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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS SAN ANTONIO DIVISION
SHANNON PEREZ, et al.,
STATE OF TEXAS, et al.,
MEXICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE CAUCUS, TEXAS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (MALC),
STATE OF TEXAS, et al.,
TEXAS LATINO REDISTRICTING TASK
FORCE, et al.,
Civil Action No. 5:11-cv-360 (OLG-JES-XR)
Three-Judge Court [Lead Case]
Civil Action No. 5:11-cv-361 (OLG-JES-XR)
Three-Judge Court [Consolidated Case]
Civil Action No. 5:11-cv-490 (OLG-JES-XR)
Three-Judge Court [Consolidated Case]
MARGARITA V. QUESADA, et al.,
RICK PERRY, et al.,
JOHN T. MORRIS,
STATE OF TEXAS, et al.
EDDIE RODRIGUEZ, et al.,
RICK PERRY, et al.
Civil Action No. 5:11-cv-592
Civil Action No. 5:11-cv-615
Civil Action No. 5:11-cv-635
STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO SECTION 3(C) OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
Section 3(c) of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c), is a vital remedial provision through
which federal courts can protect the rights of minority voters by imposing a preclearance
requirement on jurisdictions where intentional racial discrimination in voting has occurred.
Because the State of Texas is no longer subject to the preclearance provisions of Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act through the formula in Section 4(b), Section 3(c) relief is available against the
State. This Court must now determine whether intentional discrimination motivated the State’s 2011
Congressional and State House redistricting plans in order to adjudicate Plaintiffs’ requests for
such relief. As discussed below, Section 3(c) relief is warranted in this case because existing
evidence establishes intentional voting discrimination and other proceedings provide overwhelming
evidence of constitutional violations in and by the State.
I. THE UNITED STATES’ INTEREST
The United States respectfully submits this Statement of Interest under 28 U.S.C. § 517 to address
Section 3(c) of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c), and the possible impact of that
provision on this case. See Order (ECF No. 772); see also 28 U.S.C. § 517 (authorizing the
Attorney General to attend to the interests of the United States in any pending suit). In light of
the United States’ enforcement responsibilities with regard to racial discrimination in voting and
the Attorney General’s obligation to review proposed voting changes in jurisdictions that are
covered under Section 3(c), see 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c), the United States has a strong interest in
ensuring that this provision of the Voting Rights Act is interpreted and applied appropriately.
The United States has a particular interest in the application of Section 3(c) in this case. In
defending the judicial preclearance action filed by the State of Texas under Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act, see Texas v. United States, 887 F. Supp. 2d 133 (D.D.C. 2012) (three-judge
court), vacated, 570 U.S. , 2013 WL 3213539 (U.S. June 27, 2013), the United States took
the position that the State failed to establish that its 2011 Congressional and State House
redistricting plans were not adopted with a discriminatory purpose, see U.S. Post-Trial Br., Texas
v. United States, No. 1:11-cv-1303 (D.D.C. Feb. 6, 2012) (ECF No. 203), and the United States avers
that the evidence presented in that case proves that those redistricting plans are intentionally
discriminatory regardless of which party bears the burden of proof. Those same plans are the
subject of Plaintiffs’ challenge in this case under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §
1973, and the intentional discrimination underlying those plans is the core of Plaintiffs’ requests
for Section 3(c) relief. See, e.g., NAACP Proposed 2d Am. Compl. (ECF No. 776-2).
II. SECTION 3(C) OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
Section 3(c) of the Voting Rights Act provides:
If in any proceeding instituted by the Attorney General or an aggrieved person under any statute to
enforce the voting guarantees of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendment in any State or political
subdivision the court finds that violations of the fourteenth or fifteenth amendment justifying
equitable relief have occurred within the territory of such State or political subdivision, the
court, in addition to such relief as it may grant, shall retain jurisdiction for such period as it
may deem appropriate and during such period no voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or
standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect at
the time the proceeding was commenced shall be enforced unless and until [preclearance is granted
by the court or the Attorney General declines to interpose an objection].
42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c); see also H.R. Rep. 89-439 at 13 (1965) (“Section 3 of the bill makes
additional remedies available to deal with denials or abridgments of the right to vote in so-called
‘pockets of discrimination’—areas outside the States and subdivisions to which the prohibitions of
section 4 are in effect.”). Thus, under Section 3(c), a court can “bail in” a jurisdiction,
subjecting it to a preclearance regime akin to that under Section 5. See 28 C.F.R. § 51.8. Since
the adoption of the Voting Rights Act in 1965, courts in at least 18 different cases have ordered
relief under Section 3(c), requiring jurisdictions not covered through Section 4’s formula to
obtain preclearance of some or all proposed voting changes. These cases have led to the coverage of
two states—Arkansas, see Jeffers v. Clinton, 740 F. Supp. 585 (E.D. Ark. 1990) (three-judge court),
and New Mexico, see Sanchez v. Anaya, No. 82-0067 (D.N.M. Dec. 17,
1984)—as well as twelve counties, two cities, and two school districts.1
Once covered, these
jurisdictions, like the jurisdictions covered by Sections 4(b) and 5, typically have sought
administrative preclearance for voting changes from the Attorney General, rather than seeking
judicial preclearance from the federal district court.
To trigger Section 3(c) coverage, the Attorney General or an aggrieved person must establish that a
violation of the voting guarantees of the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments has occurred within
the jurisdiction. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c). As a practical matter, this requires a finding of
intentional voting discrimination. See Jeffers, 740 F. Supp. at 591-92; Brown v. Bd. of Sch.
Comm’rs, 542 F. Supp. 1078, 1101-03 (S.D. Ala. 1982); see also Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S.
