Final Report October 1997

Report of The Executive Committee



For



Indian Country Law Enforcement Improvements















FINAL REPORT



To



The Attorney General



And



The Secretary of the Interior

















































October 1997





U. S. Department of Justice

Criminal Division








Office of the Deputy Assistant Attorney General Washington, D.C. 20530









October 31, 1997











EXECUTIVE SUMMARY



MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE

SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR

THROUGH: THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL

FROM: Kevin V. Di Gregory
Deputy Assistant Attorney General

Hilda A. Manuel
Deputy Commissioner of Indian Affairs

Co-Chairs: Executive Committee for Indian Country
Law Enforcement Improvements

SUBJECT: Final Report of the Executive Committee for
Indian Country Law Enforcement Improvements

PURPOSE: To provide the Attorney General and the Secretary
with the analysis, findings, and options for
improvements prepared by the Executive Committee
in accordance with the Presidential DIRECTIVE ON
LAW ENFORCEMENT IN INDIAN COUNTRY of August 25,
1997.

TIMETABLE: td> The President has requested options from you by
December 31, 1997



DISCUSSION:



There is a public safety crisis in Indian Country. In
recognition of this, President Clinton asked both of you "to work
with tribal leaders to analyze law enforcement problems on Indian
lands [and to] provide [the President] with options for improving
public safety and criminal justice in Indian Country." The
urgency of the situation required completion of this report by
October 31, 1997, so that it could be included in the next budget
cycle. An "Executive Committee for Indian Country Law
Enforcement Improvement" was formed to help carry out this
mandate.(1) Its views and findings are in the attached Report.
Generally, the Executive Committee, in consultation with the
Tribes, examined the issues and problems and determined that (1)
a substantial infusion of resources into Indian Country law
enforcement is essential, and (2) the delivery of law enforcement
services must be consolidated and improved.



U.S. Attorneys led a series of tribal consultations on
Indian Country law enforcement across the country during
September and early October of 1997. In the lower 48 states, a
total of 205 of the 332 Tribes (62 percent) participated in these
consultations. There was a general consensus among the Tribes on
the following issues:

Law enforcement in Indian Country, as it presently exists,
often fails to meet basic public safety needs.



Serious and violent crime is rising significantly in Indian
Country -- in sharp contrast to national trends.



The single most glaring problem is a lack of adequate
resources in Indian Country.



Although the system must change, Indian hiring preferences
and contracting/compacting guarantees must be protected
under any new structure.(2)



The fragmented criminal justice system results in poor
coordination, which can be remedied only by consolidating
services under one authority.



Tribal governments do not consider the FBI to be an
appropriate management structure for this purpose.(3)





The Executive Committee recommends the following two options
for your consideration:







OPTION A



Consolidate the three major law enforcement programs under the
line and budgetary authority of BIA's Office of Law Enforcement
Services (OLES). DOJ will assist OLES by expanding the
availability of technical assistance and training.



OPTION B



Transfer all three major law enforcement programs in BIA
(criminal investigations, uniformed police, and detention
services) to DOJ, maintaining Indian hiring preference and
contracting/compacting authority. DOJ will create liaison
positions to assure that community accessibility and tribal input
on local law enforcement issues and priorities are maintained.









TABLE OF CONTENTS

Indian Country Law Enforcement Improvements





A.

Introduction 1

B.

The Consultation Process: Findings 3

C.

The Law Enforcement Crisis in Indian Country 4

Rising Crime 4

Deficient Resources 6

Funding Indian Country Law Enforcement 7

D.

Options to Improve Law Enforcement Services 8

Option A 9

Option B 10

Implementation Overview 10

E.

Estimated Costs and Staffing Issues 11

Basic Law Enforcement Needs 11

Detention 12

Training 12

Contracting 12

Liability Insurance 13

F.

Appendix 13

Juvenile Crime and Gang Activity Tab A

Sexual and Physical Abuse of Children Tab B

Substance Abuse in Indian Country Tab C

Detention Operations Tab D

Training Needs Tab E

Summary of Preliminary Consultations with Tribes Tab F

Tribal Preferences as Stated in the Consultations Tab G

Executive Committee List Tab H













REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE FOR INDIAN

COUNTRY LAW ENFORCEMENT IMPROVEMENTS




October 31, 1997



A. INTRODUCTION



There is a public safety crisis in Indian Country. Leaders
from the federal and tribal governments have examined the law
enforcement problems and determined that a substantial infusion
of resources into Indian Country law enforcement is essential.
This report discusses the issues and presents two options that
address these problems.


Basic law enforcement protection and services are severely
inadequate for most of Indian Country. This problem affects more
than 1.4 million people who depend on the federal government for
these services.(4) Simply put, many American citizens living on
Indian reservations do not receive even the minimum level of law
enforcement services taken for granted in non-Indian communities.
According to a 1997 census estimate by the Indian Health Service
(IHS), there are 1,429,800 Indians residing on or adjacent to
Indian reservations, allotments, and dependent Indian communities
governed by federally-recognized Tribes. In the lower 48 states,
these communities are spread across approximately 56 million
acres, with millions of additional acres in Alaska. American
Indians are one of the fastest growing minority groups in the
nation, yet rank at the bottom of all minority groups in terms of
life expectancy. Unfortunately, violence and crime are
contributing factors. According to a 1996 IHS report,(5) the
homicide rate for Indian males is almost three times higher than
the rate for white males.

A reported crime in Indian Country is twice as likely to be
violent as compared to crimes reported elsewhere in the United
States. In contrast, there are fewer than half as many law
enforcement officers per capita.(6) This is not a new situation;
the problems addressed in this report developed over decades.(7)
In the early 1990s, however, federal agencies with law
enforcement responsibilities initiated an effort to re-examine
and evaluate the federal government's role in ensuring public
safety on America's Indian reservations.



The first step in addressing this process was President
Clinton's Executive Memorandum on Government-to-Government
Relations With Native American Tribes
(April 28, 1994). Shortly
thereafter, the historic 1994 Listening Conference was held in
Albuquerque. There, the Departments of Justice, Interior, and
Housing and Urban Development heard the concerns of tribal
leaders. Issues of public safety and crime on reservations were
recurring themes. As a direct response to the Listening
Conference, the Attorney General created the Department's Office
of Tribal Justice and issued the Department's Policy on Indian
Sovereignty and Government-to-Government Relations
(June 1,
1995). To address tribal concerns and improve law enforcement in
Indian Country, a number of initiatives were undertaken,
including the assignment of additional FBI investigators and
federal prosecutors to Indian Country, and targeted Bureau of
Indian Affairs (BIA) law enforcement projects. Furthermore, in
November 1995, the Department of Justice launched the Indian
Country Justice Initiative, an inter-departmental project
specifically intended to explore and address the broad array of
public safety needs in Indian Country.



As these efforts were implemented and continued to develop,
some basic problems became apparent. The most glaring deficiency
is a chronic lack of law enforcement resources in Indian Country.
This realization lead to a series of informal meetings between
the BIA and DOJ, and a preliminary tribal consultation on this
issue was initiated in June 1996. As the discussions

expanded, new participants brought new information. It became
clear that the law enforcement problems in Indian Country are
severe.

In recognition of this, President Clinton asked the Attorney
General and the Secretary of the Interior "to work with tribal
leaders to analyze law enforcement problems on Indian lands [and
to] provide [the President] with options for improving public
safety and criminal justice in Indian Country." The Attorney
General and the Secretary in turn appointed an "Executive
Committee for Indian Country Law Enforcement Improvement,"
charged with carrying out this mandate.(8) The urgency of the
crisis in Indian Country required completion of this report by
October 31, 1997, so that any options selected that require
additional funds could be included in the President's budget
request for FY 1999. The views and findings of the Executive
Committee follow.

