulations, in order to vest the Board with jurisdiction to review the Immigration Judge's decision on the issues raised in the reopened proceedings. That appeal would be a separate and independent appeal from any previously filed appeal and would not be consolidated with an appeal before the Board regarding issues which have been administratively closed.
(5) Any appeal pending before the Board regarding issues or forms of relief from deportation which have been administratively closed by the Board prior to the reopening of the alien's proceedings will remain administratively closed. A motion to reinstate an appeal is required before issues which have been administratively closed can be considered by the Board.
APPEALS
Matter of S-H-, 23 I&N Dec. 462 (BIA 2002)
Under new regulations that become effective on September 25, 2002, the Board of Immigration Appeals has limited fact-finding ability on appeal, which heightens the need for Immigration Judges to include in their decisions clear and complete findings of fact that are supported by the record and are in compliance with controlling law. Matter of Vilanova-Gonzalez, 13 I&N Dec. 399 (BIA 1999), and Matter of Becerra-Miranda, 12 I&N Dec. 358 (BIA 1967), superseded.
Matter of A-S-B-, 24 I&N Dec. 493 (BIA 2008)
(1) Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3) (2008), the Board of Immigration Appeals should defer to the factual findings of an Immigration Judge, unless they are clearly erroneous, but it retains independent judgment and discretion, subject to applicable governing standards, regarding pure questions of law and the application of a particular standard of law to those facts.
(2) In determining whether established facts are sufficient to meet a legal standard, such as “well-founded fear,” the Board has the authority to weigh the evidence in a manner different from that accorded by the Immigration Judge, or to conclude that the foundation for the Immigration Judge’s legal conclusions was insufficient or otherwise not supported by the evidence of record.
Standard and Scope of Review–BIA
Matter of A-S-B-, 24 I&N Dec. 493 (BIA 2008)
1) Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3) (2008), the Board of Immigration Appeals should defer to the factual findings of an Immigration Judge, unless they are clearly erroneous, but it retains independent judgment and discretion, subject to applicable governing standards, regarding pure questions of law and the application of a particular standard of law to those facts.
(2) In determining whether established facts are sufficient to meet a legal standard, such as “well-founded fear,” the Board has the authority to weigh the evidence in a manner different from that accorded by the Immigration Judge, or to conclude that the foundation for the Immigration Judge’s legal conclusions was insufficient or otherwise not supported by the evidence of record.
Matter of V-K-, 24 I&N Dec. 500 (BIA 2008)
The Board of Immigration Appeals reviews de novo an Immigration Judge’s prediction or finding regarding the likelihood that an alien will be tortured, because it relates to whether the ultimate statutory requirement for establishing eligibility for relief from removal has been met and is therefore a mixed question of law and fact, or aquestion of judgment.
Matter of Lopez, 22 I&N Dec. 16 (BIA 1998)
Where the Board of Immigration Appeals dismisses an appeal as untimely, without adjudication on the merits, the Board retains jurisdiction over a motion to reconsider its dismissal of the untimely appeal to the extent that the motion challenges the finding of untimeliness or requests consideration of the reasons for untimeliness. Matter of Mladineo, 14 I&N Dec. 591 (BIA 1974), modified.
Matter of Liadov, 23 I&N Dec. 990 (BIA 2006)
(1) Neither the Immigration and Nationality Act nor the regulations grant the Board of Immigration Appeals authority to extend the 30-day time limit for filing an appeal to the Board.
(2) Although the Board may certify a case to itself under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(c) (2006) where exceptional circumstances are present, a short delay by an overnight delivery service is not a rare or extraordinary event that would warrant consideration of an untimely appeal on certification.
Matter of L-V-K-, 22 I&N Dec. 976 (BIA 1999)
(1) An Immigration Judge’s order of deportation becomes a final administrative decision upon an alien’s waiver of the right to appeal.
(2) Where an alien files a motion to remand during the pendency of an appeal from an Immigration Judge’s denial of a motion to reopen a final administrative decision and more than 90 days have passed since entry of that final administrative decision, the Board of Immigration Appeals lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the motion because it is time-barred by 8 C.F.R. §3.2(c)(2) (1999).
Matter of Ocampo, 22 I&N Dec. 1301 (BIA 2000)
Voluntary departure may not be granted prior to the completion of removal proceedings without an express waiver of the right to appeal by the alien or the alien’s representative.
Matter of Rodriguez-Diaz, 22 I&N Dec. 1320 (BIA 2000)
An unrepresented alien who accepts an Immigration Judge’s decision as “final” does not effectively waive the right to appeal where the Immigration Judge failed to make clear that such acceptance constitutes an irrevocable waiver of appeal rights; therefore, the Board of Immigration Appeals has jurisdiction to consider the alien’s appeal.
Matter of Patino, 23 I&N Dec. 74 (BIA 2001)
A party wishing to challenge the validity of an appeal waiver may file either a motion to reconsider with the Immigration Judge or an appeal directly with the Board of Immigration Appeals.
ASYLUM
Matter of K-A-, 23 I&N Dec. 661 (BIA 2004)
(1) Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1209.2(c) (2004), once an asylee has been placed in removal proceedings, the Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals have exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate the asylee’s applications for adjustment of status and a waiver of inadmissibility under sections 209(b) and (c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1159(b) and (c) (2000). Matter of H-N-, 22 I&N Dec. 1039 (BIA 1999), distinguished.
(2) Termination of a grant of asylum pursuant to section 208(c)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(2) (2000), is not mandatory with respect to an asylee who qualifies for and merits adjustment of status and a waiver of inadmissibility under sections 209(b) and (c) of the Act.
Matter of L-K-, 23 I&N Dec. 677 (BIA 2004)
(1) Under section 245(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1255(c)(2) (2000), an alien who has failed to continuously maintain a lawful status since entry into the United States, other than through no fault of his own or for technical reasons, is ineligible for adjustment of status under section 245(a) of the Act.
(2) A failure to maintain lawful status is not “for technical reasons” within the meaning of section 245(c)(2) of the Act and the applicable regulations at 8 C.F.R. §§ 1245.1(d)(2)(ii) (2004), where the alien filed an asylum application while in lawful nonimmigrant status, the nonimmigrant status subsequently expired, and the asylum application was referred to the Immigration Court prior to the time the alien applied for adjustment of status.
Matter of L-T-P-, 26 I&N Dec. 862 (BIA 2016)
(1) An applicant for adjustment of status under section 209 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1159 (2012), must be either a refugee or an asylee.
(2) Cubans who were paroled into the United States under section 212(d)(5) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1976), between April 1, 1980, and May 18, 1980, are considered to have been admitted as refugees pursuant to the Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102.
(3) The respondent, who was paroled into the United States on August 25, 1980, with an Arrival/Departure Record (Form I-94) that was stamped "Cuban/Haitian Entrant (Status Pending)" and indicates that the purpose of his parole was for "Cuban Asylum," is ineligible to adjust his status under section 209 of the Act because he was neither admitted as a refugee nor granted asylum.
Matter of N-A-I-, 27 I&N Dec. 72 (BIA 2017)
(1) An alien who adjusts status under section 209(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b) (2012), changes his or her status from that of an alien granted asylum to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, thereby terminating the alien’s asylee status. Matter of C-J-H-, 26 I&N Dec. 284 (BIA 2014), clarified.
(2)The restrictions on removal in section 208(c)(1)(A) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(1)(A) (2012), do not apply to an alien granted asylum whose status is adjusted to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence pursuant to section 209(b) of the Act.
Matter of C-B-, 25 I&N Dec. 888 (BIA 2012)
(1) In order to meaningfully effectuate the statutory and regulatory privilege of legal representation where it has not been expressly waived by a respondent, an Immigration Judge must grant a reasonable and realistic period of time to provide a fair opportunity for the respondent to seek, speak with, and retain counsel.
(2) If a respondent expresses a fear of persecution or harm in a country to which he or she might be removed, the regulations require the Immigration Judge to advise the respondent of the right to apply for asylum or withholding of removal (including protection under the Convention Against Torture) and make the appropriate application forms available.
(3) If a respondent indicates that he or she will not waive appeal and is therefore ineligible or a grant of voluntary departure prior to the completion of removal proceedings under section 240B(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a)(1) (2006), the Immigration Judge should consider the respondent’s eligibility for voluntary departure at the
Matter of D-M-C-P-, 26 I&N Dec. 644 (BIA 2015)
(1) Neither an Immigration Judge nor the Board of Immigration Appeals has jurisdiction to consider whether asylum-only proceedings were improvidently instituted pursuant to a referral under the Visa Waiver Program.
(2) It is improper to deem an application for relief abandoned based on the applicant’s failure to comply with the biometrics filing requirement where the record does not reflect that the applicant received notification advisories concerning that requirement, was given a deadline for submitting the biometrics, and was advised of the consequences of his or her failure to comply.
Matter of E-P-, 21 I&N Dec. 860 (BIA 1997)
(1) A finding of credible testimony by an asylum applicant is not dispositive as to whether asylum should be granted; rather, the specific content of the testimony, and any other relevant evidence in the record, is also considered.
(2) When evaluating an asylum claim, the changed conditions of the country at issue, as properly established in the record of proceedings, may be a significant factor in concluding that an applicant has not established a well-founded fear of persecution.
Matter of A-E-M-, 21 I&N Dec. 1157 (BIA 1998)
(1) The reasonableness of an alien’s fear of persecution is reduced when his family remains in his native country unharmed for a long period of time after his departure.
(2) Where evidence from the United States Department of State indicates that country conditions have changed after an alien’s departure from his native country and that the Peruvian Government has reduced the Shining Path’s ability to carry out persecutory acts, the alien failed to establish a well-founded fear of persecution in Peru.
(3) An alien who failed to rebut evidence from the United States Department of State indicating that the Shining Path operates in only a few areas of Peru did not establish a well-founded fear of country-wide persecution in that country.
Matter of N-M-A-, 22 I&N Dec. 312 (BIA 1998)
(1) Under 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i) (1998), where an asylum applicant has shown that he has been persecuted in the past on account of a statutorily-protected ground, and the record reflects that country conditions have changed to such an extent that the asylum applicant no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution from his original persecutors, the applicant bears the burden of demonstrating that he has a well-founded fear of persecution from any new source.
(2) An asylum applicant who no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution due to changed country conditions may still be eligible for a discretionary grant of asylum under 8 C.F.R. §208.13(b)(1)(ii) only if he establishes, as a threshold matter, compelling reasons for being unwilling to return to his country of nationality or last habitual residence arising out of the severity of the past persecution.
(3) The applicant failed to establish compelling reasons arising out of the severity of the past persecution for being unwilling to return to Afghanistan where he suffered beatings during a month-long detention and the disappearance and likely death of his father.
Matter of A-E-M-, 21 I&N Dec. 1157 (BIA 1998)
(1) The reasonableness of an alien’s fear of persecution is reduced when his family remains in his native country unharmed for a long period of time after his departure.
(2) Where evidence from the United States Department of State indicates that country conditions have changed after an alien’s departure from his native country and that the Peruvian Government has reduced the Shining Path’s ability to carry out persecutory acts, the alien failed to establish a well-founded fear of persecution in Peru.
(3) An alien who failed to rebut evidence from the United States Department of State indicating that the Shining Path operates in only a few areas of Peru did not establish a well-founded fear of country-wide persecution in that country.
Matter of M-Z-M-R-, 26 I&N Dec. 28 (BIA 2012)
(1) In assessing an asylum applicant’s ability to internally relocate, an Immigration Judge must determine whether the applicant could avoid future persecution by relocating to another part of the applicant’s country of nationality and whether, under all the circumstances, it would be reasonable to expect the applicant to do so.
(2) For an applicant to be able to internally relocate safely, there must be an area of the country where the circumstances are substantially better than those giving rise to a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of the original claim.
(3) If an applicant is able to internally relocate, an Immigration Judge should balance the factors identified at 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(3) (2012) in light of the applicable burden of proof to determine whether it would be reasonable under all the circumstances to expect the applicant to relocate.
Matter of B-, 21 I&N Dec. 66 (BIA 1995)
Under the circumstances of this case, where an asylum applicant’s testimony was plausible, detailed, internally consistent, consistent with the asylum application, and unembellished during the applicant’s repeated relating of events in a probing cross-examination, the Board declines to adopt the Immigration Judge’s adverse credibility finding.
Matter of S-S-, 21 I&N Dec. 121 (BIA 1995)
(1) In order to fully and fairly review a decision of an Asylum Office Director in asylum proceedings, the Board of Immigration Appeals must have before it the primary evidentiary matters relied upon by the initial adjudicator.
(2) When the credibility of an applicant for asylum and withholding of deportation is placed in issue because of alleged statements made at the asylum interview, at a minimum, the record of the interview must contain a meaningful, clear, and reliable summary of the statements made by the applicant. In the alternative, a record of the interview might be preserved in a handwritten account of the specific questions asked of the applicant and his specific responses or through transcription of an electronic recording.
Matter of S-M-J-, 21 I&N Dec. 722 (BIA 1997)
(1) General background information about a country, where available, must be included in the record as a foundation for an applicant's claim of asylum and withholding of deportation.
