Appeal, Inc. v. OJP, No. 22-02111, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188491 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2024) (Hsu, J.)
Date
Appeal, Inc. v. OJP, No. 22-02111, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188491 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2024) (Hsu, J.)
Re: Request for certain death-in-custody forms and reports
Disposition: Granting in part and denying in part defendant’s motion for summary judgment
- Litigation Considerations, Evidentiary Showing, Adequacy of Search: The court finds that, “[h]ere, there is little evidence to indicate that Defendant failed to conduct a search reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents.” “Defendant identified the particular employees responsible for conducting the searches and described their methods of searching and locations searched.” “In each instance, it appears that the employees searched to the best of their abilities.” “Defendant provided affidavits of each employee who conducted the searches, in which they described their procedures and efforts in full.” “Given the level of detail and precision, Defendant has properly demonstrated the search was reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents.” “This is particularly true where there is no allegation of bad faith.”
“The Court rejects Plaintiffs’ argument that Defendant failed to adequately search because it was ‘obligated to search for whichever forms fulfill the substance of the Requests,’ beyond the forms Plaintiffs named.” “Though the point is taken that there were, perhaps, additional forms containing data responsive to Plaintiffs’ requests, that, alone, does not mean that Defendant failed to conduct a search reasonably calculated to uncover all relevant documents.”
- Exemption 3: The court relates that “Defendant asserts that the Privacy Provision of Title I of the [Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (“CCA”)] is the type of statute that qualifies for withholding records under FOIA’s Exemption 3.” “The Court agrees.” “This Privacy Provision ‘undoubtedly is’ the type of statute that invokes FOIA’s Exemption 3.” That provision states: “‘No officer or employee of the Federal Government, and no recipient of assistance under the provisions of this title shall use or reveal any research or statistical information furnished under this title by any person and identifiable to any specific private person for any purpose other than the purpose for which it was obtained in accordance with this title.” “Such information and copies thereof shall be immune from legal process, and shall not, without the consent of the person furnishing such information, be admitted as evidence or used for any purpose in any action, suit, or other judicial, legislative, or administrative proceedings.’” “Thus, the ‘dispositive question’ is whether the data collected pursuant to the DCRA is technically ‘furnished under’ Title I of the CCA, such that the Privacy Provision applies.” “The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that the data collected pursuant to the [Death in Custody Reporting Act (“DCRA”)] is not ‘furnished under’ Title I of the CCA.” “‘Furnish’ means to supply.” “‘Under’ means ‘subject or pursuant to,’ ‘governed by,’ or ‘by reason of the authority of.’” “BJS created [the Mortality in Correctional Institutions (“MCI”) program] to collect data pursuant to DCRA 2000.” “Although BJS may have collected such data previously, following the enactment of DCRA 2000, this altered the ‘specificity of the data, the frequency of collection, and the compliance mechanisms.’” “Logically, then, DCRA data is being collected ‘by reason of the authority of’ the DCRA, as well as ‘subject to’ the requirements of the DCRA.” “Accordingly, DCRA data was furnished under the DCRA, rather than Title I.” “The Court notes Defendant’s argument that DCRA data could be furnished under both Title I and the DCRA.” “The Court disagrees, however, in this instance.” “[G]iven that Title I does not, in any way, require reporting on the specific type of data that the DCRA mandates, it is furnished under the DCRA, alone.” “Following a structural analysis, the court further highlighted that nowhere does the DCRA make explicit reference to Title I.”
“The Court, however, takes note that the DCRA-type data collected from 2006 until 2015 when the DCRA was revived may be a different story.” “In that case, such data was collected by BJS, absent any other statutory mandate apart from BJS’ authorizing statute in Title I.” “The use of ‘forms authorized to implement DCRA’ during the time when the DCRA was inactive does not lead to the logical conclusion that such data was furnished under a then-inactive statute.” “The only possible statute under which such data was furnished between 2006 and 2015 is Title I.” “As such, the Privacy Provision applies to the DCRA-type data collected during those years.” “The Privacy Provision exempts disclosure of documents when they will be used ‘for any purpose other than the purpose for which [they were] obtained in accordance with this chapter.’” “The explicit purpose of BJS’ data collection stated in Title I is for ‘research or statistical purpose.’” “Plaintiffs argue that, as their intent is to use the data for research or statistical analysis, their usage comports with the purpose for which the data was obtained; Plaintiffs contend that this prevents the Privacy Provision from operating to exempt the sought after data.” “The Court disagrees.” “Plaintiffs’ reading of the Privacy Provision is too literal.” “While Plaintiffs do seek to use the data for research or statistical purposes, more generally, that does not mean that the data is being used for the purpose for which it was collected.” “The purpose for which the data was obtained, within the meaning of the Privacy Provision, is for ‘statistical analysis by BJS and BJA, not by the public at large.’” “Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ intended use of the data is for a purpose other than the purpose for which it was obtained.” “As such, the DCRA-type data collected by BJS from 2005 to 2016 is exempt from disclosure by Title I’s Privacy Provision.”
- Exemption 7, Threshold; Exemption 7(C): “[T]he Court finds that Exemption 7(C) is inapplicable to the requested data.” “[T]he Court is not convinced that the data was collected for ‘law enforcement purposes.’” “This is particularly true where BJS’ authorizing statute makes clear that its data is precluded from ‘use for law enforcement.’” “Although Defendant argues that ‘departments of corrections and other state or local agencies that operate correctional facilities are law enforcement agencies,’ it does not track that DCRA data was collected for law enforcement purposes.” “Data being collected by agencies that could be considered law enforcement does not amount to the data collection being for the purposes of law enforcement.”