Table of contents




B. THE CONSULTATION PROCESS: FINDINGS



Pursuant to the President's Directive, the Attorney General
requested that the U.S. Attorneys with Indian Country
jurisdiction hold consultations with tribal leaders. A series of
tribal consultations about Indian Country law enforcement was
held across the country during September and early October of
1997. In the lower 48 states, a total of 205 of the 332 Tribes
(62 percent) participated in these consultations.
(9) Specific
issues common to the consultation process are discussed at Tab F.
A general consensus was reached on the following issues:

Law enforcement in Indian Country, as it presently exists,
often fails to meet basic public safety needs.



Serious and violent crime is rising significantly in Indian
Country -- in sharp contrast to national trends.



The single most glaring problem is a lack of adequate
resources in Indian Country. Any solution requires a substantial
infusion of new money in addition to existing funds under the
current tribal priority allocation (TPA) system.



Although the system must change, Indian hiring preferences
and contracting/compacting guarantees must be protected under any
new structure.



The current criminal justice system is fragmented, and the
resulting poor coordination can be remedied only by consolidating
investigative, police and detention services under one authority.



Tribal governments do not consider the FBI to be an
appropriate management structure for the consolidated law
enforcement services.

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C. THE LAW ENFORCEMENT CRISIS IN INDIAN COUNTRY




Rising Crime



Americans have come to expect protection of their basic
rights, a sense of justice, and freedom from fear. A responsive,
professional criminal justice system makes this possible.
Uniformed police officers handle complaints, maintain order, and
make arrests. Professional investigators handle serious or
complex crimes. Jails and prisons house offenders; many provide
appropriate treatment and other programs. Nearby magistrates set
bail and judges hear cases. Probation officers make
recommendations to the court and supervise probationers as well
as those released from prison. To a large extent, what we take
for granted exists only in a rudimentary form or does not exist
at all for the 1.4 million Native Americans who live on or near
Indian lands. Today, many Indian citizens receive police,
investigative, and detention services that are not only
inadequate, but also suffer by comparison to this country's
poorest jurisdictions.



Information from the FBI, the BIA, U.S. Attorneys,
researchers, and tribal leaders themselves depicts a stark
contrast between public safety in Indian Country and the rest of
the United States. Nationwide, for example, violent crime has
declined significantly between 1992 and 1996. The overall
violent crime rate has dropped about 17 percent, and homicides
are down 22 percent. For the same time period, however, the BIA
reports that homicides in Indian Country rose sharply.
(10) Some
Tribes have murder rates that far exceed those of urban areas
known for their struggles against violent crime. In 1995, for
example, the murder rate on Ft. Peck Reservation in Montana was
more than twice that of New Orleans, one of the most violent
cities in the United States. During 1996, the people on
America's largest reservation, the Navajo Nation, endured 46
non-negligent homicides, resulting in a rate which would place it
among the top 20 most violent cities.



Other violent crimes, such as gang violence, domestic
violence, and child abuse have paralleled the rise in homicides.
During fiscal years 1994 - 1996, 84 percent of the FBI Indian
Country cases opened (4,334) involved either crimes of violence
(48%) or the sexual or physical abuse of a minor child (36%).
Violent Indian gangs, who model themselves after their urban
counterparts, are a frightening new reality on many reservations.
Drug abuse now has been added to the problems caused by alcohol.

There is broad consensus among law enforcement professionals
and U.S. Attorneys in Indian Country that the situation is
serious and merits urgent attention. Indeed, there is concern
that available statistics understate the magnitude of the problem
in many areas of Indian Country. A major finding of a recent DOJ
Inspector General report on Criminal Justice in Indian Country(11)
was that there is a pervasive "lack of reliable crime statistics
in Indian Country...." Moreover, while law enforcement resources
have been increased and deployed effectively throughout the
United States, BIA resources actually have been reduced in Indian
Country during the past few years.(12)



Indian Country is extraordinarily diverse in terms of size,
geography, enrollment figures, government structure, resources,
culture, language, traditions, and law enforcement capabilities.
What has become common to too many Tribes is increasing violence,
including juvenile crime, gangs, drug abuse, and the physical or
sexual assault of children. Problem statements addressing
specific criminal justice issues are included as Tabs A through
D.

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Deficient Resources



One of the most telling indicators of inadequate law
enforcement services in Indian Country is the chronic shortage of
personnel. For example, the 1996 UCR statistics show 2.9
officers per 1,000 citizens in non-Indian communities under
10,000.
(13) The equivalent ratio in Indian Country is 1.3 officers
per 1,000 citizens -- less than one-half the per capita coverage
in small communities outside of Indian Country. Approximately
1,600 BIA and tribal uniformed officers must patrol the 56
million acres of tribal lands in the lower 48 states. On the
17.5 million acres owned by the Navajo Nation, the ratio of
officers to citizens is only 0.9 per 1,000. Remote areas, poor
roads, and no backup not only result in poor service to the
people, but also stressful and dangerous jobs for the officers.
On the Navajo Nation alone, two officers were killed in the line
of duty in the last two years while patrolling alone.



In FY 1998, only 78 full-time BIA criminal investigators and
the full-time equivalent of 102 FBI agents are available to
investigate violent and serious crimes nationwide.(14) Although
there are about 90 tribal investigators, they often handle tribal
code cases and seldom appear in federal court except as
witnesses. The total investigative capacity for Indian Country
is inadequate, especially given the rise in violent crime. As an
interim measure, DOJ has requested additional FBI agents and
Assistant U.S. Attorneys in Indian Country to help handle the
higher Indian caseload.



Detention services also suffer from grossly inadequate
resources. There are 70 jails, including detention and holding
facilities, located on 55 reservations. Most were designed to
hold between 10 and 30 inmates, were built in the 1960s and
1970s, are outdated, do not offer sufficient bed space for
current needs, do not meet jail or building codes, and present a
threat to the health and safety of inmates. Only 10 of the 55
jails are juvenile facilities, even though bed space demand for
juvenile offenders is rising rapidly. Many Indian Country jails
house both adults and juveniles. Funds are not available for
renovation and new construction, and very little is available to
maintain existing buildings.



Jail operations are also poorly funded. Staffing levels
fall far short of those required for adequate inmate supervision,
thus creating a threat to the welfare of the community, staff,
and inmates. Funds for needed inmate programs, such as education
and substance abuse treatment, are virtually non-existent.
Resources for equipment and supplies are such that, in some
jails, inmates receive no blankets or mattresses and no basic
hygiene items, such as soap or toothpaste. Staff sometimes buy
these basic items with their personal funds. Finally, staff
receive little or no training for the responsibilities and
liabilities they face because (1) staffing levels are so low the
jails cannot afford to lose an officer temporarily, and (2) funds
are not available to travel to and attend the Indian Police
Academy.

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Funding Indian Country Law Enforcement



The Executive Committee's funding determination is a
minimum figure necessary to bring law enforcement in Indian
Country up to a basic level of services. Each Tribe's current
law enforcement TPA allocation will form the baseline for that
Tribe's law enforcement budget. Because this total figure
represents the minimum amount needed to address these problems,
funds must be dedicated solely for law enforcement services.
Among the factors that will be considered in allocating these
funds are the following:

Serious and violent crime rates and trends

Population and distribution

Geographic size, accessibility and infrastructure

Current sworn force and existing law enforcement resources

DOJ program grants and other assistance will continue as a
separate funding source that complements community outreach,
victim assistance and other programs related to basic law
enforcement efforts. As a consequence of improvements to law
enforcement services, a corresponding increase in funds is needed
for judicial systems, especially tribal courts. As a first step,
DOJ is requesting $10 million for FY 1999 and BIA is asking for
$11.1 million to aid tribal courts through a variety of programs.

