Change of Venue
Section 1404(a) of Title 28 provides that: "for the
of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district
transfer any civil action to any other district where it might have
Any party, including plaintiff, may move for a transfer under
U.S.C. § 1404(a). I-T-E- Circuit Breaker Co. v. Regan, 348 F.2d
(8th Cir. 1965); American Standard, Inc. v. Bendix Corp., 487 F.
254, 260 (W.D. Mo. 1980). A party may move for transfer, even if it
waived any objection to venue. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Anderson
Service, Inc., 339 F. Supp. 713, 718 n.3 (W.D. Mo. 1971). The court
also transfer an action sua sponte. Lead Industries Association,
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 610 F.2d 70, 79 n.17
Cir. 1979); Mobil Corp. v. S.E.C., 550 F. Supp. 67, 69 (S.D.N.Y.
While 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) contains no time limit for the filing
motion, the motion may be denied if the passage of time or any
causes undue prejudice or is considered dilatory. See American
Inc., 487 F. Supp. at 261, and cases cited. "The moving party has
burden of proof, and must make a convincing showing of the right to
The power of the court to transfer is limited to those
divisions where the case "might have been brought." 28 U.S.C. §
1404(a); American Standard, 487 F. Supp. at 261, and authorities
Thus, a transfer would be denied where some defendants would not be
subject to jurisdiction or where the venue would be improper in the
transferee forum as to any defendant. See Hoffman v. Blaski, 363
335, 344 (1960); In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, 685 F.2d
819 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1156 (1983); Security
Bank v. Baty, 439 F.2d 910, 912 (10th Cir. 1971); Lamont v. Haig,
F.2d 1124, 1131 n.45 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
One of, if not the most important factors to be considered, is
of convenience of the witnesses. In this regard, the inquiry is
not at the numbers, but rather at the nature and quality of the
witnesses' testimony and the question of whether they can be
to testify. See Hotel Constructors, Inc. v. Seagrave Corp., 543 F.
1048, 1051 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Schmidt v. Leader Dogs for the Blind,
544 F. Supp. 42, 48 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Capitol Cabinet Corp. v.
Dynamics, Ltd., 541 F. Supp. 588, 591 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
Another of the very important factors is the "interest of
-- a factor susceptible to a wide variety of definitions. For
court might properly consider the degree "of uncertainty in
state law." See Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964). Other
examples of matters considered under rubric of "interest of
are: efficient use of judicial resources and avoidance of
waste and expense, Continental Grain Co. v. The FBL-585, 364 U.S.
26-27 (1960); Smithkline Corp. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 406 F. Supp.
55 (D.C. Del. 1975); avoidance of inconsistent adjudications and
"possibility of prejudice to the plaintiffs flowing from that
Amoco Production Co. v. U.S. Dept. of Energy, 469 F. Supp. 236, 244
(D.C. Del. 1979); "familiarity of the court with the state law to
applied and the desirability of having localized controversies
at home," Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Dolby, 531 F. Supp. 511, 514
Pa. 1982), and cases cited; and permitting the transferee judge to
interpret his outstanding protective order and familiarity of
judge with relevant documents. Mobil Corporation, 550 F. Supp. at
"The factor of the convenience of parties and witnesses must also
measured in terms of the interest of justice." See American
487 F. Supp. at 264. The level of congestion of the respective
dockets and the speed with which the dispute can be resolved are
proper matters to be considered. See Securities and Exchange
v. Savoy Industries, Inc., 587 F.2d 1149, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 1978),
denied, 440 U.S. 913 (1979).
[cited in USAM 4-2.200]