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Freedom of Information Act Guide, May 2004

Exemption 7(C)

Exemption 7(C) provides protection for personal information in law enforcement records. This exemption is the law enforcement counterpart to Exemption 6, which is the FOIA's fundamental privacy exemption. (See the discussions of the primary privacy-protection principles that apply to both exemptions under Exemption 6, above.) Exemption 7(C) provides protection for law enforcement information the disclosure of which "could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." (1) Despite their similarities in language, though, the sweep of the two exemptions can be significantly different.

Whereas Exemption 6 routinely requires an identification and balancing of the relevant privacy and public interests, Exemption 7(C) can be even more "categorized" in its application. Indeed, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held in SafeCard Services v. SEC (2) that based upon the traditional recognition of the strong privacy interests inherent in law enforcement records, (3) and the logical ramifications of United States Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, (4) the "categorical withholding" of information that identifies third parties in law enforcement records will ordinarily be appropriate under Exemption 7(C). (5) (See the discussion of the Supreme Court's Reporters Committee decision under Exemption 6, The Reporters Committee Decision, above.)

Certain other distinctions between Exemption 6 and Exemption 7(C) are apparent: in contrast with Exemption 6, Exemption 7(C)'s language establishes a lesser burden of proof to justify withholding in two distinct respects. (6) First, it is well established that the omission of the word "clearly" from the language of Exemption 7(C) eases the burden of the agency and stems from the recognition that law enforcement records are inherently more invasive of privacy than "personnel and medical files and similar files." (7) Indeed, the "'strong interest' of individuals, whether they be suspects, witnesses, or investigators, 'in not being associated unwarrantedly with alleged criminal activity'" has been repeatedly recognized. (8)

Second, the Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986 further broadened the protection afforded by Exemption 7(C) by lowering the risk-of-harm standard from "would" to "could reasonably be expected to." (9) This amendment to the Act eased the standard for evaluating a threatened privacy invasion through disclosure of law enforcement records. (10) One court, in interpreting the amended language, pointedly observed that it affords the agency "greater latitude in protecting privacy interests" in the law enforcement context. (11) Such information "is now evaluated by the agency under a more elastic standard; exemption 7(C) is now more comprehensive." (12)

Under the balancing test that traditionally has been applied to both Exemption 6 and Exemption 7(C), the agency must first identify and evaluate the privacy interest(s), if any, implicated in the requested records. (13) But in the case of records related to investigations by criminal law enforcement agencies, the case law has long recognized, either expressly or implicitly, that "'the mention of an individual's name in a law enforcement file will engender comment and speculation and carries a stigmatizing connotation.'" (14) Accordingly, Exemption 7(C) has been regularly applied to withhold references to persons who are not targets of investigations and who were merely mentioned in law enforcement files, (15) as well as to persons of "investigatory interest" to a criminal law enforcement agency. (16) Indeed, the Supreme Court in Reporters Committee placed strong emphasis on the propriety of broadly protecting the interests of private citizens whose names or identifying information is in a record that the government "happens to be storing." (17) More recently, in NARA v. Favish, the Supreme Court likewise recognized that law enforcement files often contain information on individuals by "mere happenstance," and it strongly reinforced the protection available under Exemption 7(C). (18) Hence, the small minority of older district court decisions that failed to appreciate the strong privacy interests inherent in the association of an individual with a law enforcement investigation should no longer be regarded as authoritative. (19)

The identities of federal, state, and local law enforcement personnel referenced in investigatory files are also routinely withheld, usually for reasons similar to those described quite aptly by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit:

One who serves his state or nation as a career public servant is not thereby stripped of every vestige of personal privacy, even with respect to the discharge of his official duties. Public identification of any of these individuals could conceivably subject them to harassment and annoyance in the conduct of their official duties and in their private lives. (20)

It should be noted that prior to the Reporters Committee and SafeCard decisions, courts ordinarily held that because Exemption 7(C) involves a balancing of the private and public interests on a case-by-case basis, there existed no "blanket exemption for the names of all [law enforcement] personnel in all documents." (21) Nonetheless, absent a demonstration of significant misconduct on the part of law enforcement personnel or other government officials, (22) the overwhelming majority of courts have declared their identities exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption 7(C). (23) Those few decisions ordering disclosure of the names of government investigators -- other than when demonstrated misconduct has been involved -- either predate Reporters Committee (24) (not to mention Favish) or else find an unusually significant public interest in disclosure. (25)

The history of one case in the District Court for the District of Columbia illustrates the impact of the Reporters Committee decision in this area of law. In Southam News, (26) the district court initially held that the identities of FBI clerical personnel who performed administrative tasks with respect to requested records could not be withheld under Exemption 7(C). Even then, this position was inconsistent with other, contemporaneous decisions. (27) Following the Supreme Court's decision in Reporters Committee, the government sought reconsideration of the Southam News decision. Agreeing that revelation of identities and activities of low-level agency personnel ordinarily will shed no light on government operations, as required by Reporters Committee, the district court reversed its earlier disclosure order and held the names to be properly protected. (28) Significantly, the court also recognized that "the only imaginable contribution that this information could make would be to enable the public to seek out individuals who had been tangentially involved in investigations and to question them for unauthorized access to information as to what the investigation entailed and what other FBI personnel were involved." (29) More recently, after undertaking a post-Reporters Committee analysis, the same district court strongly reaffirmed that identities of both FBI clerical personnel and low-level special agents are properly withheld as a routine matter under Exemption 7(C), even when they take part in a highly publicized investigation. (30)

On the other hand, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has exhibited a persistent lack of obeisance to the Reporters Committee decision. (31) In two of its most recent decisions, Lissner v. United States Customs Service (32) and Favish v. Office of Independent Counsel, (33) the Ninth Circuit inexplicably ignored well-recognized privacy interests and refused to adhere to the narrow definition of public interest set forth in Reporters Committee. (34) In Lissner, the Ninth Circuit ordered disclosure of the "general physical description" of two state law enforcement officers who were involved in smuggling steroids. (35) In so doing, it neglected to consider the fact that the physical descriptions of these persons would shed no light on the activities of the United States Customs Service. (36)

Likewise, in Favish v. Office of Independent Counsel, in attempting to balance the interests involved in ten photographs of the scene of Deputy White House Counsel Vincent Foster's suicide, the Ninth Circuit sent the case to the district court for it to view the photographs in camera and inevitably order disclosure under highly flawed standards (37) -- doing so even though those very photographs had been held to be protected by Exemption 7(C) in a previous case. (38) Further, in analyzing the public interest in disclosure, the Ninth Circuit purported to follow Reporters Committee yet based its finding of public interest in disclosure of the photographs merely upon plaintiff's "doubts" regarding the adequacy of the government's investigation into the suicide (39) -- leading to an order from the district court to disclose five of the death-scene photographs. (40)

This past year the Supreme Court very soundly rejected the Ninth Circuit's crabbed views of privacy protection, and its acceptance of spurious public interest arguments, in NARA v. Favish. (41) It ruled that while the Ninth Circuit had recognized the family's privacy interest and the nature of the asserted public interest, it had utterly failed to properly balance the two when it required no credible evidence showing actual government wrongdoing. (42) Such a reading of the Reporters Committee public interest standard in this context, the Supreme Court said, "leaves Exemption 7(C) with little force or content." (43) So under the Supreme Court's ruling in Favish, and its decision to protect the photographs at issue, a FOIA requester's assertion of a public interest based on "government wrongdoing" now must meet a distinctly higher standard. (44) Indeed, the Supreme Court's repudiation of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Favish is sweeping enough to discredit (or effectively overrule) that circuit court's previous aberrational privacy jurisprudence. (45) (See also the further discussions of Favish's fundamental privacy-protection principles under Exemption 6, above.)

Furthermore, Favish now seriously calls into question the continued vitality of the Sixth Circuit's singular view of an individual's privacy interest as enunciated by a divided panel in Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. Department of Justice, a case involving the disclosure of "mug shots." (46) The Supreme Court reiterated in Favish that privacy rights are not a "cramped notion" (47) and that Exemption 7(C)'s privacy protection must be construed broadly in light of its specific language and "comparative breadth" to the language of Exemption 6. (48) The fact that photographs taken of a private citizen in a public place become available to the public at large does not lessen the privacy interest in those photographs, contrary to the conclusion reached by the Sixth Circuit. (49) In fact, affirmatively making such photographs available to the public can go beyond merely violating privacy to inviting harassment, stigmatization, and overwhelming media scrutiny. (50) One court has logically distinguished "mug shots" from standard photographs, noting that a "mug shot" carries with it a unique "stigmatizing effect," even for a defendant who already has been convicted and sentenced. (51) Thus, in light of the Favish decision, atop the overwhelming weight of case law broadly interpreting Exemption 7(C)'s privacy protection, Detroit Free Press should no longer be regarded as authoritative even within the Sixth Circuit.

In Reporters Committee, the Supreme Court found that substantial privacy interests can exist in personal information such as is contained in "rap sheets," even though the information has been made available to the general public at some place and point in time. Applying a "practical obscurity" standard, (52) the Court observed that if such items of information actually "were 'freely available,' there would be no reason to invoke the FOIA to obtain access to [them]." (53) (See Exemption 7(D), below, for a discussion of the status of open-court testimony under that exemption.)

All but one court of appeals to have addressed the issue have found protectible privacy interests in conjunction with or in lieu of protection under Exemption 7(D) -- in the identities of individuals who provide information to law enforcement agencies. (54) Consequently, the names of witnesses and their home and business addresses have been held properly protectible under Exemption 7(C). (55) Additionally, Exemption 7(C) protection has been afforded to the identities of informants, (56) even when it was shown that "the information provided to law enforcement authorities was knowingly false." (57)

Although on occasion a pre-Reporters Committee decision found that an individual's testimony at trial precluded Exemption 7(C) protection, (58) under the Reporters Committee "practical obscurity" standard trial testimony should not diminish Exemption 7(C) protection. (59) Plainly, if a person who actually testifies retains a substantial privacy interest, the privacy of someone who is identified only as a potential witness likewise should be preserved. (60)

Moreover, courts have repeatedly recognized that the passage of time will not ordinarily diminish the applicability of Exemption 7(C). (61) This may be especially true in instances in which the information was obtained through questionable law enforcement investigations. (62) In fact, the "practical obscurity" concept expressly recognizes that the passage of time may actually increase the privacy interest at stake when disclosure would revive information that was once public knowledge but has long since faded from memory. (63)

An individual's Exemption 7(C) privacy interest likewise is not extinguished merely because a requester might on his own be able to "piece together" the identities of third parties whose names have been deleted. (64) Nor do persons mentioned in law enforcement records lose all their rights to privacy merely because their names have been disclosed. (65) Similarly, "[t]he fact that one document does disclose some names . . . does not mean that the privacy rights of these or others are waived; it has been held that [requesters] do not have the right to learn more about the activities and statements of persons merely because they are mentioned once in a public document about the investigation." (66)

Under the traditional Exemption 7(C) analysis, once a privacy interest has been identified and its magnitude has been assessed, it is balanced against the magnitude of any recognized public interest that would be served by disclosure. (67) And under Reporters Committee, the standard of public interest to consider is one specifically limited to the FOIA's "core purpose" of "shed[ding] light on an agency's performance of its statutory duties." (68) Accordingly, for example, the courts have consistently refused to recognize any public interest, as defined by Reporters Committee, in disclosure of information to assist a convict in challenging his conviction. (69) Indeed, a FOIA requester's private need for information in connection with litigation plays no part whatsoever in determining whether disclosure is warranted. (70) In NARA v. Favish, the Supreme Court further reinforced the FOIA principle that a requester's identity generally is irrelevant in the processing of a FOIA request, (71) but it at the same time made clear that a requester's reason for making a FOIA request, insofar as an evidentiary showing on an asserted "public interest" is required, can of course affect Exemption 7(C) decisionmaking. (72)

Unsubstantiated allegations of official misconduct are simply insufficient to establish a public interest in disclosure: The Supreme Court in NARA v. Favish has now made it very clear that "bare suspicion" is completely inadequate and that a requester must produce evidence that would be credible in the eyes of a reasonable person. (73) Now, one who asserts government misconduct as the public interest is held to a higher standard: Such a FOIA requester must make a "meaningful evidentiary showing" in order to provide even a public interest "counterweight" to the privacy interest and require a balancing of the two. (74) Additionally, the requester must establish some "nexus" between the requested documents and the asserted "significant" public interest in disclosure. (75)

It also has been held that no public interest exists in federal records that pertains to alleged misconduct by state officials; (76) such an attenuated interest "falls outside the ambit of the public interest the FOIA was enacted to serve." (77) Moreover, it should be remembered that any special expertise claimed by the requester is irrelevant in assessing any public interest in disclosure. (78)

It also is important to remember that a requester must do more than identify a public interest that qualifies for consideration under Reporters Committee: The requester must demonstrate that the public interest in disclosure is sufficiently compelling to, on balance, outweigh legitimate privacy interests. (79) Of course, "[w]here the requester fails to assert a public interest purpose for disclosure, even a less-than- substantial invasion of another's privacy is unwarranted." (80) In the wake of Reporters Committee, the public interest standard ordinarily will not be satisfied when FOIA requesters seek law enforcement information pertaining to living persons. (81)

In order to protect the privacy interest of any individual who may be living, agencies may use many different kinds of tests or research methods to determine whether that person is still living or has died. The D.C. Circuit very recently approved the Federal Bureau of Investigation's methods for doing this in Schrecker v. United States Dep't of Justice. (82) The FBI uses several steps to determine whether an individual mentioned in a record is alive or dead, including looking up the individual's name in Who Was Who, employing its "100-year rule" (which presumes that an individual is dead if his or her birthdate appears in the responsive documents and he or she would be over 100 years old), and using previous FOIA requests (institutional knowledge), a search of the Social Security Death Index (when the Social Security number appears in the responsive documents), and other "internal" sources. (83) Other agencies may now do likewise.

In Reporters Committee, the Supreme Court also emphasized the desirability of establishing "categorical balancing" under Exemption 7(C) as a means of achieving "workable rules" for processing FOIA requests. (84) In so doing, it recognized that entire categories of cases can properly receive uniform disposition "without regard to individual circumstances; the standard virtues of bright-line rules are thus present, and the difficulties attendant to ad hoc adjudication may be avoided." (85) This approach, in conjunction with other elements of Reporters Committee and traditional Exemption 7(C) principles, subsequently led the D.C. Circuit to largely eliminate the need for case-by-case balancing in favor of "categorical" withholding of individuals' identities in law enforcement records. (86)

In SafeCard, the plaintiff sought information pertaining to an SEC investigation of manipulation of SafeCard stock, including "names and addresses of third parties mentioned in witness interviews, of customers listed in stock transaction records obtained from investment companies, and of persons in correspondence with the SEC." (87) Recognizing the fundamentally inherent privacy interest of individuals mentioned in any way in law enforcement files, (88) the D.C. Circuit found that the plaintiff's asserted public interest -- providing the public "with insight into the SEC's conduct with respect to SafeCard" -- was "not just less substantial [but] insubstantial." (89) Based upon the Supreme Court's endorsement of categorical rules in Reporters Committee, it then further determined that the identities of individuals who appear in law enforcement files would virtually never be "very probative of an agency's behavior or performance." (90) It observed that such information would serve a "significant" public interest only if "there is compelling evidence that the agency . . . is engaged in illegal activity." (91) Consequently, the D.C. Circuit held that "unless access to the names and addresses of private individuals appearing in files within the ambit of Exemption 7(C) is necessary in order to confirm or refute compelling evidence that the agency is engaged in illegal activity, such information is [categorically] exempt from disclosure." (92) This all now should be viewed, though, together with the standard applied by the Supreme Court in NARA v. Favish regarding any specific evaluation of an asserted "agency wrongdoing public interest." (93) In any event, of course, agencies should be sure to redact their law enforcement records so that only identifying information is withheld under Exemption 7(C). (94) (See the further discussion of privacy redaction under Exemption 6, The Balancing Process, above.)