D. OPTIONS TO IMPROVE LAW ENFORCEMENT SERVICES

Numerous options to improve law enforcement in Indian
Country were explored during consultations with the Tribes.
Based on these consultations, the Executive Committee refined the
range of possibilities and present for consideration the
following two options. Both options assume significant funding
increases above existing tribal allocation funds for law
enforcement. Also, Option B assumes that Congress will give DOJ
the necessary authority to contract/compact with Tribes and to
offer Indian hiring preference.

The Tribes expressed little interest in options such as
splitting functions between the Justice and Interior Departments
or maintaining the status quo. Also, as a variation of the DOJ
Option, the Tribes expressed no interest in placing all of the
law enforcement responsibilities within the FBI. Some wanted no
changes at all, just additional funds. A few others requested
that Tribes be provided directly with sufficient funds for all
law enforcement services. One variation on the BIA option was
advanced by the Navajo Nation.
(15) Accordingly, we have narrowed
the options to two.(16) Also, based on feedback from the Tribes,
the Executive Committee recommends designation of individuals to
function as liaisons between each Tribe and the federal (and
local) law enforcement community to improve accessibility and
tribal input on local law enforcement issues and priorities.
These persons could work out of U.S. Attorneys' offices or the
appropriate field structure.

The options presented below include commentary that may be
helpful to the deliberative process.

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OPTION A

Consolidate the three major law enforcement programs under the
line and budgetary authority of BIA's Office of Law Enforcement
Services (OLES). DOJ will assist OLES by expanding the
availability of technical assistance and training.

Commentary

Standardizes and consolidates BIA's currently bifurcated law
enforcement administrative structure. Presently, criminal
investigators work within a professional law enforcement
organization, headed by managers with law enforcement
training. In contrast, BIA uniformed police and detention
staff report to that reservation's BIA superintendent, who
generally has no law enforcement background.
(17) The
elimination of fragmented responsibilities for law
enforcement within BIA would allow BIA to build on its
collective experience in delivering Indian Country law
enforcement services.

Contains some of the same advantages of the DOJ Option,
while allaying concern that the BIA is being dismantled.

Allows for the uniform application of standards, policies,
and procedures within BIA law enforcement components.

A preliminary BIA analysis indicates that this consolidation
may be possible under the 1990 Indian Law Enforcement Reform
Act, thus eliminating the need for new legislation.

Because of the diverse mandate of the Department of the
Interior, BIA may be unable to obtain or sustain adequate
funding for law enforcement unless Congress requires a
separate funding stream for that purpose.

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OPTION B

Transfer all three major law enforcement programs in BIA
(criminal investigations, uniformed police, and detention
services) to DOJ, maintaining Indian hiring preference and
contracting/compacting authority. DOJ will create liaison
positions to assure that community accessibility and tribal input
on local law enforcement issues and priorities are maintained.

Commentary

Moves the law enforcement function to the Department with
primary responsibility for federal law enforcement.

This assures that professional standards for investigative,
police, and detention services in Indian Country would be
met.

Brings the full array of all DOJ resources to bear on the
deplorable condition of Indian Country law enforcement.

Helps insulate Indian Country law enforcement from budget
cuts that may affect a more multi-function Department such
as Interior.

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Implementation Overview

Under Option A, the Interior Secretary would direct the
consolidation of criminal investigators, uniformed police,
detention services, and other related law enforcement activities
under BIA/OLES. The Indian Law Enforcement Reform Act of 1990
appears to provide the Interior Secretary with the required
authority. Necessary legislation would be identified and
requested.
(18) OLES would begin efforts to upgrade their training
capacity. DOJ would establish a liaison mechanism with BIA and
would support BIA's efforts through technical assistance and
training. Also, DOJ would continue its existing grant programs
to Tribes.

Under Option B, DOJ would ask Congress for enabling
legislation to create a new Indian Country Law Enforcement
Bureau, including authority to contract/compact with Tribes and
to offer Indian hiring preference. A small headquarters and six
field offices would be established. Simultaneously, the Interior
Secretary would direct the consolidation of services as stated
above. As part of an overall implementation plan, the ability to
increase training capacity quickly is a priority. Also necessary
are criteria for funding within program categories. Following
Congressional approval, the functions, as well as both law
enforcement and administrative personnel from OLES, would be
transferred into the new DOJ bureau.

Under both options it would be necessary to develop a budget
implementation plan and hire new staff.

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E. ESTIMATED COSTS AND STAFFING ISSUES

Under any option, significant additional resources will be
required to address the chronic and pervasive problems
confronting law enforcement efforts in Indian Country.
Additional resources are needed to create an effective uniformed
police presence, to investigate major crimes in Indian Country,
and to augment law enforcement management, administration, and
oversight functions. In addition, resources are badly needed for
a basic adult and juvenile detention capacity in Indian Country,
including the construction, renovation, and operation of
detention facilities. Where it is appropriate, funds are needed
to contract for additional detention space. Imbedded in the
options are several resource-related considerations which are
discussed below, along with a discussion of cost estimates.

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Basic Law Enforcement Needs

Given the current estimated population in Indian Country
(1,429,800), a total of at least 4,290 sworn officers are needed
to provide a minimum level of coverage comparable to that in
rural America. Of that amount, about 15 percent should be
criminal investigators and 85 percent should be uniformed
officers. Adjusting for the fact that Indian lands in P.L. 280
states generally require only limited services from federal
criminal investigators, a total of 496 criminal investigators and
3,647 uniformed officers are needed in Indian Country.
(19)
Therefore, an increase of 226 (from 270 to 496) criminal
investigators and 2,047 (from 1,600 to 3,647) uniformed officers
would be necessary to meet minimum standards. These increases
will be necessary regardless of whether the law enforcement
officers remain within a reorganized BIA or are assigned to a new
DOJ agency. Also, clerical and support staff eventually would be
needed at a level commensurate with the increase in sworn
officers.

Additional Assistant U.S. Attorneys (AUSAs) are needed to
support the increase in criminal investigators. Based on current
standards in Indian Country, 1 AUSA is needed for every 3
investigators. Therefore, an additional 75 AUSAs (and
commensurate support positions) are required to support an
increase of 226 criminal investigators.

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Detention



Detention needs in Indian Country involve funding for (1)
operations, including staff, equipment, and supplies; (2)
facilities, including maintenance, renovation, and new
construction; (3) inspection and oversight; and (4) training and
technical assistance. Most of the 70 jails in Indian Country are
old, unsafe, and do not meet basic code requirements. At the
same time, demand, especially for juvenile bed space, is rising.
Initial costs for construction and renovation can be phased in
over several years. The average, expected life of a jail is
about 30 years, and most Indian Country jails were built in the
1960s and early 1970s. Once complete, however, about 80 percent
of the budget should be for staffing. Funds are needed for
augmenting current staffing and upgrading staff capabilities
through training and technical assistance.

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Training

It is imperative that law enforcement officers receive full
and appropriate training. The range of training options must
include curricula and certification for investigators, first
responders, jailers, and support staff. Currently, there is no
site that can accommodate the needed training programs. Moreover,
the training capacity must increase to accommodate a surge in
students. Thus, a police academy is needed to handle current and
future training needs. While adequate curricula exist, an
appropriate site must be identified, such as a recently closed
military facility. See Tab E for further discussion.

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Contracting

In 1974, Congress passed, and the President signed, into law
the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (P.L.
93-638).
(20) As amended, this law allows Tribes to enter into
contracts for services in Indian Country that the BIA and some
other federal agencies perform on Indian lands. Since 1995, the
majority of Tribes have contracted all or part of their law
enforcement programs, and all funds related to the contracted
activity are provided to the Tribe. This includes funding for
personnel, operating costs, and the indirect costs of performing
the law enforcement function (such as personnel benefits,
procurement, facilities management, and so on). For the most
part, law enforcement funds are mixed with all other
contracted/compacted funds and can be shifted to other needs as
determined by the Tribe.

