Case Document

Maricopa County v. United States Opposition to Certiorari

Date

Friday, February 15, 2019

Document Type

Briefs - Miscellaneous

Attachments

County of Maricopa v. United States Opposition to Certiorari

No. 18-498

In the Supreme Court of the United States

MARICOPA COUNTY, ARIZONA, ET AL., PETITIONERS

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

NOEL J. FRANCISCO
Solicitor General Counsel of Record

ERIC S. DREIBAND
Assistant Attorney General

THOMAS E. CHANDLER

ELIZABETH P. HECKER
Attorneys
Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530-0001

SupremeCtBriefs@usdoj.gov
(202) 514-2217

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether Arizona sheriffs are final policymakers for their counties concerning law enforcement in
light of Arizona’s constitution, statutes, and case law.

2. Whether municipalities can be liable for unlawful actions of their final policymakers under
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq., and 34 U.S.C. 12601 (Supp V.
2017).

3. Whether the courts below correctly applied issue preclusion to bind the petitioner to findings
in related litigation regarding the lawfulness of its policing policies.

(I)

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

Opinions below .............................................................................. 1
Jurisdiction .................................................................................... 1
Statement ...................................................................................... 2
Argument..................................................................................... 11
Conclusion ................................................................................... 22
Appendix A — Email from Paul Killebrew, Special Counsel, Civil Rights Div.,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Richard Walker et al. (May 11, 2018) .................................... 1a
Appendix B — Letter from Steven H. Rosenbaum, Chief, Special Litigation Section,
Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Stephanie Cherny, Chief of Staff & Special Counsel,
Maricopa Cnty. Sherriff’s Office (Aug. 3, 2017)................... 4a

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Arata v. Nu Skin Int’l, Inc., 96 F.3d 1265
(9th Cir. 1996)...................................................................... 12
Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002) .............................. 18
Braillard v. Maricopa Cnty., 232 P.3d 1263
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2010), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 1008
(2011) ...................................................................................... 2
Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States,
506 U.S. 9 (1992) ................................................................. 12
Davis ex. rel LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of
Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999) ............................................. 7, 18
Flanders v. Maricopa Cnty., 54 P.3d 837
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) ....................................................... 9, 15
Franklin v. Zaruba, 150 F.3d 682 (7th Cir. 1998),
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1141 (1999) ..................................... 16

(III)

Cases—Continued: Page

Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274
(1998) ................................................................................ 8, 18
Grech v. Clayton Cnty., 335 F.3d 1326
(11th Cir. 2003).................................................................... 15
Knight v. C.D. Vernon, 214 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2000) ... 16, 17
Maricopa Cnty. v. Melendres, 136 S. Ct. 799
(2016) .................................................................... 3, 12, 13, 21
McMillian v. Monroe Cnty., 520 U.S. 781
(1997) ............................................................3, 7, 9, 13, 14, 15
Melendres v. Arpaio: 598 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (D. Ariz. 2009).......... 2
784 F.3d 1254 (9th Cir. 2015), cert denied,
136 S. Ct. 799 (2016) .................................................... 3
Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651 (1895)...................................... 12
Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658
(1978) ........................................................................ 17, 18, 19
Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986)...... 7, 19
Scott v. O’Grady, 975 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1992),
cert denied, 508 U.S. 942 (1993) .................................. 16, 17
Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008).................... 11, 20, 21
Turquitt v. Jefferson Cnty., 137 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir.),
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 874 (1998) ....................................... 16

Constitutions and statutes:

U.S. Const.:
Amend. I............................................................................. 4
Amend. IV .......................................................................... 2
Amend. XI........................................................................ 16
Amend. XIV ................................................................... 2, 4
Ariz. Const. Art. 12, § 3 ........................................................... 9
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Tit. VI, 42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq........ passim

Statutes—Continued: Page

42 U.S.C. 2000d................................................................ 18
Education Amendments of 1972, Tit. IX,
20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq........................................................... 18
34 U.S.C. 12601 (Supp. V 2017) ................................... passim
42 U.S.C. 1983 ............................................................... passim
42 U.S.C. 14141 (2012)............................................................. 4
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. (2012):
§ 11-251(1) (Supp. 2017) .............................................. 9, 16
§ 11-253(A) ......................................................................... 9
§ 11-401(A)(1)..................................................................... 9
§ 11-444(A) ......................................................................... 9

Miscellaneous:

Yihyun Jeong, Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office meets federal language-access requirements in jails,
azcentral.com, Aug. 10, 2017, https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/
local/phoenix/2017/08/10/sheriffs-office-meets- federal-language-access-requirements-jails/
554638001/.............................................................................. 6
1 Restatement (Second) of Judgments (1982) .................... 20

In the Supreme Court of the United States

No. 18-498

MARICOPA COUNTY, ARIZONA, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 4-14) is reported at 889 F.3d 648. The opinion of
the district court denying petitioner’s motion for summary judg- ment and granting summary judgment
to the United States (Pet. App. 33-102) is reported at 151 F. Supp. 3d 998. The opinion of the
district court denying peti- tioner’s motion to dismiss (Pet. App. 15-32) is reported at 915 F.
Supp. 2d 1073.

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on May 7, 2018. A petition for rehearing was
denied on July 16, 2018 (Pet. App. 268-269). The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on
October 15, 2018. The juris- diction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

(1)

STATEMENT

1. In 2007, private parties brought a class action against petitioner Maricopa County, then-Sheriff
Jo- seph Arpaio, and the Maricopa County Sheriff ’s Office (MCSO) under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging
that the defend- ants had engaged in discriminatory policing against La- tinos in violation of the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amend- ments. See Melendres v. Arpaio, No. 07-cv-2513 (D. Ariz. filed Dec.
12, 2007).