Protecting the privacy interests of individuals who are the targets of FOIA requests and are named in investigatory records requires special procedures. Most agencies with criminal law enforcement responsibilities follow the approach of the FBI, which is generally to respond to FOIA requests for records concerning other individuals by refusing to confirm or deny whether such records exist. Such a response is necessary because, as previously discussed, members of the public may draw adverse inferences from the mere fact that an individual is mentioned in the files of a criminal law enforcement agency. (95) Except when the third-party subject is deceased or provides a written waiver of his privacy rights, law enforcement agencies ordinarily "Glomarize" such third-party requests -- refusing either to confirm or deny the existence of responsive records -- in order to protect the privacy of those who are in fact the subject of or mentioned in investigatory files. (96)

In employing privacy "Glomarization," however, agencies must be careful to use it only to the extent that is warranted by the terms of the particular FOIA request at hand. (97) For a request that involves more than just a law enforcement file, the agency must take a "bifurcated" approach to it, distinguishing between the exceptionally sensitive law enforcement part of the request and any part that is not so sensitive as to require "Glomarization." (98) In so doing, agencies apply the following general rules: (1) FOIA requests that merely seek law enforcement records pertaining to a named individual, without any elaboration, can be given a standard "Glomarization" response; (2) any request that is specifically and exclusively directed to an agency's non-law enforcement files (e.g., one aimed at personnel files only) should receive purely conventional treatment, without "Glomarization"; and (3) FOIA requests that do more than simply seek law enforcement records on a named individual (e.g., ones that encompass personnel or possible administrative files as well) must be bifurcated for conventional as well as "Glomarization" treatment. (99) The "Glomar" response also is appropriate when one government agency has officially acknowledged the existence of an investigation but the agency that received the third-party request has never officially acknowledged undertaking an investigation into that matter. (100)

Prior to Reporters Committee, before an agency could give a "Glomarization" response, it was required to check the requested records, if any existed, for any official acknowledgment of the investigation (e.g., as a result of prosecution) or for any overriding public interest in disclosure that would render "Glomarization" inapplicable. However, in Reporters Committee, the Supreme Court eliminated the need to consider whether there has been a prior acknowledgment when it expressly "recognized the privacy interest inherent in the nondisclosure of certain information even when the information may have been at one time public." (101) Further, as the very fact of an arrest and conviction of a person, as reflected in his FBI "rap sheet," creates a cognizable privacy interest, any underlying investigative file, containing a far more detailed account of the subject's activities, gives rise to an even greater privacy interest. (102)

At the litigation stage, the agency must demonstrate to the court, either through a Vaughn affidavit or an in camera submission, that its refusal to confirm or deny the existence of responsive records is appropriate. (103) Although this "refusal to confirm or deny" approach is now widely accepted in the case law, (104) several cases have illustrated the procedural difficulties involved in defending a "Glomar" response when the requester's "speculation" as to the contents of the records (if any exist) raises a qualifying public interest. (105)

The significantly lessened certainty of harm now required under Exemption 7(C) and the approval of "categorical" withholding of privacy-related law enforcement information in most instances should permit agencies to afford full protection to the personal privacy interests of those mentioned in law enforcement files (106) whenever those interests are threatened by a contemplated FOIA disclosure. (107)

    1. 5 U.S.C.  552(b)(7)(C) (2000).

    2. 926 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

    3. See Attorney General's Memorandum for Heads of All Federal Departments and Agencies Regarding the Freedom of Information Act (Oct. 12, 2001) [hereinafter Attorney General Ashcroft's FOIA Memorandum], reprinted in FOIA Post (posted 10/15/01) (evincing government commitment to enhancing effectiveness of law enforcement agencies).

    4. 489 U.S. 749 (1989); see also Attorney General Ashcroft's FOIA Memorandum, reprinted in FOIA Post (posted 10/15/01) (emphasizing the importance of protecting personal privacy among the other interests that are protected by the FOIA's exemptions); FOIA Update, Vol. X, No. 2, at 3-7 (discussing mechanics of privacy-protection decisionmaking process employed under Exemptions 6 and 7(C)).

    5. 926 F.2d at 1206; see, e.g., Blanton v. United States Dep't of Justice, 64 Fed. Appx. 787, 789 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (protecting identities of third parties contained in FBI files categorically, including those assumed to be deceased); Fiduccia v. United States Dep't of Justice, 185 F.3d 1035, 1047-48 (9th Cir. 1999) (protecting records concerning FBI searches of house of two named individuals categorically); Nation Magazine v. United States Customs Serv., 71 F.3d 885, 896 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (restating that those portions of records in investigatory files which would reveal subjects, witnesses, and informants in law enforcement investigations are categorically exempt (citing SafeCard)); Mack v. Dep't of the Navy, 259 F. Supp. 2d 99, 106 (D.D.C. 2003) (protecting identities of law enforcement agents, victims, witnesses, subjects of investigative interest, and third parties contained in investigative records categorically); Carp v. IRS, No. 00-5992, 2002 WL 373448, at **4-5 (D.N.J. Jan. 28, 2002) (holding that all information that identifies third parties is categorically exempt); Pusa v. FBI, No. CV-00-12384, slip op. at 8 (C.D. Cal. May 4, 2001) (finding certain information pertaining to third parties to be categorically exempt), aff'd, 31 Fed. Appx. 567 (9th Cir. 2002); Coolman v. IRS, No. 98-6149, 1999 WL 675319, at *5 (W.D. Mo. July 12, 1999) (finding categorical withholding of third-party information in law enforcement records to be proper), summary affirmance granted, 1999 WL 1419039 (8th Cir. 1999); Ctr. to Prevent Handgun Violence v. United States Dep't of the Treasury, 981 F. Supp. 20, 23 (D.D.C. 1997) (stating that "categorical exclusion from release of names in law enforcement reports applies only to subjects, witnesses, or informants in law enforcement investigations"); McNamera v. United States Dep't of Justice, 974 F. Supp. 946, 957-60 (W.D. Tex. 1997) (allowing categorical withholding of information concerning criminal investigation of private citizens); Tanks v. Huff, No. 95-568, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7266, at **12-13 (D.D.C. May 28, 1996) (holding that absent compelling evidence of agency wrongdoing, criminal histories and other personal information about informants are categorically exempt), appeal dismissed voluntarily, No. 96-5180 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 13, 1996); Straughter v. HHS, No. 94-0567, slip op. at 5 (S.D. W. Va. Mar. 31, 1995) (magistrate's recommendation) (affording per se protection under Exemption 7(C) for witnesses and third parties when requester has identified no public interest), adopted (S.D. W. Va. Apr. 17, 1995); cf. AFL-CIO v. FEC, 177 F. Supp. 2d 48, 61 (D.D.C. 2001) (applying "this Circuit['s]" categorical rule that requires withholding under Exemption 7(C) of names of, and identifying information about, private individuals appearing in law enforcement files, even though action was brought under Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.  706(2)(A) (2000), and despite questionable standing of plaintiff organization to assert any such privacy interest), aff'd on other grounds, 333 F.3d 168 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Alexander & Alexander Servs. v. SEC, No. 92-1112, 1993 WL 439799, at *10 (D.D.C. Oct. 19, 1993) (requiring categorical withholding of personal information, even when records concern only professional activity of subjects, when no compelling evidence of illegal agency activity exists) ("reverse" FOIA case), appeal dismissed, No. 93-5398 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 4, 1996). But see Kimberlin v. United States Dep't of Justice, 139 F.3d 944, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (eschewing the categorical rule of nondisclosure for Office of Professional Responsibility files, and suggesting the use of a case-by-case balancing test involving consideration of the "rank of public official involved and the seriousness of misconduct alleged"); Davin v. United States Dep't of Justice, 60 F.3d 1043, 1060 (3d Cir. 1995) (ruling that the "government must conduct a document by document fact-specific balancing"); Konigsberg v. FBI, No. 02-2428, slip op. at 5-7 (D.D.C. May 27, 2003) (refusing to apply categorical rule to records on informant who allegedly was protected from prosecution by FBI, based upon exceptional circumstances presented); Baltimore Sun v. United States Marshals Serv., 131 F. Supp. 2d 725, 730 n.5 (D. Md. 2001) (declining to accord categorical protection to third parties who purchased federally forfeited property), appeal dismissed voluntarily, No. 01-1537 (4th Cir. June 25, 2001).

    6. See NARA v. Favish, 124 S. Ct. 1570, 1576-77 (2004) (distinguishing between Exemption 6's and Exemption 7(C)'s language), reh'g denied, No. 02-409, 2004 WL 108633 (U.S. May 17, 2004).

    7. See Cong. News Syndicate v. United States Dep't of Justice, 438 F. Supp. 538, 541 (D.D.C. 1977) ("[A]n individual whose name surfaces in connection with an investigation may, without more, become the subject of rumor and innuendo."); see also, e.g., Iglesias v. CIA, 525 F. Supp. 547, 562 (D.D.C. 1981).

    8. Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F.2d 755, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (quoting Stern v. FBI, 737 F.2d 84, 91-92 (D.C. Cir. 1984)); see also Neely v. FBI, 208 F.3d 461, 464-66 (4th Cir. 2000) (finding that FBI Special Agents and third-party suspects have "substantial interest[s] in nondisclosure of their identities and their connection[s] to particular investigations"); Quiñon v. FBI, 86 F.3d 1222, 1230 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (ruling that "'[p]ersons involved in FBI investigations -- even if they are not the subject of the investigation -- "have a substantial interest in seeing that their participation remains secret"'" (quoting Fitzgibbon, 911 F.2d at 767 (quoting, in turn, King v. United States Dep't of Justice, 830 F.2d 210, 233 (D.C. Cir. 1987)))); Schiffer v. FBI, 78 F.3d 1405, 1410 (9th Cir. 1996) (stating that persons named in FBI files have "strong interest in 'not being associated unwarrantedly with alleged criminal activity'" (quoting Fitzgibbon, 911 F.2d at 767)); Computer Prof'ls for Soc. Responsibility v. United States Secret Serv., 72 F.3d 897, 904 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding that release of names of individuals, including nonsuspects, who attended public meeting that attracted attention of law enforcement officials would impinge upon their privacy); Hunt v. FBI, 972 F.2d 286, 288 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding that association of FBI "agent's name with allegations of sexual and professional misconduct could cause the agent great personal and professional embarrassment"); Dunkelberger v. Dep't of Justice, 906 F.2d 779, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (refusing to confirm or deny existence of letter of reprimand or suspension of named FBI agent); Bast v. United States Dep't of Justice, 665 F.2d 1251, 1254-55 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (ruling that government officials do not surrender all rights to personal privacy by virtue of public appointment); Leveto v. IRS, No. 98-285 E, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5791, at **17-18 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 10, 2001) (recognizing privacy interests of suspects, witnesses, interviewees, and investigators); Morales Cozier v. FBI, No. 1:99 CV 0312, slip op. at 16-17 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 25, 2000) (protecting identities of FBI support personnel and individuals who provided information to FBI; citing 'well-recognized and substantial privacy interest' in nondisclosure (quoting Neely, 208 F.3d at 464)); Franklin v. United States Dep't of Justice, No. 97-1225, slip op. at 10 (S.D. Fla. June 15, 1998) (magistrate's recommendation) (stating law enforcement officers, suspects, witnesses, innocent third parties, and individuals named in investigative files have substantial privacy interests in nondisclosure (citing Wichlacz v. United States Dep't of Interior, 938 F. Supp. 325, 330 (E.D. Va. 1996))), adopted (S.D. Fla. June 26, 1998), aff'd per curiam, 189 F.3d 485 (11th Cir. 1999); Buros v. HHS, No. 93-571, slip op. at 10 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 26, 1994) (refusing to confirm or deny existence of criminal investigatory records concerning county official, even though subject's alleged mishandling of funds already known to public; "confirming . . . federal criminal investigation brushes the subject with an independent and indelible taint of wrongdoing"). But see Davin v. United States Dep't of Justice, No. 92-1122, slip op. at 9 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 1998) (concluding that individuals' privacy interests became diluted during more than twenty years that had passed since investigation was conducted), aff'd, 176 F.3d 471 (3d Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision).

    9. Pub. L. No. 99-570,  1802, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-48; see Attorney General's Memorandum on the 1986 Amendments to the Freedom of Information Act 9-12 (Dec. 1987) [hereinafter Attorney General's 1986 Amendments Memorandum]; see also Favish, 124 S. Ct. at 1579 (evincing the Supreme Court's reliance on "the Attorney General's consistent interpretation of" the FOIA in successive such Attorney General memoranda).

    10. See Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 756 n.9; Stone v. FBI, 727 F. Supp. 662, 665 (D.D.C. 1990) (stating that the 1986 FOIA amendments have "eased the burden of an agency claiming that exemption"), aff'd, No. 90-5065 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 14, 1990).

    11. Wash. Post Co. v. United States Dep't of Justice, No. 84-3581, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14936, at *32 (D.D.C. Sept. 25, 1987) (magistrate's recommendation), adopted (D.D.C. Dec. 15, 1987), rev'd on other grounds & remanded, 863 F.2d 96 (D.C. Cir. 1988).

    12. Id.; see also Keys v. United States Dep't of Justice, 830 F.2d 337, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (finding that the "government need not 'prove to a certainty that release will lead to an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,'" at least not after the 1986 FOIA amendments (quoting Reporters Comm., 816 F.2d 730, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1987))); Nishnic v. Dep't of Justice, 671 F. Supp. 776, 788 (D.D.C. 1987) (holding phrase "could reasonably be expected to" to be more easily satisfied standard than phrase "likely to materialize").

    13. See e.g., Straughter, No. 94-0567, slip op. at 5 (S.D. W. Va. Mar. 31, 1995) ( observing that agency must first identify and evaluate particular privacy interest implicated); Albuquerque Publ'g Co. v. United States Dep't of Justice, 726 F. Supp. 851, 855 (D.D.C. 1989) ("Our preliminary inquiry is whether a personal privacy interest is involved."); see also FOIA Update, Vol. X, No. 2, at 7 (advising that there first must be a viable privacy interest of an identifiable, living person in the requested information for any further consideration of privacy-exemption protection to be appropriate).