1 See Blackmoon v. Charles Mix Cnty., No. 05-CV-4017 (D.S.D. Dec. 4, 2007); Kirkie v. Buffalo
Cnty., No. 03-CV-3011 (D.S.D. Feb. 10, 2004); United States v. Bernalillo Cnty., No. 93-156-BB/LCS
(D.N.M. Apr. 22, 1998); United States v. Alameda Cnty., No. C95-1266 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 1996);
United States v. Cibola Cnty., No. 93-1134 (D.N.M. Apr. 21, 1994); United States v. Socorro Cnty.,
No. 93-1244 (D.N.M. Apr. 11, 1994); Garza v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, No. 88-5143 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25,
1991); United States v.
Sandoval Cnty., No. 88-1457 (D.N.M. May 17, 1990); United States v. McKinley Cnty., 86-0029-C
(D.N.M. Jan. 13, 1986); Woodring v. Clarke, No. 80-4569 (S.D. Ill. Oct. 31, 1983) (Alexander
County); McMillan v. Escambia Cnty., No. 77-0432 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 3, 1979); United States v.
Thurston Cnty., No. 78-0-380 (D. Neb. May 9, 1979); United States v. Vill. of Port Chester, No.
06-15173 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2006); Brown v. Bd. of Comm’rs, No. CIV-1-87-388 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 18,
1990) (City of Chattanooga); Cuthair v. Moteczuma-Cortez Sch. Dist. No. RE-1, No. 89-C-964 (D. Col.
Apr. 8, 1990); NAACP v.
Gadsden Cnty. Sch. Bd., 589 F. Supp. 953 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 1984).
613, 617-20 (1982).2
A court must also find that the constitutional violation justifies equitable
Once a court makes such a finding, Section 3(c) authorizes a district court to require preclearance
of all voting changes. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c) (applying to any “voting qualification or
prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting”); cf. Allen v.
State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 565 (1969) (“The Voting Rights Act was aimed at the subtle,
as well as the obvious, state regulations which have the effect of denying citizens
their right to vote because of their race.”).3 Imposing a preclearance requirement for all voting
changes is warranted when there is a demonstrated history of intentional discrimination and the
potential for backsliding through creative changes in voting procedures. Cf. South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328 (1966) (describing preclearance as “shift[ing] the advantage of time
and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil to its victims.”); H.R. Rep. 94-196, at 57-58 (1975)
(describing preclearance as a remedy “to a common practice in some jurisdictions of staying one
step ahead of the federal courts by passing new discriminatory voting laws as soon as
2 Although Section 3(c) uses the plural term “violations of the fourteenth or fifteenth amendment
justifying equitable relief . . . within the territory of such State or political subdivision” to
describe the trigger, 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c), the provision is best read to require proof of only a
single constitutional violation. See 1 U.S.C. § 1 (“In determining the meaning of any Act of
Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise, . . . words importing the plural include the
singular.”); see also McMillan v.
Escambia Cnty., 559 F. Supp. 720, 728 (N.D. Fla. 1983) (“Section 1973a(c) applies to situations
such as the one found here—in which a court has found in a suit a violation of the fourteenth or
fifteenth amendments justifying equitable relief.” (emphasis added)); cases cited supra note 1
(applying coverage after a single constitutional violation). But see Jeffers, 740 F. Supp. at 600
(“[I]t would be strange if a single infringement could subject a State to such strong medicine.”).
The Court need not reach this issue in this case, both because of the multiple constitutional
violations at issue in this litigation and the State of Texas’s history of intentional
discrimination against minority voters.
3 In some cases, courts have exercised discretion to limit relief to a particular subset of voting
changes. See, e.g., Jeffers, 740 F. Supp. at 601-02 (requiring preclearance for any voting changes
related to the imposition of a majority-vote requirement in general elections, and retaining
jurisdiction to review challenged redistricting plans for the State House and State Senate); United
States v. Vill. of Port Chester, No. 06-15173 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2006).
the old ones had been struck down”). The duration of the preclearance remedy is subject to the
court’s discretion. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c) (providing that the court “shall retain jurisdiction
for such period as it may deem appropriate”).
Notably, a request for relief under Section 3(c) need not be the primary focus of a complaint. See
Jeffers, 740 F. Supp. at 591-92 (holding that constitutional violations with respect to voting
practices that were not “the principal focus of the complaint” satisfied Section 3(c)). Texas’s
argument to the contrary lacks a firm grounding in the statutory text. See Tex. Br. 17-18 (ECF No.
824). As the three-judge court properly held in Jeffers, the phrase “violations of the fourteenth
or fifteenth amendment justifying equitable relief” in Section 3(c) is not limited to the conduct
that was the focus of the plaintiff’s complaint. 740 F. Supp. at 592. No such limitation appears
anywhere in the text of Section 3(c). See 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c); Jeffers, 740 F. Supp. at 592
(noting that reading the statute in such a “crabbed” manner would be “inconsistent with its broad
Section 3(c) does not require that other equitable relief actually has been granted regarding the
constitutional violations underpinning a bail-in, since the statutory text specifies only that
there must be constitutional violations “justifying,” but not necessarily resulting in,
equitable relief. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a); see also Jeffers, 740 F. Supp. at 595 & n.7, 600.4
to the extent that Section 3(c) requires a court to find that equitable relief is justified, the
4 Nothing in the statute’s text supports Texas’s argument that Section 3(c) relief can be imposed
only after a final judgment of intentional discrimination. See Tex. Br. 9-12. So long as “the
court finds that violations of the fourteenth or fifteenth amendment justifying equitable relief
have occurred,” the court can impose relief under Section 3(c). 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c). There is no
statutory basis to exclude findings of intentional discrimination made in support of a preliminary
injunction under Rule 65(a) or partial final judgment under Rule 54(b). While Section 3(a)
references both “interlocutory orders” and “final judgments,” 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(a), Section 3(c)
does not refer to one at the expense of the other, as Texas infers. See Tex. Br. 10-11. Section
3(c) refers to neither. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c).
preclearance remedy in Section 3(c) can be that relief. Moreover, a court must take into account
“both State and local violations of the voting guarantees of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments,” Jeffers, 740 F. Supp. at 600, because the text of Section 3(c) requires only that
violations have occurred “within the territory” of the jurisdiction. 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c).