- Exemption 6: “[T]he Court finds that, though Exemption 6 does apply to the requested data, the public interest outweighs the privacy interest in non-disclosure.” “First, the Court is convinced that the files sought in the request fall within the type of files protected by Exemption 6.” “Where the decedents’ causes of death may relate to medical conditions, and the files certainly contain information that ‘applies to particular individuals,’ it appears death-in-custody records fall within the ‘broad’ scope of files encompassed by Exemption 6.” “Plaintiffs are correct that the deceased have a diminished privacy interest.” “Further, Plaintiffs are correct that family members do not retain the same privacy interest as the deceased individual.” “That, however, does not mean that the family of a deceased person has no privacy interest regarding the information released about the decedent; Defendant has demonstrated that releasing the requested information, which includes cause of death, certainly implicates privacy concerns.” “Not all deaths-in-custody are the same, and not all deaths are, for example, at the hands of law enforcement.” “Some records would potentially reveal deaths stemming from ‘AIDS-related illness, accidental alcohol or drug intoxication, [or] suicide[.]’” “Given Defendant’s demonstration that the privacy concern is ‘plainly more than de minimis,’ that interest must be balanced against the public interest in disclosure.”
The court then finds that, “[h]ere, the public interest in disclosure is undoubtedly high.” “Disclosure of this data would bring more than ‘marginal additional usefulness[.]’” “This is particularly so where much of the data requested has, evidently, not always been made publicly available in other ways.” “The public interest, however, is not merely in the information contained in the data itself.” “As Plaintiffs noted, disclosing the records ‘serves public interest by “shed[ding] light on [the Department of Justice’s] performance of its statutory duties,’ under DCRA[.]’” “If the Department of Justice (‘DOJ’) is collecting this data, as mandated by Congress, but there is no appreciable effort to do anything with this data – including making it publicly available – that is something the public deserves to know.” “More broadly, disclosing this data serves the public interest in understanding ‘who is dying in custody, how, and why[.]’” “Noting that much of the data involves deaths in state and local facilities, Defendants argue that, accordingly, ‘[s]uch records are not relevant to the specific public interest that FOIA is concerned with[.]’” “The Court disagrees.” “Disclosing DCRA data in this instance is less about shedding light on state agency wrongdoing and more about the DOJ’s response, or lack thereof, to address it.” “Finally, where the purpose for collecting this death-in-custody data was to increase accountability and transparency, it follows that disclosing this data serves public interest, as intended.”
- Litigation Considerations, Evidentiary Showing, “Reasonably Segregable” Showing & Procedural Requirements, “Reasonably Segregable” Obligation: “Though the Court agrees that Exemption 6 applies to the records requested, Defendant has failed to provide reasonably segregable, non-exempt portions of the requested records.” “Here, Defendant attempted to provide segregable, non-exempt portions of the data set by applying an algorithm called ‘k-anonymity,’ with the goal of protecting all individuals from being identifiable in the data.” “K-anonymity ‘protects the privacy of person-specific, field-structured data,’ ensuring that the identity of individuals who appear in a released data set cannot be determined in combination with other, publicly available information.” “It is a de-identification method recognized by the National Institute of Standards and Technology.” “Given the size of the data set, Defendant argues that BJS chose to rely on k-anonymity as ‘“an efficient and objective optimization method that minimizes the number of redacted cells while protecting against the unwarranted invasion of privacy.”’” “While the Court recognizes that the privacy concerns are not de minimis, and that some form of redaction is necessary to protect these privacy concerns, the Court is not convinced that this method ‘ensured that the redactions were no greater than necessary.’
“The Court takes issue with the use of k-anonymity for two main reasons.” “First, though a privacy interest may exist in these records, Plaintiffs highlight that this interest varies in type and magnitude across the decedents and their families.” “Applying a technique that renders every single individual unidentifiable is heavy-handed where it very well be that many of these individuals have little to no actual privacy interest.” “In sum, an approach to redaction that over-simplifies varying degrees of privacy interests does not satisfy FOIA’s mandate to provide reasonably segregable, non-exempt portions.” “K-anonymity treats all decedents as a single category and fails to provide the reasonably segregable, non-exempt portions of the data.
“Second, the Court takes issue with the practical result of the redaction by [k-anonymity].” “Plaintiffs point out that the algorithm ‘strips the data to nothing[.]’” “The result is that the data is so redacted that it forecloses any ‘meaningful analysis – how inmates die, where, and why.’” “To be sure, Plaintiffs recognize that basic redaction by category of information – including name, birth date, and social security number – is appropriate.” “To the extent that Defendant can point to additional categories to be redacted, supported by a specific and articulable privacy concern, the Court is willing entertain expanding the categories beyond personally identifiable information.” “The Court, however, agrees that, with respect to the use of k-anonymity, such ‘stringent redaction is not mandated (or warranted) here.’”
Court Decision Topic(s)
District Court opinions
Exemption 3
Exemption 6
Exemption 7
Exemption 7(C)
Litigation Considerations, Adequacy of Search
Litigation Considerations, “Reasonably Segregable” Requirements
Procedural Requirements, “Reasonably Segregable” Obligation
Updated December 3, 2024