    14. Fitzgibbon, 911 F.2d at 767 (quoting Branch v. FBI, 658 F. Supp. 204, 209 (D.D.C. 1987)); see also Massey v. FBI, 3 F.3d 620, 624 (2d Cir. 1993) (same); Miller v. Bell, 661 F.2d 623, 631-32 (7th Cir. 1981) ("real potential for harassment"); Lesar v. United States Dep't of Justice, 636 F.2d 472, 488 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("'It is difficult if not impossible, to anticipate all respects in which disclosure might damage reputation or lead to personal embarrassment and discomfort.'" (quoting Lesar v. United States Dep't of Justice, 455 F. Supp. 921, 925 (D.D.C. 1978))); Palacio v. United States Dep't of Justice, No. 00-1564, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2198, at *9 (D.D.C. Feb. 11, 2002) (finding that release of individual's name in connection with criminal investigation may carry stigma and subject him to unnecessary public attention or harassment), summary affirmance granted, No. 02-5247, 2003 WL 242751 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 31, 2003); Brady-Lunny v. Massey, 185 F. Supp. 2d 928, 932 (C.D. Ill. 2002) (deciding that release of names of federal inmates, some of whom had not been charged with or convicted of crimes, would "stigmatize these individuals and cause what could be irreparable damage to their reputations"); Perlman v. United States Dep't of Justice, No. 00 Civ. 5842, 2001 WL 910406, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2001) (finding that release of names of individuals who provided information during investigation would subject them to "embarrassment, harassment or threats of reprisal"), aff'd in pertinent part, 312 F.3d 100, 106 (2d Cir. 2002) (recognizing that witnesses and third parties have "strong privacy interests" in not being identified as having been part of law enforcement investigation), vacated & remanded, 124 S. Ct. 1872 (2004); Times Picayune Publ'g Corp. v. United States Dep't of Justice, 37 F. Supp. 2d 472, 477 (E.D. La. 1999) (recognizing that a "mug shot's stigmatizing effect can last well beyond the actual criminal proceeding"); Abraham & Rose, P.L.C. v. United States, 36 F. Supp. 2d 955, 957 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (noting that filing of tax lien against individual could cause "comment, speculation and stigma"); Thompson v. United States Dep't of Justice, No. 96-1118, slip op. at 24 (D. Kan. July 14, 1998) (finding that release of third-party names could invite harassment, embarrassment, or annoyance); Anderson v. USPS, 7 F. Supp. 2d 583, 586 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (disclosing identities of interviewees and witnesses may result in embarrassment and harassment), aff'd, 187 F.3d 625 (3d Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision); Cujas v. IRS, No. 1:97-00741, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6466, at *9 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 15, 1998) (finding that "third parties named in these law enforcement records have a very strong privacy interest in avoiding the stigma and embarrassment resulting from their identification as a person that is or was under investigation"), summary affirmance granted, No. 98-1641, 1998 WL 539686 (4th Cir. Aug. 25, 1998); Hamilton v. Weise, No. 95-1161, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18900, at *20 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 1, 1997) (protecting third-party names to avoid harassment, embarrassment, and unwanted public attention); McNamera, 974 F. Supp. at 958 (rejecting argument that individual already investigated by one agency cannot be stigmatized by acknowledgment of investigation by another agency); Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. United States Dep't of the Navy, No. C-3-95-328, slip op. at 51 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 13, 1996) (withholding records concerning acquitted criminal defendants because disclosure "can cause not only extreme embarrassment and humiliation, but also severe professional and economic hardship"); Southam News v. INS, 674 F. Supp. 881, 887 (D.D.C. 1987) (finding disclosure of identities of individuals excludable from U.S. "would result in derogatory inferences about and possible embarrassment to those individuals"); cf. Cerveny v. CIA, 445 F. Supp. 772, 776 (D. Colo. 1978) (finding mere mention of individual's name as subject of CIA file could be damaging to his or her reputation) (Exemption 6). But see Blanton v. United States Dep't of Justice, No. 93-2398, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21444, at **8-12 (W.D. Tenn. July 14, 1993) (holding that there is no privacy interest in mere mention of defense attorney's name in criminal file or in validity of law license when attorney represented requester at criminal trial) (Exemptions 6 and 7(C)).

    15. See SafeCard, 926 F.2d at 1206 (protecting names of third parties); Rugiero v. United States Dep't of Justice, 257 F.3d 534, 552 (6th Cir. 2001) (protecting identifying information about third parties), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1134 (2002); Shafizadeh v. ATF, No. 99-5727, 2000 WL 1175586, at *2 (6th Cir. Aug. 10, 2000) (protecting names of, and identifying information about, private individuals); Neely, 208 F.3d at 464 (withholding names of third parties mentioned or interviewed in course of investigation); Halpern v. FBI, 181 F.3d 279, 297 (2d Cir. 1999) (same); Johnston v. United States Dep't of Justice, No. 97-2173, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 18557, at *2 (8th Cir. Aug. 10, 1998) (same); Gabel v. IRS, 134 F.3d 377, 377 (9th Cir. 1998) (protecting third-party names in Department of Motor Vehicles computer printout included in plaintiff's IRS file); Computer Prof'ls, 72 F.3d at 904 (finding that release of names of any individuals who attended public meeting that attracted attention of law enforcement officials would impinge upon their privacy); Chourre v. IRS, No. C01-5171, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2925, at *9 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 4, 2002) (holding that redaction of third-party taxpayer information was proper); Amro v. United States Customs Serv., 128 F. Supp. 2d 776, 787 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (withholding names of "non-suspects arising during investigations"); Morales Cozier, No. 99-CV-0312, slip op. at 17 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 25, 2000) (protecting identities of third parties mentioned in law enforcement documents); Comer v. IRS, No. 97-CV-76329, slip op. at 2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 17, 2000) (approving withholding of third party's driver's license information); Bartolotta v. FBI, No. 99-1145, slip op. at 6 (D.D.C. July 13, 2000) (withholding personal information regarding potential visitors to inmate-plaintiff); W. Ctr. for Journalism v. IRS, 116 F. Supp. 2d 1, 12 (D.D.C. 2000) (protecting address of complainant and "unrelated, incidental medical information about a third party"), aff'd, 22 Fed. Appx. 14 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Murphy v. IRS, 79 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1185 (D. Haw. 1999) (protecting identities of third parties); Franklin, No. 97-1225, slip op. at 13 (S.D. Fla. June 15, 1998) (magistrate's recommendation) (protecting names, addresses, and other information that would identify individuals associated with plaintiff), adopted (S.D. Fla. June 26, 1998); Crump v. EEOC, No. 97-0275, slip op. at 6 (M.D. Tenn. May 30, 1997) (magistrate's recommendation) (protecting personal information of third parties who filed charges with EEOC), adopted (M.D. Tenn. June 18, 1997); Feshbach v. SEC, 5 F. Supp. 2d 774, 785 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (withholding identities of third parties against whom SEC did not take action); Ajluni v. FBI, 947 F. Supp. 599, 604-05 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (protecting identities of third parties merely mentioned in FBI files); Perrone v. FBI, 908 F. Supp. 24, 26-27 (D.D.C. 1995) (holding that release of names of persons mentioned in law enforcement files could lead to "stigmatizing public attention and even harassment"); Fritz v. IRS, 862 F. Supp. 234, 236 (W.D. Wis. 1994) (protecting name and address of person who purchased requester's seized car). But see City of Chicago v. United States Dep't of the Treasury, 287 F.3d 628, 636 (7th Cir. 2002) (declining to find "any legitimate privacy concerns" in names and addresses of firearm purchasers), vacated & remanded, 537 U.S. 1229 (2003); Baltimore Sun, 131 F. Supp. 2d at 729 (rejecting protection of names and addresses of purchasers of forfeited property); see also FOIA Post, "Supreme Court Vacates and Remands in ATF Database Case" (posted 3/25/03) (discussing impact of vacatur in City of Chicago case).

    16. See, e.g., Neely, 208 F.3d at 464 (withholding names and identifying information of third-party suspects); Halpern, 181 F.3d at 297 (finding strong privacy interest in material that suggests person has at one time been subject to criminal investigation); O'Kane v. United States Customs Serv., 169 F.3d 1308, 1309 (11th Cir. 1999) (protecting home addresses of individuals whose possessions were seized by government); Spirko v. USPS, 147 F.3d 992, 998-99 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (protecting suspects' palm- and fingerprints, their interviews and discussions with law enforcement officers, and photographs of former suspects and their criminal histories); Computer Prof'ls, 72 F.3d at 904 (holding potential suspects would have their privacy impinged if names disclosed); Massey, 3 F.3d at 624 (finding third parties' privacy interests in nondisclosure "potentially greater" than those of law enforcement officers); McDonnell v. United States, 4 F.3d 1227, 1255 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding suspects have "obvious privacy interest in not having their identities revealed"); Maynard v. CIA, 986 F.2d 547, 566 (1st Cir. 1993) (reiterating "potential for harassment, reprisal or embarrassment" if names of individuals investigated by FBI disclosed); Davis v. United States Dep't of Justice, 968 F.2d 1276, 1281 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (deciding that "embarrassment and reputational harm" would result from disclosure of taped conversations of individuals with boss of New Orleans organized crime family); Silets v. United States Dep't of Justice, 945 F.2d 227, 230 (7th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (protecting associates of Jimmy Hoffa who were subjects of electronic surveillance); Fund for Constitutional Gov't v. Nat'l Archives & Records Serv., 656 F.2d 856, 861-66 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (withholding identities of persons investigated but not charged, unless "exceptional interests militate in favor of disclosure"); Garcia v. United States Dep't of Justice, 181 F. Supp. 2d 356, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (protecting names, identities, addresses, and information pertaining to third parties who were of investigatory interest); Amro, 128 F. Supp. 2d at 784 (finding that disclosure of names of third parties of investigatory interest to Customs Service would "undermine the privacy interests of these individuals"); Willis v. FBI, No. 99-CV-73481, slip op. at 18 (E.D. Mich. July 11, 2000) (magistrate's recommendation) (protecting identifying information concerning subject of FBI investigation), adopted (E.D. Mich. Sept. 26, 2000); Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. HHS, 69 F. Supp. 2d 63, 68 (D.D.C. 1999) (protecting names of doctors "investigated for -- but not charged with -- Medicare fraud"); Thompson, No. 96-1118, slip op. at 24 (D. Kan. July 14, 1998) (withholding names of complainant, information provided by third-party subject, and names of individuals interviewed); Tawalbeh v. United States Dep't of the Air Force, No. 96-6241, slip op. at 7 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 1997) (protecting names of third parties who were potential targets of criminal investigation); Buros, No. 93-571, slip op. at 10 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 26, 1994) (finding that even though subject's alleged mishandling of funds already known to public, confirming federal criminal investigation "brushes the subject with an independent and indelible taint of wrongdoing").

    17. See 489 U.S. at 774-75, 780 (declaring with no small emphasis that "it should come as no surprise that in none of our cases construing the FOIA have we found it appropriate to order a Government agency to honor a FOIA request for information about a particular private citizen").

    18. Favish, 124 S. Ct. at 1577 (explicating in full that "law enforcement documents obtained by Government investigators often contain information about persons interviewed as witnesses or initial suspects but whose link to the official inquiry may be the result of mere happenstance"); see also FOIA Post, "Supreme Court Rules for 'Survivor Privacy' in Favish" (posted 4/9/04) (emphasizing breadth of privacy protection enunciated by Supreme Court in Favish).

    19. See, e.g., Silets v. FBI, 591 F. Supp. 490, 498 (N.D. Ill. 1984); Cunningham v. FBI, 540 F. Supp. 1, 2 (N.D. Ohio 1981), rev'd & remanded with order to vacate, No. 84-3367 (6th Cir. May 9, 1985); Lamont v. Dep't of Justice, 475 F. Supp. 761, 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).

    20. Nix v. United States, 572 F.2d 998, 1006 (4th Cir. 1978); see FOIA Update, Vol. V, No. 2, at 5; see, e.g., Favish, 124 S. Ct. at 1580 (finding privacy interests to be undiminished by deceased's status as high-level public official); Rugiero, 257 F.3d at 552 (upholding nondisclosure of identifying information about DEA agents and personnel); Robert v. Nat'l Archives, 1 Fed. Appx. 85, 86 (2d Cir. 2001) (protecting government employee's name); Shafizadeh, No. 99-5727, 2000 WL 1175586, at *2 (withholding names of, and identifying information about, federal law enforcement personnel); Neely, 208 F.3d at 464 (withholding FBI Special Agents' names); Fiduccia, 185 F.3d at 1043-45 (withholding DEA and INS agents' names); Halpern, 181 F.3d at 296 (protecting identities of nonfederal law enforcement officers); Johnston, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 18557, at *2 (protecting names of DEA agents and personnel and local law enforcement personnel); Manna v. United States Dep't of Justice, 51 F.3d 1158, 1166 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding law enforcement officers have substantial privacy interest in nondisclosure of names, particularly when requester held high position in La Cosa Nostra); Jones v. FBI, 41 F.3d 238, 246 (6th Cir. 1994) (protecting names of FBI Special Agents and federal, state, and local law enforcement personnel); Becker v. IRS, 34 F.3d 398, 405 n.23 (7th Cir. 1994) (protecting initials, names, and phone numbers of IRS employees); Church of Scientology Int'l v. IRS, 995 F.2d 916, 920-21 (9th Cir. 1993) (deciding privacy interest exists in handwriting of IRS agents in official documents); Maynard, 986 F.2d at 566 (protecting names and initials of low-level FBI Special Agents and support personnel); Hale v. United States Dep't of Justice, 973 F.2d 894, 902 (10th Cir. 1992) (finding FBI employees have substantial privacy interest in concealing their identities), vacated & remanded on other grounds, 509 U.S. 918 (1993); Davis, 968 F.2d at 1281 (holding that "undercover agents" have protectible privacy interests); New England Apple Council v. Donovan, 725 F.2d 139, 142-44 (1st Cir. 1984) (inspector general investigator has "interest in retaining the capability to perform his tasks effectively by avoiding untoward annoyance or harassment"); Miller, 661 F.2d at 630 ("It is not necessary that harassment rise to the level of endangering physical safety before the protections of 7(C) can be invoked."); Lesar, 636 F.2d at 487-88 (annoyance or harassment); Summers v. United States Dep't of Justice, No. 98-1837, slip op. at 15 (D.D.C. Mar. 10, 2003) (approving FBI's decision to distinguish between low-level (or first-line) supervisors and high-level supervisors who may be more knowledgeable about investigation); Aldridge v. United States Comm'r of Internal Revenue, No. 7:00-CV-131, 2001 WL 196965, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2001) (withholding IRS employees' social security numbers, home addresses, phone numbers, birthdates, and direct dial telephone number of acting chief of IRS's Examinations Division), appeal dismissed sub nom. Aldridge v. Rossotti, 2001 WL 456239 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 27, 2001); Times Picayune, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 478 (noting that one's status "as a 'public figure' does not eviscerate" one's privacy interest under the FOIA); Ortiz v. United States Dep't of Justice, No. 97-140, slip op. at 5 (M.D. La. Aug. 25, 1998) (magistrate's recommendation) (protecting names and identifying information pertaining to local and foreign law enforcement officers), adopted (M.D. La. Oct. 1, 1998); see also Sosa v. FBI, No. 93-1126, slip op. at 8 (D.D.C. Apr. 9, 1998) (protecting murdered law enforcement officer's autopsy reports). But see Lissner v. United States Customs Serv., 241 F.3d 1220, 1224 (9th Cir. 2001) (ordering release of physical description of state law enforcement officers involved in smuggling incident); Trentadue v. President's Council on Integrity & Efficiency, No. 03-339, slip op. at 4 (D. Utah Apr. 26, 2004) (refusing to find any privacy interest and therefore ordering release of names of mid-level government employees involved in investigation of Department of Justice IG despite failure of requester to demonstrate any public interest); Darby v. United States Dep't of the Air Force, No. CV-S-00-0661, slip op. at 11-12 (D. Nev. Mar. 1, 2002) (ordering release of names of DOD IG investigators and other government employees involved in investigation), aff'd sub nom. Darby v. DOD, 74 Fed. Appx. 813 (9th Cir. 2003); Hardy v. FBI, No. 95-883, slip op. at 21, 28 (D. Ariz. July 29, 1997) (ordering release of names of ATF supervisory agents involved in raid at Waco); Williams v. FBI, No. 91-1054, slip op. at 5 (D.D.C. Apr. 18, 1997) (ordering release of names of arresting officers and officers who participated in search and seizure); Butler v. United States Dep't of Justice, No. 86-2255, 1994 WL 55621, at **5-6 (D.D.C. Feb. 3, 1994) (ordering release of names of supervisory FBI personnel involved in requester's case), appeal dismissed voluntarily, No. 94-5078 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 8, 1994); see also FOIA Post, "Supreme Court Rules for 'Survivor Privacy' in Favish" (posted 4/9/04) (discussing privacy expectations of individual identified as "public figure").

