FOIA Guide, 2004 Edition: Exemption 7

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Freedom of Information Act Guide, May 2004


Exemption 7

Exemption 7 of the FOIA, as amended, protects from disclosure "records or
information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the
production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be
expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a
right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to
constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be
expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source, including a State, local, or
foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on
a confidential basis, and, in the case of a record or information compiled by a
criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an
agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information
furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for
law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law
enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be
expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to
endanger the life or physical safety of any individual." (1)

The threshold requirement for Exemption 7 has been modified by Congress
twice since the enactment of the FOIA. In its original form, this exemption simply
permitted the withholding of "investigatory files compiled for law enforcement
purposes except to the extent available by law to a party other than an agency." (2) As
such, it was consistently construed to exempt all material contained in an
investigatory file, regardless of the status of the underlying investigation or the
nature of the documents requested. (3) In 1974, Congress rejected the application of a
"blanket" exemption for investigatory files and narrowed the scope of Exemption 7
by requiring that withholding be justified by one of six specified types of harm. (4)
Under this revised Exemption 7 structure, an analysis of whether a record was
protected by this exemption involved two steps: First, the record had to qualify as
an "investigatory record compiled for law enforcement purposes"; second, its
disclosure had to be found to threaten one of the enumerated harms of Exemption
7's six subparts. (5)

Congress amended Exemption 7 again in 1986, retaining its basic structure as
established by the 1974 FOIA amendments, but significantly broadening the
protection given to law enforcement records virtually throughout the exemption and
its subparts. (6) The Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986, often referred to as
the 1986 FOIA amendments, modified the threshold requirement of Exemption 7 in
several distinct respects; it deleted the word "investigatory" and added the words
"or information," such that Exemption 7 protections are now potentially available to
all "records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes." (7) And, except for
Exemption 7(B) and part of Exemption 7(E), it altered the requirement that an agency
demonstrate that disclosure "would" cause the harm each subsection seeks to
prevent, to the lesser standard that disclosure "could reasonably be expected to"
cause the specified harm. (8)

Exemption 7's expansion to cover "information" compiled for law enforcement
purposes extended protection to compilations of information as they are preserved
in particular records and also to information within the record itself, so long as that
information was compiled for law enforcement purposes. (9) It plainly was designed
"to ensure that sensitive law enforcement information is protected under Exemption
7 regardless of the particular format or record in which [it] is maintained." (10) It was
intended to avoid use of any mechanical process for determining the purpose for
which a physical record was created and to instead establish a focus on the purpose
for which information contained in a record has been generated. (11) In making their
determinations of threshold Exemption 7 applicability, agencies should focus on the
content and compilation purpose of each item of information involved, regardless of
the overall character of the record in which it happens to be maintained. (12)

This amendment of Exemption 7 shifted its focus from a "record" to an item of
"information," building upon the approach to Exemption 7's threshold that was
employed by the Supreme Court in FBI v. Abramson, (13) in which the Court
pragmatically focused on the "kind of information" contained in the law enforcement
records before it. The amendment essentially codified prior judicial determinations
that an item of information originally compiled by an agency for a law enforcement
purpose does not lose Exemption 7 protection merely because it is maintained in or
recompiled into a non-law enforcement record. (14) This properly places "emphasis on
the contents, and not the physical format of documents." (15)

The scope of Exemption 7 was further expanded by the 1986 FOIA
amendments, which removed the requirement that records or information be
"investigatory" in character in order to qualify for Exemption 7 protection. (16) Under
the former formulations, agencies and courts considering Exemption 7 issues often
found themselves struggling with the "investigatory" requirement, which held the
potential for disqualifying sensitive law enforcement information from Exemption 7
protection. (17) Courts construing this statutory term generally interpreted it as
requiring that the records in question result from specifically focused law
enforcement inquiries as opposed to more routine monitoring or oversight of
government programs. (18)

The distinction between "investigatory" and "noninvestigatory" law
enforcement records, was not always so clear. (19) Moreover, the "investigatory"
requirement per se was frequently blurred together with the "law enforcement
purposes" aspect of the exemption, so that it sometimes became difficult to
distinguish between the two. (20) Law enforcement manuals containing sensitive
information about specific procedures and guidelines followed by an agency were
held not to qualify as "investigatory records" because they had not originated in
connection with any specific investigation, even though they clearly had been
compiled for law enforcement purposes. (21)

The 1986 FOIA amendments were a response to such troublesome
distinctions, and they broadened the potential sweep of the exemption's coverage
considerably. (22) Under those FOIA amendments, the protections of Exemption 7's six
subparts were made available to all records or information compiled for "law
enforcement purposes." (23) Even records generated pursuant to routine agency
activities that previously could not be regarded as "investigatory" now should qualify
for Exemption 7 protection when those activities involve a law enforcement purpose.
This certainly includes records generated for general law enforcement purposes
that do not necessarily relate to specific investigations, although some relatively
recent decisions still carelessly contain the pre-1986 FOIA amendment
"investigatory" language. (24)

Records such as law enforcement manuals, for example, which previously
were found unqualified for Exemption 7 protection only because they were not
"investigatory" in character, (25) now should satisfy the exemption's threshold
requirement. (26) The sole issue remaining is the application of the phrase "law
enforcement purposes" in the context of the amended Exemption 7.

Relatively few cases have addressed the parameters of this less-demanding
threshold standard under the 1986 FOIA amendments, so it is useful also to examine
the cases interpreting the identical "law enforcement purposes" language under the
prior version of this exemption, as all law enforcement records found qualified for
exemption protection under the pre-1986 language of Exemption 7 undoubtedly
remain so. (27)

Thus, the "law" to be enforced within the meaning of the term "law
enforcement purposes" includes both civil (28) and criminal statutes, (29) as well asthose statutes authorizing administrative (i.e., regulatory) proceedings. (30)

Most significantly, the courts recognize that "law enforcement" within the
meaning of Exemption 7 extends beyond these traditional realms into the realms of
national security and homeland security-related government activities as well. (31) For
example, in Center for National Security Studies v. United States Department of
Justice
, the D.C. Circuit recently explained that the names of post-9/11 detainees,
found on documents that traditionally have been public, are properly withheld
because they were compiled for the law enforcement purpose of pursuing a
"heinous violation of federal law as well as a breach of national security." (32) Indeed, in
accepting arguments that terrorists could use information previously considered
innocuous and safe for public release, courts have shown a new sensitivity to the
needs of homeland security by recognizing the law enforcement nexus for certain
documents that readily could be used by terrorists to assess the likelihood of
detection, to analyze the degree of damage inflicted by striking one particular target
instead of another, or even to intimidate witnesses and/or the families of
witnesses. (33) The courts that have uniformly determined that documents related to
national or homeland security satisfy Exemption 7's law enforcement requirement
have discussed repeatedly that the agencies' mandates to protect society and to
prevent violence are key to establishing the threshold's satisfaction. (34) Furthermore,
in this area courts pointedly emphasize the propriety of judicial deference; indeed, in
Center for National Security Studies, the D.C. Circuit observed that it was acting fully
"in accord with several federal courts that have wisely respected the executive
judgments in prosecuting the national response to terrorism" by deferring to the
executive on "decisions of national security," especially in establishing the law
enforcement purpose and in foreseeing the harm from disclosure. (35) (For further
discussions of homeland security-related matters, see Exemption 1, Homeland
Security-Related Information, above, and Exemption 2, Homeland Security-Related
Information, above.)

In addition to all such matters of federal law enforcement, Exemption 7 also
applies to records compiled to enforce state law, (36) and even foreign law. (37) There is
no requirement that the matter culminate in actual administrative, civil, or criminal
enforcement. (38) However, if the agency lacks the authority to pursue a particular law
enforcement matter, Exemption 7 protection may not be afforded. (39)

Additionally, "[b]ackground security investigations by governmental units
which have authority to conduct such functions" (40) have been held by most courts to
meet the threshold tests under the succeeding formulations of Exemption 7. (41)
Personnel investigations of government employees also are compiled for law
enforcement purposes if they focus on "specific and potentially unlawful activity by
particular employees" of a civil or criminal nature. (42) By contrast, "an agency's general
monitoring of its own employees to ensure compliance with the agency's statutory
mandate and regulations" does not satisfy Exemption 7's threshold requirement. (43)

Thus, while the line between mere employee monitoring and an investigation
of an employee that satisfies the threshold requirement of Exemption 7 is narrow,
the following examples satisfying the threshold shed useful light on this distinction:

(1) an investigation of an employee's allegations of misconduct and gross
incompetence; (44)

(2) an investigation triggered by a complaint letter alleging that particular
government prosecutors had withheld certain information during litigation; (45)

(3) an investigation of a particular Assistant United States Attorney for
disclosing confidential information about the alleged use of cocaine by a suspect; (46)
and

(4) an investigation triggered by an allegation of racial harassment. (47)

On the other hand, examples of matters that do not satisfy the threshold are:

(1) an investigation into whether an employee who spoke at a meeting
sponsored by a regulated company violated agency regulations when the case
focused on "whether an agency employee has complied with agency regulations"; (48)

(2) records concerning an employee who had been disciplined because the
agency was participating "as an employer" and not as an "agency enforcing the
revenue laws"; (49) and

(3) an investigation conducted by an Office of Inspector General that the
agency merely asserted "must" have been for law enforcement purposes even
though the Inspector General "also investigates internal matters concerning agency
inefficiency and mismanagement." (50)

The common thread running through all these cases is the one first
established in Rural Housing and then reiterated in Stern: It is imperative that an
agency articulate the purpose of its actions and, as necessary, "distinguish
[between] two types of files relating to government employees." (51) Most especially,
entities such as an Office of Inspector General and the Department of Justice's Office
of Professional Responsibility need to take particular care in describing the different
types of personnel investigations that they conduct, because such entities routinely
conduct both law enforcement and non-law enforcement investigations of agency
employees. (52)

In determining whether a record concerning matters other than an agency's
own activities and personnel was "compiled for law enforcement purposes" under
Exemption 7, the courts have generally distinguished between agencies with both
law enforcement and administrative functions and those whose principal function is
criminal law enforcement. (53) An agency whose functions are "mixed" usually has to
show that the records at issue involved the enforcement of a statute or regulation
within its authority. (54) Courts have additionally required that the records be compiled
for "adjudicative or enforcement purposes." (55)

However, in two recent cases involving agencies with "mixed" functions,
courts have applied the phrase "law enforcement purpose" broadly. (56) In Living
Rivers, Inc. v. United States Bureau of Reclamation
, the court explained that before it
could determine if "dam inundation" maps created by the Department of the
Interior's Bureau of Reclamation (BOR) were withheld properly pursuant to either
Exemption 7(E) or Exemption 7(F), it first had to determine whether Exemption 7's
threshold requirement was met. (57) Reiterating the differences between "per se" law
enforcement agencies and those with both administrative and law enforcement
functions, the court pragmatically acknowledged that "Congress has provided the
BOR with express 'law enforcement authority' to 'maintain law and order and protect
persons and property within Reclamation projects and on Reclamation lands.'" (58)
After endorsing this express grant of law enforcement authority, the court next
addressed the "compilation" aspect of the threshold requirement, finding that the
"context in which an agency has currently compiled a document, rather than the
purpose for which the document was originally created, determines whether it is
'compiled for law enforcement purposes.'" (59) Based upon this pragmatic, post-9/11
analysis, the court ruled that "the inundation maps are presently used and were
compiled in direct relation to the BOR's statutory law enforcement mandate. The
BOR therefore satisfies the first prong of Exemption 7." (60)