In 2008, the defendants in the Melendres action moved to dismiss MCSO from the case on the ground
that MCSO did not have a legal existence separate from petitioner. Defs. Mot. to Dismiss Pls. First
Am. Compl., 07-cv-2513 D. Ct. Doc. 39, at 19-20 (D. Ariz. Sept. 29, 2008). The district court denied

the motion, noting that Arizona law was unsettled on whether county police forces have separate

legal existences from the counties that they serve. Melendres v. Arpaio, 598 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1039 (D. Ariz. 2009).

In 2009, with petitioner’s consent, the Melendres plaintiffs filed a joint motion and stipulation
to dismiss petitioner from the Melendres lawsuit without preju- dice. The motion stated that
“Defendant Maricopa County [was] not a necessary party at [that] juncture for obtaining the
complete relief sought,” but that the dismissal was “without prejudice to rejoining” peti- tioner
as a defendant at a later time “if doing so becomes necessary to obtain complete relief.” Pet. App.
105.

In 2010, the Arizona Court of Appeals held in Braillard v. Maricopa County, 232 P.3d 1263,

cert. denied, 563 U.S. 1008 (2011), that the MCSO was not a separate legal en- tity from

petitioner and therefore could not be sued in its own right. Id. at 1269.

In 2013, after a bench trial, the district court in Melendres found MCSO and Arpaio liable for
constitu- tional violations. Pet. App. 111-267. As relevant here, the court found that MCSO had
conducted pretextual traffic stops to determine whether vehicle occupants were legally authorized
to be in the country, had used Hispanic ancestry or race as part of the evidence to es- tablish
reasonable suspicion for suspected state-law im- migration violations, and had conducted other
discrimi- natory traffic stops. Id. at 114, 221-224, 240-241. The district court entered a
permanent injunction directing MCSO to amend various policies and procedures. Id. at 265-267.

The court of appeals affirmed the district court’s findings and virtually all of the ordered
injunctive relief. Melendres v. Arpaio, 784 F.3d 1254, 1260-1267 (9th Cir.
2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 799 (2016). However, the court concluded that the MCSO was not in
fact a sepa- rate legal entity from petitioner in light of the interven- ing decision in Braillard.
Id. at 1260. The court there- fore dismissed MCSO from the case and substituted pe- titioner in its
place. Ibid.

Petitioner sought a writ of certiorari. It argued that the court of appeals had erred in
substituting petitioner for MCSO in light of McMillian v. Monroe County,
520 U.S. 781 (1997). It further argued that under McMillian, Arizona sheriffs are policymakers for
the State, not their respective counties, in the area of law enforcement. See Pet. at 11-19,
Maricopa Cnty. v. Melendres, 136 S. Ct. 799 (2016) (No. 15-376); Pet. Cert. Reply. Br. at 4-9,
Melendres, supra (No. 15-376). This Court denied the petition. Maricopa Cnty. v. Melen- dres, 136
S. Ct. 799 (2016) (No. 15-376).

2. a. In 2012, while the Melendres case was pend- ing, the United States filed this action against
peti- tioner, then-Sheriff Arpaio, and MCSO, alleging a pat- tern or practice of unlawful
discriminatory police con- duct directed at Latinos in Maricopa County. The com- plaint alleged
discriminatory traffic policing in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and 34 U.S.C. 12601 (Supp.
V 2017) (formerly 42 U.S.C. 14141 (2012)) (Count 1); unlawful raids of homes and worksites in
violation of the Fourth Amendment and Section 12601 (Count 2); discriminatory policing practices in
violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VI), 42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq. (Count
3); discriminatory treatment of prisoners with limited English proficiency (LEP) in Maricopa County
jails, in violation of Title VI (Count 4); discriminatory practices in violation of the defendants’
Title VI contractual assurances (Count 5); and retalia- tion in violation of the First Amendment
and Section 12601 (Count 6). D. Ct. Doc. 1, at 27-30 (May 10, 2012). The conduct underlying Counts
1, 3, and 5 included the same traffic policing practices at issue in the Melendres litigation. Id.
at 5-11.

b. Petitioner and the other defendants moved to dis- miss. MCSO argued that it should be dismissed
because it was not a legal entity separate from petitioner and was therefore incapable of being
sued in its own name. D. Ct. Doc. 35, at 2-4 (June 18, 2012). Petitioner argued that it could not be held liable for
Sheriff Arpaio’s ac- tions under Section 12601 or Title VI. D. Ct. Doc. 36, at 7-17 (June 21, 2012).

The district court granted MCSO’s motion to dismiss but denied petitioner’s motion. Pet. App.
15-32. It granted MCSO’s motion because it concluded based on Braillard that MCSO was a non-jural
entity that could

not be sued in its own name. Id. at 17. It denied peti- tioner’s motion because it concluded that
petitioner could be held liable for constitutional violations result- ing from its own policies.
Id. at 27, 31. The court fur- ther held that the sheriff was a final policymaker for pe- titioner
with respect to law enforcement under Arizona law. Id. at 31-32.

c. After the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted the
United States’ motion for summary judgment on Counts 1, 3, and 5, to the extent that they were
predicated on the same polic- ing policies found unlawful in Melendres, and denied pe- titioner’s
cross-motion. Pet. App. 33-102. As relevant here, the court held that municipalities can be liable
un- der Title VI and Section 12601 for the actions of their policymakers. Id. at 52-58, 63-70. And
the court con- cluded that the United States was entitled to summary judgment on Counts 1, 3, and
5, to the extent that they were predicated on the policing policies at issue in Melendres, because
petitioner was bound by the Melen- dres court’s findings regarding those policies. In par- ticular,
the court concluded that offensive, non-mutual issue preclusion applied because petitioner had a
“pre- existing ‘substantive legal relationship’” with MCSO, which was bound by the Melendres
judgment, and be- cause petitioner’s interests were “adequately repre- sented by” MCSO in the
Melendres litigation. Id. at 81 (citation omitted); see id. at 80-84. It further held that the
Melendres findings established violations of Section 12601 and Title VI. Id. at 85-89.

d. The United States elected not to further pursue Counts 1, 3, and 5, to the extent that they were
based on conduct other than that deemed unconstitutional in

Melendres. The district court then dismissed with prej- udice all “portions of Counts One, Three,
and Five not based on the unconstitutional discrimination found” in Melendres. Pet. App. 274-275.