    21. Lesar, 636 F.2d at 487.

    22. See, e.g., Perlman, 312 F.3d at 107-09 (ordering release of extensive details concerning IG investigation of former INS general counsel who was implicated in wrongdoing, and enunciating unique five-factor test to balance government employee's privacy interest against public interest in disclosure, including employee's rank, degree of wrongdoing and strength of evidence, availability of information, whether information sheds light on government activity, and whether information is related to job function or is personal in nature); Stern, 737 F.2d at 94 (ordering release of name of FBI Special Agent-in-Charge who directly participated in intentional wrongdoing, while protecting names of two mid-level agents whose negligence incidentally furthered cover-up); Chang v. Dep't of the Navy, No. 00-0783, slip op. at 15 (D.D.C. Apr. 22, 2004) (approving disclosure of details of nonjudicial punishment and letter of reprimand of commander of ship punished for dereliction of duty) (Privacy Act "wrongful disclosure" decision interpreting Exemption 6); Wood v. FBI, No. 02-2058, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5525, at **50-52 (D. Conn. Mar. 31, 2004) (applying Perlman test in disallowing Exemption 6 protection and ordering release of information identifying FBI Special Agent with supervisory authority who was investigated for wrongdoing, but withholding names of investigators under Exemption 7(C)); see also Jefferson v. United States Dep't of Justice, No. 01-1418, slip op. at 11 (D.D.C. Nov. 14, 2003) (protecting details of IG investigation of government attorney-advisor with no decisionmaking authority as employee whose rank was not so high that public interest in disclosure could outweigh personal privacy interest in learning of any investigated alleged misconduct).

    23. See, e.g., Manna, 51 F.3d at 1166 (finding unfounded complaints of government misconduct insufficient to outweigh law enforcement officers' substantial privacy interests); Hale, 973 F.2d at 901 (holding unsubstantiated allegations of government wrongdoing do not justify disclosing law enforcement personnel names); Davis, 968 F.2d at 1281 ("undercover agents"); In re Wade, 969 F.2d 241, 246 (7th Cir. 1992) (FBI Special Agent); Patterson v. FBI, 893 F.2d 595, 601 (3d Cir. 1990) (FBI personnel); Johnson, 739 F.2d at 1519 (deciding that FBI Special Agents' identities are properly protectible absent evidence in record of impropriety); Dorsett v. United States Dep't of the Treasury, 307 F. Supp. 2d 28, 38-39 (D.D.C. 2004) (withholding names of Secret Service Special Agents and personnel, FBI Special Agents, and other employees in face of allegations of misconduct); Lopez v. United States Dep't of Justice, No. 99-1722, slip op. at 10-12 (D.D.C. Jan. 21, 2003) (protecting names of government employees absent evidence of misconduct), summary affirmance granted in pertinent part, No. 03-5192, 2004 WL 626726 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 29, 2004); Pontecorvo v. FBI, No. 00-1511, slip op. at 41 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2001) (withholding identity of FBI Special Agent who conducted plaintiff's background investigation, absent sufficient evidence of misconduct); Robert v. Dep't of Justice, No. 99-CV-3649, slip op. at 16 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2001) (withholding employees' names and personal information because disclosure could cause embarrassment in light of "plaintiff's far[-]reaching allegations of departmental wrongdoing"); Manchester v. DEA, 823 F. Supp. 1259, 1271 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (withholding agents' names despite plaintiff's sweeping allegations of governmental misconduct); Ray v. United States Dep't of Justice, 778 F. Supp. 1212, 1215 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (affirming government may neither confirm nor deny existence of records concerning results of INS investigation of alleged misconduct of employee); see also Favish, 124 S. Ct. at 1581-82 (holding that requester who asserts a "government misconduct public interest" must produce evidence that would be deemed believable by a "reasonable person" for there to exist a "counterweight on the FOIA scale for the court to balance against the cognizable privacy interests in the requested records"); Aldridge, No. 7:00-CV-131, 2001 WL 196965, at *3 (ordering disclosure of recommendation concerning potential disciplinary action against IRS employees, with only their names redacted, based upon public's "interest in knowing how well a particular agency's employees behave on the job").

    24. See, e.g., Castañeda v. United States, 757 F.2d 1010, 1012 (9th Cir. 1985) (treating USDA investigator's privacy interest as "not great," based upon novel reasoning that his "name would be discoverable in any civil case brought [against the agency]"), amended upon denial of panel reh'g, 773 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1985); Iglesias, 525 F. Supp. at 563 (disclosing names of government employees involved in conducting investigation); Canadian Javelin, Ltd. v. SEC, 501 F. Supp. 898, 904 (D.D.C. 1980) (releasing names of SEC investigators). But see also FOIA Post, "Supreme Court Rules for 'Survivor Privacy' in Favish" (posted 4/9/04) (discussing questionable viability of Castañeda decision in light of Supreme Court's repudiation of Ninth Circuit's privacy jurisprudence).

    25. See Lissner, 241 F.3d at 1223 (ordering disclosure of physical description of state law enforcement officers, and citing only general public interest in ensuring reliability of government investigations); Hardy, No. 95-883, slip op. at 21 (D. Ariz. July 29, 1997) (releasing identities of supervisory ATF agents and other agents publicly associated with Waco incident, finding that public's interest in Waco raid "is greater than in the normal case where release of agent names affords no insight into an agency's conduct or operations"); Butler, 1994 WL 55621, at *13 (releasing identities of supervisory FBI personnel upon finding of "significant" public interest in protecting requester's due process rights); cf. Weiner v. FBI, No. 83-1720, slip op. at 7 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 1995) (finding public interest in release of names and addresses of agents involved in management and supervision of FBI investigation of music legend John Lennon) (applying FOIA analysis in civil discovery context). But see FOIA Post, "Supreme Court Rules for 'Survivor Privacy' in Favish" (posted 4/9/04) (pointing out that Lissner decision is now "discredit[ed] or effectively overrule[d]" by Supreme Court's repudiation of Ninth Circuit's privacy jurisprudence).

    26. 674 F. Supp. at 888.

    27. See, e.g., Doherty v. United States Dep't of Justice, 775 F.2d 49, 52 (2d Cir. 1985) (protecting identities of FBI Special Agents and nonagent personnel); Kirk v. United States Dep't of Justice, 704 F. Supp. 288, 292 (D.D.C. 1989) ("Just like FBI [S]pecial [A]gents, administrative and clerical personnel could be subject to harassment, questioning, and publicity, and the Court concludes that the FBI did not need to separate the groups of employees for purposes of explaining why disclosure of their identities was opposed.").

    28. Southam News v. INS, No. 85-2721, slip op. at 3 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 1989).

    29. Id.; see also Judicial Watch v. United States, 84 Fed. Appx. 335, 339 (4th Cir. 2004) (protecting names and home addresses of lower-level IRS employees absent compelling evidence of agency corruption, in order to avoid potential harassment) (Exemption 6), petition for cert. filed, 72 U.S.L.W. 3644 (U.S. Apr. 5, 2004) (No. 03-1389); Halpern, 181 F.3d at 296 (concluding that disclosure of names of law enforcement personnel could subject them to "harassment in the conduct of their official duties"); Manna, 51 F.3d at 1166 (holding law enforcement officers involved in La Cosa Nostra investigation have substantial privacy interest in nondisclosure of their names); Joyce v. FBI, 152 F. Supp. 2d 32, 36 (D.D.C. 2001) (approving the redaction of names of, and identifying information about, law enforcement personnel, given the "potential for harassment and the infringement on the private lives of law-enforcement officials"); Morales Cozier, No. 99-CV-0312, slip op. at 17 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 25, 2000) (withholding identities of FBI Special Agents who investigated requester after her professional contact with Cuban citizen; citing potential for "harassment, surveillance, or [undue] investigation of these [Special A]gents by foreign governments"); Bartolotta, No. 99-1145, slip op. at 9 (D.D.C. July 13, 2000) (accepting that disclosing identities of two Criminal Division attorneys could result in harassment or reprisals, and could make it more difficult for them to perform duties that require low profile); Hambarian v. IRS, No. 99-9000, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6317, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 15, 2000) (protecting names and identification numbers of IRS employees "who participated in the investigation of" the requester); Ortiz, No. 97-140, slip op. at 7 (M.D. La. Aug. 25, 1998) (magistrate's recommendation) (finding that disclosure of names of FBI personnel could subject them to "harassment and annoyance"), adopted (M.D. La. Oct. 1, 1998); Smith, 977 F. Supp. at 499 (finding disclosure of law enforcement officers' names "might seriously prejudice their effectiveness in conduct of investigations"); Harvey v. United States Dep't of Justice, No. 96-0509, 1997 WL 669640, at *3 (D.D.C. Oct. 23, 1997) (recognizing that release of names of DEA support personnel could target them for "'harassing inquiries for unauthorized access' to information"); Simon v. United States Dep't of Justice, 752 F. Supp. 14, 19 (D.D.C. 1990) (protecting identities of FBI Special Agents and other government personnel involved in processing FOIA request), aff'd, 980 F.2d 782 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

    30. Stone, 727 F. Supp. at 663 n.1 (protecting identities of FBI Special Agents and clerical employees who participated in investigation of assassination of Robert F. Kennedy); see also Hoffman v. Brown, No. 97-1145, 1998 WL 279575 (4th Cir. May 19, 1998) (per curiam) (withholding portions of transcript of unauthorized audiotaped conversations of Veterans Administration Medical Center employees made during IG investigation); Wichlacz, 938 F. Supp. at 334 (E.D. Va. 1996) (protecting names of Park Police officers who investigated suicide of Deputy White House Counsel Vincent Foster, as well as psychiatrists who were listed on paper found in Foster's wallet, because disclosure would cause "onslaught of media attention" and could cause camera crews to "besiege" their workplaces and homes), aff'd per curiam, 114 F.3d 1178 (4th Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision); Exner v. United States Dep't of Justice, 902 F. Supp. 240, 243-45 (D.D.C. 1995) (protecting identities of deceased former FBI Special Agent and his two sons, one of whom FBI may have observed "in criminally suspect behavior" at requester's apartment, which requester claimed had been searched for political reasons involving her alleged relationship with President Kennedy), appeal dismissed, No. 95-5411, 1997 WL 68352 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 15, 1997); cf. Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 97 F.3d 575, 581-82 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding that agency had not adequately defended categorical rule for withholding identities of low-level FBI Special Agents) (Exemption 6).

    31. See, e.g., Bibles v. Or. Natural Desert Ass'n, 83 F.3d 1168, 1172 (9th Cir. 1996) (Fernandez, J., dissenting) ("Once again we are asked to bridle at and practically ignore the FOIA teachings of the United States Supreme Court."), summarily rev'd & remanded per curiam, 519 U.S. 355 (1997) (Exemption 6); see also FOIA Update, Vol. XVIII, No. 1, at 1 (discussing the Supreme Court's extraordinary action in summarily reversing the Ninth Circuit's decision in Bibles).

    32. 241 F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 2001).

    33. 217 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2000), summary judgment granted on remand, No. CV 97-1479, 2001 WL 770410 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2001), aff'd, 37 Fed. Appx. 863 (9th Cir. 2002), rev'd sub nom. NARA v. Favish, 124 S. Ct. 1570 (2004), reh'g denied, No. 02-409, 2004 WL 108633 (U.S. May 17, 2004).

    34. See FOIA Update, Vol. X, No. 2, at 3 (analyzing the Supreme Court's Reporters Committee decision).

    35. 241 F.3d at 1224.

    36. See Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 774 ("[T]he FOIA's central purpose is to ensure that the Government's activities be opened to the sharp eye of public scrutiny . . . .").

    37. See 217 F.3d at 1174.

    38. See Accuracy in Media, Inc. v. Nat'l Park Serv., 194 F.3d 120, 122-23 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (finding that the spouse, parents, and children of Deputy White House Counsel Vincent Foster have a discernible privacy interest in not having his death-scene photographs made public; holding that to show that an invasion of privacy is not unwarranted, the plaintiff must produce "'compelling evidence that the agency denying the FOIA request is engaged in illegal activity, and access to the [photograph] is necessary in order to confirm or refute that evidence'" (quoting SafeCard, 926 F.2d at 1205-06)); see also Accuracy in Media, Inc. v. Office of Indep. Counsel, 61 Fed. Appx. 712 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (ruling that requester had "once again failed to demonstrate" that agency engaged in illegal activity, and finding that same privacy interest in nondisclosure of photograph of hand and description of body existed as in Accuracy in Media, 194 F.3d at 122).

    39. 217 F.3d at 1174; see also id. at 1184 (Pregerson, J., dissenting) (observing that "Favish has made no showing that anyone connected with the OIC's investigations . . . engaged in wrongful conduct"; explaining that the requester bears the burden of advancing the public interest, and that this requester "has failed to do so").

    40. Favish, 2001 WL 770410, at *1 (ordering five of ten photographs at issue released to plaintiff).

    41. 124 S. Ct. 1570 (2004), reh'g denied, No. 02-409, 2004 WL 108633 (U.S. May 17, 2004).

    42. Id. at 1581.

    43. Id.

    44. Id. at 1580-81; see also FOIA Post, "Supreme Court Rules for 'Survivor Privacy' in Favish" (posted 4/9/04) (discussing higher standard, as well as continued need for showing of Reporters Committee-type public interest even when requester successfully alleges government wrongdoing).

    45. See, e.g., Lissner, 241 F.3d at 1224; Rosenfeld, 57 F.3d at 812; Dobronski v. FCC, 17 F.3d 275, 278 (9th Cir. 1994); Dow Jones Co., Inc. v. FERC, 219 F.R.D. 167, 175-76 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (ordering disclosure of names of individuals who cooperated with investigation, expressly based upon Ninth Circuit's now-repudiated Favish ruling, merely because they were not accused of criminal activity); see also FOIA Post, "Supreme Court Rules for 'Survivor Privacy' in Favish" (posted 4/9/04) (analyzing Favish decision's sweeping impact on Ninth Circuit case law).

    46. 73 F.3d 93, 98 (6th Cir. 1996) (finding that disclosure of mug shots of indicted individuals who had already appeared in court and had their names divulged did not constitute unwarranted invasion of privacy).

    47. See Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at 763; see also FOIA Post, "Supreme Court Rules for 'Survivor Privacy' in Favish" (posted 4/9/04) (discussing vital privacy interests found in Reporters Committee and Favish).

    48. Favish, 124 S. Ct. at 1576-77.

    49. Id. at 1577, 1580 (stating that when subject of government record is private citizen, privacy interest is "at its apex," and finding that "public" nature of photographs does not detract from "weighty" privacy interests involved); see also FOIA Post, "Supreme Court Rules for 'Survivor Privacy' in Favish" (posted 4/9/04) (discussing fact that public location and disclosure of photographs did not negatively impact privacy interests).

    50. Favish, 124 S. Ct. at 1577-79; see also FOIA Post, "Supreme Court Rules for 'Survivor Privacy' in Favish" (posted 4/9/04) (pointing out that in Favish "this meant that the expected 'public exploitation' of the requested records through 'attempts to exploit pictures of the deceased family member's remains for public purposes' by the media, among other things, were properly taken into consideration").

    51. Times Picayune, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 477 (finding protectable privacy interest in mug shot despite fact that defendant was well known and photograph already had been made public).

    52. 489 U.S. at 762-63, 780.