Similarly, in Coastal Delivery v. United States Customs Service, the court
recognized readily that "Customs has a law enforcement mandate" regarding the
"number of examinations it performed on merchandise arriving into the Los
Angeles/Long Beach seaport." (61) Accordingly, it found a sufficient Exemption 7
nexus, in support of both Exemption 2 and Exemption 7(E) protection, because "the
numbers allow Customs to track the overall effectiveness of its examination
technique, and evaluate both its commercial enforcement strategy and its border
security responsibilities." (62)

The Supreme Court in 1990 resolved a conflict in lower court decisions (63) by
decisively holding that information not initially obtained or generated for law
enforcement purposes may still qualify under Exemption 7 if it is subsequently
compiled for a valid law enforcement purpose at any time prior to "when the
Government invokes the Exemption." (64) Rejecting the distinction between documents
originally compiled or obtained for law enforcement purposes and those later
assembled for such purposes, the Court held that the term "compiled" must be
accorded its ordinary meaning -- which includes "materials collected and assembled
from various sources or other documents" -- and it found that the plain meaning of
the statute contains "no requirement that the compilation be effected at a specific
time." (65)

In the case of criminal law enforcement agencies, the courts have accorded
the government varying degrees of special deference when considering whether
their records meet the threshold requirement of Exemption 7. (66) Indeed, the First,
Second, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals have adopted a per se
rule that qualifies all "investigative" records of criminal law enforcement agencies for
protection under Exemption 7. (67) Other courts, while according significant deference
to criminal law enforcement agencies, have held that an agency must demonstrate
some specific nexus between the records and a proper law enforcement purpose. (68)

The existing standard for review of criminal law enforcement records in the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit is somewhat more stringent
than the per se rule discussed above. The D.C. Circuit held in Pratt v. Webster that
records generated as part of a counterintelligence program of questionable legality
which was part of an otherwise clearly authorized law enforcement investigation
met the threshold requirement for Exemption 7 and rejected the per se approach. (69)
Instead, it adopted a two-part test for determining whether the threshold for
Exemption 7 has been met: (1) whether the agency's investigatory activities that
give rise to the documents sought are related to the enforcement of federal laws or
to the maintenance of national security; and (2) whether the nexus between the
investigation and one of the agency's law enforcement duties is based on
information sufficient to support at least a colorable claim of rationality. (70)

Since the removal of the word "investigatory" from the threshold requirement
of Exemption 7 in 1986, the D.C. Circuit has had few opportunities to reconsider the
Pratt test, a portion of which expressly requires a nexus between requested records
and an investigation. (71) In Keys v. United States Department of Justice, however, the
D.C. Circuit modified the language of the Pratt test to reflect those amendments and
to require that an agency demonstrate the existence of a nexus "between [its]
activity" (rather than its investigation) "and its law enforcement duties." (72) Although
not spe-cifically relying on the amended statutory language, the D.C. Circuit in Keys
held that records compiled solely because the subject had a known affiliation with
organizations that were strongly suspected of harboring Communists met the
Exemption 7 threshold. (73) As no appellate decision has yet employed the modified
Pratt test adopted by Keys, the impact of this change in the threshold is not yet fully
realized.

Even under the test enunciated in Pratt, (74) significant deference has been
accorded criminal law enforcement agencies. (75) Nevertheless, the D.C. Circuit has
indicated in Pratt and elsewhere that if an investigation is shown to have been in
fact conducted for an improper purpose, Exemption 7 may not be applicable to the
records of that investigation. (76)

Courts have yet to fully test the boundaries of Exemption 7's threshold after
the broadening of the 1986 FOIA amendments. Under Exemption 7 as amended, all
federal agencies should consider which records of a noninvestigatory character may
qualify for protection because they relate sufficiently to a law enforcement mission
assigned to the agency. (77) Agencies may now be able to apply Exemption 7
protection, for example, to law enforcement manuals, program oversight reports,
and other similar documents because of their relationship to the agency's law
enforcement mission. (78) The full effects of these amendments will be realized only
upon the case-by-case identification of particular items of noninvestigatory law
enforcement information the disclosure of which could cause one of the harms
specified in Exemption 7's six subparts. (79)

For example, emerging case law supports the use of Exemption 7 to protect
integrated intelligence and law enforcement information -- which might not
previously have been categorized as collected for law enforcement purposes --
particularly in situations where agencies have gathered information for purposes of
combating terrorism and protecting homeland security. (80) Such case law finds its
antecedent in the "national security" framework found in Pratt (81) and logically applies
Exemption 7 to protect intelligence data that relates to an agency's law enforcement
mission. (82) Indeed, three post-9/11 FOIA decisions have recognized this newer
"national security" framework and have applied it to protect sensitive, homeland
security-related information -- explaining that terrorists could use the information to
increase the risk of an attack or to increase the damage done by an attack. (83)

Nevertheless, agencies should be mindful that while the FOIA's policy goals
strongly support protecting intelligence information as part of the preventative law
enforcement mission under Exemption 7, (84) courts may require some showing of a
rational nexus between such activities and an agency's law enforcement functions. (85)
Accordingly, agencies should carefully examine their law enforcement purposes in
determining that a "sound legal basis" exists for applying Exemption 7 and gaining
its broad protections under the six subparts discussed below. (86) And while agencies
must establish this "connection" between their activities and their institutional
mandates in general, they can be mindful that the courts have properly given
deference to agency expertise in this area -- particularly in post-9/11 judicial
decisions, which repeatedly advert to the tragic events of that day and to how
"American life [has] changed drastically and dramatically." (87)

    1. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (2000).

    2. Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54, 55 (1967) (subsequently amended).

    3. See, e.g., Weisberg v. United States Dep't of Justice, 489 F.2d 1195, 1198-1202
    (D.C. Cir. 1973).

    4. Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561, 1563 (1974) (subsequently amended).

    5. See FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 622 (1982).

    6. Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1802, 100 Stat.
    3207, 3207-48; see United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of
    the Press
    , 489 U.S. 749, 756 n.9 (1989) (recognizing that the shift from "would
    constitute" standard to "could reasonably be expected to constitute" standard
    "represents a congressional effort to ease considerably a Federal law enforcement
    agency's burden in invoking [Exemption 7]"); Tax Analysts v. IRS, 294 F.3d 71, 79 (D.C.
    Cir. 2002) (explaining that 1986 FOIA amendments changed threshold for Exemption
    7 to delete "any requirement" that information be investigatory and that exemption
    therefore can be applied more widely); Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 866 F.2d 1185, 1222
    n.27 (10th Cir. 1989) ("The 1986 amendment[s] broadened the scope of exemption 7's
    threshold requirement . . . ."); North v. Walsh, 881 F.2d 1088, 1098 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
    (stating that Congress in 1986 "changed the threshold requirement for withholding
    information under exemption 7" so that "it now applies more broadly"); Wash. Post
    Co. v. United States Dep't of Justice
    , No. 84-3581, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14936, at *26
    (D.D.C. Sept. 25, 1987) (magistrate's recommendation) (noting that an "[a]gency's
    burden of proof in this threshold test has been lightened considerably"), adopted
    (D.D.C. Dec. 15, 1987), rev'd in part on other grounds & remanded, 863 F.2d 96 (D.C.
    Cir. 1988).

    7. § 1802, 100 Stat. at 3207-48; see also Tax Analysts, 294 F.3d at 79 (emphasizing
    that the "legislative history makes it clear that Congress intended the amended
    exemption to protect both investigatory and non-investigatory materials, including
    law enforcement manuals and the like" (citing S. Rep. No. 98-221, at 23 (1983))).

    8. Id.; see Attorney General's Memorandum on the 1986 Amendments to the
    Freedom of Information Act
    9-13 (Dec. 1987) [hereinafter Attorney General's 1986
    Amendments Memorandum
    ]; cf. NARA v. Favish, 124 S. Ct. 1570, 1579 (2004) (evincing
    the Supreme Court's reliance on "the Attorney General's consistent interpretation of"
    the FOIA in successive such Attorney General memoranda).

    9. Attorney General's 1986 Amendments Memorandum at 5.

    10. S. Rep. No. 98-221, at 23 (1983).

    11. See id.

    12. See id.; Abramson, 456 U.S. at 630-32; see also Living Rivers, Inc. v. United States
    Bureau of Reclamation
    , 272 F. Supp. 1313, 1319 (D. Utah 2003) (finding that records
    created to protect dams from terrorism satisfy Exemptions 7's threshold, and
    reasoning that "the context in which an agency has currently compiled a document . .
    . determines whether it is 'compiled for law enforcement purposes'" (quoting John
    Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp.
    , 493 U.S. 146, 153-54 (1989))); Hogan v. Huff, No. 00 Civ.
    6753, 2002 WL 1359722, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2002) (declaring that "[d]ue to the
    nature of the origin" of documents used to determine a target's "status as a potential
    unregistered agent for the Cuban government, the documents in question meet the
    requirement of being gathered for law enforcement purposes"); Ctr. to Prevent
    Handgun Violence v. United States Dep't of the Treasury
    , 981 F. Supp. 20, 22-23
    (D.D.C. 1997) (finding that because reports of gun sales are "starting points for
    investigations of illegal gun trafficking," such reports are "clearly law enforcement
    records"); cf. Avondale Indus. v. NLRB, 90 F.3d 955, 962 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding no
    evidence in the requested record or in case law that union "voting lists were, in any
    way, compiled for a law enforcement purpose").

    13. 456 U.S. at 626.

    14. See id. at 631-32 ("We hold that information initially contained in a record made
    for law enforcement purposes continues to meet the threshold requirements of
    Exemption 7 where that recorded information is reproduced or summarized in a new
    document for a non-law-enforcement purpose."); Lesar v. United States Dep't of
    Justice
    , 636 F.2d 472, 487 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding that documents from review of
    previous FBI surveillance meet threshold); see also Assassination Archives &
    Research Ctr. v. CIA
    , 903 F. Supp. 131, 132-33 (D.D.C. 1995) (finding that information
    from criminal investigations recompiled into administrative file to assist FBI in
    responding to Senate committee hearings "certainly satisfies" threshold
    requirement), dismissed without prejudice, No. 94-0655 (D.D.C. May 31, 1996); Exner v.
    United States Dep't of Justice
    , 902 F. Supp. 240, 242 & n.3 (D.D.C. 1995) (protecting
    law enforcement document even if copy is maintained in non-law enforcement file),
    appeal dismissed, No. 95-5411, 1997 WL 68352 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 15, 1997). But cf.
    Rosenfeld v. United States Dep't of Justice, 57 F.3d 803, 811 (9th Cir. 1995) (affirming
    district court's refusal to apply Abramson principle to documents originally compiled
    for law enforcement purposes but "channelized" into non-law enforcement files
    when principle raised as defense for first time in motion for reconsideration).

