Appendix 8

CCA Documents in Response to the July 25, 1998 NEOCC Inmate Escapes

 

CCA After-Action Report

CCA Plan of Action

CCA Response to DOC

 

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MEMORANDUM

TO: CHARLES BLANCHETTE, V.P. OPERATION

FROM: MELODY TURNER, SENIOR DIVISION COORDINATOR

DATE: JULY 30, 1998

SUBJECT: AFTER-ACTION REVIEW OF ESCAPE OF 07/25/98

An after-Action Team consisting of Wardens J.L. Craven, Pablo Sedillo and Robert Lacy was assembled in Youngtown, Ohio following the successful escape of six (6) inmates from the NEOCC on July 25, 1998.

A review of the event reveals a number of problem areas which contributed to the escape which occurred without staff knowledge until reported by an inmate informant to a Unit Manager. Staff response, after being informed of the incident was very satisfactory, however, the problems noted prior to the escape are of significant concern.

The contributing factors include the following categories:

 

 

 

 

Each of the contributing factors will be examined separately and appropriate documentation to support the contributing factor will attached to this support.

 

 

A. Staff Actions and Performance.

At approximately 12:15 P.M. on 07/25/98, two hundred and nineteen (219) inmates were moved to the #3 Recreation Yard. During that process five (5) assigned staff were present, however, no supervisory staff was identified. The Central Control was notified of the count of inmates on the yard and staff assumed appropriate vantage points to supervise the inmates. It is noted that a walk through metal detector was used to screen the inmates, and when staff saw a visible alert on the metal detector the inmate would be pulled aside and pat searched. No hand held detector was present or in use, thereby allowing items secreted in shoes, radios to pass onto the yard. Staff interviews revealed serious staffing shortages began to occur in violation of the staffing levels mandated by Chief ________ memo of 06/26/98. Lt. _______ called one (1) officer off the yard to supplement staffing in a housing unit. Two (2) staff reportedly took restroom breaks of approximately 10-15 minutes with no relief provided. An additional staff conducted an escort to medical. It is conceivable that some 10-40 minutes passed with the total available staff being two (2) or three (3) officers. With consideration of the needed coverage in the gym, on the courts in front of the gym, and the large field, inmates would reasonably have had access to substantial time to approach and cut the fences without detection. Personal observations of the perimeter patrol vehicles reveal a pattern of 7 ½ to 10 minutes between rounds and appear to follow a distinct directions and timed route.

Several possible scenarios for access to the cutting tool have been developed and presented, however, the introductive of the unlocated cutters by a staff member appears most viable. That possibility is being investigated by law enforcement officials and this team is unable to validate where the cutters came from as of this writing.

Investigator information reveals that the initial escape was planned and implemented by one (1) or two (2) inmates with either four (4) or five (5) who just took advantage of the opportunity and impulsively followed. Additionally, the information developed indicates that the inmates on the #3 Yard, aware of the escape, began moving back toward the building to return without being recalled by staff. Rec officers informed the supervisors that the inmates wanted to return and received approval to process them back in since it was intended to recall early due to staff shortages on the 3^rd shift. This occurred at approximately 2:10 P.M. and with only four (4) staff present, no accurate count was taken.

It is also noted that the procedures described by the rec officers for securing the yard do not include a fence inspection and none was conducted. After the inmates began arriving back in the housing unit, an informant on the unit informed staff of escape some 30 minutes after the inmates had successfully breeched the perimeter.

It is also note that no supervisor was provided to the operation of the Recreation Yard during this entire time period. In conclusion the staffing issues contributing to the compromise includes:

1. At least two (2) maybe three (3) of the assigned staff were absent for portions of the time.

2. There is no clear knowledge of the specific assignments and procedures to appropriately supervise the area.

3. No supervision was provided to the yard officers during the entire rec period.

4. Security procedures involving the shakedown on/off the yard is compromised by the existing metal detector and no follow-up transfrisker.

5. There is no record of inmates being counted back into the building from any rec yard.

6. There are no staff who indicate that fence inspections are needed prior to opening or after closing the yard.

7. The shift Captain turned over the entire day's operation to the shift Lieutenant which is reported to be a regular occurrence.

8. As staff were moved from the yard, positions of observation were changed which eliminated staff observation of the area breeched by the inmates.

B. The second contributing factor involves Policy and Procedural Compliance.

1. The Post Orders and Policy lack clear guidance for the staff tracked with supervision of the Recreation Yard. No fence checks are required nor is it required to verify the operation of the detection system. Note: Zone six (6) which is the covering zone at the breech point did not activate at any time during the recreation period.

Officers have no clear guidance from supervisor's, Post Orders or Policy on how and where to position themselves.

2. The existing metal detector system is ineffective to detect and control contraband on or off they yard.

3. Although the post orders clearly dictate counting on and off the yard, that is not occurring and no counts off the yard were noted. An accurate count off the yard could have resulted in a more timely knowledge of the escape.

4. Most glaring is the complete lack of the supervisors involvement in the recreation process. Staff were moved without supervisory authority in two (2) cases which brought staffing to a level incapable of adequate supervisor.

C. Physical Deficiencies and Problems also served to contribute to this breech.

1. The zone alarm (#6) did not activate during the entire recreation period. Zone #6 is the covering zone for the area of the escape. Visual inspection revealed the zone transmitter to be aimed at a point some 45 feet up the fence from the breech area, precluding appropriate detection of that area.

2. The routes, direction and predictability of the perimeter vehicles allowed inmates to be well aware of their timing and presence.

3. The placement and use of the walk through metal detector does little to preclude contraband traffic to and from the yard.

Recommendations.

1. Staffing:

A) A complete review of the existing staffing, training and supervisor needs for the effective operation of the Recreation Yards is appropriate.