Texas’s assertion that Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013), renders Section 3(c)
constitutionally suspect, Tex. Br. at 3, 9, 18-20, ignores the central logic of the decision.
Shelby County held only that the coverage formula in Section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act, as
reauthorized by the Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, is
unconstitutional and “can no longer be used as a basis for subjecting jurisdictions to
preclearance” under Section 5 of the Act. 133 S. Ct. at 2631. The Court concluded that the coverage
formula no longer “makes sense in light of current conditions,” id. at 2629, but the Court
indicated specifically that it was issuing “no holding on [Section] 5 itself, only on the coverage
formula,” id. at 2631, and did not address Section 3(c). The trigger for Section 3(c) relief is
far different than the coverage formula in Section 4(b). The trigger is geographically focused and
dependent on a judicial finding of a recent constitutional violation.
III. SECTION 3(C) APPLIED TO THIS LITIGATION
For this Court to impose relief under Section 3(c), two basic conditions must be met.
First, the request for relief must be made in a “proceeding instituted by the Attorney General or
an aggrieved person under any statute to enforce the voting guarantees of the fourteenth or
fifteenth amendment in any State or political subdivision.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c). In this case,
plaintiffs filed an action under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, to enforce
the guarantees of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments against racial discrimination in voting
in the State of Texas, among other claims. Second, a court must conclude that “violations
of the fourteenth or fifteenth amendment justifying equitable relief have occurred within the
territory of such State or political subdivision.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c). Although this Court has
not yet made such findings regarding the State’s 2011 redistricting plans, the evidence presented
to this Court—as well as the substance of the decision in Texas v. United States and other
instances of discrimination in voting in Texas—demonstrates that such constitutional violations
have occurred within the State.5
For the reasons set out below, this Court has jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs’ request for relief
under Section 3(c). While Plaintiffs can effectively present the evidence already admitted before
this Court, the Attorney General is uniquely positioned to describe the evidence presented in Texas
v. United States and other instances of intentional discrimination in Texas. The Attorney General
avers that the Court should impose Section 3(c) coverage on the State of Texas as to all voting
changes for a ten-year period following the entry of a coverage order, and should consider
extending the bail-in period beyond 10 years in the event of further discriminatory acts. This
preclearance requirement would apply to any voting qualification or voting-related standard,
practice, or procedure that the State enacts or seeks to administer that differs “from that
5 Texas’s contention that a court can order bail-in only after providing some other relief to the
plaintiff, see Tex. Br. 3, 6-7, once again contradicts the text of the statute, which expressly
authorizes a court to require preclearance of voting changes regardless of whether the court grants
any additional relief.
Congress could have authorized a federal court to order bail-in “in addition to granting other
relief”; instead, Congress authorized a federal court to order bail-in “in addition to such relief
as it may grant.” 42 U.S.C. 1973a(c) (emphasis added). We note that this Court has already entered
equitable relief in response to Plaintiffs’ claims in this case, in ordering implementation of
interim redistricting plans, premised in part on this Court’s findings that in several districts
there were “not insubstantial” claims of racially discriminatory purpose. See Order (ECF No. 690);
Order (ECF No. 691).
in force or effect at the time th[is] proceeding was commenced.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c). The instant
litigation commenced on May 9, 2011.
A. This Court Maintains Jurisdiction to Consider Additional Relief for Claims Against Texas’s 2011
Plaintiffs in this litigation have principally requested that this Court “[d]eclare the existing
plans for election of the Texas House of Representatives and Texas Congressional seats to be in
violation of the Voting Rights Act and unconstitutional and enjoin their use in any future
elections.” E.g., Perez 3d Am. Compl., Request for Relief ¶ B (ECF No. 53).6 Since 1975, and
until the Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County, Texas had been covered under Section 4(b) of
the Voting Rights Act and was therefore subject to the preclearance requirements of Section 5. The
question of relief under Section 3(c) therefore never arose, as coverage subjecting Texas to
the preclearance requirements set forth in Section 5 existed already.7
However, now that the
Supreme Court has struck down the Section 4(b) coverage formula and thereby relieved Texas from the
requirement to comply with Section 5, see Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2631, the question of
additional relief under Section 3(c) of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c), predictably
Texas argues primarily that this Court lacks jurisdiction to impose Section 3(c) relief as a remedy
for intentional discrimination underlying the State’s 2011 redistricting plans because those plans
have now been repealed and can no longer serve as the basis for the findings of violations of the
Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment. See Tex. Br. at 4. It is axiomatic that a
6 This Court has not yet granted the Perez Plaintiffs’ request for leave to file a Fourth Amended
7 This explains the relatively few cases in which relief under Section 3(c) has been imposed to
date, as Section 4(b) subjected those jurisdictions with the most egregious histories of racial
discrimination to a preclearance requirement.
case “becomes moot only when it is impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief whatever to
the prevailing party.” Chafin v. Chafin, 133 S. Ct. 1017, 1023 (2013) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). A case is not moot if the court can grant even a “partial remedy.”
Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 13 (1992); see also, e.g., Reno v.
Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 327-28 (2000) (holding that a preclearance action under
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act was not moot even though the districts at issue would not be
used in any future elections); United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734, 752-53 (5th Cir. 1967)
(holding that the “mere cessation of unlawful activity” concerning minority voting rights does not
“render a case moot” when additional remedies are available).8
This case is not moot because the availability of the Section 3(c) remedy allows this Court to
grant relief to the Plaintiffs if they prevail on their claims. In this case, Plaintiffs have pled
constitutional violations regarding the 2011 State House and Congressional plans.9 The prayers for
relief in Plaintiffs’ complaints are broad enough to encompass requests for relief under Section
3(c), through either requests for compliance with preclearance requirements or requests for further
just and proper relief. See, e.g., MALC 2d Am. Compl., Prayer ¶¶ A, G (ECF No. 50); LULAC Am.
Compl., Prayer ¶ C (ECF No. 78). Moreover, in light of Shelby
8 See also Harris v. City of Houston, 151 F.3d 186, 188, 191 n.6 (5th Cir. 1998) (noting that a
plaintiff “could have preserved his suit by requesting” additional relief, “as opposed to resting
completely on the request for injunctive relief” against an event that had by that point occurred);
FTC v. Gibson Prods. of San Antonio, Inc., 569 F.2d 900, 903 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that
substantial compliance with subpoenas did not moot enforcement action because further relief would
be available in the event that subpoenas were invalid).
9 Texas’s argument that the plaintiff who initiated the litigation must still be “aggrieved” by the
practice that initially prompted the lawsuit, see Tex. Br. at 4, 6, is inconsistent with the
language of Section 3(c). The provision merely requires that the relevant proceeding have been
“instituted by the Attorney General or an aggrieved person.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (emphasis
added); see also Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 870 (2011) (holding that
“aggrieved” denotes an individual within the zone of interest sought to be protected by the
provision and making no reference to temporal limitations).
County, Plaintiffs now have sought to amend their complaints to clarify their requests for Section
3(c) relief. See, e.g., NAACP Mot. for Leave to Amend (ECF No. 776); NAACP Proposed 2d Am. Compl. ¶
61, Prayer ¶ C (ECF No. 776-2); MALC Mot. for Leave to Amend (ECF No.
779); MALC Proposed 3d Am. Compl., Prayer ¶ C (ECF No. 779-1). These requests for Section 3(c)
relief are sufficient to preserve this Court’s jurisdiction.
In Blackmoon v. Charles Mix County, 505 F. Supp. 2d 585 (D.S.D. 2007), the court addressed closely
analogous circumstances regarding Section 3 of the Voting Rights Act. After modifying the
jurisdiction’s redistricting plan to remedy a successful malapportionment claim, the court
nonetheless denied a defendant jurisdiction’s motion to dismiss as moot plaintiffs’ claims that the
prior redistricting plan was racially discriminatory. See id. at 593. The court concluded that if
plaintiffs prevailed on their race discrimination claim, they might be entitled to
relief under Section 3 of the Voting Rights Act, and the possibility of further relief precluded
mootness. See id.10
A similar result is warranted here. Had Texas not been covered under Section 4(b)’s formula, this
Court likely would have already adjudicated Plaintiffs’ claims of intentional discrimination and
addressed the issue of Section 3(c) coverage. Should this Court impose Section 3(c) relief, the
redistricting plans enacted by Texas in 2013 will be subject to review under Section 3(c)’s
preclearance process. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c) (requiring preclearance for
10 Escambia County v. McMillan, 466 U.S. 48, 51 (1984) (per curiam), is not to the contrary. In
that case, the Court addressed only the district court’s finding that the county’s at-large
election system violated the Fourteenth Amendment. It vacated and remanded the case for
consideration of whether the method of election violated the newly amended Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act, and it noted that a finding of liability under Section 2 “would moot the constitutional
issues presented by the case.” Id. But the Court expressly refused to reach the issue of remedy.
See id. at 51 n.4 (noting that the Court was not reaching the issue of remedy); id. at 52 n.6
(same). Thus the Court’s statement that a finding of liability would moot the constitutional issues
refers to issues of liability, not remedy.
any voting practice “different from that in force or effect at the time the proceeding was
commenced”). Texas should not be permitted to avoid Section 3(c) review of future voting changes
only because Section 4(b) once required that it be subject to Section 5. While there was once no
need for this Court to consider Section 3(c), the issue is now plainly ripe, and these facts are
precisely what Section 3(c) was intended to address. Intentional discrimination has occurred
within a jurisdiction now not subject to Section 5, and preclearance review will prevent that
jurisdiction from enforcing new rules to perpetuate voting discrimination. Cf. South Carolina, 383
U.S. at 335.
Texas’s interpretation of when Section 3(c) relief would become moot would render the provision a
nullity, effectively permitting a defendant to avoid bail-in by abandoning a challenged practice at
any time up to the moment of final judgment. See Tex. Br. 4-5, 13-14.
The jurisdiction could then adopt a slightly modified discriminatory practice, necessitating the
filing of a new complaint. This cycle of discrimination would create the type of gamesmanship the
preclearance requirements embodied in both Section 5 and Section 3(c) were designed to end.
B. Violations of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments Justifying Equitable Relief Have Occurred
in the State of Texas.
The evidence before this Court establishes that Texas enacted its 2011 Congressional and State
House redistricting plans with the intent to discriminate against minority voters, in violation of
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the voting guarantees of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. This Court may consider testimony and evidence offered during
its prior hearings; depositions and other documentary evidence previously offered in Texas v.
United States, No. 1:13-cv-1303 (D.D.C), see Order at 2 (ECF No.
772); and sworn trial testimony given in Texas v. United States. Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(4)(E),
As noted below, aside from the 2011 statewide redistricting plans, there is also
substantial evidence of recent discrimination in violation of Sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights
Act and the voting guarantees of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
Although this Court should consider Plaintiffs’ claims against the 2011 Congressional and State
House plans, it need not issue an opinion that addresses all challenged aspects of those plans,
since the 2013 plans eliminate the need to redraw either map. Rather, once this Court finds any
constitutional violation justifying equitable relief, the requirement for imposing relief under
Section 3(c) has been met, and further analysis of the 2011 plans is unnecessary.