    15. Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. CIA, 577 F. Supp. 584, 590 (D.D.C. 1983) (applying
    Abramson to hold that duplicate copy of congressional record maintained in agency
    files is not an "agency record"); see, e.g., Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. United States
    Dep't of Justice
    , 331 F.3d 918, 926 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (explaining that although the
    requested documents are of a type that "have traditionally been public . . . [a]s
    compiled, they constitute a comprehensive diagram of the law enforcement
    investigation" and thus are "[c]learly" compiled for law enforcement purposes), cert.
    denied
    , 124 S. Ct. 1041 (2004); Ponder v. Reno, No. 98-3097, slip op. at 4-5 (D.D.C. Jan.
    22, 2001) (concluding that "the agency's purpose in compiling the records, not their
    ultimate use of the documents, determines if they meet the Exemption 7 threshold");
    Exner, 902 F. Supp. at 242 n.3 (explaining that documents compiled in course of FBI
    investigation into "underworld/criminal activities" involving federal antiracketeering
    statutes "clearly constitute records or information compiled for law enforcement
    purposes" even if "a copy of the documents might also be found in a non-law
    enforcement file"); ISC Group v. DOD, No. 88-631, 1989 WL 168858, at *5 (D.D.C.
    May 22, 1989) (failing to protect the investigatory report prepared by a private
    company expressly for the agency's criminal investigation pursuant to Exemption 7
    "would elevate form over substance and frustrate the purpose of the exemption"); cf.
    In re Sealed Case, 856 F.2d 268, 271 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (explaining that law enforcement
    privilege protects testimony about contents of files which would themselves be
    protected, because public interest in safeguarding ongoing investigations is
    identical in both situations); Weinstein v. HHS, 977 F. Supp. 41, 45 (D.D.C. 1997)
    (applying Abramson to protect sensitive information under Exemption 5).

    16. See Attorney General's 1986 Amendments Memorandum at 6.

    17. See id.

    18. Compare, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. GSA, 509 F.2d 527, 529-30 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
    (deciding that records submitted for mere monitoring of employment discrimination
    are not "investigatory"), with Ctr. for Nat'l Policy Review on Race & Urban Issues v.
    Weinberger
    , 502 F.2d 370, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (ruling that records of agency review of
    public schools suspected of discriminatory practices are "investigatory").

    19. Compare, e.g., Gregory v. FDIC, 470 F. Supp. 1329, 1334 (D.D.C. 1979) (finding that
    bank examination report "typifies routine oversight" and thus is not "investigatory"),
    rev'd on other grounds, 631 F.2d 896 (D.C. Cir. 1980), with Copus v. Rougeau, 504 F.
    Supp. 534, 538 (D.D.C. 1980) (holding that compliance review forecast report is
    "clearly" investigative record).

    20. See, e.g., Rural Hous. Alliance v. USDA, 498 F.2d 73, 81 & n.47 (D.C. Cir. 1974).

    21. See Sladek v. Bensinger, 605 F.2d 899, 903 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding Exemption 7
    inapplicable to DEA manual that "was not compiled in the course of a specific
    investigation"); Cox v. United States Dep't of Justice, 576 F.2d 1302, 1310 (8th Cir. 1978)
    (same).

    22. See Attorney General's 1986 Amendments Memorandum at 7.

    23. Id.

    24. See Boyd v. DEA, No. 01-0524, slip op. at 7-8 (D.D.C. Mar. 8, 2002) (finding that
    agency could withhold highly sensitive research analysis in intelligence report
    pursuant to Exemption 7(E)); Tran v. United States Dep't of Justice, No. 01-0238, 2001
    WL 1692570, at *3 (D.D.C. Nov. 20, 2001) (concluding that INS form was properly
    withheld under Exemption 7(E) because it would reveal law enforcement
    techniques); see, e.g., Allnutt v. Dep't of Justice, 99 F. Supp. 2d 673, 680 (D. Md. 2000)
    (stating that the Tax Division records at issue "must generally arise during the
    course of an investigation" and "must involve the detection or punishment of
    violations of law" to satisfy the Exemption 7 threshold), renewed motion for summary
    judgment granted
    , No. Y-98-901, 2000 WL 852455, at **20-21 (D. Md. Oct. 23, 2000),
    aff'd sub nom. Allnutt v. Handler, 8 Fed. Appx. 225 (4th Cir. 2001); Morales Cozier v.
    FBI
    , No. 1:99-0312, slip op. at 15 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 25, 2000) (finding that records
    generated by invitation to official of Cuban government to speak in United States
    were compiled for law enforcement purposes).

    25. See, e.g., Sladek, 605 F.2d at 903; Cox, 576 F.2d at 1310.

    26. See Attorney General's 1986 Amendments Memorandum at 7; see, e.g., Tax
    Analysts
    , 294 F.3d at 79 (explaining that "the legislative history makes it clear that
    Congress intended the amended exemption to protect both investigatory and non-investigatory materials, including law enforcement manuals and the like"); PHE, Inc.
    v. Dep't of Justice
    , 983 F.2d 248, 249, 251 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding portions of FBI's
    Manual of Investigative Operations and Guidelines properly withheld pursuant to
    Exemption 7(E)); Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. INS, No. 87-2068, 1990 WL 236133, at *6
    (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 1990) (reiterating that documents relating to INS's law enforcement
    procedures meet threshold requirement as "purpose in preparing these documents
    relat[es] to legitimate concerns that federal immigration laws have been or may be
    violated"). But see Maydak, 254 F. Supp. 2d 23, 38 (D.D.C. 2003) (finding that Bureau
    of Prisons failed to satisfy law enforcement threshold for records in its Inmate
    Central Records System, which it described as concerning day-to-day activities and
    events occurring during inmates' confinement); Cowsen-El v. United States Dep't of
    Justice
    , 826 F. Supp. 532, 533 (D.D.C. 1992) (explaining that threshold is not met by
    Bureau of Prisons guidelines covering how prison officials should count and inspect
    prisoners).

    27. See Rural Hous., 498 F.2d at 80-82 (finding that threshold of Exemption 7 met if
    investigation focuses directly on specific illegal acts which could result in civil or
    criminal penalties); Southam News v. INS, 674 F. Supp. 881, 887 (D.D.C. 1987) (finding
    that, based upon pre-1986 language, INS Lookout Book used to assist in exclusion of
    inadmissible aliens satisfies threshold requirement); U.S. News & World Report v.
    Dep't of the Treasury
    , No. 84-2303, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27634, at *5 (D.D.C. Mar. 26,
    1986) (reasoning that records pertaining to acquisition of two armored limousines for
    President meet threshold test when activities involved investigation of how best to
    safeguard President); Nader v. ICC, No. 82-1037, slip op. at 10-11 (D.D.C. Nov. 23, 1983)
    (deciding that disbarment proceedings meet Exemption 7 threshold because they
    are "quasi-criminal" in nature).

    28. See, e.g., Rugiero v. United States Dep't of Justice, 257 F.3d 534, 550 (6th Cir.
    2001) (explaining that the "Court has adopted a per se rule" that applies not only to
    criminal enforcement actions, but to "records compiled for civil enforcement
    purposes as well"), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1134 (2002); Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. Dep't
    of Justice
    , 73 F.3d 93, 96 (6th Cir. 1996) (recognizing that United States Marshals
    Service's mug shots of federal indictees were compiled for law enforcement
    purposes); Koch v. USPS, No. 93-1487, 1993 WL 394629, at *1 (8th Cir. Oct. 8, 1993)
    (determining that report initiated by allegation that postal service employee
    threatened to bring grenade to work was compiled for law enforcement purposes);
    Rural Hous., 498 F.2d at 81 & n.46 (holding that the "character of the statute violated
    would rarely make a material distinction, because the law enforcement purposes . . .
    include both civil and criminal purposes"); Williams v. IRS, 479 F.2d 317, 318 (3d Cir.
    1973) (affirming that data compiled in connection with audit of individual's income
    tax liability was compiled for law enforcement purposes); Black & Decker Corp. v.
    United States
    , No. 02-2070, 2004 WL 500847, at *3 (D. Md. Feb. 19, 2004) (stating that
    "law enforcement" includes both civil and criminal matters); Judicial Watch, Inc. v.
    Rossotti
    , No. 01-2672, U.S. Dist. 2002 LEXIS 25213, at **19-20 (D. Md. Dec. 16, 2002)
    (ruling that letters written by citizens concerned about plaintiff's compliance with
    IRS laws were compiled for "civil law enforcement purposes"), aff'd sub nom. Judicial
    Watch, Inc. v. United States
    , 84 Fed. Appx. 335 (4th Cir. 2004), petition for cert. filed,
    72 U.S.L.W. 3644 (U.S. Apr. 5, 2004) (No. 03-1389); Schiller v. INS, 205 F. Supp. 2d 648,
    659 (W.D. Tex. 2002) (stating that "[l]aw enforcement for purposes of the FOIA is not
    limited strictly to criminal investigations but also includes within its scope civil
    investigations" (citing Rugiero, 257 F.3d at 550)); Baltimore Sun v. United States
    Marshals Serv.
    , 131 F. Supp. 2d 725, 728 n.2 (D. Md. 2001) (reasoning that United
    States Marshals Service forfeiture records satisfy threshold because agency is
    responsible for "enforcement of civil and criminal seizure and forfeiture laws");
    Youngblood v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, No. 2:99-9253, 2000 WL 852449, at *10
    (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2000) (holding that IRS "investigations or proceedings in the civil or
    criminal context" satisfy the threshold); Abraham & Rose, P.L.C. v. United States, 36
    F. Supp. 2d 955, 956 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (affirming that records compiled by IRS to
    collect outstanding tax debts satisfy Exemption 7 threshold); Ligorner v. Reno, 2 F.
    Supp. 2d 400, 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that letter used during Office of
    Professional Responsibility investigation into allegations of misconduct by
    Department of Justice attorneys was compiled for law enforcement purposes). But
    see
    Jefferson v. Dep't of Justice, 284 F.3d 172, 179 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (declining to find
    that all Department of Justice Office of Professional Responsibility records regarding
    a Assistant United States Attorney are law enforcement records, particularly
    because the "Department's regulations describe OPR as a mixed-function agency
    with responsibilities that embrace not only investigations of violations of law and
    breaches of professional standards that may result in civil liability, . . . but breaches
    of internal Department guidelines that may lead to disciplinary proceedings . . . of
    such non-law violations"); Allnutt, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 680 (holding that "the Court is
    unable to understand how the bankruptcy proceeding that generated the record
    qualifies as a law enforcement activity").

