United States v. MSC Shipmanagement Limited, et al.

On August 10, 2026, the court sentenced a vessel operating company and the company’s chief engineer following an incident in June 2024 where the vessel, MSC Michigan VII, caused the evacuation of a large bridge in Charleston, South Carolina. The event also created a significant wake that injured two people, damaged ships and piers, and led to the clearing of local beaches.

MSC Shipmanagement Limited (MSC) will pay a $6 million fine and complete a four-year term of probation. The company pleaded guilty to failing to report a hazardous condition on the vessel and to obstructing a National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) investigation. MSC must also conduct a root-cause analysis of the circumstances relating to the hazardous conditions onboard the MSC Michigan VII.

Chief engineer Fernando San Diego San Juan was sentenced to pay a $2,000 fine. He pleaded guilty to failing to report a hazardous condition and obstructing the investigation (46 U.S.C. § 70036(b)(1); 18 U.S.C. § 1505).

On June 5, 2024, the MSC Michigan VII departed from Charleston. The vessel intended to travel up the Cooper River to a turning basin. Once it turned around, it was to proceed down along the river, beneath the Arthur Ravenel Jr. Bridge (bridge), through Charleston Harbor, and out to sea. The bridge is an eight-lane thoroughfare spanning two-and-a-half miles and connecting Charleston with Mount Pleasant, South Carolina. 

During this outbound transit, the linkage rod (LR) disconnected from the vessel’s governor (which regulates speed) after the vessel’s crew manually adjusted it. As a result, the main engine sped up to 16-17 knots. The bridge was evacuated over concerns the vessel might strike it, though the ship passed underneath and out to sea. The wake caused by the vessel’s passing however, damaged ships and piers, injured two people on a beach, and forced officials to clear local beaches. 

At times, the exact revolutions per minute (rpms) ordered by the MSC Michigan VII’s bridge telegraph could be achieved only if the length of the LR between the governor and fuel rack was manually adjusted. Only trained technicians should manually adjust a vessel’s governor and LR, and none of the engineering crew onboard the MSC Michigan VII were qualified to do so. Despite this, when the vessel was either entering or departing a port, the engineering crew had to pay attention to the bridge telegraph order that could be seen in the engine control room. As needed, they would go to the governor and manually adjust the length of the LR until the desired rpms were reached. 

Additionally, bridge crew members would occasionally call the engine control room and request the rpms be raised or lowered to match the telegraph order. Chief Engineer San Diego San Juan knew that this practice was hazardous because manually adjusting the length of the LR could cause it to fail. Even so, he allowed the practice to continue. 

Both the failure of the engine to achieve the rpms dictated by the bridge telegraph and the manual adjustment to the LR during maneuvering constituted hazardous conditions that should have been reported to the USCG.

During their investigation, the USCG and the NTSB interviewed San Diego San Juan and asked him if the LR was ever adjusted. He lied and said that the crew never adjusted the LR and only a qualified technician would do the adjustment. The NTSB and USCG reinterviewed San Diego San Juan and asked him whether there had been a delay between the bridge telegraph and the main engine response in the past. He lied and said no. Investigators asked him again if anyone had ever adjusted the LR and he said no. 

San Diego San Juan also told a few crew members what he told the USCG and told them to repeat the same version of events when questioned so they would all be on “the same page.” 

The U.S. Coast Guard and the National Transportation Safety Board conducted the investigation.