Department or Agency
For cases before the 1996 amendments, in Hubbard v. United
States, 115 S.Ct. 1754 (1995), the United States Supreme Court concluded
a court is neither a "department" nor an "agency" under § 1001. The
thereby overruled United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503 (1955), a
broadly construing 18 U.S.C. § 1001 in holding that the word
Section 1001 was meant to extend the statute's reach to all three branches
government. Section 6 of Title 18, United States Code, defines the words
department and agency.|
Although the Hubbard opinion left open the possibility that
judicial or legislative entity might still be considered an "agency" under
section 1001, several courts have interpreted Hubbard broadly to mean that
section 1001 applies only to false statements made to the executive branch.
See, e.g., United States v. Dean, 55 F.3d 640 (D.C. Cir.
cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 1288 (1996); United States v.
Rostenkowski, 59 F.3d 1291, 1301 (D.C. Cir. 1995). As of this writing,
is still pending in the District of Columbia Circuit an interlocutory appeal
concerning whether the old version of section 1001, even after Hubbard,
applies to financial disclosure statements that Members of Congress filed,
pursuant to the Ethics in Government Act, with the Clerk of the House of
Representatives before October 11, 1996. See United States v.
Oakar, No. 96-3084 (D.C. Cir.). Prosecutors therefore should not
in any pleadings or arguments presented in federal courts, that the old
1001 does not apply to such statements, at least until the Court of Appeals
the District of Columbia Circuit decides this case.
The 1996 statute effectively overrules Hubbard, and
provides that section 1001 covers false statements that are made to all
branches of the federal government, without regard to whether the entity may
categorized as a "department" or "agency."
Under both the pre-1996 and post-1996 statutes, the government is
required to prove that the defendant had actual knowledge that the false
statement in question was within the jurisdiction of a Federal department or
agency. See United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 68 (1984);
on remand, 741 F.2d 267 (1984). Nor must the government prove
the defendant had the specific intent to deceive the Federal government.
Yermian, 468 U.S. at 73. After United States v. Gaudin, 115
S.Ct.2310 (1995), the element of agency jurisdiction is probably a jury
But cf. United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 479
United States v. Diaz, 690 F.2d 1352 (11th Cir. 1982); United
v. Goldstein, 695 F.2d 1228 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 462
1132 (1983). The requirement that the statement must be "within the
jurisdiction" of a federal agency is to be interpreted broadly.
United States v. Notarantonio, 758 F.2d 777, 787 (1st Cir. 1985).
liability under Section 1001 to attach, it is necessary only that the "false
statements . . . result in the perversion of the authorized functions of a
federal department or agency." United States v. Gilliland, 312 U.S.
93 (1941); Notarantonio, 758 F.2d at 787.
In United States v. Candella, 487 F.2d 1223 (2d Cir. 1973)
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974), for example, false affidavits
by movers were executed on forms prepared by the City of New York and not by
Department of Housing and Urban Development; but the false affidavits were
the purview of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, because the city had entered into a
with the United States prompting the move, the government was ultimately
responsible for paying the moving expenses, and the movers were aware of the
relationship between the government and the city.
Candella makes clear that Section 1001 "does not require
the false statement must actually have been submitted to a department or
of the United States, but rather that it was contemplated that the statement
to be utilized in a matter which was within the jurisdiction of such
or agency." Id. at 1227. In Candella, one of the purposes of
records was to provide an "audit trail" for Federal program auditors.
also United States v. Kraude, 467 F.2d 37 (9th Cir. 1972),
denied, 409 U.S. 1076 (1972); United States v. Waters, 457 F.2d
(3d Cir. 1972). In United States v. Munoz, 392 F. Supp. 183 (E.D.
1974), aff'd, 529 F.2d 526 (6th Cir. 1975), the Department of Labor
authority to regulate the use of funds distributed through a national
organization that was a contractor to the Department of Labor, to a
state-chartered non-profit organization that was a subcontractor to the
organization. Any false statement submitted to the state-chartered
under such circumstances was held to be a matter within the "jurisdiction of
agency or department of the United States." Munoz reaffirms not only
proposition that the fraud need not be perpetrated directly on or to the
governmental agency involved but also that the term "jurisdiction" in
1001 should not be given a narrow or technical meaning. See also
Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64 (1969).
[cited in USAM 9-42.001]