1. The 2011 Congressional Plan
In Texas v. United States, a three-judge court of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia unanimously concluded that Texas had not met its burden of showing no discriminatory
purpose when it enacted the 2011 Congressional redistricting map, Plan C185.
See 887 F. Supp. 2d at 159-62. As the D.C. court noted, the United States and defendant-
intervenors in that litigation “provided more evidence of discriminatory intent than [the Court
had] space, or need, to address.” Id. at 161 n.31. The evidence in that case—as well as that
presented to this Court—provides a sufficient basis for this Court to conclude that Texas had a
discriminatory purpose when it enacted the 2011 Congressional redistricting plan.
In the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, the United States presented several
categories of circumstantial evidence under the framework set out in Village of Arlington
11 To the extent this Court concludes that any such testimony is inadmissible, the Court should
permit the presentation of additional testimony concerning the adoption of the 2011 Plans.
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266-68 (1977). See Texas v.
United States, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 159. First, the evidence established that “substantial surgery”
had been performed on each of the black ability to elect districts in Texas, removing “economic
engines” and Congressional district offices in a manner that “could not have happened by accident,”
and that “[n]o such surgery was performed on the districts of Anglo incumbents.” Id. at 159-60;
see also id. at 160 (rejecting Texas’s proffered explanation: “coincidence”). The parties then
established Texas’s “history of failures to comply with the [Voting Rights Act],” the exclusion of
minority members of Congress and state legislators from effective participation in the
redistricting process, and procedural and substantive departures from the normal decision- making
process. Id. at 160-61. The D.C. court deemed this evidence sufficient to preclude the State from
establishing the absence of discriminatory intent and noted that the court’s silence concerning
potential discriminatory intent in District 23 and the Dallas-Fort Worth Metroplex reflected only
the lack of need to address those additional areas. See id. at 161 & n.31.
In fact, the United States presented substantial additional evidence of discriminatory intent in
District 23 and the Metroplex. The contours of District 23 reflect a concerted effort to minimize
Hispanic voter registration and turnout levels while preserving Hispanic population majorities—a
purely superficial victory for Hispanic voters. See DX 304, Notice of Filing Def. Ex. List (ECF No.
615); see also DX 294, Notice of Filing Def. Ex. List (ECF No. 615) (request by the map-drawer for
necessary information). Precincts are deliberately split along the border of Congressional
District 23 without political data, in a manner that establishes a statistically significant racial
bias. See DX 320 at 56 tbl. 21, Notice of Filing Def. Ex. List (ECF No. 615). District 23 divided
Maverick County and the City of Eagle Pass just after the Hispanic
community there had become more politically active, see Trial Tr. at 112:24-113:1, 116:17-
117:19, Texas v. United States, No. 1:12-cv-1303 (D.D.C. Jan. 18 p.m.) (Ex. 1), and even the
State’s expert admitted before this Court that he would “not recommend changing the 23rd in the way
in which it was changed.” Trial Tr. at 1839:1-24, 1879:21-22.
The 2011 Congressional redistricting plan split the African-American and Hispanic communities of
the Dallas-Fort Worth Metroplex into four separate Anglo-controlled Congressional districts:
Districts 6, 12, 26, and 33. DX 320 ¶¶ 148-152 & tbls. 16-17, Notice of Filing Def. Ex. List (ECF
No. 615). The lightning-bolt shape of District 26 illustrates a particularly egregious
configuration, capturing much of the Hispanic population of Tarrant County—from both whole and
partial precincts—and appending that population to primarily Anglo Denton County. See DX 630,
Notice of Filing Def. Ex. List (ECF No. 615); DX 887 at 74-82, 185-88, Notice of Filing Def. Ex.
List (ECF No. 615). To prevent the emergence of a new district in the Metroplex in which minority
voters would have the ability to elect representatives of their choice, the State increased the
combined black and Hispanic voting-age population of District 30—the sole minority ability district
in the region—from an already concentrated 81.1% to a remarkable 85.9%. See DX 858 at 2, Notice of
Filing Def. Ex. List (ECF No. 615) (2011 plan data); DX 859 at 2, Notice of Filing Def. Ex. List
(ECF No. 615) (benchmark plan data). Therefore, Congressional districts in the Dallas-Fort Worth
area provide additional evidence of discriminatory intent underlying Plan C185—more of the evidence
of intentional discrimination that the D.C. court had neither “space, [n]or time, to address.” 887
F. Supp. 2d at 161 n.31.
2. The 2011 State House Plan
Because the D.C. court determined that the State of Texas had failed to establish that its 2011
redistricting plan for the Texas House of Representatives would not have had a
retrogressive effect, the court did not analyze whether Texas had established that the plan did not
intentionally discriminate against minority voters. See Texas v. United States, 887 F. Supp. 2d at
177-78. Nonetheless, the United States and defendant-intervenors presented sufficient evidence to
prove that the 2011 House redistricting map—Plan H283—was enacted with discriminatory intent in
violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the
U.S. Constitution. See id. at 177 (cataloging substantial “record evidence” concerning the State’s
The United States first established the basic fact that Texas had failed to create any new House
districts in which minority voters would have the ability to elect their preferred candidates of
choice, despite dramatic growth in the State’s Hispanic population in the decade preceding
redistricting. See id. at 177-78. The United States next showed that in House District 117, map-
drawers had used a “deliberate, race-conscious method to manipulate not simply the Democratic vote
but, more specifically, the Hispanic vote,” namely by “switching high-turnout for low- turnout
Hispanic voters, hoping to keep the [Spanish Surname Voter Registration] level just high enough to
pass muster under the [Voting Rights Act] while changing the district into one that performed for
Anglo voters.” Id. at 178; see also id. at 238-40 (findings of fact). Moreover, the United States
established that the lead House map-drawer offered “incredible testimony” that “reinforces evidence
suggesting mapdrawers cracked [precincts] along racial lines to dilute minority voting power” and
“suggests that Texas had something to hide in the way it used racial data to draw district lines.”