The United States subsequently intervened in the Melendres litigation and agreed to pursue all
relief re- lating to Counts 1, 3, and 5 of this case—addressing the conduct at issue in
Melendres—through the Melendres case. See 07-cv-2513 D. Ct. Doc. 1239 (D. Ariz. Aug. 13, 2015); D.
Ct. Doc. 407, at 7 (Sept. 2, 2015). Accordingly, the district court ordered the clerk of court to
enter fi- nal judgment in this case in favor of the United States on Counts 1, 3, and 5, and to
terminate the case, stating that “[p]ursuant to the United States’ representations, all injunctive
relief on Claims One, Three, and Five will be pursued in Melendres.” D. Ct. Doc. 407, at 7.

e. The parties entered into settlement agreements resolving all the other counts. In the settlement
agree- ment to resolve Count 4, the government agreed to dis- miss the count, and petitioner agreed
to modifications of its procedures regarding LEP inmates in MCSO’s jails. D. Ct. Doc. 391-2,
Attachment A (July 17, 2015). After an oversight period of two years, the government agreed that
petitioner had fulfilled all of its obligations under that settlement.* The parties entered into a
sep- arate agreement resolving Counts 2 and 6. Pet. App.

_________

* See App., infra, 5a (“We have determined that MCSO and Mar- icopa County have met the terms of
the jails agreement and, accord- ingly, that it is appropriate for DOJ to conclude its enforcement
and oversight of the agreement.”); see also Yihyun Jeong, Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office meets
federal language-access requirements in jails, azcentral.com, Aug. 10, 2017, https://www.azcentral.
com/story/news/local/phoenix/2017/08/10/sheriffs-office-meets-federal-
language-access-requirements-jails/554638001/.

276-285. The district court entered that agreement as an order and retained jurisdiction over its
enforcement. Id. at 275.

3. Petitioner appealed the judgment in this case, and the court of appeals affirmed. Pet. App.
4-14.

The court of appeals held that a county can be liable under Title VI and Section 12601 for the acts
of its final policymakers. Pet. App. 9-13. It noted that this Court has determined that local
governments can be liable for deprivations of constitutional or federal rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983
“if a local government’s own official pol- icy or custom caused the deprivation of federal rights.”
Pet. App. 10. This Court, the court of appeals noted, had explained that requirement as ensuring
“that a mu- nicipality’s liability ‘is limited to acts that are, properly speaking, acts “of the
municipality”—that is, acts which the municipality has officially sanctioned or ordered.’ ” Ibid.
(quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986)). The court of appeals noted that
this Court has held that only certain officials can “establish official policy on the government’s
behalf”: those who “ex- ercise ‘final policymaking authority for the local govern- mental actor
concerning the action alleged to have caused the particular constitutional or statutory violation
at is- sue.’” Ibid. (quoting McMillian, 520 U.S. at 785).

The court of appeals concluded that the concept of policymaker liability could also be used in
assessing mu- nicipal liability under Title VI and Section 12601. The court found that decisions of
this Court indicate that Ti- tle VI makes entities liable for their own misconduct, and further
establish that an entity’s misconduct in- cludes wrongdoing undertaken pursuant to official pol-
icies. Pet. App. 11 (discussing Davis ex. rel LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 640

(1999); Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 285 (1998)).

The court of appeals reasoned that Section 12601 also permits municipalities to be held liable for
the ac- tions of their final policymakers. Pet. App. 11. It de- scribed Section 12601 as sharing
the same basic purpose as Section 1983. Id. at 12. Further, the court observed, the text of Section
12601 makes clear that it “imposes liability on local governments.” Ibid. “Indeed,” the court
reasoned, “the language of § 12601 goes even fur- ther than § 1983, making it unlawful for ‘any
govern- mental authority or any agent thereof, or any person acting on behalf of a governmental
authority’ to engage in the prohibited conduct.” Ibid. (citation omitted). The court stated that it
need not decide whether this broad language means local governments can be held liable “on the
basis of general agency principles.” Ibid. In- stead, the court observed, “[i]t is enough for us to
con- clude, as we do, that § 12601 at least imposes liability on a governmental authority whose own
official policy causes it to engage in ‘a pattern or practice of conduct by law enforcement
officers’ that deprives persons of federally protected rights.” Ibid. (citation omitted).

The court of appeals also rejected petitioner’s con- tention that petitioner could not be liable
for Sheriff Ar- paio’s actions because Sheriff Arpaio was not a final pol- icymaker on its behalf.
Pet. App. 7-9. Applying the framework in McMillian, the court assessed the sher- iff’s status as
policymaker by examining “Arizona’s Constitution and statutes, and the court decisions inter-
preting them.” Id. at 7. The court concluded that those authorities demonstrated that Arizona
sheriffs were policymakers for their counties concerning law enforce- ment. The court noted that
the Arizona Constitution