Under any option, the practice of contracting/compacting
services must be preserved because it is central to tribal self-determination. Therefore, if the law enforcement function is transferred to DOJ, P.L. 93-638 must be amended to allow the
Attorney General to enter into contract agreements with the
Tribes. In addition, mechanisms must be put into place to ensure
that law enforcement funds are used only for law enforcement
purposes.

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F. APPENDIX

TAB A

JUVENILE CRIME AND GANG ACTIVITY

There are two realities that have fueled the rise of
juvenile crime on Indian lands during the past several years.
First, after decades of stable birth rates, the fertility rate in
Indian Country began to rise sharply during the 1970s. The 1990
Census reports that, while 26 percent of all Americans were under
the age of 18, 34 percent of the Indian population was in this
age group. The Census Bureau estimates this trend will continue,
with a projected Indian population of 4.3 million by the year
2050. In the Gila River Indian Community in Arizona, an area
struggling with gang problems, approximately one-half of the
population is projected to be under 18 by the year 2000.

Second, the old termination policies and the constraints of
reservation life have made economic sufficiency and traditional
culture more difficult to sustain. American Indian communities
confront difficult social and economic conditions not generally
characteristic of other U.S. communities.
(21) Chronic unemployment,
low levels of educational attainment, geographic displacement,
and family disruption help foster the rise in juvenile crime now
confronting Indian Country.

ealing with Indian Country juvenile crime is complex.
Intelligence on Indian youth gangs can be extremely difficult to
gather in light of overlapping jurisdictions, geographic
remoteness, and understaffed and overworked FBI, BIA, and tribal
law enforcement. Where detailed records are kept, the news is
not encouraging. A 1997 BIA survey, with 132 participating
Tribes, estimates 375 gangs with approximately 4,650 gang members
on or near Indian Country. Tribal police on the Menominee
Reservation in Wisconsin report two organized gangs and a 293
percent increase in juvenile arrests between 1990 and 1994; for
the same period, there was only a 45 percent increase in adult
arrests.

Despite similarities, the development and characteristics of
urban street gangs appears unlike Indian gangs. Most gangs in
Indian Country are not motivated by economic enterprise to the
same extent as urban street gangs, but can be as dangerous or
more so as they undertake violent acts to acquire status within
their ranks. Some of the Indian gang violence can be shocking:

In 1996, a man on the Laguna Pueblo was bludgeoned with a
beer bottle, stabbed 72 times, then left with a ritualistic
triangle carved on his side.

Also in 1996, on the Laguna Reservation, the nine police
officers (who must patrol one-half million acres) were
assaulted 34 times, often by juveniles.

In the Salt River Pima-Maricopa community in Arizona, the
number of drive-by shootings rose from 1 in 1992 to 55 in
1994.

In October 1996, five members of the East Side Crips Rolling
30s were indicted under the RICO statute with predicates
that included murder, arson, and witness intimidation. All,
who were members of the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Community
in Arizona, were convicted on May 9, 1997.

Few detention facilities exist in Indian Country that are
suitable for juveniles. In short, juvenile delinquents can be
arrested, but the lack of detention facilities, probation
officers, social services, and other needed programs perpetuates
the problem. Not surprisingly, juvenile recidivism in Indian
Country is very high. Those programs which are in place are
often understaffed and lack adequate funding. As existing
juvenile facilities are frequently at capacity, juvenile
offenders are often kept overnight and then released to their
parents. The Omaha Tribal Prosecutor in Nebraska reported that
$30,000 was spent in 1996 housing juveniles at the Wayne,
Nebraska, detention center; more than $180,000 has been spent
housing juveniles during the first three quarters of FY 1997,
which represents a 500% increase in costs.

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TAB B

SEXUAL AND PHYSICAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN

Child abuse has no cultural or socioeconomic boundaries and
permeates all societies. Despite the lack of accurate reporting,
child abuse is undisputedly one of the most prevalent crimes in
Indian Country. According to BIA figures from 1993 to 1995,
child sexual abuse is among the top three crimes reported in
Indian Country.
(22) Indeed, in 1990, after hearings on hundreds of
documented child sexual abuse cases at the Hopi, Navajo, and
North Carolina Cherokee Indian Reservations, Congress enacted the
Indian Child Protection and Family Violence Prevention Act.(23)

To improve our response to these crimes, federal agencies
have attempted to improve the protocols for crime reporting,
victim services, background checks, and training. For example,
within the Navajo Nation, FBI and the Navajo Division of Public
Safety have implemented a Safe Trails Task Force. The New Mexico
Safe Trails Task Force has five agents and three criminal
investigators from the Navajo Division of Public Safety. Eighty
percent of the task force's caseload involves the sexual or
physical abuse of children. The caseload is so high that the FBI
investigates only sexual abuse involving children under the age
of 12. Even so, as of October 1997 the Phoenix Division Task
Force reported 127 open child sexual abuse cases, in addition to
83 homicide cases. Other felony sexual abuse matters are
referred to the Tribe for investigation and subsequent referral
to the U.S. Attorney's Office.

Other efforts include memoranda of agreements between
federal, state and tribal authorities to streamline the reporting
and investigation of child abuse. Since 1995, pursuant to a
formal agreement between FBI and OLES, fingerprint checks have
been conducted on tribal employees whose duties and
responsibilities allow them regular contact with or control over
Indian children.

An inherent difficulty in child sexual abuse investigations
is the lack of physical evidence. In one study, experts found
that in more than 85 percent of all child sexual abuse cases
there was no physical evidence of abuse. Defense attorneys
frequently attack interviews of children as suggestive, and
investigations are often criticized as inadequate.

Despite attempts to quell child abuse through increased
training, multidisciplinary approaches, and prosecution, child
abuse continues to threaten Indian Country's most precious
resource. Under-reporting continues to mask the toll that child
abuse continues to take in Indian Country. Children are
reluctant to disclose sexual abuse because of fear and
retaliation. Particularized training is necessary to recognize
signs and symptoms consistent with child abuse. Support systems
must be in place for those victims and their families who come
forward. For example, in a recent case, a child victim and her
family were forced out of their community and had to live in a
hotel for over nine months while they awaited trial of the
defendant, a prominent tribal leader.

Like child abuse cases nationwide, most child abuse cases in
Indian Country involve a family member, acquaintance, or other
authority figure. Recently, a jailer was convicted of sexually
molesting a 14-year-old inmate. Now, at an increasingly
disturbing rate, more juveniles are committing sexual crimes
against children.(24) One of
the most egregious pedophile cases in history involved a non-Indian
school teacher employed by BIA boarding schools. Non-Indians
pose unique problems for Indian communities because tribal law
enforcement has no criminal jurisdiction over them.

Treatment for both victims and offenders, especially
juveniles, are limited. Facilities available through BOP
contractors, Federal Probation, and the Tribes, cannot
accommodate the disturbing increase in these cases. Given that
child abuse occurs at an alarming rate, the issue for the federal
government, in meeting its trust responsibility to Indian people,
is to ensure that the needed prevention and intervention
capabilities increase accordingly.

Table of contents

TAB C

SUBSTANCE ABUSE

Alcohol remains the most pervasive substance abuse problem
in Indian Country. Its destructive effects range from homicides
to fetal alcohol syndrome. Although data are incomplete, there
is broad consensus among Indian Country law enforcement personnel
that the vast majority of violent assaults on children, spouses,
and others involve excessive alcohol consumption.

Substance abuse, and our lack of an effective response,
directly contribute to rising violence on Indian lands in
America. Compounding the problems related to alcohol abuse is
the growing use of illicit drugs, especially marijuana and
methamphetamine, primarily among young people. The drug problem
is spreading -- it is no longer confined to a few reservations
near urban areas. Informal surveys of law enforcement officers
and prosecutors indicate that a significant percentage of thefts
and violent crimes in Indian Country are related to drug or
alcohol abuse.