Id. at 178; see also id. at 232-34, 240-41 (findings of fact). See generally id. at 229-35
(findings of fact concerning House redistricting process).
The United States and other parties presented substantial additional unrebutted evidence
of discriminatory intent that the D.C. court ultimately had no need to address. See U.S. Br. at 3-
12 (ECF No. 630). The most damning evidence relates to House District 41, where Texas used race as
a proxy for partisanship and drew the district with the intent to minimize minority voting strength
in an effort to eliminate minority voters’ ability to elect their candidates of choice. The State
of Texas’s redistricting reports specifically showed that in the absence of partisan data,
map-drawers split Hidalgo County precincts 25, 47, 48, 88, 95, and 103 along stark racial lines, to
exclude from House District 41 certain neighborhoods containing far greater concentrations of
Hispanic voters. See DX 886 at 71, 75-77, Notice of Filing Def. Ex. List (ECF No. 615); see also
DX 787, Notice of Filing Def. Ex. List (ECF No. 615) (RedAppl screen captures).
Representative Aaron Peña—the Anglo-preferred incumbent on whose behalf map-drawers crafted
District 41—admitted in his deposition that he lacked sufficient local knowledge to provide
political information at the sub-precinct level and denied asking that the precincts be split. See
Joint Deposition Designations at 1058-71, Texas v. United States, No. 1:12-cv-1303 (Peña Dep. at
154:2-173:24, Oct. 19, 2011) (Ex. 2).
The configurations in Plan H283 for Nueces and Harris Counties provide additional evidence of
intent driven by racial discrimination, rather than partisanship. In Nueces County, the State
deliberately eliminated House District 33—a district in which minority voters had the ability to
elect representatives of their choice that was then represented by a Hispanic Republican—and
protected the Anglo incumbent in District 32 by crafting a hook-shaped extension to pack Hispanic
voters and potential Hispanic challengers (Republican and Democrat) into District 34. See DX 510 at
2, Notice of Filing Def. Ex. List (ECF No. 615); DX 737 at 13- 15, Notice of Filing Def. Ex. List
(ECF No. 615) (Pre-Filed Direct Testimony of Abel Herrero); Trial Tr. at 110:20-112:8, Texas v.
United States, No. 1:12-cv-1303 (D.D.C. Jan. 17 a.m.) (Ex.
In Harris County, the State deviated from established procedures by excluding every minority
legislator in the delegation from the redistricting process for the express purpose of protecting
incumbents from minority population growth—resulting in the elimination of a district represented
by the Texas House’s sole Vietnamese member rather than the district of a senior Anglo Democrat.
See Trial Tr. at 53:19-55:18, 68:10-22, Texas v. United States, No.
1:12-cv-1303 (D.D.C. Jan. 19 p.m.) (Ex. 4); DX 738 at 12-14, 19-22, Notice of Filing Def. Ex. List
(ECF No. 615) (Pre-Filed Direct Testimony of Scott Hochberg).
In sum, the evidence convincingly establishes that the State of Texas enacted its 2011 House
redistricting plan with discriminatory intent.12
3. Other Violations of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
As noted above, for purposes of Section 3(c), the relevant evidence of discrimination is not
limited to the precise practices that were challenged in the lawsuit. See Jeffers, 740 F. Supp. at
591-92 (holding that constitutional violations with respect to voting practices that were not “the
principal focus of the complaint” satisfied Section 3(c)). In this case, Texas’s pervasive history
of voting discrimination against its African-American and Hispanic citizens is long- standing and
well-documented. As recently as 2006, the Supreme Court held that the State’s Congressional
redistricting plan “undermined the progress of a racial group that has been subject to significant
voting-related discrimination.” LULAC v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 438 (2006). The Court concluded that
the State’s division of a cohesive Hispanic community just as it “was
12 Although the United States did not oppose preclearance of Texas’s 2011 State Senate plan,
intervenors did oppose preclearance, and the District Court denied preclearance of that plan after
concluding that Texas had not met its burden of showing no discriminatory purpose when it enacted
the 2011 Senate redistricting map. See Texas v. United States, 887 F. Supp. 2d at 162, 166.
becoming more politically active” bore “the mark of intentional discrimination that could give rise
to an equal protection violation.” Id. at 438-39.
In every redistricting cycle since 1970, courts have similarly found that one or more of Texas’s
statewide redistricting plans violated the voting guarantees of the Constitution or provisions of
the Voting Rights Act.13 Likewise, since Texas became a covered jurisdiction under Section 5
pursuant to the 1975 amendments to the Voting Rights Act, the Attorney General has interposed an
objection to at least one of the State’s redistricting plans in each decennial redistricting
Overall, the Attorney General has frequently interposed objections to a broad spectrum of
voting changes proposed by the State and its political subdivisions.15
Since 1976, the
Department has issued 207 Section 5 objections to proposed electoral changes in Texas (188 related
to changes enforced by Texas political subdivisions, 19 by the State itself). On numerous
occasions, the Attorney General determined that the State or its political subdivisions were unable
to demonstrate that proposed voting changes were adopted without a discriminatory purpose. See
generally 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a)-(c). Examples in the last three years alone include:
• A 2012 objection to a Galveston County redistricting plan for Commissioners Court. The
Attorney General concluded that the county had not met its burden with regard to discriminatory
purpose, citing (1) a failure to adopt set redistricting criteria, (2) the
13 See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 887 F. Supp. 2d 133 (D.D.C. 2012) (three-judge court),
vacated on other grounds, 570 U.S. _, 2013 WL 3213539 (U.S. June 27, 2013); LULAC v. Perry, 548
(2006); Balderas v. State of Texas, No. 6:01CV158, 2001 WL 36403750 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 2001)
(three-judge court) (per curiam); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Terrazas v. Slagle, 789 F.
Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex. 1991) (three-judge court), aff’d sub nom., Richards v. Terrazas, 505 U.S. 1214
(1992); Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37 (1982); Terrazas v. Clements, 537 F. Supp. 514 (N.D. Tex.
1982) (three- judge court) (per curiam); McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U.S. 130 (1981); White v.
Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783 (1973).
14 See DX 277-86, Notice of Filing Def. Ex. List (ECF No. 615) (DOJ Objection Letters).
15 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Section 5 Objections Texas, at
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/tx_obj2.php (last visited July 17, 2013) (listing
Section 5 objections in Texas).
deliberate exclusion from the redistricting process of the sole minority-preferred Commissioner,
and (3) the discriminatory impact of the voting change on minority groups.16
• A 2012 objection to a Nueces County redistricting plan for Commissioners Court. The Attorney
General concluded that the county had not met its burden with regard to discriminatory purpose
after it intentionally moved Anglo voters into a district in which Hispanic voters previously had
the ability to elect their preferred candidates of choice and moved Hispanic voters out of that
district, over the vocal opposition of Hispanic citizens.17
• A 2010 objection to Runnels County’s Spanish-language election procedures. The Attorney
General concluded that the county had not met its burden with regard to discriminatory purpose
after the county proposed replacing bilingual poll officials in each precinct with a single
bilingual assistor available by phone, admitted rapid growth in the county’s Hispanic population,
and failed to provide a credible explanation for the proposed change.18
• A 2010 objection to Gonzales County’s Spanish-language election procedures. The Attorney
General concluded that the county had not met its burden with regard to discriminatory purpose
after the county proposed replacing bilingual poll workers in ten of the county’s eighteen voting
precincts with “best efforts” to place bilingual workers in seven of fifteen precincts, noting
county officials’ “openly expressed hostility toward complying with the language minority
provisions of the Voting Rights Act.”19
Moreover, as the Supreme Court has recognized, a jurisdiction’s historical practices can provide
relevant circumstantial evidence from which a court can infer that more recent conduct was
motivated by discriminatory purpose. See Rogers, 458 U.S. at 625 (holding that evidence of past
discrimination is relevant to drawing an inference of purposeful discrimination); City of Rome v.
United States, 446 U.S. 156, 177 (1980) (“[E]lectoral changes by jurisdictions with a demonstrable
history of intentional racial discrimination in voting create the risk of purposeful
16 Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to an attorney for
Galveston County, Texas (Mar. 5, 2012), available at
17 Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to attorneys for
Nueces County, Texas (Feb. 7, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/ltr/
18 Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to the Runnels County
Clerk (June 28, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/ltr/l_062810.php.
19 Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to an attorney for
Gonzales County, Texas (Mar. 10, 2010), available at
discrimination.”). Therefore, Texas’s present-day discrimination must be considered in the context
of its robust history of voting discrimination against racial minorities, which dates back to
Reconstruction. See generally White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 766-69 (1973) (recounting “the
history of official racial discrimination in Texas”); Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304, 1317
(S.D. Tex. 1994) (three-judge court) (noting that “Texas has a long, well-documented history of
discrimination that has touched upon the rights of African-Americans and Hispanics to register, to
vote, or to participate otherwise in the electoral process”), aff’d sub nom. Bush v.
Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996). As the Supreme Court has recognized, Texas’s pervasive history of
discrimination has included efforts to prevent African-American and Hispanic voters from
participating equally in the electoral process, with State officials promptly enacting new
discriminatory measures shortly after established laws were struck down. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 439-40
(quoting Vera, 861 F.Supp. at 1317). These discriminatory election practices have included State
constitutional amendments and codified laws that levied poll taxes, established all-white
primaries, created restrictive voter-registration time periods, diluted minority voting
strength through the use of racial gerrymandering, and even barred the election of minority
officeholders. See LULAC, 548 U.S. at 439-40.20
20 See also, e.g., Beare v. Smith, 321 F. Supp. 1100 (S.D. Tex. 1971) (three-judge court) (striking
down newly instituted annual voter-registration system), aff’d sub nom. Beare v. Briscoe, 498 F.2d
244 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. Texas, 252 F. Supp. 234 (W.D. Tex. 1966) (barring use of a
poll tax as a voting requirement), aff’d, 384 U.S. 155 (1966); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953)
(striking down all-white “Jaybird primary”); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (striking down
white primary); Grovey v.
Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935) (permitting exclusion of African Americans from Democratic primary
based on purported lack of state action); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) (striking down State-
authorized white primary); Nixon v. Herdon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (striking down State-mandated white
primary). See generally Robert Brischetto et al., Texas, in Quiet Revolution in the South: The
Impact of the Voting Rights Act 1965-1990, at 233-70 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds.,
D. This Court Should Impose Section 3(c) Preclearance.
Upon finding that the 2011 Congressional or State House redistricting plan was intentionally
discriminatory, this Court should grant relief pursuant to Section 3(c) of the Voting Rights Act.
As set forth above, the prerequisites to Section 3(c) relief have been met, and Texas’s pattern of
intentional discrimination in voting warrants the imposition of a preclearance requirement under
Section 3(c). As in Jeffers, the violations in this case are “persistent and repeated,” otherwise
likely to recur, and of the type “likely [to] be prevented, in the future, by preclearance.” 740 F.
Supp. at 601.