(2) Where the record contains general country condition information and an applicant's claim relies primarily on personal experiences not reasonably subject to verification, corroborating documentary evidence of the asylum applicant's particular experience is not required; but where it is reasonable to expect such corroborating evidence for certain alleged facts pertaining to the specifics of an applicant's claim, such evidence should be provided or an explanation should be given as to why such information was not presented. Matter of Dass, 20 I&N Dec. 120 (BIA 1989); Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I&N Dec. 439 (BIA 1987), clarified.
(3) The Immigration and Naturalization Service should play an active role in introducing evidence regarding current country conditions.
(4) Although the burden of proof is not on the Immigration Judge, if background evidence is central to an alien's claim and the Immigration Judge relies on the country conditions in adjudicating the alien's case, the source of the Immigration Judge's knowledge of the particular country must be made part of the record.
Matter of E-P-, 21 I&N Dec. 860 (BIA 1997)
(1) A finding of credible testimony by an asylum applicant is not dispositive as to whether asylum should be granted; rather, the specific content of the testimony, and any other relevant evidence in the record, is also considered.
(2) When evaluating an asylum claim, the changed conditions of the country at issue, as properly established in the record of proceedings, may be a significant factor in concluding that an applicant has not established a well-founded fearof persecution.
Matter of S-S-, 21 I&NDec. 900 (BIA 1997) (Asylum Interview Statement)
(1) In order to fully and fairly review a decision of an Asylum Office Director in asylum proceedings, the Board of Immigration Appeals must have before it the primary evidentiary matters relied upon by the initial adjudicator.
(2) When the credibility of an applicant for asylum and withholding of deportation is placed in issue because of alleged statements made at the asylum interview, at a minimum, the record of the interview must contain a meaningful, clear, and reliable summary of the statements made by the applicant. In the alternative, a record of the interview might be preserved in a handwritten account of the specific questions asked of the applicant and his specific responses or through transcription of an electronic recording.
Matter of O-D-, 21 I&N Dec. 1079 (BIA 1998) (Counterfeit Document)
Presentation by an asylum applicant of an identification document that is found to be counterfeit by forensic experts not only discredits the applicant’s claim as to the critical elements of identity and nationality, but, in the absence of an explanation or rebuttal, also indicates an overall lack of credibility regarding the entire claim.
Matter of A-S-, 21 I&N Dec. 1106 (BIA 1998)
(1) Although the Board of Immigration Appeals has de novo review authority, the Board accords deference to an Immigration Judge’s findings concerning credibility and credibility-related issues.
(2) The Board of Immigration Appeals defers to an adverse credibility finding based upon inconsistencies and omissions regarding events central to an alien’s asylum claim where a review of the record reveals that (1) the discrepancies and omissions described by the Immigration Judge are actually present; (2) these discrepancies and omissions provide specific and cogent reasons to conclude that the alien provided incredible testimony; and (3) a convincing explanation for the discrepancies and omissions has not been supplied by the alien.
(3) Since an Immigration Judge is in the unique position to observe the testimony of an alien, a credibility finding which is supported by a reasonable adverse inferencedrawn from an alien’s demeanor generally should be accorded a high degree of deference, especially where such inference is supported by specific and cogent reasons for doubting the veracity of the substance of the alien’s testimony.
Matter of Y-B-, 21 I&N Dec. 1136 (BIA 1998)
(1) An asylum applicant does not meet his or her burden of proof by general and meager testimony.
(2) Specific, detailed, and credible testimony or a combination of detailed testimony and corroborative background evidence is necessary to prove a case for asylum.
(3) The weaker an applicant’s testimony, the greater the need for corrobative evidence.
Matter of M-D-, 21 I&N Dec. 1180 (BIA 1998) (Identity)
An alien who did not provide any evidence to corroborate his purported identity, nationality, claim of persecution, or his former presence or his family’s current presence at a refugee camp, where it was reasonable to expect such evidence, failed to meet his burden of proof to establish his asylum claim.
Matter of S-B-, 24 I&N Dec. 42 (BIA 2006)
(1) The provisions regarding credibility determinations enacted in section 101(a)(3) of the REAL ID Act of 2005, Div. B of Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, 303 (effective May 11, 2005) (to be codified at section 208(b)(1)(B)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)), only apply to applications for asylum, withholding, and other relief from removal that were initially filed on or after May 11, 2005, whether with an asylum officer or an Immigration Judge.
(2) Where the respondent filed his applications for relief with an asylum officer prior to the May 11, 2005, effective date of section 208(b)(1)(B)(iii) of the Act, but renewed his applications in removal proceedings before an Immigration Judge subsequent to that date, the provisions of section 208(b)(1)(B)(iii) were not applicable to credibility determinations made in adjudicating hisapplications.
Matter of J-Y-C-, 24 I&N Dec. 260 (BIA 2007)
(1) Under section 101(a)(3) of the REAL ID Act of 2005, Div. B of Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302, 303 (to be codified at section 208(b)(1)(B)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)), a trier of fact may, considering the totality of the circumstances, base a credibility finding on an asylum applicant’s demeanor, the plausibility of his account, and inconsistencies in statements, without regard to whether they go to the heart of the asylum claim.
(2) The Immigration Judge properly considered the totality of the circumstances in finding that the respondent lacked credibility based on his demeanor, his implausible testimony, the lack of corroborating evidence, and his inconsistent statements, some of which did not relate to the heart of hisclaim.
Matter of L-A-C-, 26 I&N Dec. 516 (BIA 2015)
(1) Where an Immigration Judge finds that an applicant for asylum or withholding of removal has not provided reasonably available corroborating evidence to establish his claim, the Immigration Judge should first consider the applicant’s explanations for the absence of such evidence and, if a continuance is requested, determine whether there is good cause to continue the proceedings for the applicant to obtain the evidence.
(2) Although an Immigration Judge should consider an applicant’s explanation for the absence of corroborating evidence, section 208(b)(1)(B)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2012), does not require the Immigration Judge to identify the specific evidence necessary to meet the applicant’s burden of proof and to provide an automatic continuance for the applicant to obtain that evidence prior to rendering a decision on the application.
Matter of R-K-K-, 26 I&N Dec. 658 (BIA 2015)
(1) Significant similarities between statements submitted by applicants in different proceedings can be considered by an Immigration Judge in making an adverse credibility determination if certain procedural steps are undertaken to preserve the fairness of the proceedings.
(2) When relying on inter-proceeding similarities, the Immigration Judge should give the applicant meaningful notice of the similarities and a reasonable opportunity to explain them prior to making a credibility determination that is based on the totality of the circumstances.
Matter of L-S-J-, 21 I&N Dec. 973 (BIA 1997)
(1) An asylum applicant who has been convicted of robbery with a deadly weapon (handgun) and sentenced to 2 1/2 years in prison is not eligible for asylum because he has been convicted of an aggravated felony, that is, a crime of violence for which the sentence is at least 1 year.
(2) An applicant for withholding of deportation who has been convicted of robbery with a deadly weapon (handgun) has been convicted of a particularly serious crime and is not eligible for withholding of deportation regardless of the length of his sentence.
Matter of Jean, 23 I&N Dec. 323 (A.G. 2002)
(1) The 30-day period set forth in 8C.F.R. §3.38(b) (2002) for filing an appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals is mandatory and jurisdictional, and it begins to run upon the issuance of a final disposition in the case.
(2) The Board of Immigration Appeals' authority under 8C.F.R. §3.1(c) (2002) to certify cases to itself in its discretion is limited to exceptional circumstances, and is not meant to be used as a general cure for filing defects or to otherwise circumvent the regulations, where enforcing them might result in hardship.
(3) In evaluating the propriety of granting an otherwise inadmissible alien a discretionary waiver to permit adjustment of status from refugee to lawful permanent resident pursuant to section 209(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8U.S.C. §1159(c) (2000), any humanitarian, family unity preservation, or public interest considerations must be balanced against the seriousness of the criminal offense that rendered the alien inadmissible.
(4) Aliens who have committed violent or dangerous crimes will not be granted a discretionary waiver to permit adjustment of status from refugee to lawful permanent resident pursuant to section 209(c) of the Act except in extraordinary circumstances, such as those involving national security or foreign policy considerations, or cases in which an alien clearly demonstrates that the denial of status adjustment would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. Depending on the gravity of the alien's underlying criminal offense, such a showing of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship might still be insufficient.
(5) Aliens who have committed violent or dangerous crimes will not be granted asylum, even if they are technically eligible for such relief, except in extraordinary circumstances, such as those involving national security or foreign policy considerations, or cases in which an alien clearly demonstrates that the denial of status adjustment would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. Depending on the gravity of the alien's underlying criminal offense, such a showing of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship might still be insufficient.
Matter of E-A-, 26 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 2012)
(1) In assessing whether there are serious reasons for believing that an applicant for asylum or withholding of removal has committed a serious nonpolitical crime, an Immigration Judge should balance the seriousness of the criminal acts against the political aspect of the conduct to determine whether the criminal nature of the acts outweighs their political character.
(2) When considered together, the applicant’s actions as a member of a group that burned passenger buses and cars, threw stones, and disrupted the economic activity of merchants in the market, while pretending to be from the opposition party, reached the level of serious criminal conduct that, when weighed against its political nature, constituted a serious nonpolitical crime.
Matter of M-H-, 26 I&N Dec. 46 (BIA 2012)
The holding in Matter of N-A-M-, 24 I&N Dec. 336 (BIA 2007), that an offense need not be an aggravated felony to be considered a particularly serious crime for purposes of barring asylum or withholding of removal, should be applied to cases within the jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
Matter of B-R-, 26 I&N Dec. 119 (BIA 2013)
An alien who is a citizen or national of more than one country but has no fear of persecution in one of those countries does not qualify as a “refugee” under section 101(a)(42) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006), and is ineligible for asylum.
Matter of G-A-C-, 22 I&N Dec. 83 (BIA 1998)
An applicant for asylum who departed the United States after having been granted an advance authorization for parole, and who, on his return, was paroled into this country under the provisions of section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (Supp. V 1993), was properly placed in exclusion proceedings following the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s denial of his application for asylum and revocation of his parole. Navarro-Aispura v. INS, 53 F.3d 233 (9th Cir. 1995); and Barney v. Rogers, 83 F.3d 318 (9th Cir. 1996),distinguished.
Matter of A-N- & R-M-N-, 22 I&N Dec. 953 (BIA 1999)
Aliens seeking to reopen exclusion proceedings to apply for asylum and withholding of deportation who have presented evidence establishing materially changed circumstances in their homeland or place of last habitual residence, such that they meet the general requirements for motions to reopen, need not demonstrate "reasonable cause" for their failure to appear at the prior exclusion hearing.
Matter of K-R-Y- and K-C-S-, 24 I&N Dec. 133 (BIA 2007)
(1) The North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-333, 118 Stat. 1287, which provides that North Koreans cannot be barred from eligibility for asylum on account of any legal right to citizenship they may enjoy under the Constitution of South Korea, does not apply to North Koreans who have availed themselves of the right to citizenship in South Korea.
(2) The respondents, natives of North Korea who became citizens of South Korea, are precluded from establishing eligibility for asylum as to North Korea on the basis of their firm resettlement in South Korea.
Matter of A-G-G-, 25 I&N Dec. 486 (BIA 2011)
(1) Pursuant to section 208(b)(2)(A)(vi) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi) (2006), and 8 C.F.R. § 1208.15 (2011), the framework for making firm resettlement determinations focuses exclusively on the existence of an offer of permanent resettlement and allows for the consideration of direct and indirect evidence.
(2) The Department of Homeland Security has the initial burden to make a prima facie showing of an offer of firm resettlement by presenting direct evidence of an alien’s ability to stay in a country indefinitely; when direct evidence is unavailable, indirect evidence may be used if it has a sufficient level of clarity and force to establish that the alien is able to permanently reside in the country.
(3) An asylum applicant can rebut evidence of a firm resettlement offer by showing by a preponderance of the evidence that such an offer has not been made or that the applicant’s circumstances would render him or her ineligible for such an offer of permanent residence.
(4) Evidence that permanent resident status is available to an alien under the law of the country of proposed resettlement may be sufficient to establish a prima facie showing of an offer of firm resettlement, and a determination of firm resettlement is not contingent on whether the alien applies for that status. Matter of Soleimani, 20 I&N Dec. 99 (BIA 1989), modified.
Matter of D-X- & Y-Z-, 25 I&N Dec. 664 (BIA 2012)
(1) A facially valid permit to reside in a third country constitutes prima facie evidence of an offer of firm resettlement pursuant to section 208(b)(2)(A)(vi) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi) (2006), even if the permit was fraudulently obtained.
(2) Where an asylum applicant who has resettled in a third country travels to the United States or the country of claimed persecution and then returns to the country of resettlement, he or she has not remained in that country "only as long as was necessary to arrange onward travel" for purposes of establishing an exception to firm resettlement pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1208.15(a) (2011).
Matter of Y-L-, 24 I&N Dec. 151 (BIA 2007)
(1) In determining that an application for asylum is frivolous, the Immigration Judge must address the question of frivolousness separately and make specific findings that the applicant deliberately fabricated material elements of the asylum claim.