designates the office of the sheriff as one “created in and for each organized county of the
state,” Pet. App. 8 (quoting Ariz. Const. Art. 12, § 3), and that Arizona law “explicitly states
that sheriffs are ‘officers of the county,’” ibid. (quoting Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11-401(A)(1)
(2012)). It also observed that Arizona law empowers each county board of supervisors to “
‘supervise the of- ficial conduct of all county officers,’ including the sher- iff, to ensure that
‘the officers faithfully perform their duties.’” Ibid. (brackets omitted) (quoting Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 11-251(1) (Supp. 2017)). Further, the court noted, county boards may “ ‘require [a sheriff]
to make reports under oath on any matter connected with the duties of his office,’ and may remove
an officer who ne- glects or refuses to do so.” Ibid. (quoting Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11-253(A)
(2012)). The court also relied on the fact that state law requires Arizona counties to pay their
sheriffs’ expenses, ibid. (citing Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11-444(A) (2012)), including expenses
incurred in complying with injunctive relief ordered against the sheriff and sheriff’s office,
ibid. In addition, the court determined that the most relevant state court decision “confirm[ed]
that sheriffs act as policymakers for their respective counties.” Ibid.; see id. at 8-9 (discussing
Flanders v. Maricopa Cnty., 54 P.3d 837 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002)). While the court acknowledged that
“sheriffs in Arizona are independently elected and that a county board of supervisors does not
exercise complete control over a sheriff’s actions,” it concluded that “ ‘the weight of the
evidence’ strongly supports the conclusion that sheriffs in Arizona act as final policymakers for
their respective counties on law-enforcement matters.” Id. at 9 (quoting McMillian, 520 U.S. at
793).

Finally, the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s application of issue preclusion to
prevent peti- tioner from re-litigating the lawfulness of the traffic po- licing practices that
were held unlawful in Melendres. Pet. App. 13-14. The court observed that petitioner had been
“originally named as a defendant in the Melendres action,” and was dismissed by joint stipulation
“without prejudice to [petitioner’s] being rejoined as a defendant later in the litigation if that
became necessary to afford the plaintiffs full relief.” Id. at 13. The court further observed that
petitioner had effectively “agreed to del- egate responsibility for defense of the action to Arpaio
and MCSO, knowing that it could be bound by the judg- ment later despite its formal absence as a
party.” Ibid. Accordingly, the court explained, when the intervening state-law decision in
Braillard made clear that MCSO was a nonjural entity that could not be sued in its own name, it had
re-joined petitioner as a defendant in the Melendres action. Id. at 13-14. The court noted that
petitioner had challenged that determination in this Court, and this Court had denied certiorari.
Id. at 14.

The court of appeals concluded that under those cir- cumstances, “[e]ach of the elements of
offensive non- mutual issue preclusion is satisfied.” Pet. App. 14. In particular, “[t]here was a
full and fair opportunity to lit- igate the identical issues in the prior action; the issues were
actually litigated in the prior action; the issues were decided in a final judgment; and
[petitioner] was a party to the prior action.” Ibid. The court noted that petitioner “contests only
the last element, arguing that it was not in fact a party to Melendres.” Ibid. But it determined
that petitioner’s challenge “[wa]s not accu- rate as a factual matter, because [petitioner] was
origi- nally named as a defendant in Melendres and is now one

of the parties bound by the judgment in that action.” Ibid. “Moreover,” petitioner “effectively
agreed to be bound by the judgment in that action,” and “[s]uch an agreement is one of the
recognized exceptions to non- party preclusion.” Ibid. (citing Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880,
893 (2008)).

4. In May 2018, the United States contacted counsel for petitioner to propose that the parties
jointly move the district court to terminate the settlement agree- ment regarding Counts 2 and 6,
because MCSO had complied with all terms of the agreement. See App., infra, 1a-2a. Petitioner did
not respond.

ARGUMENT

Petitioner seeks this Court’s review of whether Ari- zona sheriffs are final policymakers for their
counties on matters of law enforcement (Pet. 16-27), whether counties can be liable under Title VI
and Section 12601 for actions of their policymakers (Pet. 27-31), and whether the courts below
correctly applied principles of collateral estoppel in this case (Pet. 31-36). The peti- tion
should be denied. The questions presented appear to lack ongoing significance for petitioner in
this case. And in any event, the court of appeals correctly rejected petitioner’s arguments in
determinations that do not conflict with any decision of this Court or any other court of appeals.

1. As an initial matter, the petition should be denied because the questions presented appear to
lack ongoing practical significance for petitioner in this case. Three of the six counts in the
United States’ complaint (Counts 2, 4, and 6) have been settled. Petitioner fulfilled the terms of
the settlement agreement with respect to Count 4. And the United States has also proposed ter-
minating the settlement agreement regarding Counts 2

and 6—the only settlement agreement for which the district court retains jurisdiction—because it
believes that petitioner has complied with all terms of that agreement. If that agreement is
terminated, then the issue of petitioner’s liability with respect to the settled counts will be
moot. See Arata v. Nu Skin Int’l, Inc., 96 F.3d 1265, 1269 (9th Cir. 1996) (relinquishing juris-
diction where the terms of a settlement agreement were “completed to the satisfaction of the Court
in a manner that [wa]s fair, adequate and reasonable”).

The United States has agreed to pursue all relief pertaining to the remaining counts (Counts 1, 3,
and 5) in the separate Melendres litigation. D. Ct. Doc. 407, at 7. Citing that agreement, the district

court ordered this case terminated, and the United States therefore can- not pursue any relief relating to

Counts 1, 3, or 5 in this case. Ibid. It thus does not appear that the Court’s res- olution of the questions

presented here would have any legal or practical significance for petitioner in this case. See Church of

Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992) (when it is “impossible for the court to

grant ‘any effectual relief whatever’ to a prevailing party, the appeal must be dismissed.”) (quoting Mills v.

Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895)).

Insofar as any of the questions presented has contin- uing relevance for petitioner in Melendres,
the appro- priate course was to seek this Court’s review of those questions in Melendres—the case
whose disposition would potentially be affected by the determination of the questions presented.
See Pet., Maricopa Cnty. v. Melendres, No. 18-735 (filed Dec. 6, 2018) (seeking re- view of whether
sheriffs are final policymakers for their counties on law-enforcement matters under Arizona law);
see also Maricopa Cnty. v. Melendres, 136 S. Ct.