    29. See, e.g., Beard v. Espy, No. 94-16748, 1995 WL 792071, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec.
    11,1995) (protecting complaint letter and notes compiled during criminal
    investigation involving USDA loans); Ortiz v. HHS, 70 F.3d 729, 730 (2d Cir. 1995)
    (holding that unsigned, unsolicited letter used to launch criminal investigation by
    Social Security Administration meets threshold for law enforcement purposes,
    although no charges filed against target); Solar Sources v. United States, No. 96-0772,
    slip op. at 5 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 10, 1997) (holding that criminal antitrust investigation of
    explosives industry was "indisputably" compiled for law enforcement purposes),
    aff'd, 142 F.3d 1033 (7th Cir. 1998); Hoffman v. Brown, No. 1:96-53, slip op. at 4
    (W.D.N.C. Nov. 26, 1996) (finding that information compiled by VA police canvassing
    plaintiff's neighbors regarding "alleged criminal activity of plaintiff at home" meets
    threshold), aff'd, 145 F.3d 1324 (4th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision); Mavadia v.
    Caplinger
    , No. 95-3542, 1996 WL 592742, at *2 (E.D. La. Oct. 11, 1996) (finding that both
    civil and criminal investigations of possible violations of immigration laws satisfy
    threshold); Cappabianca v. Comm'r, United States Customs Serv., 847 F. Supp. 1558,
    1565 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (stating that records of internal investigation focusing
    specifically on alleged acts that could result in civil or criminal sanctions were
    compiled for law enforcement purposes); Stone v. Def. Investigative Serv., 816 F.
    Supp. 782, 787 (D.D.C. 1993) (protecting foreign counterintelligence investigation and
    investigation into possible violation of federal statute), appeal dismissed for failure
    to prosecute
    , No. 93-5178 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 11, 1994); Buffalo Evening News, Inc. v.
    United States Border Patrol
    , 791 F. Supp. 386, 394 (W.D.N.Y. 1992) (reasoning that
    USBP form meets threshold because it is generated in investigations of violations of
    federal immigration law).

    30. See, e.g., Ctr. for Nat'l Policy Review, 502 F.2d at 373 (holding that administrative
    determination has "salient characteristics of 'law enforcement' contemplated" by
    Exemption 7 threshold requirement); Schiller, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 559 (stating that "law
    enforcement" for purposes of FOIA includes regulatory proceedings (citing Rugiero,
    257 F.3d at 550)); Hidalgo v. Bureau of Prisons, No. 00-1229, slip op. at 3 (D.D.C. June 6,
    2001) (determining that records compiled during investigation of prisoner for
    violating institutional rules and regulations satisfy threshold), summary affirmance
    granted
    , No. 01-5257, 2002 WL 1997999 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 29, 2002); McErlean v. Dep't of
    Justice
    , No. 97-7831, 1999 WL 791680, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1999) (stating that "it is
    well-settled that documents compiled by the INS in connection with the
    administrative proceedings authorized by the Immigration and Naturalization Act
    are documents compiled for 'law enforcement purposes'"); Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 18
    F. Supp. 2d 138, 143-44 (D. Mass. 1998) (reasoning that EPA decision to classify a site
    as contaminated "is not an enforcement action at all but rather ordinary informal
    rulemaking," which would ordinarily not meet Exemption 7 threshold, though in this
    case it did because "it is entirely reasonable for the agency to anticipate that
    enforcement proceedings are in the offing"); Johnson v. DEA, No. 97-2231, 1998 U.S.
    Dist. LEXIS 9802, at *9 (D.D.C. June 25, 1998) (reiterating that "law being enforced
    may be . . . regulatory"); Straughter v. HHS, No. 94-0567, slip op. at 4 (S.D. W. Va.
    Mar. 31, 1995) (magistrate's recommendation) (finding threshold met by records
    compiled by HHS's Office of Civil Rights in course of investigation of handicap
    discrimination as violation of Rehabilitation Act), adopted (S.D. W. Va. Apr. 17, 1995);
    Kay v. FCC, 867 F. Supp. 11, 16-18 (D.D.C. 1994) (explaining that FCC's statutory
    authority to revoke licenses or deny license applications is qualifying law
    enforcement purpose); Aircraft Gear Corp. v. NLRB, No. 92-C-6023, slip op. at 10 (N.D.
    Ill. Mar. 14, 1994) (stating that documents created in connection with NLRB unfair
    labor practices cases and union representation case meet threshold); Ehringhaus v.
    FTC
    , 525 F. Supp. 21, 22-23 (D.D.C. 1980) (deciding that documents prepared as part
    of FTC investigation into advertising practices of cigarette manufacturers meet
    threshold).

    31. See Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies, 331 F.3d at 926 (finding law enforcement
    threshold met by records compiled in course of investigation into "breach of this
    nation's security"); Living Rivers, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 1321 (finding that terrorists could
    make use of downstream flooding projections from agency's dam "inundation maps,"
    and obliquely referring to "a dam failure as [seeking] a 'weapon of mass
    destruction'"); Coastal Delivery Corp. v. United States Customs Serv., 272 F. Supp. 2d
    958, 964-65 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (ruling that terrorists could use information to avoid
    detection and to direct "merchandise to vulnerable ports"), reconsideration denied,
    No. 02-3838, 2002 WL 21507775 (C.D. Cal. June 13, 2003), appeal dismissed voluntarily,
    No. 03-55833 (9th Cir. Aug. 26, 2003); see also Pratt v. Webster, 673 F.2d 408, 421 (D.C.
    Cir. 1982) (explaining that "to pass the FOIA Exemption 7 threshold," agencies must
    establish that their activities are based on a concern that "federal laws have been or
    may be violated or that national security may be breached" (emphasis added)).

    32. 331 F.3d at 926, 929.

    33. See id. at 929 ("While the name of any individual detainee may appear innocuous
    or trivial, it could be of great use to al Qaeda in plotting future terrorist attacks or
    intimidating witnesses in the present investigation."); Living Rivers, 272 F. Supp. 2d
    at 1321 (reasoning that terrorists could use "inundation maps" to aid in carrying out
    attacks on dams both in choosing potential targets and in selecting particular, more
    vulnerable features of certain dams); Coastal Delivery, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 964, 966
    (explaining that information that appears to be "innocuous on its own" could
    reasonably be used by "potential terrorists and smugglers" to circumvent law
    enforcement procedures); see also FOIA Post, "FOIA Officers Conference Held on
    Homeland Security" (posted 7/3/03) (discussing recent case law developments, and
    advising on the "increasing significance of both information sharing and information
    safeguarding in connection with sensitive homeland security information"); cf. FOIA
    Post
    , "Guidance on Homeland Security Information Issued" (posted 3/21/02)
    (stressing need for safeguarding not only classified records but also "sensitive
    information related to America's homeland security that might not meet"
    classification standards).

    34. See Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies, 331 F.3d at 926, 928 (explaining that "America
    faces an enemy" and that the terrorism investigation into this "heinous violation" is
    one of the Department of Justice's chief law enforcement duties); Living Rivers, 272
    F. Supp. 2d at 1320 (concluding that "inundation maps" were compiled for law
    enforcement purposes because they are used for homeland security as part of the
    Department of the Interior's "Emergency Action Plans and to protect and alert
    potentially threatened people"); see also Pratt, 673 F.2d at 410, 422-23 (finding that
    documents gathered during the investigation of the Black Panther Party, "an
    allegedly subversive and violent domestic organization," met law enforcement
    threshold because investigation involved "prevention of violence" on American soil);
    Ayyad v. United States Dep't of Justice, No. 00-960, 2002 WL 654133, at **8-12
    (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2002) (ruling that the information satisfies Exemption 7's threshold,
    because it "is clearly related to law enforcement proceedings and was compiled by
    the FBI to investigate" the 1993 World Trade Center bombing); Judicial Watch, Inc. v.
    Reno
    , No. 00-0723, slip op. at 21 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 2001) (stating that "information
    related to an investigation of possible terrorist threats . . . is sufficient to meet" the
    threshold); Morales Cozier, No. 99-0312, slip op. at 14-15 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 25, 2000)
    (explaining that the law enforcement threshold is met by an investigation of
    activities that "could have presented an interference with United States foreign
    policy or national security"); cf. Jabara v. Webster, 691 F.2d 272, 279-80 (6th Cir. 1982)
    (clarifying, in a Privacy Act case, that an investigation encompassing the exercise of
    First Amendment rights is not barred if it is relevant to an authorized criminal, civil,
    administrative, or intelligence investigation).

    35. 331 F.3d at 932; see also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696 (2001) (noting that
    circumstances of "terrorism" can warrant heightened deference) (non-FOIA case);
    Dep't of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988) (stating that courts are reluctant to
    intrude into "national security affairs") (non-FOIA case); cf. North Jersey Media Group
    v. Ashcroft
    , 308 F.3d 198, 200-03 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that closure of "special
    interest" deportation hearings involving detainees with alleged connections to
    terrorism does not violate First Amendment when "open hearings might impair
    national security" by disclosing potentially sensitive information) (non-FOIA case),
    cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 2215 (2003).

    36. See Hopkinson, 866 F.2d at 1222 n.27 (holding that Exemption 7 applies "to FBI
    laboratory tests conducted at the request of local law enforcement authorities");
    Franklin v. DEA, No. 97-1225, slip op. at 7 (S.D. Fla. June 26, 1998) (stating that
    documents compiled for "federal or state" law enforcement purposes meet
    threshold); Code v. FBI, No. 95-1892, 1997 WL 150070, at *5 (D.D.C. Mar. 26, 1997)
    (finding that documents compiled in connection with FBI's efforts to assist local
    police in homicide investigations meet threshold); Butler, 888 F. Supp. at 180, 182
    (finding that Air Force personnel background report -- requested by local law
    enforcement agency for its investigation into murder -- was compiled for law
    enforcement purposes); Kuffel v. Bureau of Prisons, 882 F. Supp. 1116, 1124 (D.D.C.
    1995) (ruling that information from state law enforcement agency investigating
    various state crimes qualifies); Wojtczak v. United States Dep't of Justice, 548 F.
    Supp. 143, 146-48 (E.D. Pa. 1982) ("This Court must therefore interpret the statute as
    written and concludes that Exemption 7 applies to all law enforcement records,
    federal, state, or local, that lie within the possession of the federal government"); see
    also
    Shaw v. FBI, 749 F.2d 58, 64 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (explaining that authorized federal
    investigation into commission of state crime constitutes valid criminal law
    enforcement investigation, which qualifies confidential source-provided information
    for protection under second half of Exemption 7(D)); Palacio v. United States Dep't of
    Justice
    , No. 00-1564, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2198, at *16 (D.D.C. Feb. 11, 2002)
    (explaining that records of investigation conducted by city task force were "created
    or compiled" for law enforcement purposes and thus satisfy threshold), summary
    affirmance granted
    , No. 02-5247, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 1804 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 31, 2003);
    Rojem v. United States Dep't of Justice, 775 F. Supp. 6, 10 (D.D.C. 1991) (determining
    that material provided to FBI by state law enforcement agency for assistance in that
    state agency's criminal investigation is "compiled for law enforcement purposes"),
    appeal dismissed for failure to timely file, No. 92-5088 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 4, 1992).

    37. See, e.g., Bevis v. Dep't of State, 801 F.2d 1386, 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (finding no
    distinction between foreign and domestic enforcement purposes in language of
    statute); Zevallos-Gonzalez v. DEA, No. 97-1720, slip op. at 9 (D.D.C. Sept. 25, 2000)
    (concluding that documents generated during an investigation conducted under the
    "authority of Peruvian laws and under the authority granted to the DEA under the
    Controlled Substance Act to pursue the agency's law enforcement obligations under
    both United States statutes and international agreements . . . were compiled for law
    enforcement purposes"); Schwarz v. United States Dep't of Justice, No. 95-2162, slip
    op. at 6 (D.D.C. May 31, 1996) (stating that information compiled by INTERPOL at
    behest of foreign government meets requirements), summary affirmance granted,
    No. 96-5183 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 23, 1996); Donovan v. FBI, 579 F. Supp. 1111, 1119-20
    (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (stating that an FBI investigation undertaken and laboratory tests
    performed in support of a foreign government's efforts to identify and prosecute
    perpetrators of crimes satisfy threshold, and reasoning that "refusing to apply
    Exemption 7 to foreign law enforcement might have the practical effect of interfering
    with cooperation and information sharing"), vacated on other grounds on motion for
    reconsideration
    , 579 F. Supp. 1124 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed as moot, 751 F.2d 368
    (2d Cir. 1984); see also FOIA Update, Vol. V, No. 2, at 6-7 (reasoning that records
    compiled for "nonfederal" investigations satisfy threshold, because "Exemption 7's
    threshold requirement . . . makes no reference to federal investigations, nor can any
    such limitation logically be inferred").