(2) Before the Immigration Judge makes a finding that an asylum application is frivolous, the applicant must be given sufficient opportunity to account for any discrepancies or implausible aspects of the claim.
(3) The Immigration Judge must provide cogent and convincing reasons for determining that a preponderance of the evidence supports a frivolousness finding, taking into account any explanations by the applicant for discrepancies or implausibleaspects of the claim.
Matter of B-Y-, 25 I&N Dec. 236 (BIA 2010)
(1) In making a frivolousness determination, an Immigration Judge may incorporate by reference any factual findings made in support of an adverse credibility finding, so long as the Immigration Judge makes explicit findings that the incredible aspects of the asylum application were material and were deliberately fabricated. Matter of Y-L-, 24 I&N Dec. 151 (BIA 2007), clarified.
(2) In considering an asylum applicant’s explanations for inconsistencies or discrepancies, an Immigration Judge making a frivolousness determination must separately address the applicant’s explanations in the context of how they may have a bearing on the materiality and deliberateness requirements unique to that determination.
(3) When the required frivolousness warnings have been given to an asylum applicant prior to the merits hearing, the Immigration Judge is not required to afford additional warnings or to seek further explanation in regard to inconsistencies that have become obvious during the course of the hearing.
Matter of M-S-B-, 26 I&N Dec. 872 (BIA 2016)
(1) An untimely application for asylum may be found frivolous under section 208(d)(6) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(6) (2012). Luciana v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 502 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2007), distinguished. Matter of X-M-C-, 25 I&N Dec. 322 (BIA 2010), followed.
(2) The respondent’s asylum application is frivolous because he deliberately made a false statement postdating by more than 2 years his date of entry into this country, which is a material element in determining his eligibility to seek asylum given the general requirement to file the application within 1 year of the date of arrival in the United States.
Matter of L-S-, 25 I&N Dec. 705 (BIA 2012)
(1) An asylum applicant who has established past persecution but no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution may nevertheless warrant a discretionary grant of humanitarian asylum based not only on compelling reasons arising out of the severity of the past persecution, but also on a “reasonable possibility that he or she may suffer other serious harm” upon removal to his or her country under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)(B) (2011).
(2) “Other serious harm”may bewholly unrelated to the applicant’s past harmand need not be inflicted on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, but the harm must be so serious that it equals the severity of persecution.
(3) In determiningwhether an applicant has established a “reasonable possibility” of “other serious harm,” adjudicators should focus on current conditions that could severely affect the applicant, such as civil strife and extreme economic deprivation, as well as on the potential for new physical or psychological harm that the applicant might suffer.
Jurisdiction of Immigration Judges
Matter of P-L-P-, 21 I&N Dec. 887 (BIA 1997)
(1) Under 8 C.F.R. § 208.2(a) (1996), the Office of Refugees, Asylum, and Parole has initial jurisdiction over an alien’s asylum application when the alien has not been served an Order to Show Cause and Notice of Hearing (Form I-221).
(2) Under 8C.F.R. § 208.2(b) (1996), an Immigration Judge has exclusive jurisdiction over an asylum application filed by an alien once an Order to Show Cause has been served upon the alien and filed with the ImmigrationCourt.
Matter of A-S-J-, 25 I&N Dec. 893 (BIA 2012)
An Immigration Judge lacks jurisdiction to review the termination of an alien’s asylum status by the Department of Homeland Security pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 208.24(a) (2007).
Matter of D-M-C-P-, 26 I&N Dec. 644 (BIA 2015)
(1) Neither an Immigration Judge nor the Board of Immigration Appeals has jurisdiction to consider whether asylum-only proceedings were improvidently instituted pursuant to a referral under the Visa Waiver Program.
(2) It is improper to deem an application for relief abandoned based on the applicant’s failure to comply with the biometrics filing requirement where the record does not reflect that the applicant received notification advisories concerning that requirement, was given a deadline for submitting the biometrics, and was advised of the consequences of his or her failure to comply.
Matter of K-R-Y- and K-C-S-, 24 I&N Dec. 133 (BIA 2007)
(1) The North Korean Human Rights Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-333, 118 Stat. 1287, which provides that North Koreans cannot be barred from eligibility for asylum on account of any legal right to citizenship they may enjoy under the Constitution of South Korea, does not apply to North Koreans who have availed themselves of the right to citizenship in South Korea.
(2) The respondents, natives of North Korea who became citizens of South Korea, are precluded from establishing eligibility for asylum as to North Korea on the basis of their firm resettlement in South Korea.
Matter of Y-C-, 23 I&N Dec. 286 (BIA 2002)
An unaccompanied minor who was in the custody of the Immigration and Naturalization Service pending removal proceedings during the 1-year period following his arrival in the United States established extraordinary circumstances that excused his failure to file an asylum application within 1 year after the dateof his arrival.
Matter of F-P-R-, 24 I&N Dec. 681 (BIA 2008)
For purposes of determining if an alien’s application for asylum was timely filed within 1 year of arrival in the United States pursuant to section 208(a)(2)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (2006), the term “last arrival” in 8 C.F.R. § 1208(a)(2)(ii) (2008) refers to the alien’s most recent arrival in the United States from a trip abroad.
Matter of T-M-H- & S-W-C-, 25 I&N Dec. 193 (BIA 2010)
(1) An alien does not receive an automatic 1-year extension in which to file an asylum application following “changed circumstances” under section 208(a)(2)(D) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D) (2006).
(2) Under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(4)(ii) (2010), the particular circumstances related to delays in filing an asylum application must be evaluated to determine whether the application was filed “within a reasonable period given those ‘changed circumstances.’”
Matter of M-A-F-, 26 I&N Dec. 651 (BIA 2015)
(1) Where an applicant has filed an asylum application before the May 11, 2005, effective date of the REAL ID Act of 2005, Division B of Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302, and, on or after that date, submitted a subsequent application that is properly viewed as a new application, the later filing date controls for purposes of determining the applicability of section 208(b)(1)(B)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2012), to credibility determinations.
(2) A subsequent asylum application is properly viewed as a new application if it presents a previously unraised basis for relief or is predicated on a new or substantially different factual basis.
(3) Where an alien has filed more than one application for asylum and the subsequent one is deemed to be a new application, the filing date of the later application controls for purposes of determining whether the 1-year statutory time bar applies under section 208(a)(2)(B) of the Act.
Matter of M-S-B-, 26 I&N Dec. 872 (BIA 2016)
(1) An untimely application for asylum may be found frivolous under section 208(d)(6) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(6) (2012). Luciana v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 502 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2007), distinguished. Matter of X-M-C-, 25 I&N Dec. 322 (BIA 2010), followed.
(2) The respondent’s asylum application is frivolous because he deliberately made a false statement postdating by more than 2 years his date of entry into this country, which is a material element in determining his eligibility to seek asylum given the general requirement to file the application within 1 year of the date of arrival in the United States.
Matter of H-, 21 I&N Dec. 337 (BIA 1996)
(1) Membership in a clan can constitute membership in a "particular social group" within the meaning of section 208(a) of the Immigration & Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1994); the Marehan sub clan of Somalia, the members of which share ties of kinship and linguistic commonalities, is such a "particular social group."
(2) While interclan violence may arise during the course of civil strife, such circumstances do not preclude the possibility that harm inflicted during the course of such strife may constitute persecution within the meaning of section 208(a) of the Act; and, persecution may occur irrespective of whether or not a national government exists.
(3) An alien who has demonstrated past persecution is presumed to have a well-founded fear of future persecution unless it is demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that, since the time the persecution occurred, conditions in the applicant's country have changed to such an extent that the applicant no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution in that country.
(4) In the consideration of whether a favorable exercise of discretion should be afforded an applicant who has established eligibility for asylum on the basis of past persecution, careful attention should be given to compelling, humanitarian considerations that would be involved if the refugee were to be forced to return to a country where he or she was persecuted in the past.
Matter of Kasinga, 21 I&N Dec. 357 (BIA 1996)
(1) The practice of female genital mutilation, which results in permanent disfiguration and poses a risk of serious, potentially life-threatening complications, can be the basis for a claim of persecution.
(2) Young women who are members of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe of northern Togo who have not been subjected to female genital mutilation, as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose the practice, are recognized as members of a "particular social group" within the definition of the term "refugee" under section 101(a)(42)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1994).
(3) The applicant has met her burden of proving through credible testimony and supporting documentary evidence (1) that a reasonable person in her circumstances would fear country-wide persecution in Togo on account of her membership in a recognized social group and (2) that a favorable exercise of discretion required for a grant of asylum is warranted.
Matter of C-A-, 23 I&N Dec. 951 (BIA 2006)
(1) The members of a particular social group must share a common, immutable characteristic, which may be an innate one, such as sex, color, or kinship ties, or a shared past experience, such as former military leadership or land ownership, but it must be one that members of the group either cannot change, or should not be required to change, because it is fundamental to their individual identities or consciences. Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211(BIA 1985), followed.
(2) The social visibility of the members of a claimed social group is an important consideration in identifying the existence of a “particular social group” for the purpose of determining whether a person qualifies as a refugee.
(3) The group of “former noncriminal drug informants working against the Cali drug cartel” does not have the requisite social visibility to constitute a “Particular Social Group.”
Matter of A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I&N Dec. 69 (BIA 2007)
(1) Factors to be considered in determining whether a particular social group exists include whether the group’s shared characteristic gives the members the requisite social visibility to make them readily identifiable in society and whether the group can be defined with sufficient particularity to delimit its membership.
(2) The respondents failed to establish that their status as affluent Guatemalans gave them sufficient social visibility to be perceived as a group by society or that the group was defined with adequate particularity to constitute a Particular Social Group.
Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I&N Dec. 579 (BIA 2008)
Neither Salvadoran youth who have been subjected to recruitment efforts by the MS-13 gang and who have rejected or resisted membership in the gang based on their own personal, moral, and religious opposition to the gang’s values and activities nor the family members of such Salvadoran youth constitute a “Particular Social Group.”
Matter of E-A-G-, 24 I&N Dec. 591 (BIA 2008)
(1) The respondent, a young Honduran male, failed to establish that he was a member of a particular social group of “persons resistant to gang membership,” as the evidence failed to establish that members of Honduran society, or even gang members themselves, would perceive those opposed to gang membership as members of a social group.
(2)Because membership in a criminal gang cannot constitute membership in aparticular social group, the respondent could not establish that he was a member of a particular social group of “young persons who are perceived to beaffiliated with gangs” based on the incorrect perception by others that he is such a gang member.
Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I&N Dec. 208 (BIA 2014)
(1) In order to clarify that the “social visibility” element required to establish a cognizable “particular social group” does not mean literal or “ocular” visibility, that element is renamed as “social distinction.” Matter of E-A-G-, 24 I&N Dec. 591 (BIA 2008); Matter of S E G-, 24 I&N Dec. 579 (BIA 2008); Matter of A-M-E- & J G-U-, 24 I&N Dec. 69 (BIA 2007); and Matter of C-A-, 23 I&N Dec. 951 (BIA 2006), clarified.
(2) An applicant for asylum or withholding of removal seeking relief based on “membership in a particular social group” must establish that the group is (1) composed of members who share a common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society in question.
(3) An applicant has the burden of demonstrating not only the existence of a cognizable particular social group and his membership in that particular social group, but also a risk of persecution “on account of” his membership in that group.
(4) The respondent did not establish that “former members of the Mara 18 gang in El Salvador who have renounced their gang membership” constitute a “particular social group” or that there is a nexus between the harm he fears and his status as a former gang member.
Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 227 (BIA 2014)
(1) In order to clarify that the “social visibility” element required to establish a cognizable “particular social group” does not mean literal or “ocular” visibility, that element is renamed as “social distinction.” Matter of E-A-G-, 24 I&N Dec. 591 (BIA 2008); Matter of S E G-, 24 I&N Dec. 579 (BIA 2008); Matter of A-M-E- &J G-U-, 24 I&N Dec. 69 (BIA 2007); and Matter of C-A-, 23 I&N Dec. 951 (BIA 2006), clarified.
(2) An applicant for asylum or withholding of removal seeking relief based on “membership in a particular social group” must establish that the group is (1) composed of members who share a common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society in question.
(3) Whether a social group is recognized for asylum purposes is determined by the perception of the society in question, rather than by the perception of the persecutor.
Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 388 (BIA 2014)
Depending on the facts and evidence in an individual case, "married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship" can constitute a cognizable particular social group that forms the basis of a claim for asylum or withholding of removal under sections 208(a) and 241(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(a) and 1231(b)(3) (2012).
Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I&N Dec. 40 (BIA 2017)
(1) Whether a particular social group based on family membership is cognizable depends on the nature and degree of the relationships involved and how those relationships are regarded by the society in question.
(2) To establish eligibility for asylum on the basis of membership in a particular social group composed of family members, an applicant must not only demonstrate that he or she is a member of the family but also that the family relationship is at least one central reason for the claimed harm.
Matter of N-M-A-, 22 I&N Dec. 312 (BIA1998)
(1) Under 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i) (1998), where an asylum applicant has shown that he has been persecuted in the past on account of a statutorily-protected ground, and the record reflects that country conditions have changed to such an extent that the asylum applicant no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution from his original persecutors, the applicant bears the burden of demonstrating that he has a well-founded fear of persecution from any new source.