799 (2016) (No. 15-376) (denying review of whether the court of appeals erred by substituting
petitioner for MCSO and whether the court erred in its analysis of sheriffs’ status as county
policymakers in Arizona).

2. In any event, none of the claims in the petition warrants this Court’s review.

a. Certiorari is not warranted to review the court of appeals’ conclusion that Arizona sheriffs are
policymak- ers for their counties concerning law enforcement. This Court recently denied review of
that state-law-specific issue, Melendres, 136 S. Ct. 799, and the same result is warranted in this
case.

i. The court of appeals’ determination of the policy- maker status of Arizona sheriffs reflects a
correct ap- plication of McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781 (1997). In McMillian, a Section
1983 case, the Court assessed whether Alabama sheriffs were policymakers for the State or for their
respective counties in the area of law enforcement by examining the Alabama Consti- tution, the
Alabama Code, and relevant case law. In concluding that sheriffs were officers of the State, the
Court found “especially important” the designation of sheriffs as state officers under Alabama’s
Constitution. Id. at 787. The Court also relied in part on the Alabama Supreme Court’s conclusion
“that sheriffs are state of- ficers, and that tort claims brought against sheriffs based on their
official acts therefore constitute suits against the State.” Id. at 789. In addition, the Court
viewed the State’s responsibility for judgments against sheriffs as “strong evidence in favor of
the * * * con- clusion that sheriffs act on behalf of the State.” Ibid. Because Alabama was under
the jurisdiction of the

Eleventh Circuit, the Court also “defer[red] considera- bly to” the court of appeals’ “expertise in
interpreting Alabama law.” Id. at 786.

In reaching its conclusion with respect to Alabama sheriffs, this Court emphasized that it was not
setting forth a uniform rule for all sheriffs. See McMillian, 520 U.S. at 795. It explained that
while such approach “might [make it] easier to decide cases,” it “would ig- nore a crucial axiom of
our government: the States have wide authority to set up their state and local govern- ments as
they wish.” Ibid. Given States’ authority over their own governments, the Court concluded, it was
“en- tirely natural that both the role of sheriffs and the im- portance of counties vary from State
to State, [and] there is no inconsistency created by court decisions that declare sheriffs to be
county officers in one State, and not in another.” Ibid.

The court of appeals correctly applied McMillian to determine that Arizona sheriffs are
policymakers for their counties, not for the State. It relied on the Arizona Constitution, which
designates the office of the sheriff as “created in and for each organized county of the state,”
and provisions of Arizona law “explicitly stat- [ing] that sheriffs are ‘officers of the county.’”
Pet. App. 8 (citations and emphasis omitted). It also properly took into account provisions of
Arizona law authorizing the county board of supervisors to supervise sheriffs’ performance of their
duties and requiring each county to pay its sheriff’s expenses, including expenses in- curred in
complying with injunctive relief against the sheriff and his office. Ibid. Finally, it properly
deter- mined that the most pertinent state court decision also signaled that sheriffs are county
policymakers with re-

spect to law enforcement. Id. at 8-9 (discussing Flan- ders v. Maricopa Cnty., 54 P.3d 837 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2002)).

ii. The court of appeals’ conclusion regarding the status of Arizona sheriffs does not present any
conflict warranting this Court’s intervention. As this Court ex- plained in McMillian, the
classification of officials as policymakers for the State or the county “is dependent on an
analysis of state law.” 520 U.S. at 786. Because no other court of appeals appears to have
considered whether Arizona sheriffs are county or state officials on matters of law enforcement
policy, the application of McMillian to Arizona sheriffs implicates no conflict.

Petitioner is mistaken in asserting (Pet. 23-25) a con- flict between the decision below and
decisions that con- sidered the status of sheriffs under distinct state-law schemes. Grech v.
Clayton County, 335 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc), held that a Georgia sheriff was not
acting on behalf of the county when he main- tained a policy permitting invalid arrest warrants to
re- main in a state database. Six judges concluded that Georgia sheriffs are final policymakers for
the State in the area of law enforcement, id. at 1330-1348 (plurality opinion), but six other
judges disagreed, id. at 1349- 1364. Accordingly, the court did not adopt any categor- ical holding
on the status of Georgia sheriffs. Id. at 1347 n.46 (plurality opinion). In any event, the plurality’s conclusion

that Georgia sheriffs were state policymak- ers rested on provisions of Georgia law that differ from

the corresponding provisions of Arizona law. For exam- ple, whereas Georgia courts had held that

county com- missions cannot influence how sheriffs spend their funds, id. at 1339 (plurality opinion), Arizona

law pro- vides for counties to “supervise the official conduct of”

all county officers, including the sheriff, to ensure that they “faithfully perform their duties
and direct prosecu- tions for delinquencies,” Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11-251(1) (Supp. 2017).

Similarly, the decision below does not conflict with the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Turquitt v.
Jefferson County, 137 F.3d 1285 (en banc), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 874 (1998). Turquitt determined
that Alabama sheriffs acted on behalf of the State, rather than the county, when operating county
jails. Id. at 1288. Its analysis “turn[ed] on state law, including state and local positive law, as
well as custom and usage having the force of law.” Ibid.; see id. at 1288-1291 (discussing the Ala-
bama Constitution, Alabama Code, and Alabama case law). Although petitioner asserts (Pet. 23) a
conflict be- cause the court in Turquitt stated that local govern- ments cannot be liable under
Section 1983 “for the acts of those whom the local government has no authority to control,” 137
F.3d at 1292, the court below did not adopt a contrary rule. Rather, the court stressed that
Arizona laws do “empower counties to supervise * * * their re- spective sheriffs,” even though the
county “does not ex- ercise complete control” over its sheriff’s activities. Pet. App. 8-9
(emphasis added).