    38. See, e.g., Ponder, No. 98-3097, slip op. at 5 (D.D.C. Jan. 22, 2001) (ruling that
    records were compiled for law enforcement purpose despite fact that subject was
    never prosecuted); Goldstein v. Office of Indep. Counsel, No. 87-2028, 1999 WL
    570862, at **8-9 (D.D.C. July 29, 1999) (magistrate's recommendation) (determining
    that investigation of perennial presidential candidate Lyndon LaRouche for possible
    criminal violations was for legitimate law enforcement purpose even if that
    investigation "went nowhere").

    39. See, e.g., Rosenfeld, 57 F.3d at 808-09 (finding no law enforcement purpose
    when "documents all support a conclusion that . . . any asserted purpose for
    compiling these documents was pretextual"); Weissman v. CIA, 565 F.2d 692, 696
    (D.C. Cir. 1977) (ruling that the CIA's "full background check within the United States
    of a citizen who never had any relationship with the CIA is not authorized and the
    law enforcement exemption is accordingly unavailable"); Taylor v. United States
    Dep't of Justice
    , 257 F. Supp. 2d 101, 108 (D.D.C. 2003) (stating that investigations
    must be "'within the agency's law enforcement authority'" (quoting Whittle v.
    Moschella
    , 756 F. Supp. 589, 593 (D.D.C. 1991))), reconsideration denied, 268 F. Supp.
    2d 34 (D.D.C. 2003), appeal dismissed for failure to prosecute, No. 03-5111, 2003 WL
    2205968 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 19, 2003); Enviro Tech Int'l v. EPA, No. 02 C 4650, slip op. at 14
    (N.D. Ill. Mar. 11, 2003) (describing Exemption 7 as having "hook" that can in some
    cases restrict its use to "only those documents relating to specifically authorized
    agency activities"); Youngblood, No. 2:99-9253, 2000 WL 852449, at *10 (concluding
    that the "authority bestowed upon IRS by Congress to enforce the internal revenue
    laws . . . is an extraordinarily broad mandate . . . [which is] analogous to that of a
    grand jury"); Miscavige v. IRS, No. 91-3721, slip op. at 2, 5 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 1992)
    (finding no law enforcement purpose for post-1986 documents because IRS
    investigation concluded in 1985); cf. Kuzma v. IRS, 775 F.2d 66, 69 (2d Cir. 1985)
    (declaring that unauthorized or illegal investigative tactics may not be shielded from
    public by use of FOIA exemptions). But cf. Pratt, 673 F.2d at 422-23 (explaining that
    "Exemption 7 refers to purposes rather than methods" and that "[w]hile many of the
    FBI's goals and methods in its COINTELPRO activities against the [Black Panther
    Party] give us serious pause," such as the goal to prevent "militant black nationalist
    groups and leaders from gaining respectability by discrediting them," these
    questionable methods do not defeat the exemption's coverage when law
    enforcement is the primary purpose because, "[f]rom the record before us, we
    cannot conclude that [the FBI's concern about violence] was implausible or
    irrational"); Hrones v. CIA, 685 F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 1982) (legality of agency's actions in
    national security investigation falls outside scope of judicial review in FOIA action).

    40. S. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1200, at 12 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6267, 6291.

    41. See, e.g., Mittleman v. OPM, 76 F.3d 1240, 1241-43 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (OPM
    background investigation); Rosenfeld, 57 F.3d at 809 ("FBI government appointment
    investigations"); Pontecorvo v. FBI, No. 00-1511, slip op. at 37-38 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2001)
    (background investigation of potential employee); Melius v. Nat'l Indian Gaming
    Comm'n
    , No. 92-2210, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17537, at **6, 15 (D.D.C. Nov. 3, 1999)
    ("suitability investigations" for gaming contracts); Assassination Archives, 903 F.
    Supp. at 132 (FBI "background investigations"); Bostic v. FBI, No. 1:94 CV 71, slip op.
    at 2, 11 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 16, 1994) (FBI pre-employment investigation); Doe v. United
    States Dep't of Justice
    , 790 F. Supp. 17, 20-21 (D.D.C. 1992) (background investigation
    of individual conditionally offered employment as attorney); Miller v. United States,
    630 F. Supp. 347, 349 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (USIA background-security investigation of
    federal job applicant); Koch v. Dep't of Justice, 376 F. Supp. 313, 315 (D.D.C. 1974)
    (background investigations fall within Exemption 7 because they involve
    determinations as to whether applicants engaged in criminal conduct that would
    disqualify them for federal employment); see also FOIA Update, Vol. VI, No. 4, at 6.

    42. Stern v. FBI, 737 F.2d 84, 89 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also Perlman v. United States
    Dep't of Justice
    , 312 F.3d 100, 103, 105 (2d Cir. 2002) (discussing allegations of
    preferential treatment and undue access and influence in INS Investor Visa Program
    by former INS general counsel, and finding that records compiled during
    investigation into allegations satisfy Exemption 7's threshold, because such acts
    could subject him to criminal or civil penalties), cert. granted, vacated & remanded,
    72 U.S.L.W. 3632 (U.S. Apr. 5, 2004) (No. 02-1270); Ford v. West, No. 97-1342, 1998 WL
    317561, at *4 (10th Cir. June 12, 1998) (finding that investigation into alleged racial
    harassment meets threshold); Kimberlin v. Dep't of Justice, 139 F.3d 944, 947-48 (D.C.
    Cir. 1998) (concluding that an investigation "conducted in response to and focused
    upon a specific, potentially illegal release of information by a particular, identified
    official" satisfies the threshold); Strang v. Arms Control & Disarmament Agency, 864
    F.2d 859, 862 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (characterizing agency investigation into employee
    violation of national security laws as law enforcement); Edmonds v. FBI, 272 F. Supp.
    2d 35, 42, 54 (D.D.C. 2003) (ruling that the agency has met the law enforcement
    threshold for material compiled during investigations into plaintiff's allegations of
    "serious problems, misconduct, security lapses, a breakdown in quality, and gross
    incompetence" in the FBI's translation unit (quoting plaintiff's brief)); Lewis v. United
    States
    , No. 02-3249, slip op. at 1, 6 (C.D. Cal. June 2, 2003) (finding that investigation
    of alleged unauthorized collection action by IRS employees was for law enforcement
    purposes); Mueller v. Dep't of the Air Force, 63 F. Supp. 2d 738, 742 (E.D. Va. 1999)
    (holding that the investigation into prosecutorial misconduct was for law
    enforcement purposes because "'an agency investigation of its own employees is for
    law enforcement purposes . . . if it focuses directly on specifically alleged illegal acts,
    illegal acts of a particular identified official, acts which could, if proved, result in civil
    or criminal sanctions'" (quoting Stern, 737 F.2d at 89)); Hayes v. United States Dep't of
    Labor
    , No. 96-1149, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14120, at **11-12 (S.D. Ala. June 10, 1998)
    (explaining that records of "internal agency investigations are considered to be
    compiled for 'law enforcement purposes' when the investigations focus on
    specifically alleged acts, which, if proved, could amount to violations of civil or
    criminal law"), adopted (S.D. Ala. Aug. 10, 1998); Ligorner, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 402-04
    (finding threshold satisfied by investigation into allegations of misconduct by Justice
    Department attorneys); Lurie v. Dep't of the Army, 970 F. Supp. 19, 36 (D.D.C. 1997)
    (explaining that threshold met because investigation focused directly on specifically
    alleged illegal acts of identified officials (citing Rural Hous., 498 F.2d at 81)), appeal
    dismissed voluntarily
    , No. 97-5248 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 22, 1997); Linn v. United States Dep't
    of Justice
    , No. 92-1406, 1995 WL 631847, at *22 (D.D.C. Aug. 22, 1995) ("[D]ocuments
    compiled for purposes of internal discipline of employees are not compiled for law
    enforcement purposes . . . [b]ut such internal monitoring of employees may be 'for
    law enforcement purposes' if the focus of the investigation concerns acts that could
    result in civil or criminal sanctions." (quoting Stern, 737 F.2d at 89)), appeal dismissed
    voluntarily
    , No. 97-5122 (D.C. Cir. July 14, 1997); Housley v. United States Dep't of the
    Treasury
    , 697 F. Supp. 3, 5 (D.D.C. 1988) (reiterating that investigation concerning
    misconduct by special agent which, if proved, could have resulted in federal civil or
    criminal sanctions qualifies as law enforcement); cf. Favish, 124 S. Ct. at 1582
    (recognizing realistically that "[a[llegations of government misconduct are 'easy to
    allege and hard to disprove'" (quoting Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 585 (1998)));
    In re Dep't of Investigation of N.Y., 856 F.2d 481, 485 (2d Cir. 1988) (explaining that the
    law enforcement privilege applies in the discovery context when the investigation
    served the "dual purposes of evaluating conduct in office and enforcing the criminal
    law") (non-FOIA case).

    43. Stern, 737 F.2d at 89 (dictum) (reminding that "it is necessary to distinguish
    between those investigations conducted 'for a law enforcement purpose' and those
    in which an agency, acting as the employer, simply supervises its own employees");
    see also Jefferson, 284 F.3d at 177-78 (ruling that agencies must distinguish between
    records based on "allegations that could lead to civil or criminal sanctions" and
    records "maintained in the course of general oversight of government employees");
    Patterson v. IRS, 56 F.3d 832, 837-38 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that the "general citation
    to an entire body of statutes contained in the United States Code under the heading
    'Equal Employment Opportunity statutes'" does not establish a law enforcement
    purpose, and declaring that the agency must "'distinguish between internal
    investigations conducted for law enforcement purposes and general agency
    monitoring'" (quoting Stern, 727 F.2d at 89)); Rural Hous., 498 F.2d at 81
    (distinguishing between agency oversight of performance of employees and
    investigations focusing on specific illegal acts of employees); Wood v. FBI, No.
    3:02cv2058, 2004 U.S. LEXIS 5525, at *34 (D. Conn. Mar. 31, 2004) (reiterating that "'an
    investigation conducted by a federal agency for the purpose of determining whether
    to discipline employees for activity which does not constitute a violation of law is not
    for law enforcement purposes under Exemption 7'" (quoting Stern, 737 F.2d at 90));
    Jefferson v. United States Dep't of Justice, No. 01-1418, slip op. at 16 (D.D.C. Mar. 31,
    2003) (finding that Office of Inspector General records concerning particular federal
    employee were not oversight records of internal agency monitoring, because they
    were compiled during investigation into her failure to comply with court order),
    motion for reconsideration granted on other grounds, No. 01-1418 (D.D.C. Nov. 14,
    2003); Varville v. Rubin, No. 3:96CV00629, 1998 WL 681438, at *14 (D. Conn. Aug. 18,
    1998) (explaining that the threshold was not met by a report discussing possible
    ethical violations and prohibited personnel practices because the inquiry "more
    closely resembles an employer supervising its employees than an investigation for
    law enforcement purposes"); Lurie, 970 F. Supp. at 36 ("The general internal
    monitoring by an agency of its own employees is not shielded from public scrutiny
    under Exemption 7, because 'protection of all such internal monitoring under
    Exemption 7 would devastate FOIA.'" (quoting Stern, 737 F.2d at 89)); Fine v. United
    States Dep't of Energy
    , 823 F. Supp. 888, 907-08 (D.N.M. 1993) (ruling that threshold
    met by agency with both administrative and law enforcement functions when
    documents were compiled during investigation of specific allegations and not as
    part of routine oversight); Cotton v. Adams, 798 F. Supp. 22, 25 (D.D.C. 1992) (holding
    that agency's internal investigation of its own employees satisfies threshold only if it
    focuses directly on illegal acts that could result in criminal or civil sanctions;
    Greenpeace USA, Inc. v. EPA, 735 F. Supp. 13, 15 (D.D.C. 1990) (threshold was not met
    by internal investigation into whether employee complied with agency conflict-of-interest regulations). But cf. Nagel v. HEW, 725 F.2d 1438, 1441 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
    (holding that the "employer's determination whether a federal employee is
    performing his job adequately constitutes an authorized law enforcement activity"
    within the meaning of subsection (e)(7) of the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a
    (2000)).