(2) An asylum applicant who no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution due to changed country conditions may still be eligible for a discretionary grant of asylum under 8 C.F.R. §208.13(b)(1)(ii) only if he establishes, as a threshold matter, compelling reasons for being unwilling to return to his country of nationality or last habitual residence arising out of the severity of the past persecution.
(3) The applicant failed to establish compelling reasons arising out of the severity of the past persecution for being unwilling to return to Afghanistan where he suffered beatings during a month-long detention and the disappearance and likely death of hisfather.
Matter of Y-T-L-, 23 I&N Dec. 601 (BIA 2003)
Where an alien has established past persecution based on the forced sterilization of his spouse pursuant to a policy of coercive family planning, the fact that, owing to such sterilization, the alien and his spouse face no further threat of forced sterilization or abortion does not constitute a “fundamental change” in circumstances sufficient to meet the standards for a discretionary denial under 8 C.F.R. §1208.13(b)(1)(i)(A).
Matter of A-T-, 24 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 2007)
(1) Because female genital mutilation (“FGM”) is a type of harm that generally is inflicted only once, the procedure itself will normally constitute a “fundamental change in circumstances” such that an asylum applicant no longer has a well-founded fearof persecution based on the fear that she will again be subjected to FGM.
(2) Unlike forcible sterilization, a procedure that also is performed only once but has lasting physical and emotional effects, FGM has not been specifically identified as a basis for asylum within the definition of a “refugee” under section 101(a)(42) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2000), so FGM does not qualify as “continuing persecution.” Matter of Y-T-L-, 23 I&N Dec. 601(BIA 2003), distinguished.
Matter of D-I-M-, 24 I&N Dec. 448 (BIA 2008)
(1) When evaluating an application for asylum, the Immigration Judge must make aspecific finding that the applicant has or has not suffered past persecution based on a statutorily enumerated ground and then apply the regulatory framework at 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(2007).
(2) If the applicant has established past persecution, there is a presumption of a well-founded fear of persecution in the future and the burden shifts to the Department of Homeland Security to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that there are changed country conditions, or that the applicant could avoid future persecution by relocating, and that it would be reasonable to do so under all of the circumstances.
Matter of S-A-K- and H-A-H-, 24 I&N Dec. 464 (BIA 2008)
A mother and daughter from Somalia who provided sufficient evidence of past persecution in the form of female genital mutilation with aggravated circumstances are eligible for a grant of asylum based on humanitarian grounds pursuant to 8 C.F.R § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)(A) (2007), regardless of whether they can establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. Matter of Chen, 20 I&N Dec. 16 (BIA 1989), followed.
Matter of O-Z- & I-Z-, 22 I&N Dec. 23 (BIA 1998)
An alien who suffered repeated beatings and received multiple handwritten anti-Semitic threats, whose apartment was vandalized by anti-Semitic nationalists, and whose son was subjected to degradation and intimidation on account of his Jewish nationality established that he has suffered harm which, in the aggregate, rises to the level of persecution as contemplated by the Immigration and Nationality Act.
Matter of H-, 21 I&N Dec. 337 (BIA 1996)
(1) Membership in a clan can constitute membership in a "particular social group" within the meaning of section 208(a) of the Immigration & Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1994); the Marehan subclan of Somalia, the members of which share ties of kinship and linguistic commonalities, is such a "particular social group."
(2) While interclan violence may arise during the course of civil strife, such circumstances do not preclude the possibility that harm inflicted during the course of such strife may constitute persecution within the meaning of section 208(a) of the Act; and, persecution may occur irrespective of whether or not a national government exists.
(3) An alien who has demonstrated past persecution is presumed to have a well-founded fear of future persecution unless it is demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that, since the time the persecution occurred, conditions in the applicant's country have changed to such an extent that the applicant no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution in that country.
(4) In the consideration of whether a favorable exercise of discretion should be afforded an applicant who has established eligibility for asylum on the basis of past persecution, careful attention should be given to compelling, humanitarian considerations that would be involved if the refugee were to be forced to return to a country where he or she was persecuted in the past.
Persecution - Coercive Population Control
Matter of X-P-T-, 21I&N Dec. 634 (BIA 1996)
(1) An alien who has been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary sterilization, or who has been persecuted for resistance to a coercive population control program, has suffered past persecution on account of political opinion and qualifies as a refugee within the amended definition of that term under section 101(a)(42) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)). Matter of Chang, 20 I&N Dec. 38 (BIA 1989), superseded.
(2) The language of section 101(a)(42) of the Act deeming persons who have been subject to population control measures or persecuted for resistance to such programs to have been persecuted on account of political opinion applies to determinations of eligibility for withholding of deportation, as well as asylum.
(3) Section 207(a)(5) of the Act (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(5)) limits the number of refugees that may be admitted to the United States or granted asylum pursuant to the provisions of section 101(a)(42) of the Act relating to persecution for resistance to coercive population control methods.
(4) The applicant, who was forcibly sterilized for violating the coercive population control policies of China, is granted asylum conditioned upon a determination by the Immigration and Naturalization Service that a number is available for such grant; withholding of exclusion and deportation is also granted without condition.
Matter of C-Y-Z-, 21 I&N Dec. 915 (BIA 1997), review denied, 23 I&N Dec. 693 (A.G. 2004) (overruled by Matter of J-S-, 24 I&N Dec. 520 (A.G. 2008))
(1) An alien whose spouse was forced to undergo an abortion or sterilization procedure can establish past persecution on account of political opinion and qualifies as a refugee within the definition of section 101(a)(42) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1994), as amended by section 601(a) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, enacted as Division C of the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, and the Judiciary Appropriations Act for 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, ____.
(2) The regulatory presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution may not be rebutted in the absence of changed country conditions, regardless of the fact that the sterilization of the alien’s spouse negates the likelihood of future sterilization to the alien.
Matter of X-G-W-, 22 I&N Dec. 71 (BIA 1998) (superseded by Matter of G-C-L-, 23 I&N Dec. 359 (BIA 2002))
Due to a fundamental change in the definition of a “refugee” brought about by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Division C of Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546, the Board of Immigration Appeals will allow reopening of proceedings to pursue asylum claims based on coerced population control policies, notwithstanding the time and number limitations on motions specified in 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1997).
Matter of G-C-L-, 23 I&N Dec. 359 (BIA 2002)
The Board of Immigration Appeals withdraws from its policy of granting untimely motions to reopen by applicants claiming eligibility for asylum based solely on coercive population control policies, effective 90 days from the date of this decision. Matter of X-G-W-, 22 I&N Dec. 71 (BIA 1998), superseded.
Matter of Y-T-L-, 23 I&N Dec. 601 (BIA 2003)
Where an alien has established past persecution based on the forced sterilization of his spouse pursuant to a policy of coercive family planning, the fact that, owing to such sterilization, the alien and his spouse face no further threat of forced sterilization or abortion does not constitute a “fundamental change” in circumstances sufficient to meet the standards for a discretionary denial under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(A).
Matter of C-C-, 23 I&N Dec. 899 (BIA 2006)
An alien seeking to reopen removal proceedings based on a claim that the birth of a second child in the United States will result in the alien’s forced sterilization in China cannot establish prima facie eligibility for relief where the evidence submitted with the motion and the relevant country conditions reports do not indicate that Chinese nationals returning to that country with foreign-born children have been subjected to forced sterilization in the alien’s home province. Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556 (3d Cir. 2004), distinguished.
Matter of S-L-L-, 24 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 2006) (overruled by Matter of J-S-, 24 I&N Dec. 520 (A.G. 2008))
(1) An alien whose spouse was forced to undergo an abortion or sterilization can establish past persecution on account of political opinion and qualify as a refugee within the definition of section 101(a)(42) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2000), but only if the alien was, in fact, opposed to the spouse’s abortion or sterilization and was legally married at the time of the abortion or sterilization. Matter of C-Y-Z-, 21 I&N Dec. 915 (BIA 1997), reaffirmed and clarified.
(2) Unmarried applicants claiming persecution related to a partner’s coerced abortion or sterilization may qualify for asylum if they demonstrate that they have been persecuted for “other resistance to a coercive population control program” within the meaning of section 101(a)(42) of the Act.
Matter of J-W-S-, 24 I&N Dec. 185 (BIA 2007)
(1) The evidence of record did not demonstrate that the Chinese Government has a national policy of requiring forced sterilization of a parent who returns with a second child born outside of China.
(2) Although some sanctions may be imposed pursuant to local family planning policies in China for the birth of a second child abroad, the applicant failed to provide evidence that such sanctions in Fujian Province or Changle City would rise to the level of persecution.
Matter of J-H-S-, 24 I&N Dec. 196 (BIA 2007)
A person who fathers or gives birth to two or more children in China may qualify as a refugee if he or she establishes that the births are a violation of family planning policies that would be punished by local officials in a way that would give rise to a well-founded fear of persecution.
Matter of S-Y-G-, 24 I&N Dec. 247 (BIA 2007)
In her motion to reopen proceedings to pursue her asylum claim, the applicant did not meet the heavy burden to show that her proffered evidence is material and reflects “changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality” to support the motion where the documents submitted reflect general birth planning policies in her home province that do not specifically show any likelihood that she or similarly situated Chinese nationals will be persecuted as a result of the birth of a second child in the United States.
Matter of J-S-, 24 I&N Dec. 520 (A.G. 2008)
(1) The spouse of a person who has been physically subjected to a forced abortion or sterilization procedure is not per se entitled to refugee status under section 601(a) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Division C of Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-689, codified at section 101(a)(42) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2000). The holdings to the contrary in Matter of S-L-L-, 24 I&N Dec. 1 (BIA 2006); Matter of C-Y-Z-, 21 I&N Dec. 915 (BIA 1997), overruled.
(2) Persons who have not physically undergone a forced abortion or sterilization procedure may still qualify as a refugee on account of a well-founded fear of persecution of being forced to undergo such a procedure, or on account of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution for failure or refusal to undergo such a procedure or for other resistance to a coercive population control program, oron other grounds enumerated in the Immigration and Nationality Act.
Matter of M-F-W- & L-G-, 24 I&N Dec. 633 (BIA 2008)
An act that thwarts the goals of China’s family planning policy, such as removing an intrauterine device (“IUD”) or failing to attend a mandatory gynecological appointment, may constitute“resistance” to the policy.
The insertion of an IUD does not rise to the level of harm necessary to constitute “persecution,” absent some aggravating circumstances. Generally, where the insertion or reinsertion of an IUD is carried out as part of a routine medical procedure, an alien will not be able to establish the required nexus, i.e., that the procedure was or would be her resistance to China’s family planning policy.
Matter of H-L-H- & Z-Y-Z-, 25 I&N Dec. 209 (BIA 2010)
(1) Whether an alien has presented sufficient evidence to establish a well-founded fear of persecution is a legal determination that is reviewed de novo by the Board of Immigration Appeals.
(2) In order to determine, under de novo review, whether specific facts are sufficient to meet a legal standard such as a “well-founded fear,” the Board has authority to give different weight to the evidence from that given by the Immigration Judge.
(3) State Department reports on country conditions are highly probative evidence and are usually the best source of information on conditions in foreign nations.
(4) The evidence presented by the respondents, considered in light of State Department country reports specific to Fujian Province, failed to establish a reasonable possibility that either respondent would be subject to forced sterilization due to having two children born in the United States or would face penalties or sanctions so severe that they would rise to the level of persecution.
Persecution - Cumulative Discrimination
Matter of O-Z- & I-Z-, 22 I&N Dec. 23 (BIA 1998)
An alien who suffered repeated beatings and received multiple handwritten anti-Semitic threats, whose apartment was vandalized by anti-Semitic nationalists, and whose son was subjected to degradation and intimidation on account of his Jewish nationality established that he has suffered harm which, in the aggregate, rises to the level of persecution as contemplated by the Immigration and Nationality Act.
Persecution - Domestic Violence
Matter of R-A-, 22 I&N Dec. 906 (BIA 1999, A.G. 2001) (vacated and remanded by the Attorney General for reconsideration), remanded by the Attorney General to the Board, 23 I&N Dec. 694 (A.G. 2005)
(1) Where a victim of domestic violence fails to introduce meaningful evidence that her husband’s behavior was influenced by his perception of her opinion, she has not demonstrated harm on account of political opinion or imputed political opinion.
(2) The existence of shared descriptive characteristics is not necessarily sufficient to qualify those possessing the common characteristics as members of a particular social group for the purposes of the refugee definition at section 101(a)(42)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(42)(A) (1994); rather, in construing the term in keeping with the other four statutory grounds, a number of factors are considered in deciding whether a grouping should be recognized as a basis for asylum, including how members of the grouping are perceived by the potential persecutor, by the asylumapplicant, and by other members of the society.
(3) An applicant making a particular social group claim must make a showing from which it is reasonable to conclude that the persecutor was motivated to harm the applicant, at least in part, by the asserted groupmembership.
(4) An asylum applicant who claims persecution on the basis of a group defined as "Guatemalan women who have been involved intimately with Guatemalan male companions, who believe that women are to live under male domination must demonstrate", inter alia, that her persecutor husband targeted and harmed her because he perceived her tobe a member of this particular social group.