Federal investigators agree that marijuana and
methamphetamine are the illicit drugs of choice in Indian
Country. Marijuana is often cultivated in remote areas of Indian
Country, for later distribution both on and off Indian lands.
(25)
In addition, the BIA reports an alarming trend of methamphetamine
manufacture and consumption on Indian lands. In 1996 alone, BIA
seized two clandestine methamphetamine labs, including 12 gallons
of methamphetamine oil.

Indian Tribes face unique impediments to effective drug
enforcement in that Tribes have no jurisdiction to prosecute non-Indians
who commit crimes on Indian lands. As a result, only
state and federal courts have jurisdiction to prosecute non-Indians who
sell illicit substances on the reservation. However,
because the quantities are usually below minimum thresholds for
federal prosecution, and because state courts are not often
receptive to such prosecutions for a variety of reasons, many
non-Indian traffickers operate with impunity.

Tribal justice systems often lack the resources to deal with
these cases effectively. The tribal obstacles are twofold:
statutory and financial. First, the Indian Civil Rights Act
limits tribal criminal sentences to no more than one year in
custody and a $5,000 fine, regardless of the crime. This maximum
sentence has little deterrent value.

Second, and more importantly, only a small percentage of the
558 federally-recognized Tribes have the resources actually to
incarcerate convicted offenders because few Tribes have access to
affordable detention facilities.

Tribal judges can adjudicate offenders, but lack viable
options because of inadequate detention facilities, intermediate
sanctions, and substance abuse treatment programs. Many drug
offenders are put on tribal probation, yet there are not enough
probation officers to handle the growing caseloads.

Federal prosecution is also problematic. Local drug
organizations are aware that most U.S. Attorneys' offices simply
do not have the resources to handle large numbers of small
marijuana or methamphetamine cases. In addition, some federal
judges perceive that such cases are inappropriate for
adjudication in federal courts. Unfortunately, the reality is
that drug trafficking activities on a reservation may have a
disproportionate impact in relation to the size of the community
and the quantity of drugs being distributed. A trafficker whose
weekly supply is a couple of pounds of marijuana and some "crank"
(methamphetamine) can create significant problems in a small
rural community where jobs and constructive activities are
scarce.

Without the range of prevention, intervention, and
enforcement tools that are common in non-Indian communities,
Indians must rely more on federal drug enforcement. One positive
development is that more U.S. Attorneys who have Indian lands
within their districts are more sensitive to the special drug
enforcement needs of Indian Tribes. Where possible, minimum drug
thresholds are relaxed for Indian Country cases. Thus, Indian
Country U.S. Attorneys have made an effort to target the worst
offenders on reservations and file federal cases that can make an
impact beyond the immediate effects on the individual
defendants.(26)

Table of contents

TAB D

DETENTION

Detention operations in most Indian Country jails fall far
short of basic professional and BIA detention standards. This
results from a chronic shortage of operating funds, training, and
technical assistance. Operations are substandard in such
critical areas as staff and inmate safety; inmate supervision and
management; inmate services and programs; fire safety; hazardous
substance control; sanitation and pest control; and preventive
maintenance. The design of many of these old jails presents
diverse health hazards, including an inability to isolate inmates
with communicable diseases such as tuberculosis. Most jails do
not have written operations policies and procedures, nor do they
have adequate systems of documenting operations.

On average, about 80% of a jail's operating budget is
dedicated to staffing, but most Indian Country jails have
insufficient staff to perform all security, custody, and
ancillary functions inherent to jail operations. If staff cannot
supervise inmates, they also cannot prevent escapes, suicides,
assaults, and vandalism. Moreover, of all law enforcement
personnel in Indian Country, detention officers receive the
lowest pay and the fewest career opportunities, conditions which
contribute to extreme staff "burnout" and high turnover.
Detention staff also suffer from inadequate training because
staffing levels are low and people cannot be spared to attend
training, and because training costs are relatively high. There
is a pervasive lack of funding, equipment, and supplies for such
areas as security, safety, sanitation and hygiene, inmate
services and programs, record keeping, and jail administration.
Finally, little technical assistance has been available to Indian
Country jails from the federal government.
(27)

Deficient jail operations are accompanied by completely
antiquated and inadequate jail structures, which contribute to
high suicide rates.(28) Most Indian Country jails were designed
without consideration for their population: facilities usually
were built with a high-security design, while the population
typically consists of misdemeanants who are usually cooperative
when sober. Most inmates in Indian Country jails are sentenced
for misdemeanor offenses, usually related to alcohol-abuse.
Although inmates can be sentenced for up to one year for a tribal
offense (and longer for multiple counts), most serve less than
one year. A minority of inmates are felony offenders who are
held until they are transferred to federal facilities.

Most Indian Country jails are in such poor condition that
they are out of compliance with building codes as well as
professional and BIA jail standards.(29) As part of its technical
assistance program, NIC has conducted reviews of some Indian
Country jails and cited serious physical plant deficiencies in
terms of safety, security, and conditions of confinement.
Although tribal judges have been commended for innovative
sentencing to community service and their use of alternative
sanctions, many Indian Country jails are extremely crowded,
especially on weekends and during tribal celebrations, and bed
space is scarce. Even worse off are Tribes which lack facilities
altogether and must transport prisoners to other locations.

This broad array of detention problems is a direct result of
inadequate funding. In the critical area of construction, for
example, no new construction funds were appropriated for fiscal
years 1996 and 1997. In the past nine years, the BIA has been
able to construct only five jails and provide limited repairs to
others.

Table of contents

TAB E

TRAINING NEEDS

Presently, most uniformed police officers attend the BIA
Indian Police Academy (IPA) at Artesia, New Mexico. It is a
satellite facility of the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center
(FLETC) in Glynco, Georgia, operated by the Department of the
Treasury. The basic police officer course is run three times a
year for 16 weeks. Each session has 50 students, with 52 beds
available at the IPA during any one time. A waiting period of
one year currently exists to receive training at the IPA.

According to the IPA staff, the attrition rate of new
officers is approximately 50 percent. In addition, of the
officers who graduate, approximately 50 percent leave Indian
Country law enforcement within two years.

No present federal law enforcement academy, including the
Glynco facility, can train the number of officers projected for
this initiative. Either creating a new training facility to
replace the current IPA, or acquiring a second academy will be
necessary. The need for a greater capacity reflects both the
projected surge of new law enforcement officers and the high
turnover rate among Indian Country police officers.

Any new facility should be accessible to land and air
transportation. The facility could be associated with a
university or tribal college that could be used as a resource and
means for attendees to obtain college credits for courses
received. Ideally, it should be large enough for a driving
course and a firearms range. In addition, the new academy could
be affiliated with a laboratory structure that can address the
forensic needs of Indian Country.

Tribal police and detention officers are often sent to the
training academies of various states. A component of any new
training unit should be created to help certify that these
officers meet federal standards. In addition, this group should
work with the police officer standards training (POST) commission
of each state so that training received by officers at the IPA is
accepted by that state.

Table of contents

TAB F

SUMMARY OF PRELIMINARY CONSULTATIONS WITH TRIBES

The Executive Committee has summarized below the concerns
expressed by the Tribes during the recent consultation process.
We have chosen to express those concerns as questions.

TRIBAL CONCERNS

Q. Contracting/Compacting. If the functions are moved to DOJ,
what would happen to self-determination and self-governance
compacting?

A. If functions are transferred, DOJ will seek the necessary
legislation to protect the rights of Tribes to contract or
compact in much the same way as they now do under BIA. DOJ
believes that this is a necessary prerequisite.