The decision below likewise does not conflict with Franklin v. Zaruba, 150 F.3d 682 (7th Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1141 (1999), or Knight v. C.D. Vernon, 214 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 2000).
Franklin, a sovereign im- munity case, held that sheriffs in Illinois were not state officials for
purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. 150 F.3d at 684-685. In doing so, the court relied in part on
Scott v. O’Grady, 975 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 942 (1993), in which the
court had held that sheriffs generally act on behalf of Illinois counties

when executing law enforcement duties. Ibid. O’Grady, in turn, rested on an examination of
Illinois law. Id. at 370-372. Knight similarly held that North Caro- lina sheriffs were not
policymakers for their counties when making sheriff’s office personnel decisions, based on an
analysis of North Carolina law. 214 F.3d at 552- 553. Those state-specific rulings do not conflict

with the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of the status of sheriffs under Arizona law.

b. The court of appeals’ determination that Title VI and Section 12601 impose liability on
municipalities for the unlawful actions of their final policymakers also does not warrant further
review.

i. The court of appeals’ interpretation of Title VI and Section 12601 was correct. This Court has
held that a locality may be liable for the unlawful acts of its poli- cymakers under Section 1983,
which imposes liability on any “person” who, under color of law, deprives another, or “causes”
another to be deprived, of a federally pro- tected right, 42 U.S.C. 1983. See Monell v. Department
of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Monell held, in particular, that a locality may be liable
under Section 1983 for the “execution of a government’s policy or cus- tom, whether made by its
lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official pol- icy.” Id.
at 694.

Against that backdrop, the text and history of Sec- tion 12601 support the court of appeals’
conclusion that a municipality may also be held liable under Section 12601 for edicts or acts of
their final policymakers. Sec- tion 12601 is even more explicit than Section 1983 in making
municipalities liable for actions of their policy- makers, because Section 12601 directly states
that it is “unlawful for any governmental authority, or any

18
agent thereof, or any person acting on behalf of a gov- ernmental authority, to engage in a pattern
or practice of conduct by law enforcement officers * * * that de- prives persons of rights,
privileges, or immunities se- cured or protected by” federal law. 34 U.S.C. 12601 (Supp. V 2017)
(emphasis added). In addition, as the court of appeals observed, Section 1983 and Section 12601
“share[] important similarities,” in that both were created to address violations of federal civil
rights and impose liability on municipal governments. Pet. App. 12.

The court of appeals was likewise correct that a mu- nicipality can be liable under Title VI for the
actions of its policymakers. Title VI provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground
of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be de- nied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal finan- cial
assistance.” 42 U.S.C. 2000d. This Court has held that an analogous statute, Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq., renders municipalities liable for
discrimination resulting from their official policies. See Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe
Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 640-642 (1999); Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S.
274, 290 (1998). And this Court “has interpreted Title IX consistently with Title VI.” Barnes v.
Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 185 (2002). Because Monell establishes that an entity’s “official policy”
includes “polic[ies] or custom[s] * * * made by * * * those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said
to represent official policy,” 436 U.S. at 694, these precedents establish that munici- palities
may be liable under Title VI for actions of their
policymakers.

Petitioner is mistaken in contending (Pet. 30) that municipal liability is inappropriate under
Title VI and Section 12601 because the language of those provisions “suggests Congress intended
only to impose liability on those who are themselves involved in the proscribed ac- tivity.”
Policymaker liability is a form of direct liability, because the edicts or actions of the
policymaker “may fairly be said to represent official policy” of the local government. Monell, 436
U.S. at 694; see Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986) (stating that limiting
municipal liability to acts of policymakers en- sures that a municipality’s liability is “limited
to acts that are, properly speaking, acts of the municipality”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Petitioner also notes (Pet. 29-30) that Title VI and Section 12601 have distinct histories, but it
points to no evidence in the his- tory of Title VI or Section 12601 indicating that Con- gress
intended narrower policymaker liability under those provisions than under Section 1983. Finally,
peti- tioner seeks (Pet. 31) to distinguish the statutes here from Section 1983 on the ground that
Title VI and Sec- tion 12601 do not include Section 1983’s phrase, “causes to be subjected.” But
neither Monell nor any other de- cision of this Court suggests that it is the phrase “causes to be
subjected” that gives rise to policymaker liability in Section 1983, or, conversely, that the
absence of this language means that policymaker liability would not apply.

ii. The question whether a county government may be held liable for the actions of its policymakers
under Title VI and Section 12601 does not warrant this Court’s intervention. That question does not
implicate any dis- agreement among the courts of appeals. To the con-

trary, as the court below noted, Pet. App. 9, and peti- tioner acknowledges, Pet. 28, no other
court of appeals appears to have addressed whether municipalities can be liable for the actions of
their policymakers under these provisions. Petitioner identifies no sound reason for this Court to
grant certiorari here on an issue of first impression.

c. Finally, contrary to petitioner’s suggestion (Pet. 31-36) no further review is warranted of the
court of ap- peals’ application of principles of issue preclusion to the facts of this case.

i. The courts below correctly determined that issue preclusion barred petitioner from relitigating
the law- fulness of its traffic policing policies. Issue preclusion bars “‘successive litigation of
an issue of fact or law ac- tually litigated and resolved in a valid court determina- tion
essential to the prior judgment,’ even if the issue recurs in the context of a different claim.”
Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008) (citation omitted). Is- sue preclusion generally
applies against a party to the prior judgment, so long as the party had a full and fair opportunity
to litigate the determination in question. See 1 Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 29 (1982).
Issue preclusion can also be applied against a non-party that “agree[d] to be bound by the
determination of is- sues in an action between others.” Sturgell, 553 U.S. at 893 (quoting 1
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 40 (1982)). Here, as the court of appeals determined, peti-
tioner was a party to the Melendres judgment. Pet. App. 13-14. Moreover, as the court of appeals
also held, even if petitioner were not properly described as a party in Melendres, petitioner fell
within “one of the recog- nized exceptions to non-party preclusion” because it

“effectively agreed to be bound by the judgment in that action.” Id. at 14 (citing Sturgell, 553
U.S. at 893).