Matter of R-A-, 24 I&N Dec. 629 (A.G. 2008)
The Attorney General lifted the stay previously imposed on the Board of Immigration Appeals and remanded the case for reconsideration of the issues presented with respect to asylum claimsbased on domestic violence.
Matter of C-A-, 23 I&N Dec. 951 (BIA 2006)
(1) The members of a particular social group must share a common, immutable characteristic, which may be an innate one, such as sex, color, or kinship ties, or a shared past experience, such as former military leadership or land ownership, but it must be one that members of the group either cannot change, or should not be required to change, because it is fundamental to their individual identities or consciences. Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211(BIA 1985), followed.
(2) The social visibility of the members of a claimed social group is an important consideration in identifying the existence of a “particular social group” for the purpose of determiningwhether a person qualifies as a refugee.
(3) The group of “former noncriminal drug informants working against the Cali drug cartel” does not have the requisite social visibility to constitute a “Particular Social Group.”
Matter of T-M-B-, 21 I&N Dec. 775 (BIA 1997)
1) An applicant for asylum need not show conclusively why persecution occurred in the past or is likely to occur in the future. However, the applicant must produce evidence from which it is reasonable to believe that the harm was motivated, at least in part, by an actual or imputed protected ground.
(2) Criminal extortion efforts do not constitute persecution “on account of” political opinion where it is reasonable to conclude that those who threatened or harmed the respondent were not motivated by her political opinion.
(3) Country profiles submitted by the Department of State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor areentitled to considerable deference.
Persecution - Female Genital Mutilation
Matter of Kasinga, 21I&N Dec. 357 (BIA 1996)
(1) The practice of female genital mutilation, which results in permanent disfiguration and poses a risk of serious, potentially life-threatening complications, can be the basis for a claim of persecution.
(2) Young women who are members of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe of northern Togo who have not been subjected to female genital mutilation, as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose the practice, are recognized as members of a "particular social group" within the definition of the term "refugee" under section 101(a)(42)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)(1994).
(3) The applicant has met her burden of proving through credible testimony and supporting documentary evidence (1) that a reasonable person in her circumstances would fear country-wide persecution in Togo on account of her membership in a recognized social group and (2) that a favorable exercise of discretion required for a grant of asylumis warranted.
Matter of A-K-, 24 I&N Dec. 275 (BIA 2007)
An alien may not establish eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal based solely on fear that his or her daughter will be harmed by being forced to undergo female genital mutilation upon returning to the alien’s home country.
Matter of A-T-, 24 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 2007)
(1) Because female genital mutilation (“FGM”) is a type of harm that generally is inflicted only once, the procedure itself will normally constitute a “fundamental change in circumstances” such that an asylum applicant no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution based on the fear that she will again be subjected to FGM.
(2) Unlike forcible sterilization, a procedure that also is performed only once but has lasting physical and emotional effects, FGM has not been specifically identified as a basis for asylum within the definition of a “refugee” under section 101(a)(42) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2000), so FGM does not qualify as “continuing persecution.” Matter of Y-T-L-, 23 I&N Dec. 601 (BIA 2003), distinguished.
Matter of S-A-K- and H-A-H-, 24 I&N Dec. 464 (BIA 2008)
A mother and daughter from Somalia who provided sufficient evidence of past persecution in the form of female genital mutilation with aggravated circumstances are eligible for a grant of asylum based on humanitarian grounds pursuant to 8 C.F.R § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)(A) (2007), regardless of whether they can establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. Matter of Chen, 20 I&N Dec. 16 (BIA 1989), followed.
Matter of A-T-, 24 I&N Dec. 617 (A.G. 2008)
The Attorney General vacated the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals and remanded the record for reconsideration of questions relating to the respondent’s eligibility for withholding of removal pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §1208.16(b)(1) (2008) based on her claim that she has been subjected to female genitalmutilation.
Matter of A-T-, 25 I&N Dec. 4 (B.I.A. 2009)
(1) Requests for asylum or withholding of removal premised on past persecution related to female genital mutilation must be adjudicated within the framework set out by the Attorney General in Matter of A-T-, 24 I&N Dec. 617 (A.G. 2008).
(2) Once past persecution on account of an enumerated ground is shown, a presumption is triggered that there would be future harm on the basis of the original claim or, in other words, on account of the same statutory ground.
(3) An applicant for asylum or withholding should clearly indicate what enumerated ground(s) he or she is relying upon in making a claim, including the exact delineation of any particular social group to which the applicant claims to belong.
Persecution - Guerrilla Recruitment
Matter of C-A-L-, 21 I&N Dec. 754 (BIA 1997)
(1) An alien, who served as a soldier in the Guatemalan Army, has not established a well-founded fear of persecution by the guerrillas on account of one of the five grounds enumerated in section 101(a)(42)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1994), where he claims that his personal file from the army fell into the hands of the guerrillas, who sought to recruit him for his artillery expertise.
(2) An alien has failed to establish that he has a well-founded fear of country-wide persecution from the guerrillas in Guatemala where he was able to live for more than 1 year in different areas within the country, including an area well known for its guerrilla operations, without experiencing any problems from the guerrillas.
Matter of V-T-S-, 21 I&N Dec. 792 (BIA 1997)
(1) Although kidnapping is a very serious offense, the seriousness of conduct is not dispositive in determining persecution, which does not encompass all treatment that society regards as unfair, unjust, or even unlawful or unconstitutional.
(2) While there may be a number of reasons for a kidnapping, an asylum applicant bears the burden of establishing that one motivation was to persecute him on account of an enumerated ground, and evidence that indicates that the perpetrators were motivated by the victim's wealth, in the absence of evidence to suggest other motivations, will not support a finding of persecution within the meaning of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
Matter of S-P-, 21 I&N Dec. 486 (BIA 1996)
(1) Although an applicant for asylum must demonstrate that harm has been or would be inflicted on account of one of the protected grounds specified in the "refugee" definition, persecution for "imputed" reasons can satisfy that definition.
(2) In mixed motive cases, an asylum applicant is not obliged to show conclusively why persecution has occurred or may occur; however, in proving past persecution, the applicant must produce evidence, either direct or circumstantial, from which it is reasonable to believe that the harm was motivated in part by an actual or imputed protected ground.
(3) In situations involving general civil unrest, the motive for harm should be determined by considering the statements or actions of the perpetrators; abuse or punishment out of proportion to nonpolitical ends; treatment of others similarly situated; conformity to procedures for criminal prosecution or military law; the application of antiterrorism laws to suppress political opinion; and the subjection of political opponents to arbitrary arrest, detention, and abuse.
(4) Asylum was granted where the applicant was detained and abused by the Sri Lankan Government, not only to obtain information about the identity of guerrilla members and the location of their camps, but also because of an assumption that his political views were antithetical to those of the Government.
Matter of J-B-N- & S-M-, 24 I&N Dec. 208 (BIA 2007)
Under section 101(a)(3) of the REAL ID Act of 2005, Div. B of Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302, 303, in mixed motive asylum cases, an applicant must prove that race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion was or will be at least one central reason for the claimed persecution.
Persecution - Nonphysical Harm
Matter of T-Z-, 24 I&N Dec. 163 (BIA 2007)
(1) An abortion is forced by threats of harm when a reasonable person would objectively view the threats for refusing the abortion to be genuine, and the threatened harm, if carried out,would rise to the level of persecution.
(2) Nonphysical forms of harm, such as the deliberate imposition of severe economic disadvantage or the deprivation of liberty, food, housing, employment, or other essentials of life,may amount to persecution.
(3) When an Immigration Judge denies asylum solely in the exercise of discretion and then grants withholding of removal, 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(e) (2006) requires the Immigration Judge to reconsider the denial of asylum to take into account factors relevant to familyunification.
Persecution - Opposition to Corruption
Matter of N-M-, 25 I&N Dec. 526 (BIA 2011)
(1) Opposition to state corruption may, in some circumstances, constitute the expression of political opinion or give a persecutor a reason to impute such an opinion to an alien.
(2) For claims arising under the REAL ID Act of 2005, Division B of Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 302, a showing of retaliation for opposing governmental corruption is, by itself, insufficient to establish eligibility for relief; instead, an alien must persuade the trier of fact that his or her actual or imputed anticorruption belief (or other protected trait) was one central reason for the harm.
(3) In making the nexus determination, an Immigration Judge should consider: (1) whether and to what extent the alien engaged in activities that could be perceived as expressions of anticorruption beliefs; (2) any direct or circumstantial evidence that the persecutor was motivated by the alien’s actual or perceived anticorruption beliefs; and (3) any evidence regarding the pervasiveness of corruption within the governing regime
Matter of D-V-, 21 I&N Dec. 77 (BIA 1993)
Well-founded fear of persecution in Haiti was established by a 27-year-old married female activist member of a pro-Aristide church group who was gang-raped and beaten in her home by soldiers and who was targeted by her attackers because of her political opinion and religion.
Persecution - Reasons for Persecution
Matter of T-M-B-, 21 I&N Dec. 775 (BIA 1997)
(1) An applicant for asylum need not show conclusively why persecution occurred in the past or is likely to occur in the future. However, the applicant must produce evidence from which it is reasonable to believe that the harm was motivated, at least in part, by an actual or imputed protected ground.
(2) Criminal extortion efforts do not constitute persecution “on account of” political opinion where it is reasonable to conclude that those who threatened or harmed the respondent were not motivated by her political opinion.
(3) Country profiles submitted by the Department of State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor areentitled to considerable deference.
Matter of S-A-, 22 I&N Dec. 1328 (BIA 2000)
A woman with liberal Muslim beliefs established by credible evidence that she suffered past persecution and has a well-founded fear of future persecution at the hands of her father on account of her religious beliefs, which differ from her father’s orthodox Muslim views concerning the proper role of women in Moroccan society.
Matter of A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I&N Dec. 69 (BIA 2007)
(1) Factors to be considered in determining whether a particular social group exists include whether the group’s shared characteristic gives the members the requisite social visibility to make them readily identifiable in society and whether the group can be defined with sufficient particularity to delimit its membership.
(2) The respondents failed to establish that their status as affluent Guatemalans gave them sufficient social visibility to be perceived as a group by society or that the group was defined with adequate particularity to constitute a particular social group.
Matter of J-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 161 (BIA 2013)
(1) An alien who is subject to an in absentia removal order need not first rescind the order before seeking reopening of the proceedings to apply for asylum and withholding of removal based on changed country conditions arising in the country of the alien’s nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered.
(2) The numerical limitations on filing a motion to reopen in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) (2013) are not applicable to an alien seeking reopening to apply for asylum and withholding of removal based on changed country conditions arising in the country of the alien’s nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered.
Matter of E-F-H-L-, 26 I&N Dec. 319 (BIA 2014)
In the ordinary course of removal proceedings, an applicant for asylum or for withholding or deferral of removal is entitled to a hearing on the merits of those applications, including an opportunity to provide oral testimony and other evidence, without first having to establish prima facie eligibility for the requested relief. Matter of Fefe, 20 I&N Dec. 116 (BIA 1989), followed.
Matter of M-S-, 21 I&N Dec. 125 (BIA 1995)
(1) In asylum proceedings involving a stowaway applicant, where an adverse credibility finding is adequately supported by information provided in documents executed by the applicant, without reliance upon statements allegedly made by the applicant in his interview with an asylum officer, it is not necessary to remand the case for a record of the interview which satisfies the requirements of Matter of S-S-, 21 I&N Dec. 121 (BIA 1995). Matter of S-S-, supra, distinguished.
(2) Where new asylum proceedings are conducted as a result of some defect in the original proceedings, statements made by the applicant in the original proceedings which are relevant to his persecution claim may be considered in the new proceedings.
(3) In asylum proceedings within the jurisdiction of the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s Office of Refugees, Asylum, and Parole, which include proceedings involving stowaway applicants, new regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 208.9(g) (1995) require an applicant who is unable to proceed with his asylum interview in English to provide, at no expense to the government, a competent interpreter who is fluent in both English and the applicant’s native language.
(4) In the interest of developing a full and complete record for review by the Board of Immigration Appeals, an asylum officer should draw a stowaway applicant’s attention to any inconsistencies in his account which may be apparent at the time of his asylum interview and accord the applicant an opportunity to address those inconsistencies at the interview.
Matter of V-X-, 26 I&N Dec. 147 (BIA 2013)
(1) A grant of asylum is not an “admission” to the United States under section 101(a)(13)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (2006).
(2) When termination of an alien’s asylum status occurs in conjunction with removal proceedings pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1208.24 (2013), the Immigration Judge should ordinarily make a threshold determination regarding the termination of asylum status before resolving issues of removability and eligibility for relief from removal.
(3) An adjudication of “youthful trainee” status pursuant to section 762.11 of the Michigan Compiled Laws is a “conviction” under section 101(a)(48)(A) of the Act because such an adjudication does not correspond to a determination of juvenile delinquency under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-5042 (2006). Matter of Devison, 22 I&N Dec. 1362 (BIA 2000), followed.