Q. Indian Preference. Given the restrictive Supreme Court
interpretation of the Indian Preference clause, would DOJ
need and seek statutory authorization for Indian hiring
preference?

A. As a necessary part of legislation enabling the transfer,
DOJ will seek such legislation.

Q. Scale of Possible Transfer. Could specific agencies or
Tribes opt in or out of the transfer of certain functions to
DOJ? Or will any transfer be nationwide?

A. Opting in or out would be organizationally unmanageable and
would conflict directly with our overarching goal of
reducing the fragmentation and diffusion of law enforcement
services that now compromise their effective delivery.

Q. P.L. 280. Do these proposals envision any changes in 18
U.S.C. § 1162?

A. In order to stay focused on securing essential funds to
improve law enforcement services through a more responsive
organizational structure, we do not plan to ask for any
changes in P.L. 280.

Q. Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction. Would centralization of law
enforcement functions, especially in DOJ, further erode
tribal criminal jurisdiction?

A. We do not believe that centralization of law enforcement
functions, either in BIA or in DOJ, will erode tribal
criminal jurisdiction. Our goals of strengthening both
federal and tribal law enforcement at the same time are
compatible. For example, tribal officers (whether provided
directly or by contract) not only maintain order and enforce
tribal codes, but also are the typical "first responders" to
serious crimes that may fall under federal jurisdiction.

Q. Trust Responsibility. If there is a transfer, what happens
to the trust responsibility that now rests with the BIA?

A. That trust responsibility binds the entire Executive Branch,
not just BIA. Reflecting that trust responsibility, DOJ has
written a Directive (June 1, 1995) that guides its work in
Indian Country and will remain in force regardless of who
the next Attorney General may be. At the same time, we
recognize that there are always transitional issues
associated with any government reorganization.

Q. Funding Formula. What funding formula will DOJ use to
assign law enforcement personnel? Will the financial status
or land area of Tribes be considered?

A. We have no firm answers to this at such an early stage.
Violent crime rates, size, and population will be among the
factors considered. However, the Justice Department has
taken a position on "means testing." In a July 22, 1997
letter to Senator Stevens, DOJ "strongly opposed" the "means
testing" provision in Section 118 of the Interior
Appropriations Bill as "contrary to the United States'
longstanding protection of tribal self-government and the
Federal trust responsibility...."

Q. Funding. How much additional money is being requested by
category (detention, investigators, etc.)? Does this amount
change much depending on which agency is mandated to carry
out these responsibilities?

A. See the section on Cost Estimates supra.

Q. Law Enforcement and TPA Accounts. If funds in the "638" law
enforcement contracts are unused, will they revert to the
TPA allocation system and be available for other non-law
enforcement programs or will the funds simply be returned to
the Treasury?

A. Each Tribe's current law enforcement TPA allocation will
form the baseline for that Tribe's law enforcement budget.
Additional funds, representing the 350% increase over five
years proposed by the Executive Committee, will supplement
this baseline amount. Also, we will recommend that the
Administration seek "no year" funding authority for these
funds so that they may be reserved for law enforcement
purposes.

Q. Training. How will BIA or DOJ increase access to training
for law enforcement officers?

A. There will be adequate funding to train all additional
officers and investigators at a federal or appropriate state
facility. (See Tab E.)

Q. Tribal Courts. Is DOJ considering a request for oversight
of tribal court programs? What is planned to strengthen
tribal courts?

A. No, that responsibility will remain with BIA. DOJ is
requesting $10 million for FY 1999 and BIA is asking for

$11.1 million to aid tribal courts through a variety of
programs, including drug courts, special grants, and
technical assistance.

Q. Law Enforcement Responsiveness to Local Needs. If
investigative and local police functions are centralized in
DOJ, how will each Tribe be able to express their views on
law enforcement problems and priorities? Will ICIS or OLES
investigators investigate tribal crimes?

A. DOJ plans to create liaison positions to assure that
community accessibility and tribal input on local law
enforcement issues and priorities are maintained. Also,
community policing will be emphasized. Federal
investigators will continue to investigate serious crimes.
Uniformed officers will continue to enforce tribal laws.
Whether the subsequent case is presented in federal or
tribal court is, and will continue to be, a prosecutorial
decision.

Q. DOJ Cultural Sensitivity. If there is a transfer, how will
DOJ compensate for its lack of demonstrated experience with
Indian Country law enforcement issues?

A. Under Attorney General Reno's leadership, DOJ has worked
hard to improve law enforcement in Indian Country.
Assistant U.S. Attorneys have been designated as tribal
liaison; the Office of Tribal Justice was created in 1995 to
serve as liaison with tribal governments; the Criminal
Division has developed a pilot program to improve
coordination of Indian Country law enforcement matters; the
FBI has established an Office of Indian Country
Investigations and has dedicated increased manpower to fight
violent crime; and the COPS Office as well as the Office of
Justice Programs have substantially increased assistance to
Indian Country. Finally, U.S. Attorneys have been
prosecuting serious crimes in Indian Country since passage
of the Major Crimes Act in 1885.

Q. Impact on BIA. Would a transfer of law enforcement
functions to DOJ impair BIA's ability to fulfil their broad
mandate as the focal point for government-to-government
relations between the United States and Indian Tribes?

A. No. Currently, DOJ works closely with BIA in its central
role in fulfilling the federal trust responsibility and will
continue to do so regardless of whether BIA law enforcement
functions are transferred to DOJ. BIA will remain the core
Indian agency in the Executive Branch.

Q. Youth Crime and Treatment. Many Tribes are concerned that
more must be done to help at-risk youth and to treat
offenders, when appropriate, and reintegrate them into the
Tribe. Does DOJ plan to help in this area?

A. Although not the focus of this initiative, DOJ is asking for
$30 million in FY 1999 for drug testing and treatment, as
well as prevention and intervention for Indian youth.

Selected Excerpts

Albert Hale, President, Navajo Nation: "...the threshold
issue is expanding the ability to 638 contract over to the
Department of Justice."

Gregg Bourland, Chairman, Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe:
"...these kids think that they're above the law. 'I'm
sixteen years old. I'm above the law. I'm in a gang, but
they're going to baby me around in tribal court.'"

Eddie Tullis, Chairman, Poarch Creek Band of Creek Indians:

"I am of the opinion that law enforcement is such a
complicated issue that if you have the investigative
services on one side and then you have the uniformed police
officers in another, you're asking for some real conflicts
to develop from an operational point of view."

Table of contents

TAB G

OUTCOMES OF THE CONSULTATIONS

TRIBAL PREFERENCES

BIA ICIS

Formal Responses Informal Responses Formal Responses Informal Responses
Arizona

*Colorado River

*Navajo Nation

*Salt River

Pima-Maricopa

*White Mountain

Arizona

Pascua Yaqui

Arizona

*Tohono O'odham

Alabama

*Poarch Creek

California

Cortina Rancheria

Iowa

Meskwaki Tribe

Colorado

Ute Mountain Ute

Minnesota

Leech Lake

Nevada

Duck Valley

Louisiana

*Chitimacha

*Coushatta

*Tunica-Biloxi

Idaho

*Nez Perce

Montana

*Fort Peck



*Denotes contracting or compacting tribes for any and all law enforcement functions

(including 6 self-funded tribes)



BIA ICIS

Formal Responses Informal Responses Formal Responses Informal Responses
Oklahoma

Caddo Tribe

*Cherokee

Chickasaw Nation

*Choctaw Nation

*Kaw Tribe

Modoc Tribe

*Muscogee(Creek)