    53. Id. at 764; see Fiduccia, 185 F.3d at 1047 (protecting FBI records reflecting information that is also available in "various courthouses"); Abraham & Rose, P.L.C. v. United States, 138 F.3d 1075, 1083 (6th Cir. 1998) (stating that clear privacy interest exists with respect to names, addresses, and other identifying information, even if already available in publicly recorded filings (citing DOD v. FLRA, 510 U.S. 487, 500 (1994) (Exemption 6))); Times Picayune, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 478-79 (holding that public dissemination of mug shot after trial would trigger renewed publicity and renewed invasion of privacy of subject); Billington v. United States Dep't of Justice, 11 F. Supp. 2d 45, 61 (D.D.C. 1998) (finding that "agency is not compelled to release information just because it may have been disclosed previously"), aff'd in pertinent part, 233 F.3d 581 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Greenberg v. United States Dep't of Treasury, No. 87-898, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9803, at *55 (D.D.C. July 1, 1998) (finding third party's privacy interest not extinguished because public may be aware he was target of investigation); Baltimore Sun Co. v. United States Customs Serv., No. 97-1991, slip op. at 4 (D. Md. Nov. 12, 1997) (holding that inclusion of poor copy of defendant's photograph in publicly available court record did not eliminate privacy interest in photo altogether); Lewis v. USPS, No. 96-3467, slip op. at 2 (D. Md. Apr. 30, 1997) (holding that fact that complainant's name is already known, whether disclosed by investigating agency or otherwise, is irrelevant; declaring that "limited oral disclosure" does not constitute waiver of exemption).

    54. See, e.g., Hoffman, 1998 WL 279575 (protecting "private citizen identifiers" in VA investigative report); Beard v. Espy, No. 94-16748, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 38269, at *2 (9th Cir. Dec. 11, 1995) (protecting complaint letter); Manna, 51 F.3d at 1166 (holding that interviewees and witnesses involved in criminal investigation have substantial privacy interest in nondisclosure of their names, particularly when requester held high position in La Cosa Nostra); McDonnell, 4 F.3d at 1256 (protecting identities of witnesses and third parties involved in criminal investigation of maritime disaster); Massey, 3 F.3d at 624 (declaring that disclosure of names of cooperating witnesses and third parties, including cooperating law enforcement officials, could subject them to "embarrassment and harassment"); KTVY-TV v. United States, 919 F.2d 1465, 1469 (10th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (withholding interviewees' names as "necessary to avoid harassment and embarrassment"); Cleary v. FBI, 811 F.2d 421, 424 (8th Cir. 1987) (deciding disclosure would subject "sources to unnecessary questioning concerning the investigation [and] to subpoenas issued by private litigants in civil suits incidentally related to the investigation"); Cuccaro v. Sec'y of Labor, 770 F.2d 355, 359 (3d Cir. 1985) ("privacy interest of . . . witnesses who participated in OSHA's investigation outweighs public interest in disclosure"); L&C Marine Transp., Ltd. v. United States, 740 F.2d 919, 923 (11th Cir. 1984) (reasoning that disclosure of identities of employee-witnesses in OSHA investigation could cause "problems at their jobs and with their livelihoods"); New England Apple, 725 F.2d at 144-45 ("Disclosure could have a significant, adverse effect on this individual's private or professional life."); Kiraly v. FBI, 728 F.2d 273, 279 (6th Cir. 1984) (finding that, in absence of public benefit in disclosure, informant's personal privacy interests do not lapse at death); Holy Spirit Ass'n v. FBI, 683 F.2d 562, 564-65 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (concurring opinion) (citing "risk of harassment" and fear of reprisals); Alirez v. NLRB, 676 F.2d 423, 427 (10th Cir. 1982) (holding that disclosure would result in "embarrassment or reprisals"); Lesar, 636 F.2d at 488 ("'Those cooperating with law enforcement should not now pay the price of full disclosure of personal details.'" (quoting Lesar, 455 F. Supp. at 925)); cf. Grand Cent. P'ship v. Cuomo, 166 F.3d 473, 486 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding that HUD failed to prove that disclosure of documents would identify individuals). But see Cooper Cameron Corp. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 280 F.3d 539, 554 (5th Cir. 2002) (rebuffing idea of retaliation against employees who gave statements to OSHA investigator, and ordering disclosure of source-identifying content of statements despite fact that identifiable employee-witnesses' names already had been released in separate civil proceeding).

    55. See Coulter v. Reno, No. 98-35170, 1998 WL 658835, at *1 (9th Cir. Sept. 17, 1998) (protecting names of witnesses and of requester's accusers); Spirko, 147 F.3d at 998 (protecting notes and phone messages concerning witnesses); Computer Prof'ls, 72 F.3d at 904 (protecting names of witnesses); Manna, 51 F.3d at 1166 (deciding witnesses in La Cosa Nostra case have "substantial" privacy interest in nondisclosure of their names); L&C Marine, 740 F.2d at 922 ("employee-witnesses . . . have a substantial privacy interest"); Antonelli v. Sullivan, 732 F.2d 560, 562 (7th Cir. 1984) ("[The requester] has mentioned no legitimate need for the witnesses' phone numbers and we can well imagine the invasions of privacy that would result should he obtain them."); Johnson v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 239 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1137 (W.D. Wash. 2002) (protecting identifying information of third parties and witnesses contacted during IRS investigation); Hogan v. Huff, No. 00-6753, 2002 WL 1359722, at **9-10 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2002) (protecting identities of witnesses); Wayne's Mech. & Maint. Contractor, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Labor, No. 1:00-CV-45, slip op. at 9 (N.D. Ga. May 7, 2001) ("In the context of OSHA investigations, employee-witnesses have a substantial privacy interest regarding statements given about a work-related accident in light of the potential for embarrassment and retaliation that disclosure of their identity could cause."); Heggestad v. United States Dep't of Justice, 182 F. Supp. 2d 1, 13 (D.D.C. 2000) (withholding identities of certain grand jury witnesses); May, 85 F. Supp. 2d at 946 (protecting personal information about witnesses); Foster v. United States Dep't of Justice, 933 F. Supp. 687, 692 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (protecting prospective witnesses); Crooker v. Tax Div. of the United States Dep't of Justice, No. 94-30129, 1995 WL 783236, at *18 (D. Mass. Nov. 17, 1995) (magistrate's recommendation) (holding names of witnesses and individuals who cooperated with government protected to prevent "undue embarrassment and harassment"), adopted (D. Mass. Dec. 15, 1995), aff'd per curiam, 94 F.3d 640 (1st Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision); Cappabianca v. Comm'r, United States Customs Serv., 847 F. Supp. 1558, 1566 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (witnesses, investigators, and other subjects of investigation have "substantial privacy interests"); Farese v. United States Dep't of Justice, 683 F. Supp. 273, 275 (D.D.C. 1987) (protecting names and number of family members of participants in Witness Security Program, as well as funds authorized to each, because disclosure "would pose a possible danger to the persons named" or "might subject those persons to harassment"); see also Kilroy v. NLRB, 633 F. Supp. 136, 145 (S.D. Ohio 1985) (protecting names and telephone numbers of persons who provided affidavits), aff'd, 823 F.2d 553 (6th Cir. 1987) (unpublished table decision); cf. Brown v. FBI, 658 F.2d 71, 75-76 (2d Cir. 1981) (protecting information concerning witness who testified against requester) (Exemption 6). But see Cooper Cameron, 280 F.3d at 545, 554 (holding names of three employee-witnesses exempt, yet inconsistently ordering release of source-identifying content of their statements); Lipman v. United States, No. 3:97-667, slip op. at 3 (M.D. Pa. June 3, 1998) (releasing names of witnesses who testified at trial based upon assumption defendant had already received information under Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957)), appeal dismissed voluntarily, No. 98-7489 (3d Cir. Feb. 23, 1999).

    56. See Fiduccia, 185 F.3d at 1044 (withholding names of informants); Quiñon, 86 F.3d at 1227, 1231 (protecting informants' identities in absence of agency misconduct); Schiffer, 78 F.3d at 1410 (protecting names of persons who provided information to FBI); Computer Prof'ls, 72 F.3d at 904-05 (protecting names of informants, including name of company that reported crime to police, because disclosure might permit identification of corporate officer who reported crime); Manna, 51 F.3d at 1162 (safeguarding names of informants in La Cosa Nostra case); Jones, 41 F.3d at 246 (protecting informants' identities); McCutchen v. HHS, 30 F.3d 183, 189 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (protecting names of individuals alleging scientific misconduct); Koch v. USPS, No. 93-1487, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 26130, at *2 (8th Cir. Oct. 8, 1993) ("The informant's interest in maintaining confidentiality is considerable [because] the informant risked embarrassment, harassment, and emotional and physical retaliation."); Nadler v. United States Dep't of Justice, 955 F.2d 1479, 1490 (11th Cir. 1992) ("Disclosure of the identities of the FBI's sources will disclose a great deal about those sources but in this case will disclose virtually nothing about the conduct of the government."); Coleman v. United States Dep't of Justice, No. 02-79-A, slip op. at 11 (E.D. Va. Oct. 7, 2002) (protecting names and identifying information of people who aided in investigation of Ruby Ridge incident); LaRouche v. United States Dep't of Justice, No. 90-2753, slip op. at 17-18 (D.D.C. July 5, 2001) (finding that informant's handwritten drawings could reveal identity); Gonzalez v. FBI, No. CV F 99-5789, slip op. at 18 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2000) (finding that privacy interest is not invalidated merely because person is confirmed informant); Unger v. IRS, No. 99-698, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5260, at *12 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 28, 2000) (protecting "identities of private citizens who provided information to law enforcement officials"); Petterson v. IRS, No. 98-6020, slip op. at 8 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 22, 1999) (protecting informant's personal data); Pfannenstiel v. FBI, No. 98-0386, slip op. at 7 (D.N.M. Feb. 18, 1999) (withholding identities of confidential informants); Schlabach v. IRS, No. 98-0075, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19579, at *2 (E.D. Wash. Nov. 10, 1998) (withholding personal information obtained from private citizens during investigation); Local 32B-32J, Serv. Employees Int'l Union v. GSA, No. 97-8509, 1998 WL 726000, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 1998) (finding that disclosure of names of individuals who provided information during investigation may subject them to threats of reprisal); Billington, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 63 (finding that witnesses' privacy interests outweigh public interest, even when witnesses appeared in court or participated in media interview); Thompson, No. 96-1118, slip op. at 24 (D. Kan. July 14, 1998) (protecting names and identifying information about individuals who provided or could provide information concerning investigation); Hayes v. United States Dep't of Labor, No. 96-1149, slip op. at 16 (S.D. Ala. June 10, 1998) (magistrate's recommendation) (withholding identity of confidential source), adopted (S.D. Ala. Aug. 10, 1998); Rosenberg, No. 97-0476, slip op. at 10 (D.D.C. May 13, 1998) (protecting names of individuals who cooperated and actively participated in investigation, as well as of "individuals who provided assistance to the operation because of their occupation or use of their property"); Steinberg v. United States Dep't of Justice, 179 F.R.D. 357, 363 (D.D.C. 1998) (withholding informants' names, alias names, and portions of interview regarding terrorist activities); see also Wrenn v. Vanderbilt Univ. Hosp., No. 3:91-1005, slip op. at 14-15 (M.D. Tenn. June 10, 1993) (protecting identity of person alleging discrimination), aff'd, 16 F.3d 1224 (6th Cir. 1994) (unpublished table decision).

    57. Gabrielli v. United States Dep't of Justice, 594 F. Supp. 309, 313 (N.D.N.Y. 1984); see also Block v. FBI, No. 83-813, slip op. at 11 (D.D.C. Nov. 19, 1984) ("[The requester's] personal interest in knowing who wrote letters concerning him . . . is not sufficient to demonstrate a public interest.") (Exemption 6).

    58. Compare Myers, No. 85-1746, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20058, at **4-7 (D.D.C. Sept. 22, 1986) ("no privacy interest exists" as to names of law enforcement personnel who testified at requester's trial), with Prows v. United States Dep't of Justice, No. 87-1657, 1989 WL 39288, at *3 (D.D.C. Apr. 13, 1989) ("[T]he protection of Exemption 7(C) is not waived by the act of testifying at trial."), summary affirmance granted, No. 89-5185 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 26, 1990).

    59. See Jones, 41 F.3d at 247 (holding fact that law enforcement employee chose to testify or was required to testify or otherwise come forward in other settings does not amount to waiver of personal privacy); Burge, 934 F.2d at 579 (affirming refusal, under Exemption 7(C), to confirm or deny existence of information in FBI files regarding individuals who testified at plaintiff's murder trial); Boyd v. United States Marshals Serv., No. 99-2712, slip op. at 5 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 2001) (finding that plaintiff's assertion that informant and others who testified at his criminal trial waived their right to privacy by testifying is "simply wrong"); Galpine, No. 99-1032, slip op. at 12 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2000) (reiterating that Exemption 7(C) protects "identities of individuals who testified at [requester's] criminal trial"); Rivera v. FBI, No. 98-0649, slip op. at 5 (D.D.C. Aug. 31, 1999) ("Individuals who testify at trial do not waive their privacy interest[s] beyond the scope of the trial record."); Robinson v. DEA, No. 97-1578, slip op. at 9 (D.D.C. Apr. 2, 1998) (stating that "[t]he disclosure during a trial of otherwise exempt information does not make the information public for all purposes"); Baltimore Sun, No. 97-1991, slip op. at 5 (D. Md. Nov. 21, 1997) (reasoning that request for original photograph of defendant because court's copy was unreproducible is evidence that "substance of photograph had not been fully disclosed to the public," so defendant retained privacy interest in preventing further dissemination); Dayton Newspapers, No. C-3-95-328, slip op. at 42 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 12, 1996) (finding that victims who testified at trial retain privacy interests in their identities); Tanks, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7266, at *10 (holding that requester's knowledge of identities of informants who testified against him does not diminish their privacy interests); cf. Bey v. FBI, No. 01-0299, slip op. at 4 (D.D.C. Aug. 2, 2002) (releasing most of list of telephone numbers (captured on court-ordered "pen register") that were dialed from telephone in plaintiff's house, because numbers were made public in open-court testimony at plaintiff's criminal trial). But see Linn v. United States Dep't of Justice, No. 92-1406, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9321, at *17 (D.D.C. May 29, 1997) (finding no justification for withholding identities of witnesses who testified against requester at trial) (Exemptions 7(C) and 7(F)), appeal dismissed voluntarily, No. 97-5122 (D.C. Cir. July 14, 1997).

    60. See Rosenglick v. IRS, No. 97-747-18A, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3920, at *9 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 10, 1998); Watson v. United States Dep't of Justice, 799 F. Supp. 193, 196 (D.D.C. 1992).