Matter of P-S-H-, 26 I&N Dec. 329 (BIA 2014)
To terminate a grant of asylum pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1208.24 (2013), the Department of Homeland Security must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that (1) there was fraud in the alien’s asylum application and (2) the fraud was such that the alien was not eligible for asylum at the time it was granted; however, proof that the alien knew of the fraud in the application is not required in order to satisfy the first criterion. Matter of A-S-J-, 25 I&N Dec. 893 (BIA 2012), clarified.
Matter of U-H-, 23 I&N Dec. 355 (BIA 2002)
Section 412 of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 351 (“USA PATRIOT ACT”), does not change the standard employed to determine, for purposes of adjudicating an application for asylum or withholding of removal, whether there is reasonable ground to believe that an alien is engaged in, or is likely to engage in, terrorist activity under section 212(a)(3)(B)(i)(II) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 182(a)(3)(B)(i)(II) (2000), or whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that he or she is a danger to the security of the United States under section 241(b)(3)(B)(iv) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §1231(b)(3)(B)(iv) (2000).
Matter of A-H-, 23 I&N Dec. 774 (A.G. 2005)
(1) The Attorney General denied asylum in the exercise of discretion to a leader-in-exile of the Islamic Salvation Front of Algeria who was associated with armed groups that committed widespread acts of persecution and terrorism in Algeria, because the United States has significant interests in combating violent acts of persecution and terrorism, and it is inconsistent with these interests to provide safe haven to individuals who have connections to such acts of violence.
2) Terrorist acts committed by the armed Islamist groups in Algeria, including the bombing of civilian targets and the widespread murders of journalists and intellectuals on account of their political opinions or religious beliefs, constitute the persecution of others.
(3) A person who is a leader-in-exile of a political movement may be found to have “incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in” acts of persecution in the home country by an armed group connected to that political movement where there is evidence indicating that the leader (1) was instrumental in creating and sustaining the ties between the political movement and the armed group and was aware of the atrocities committed by the armed group; (2) used his profile and position of influence to make public statements that encouraged those atrocities; or (3) made statements that appear to have condoned the persecution without publicly and specifically disassociating himself and his movement from the acts of persecution, particularly if his statements appear to have resulted in anincrease in the persecution.
(4) The phrase “danger to the security of the United States” means any nontrivial risk to the Nation’s defense, foreign relations, or economic interests, and there are “reasonable grounds for regarding” an alien as a danger to the national security where there is information that would permit a reasonable person to believe that the alienmay pose such a danger.
(5) The Attorney General remanded the record for further consideration by the Board of Immigration Appeals of the questions whether (1) there is sufficient evidence to indicate that the respondent “incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution” of others; (2) deference should be given to the credibility findings of the Immigration Judge; (3) there are “reasonable grounds for regarding [the respondent] as a danger to the security of the United States”; (4) the respondent presently faces a threat to his life or freedom if removed to Algeria; and (5) the respondent presently faces a likelihood of being tortured in Algeria.
Matter of S-K-, 23 I&N Dec. 936 (BIA 2006) (decided by Attorney General September 14,2007)
(1) The statutory language of section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(3)(B) (West 2005), does not allow a “totality of the circumstances” test to be employed in determining whether an organization is engaged in terrorist activity, so factors such as an organization’s purposes or goals and the nature of the regime that the organization opposes may not be considered.
(2) Neither an alien’s intent in making a donation to a terrorist organization nor the intended use of the donation by the recipient is considered in assessing whether the alien provided “material support” to a terrorist organization under section212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) of the Act.
(3) The respondent’s contribution of S$1100 (Singapore dollars) over an 11-month period to the Chin National Front was sufficiently substantial to constitute material support to an organization, which despite its democratic goals and use of force only in self-defense, is defined by statute as a terrorist organization acting against the Government of Burma, so the respondent is barred from asylum and withholding of removal.
The Attorney General remanded the case for the Board of Immigration Appeals to consider if further proceedings are appropriate in light of the February 20, 2007, determination of the Secretary of Homeland Security that section 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) (West 2005), shall not apply with respect to material support provided to the Chin National Front/Chin National Army by an alien who satisfies certain specified criteria.
Matter of S-K- , 24 I&N Dec. 289 (A.G.2007)
The Attorney General remanded the case for the Board of Immigration Appeals to consider if further proceedings are appropriate in light of the February 20, 2007, determination of the Secretary of Homeland Security that section 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) (West 2005), shall not apply with respect to material support provided to the Chin National Front/Chin National Army by an alien who satisfies certain specified criteria.
Matter of S-K-, 24 I&N Dec. 475 (BIA 2008)
(1) Section 691(b) of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, Division J of Pub. L. No. 110-161, 121 Stat. 1844, 2365 (enacted Dec. 26, 2007), provides that for purposes of section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(a)(3)(B) (West 2005), certain groups, including the Chin National Front, “shall not be considered to be a terrorist organization on the basis of any act or event occurring before the date of enactment of this section.”
(2) The Attorney General’s remand in Matter of S-K-, 24 I&N Dec. 289 (A.G. 2007), does not affect the precedential nature of the conclusions of the Board of Immigration Appeals in Matter of S-K-, 23 I&N Dec. 936 (BIA 2006), regarding the applicability and interpretation of the material support provisions in section 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI) of the Act.
Matter of Gallardo, 21 I&N Dec. 210 (BIA 1996)
An alien's admission pursuant to the Visa Waiver Pilot Program does not curtail his ability to obtain a bond redetermination hearing when the Immigration and Naturalization Service has issued an Order to Show Cause and Notice of Hearing (Form I-221) and the alien has applied for asylum and withholding of deportation.
Matter of Kanagasundram, 22 I&N Dec. 963 (BIA 1999)
Under the provisions of 8 C.F.R. §217.4(a)(1) (1999), proceedings against an alien who has been refused admission under the Visa Waiver Pilot Program and who has applied for asylum must be commenced with a Notice of Referral to Immigration Judge (FormI-863).
Matter of Werner, 25 I&N Dec. 45 (BIA 2009)
(1) The Attorney General has not delegated authority to Immigration Judges, under 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d) (2009), to redetermine the conditions of custody imposed by the Department of Homeland Security with respect to aliens who have not been issued and served with a Notice to Appear (Form I-862) in relation to removal proceedings pursuant to 8 C.F.R. Part 1240 (2009).
(2) An alien admitted to the United States pursuant to the Visa Waiver Program who has not been served with a Notice to Appear pursuant to 8 C.F.R. Part 1240 is not entitled to a custody hearing before an Immigration Judge under 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d). Matter of Gallardo, 21 I&N Dec. 210 (BIA 1996), superseded.
Matter of D-M-C-P-, 26 I&N Dec. 644 (BIA 2015)
(1) Neither an Immigration Judge nor the Board of Immigration Appeals has jurisdiction to consider whether asylum-only proceedings were improvidently instituted pursuant to a referral under the Visa Waiver Program.
(2) It is improper to deem an application for relief abandoned based on the applicant’s failure to comply with the biometrics filing requirement where the record does not reflect that the applicant received notification advisories concerning that requirement, was given a deadline for submitting the biometrics, and was advised of the consequences of his or her failure to comply.
Matter of H-L-H- & Z-Y-Z-, 25 I&N Dec. 209 (BIA 2010)
(1) Whether an alien has presented sufficient evidence to establish a well-founded fear of persecution is a legal determination that is reviewed de novo by the Board of Immigration Appeals.
(2) In order to determine, under de novo review, whether specific facts are sufficient to meet a legal standard such as a “well-founded fear,” the Board has authority to give different weight to the evidence from that given by the Immigration Judge.
(3) State Department reports on country conditions are highly probative evidence and are usually the best source of information on conditions in foreign nations.
(4) The evidence presented by the respondents, considered in light of State Department country reports specific to Fujian Province, failed to establish a reasonable possibility that either respondent would be subject to forced sterilization due to having two children born in the United States or would face penalties or sanctions so severe that they would rise to the level of persecution.
Matter of Z-Z-O-, 26 I&N Dec. 586 (BIA 2015)
(1) An Immigration Judge’s predictive findings of what may or may not occur in the future are findings of fact, which are subject to a clearly erroneous standard of review. Matter of V-K-, 24 I&N Dec. 500 (BIA 2008), and Matter of A-S-B-, 24 I&N Dec. 493 (BIA 2008), overruled.
(2) Whether an asylum applicant has an objectively reasonable fear of persecution based on the events that the Immigration Judge found may occur upon the applicant’s return to the country of removal is a legal determination that is subject to de novo review.
Matter of J-R-R-A-, 26 I&N Dec. 609 (BIA 2015)
If an applicant for asylum has competency issues that affect the reliability of his testimony, the Immigration Judge should, as a safeguard, generally accept his fear of harm as subjectively genuine based on the applicant’s perception of events.
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE
Matter of Gadda, 23 I&N Dec. 645 (BIA 2003)
(1) An attorney who practices immigration law in proceedings before the Board of Immigration Appeals, the Immigration Courts, and the Department of Homeland Security must be a member in good standing of a State bar and is therefore subject to discipline by State barauthorities.
(2) The Board of Immigration Appeals has authority to increase the level of disciplinary sanction initiallyimposed by an adjudicating official against an attorney.
(3) Where the respondent was disbarred by the Supreme Court of California based on his egregious and repeated acts of professional misconduct over a number of years, expulsion from practice before the Board of Immigration Appeals, the Immigration Courts, and the Department of Homeland Security is anappropriate sanction.
Matter of Ramos, 23 I&N Dec. 843 (BIA 2005)
(1) Under the attorney discipline regulations, a disbarment order issued against a practitioner by the highest court of a State creates a rebuttable presumption that disciplinary sanctions should follow, which can only be rebutted upon a showing that the underlying disciplinary proceeding resulted in a deprivation of due process, that there was an infirmity of proof establishing the misconduct, or that discipline would result in injustice.
(2) A practitioner who has been expelled may petition the Board of Immigration Appeals for reinstatement after 1 year, but such reinstatement is not automatic and the practitioner must qualify as an attorney or representative under the regulations.
(3) The Government is not required to show that an attorney has “appeared” before it, because any attorney is a “practitioner” and is therefore subject to sanctions under the attorney discipline regulations following disbarment.
(4) Where the respondent was disbarred by the Supreme Court of Florida as a result of his extensive unethical conduct, expulsion from practice before the Board, the Immigration Courts, and the Department of Homeland Security is an appropriatesanction.
Matter of Truong, 24 I&N Dec. 52 (BIA 2006)
(1) Under the attorney discipline regulations, a disbarment order issued against a practitioner creates a rebuttable presumption of professional misconduct, which can only be rebutted by a showing that the underlying disciplinary proceeding resulted in a deprivation of due process, that there was an infirmity of proof establishing the misconduct, or that discipline would result in grave injustice.
(2) Where the respondent was disbarred by the highest court of the State of New York, based in large part on his misconduct in a State court action, and where none of the exceptions to discipline are applicable, suspension from practice before the Board of Immigration Appeals, the Immigration Courts, and the Department of Homeland Security for 7 years is an appropriate sanction.
Matter of Shah, 24 I&N Dec. 282 (BIA 2007)
(1) An attorney who knowingly makes a false statement of material fact or law or willfully misleads any person concerning a material and relevant matter relating to a case is subject to discipline.
(2) It is in the public interest to discipline an attorney who knowingly and willfully misled the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services by presenting an improperly obtained certified Labor Condition Application under his signature in support of anonimmigrant worker petition.
Matter of Krivonos, 24 I&N Dec. 292 (BIA 2007)
A motion for reinstatement to practice filed by an attorney who was expelled from practice before the Board of Immigration Appeals, the Immigration Courts, and the Department of Homeland Security as a result of his conviction for immigration-related fraud, but who was reinstated to practice law in New York, was denied because he failed to show that he possessed the moral and professional qualifications to be reinstated to practice and that his reinstatement would not be detrimental to the administration of justice.
Matter of Jean-Joseph, 24 I&N Dec. 292 (BIA 2007)
Where an attorney who was suspended from practice before the Board of Immigration Appeals, the Immigration Courts, and the Department of Homeland Security pending the final disposition of his attorney discipline proceeding sought reinstatement because he had been reinstated to the Florida Bar, but he had practiced before the Miami Immigration Court while under the Board’s immediate suspension order, his motion was denied, and he was instead suspended for 120 days, twice the recommended discipline in the Notice of IntentTo Discipline.
Matter of Rosenberg, 24 I&N Dec. 744 (BIA 2009)
(1) A claim by an attorney who is currently suspended from practice before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that he is in good standing before the California State Bar is not a basis to set aside an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals suspending him from practice before the Board, the Immigration Courts, and the Department of Homeland Security.
(2) It is not in the interest of justice to set aside the Board’s immediate suspension order where the attorney failed to object to the Ninth Circuit Appellate Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation and is therefore not likely to prevail on the merits of the attorney discipline case, given the heavy burden of proof under 8 C.F.R. §1003.103(b)(2) (2008).
Matter of Kronegold, 25 I&N Dec. 157 (BIA 2010)
(1) Where disciplinary proceedings are based on a final order of suspension or disbarment, the order creates a rebuttable presumption that reciprocal disciplinary sanctions should follow, which can be rebutted only if the attorney demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the underlying disciplinary proceeding resulted in a deprivation of due process, that there was an infirmity of proof establishing the misconduct, or that discipline would result in a grave injustice.