    44. Edmonds, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 42, 54.

    45. Ligornor, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 402-03.

    46. Kimberlin, 139 F.3d at 946-47.

    47. Ford, 1998 WL 317561, at **1-2.

    48. Greenpeace, 735 F. Supp. at 14-15.

    49. Patterson, 56 F.3d at 837.

    50. Cotton, 798 F. Supp. at 25; see also Jefferson, 284 F.3d at 178-79 (stating that
    oversight of performance, including review of violations of agency rules, does not
    qualify as "law enforcement" within meaning of Exemption 7); Wood, 2004 U.S. Dist.
    LEXIS 5525, at *37 (finding that employee conduct at issue involved only "violations of
    agency policy" and thus did not satisfy threshold).

    51. Rural Hous., 498 F.2d at 82 (stating that the "purpose of the 'investigatory files' is
    thus the critical factor," and reiterating that an agency must distinguish between its
    "surveillance of the performance of duties by government employees [and its] inquiry
    as to an identifiable possible violation of law"); Stern, 737 F.2d at 89 (emphasizing
    that an agency's "general internal monitoring of its own employees to insure
    compliance with the agency's statutory mandate and regulations is not protected
    from public scrutiny under Exemption 7 . . . [and that] an agency's investigation of its
    own employees is for 'law enforcement purposes' only if it focuses 'directly on
    specifically alleged illegal acts, illegal acts of particular identified officials, acts
    which could, if proved, result in civil or criminal sanctions'" (quoting Rural Hous., 498
    F.2d at 81)).

    52. See, e.g., Jefferson, 284 F.3d at 176 (finding, based upon existing regulations,
    that Department of Justice's Office of Professional Responsibility conducts "both law
    enforcement and non-law enforcement activities"); Cotton, 798 F. Supp. at 25 (stating
    that while "the [Office of] Inspector General has the ability to conduct
    investigations," it also looks into "internal matters concerning agency inefficiency and
    mismanagement," so its documents "could merely" pertain to an alleged violation of
    the agency's own rules); Greenpeace, 735 F. Supp. at 15 (finding that documents at
    issue concerned mere compliance with agency regulations).

    53. See Attorney General's 1986 Amendments Memorandum at 7.

    54. See Lewis v. IRS, 823 F.2d 375, 379 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding the threshold met
    when the IRS "had a purpose falling within its sphere of enforcement authority in
    compiling particular documents"); Birch v. USPS, 803 F.2d 1206, 1210-11 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
    (explaining that threshold was met because enforcement of laws regarding use of
    mails falls within statutory authority of Postal Service); Church of Scientology v.
    United States Dep't of the Army
    , 611 F.2d 738, 748 (9th Cir. 1979) (remanding to Naval
    Investigative Service for it to show that investigation involved enforcement of
    statute or regulation within its authority); Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468, 473 (1st Cir. 1979)
    (determining that mixed-function agency must demonstrate purpose falling within
    its sphere of enforcement authority); see also Cooper Cameron Corp. v. Dep't of
    Labor
    , 280 F.3d 539, 545 (5th Cir. 2002) (observing that "Congress obviously intended
    OSHA inspections to be part of an enforcement program," particularly when the
    agency is responding to a workplace accident); Coulter v. Reno, No. 98-35170, 1998
    WL 658835, at *1 (9th Cir. Sept. 17, 1998) (holding threshold met by records of Navy
    criminal investigation into allegations of lewd and lascivious conduct by Navy
    personnel); Church of Scientology Int'l v. IRS, 995 F.2d 916, 919 (9th Cir. 1993) ("This
    court has clearly held that the IRS has the 'requisite law enforcement mandate'"
    through its enforcement provisions of the federal tax code (quoting Lewis, 823 F.2d
    at 379)); Moye, O'Brien, O'Rourke, Hogan & Pickert v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., No.
    6:02-CV-126, 2003 WL 21146674, at *17 (M.D. Fla. May 13, 2003) (reiterating that an
    agency "with mixed law enforcement and non-law enforcement functions requires
    the Court to consider the purpose of the investigation and to determine whether the
    information was gathered as part of an inquiry about a potential violation of the law,
    rather than in the course of the agency's administrative function of overseeing
    compliance with its rules and regulations") (appeal pending); Carp v. IRS, No. 00-5992, 2002 WL 373448, at **4-5 (D.N.J. Jan. 28, 2002) (determining that IRS
    investigation targeting individual for possible violation of federal tax law satisfies
    threshold); Wayne's Mech. & Maint. Contractor, Inc. v. Dep't of Labor, No. 1:00-45, slip
    op. at 7 n.2 (N.D. Ga. May 7, 2001) (concluding that records compiled by OSHA during
    investigation of industrial accident were within agency's statutory law enforcement
    mandate); Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. HHS, 69 F. Supp. 2d 63, 67 (D.D.C. 1999) (holding
    that investigative records created in response to specific allegations of Medicare
    fraud by physicians at a teaching hospital were compiled for law enforcement
    purposes).

    55. Rural Hous., 498 F.2d at 81; see Pac. Energy Inst. v. IRS, No. 94-36172, 1996 WL
    14244, at *1 (9th Cir. Jan. 16, 1996) (accepting that investigations involving
    enforcement of Internal Revenue Code satisfy threshold); Becker v. IRS, 34 F.3d 398,
    407 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that IRS has "law enforcement purpose in investigating
    potential illegal tax protester activity"); Church of Scientology, 995 F.2d at 919
    (finding that IRS Exempt Organizations Division "performs law enforcement function
    by enforcing provisions of the federal tax code"); Means v. Segal, No. 97-1301, slip op.
    at 12 (D.D.C. Mar. 18, 1998) (magistrate's recommendation) (holding that Federal
    Labor Relations Authority is charged with statutory responsibility to conduct
    investigations related to unfair labor practices and records related to this duty meet
    threshold), adopted (D.D.C. Apr. 15, 1998), aff'd on other grounds, No. 98-5170 (D.C.
    Cir. Oct. 6, 1998); cf. Reed v. NLRB, 927 F.2d 1249, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (noting
    "skepticism" of government's alternative argument regarding application of
    Exemption 7(C)'s threshold to lists of names and addresses of eligible voters in union
    representative election compiled for NLRB compliance purposes).

    56. Living Rivers, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 1318-20; Coastal Delivery, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 963.

    57. 272 F. Supp. 2d at 1318.

    58. Id. at 1318-19 (quoting "General Authority of Secretary of the Interior," 43
    U.S.C.A. § 373b(a) (2000 & Supp. I 2001), pertaining to law enforcement authority
    granted to Bureau of Reclamation, specifically regarding public safety).

    59. Id. at 1319-20.

    60. Id. (quoting John Doe Agency, 493 U.S. at 153-54).

    61. 272 F. Supp. 2d at 963; see also Favish, 124 S. Ct. at 1576 (stating succinctly that
    "[i]t is common ground among the parties that the death-scene photographs in OIC's
    possession are 'records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes' as
    that phrase is used in Exemption 7(C)"); cf. Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies, 331 F.3d at 926
    (stating that the "terrorism investigation [into the events of September 11, 2001] is
    one of DOJ's chief 'law enforcement duties' at this time," and thereby merging
    national security and homeland security concerns into "law enforcement purposes").

    62. 272 F. Supp at 963.

    63. Compare Crowell & Moring v. DOD, 703 F. Supp. 1004, 1009-10 (D.D.C. 1989)
    (holding that solicitation and contract bids may be protected), and Gould Inc. v. GSA,
    688 F. Supp. 688, 691 (D.D.C. 1988) (finding that routine audit reports may be
    protected), with John Doe Corp. v. John Doe Agency, 850 F.2d 105, 109 (2d Cir. 1988)
    (ruling that routine audit reports are not protectable), rev'd & remanded, 493 U.S. 146
    (1989), and Hatcher v. United States Postal Serv., 556 F. Supp. 331, 335 (D.D.C. 1982)
    (holding that routine contract negotiation and oversight material is not protectible).

    64. John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. at 153; see also KTVY-TV v. United
    States
    , 919 F.2d 1465, 1469 (10th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (applying John Doe Agency to
    hold that information regarding personnel interview conducted before investigation
    commenced and later recompiled for law enforcement purposes satisfied Exemption
    7 threshold); Kansi v. United States Dep't of Justice, 11 F. Supp. 2d 42, 44 (D.D.C. 1998)
    (explaining that once documents become assembled for law enforcement purposes,
    "all [such] documents qualify for protection under Exemption 7 regardless of their
    original source"); Hayes, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14120, at *12 ("Records that are
    incorporated into investigatory files also qualify . . . even though those records may
    not have been created originally for law enforcement purposes."); Perdue Farms, Inc.
    v. NLRB
    , No. 2:96-27, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14579, at *37 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 5, 1997)
    (magistrate's recommendation) (stating that the language of the statute "contains no
    requirement that the compilation be effected at a specific time" (citing John Doe
    Agency
    , 493 U.S. at 153)), adopted (E.D.N.C. Jan. 20, 1998); Butler v. Dep't of the Air
    Force
    , 888 F. Supp. 174, 179-80, 182 (D.D.C. 1995) (holding Air Force personnel
    background report -- requested by local law enforcement agency for its investigation
    into murder -- to be compiled for law enforcement purposes), aff'd per curiam, No.
    96-5111 (D.C. Cir. May 6, 1997).

    65. John Doe Agency, 493 U.S. at 153.

    66. Compare, e.g., Pratt, 673 F.2d at 418 (declaring that "a court can accept less
    exacting proof from [a law enforcement agency]"), with Kuehnert v. FBI, 620 F.2d 662,
    667 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding that "Exemption 7 extends to all investigative files of a
    criminal law enforcement agency").

