Opinions

In designating an Acting Director of National Intelligence, the President could choose anyone who is eligible under the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998, even though 50 U.S.C. § 3026(a)(6) specifies that the Principal Deputy DNI “shall act for” the DNI during a vacancy.

The President could designate the Senate-confirmed Director of the National Counterterrorism Center as the Acting DNI, but that person could not perform the duties of the NCTC Director during his time as the Acting DNI because no person may “simultaneously serve” as NCTC Director and “in any other capacity in the executive branch,” 50 U.S.C. § 3056(b)(2).

Because the incumbent NCTC Director was rendered unable to perform the duties of that office while serving as Acting DNI, the NCTC Director’s first assistant would, in the absence of an alternative presidential designation, automatically serve as Acting NCTC Director under the Vacancies Reform Act.

Congressional committees participating in an impeachment inquiry may not validly compel executive branch witnesses to testify about matters that potentially involve information protected by executive privilege without the assistance of agency counsel. Congressional subpoenas that purport to require executive branch witnesses to appear without agency counsel in these circumstances are legally invalid and are not subject to civil or criminal enforcement.

The statutory procedures for appointing and removing Federal Reserve Bank members of the Federal Open Market Committee are consistent with the Constitution, and would have continued to be so under proposed H.R. 6741, the Federal Reserve Reform Act of 2018.

The President may direct independent regulatory agencies to comply with the centralized regulatory review process prescribed by Executive Order 12866.

A complaint from an intelligence-community employee about statements made by the President during a telephone call with a foreign leader does not involve an “urgent concern,” as defined in 50 U.S.C. § 3033(k)(5)(G), because the alleged conduct does not relate to “the funding, administration, or operation of an intelligence activity” under the authority of the Director of National Intelligence. As a result, the statute does not require the Director to transmit the complaint to the congressional intelligence committees.

The restriction in 20 U.S.C. § 1066c(c) on the Department of Education’s authority to guarantee loans for capital improvements at historically black colleges and universities “in which a substantial portion of its functions is subsumed in a religious mission” violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.

The remaining restrictions in the statute can, and must, be construed to avoid further conflict with the Free Exercise Clause. We thus read section 1066c(c) and 20 U.S.C. § 1068e(1) to deny loans under the program only for facilities that are predominantly used for devotional religious activity, or for facilities that are part of an HBCU, or part of a department or branch of an HBCU, that offers only programs of instruction devoted to vocational religious education.

The Assistant to the President and Senior Counselor to the President is absolutely immune from compelled congressional testimony in her capacity as a senior adviser to the President.

The provisions in 26 U.S.C. § 6103 protecting confidentiality of tax returns prohibited the Department of the Treasury from complying with a request by the Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee for the President’s tax returns. The text of section 6103(f), the statutory exception under which the request was made, does not require the Committee to state any purpose for its request. But Congress could not constitutionally confer upon the Committee the right to compel the Executive Branch to disclose confidential information without a legitimate legislative purpose. Under the facts and circumstances, the Secretary of the Treasury reasonably and correctly concluded that the Committee’s asserted interest in reviewing the Internal Revenue Service’s audits of presidential returns was pretextual and that its true aim was to make the President’s tax returns public, which is not a legitimate legislative purpose.

Because section 6103(a) prohibited the disclosure of the tax returns sought in the Chairman’s request, as well as in the corresponding subpoenas, the Department of the Treasury’s refusal to provide the information did not violate either 26 U.S.C. § 7214(a)(3) or 2 U.S.C. § 192.

The President may assert executive privilege over “priority documents” relating to the Secretary of Commerce’s decision to include a citizenship question on the 2020 decennial census questionnaire that the House Committee on Oversight and Reform has demanded as responsive to its subpoenas. The “priority documents” all involve pre-decisional deliberative material, attorney-client communications, or attorney work product.

The President may make a protective assertion of executive privilege over the remaining subpoenaed documents to give time for the Departments of Commerce and Justice to determine whether any remaining documents may be subject to privilege.

Congress may not constitutionally prohibit agency counsel from accompanying agency employees called to testify about matters that potentially involve information protected by executive privilege. Such a prohibition would impair the President’s constitutional authority to control the disclosure of privileged information and to supervise the Executive Branch’s communications with Congress.

Congressional subpoenas that purport to require agency employees to appear without agency counsel are legally invalid and are not subject to civil or criminal enforcement.