(2) In determining whether to impose reciprocal discipline on an attorney who has been suspended or disbarred by a State court, the Board of Immigration Appeals conducts a deferential review of the proceedings that resulted in the initial discipline.
(3) Where the respondent was disbarred in New York, which precludes an attorney from seeking reinstatement for 7 years, and he failed to rebut the presumption that reciprocal discipline should be imposed, his suspension from practice before the Board, the Immigration Courts, and the Department of Homeland Security for 7 years was an appropriate sanction.
Matter of Salomon, 25 I&N Dec. 559 (BIA 2011)
Nonidentical reciprocal discipline of an attorney does not amount to a “grave injustice”under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.103(b)(2)(iii) (2011) where the attorney has engaged in wide-ranging misconduct and was disciplined in multiple jurisdictions.
Matter of P. Singh, 26 I&N Dec. 623 (BIA 2015)
An attorney who admitted to engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice by enlisting his legal assistant to impersonate him during multiple telephonic appearances before Immigration Judges was appropriately suspended from practice before the Immigration Courts, the Board of Immigration Appeals, and the Department of Homeland Security for a period of 16 months and prohibited from appearing telephonically in the Immigration Courts for 7 years.
ATTORNEY GENERAL CERTIFICATION
Matter of E-L-H-, 22 I&N Dec. 21 (BIA 1998), remanded by the Attorney General 23 I&N Dec. 700 (A.G. 2004), decided by the Board, 23 I&N Dec. 814 (BIA 2005)
Precedent decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals which have been certified to the Attorney General for review are binding on the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the Immigration Judges and continue to serve as precedent in all proceedings involving the same issue or issues unless or until they are modified or overruled by the Board or the Attorney General.
The Attorney General remanded the case for reconsideration, in light of Matter of A-H-, A.G. Order No. 2380-2001 (Jan. 19, 2001), whether a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals is final and effective while it is pending review before the Attorney General on certification.
Matter of Robles, 24 I&N Dec. 22 (BIA 2006)
(1) When the Attorney General overrules or reverses only one holding in a precedent decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals and expressly declines to consider any alternative holding in the case, the remaining holdings retain their precedential value.
(2) Misprision of a felony in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 4 (2000) is a crime involving moral turpitude. Matter of Sloan, 12 I&N Dec. 840 (A.G. 1968; BIA 1966), overruled in part.
(3) Under the “stop-time” rule in section 240A(d)(1)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1)(B) (2000), an offense is deemed to end an alien’s continuous residence as of the date of its commission, even if the offense was committed prior to the enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Division C of Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546. Matter of Perez, 22I&N Dec. 689 (BIA 1999), reaffirmed.
BACKGROUND AND SECURITY CHECKS
Matter of Alcantara-Perez, 23 I&N Dec. 882 (BIA 2006)
(1) When the Board of Immigration Appeals has remanded the record for completion of background and security checks and new information that may affect the alien’s eligibility for relief is revealed, the Immigration Judge has discretion to determine whether to conduct an additional hearing to consider the new evidence before entering an order granting or denying relief.
(2) When a proceeding is remanded for background and security checks, but no new information is presented as a result of those checks, the Immigration Judge should enter an order grantingrelief.
Matter of M-D-, 24 I&N Dec. 138 (BIA 2007)
(1) When a case is remanded to an Immigration Judge for completion of the appropriate background checks, the Immigration Judge is required to enter a final order granting or denying the requested relief.
(2) Although an Immigration Judge may not reconsider the prior decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals when a case is remanded for background checks, the Immigration Judge reacquires jurisdiction over the proceedings and may consider additional evidence regarding new or previously considered relief if it meets the requirements for reopeningof the proceedings.
Matter of D-M-C-P-, 26 I&N Dec. 644 (BIA 2015)
(1) Neither an Immigration Judge nor the Board of Immigration Appeals has jurisdiction to consider whether asylum-only proceedings were improvidently instituted pursuant to a referral under the Visa Waiver Program.
(2) It is improper to deem an application for relief abandoned based on the applicant’s failure to comply with the biometrics filing requirement where the record does not reflect that the applicant received notification advisories concerning that requirement, was given a deadline for submitting the biometrics, and was advised of the consequences of his or her failure to comply.
BIA PRECEDENT DECISIONS
Matter of Salazar, 23 I&N Dec. 223 (BIA 2002)
(1) An alien whose adjudication of guilt was deferred pursuant to article 42.12, section 5(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure following her plea of guilty to possession of a controlled substance is considered to have been convicted of the offense. Matter of Roldan, 22 I&N Dec. 512 (BIA 1999), reaffirmed.
(2) In Lujan-Armendariz v. INS, 222 F.3d 728 (9th Cir. 2000), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overruled in part Matter of Roldan, supra, which will not be applied in cases arising within the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit.
(3) In light of the decisions in United States v. Hernandez-Avalos, 251 F.3d 505 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 305 (2001), and United States v. Hinojosa-Lopez, 130 F.3d 691 (5th Cir. 1997), the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals in Matter of K-V-D-, 22 I&N Dec. 1163 (BIA 1999), will not be applied in cases arising within the jurisdiction of the Fifth Circuit.
Matter of U. Singh, 25 I&N Dec. 670 (BIA 2012)
(1) A decision by a Federal court of appeals reversing a precedent decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals is not binding authority outside the circuit in which the case arises.
(2) A stalking offense for harassing conduct in violation of section 646.9(b) of the California Penal Code is a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (2006) and is therefore an aggravated felony under section 101(a)(43)(F) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (2006). Matter of Malta, 23 I&N Dec. 656 (BIA 2004), reaffirmed. Malta-Espinoza v. Gonzales, 478 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2007), followed in jurisdiction only.
CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL (LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENTS)
Matter of Perez, 22 I&N Dec. 689 (BIA 1999)
(1) Pursuant to section 240A(d)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1) (Supp. II 1996), continuous residence or physical presence for cancellation of removal purposes is deemed to end on the date that a qualifying offense has beencommitted.
(2) The period of continuous residence required for relief under section 240A(a) commences when the alien has been admitted in any status, which includes admission as a temporary resident.
(3) An offense described in section 240A(d)(1) is deemed to end continuous residence or physical presence for cancellation of removal purposes as of the date of its commission, even if the offense was committed prior to the enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Division C of Pub. L. No.104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546.
Matter of Campos-Torres, 22 I&N Dec. 1289 (BIA 2000)
(1) Pursuant to section 240A(d)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §1229b(d)(1) (Supp. II 1996), an offense must be one “referred to in section 212(a)(2)” of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) (1994 & Supp. II 1996), to terminate the period of continuous residence or continuous physical presence required for cancellation of removal.
(2) A firearms offense that renders an alien removable under section 237(a)(2)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C) (Supp. II 1996), is not one “referred to in section 212(a)(2)” and thus does not stop the further accrual of continuous residence or continuous physical presence for purposes of establishing eligibility for cancellation of removal.
Matter of Blancas, 23 I&N Dec. 458 (BIA 2002)
The period of an alien’s residence in the United States after admission as a nonimmigrant may be considered in calculating the 7 years of continuous residence required to establish eligibility for cancellation of removal under section 240A(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §1229b(a)(2) (Supp. V1999).
Matter of Jurado, 24 I&N Dec. 29 (BIA 2006)
(1) An alien need not be charged and found inadmissible or removable on a ground specified in section 240A(d)(1)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1)(B) (2000), in order for the alleged criminal conduct to terminate the alien’s continuous residence in this country.
(2) Retail theft in violation of title 18, section 3929(a)(1) of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes is acrime involving moral turpitude.
(3) Unsworn falsification to authorities in violation of title 18, section 4904(a) of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes is a crime involving moral turpitude.
Matter of Escobar, 24 I&N Dec. 231 (BIA 2007)
A parent’s lawful permanent resident status cannot be imputed to a child for purposes of calculating the 5 years of lawful permanent residence required to establish eligibility for cancellation of removal under section 240A(a)(1) of the Immigration andNationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(1) (2000).
Matter of Nelson, 25 I&N Dec. 410 (BIA 2011)
Once an alien has been convicted of an offense that stops the accrual of the 7-year period of continuous residence required for cancellation of removal under section 240A(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (2006), section 240A(d)(1) of the Act does not permit such residence to restart simply because the alien has departed from, and returned to, the United States.
Matter of Camarillo, 25 I&N Dec. 644 (BIA 2011)
Under the “stop-time rule” at section 240A(d)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1) (2006), any period of continuous residence or continuous physical presence of an alien applying for cancellation of removal under section 240A is deemed to end upon the service of a notice to appear on the alien, even if the notice to appear does not include the date and time of the initial hearing.
Matter of Montoya-Silva, 26 I&N Dec. 123 (BIA 2013)
A parent’s lawful permanent resident status and residence in the United States cannot be imputed to an unemancipated minor for purposes of establishing the child’s eligibility for cancellation of removal under section 240A(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (2006). Matter of Escobar, 24 I&N Dec. 231 (BIA 2007); and Matter of Ramirez-Vargas, 24 I&N Dec. 599 (BIA 2008), reaffirmed.
Matter of Deanda-Romo, 23 I&N Dec. 597 (BIA 2003)
The respondent, who was convicted of two misdemeanor crimes involving moral turpitude, is not precluded by the provisions of section 240A(d)(1)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1)(B) (2000), from establishing the requisite 7 years of continuous residence for cancellation of removal under section 240A(a)(2), because his first crime, which qualifies as a petty offense, did not render him inadmissible, and he had accrued the requisite 7 years of continuous residencebefore the second offense was committed.
Matter of Garcia, 25 I&N Dec. 332 (BIA 2010)
A conviction for a single crime involving moral turpitude that qualifies as a petty offense is not for an “offense referred to in section 212(a)(2)” of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) (2006), for purposes of triggering the “stop-time” rule in section 240A(d)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1) (2006), even if it renders the alien removableunder section 237(a)(2)(A)(i) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i) (2006).
Matter of C-V-T-, 22 I&N Dec. 7 (BIA 1998)
(1) To be statutorily eligible for cancellation of removal under section 240A(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)), an alien must demonstrate that he or she has been lawfully admitted for permanent residence for not less than 5 years, has resided in the United States continuously for 7 years after having been admitted in any status, and has not been convicted of an aggravated felony.
(2) In addition to satisfying the three statutory eligibility requirements, an applicant for relief under section 240A(a) of the Act must establish that he or she warrants such relief as amatter of discretion.
(3) The general standards developed in Matter of Marin, 16 I&N Dec. 581, 584-85 (BIA 1978), for the exercise of discretion under section 212(c) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c)(1994), which was the predecessor provision to section 240A(a), are applicable to the exercise of discretion under section 240A(a).
Matter of Sotelo, 23 I&N Dec. 201 (BIA 2001)
An applicant for cancellation of removal under section 240A(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (Supp. V 1999), need not meet a threshold test requiring a showing of “unusual or outstanding equities” before a balancing of the favorable and adverse factors of record will be made to determine whether relief should be granted in the exercise of discretion. Matter of C-V-T-, 22 I&N Dec. 7(BIA 1998), clarified.
Matter of Koloamatangi, 23 I&N Dec. 548 (BIA 2003)
An alien who acquired permanent resident status through fraud or misrepresentation has never been “lawfully admitted for permanent residence” and is therefore ineligible for cancellation of removal under section 240A(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (2000).
CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL (NON-LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENTS)
Matter of Mendoza-Sandino, 22 I&N Dec. 1236 (BIA 2000)
Pursuant to section 240A(d)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1) (Supp. II 1996), an alien may not accrue the requisite 7 years of continuous physical presence for suspension of deportation after the service of the Order to Show Cause and Notice of Hearing (Form I-221), as service of the Order to Show Cause endscontinuous physical presence.
Matter of Campos-Torres, 22 I&N Dec. 1289 (BIA 2000)
(1) Pursuant to section 240A(d)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §1229b(d)(1) (Supp. II 1996), an offense must be one “referred to in section 212(a)(2)” of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) (1994 & Supp. II 1996), to terminate the period of continuous residence or continuous physical presence required for cancellation of removal.
(2) A firearms offense that renders an alien removable under section 237(a)(2)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C) (Supp. II 1996), is not one “referred to in section 212(a)(2)” and thus does not stop the further accrual of continuous residence or continuous physical presence for purposes of establishing eligibility for cancellation of removal.
Matter of Romalez, 23 I&N Dec. 423 (BIA 2002)
For purposes of determining eligibility for cancellation of removal pursuant to section 240A(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8U.S.C. §1229b(b) (Supp. IV 1998), continuous physical presence is deemed to end at the time an alien is compelled to depart the United States under threat of the institution of deportation or removal proceedings.
Matter of Cisneros, 23 I&N Dec. 668 (BIA 2004)
Pursuant to section 240A(d)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1) (2000), an alien’s period of continuous physical presence in the United States is deemed to end when the alien is served with the charging document that is the basis for the current proceeding.
Service of a charging document in a prior proceeding does not serve to end the alien’s period of continuous physical presence with respect to an application for cancellation of removal filed in the current proceeding. Matter of Mendoza-Sandino, 22 I&NDec. 1236 (BIA 2000), distinguished.