Petitioner disputes (Pet. 32-36) whether this case satisfies the requirements for non-party
preclusion. But the court of appeals properly concluded that peti- tioner was subject to issue
preclusion as a party in Melendres, before addressing non-party preclusion in the alternative. Pet.
App. 13-14. Although petitioner filed a petition for a writ of certiorari challenging the court of
appeals’ decision in Melendres to join petitioner as a party, this Court declined review of that
determi- nation. 136 S. Ct. 799 (2016) (No. 15-376). And peti- tioner develops no argument that it
was entitled to re- litigate the legality of Sheriff Arpaio’s policing policies under the
principles governing preclusion of parties.

In any event, as to non-party preclusion, petitioner is mistaken in contending (Pet. 35) that issue
preclusion principles do not apply because petitioner did not “agree[] to be bound by” the
determination of issues in Melendres. When petitioner agreed in Melendres to be dismissed from the
suit “without prejudice to rejoining” petitioner “at a later time if doing so be[came] neces- sary
to obtain complete relief,” Pet. App. 105, petitioner agreed that it could be added to the
litigation as a party that would be bound by the judgment if necessary to af- ford relief against
MCSO. And as the court of appeals concluded in Melendres, petitioner’s rejoinder did be- come
necessary once Braillard established that MCSO did not have a legal existence separate from
petitioner.

ii. The application of issue preclusion principles in the circumstances of this case does not
warrant this Court’s review. Petitioner alleges no conflict among the courts of appeals regarding
the application of preclu- sion principles. Nor does petitioner dispute that under

this Court’s precedents, a non-party may be bound by the judgment in a suit based on its agreement.
Instead, petitioner asserts (Pet. 34-35) that the record did not adequately establish agreement on
the facts of peti- tioner’s case. That fact-bound claim—i.e., that the courts below misapplied
preclusion principles to the particular record in this case—does not warrant further review.

CONCLUSION

The petition for writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

FEBRUARY 2019

NOEL J. FRANCISCO
Solicitor General

ERIC S. DREIBAND
Assistant Attorney General

THOMAS E. CHANDLER

ELIZABETH P. HECKER
Attorneys

APPENDIX A

[Image of Kellebrew, Paul (CRT) email]

Rick, Stephanie, and Joe,

I hope you’re all well. As I’ve discussed with Rick, it is now appropriate to terminate the
settlement agree- ment in US v. Maricopa County that covers worksite operations and First Amendment
retaliation. MCSO has complied with the settlement agreement. The agency has not carried out a
worksite operation in sev- eral years, and its policy on First Amendment retalia- tion has been in
effect for some time. We’ve drafted a joint motion to terminate the settlement agreement, and it’s
attached for your review, along with an exhibit to the pleading.

Joe, I know you haven’t been involved in these discus- sions, but I’ve included you because you’ve
entered an appearance in US v. Maricopa County on behalf of the Sheriff.

I also wanted to briefly address the email preservation discussion. It’s my understanding that I’m
waiting for the County to send me a list of all County employees whose emails are being preserved,
including the suc-

(1a)

cessors to those previously sent litigation hold notices. While that list is necessary for reaching
resolution on the County’s email preservation, I can go ahead and give you my response regarding
MCSO’s email preservation efforts.

In the May 1, 2018 letter, Rick characterized a proposal that I made regarding MCSO’s email
preservation ef- forts on an April 13, 2018 conference call. Rick cor- rectly stated that I
proposed to preserve the emails of (1) all employees in BIO and PSB up through their Chain of Command
to the Sheriff; and (2) all Captains and above including the Sheriff on the Patrol side. But there was one
more category in my proposal, which is: (3) all email communications that indicate bias. As I said on the
April 13th call, I do not anticipate that this third category would require any additional preser- vation
efforts beyond what is already required in the Melendres v. Penzone litigation; I include this
category because such communications are central to the United States’ claims in US v. Maricopa
County, and I cannot make a preservation agreement that leaves such com- munications out. But
again, I would not expect MCSO to do anything in addition to what is already required by Melendres
to preserve email communications that fall into the third category. If these three categories are
acceptable to MCSO and the County, I think we have an agreement on email preservation as to MCSO.

Please do not hesitate to contact me if I can provide any additional information or answer any
questions.

Have a great weekend!

Paul

APPENDIX B

[Letterhead - U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Special Litigation Section]

Aug. 3, 2017

Stephanie Cherny
Chief of Staff & Special Counsel

Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office

550 West Jackson Street

Phoenix, AZ 85003

Re: Settlement Agreement Regarding Language Access in the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office Jails

Dear Ms. Cherny:

This concerns the settlement agreement between the United States, the Maricopa County Sheriff’s
Office (MCSO), and Maricopa County, concerning language access for limited English proficient (LEP)
inmates in the MCSO jails (the “jails agreement”), which became effective on November 6, 2015, upon
its approval by the court in the United States v. Maricopa County (D. Ariz.).¹

____________
¹ United States v. Maricopa County, et al., raised claims relating to four distinct but interrelated patterns
of unconstitutional dis- criminatory police practicestargeting Latinos in Maricopa County, one of which involved
discrimination against LEP Latino inmates in MCSO jails. The United States resolved the remaining claims

We have determined that MCSO and Maricopa County have met the terms of the jails agreement and,
accordingly, that it is appropriate for DOJ to conclude its enforcement and oversight of the
agreement. Im- plementing the reforms set forth in the jails agreement is a significant
accomplishment and we extend our congratulations to MCSO and the County. We recog- nize the hard
work and dedication that went into de- velopment and implementation of these reforms, and
appreciate the cooperation of MCSO, and, in particular, the MCSO jails’ command staff and
personnel. As a result of their efforts, we believe that there has been a significant shift in MCSO
jail personnel’s attitudes to- ward and treatment of Latinos in MCSO jails. This shift, together
with the reforms implemented in con- nection with the jails agreement, has contributed to a safer
and more equitable environment for Latinos in MCSO jails.