B) Review Post Orders and Policy to ensure security inspections, fence checks, zone validation, staff positioning, relief's and etc. are properly addressed.

C) Conduct a complete assessment of the capability and effectiveness of the detection system and modify as needed.

D) Add additional razor wire to the outer perimeter around the entire facility. Consider placement of two (2) to four (4) additional rolls on the ground between the fence.

E) Evaluate the existing Perimeter Patrol System and modify as needed to make it more effective.

F) Established a Routine Inspection System.

G) Install a Management or Control Fence to preclude inmate access to outer fence and zone coverage.

Should you have additional questions, please contact me.

MT/JLC:lma

NORTHEAST OHIO CORRECTIONAL CENTER

ESCAPE INCIDENT - JULY 25, 1998

PLAN OF ACTION

IDENTIFIED CAUSE[s]	ACTION TAKEN	STATUS
1. The shift supervisor responsible for the 7am to 3pm shifts had delegated the supervision of the shift to an assistant shift supervisor. In doing so secluded himself into an office for the entire shift.	1.a. The individual shift supervisor's employment has been terminated for violation of policy, procedure and post orders.	1.a. Completed.
2. The assistant shift supervisor acting as the "shift supervisor" made the decision to reduce the staffing on the outside recreation yard by one correctional officer. There is a written directive in place requiring five correctional officers to operate recreation yard #3. This action reduced the number from 5 to 4 shortly after 219 inmates had been placed onto the recreation yard.	2.a. The individual assistant shift supervisor has received formal disciplinary action for failing to comply with written directives. 2.b. The written directive has been re-enforced at subsequent security supervisor and department head meetings.	2.a. Completed. 2.b. Completed.

NORTHEAST OHIO CORRECTIONAL CENTER

ESCAPE INCIDENT - JULY 25, 1998

PLAN OF ACTION

IDENTIFIED CAUSE [s]	ACTION TAKEN	STATUS
3. The design and construction of the recreation yard #3 allowed access by the inmates into the motion detector alarm areas. Creating multiple accidental activation of the motion detector system from retrieving soccer or baseball by inmates. This repetitive action created a callousness in the response by the central control and perimeter patrol officers.	3.a. A control/management fence has been constructed in recreation yard #3. Preventing access by the inmates into the motion detector alarm areas. Preventing any future false alarms.	3.a. Completed. See attachment A.
4. There were four correctional officers in the recreation area at the time of the escape. None had visual vantage point on the area of the escape. The investigation reveals that early in the recreation period the officers were dispersed between the gym, basketball court, and the baseball field. During the recreation period both officers left portions of the baseball field unsupervised by standing inside of the basketball court. Both officers could only see part of the ball field the escape occurred in the section that vision was blocked by the gym.	4.a. The correctional officers who were assigned to the ball field have received formal disciplinary action for abandoning their post. 4.b. The shift supervisors post order has been revised requiring at the minimum a senior correctional officer to provide direct supervision to the c/o's during recreation period. 4.c. Three twenty-foot towers are under construction. Each outside of the perimeter fence, activated during recreation as an armed post supervise all outside recreation activities.	4.a. Completed 4.b. Completed. See attachment B. 4.c. Completed. See attachment C.

NORTHEAST OHIO CORRECTIONAL CENTER

ESCAPE INCIDENT - JULY 25, 1998

PLAN OF ACTION

IDENTIFIED CAUSE[s]	ACTION TAKEN	STATUS
5. The staff did not document counting the inmates back into the building from the recreation yard. There is evidence that the field was inspected prior to allowing the inmates access to the recreation field. There was no inspection of the recreation area after the inmates were escorted into the building.	5.a. Re-enforcement of the current recreation officer post orders requiring counting both in and out from the recreation area. 5.b. Post orders revised requiring inspection of the fence and recreation area both prior to and after each recreation period.	5.a. Completed. 5.b. Completed. see attachment D.
6. The method of cutting the fence fabric remains under investigation by the U.S. Marshals Office. A single employee remains on administrative leave pending the results of the investigation.	6.a. Two separate inventories were conducted immediately after the escape. All tools which belong to the facility are accounted for. 6.b. Because of the current suspicion of employee involvement in providing the tool used. The pedestrian checkpoint post has been changed from active 17 hours to 24 hours per day.	6.b. Completed. see attachment E.

NORTHEAST OHIO CORRECTIONAL CENTER

ESCAPE INCIDENT - JULY 25, 1998

PLAN OF ACTION

IDENTIFIED CAUSE[s]	ACTION TAKEN	STATUS
7. 219 inmates within the gym, basketball court, and baseball field were too large of a number to be supervised by 4 or 5 Correctional Officers. The current recreation schedule allows access to the recreation area by two buildings at one time up to 256 beds.	7.a. The recreation schedule has been changed to allow access to the recreation yard to a maximum of 128 inmates.	7.a. Completed.
8. The motion detector system is relied upon too heavily.	8.a. The construction and use of the manned/armed towers will provide direct clovated armed supervision of the perimeter in and around the outside recreation yards. 8.b. Razor ribbon has been added to the exterior fence creating a solid wall completely surrounding the entire perimeter.	8.a. Completed. 8.b. Completed. see attachment F.

 

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October 23, 1998

Calvin R. Edwards
Interim Director
Government of the District of Columbia
Department of Corrections, Suite N-203
1923 Vermont Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001

Dear Mr. Edwards:

Your letter of September 24, 1998 to Doctor Crants requesting a copy of the plan of action complied by CCA after the escape involving Northeast Ohio Correctional Center has been forwarded to me for response. Please enclosed the plan of action.

If you have additional questions, please feel free to contact me.

Respectfully,

/s/

 

Linda G. Cooper

cc: Doctor R. Crants (w/o enclosure)