Brennan Ctr. for Justice at N.Y. Univ. School of Law v. DOJ, No. 18-1860, 2020 WL 1189091 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 2020) (Moss, J.)

Brennan Ctr. for Justice at N.Y. Univ. School of Law v. DOJ, No. 18-1860, 2020 WL 1189091 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 2020) (Moss, J.)

Re:  Request for records concerning terrorism cases contained in database that contains information about cases involving 94 U.S. Attorney's Offices brought in federal courts

Disposition:  Granting in part and denying in part defendants motion for summary judgment; granting in part and denying in part plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment

• Exemptions 6 & 7(C):  "[T]he Court concludes that the Department may lawfully withhold the docket numbers for cases that resulted in acquittal or dismissal under FOIA Exemption 7(C)."  However, the court finds that defendant may not withhold this same information for cases that resulted in conviction.  As background, the court relates that "[t]he Department provides online access to its 'entire case management database for all 94 United States Attorney's Offices' around the country, which 'contains millions of cases with hundreds of data points on each case.'"  "'In order to protect individual privacy,' however, the Department has 'redacted personally identifying information in the database,' . . . including the docket numbers . . . ."  Similarly here, "[t]he Department withheld the docket numbers at issue pursuant to FOIA Exemptions 6 and 7(C)."  First, the court agrees with defendant "that the docket numbers at issue here were compiled for law enforcement purposes and thus fall within the scope of Exemption 7(C), and that, because Exemption 7(C) imposes a 'lower bar for withholding' than Exemption 6, the Court need consider only 'whether Exemption 7(C) was properly invoked.'"  Second, substantively, "the Court is convinced that the records at issue – which deal with terrorism investigations and prosecutions – were compiled for law enforcement purposes."  "[I]t is not the nature of the agency that controls, but the character of the records . . . ."
   
  Third, regarding interests at issue, the court relates that "[t]he parties agree, and the law of the circuit is clear, that the significance of the privacy interest protected by Exemption 7(C) varies depending on whether the underlying case resulted in a conviction:  'defendants whose prosecutions ended in acquittal or dismissal have a much stronger privacy interest in controlling information concerning those prosecutions than defendants who were ultimately convicted.'" 
   
  Concerning cases that resulted in convictions, the court finds that "'in light of . . . the relative weakness of the privacy interest at stake' and 'the strength of the public interest in disclosure,' the Court concludes that release of the docket numbers for cases that resulted in convictions 'will not constitute an "unwarranted" invasion of personal privacy under Exemption 7(C).'"  The court explains that "[f]or those prosecutions that have resulted in convictions, it is unlikely that the case and the government's allegations have previously avoided public attention."  "To the contrary, even in garden-variety cases, 'newspapers regularly report on federal prosecutions, and their accounts can easily be found on the internet.'"  "If anything, terrorism-related cases are likely to generate more press coverage and greater public attention than the average case."  Additionally, as the D.C. Circuit noted in ACLU I, docket numbers 'contain[ ] little that is personal,' 'reveal only a single prosecution,' and their disclosure leads 'only [to] information that has already been the subject of a public proceeding.'"  Against that privacy interest, the court finds that "the topic of 'substantive law enforcement policy,' such as the Department's prosecution of terrorism cases, is 'properly the subject of public concern.'"  The court specifically notes that "[n]either the federal judiciary's national docket access system, Public Access to Court Electronic Records . . . , nor any court-specific filing-systems identify cases as 'terrorism-related.'"  "Although interested members of the public might be able to identify a subset of cases that the Department considers terrorism-related based on the Department's press releases, the only way to conduct a comprehensive study of the prosecutions Department categorizes in this manner is through the disclosure of the requested docket numbers."  Weighing these two interests, the court finds that "[the] balance tips decidedly in favor of disclosure."  "To be sure, terrorism charges are uniquely stigmatizing."  "But, where someone has been convicted of terrorism-related charges, disclosure of the information contained in the LIONS database – including the docket number of the case – would risk little additional public opprobrium."  "On the other hand, the public interest weighs heavily in favor of disclosure."  "Understanding how and when the Department categorizes cases as terrorism cases and following trends relating to these prosecutions would shed light on the workings of government and 'would inform . . . ongoing public policy discussion[s]' on [a] range of issues, . . . from immigration, to national security, to prosecutorial priorities . . . ."
   
  Concerning cases that did not result in convictions, the court relates that "the D.C. Circuit held that 'defendants whose prosecutions ended in acquittal or dismissal have a much stronger privacy interest in controlling information concerning those prosecutions than defendants who were ultimately convicted.'"  "The court finds that disclosure "risks renewing attention on those subject to these prosecutions, risks interfering with their entitlement 'to move on with their lives,' and thus risks infringing upon their privacy interests."  The court discounts plaintiff's argument that "the privacy interest at stake is diminished in this case because 'each individual would be one name buried in a list 724 long.'"  The court finds that "even if the release of a mass of data might – at least arguably – reduce the risk to each individual, the overall risk of intruding on the significant privacy interests of the group increases with the size of the release."  "No one would suggest, for example, that a massive data breach resulting in the theft of millions of personal health records is not serious – even if each individual patient might take some (cold) comfort in the hope that their medical records might be lost in the flood of information."  The court also discounts plaintiff's highlight of "the Department’s practice of issuing press releases that announce the names of individuals in many terrorism-related prosecutions."  The court finds that "[d]espite the existence of those press releases, disclosure of the docket numbers would “create the risk – perhaps small, but nonetheless real – that renewed attention would be paid to the individuals who were the subject of these prosecutions.'"  Regarding the public interest, the court finds that it is not that "the disclosure of docket numbers for cases that resulted in acquittals or dismissals is never warranted but, rather, only that the privacy interests at stake are more substantial than for cases that ended in conviction."  The court finds that "[h]ere, that distinction is dispositive."