This Court should issue an order requiring Section 3(c) preclearance review of all voting changes
that the State of Texas enacts or seeks to administer during the ten-year period following the
issuance of such order. This coverage period is no longer or shorter than necessary here to ensure
that preclearance will be applied to decennial redistricting and the accompanying reconfiguration
of precincts. During that period, no “voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard,
practice, or procedure with respect to voting different from that in force or effect at the time
the proceeding was commenced,” i.e., May 9, 2011, that the State of Texas enacts or seeks to
administer could be implemented unless and until this Court concludes that the proposed change does
not have the purpose or effect of denying or abridging the right to vote based on race, color, or
language minority status, or such change has been submitted for review by the Attorney General and
the Attorney General fails to interpose an objection within sixty days of the submission. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973a(c). If at any point during the ten-year period following such order this Court finds that
the State has not met its statutory burden under Section 3 or the Attorney General objects to a
proposed change (and such objection is not overturned by
a decision of this Court), this Court should consider extending the bail-in period beyond the
original 10 years. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(5) (requiring termination of a bailout from Section
4(b) coverage in the event of discriminatory acts within a ten-year period); id. § 1973b(a)(1)(D)
(barring bailout in the event of a denial of judicial preclearance or imposition of a Section 5
objection not overturned by a court).
For the reasons set out above, this Court maintains jurisdiction to consider requests for relief
under Section 3(c) of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(c), and should grant such relief in
Date: July 25, 2013
ROBERT PITMAN JOCELYN SAMUELS
United States Attorney Acting Assistant Attorney
Western District of Texas Civil Rights Division
/s/ Jaye Allison Sitton
T. CHRISTIAN HERREN, JR. TIMOTHY F. MELLETT BRYAN SELLS
JAYE ALLISON SITTON DANIEL J. FREEMAN MICHELLE A. MCLEOD
Voting Section, Civil Rights Division
U.S. Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on July 25, 2013, I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing via the
Court’s ECF system on the following counsel of record:
David R. Richards
Richards Rodriguez & Skeith, LLP email@example.com
Richard E. Grey III Gray & Becker, P.C.
Counsel for Perez Plaintiffs
and Plaintiff-Intervenors Pete Gallego and Filemon Vela Jr.
Luis Roberto Vera, Jr.
Law Offices of Luis Roberto Vera, Jr. & Associates
George Joseph Korbel
Texas Rio Grande Legal Aid, Inc. firstname.lastname@example.org
Counsel for Plaintiff League of United Latin American Citizens
John T. Morris email@example.com
Pro Se Plaintiff
Counsel for Plaintiff Latino Redistricting Task Force
Law Office of Jose Garza firstname.lastname@example.org
Joaquin G. Avila
Seattle University School of Law email@example.com
Cynthia B. Jones
Jones Legal Group, LLC firstname.lastname@example.org
Counsel for Plaintiff Mexican American Legislative Caucus
Karen M. Kennard
City of Austin Law Department email@example.com
Max Renea Hicks
Law Office of Max Renea Hicks firstname.lastname@example.org
Manuel Escobar, Jr.
Manuel G. Escobar Law Office email@example.com
Travis County Ass’t Attorney firstname.lastname@example.org
Counsel for Rodriguez Plaintiffs
J. Gerald Hebert
Law Office of Joseph Gerald Hebert email@example.com
Law Office of Jesse Gaines firstname.lastname@example.org
Counsel for Quesada Plaintiff-Intervenors
Rolando L. Rios
Law Offices of Rolando L. Rios email@example.com
Counsel for Plaintiff-Intervenor Henry Cuellar
Gary L. Bledsoe
Law Office of Gary L. Bledsoe firstname.lastname@example.org
Victor L. Goode NAACP
Law Office of Robert Notzon email@example.com
Counsel for Plaintiff-Intervenor Texas State Conference of NAACP Braches
Counsel for Plaintiff-Intervenor Texas Democratic Party
John K. Tanner
John Tanner Law Office 3743 Military Rd. NW Washington, DC 20015
Counsel for Plaintiff-Intervenor Texas Legislative Black Caucus
Eric Christopher Opiela Eric Opiela PLLC firstname.lastname@example.org
James Edwin Trainor, III
Beirne, Maynard & Parsons, LLP email@example.com
Joseph M. Nixon
Beirne Maynard & Parsons LLP firstname.lastname@example.org
Counsel for Plaintiff-Intervenors Joe Barton et al.
Patrick K. Sweeten Angela V. Colmenero Matthew Frederick Ana M. Jordan Jennifer Settle Jackson
Office of the Texas Attorney General email@example.com
firstname.lastname@example.org angela.colmenero@ texasattorneygeneral.gov
matthew.frederick@ texasattorneygeneral.gov email@example.com
Counsel for Defendants State of Texas and Rick Perry and Defendant-Intervenors David Dewhurst, Joe
Strauss, and John Steen
Donna Garcia Davidson
Donna G. Daviddson Law Firm firstname.lastname@example.org
Frank M. Reilly Potts & Reilly, LLP
Counsel for Defendant-Intervenors Steve Munisteri
Kent M. Adams
Lewis, Brisbois, Bisgaard, & Smith LLP email@example.com
Counsel to Defendant-Intervenor Sarah M. Davis
Clarkson F. Brown
Bexar County District Attorney’s Office, 101 W Nueva, Suite 5049
San Antonio, TX 78205 (210) 335-2150
Counsel for Amicus Curiae Bexar County
Ned Bennet Sandlin Texas Municipal League firstname.lastname@example.org
Counsel for Amicus Curiae Texas Municipal League
Manuel A. Pelaez-Prada Pelaez Prada, PLLC email@example.com
Counsel for Amicus Curiae San Antonio Hispanic Chamber of Commerce
/s/ Jaye Allison Sitton
JAYE ALLISON SITTON
Attorney, Voting Section Civil Rights Division
U.S. Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20530