    61. See, e.g., Halpern, 181 F.3d at 297 ("Confidentiality interests cannot be waived through . . . the passage of time."); McDonnell, 4 F.3d at 1256 (deciding that passage of forty-nine years does not negate individual's privacy interest); Maynard, 986 F.2d at 566 n.21 (finding effect of passage of time upon individual's privacy interests to be "simply irrelevant"); Fitzgibbon, 911 F.2d at 768 (concluding that passage of more than thirty years irrelevant when records reveal nothing about government activities); Keys, 830 F.2d at 348 (holding that passage of forty years did not "dilute the privacy interest as to tip the balance the other way"); King, 830 F.2d at 234 (rejecting argument that passage of time diminished privacy interests at stake in records more than thirty-five years old); Diamond v. FBI, 707 F.2d 75, 77 (2d Cir. 1983) ("the danger of disclosure may apply to old documents"); Perlman, No. 00-5842, 2001 WL 910406, at **4-5 (deciding that subject of investigation does not lose privacy rights through passage of time); Sinito v. United States Dep't of Justice, No. 87-0814, slip op. at 21 (D.D.C. July 12, 2000) (concluding that the "passage of time ordinarily does not diminish the applicability of Exemption 7(C)"); Franklin, No. 97-1225, slip op. at 12 (S.D. Fla. June 15, 1998) (magistrate's recommendation) (rejecting argument that passage of time vitiates individual's privacy interest in nondisclosure), adopted (S.D. Fla. June 26, 1998); Stone, 727 F. Supp. at 664 (explaining that FBI Special Agents who participated in investigation over twenty years ago, even one as well known as RFK assassination, "have earned the right to be 'left alone' unless an important public interest outweighs that right"); see also Exner, 902 F. Supp. at 244 n.7 (holding that fact that incidents in question "occurred more than thirty years ago may, but does not necessarily, diminish the privacy interest"); Branch, 658 F. Supp. at 209 (The "privacy interests of the persons mentioned in the investigatory files do not necessarily diminish with the passage of time."); cf. Schrecker v. United States Dep't of Justice, 349 F.3d 657, 664-65 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (approving FBI's use of "100-year rule," which presumes that individual is dead if birthdate appeared in documents responsive to request and was more than 100 years old, to determine if subject of requested record is still alive and has privacy interest); Oglesby v. United States Dep't of the Army, 79 F.3d 1172, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (ruling that "mere passage of time is not a per se bar to reliance on [E]xemption 1"). But see Davin, 60 F.3d at 1058 (finding that for some individuals, privacy interest may become diluted by passage of over sixty years, though under certain circumstances potential for embarrassment and harassment may endure); Outlaw v. United States Dep't of the Army, 815 F. Supp. 505, 506 (D.D.C. Mar. 25, 1993) (ordering release of twenty-five-year-old photographs of murder victim with no known surviving next of kin); Silets, 591 F. Supp. at 498 ("[W]here documents are exceptionally old, it is likely that their age has diminished the privacy interests at stake.").

    62. See, e.g., Dunaway v. Webster, 519 F. Supp. 1059, 1079 (N.D. Cal. 1981) ("[The target of a McCarthy era investigation] may . . . deserve greater protection, because the connection to such an investigation might prove particularly embarrassing or damaging."); see also Campbell v. United States Dep't of Justice, 193 F. Supp. 2d 29, 40-41 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (finding that "the persons who were involved in [investigation of 1960s writer and civil rights activist James Baldwin] deserve protection of their reputations as well as recognition that they were simply doing a job that the cultural and political climate at the time dictated").

    63. See Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 767 ("[O]ur cases have also recognized the privacy interest inherent in the nondisclosure of certain information even when the information may at one time have been public."); Rose v. Dep't of the Air Force, 495 F.2d 261, 267 (2d Cir. 1974) ("[A] person's privacy may be as effectively infringed by reviving dormant memories as by imparting new information.") (Exemption 6), aff'd, 425 U.S. 352 (1976); see also Assassination Archives & Research Ctr. v. CIA, 903 F. Supp. 131, 133 (D.D.C. 1995) (finding that passage of thirty or forty years "may actually increase privacy interests, and that even a modest privacy interest will suffice" to protect identities). See generally Favish, 124 S. Ct. at 1581 (according full privacy protection without any hesitation, notwithstanding passage of ten years since Vincent Foster's death).

    64. Weisberg v. United States Dep't of Justice, 745 F.2d 1476, 1491 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also Ford v. West, No. 97-1342, 1998 WL 317561, at *3 (10th Cir. June 12, 1998) (holding fact that requester obtained some information through other channels does not change privacy protection under FOIA and no waiver of third parties' privacy interests due to "inadequate redactions"); L&C Marine, 740 F.2d at 922 ("An individual does not lose his privacy interest under 7(C) because his identity . . . may be discovered through other means."); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. FBI, No. 00-745, slip op. at 11 (D.D.C. Apr. 20, 2001) ("The fact that the requester might be able to figure out the individuals' identities through other means or that their identities have been disclosed elsewhere does not diminish their privacy interests . . . ."); Voinche v. FBI, No. 99-1931, slip op. at 13 n.4 (D.D.C. Nov. 17, 2000) ("The fact that Mr. Voinche [might have] learned of the identity of these individuals by reading a publication does not impair the privacy rights enjoyed by these three people."); Billington v. Dep't of Justice, 69 F. Supp. 2d 128, 137 (D.D.C. 1999) (deciding that disclosure of unredacted records due to administrative error did not "diminish the magnitude of the privacy interests of the individuals" involved); Cujas, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6466, at *9 (reiterating that fact that information available elsewhere does not diminish third-party privacy interests in such law enforcement records); Smith, 977 F. Supp. at 500 (finding fact that plaintiff "can guess" names withheld does not waive privacy interest); Master v. FBI, 926 F. Supp. 193, 198-99 (D.D.C. 1996) (protecting subjects of investigative interest even though plaintiffs allegedly know their names), summary affirmance granted, 124 F.3d 1309 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision). But see Cooper Cameron, 280 F.3d at 553 (refusing to protect the content of three employee-witness statements after release of the witnesses' names, even though disclosure would result in linking each employee to his or her statement).

    65. See, e.g., Fiduccia, 185 F.3d at 1047 (concluding that privacy interests are not lost by reason of earlier publicity); Halpern, 181 F.3d at 297 ("Confidentiality interests cannot be waived through prior public disclosure . . . ."); Kimberlin, 139 F.3d at 949 (finding that even after subject's public acknowledgment of charges and sanction against him, he retained privacy interest in nondisclosure of "'details of investigation, of his misconduct, and of his punishment,'" and in "preventing speculative press reports of his misconduct from receiving authoritative confirmation from official source" (citing Bast, 665 F.2d at 1255)); Schiffer, 78 F.3d at 1410-11 (deciding fact that much of information in requested documents was made public during related civil suit does not reduce privacy interest); Jones, 41 F.3d at 247 (holding fact that law enforcement employee chose to testify or was required to testify or otherwise come forward in other settings does not amount to personal privacy waiver); Hunt, 972 F.2d at 288 ("public availability" of accused FBI Special Agent's name does not defeat privacy protection and "would make redaction of [the agent's name in] the file a pointless exercise"); Fitzgibbon, 911 F.2d at 768 (concluding fact that CIA or FBI may have released information about individual elsewhere does not diminish the individual's "substantial privacy interests"); Bast, 665 F.2d at 1255 (finding that "previous publicity amounting to journalistic speculation cannot vitiate the FOIA privacy exemption"); Shores v. FBI, 185 F. Supp. 2d 77, 83 (D.D.C. 2002) (deciding that privacy interests are not diminished by the fact that plaintiff "may deduce the identities of individuals through other means or that their identities have already been disclosed" (citing Fitzgibbon, 911 F.2d at 768, and Weisberg, 745 F.2d at 1491)); LaRouche, No. 90-2753, slip op. at 24 (D.D.C. July 5, 2001) (holding that "release of similar information in another case does not warrant disclosure of otherwise properly exempted material"); Ponder v. Reno, No. 98-3097, slip op. at 6 (D.D.C. Jan. 22, 2001) (deciding that the fact that the government "failed to fully redact all agents' names does not constitute a waiver of Exemption 7(C)"); McGhghy v. DEA, No. C 97-0185, slip op. at 11 (N.D. Iowa May 29, 1998) (holding that "mere fact that individuals named in withheld documents may have previously waived their confidentiality interests, either voluntarily or involuntarily, does not mandate disclosure of withheld documents"), aff'd per curiam, No. 98-2989, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 16709 (8th Cir. July 13, 1999); Thomas v. Office of United States Attorney, 928 F. Supp. 245, 250 & n.8 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that despite public disclosure of some information about attorney's connection with crime family, he still retains privacy interests in preventing further disclosure), appeal dismissed, No. 93-CV-3128 (2d Cir. Oct. 29, 1996); Crooker, 1995 WL 783236, at *18 (holding that despite fact that requester may have learned identities of third parties through criminal discovery, Exemption 7(C) protection remains). But see Detroit Free Press, 73 F.3d at 98 (finding no unwarranted invasion of privacy in disclosure of mug shots of indicted individuals who had already appeared in court and had their names divulged); Steinberg v. United States Dep't of Justice, 179 F.R.D. 366, 371 (D.D.C. 1998) (holding content of sources' interviews must be disclosed once agency disclosed their identities); cf. Grove v. CIA, 752 F. Supp. 28, 32 (D.D.C. 1990) (ordering FBI to further explain Exemption 7(C) withholdings in light of highly publicized nature of investigation and fact that CIA and Secret Service released other records pertaining to same individuals).

    66. Kirk, 704 F. Supp. at 292; see also Favish, 124 S. Ct. at 1580 (holding that "the fact that other pictures had been made public [does not] detract[] from the weighty privacy interests" in the remaining pictures); Kimberlin, 139 F.3d at 949 (reasoning that merely because subject of investigation acknowledged existence of investigation -- thus breaking bulwark level of "Glomarization" -- does not constitute waiver of subject's interest in keeping contents of Office of Professional Responsibility report confidential).

    67. See Schiffer, 78 F.3d at 1410 (explaining once agency shows that privacy interest exists, court must balance it against public's interest in disclosure); Computer Prof'ls, 72 F.3d at 904 (finding after privacy interest found, court must identify public interest to be served by disclosure); Massey, 3 F.3d at 624-25 (holding once agency establishes that privacy interest exists, that interest must be balanced against value of information in furthering FOIA's disclosure objectives); Church of Scientology, 995 F.2d at 921 (remanding case because district court failed to determine whether public interest in disclosure outweighed privacy concerns); Grine v. Coombs, No. 95-342, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19578, at *19 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 10, 1997) (requiring balancing of privacy interest and extent to which it is invaded against public benefit that would result from disclosure); Thomas, 928 F. Supp. at 250 (observing that since personal privacy interest in information is implicated, court must inquire whether any countervailing factors exist that would warrant invasion of that interest); Globe Newspaper Co. v. FBI, No. 91-13257, 1992 WL 396327, at *4 (D. Mass. Dec. 29, 1992) (finding public interest in disclosing amount of money government paid to officially confirmed informant guilty of criminal wrongdoing outweighs informant's de minimis privacy interest); Church of Scientology, 816 F. Supp. at 1160 (concluding while employees have privacy interest in their handwriting, that interest does not outweigh public interest in disclosure of information contained in documents not otherwise exempt); see also Favish, 124 S. Ct. at 1582 (holding that "only when the FOIA requester has produced evidence to satisfy [a belief by a reasonable person] will there exist a counterweight on the FOIA scale for the court to balance against the cognizable privacy interests in the requested records"); Lawyers Comm. for Human Rights v. INS, 721 F. Supp. 552, 571 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (balancing plaintiff's interests in disclosure of names of individuals listed in INS Lookout Book on basis of ideological exclusion provision against excluded individuals' privacy interests); FOIA Post, "Supreme Court Rules for 'Survivor Privacy' in Favish" (posted 4/9/04) (discussing balancing of privacy interests and public interest); FOIA Update, Vol. X, No. 2, at 7.

    68. 489 U.S. at 773; see also Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. United States Dep't of the Navy, 109 F. Supp. 2d 768, 775 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (concluding that questionnaire responses by court-martial members were properly withheld because the "information contained therein sheds no light on the workings of the government").

    69. See, e.g., Oguaju v. United States, 288 F.3d 448, 450 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (finding that plaintiff's "personal stake in using the requested records to attack his convictions does not count in the calculation of the public interest"), vacated & remanded, 124 S. Ct. 1903 (2004); Neely, 208 F.3d at 464 (ruling that requester's wish to establish his own innocence does not create FOIA-recognized public interest); Hale, 973 F.2d at 901 (finding no FOIA-recognized public interest in death-row inmate's allegation of unfair trial); Landano v. United States Dep't of Justice, 956 F.2d 422, 430 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding no public interest in disclosure of identities of individuals involved in murder investigation because such release would not shed light on how FBI fulfills its responsibilities), cert. denied on Exemption 7(C) grounds, 506 U.S. 868 (1992), rev'd & remanded on other grounds, 508 U.S. 165 (1993); Burge, 934 F.2d at 580 ("requester's need, however significant, does not warrant disclosure"); Taylor v. United States Dep't of Justice, 257 F. Supp. 2d 101, 110 (D.D.C.) (finding no public interest in disclosure of third-party information that requester asserted might assist him in challenging his conviction), reconsideration denied, 268 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 2003), appeal dismissed sub nom. Taylor v. FBI, No. 03-5111, 2003 WL 22005968 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 19, 2003); Boyd, No. 99-2712, slip op. at 5 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 2001) (finding requests for Brady material to be outside the proper role of FOIA); Galpine, No. 99-1032, slip op. at 13 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2000) (restating that requests for exculpatory evidence are "'outside the proper role of FOIA'" (quoting Colon, 1998 WL 695631, at *5)); Fedrick v. United States Dep't of Justice, 984 F. Supp. 659, 664 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) (magistrate's recommendation) (finding that requester's personal interest in seeking information for use in collateral challenge to his conviction does not raise "FOIA-recognized interest"), adopted, No. 95-558 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 1997), aff'd sub nom. Fedrick v. Huff, 165 F.3d 13 (2d Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision); Trupei, 1998 WL 8986, at *3 (concluding that request for Brady material is not within role of FOIA); Smith, 977 F. Supp. at 499 (holding that requester's personal interest in obtaining exculpatory statements does not give him greater rights under FOIA); Thomas, 928 F. Supp. at 251 (holding that prisoner's personal interest in information to challenge his conviction "does not raise a FOIA-recognized interest that should be weighed against the subject's privacy interests"); Durham v. USPS, No. 91-2234, 1992 WL 700246, at *2 (D.D.C. Nov. 25, 1992) (holding "Glomar" response appropriate even though plaintiff argued that information would prove his innocence), summary affirmance granted, No. 92-5511 (D.C. Cir. July 27, 1993); Johnson, 758 F. Supp. at 5 ("Resort to Brady v. Maryland as grounds for waiving confidentiality [under Exemptions 7(C) and 7(D)] is . . . outside the proper role of the FOIA. Exceptions cannot be made because of the subject matter or [death-row status] of the requester."). But see Lipman, No. 3:97-667, slip op. at 4 (M.D. Pa. June 3, 1998) (making exceptional finding of public interest in plaintiff's quest to discover whether government withheld Brady material).

    70. See Massey, 3 F.3d at 625 ("[The] mere possibility that information may aid an individual in the pursuit of litigation does not give rise to a public interest."); Joslin v. United States Dep't of Labor, No. 88-1999, slip op. at 8 (10th Cir. Oct. 20, 1989) (finding no public interest in release of documents sought for use in private tort litigation); Garcia, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 372 (holding that a request seeking information in furtherance of private litigation falls outside "the ambit of FOIA's goal of public disclosure of agency action"); Exner, 902 F. Supp. at 244 & n.8 (explaining requester's interest in pursuing legal remedies against person who entered her apartment does not pertain to workings of government); Bruscino, No. 94-1955, 1995 WL 444406, at *9 (D.D.C. May 12, 1995) (concluding no public interest in release of information concerning other inmates sought for use in private litigation); Andrews v. United States Dep't of Justice, 769 F. Supp. 314, 317 (E.D. Mo. 1991) (deciding no public interest in satisfaction of private judgments). But see Butler, No. 86-2255, 1994 WL 55621, at **5-6 (D.D.C. Feb. 3, 1994) (ordering identities of supervisory FBI personnel disclosed because of "significant" public interest in protecting requester's due process rights in his attempt to vacate sentence).

    71. See Favish, 124 S. Ct. at 1579 ("As a general rule, withholding information under FOIA cannot be predicated on the identity of the requester."); see also FOIA Post, "Supreme Court Rules for 'Survivor Privacy' in Favish" (posted 4/9/04) (pointing out that "Favish thus stands as a reminder to all agencies that their consideration of potential privacy invasions must include both what the requester might do with the information at hand and also what any other requester (or ultimate recipient) might do with it as well").