As part of our oversight of the jails agreement, we conducted two site visits to the MCSO jails.
During the more recent of these visits, in January 2017, we were encouraged to hear MCSO command
staff and counsel express a commitment to sustaining and continuing the improvements to the
provision of language access ser- vices and the treatment of LEP inmates in MCSO jails. To assist
in these efforts, we briefly describe below our recommendations for MCSO’s sustained and continuing

____________

through a court-enforceable settlement agreement with MCSO and Maricopa County, entered into
simultaneously with the jails agree- ment, and through intervention in a parallel, private lawsuit,
Melen- dres v. Arpaio. The United States’ enforcement work relating to that settlement agreement
and the Melendres court orders proceed separately from the enforcement of the jails agreement and
are not addressed in this letter.

improvement of its provision of language access in its jails.

First, implementation of the jails agreement required MCSO to develop, implement, and improve
procedures for accurately identifying inmates who need language assistance. Early identification of
LEP inmates is a critically important step in the provision of language access in jails, and it is
an area in which MCSO has made enormous improvements. For example, we were favorably impressed with
the expanded and more for- mally defined role of the “information officers” involved in greeting
and orienting individuals being admitted to MCSO jails, and note that this has improved the effi-
cacy and accuracy of early identification of LEP in- mates in the jails. Similarly, the increase in
the num- ber of Spanish-speaking bilingual staff working in “clas- sification” of inmates—the stage
where newly admitted inmates are interviewed and assigned to housing units— appears to have helped
improve the accuracy of identi- fication of LEP inmates. We urge MCSO to institu- tionalize these
changes and to continue to assess their efficacy and consider and implement any necessary
improvements to the procedures for identifying LEP inmates. Related to this, we recommend that MCSO
continue to explore ways to safely and effectively en- sure that detention officers are aware of
which inmates under their supervision are LEP.

Second, implementation of the jails agreement re- quired effective and appropriate use of bilingual
jail personnel to communicate with LEP inmates or facili- tate communication between LEP inmates
and English- speaking, monolingual jail personnel. This is another area where we observed
significant progress. For ex-

ample, although not required by the jails agreement, MCSO offered a salary increase to employees
with foreign language skills, to serve as an incentive for em- ployees to self-identify as foreign
language speakers. The bilingual jail personnel we met were proud of their qualifications and eager
to use their foreign language skills. Moreover, in our interviews with Latino LEP in- mates, we
heard very few accounts of Spanish-speaking officers refusing to speak with or act as interpreters
for Latino LEP inmates.

Nonetheless, particularly given how fundamental ef- fective communication between detention
officers and in- mates is for maintaining safety within the jails, we en- courage MCSO to continue
to take steps to hire and retain bilingual personnel—given the substantial Latino LEP population in
MCSO’s jails—and to improve the manner and frequency of the communication between bilingual
detention officers and inmates. For example, once MCSO has identified inmates as LEP, MCSO should
not rely solely on inmates to assert that they do not understand or to specifically request
language as- sistance. Similarly, detention officers should inter- vene in cases in which inmates
are acting as interpret- ers for one another, particularly when it seems possible that the inmate
may need or want to discuss matters that are private or that could compromise the inmate’s safety
in the housing unit. To address these situa- tions, we recommend that detention officers be trained
about when and why it would be inappropriate to allow inmates to act as interpreters for one
another, about how to handle situations in which inmates are inter- preting for other inmates or
for jail personnel, and about how to identify situations in which it may present

a particular safety threat for inmates to be offering to act as interpreters for other inmates.

Third, one of the significant measures of the success of the jails agreement is the extent to which
critical information, such as the jails’ rules and regulations, is effectively communicated to LEP
inmates. This is an area in which we observed marked and continuing im- provement, even as between
the two site visits we con- ducted to assess MCSO’s implementation of the jails agreement. For
example, we observed that signs were posted in English and Spanish throughout the MCSO jails and
that announcements about important infor- mation, such as when medical staff is entering a hous-
ing unit or when a housing unit is being put on a disci- plinary “lock down,” were broadcast in
English and Spanish.

We encourage MCSO to continue to explore effec- tive ways to communicate critical information to
its LEP Latino population, with particular attention to the fact that a significant proportion of
the population has limited education and literacy. For example, MCSO could develop a brief handout
for inmates with a sum- mary of the MCSO jails’ rules and regulations, availa- ble in English and
Spanish, and a summary of the most important points of the language access policies and procedures,
ideally distributed both in paper copy at intake and through the video kiosks located in the
housing units. We have been impressed with MCSO’s use of televisions and interactive video kiosks
to com- municate information with inmates both in the intake area and in the housing units, and we
would encourage MCSO to continue to explore how these video monitors can be used to effectively
communicate information to

inmates who are both LEP and have limited literacy. Finally, we encourage MCSO to continue to
improve access to classes and programs for Spanish-speaking inmates, by exploring more effective
way to make La- tino LEP inmates aware of the programs that are cur- rently available, by housing
Spanish-speaking LEP in- mates in housing units that have Spanish-language clas- ses, and by
increasing the number of classes offered in Spanish throughout the jail facilities.

Again, we congratulate MCSO and Maricopa County for fully implementing the reforms in the jails
agree- ment, and look forward to hearing of your sustained and continuing dedication to protecting
and improving safe and equitable conditions of Latino LEP inmates in MCSO jails.

Sincerely,

/s/ STEVEN H. ROSENBAUM

STEVEN H. ROSENBAUM
Chief
Special Litigation Section
cc: Bill Montgomery

Maricopa County Attorney

Richard K. Walker
Counsel for Maricopa County

Updated April 18, 2023