*Pawnee Tribe

Seminole Tribe

Minnesota

Upper Sioux

Maine

*Passamaquoddy

Pleasant Point

*Passamaquoddy

Township

*Penobscot

Nevada

Inter-Tribal Council

Battle Mountain

Carson Colony

Dresslerville Colony

*Duckwater

Elko Colony

*Goshute Paiute
UT/NV

Moapa River

South Fork

Stewart Colony

Summit Lake

*Walker River

Wells River

Winnemucca Colony

Woodfords Colony

Yomba Colony

*Yerington Colony



Representing Council

*Ely Indian Colony

*Fallon Colony

Fort McDermitt

Lovelock Colony

*Pyramid Lake

*Reno-Sparks Colony

*Te-Moak W. Shoshone

*Washoe





BIA ICIS

Formal Responses Informal Responses Formal Responses Informal Responses
Washington

*Colville

*Yakama

Mississippi

*Choctaw

New Mexico

*Taos Pueblo

South Dakota

*Cheyenne River

Nebraska

Winnebago Tribe

*Omaha Tribe

North Dakota

Three Affiliate Trbe

Turtle Mountain

*Sisseton-Wahpeton

Spirit Lake Nation

Standing Rock Sioux

Washington

*Lower Elwha

New Mexico

*Acoma Pueblo

Cochiti Pueblo

*Isleta Pueblo

Jemez Pueblo

*Laguna Pueblo

Mescalero Apache

*Ramah

*San Juan Pueblo

*Sandia Pueblo

*Santa Ana Pueblo

Santo Domingo Pueblo

*Zia Pueblo

*Zuni Pueblo

Oklahoma

*Absentee Shawnee

Wisconsin

*Menominee

Oklahoma

*Cheyenne-Arapaho

Miami Tribe

*Wyandotte

South Dakota

*Oglala Sioux



BIA ICIS

Formal Responses Informal Responses Formal Responses Informal Responses
Oregon

*Burns Paiute

*Coquille Community

*Grand Ronde

*Siletz

*Umatilla

*Warm Springs

Washington

*Quinalt

South Carolina

Catawba Tribe

Washington

*Swinomish

*Squaxin Island

*Puyallup

*Skokomish

*Upper Skagit

*Port Gamble

S'Klallam

NO POSITION

Arizona

*Ak-Chin

*Cocopah

*Fort McDowell

*Fort Mohave

Gila River

Havasupai

Hopi

Hualapai Tribe

*Kaibab-Paiute

Quechan Tribe

*San Carlos Apache

San Juan Southern Paiute

Tonto Apache

Yavapai-Apache

Yavapai-Prescott

California

*Hoopa Valley

Mooretown

Pit River Tribe

Quartz Valley

Redding Rancheria

Tule River

Twenty-Nine Palms

Wiyot Tribe

Colorado

*Southern Ute

Florida

*Miccosukee

*Seminole Tribes

Idaho

*Coeur D'Alene

Shoshone-Bannock Tribes

Kansas

*Iowa

*Kickapoo

*Prairie Band Potawatomi

*Sac and Fox

Michigan

*Bay Mills Chippewa

*Grand Traverse

*Hannahville

*Keweenaw Bay Indian Community

*Lac Vieux Desert

Little River Band

*Little Traverse Bay Bands

*Saginaw Chippewa Tribe

*Sault Ste. Marie



Minnesota

Bois Forte

Fond du Lac

Grand Portage

Lower Sioux

*Mille Lacs

Prairie Island Community

*Red Lake Band

Shakopee

White Earth

Montana

*Blackfeet

Crow

*Fort Belknap

Northern Cheyenne

*Rocky Boy

*Salish and Kootenai

Nevada

*Las Vegas Colony

New Mexico

*Jicarilla Apache

Nambe Pueblo

*Picuris Pueblo

*Pojoaque Pueblo

San Ildefonso Pueblo

*Santa Clara Pueblo

*Tesuque Pueblo

New York

Cayuga Nation

*Oneida

Onondaga

Seneca Nation

*St. Regis Mohawk

Tonawanda

Tuscarora Nation

North Carolina

*Eastern Cherokee

Oklahoma

Alabama Quassarte Tribal Town

Chickasaw Nation

*Citizen Band Potawatomi

*Comanche Tribe

*Iowa

*Kickapoo Tribe

*Ponca

*Sac and Fox

Seneca-Cayuga Tribe

Thlopthlocco Tribal Town

South Dakota

*Crow Creek Sioux

Flandreau Santee Sioux

Lower Brule

*Rosebud

Yankton

Texas

Alabama-Coushatta

Kickapoo

*Tigua (Ysleta del Sur Pueblo)

Utah

Paiute Indian Tribe

Uintah and Ouray

Washington

*Kalispel

*Makah

Spokane

Wisconsin

*Oneida

Stockbridge-Munsee

Wyoming

Eastern Shoshone

Northern Arapaho

Table of contents

TAB H



EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE (EC) FOR INDIAN COUNTRY

LAW ENFORCEMENT IMPROVEMENT (FORMERLY ICIS)



LIAISON WITH CONGRESS, THE WHITE HOUSE, AND CABINET OFFICERS

David Ogden (DOJ) and Anne Shields (DOI)



THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE




Name Phone Fax
Co-Chairs:
Kevin Di Gregory (DOJ)
*Hilda Manuel (BIA)

Members:
*Tom LeClaire (DOJ-OTJ)

*Ted Quasula (BIA-OLES)

*Derril Jordan (DOI-SW)
Tim Vollmann (DOI-HQ)

*Ron Allen (S'Klallam)
*Mary Thomas (Gila River)

*Phillip Martin (Choctaw)

*Bill Anoatubby (Chickasaw)

*W. Walksalong (Cheyenne)

*Roland Johnson (Laguna)

Janet Napolitano (USA)

John Kelly (USA)

S. Matteucci (USA-Alt)

Mike Roper (DOJ)
Steve Wiley (FBI)
Pat Sledge (BOP)

202-514-9724
202-208-5116

202-514-8835

505-248-7937
202-208-3401
505-883-6700
202-466-7767
520-562-6000
601-656-5251
405-436-7204

406-477-6284

505-552-6654

602-514-7576

505-766-3341

406-657-6101

202-514-1843

202-324-4188

202-514-8585

514-6034
208-5320

514-9078
248-7905
219-1791
883-6711
466-7797
562-3422
656-1992
436-4287
477-6210
552-6941
514-7670
766-5574
657-6989
514-1778
324-3089
307-0215



STAFF TO EC

Director:
* Phil Baridon

Members:
Soo Song (OTJ-20%)

T. Toulou (MT AUSA-25%)

* K. Bliss (NM AUSA-25%)

S. Kimball (NM-AUSA-20%)

Mikki Atsatt (DOJ/BS-15%)

* Brent LeRocque (OLES-25%)

* Dave Nicholas (BIA-25%)

* Craig Jones (BIA-10%)

June Kress (COPS-50%)

Ginny Hutchinson(NIC-15%)

Joe Lodge (AZ AUSA-15%)

* Walt Lamar (OK FBI-20%)

Mark Donahue (FBI-HQ)

Beth Luedtke (DOJ-100%)

202-514-2659

202-616-9040

406-247-4629
505-766-2868
505-766-2868

202-616-3786
505-248-7937

202-208-5039
505-746-5752
202-616-2915

303-682-0639
602-514-7565
405-290-7770
202-324-3366

202-514-4669

514-9087

514-9078
657-6989 x185
766-8517 x138
766-2127
514-3333
248-7905
208-6170
748-8162
616-9612 x140
682-0469
514-7693
290-3885
324-2731
514-9087

ALIGN=CENTER>



Enrolled tribal members.

Footnotes:

1. This Committee includes tribal leaders and representatives
from DOI and DOJ. See the full list at Tab H.

2. Of all issues discussed by the Executive Committee, tribal
leaders held the strongest views on these two issues. The Tribes
have made it very clear that assurances are mandatory that
present contracting/compacting and Indian preference policies
will continue.

3. The FBI, however, will continue to play an important role
in Indian Country, and no proposal envisions any change in their
statutory authority.

