Opinions
Peace Corps Employment Policies for Pregnant Volunteers
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) would prohibit the Peace Corps from implementing an across-the-board policy of terminating or reassigning volunteers solely because they become pregnant while assigned overseas, or because they have an abortion. A decision to terminate a pregnant volunteer must be based on a case-by-case assessment of the volunteer’s ability to function effectively in her assignment while pregnant or after delivery of the child.
Under the PDA, the fact that a volunteer who has been terminated because of pregnancy chooses to have an abortion cannot be considered in a decision on her reapplication for service.
Even though a specific restriction in the Peace Corps’ appropriation prohibits the use of its funds to perform abortions, so that the Peace Corps may not pay for the cost of an abortion for one of its volunteers, the PDA would require the Peace Corps to continue to pay travel and per diem expenses to volunteers evacuated to have an abortion, as long as it provides such compensation to other volunteers evacuated for comparable medical conditions. The Peace Corps must also allow volunteers to draw upon their accumulated readjustment allowance to pay for an abortion, if similar access is allowed for other medical expenses.
Obligation of the Office of the Vice President to Pay State or City Accommodations Taxes
The Office of the Vice Presidency is immune from state taxation by virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, and is thus not required to pay a state or city accommodations tax on hotel bills for which it is billed directly.
The President’s Power to Remove Members of the Federal Council on the Aging
The text and legislative history of the statute creating the Federal Council on the Aging indicate that Congress did not intend to restrict the President’s power to remove his appointees to the Council. Neither the Council’s “independence” in terms of its membership and staff, nor its function of providing advice to Congress necessarily suggest that Congress intended to restrict the President’s power of free removal which is ordinarily incident to his power of appointment.
Because the structure and functions of the Federal Council on the Aging establish that it is a purely executive body, Congress could not constitutionally limit the President’s power to remove its members.
Constitutionality of Federal Habitual Offender Legislation
Provisions of proposed “habitual offender” legislation would be within Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause even though they may penalize activities which are entirely intrastate, if Congress has a rational basis for finding that these activities have some effect on interstate commerce.
Steel Industry Compliance Extension Act of 1981
The Steel Industry Compliance Extension Act of 1981 (Act) permits the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency to accede to a steel company’s request for an extension of otherwise applicable deadlines for compliance with the Clean Air Act only if the Administrator finds that the company has met its ongoing obligations under its existing consent decrees, or that any violations are de minimis in nature.
While the term “de minimis” is not defined in the Act, the legislative history confirms that it was meant to have its ordinary meaning—that is, “negligible” or “insubstantial or inconsequential.”
Applicability of the California Penal Code to Investigations Conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
A federal law enforcement officer who must violate state criminal law in the course of performing his official duty is immune from criminal prosecution and civil liability stemming from such a violation.
An informer may claim immunity from civil liability under state law by virtue of the Supremacy Clause, and it would be unwise to base an informer’s defense on sovereign immunity, given the potential for government liability if the informer’s actions were to be characterized as those of a government employee.
Ethical Issues Raised by Assistant United States Attorneys’ Representation of Judges
A number of concerns are raised under the American Bar Association’s canons of professional ethics when an Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA) is asked to represent a judge in his or her district in a suit brought by a private individual. These ethical concerns could be handled through disclosure of prior or pending representation to opposing counsel, by arranging to have the judge represented by an AUSA from another district, or by retaining private counsel to represent the judge.
Congressional Disapproval of AWACS Arms Sale
The provision in § 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act for congressional disapproval by concurrent resolution of a proposed sale of military equipment is unconstitutional under the Presentation Clauses of the Constitution; since a resolution of disapproval under § 36(b) has the force and effect of law, the President must be given the opportunity to approve or veto such congressional action.
The legislative veto in § 36(b) impermissibly intrudes on the President’s authority to execute the laws and to conduct the Nation’s foreign relations, in violation of the principle of separation of powers.
The legislative veto in § 36(b) is severable from the other provisions of the Arms Export Control Act, since nothing in the legislative history of that Act indicates an intent to deprive the President altogether of his power to transact foreign military sales.
The “report-and-wait” provision in § 36(b), which requires that the President report arms sales to the Congress and delay the transaction for a 30-day period pending congressional action to disapprove the sale through the enactment of legislation, is not unconstitutional.
The President could, consistent with the longstanding position of the Executive Branch and with the express statements of his two immediate predecessors, choose to treat a congressional resolution of disapproval under § 36(b) as a legal nullity. Alternatively, the President could avoid the necessity to submit a proposed arms sale for congressional review by invoking the emergency provision of § 36(b), or by making a finding that the sale is vital to the national security interests of the United States under the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1980.
Assertion of Executive Privilege in Response to a Congressional Subpoena
Executive privilege can and should be asserted to withhold deliberative, predecisional documents from Congress, where release of the documents would seriously impair the deliberative process and the conduct of foreign policy, and where Congress’ only stated interest in obtaining the documents is for general oversight purposes.
Where Congress has a legitimate need for information that will help it legislate, and the Executive Branch has a legitimate constitutionally recognized need to keep information confidential, each branch has an obligation to make a principled effort to accommodate the needs of the other.
The Legislative Veto and Congressional Review of Agency Rules
The following testimony discusses the constitutional objections to legislative vetoes, which are grounded in principles of presentation, bicameralism, and separation of powers. The testimony also describes and responds to several theories advanced in support of the constitutionality of legislative vetoes. Finally, it outlines the Reagan Administration’s policy objections to legislative vetoes in the broader context of congressional review of agency actions, and suggests alternative ways in which Congress may provide meaningful legislative oversight of executive action consistent with applicable constitutional principles.