Opinions

The race- and sex-based preference incorporated into 16 U.S.C. § 590c’s fee-waiver provision violates the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection. This conclusion is consistent with prior Executive Branch determinations with respect to other race- and sex-based preferences in programs administered by the Department of Agriculture.

Several other statutory provisions relating to Department of Agriculture programs do not violate the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection, either because they do not afford preferential treatment of any kind or because they are susceptible of race- and sex-neutral implementation.

In prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disability, neither section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act nor Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) imposed an integration mandate on states in their treatment of mentally disabled individuals. Nor does either statute authorize the responsible Executive Branch agencies to impose such a mandate.

A statutory mandate that states treat mentally disabled patients in maximally integrated settings would raise serious questions regarding the scope of Congress’s power under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Interstate Commerce Clause, and the Spending Clause.

In Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999), the Supreme Court did not hold that section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act or Title II of the ADA require states to treat mentally disabled patients in the most integrated setting appropriate to their needs.

The Equal Credit Opportunity Act does not create disparate-impact liability. The statute’s textual focus on an actor’s mindset, as opposed to the consequences of his actions, demonstrates that it contemplates liability only for intentional discrimination. And other indicators of statutory purpose cannot overcome the statutory text.

EEOC’s Title VII guidelines are unconstitutional because they contemplate liability based on disparate effects alone, without regard to an employer’s likely intent, and pressure employers to engage in race-based decisionmaking. Properly understood, disparate-impact liability proscribes only those practices that reflect a significant likelihood of intentional discrimination.

The business-necessity defense requires employers to demonstrate only that the challenged practice rationally serves a valid business purpose.

Workplace requirements and selection procedures—such as background checks, aptitude tests, and SAT scores—are presumptively job-related. Only irrational or arbitrary practices with no plausible job-relatedness can create disparate-impact liability.

Disparate-impact plaintiffs must both establish that the challenged employment practice specifically caused the alleged disparate impact and provide evidence that an equally effective alternative practice causes less disparate impact.

The Federal Communications Commission’s Lifeline program provides federal means-tested public benefits and must therefore comply with the eligibility restrictions set forth in the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996.

Collecting a subscriber’s Social Security Number before enrollment is not sufficient to verify noncitizen eligibility for participation in the Lifeline program.

The Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division has authority to seek statewide voter lists and share them with the Department of Homeland Security as part of its effort to identify individuals who are ineligible to vote, which other provisions of law do not limit.

The Secretary of War may designate an existing Department of War organization as a defense field activity pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 191 so long as the organization’s governing statute is not inconsistent with the requirements of a defense field activity. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 191, 192.

The term “field operating agency” in defense appropriations acts means a specialized subdivision of the Office of the Secretary of War or of an Armed Service that carries out noncombat activities under the Office of the Secretary of War or the relevant Armed Service’s headquarters. The term does not include a major command or its subordinate commands, nor does it include Combat Support Agencies. See Pub. L. No. 118-47, § 8044(a)(1), 138 Stat. 460, 492 (2024).

The procedural requirements of section 8044 of Public Law 118-47 are not triggered where the action of the Secretary of War establishes a defense field activity yet does not “bring about or into existence” a new field operating agency. See Pub. L. No. 118‑47, § 8044(a)(1), (b), 138 Stat. 460, 492–93 (2024).

The Presidential Records Act is unconstitutional because it exceeds Congress’s enumerated and implied powers and aggrandizes the Legislative Branch at the expense of the constitutional independence and autonomy of the Executive.

A bankruptcy court’s unilateral subdelegation of functions requiring an Article III judge’s “total control” violates Article III of the Constitution.

Proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure authorizing bankruptcy judges to appoint special masters to perform functions involving constitutionally non-core claims would deprive Article III courts of the requisite “total control.”

Presidential orders issued as an exercise of congressionally delegated authority or the President’s constitutional powers have the force of federal law under the Supremacy Clause and may preempt state law.

An order issued pursuant to the Defense Production Act may preempt state laws expressly or by conflict.

An order issued pursuant to the Defense Production Act may displace sanctions for non-compliance with a contrary consent decree, even if that consent decree rests on federal-law claims.