    67. See First Circuit: Curran v. Dep't of Justice, 813 F.2d 473, 475 (1st Cir. 1987)
    (holding that investigatory records of law enforcement agencies are "inherently"
    compiled for law enforcement purposes); Irons, 596 F.2d at 474-76 (holding that
    "investigatory records of law enforcement agencies are inherently records compiled
    for 'law enforcement purposes' within the meaning of Exemption 7"); Second Circuit:
    Halpern v. FBI, 181 F.3d 279, 296 (2d Cir. 1999) (applying rule that when records are
    compiled in course of law enforcement investigation, purpose of investigation is not
    subject of review by court); Ferguson v. FBI, 957 F.2d 1059, 1070 (2d Cir. 1992) (finding
    that there is "no room for [a] district court's inquiry into whether the FBI's asserted
    law enforcement purpose was legitimate"); Williams v. FBI, 730 F.2d 882, 884-85 (2d
    Cir. 1984) (ruling that records of a law enforcement agency are given "absolute
    protection" even if "records were compiled in the course of an unwise, meritless or
    even illegal investigation"); Sixth Circuit: Detroit Free Press, 73 F.3d at 96 (holding
    that mug shots are created for law enforcement purpose, applying per se rule
    adopted previously in Jones v. FBI, 41 F.3d 238, 246 (6th Cir. 1994) (adopting a per se
    rule that the FBI is "archetypical" federal law enforcement agency and that "concern
    about overbroad withholding should therefore be addressed by proper scrutiny of
    the claimed exemptions themselves and not by use of a blunt instrument at the
    threshold")); Eighth Circuit: Miller v. USDA, 13 F.3d 260, 263 (8th Cir. 1993) (tardiness
    in working on case does not eliminate law enforcement purpose); Kuehnert, 620 F.2d
    at 666 (FBI need not show law enforcement purpose of particular investigation as
    precondition to invoking Exemption 7); Eleventh Circuit: Robinson v. Dep't of Justice,
    No. 00-11182, slip op. at 10 (11th Cir. Mar. 15, 2001) (holding that investigative records
    concerning search and seizure of drug-carrying vessel are "'inherently records
    compiled for law enforcement purposes'" (quoting Curran, 813 F.2d at 475));
    Arenberg v. DEA, 849 F.2d 579, 581 (11th Cir. 1988) (suggesting that courts should be
    "hesitant" to reexamine law enforcement agency's decision to investigate if there is
    plausible basis for agency's decision); see also Binion v. United States Dep't of
    Justice
    , 695 F.2d 1189, 1193-94 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that "a fortiori" approach is
    appropriate when FBI pardon investigation was "clearly legitimate").

    68. See, e.g., Davin v. United States Dep't of Justice, 60 F.3d 1043, 1056 (3d Cir. 1995)
    (applying "adaptation" of two-pronged rational nexus test and holding FBI's "simple
    recitation of statutes, orders and public laws" insufficient; agency must describe
    nexus between "each document" and particular investigation), on remand, No. 92-1122, slip op. at 11-13 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 1998) (finding that government demonstrated
    connection between target and "potential violation of law or security risk" for each
    investigation), aff'd, 176 F.3d 471, 471 (3d Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision);
    Beneville v. United States Dep't of Justice, No. 98-6137, slip op. at 17 (D. Or. June 11,
    2003) (declaring that the agency "has established that it is a law enforcement
    agency" and that it satisfied the threshold requirement by showing a "rational nexus
    between the enforcement of a federal law and the documents for which the
    exemption is claimed"); Kern v. FBI, No. 94-0208, slip op. at 9 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 1998)
    (rejecting FBI's Vaughn Index as inadequate because it did not demonstrate nexus
    between duty to investigate espionage and documents sought); Franklin, No. 97-1225, slip op. at 7-8 (S.D. Fla. June 26, 1998) (reiterating the need for a "nexus
    between the records and the enforcement of federal or state law"); Grine v. Coombs,
    No. 95-342, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19578, at **14-18 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 10, 1997) (holding
    that the "proper test is the 'rational nexus' test," and determining that investigatory
    reports triggered by complaints of dumping hazardous waste satisfy test);
    Crompton v. DEA, No. 95-8771, slip op. at 12-13 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 1997) (stating that
    agencies with "clear law enforcement mandate such as the DEA need only establish
    a 'rational nexus' between enforcement of a federal law and the document for which
    a law enforcement exemption is claimed," and holding that there is a such nexus
    between DEA's "law enforcement duties to manage the national narcotics
    intelligence system" and information withheld); Marriott Employees' Fed. Credit
    Union v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin.
    , No. 96-478-A, slip op. at 5-7 (E.D. Va. Dec. 24, 1996)
    (finding that documents compiled by NCUA pursuant to administration of Federal
    Credit Union Act satisfy standard); Blanton v. United States Dep't of Justice, No. 93-2398, slip op. at 5-8 (W.D. Tenn. July 14, 1994) (finding that information concerning the
    validity of plaintiff's counsel's purported license to practice law does not meet the
    threshold because law licenses are matter of public record and that the government
    failed to prove that records were "compiled for a law enforcement purpose");
    Rosenfeld v. United States Dep't of Justice, 761 F. Supp. 1440, 1445-48 (N.D. Cal. 1991)
    (explaining that FBI investigation of Free Speech Movement "was begun in good
    faith and with a plausible basis," but ceased to have "colorable claim [of rationality]
    as the evidence accumulated" and became "a case of routine monitoring . . . for
    intelligence purposes"; date at which FBI's initial law enforcement-related suspicions
    were "demonstrably unfounded" was "cut-off point for the scope of a law
    enforcement purpose" under Exemption 7), aff'd in pertinent part, rev'd in part &
    remanded
    , 57 F.3d 803 (9th Cir. 1995); Friedman v. FBI, 605 F. Supp. 306, 321 (N.D. Ga.
    1984) (finding that the FBI was "'gathering information with the good faith belief that
    the subject may violate or has violated federal law' rather than 'merely monitoring
    the subject for purposes unrelated to enforcement of federal law'" (quoting Lamont
    v. Department of Justice
    , 475 F. Supp. 761, 770 (S.D.N.Y. 1979))). But see also Prescott
    v. Dep't of Justice
    , No. 00-0187, slip op. at 10 (D.D.C. Aug. 10, 2001) (rejecting the
    assertion that all Bureau of Prisons records "per se satisfy the threshold
    requirement," while suggesting that Bureau of Prisons may not be "a law
    enforcement agency for purposes of FOIA deference").

    69. 673 F.2d at 416 n.17.

    70. Id. at 420-21; see, e.g., Campbell v. United States Dep't of Justice, 164 F.3d 20, 32
    (D.C. Cir. 1998) (requiring nexus between agency activities and law enforcement
    duties, and finding that most FBI files of 1960s investigations of James Baldwin --
    believed to be associated with subversive organizations -- meet threshold, but
    elaborating that law enforcement agency may not simply rely on file names to satisfy
    threshold); Summers v. United States Dep't of Justice, 140 F.3d 1077, 1083 (D.C. Cir.
    1998) (to show nexus, FBI must link names redacted from former FBI Director J.
    Edgar Hoover's telephone logs to law enforcement activities); Quiñon v. FBI, 86 F.3d
    1222, 1228-29 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (reiterating that agency's basis for connection between
    object of investigation and asserted law enforcement duty cannot be pretextual or
    wholly unbelievable and remanding because FBI's affidavits were insufficient to
    show that Pratt nexus test satisfied when only specific fact cited is filing of motion;
    "filing of a non-fraudulent pleading cannot, taken alone, form the basis for a
    legitimate obstruction of justice investigation"); Computer Prof'ls for Soc.
    Responsibility v. United States Secret Serv.
    , 72 F.3d 897, 902, 904 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
    (investigation into allegations of telecommunications fraud satisfies threshold, as do
    documents pertaining to police breakup of public meeting of computer hackers
    club); King v. United States Dep't of Justice, 830 F.2d 210, 229 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
    (supporting Pratt two-part test by stating that agency must identify particular
    individual/incident as object of its investigation and specify connection between
    individual/incident and possible security risk or violation of federal law and that
    agency must then demonstrate that relationship is based on information sufficient to
    support colorable claim of rationality); Founding Church of Scientology v. Smith, 721
    F.2d 828, 829 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that "Pratt is the law of this circuit insofar as
    it interprets the threshold requirement of exemption 7"); Wichlacz v. United States
    Dep't of Interior
    , 938 F. Supp. 325, 330 (E.D. Va. 1996) (observing that "investigative
    activities giving rise to the compilation of the records must be related to the
    enforcement of federal law, and there must be a rational connection between the
    investigative activities and the agency's law enforcement duties"), aff'd, 114 F.3d 1178
    (4th Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision); Exner, 902 F. Supp. at 242-43 (finding that
    investigatory activities were based on legitimate concern that federal laws were
    being violated and that activities connected rationally to target).

    71. See, e.g., King, 830 F.2d at 229 n.141 (dictum) (holding that the 1986 FOIA
    amendments did not "qualif[y] the authority of Pratt" test).

    72. 830 F.2d 337, 340 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also Rochon v. Dep't of Justice, No. 88-5075,
    slip op. at 3 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 14, 1988) (holding that agency must demonstrate nexus
    between its compilation of records and its law enforcement duties); Hall v. United
    States Dep't of Justice
    , 63 F. Supp. 2d 14, 16 (D.D.C. 1999) (holding that Davin "is not
    persuasive authority" because "Third Circuit standard is more permissive" than
    established D.C. Circuit standard (referring to Campbell, 164 F.3d at 32)),
    reconsideration denied, No. 96-2306, slip op. at 2 (D.D.C. May 29, 2003); Code, No. 95-1892, 1997 WL 150070, at **4-5 (reiterating requirement for nexus between activities
    and law enforcement duties); Wickline v. FBI, No. 92-1189, 1994 WL 549756, at *2
    (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 1994) (finding that requirement for "nexus between the agency's
    activity and its law enforcement duties" was met when FBI compiled requested
    information through its investigation of series of murders involving organized crime);
    Abdullah v. FBI, No. 92-0356, slip op. at 3 (D.D.C. Aug. 10, 1992) (holding that "law
    enforcement agencies such as the FBI must show that the records at issue are
    related to the enforcement of federal laws and that the law enforcement activity
    was within the law enforcement duty of that agency"); Beck v. United States Dep't of
    Justice
    , No. 87-3356, slip op. at 26-27 (D.D.C. Nov. 7, 1989) ("[D]efendants must merely
    establish that the nexus between the agency's activity and its law enforcement duty"
    is based on a "colorable claim of rationality."). But see Simon v. Dep't of Justice, 980
    F.2d 782, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (stating that agency must demonstrate nexus between
    investigation and one of its law enforcement duties (citing Pratt, 673 F.2d at 420-21));
    Reiter v. DEA, No. 96-0378, 1997 WL 470108, at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 13, 1997) (describing
    how the nexus "requires an agency to establish a connection between the individual
    under investigation and a possible violation of a federal law"), summary affirmance
    granted
    , No. 97-5246 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 3, 1998); Keenan v. Dep't of Justice, No. 94-1909,
    slip op. at 12-15 (D.D.C. Mar. 2, 1997) (ruling that the agency had not established the
    required nexus, because it was "unclear as to whether an investigation was
    conducted at all"); Assassination Archives & Research Ctr. v. United States Dep't of
    Justice
    , No. 92-2193, 1993 WL 763547, at **6-7 (D.D.C. Apr. 29, 1993) (declaring that
    government must establish that investigation related to enforcement of federal law
    raises colorable claim rationally related to one or more of agency's law enforcement
    duties).