    72. See Favish, 124 S. Ct. at 1580-81 (stating that when the privacy concerns of Exemption 7(C) apply, an agency can require the requester "to establish a sufficient reason for the disclosure" by having the requester demonstrate both "that the public interest sought to be advanced [by disclosure] is a significant one" and that disclosure of the "information [requested] is likely to advance that interest"); see also FOIA Post, "Supreme Court Rules for 'Survivor Privacy' in Favish (posted 4/9/04) (discussing public interest standard adopted in Favish, as well as required "nexus" between requested information and public interest asserted).

    73. 124 S. Ct. at 1581; see also Oguaju, 288 F.3d at 451 (holding that "bald accusations" of prosecutorial misconduct are insufficient to establish public interest); Spirko, 147 F.3d at 999 (finding no public interest in names and information pertaining to suspects and law enforcement officers absent any evidence of alleged misconduct by agency); Enzinna v. United States Dep't of Justice, No. 97-5078, 1997 WL 404327, at *1 (D.C. Cir. June 30, 1997) (finding that without evidence that Assistant United States Attorney made misrepresentation at trial, public interest in disclosure is insubstantial); Quiñon, 86 F.3d at 1231 (holding that in absence of evidence FBI engaged in wrongdoing, public interest is "insubstantial"); Schiffer, 78 F.3d at 1410 (finding "little to no" public interest in disclosure when requester made unsubstantiated claim that FBI's decision to investigate him had been affected by "undue influence"); McCutchen, 30 F.3d at 189 (finding "negligible" public interest in disclosure of identities of agency scientists who did not engage in scientific misconduct); Beck v. Dep't of Justice, 997 F.2d 1489, 1492-94 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding that agency properly "Glomarized" request for records concerning alleged wrongdoing by two named employees; no public interest absent any evidence of wrongdoing or widespread publicity of investigation); KTVY-TV, 919 F.2d at 1470 (allegations of "possible neglect"); Shores, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 83 (finding no public interest in unsubstantiated assertion that certain FBI Special Agents committed unlawful acts); Ligorner, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 405 (when considering privacy interests of person accused of misconduct, public interest is "de minimis"); Greenberg v. United States Dep't of Treasury, 10 F. Supp. 2d 3, 25 (D.D.C. 1998) (rejecting plaintiffs' "post-hoc rationalization of public interest" in FBI investigation because they had not even suggested FBI wrongdoing during investigation); Exner, 902 F. Supp. at 244-45 & n.9 (finding allegation of FBI cover-up of "extremely sensitive political operation" provides "minimal at best" public interest); Triestman v. United States Dep't of Justice, 878 F. Supp. 667, 673 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding no substantial public interest in disclosure when request seeks information concerning possible investigations of wrongdoing by named DEA agents); Buros, No. 93-571, slip op. at 10 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 26, 1994) (holding even though subject's potential mishandling of funds already known to public, "confirming . . . federal criminal investigation brushes the subject with an independent and indelible taint of wrongdoing"); Williams v. McCausland, No. 90-7563, 1994 WL 18510, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 1994) (protecting identities of government employees accused of improper conduct) (Exemptions 6 and 7(C)); Manchester, 823 F. Supp. at 1271 (sweeping allegations of governmental misconduct). But see Providence Journal Co. v. United States Dep't of the Army, 981 F.2d 552, 567-69 (1st Cir. 1992) (making aberrational finding of public interest in disclosure of unsubstantiated allegations against two senior officials); McLaughlin v. Sessions, No. 92-0454, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13817, at *18 (D.D.C. Sept. 22, 1993) (reasoning that because request seeks information to determine whether FBI investigation was improperly terminated, requester's interest in scope and course of investigation constitutes recognized public interest which must be balanced against privacy interests of named individuals).

    74. Favish, 124 S. Ct. at 1581-82 (stating that Court cannot ignore fact that five different investigations into Foster matter reached same conclusion, and noting that Favish failed to produce any evidence of government impropriety that would be believable by reasonable person); see also FOIA Post, "Supreme Court Rules for 'Survivor Privacy' in Favish" (posted 4/9/04) (discussing specific public interest standard as enunciated in Favish).

    75. 124 S. Ct. at 1582; see also FOIA Post, "Supreme Court Rules for 'Survivor Privacy' in Favish" (posted 4/9/04) (discussing necessary nexus between requested information and asserted public interest).

    76. See Landano, 956 F.2d at 430 (stating that there is "no FOIA-recognized public interest in discovering wrongdoing by a state agency"); Garcia, 181 F. Supp. 2d at 374 ("The discovery of wrongdoing at a state as opposed to a federal agency . . . is not the goal of FOIA."); LaRouche, No. 90-2753, slip op. at 17 (D.D.C. July 5, 2001) ("The possible disclosures of state government misconduct is not information that falls within a public interest FOIA [was] intended to protect."); Thomas, 928 F. Supp. at 251 (recognizing that FOIA cannot serve as basis for requests about conduct of state agency). But see also Lissner, 241 F.3d at 1223 (rationalizing that public interest exists in Custom Service's handling of smuggling incident despite fact that information pertained to actions of state law enforcement officers).

    77. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 775; see also FOIA Update, Vol. XII, No. 2, at 6 (explaining that "government activities" in Reporter's Committee standard means activities of federal government).

    78. See Ford, 1998 WL 317561, at *3 (holding that plaintiff's prior EEO successes against agency do not establish public interest in disclosure of third-party names in this investigation); Massey, 3 F.3d at 625 (finding that the identity of the requesting party and the use that that party plans to make of the requested information have "no bearing on the assessment of the public interest served by disclosure"); Stone, 727 F. Supp. at 668 n.4 (stating that court looks to public interest served by release of information, "not to the highly specialized interests of those individuals who understandably have a greater personal stake in gaining access to that information"). But cf. Manna, 51 F.3d at 1166 (deciding that although court does not usually consider requester's identity, fact that requester held high position in La Cosa Nostra is certainly material to protection of individual privacy).

    79. See Senate of P.R., 823 F.2d at 588 (holding general interest of legislature in "getting to the bottom" of highly controversial investigation not sufficient to overcome "substantial privacy interests"); Morales Cozier, No. 1:99-CV-0312, slip op. at 18 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 25, 2000) (concluding that public interest in knowing what government is up to in relation to investigation of individuals having contact with Cubans is not furthered by disclosing government employees' names and identifying information); Schrecker v. United States Dep't of Justice, 74 F. Supp. 2d 26, 34 (D.D.C. 1999) (finding requester's "own personal curiosity" about names of third parties and agents insufficient to outweigh privacy interests), rev'd on other grounds, 254 F.3d 162, 166 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Times Picayune, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 482 (describing public interest in public figure's mug shot as "purely speculative" and therefore readily outweighed by privacy interest); Ajluni, 947 F. Supp. at 605 ("In the absence of any strong countervailing public interest in disclosure, the privacy interests of the individuals who are the subjects of the redacted material must prevail."); Fitzgibbon v. United States Secret Serv., 747 F. Supp. 51, 59 (D.D.C. 1990) (holding public interest in alleged plot in United States by agents of now deposed dictatorship insufficient to overcome "strong privacy interests"); Stone, 727 F. Supp. at 667-68 n.4 ("[N]ew information considered significant by zealous students of the RFK assassination investigation would be nothing more than minutia of little or no value in terms of the public interest."); see also Ctr. to Prevent Handgun Violence, 981 F. Supp. at 23-24 (finding "minuscule privacy interest" in identifying sellers in multiple-sales gun reports in comparison to public interest in scrutinizing ATF's performance of its duty to enforce gun control laws and to curtail illegal interstate gun trafficking); Steinberg, 1998 WL 384084, at *3 (finding significant public interest in criminal investigation of alleged counterterrorist activities, which outweighs privacy interests of informants known to plaintiff). But see Cooper Cameron, 280 F.3d at 547, 554 (mischaracterizing a "general public interest in monitoring" a specific OSHA investigation as sufficient to overcome employee-witnesses' privacy interests against employer retaliation).

    80. King v. United States Dep't of Justice, 586 F. Supp. 286, 294 (D.D.C. 1983), aff'd, 830 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also Beck, 997 F.2d at 1494 (observing that because request implicates no public interest at all, court "'need not linger over the balance; something . . . outweighs nothing every time'" (quoting Nat'l Ass'n of Retired Fed. Employees v. Horner, 879 F.2d 873, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1989)) (Exemptions 6 and 7(C)); Fitzgibbon, 911 F.2d at 768 (same); FOIA Update, Vol. X, No. 2, at 7.

    81. See, e.g., Abraham & Rose, 138 F.3d at 1083 (stating that public may have interest in learning how IRS exercises its power over collection of taxes but that this does not mean that identity or other personal information concerning taxpayers will shed light on agency's performance) (Exemption 6); Spirko, 147 F.3d at 999 (recognizing strong privacy interests of suspects and law enforcement officers when requested documents neither confirm nor refute plaintiff's allegations of government misconduct); Quiñon, 86 F.3d at 1231 (finding insufficient public interest in disclosing individuals mentioned in FBI files when no evidence of wrongdoing; even if individuals had engaged in wrongdoing, such misconduct would have to shed light on agency's action); Schiffer, 78 F.3d at 1410 (recognizing "little to no" public interest in disclosure of persons in FBI file, including some who provided information to FBI, when no evidence of FBI wrongdoing); Schwarz v. INTERPOL, No. 94-4111, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 3987, at *7 (10th Cir. Feb. 28, 1995) (ruling that disclosure of any possible information about whereabouts of requester's "alleged husband" is not in public interest); Maynard, 986 F.2d at 566 (disclosing information concerning low-level FBI employees and third parties not in public interest); Fitzgibbon, 911 F.2d at 768 ("[T]here is no reasonably conceivable way in which the release of one individual's name . . . would allow citizens to know 'what their government is up to.'" (quoting Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 1481)); Pemco Aeroplex, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Labor, No. 01-AR-1421, slip op. at 5 (N.D. Ala. Dec. 11, 2001) (finding no public interest in disclosing identities of employees who completed race-discrimination questionnaire); Greenberg, 10 F. Supp. 2d at 29 (holding that privacy interests of individuals mentioned in FBI surveillance tapes and transcripts obtained in arms-for-hostages investigation clearly outweigh any public interest in disclosure); McNamera, 974 F. Supp. at 958-61 (finding, where no evidence of agency wrongdoing, no public interest in disclosure of information concerning criminal investigations of private citizens); Stone, 727 F. Supp. at 666-67 (stating that disclosing identities of low-level FBI Special Agents who participated in RFK assassination investigation is not in public interest); see also KTVY-TV, 919 F.2d at 1470 (stating that disclosing identities of witnesses and third parties would not further plaintiff's unsupported theory that post office shootings could have been prevented by postal authorities); Halloran v. VA, 874 F.2d 315, 323 (5th Cir. 1989) ("[M]erely stating that the interest exists in the abstract is not enough; rather, the court should have analyzed how that interest would be served by compelling disclosure."); FOIA Update, Vol. X, No. 2, at 6; cf. Nation Magazine, 71 F.3d at 895 (finding that "in some, perhaps many" instances when third party seeks information on named individual in law enforcement files, public interest will be "negligible"; but when individual had publicly offered to help agency, disclosure of records concerning that fact might be in public interest by reflecting "agency activity" in how it responded to offer of assistance). But cf. Favish, 124 S. Ct. at 1577-79 (recognizing "survivor privacy" principle, and holding that family of deceased individual has own right and interest in personal privacy protection with respect to decedent's death-scene photographs due to their exceptional sensitivity); Accuracy in Media, 194 F.3d at 123 (protecting autopsy and death-scene photographs arising out of the investigation of Deputy White House Counsel Vincent Foster's suicide, and rejecting plaintiff's categorical argument that the "FOIA's protection of personal privacy ends upon the death of the individual depicted"); FOIA Post, "Supreme Court Rules for 'Survivor Privacy' in Favish" (posted 4/9/04) (discussing "survivor privacy" principle and its exceptional contours).

    82. 349 F.3d at 663 (approving FBI's method to determine whether individual was living or dead); see also Johnson v. Executive Office for United States Attorneys, 310 F.3d 771, 775 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (approving of the agency's inquiries concerning the subject of a request, and refusing to establish a "brightline set of steps for an agency" to determine whether they were living or dead).

    83. Schrecker, 349 F.3d at 663-66.

    84. 489 U.S. at 776-80.

    85. Id. at 780. But see also Cooper Cameron, 280 F.3d at 553 (acknowledging that statements to OSHA by employee-witnesses are "a characteristic genus suitable for categorical treatment," yet inconsistently declining to use categorical approach).

    86. SafeCard, 926 F.2d at 1206.

    87. Id. at 1205.

    88. Id. (recognizing privacy interests of suspects, witnesses, and investigators).

    89. Id.

    90. Id.

    91. Id. at 1206; see also Oguaju, 288 F.3d at 451 (finding that "exposing a single, garden-variety act of misconduct would not serve the FOIA's purpose of showing 'what the Government is up to'" (quoting Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 780)); Quiñon, 86 F.3d at 1231 (finding insufficient public interest in revealing individuals mentioned in FBI files absent evidence of wrongdoing; even if individuals had engaged in wrongdoing, such misconduct would have to shed light on agency's action); McCutchen, 30 F.3d at 188 ("Mere desire to review how an agency is doing its job, coupled with allegations that it is not, does not create a public interest sufficient to override the privacy interests protected by Exemption 7(C)."); Davis, 968 F.2d at 1282 ("[W]hen . . . governmental misconduct is alleged as the justification for disclosure, the public interest is 'insubstantial' unless the requester puts forward 'compelling evidence that the agency denying the FOIA request is engaged in illegal activity' and shows that the information sought 'is necessary in order to confirm or refute that evidence.'" (quoting SafeCard, 926 F.2d at 1205-06)); Goldstein v. Office of Indep. Counsel, No. 87-2028, 1999 WL 570862, at *9 (D.D.C. July 29, 1999) (magistrate's recommendation) (finding "significant public interest" in documents relating to FBI's terrorism investigations but concluding that withholding of third-party names is proper absent compelling evidence of illegal activity by FBI); Chasse v. United States Dep't of Justice, No. 98-207, slip op. at 11 (D. Vt. Jan. 12, 1999) (magistrate's recommendation) (deciding that Exemption 7(C) does not apply to information regarding job-related activities of high-level INS officials alleged to have deceived members of congressional task force), adopted (D. Vt. Feb. 9, 1999), aff'd, No. 99-6059 (2d Cir. Apr. 6, 2000) (Privacy Act wrongful disclosure case); McGhghy, No. C 97-0185, slip op. at 10 (N.D. Iowa May 29, 1998) (holding that there is "no compelling public interest rationale" for disclosing the names of law enforcement officers, private individuals, investigative details, or suspects' names from DEA files); cf. Nation Magazine, 71 F.3d at 895-96 (noting that when individual had publicly offered to help agency, disclosure of records concerning that fact might be in public interest by reflecting "agency activity" in how it responded to offer of assistance); Dunkelberger, 906 F.2d at 782 (finding some cognizable public interest in "FBI Special Agent's alleged participation in a scheme to entrap a public official and in the manner in which the agent was disciplined"); Or. Natural Desert Ass'n v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 24 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1093-94 (D. Or. 1998) (finding that public interest in knowing how government enforces and punishes violations of land-management laws outweighs privacy interests of cattle trespassers who admitted violations) (Exemptions 6 and 7(C)). But see Detroit Free Press, 73 F.3d at 98 (finding, despite no evidence of government wrongdoing, public interest in disclosure of mug shots of indicted individuals who had already appeared in court and had their names divulged); Rosenfeld, 57 F.3d at 811-12 (making exceptional finding of public interest in disclosure of names of subjects of investigatory interest because disclosure would serve public interest by shedding light on FBI actions and showing whether and to what extent FBI "abused its law enforcement mandate by overzealously investigating a political protest movement"); Providence Journal, 981 F.2d at 567-69 (making exceptional finding of public interest in disclosure of unsubstantiated allegations); Bennett v. DEA, 55 F. Supp. 2d 36, 41 (D.D.C. 1999) (ordering release of informant's rap sheet after finding "very compelling" evidence of "extensive government misconduct" in handling informant); Davin, No. 92-1122, slip op. at 9 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 1998) (ordering disclosure of names and addresses of individuals in records of FBI investigation of Workers Alliance of America conducted between 1938 and 1964).