Matter of Avilez, 23 I&N Dec. 799 (BIA 2005)
(1) Where an alien departed the United States for a period less than that specified in section 240A(d)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229b(d)(2)(2000), and unsuccessfully attempted reentry at a land border port of entry before actually reentering, physical presence continued to accrue for purposes of cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(1)(A) unless, during that attempted reentry, the alien was formally excluded or made subject to an order of expedited removal, was offered and accepted the opportunity to withdraw an application for admission, or was subjected to some other formal, documented process pursuant to which the alien was determined to be inadmissible to the United States.
(2) The respondent’s 2-week absence from the United States did not break her continuous physical presence where she was refused admission by an immigration official at a port of entry, returned to Mexico without any threat of the institution of exclusion proceedings, and subsequently reentered without inspection.
Matter of Bautista-Gomez, 23 I&N Dec. 893 (BIA 2006)
The provision in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(3) (2005) that an applicant for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) (2000), must demonstrate statutory eligibility for that relief prior to the service of a notice to appear applies only to the continuous physical presence requirement and has no bearing on the issues of qualifying relatives, hardship, or goodmoral character.
Matter of Ramirez-Vargas, 24 I&N Dec. 599 (BIA 2008)
A parent’s period of residence in the United States cannot be imputed to a child for purposes of calculating the 7 years of continuous residence required to establish eligibility for cancellation of removal under section 240A(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(2)(2006).
Matter of Reza-Murillo, 25 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 2010)
A grant of Family Unity Program benefits does not constitute an “admission” to the United States under section 101(a)(13)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (2006), for purposes of establishing that an alien has accrued the requisite 7-year period of continuous residence after having been “admitted in any status” to be eligible for cancellation of removal under section 240A(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(2) (2006).
Matter of Velasquez-Cruz, 26 I&N Dec. 458 (BIA 2014)
An alien's departure from the United States following a criminal conviction for illegal entry under section 275(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1) (2012), interrupts the 10-year period of continuous physical presence required to establish eligibility for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) (2012).
Matter of Fajardo-Espinoza, 26 I&N Dec. 603 (BIA 2015)
A grant of Family Unity Program benefits does not constitute an “admission” to the United States under section 101(a)(13)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A) (2012), for purposes of establishing that an alien has accrued the requisite 7 years of continuous residence after having been “admitted in any status” to be eligible for cancellation of removal under section 240A(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(2) (2012). Matter of Reza, 25 I&N Dec. 296 (BIA 2010), reaffirmed. Garcia-Quintero v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2006), not followed.
Matter of Ordaz, 26 I&N Dec. 637 (BIA 2015)
A notice to appear that was served on an alien but never resulted in the commencement of removal proceedings does not have “stop-time” effect for purposes of establishing eligibility for cancellation of removal pursuant to section 240A(d)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1) (2012).
Matter of Castrejon-Colino, 26 I&N Dec. 667 (BIA 2015)
(1) Where an alien has the right to a hearing before an Immigration Judge, a voluntary departure or return does not break the alien’s continuous physical presence for purposes of cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(1)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A) (2012), in the absence of evidence that he or she was informed of and waived the right to such a hearing. Matter of Avilez, 23 I&N Dec. 799 (BIA 2005), clarified.
(2) Evidence that an alien who had the right to a hearing before an Immigration Judge was fingerprinted and/or photographed before being allowed to voluntarily depart is not enough, in itself, to demonstrate a waiver of the right to a hearing or to show a process of sufficient formality to break continuous physical presence.
Matter of Garcia-Ramirez, 26 I&N Dec. 674 (BIA 2015)
(1) Where an alien has the right to a hearing before an Immigration Judge, a voluntary departure or return does not break the alien’s continuous physical presence for purposes of cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(1)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A) (2012), in the absence of evidence that he or she was informed of and waived the right to such a hearing, regardless of whether the encounter occurred at or near the border. Matter of Avilez, 23 I&N Dec. 799 (BIA 2005), clarified.
(2) Evidence that an alien who had the right to a hearing before an Immigration Judge was fingerprinted and/or photographed before being allowed to voluntarily depart is not enough, in itself, to demonstrate a waiver of the right to a hearing or to show a process of sufficient formality to break continuous physical presence. Matter of Castrejon-Colino, 26 I&N Dec. 667 (BIA 2015), followed.
Matter of Garcia-Hernandez, 23 I&N Dec. 590 (BIA 2002)
(1) An alien who has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude that falls within the “petty offense” exception in section 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II) of the Immigration andNationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II) (1994), is not ineligible for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(1)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C) (Supp. IV1998), because he “has not been convicted of an offense under section 212(a)(2)” of the Act.
(2) An alien who has committed a crime involving moral turpitude that falls within the“petty offense” exception is not ineligible for cancellation of removal under section240A(b)(1)(B) of the Act, because commission of a petty offense does not bar the offender from establishing good moral character under section 101(f)(3) of the Act, 8 U.S.C.§ 1101(f)(3) (Supp. IV 1998).
(3) An alien who has committed more than one petty offense is not ineligible for the “petty offense” exception if “only one crime” is a crime involving moral turpitude.
(4) The respondent, who was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude that qualifies as a petty offense, was not rendered ineligible for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(1) of Act by either his conviction or his commission of another offense that is not a crime involving moral turpitude.
Matter of Gonzalez-Silva, 24 I&N Dec. 218 (BIA 2007)
An alien whose conviction precedes the effective date of section 237(a)(2)(E) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(E) (2000), is not “convicted of an offense under” that section and therefore is not barred from establishing eligibility for cancellation of removal by section 240A(b)(1)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C) (2000).
Matter of Almanza-Arenas, 24 I&N Dec. 771 (BIA 2009)
(1) An alien whose application for relief from removal was filed after the May 11, 2005, effective date of the REAL ID Act of 2005, Division B of Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (“REAL ID Act”), has the burden to prove that he satisfies the applicable eligibility requirements and merits a favorable exercise of discretion under section 240(c)(4)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(A) (2006), and must provide corroborating evidence requested by the Immigration Judge pursuant to section 240(c)(4)(B), unless it cannot be reasonablyobtained.
(2) An alien whose application for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(1) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) (2006), is governed by the provisions of the REAL ID Act, and who has been convicted of an offense under a divisible criminal statute, has the burden to establish that the conviction was not pursuant to any part of the statute that reaches conduct involving moral turpitude, including the burden to produce corroborating conviction documents, such as a transcript of the criminal proceedings, as reasonably requested by the Immigration Judge. Sandoval-Lua v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2007),distinguished.
(3) An alien who has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude has been “convicted of an offense under” section 237(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (2006), and is therefore ineligible for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(1)(C), regardless of his status as an arriving alien or his eligibility for a petty offense exception under section 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II) (2006).
Matter of Cortez, 25 I&N Dec. 301 (BIA 2010)
(1) An alien who has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude for which a sentence of a year or longer may be imposed has been convicted of an offense “described under” section 237(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (2006), and is therefore ineligible for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(1)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C) (2006), regardless of the alien’s eligibility for the petty offense exception under section 212(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II) (2006).Matter of Almanza, 24 I&N Dec. 771 (BIA 2009), clarified. Matter of Gonzalez-Zoquiapan, 24 I&N Dec. 549 (BIA 2008); Matter of Gonzalez-Silva, 24 I&N Dec. 218 (BIA 2007); and Matter of Garcia-Hernandez, 23 I&N Dec. 590 (BIA 2003), explained.
(2) In determining which offenses are “described under” sections 212(a)(2), 237(a)(2), and 237(a)(3) of the Act for purposes of section 240A(b)(1)(C) of the Act, only language specifically pertaining to the criminal offense, such as the offense itself and the sentence imposed or potentially imposed, should be considered.
(3) The respondent’s misdemeanor conviction for welfare fraud in violation of section 10980(c)(2) of the California Welfare and Institutions Code rendered her ineligible for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(1)(C) of the Act, because it was for a crime involving moral turpitude for which she could have been sentenced to a year in county jail and was therefore for an offense “described under” section 237(a)(2) of the Act.
Matter of Bustamante, 25 I&N Dec. 564 (BIA 2011)
The bar to cancellation of removal in section 240A(b)(1)(C) of the Immigration andNationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C) (2006), which precludes an alien who has beenconvicted of an offense under section 212(a)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) (2006),from establishing eligibility for relief, may not be overcome by a waiver under section212(h) of the Act.
Matter of Pina-Galindo, 26 I&N Dec. 423 (BIA 2014)
An alien is ineligible for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(1)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C) (2012), if he or she falls within the scope of section 212(a)(2)(B) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(B) (2012), as having been convicted of two or more offenses for which the aggregate sentences imposed were 5 years or more.
Matter of Flores-Abarca, 26 I&N Dec. 992 (BIA 2017)
The crime of transporting a loaded firearm in violation of title 21, section 1289.13 of the Oklahoma Statutes is categorically a firearms offense under section 237(a)(2)(C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C) (2012), even though the term "transporting" is not included in the Act, because section 237(a)(2)(C) is broadly construed to encompass all types of firearms offenses.
Exceptional and Extremely Unusual Hardship
Matter of Monreal, 23 I&N Dec. 56 (BIA 2001)
(1) To establish “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship,” an applicant for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) (Supp. V 1999), must demonstrate that his or her spouse, parent, or child would suffer hardship that is substantially beyond that which would ordinarily be expected to result from the alien’s deportation, but need not show that such hardship would be “unconscionable.”
(2) Although many of the factors that were considered in assessing “extreme hardship” for suspension of deportation should also be considered in evaluating “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship,” an applicant for cancellation of removal must demonstrate hardship beyond that which has historically been required in suspension of deportation cases involving the “extreme hardship” standard.
(3) In establishing eligibility for cancellation of removal, only hardship to qualifying relatives, not to the applicant himself or herself, may be considered, and hardship factors relating to the applicant may be considered only insofar as they might affect the hardship to a qualifying relative.
Matter of Andazola, 23 I&N Dec. 319 (BIA 2002)
(1) The respondent, an unmarried mother, did not establish eligibility for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) (2000), because she failed to demonstrate that her 6- and 11-year-old United States citizen children will suffer exceptional and extremely unusual hardship upon her removal to Mexico.
(2) The factors considered in assessing the hardship to the respondent’s children include the poor economic conditions and diminished educational opportunities in Mexico and the fact that the respondent is unmarried and has no family in that country to assist in their adjustment upon her return.
Matter of Recinas, 23 I&N Dec. 467 (BIA 2002)
(1) The respondent, a single mother who has no immediate family remaining in Mexico, provides the sole support for her six children, and has limited financial resources, established eligibility for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8U.S.C. §1229b(b) (2002), because she demonstrated that her United States citizen children, who are 12, 11, 8, and 5 years old, will suffer exceptional and extremely unusual hardship upon her removal to her native country.
(2) The factors considered in assessing the hardship to the respondent's children include the heavy burden imposed on the respondent to provide the sole financial and familial support for her six children if she is deported to Mexico, the lack of any family in her native country, the children's unfamiliarity with the Spanish language, and the unavailability of an alternative means of immigrating to this country.
Matter of Calderon-Hernandez, 25 I&N Dec. 885 (BIA 2012)
An applicant for cancellation of removal seeking to establish exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his or her child is not required to provide an affidavit and other documentary evidence regarding the child’s care and support upon the alien’s removal if the child will remain in the United States with another parent, even if the other parent is in this country unlawfully. Matter of Ige, 20 I&N Dec. 880 (BIA 1994), clarified.
Matter of Ortega-Cabrera, 23 I&N Dec. 793 (BIA 2005)
(1) Because an application for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229b(b)(1) (2000), is a continuing one for purposes of evaluating an alien’s moral character, the period during which good moral character must be established ends with the entry of a final administrative decision by the Immigration Judge or the Board of ImmigrationAppeals.
(2) To establish eligibility for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(1) of the Act, an alien must show good moral character for a period of 10 years, which is calculated backward from the date on which the application is finally resolvedby the Immigration Judge or the Board.
Matter of G-D-M-, 25 I&N Dec. 82 (BIA 2009)
An alien who entered the United States pursuant to a crewman’s visa for the purpose of obtaining employment as a crewman is statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal under section 240A(c)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(c)(1) (2006). Matter of Goncalves, 10 I&N Dec. 277 (BIA 1963), followed.
Matter of Portillo-Gutierrez, 25 I&N Dec. 148 (BIA 2009)
A stepchild who meets the definition of a “child” under section 101(b)(1)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)(B) (2006), is a qualifying relative for purposes of establishing exceptional and extremely unusual hardship for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(1)(D) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) (2006).
Matter of Morales, 25 I&N Dec. 186 (BIA 2010)
A stepparent who qualifies as a “parent” under section 101(b)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(2) (2006), at the time of the proceedings is a qualifying relative for purposes of establishing exceptional and extremely unusual hardship for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(1)(D) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) (2006).
Matter of Dorman, 25 I&N Dec. 485 (A.G. 2011)
The Attorney General vacated the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals and remanded for the Board to make specific findings with regard to the respondent’s eligibility for cancellation of removal.
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