47.
Court of Federal Claims Litigation
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Under the "Little Tucker Act," 28 U.S.C. § 1346, the
district
courts possess concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Federal
Claims to
entertain any monetary claim against the United States for an
amount not
exceeding $10,000 "founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act
of
Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any
express or implied contract with the United States, or for
liquidated or
unliquidated damages not sounding in tort." When more than $10,000
is
claimed, the Court of Federal Claims possesses exclusive
jurisdiction in
these cases. 28 U.S.C. § 1491. Although the general rule is
that
jurisdiction is established at the time of filing, there is
precedent
that a claim which is for less than $10,000 when filed but is
accruing
so that it will be for more than $10,000 at the time of judgment is
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims.
Goble
v. Marsh, 684 F.2d 12 (D.C. Cir. 1982). It is settled that a
plaintiff
may remain in the district court under the Tucker Act even if his
damages exceed $10,000 as long as he waives all recovery in excess
of
$10,000. E.g., Stone v. United States, 683 F.2d 449, 451 (D.C. Cir.
1982).
There is precedent that a district court possesses jurisdiction
to
grant equitable relief even though the Court of Federal Claims
possesses
exclusive jurisdiction over the derivative monetary claim. E.g.,
Giordano v. Roudebush, 617 F.2d 511 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding in a
civilian personnel case that a district court has jurisdiction to
grant
reinstatement even though the Court of Federal Claims had exclusive
jurisdiction over a claim for monetary damages exceeding $10,000).
The
majority of courts, however, have adopted the better rule that,
when the
employee claims reinstatement and more than $10,000 of back pay,
the
Court of Federal Claims possesses exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and
decide the suit. E.g., Keller v. Merit Systems Protection Board,
679
F.2d 220 (11th Cir. 1982); Cook v. Arentzen, 582 F.2d 870 (4th Cir.
1978); Carter v. Seamans, 411 F.2d 767 (5th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied,
397 U.S. 941 (1970).
Disputes arising out of contracts with the federal government
are
generally governed by the Contract Disputes Act, 41 U.S.C. §
601 et
seq. (CDA). Both claims by a contractor against the government and
claims by the government against a contractor must be decided first
by
the contracting officer. 41 U.S.C. § 605(a). A contractor may
contest the contracting officer's final decision either by filing
a
direct action in the Court of Federal Claims or by appealing to a
board
of contract appeals. 41 U.S.C. §§ 606, 609(a)(1). The CDA
provides the exclusive method for resolution of any dispute
relating to
a government contract and district courts possess no jurisdiction
in
these cases. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2) ("(T)he district courts
shall
not have jurisdiction of any civil action or claim against the
United
States founded upon any express or implied contract with the United
States or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not
sounding
in tort which are subject to sections 8(g)(1) and 10(a)(1) of the
Contract Disputes Act of 1978"); 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(2) ("The
Court
of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon
any
claim by or against, or dispute with, a contractor arising under
section
10(a)(1) of the Contract Disputes Act of 1978."); United States v.
Dabbs, 608 F. Supp. 507 (S.D. Miss. 1985) (holding that the CDA
provides
the exclusive method for challenging the final decision of the
contracting officer.) If a claim arising out of a government
contract is
subject to the CDA, it is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Court
of Federal Claims. A & S Council Oil Co. v. Lader, 56 F.3d 234
(D.C.
Cir. 1995); but see Quality Tooling, Inc. v. United States, 47 F.3d
1569, (Fed. Cir. 1995) (district court, sitting in bankruptcy, may
entertain a CDA claim). For a discussion of affirmative suits under
the
CDA, see USAM 4-4.420.
The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 (FCIA) authorized
the
Court of Federal Claims "to grant declaratory judgments and such
equitable and extraordinary relief as it deems proper, including
but not
limited to injunctive relief" in bid protest cases brought before
contract award. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(3). Award after the
complaint has been filed does not divest the Court of Federal
Claims of
jurisdiction. See F. Alderete General Contractor v. United States,
715
F.2d 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The Court of Federal Claims possesses
exclusive jurisdiction in these pre-award cases. Rex Systems, Inc.
v.
Holiday, 814 F.2d 994 (4th Cir. 1987); but see, In re Smith &
Wesson,
757 F.2d 431 (1st Cir. 1985); Coco Brothers, Inc. v. Pierce, 741
F.2d
675 (3d Cir. 1984) (looking behind the express language of the
statute
to its legislative history). It is settled that, notwithstanding
the
FCIA, the district courts still have jurisdiction over bid protests
filed after contract award. B.K. Instruments, Inc. v. United
States, 715
F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1983).
If a case within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of
Federal
Claims is filed in the district court, a motion to dismiss or a
motion
to transfer is appropriate. Section 1631 of title 28, United States
Code, authorizes a court without jurisdiction over a case to
transfer it
to a different court in which the case could have been brought "if
it is
in the interest of justice." An order granting or denying, in whole
or
in part, such a motion is immediately appealable to the United
States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. See 28 U.S.C. §
1292(d)(4)(A).
[updated May 1998]
[cited in USAM 4-4.210;
Civil Resource Manual 148]
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