    92. SafeCard, 926 F.2d at 1206; see also Neely, 208 F.3d at 464 (adopting SafeCard approach). But see Baltimore Sun, 131 F. Supp. 2d at 730 n.5 (rationalizing that "plaintiff need not provide compelling evidence of government wrongdoing in light of the inapplicability of the categorical rule of SafeCard" to this case; deciding that "[a] more general public interest in what a government agency is up to is sufficient here").

    93. See FOIA Post, "Supreme Court Rules for 'Survivor Privacy' in Favish" (posted 4/9/04) (advising that the Supreme Court "has explained that in seeking to apply some 'clear' or 'compelling' evidence test in such a case an agency now specifically should consider whether the requester has 'produced any evidence that would warrant a belief by a reasonable person that the alleged [g]overnment impropriety might have occurred'" (quoting Favish, 124 S. Ct. at 1582)).

    94. See, e.g., Church of Scientology Int'l v. United States Dep't of Justice, 30 F.3d 224, 230-31 (1st Cir. 1994) (deciding that Vaughn Index must explain why documents entirely withheld under Exemption 7(C) could not have been released with identifying information redacted); Canning v. United States Dep't of Justice, No. 01-2215, slip op. at 19 (D.D.C. Mar. 9, 2004) (finding application of Exemption 7(C) to entire documents rather than to personally identifying information within documents to be overly broad); Rashid v. United States Dep't of Justice, No. 99-2461, slip op. at 21 (D.D.C. June 12, 2001) (concluding that all identifying information, including information that would be traceable to specific individuals, may be withheld); Prows v. United States Dep't of Justice, No. 90-2561, 1996 WL 228463, at *3 (D.D.C. Apr. 25, 1996) (concluding that rather than withholding documents in full, agency simply can delete identifying information about third-party individuals to eliminate stigma of being associated with law enforcement investigation); Lawyers Comm., 721 F. Supp. at 571 (finding a middle ground in balancing of interest in disclosure of names in INS Lookout Book on basis of "ideological exclusion" provision against individuals' privacy interest by ordering release of only the occupation and country of excluded individuals); see also Aldridge, No. 7:00-CV-131, 2001 WL 196965, at **2-3 (deciding that privacy of IRS employees could be adequately protected by redacting their names from recommendation concerning potential disciplinary action against them).

    95. See Ray, 778 F. Supp. at 1215; FOIA Update, Vol. X, No. 3, at 5; FOIA Update, Vol. VII, No. 1, at 3-4 ("OIP Guidance: Privacy 'Glomarization'"); FOIA Update, Vol. III, No. 4, at 2; see also Enzinna, 1997 WL 404327, at *2 (finding government's "Glomar" response appropriate because acknowledging existence of responsive documents would associate witnesses with criminal investigation); Massey, 3 F.3d at 624 ("individuals have substantial privacy interests in information that either confirms or suggests that they have been subject to criminal investigations or proceedings"); Antonelli v. FBI, 721 F.2d 615, 617 (7th Cir. 1983) ("even acknowledging that certain records are kept would jeopardize the privacy interests that the FOIA exemptions are intended to protect"); Burke v. United States Dep't of Justice, No. 96-1739, 1999 WL 1032814, at *5 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 1999) (permitting agency to "simply 'Glomarize'" as to portion of request that seeks investigatory records); Greenberg, 10 F. Supp. 2d at 24 (holding "Glomar" response appropriate when existence of records would link named individuals with taking of American hostages in Iran and disclosure would not shed light on agency's performance); McNamera, 974 F. Supp. at 957-60 (allowing FBI and INTERPOL to refuse to confirm or deny whether they have criminal investigatory files on private individuals who have "great privacy interest" in not being associated with stigma of criminal investigation); Tanks, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7266, at **12-13 (permitting FBI to refuse to confirm or deny existence of any law enforcement records, unrelated to requester's case, concerning informants who testified against requester); Latshaw v. FBI, No. 93-571, slip op. at 1 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 21, 1994) (deciding that FBI may refuse to confirm or deny existence of any law enforcement records on third party), aff'd, 40 F.3d 1240 (3d Cir. 1994) (unpublished table decision).

    96. See, e.g., Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 775 (upholding FBI's refusal to confirm or deny that it maintained "rap sheets" on named individual); Oguaju, 288 F.3d at 451 (approving the government's use of "Glomar" response for a third-party request for any information on an individual who testified at the requester's trial when the requester provided no public interest rationale); Schwarz, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 3987, at *7 (holding "Glomar" response proper for third-party request for file of requester's "alleged husband" when no public interest shown); Antonelli, 721 F.2d at 617 (deciding that "Glomar" response is appropriate for third-party requests when requester has identified no public interest in disclosure); Boyd v. DEA, No. 01-0524, slip op. at 3-4 (D.D.C. Mar. 8, 2002) ("The FBI's Glomar response was appropriate because the subject of the FOIA request was a private individual in law enforcement records and plaintiff's claim of his misconduct would not shed light on the agency's conduct."); Daley v. United States Dep't of Justice, No. 00-1750, slip op. at 2-3 (D.D.C. Mar. 9, 2001) (holding "Glomar" response proper when request seeks information related to third party who has not waived privacy rights); Schwarz v. United States Dep't of Treasury, 131 F. Supp. 2d 142, 150 (D.D.C. 2000) (finding that "Glomar" response is proper in connection with request for third party's law enforcement records); Claudio v. Soc. Sec. Admin., No. H-98-1911, slip op. at 16 (S.D. Tex. May 24, 2000) (holding "Glomar" response proper when request sought any investigatory records about administrative law judge); McNamera, 974 F. Supp. at 954 (deciding that "Glomar" response concerning possible criminal investigatory files on private individuals is appropriate where records would be categorically exempt); Early v. Office of Prof'l Responsibility, No. 95-0254, slip op. at 3 (D.D.C. Apr. 30, 1996) (concluding that "Glomar" response concerning possible complaints against or investigations of judge and three named federal employees was proper absent any public interest in disclosure), summary affirmance granted, No. 96-5136, 1997 WL 195523 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 31, 1997); see also FOIA Update, Vol. X, No. 3, at 5; FOIA Update, Vol. VII, No. 1, at 3-4. But cf. Jefferson v. Dep't of Justice, 284 F.3d 172, 178-79 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (declining to affirm district court's approval of "Glomar" response to request for Office of Professional Responsibility records pertaining to Assistant United States Attorney, because of possibility that some non-law enforcement records were within scope of request).

    97. See, e.g., Nation Magazine, 71 F.3d at 894-96 (holding categorical "Glomar" response concerning law enforcement files on individual inappropriate when individual had publicly offered to help agency; records discussing reported offers of assistance to agency by former presidential candidate H. Ross Perot "may implicate a less substantial privacy interest than any records associating Perot with criminal activity," so conventional processing is required for such records); see also FOIA Update, Vol. XVII, No. 2, at 3-4 ("OIP Guidance: The Bifurcation Requirement for Privacy 'Glomarization'").

    98. See, e.g., Jefferson, 284 F.3d at 178-79 (refusing to allow categorical Exemption 7(C) "Glomar" response to request for Office of Professional Responsibility records concerning Assistant United States Attorney because agency did not bifurcate for separate treatment of its non-law enforcement records); Nation Magazine, 71 F.3d at 894-96 (deciding that "Glomar" response is appropriate only as to existence of records associating former presidential candidate H. Ross Perot with criminal activity), on remand, 937 F. Supp. 39, 45 (D.D.C. 1996) (finding that "Glomar" response as to whether Perot was subject, witness, or informant in law enforcement investigation appropriate after agency searched law enforcement files for records concerning Perot's efforts to assist agency), further proceedings, No. 94-00808, slip op. at 9-11 (D.D.C. Feb. 14, 1997) (ordering agency to file in camera declaration with court explaining whether it ever assigned informant code to named individual and results of any search performed using that code; agency not required to state on record whether individual was ever assigned code number), further proceedings, No. 94-00808, slip op. at 9-10 (D.D.C. May 21, 1997) (accepting agency's in camera declaration that search of its records using code number assigned to named individual uncovered no responsive documents); Burke, 1999 WL 1032814, at *5 (finding no need to bifurcate request that "specifically and exclusively" sought investigative records on third parties); Tanks, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7266, at *4 (upholding privacy "Glomarization" after agency bifurcated between aspects of request); Nation Magazine v. Dep't of State, No. 92-2303, slip op. at 23-24 (D.D.C. Aug. 18, 1995) (requiring FBI to search for any "noninvestigative" files on Perot); Grove, 802 F. Supp. at 510-11 (finding agency conducted search for administrative records sought but "Glomarized" part of request concerning investigatory records); accord Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 757 (involving "Glomarization" bifurcation along "public interest" lines); Gardels v. CIA, 689 F.2d 1100, 1102-03 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (approving "Glomarization" bifurcation that acknowledged overt contacts with educational institution but refused to confirm or deny covert contacts) (Exemptions 1 and 3); cf. Jefferson, 284 F.3d at 179 (requiring Office of Professional Responsibility to determine nature of records contained in file pertaining to Assistant United States Attorney before giving categorical "Glomar" response).

    99. Accord FOIA Update, Vol. XVII, No. 2, at 3-4; see, e.g., Nation Magazine, 937 F. Supp. at 45 (finding that "Glomar" response as to whether presidential candidate H. Ross Perot was subject, witness, or informant in law enforcement investigation appropriate after agency searched law enforcement files for less sensitive law enforcement records); Tanks, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7266, at *4 (finding that agency properly bifurcated between aspects of request); Grove, 802 F. Supp. at 510-14 (allowing Navy to bifurcate between "administrative documents" and those held by its investigative component, Naval Investigative Service).

    100. See McNamera, 974 F. Supp. at 958 (finding that "Glomar" response is proper so long as agency employing it has not publicly identified individual as subject of investigation); cf. Frugone v. CIA, 169 F.3d 772, 774-75 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (finding that CIA properly "Glomarized" existence of records concerning plaintiff's alleged employment relationship with CIA despite allegation that another government agency confirmed plaintiff's status as former CIA employee) (Exemptions 1 and 3).

    101. 489 U.S. at 767.

    102. See FOIA Update, Vol. X, No. 3, at 5 (stating that under Reporters Committee, Exemption 7(C) "Glomarization" can be undertaken without review of any responsive records, in response to third-party requests for routine law enforcement records pertaining to living private citizens who have not given consent to disclosure); see also FOIA Update, Vol. XII, No. 2, at 6 (warning agencies not to notify requesters of identities of other agencies to which record referrals are made, in any exceptional case in which doing so would reveal sensitive abstract fact about existence of records).

    103. See Ely v. FBI, 781 F.2d 1487, 1492 n.4 (11th Cir. 1986) ("the government must first offer evidence, either publicly or in camera to show that there is a legitimate claim"); McNamera, 974 F. Supp. at 957-58 (finding agencies' affidavits sufficient to support "Glomar" response); Nation Magazine, No. 94-00808, slip op. at 9-11 (D.D.C. Feb. 14, 1997) (ordering agency to file in camera declaration with court explaining whether it ever assigned informant code to named individual and results of any search performed using that code); Grove, 752 F. Supp. at 30 (requiring agency to conduct search to properly justify use of "Glomar" response in litigation).

    104. See, e.g., Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 757 (request for any "rap sheet" on individual defense contractor); Oguaju, 288 F.3d at 451 (request for information on individual who testified at requester's trial); Schwarz, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 3987, at *7 (request for file on "alleged husband"); Beck, 997 F.2d at 1493-94 (request for records concerning alleged wrongdoing by two named DEA agents); Dunkelberger, 906 F.2d at 780, 782 (request for information that could verify alleged misconduct by undercover FBI Special Agent); Freeman v. United States Dep't of Justice, No. 86-1073, slip op. at 2 (4th Cir. Dec. 29, 1986) (request for alleged FBI informant file of Teamsters president); Strassman v. United States Dep't of Justice, 792 F.2d 1267, 1268 (4th Cir. 1986) (request for records allegedly indicating whether governor of West Virginia threatened to invoke Fifth Amendment); Antonelli, 721 F.2d at 616-19 (request seeking files on eight third parties); Voinche, No. 99-1931, slip op. at 12-13 (D.D.C. Nov. 17, 2000) (request for information on three individuals allegedly involved in Oklahoma City bombing); Greenberg, 10 F. Supp. 2d at 10 (request for information relating to involvement of named individuals in "October Surprise" allegations); Early, No. 95-0254, slip. op. at 3 (D.D.C. Apr. 30, 1996) (request for complaints against or investigations of judge and three named federal employees); Triestman, 878 F. Supp. at 669 (request by prisoner seeking records of investigations of misconduct by named DEA agents); Ray, 778 F. Supp. at 1215 (request for any records reflecting results of INS investigation of alleged employee misconduct); Knight Publ'g Co. v. United States Dep't of Justice, No. 84-510, slip op. at 1-2 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 28, 1985) (request by newspaper seeking any DEA investigatory file on governor, lieutenant governor, or attorney general of North Carolina); Ray v. United States Dep't of Justice, 558 F. Supp. 226, 228-29 (D.D.C. 1982) (request by convicted killer of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., seeking any file on requester's former attorney or Congressman Louis Stokes), aff'd, 720 F.2d 216 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (unpublished table decision); Blakey v. Department of Justice, 549 F. Supp. 362, 365-66 (D.D.C. 1982) (request by professor seeking any records relating to a minor figure in investigation of assassination of President Kennedy who was indexed under topics other than Kennedy assassination), aff'd in part & vacated in part, 720 F.2d 215 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (unpublished table decision).

    105. See Shaw v. FBI, 604 F. Supp. 342, 344-45 (D.D.C. 1985) (seeking any investigatory files on individuals whom requester believed participated in assassination of President Kennedy); Flynn v. United States Dep't of Justice, No. 83-2282, slip op. at 1-3 (D.D.C. Feb. 18, 1984) (alleging documents reflect judicial bias), summary judgment for agency granted (D.D.C. Apr. 6, 1984); see also Knight Publ'g, No. 84-510, slip op. at 2 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 28, 1985) (unsealing of in camera affidavit on motion to compel).

    106. Favish, 124 S. Ct. at 1577 (noting that "law enforcement documents obtained by Government investigators often contain information about persons interviewed as witnesses or initial suspects but whose link to the official inquiry may be the result of mere happenstance").

    107. See Attorney General's 1986 Amendments Memorandum at 9-12; see also Favish, 124 S. Ct. at 1579 (evincing the Supreme Court's reliance on "the Attorney General's consistent interpretation of" the FOIA in successive such Attorney General memoranda); accord Attorney General Ashcroft's FOIA Memorandum, reprinted in FOIA Post (posted 10/15/01) (stressing importance of protecting law enforcement interests).

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