    73. 830 F.2d at 341-42.

    74. 673 F.2d at 421 (A court should be "hesitant to second-guess a law enforcement
    agency's decision to investigate if there is a plausible basis" for its decision.).

    75. See, e.g., Rosenfeld, 57 F.3d at 808 (ruling that Pratt's rational nexus test
    requires "a degree of deference to a law enforcement agency's decision to
    investigate"); King, 830 F.2d at 230-32 (finding that subject's close association with
    "individuals and organizations . . . of investigative interest to the FBI" and its
    consequent investigation of the subject during the McCarthy era for possible
    violation of national security laws meets the threshold in the absence of evidence
    supporting the existence of an improper purpose); Campbell v. Dep't of Justice, 193
    F. Supp. 2d 29, 39-40 (D.D.C. 2001) (clarifying that law enforcement purpose must be
    evaluated as of the time that the records are compiled, even if history now questions
    the legal basis for investigation today); Simon v. United States Dep't of Justice, 752 F.
    Supp. 14, 18 (D.D.C. 1990) (Given the subject's prior pacifist activities, it was not
    "irrational or implausible for [the FBI] -- operating in the climate existing during the
    early 1950s -- [to conduct] what appears to have been a brief criminal investigation
    into the possibility that the plaintiff harbored Communist affiliations."), aff'd on other
    grounds
    , 980 F.2d 782 (D.C. Cir. 1992); see also Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies, 331 F.3d at
    927-28 (declaring that "[j]ust as we have deferred to the executive when it invokes
    FOIA Exemptions 1 and 3 in national security cases, we owe the same deference
    under Exemption 7(A) in appropriate cases"). But see Jefferson, 284 F.3d at 178
    (limiting deference when an agency relies on a "bare assertion to justify invocation of
    an exemption"); Summers, 140 F.3d at 1082, 1084 (suggesting that deference to
    agency may be overcome when records, such as J. Edgar Hoover's "official and
    confidential" (O&C) files, were "not readily available to field agents" and "contain[ed]
    scandalous material on public figures to be used for political blackmail"), on remand,
    No. 87-3168, slip op. at 3 & n.4 (D.D.C. Apr. 19, 2000) (finding, after in camera review of
    four thousand pages of the O&C files, that the FBI "ha[d] adequately established"
    that Exemption 7's "threshold requirement" was met).

    76. See Pratt, 673 F.2d at 420-21 (reiterating that Exemption 7 is not intended to
    "include investigatory activities wholly unrelated to law enforcement agencies'
    legislated functions of preventing risks to the national security and violations of the
    criminal laws and of apprehending those who do violate the laws"); see also Quiñon,
    86 F.3d at 1228-29 (explaining that agency's connection between object of
    investigation and asserted law enforcement duty cannot be pretextual or wholly
    unbelievable and holding FBI affidavits insufficient to demonstrate legitimate basis
    for obstruction of justice charge; "cryptic allusion to 'certain events' is especially
    problematic" when events "may be nothing more sinister than . . . criticisms"); Shaw,
    749 F.2d at 63 (stating that the "mere existence of a plausible criminal investigatory
    reason to investigate would not protect the files of an inquiry explicitly conducted . . .
    for purposes of harassment"); Lesar, 636 F.2d at 487 (questioning whether records
    that were generated after investigation "wrongly strayed beyond its original law
    enforcement scope" would meet threshold test for Exemption 7); Enviro Tech, No. 02
    C 4650, slip op. at 13-14 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 11, 2003) (discussing the consequences of "ultra
    vires decisions," and explaining that Exemption 7 has a "hook that might restrict the
    exemption to only those documents relating to specifically authorized agency
    activities") (dicta); Warren v. United States, No. 1:99-1317, 2000 WL 1868950, at *6
    (N.D. Ohio Oct. 31, 2000) (determining that despite fact that IRS investigator may
    have aggressively gathered information during civil audit, this had clear law
    enforcement purpose and was not beyond authority of agency). But see Sinito v.
    United States Dep't of Justice
    , No. 87-0814, slip op. at 17 (D.D.C. July 11, 2000)
    (declaring that plaintiff's "[u]nanswered questions and inflammatory accusations
    regarding alleged governmental agent corruption . . . do not persuade this Court"
    that records were not compiled for law enforcement purposes).

    77. See PHE, 983 F.2d at 249, 251, 253 (holding portions of FBI's Manual of
    Investigative Operations & Guidelines
    properly withheld pursuant to Exemption
    7(E)).

    78. See Attorney General's 1986 Amendments Memorandum at 8-9; see also
    Guerrero v. DEA, No. 93-2006, slip op. at 14-15 (D. Ariz. Feb. 22, 1996) (approving
    nondisclosure of portions of DEA Agents Manual); Church of Scientology Int'l v. IRS,
    845 F. Supp. 714, 723 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (concluding that parts of IRS Law Enforcement
    Manual were exempt from disclosure pursuant to Exemption 7(E)).

    79. Accord Attorney General's Memorandum for Heads of All Federal Departments
    and Agencies Regarding the Freedom of Information Act (Oct. 12, 2001), reprinted in
    FOIA Post (posted 10/15/01) (instructing agencies to protect national security and
    their law enforcement missions by undertaking "full and deliberate consideration of
    the institutional, commercial, and personal privacy interests that could be implicated
    by disclosure").

    80. See, e.g., Ayyad, WL 654133, at *3 (holding that records concerning the 1993
    terrorist bombing of the World Trade Center satisfy the threshold when "the
    Government may need [information from the requester's file] to use to detect threats
    to the integrity of the nation's security"); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. FBI, No. 00-745, slip
    op. at 6-7 (D.D.C. Apr. 20, 2001) (finding that FBI has shown nexus between
    investigation related to domestic security/terrorism and its assigned law
    enforcement mission); Judicial Watch, No. 00-0723, slip op. at 21 (D.D.C. Mar. 30, 2001)
    (finding that records concerning "the investigation of terrorist threats" involved "a
    legitimate law enforcement duty" and satisfied the threshold). But see also
    Weissman, 565 F.2d at 695-96 (finding that the CIA's authority was limited by
    Congress to intelligence matters abroad, and holding that the agency was not
    authorized to conduct "investigations of private American nationals who had no
    contact with the CIA, [merely] on the grounds that eventually their activities might
    threaten the Agency").

    81. Pratt, 673 F.2d at 420 (applying two-part test, and allowing that the threshold
    may be satisfied if the agency's investigatory activities "relate[] to the enforcement
    of federal laws or to the maintenance of national security").

    82. See, e.g., Morales Cozier, No. 99-0312, slip op. at 14-15 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 25, 2000)
    (stating that the threshold was satisfied under either the "per se" test or the Pratt
    test because "[p]laintiff's activities in contacting an official of a government with
    which the United States has no official relations and inviting him to the United States
    could have presented an interference with United States foreign policy or national
    security in an area where the FBI has an investigatory or enforcement interest"); cf.
    White House Memorandum for Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies
    Concerning Safeguarding Information Related to Homeland Security (Mar. 19, 2002),
    reprinted in FOIA Post (posted 3/21/02) (emphasizing need to protect information
    "that could reasonably be expected to assist" specific terrorist activity).

    83. See Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies, 331 F.3d at 928-29 (explaining that "disclosure of
    [post-9/11] detainees' names would enable al Qaeda or other terrorist groups to map
    the course of the investigation [and] could be of great use to al Qaeda in plotting
    future terrorists attacks or intimidating witnesses"); Living Rivers, 272 F. Supp. 2d at
    1321 (stating that terrorists could use "inundation maps" to aid both in target
    selection and in carrying out terrorist attacks by analyzing downstream harm from
    projected extent of flooding); Coastal Delivery, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 964 (finding that
    terrorists could use information about rate of examinations at ports to avoid
    detection by selecting those ports with relatively low rates of examinations); see
    also
    Campbell, 164 F.3d at 31-33 (discussing whether 1960s investigations of
    subversive organizations believed to be threat to U.S. security meet threshold);
    Pratt, 673 F.2d at 421 (explaining that investigation into breach of national security
    qualifies as law enforcement); Simon, 752 F. Supp. at 18 (explaining that given the
    "climate existing during the early 1950's [the court] cannot conclude that it was
    irrational or implausible" to take into account "earlier passivist activities" and
    conduct a "criminal investigation into the possibility that [the subject] harbored
    Communist affiliations," and therefore finding that the records met the law
    enforcement threshold); FOIA Post, "FOIA Officers Conference Held on Homeland
    Security" (posted 7/3/03) (discussing use of FOIA's law enforcement exemptions
    where necessary to protect homeland security-related information); cf. Maydak v.
    United States
    , No. 02-5168, slip op. at 7 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 20, 2004) (reiterating that
    "[a]lthough the Privacy Act does not define 'law enforcement authority,' we have
    interpreted the phrase broadly," and given the Bureau of Prison's mandate to
    preserve prison security, "we have no doubt that examining photographs for conduct
    that may threaten that security is pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized
    law enforcement activity").

    84. See Attorney General Ashcroft's FOIA Memorandum, reprinted in FOIA Post
    (posted 10/15/01) (describing a FOIA policy goal of "safeguarding our national
    security [and] enhancing the effectiveness of our law enforcement agencies").

    85. See Pratt, 673 F.2d at 420. But see also Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies, 331 F.3d at 921,
    926 (seemingly going beyond Pratt for homeland security/terrorism purposes by
    finding that although names of detainees traditionally are made public, names which
    were gathered in "response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 . . .
    constitute a comprehensive diagram of the law enforcement investigation," and thus
    were compiled for law enforcement purposes and were properly withheld).

    86. Attorney General Ashcroft's FOIA Memorandum, reprinted in FOIA Post (posted
    10/15/01).

    87. North Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 202-03 (discussing First Amendment
    rights, and recognizing that the "case arises in the wake of September 11, 2001, a
    day on which American life changed drastically and dramatically . . . . Since the
    primary national policy must be self-preservation, it seems elementary that, to the
    extent open deportation hearings might impair national security," the special
    interest deportation hearings were properly closed); see Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies,
    331 F.3d at 926, 932 (referring to 9/11 terrorism as a "heinous violation," and stating
    that "the courts must defer to the executive on [such] decisions of national security");
    Coastal Delivery, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 960-61, 964 (pointing to the existence of "new
    anti-terrorism programs" in approving protection of the type of information released
    prior to 9/11, and stating that "plaintiff's arguments that potential terrorists and
    smugglers could not and would not use the information" are simply "unpersuasive" in
    that context); see also, e.g., Edmonds, 272 F. Supp. at 55 (stating that the "deference
    that has historically been extended to the executive when it invokes FOIA
    Exemption 1" must be extended to Exemption 7 in the national security area); cf.
    Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 696 (recognizing that terrorism can warrant "heightened
    deference").

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