4. Today, federal law enforcement is the only protection for
victims of violent felonies in most of Indian Country. The
federal government has a basic responsibility to preserve public
safety in all of Indian Country. In general, this responsibility
derives from the unique trust relationship between federal and
tribal governments, as well as specific statutory provisions such
as those that mandate exclusive federal jurisdiction for "major
crimes," including murder, rape, robbery, and child abuse. (See
18 U.S.C. § 1152-1153). Moreover, the 1994 Crime Act has
expanded federal criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country in such
areas as guns, violent juveniles, drugs, and domestic violence.
In states covered under 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (P.L. 280), such as
California and Alaska, baseline law enforcement services are
provided by the state, and Indian Tribes have concurrent
authority over crimes by Indians.

5. Homicide and Suicide Among Native Americans (1979-1992) at
17. A report by The Indian Health Service in cooperation with
the National Center for Injury Prevention and Control (1996).

6. Based on data from FBI Uniform Crime Reports and BIA
Annual Law Enforcement Reports.

7. See, for example, the Report of the Task Force on Indian
Matters
, U.S. Department of Justice, October 1975.

8. This Committee includes tribal leaders and representatives
from DOI and DOJ. See the full list at Tab H.

9. This figure does not include Alaska, which has a large
indigenous population and 226 Tribes. However, only one small
Tribe in Alaska (the Metlakatla) is under federal jurisdiction.
Alaska does have tribal police and a serious crime problem.
While Alaska Natives represent 16 percent of the state's
population, they account for 34 percent of the prison population.
According to Crime Reported in Alaska 1995 (Alaska Department of
Public Safety), death rates for Alaska Native males from homicide
and legal execution were 2.3 times those of white males.

10. Based on data from FBI Uniform Crime Reports and BIA
Annual Law Enforcement Reports.

11. 11 Report No. 96-16, September 1996. For example, in 1996
only 32 percent of the Tribes submitted official crime reports to
the BIA. Much information comes from informal surveys.

12. 12 According to the BIA Office of Law Enforcement Services,
more than 100 positions were lost during the 1995 RIFs. This
includes 30 criminal investigators, 55 police officers, 16
jailers, and other essential support personnel. These BIA
funding cutbacks also cause parallel reductions in law
enforcement services provided by the Tribes. Although those lost
were permanent personnel, the three-year grants by the COPS
Office have helped increase the uniformed police presence on some
reservations.

13. 13 Using the 1990 census, the BIA reports that only 24 of the
558 federally-recognized Tribes numbered more than 10,000.
Hence, this is the nearest possible comparison.

14. Although the FBI has assigned additional agents to help
compensate for the loss of BIA criminal investigators, they
normally work out of resident agencies or satellite offices that
are not close to the Tribes they serve. For example, agents
assigned to the FBI office in Gallup, N.M., report that it is not
unusual to travel three to six hours for a single witness
interview.

15. The Navajo Nation favors the BIA option but suggests "that
OLES be elevated within (DOI) to a level equal with the several
bureaus in (DOI), such as BIA, Bureau of Reclamation, Land
Management, etc." In addition, the Navajo Nation believes that a
DOJ office should be created to provide "a comprehensive
interface between the DOI/BIA and USDOJ...to ensure coordination
of the full range of services needed to support an enhanced law
enforcement system in Indian Country."

16. Once an option is selected, a performance plan that will
establish goals and measures of results will be developed, as
mandated under the Government Performance Results Act (GPRA).

17. This problem was highlighted in an Oversight Hearing
before the Subcommittee on Native American Affairs on the Indian
Law Enforcement Reform Act, March 18, 1994. H.R. Doc. No. 103-74,
p.50.

18. This may include whether technical corrections are needed
in the Indian Law Enforcement Reform Act of 1990. For example,
one area of interest is Sec. 5, 25 U.S.C. § 2804, relating to
cross-deputization agreements.

19. At 15%, the number of criminal investigators needed would
be 644. However, this figure was reduced to 496 to take into
account the 23% of tribal population that is covered by P.L. 280
and thus would not need additional federal criminal
investigators. For example, approximately 100,000 Alaskan
Natives would be eligible for additional police officers, but not
a corresponding increase in criminal investigators, because the
state is responsible for criminal investigations.

20. 20 Title I, § 102, 102 Stat.2285, as amended by P.L. 103-413,
P.L. 103-435, and P.L. 103-437.

21. 21BIA Strategic Plan, August 1997.

22. For example, in the BIA Phoenix area, which includes
Nevada, 131 sexual abuse offenses out of 413 total offenses were
reported in calendar year 1995. This figure does not reflect all
incidents, since fewer than half of the Tribes provided crime
data during those years.

23. 23 Codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3201 et seq. Congress expressly
found that throughout Indian Country there was gross under-reporting of child abuse, repeated incidents of child abuse
perpetrated by federal employees, a complete failure by the
federal government and Tribes to conduct criminal background
checks for child care providers and teachers, and de minimis
funding of counseling and other victim services.

24. Examples include a 16-year-old step brother who sneaked
into his seven-year-old step sister's bedroom each night to
fondle her under her pajamas; two cousins, one 14, the other 16,
who sodomized two neighborhood children because "they thought it
would be fun;" a 14-year-old boy who, left to babysit an eight-year-old girl and her six-year-old brother, threw the girl down
to the floor and raped her; and two 16-year-old brothers who
raped girls in the community and then tattooed them. Other
tragic examples of child abuse abound.

25. In 1995, BIA seized 13,793 cultivated marijuana plants
from many Indian reservations throughout the United States.
Almost as many (11,884) were seized in 1996.

26. For example, the U.S. Attorney's office in the Eastern
District of Wisconsin recently coordinated an extensive
investigation of a drug trafficking organization on the Menominee
reservation. The investigation included the first Title III
wiretap on an Indian reservation, culminating in two multi-count
indictments charging 27 people with various federal narcotics
offenses, including ten who are subject to five-year mandatory
minimum penalties. Similarly, on September 4, 1997, 22
individuals were arrested on federal drug trafficking charges
resulting from a seven-month, joint-agency undercover
investigation on the Pine Ridge Reservation in South Dakota. The
marijuana purchased in that investigation will expose some
defendants to five-year minimum sentences. Other U.S. Attorneys'
offices, especially in the Southwest, are also making an effort
to coordinate investigations, search warrants, and federal
indictments directed at drug traffickers on Indian reservations.

27. The BIA has only one detention specialist position, which
has proven inadequate to provide the level of service needed to
help jail staff effectively manage and operate their facilities.
Additional technical assistance has been provided through the
Justice Department's National Institute of Corrections (NIC).
NIC, however, has a very limited budget which must provide
technical assistance and training to prisons, jails, probation,
parole, and community corrections facilities nationwide.
Services to Indian Country jails constitute only a small
percentage of NIC's yearly assistance.

28. Most Indian Country jails are of a linear design, meaning
cells are arranged in a row and sit at right angles to a
corridor. Bars or security doors separate the cells from the
corridor. Staff observe the inmates in their cells by
"patrolling" the corridor at irregular intervals. This design
has proven to be a hindrance to even the most basic of jail
operations, including inmate observation, supervision, and
management. Under ideal conditions staff would patrol the
corridor at least every 30 minutes. Staffing levels often result
in patrol intervals that are much longer.

29. In 1995, the BIA contracted with a consultant to conduct
needs assessments on 34 BIA-owned facilities. The firm concluded
that many facilities are beyond repair and should be replaced.
The BIA's Division of Safety Management, the Indian Health
Service, and some tribal courts have recommended or ordered that
facilities be repaired or closed. Very recently, the Federal
Court, District of Colorado, ordered the BIA to make major
repairs to the BIA jail on the Ute Mountain Ute Reservation.

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